THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF A POLITICIZED MARKET: THE PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION OF KURDISH MUSIC IN TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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Ankara
January 2015

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNİVERSİTY
ANKARA

January 2015

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ABSTRACT

THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF A POLITICIZED MARKET:
THE PRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION OF KURDISH MUSIC IN TURKEY

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This dissertation explicates the emergence and evolution of a market for Kurdish music in Turkey. Using ethnographic methods, I start by detailing the illegal circulation of cassettes during the restrictive and strife-laden period of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. Through the resistive practices of circulation - recording, hiding, playing, and exchanging cassettes – cassettes became saturated with emotions, established shared emotional repertoires, and habituated individuals and collectives into common emotional dispositions. An emotional structure was generated, and accompanied the emergence of a sense of "us," the delineation of the "other," and the resistive relationship between the two. I thus demonstrate the entwinement of materiality with emotions, and the structuring potentiality that this entwinement generates. In the second part, I ethnographically explore the trajectory of the market after legalization in 1991. Situated within a context characterized by the socio-political dynamics of domination and stigmatization, I detail how market producers collectively construct an oppositional "market culture" by framing their market-related experiences, as well as by interacting with and borrowing ideological codes from the neighboring Kurdish political movement. These frames become entrenched as a political-normative logic, shaping artistic production and business decisions. This emergent logic negotiates societal-level conflict and stigma, and also resolves the market-level tension between artistic and commercial concerns. Finally, I explore the segmentation of the market in conjunction with changes in the socio-political atmosphere in the 2000s. I discuss how segmentation also corresponds to competing social imaginaries of a Kurdish public.

KEYWORDS: Materiality, Circulation, Emotional Structures, Resistance, Community Market Formation, Framing, Political Normativity, Institutionalization, Social Movements, Market Culture, Stigmatization, Domination, Segmentation.

ÖZET

BİR PİYASANIN SİYASİLEŞEREK GELİŞMESİ:

TÜRKİYE'DE KÜRTÇE MÜZİK ÜRETİMİ VE DOLAŞIMI

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Bu tezde, Türkiye'deki Kürtçe müzik piyasasının oluşumu ve gelişimi etnografik metodlarla incelenmektedir. İlk kısımda, 1970, 80 ve 90lardaki kısıtlamalı ve çatışmalı ortamda, müzik kasetlerinin yasadışı yollarla dolaşımlarını araştırıyor, bu dolaşımın ortaya çıkardığı "duygusal ekonomi"yi tarif ediyorum. Kasetlerin dolaşımları sürecinde (müzik kaydedilirken ve çalınırken, kasetler saklanırken, alışveriş veya değiş-tokuş edilirken) açığa çıkardıkları duygular ile yüklendiklerini, bu şekilde ortak duygusal repertuvarlar ve yönelimler oluşmasına, ve bir "duygusal yapılanma"ya vesile olduklarını anlatıyorum. Bu yapılanmanın hem "topluluk" hissini oluşturmaya, hem de "öteki"ni - bu durumda, devleti - tanımlamaya ve ona karşı direnmeye tekabül ettiğini belirtiyorum. İkinci kısımda, 1991de Kürtçe müzik üretiminin yasallaşmasından sonra piyasanın gelişimini takip ediyorum. Tahakküm, ötekileştirme ve damgalama ilişkileri üzerinden tarif ettiğim bir bağlamda, piyasa aktörlerinin kolektif olarak karşıt bir "piyasa kültürü"nü nasıl inşa ettiklerini inceliyorum. Bunu, hem kendi piyasa içi tecrübelerini, hem de piyasayla yakın ilişki içerisindeki Kürt siyasi hareketindeki bazı yerleşik ideolojik kodları çerçeveleyerek yaptıklarını anlatıyorum. Aktörlerin kurguladığı çerçevelerin, piyasada zamanla yerleşerek siyasi-normatif bir "kurumsal mantık" oluşturduğunu, bu mantığın da hem sanatsal hem de işletme ile ilgili kararları şekillendirdiğini belirtiyorum. Bu siyasi-normatif mantık ile hem toplumsal düzeydeki çatışmaların piyasadaki yansımalarının hedef alındığını, hem de piyasa düzeyindeki estetik-sanatsal kaygılar arasındaki çatışmanın çözümlendiğini anlatıyorum. Son olarak da, piyasanın 2000li yıllarda, sosyo-politik ortamdaki değişikliklerle beraber bölümlenmesini inceliyorum. Bu bölümlenmenin aynı zamanda birbiriyle yarışan farklı Kürt toplumu tahayülleri ile de örtüştüğünü belirtiyorum.

ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Materyal Kültür, Dolaşım, Duygusal Yapılanmalar, Direniş, Toplum Tahayyülü, Tahakküm, Siyasi Normativite, Çerçeveleme, Piyasa Oluşumu, Piyasa Kültürü, Kurumsallaşma, Sosyal hareketler, Bölümlenme

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin by thanking Prof. Dr. Güliz Ger. She was not just an advisor who guided me through the long and arduous PhD process - she was, to put it simply, a most inspiring role model. I feel honored to have been her student. I was also very fortunate to have Prof. Dr. Özlem Sandıkcı, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nedim Karakayalı, Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar, and Assist. Prof. Dr. Olga Kravets in my examining committee. They witnessed the emergence and evolution of this project throughout the years, offered invaluable and stimulating comments and critiques, and patiently supported me in my endeavors to shape it into its current incarnation. Thank you all for your time and wisdom.

I gratefully acknowledge the support of Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel, our dean; Dr. Zeynep Önder, the director of the PhD program; as well as the wonderful administrative staff of the Faculty of Business Administration.

I don't know how I would have written this dissertation without the support and camaraderie provided by an army of friends. I am especially grateful to Berna Ekal, N. Pınar Özgüner, Pelin Ayter, Yeşim Özalp, Hilal Alkan, Ozan Zeybek, Onur Güvenç, Altan İlkuçan, Kerem Yücetürk, Aykut Erdem, Paul D. Melton, and Wendelmoet Hamelink, who shared my excitement (and sometimes boredom) about this research, and generously allocated their time - encouraging me via e-mail, hosting me in their homes, joining me on food and ice-cream expeditions, commenting on drafts, and providing tech support, along the road to defense. My

wonderful, adventurous friend Esther Giovanna Parker, who accompanied me on several field excursions, was senselessly taken from this world on April 6, 2014. I miss her very much.

Cohorts from the MSc/PhD program at Bilkent were partners in fun and crime, as well as "sounding boards" for academic grievances. I am thankful to have known and befriended Şahver Omeraki, Berna Tarı Kasnakoğlu, Meltem Türe, Anıl İşisağ, Figen Güneş Doğan, Burze Kutur Yaşar, Jan Dirk Kemming, and many others throughout the years.

The endless love and support of my family - my parents Yıldız and Zeki Kuruoğlu, as well as my grandmother Emine Leman Bulca - lifted me and kept me going.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the people who contributed very significantly to this work: my "informants," who generously volunteered their time, shared their experiences, and allowed their stories to be retold. While researching for and writing this dissertation, I have become "attuned" into soundscapes and lifeworlds that were once, admittedly, quite foreign to me - and for that I will always be grateful. I can only hope that I have done justice to the material I have been entrusted with. I am truly thankful for the many friendships and convivial dialogues this dissertation has initiated - sadly, I cannot disclose any names, but can only say, *gelek spas*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ……iii

ÖZET ……..iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ……..vii

LIST OF FIGURES ……ix

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ……1

1.1 Research Context: Music and the Kurds of Turkey…… 9
1.2 Methodology……..16

CHAPTER 2: AN EMOTIONAL ECONOMY OF MUNDANE OBJECTS…… 26

2.1 Introduction……26
2.2 Theoretical Foundations…….29
2.2.2 Emotional Materiality…… 29
2.2.3 Movement and Resistance……. 35
2.3 Findings: The Circulation of Cassettes…….. 38
2.3.1 Recording Music: Capturing Emotions on Tape…… 39
2.3.2 Hiding, Storing and Destroying Cassettes: Emotions Buried and Afloat……44
2.3.3 Playing Cassettes: Building the Audience-Public……..49
2.3.4 Sharing, Gifting and Selling: The Exchange of Cassettes…….58
2.4 Discussion……..63

CHAPTER 3: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL MARKET…….69
3.1 Introduction……69
3.2 Theoretical Framework……..74
3.2.1 Stigma, Domination, and Consumer Markets……74

3.2.2 Market Culture and Collective Identity……. 81
3.2.3 Institutional Theory and Markets…….. 84
3.2.4 Social Movements, Market Formation and Field Level Frames……90
3.3 Findings: The Emergence of the Legal Market……..95
3.3.1 The Pre-Legal Era (Pre-1991)……97
3.3.1.1 Frame 1: Raising "Consciousness" through Music and Circulation……97
3.3.1.2 Frame 2: Illegal Circulation as the Lineage of the Legal Market……. 111
3.3.1.3 Frame 3: Grievances Resulting from Encounters with the State……114
3.3.1.4 Frame 4: Market Actors as Activists……115
3.3.1.4 Section Summary…… 123
3.3.2 The Contentious Marketplace (1991-2000)……124
3.3.2.1 Frame 3 Revisited: Grievances……124
3.3.2.2 Frame 4 Revisited: Actors as Activists…….136
3.3.2.3 Frame 5: Being *Yurtsever* and *Örgütlü:* Collective Identity Shaping Business Practices…….. 143
3.3.2.4 Business Practices: Alternative Media Outlets and Word-of-Mouth…….154
3.3.2.4 Section Summary……..161
3.3.3 Competing Logics in a Field of Artistic Production…….. 163
3.3.3.1 The Emergent Political-Normative Logic…… 163
3.3.3.2 Frame 6: Good Music as "Taking Kurdish Music Forward"……167
3.3.3.3 Frame 7: Sales as Service versus Commercial Orientation…… 176
3.3.3.4 Pure versus Mixed Employment of Logics…… 181
3.3.3.5 Section Summary…… 184

3.4 Discussion …….. 185

CHAPTER 4: THE SEGMENTATION OF THE MARKET…….. 192
4.1 Introduction…… 192
4.2 Changes in the Social-Political Environment……..196
4.3 Findings…….. 204
4.3.1 Segment 1: The Political Segment…… 204
4.3.2 Segment 2: The World Music Segment…….. 220
4.3.3 Segment 3: The Commercial Segment…….. 246
4.3.4 Segment 4: The Challenger Segment…….. 253
4.4 Discussion …… 261

CHAPTER 5: EPILOGUE……268

5.1 Conclusion …… 268
5.2 Limitations…….. 276

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY…… 279

LIST OF FIGURES

1. The Emotional Habitus……..66

2. The Emergent Market for Kurdish Music……188

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is concerned with how cultural products "circulate" — through illegal practices as well as formal markets — under restrictive circumstances. Resistance, collective identity, emotional structures, and political-norms that shape markets and market activities are the themes that unify the two interrelated (but also distinct) studies that form this dissertation. Spanning a time period from the 1970s to the current day, I present an account on the production and circulation of Kurdish music in Turkey. A two-year fieldwork, comprising data gathered through in-depth interviews, observations, unstructured conversations, archives of print and online magazines and newspapers, as well as social media commentary, informed this research. In the three chapters that comprise the body of the dissertation, I detail how the circulation of material objects generate emotional structures that shape resistive communities; how actors who were habituated into these emotional structures, also influenced by a political movement, collaboratively shape a politically charged market culture; and how a market becomes segmented with shifts in the social-political environment.

A formal and legal market for Kurdish music is relatively new. The production, performance, broadcast, and sales of Kurdish music was banned for the better part of the 20th Century. Nonetheless, music was rarely, if ever, absent from the lives of Kurds. Pirated radio broadcasts, 45 *rpm*s recorded and sold during intermittent periods of less restricted periods, and local performances of oral traditions as well as popular/protest music colored the soundscapes until the 1970s. With the 1970s, cassette technology entered the picture. Thus commenced an era of intense, far-reaching circulation of local as well as smuggled recordings. In 1991 the constitutional ban on music circulation was partially lifted, allowing performance and sales, but not broadcast. Unofficial restrictions, surveillance, and censorship, however, remained. Actors who engaged with music production and performance, throughout these periods, were subject to stigma (Link and Phelan 2001), particularly enforced through "terrorism" narratives employed by authorities in describing and punishing such acts. These "terrorism" narratives moreover prevalently circulated through mainstream media, and colored the mainstream public opinion as such. It is against this backdrop that Kurdish music was played, performed, and exchanged; initially illegally and through dispersed efforts; and later through a legal and centralized market.

In the second chapter of this dissertation, titled "An emotional economy of mundane objects," I construct an oral-historiographical account of the illegal circulation of Kurdish music cassettes throughout the strife-leaden 1970s, 80s, and 90s. I detail how the circulation of a mundane object - such as the music cassette - has the potentiality to play a part in the generation of community and resistance, a process of great political import. I draw from material culture studies, noting that

objects, in their materiality, "objectify" identities, relationships, symbols, values, meanings, power, and tensions (Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Holttinen 2014; Kravets and Örge 2010; Madianou and Miller 2011; Miller 1987, 1998, 2005) and also constitute the imagined communities (Anderson 1983) within which they circulate (Aronczyk and Craig 2012; Lee and LiPuma 2002). Emotionality, while implied as the "nature" of relationships that is materialized, is nonetheless not explicated. Inspired by Sara Ahmed's (2004) model of an affective economy - of bodies becoming "sticky" with the emotions they awaken in those they encounter and, through circulation, "sticking" certain bodies together while setting other bodies "outside;" I seek to understand how mundane objects might hold similar affective potentialities. Thus, the second chapter is driven by the following research question: **How does a *nexus of emotionality and materiality* emerge and serve to generate community and resistance?**

I trace an answer to this inquiry through the emotionally charged narratives on four practices of circulation- recording, owning/storing/destroying, listening, and exchanging cassettes, detecting the way that emotions move and "stick" with and onto the cassettes with each practice. The metaphor of "stickiness" illustrates that emotionality becomes intertwined with materiality, and circulates with the circulating object(s); drawing people into shared ways of being and doing, and intensifying through time, thickening the threads that bind people together and strengthening the walls that set them apart from the others. Narratives on circulation are peppered with emotions that seep into the present; with joyful experiences of communing - such as gatherings with families and friends, hearing music in one's native tongue stories exist alongside fearful, angry, and sorrowful stories of sacrifice and violent

encounters with the agencies of the state. Communality with other Kurds, as well as the resistive boundaries towards the state - which dominates and stigmatizes - are concomitantly "felt" through circulation. Thus, cassettes simultaneously materialize relationships that are unifying and separative; communal and resistive.

As the cassettes circulate, the number of people who share similar experiences and emotions increase - common orientations and dispositions are generated - and hence, an emotional structure emerges: in other words, an emotional "habitus" (Kane 2001) is shaped, in part, by the circulation of cassettes. This structure in turn disposes individuals to relate to their surroundings in certain ways: in particular, to take a resistive stance, and to continue to indulge in circulation. In other words, these practices of circulation are influential in cultivating a "collective identity" (Hunt and Benford 2004; Jenkins 2008; Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001) that is grounded not only in shared ethnic background, but also shaped by this "structured and structuring" (Swartz 1997) emotional habitus (Calhoun 2001; Kane 2001; Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014).

Concomitantly, I note that illegal circulation also played a part in Kurds perceiving of themselves, "marked," individually but also as a community, as terrorists— in other words, stigmatized (Link and Phelan 2001) and dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) by the forceful policies and agencies of the state. The tactical (De Certeau 1988), infrapolitical (J.C. Scott 1990) and grassroots forms of resistance that I detail in chapter 2 emerge in response to these "felt" realizations of stigma and domination - but that is not the only response that was relevant in the Kurdish context. Tactical resistance, as noted by Scott (J.C. 1990), often forms the underpinning of larger-scale collective action - indeed, an armed Kurdish political

movement also gained strength during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In chapter 2, I acknowledge, but do not detail, that activists of the emergent Kurdish movement also saw music as a powerful way to ideologically educate, politicize, and mobilize the people. In chapter 3, I take into account that the Kurdish political movement interacts with music production, performance, and circulation in cultivating a politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001) that is constitutive of both producers and consumers in the market. I explicate the involvement of the Kurdish movement - both in its appropriation of musical performance and circulation for its political agenda, and also on its ideological influence upon the actors who are involved (in both illegal and legal) music performance, production, and circulation.

In the 1990s, after legalization, while illegal circulation continued, a large portion of new music started to be recorded professionally in studios; produced and distributed through music production companies in Unkapanı, Istanbul — the headquarters of music production in Turkey. The production of Kurdish music thus became centralized and formalized. As such, the emotional economy of music circulation encountered the dynamics of the formal market. I detect that a politicized collective identity grounded in an emotional structure; market experiences and grievances related to stigma and domination; and ideology espoused by the armed Kurdish movement all had "structuring" influence on the legal market activities. This is the focus of the third chapter, in which I inquire: **How does a market, whose producer and consumer constituency is subject to sociocultural and political dynamics of domination and stigmatization, emerge and evolve? How do market actors (in particular, producers) navigate this process?**

In this chapter, I revisit illegal circulation with the understanding that it served as a backdrop for the formal market. From the object and emotion-centered

view of chapter 2, however, I shift the focus to the rhetorical devices - frames - that operate at a more cognitive level: how actors' grievous experiences are processed and turned into political-normative tenets that shape market activity: how "consciousness" of being part of a political community is awakened; producer-activist identities constructed; and business as well as artistic decisions are made with political agendas in mind. I detail how, accordingly, a politicized "market culture" (Abolafia 1998; Ho 2009; Penaloza 2000; Spillman 1999; Zelizer 2010) emerges and is framed by actors. Market culture, as conceptualized by Spillman (1999), is constituted by three elements: the object of market exchange; a social imaginary of producers and consumers - i.e., the collectivity comprised by the parties to exchange; and the norms of exchange. By tracing the evolution of political-normative structures through the field-level frames (Goffman 1976; Lounsbury et al. 2003) employed by market actors, I explore the emergence of a new market culture. I find that the frames shaping the market culture were influenced by both the neighboring Kurdish political movement, as well as shaped by actors' "local" experiences (Scott 1998) in the marketplace, particularly in their dealings with the state. I also note that these political-normative frames help to negotiate the additional tension between artistic concerns - "the logic of art", and commercial concerns - "the logic of commerce" (Bourdieu 1996; Caves 2000; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). In this field characterized by restrictions, this tension is resolved by attributing both artistic merit and sales success to furthering the pro-Kurdish political agenda.

I thus detail how market actors - producers, in particular - co-produced an emergent market culture, while facing restrictions from the state and lacking recognition within mainstream culture. Bridging social-movements and institutional theory perspectives on market formation, I trace how actors generate, adapt, and

articulate political-normative frames. These frames, I note, become entrenched as "proto-institutional" logics (Lawrence et al. 2002) that shape the "norms" of production and exchange in a marketplace - such as the prevalence of collaborations and informal networks, political alliances, and the forgoing of commercial interests; influence the meanings and roles attributed to the object(s) of exchange - the music that is the object of exchange is likewise politicized, and associated with a markedly "Kurdish" resistance; and, finally, construct the marketplace as constituting a social imaginary of a resistive and pro-movement "Kurdish nation." As such, I complement two streams of research: (1) The institutional/legitimation perspectives on market formation, which focus on the institutional (i.e., external) structures and thus inadequately address the (field-level) issues of collective identity and culture in the marketplace; and which also do not account for stigma and domination as a source of institutional conflict. (2) Consumer research literature on oppositional/counter-cultural communities, which lacks studies that explicitly focus on the role of market producers in shaping collective identity, resistance, and normative-political activity.

Following the early 2000s, however, changes in the political-societal environment led to significant changes in the field of Kurdish music production, as well: looser restrictions - such as a decrease in instances of censorship and criminal charges, an increasing number of venues for performance and sales, and the legalization of Kurdish language broadcast - meant that actors who were not motivated by a pro-Kurdish political agenda also started to operate within the field. In chapter 4, I identify the different collectivities - and correspondingly, different market segments - that emerge in the marketplace. I note that the employment of different logics is linked with different organizational practices, and thus segmentation within the market (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008;

Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005). I also link segmentation to different market cultures, and thus, different social imaginaries - thus, to different and sometimes competing ideals of "Kurdish society." Segmentation in the market culture not only corresponds to multiple collectives with their internal alignments, but it also (re)produces boundaries amongst these different collectivities - with some boundaries more impenetrable than others. Thus, in addition to the delineation of the external "other," which was the topic particularly of chapter 2, I look into the delineation of internal "other(s)," and competing imaginings of Kurdish political identities.

Chapter 4 also inquires into the conditions wherein a legitimacy-challenged market may find inclusion into mainstream culture. A changing socio-political environment, combined with market actors' efforts to employ ideological frames that are more "palatable," aesthetic qualities that have found some popularity in mainstream culture; and an accompanying market imaginary that is more accessible for mainstream Turkish audience may lead to greater recognition and representation. Thus, in addition to changing socio-political conditions, I suggest that the adoption of less oppositional and more mainstream - i.e., palatable - political frames may be necessary to gain mainstream acceptance.

The organization of this dissertation is as follows: I will be detailing the methodology and the research context that pertains to the whole dissertation after this introduction section. Chapter 2, which is derived from a published article, will have its own introduction, theoretical framework, findings, and discussion sections. Chapter 3 and 4 share an introduction and theoretical framework (presented in chapter 3) and have separate findings and discussion sections. The final chapter of

the dissertation consists of a concluding remarks on the whole dissertation, and a reflection on the limitations of this research.

1.1 Research Context: Music and the Kurds of Turkey

The context of "Kurdish music circulation" - both through illegal practices, and through an (emergent) legal market - was appropriate for addressing the research questions I pose throughout chapters 2, 3, and 4. In the very beginning of the research, not knowing much about the history of Kurdish music circulation in Turkey, I thought this context was appropriate in order to gain a deeper understanding of the creation of a new market - a reasonable idea, I thought, considering that the legal market had commenced quite recently, in 1991. However, as I conducted fieldwork, I not only found that an illegal market preceded the legal one, I also found that the legal market was highly charged with "politics." My research questions were thus shaped considerably throughout the time I spent in the field, and by particularities of the context, rather than being set a priori. Ustuner and Holt (2007: 47) have noted that "contexts matter when they harbor underlying structures that differently affect" the phenomena in study. The dominated-dominating relationship amongst the Kurdish constituency and the Turkish state, and the emergence of a Kurdish movement (outside of the market) in response to this relationship, are some contextual particularities that greatly shaped the dynamics of market formation. In this section, I present a brief overview of the historical development of the "Kurdish issue," particularly as it pertains to and influences the

production and performance of music. I also provide further contextual details where necessary throughout the findings.

Kurdish music is situated within a complicated regional history, with demands and negotiations concerning decentralized administration and autonomy ongoing to this day. After WWI, the new borders drawn by the Allied Forces split the Kurdish population into four different countries in the Middle East. Kurds remained a stateless ethnic, multi-dialectic, multi-sectarian, tribal, and feudal community, amidst a wave of global nationalist movements. With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, non-Muslim religious minorities, in accordance with the newly-signed Lausanne Treaty, were granted rights to establish their own religious, educational, and social welfare institutions (Toktaş and Aras 2009). However, Muslim peoples, including the Kurds, were not officially recognized as minorities and were not granted such rights. Constitutional law and assimilative policies aimed to homogenize the young nation. These included mandatory Turkish-language formal education as well as bans on publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish language.

While Kurdish nationalist uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s were terminated by the Turkish state, the late 1960s and 1970s presented political opportunities that allowed the emergence of numerous pro-Kurdish organizations, many of which also engaged in the production and circulation of music. The Kurdish resistance culminated in the emergence of the PKK (*Partiya Karkaren Kurdi,* The Kurdistan Workers' Party), which was established in the late 1970s. The 1970s was a time of general political unrest that ended with a military coup d'état in 1980 and, subsequently, a new, more controlling constitution. Starting in 1984, the PKK was

involved in combat with the Turkish military and attacks on civilian outposts. By the late 1980s, the PKK, emically termed a “freedom movement,” had become classified as a “terrorist organization” (Romano 2006). In addition to the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military, a state of consistent tension characterized the densely Kurdish-populated Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey throughout the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s: hundreds of people were detained on charges of aiding the PKK and approximately 3200 villages were evacuated, forcing their inhabitants to migrate to cities elsewhere in Turkey (Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu 2014).

Kurdish music was intermittently banned throughout the 20th Century. Yet, a tradition of oral performance (including traveling folk singers called *dengbêj*), recordings - both locally and internationally produced - and radio broadcasts from Yerevan and Baghdad (both cities with Kurdish-speaking populations) were involved in the transmission of music. There were periods with loosened restrictions, but in the 1980s, the ban on performance, broadcast, and sales was rigorously enforced, particularly in the Kurdish-inhabited regions. In 1991 this ban was partially lifted, allowing performance and sales, but not broadcast, of music. Importantly, unofficial restrictions on Kurdish music remained well into the 2000s. Albums thought to contain separatist lyrics or imagery were subject to confiscation and individuals who produced, owned, or sold them could be charged, fined, or even imprisoned. A prevalent “terrorism” narrative framed many cultural products and performances as such. Under these conditions, Kurdish music was unsanctioned and linked, in Turkish state and public discourse, to terrorism.

In this context, the illegal circulation of cassettes stands out amongst the resistive and community-building practices available to the Kurds of Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. In the relative absence of written traditions – Kurdish language and writing was not standardized until the 1980s and 90s (Uçarlar 2009) - musical traditions constituted a central place in the lives of many Kurds, in their homelands or in diasporas (Blum and Hassanpour 1996; Scalbert-Yücel 2009). Music, in its immediacy, emotiveness, and symbolism, holds great potential for resistance (Hennion 2003). Through creating affect (Born 2011, Hirschkind 2006) and articulating emotions (Feld 1990), sound and music facilitate the formation of networks (Tacchi 1998) and communities. Collective musical practices including composing, singing, listening, and dancing have played a particularly potent role in social movements (Adams 2002; Jasper 2011). While the connecting and resistive role of music is well-established, I focus on its material circulation. We find that circulation fueled a grass-roots imagination of communal bonds and provided support for pro-Kurdish political purposes, often simultaneously. I acknowledge the presence of the latter, but my primary concern in chapter 2 is the former. Thus, illegal circulation situated within this context forms the focus of Chapter 2.

Whereas tribalism and sectarianism have been prevalent among the Kurds (Romano 2006), during the 1980s and 1990s the Kurds of Turkey became unified "on a much more ethnic nationalist basis than on a tribal or religious one" (İçduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci 1999, 994). Analyses of the Kurdish movement (e.g., Romano 2006; Güneş 2012) emphasize the grand narratives that constituted this period: how political structures, resources, and ideologies came together in mobilizing masses

and challenging the dominant orders. Yet, the role of the everyday material practices and the accompanying emotionality have often been overlooked. I discovered and explicated how the circulation of cassettes in daily life served "tactical" (De Certeau 1988) or "infrapolitical" (Scott 1990) resistance, and simultaneously generated feelings and imaginings of a unified community based on ethnicity rather than fragmented tribal identities.

I was struck by the fact that when I uttered the phrase "Kurdish music," informants immediately and passionately volunteered their historical experiences of cassettes and provided detailed accounts of their involvement in the illegal circulation of cassettes throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. What I found particularly noteworthy was how a commonality in practices of circulation was accompanied by a shared emotional and experiential repertoire (despite the diversity of informants) regarding these cassettes. Informants saw these cassettes as an inextricable component of coming of age as a Kurd in Turkey, and sometimes also explicitly termed practices related to cassettes as acts of rebellion or resistance. More subtle, however, was the way that emotions surfaced during early stages of fieldwork: not only were emotions commonly recounted as having been felt during the years in which this illegal circulation took place, but they also seeped into the act of speech in the present. Informants were often visibly and audibly moved by their retelling of experiences of the past – and terms they used to articulate these emotions were also strikingly similar. Cassettes, I found, were embedded in informants' emotional life stories. While the particularities of life stories could be different, the emotionality

generated through and associated with the cassettes served as a unifying theme. Thus was born the focus of the second chapter.

The period of illegal circulation had a structuring influence on the formal market, as well. Market actors who were active throughout the 1990s were "raised" within and habituated into the emotional dynamics and the accompanying resistive-communality that were generated by illegal circulation, and they also perceived of themselves as taking an active part in continuing the circulation and, accordingly, serving the unification of and resistance enacted by, the Kurds. In the third chapter, I start to engage more explicitly with the PKK-line Kurdish movement as partaking in circulation, and also as an ideological resource - in motivating activism, establishing a collective identity, and instilling a sense of "national" unity - for the market. As noted, The PKK, at the same time, was engaged in increasingly violent conflicts with the military, and sometimes also directed violence towards civilians. It thus started to become more salient in media.

Starting with the late 1980s, the "Kurdish problem", or as it was more commonly referred, the "Eastern problem" and the "terror problem", became a household issue, finding a place in politician's speeches, newspaper pages, and in public discourse. The president at the time, Turgut Özal, declaring that he would like to bring an end to the conflict, started implementing a series of protocols, including a number of legal amendments in the early 1990s. One of these concerned the publication and dissemination of Kurdish language cultural products, including music. With this amendment, Kurdish music was constituted as legal for sale, for playing and performing live, but remained illegal to broadcast on radio or television. Products to be sold on the legal market were (as were all such materials produced in

Turkey) subject to preliminary review by the Ministry of Culture. Thus commenced the formal market.

What followed legalization was an initial surge of Kurdish language music production – greeted very enthusiastically by the audience - but a subsequent drop in the number of companies producing this music shortly thereafter. Despite legalization, the terrorism counter-frame continued to inform dominant discourse on Kurds throughout the 1990s, and well into the 2000s. Throughout the 1990s, a large volume of albums were produced by a very limited number of production companies, and with the involvement of a small group of people. The field of Kurdish music production was insufficiently recognized by and represented in mainstream sales and broadcasting channels, and with a very limited audience amongst the non-Kurdish (that is, predominantly Turkish) public. What struck me during my fieldwork in the field is how these early years of cultural production are described by its actors as having been plagued with legal difficulties, but also as being a time of hope, excitement, and being guided by political ideals. These political ideals themselves were quite dynamic, and were shaped by the events, tensions, and discourses of the day – discourses produced and disseminated by, among other actors, the Turkish state, the Kurdish movement (and its intellectual leaders), the media (both Turkish and Kurdish) and the actors in various fields of production, including the music market. I found that this idealism and these dynamics sets of political, social, and cultural ideals pointed towards a dominant political-normative order. I thus decided to try to unpack this entwinement of the political-normative and the business as well as artistic activities in the context of the (legal) market for Kurdish music.

1.2 Methodology

My aim, in writing this dissertation, was to gain an in-depth and detailed (Patton 1990) understanding of the circulation of and the market for Kurdish music from the point of view of Kurdish "actors" who participated in both "making" and "hearing" the music. Moreover, I wanted to gain a processual understanding (Maxwell 1996) of how a market was collaboratively formed and how it evolved over time, as situated within a specific social, historical and political context. Thus, fieldwork comprising qualitative methods was most appropriate.

The fieldwork spanned two years (between April 2011 - June 2013), two cities (predominantly Istanbul, but also Diyarbakır, which I visited in May 2013), and involved in-depth interviews, observations at concerts and other social events, unstructured conversations with Kurdish individuals at these events and also during and after Kurdish language classes taken with Kurds who are not fluent in the language. I carried out the majority of the fieldwork in Istanbul, but also conducted interviews and made observations in Diyarbakır. These primary sources of data provided an emic oral-history account of illegal and legal music circulation and productions, starting in the 1970s, and continuing up until today. Archived print and online newspapers, magazines, as well as social media accounts of Kurdish music enthusiasts and activists also served as a valuable repository of data. These multiple sources of data were useful in ensuring the trustworthiness of the findings (Berg 1998; Lincoln and Guba 1985). Additionally, readings on both academic and journalistic analyses of the history of the "Kurdish Question" in Turkey were helpful in contextualizing the data, and understanding the institutional environment that gave rise to illegal circulation and the formal market for Kurdish music.

My very first informant, "Nizam," was introduced by a mutual acquaintance, during a trip to *Unkapanı*, the headquarters of music production, located in the *Fatih* district in Istanbul. At the time, I had not yet decided to write a dissertation on the market for Kurdish music, but was intrigued by the hundreds of albums featuring music sung with Kurdish lyrics. Our informal conversation with the shop owner that day further piqued my curiosity: he spoke of Şivan Perwer, one of the most famed Kurdish singers, who had left the country in the 1970s and, at the time of our conversation, was yet to return. Perwer had declared, according to Nizam, that he would return only after there was "peace" in the country. (It should be noted that Perwer would return in the course of my writing this dissertation, although whether "peace" had arrived at the time of his return is highly debatable.) I left the office that day with an album - a recording of a female *dengbêj* - gifted to me by my acquaintance, and with seeds planted in my mind. Months later, when I decided tentatively to write my dissertation on Kurdish music, I started by interviewing Nizam. I contacted further informants through a variety of methods - in some cases, I asked a former informant to introduce or refer me to someone (which they sometimes did without even asking), whereas in other cases, I called, sent messages through facebook, or visited offices. Personal introductions, "greetings," and name-dropping from previous informants were helpful in establishing rapport. As I prolonged my engagement, I came to learn and employ certain practices and emic terms, which ranged from drinking countless glasses of Ceylon tea (*kaçak çay*), to referring to the PKK as the "Kurdish movement."

Throughout the fieldwork, I conducted a total of 27 loosely structured and recorded interviews with individuals who self-identified as ethnically Kurdish. Two

additional interviews (which exceeded “informal conversations”) took place without being recorded. All informants had come of age during or before the 1980s, they all witnessed the restrictions on Kurdish music, and were involved in circulating cassettes. 23 interviews were conducted in Istanbul, and 4 interviews were conducted in Diyarbakır, a major city in Southeastern Turkey with a predominantly Kurdish population. Business offices, cafes, cultural centers, and in one case, the home of the informant constituted the sites for interviews. In all cases, the interview sites were places where the informant and I could converse about politically sensitive topics: the three cafes where I conducted some interviews, for instance, were owned/ managed and frequented by Kurds, and the other sites were private spaces.

With the exception of three individuals who came of age in cities in the West of Turkey, all of the other informants grew up in cities, towns, or villages in the Southeastern/Eastern region (which I shall simply refer to as the “region” - an emic term - from this point on) of Turkey that are and historically have been densely populated with Kurds. Informal conversations also involved individuals who came of age in Western Europe. The accounts of the informants who did not grow up in the “region” provided insights on how the circulation of music also reached and influenced the lives of Kurds living in the Western parts of Turkey and abroad.

The sampling for finding and interviewing informants was purposive (Patton 1990; Maxwell 1996): Once I started to get a “feel” of the field, I identified and interviewed a variety of producer-actors; who deployed political-normative frames, artistic logics, and commercial logics to different extents and in different combinations. Owners of music companies (referred to as “producers” (*yapımcı*) in

the music market); employees of a recording studio specializing in Kurdish music; performers (both singers and musicians); and retailers selling Kurdish music, were among the music market professionals interviewed. I took care to interview some individuals who were identified, by other informants, as pioneers or key actors in the field. Several of these producer-actors were, before 1991 (the legalization of the market) actively involved in other circulation in the informal market, such as performing music, duplicating cassettes, and transporting them to different cities and towns in Turkey. Some of these individuals - such as the sound engineers at the recording studio, as well as the people working in the cultural centers, also had had careers as singers or musicians. Additionally, the directors of four cultural centers (two in Istanbul and two in Diyarbakır), one "songwriter" (i.e., composer and lyricist); two people involved with NGOs in Diyarbakır (with some involvement in concert organizations), and the co-owners of a Kurdish publishing house were interviewed to gain a better understanding of the overarching field of cultural production. The owners of the publishing house, who I interviewed early on, were particularly helpful in addressing some questions that I had, until then, found difficult to ask music producers - with their "outsider" (but still, to some extent, insider) position to the music market, they were able to provide valuable insights to topics that generated a "defensive" stance in music producers and performers. Finally, to enrich and diversify the data for the chapter on illegal circulation, four Kurdish individuals without any professional involvement with the formal music market were also interviewed.

I conducted all interviews in Turkish (the language in which all informants received formal education). I do not have sufficient knowledge of Kurdish to conduct

an interview, though my limited knowledge was somewhat helpful in establishing rapport, or at the very least, in setting a convivial tone with new acquaintances. (It should be noted, moreover, that not all of my informants are proficient at speaking Kurdish.) I transcribed most recorded interviews in their completion - although with a few, I transcribed only the most relevant portions. Before each interview, I prepared a list of "topics to be covered" with that particular interviewee, depending on his role in the market, but did not rely on an interview guide after seeing the futility of trying to do so during my first few interviews.

I told informants that my research was on the Kurdish music market ("*Kürtçe müzik sektörü*" which is an emic term). After deciding to write a chapter on illegal circulation, I told informants, if needed, that I was interested not only in the formal market (*resmi sektor*) but also in the "cassettes" before 1991. (Often illegal circulation came up without my prompting.) I assured informants that their real names or identifying characteristics would not be used - although many noted that they did not mind if I used their real names. I asked for permission and recorded the formal interviews. The interviews lasted from one hour to four hours, and some informants were interviewed up to three times. I tried to transcribe interviews almost immediately after I conducted them, so I could think about the analysis and also determine if I needed a follow-up. In order to protect the privacy of all those who have been consulted, I use pseudonyms (with few exceptions, which I indicate in the text) and exclude most personal details.

For the chapter on illegal circulation, interviews focused on informants' memories of cassette circulation from their childhood or youth in the 1970s, 80s and 90s: cassette-related experiences, encounters, and stories, intertwined with life

stories, were relayed. For the chapter on the formal market, I usually started by asking about how the informant became involved with the Kurdish music scene, and responses would often begin with (illegal) circulation of cassettes and continue onto the informants' tenure at Unkapanı. Informants placed a great deal of emphasis on restrictions - some of this emphasis was based on actual encounters with law enforcement, but in a more general sense, the state, I came to realize, was a specter, providing a constant counterpoint to the market's operations. All market activity was framed *despite* and *against* this (both real and imagined) opponent. This informed my focus in the second chapter, as the encounters with and the imagination of the state, co-producing the normative-political frames that infused the market culture.

I maintained social relations with some of the informants, and our informal conversations – which sometimes included informants' Kurdish friends, relatives, or spouses who were not formally interviewed - turned into impromptu focus groups about music, as well as on growing up and coming of age as a Kurd in Turkey. These conversations contributed significantly to my comprehension of the significance of the circulation of cassettes, both legally and illegally.

I observed behaviors, emotions, and conversations at public events - including concerts, talks, and political gatherings that involved musical performance. Concerts were particularly important in understanding the segmentation of the market after the 2000s: performers from different segments, and with different political orientations also drew visibly different audiences, who behaved in different ways. While some of the concerts (particularly of performers who I identify as belonging to the "world music segment") also attracted Turkish audience, at other concerts, performers were predominantly Kurdish. I also observed interactions at

music production companies in Unkapanı and at a recording studio- although admittedly, I was not privy to the actual processes of recording, signing contracts, or other aspects of production. However, these observations still gave me some idea of relationships amongst Kurdish producers in Unkapanı, as well as their relationship to other production companies. Moreover, many informal conversations, at concerts, political activities, and through other social encounters, were also recorded as fieldnotes.

I also collected data from two different types of print media. Newspapers and magazines that were published by Kurds (often featuring both Kurdish and Turkish materials) - such as Özgür Gündem (newspaper), Tiroj, Nubihar, Dojin (magazines), as well as websites which compile newspaper articles, including published interviews and opinion pieces about music and performers (such as navkurd.eu; kurdishmagazine.com) were helpful in supporting my primary data. While I read through the physical archives of Kurdish-published specialty magazines (the Ismail Beşikçi Vakfı Library in Istanbul hosts an impressive archive of magazines, some of which published only a few issues), I conducted online searches to access newspaper articles and interviews. The online archives of mainstream Turkish newspapers, such as *Radikal*, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, on the other hand, were helpful in tracing when Kurdish music started to enter the mainstream, and which performers / companies were able to do so. Published interviews and opinion pieces, particularly after 2000, were especially informative.

Thus, approximately 250 pages of single-spaced interview transcripts, 300 pages of notes on journal and newspaper archives, and over 300 pages of handwritten fieldnotes informed the emergent account presented here.

Analysis and fieldwork overlapped considerably. From early on, informants were interested in providing long answers, at times interweaving their responses with episodes from their life histories, as well as their personal analyses of political and historical events. I made a conscious decision to "follow participants down their diverse trails" (Riessman 2003). This intertwinement with life histories turned out to be quite influential in my understanding of how cassettes shaped the informants' lives and their emotional understandings of themselves as "Kurds." This understanding, moreover, helped me make sense of the way in which illegal circulation was a means through which several market actors were "produced" as producers (Weber et al. 2008) with a particular political orientation. It helped me understand how informants' experiences growing up led them to perceive the state as oppressive, and themselves, as producers and/or audience members, as contributing - in one way or another - to a collective pro-Kurdish cause.

In moving from the emic to the etic, I followed a hermeneutic approach (Thompson 1997) to analysis, particularly as field data included detailed accounts of personal histories intertwined with emotional narratives on music, cassettes, circulation, and the formal market. Moving back and forth between inter- and intra-textual approaches, I conducted several reiterations (Miles and Huberman 1994) of reading the data, coding, and engaging with theory. As a first step, I transcribed and coded each interview shortly after conducting it. Open coding - "the process of breaking down examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61) - was following by generating higher-order categories and frames through axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990). I similarly

coded other textual (archives of published materials, fieldnotes) data. In analyzing data for the chapter on illegal circulation, I identified common themes of resistance facilitated by the materiality of cassettes as well as the emotionally charged nature of these accounts, and thus engaged with theoretical literature on emotions, community, and resistance. The following iterations concerned moving back to individual accounts, working with parts of each text, in order to understand which emotions were generated through the circulation of cassettes, and how emotional understandings of belonging to community as well as emotional orientations towards resistance developed within accounts. This was followed by a re-engagement with the theoretical foundations, and refining the theoretical contributions.

The data on the legal market was more voluminous and more fragmented. The analysis underwent several re-iterations. At the outset, I engaged with a theoretical perspective that viewed market creation as a process of legitimation (Humphreys 2010b), but saw that the limitations of this view: not only did the market for Kurdish music *not* conform to a straightforward process of attaining legitimacy within mainstream culture; the theoretical story of legitimation also did not address the multiplicities and tensions in the social-political context. Yet, institutional theory provided further tools to address this issue: drawing on Bourdieu, I was able to better analyze the market as a field that is shaped by both "internal" and "external" processes. Thus, I tried to reflect this in the analysis by, on one hand, by understanding the "external" social and political contradictions and processes/ transformations, and also through analyzing the ways in which market actors framed (Benford and Snow 1988; Goffman 1976; Humphreys 2010a; Lounsbury et al. 2003) their practices as well as their perceptions of the market and the context. Again,

reading iteratively, across and within interviews, I grouped together the frames that actors used to diagnose their grievances and prognose actions, and constructed a narrative of how a particular "alternative" market culture (Spillman 1999) emerged. I finally presented the final portion of my findings to portray the market as divided into multiple segments following the early 2000s, accompanied by changes in the social, political, and technological environment.

CHAPTER 2:

AN EMOTIONAL ECONOMY OF MUNDANE OBJECTS1

2.1 Introduction

Performing, broadcasting, and selling music with Kurdish-language lyrics was restricted in Turkey through most of the 20th Century. Yet, cassette technology, starting from the mid-1970s, and overlapping with the escalation of ethnic strife and violence, brought vitality to an underground music scene. Anyone in possession of a tape recorder was able to become a brave producer as well as a consumer of dissident music. Cassettes were copiously recorded at homes or smuggled across the borders; duplicated, exchanged among friends and relatives; hidden in dowry chests or buried underground; sold in streetcars, or from the under the counter, shrouded by covers of Turkish pop. Music was played behind closed doors, with children standing guard in hallways and door-fronts, and an exit plan in place for what to do with the cassettes if authorities dropped in. Cartoonists portrayed cassettes as hand grenades, ready to blow up in the face of law enforcement. There was fear, among the Kurds, of getting

[1] This chapter has been derived from a portion of an eponymously titled article published in *Consumption Markets and Culture.* When citing from this chapter, please refer accordingly: Kuruoğlu, Alev P., and Güliz Ger. 2014. "An emotional economy of mundane objects." *Consumption Markets & Culture* DOI: 10.1080/10253866.2014.976074: 1-30.

caught, and anger at the state and its instruments. There was also love for the music, the singers, and the landscapes immortalized in song, and also for the people with whom the music was shared. There was sorrow, for people lost and hometowns left behind, but also hope for better times. While music, in its evocative glory, may seem to be the glue that sticks these people, places, and experiences together, the unsung hero of this story is a thing that transcends its mundaneness.

In this chapter, I examine how a commodity, such as a cassette, plays a vital part, through its circulation, in generating community and resistance. The cassette, as an artefact, is easy to hide, transport, distribute, and record upon, and it easily evades attempts to restrict its circulation. Cassettes have been credited with facilitating monumental transformations such as overthrowing regimes (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi 1994), instigating religious revivals (Hirschkind 2006), as well as re-aligning interpersonal dynamics, such as family relationships (Abu-Lughod 1989). They have been discussed as taking part in these transformations mainly by virtue of the textual content (be it song, poetry, or speech) they mediate. Studies on consumption and markets have shown, however, that objects, in their materiality, take part in the social construction of identities, relationships and collectivities.

Things do not just "represent" and "communicate," but "objectify" identities, relationships, symbols, values, meanings, power, and tensions (Borgerson 2005, 2009; Chitakunye and Maclaran 2014; Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Holttinen 2014; Kravets and Örge 2010; Madianou and Miller 2011; Miller 1987, 1998, 2005). The circulation of objects across space and time, moreover, has a performative and materializing character (Aronczyk and Craig 2012; Lee and LiPuma 2002) that serves to constitute the objects themselves as well as the imagined communities

(Anderson 1983) within which they circulate. Thus, I approach cassettes, in their materiality, as "more than transmitters of content" (Larkin 2008, 2). Even though emotionality is implicit in the relationships that are objectified, such as love among members of a family (Miller 1998), or the "feeling" of belonging to a community (Anderson 1983), we discern that the affective potentialities that materialization entails have not been explicated. I thus inquire: How does a nexus of emotionality and materiality emerge and serve to generate community and resistance?

My focus on the nexus of emotionality and materiality moves from the premise that emotions are evoked by encounters with other bodies and objects: emotions "stick" and circulate with these objects (Ahmed 2004). Emotions are conceptualized as active, energy-laden (Illouz 2007), and generative: they create affective fields (Harris and Sørensen 2010), and move individuals and collectivities into shared ways of feeling, thinking, and acting (Ahmed 2004, 2010; Calhoun 2001; Illouz 2007; Gould 2009; Kane 2001). Thus, as an effect of their circulation, emotions generate common orientations and dispositions – hence, an emotional habitus accompanies the emergence of a sense of "us" as well as the delineation of the "other." The role of emotions in shaping communal imaginaries (Chronis, Arnould, and Hampton 2012) and structuring consumption practices (Gopaldas 2014; Thompson 2005) has been noted, but how objects and consumption experiences play a part in the emergence of "structured and structuring" (Swartz 1997) emotional structures is less clear. I thus study how an emotional habitus emerges, and how it shapes practices and collective imaginaries.

The circulation of the emotionally potent yet legally inadmissible cassette also draws our attention to the performance of resistance through objects and their

uses (Smith 2009). I propose, moreover, that the emotionality that shapes and is also generated by resistance, in conjunction with materiality, deserves closer scrutiny. Thus, I study how the materiality-emotionality nexus serves in resisting dominant orders. In so doing, I also contribute to consumption studies scholarship on resistance (Izberk-Bilgin 2010 for a review). I elucidate how an emergent community engages with consumption in the making of a collective ethnic identity and in resisting a hegemonic order other than the market. Accordingly, I also extend discussions on the role played by emotions in oppositional communities (Jasper 2011; Sandlin and Callahan 2009) by providing an account of the interplay of materiality, emotions, and consumption in everyday resistance.

Hence, I focus on the practices that propel cassettes into circulation; the emotions these cassettes elicit during their encounters with subjects; the relationships, socialities and communality they objectify, and the boundaries they solidify, as they traverse their paths of circulation.

2.2 Theoretical Foundations

2.2.2 Emotional Materiality

Objects, in their capacity to symbolize and represent meanings, values, mythologies, relationships, and identities have drawn considerable scholarly interest (e.g., Belk 1988; Bonsu and Belk 2003; Grayson and Shulman 2000; Holt 2004; Levy 1959; McCracken 1986; Mick 1986; Moisio, Arnould, and Price 2004; Solomon 1983; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988; Weiner 1994). On the other hand, material culture studies have drawn our attention to the entwinement of meanings, symbols,

subjectivities, and relationships with the artefactual quality of objects (e.g., Aronczyk and Craig 2012; Beckstead et al. 2001; Borgerson 2005, 2009; Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Kravets and Örge 2010; Miller 1987, 1998, 2005; Smith 2009) and to the constitutive and co-emergent, rather than merely representative, nature of this entwinement. Familial socialization and interaction (e.g., Chitakunye and Maclaran 2014; Holttinen 2014; Madianou and Miller 2011; Miller 1998), as well as belonging to religious (D'Alisera 2001; Tarlo 2007), ethnic (Avieli 2009), or literary (Craig 2011) communities are thus seen to be objectified and mediated by objects that are enmeshed in peoples' everyday lives – such as clothes, accessories, chapbooks, food, letters, cassettes, and television. This objectification of identities, relationships, and collectivities may take place in ways that conform to (Douny 2011; Naji 2009) or resist and challenge (Smith 2009) dominant moral or political orders and hierarchies. Such processes involve the entwinement of materiality and symbolism (e.g., Bartmanski and Woodward 2013; Craig 2011; Curasi, Price, and Arnould 2004; D'Alisera 2001; Douny 2011; Epp and Price 2010; Holttinen 2014; Kravets and Örge 2010; Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) - and thus the symbolic densification of objects (Weiner 1994).

Yet, one detects that the relationships and ideals that are materialized, transformed, and negotiated through objects and related practices – such as provisioning (Miller 1998), preparing food (Holttinen 2014), watching television (Chitakunye and Maclaran 2014), exchanging written letters and audio recordings (Madianou and Miller 2011) in the context of the "loving family," or making clothes that materialize mother-daughter and kinship bonds (Margiotti 2013) – are also inherently emotional. I wonder if the objectification of emotional relationships is

accompanied by the saturation of these objects with affect. Thus, relevant to my focus in this chapter is understanding (1) how objects become laden with emotionality and (2) how this emotional potency serves community and resistance.

Consumer research literature has explored the evocative and experiential aspect of consumption objects and practices; as well as the influence of emotions in motivating consumption practices, bonding individuals, and building communities of varying degrees of permanence. Emotions are viewed as influencing consumption choice and decision making processes (e.g., Mogilner, Aaker, and Kamvar 2012; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999). Transient emotional states - excitement, pleasure, anger, and others - are seen as evoked by consumption experiences (Arnould and Price 1993; Belk and Costa 1998; Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry 1989; Bonsu and Belk 2003; Bonsu, Darmody and Parmentier 2010; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993; Goulding et al. 2009; Henry and Caldwell 2007; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Holt 1995; Martin 2004; Mick and Fournier 1998; Wallendorf and Arnould 1991). These activities, when performed in the company of others, may lead to shared heightened emotional states - what Durkheim (2001 [1912]) refers to as "collective effervescence," and a sense of togetherness - Turner's (1969) communitas.

Research on brand and consumption communities, as well as consumer resistance movements (e.g., Belk and Costa 1998; Cova and Cova 2002; Cronin, McCarthy, and Collins 2014; Kozinets 2001, 2002; Muniz and O'Guinn 2001; Portwood-Stacer 2012; Sandlin and Callahan 2009; Schouten and McAlexander 1995; Thompson 2005; Thompson and Arsel 2004; Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007) also refer to a sense of communality amongst participants. Such communities – akin to postmodern "tribes" (Maffesoli 1996) – are characterized by voluntary

participation. While some communities are more transient, participation to others are more enduring. Thompson (2005), drawing on Williams (1977, 1979) has noted that commitment to such communities are structured by shared ideological beliefs which are experienced by participants as "feelings."

Furthermore, collective consumption practices and experiences have also been demonstrated to mediate more permanent bonds among subjects and collectivities. Gift-giving, for instance, expresses and (re-)aligns relatively non-transient emotional relationships (Belk and Coon 1993; Joy 2001; Ruth, Otnes and Brunel 1999; Sherry 1983) between individuals and within a community (Weinberger and Wallendorf 2012), as do various consumption activities that take place in the context of romantic relationship (Illouz 2007, 2009). Touristic consumption experiences of visiting historical sites and exhibitions have been argued to generate emotional responses that serve collective imaginaries and communal bonding (Chronis 2006; Chronis et al. 2012) at the national level. Emotional object-subject bonds (e.g., Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988; Fournier 1998; Lastovicka and Sirianni 2011; Roster 2014) often relate to self-identity, but may also serve interpersonal and communal ends.

Thus, even though few studies explicitly deal with emotions as an analytical category (see Gopaldas 2014 and Illouz 2009 for critiques), several have worked on emotion-laden topics and point us in the direction of emotions structuring practices, generating shared dispositions, and binding collectivities. I have discerned, however, that we know less about the co-constitutive linkages amongst the elicitation of emotions - particularly as mediated by objects, the generation of structures, and the materialization of communal relationships. I thus trace the emergence of an

emotional structure which, in turn, animates consumption practices, and structures relationships and communities.

To this end, I turn to the literature that explores the generative capacity of emotions. Emotions have been conceptualized as evaluative (Nussbaum 2003), energy-laden (Illouz 2007). Arising through humans' interactions with other bodies - imagined or real, human or non-human, individual or collective - emotions can also *move* and *orient* people towards and apart from other bodies, and into shared ways of being and acting (Ahmed 2004; Burkitt 1997, 2002; Calhoun 2001; Harris and Sørensen 2010; Kane 2001). In other words, emotions can generate dispositions, a la Bourdieu. In understanding how emotions generate structures and dispositions, I find inspiration in Ahmed's (2004) arguments that emotions are "sticky" and that they circulate.

In what Ahmed terms an "affective economy," emotions stick to and circulate with bodies and objects, and in effect, also stick subjects together. To illustrate, "hate" is evoked by and sticks onto the bodies of such figures as the "immigrant" and circulates with these bodies, as well as through hate speeches and texts. Ahmed suggests that hate "intensifies" on these bodies - in other words, these bodies become saturated with hate. This intensification "sticks" the bodies of the immigrants together as a "common threat," while at the same time binding the "white nation" as a unified community. Thus, intensification has a twofold effect: it not only shapes an understanding of which bodies constitute "us," but also constitutes and delineates certain bodies as the "other" and draws boundaries between the two. This can work through objects saturated with negative emotions, such as hate and fear as in the

immigrant and the terrorist, but also through objects of positive emotions, such as love and happiness (Ahmed 2010) as in the "objects" of the family and the nation.

Harris and Sørensen (2010), drawing on Ahmed (2004) suggest that material objects generate and are inherent to "affective fields:" webs of emotionally evocative relationships amongst objects, things, and places. I discern that this notion of affective fields provides a linkage between Ahmed's affective economy and objectification: Practices and processes that materialize relationships also draw individuals into the affective fields generated by the object. I suggest that individuals who are drawn into an object's affective field become linked to others who have been similarly affected by the object: they come to have a common repertoire of experiences, emotions, and relationships related to that object, and they take a certain position with respect to this object. In other words, they are *oriented*. This orientation, in turn, can be broadened to encompass a more general way of relating to the world: taking inspiration from Bourdieu, an *emotional habitus*. This term has been used by several scholars (e.g., Calhoun 2001; Gould 2009; Illouz 2007; Kane 2001) to describe the deeply internalized, unreflexive, and partially conscious "structure" that shapes relations and (re)actions to objects or situations. The emotional saturation and circulation of objects thus generate affective fields, and attune people into common orientations and dispositions. Thus, one can extrapolate: Objects, by generating, embodying, and circulating emotions across space and time, also play a part in shaping an emotional habitus. Through their encounters with these objects, individuals and collectivities become habituated.

Bridging Ahmed's perspective on the circulation of emotions with literature on materiality, I propose that the objects can become "sticky" and "intense," with a

multitude of emotions, and this "stickiness" is integral to the materializing nature (Aronczyk and Craig 2012) of object circulation. The process of intensification, we note, also suggests temporality: the circulation of an object, as it continues through time and space, leads to more intense emotionality. This, in turn, can be said to thicken the threads that weave together a collectivity: solidifying the sense of "us," while concomitantly rigidifying the boundaries against the "other." Thus, a shared emotional disposition is generated by the circulation of a class of objects, and in turn this disposition is what binds and delineates the communal body.

I inquire how mundane objects of everyday life can become "sticky" with multiple emotions, and set an affective economy into motion. In a context laden with ethnic strife, and where the circulation of certain objects is restricted, I note that this circulation takes on a resistive character, and the emotional economy takes on a particularly political significance. I am compelled to ask, then, how emotions and materiality work together in producing and solidifying imaginaries of communities and boundaries, and in this process, also constitute resistance. Hence, I seek to elucidate how the affective potentiality of an object animates emotional structures that shape community and resistance.

2.2.3 Movement and Resistance

The way that community is materialized through objects and practices not only reproduces collective imaginaries and reinforces relationships, but also by doing so may position the collectivity in opposition to its other(s). Opposition is often articulated in terms of "grievances" (Snow and Benford 1988) – perceived injustice, inequality, and wrongdoings, which, as the term itself implies, are "felt." Grievances

and opposition thus also correspond to a shared emotional orientation – one most commonly of anger and indignation - with respect to certain orders and institutions. Thus, opposition also entails an emotional habitus.

Opposition can take one of two forms. It can develop into political activism and social movements (Tarrow 2012), in which collective grievances are framed and, in concert with resources and opportunities, fuel collective action. Movement activists often engage in "emotion work" (Hochschild 1979; Sandlin and Callahan 2009) – managing emotions through various tools (including music, imagery, and speech acts) to strengthen the sense of shared identity and purpose within the movement, and to mobilize people into action (Jasper 2011). Visible and large-scale organized action, however, is not the only way in which opposition is enacted. The domain of mundane everyday practices (De Certeau 1988) and more evasive and small-scale acts of disobedience (Abu-Lughod 1990; Scott 1990) also constitute forms of resistance. Unlike the "strategies" (De Certeau 1988) that dominant institutional actors employ, the subordinate engage in less organized material and discursive practices, such as poaching, pilfering, tax evasion, rumor, and gossip (Scott 1990). Rather than geared towards being noticed, these practices are performed with the hopes that they will remain undetected – yet they also function in ways to shake the authority of dominant orders. Scott (1990, 184) terms such practices as constituting "infrapolitics," noting that they often co-exist with and "[provide] much of the cultural and structural underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has been generally focused." Materiality, as emergent within specific social and historical contexts, is particularly pertinent to

such types of resistance (Smith 2009). Yet, the nexus of emotionality and materiality that is generated by, and which in turn (re)produces such infrapolitical or tactical resistance remains to be explicated. I shall thus inquire how tactical or infrapolitical practices weave the emotional underpinning of a collective resistance.

The potentialities of emotional-material dynamics for generating tactical resistance remains to be explicated not only in the social sciences but also in consumer research literature. Consumer researchers have focused on the market and consumerism as the hegemonic order to be resisted (Izberk-Bilgin 2010; see also Cronin, McCarthy and Collins 2014; Gopaldas 2014; Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Karababa and Ger 2011; Mikkonen and Bajde 2013; Portwood-Stacer 2012; Sandlin and Callahan 2011; Ulver-Sneistrup, Askegaard and Christensen 2011). Moreover, cassette technology has allowed amateur producers to engage with the production, circulation, and distribution of music, and thus to subvert hegemonic market orders (Manuel 1993). However, market actors can also collaborate and challenge other dominant orders, including the state (Goulding et al. 2009; Humphreys 2010; Karababa and Ger 2011; Sandıkcı and Ger 2010). I thus supplement this emergent research on how communities engage with markets in opposing dominant structures other than the market. In doing so, I also respond to Izberk-Bilgin's (2010, 319) call for investigations of oppositional communities "where social solidarity is longer-lasting and not based on brand loyalty, and to which membership cannot be purchased." Accordingly, I examine grassroots practices of cassette circulation as sites of emotional and communal resistance that target the state. I thus explore the

emotionality of these resistive material practices, and explicate how such practices simultaneously facilitate unity around a shared ethnic identity.

2.3 Findings: The Circulation of Cassettes

The mid-1970s saw the widespread availability of cassette technology throughout Turkey – and hence, the practices of circulating cassettes commenced and continued until the late 1990s. While a portion of Kurdish cassettes in circulation were recordings made by pro-Kurdish organizations, local performances of oral performers – foremostly the *dengbêj* – as well as other artists were also recorded. After the 1980 military coup d'état, many performers fled the country, while others were jailed or forced to stop performing. The *dengbêj* were left unable to travel as they used to, and the live music scene became more or less silent. Yet, beneath this silence, behind hidden doors, a thriving cassette culture emerged along with a resistive community.

Studio recordings of artists who sought asylum in Europe in 1980s made their way into Turkey hidden in the suitcases of Kurds making a living as "guestworkers" in various European countries, and were also smuggled across the borders by professional smugglers. *Dengbêj* music that had been recorded during live performances in the 70s, on the other hand, was continually circulated, through copies of amateur home recordings. The 1980s thus saw no shortage of music circulation, despite various risks associated with recording, owning, playing, and exchanging cassettes. Cassettes, being small, cheap, durable, and easy to record on, transport, and hide, seem ideal for carrying music. But, as we shall see, these

material properties also made cassettes open for becoming saturated with affect and, in the process, made them *matter*.

Set in that stage, I identified four entangled practices, which (non-linearly) comprise circulation: recording, hiding, listening, and exchanging. I now demonstrate how these practices set into motion an embedded emotional economy, an illegal market, and a resistive community.

2.3.1 Recording Music: Capturing Emotions on Tape

My findings reveal that the recording of music onto cassettes was often an emotional affair. I shall illustrate how social and political circumstances engendered the recording process as an evocative occasion, and, in turn, how the cassettes became "sticky" with the emotions that were evoked during the process. Two practices are poignant in this regard: home recordings of *dengbêj* sessions in Turkey and a studio recording made in Europe.

Until the 1980s, a typical *dengbêj* would travel through the countryside in the "region," stopping for visits in towns and villages where families could host him. He would perform his songs, which could be based on a range of topics, including historical events, folk legends, and love stories. The townsfolk would gather at the host's home and listen to these performances, which sometimes went on for nights on end. In the 1970s, with the availability of cassette technology, hosts started to record these sessions. In return for the performance, the host would present the *dengbêj* with gifts of grains or livestock. After the 1970s, owning a cassette recorder also became a

requisite to host a *dengbêj*. Cem, a restaurant manager in his mid-30s, had an uncle who performed this role in their village in the city of Muş. Cem recalls,

> "[My uncle] was not a rich man, but he found the resources, not only to provide the *dengbêj* with gifts, but also to [buy] new recording devices. He always ordered new cassette recorders from relatives who came to visit from Germany, and he recorded all of the *dengbêj* sessions that took place in his home."

Cem noted that his uncle performed a "sacrifice" by allocating what limited resources he had to acting as a patron of *dengbêj*s. *Dengbêj*s and their hosts were discussed by Cem, as well as by other informants, as preserving what has now come to be consciously termed as "heritage," thus performing community service, and doing so as acts of love and sacrifice. The host's generosity would, in turn, be recognized by the *dengbêj,* who would acknowledge the host's names when recording began. Thus, the host's name would also be heard during replays of copies, sometimes hundreds or thousands of miles away and by people who had no connection to the original "producer" of the cassette. This love towards the *dengbêj*, and the respectful recognition of sacrifice performed by the host, would thus become part of a constellation, along with the music and narratives, that would find body in and circulate with the "object" of the cassette.

Recordings were often made using a cheap and simple tape recorder, in the presence of adults seated around the *dengbêj*, children running around, and audience shouting terms of encouragement and adulation to the performer. These atmospheric sounds, the substandard audio quality due to poor recording equipment, the crackles arising from the material wear and tear of the cassettes after they were played and

duplicated too many times, are not seen as distractions. Rather, as Dicle and Melda, co-owners of a publishing house, fondly reminisce, "you could not think of [*dengbêj*] music in any other way." These sounds, music, narratives and the cassette have been discussed by informants as an integral part of growing up "in a Kurdish household." The physical and experiential particularities of the recording process weave into the cassette, saturating it with the excitement, joy, and everydayness of the recording process. These emotions seep into future experiences of listening, intensifying and becoming more tangible as the cassette continues to circulate.

The material properties of the cassette recorder and the cassette itself meant that amateur recordings as well as duplicates could be easily made and easily circulated (as opposed to vinyl, which had to be recorded professionally, and was quite fragile). The cassettes, by circulating, enabled audiences to hear similar sounds and experience similar emotions - generating a shared repertoire. Dicle and Melda, despite having grown up in *Zazaki* and *Kurmanji* speaking homes, respectively, in different parts of the "region," recount these cassettes in very similar, lovingly familiar terms, as does Cem, whose childhood was divided between the "region" and a city in Western Turkey. Individuals who grew up in times or regions where *dengbêj*s did not perform also became privy to the *dengbêj* experience through these crackly, noisy cassettes – thus a union in experience and emotional orientations regarding the *dengbêj*s, the music, the hosts, and the cassettes took place; uniting people across geographies, differences in practices of oral traditions, or tribal origins. The connections among those in the audience at the time of the recording, those in different villages and cities who received and further exchanged this recording, and

those hearing it, perhaps ten years in the future in another city are materialized through these cassettes, which carry different songs but have been recorded through similar practices and give way to similar emotional experiences – which, in turn, are articulated in very similar ways. The cassette, then, is an "object" uniting these audiences: its materiality is entwined with the emotionality generated during its recording and through other practices that follow.

Studio albums produced professionally in Europe and brought into Turkey by guest workers – on their own accord or upon insistent demands - comprised another class of recordings in circulation, particularly in the 1980s, and generated similar emotional dynamics. The narrative of the recording of *Helebçe*, a song written and performed by Şivan Perwer, stands out as a collective reminiscence. Perwer, arguably the most famed, beloved, but also polarizing among Kurdish artists, has lived in Europe after fleeing Turkey in 1976 (Kevirbiri 2004). His albums have, nonetheless, circulated extensively, with some reportedly reaching a circulation of hundreds of thousands in illegal copies. The extent of his influence is best expressed by Utku, a music producer: "No single book, no single word has been as influential as [his] music, as unifying as his music," particularly in "connecting people to their Kurdishness" and mobilizing them politically - an influence made possible through illegal circulation. *Helebçe*, the song in question, was recorded on Perwer's eponymous album, in 1988, shortly after Saddam Hussein's administration committed a chemical attack on the Kurdish-populated town of Halabja in Northern Iraq, leaving an estimated 5,000 people dead. Perwer, deeply moved by photos of the tragedy – of children lying dead, of an old man crying – composed a song and

recorded it in one take. The story of how he wrote and recorded the song has become a matter of circulation in itself, with Perwer recounting the story in interviews (e.g., Matur 2009; Perwer 2013), emphasizing that he was crying in pain while recording and that he wanted his cries to be heard on the record. Word of the song reached Turkey before the album itself, and once the cassette came, it was greeted with a mixture of joy and sorrow. Murat, a university student at the time, recalled receiving the *Helebçe* cassette, in Diyarbakır: "I've seen people cry when they received that album," he said, "not just because of the song, but also because we were able to procure such a beautifully recorded album."

The sorrow that Perwer recorded as a reaction to the Halabja massacre, while he was in exile from his own homeland, is bridged to the audience's sorrows regarding their own strife and struggles- particularly those related to being a Kurd, and the collective sorrows were intensified with the circulation of the cassette. The cassette, when it is delivered into the hands of a Kurd in Diyarbakır, is already loaded. Many Kurds have already been touched by the emotions and atmospheres that Perwer sings about, and they already have an emotional repertory (Nussbaum 2003) related to music cassettes. Even before they receive the physical artifact, or before they hear the songs on the album, they are ready to be attuned to the affective field (Harris and Sørensen 2010) generated by the cassette, and are thus the cassette's primary addressees (Warner 2002). The sorrowful emotional orientation with respect to Halabja (the city), as mediated by *Helebçe* (the cassette) eventually comes to be shared by many a Kurd: thus the cassette plays a part in shaping an emotional habitus, and elevates a collectivity formed around the cassette into a broader

“Kurdish” community. In Ahmed’s (2004) terms, the cassette becomes sticky with emotion, and by virtue of this stickiness, plays a part in bonding the community.

These two examples illustrate how recording music onto cassettes sets the stage for the emotions, experiences, and narratives that would come to circulate throughout the cassette’s trajectory. The social, historical, and material properties regarding the manner in which the music is performed, recorded, played, and exchanged, along with musical content and stories that circulate, potentiates the cassettes with emotional density. Affective fields that are comprised of joy, sorrow, anger, or pain felt by those involved in recording, continued to circulate as the cassettes were received, played, exchanged: intensifying even when cassettes remained hidden in chests, buried underground, or were burned in fires. The circulation of cassettes, starting with recording the music, thus provided the means for socialization (Thompson 2005) into an emergent “structure of feelings” (Williams 1977, 1979). This structure, as I will continue to explore, became stronger through time, as emotions intensified (Ahmed 2004); and came to encompass a broader constituency: the community was imagined as larger but also as more solid, and the boundaries against the “other” became more defined.

2.3.2 Hiding, Storing and Destroying Cassettes: Emotions Buried and Afloat

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, households in the “region” were frequently searched by police, military, or special operative forces. Materials that were seen as evidence linking inhabitants to illegal activities and organizations (particularly the

PKK) included Kurdish music cassettes, even after the production and sales of Kurdish music became legal. Individuals arrested and taken under custody were reportedly subject to severe physical violence, and often received terrorism charges and a prison sentence. Tahir, a musician and sound engineer says, “Some people never survived these arrests... some people’s fingers and arms were broken.” News of such ordeals would travel, accompanied by waves of fear and anticipation of violence. Thus, cassettes were often kept hidden in hopes of escaping detection during a possible search: the bottoms of women’s dowry chests, beneath the haystacks in the barn, and sometimes, buried deep underground.

Sami, a social worker in his 30s, grew up in a small Kurdish-inhabited town in the Northern part of the “region,” in the same household as his uncle. His narrative illustrates the secrecy and care his family paid in hiding their cassettes:

> My uncle owned a large collection of cassettes, which he kept hidden somewhere in the house, in a briefcase, next to his guns. Every once in a while, he would ceremoniously take the briefcase out of its hiding place, which no one else in the household knew. Everyone would gather around the cassette player, observe, and listen. No one else was allowed to handle the cassettes.

Sami’s uncle had accumulated this collection arduously throughout the years, through gifts and by requesting cassettes from personal contacts. However, in 1990, the town became rife with tension due to armed conflict between the PKK and the military. Police raided households suspected of aiding the PKK, and took several people under custody, which started, in Sami’s words, “an endless cycle of violence and torture.” Sami’s narrative highlights intensification of fear during that period:

> It was terrible, everyone was really frightened. It was a huge crime to be caught owning guns, because there were armed conflicts all around. In that period, all the cassettes were also destroyed. But before they were destroyed, I remember that the cassettes and the guns were thrown into a hole that was dug in the barn and then buried. They were buried as a precaution, [the cassettes] were that dangerous, that's how [we] perceived the situation.

I note that the cassette comes to be perceived, by Kurds and Turkish authorities alike, as a "weapon" (as dangerous as guns) against the state. Hiding, burying, or otherwise destroying cassettes are ways of tricking the authorities - what De Certeau (1988) refers to as diversionary tactics of "perruque" - to the objects, and thus constitute infrapolitics or tactical resistance (Scott 1990). Fear was a prominent response to being sealed (Ahmed 2003, 2004) as "terrorists" by the law, the authorities, and to some extent the general public, and this fear "stuck" onto the cassettes, through their possession being associated with "terrorist activities." Fear intensifies with the burial and destruction of the cassette, and a fearful relationship between the people and the state is materialized through this practice. As such, the very presence of the state as "the other" is *felt* through these emotionally charged experiences, and the emotional saturation of the cassettes become denser.

Throughout fieldwork, I witnessed that informants were most moved - with anger as well as sorrow - while they were relating stories about hiding or destroying their cassettes. It was not unusual for a Kurdish informant or acquaintance to offer a story about their buried cassettes, almost immediately after we met. Elif, a Kurdish student raised in German, is one such example She spoke of visiting her family's village during the summers in the 1990s, and noted how surprised she was when one

summer, her cousins took her to the barns and retrieved some cassettes that were hidden underneath the haystacks. This occasion was her initiation into understanding the fears, secrecy, and frustration associated with being a Kurd in Turkey - this took place through her initiation into the affective field generated by the cassettes. Ersin, a librarian in his 30s, talked about the cassettes his father had felt obligated to bury in their backyard, not five minutes after we met. He was visibly saddened when he recounted how, twenty years after burying these cassettes, his father had asked to find them. He and his brothers managed to locate and unearth these cassettes - unforgotten for twenty years - but they were consumed by mould and had to be thrown away. Despite being disposed of, the cassettes continued to have an emotional hold on the family to this day - an indication that the affective field does not necessarily diminish once the object is destroyed. Similarly, a number of other informants have commented that there are "graveyards" of cassettes (*kaset mezarlıkları*) throughout the "region." The repetition of this emotionally loaded metaphor is indicative of a shared emotional vocabulary (Burkitt 2002) developed to express similar feelings generated by the practice of burying, and which might not be initially comprehendible to outsiders. This, in turn, is indicative of a "structure" of emotions, or a habitus: one that is reinforced through practices of hiding and burying, as well as the narratives that continued to circulate.

Hiding or burying create an even stronger affective field around the cassettes, and these fields also served to compound and intensify fear, anger, and resentment; thus reinforcing a resistive stance against the state. This relationship amongst the state and the Kurds, as objectified through the cassettes, was also narrated through

the notion of being "marked:" a more literal usage of the term relates to the arrests (i.e., "marks") that many Kurds had on their legal records. In a more figurative sense, it relates to a "feeling" of being marked as an illegitimate member of society. It is so common to be "marked" in both manners that when the state established a Kurdish-language television channel in 2009, their attempts to find Kurdish employees with "clean records" became a source of ridicule among Kurds, because, in Dicle's words, "there are no unmarked Kurds." Being "marked" due to owning, hiding, or burying cassettes, and the narratives that accompanied these "marks" intensified the affective field generated by the cassettes. The notion of "sacrifice" also deeply colors these "marking" experiences and narratives related to cassettes. Informants emphasized, "despite all the risks," people continued to procure and hide music cassettes, some forsaking their safety and freedom in the process - a notion that is emically referred to as "*bedel,*" a Turkish word that roughly translates as "sacrificial price." Again, this emotionally loaded term is part of a shared vocabulary and expresses the resentful, fearful, but also proud emotional orientation that accompanies a resistive stance against the state.

Thus a generative structure emerges: the emotional habitus, shaped by experiences and narratives, in turn disposes its constituents towards certain ways of being, acting, and feeling. An emotional habitus shaped by fear, anger/resentment, sacrifice, and sorrow in turn shaped practices that were sacrificial and resistive - and such practices further reinforced the emotional structure. Rather than serving identity projects that are limited to the individual (Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988; Roster 2014) or the nuclear family (Curasi, Price, and Arnould 2004; Epp and Price 2008, 2010) the

possession, use and dispossession of objects generated emotional experiences and orientations which led to (real or imagined) alignments with a collective body. In-group and out-group dynamics also simultaneously took shape through this process. The very idea of an "other" takes shape as a coherent entity - in this case, the state and its apparatuses - through encounters and experiences that also generate an emotional structure. Such coherence and boundary shaping dynamics also characterized experiences of playing the cassettes.

2.3.3 Playing Cassettes: Building the Audience-Public

The practice of listening to cassettes often assembled family and friends together and, at times, served to establish new friendships and social networks. But, importantly, it connected individuals and collectivities on an imagined level, among past, present, and future audiences, by virtue of listening to the same recordings, learning the same stories, and constructing a common repertoire of experiences. Shared emotional orientations that emerged through these practices served to connect Kurds across national, lingual, and tribal borders.

In Kurdish homes, noted Mehmet, an academic, "whenever there were guests one of those poorly recorded *dengbêj* cassettes would be played," if only in the background while the adults were conversing. "The music *had to* play there," he says, even if no one actively listened to it, and notes this obligation was in place especially because these cassettes were illegal, interpreting it as a form of resistance. There were also times, Mehmet recalls, when a cassette would be the reason for getting together and all the conversations that night would concern that cassette. Such

gatherings were common in the "region," but also took place and were even more emotionally charged in other parts of Turkey (which were "diaspora" for the Kurds).

Cem and his family migrated to a city in the Northwest of Turkey when Cem was five years old. Cem recalls that in their new hometown, they initially avoided acknowledging to neighbors that they were Kurds, and they no longer spoke Kurdish in public. "When people learned we were Kurds, they treated us as if we were aliens," he says. Cem's family brought along all their existing cassettes to this new dwelling and continued to enlist friends and relatives to bring back new recordings back from the "region." Upon the arrival of new cassettes, Cem's parents would host "cassette sessions:" liminal (Turner 1969) spaces and times during which emotions and Kurdish language flowed freely:

> About 90 percent of the time, [we would gather] because someone came to visit from our hometown, so [all the Kurds living in the area] would get together in someone's home. And then after each song, [the grown-ups] would refer to the story in the song. It would be a love story told by Dengbêj Ṣakiro, for example, so thousands of time, they would make the same comments about that song. This and that happened… like there was a story where a young woman falls in love with a *madrasa* [religious school] student, that story was told to us [children] perhaps a thousand times. … there were other things, like escapades. They would tell us about things they remembered from their own lifetimes, such as the cruelties of *Feshi Aǧa* [a feudal lord], they would recall the bandits who were famous back then, how brave they were … In those cassettes, you would always hear the voices in the background, people calling out [words of encouragement], and other laudatory words, like *her biji* [long live]. If someone in the room had actually been there the night that cassette was recorded, they would commemorate that. People would get extremely emotional, which was also because we were [far from home].

> At least one or two people would most definitely say "I would like a copy of this cassette," so the host would be assigned this duty as well.

The emotional economy of the cassette – set into motion during recording, as evidenced once again in Cem's narrative – is compounded by the emotions displayed and the storytelling that takes place during group-listening practices. The young children are initiated into "being Kurdish" through these sessions. They learn about the stories told in and around the cassette. They observe and experience the emotions and the communitas generated through the cassettes during these sessions, and thus enter into the affective field created by the cassettes, and become habituated.

Strangers were also sometimes invited and became attuned into this field – thus new relationships materialized through practices of listening together. Cem recalls that some Kurdish residents of their new town heard about "the new Kurdish family" in possession of a large cassette collection. These people initiated contact, and started attending cassette sessions at Cem's home. They would bring gifts, such as homemade yogurt and fresh produce in gratitude for being hosted. The cassettes were responsible for bringing the music, stories, and conversation into the family home, and objectified these friendly relationships. Memories would be rehashed, with Kurds from different regions and perhaps with different affiliations sharing their similar yet different stories. New collective experiences became part of shared repertoires. Sorrow accompanied listening to the music of the hometown left behind and colored the experience even if the music itself was happy or upbeat. This love and sorrow for the hometown found body in the crackling cassette that played, and these emotions were experienced, by the children who perhaps never even saw the

hometown. The experientiality (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982) of the session thus has broader consequences that transcend temporal and geographic locales. The emotionality generated during the session draws the participants into partaking in a broader and markedly "Kurdish" experiential repertoire. Making a copy, as requested from the host, not only enabled the music to change hands, but also extends this constellation of music, experience, and emotions – tears, crackles and all - into the lifeworlds of others.

Listening to cassettes also objectified intimate and familial relationships (Miller 1998), and moreover, our findings suggest that these experiences are part of a common repertoire of "being Kurdish." Even the materialization of intimate relationships has communal repercussions, as illustrated by the narratives of informants who had difficulties in communicating with their parents. Children received mandatory formal education in Turkish, thus for those who came of age in larger cities after the 1980s, Kurdish was not the primary language of communication and socialization. On the other hand, parents, especially those who didn't receive much formal education, were often not as fluent in Turkish as their children. This sometimes created chasms in relationships. Cem was worried, as an adult, that he was never able to properly express his love for his mother. He and his mother frequently listened to cassettes of the *dengbêj* Ṣakiro together. It was through listening to these cassettes that Cem came to learn most of his Kurdish, and he also came to realize, that even without words spoken between them, "we were able to express ourselves to each other by listening to cassettes together." Nurten, the director of an NGO, went to school in Diyarbakır in the 1980s. As a child, she prided

herself in her fluent and accent-free Turkish, and struggled with her feelings about her mother, whose Turkish, she felt, was embarrassingly flawed. Nurten herself refused to learn or speak Kurdish. Nonetheless, she says she knew many songs by heart, as they always played cassettes at home. Cassettes objectified, mediated and also mended the relationships at times when words were not available. Interpersonal and familial bonds, including emotional frustrations, as materialized or resolved through cassettes, were articulated as part as growing up as an ethnic Kurd. The affective field generated by cassettes thus also included these shared familial love and frustrations – which in turn indicate a pointedly *Kurdish* emotional habitus. Thus, the object and practice not only "crafted" love (Madianou and Miller 2011) and negotiated family identity (Holttinen 2014) but also contributed to the emotional structuring of Kurdish community.

Listening, particularly in groups, could also bring the emotions and sufferings of other Kurds, even across state borders, into the circle, effectively situating them as part of a Kurdish "us" that transcended national borders. The experience of listening to Perwer's *Helebçe*, the lamentation sung in memory of the deaths of Iraqi Kurds in the hands of Saddam Hussein, is an instance in which sorrow finds body through and circulates with the cassette, entering the field of emotions and experiences of the participants of other social circles. Murat recalls the times he and his friends got together and listened to the song, over and over again, always crying while doing so. The emotional density of the cassette intensified each time it was played, and later copied and given away. The cassette, already "sticky" (Ahmed 2004) with emotions – recall, if you will, that Perwer cried while recording it, and the students cried with

joy and sorrow when they received it – thus kept thickening with sorrow for the Kurds of Halabja, and also bridged to the audience's own experiences, emotions, and dispositions related to being a Kurd in Turkey, giving this sorrow a different flavor than what would be experienced, say, by someone who is not a Kurd. It is this particular flavor that indicates an emotional habitus, and that allows the cassettes to "address" (Warner 2002) a Kurdish public.

While intimate and imagined relationships constituting "us" were objectified, the resistive relationship with "them" simultaneously emerged and took shape through listening practices. As with hiding and destroying the cassettes, fear colored many experiences of listening. Cem recalls that whenever his parents listened to cassettes in the 1980s (by themselves or during the cassette sessions), they would assign a few children to play outside the door, so that they could have ample warning if someone – say, an intolerant Turkish neighbor, or the police – came by. In the "region," fear was even more intense and was also commonly exercised by law enforcement as a means of upholding order. Mehmet recalls, as a young boy, that a wedding he attended was raided by "special ops carrying very large guns." Children would hang around the street give news of approaching law enforcement. Adults would then try to switch the cassettes, hiding them in Turkish covers, and playing Turkish pop before the enforcement arrived – as with burying, a case of employing a *perruque* (De Certeau 1988) appropriate for that moment.

An evocative case of such diversion, shaped by and generating the dual emotions of fear and bravery, took place in minibuses, which to this day provide transportation between cities, towns, and villages in the "region." In the 1980s and

90s, the minibuses would be stacked with Kurdish music cassettes, which would be played throughout the journeys, during which solidarity amongst the driver and the passengers prevailed. There were multiple military checkpoints, and upon approaching them, the driver would hide the cassettes with a sleight of hand. According to Sami, who grew up speaking *Kurmanji* Kurdish, military forces conducting searches knew that cassettes were hidden somewhere on the minibus, and the driver and passengers knew that the soldiers knew. Yet, the passengers would never speak out. On some days, the soldiers would perform thorough searches, forcing the driver to turn the cassettes in, and would consequently destroy the cassettes. On other days, they would let this offense slide. Such games characterized many exchanges between Kurds and law enforcers – the Kurds affirming their own communality, banding against the authorities (even in their silence) and forcing the boundaries to the limit. In *Zazaki* speaker Dicle's reminiscence of similar incidences in a different city in the "region," the driver would turn the volume on full blast after passing the checkpoint. The passengers, in turn, might applaud the driver. I have witnessed that checkpoints, as well as the habit of turning the music off at the checkpoint and turning the volume all the way up after passing inspection remain today. And, despite the legality of the Kurdish music the conflicted relationship between "us" and "them" continues to play out in the collective imaginary. Similar stories articulated in very similar ways, and practices that even to this day remain embedded in daily life, are indicative of an emotional habitus shaped by emotions and the fields generated by these encounters.

Stories of “in-your-face” acts of disobedience were also found alongside narratives of evasive and manipulative practices. Mehmet recounted a confrontation that took place when he was a teenager working a summer job at a shoe store. He frequently hung out with other teens who worked at surrounding shops. One of these shops was a music store, and the boy who worked there, a few years older than Mehmet, was “a very rebellious boy” they were all envious of. One day, this boy played Şivan Perwer at full blast while armored military vehicles were passing by. “Suddenly,” Mehmet says, “one of the [vehicles] stopped, turned around, and the [special ops] guys got off, these huge men, carrying automatic rifles. They came into the shop, shook [the boy], stomped onto some cassettes, and told him to never play this music again.” Children also often witnessed scenes when the music was shut down, cassettes broken, their homes searched, family members threatened and sometimes even taken away. Through such experiences, the relationship between the armed forces (and thus the Turkish state) and the Kurds was objectified in a manner that is fraught with fear, anger, and rebellion, and the materiality of the cassette is entwined with these emotions. Such encounters engender a shared emotional disposition, which in turn drives various tactics and rebellions towards the state. A structure of feelings thus develops and solidifies through practices, experiences and encounters related to playing cassettes.

Another site in which these emotional dispositions towards the “other” found body was the wedding party. Utku, a music producer, notes that the bride and groom were sometimes “figurines,” and the wedding was more of an opportunity to get together, engage in political discourse, distribute political pamphlets, and feel

incensed. Talat, an employee at an NGO remembers people dancing, at weddings, while "songs about martyrs played on the cassettes." Semih, the owner of a bookstore, noted that guests would become angry if songs with agitative lyrics were not played. A popular song of the 1980s was Ṣivan Perwer's *Serhildan Jiyane*, whose title translates to "resisting is living." This phrase aptly serves as a trope for the emotional habitus that is constitutive of living life as a Kurd, and in explaining such resistive acts and attitudes even at celebratory events. The risky acts of listening to illegal cassettes at homes, weddings, and minibuses, not only shaped young peoples' understandings of being Kurdish, but simultaneously shaped their understanding of the state as oppressive and hostile, thus moving them into banding together, engaging with politics, resisting authorities in evasive as well as confrontational manners.

Informants often emphasized the emotions and contextual particularities as shaping their listening experiences - sometimes above and beyond the lyrics or compositions. For example, when Cem was asked to talk about memories of listening to his favorite songs, he referred to "[my parents'] fear, their longing for our hometown, how we kids used to go to wait at the doorway while they listened." He moreover emphasized the music of *dengbêj* Ṣakiro as occupying a special place among his favorites, as this was the music that he listened to with his mother. Thus, it was also the secrecy, the fear, and the longing that *matter*ed. These emotions, in turn, shaped Cem's relationship with his parents, especially his mother, his own identity as part of the Kurdish community, and also shaped how he learned to regard the state as posing a looming threat. Such experiences were common in other interviews – more than one informant referred to music as teaching her/him "what it

means to be a Kurd," and when asked to elaborate, informants often focused on practices related to the cassettes. This indicates that the emotionality of the content also intensified upon the object of the cassette. Thus, the elements of the music, lyrics, and narratives are part of a constellation that finds body in the cassette, which, through the practice of listening, generates affective fields that touch all those who come into contact.

Through listening, then, joy, bravery, sacrifice, love, anger, fear, and repulsion were evoked, intensified, and continued to circulate. Cassettes as objects provided ways to emotionally address (Warner 2002) Kurds as a public, by drawing them into an emotional habitus. The "feeling" of belonging that is noted by Anderson (1983) can be explained as stimulated by being habituated into such this shared structure. Emotionally charged experiences related to listening to the music and playing the cassettes thus materialized interpersonal as well as communal relationships (imagined and real), influenced people's understandings of their selves as Kurds, and also shaped resistance against those who were perceived as the oppressors - in other words, collective alignments and boundaries emerged. Practices of exchange, as we shall see, enabled cassettes to move amongst people, and thus to touch and move new people into this emergent resistive community.

2.3.4 Sharing, Gifting and Selling: The Exchange of Cassettes

In the absence of a legal network of distributors and retailers for Kurdish music, dispersed efforts to duplicate and exchange cassettes allowed the music to travel throughout places with Kurdish inhabitants. It was very common for individuals to

make copies of cassettes and gift them within friendship and kinship networks. More concerted efforts to duplicate and sell the cassettes on the black market were also in existence: studio recordings that were smuggled across the borders, as well as recordings of famous *dengbêj* were duplicated by makeshift equipment, and sold by unregistered vendors and also by regular retailers "under the table." These "off the books" sales remained in place well after legalization in 1991 - partly due to the cheapness of reproducing cassettes in this manner, and partly due to remaining legal and normative restrictions.

Street vendors called *tablac*ıs sold cassettes in the "region" as well as other cities with Kurdish populations, including Istanbul. The *tablac*ıs' merchandise was not limited to Kurdish music, but they would often also hide the Kurdish recordings under cassette covers of Turkish pop. How to locate these vendors was part of a repertoire of local knowledge; new customers – especially during times of heightened surveillance – would have to use chains of reference. Formal retailers, after legalization, were still under close scrutiny and surveillance by Turkish authorities. Cassettes often travelled perilous roads, crossing borders and checkpoints, often evading inspections. Stories of how far a cassette travelled until it reached a particular home or vendor could intensify the affective field a particular cassette generated, and thus thicken its emotional saturation, and also increasing its emotional impact on the buyer or receiver. Encounters with law enforcement created an economy of fear, which was countered by tactics (De Certeau 1988) and the formation of a repertoire of insider knowledge. Cassettes were duplicated and circulated in masses, vendors and retailers alike made mix tapes from popular songs

found on both legal and illegal recordings, and sold them off the books for cheaper prices. There was, thus, a wide array of cassettes on the market.

The exchange of cassettes was often described as being primarily non-commercial in intent, even in cases where the cassettes were sold for money. Informants framed their own acts of sharing and gifting not only within the realm of friendly or kinship relationships, but also as a means of helping other people learn about and embrace Kurdish identity – thus including others in what they perceived as *their* community. Trying to make money out of this almost-sacred process was, according to Cem, embarrassing. He noted, "It was only [after the 1990s] that Kurdish cassettes were sold for money. Previously they were only duplicated, and given away as part of a gift-giving culture … a person might bring his or her own blank cassette and ask, could you record [that album] onto this cassette?" Murat similarly framed selling music as more of a service to the people rather than a profit-making practice, indicating that sellers would often provide discounts, or even give cassettes away for free, as their primary purpose was to circulate the music. The exchange of cassettes materialized relationships that were beyond transactional and embedded in the sacred realm of communality. It has been argued that anonymously bequeathed intracommunal gifts - as opposed to dyadic gifting - generate solidarity and communality (Weinberger and Wallendorf 2012). Yet, we find that dyadic gifting practices, as well as other forms of exchange, by contributing to shared experiential and emotional repertoires, and by drawing individuals into affective fields, serve communal bonds in addition to interpersonal relationships.

One of Murat's memories regarding exchange further illustrates the lack of financial concerns and the role of gifting in establishing communality. While still a teenager in the early 1980s, living in a province of Diyarbakır, he had a cousin who made frequent visits to the city center and brought back cassettes each time. There was a minibus service between the city and the provincial towns, and it was almost always the same driver who served that route. One memorable encounter with this driver is as follows:

> On one journey, this driver saw that a cassette that had fallen out of my cousin's bag. He asked for the cassette, and said, "if you don't give it to me, I will report you to the gendarmerie or the police. My cousin somehow told the driver that if he was serious in his threat, he wouldn't give the cassette, [the driver] should go ahead and call the police or gendarmeries. However, if the driver wanted to listen to the cassette, [my cousin] would give it to him as a gift. The driver apologized, said he had been joking and took the cassette, saying he would like to listen to it. My cousin said he gave the cassette … thinking maybe the driver really wanted to listen to this music. When he told me about this, we thought why don't we make copies of other cassettes and give it to the driver. We presented them to the driver the next time he passed through their town. The driver was really delighted. He didn't charge us on one of our following journeys to the city center.

An interesting juxtaposition took place here: rather than being afraid of or angry at the bus driver, Murat's cousin tactically invited him into forming a relationship based on camaraderie and compatriotism, at which he succeeded. Gifting the cassettes thus helped someone establish or strengthen the bond with his own "Kurdishness" and it also created rapport among three members of a community. While gifting cassettes to friends and relatives was common, the type of gift-giving between Murat, his cousin, and the driver, points towards a relationship established

among strangers who only have an ethnic background in common. This common background, through the practice of gifting, becomes elevated into "community." Engendering a loving disposition towards members of one's ethnic community - despite possibly being of different tribal, regional, lingual, or religious backgrounds - is established, in part, through these gifting practices. In some cases, a person might not be aware of what being part of this community entails – in such cases, gifting the cassette may teach a lesson of camaraderie.

Various forms of exchange, then, extended the affective fields of cassettes to a variety of places and spaces. Cassettes crossed borders between regions, dialects, tribal and religious backgrounds, established bridges and helped shape a constituency. Violent or non-submissive encounters with authorities and law enforcement – the oppressive other – shaped these fields, and also were an inextricable part of the process of understanding and experiencing this resistive communal ethnic identity. The constant danger of violence created fear, anger, and frustration; but also bravery and camaraderie, which saturated the cassettes. Resistance, as well as communality, was materialized through these practices, in these objects and bodies. Through the practice of exchange, particularly through gifting, loving relationships were created and maintained. While the recipients of cassettes could already exist as part of an individual's network of friends and families, the selling and gifting of cassettes could also act as a means of initiating people into one's broader network of fellow Kurds – that is, exchange could act as a means of inviting people to *become* Kurdish, and attuning them into the affective field of the cassette: moving them from strangers into parts of "us" who share

emotional orientations. As the cassette was shared, exchanged, and consequently encountered new individuals, the stories and emotions circulated as well. Emotions intensified, weaving thicker threads through the community and fortifying the boundaries against its "other"s, throughout the cassette's travels.

2.4 Discussion

In this chapter, I traced the circulation of cassettes through a number of practices - recording, owning, hiding, destroying, playing, and exchanging. Through informants' narratives, I examined the various experiences and encounters, the elicitation of emotions, and the materialization of relationships that the circulation of cassettes animates. My findings allow me to explain the entwinement of emotions with materiality, as well as the generative and structuring potentialities that this entwinement entails.

My first argument concerns the entwinement of materiality and emotionality. I observe in the findings that cassettes are inextricably entwined in the interpersonal relationships with family members, friends, local community members, as well as imagined relationships with a broader Kurdish community, and a resistive relationship with the state. Cassettes objectify these unifying as well as oppositional relationships through various practices, experiences and encounters, such as collective listening experiences with family and local community members, gifting to strangers - and resistive encounters with the state, in manners that are overt (such as playing loud music towards law enforcement) and evasive (as with hiding the cassettes, or enlisting the children to stand guard). Inspired by Ahmed (2004), I use the metaphor of "stickiness" to explain the association of the emotions that are

elicited during these materializing experience and encounters. This emotional "stickiness" of cassettes is evidenced by informants' emotionally charged narratives in relating their experiences with cassettes. Cassettes remain "sticky" to this day, through narratives that continue to circulate, as evidenced by emotions that continue to surface today while talking about these past events - even years after many cassettes have been thrown out, legal restrictions have been relaxed, and other technologies have replaced tape players.

My second major argument is that the emotional stickiness of materiality works to "stick" individuals, binding them together and also orienting them against others. The circulation of objects materializes communal bonds (Aronczyk and Craig 2012) and resistance by also enabling the circulation of emotions (Ahmed 2004) and generating an emotional structure that is both "structured" and "structuring" (Swartz 1997). The structured-ness is derived from and reinforced by repeated evocative experiences, encounters, and relationships that are common to people across regional, lingual, religious affiliations: emotions that are elicited while listening to music together, dealing with law enforcement (in actuality or the threat thereof), hearing stories, and through other experiences, become part of a shared repertoire - one that is evidenced by the similarity of stories told, as well as the commonality of vocabulary (Burkitt 2002) and metaphors (Kane 2001) that are used - such as graveyards, markings, and sacrifice - in describing experiences and encounters. The cassette is the object that brings these experiences to life and makes these shared repertoires of emotions possible - and thus it plays a vital role in socializing individuals into the "structure."

The “structuring” aspect of emotions, on the other hand, works both to align individuals into a collective body, and orients them against the state. This structuring-ness moreover entails a disposition towards performing certain practices - particularly resistive and rebellious ones - that ensure the continuation of circulation. People buying cassette recorders and making copies for friends and family even though they have limited resources, gifting cassettes - sometimes to strangers, selling without intending to make profits, hiding cassettes from law enforcement and disposing only as a last resort, and presenting a united front towards the law enforcement are some of the practices that are shaped by the emergent emotional habitus. In turn, these practices reinforce and strengthen this structure. These practices also allow new people to be socialized, and thus maintain the structure: children are introduced by participation in cassette-related experiences, gifts are given to those who had not been initiated before - thus the structure also disposes its constituents to habituate others.

Thus, the cassette transcends its mundanity, and emerges as an “object” that stimulates an emotional economy. While the entwinement of iconization and signification with materialization (Bartmanski and Woodward 2013; Beckstead et al.; Craig 2011; Douny 2011; Kravets and Örge 2011) has been documented, I provide an additional dimension to materiality. Examining the entwinement of materiality with emotions, and exploring the structuring potentiality of the materiality-emotionality nexus also allows us to see how seemingly individual or interpersonal experiences - such as listening to music, owning cassettes, gifting, selling, or dispossession may serve communal bonds by generating shared experiences and emotional orientations.

As I summarize in figure 1, a "feeling" of "being Kurdish" and of being resistive against the state, then, are experienced as emotional dispositions. In other words, the imagining of a community (Anderson 1983) comes from being habituated into and constituted by an emotional habitus. The emotional habitus is "sticky" and, as such, "sticks" the community: with the circulation of objects across time and space, and the intensification of objects' emotional saturation, the habitus also becomes stronger. The communal alignments that it structures become more solid, and the boundaries against the other more rigid.



Figure 1 - The Emotional Habitus

Previous research has acknowledged that "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977, 1979) and collective emotional dispositions (Gopaldas 2014) shape

consumption decisions and practices, and form the basis of consumption communities (Thompson 2005). In these studies, how such structures emerge and how individuals are socialized into shared dispositions is not explicit. I contribute by elucidating the linkages between evocative experiences - which involve the consumption, disposal, and various forms of exchange (including gifting and selling) of a material object - and the habituation of individuals into an emotional habitus. Whereas Thompson (2005) notes that ideology and politics are personally experienced as feelings, I show how the opposite also holds – that emotions orient individuals towards holding political and ideological stances, such as identifying as a member of an ethnic minority community and taking part in resistance. Hence, the structures generated by an emotional-material nexus can engender processes and movements of political import. By underscoring the entwinement of emotions and materiality in generating structures, I also extend Chronis et al. (2012) who note that emotions elicited during consumption experiences play a part in (re)producing collective imaginaries. The imagining of community, I show, entails the habituation into an emotional habitus, or structure. While consecrated landscapes (Chronis et al. 2012) and heritage exhibitions (Chronis 2006) may provide an avenue to become habituated, we show that a mundane object can also elicit emotionality and habituate.

Moreover, I contribute to our understanding of collective tactical resistance (De Certeau 1988; Scott 1990; see also Izberk-Bilgin 2010) by revealing its material-emotional underpinnings. We show how the hegemonic "other" that is resisted is also emotionally delineated, and that the nature of the relationship with this "other" also shapes an understanding of "us." In-group and out-group dynamics and relationships

are thus mutually and simultaneously objectified through an object category and related practices of circulation. The tense and violent relationship between the state and the Kurds shaped a Kurdish community that is resistive. The role of consumption in interpersonal, familial, and communal relationships is often depicted as bonding, and these relationships are often described as "loving" (e.g., Holttinen 2014; Miller 1998; Moisio et al. 2004). Yet, we see that oppositional, violent, and separatist relationships can simultaneously be materialized through the very same objects, and that these relationships can be fraught with fear, indignation, hatred, and other "negative" emotions. The cassette, while materializing "positive" bonds of love and kinship amongst members of the ethnic community, simultaneously materializes a resistive relationship based on anger, fear, and violence with the Turkish state. Thus, I note that consumption, markets, and material objects have the power to not only enliven bonds and objectify inclusive relationships, but also to materialize relationships that are divisive, exclusionary, oppositional, and conflicting.

CHAPTER 3:

THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL MARKET

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I move from the illegal circulation of cassettes to the emergence of a legal and formal market for Kurdish music. In chapter 2, I detailed how illegal circulation was influential in delineating a resistive "Kurdish" community (see also Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014). This delineation, I argued, worked not only to engender a sense of belonging and unity amongst individuals identifying as ethnic Kurds, but also to build resistive boundaries against the "Other:" the State, which is markedly Turkish. Thus, these practices of circulation were influential in cultivating a "collective identity" (Hunt and Benford 2004; Jenkins 2008; Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001) that is grounded not only in shared ethnic background, but also shaped by a emotional structure (Calhoun 2001; Kane 2001; Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014). This emotional structure and accompanying collective identity, in turn, were influential in the continuation of practices of circulation.

The practices of circulation that I detailed in chapter 2 took place in an illegal, informal, and grassroots manner, rather than organized by a social movement, a political organization, or a formal market. This circulation was effective, but also

dispersed and non-centralized. I acknowledged, but did not detail, that activists of the emergent Kurdish movement also took part in the circulation of cassettes, and saw music as a powerful way to ideologically educate, politicize, and mobilize the people. Concomitantly, I noted that illegal circulation also played a part in Kurds perceiving themselves as "marked" — in other words, stigmatized (Link and Phelan 2001) and dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) — by the forceful policies and agencies of the state. The emotional structure thus not only "structured" the imagination of community; it also served to politicize this community, and shaped a resistive collective identity. In this chapter, I show that the processes which generated a politicized collective identity and an emotional structure also had a "structuring" influence on formal market activities, following the legalization of the production and sale of Kurdish music.

The research questions for this chapter are thus as follows: **How does a market, whose producer and consumer constituency is subject to sociocultural and political dynamics of domination and stigmatization, emerge and evolve? How do market actors (in particular, producers) navigate this process?** In trying to respond to this inquiry, I re-visit the pre-legal circulation, but this time explicitly deal with how this circulation was fueled and appropriated by the Kurdish political movement, and how illegal circulation served as the backdrop for the formal market. I follow with the legalization of music production in 1991, which was a game-changer in many ways. While "off the books" circulation continued, a great deal of new music was recorded in studios; produced and distributed through music production companies in Unkapanı, Istanbul — the headquarters of music production in Turkey. The production of Kurdish music thus became centralized and formalized. As such, the emotional economy of music circulation encountered the dynamics of

the formal market. In this chapter, I seek out to understand how music production proceeded at the nexus of generative and resistive practices of music circulation; the logics and dynamics of a formal market; and the interceptions of the state.

The sticky and intense communal alignments, the imagining of a unified Kurdish community, and an accompanying resistive stance is one possible response to perceptions of being stigmatized and dominated. While the previous chapter was concerned with the grassroots processes of aligning with and identifying as part of an ethnic community, in this chapter, I also take into account how the Kurdish political movement interacts with music production and performance in cultivating a politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Rather than an object and emotion-centered view, however, I shift the focus to the rhetorical devices - frames - that operate at a more cognitive level: how experiences are processed and turned into motivation for market activities; participation in a political collective identity is elicited; and "consciousness" of being part of a political community is awakened, and how codes and frames from a social movement are appropriated. I detail how, accordingly, a politicized "market culture" (Abolafia 1998; Ho 2009; Penaloza 2000; Spillman 1999; Zelizer 2010) emerged and is framed by actors.

Market culture, as conceptualized by Spillman (1999), comprises three intertwined yet also distinct elements: the object of market exchange; a social imaginary of producers and consumers - i.e., the collectivity comprised by the parties to exchange; and the norms of exchange. In this chapter, by tracing the generation of normative structures through the frames (Goffman 1976) employed by market actors, I detail how a new market culture emerged. I find that this market culture was influenced by the neighboring Kurdish political movement, as well as shaped by

actors' "local" experiences (J.C. Scott 1998) in the marketplace, particularly in their dealings with the state.

A recent view in marketing literature has been to treat the emergence of a new market as a process of legitimation — wherein social entities (such as a market, its products, producers, and organizations) gain acceptance in accordance with entrenched normative, cultural, and legislative structures - that is, institutions (W.R. Scott 1995) - that preside in a society (Humphreys 2010a,b; Press and Arnould 2011). This view acknowledges that market actors - business owners, managers, and other stakeholders - navigate their social-political context, negotiate barriers, draw from supportive ideologies, and pave the way to legitimation (Humphreys 2010b; Karababa and Ger 2011). However, this relatively straightforward process of market formation does not take into account that different groups/ factions within a society may have different demands (Kraatz and Block 2008), identify with contrasting norms, values, and beliefs (Webb et al. 2009), and/or occupy a subordinate and disadvantaged, rather than mainstream, position (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 2013; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013) - and thus does not address how markets may exist and even thrive in contexts where they are not sanctified by the majority culture and/or regulative authorities.

Scholarship that links social movements to the process of market formation, on the other hand, suggests that actors who are positioned in less advantageous, or dominated positions may engage in collaborative (e.g., Lawrence et al. 2002; Lounsbury et al. 2003; Weber et al. 2008) or entrepreneurial (e.g., Maguire et al. 2004; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013) action that uncovers and exploits contrasts and tensions. Tensions and conflicts in a society may serve as stepping stones (Seo and Creed 2002) to mobilize action geared towards challenging the dominant order(s),

and creating space for new ventures. Actors (consumers as well as marketers) systematically and collectively negotiate with ideologies and institutions in generating seeking inclusion in - or forming alternative paths to - mainstream culture. "Framing" (Goffman 1976) constitutes an important discursive and practical move in social movements: actors diagnose and detect ways to respond to the tensions, contradictions, and restrictions in their environments (Benford and Snow 2000; Lounsbury et al. 2003). In markets that emerge through collective action / social movements, actors deploy framing to diagnose, prognose, and to enact business practices (Lounsbury et al. 2003). I also note that these frames, by becoming entrenched in a field of production, may evolve into proto-institutional logics (Lawrence et al. 2002) that shape practice and legitimate the activities of the market in the eyes of the audience.

Consumer research literature has also inquired into how consumers draw from and adapt oppositional political-normative (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004) or religious (Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) ideologies in reacting to their dominated status and resisting the institutional orders that marginalize them. This stream also helps us understand that multiple actors partake in creating and shaping resistive and moral subjectivities (Karababa and Ger 2011), parallel taste structures (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010), and countervailing markets (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007). Importantly, producers and consumers are aligned - both amongst themselves, and with each other. Consumer research on stigmatized, parallel, or counter-cultural communities places emphasis on community-building and meaning-making processes amongst consumers, while to some extent neglecting the role of producer-actors in collaboratively shaping market culture, and partaking in shared collective identity and shared (political) ideals.

I thus seek to understand how market actors - producers, in particular - shape an emergent market. I trace how actors generate, adapt, and articulate political-normative frames that become entrenched as "proto-institutional" logics (Lawrence et al. 2002) that shape the "norms" of production and exchange in a marketplace, influence the meanings and roles attributed to the object(s) of exchange; and construct a collective identity of producers. As such, I complement two streams of research: (1) The institutional/legitimation perspectives on market formation, which focus on the institutional (i.e., external) structures and thus inadequately address the (internal) issues of collective identity and culture in the marketplace; and which also do not account for stigma and domination as a source of institutional conflict. (2) Consumer research literature on oppositional/counter-cultural communities, which do not focus on the role of market producers in shaping collective identity, resistance, and normative-political activity.

Several other social movement researchers have commented on the place of music and other artistic production in social movements (e.g., Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Futrell et al 2006; Jasper 2011; Roy 2010). Yet, while these accounts are focused on the music and the emotions it generates during its performance, we know less about the way that these political musics are circulated and marketed - particularly when their production and circulation are legally precarious.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

3.2.1 Stigma, Domination, and Consumer Markets

Non-mainstream consumption practices, as well as communities that are formed around such practices have interested consumer researchers throughout the past two

decades. Some of these communities skirt the boundaries of what is accepted as "normal," "moral," or "legal" within the contexts their practitioners are embedded: biker communities that embrace an outlaw ethos (Schouten and McAlexander 1995), Star Trek fans who wear costumes (Kozinets 2001), rave-goers who also dabble in illegal drugs (Goulding et al. 2009); holistic-medicine (Thompson 2004; Thompson and Troester 2002) and natural-birthing adherents (Thompson 2005) are some examples. Research on consumer subcultures/ counter-cultures / microcultures / brand communities have drawn attention to the commercial/corporate co-optation and subsequent popularization of many such initially marginal, and sometimes deviant activities (see Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007 for a review).

However, as Sandikci and Ger (2010) as well as Thompson and Coskuner-Balli (2007) point out, co-optation and insertion into mainstream culture is not the only way in which non-mainstream practices and identities become part of market dynamics. Market actors - both producers and consumers - may forge communal relationships and volitionally engage in creating "countervailing" market systems that continually resist co-optation (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007). There are, moreover cases where a market and/or a consumption practice faces structural barriers towards becoming mainstream. When there is great ideological incompatibility between a minority/ oppositional community and mainstream culture, the inclusion or co-optation of this community into the mainstream culture might not be possible. With significant power difference, other dynamics - in particular, domination (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner and Thompson 2012) and stigmatization (Sandikci and Ger 2010) - may be at play.

Stigmatization, according to Link and Phelan (2001: 377), takes place "when elements of labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination occur together in a power situation that allows them." Volitional practices - such as "Trekkies" who are seen as immature or obsessive (Kozinets 2001), as well as organizations that are involved with deviant practices - such as mixed martial arts (mma) sports activities (Helms and Peterson 2014) may also be stigmatized. In several cases, however, where stigma accompanies a disadvantaged and "dominated" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) socioeconomic position, and/or differences in ethnic background, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and the such. Belonging to a stigmatized community, that is, may be "morally binding" (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 2013) rather than a leisure activity. While stigma that is of the first type (i.e., through more volitional and temporally bounded affiliations) may even be utilized by organizations as a point of advantage by targeting an audience who is appreciative of these stigmatized practices (Helms and Patterson 2014); it may not be possible to similarly manage the second and more permanent type of stigma that is related to a relationship of domination. Longstanding exclusion from mainstream institutions and violence (symbolic as well as physical) may color the experience of belonging to dominated and stigmatized groups.

Sources of stigma that consumer research scholars have studied include the racial (Crockett et al. 2003; Crockett and Wallendorf 2004) and religious (Sandikci and Ger 2010) backgrounds of consumers, their non-conformity to heteronormativity (Kates 2004, 2006) or traditional gender roles (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 2013), failure to meet hegemonic bodily ideals (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), and lack of access to cultural, social, and/or economic capital (Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner

and Thompson 2012). In many of these cases, stigma and domination translate as barriers for these groups in their pursuits of individual or collective identity projects in mainstream markets.

There are a number of ways in which stigmatized consumers (and collectivities) have engaged with the market in responding and reacting to their conditions and in challenging structural barriers, and I situate this research amongst those studies, even though I focus on producers rather than consumers. One way has been to seek recognition by and inclusion into mainstream culture. However, there are certain conditions in which acculturation fails. The female lower-class, rural migrants in Ustuner and Holt's (2007) study pursued a middle-class, Western-oriented (*Batici*) lifestyle by adopting appropriate consumption practices. These women, for the most part, did not find success in their pursuit of middle-class urban identities - the ideological disjuncture between their rural origins and the hegemonic Batıcı ideology was too deep. Young men of similarly poor-rural backgrounds, by working in the service sector, attain only a limited degree of success and recognition, and they are able to do so by partaking in status games whose rules are set by the dominant factions of society (Ustuner and Thompson 2012). More sucessful attempts have also been represented in the literature: The Fatshionistas in Scaraboto and Fischer's (2013) study seek inclusion into the field of fashion particularly through the efforts of "institutional entrepreneurs." A collective identity formed around shared frustrations and goals, appeals to and collaborations with more powerful field actors, and the deployment of institutional logics that will legitimate their collective cause, are some of the ways through which this stigmatized group has attained (albeit limited) inclusion in mainstream fashion.

Other stigmatized or marginal groups, on the other hand, have either chosen to or have been forced to take a more oppositional or reactionary stance against mainstream culture, and have cultivated parallel or alternative paths based on shared tastes and normative ideologies. The gay community, for instance, evaluates market offerings based on their fit with the community's shared values, beliefs, and ideals (Kates 2002, 2004), accepting certain brands as "legitimate" while rejecting others. In other words, an alternative (and non-mainstream) cultural and normative order guides consumption choices in this community.

Oppositional ideologies play an important role in shaping the way that (consumer) collectivities diagnose and address their situation. Crockett and Wallendorf (2004) discuss two strands of oppositional normative-political ideology that shape consumption decisions in the Black community - and, note in turn that consumption experiences serve to shape these ideologies - a similar argument is made by McAlexander et al (2014) in addressing the interplay between consumption and religious ideology. Izberk-Bilgin (2012) as well as Sandikci and Ger (2010) draw attention to two different roles of religious ideology in structuring consumption. Izberk-Bilgin (2012) focuses on religious ideology serving as a basis for rejecting brands and aspects of (Western) consumer culture while concomitantly embracing the market logic. The shantytown (i.e., "dominated") resident informants of Izberk-Bilgin's research, moreover, draw from religious ideology and the Islamist movement as resources that provide empowering narrative. Sandikci and Ger (2010) on the other hand, focus on religion informing the construction of a new middle class that comprises a parallel "taste structure." A range of consumption objects, spaces, and practices are influenced by this taste structure, which has gained more or less

equal footing with the (previously) hegemonic secular urban structure. This parallel structure, in time, becomes normalized and routinized to the extent that it starts to re-converge with mainstream culture - in the case of Islamic attire, for instance, "regular" shops in addition to those catering to covered women, have started to sell more conservative (e.g., long-sleeved) clothes.

Significant, as noted, in many of these studies is the existence or emergence of normative structures - ideologies and logics - that the stigmatized, marginalized, and dominated groups draw from in cultivating and articulating their reaction to their position. While they may draw from existent ideological structures - such as religion (Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010) - they importantly also adapt these structures to better serve their own oppositional or inclusion-seeking agendas. Black political ideologies (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004), human rights logics (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), and the norms of the gay subculture arose as a response to the marginalizing, conflict-ridden, and exclusionary institutional environment in which the community is embedded, and in turn become adapted into market cultures and relationships, shaping the way that these marginalized groups engaged with marketplace cultures. Relatedly, social movements - such as the Islamist movement (Izberk-Bilgin 2012; Sandikci and Ger 2010), the fat acceptance movement (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), the abolitionist movement (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004) address the disenfranchisement of, and serve as ideological resources for, these communities.

For instance, the "plus-sized" women in Scaraboto and Fischer's study draw from their experiences of disenfranchisement in the marketplace, and the logic of human rights from the fat acceptance movement, in justifying their demands from the

fashion industry to accommodate them with more choice in larger sizes. The authors argue that politicizing their demands using the “human rights” logic allows their appeal to exert more pressure on mainstream marketers. Research also indicates that in addition to ideology shaping consumption; consumption experiences and practices also shape ideology (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004; McAlexander et al. 2014). Crockett and Wallendorf (2004) note, also, that black consumers draw from their experiences in the marketplace in generating “ideological narratives” about inequality and in (re)establishing their relationships with others. McAlexander et al. (2014) argue that consumption behaviors help shape new “moral cognitions” and “ideologies” in the aftermath of “breaking” with a previously held ideological, or religious, conviction.

With most emphasis on how consumers "co-create" meanings and value, the role of producer-actors in a market - as fellow community members of consumers and thus embroiled in similar identity politics, and in particular the dynamics of stigmatization - in shaping a field has been largely neglected. The literature does indicate (e.g., Karababa and Ger 2011; Kates 2002; Sandikci and Ger 2010) that producers or marketers also play an integral part in making and circulating the materialities, in constructing the spaces, and orchestrating the practices that delineate communities and co-create (consumer) subjectivities. However, the cultivation of collective identity, the appropriation of ideologies, and the shaping of business practices amongst producers has largely been overlooked within this literature. Penaloza and Gilly (1999) have notably investigated how marketers “acculturate” and learn to cater to their non-mainstream (specifically, a migrant minority community) clientele - but their focus is on markets that are already in existence, and

where producers are members of the dominant culture. Addressing this important gap, I would like to elaborate on how producer-actors collaborate in the cultivation of a market and in uniting and structuring communities, of which they are also members. Penaloza and Venkatesh (2006) have called for the study of a "larger configuration of the market," as well as a conceptualization of consumers and marketers as "social beings inhabiting communities" (301). How, then, do producer-actors reconcile extant market dynamics with the normative structures and conflicts that shape the larger community in which they are embedded? How does a collective response to stigma and marginalization translate into the "culture" of a market (Spillman 1999)? These are the questions I will be dealing with in this chapter.

3.2.2 Market Culture and Collective Identity

The notion of markets as "culture"s recognizes that the market is a locus of repeated interactions and transactions, contingent upon interpersonal relationships, which lead to configuration of shared understandings and systems of meaning (Abolafia 1998; Spillman 1999; Zelizer 2010). Market culture, as such, is not fixed but is dynamic and contingent upon interactions and transactions amongst producers and consumers. Spillman (1999) relatedly treats the market as a "social imaginary" comprising a community of (potential) partners in exchange. Market "culture" is comprised of this social imaginary; the "object" of exchange (i.e., the commodity) and the rules of exchange (i.e., normative structures), all of which are socially constructed and institutionalized over time.

How, then does the stigmatization, domination, and/or marginalization of a community influence market culture? One response, as mentioned earlier, is a

resistant and oppositional stance, with ideological and emotional underpinnings (e.g., Kuruoglu and Ger 2014; Thompson 2005), in which producers as well as consumers take part (Karababa and Ger 2010; Sandikci and Ger 2010). Of particular interest in this study is the perception of stigma and domination in response to the regulations of the state. While the literature presents the state as an agency that confers or withholds "legitimacy" (Humphreys 2010a,b; Karababa and Ger 2011), the role of the state in shaping market culture is less understood. Literature on resistance and social movements provide further inspiration in understanding how actors generate "local," that is, market-level, response to the restrictions that are imposed by the state.

The state has been conceptualized as a bundle of practices, processes, and discourses (see e.g., Aretxaga 2003; Mitchell 1991), as employing prescriptive "strategies" (DeCerteau 1988) and manifesting as a "social subject" in everyday encounters with its constituents through its various administrative and regulative organizations. The state, Aretxaga (2003: 395) notes, does not exist independent of this "subjective" component, which also involves the "discourses, narratives, and fantasies generated around the ideas of the state." "Local" (i.e., civil) actors, in turn, are equipped with a different set of knowledge, skills, and tactics (see also J. Scott 1990, 1995) – for which James Scott (1998) has invoked the ancient Greek term of "metis" referring to cunning and intelligence. Particularly in the face of restrictive policies, this local knowledge is of political and reactionary nature – James Scott (1998) refers to it as "partisan knowledge" in the sense that its holders and practitioners typically have "a passionate interest in a particular outcome" (318).

As noted in chapter 2, tactical, everyday, and infrapolitical acts of resistance (De Certeau 1988; Scott 1990) often form the underpinning of larger-scale collective action - that is, social movements. Perceived stigma, injustices, and injuries are accordingly framed as "grievances" (Snow and Benford 1988, 2000) and, importantly, also form the basis for a politicized collective identity (Melucci 1995; Poletta and Jasper 2001; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Collective identity has been defined as "the cognitive, normative, and emotional connection experienced by members of a social group because of their perceived common status with other members of the social group" (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 111; see also Polletta and Jasper 2001). The generation of an emotional structure and communal imaginary through illegal circulation of cassettes, concomitantly served as infrastructure for an emergent political collective identity. I also inquire into how this type of knowledge influences the framings and practices of market actors. I show how the repertoire of experiences and encounters in the market - particularly those that involve the state, its regulative agencies, and its counter-framings of the Kurdish actors as terrorists/ criminals - are framed by actors as grievances, contributes to actors' understandings of themselves as stigmatized by and also positioned, collectively, against the state. Moreover, the PKK-line Kurdish movement, which itself engages in similar processes of framing and mobilization in response to the state, also serves as a "neighboring" ideological resource. As such, I show how presence of the restrictive state influences a politicized collective identity: market actors perceive of themselves as "activists" who need to stick together.

Understanding how market-level frames are generated, and how they shape a particular market culture requires a better understanding of how structural conditions

- particularly, tensions and conflicts - shape the emergence and establishment of markets. To this end, I will follow this section by linking stigma-domination and market formation through the perspective of institutional theory. Noting that institutional theory conceives of social movements and collective action as a way of addressing societal-level tensions, I will further explicate the employment of "framing," performed by a collectivity of actors, as a means of addressing tensions and shaping market culture.

3.2.3 Institutional Theory and Markets

Institutional theory offers perspectives on how new social ventures and entities - such as markets and organizations - emerge and become taken-for-granted. Institutional theory is based on the premise that social order is constructed through the "reciprocal typification of habitualized action by types of actors" (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 72) and the subsequent sharing and objectification of these typifications within a social group. W.R. Scott (1995: 33) provides the following definition for *institution*: "cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior." Institutions are created historically, through shared experiences, but are reified and experienced as objective reality. Thus, institutions seem firmly entrenched Lawrence and Phillips 2004) and are consistently reproduced (Rao and Giorgi 2006). Institutions as such are "structures" with which social entities - such as markets - are evaluated. A number of conceptual tools employed by institutional theory scholars help to understand how the emergence of a market is shaped by institutional structures. I briefly review these concepts, and point out how y they have influenced literature on markets and market formation.

Legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is one that has found some popularity in marketing and consumer research, and is referred to as the adherence of any social entity to widely shared values, beliefs, and understandings in a community. An early usage of the "legitimacy" concept in marketing literature was related to the widespread acceptance / rejection of certain market offerings and business models within communities, based on the fit of those market offerings to the community's shared values and beliefs. Kates (2004) studied the "legitimacy" of brands within the gay subculture-community, understanding how community members test and confer legitimate status to brands that they find fit with their shared values.

At the societal level, three types of legitimacy have been defined: Regulative legitimacy refers to whether an entity defers to authority of superior organizations, primarily governments, but also credentialing associations, professional bodies, or other, more powerful organizations. Normative legitimacy, on the other hand, is the type of legitimacy based on congruency with dominant norms and values of a group or society, rather than legality. Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is based on whether the entity (be it an institution, or a practice) can be understood, categorized, and framed by its relevant public (for a review of the types of legitimacy: W.R. Scott 1995; cf. Humphreys 2010a,b; Johnson et al 2006).

The creation of a market, or an industry has been described as "project" of attaining legitimacy and becoming "institutionalized," in all three of the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive senses (Humphreys 2010a). Press and Arnould (2011) have studied the role of prominent ideological narratives that circulate in society, that have helped to legitimate Community Supported Agriculture practices as a market form. I note, however, that the "market formation as legitimation"

viewpoint is limited in its capacity to explicate the emergence of markets: it presupposes a singular institutional environment - that is, a dominant arrangement of normative, cultural, and legislative structures - to which a market, as a social entity, needs to adhere. Many contexts, however, are characterized by multiple and conflicting institutions and institutional arrangements, as well as hierarchical relationships amongst different institutional arrangements. As in Kates (2002, 2004), non-mainstream communities may establish their own institutional arrangements. Moreover, the legitimation view presupposes that a market cannot exist without having attained at least a degree of acceptance in terms of all three types of legitimacy - but many informal (e.g., Lindeman 2012; Round et al. 2008; Webb et al. 2009) markets operate and thrive, throughout the world. Industries and organizations that do not conform to widely held normative structures nonetheless may appeal to audience constituencies (Helms and Patterson 2014).

Indeed, Kurdish music was widely circulated amongst a Kurdish constituency in Turkey, even before it was legal to do so. After legalization, the conflict and tensions amongst the Kurdish constituency and the state - particularly as enacted through conflict amongst the PKK and the military - did not subside, and also had an influence in how Kurdish music was perceived and framed in the "mainstream." Thus, to better understand how social entities, such as markets, emerge in conflicted environments, I continue by reviewing the notion of institutional complexity.

Institutional Complexity. Institutional theorists have drawn attention to the co-existence and interplay(s) of multiple institutions that govern and shape social entities (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This multiplicity, however, also generates tensions and conflicts: different groups in a society may prescribe to different values,

beliefs, and understandings (see e.g., Kraatz and Block 2008) - and thus, the tensions and contradictions that exist amongst different constituencies may also be conceptualized as tensions amongst institutions and institutional arrangements. Entities - individuals, communities, but also organizations and industries - may thus face contradictory prescriptions from different institutional structures (Greenwood et al. 2011; Pache and Santos 2010). Different organizations may respond to complexity in different ways - adhering to some institutions' prescriptions or combinations thereof, while ignoring others. This, in turn, accounts for diversity (Greenwood et al. 2011). Moreover, contradictions and tensions amongst competing institutions may also be exploited by actors and motivate collective or entrepreneurial action (Goodrick and Reay 2010). To better understand how institutions, in their multiplicity and tensions, operate within a market, it is useful to introduce the concepts of *field* and *logic*.

Organizational Field. Markets have been conceptualized as "organizational field"s (e.g., Fligstein 1996; Maguire et al. 2004; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013) that comprise multiple actors, organizations, and institutions. The notion of the "field," as it is used in institutional theory, draws from the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu defines a field as "a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97) in which actors compete to accumulate and monopolize capital (Swartz 1997). Ferguson (1998: 598) notes that a field " a field constructs a social universe in which all participants are at once producers and consumers caught in a complex web of social, political, economic, and cultural relations that they themselves have in part woven and continue to weave." Bourdieu and Wacquant note, "[t]hose who dominate in a given field are in a position to make

it function according to their advantage but they must always contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention, the "political" or otherwise, of the dominated" (102). Thus, the Bourdieusian field is a highly contentious one.

The field, from an institutional perspective, is a "local social order" (Fligstein 2001) where "organized groups of actors gather and frame their actions vis-a-vis one another" (Fligstein 2001: 108). Of interest to institutional scholars is how "particular features of the market and organizations come to acquire an 'objective,' natural and taken-for-granted character" (Fourcade 2007: 102), as well as how contradictions, tensions, and incompatibilities that affect the market may create opportunities towards transformation. Fields are structured by multiple, and potentially competing "institutional logics," which I define next.

Institutional Logics. Friedland and Alford (1991) have defined institutional logics as "supraorganizational patterns of human activity by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and organize time and space" (243). Society is conceived as an "interinstitutional system," and each institution that constitutes society has a central logic (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). This central "logic" is what gives substance and meaning to the institution (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013). Logics thus shape the actions of and relations among actors in accordance with purpose, values, beliefs (Friedland and Alford 1991; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Thornton and Ocasio 2008).

Logics that operate at a field, such as a market or an industry, are embedded in higher-order societal logics, such as professional and market logics (Thornton and Ocasio 1999; 2008). Logics not only shape action, but they also provide legitimacy

and order to the field (Thornton and Ocasio 2008) - thus organizations often try to comply with dominant logic(s) in a field in order to attain legitimacy in the eyes of relevant audiences (Greenwood et al. 2011). The notion of logic thus provides a linkage between macro-structural processes and field-level processes.

From the institutional perspective, fields comprise multiple institutions and thus are governed by multiple institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991). The logics that operate at any given context may complement or contradict each other (Greenwood et al 2011). Institutional logics may compete for dominance and also account for segmentation and heterogeneity (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005) within a field. It has been argued that artistic fields - including fields of musical production - are structured by two competing logics: the logic of art and the logic of commerce (Bourdieu 1996; Caves 2000; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). As this line of thinking goes, the logic of art may be dominant for a particular sub-field or genre of music, whereas the logic of commerce may be dominant for another. The evolution of a field may involve a shift from one dominant logic to another (e.g., Glynn and Lounsbury 2005 for the shift from artistic toward commercial logics in the field of symphony orchestra performance), another possibility is the emergence and institutionalization of a new normative order. As noted by Thornton and Ocasio (2008: 111), "as collective identities become institutionalized, they develop their own distinct institutional logic, and these logics prevail within the social group." Then, the collaborative acts and formation of collective identity involved in the emergence of a new market may also involve the shaping of a new and distinct logic.

Thornton and Ocasio (2008) warn against incorrect usages of the term "institutional logic," emphasizing that logics do not emerge from within fields, but are localized and instantiated in markets and organizations. Lounsbury et al. (2003), also cognizant that logics are "exogenous," have developed the intermediary notion of "field frames" to account for the ordering devices that emerge from within a field and challenge the dominant institutional logics that govern that field. Yet, whether frames may evolve into logics - that is, become entrenched and in a way externalized - is unclear. The oppositional meanings that inform field-level frames, I argue, can become institutionalized to the extent that they are "proto-institutional" (Lawrence et al. 2002) logics. To better understand how institutional - particularly state - hegemonies are challenged, and proto-institutional logics emerge, I turn to literature that investigates how social movements employ frames (of grievance and action) to instigate change in markets and other organizational fields.

3.2.4 Social Movements, Market Formation, and Field-Level Frames

Contention, as King and Pearce (2009: 251) note, "is a source of market dynamism, both by encouraging innovation and by transforming what is seen as acceptable market practice." Market actors, by diagnosing, exploiting, and acting upon sources of contention in the institutional environment, may create projects that transform or replace institutions, or create new institutions altogether (see also Bartley 2007). The social movement perspective has been useful in explicating the collaborative acts within a field that instigate various types of market change (e.g., Weber et al. 2008), and also, in explaining how movements that arose outside of the market have given

rise to new markets, industries, or sectors (e.g., Sine and Lee 2009; Weber et al. 2008).

Theorists studying the emergence of new markets refer to the challenge of mobilizing the requisite economic, cultural, and socio-political resources - needed, in particular, to carve out space for new ventures "at best in an institutional vacuum of institutional munificence and, at worst, in a hostile environment impervious to individual action" (Aldrich and Fiol 1994: 645). Collective efforts, which resemble or constitute social movements may be necessary to generate the necessary action and mobilize resources (Fligstein 1996). Collective action, as noted earlier, may address dissatisfaction that arises through tensions in the institutional environment. Scholars have drawn attention to movements and collective action that arise "within" the market: Such collective action has been documented to transform institutions, giving way to creating new markets and organizational forms (e.g., Lounsbury et al. 2003). Collective action may also address unsatisfied demands and generate new "logics" and markets that are structured by alternative beliefs and practices, without necessarily challenging the workings of the mainstream market - as with the emergence of a movement for grass-fed meat in the USA and the market segment that has emerged concomitantly with this movement. It has also been documented that movements external to the market (i.e., movements that did not "originate" from the market/ amongst market actors) may also generate their own organizational fields. Social movements, by constructing new cognitive, legislative, and normative structures, prepare a structural framework for market actors to engage in the creation of a market sector, as with the relationship between the environmental movement and the wind energy sector (Sine and Lee 2009). Movements mobilize resources

(including people) and ideologies in order to receive the support that is necessary to legitimate an emerging market (King and Pearce 2010; Swaminathan and Wade 2001; Weber et al. 2008). In turn, companies enact the role of "social movement organizations," working to create opportunities and facilitate cultural transformations in addition to economic outcomes (Earl 2004).

The literature, while exemplifying different cases in which one type of collective action takes place, does not explore the dynamics in which both types of collective action take place simultaneously. As with the simultaneity of infrapolitics and organized resistance (Scott 1990), market-based movements may also have a co-constitutive relationship with social movements that originated outside of the market. Research linking market formation and collective action, moreover, does not engage with linkages amongst markets and social movements that contest the state and government policies. Weber and colleagues (2008: 562) suggest that "challenges for movements and the tactics through which they effect change in markets are different than those that influence government policies." Yet, action and activism with and through the market is one way to demand change in policies and to enact resistance. I thus try to contribute to literature on social movements and resistance by depicting the market actors generating collective action through (a) framing their own experiences and thus enacting a market-level movement and (b) borrowing and adapting codes, frames, as well as resources from the neighboring political movement, in order to attain common goals.

Two aspects of social movements that are of particular importance for this study are collective identity and frames. Movements not only draw from, but also cultivate, collective identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001). At the level of the market, the

collective identity forged amongst producers (Weber 2008), amongst consumers (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), as well as the sense of communality amongst the two groups (Karababa and Ger 2011; Penaloza and Venkatesh 2006) are of interest. Importantly, cultivating a collective identity involves not only an internal cohesiveness, but, as mentioned earlier, also entails the generation of boundaries contra the "other"s. Weber et al. (2008) also draw attention to the role of collective identity in creating a "common language" and knowledge within an industry. The emergence of a collective identity, grounded, in part, in shared experiences of cassette circulation and the emotional structure that this circulation generated, was the topic of chapter 2. I explicate the role of the Kurdish political movement in (re)producing a collective identity in this chapter: yet, I note, the collective producer identity within the music market is shaped by not only the Kurdish movement, but also by producer-actors' own experiences in cassette circulation and later by their involvement in the formal market.

Scholars of social movements have also drawn from Goffman's notion of "frames" - schemata that identify, interpret, and label occurrences, rendering experiences meaningful, and guiding action (Benford and Snow 2000). Movement actors engage in framing in order to diagnose grievances, propose paths to solution, and mobilize collective action (Benford and Snow 2000). Lounsbury et al. (2003) discuss how "field-level frames" are employed by organizational actors in processes that involve political struggles for institutional transformation. They define field frames as "political constructions that provide order and meaning to fields of activity by creating a status ordering for practices that deem some practices as more appropriate than others" (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 76). While "institutional logics,"

they argue, are external to a field, and embedded in societal-level institutions; frames are co-created by the various actors that comprise the field. Field frames are sticky and durable - in this sense, akin to logics - but also malleable and subject to change through direct or indirect political action. Weber et al. (2008) also refer to "codes" of movements, which serve a similar purpose to field-frames: central ideals, values, and action frames that constitute the social movement are translated into business practices and market relationships. A market-based movement's codes shape processes of production and innovation, and also serve to both unify the "collective" of producers, and delineate the boundaries of the field/sector. Social movements thus have an impact on organizational fields by challenging and de-institutionalizing previously dominant frames or logics, and thereby influencing which field-level practices are deemed more appropriate and others by market actors (Lounsbury et al. 2003).

I suggest that field-level frames, in their durability, may become entrenched, and thus come to establish a normative order within the field. Another useful intermediary concept to explain the entrenchment of field-level frames is the "proto-institution." Coined by Lawrence et al. (2002), this term refers to new practices, technologies, and rules that are produced and diffused through collaborations, and which have the potential to become institutionalized. Bridging this notion with literature on social-movements geared towards institutional change, I suggest that the field-frames, by being persistently applied (and also re-arranged throughout time) become entrenched as proto-institutions that govern the field. They thus form the basis for an emergent institutional logic. Thus, in a sense, these frames constitute the

central logic of this proto-institution. I will refer to this logic throughout the dissertation as a "proto-institutional logic".

In this chapter, I show how the repertoire of experiences and encounters in the market - particularly those that involve the state, its regulative agencies, and its counter-framings of the Kurdish actors as terrorists/criminals - are framed by actors as grievances, contributes to actors' understandings of themselves as stigmatized by and also positioned against the state. As such, the activities of the restrictive state influences a collective identity: market actors perceive of themselves as "activists" who need to stick together.

3.3 Findings: The Emergence of the (Legal) Market

In the findings I present in this chapter, I start by filling in some of the details that I consciously left out in the previous chapter: how illegal circulation was utilized by the pro-Kurdish (mostly PKK-line) movement, leading up to production of music within the legal music market. The frames that emerged during this period were also adapted during the post-legal period: it is thus possible to talk about the beginning of an emergence of a proto-institutional logic (Lawrence et al. 2002) before the market became legalized and formalized. Thus, I note that the illegal circulation practices and experiences that shaped an emotional structure, detailed in the first section of the dissertation, contributed to the forming of a shared repertoire of political-normative frames.

In this chapter, I try to illustrate how a political-normative proto-institutional logic emerged, in concert with a politicized collective (producer and consumer) identity. Relatedly, this proto-institutional logic also influenced the ways both

business decisions were made and artistic choices were performed. This emergent logic served as both a unifying and a stratifying device in the Kurdish music market in the 1990s and 2000s. This logic comprised meanings, values and orientations that started to take place in the pre-legal era, and evolved with the market actors' experiences, through framings of their grievous experiences with the state. Frames were also drawn and adapted from the "neighboring" grievance and action frames that were espoused by the pro-Kurdish (post-1980 PKK-led) political movement. As they were employed throughout the decade, these frames became entrenched and thus evolved into a political-normative proto-institutional logic. This proto-institutional logic also provided ways to negotiate the tension of commerce and artistry/aesthetics that typically characterizes a music market. An "alternative" normative market order thus emerged.

To illustrate the emergence and evolution of field-level frames, I have organized my analysis into three periods. In this chapter, I will present findings from the first two periods: the pre-market (illegal) exchange (which addresses some issues that were not addressed in chapter 2, on the illegal circulation of cassettes) and the initial period following legalization (1991-early 2000s). The period after the early 2000s until today will be covered in chapter 4.

A roadmap of this chapter is as follows: In first section of this chapter, I detect the three frames that emerged during the period of illegal circulation: "Raising consciousness through music and circulation;" "Grievances through encounters with the state;" "Illegal circulation as a lineage for the formal market." A transitory frame is the "market actors as activists" frame, in which certain producers and performers are framed as having pushed for legalization - thereby legalization is cast as a right

that is *won* by the Kurds rather than *granted* by the state in the collective memory. The "consciousness" and "grievances" and "activist" frames are re-visited and re-articulated in narratives on the the formal period, where legal production is possible but still restricted, and a "war" is taking place amongst the PKK and the Turkish military. A fifth frame concerns the collective identity of producers as "yurtsever" (Kurdish-patriot) and "örgütlü," (member of a political movement/ organization). This is related to the "activist" frame, but is also relevant to generating and maintaining moral boundaries (Lamont 1992) against actors that are perceived as "outside" this collective identity. With these first five frames, I detail the way in which market actors diagnosed, addressed, and negotiated with societal-level tensions: the social-political dynamics which marginalize and stigmatize the Kurdish constituency, and relatedly, which do not grant the Kurdish music scene equal recognition and representation by legal, cultural, and normative orders. In the final section, in which "making good music" and "sales success" are also framed as service to the Kurdish people, I discuss how the proto-institutional logic is employed in negotiating the tension between the logics of arts and commerce: neither logic is foregone, completely, but are negotiated, re-interpreted and re-framed in a way that commercial and artistic concerns become entwined with political norms.

3.3.1 The Pre-Legal Era (1970s until 1991)

3.3.1.1 Frame 1: Raising "Consciousness" through Music and Circulation

The illegal circulation of cassettes involved some transactions in which money changed hands, but relied heavily on practices of gifting. As detailed in chapter 2, circulation was embedded in and also helped generate an emotional habitus, which served the imagination of a unified and resistive Kurdish community. These grassroots efforts were relatively de-centralized, but also formed the precursor and motivation for more organized and politically-motivated circulation. The Kurdish movement - - which was more fragmented in the 1970s, and more or less unified around the PKK after the 1980 coup - was also involved in the circulation of music, as a means for attracting and mobilizing individuals, for "teaching" ideology, and for generating emotionally charged political alliances.

Many of my informants were aware of, and drew attention to, the strong association between music acting as a vessel – and thus, its being instrumentalized by the Kurdish movement, in order to generate a feeling of belonging to the Kurdish community. Several informants referred to music serving as a conduit towards attaining a "national consciousness" (*ulus bilinci*). They were aware, moreover, that this linkage between nationalistic sentiments and music was by no means discovered by the Kurdish movement – noting that other communities and nations around the world also utilized music and other performance arts, to engender communal togetherness and to relay nationalistic propaganda. Many informants nonetheless believed that the Kurdish case was somewhat exceptional, arguing that Kurds had long relied on musical oral traditions to articulate and transmit language, history and cultural repertoires. An exemplary quote from my interview with Dicle and Melda, illustrates this understanding:

> D: … more than anything, any book or any printed product, music has a very important place in terms of nationalism, in terms of being the language of a political movement. … practically every important event has its song in this modern era, for example Mazlum Doğan[2], or others who have become heroes in the Kurdish movement, the revolutionary martyrs and so on. If it were the Basques, maybe they would have written poetry, or the Russians would have written a novel. Our people make songs. … so music became the most important vehicle in the process of becoming a nation. It is very important in creating a shared culture, a shared feeling, a shared perspective.

Even before cassette circulation, and during a period in which Kurdish music was absent from the Turkish radio-waves, a "resource" for Kurdish language and music - and thus for "awakening" the national consciousness, was Radio Yerevan (Erivan Radyosu, as it is referred to in Turkish). Broadcasting daily Kurdish music programs since the mid-1950s (Scalbert-Yucel 2012), their programs could be followed by employing various trickeries with radio antennae. There is a mythic quality that seeps into informants' accounts on Radio Yerevan. Many people use laudatory terms in discussing the broadcasts – how it provided one of the vital means of "preserving" and playing "authentic" Kurdish music. Several informants have noted that these radio broadcasts influenced performers of Kurdish music in Turkey. During this time when there were few other sources through which they could listen to music, people would await the Kurdish music programs on Radio Yerevan with great excitement. They would meticulously arrange their radio antennae to be able to receive the signal, sometimes going up the roof to find the best spot. While conducting interviews, it struck me that some of my informants had never actually listened to these broadcasts as they were aired on radio - some where too young to

[2] Founding member of the PKK who died as a result of self-immolation while a prisoner at Diyarbakır Prison following the 1980 military coup.

have done so, and some lived in regions where the broadcast could not be heard. But regardless, they were transmitting stories they had been told by their parents, friends, and relatives. These "shared memories" (whether actually experienced or not) had an immense emotional influence on many Kurds' understandings of their "musical heritage." (Less discussed, though still noted, are broadcasts on Radio Baghdad.) Thus, the Kurdish movement, in trying to shape a politicized collective identity, used references to singers and songs heard through these informal channels.

After the 1960 military coup, a new constitution was drawn up, and, according to informants, this constitution left some gray areas with respect to the production, the import, and exchange of Kurdish music. Taking advantage of these gray areas, Kurdish 45 and 78 RPMs were recorded and sold in the legal marketplace (Yektan Turkyilmaz, personal communication), and continued to be sold in the 1970s, despite a constitutional ban (instated in 1967) that was, in all possibility, only selectively enforced. In the narratives that describe the decades leading up to the 1980 coup, despite periods of relative "relaxation," the state lurks in informants' accounts as a restrictive and oppressive shadow. Even if it was not strictly illegal, listening to the Yerevan Radio is still framed as a resistive act - the use of Kurdish language was, if not constitutionally banned, still frowned upon and various policies were implemented to homogenize and "Turkish-ify" the young Republic (see e.g., Yıldız 2001). The State radio was involved in curating and modernizing (i.e., polyphonizing and transposing) music from different locales. Several songs that were originally sung in non-Turkish languages (such as Kurdish, Lazuri, Homshetsi, Georgian, etc.) were re-arranged with Turkish lyrics (see e.g., Hasgül 1996). While some Kurdish performers found fame through performing music with Turkish lyrics,

others did not become part of the "Turkish folk music" scene, or performed in both Turkish and Kurdish. Some performers travelled to Yerevan or Baghdad due to the lack of performance opportunities within Turkey. The artists who performed in Kurdish often did not gain broad public popularity in the Turkish market – moreover, a few artists who sung in both languages, and who had some visibility in the Turkish public, are often framed as having been wrongfully persecuted and stigmatized due to their singing in Kurdish. One such example is Ayşe (sometimes referred to as Eyşe) Şan, who, it is emphasized, lived a life of poverty and difficulty, at times leaving Turkey to live in other countries (including Germany and Iraq) as a consequence of performing Kurdish music (and recording albums) throughout the 1960s and 70s[3].

Nonetheless, the influence of these early broadcasts and recordings is framed as forming an "initiation" into a "Kurdish consciousness." Music thus serves to initiate and habitutate individuals into the shared emotional structure/ habitus (Kane 2001; Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014) that is constitutive of collective identity, as is evidenced through accounts of several actors in the music market. This quote from a published interview with Hozan Kawa is exemplary:

> In the area I was born and raised, all young people wanted to sing *arabesk* and they wanted to sing in Turkish. I was one of those. (...) My mother had great influence in my shift to Kurdish music. My mother practically forbade Turkish music to me, and was piling Kurdish cassettes in front of me, wanting me to listen to them. This is how I started to listen to the *dengbej*, such as Meryem Xan, Ayşe Şan, and Şakiro. Moreover, the *dengbej* tradition was very common and influential in our region. And it had its effect on Kurdish youth. Even though *arabesk* was a serious center of attraction, on the other hand, the *dengbej* were like the protective shield. Apart from this, my

[3] http://www.cafrande.org/?p=316

> mother would also systematically make me listen to Radio Yerevan which had a daily broadcast [of Kurdish music] for an hour or two. Listening to Kurdish music on Yerevan Radio really deeply affected me. We were born into a world in which the concepts of Kurdishness and Kurdistan were denied. These affected me deeply. … I wish my mother were alive today and could see that I made it here, that I am able to serve our people with my music, my art. (Online interview, no author[4])

In Hozan Kawa's narrative, particularly noteworthy is his drawing attention to the absence of the possibility to explicitly verbalize the "concept of Kurdishness and Kurdistan." In this absence, the music serves as the unifying link. The music emotionally and symbolically connotes "Kurdishness" and "Kurdistan" by virtue of its being sung in Kurdish and its connecting the audiences to the oral heritage. Many market actors - performers, producers, sound engineers alike - see themselves as following in the footsteps of these performers and broadcasters and as thus taking a more pro-active role in circulating the music - a theme that also relates to the frames of "market actors as activists" and "illegal circulation as lineage for the legal market." As such, the market actors see themselves as playing a part in unifying the Kurds around a "national consciousness."

Starting in the 1970s, with the heating political atmosphere, cassette vendors circulated recordings of music as well as political speeches. The numerous Kurdish political organizations housed their own music groups as well. Zeynel, a specialist in Kurdish linguistics, director of a cultural center, and also a former musician, notes that several music groups and artists were part of illegal Kurdish political organizations in the 1970s – moreover, their music was immensely popular, played

[4] http://biyografi.kurtcebilgi.com/kurt-sanatcilar-biyografisi/hozan-kawa/

on celebratory occasions such as weddings, in addition to being circulated covertly. Zeynel recounts;

> After the 70s, more or less all of the Kurdish illegal political parties featured [their own] illegal music groups, and these music groups conveyed the ideologies, strategies, style of struggle, worldview etcetera [of those organizations] through songs. Music was used as a means of propaganda. (…) until 1980, all the weddings would feature those groups affiliated with the political organizations, they all played political songs, revolutionary songs, propagandistic songs. And we grew up with those songs.

The recordings of these groups were circulated, and live performances took place, behind closed doors. The singer Ali Baran, during a concert in March 2012, recounted giving concerts in the 1970s in tiny rooms. Despite the risk of police raids, these concerts were very well-attended - Ali Baran jokingly lamented that he was no longer able to gather such large audiences for his concerts. Another informant, Sırrı, the owner of a shop selling Kurdish books and music, who was involved with the Kurdish political movements in the 1970s, recalled how he and his friends would gather at homes, often waiting until dark and not going in all at once but parsing their entries so as not to draw attention – and listen to music and sing together during this period. A cassette made of their singing one evening – one that was not made for circulation but rather for the benefit of the recorder's memory – recently made its way back into Sırrı's hands at the time of our interview. Sırrı was extremely moved when he received this cassette, and he recounted it to me with a smile on his face. These "revolutionary musics" of the 70s was directly associated with the burgeoning (yet still fragmented) Kurdish movement, and memories of political gatherings from that period - such as the ones recalled by singer Ali Baran and bookshop owner Sırrı, are colored with the threat of police intervention.

This covert music scene, as well as the circulation of records on the formal market came to an abrupt halt with the 1980 coup. Zeynel noted that in the period following the coup, even instrumental music with Kurdish overtones was prohibited. The Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter, according to his own account that was recounted to me by numerous informants, was once taken under custody for whistling a Kurdish tune. I lost count of the times I heard the catchphrase "It was forbidden to even *whistle* in Kurdish" (*Kürtçe ıslık çalmak bile yasaktı*). The *dengbej* were unable to travel, many musician/activists were jailed, several others fled the country before or during the period of military rule. Thus, a moratorium was effectively placed on all Kurdish cultural production and performance.

Despite the visible silence following the coup, many accounts - as explained in the chapter 2 - indicate that the recordings made and reproduced during the 1970s continued to be circulated widely in the 1980s. Moreover, artists who were in exile continued to record professionally and prolifically abroad. Şivan Perwer, based in Germany at the time, produced a number of albums, which would find their way into Turkey. The way that most people describe their attaining these cassettes connotes a claim to agency: these cassettes were not merely "brought" to them by smugglers, friends, or family members. They were "asked" to be brought to the Kurds in Turkey. Fehim, an academic in his early 30s, described his father as always "ordering" these cassettes from relatives who worked abroad – the verb he uses, "*getirtmek,*" places the agency on the one who does asks for the cassettes: the father was responsible for the bringing of the cassettes. Mehmet, the producer introduced in the previous chapter, who listened to Perwer's *Halepçe* album with his friends, talks about how they procured and "got their hands on" the cassettes (the verbs he used were

edinmek, *elimize geçirmek*). The sense I often got – supported by the selection of words, demeanor, facial expression – during interviews was that many Kurds, while they immensely enjoyed listening to this music, they additionally received pleasure and satisfaction of opposing the law and also of fulfilling patriotic duty by listening to these cassettes. In other words, "ordering," listening to, and enjoying these cassettes was a way of embodying and enacting a moral and political stance.

A significant development in the mid-1980s was the re-surfacing of the Kurdish movement – this time, subsumed more or less under one organization, the PKK. The PKK, active since the late 1970s, covertly organized and gained broader support during the military coup. The first attack on a military outpost took place in 1984 (Icduygu et al. 1999), and the organization became more visible throughout the 1980s. The PKK and its leaders were well aware of the important role of music in fostering belonging to an ethnic community/ "nation", and mobilizing supporters to the movement. Abdullah Öcalan, the now imprisoned leader of PKK, is reported to have said "We have built our revolution upon the [music] of Aram Tigran" (Xelil 2012[5]) – referring to the Armenian singer and songwriter whose family had migrated from Diyarbakır (a city that was once home to a large Armenian population), who performed Kurdish folk songs as well as his own compositions of Kurdish poetry, notably of Cegerxwin, a Kurdish nationalist poet who lived between 1903-1984.

While Tigran's music, or the music of many other folk singers / dengbej were generally not overtly political, or propagandistic, there were other groups whose music was precisely that: A new music group, Koma Berxwedan, was established in Europe in the mid-1980s. This group was formed by an artist's collective

[5] http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/index.php?rupel=nuce&id=15943

(Hunerkom) based in Germany, in the tradition of the 1970s' political, revolutionary music groups, as part of an effort to mobilize Kurds into supporting the movement, and to convey the movement's ideologies in an accessible manner. Koma Berxwedan came to be associated with a distinctive musical genre, referred to by my informants as well as in print articles by [former] members of the group as "agitative:" a term used by left-wing activists with respect to protest songs that were specifically designed to elicit feelings of anger, and hope for the future – a rosy future that was pictured as occurring following "the uprising" (in Kurdish, serhildan). One of its founders, Xemgin Birhat, described the group and it purpose in a published interview as follows:

> When the fight for freedom started emerging in the 1980s, the [technologies] for mass communication were not yet very advanced. The publications prepared by the movement for freedom [PKK] also could not be distributed to the public in a speedy manner. When you also consider the problem of [il]literacy with our people, I think you can better understand Koma Berxwedan's role in this struggle for freedom. The music of Koma Berxwedan has been a most efficient tool in spreading the newly developing ideology of freedom to the people. For instance, in that period, the standard style [of music] of agitation and propaganda were practically conceived by Koma Berxwedan. This triggered, among the people, the feelings of owning up to one's language, culture, and identity. In short, Koma Berxwedan played a large role in both conveying the politics of the freedom struggle to the people, and also to transfer the values that this struggle created, in an artistic language, back to the people. In this sense, it has been a source of *morale* support for the struggle and for the Kurdish people. (Interview published in the newspaper Yeni Özgür Politika, 2008[6])
>
> The Turkish word Birhat uses – "moral," does not translate to morality in English, but rather refers to an uplifted emotional state that involve hopes and beliefs that the movement will be victorious. With such phrasing, and with the rest of this

[6] http://lolane.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/sarkilarla-ozgurluk-atesine-davet/, accessed Dec 9 2014.

quote, it is possible to see how emotionality forms a foundation for involvement with the movement and the embodiment of a political-normative orientation: the anger against the state (agitation) and the feelings of owning up to one's language, culture, and identity. In the previous chapter, I discussed how this "feeling" was cultivated and shared, as an emotional disposition, that was shaped in part through the circulation of cassettes. The Kurdish movement organizations - especially the PKK - also employed music in a more instrumental manner to trigger and accelerate the cultivation of such feelings - and, importantly, to "move" the feelings along the direction that aligns with the political agenda of the movement. Groups such as Koma Berxwedan, comprised of individuals who also self-identified as activists, were instrumental in these efforts.

The activism of these pro-movement groups and singers, in this period, served to unify people around a politicized collective identity: Kurdishness, in activists' imagination, entailed not only a shared ethnicity, but also a subscription to a particular political ideology. The music and lyrics were thus a means to both shape and convey an emergent ideology to the people, and thus served to awaken nationalistic feelings/ cognitions of a particular kind, as is evidenced further in Birhat's quote:

> Throughout history, the Kurds have become acquainted with a number of ideologies. The most important among these is the PKK ideology, which has promised freedom and liberation to the Kurds. In these recent years, this musical style … has taken on the duty of carrying the ideology and propaganda of a political party, an organization. These political and agitative songs have been received with [fondness] among the Kurds. Because the ideological statements that were articulated [in the songs] were not divorced from the societal [needs] of the Kurds. So in this way, it has been easy to influence people by these ideological statements, and to motivate them to

> resist the existing system. The most important aspect of these songs is that they [contain] the "we" form. The [purpose] for this is to [make] the public identify with the contents of the song. The content of the songs, in general, is that the party [*PKK*] is, with no reservations, the guarantor of the struggle. [With these songs] a call is made to individuals, to unify around the party, to fight for the righteous cause.

As Birhat notes, the lyrics were written in a manner that they believed would reflect and serve a political cause: to transfer certain "values," such as freedom, and nationalistic ideals, by encoding them in emotionally charged lyrics, to "the people," some of whom are illiterate and thus can be reached only through song or speech, rather than through written text. Thus, the aim was to generate a "collective effervescence" (Durkheim 2001[1912]) around the "party"s ideologies and actions - in other words, by emotionally generating a collective subscription to the pro-PKK ideology. "The people," as a community, is imagined and constructed in part through these musical efforts.

Listening to Koma Berxwedan and other Kurdish singers during the 1980s was thus a means to become educated about about an ideal of "Kurdishness" as inextricably related to resistance. One of my informants, Metin, a performer and sound engineer, talks about how he perceived of listening to Kurdish music under legal restrictions was influential in shaping understandings of Kurdish "consciousness", and also convinced new generations of artists to become involved:

> People who were forbidden from speaking Kurdish with each other, people who were pressured, when the time came, they started to listen to Kurdish albums, they started hearing [music] from Europe, from Iraq, from Yerevan. Yes, they said, Kurdish music is made, and they liked it, and they started thinking, we can do this too. I mean, if you clog all vital arteries, but if there is flow through only one channel, then people want to pursue that. So the way to [get in touch with] Kurdish identity was through making Kurdish music. ...

> Because the language was so quick to spread, and quick to reach the ear, this was one of the methods used, and people started gaining a consciousness in this matter. It wasn't just about political messages, in the music of Hunerkom and Koma Berxwedan, the people who were making music in Europe at the time, they were also talking about the villages, the people's lives, about love. But this gradually brought about such a consciousness, that if you talk about love in Kurdish, it gains a political meaning. (Metin, performer and sound engineer)

Articulations of the Kurdish movement's (i.e., the PKK's) normative and political ideology can be found in Koma Berxwedan's music, as well as in the music of the groups that followed. While a thorough analysis of lyrics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a few examples are useful: the more abstract concepts of "freedom" –*Azadiya*, "rebellion" – *Berxwedan* and *Serhildan*, - and "homeland" - *Welat* and *Kurdistan*; the notion of martyrdom (*Şehid* - invoking fallen rebels and guerilla); as well as more concrete descriptions of mountainous landscapes, and invocations of culturally / historically significant days and events, such as *Newroz*, are some of the emotionally and symbolically charged themes that circulated through the music.

While Birhat claims that these notions and ideas are "grounded" in the traditional values of Kurdish society, analyses of the (changing) ideological frames espoused by the Kurdish movement (e.g., Güneş 2012; Romano 2006) suggest that the PKK had a more transformative agenda, grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology in the 1980s, with a shift of emphasis towards liberation and "radical democracy" in the 1990s, which problematized not only the repression of the Turkish state but also aimed at liberating the Kurds from feudal oppression. The Newroz myth, for instance, served as a symbolic resource for the movement and pro-movement

musical productions, in their collaborative efforts to construct a counter-hegemonic (with respect to both the Turkish state and the feudal relations) "national" identity (see also Aydın 2005). Importantly, this early era of agitative music would continue to influence the music produced in the legal market: performers and songwriters were encouraged, by audience and movement activists alike, to produce songs that invoked these themes of Kurdish resistance and patriotism in the 1990s. Many performers saw groups like Koma Berxwedan as their forebearers. They thus partook in a similar act of communal imagination and ideological outreach. This effort and political position, in turn, informed a collective identity amongst producers in the marketplace in the 1990s.

Around the same period that Koma Berxwedan was performing pro-movement songs, Şivan Perwer was "raising consciousness" in a somewhat different manner. Perwer was not particularly pro-PKK. In various published interviews (e.g., Kevirbiri 2003), he argues that he is not affiliated with any Kurdish organization. Indeed, in his songs, he has been critical of the disagreement amongst pro-Kurdish actors. Most striking is the album "Me Çi Kir?" ("What Have We Done?"), recorded in 1982, in which he directly references and critiques the pre-1980 fragmentation among rival Kurdish factions, particularly with the song "Yar Merhaba" ("Hello, love"). The album also included the song Cane Cane (a song that, in its Turkish incarnation, came to be very popular amongst Turkish audience who were clueless of its origins) which was reportedly composed by Delil Doğan, one of the founders of the PKK (and brother of Mazlum Doğan, who died by self-immolation in the Diyarbakır Prison, becoming one of the first "martyrs" who would go on to become an emblem for the PKK). Perwer, despite his (uncertain or shifting) alliances, was

beloved by many Kurds – lauded both musically, and also because of his songs that often wove together themes of love and Kurdish identity. He differed from Koma Berxwedan in that his songs could be musically quite experimental (Koma Berxwedan's songs were often repetitive and featured similar musical themes), and his lyrics could be more allusive than propagandistic. Even more overtly nationalistic songs, such as Kine Em? (Who are we?) were rich with poetic metaphors, and such songs, in my informant Utku's words, influenced the Kurds and awakened feelings of "Kurdish consciousness" like no other. Thus, to a certain extent, pro-movement musicians and other actors also "adopted" Perwer's music, taking inspiration from his ability to musically "affect" millions of people. Other musicians, such as Ciwan Haco, Nizamettin Ariç, Ayşe San were similarly seen as influential - but, in the words of Berdan, a performer, the pro-movement performers in the 1990s infused their music with a "more radical" political stance. These groups and performers - the explicitly pro-movement groups, as well as the "unaffiliated" performers - were seen, due to their role in generating consciousness and unity, as forming a "lineage" for the politically-motivated actors of the 1990s.

3.3.1.2 Frame 2: Illegal Circulation as the Lineage of the Legal Market

The illegal circulation of cassettes, along with other technologies and practices that enabled Kurds to listen to Kurdish music, were seen widely to have formed the backdrop for the current-day market exchange, and thus played a role in shaping the market culture. Many of my informants had been involved, in one way or another, with illegal circulation, and thus had been initiated into the emotional structures

detailed in chapter 2. This immersion forms a backbone for a shared identity and political orientation in the marketplace. While this a more or less unreflective process, at a more conscious level, many informants also explicitly linked their work as producers in the marketplace to their experiences with illegal circulation. As such, radio broadcasts from neighboring countries, the political music of the 1970s, and the cassette circulation of the 1970s were framed as forming the "lineage" of the legal music market of the 1990s. While this is easily seen in the accounts of performers, who refer to other groups/performers as "inspiring" the kind of music they make, this framing is also found in the accounts of company owners/producers, sound engineers, and other people who are involved with the music scene at a professional capacity. This was voiced explicitly by Utku, a producer at a prominent Kurdish music company, which I shall refer to as [A] Muzik. When I told him that I was interested not only in the legal market, but also in the illegal circulation that preceded it, he said, approvingly:

> It's good that you are going back to the 1970s, I mean, in a period where [communications] technology wasn't that developed, circulation took place through [informal] trade. Musicians were influenced by each other, by these flows. Of course even before [the 70s] there was Radio Yerevan, one of the factors that helped transmit Kurdish music. Now [A] *Müzik* is the next step in that process [of transmitting Kurdish music]. (Utku, producer)

Emre, who would go on to become a prominent producer in Unkapanı, also referred to his experiences with illegal circulation when I asked him about how he became involved with the music business:

> E: In the 70s, around 77, I was in [Gazi]Antep. Because import and export were limited and prohibited in Turkey at the time, cassettes would enter from Iraq and Syria into Antep, so all the [recordings] could be found around that time, as cassettes... In Antep around that period, there was this [circulation],

> with the new [cassette recording] technology arriving at the time, of things like the court defense of *Deniz Gezmiş*[7], and the [political speeches] that were made at the beginning of the new Kurdish movement… it was very lively there, there was this important political triangle formed between Ankara, Diyarbakır and Antep. So we would record those speeches, those meetings which were a bit like conferences. And then we would put the cassettes in covers depicting photos of famous singers, such as *Esengül*, to avoid being caught. This is how the recording scene was established, until September 12 [1980]. We also made recordings and distributed [cassettes] of Kurdish singers, such as Şakiro.
>
> A: You mean in studios?
>
> E: No, just by connecting tape recorders to each other... there were no studios or anything at the time. That's how I got started [and kept going], until September 12.

In Zeynel's words, "a period of silence" followed the 1980 coup. Many musicians and activists fled the country and sought asylum in Europe, continuing to perform there. Some were arrested in the period following the coup. Emre fled Antep, but was arrested on the road, when he was subject to a police search and found in possession of a banned album - a long play of Turkish folk singer and left-wing activist Zülfü Livaneli called "*Kardeşin Duymaz*." He says that he was tortured in custody for a duration of 45 days. After he was freed, he started looking for work in Istanbul, and ended up in Unkapanı - "I didn't know how to do any other kind of work," he says, of his continued involvement with music production and circulation. He moreover played a prominent role in pushing for the legalization of Kurdish music, as I will discuss further in this chapter.

Conceiving of actors of the legal market as constituting the "next step," following illegal circulation, indicates the role that their shared history played in shaping the way they now conduct their roles in the marketplace: The similar ways in

[7] Radical left-wing activist and movement leader of the 1960s who was executed by the state in 1972

which they were immersed in music while they were coming of age, such as shared experiences and narratives on Yerevan radio and cassettes, as well as the common emotional orientation that was generated through these experiences all were influential in motivating involvement with music as not only a cultural, but also a political activity. Thus, this shared orientation, rooted in the illegal era, played a part in generating a collective political identity amongst producers, and also shaped the content of music (i.e., the "object" of circulation) that was produced.

3.3.1.3 Frame 3: Grievances Resulting from Encounters with the State

The cassettes of Koma Berxwedan, Şivan Perwer, and other performers making music in Europe at the time were not sold legally in the Turkish market. However, they reached high figures – hundreds of thousands, allegedly - of circulation through illegal and informal exchange of cassettes. Being in possession of cassettes, listening to them in public, or selling them were offenses that could be met with harsh punishment: at times beatings from the police, and at extremes, several years of imprisonment. As detailed in chapter 2, these experiences led to a common feeling of being "marked" as an illegitimate - in other words, dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and stigmatized (Link and Phelan 2001) member of society. In addition to generating shared emotional orientations, as argued Chapter 2, being marked, and the accompanying narratives concerning arrests and state violence from the period of illegal circulation, have also been framed as grievances. Grievance or injustice frames (Romano 2006; Snow and Benford 2000), in turn, were frequently employed to mobilize and justify support for the movement. Stories such as Musa

Anter's whistling were very commonly recounted to me - indicating that they were also in heavy circulation amongst the Kurds. Many informants have claimed that people found in possession of cassettes in this pre-legal period were arrested and subsequently "lost" in custody. Personal experiences of circulating cassettes, stories about circulation, stories told within the music, and stories told about music all melded together. Thus, stigma and domination was influential in generating pro-movement political orientations.

One such story was narrated by Metin, when we were first introduced by Utku at the offices of a music production company. Metin was visiting Utku for a business matter, but joined our conversation for a few minutes upon hearing that I was doing research on Kurdish music. That he told me this story almost immediately after we met is, I think, illustrative of the urgency with which he wanted to illustrate to an outsider the grievances that "his people" met, and how these grievances motivated the people to resist - rather than give in to - the policies of the state:

> There was a man who [sung] in Kurdish and played the *bağlama* [long-necked lute]. *They* broke all ten of his fingers and left him incapacitated. But he got better and played again, so this time, they put one [bullet] in his head and killed him. But what is this, this is something with great meaning, if a prime minister were to go up and speak it could only have so much of an influence [on the people] because [those artists in the 1980s] would go up and sing in a forbidden language, with great self-confidence. Such was their contribution that, [taking them as an example] people contributed to the circulation of music, risking everything. There are many musicians who were killed … but despite that, despite all the pressure, Kurdish music has managed to survive. (Metin, performer and sound engineer)

I have not tried to verify through official sources whether such stories really took place, but accounts on the martial rule following the 1980 coup in the Southeast – e.g., Cemal (2003), Tan (2009), suggest their likelihood. These music-centered

stories, real or not, were in wide circulation, serving as tropes for the grievances caused by the state, and thus were the means through which the state appeared as a "subject" (Aretxaga 2003) and circulated amongst the Kurds. Other stories, such as raids, narratives of hiding / burying cassettes, all feature the state and are likewise in heavy circulation. Such grievances were, then, symbolically framed and re-circulated through the songs and narratives of the period, as well as the ten-year period that followed legalization. These grievance frames served to motivate, justify and guide actors' participation in the market, and are articulated, in the data, through the narratives of various producer-actors on how and why they participated in musical performance/production.

Emre's narrative, for example, invoked his arrest and torture by authorities. Once he started working as a produced in Unkapanı in the 1980s, he worked on Turkish music albums - yet he worked with many Kurdish artists (who performed in Turkish) and also kept looking for ways to challenge the authorities. The way he frames his eventual involvement with Kurdish music production is a case of "stubbornness" and his indignation towards the state that would not allow people to sing in their native language. He thus combines his personal grievances with the collective grievances of the Kurdish people in narrating how he eventually started to produce Kurdish music. As I shall further detail in the "market actors as activists" frame, several other producer-actors drew upon both their personal encounters with the state/authorities, and from narratives in circulation, in framing their own entry to the market. Thus, encounters with the state were significant in shaping a repertoire of action and a common moral orientation, one that is linked to the emotional habitus generated through illegal circulation, and is also fortified by specific experiences and

grievances. This orientation, as I shall further argue, were generative of particular types of artistic and business relationships and practices in the marketplace.

3.3.1.4 Frame 4: Market Actors as Activists

In the late 1980s, the PKK-led Kurdish movement started to gain visibility in Turkish media, and also intensified its recruitment amongst young Kurdish people. Music and other performance arts also started re-surfacing from the underground, despite the continuation of the legal ban. *Koma Denge Azadi* and *Koma Rojhilat*, for instance, were such groups, formed in Istanbul by young Kurdish men and women – many of them university students - around 1989-1990. Many young people were performing and recording music in an amateur manner at various community centers or "music schools" in the region as well as in Istanbul. Moreover, music producers at *Unkapanı* had started thinking about ways to bypass the legal restrictions. These schools and centers were often founded by activist-leaders, and followed political agendas - thus, at these schools, ideological training and discussions accompanied artistic education and performance. Yet, neither performance, nor formal production were legal: this led to a heightened awareness of the institutional incongruence (Webb et al. 2009) amongst the Turkish and Kurdish constituencies within the market, as well as at the broader societal level. While the music was popular and revered (had cultural-cognitive and normative legitimacy) amongst Kurdish audience, it was either unknown or was linked to "terrorism" by Turkish audience, press, and by authorities. At this juncture, a number of Kurdish producers and performers, who were already active in the Turkish music market, started to look into ways to exploit this incongruence.

In the late 80s, a number of attempts to publish albums containing Kurdish-language songs brought some mainstream awareness to the illegality of Kurdish music. All music albums issued had to (and to this day have to) pass inspection and receive a sticker indicating permit, called the *bandrol*, from the Ministry of Culture. Ministry officials were supposed to listen to the albums and read the lyrics, submitted by record companies, before issuing the *bandrol*, making sure there were no offensive lyrics or imageries – and, of course, no lyrics that were in a constitutionally inadmissible language. Thus, the ministry served not only to grant legal status to an album, but also was responsible for checking its compliance with what were deemed as "appropriate" societal norms and values. However, producers had come to believe that the officials were not always thorough. A prominent example is Ethem Güner[8], the co-owner of *Ses Plak*, who decided to test the waters and push the limits. He had frequently worked with Kurdish artists, producing music sung with Turkish lyrics but with melodies or motifs from Kurdish songs. In the late 80s, he finally decided to try something else:

> I first started with artists like Mahsun Kırmızıgül, Fırat Başkale, Nilüfer Akbal, who are of Kurdish origin, with albums named "The Eastern concerts." I made a few albums by using songs that incorporated some "le le lo lo" lyrics in the beginnings and ends. Then I [produced an album] for a local artist named Beşir Kaya from Diyarbakır. It was 1989 or 1988, I had him sing an *uzun hava* called *Xazal Xazal* in Kurdish, from beginning to end, and I produced it. And it was illegal in those years … there was law number 2932, and Kurdish could not be used in any way. But I handed [the album] over for inspection, saying that it was [completely] Turkish, and they didn't realize that there was [a] Kurdish [song] in it. So I published it and it received a great deal of reaction from the press, and it was re-collected everywhere. (Ethem Güner, producer, interview with author)

[8] I refer to Ethem Güner by his full name here, as he has given a very similar account to other publications, and it complements some other interviews that I refer to in this section.

Mr. Güner noted that in the prosecutor's report, the song was identified as being sung in an "unknown language." His interpretation is that, if the word "Kurdish" were to be used in some official records, this would be to acknowledge the name of the language, which in itself would constitute a crime – but it would also effectively acknowledge the presence of Kurdish ethnicity. He was cleared of charges related to his role as producers on this album 7 years after he first produced it. However, in the meantime, the cassette was no longer available in the legal market. In my interview with him, he noted that the album *did* circulate and sold many copies through illegal circulation – but Mr Güner did not incur any financial gain from this album.

In one sense, Mr Güner's effort was not successful – he noted that his initiative did not receive positive support from Turkish press, media, or arts circles - nonetheless, it provoked discussion regarding Kurdish music and the ban on the language, which, until that point, had remained virtually absent from public discourse. Kurds were still at that point referred to as "Easterners" or "Southeasterners" in mainstream media (e.g., Aktan 2012), and when the word Kurd was used, it was often in association with the PKK and its increasingly violent clashes with the military. In Mr Güner's words: "It was still a period in which [producing Kurdish music] was considered a big crime, still a period when [Kurds were not recognized] ... Therefore it was impossible for there to have been any support, any intelligentsia or politician to come up and say something like, look this is possible, it is actually a good thing." Thus, Mr Güner thinks even instigating discussion on music and language was a sign of progress. A few other producers and

artists tried somewhat similar tactics shortly thereafter. Singer Rahmi Saltuk recorded an album called *Hoy Nare*, which was also met with similar repercussions to those faced by Mr Güner[9]. Some of my informants mentioned that another production company in *Unkapanı* issued an instrumental album of Kurdish songs, and with the depiction of an elderly man on the cover, with black tape covering his mouth.

These musical developments took place shortly before a turning point for the Kurdish movement. On March 15 1990, a funeral for thirteen PKK members took place in Nusaybin, a province of the Southeastern city of Mardin. This funeral was attended by thousands of Kurds, and is cited as the first funeral for PKK militants with mass-attendance (e.g. Çiçek, 2012[10]). Importantly, it was the first time mass support for PKK was demonstrated in a large-scale, overt, and public manner. Several demonstrations in various cities in the Southeastern region followed the funerals. Popularly referred to as "the first *Serhildan* (uprising)" among the Kurds, the demonstrations and public displays of support for the PKK following this event were coded, by the movement, as part of a mass uprising against the Turkish state. Read within this historical context, the attempts to produce Kurdish albums for the mass market, and the emergent political music scene coincided with the *Serhildan*.

Amidst this tense environment, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of legislative reforms were implemented under the leadership of Turgut Özal (who was initially prime minister, and later president of Turkey). Some of these implementations were perceived as detrimental to the Kurdish cause: such as "state

[9] It should be noted that this album was finally re-issued in 2009, on the 20th anniversary of its ban. (http://www.esenshop.com/detail.aspx?id=20478)

[10] http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/index.php?rupel=nuce&id=15941

of emergency" being declared in the region (OHAL) starting in 1987; or the Village Guard (*köy korucusu* in Turkish) system which involved the recruitment of Kurdish villages, arming and training them to protect their villages against the PKK – a practice which, as framed by many of my informants, turned Kurds against each other and escalated the tension and violence in the region. On the other hand, Turgut Özal was also a proponent of changes in the Constitution that entailed broader cultural liberties: In 1991 Article 2932 was amended, and this led to the legalization of the production and sale of Kurdish music. Journalist Hasan Cemal argues, based on his participation in several meetings held with politicians and military officials, as well as his interviews and conversations with a number of politicians (including several with Turgut Özal) that Özal was committed to laying groundwork for Kurdish TV and radio broadcast, and, moreover, was open to discussing the possibility of a federative Kurdish state in Turkey (Cemal 2001). However, Özal passed away in 1993, before these alleged initiatives could come to fruition.

The Özal era is reminisced by several informants as a period that, at the very least, afforded legal opportunities to initiate pro-Kurdish organizations and cultural endeavors. The "Mesopotamia Cultural Center" (Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi, MKM as commonly referred to in Turkish or Navenda Çanda Mezopotamya, NÇM in Kurdish), dedicated to the arts, and the Istanbul Kurdish Institute, dedicated to Kurdish language and literature, were formed in the early 1990s, following Ozal's legal reforms. Kurdish actors importantly see the changes in the constitution and the opportunity space for these organizations as fought for, and thus gained, by the movement. Tahir, for example, said:

> With the developing Kurdish movement for freedom (*Kürt özgürlük hareketi*), especially after the 1980s until the 1990s, Kurdish [music] was only able to express itself at … at [illegal] demonstrations and meetings, and had nothing to do with the [formal market] sector. But in the 1990s, as a result of the pressure exerted especially by the Kurdish movement for freedom, and also because we were living together with the whole community of Turkey, during the period of Özal, a [legal market] space was also created for Kurdish music, and thus [Kurdish music] gained a space in the market that we call Unkapanı. (Tahir, performer and sound engineer)

The endeavors and grievances that preceded the legalization of Kurdish music are seen, by actors of the market, as part of paying a "cost" or a "price" (*bedel*) in order to attain cultural rights. Thus, legalization was not framed as being bequeathed by the state, but as something that was earned (*kazanım*) by the endeavors (*mücadele*) of the Kurdish people in general, and the Kurdish movement in particular. The term bedel recurred throughout my interviews and throughout the published interviews and opinion pieces that I examined, and often characterized the way that the Kurds perceived the problematic and tension-leaden relationship between themselves and the state. Without paying a bedel it seemed to them, the Kurds would never attain anything. This "having paid the price" also served as an element of the collective identity for producers in the market. The prices that a particular producer-actor paid indicate her/his commitment to the shared political goals and collective identity. Those who "haven't paid," in one way or another, are effectively cast as outsiders.

A related term which has its roots in the pre-legal era is yurtsever (an emic term, literally meaning "one who loves one's land" used frequently within the Kurdish as well as the radical left-wing movement). Yurtsever, in the context of the Kurdish movement, refers to devotion to the Kurdish cause, and patriotism that

pertains to Kurdish ethnic identity. In this sense, it is distinct from other terms referring to patriotism or nationalism, such as vatansever, milliyetçi, or ulusalcı, which refer to various brands of Turkish nationalism.. Individuals who aligned with the pro-Kurdish cause are often termed as such, and being a "patriot" both requires and generates a particular moral orientation. In the context of the market, it is thus conducive to a way of conducting business and performing music in the market. The history of "struggle" and the payment of high "bedel"s has paved the way for subjectivities in the market that are shaped by a particular pro-Kurdish political and moral frame. While other subjectivities and ways of doing business were seemingly available when the market was legalized, the continued tensions, and the stigmatization of the Kurds in both the public sphere as well as in the market, led to the pro-Kurdish moral-political frames to dominate the market through most of the 1990s.

3.3.1.5 Section Summary

While there was no formal market to speak of the period leading up to 1991, there were several different means through which music was played, heard, and circulated. This circulation fell into legal gray areas, at best, and was explicitly forbidden, at worst. Thus, practices related to music were often perceived as acts of dissidence, by the authorities as well as their practitioners. While the Chapter 2 of this dissertation detailed how these practices were instrumental in generating a sense of communality amongst the Kurds, this chapter showed how these (and other) musical practices constituted a lineage for the formal and legal production, exchange, and consumption of music following legalization in 1991, and formed the basis for a

collective identity of producers in the legal marketplace. The grievances and struggles incurred throughout the decades leading up to legalization, the ideological agenda of the movement, and the musical repertoires of various influential artists took part in shaping and drawing producers into a pro-Kurdish political disposition. This political-normative disposition, importantly, was constructed as contra the state policies and practices that were perceived as oppressive and in denial of Kurdish identity. Three frames are linked to the emergent pre-market culture, and thus also shaped the emergent proto-institutional (Lawrence et al. 2002) "logic" of performing and producing Kurdish music during the illegal period: awakening national consciousness, grievances with the state, and illegal circulation as lineage. The frame of "market actors as activists" on the other hand, frames the efforts of market actors in the transition from the illegal to the legal period - imbuing a sense of agency in the institutional changes that took place. In the next section, I discuss how these frames shaped the collective identity of producers in the Kurdish music market during the first ten years following legalization.

3.3.2 The Contentious Marketplace (1991-2000)

3.3.2.1 Grievance Frames Revisited

Accounts suggest that following legalization in 1991, demand was very high, and Kurdish audience were buying practically every album that was released – therefore there was an initial flux of production in the market. Seeing the potential for profit, most companies in *Unkapanı,* including those owned and run by Turks (some with strong nationalistic sentiments, claim my informants), produced at least one or two albums in the Kurdish language. Current-day producers frame this initial flux of

production as consisting mainly of actors "who sought profit." However, this trend did not last long: again, according to informants, these "commercially oriented" producers had not foreseen were the risks and punishments that often followed the production and circulation of Kurdish music. As soon as it became clear that there were (potential) repercussions, many producers retracted themselves from the Kurdish music scene. The producers who remained in the business of producing Kurdish music were people who were personally and politically motivated to serve the pro-Kurdish cause - in other words, people who identified as *yurtsever* and who were prepared to pay the necessary *bedel*. Thus, a collective identity that was grounded in shared ethnicity as well as a shared political-normative orientation became dominant in this market.

As mentioned earlier, an important this shared political-normative orientation and the "feeling" of community was greatly influenced by shared experiences - and in particular, by shared grievances and injustices. What the actors felt were stigmatizing and discriminating state policies were in turn framed as grievances. These frames served to mobilize, motivate, and unify individuals around the shared pro-Kurdish cause and politicized identity. The framing of legal-market experiences as grievances is evidenced by the commonality of grievance narratives related to me several times, using similar terms, by different actors (including producers, sound engineers, and singers/musicians) in the marketplace. To summarize: Kurdish language albums were inspected thoroughly (and with more scrutiny compared to their Turkish language counterparts) by Ministry of Culture officials, who often refused to issue the *bandrol* (the obligatory sticker that any legal musical and literary production has to receive) to an album, squashing its entry into the formal

marketplace at an early stage. Moreover, despite receiving the *bandrol*, many albums were later banned and recalled – particularly in the region, and their producers were subject to court proceedings. Several producers had ongoing trials at the *DGM*: the State Security Courts, which prosecuted cases based on charges of terrorism-related activities. This could be a long process that was both financially and emotionally draining, even if the person being tried was not found guilty. Such encounters contributed to the affirmation of an angry and oppositional orientation with regards to the state. It also, as will be discussed further, led to a sense of kinship and unity within the market.

Moreover, producers felt that there was a lack of opportunities to sell their products and to represent themselves in mainstream media: in other words, a limited number of channels through which Kurdish music could be distributed, sold, and advertised. Kurdish music could not be played on mainstream television or radio; many music stores refused to sell the albums – some out of fear of being branded as "sympathizers of PKK", some because the owners personally were opposed to Kurdish being sung or spoken. It was practically impossible to advertise the albums through any legally recognized channel within Turkey. Whereas Turkish language music could be advertised through a variety of channels, including, as Nizam pointed out, "giant billboards in city centers," Kurdish producers sometimes hesitated to place a poster advertising a new album on their office windows.Venues for live music in Kurdish language were limited, especially compared to those that were available to those who performed in Turkish language. Large-scale concerts did not take place until the early 2000s, and most performance was limited to contained spaces and occasions - particularly, weddings and celebrations. Thus, playing by the rules of the

Turkish music market - i.e., the dominant faction (Ustuner and Thompson 2012) - was not a viable option for the Kurdish actors. Whereas in some cases, the containment of illicit activities in managed and regulated spaces is facilitated by the police and statue authorities giving a "knowing wink" - as with clubbing activities in the UK (Goulding et al. 2009), in other cases, this complicity, while in the realm of possibility, could not be taken-for-granted. The counter-framing "terrorism" narrative, and the entwinement of musical activities with the broader resistive stance - the enactment of a "living is resisting" attitude (as discussed in the previous chapter) - made it such that instances of complicity were framed by informants as few and tenuous. Many of them argued that playing live music even on private occasions, such as weddings or other celebrations, could be a risky activity, with the possibility of police or military officials conducting a raid hanging in the air, especially in the Kurdish-inhabited regions.

I have pieced together an exemplary account of the ordeals a Kurdish music producer could face, based on my interviews with producers, as well as through reading several published interviews. Ethem Güner, who was one of my informants, the owner of Ses Plak, has also spoken with several journalistic publications about the music market in the early 1990s at length. Mr Güner notes that in 1991, representatives from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice were added to the seven-person inspection commission, to ensure a tighter inspection of the newly legalized Kurdish albums. Despite these tightened restrictions, albums that passed inspection could still be recalled at a future date, if suspected of including divisive or "terrorism"-related content. An exemplary case is that of Şivan Perwer's album entitled "Hêviya Te", recorded abroad in 1999 (shortly before the political

atmosphere in Turkey started to shift in a direction that was more favorable towards Kurdish music production) and distributed by Ses Plak in Turkey. The album passed inspection and received the requisite "operating certificate" (*eser işletmesi*) sticker (*bandrol*) from the Ministry of Culture. However, reportedly, upon complaint, the inspection board re-reviewed the album and repealed the certificate, contending that the album contained criminal elements that oppose public unity and interest (Radikal 26 September 1999). Hasan Güner, the brother and business partner of Mr Güner was taken under custody. The case was relayed to the State Security Court (*DGM*), which decided, on the basis of examining the Turkish translations of the lyrics, that two of the songs, *Duhok* and *Lo Mamo* contained divisive propaganda, and thus the album should be recalled from the market.

In an article published in the Turkish newspaper *Radikal (*26 September 1999), Mr Güner notes that such bans and recalls often took place after the album had been distributed to storage companies and retailers, and after they had received the *bandrol* sticker from the ministry. Thus, many albums, of which they produced thousands of copies (in the case of Perwer's album, the initial number of copies they produced was 100 thousand), were confiscated and placed into the storage facilities of the police. Legal proceedings could take around three to five years to resolve, and at the end, Mr Güner says that even if the album was re-permitted to go on the market, the copies held in custody might not be returned to the production company, or they might have already been destroyed. For the Perwer album, Mr Güner cites a

financial loss of "70-80 billion Turkish liras" which, at the time, corresponded to the vicinity of 150,000 to 170,000 USD[11].

Such losses also meant that Mr Güner (and other companies) had difficulty paying off their debt accounts to various other companies that took part in manufacturing the finished product. In a published interview with the Kurdish-operated Fırat News Agency, *ANF*, Mr Güner described the difficulties they faced in this regard (Gönençay 2012). In the music business, typically, a producer would hand a promissory check to the cassette manufacturing factory (which produces the physical objects of the cassette albums) as well as the printing house (which prepares the album covers), and would complete payment in installments, while the albums were being sold. It was, however, common knowledge that many Kurdish albums were recalled from the market, and that Kurdish production companies might also be burdened with expensive legal proceedings. Thus, it was suspected by lenders that they they would not be able to incur revenue from the sales of these albums. Thus, these other businesses would often ask for upfront cash payments from the Kurdish companies rather than accepting a promissory check. Mr Güner grants that these other businesses had to do so to protect their own interests. Thus, these legal difficulties had an impact on the way that business was conducted in the music market. Mr Güner says that his company was on the verge of bankruptcy several times, and had to rely on loans from acquaintances and friendly businesses.

Another story that articulates the difficulties faced by producers, and which demonstrates the influence of a "terrorism" counter-narrative employed by the state,

[11] Exchange rate checked through The Central Bank website; http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/kurlar/199910/01101999.html

is one that took place in the mid-1990s. A music shop in Germany ordered a batch of cassettes, including an album of Kurdish songs called "*Umut Türküleri*," a compilation album of songs that were previously issued on albums legally available in the Turkish market, and an album of *Grup Kızılırmak*, a left-wing protest music band which mostly performed in Turkish. The cover of this album depicted an elderly woman dressed in traditional garb. The cassettes were sent via a Czech transportation company. However, at the border, the driver was taken under custody. The search report noted that the truck was carrying

> "cassettes that contained Kurdish texts, and one that included a photograph that is thought to be PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's mother. Upon listening to samples from these cassettes, they were found to contain Kurdish propaganda, and divisive and regionalist elements …" (Radikal Sep 26 1999)

The TIR truck carrying the cassettes – along with other, unrelated merchandise to be delivered to a number of different places - were also stored in custody. Other companies that had contracted this distribution company to deliver their goods threatened to sue Ses Plak. Eventually, the court decided that the photo on the album cover was not one of Öcalan's mother, but decided, nonetheless, to sentence Mr Güner, based on the *TMK* (the "anti-terror law") to a one year prison sentence for producing the "*Umut Türküleri*" album, even though it contained materials previously inspected by the Ministry. Mr Güner's sentence was first delayed due to a change in legislation in 1997, and eventually overturned.

Producers have emphasized that albums which received fines and/or were recollected from the market, or that led to court proceedings, did not necessarily involve overtly political music. Murat has explained that even albums consisting

only of love songs have been recalled, and points out the arbitrariness of court decisions.

> … I once made an album for a group that sang in the Kurdish accent of the *Malatya* region, a group called *Koma* [name of group]. In that album there were songs about love, longing, about the land, it had no political content but it was banned. I was shocked, why would you ban this album? Another album I made, had a song [about] *Doktor Zeki*, about a doctor that was a victim of an unsolved murder[12] … an artist [whose album I produced] made a song about the life of this doctor … with Kurdish lyrics, and that album was banned. Now that one I could understand, it was a politically tense period, with a lot of conflict going on. But with this *Koma […]* group, the album had absolutely no political content, but still it got banned. (Murat, producer)

A similar argument was made by Nizam, who noted that he took care not to produce albums with overtly political content - he made the point that he "speaks Kurdish very well" and thus was always conscientious about the lyrics - as I shall argue further, producers also tactically used allusions and metaphors, rather than overtly political content. Nonetheless, several albums that Nizam produced were recollected and banned, and he was subject to court proceedings several times. Nizam says that all charges were eventually dropped, but these dealings were, nonetheless, time, energy and money-consuming. Moreover, he noted that while some albums passed inspection, and were sold freely in the "West" of Turkey, they could be banned in the OHAL region by order from the governor's office.

The financial costs associated with restrictions were also noted by several informants. For one, there was the issue of money spent on legal fees, and the loss of potential sales profits from recalled albums. Additionally, producers have also argued that they were in an economically disadvantaged position within the market because

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[12] *"faili meçhul*," referring to murders that were allegedly perpetrated while people were under custody and whose victims were subsequently reported to their families as "lost."

they were unable to promote and sell through the channels that were available to Turkish music. In Murat's words:

> … we haven't really talked about the commercial losses. We would make music videos, for example, but they couldn't be aired on Kral TV. An album that didn't have videos on Kral TV would not be found on the shelves of [mainstream music stores], would not go to relevant sales points, it wouldn't receive attention [from the Turkish consumers]. But if you were able to make Kurdish videos and if Kral TV would have played them, I mean, an album that normally sold a hundred thousand would maybe sell a million. There were these double standards. On any media channel, let alone playing music videos, you couldn't even run advertisements. (Murat, producer)

Legal and financial issues could also be compounded by incidents involving physical violence. Singer Rojda (female), for instance, argues that she ran into legal and physical altercations with law enforcement, starting from a very young age. Rojda was, according to this quote in a newspaper article, taken into police custody on average once every two months until 2002– at which point such arrests stopped, almost abruptly.

> I started [performing] when I was 13. I would sing at weddings and gatherings. During those years, [performing in] Kurdish was illegal, but nonetheless we would sing. And then we would play "tag" with the police. I was 16 years old the first time I was taken into custody. In Edirne, there was a Newroz celebration at the university. After the concert, I was taken into custody. They beat me up, saying "why are you here, why did you come here, Kurdish is forbidden, why are you singing in Kurdish"? The district attorney let me go. But because of the beating I received, my spine and my back were injured. I had to receive medical treatment for five years. (Başlangıç 2006[13])

Retailers selling Kurdish music were also involved in a contentious relationship with the state and authorities. At a cassette shop in Diyarbakır, situated across the street from the police headquarters, I was told during an informal

[13] http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ozgurluk_kagit_uzerinde-768966 accessed Nov 28 2014

conversation how, in the 1990s, scenes in which the officers exercised their authority towards the retailers were very common, and these helped established the way in which the state took part as a "subject" (Aretxaga 2003) in their day-to-day experiences. Apart from the overtly hostile acts, such as the times when officers would raid the shop to make sure that no "offensive" albums were sold, there were several instances during which the tension was played out in a more subtle manner. According to the owners, police officers would often drop by the shop. They would loudly place their guns on the counter next to them, sit down, and would expect the owners to order in some food and serve tea. The retailers, trying to remain on the good graces of the officers, would entertain the officers, even if they did not enjoy doing so. Thus, while outward appearances might suggest a friendly rapport between the officers and the retailers, the details – such as the gun on the counter, the unease felt and perhaps small gestures performed by the shopkeepers – indicated a contentious tableau that underscored the experience. Sometimes the officers would ask if the store had such and such cassette on stock – and, the owners note, they would ask for the albums of singers that have reputations as Turkish nationalists. The retailers saw this as a power play, and they also, to this day, retaliate with small-scale tactical measures. In 2013, for instance, during a period of (perhaps heretofore unseen) political calm, the cassette shop had decked its windows with posters and albums with Turkish language titles such as "We are still standing" (*Ayaktayız*), "We have not fallen" (*Yıkılmadık*), "We shall win" (*Biz Kazanacağız*).

Cases or threats of physical violence inflicted upon the actors subsided considerably after the late 1990s/early 2000s, some of the legal difficulties that actors encountered – or, as the actors perceive them, violations of their rights – have

repercussions that continue to this day. Tahir for instance, frames his involvement with the music scene (initially as a performer, and later as a sound engineer) as a natural result of his involvement with pro-Kurdish politics. He moreover sees a relationship between his involvement with a cultural center in the 1990s and legal difficulties he faces to this day:

> I mean, some artists who are [socially] aware and sensitive to their community's [issues] formed an establishment called [The Center]. We needed to be involved with such an organization due to our sensitivity to our community's problems, but we paid the price [for doing so]. I received a 9 month sentence because I was [a member of the Center]. And it's not just me, my wife has also seen the repercussions. My wife is a Kurd from Syria, she applied but was unable to gain [Turkish] citizenship… The state views us in a certain regard (*devletin bize bir bakış açısı var*), even though we only took part in legal activities. (Tahir, performer and sound engineer)

While the Turkish authorities saw the making of music as a punishable offence, the Kurdish actors saw making music as serving the movement (particularly in terms of framing and conveying ideology) and possible repercussions as "the price" (*bedel*) to be paid. Continuing with Tahir's narrative:

> Many [firms] were charged [by the courts], many firms were shut down. Of course Kurdish music is not just about the *le le lo lo*s, there were many groups that conveyed [the movement's] intellectual foundations to the people, as part of art, and of course the state had to do its own job, so there was this mechanism at play, court actions were filed, and of course a person who is a liberationist [*özgürlükçü*] is aware of the possible price [*bedel*] and has taken that into account. The fight still goes on, it hasn't ended.

Tahir's statement, "the state sees us in a certain regard" is particularly significant, and has been repeated in similar terms within several accounts. It refers to the Kurds' perception of their being stigmatized by the dominant culture. This involves a constant awareness of being seen and marked as "terrorists" that are to be

excluded from the mainstream cultural and economic spheres. Thus, a market culture with a strong collective identity emerges as a response to this stigmatizing marking: the actors band together and construct alternative spaces for their own cultural and economic activities, as I shall further explore.

The framing of (past and some current) difficulties – including being the recipients of physical violence – on one hand contributes to the collective identity of musicians and other market actors as "warriors" in a cultural and political battle – on the other hand, it also acts as a discriminatory tool. Those who "have paid the price" are highly critical of those who did not/ do not. Those who associate with the yurtsever ethos, and are members of certain organizations, feel a kinship amongst each other but also against the "Other"s - in this case, both other Kurds and Turk(ish state). Performers of Kurdish background who did not sing in Kurdish in the 1990s, but who started to sing later on, for instance, are viewed in a negative light (Ahmet Kaya is a rare exception).

The state's strategies of closely inspecting and frequently recalling albums, the charging of producers and performers with terrorism, the material losses as well as both physical and psychical injuries all were framed as grievances and were in circulation. In response to this array of strategies and counter-framings employed by the state, the market actors accumulated knowledge (J. Scott 1998) and a repertoire of experiences. Such repertoires, as discussed in the previous section of the dissertation, generate shared orientations which in turn have an impact on the constitution of understandings of surfaces and boundaries, of "us" and "them." Moreover, these grievances pushed many actors in the market to ideologically side with the Kurdish movement: the force, as many saw, that could resist against the

powerful state. As I shall discuss in the next frame (actors as activists) this led to producers perceiving themselves as activists - albeit in a legal field (rather than through fighting alongside the guerilla) - and as serving the "Kurdish people" - their social imaginary of the market - through their activities.

3.3.2.2 Frame 4 Revisited: Actors as Activists

A common way in which informants referred to their participation in the market was as being part of a larger "struggle" (*mücadele*). This framing of themselves as "activists" for a larger cause - which some informants implicitly or explicitly referred to as the PKK-line Kurdish movement - is related to the frames of "raising consciousness" and "grievances," but additionally refers more explicitly to the surmounting of difficulties related to participating in the market.

As such, the activist frame addresses a question that is essential to the formation of new markets: how producers are "convinced" to enter a new market, particularly one that is non-mainstream. Weber et al. (2008) note that a collective producer identity is important in convincing new producers to enter the market. Yet, previous research also suggests that "contending ideologies" may pose a normative barrier against the adoption of certain non-mainstream (business) practices even when the market and these practices are profitable (Press et al. 2014). Thus, while a collective identity - linked with a countervailing ideology - may provide incentive to enter the market, the (material or immaterial) risks of entering the market may work as an opposing force. Then, the question is, who enters the market despite the risks, and how does this shape the evolution of the market?

Many of my informants argued that immediately after legalization, several (or even all) companies in Unkapanı produced at least one or two Kurdish albums. With high demand (practically everything was sold, informants claim) and low production costs at the time, profit margins were potentially high. Yet, many producers and companies gave up despite potential for profits. Other "prices" were high, in the words of my informants. Some music producers and artists who made Kurdish music were well aware of the difficulties they would face. These actors emphasize that they they entered not just "despite" these difficulties, but also "because of" them. Many of them perceive themselves as dedicated to the Kurdish cause - the "*dava*" as they referred to it in Turkish. Restrictions often led to moral outrage, grounded in the emotions of anger and frustration, and generated a stronger commitment to the "dava," rather than convincing these producers to step away from the market. As producer Emre expressed in our interview:

> I am a Kurd. Millions of [Kurdish] people live in this country. Why should you face all those grand judges, those prosecutors, just because a man sung a traditional song named *Xazal Xazal*? [The prosecutors said] "this is producing [music] in an unknown language". That kind of response is what makes a person more stubborn. So I kept on doing it. (Emre)

This stubbornness has to do with identifying as a Kurd, and of striving for recognition and attaining rights as a Kurd, and forms the basis for a shared normative disposition among the producers I interviewed. As with Emre, producer Murat was also motivated after hearing about the difficulties faced by many producers in the market: Originally from Diyarbakır, Murat already had experiences in radio broadcasting – and dalliances with legal enforcements – starting as a university student in the early 1990s. He recounted how police would raid their offices,

confiscate cassettes, and once badly beat up an employee at the radio. He frames his entry to the market as deliberately continuing to engage, alongside fellow producer-activists, in struggle:

> [I started as a producer] around 1996... of course there are friends [here] who had been producing Kurdish music long before that. There were also many other companies, and most albums produced by these companies caused [the producers] to be prosecuted by *DGM*. At the *DGM* they would prosecute these people with very funny charges, so these people were prosecuted, their trade activities were restrained ... And then some of them got to the point where they wouldn't produce Kurdish music anymore. I heard about all this, of course I was also following the [discussions on the Kurdish issue] in Turkey very closely ... so I decided to start producing Kurdish albums. (Murat, producer)

The indignation felt towards the general plight of the Kurds - that is, sharing in the common grievances - also served as a motive to join the market as an actor. Ismail, a singer who has been performing Kurdish music since pre-legalization, describes how the political atmosphere, combined with the Kurdish movement, disposed young artists to act in ways that was shaped by the movement – illustrating how the political frames espoused by the movement became entangled with the political-normative frames that shape market practices:

> … state policies at the time made it [difficult] not just to perform music or theater, but they denied you of your identity. In such an environment, one got the chance to express themselves a bit more after the 1980s, with the struggle for freedom, and with the development of a national consciousness. That's when we started to inquire into our talents, those who had a good [singing] voice asked themselves, what can I do. I mean, what the national struggle made us see, made every individual see was this: that every individual needs to do something, that everyone needs to make use of their talents. (Ismail, performer)

Tahir similarly notes that he knew the risks associated with performing Kurdish music, but saw it as a part of the struggle he willingly took part in:

> I was aware of the *bedel* [price] I would have to pay… and as someone who lived in the 90s, as someone who paid that price, I am a supporter of freedom, I am a socialist, and undoubtedly this will be reflected in every field in which I produce [art]. And I am someone who has fought for this on a legal[ly sanctioned] platform. I never had any illegal connections, but I was sensitive towards the public's problems. There were dozens of other artists like me, we tried to establish an artistic sphere. … I believe in the liberatory [potential] of the arts. (Tahir)

Singer Mehmet Atlı (real name), for instance, also frames his involvement with the music, as both a member of an audience/constituency and a performer with an ongoing political struggle and as situated within the larger pro-Kurdish "*dava*":

> … from the beginning I experienced music as part of a political struggle, a struggle for [Kurdish] language, identity, and freedom. … [My music is influenced] by my being a member of a community that overcame their disadvantaged position by becoming politicized.[14]

This politicized "activist" identity was not only reflected in song lyrics and resistive encounters with authorities, but also through acts and dispositions that seemingly have nothing to do with the music or the market: musicians' attires, for instance, was expected to be appropriate to their political orientation. Women did not wear much make-up; and blue jeans-sweaters were more or less the expected "dress code." Consuming alcohol, while performing/listening to the music is also frowned upon - this has been explained as a "political issue" and not a "religious one" by informants. My informant Tahir, who is a performer and sound engineer, has referred to a whole "lifestyle," which includes clothes and hairstyles, that is shaped by pro-

[14] *Özgür Gündem*, August 12 2014)

movement values. While there may have been outliers, there were also people who were rejected in part due to the way they look. Singer Rojin, for instance, was turned away from a cultural center. One of my informants told me that "[Rojin] came to [our organization] years ago. She was really strange, her clothes, her manner. I sent her away." Rojin, in a printed interview, noted that she was turned away from the political circle, saying "I was criticized for wearing comfortable clothes, and for putting on makeup."

The activist frame, as discussed earlier, was initially employed to describe the acts of boundary-pushing and illegal circulation that preceded 1991. With the legalization of the market, and the strengthening of the Kurdish movement as a player in not only the political but also the cultural field, the field of musical production and performance was constituted more explicitly as a "battlefield," and actors as fighters in this field of contention (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The following quote from Ismail is lengthy but worth reproducing here, as it is particularly explanatory about how he saw their role, as performers / political activists and as the audience as people whose spirits they had to boost. There is, thus a sacred sense of duty that infuses the activist frame, which Ismail invokes in explaining what they, as a collective, accomplished, despite the threat of sanctions imposed upon them. In Ismail's words:

> When we started, it was no rose garden, we knew that we would get into trouble, there were times when we received death threats. But when we started, we didn't just get into this to make music or to make theater, we joined so that we could contribute to the struggle. So it was not our purpose to make really amazing music. We didn't join with the intention of becoming popular, singing and composing songs. Yes we were artists and musicians but we had responsibilities, political responsibilities. We had to choose our side.

> That's why, when the Center was established, we became a battleground, the cultural battleground. … We saw The Center as the ministry of culture for the future and saw ourselves as laborers of culture. So we did go through a lot of trouble back then, and we knew that would be the case. But there was also a serious togetherness, and a belief, a support for the struggle. There was a lot of excitement, because everything back then was also really beautiful, it was really natural. Singing in Kurdish was really exciting. When we would go to weddings, for example, all those people would give us a standing ovation, it was amazing… and we knew that people didn't applaud just for our voices or our appearance, they applauded our courage and maybe they saw us as representations of those old cassettes which were once buried underground. That was important for us. Maybe we were not a hundred percent aware of this, but we felt it and we gradually understood it. On the one hand, there was a war going on, people were dying, villages were being evacuated, there was a war and we were trying to do something on the cultural side, that's why we thought of ourselves as people's warriors. … as supporters of Kurds in this war… The music of that period is mostly agitative music, and aims to give moral support to the people. When you look at the lyrics, they are mostly agitative. There were songs written in memory of fallen martyrs. Songs about people who have become symbols, they have become classics. About *Zilan*[15], about *Ronahi* and *Berivan*[16], about fallen journalists, about *Ape Musa*[17], even about Kurdish politicians, like *Vedat Aydın*[18]. … That's what was keeping us on our feet, keeping the people standing. (Ismail)

In this sense, these market actors frame their experiences in a way that symbolically placed alongside - but also separate from - as the efforts of guerilla, or other pro-Kurdish activists, including politicians, journalists, writers, and prominent musicians. Framing their decisions in this manner gave these actors in-group legitimacy – but, as with many instances of attaining in-group legitimacy, this did not translate to legitimacy in the broader Turkish context. These tensions, and the lack of

[15] Pseudonym of Zeynep Kinaci, female suicide bomber.

[16] female PKK members who self-immolated on Newroz in 1993, in Germany.

[17] Musa Anter, Kurdish intellectual who was killed in 1992.

[18] Leader of the Diyarbakır office of the pro-Kurdish political party HEP, disappeared and later found dead in 1990 after taken into police custody.

legitimacy attributed to Kurdish music in the broader, predominantly Turkish, cultural sphere are evident in Nilüfer Akbal's narrative, from a published interview:

> Some very famous artists … told me, many times, "don't [perform] in Kurdish". They said, you can't get anywhere with this music. If you make Turkish music, then all the doors will be wide open to you. But if I'd done what they told me to do, I would have taken myself to the edges of denial. That is because I'm a Kurdish artist and I don't intend to give up on making Kurdish music. I know that this is a difficult path. It is a matter of choice for me. If I cannot shout in my own people's forbidden language, how can I be at ease? As a Kurdish artist, I don't think I can ever be famous in Turkey by employing this attitude. That is why, for 17 years, I've been trying to survive … and always uncertain about [whether I can make a living]. And it seems it will go on this way. (Interview conducted by Latif Epözdemir, 2005)[19]

[NOTE: It should be noted that Nilüfer Akbal eventually joined the state-operated television channel, TRT-6 as a presenter in 2009. While she continued to perform in Kurdish, and presented a Kurdish-language program on this television, this act was perceived amongst some (particularly the Center artists) as betrayal. One informant noted that, while they used to be good friends, they no longer even "exchanged greetings with" Nilüfer Akbal. Thus, gaining a degree of legitimacy within Turkish sphere led to a significant loss of legitimacy within the "Kurdish" sphere. This issue shall be discussed further but I felt that after quoting from Ms. Akbal's interview, I needed to briefly engage with it here as well.]

As with pious Muslim women who willingly take on the stigma of wearing a headscarf (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010), these actors willingly and deliberately took upon the stigma of performing and producing Kurdish music. Whereas informants in Sandıkcı and Ger's (2010) account placed more emphasis on wearing a headscarf as part of a personal relationship with religion, these quotes from the Kurdish music

[19] http://www.navkurd.net/hevpeyvin/nilufer/nilufer_akbal.htm, accessed Nov 28 2014

market are more illustrative of communal and collaborative relationships: stigma is taken on in solidarity with similar others who are stigmatized, and a stubborn attitude serves a distinctly communal, rather than personal, goal to attain recognition and cultural liberties.

The lack of recognition afforded to Kurdish producers in the marketplace is a source of frustration - but also a motivation. As Robbins (2009) as well as Walsh (2009) have noted, exchange (whether through gifts, or within capitalistic markets) is a site in which recognition takes place. In the eyes of many Kurds, they were denied recognition by the state, the mainstream media, as well as most of the Turkish public – and the market was one site, among many, in which this non-recognition took place. Thus, the market became one battlefield, among many, in which a fight for recognition, as a distinct ethnic community, took place. These communal frustrations, regarding lack of recognition and legal difficulties, go hand in hand with a shared political orientation and collective identity.

3.3.2.3 Frame 5: Being *Yurtsever* and *Örgütlü:* Collective Identity Shaping Business Practices

Related to the activist frame is the frame of collective identity: being aligned with like-minded and pro-movement oriented actors, and being affiliated with a political organization. While the activist frame was used in explaining personal orientation, the collective identity frame relates to both communal alignment and boundaries against the "outsiders." The notion of being a "yurtsever" (patriotic) actor, which first emerged in the illegal period, served as a unifying collective identity as well as a moral boundary-making (Lamont 1992) device: those who did not affiliate

themselves with, or were not perceived as "yurtsever" people were considered to be "outside" of the market. The producers and artists who, attracted by possibilities of high profit in the early 90s, produced a limited number of Kurdish albums, on one hand, are seen as "outside" of the community of actors that comprise the market. On the other hand, the producers and artists who entered the field after the late 90s/early 2000s are also left outside of this collective identity. Thus, in a sense, this is a frame that emerged in the 1990s, but it was more commonly employed to delineate amongst actors in the 2000s, after which it became possible to produce and perform music without necessarily aligning with a pro-movement orientation. Thus, its application as a boundary-making device becomes more prominent in the 2000s.

Unaware of some of these dynamics at the very beginning of my fieldwork, I made the rookie mistake of mentioning Kalan Muzik, a company that is well-known and quite well-regarded amongst Turkish audience, in my first interview. A number of artists and groups whose albums were produced by Kalan Muzik - such as Kardeş Türküler and Aynur Doğan - had attained a degree of mainstream success. My mentioning Kalan and Aynur to the owner of another company resulted in a rather lukewarm reaction, although Nizam, my interviewer, perhaps sensing my ignorance was very polite in the way he phrased his response. He noted that he regarded Hasan Saltık, the owner of Kalan Muzik, as a friend, but he did not think of Kalan Muzik as producing "Kurdish music" - Yes, the company had produced a few Kurdish language albums, but only a few. Kalan had been producing music since the early 1990s, but had not produced much Kurdish until the post-2000 era. According to Nizam, the sales figures for Kalan's Kurdish language albums were not very high, either, but the media bestowed interest upon this company and its limited roster of

Kurdish performers. Thus, as a number of producers mentioned, the Turkish public knew about Kalan Muzik. Later on, but still somewhat early in my fieldwork, my interview with Deniz, a book publisher who had friends and contacts in the music scene, shed light on the somewhat apprehensive reactions when I mentioned the company:

> There was this period where, in the 90s, particularly until 1995, you could not do anything unless you were part of a political organization [*örgütlü*]. Kalan was not part of [any] organization, it is in that sense an independent company. The owner is Hasan Saltık, right, and he is from *Dersim* [20]. Hmm, in terms of producing Kurdish music, or that kind of music… let me put it this way, from what I know, they started to produce and sell that kind of music once the price [*bedel*] to be paid had subsided and the gains were higher. And maybe that's why they're recognized by the Turks as well. But these other organizations that I'm talking about, they started doing this work when the *bedel* was high and the profit was none. And they're still doing it. I mean, back then you would get arrested for doing this work, forget about the money, there was no money in it. This was like a field of combat, I mean, some people wrote books and went to jail, some engaged in politics and got killed, some made music, and there was the sense that "this is what we're doing." So during that period, when the losses surpassed the gains by manifolds, you couldn't do it on a personal [independent] level, so that's why it was done by organizations. Kalan started doing this after the 90s, after 95, after the restrictions had been loosened. (Dicle, book publisher)

Thus, Kalan was seen as having entered a market once restrictions were loosened, as not having taken an overtly "yurtsever" political stance. In other words, Kalan was not perceived as having paid the same price - whereas for others producing Kurdish music in the 1990s, there was "no other way." (In contrast, and as I shall discuss in chapter 4, Hasan Saltık framed himself as having taken risks and a

[20] Dersim is the historical name of a region in Eastern Turkey – modern day Tunceli and parts of Erzincan - with a population that is predominantly *Zaza*, some of whom identify as Alevi Kurds. The reference of Hasan Saltık being from Dersim indicates an acknowledgement of his being a "politicized" figure - albeit not one who is aligned with the rest of the market actors.

political stance - though not necessarily one aligned with the PKK-line Kurdish movement. He also distanced himself from other companies in aesthetic terms.) While this delineation is more relevant to the 2000s, the framing of Kalan and other post-2000 entrants as "the others" also helps to understand how the actors in the 1990s cultivated a collective identity that was influenced by affiliations with the movement.

Being "*örgütlü*" in the 1990s meant being affiliated with a political organization - in the case of the Kurdish music scene, this often indicated the PKK, but might also involve membership to legal organizations (such as *dernek*s) or cultural centers (kültür merkezi) that had some "organic" links to, and followed the ideological tenets of, the PKK. Dicle noted that being a "member" also had some practical implications for the music as well as the publishing industry: if, for instance, some personnel working for the business were arrested, then the political organization would provide/recruit replacements. During a tumultuous period, when music companies were frequently raided, being "*örgütlü*" served as insurance. Moreover, in an interview with a Kurdish performer who used to be affiliated with a PKK-line cultural center, I asked about the financing of albums. I was told that the "Kurdish movement" allocated funds for "cultural production." "There was a war going on in the 1990s, and that war had its own economic resources," I was told. Some of them were distributed throughout the "cultural battlefield." I was told by a number of informants that it was practically impossible to exist in the music scene in the 1990s without being "*örgütlü*."

Organizations and cultural centers were very influential in cultivating collaborations and political alliances with the movement. An exemplary organization

of this variety is a school and venue for the performance arts that I refer throughout the dissertation as "The Center." The Center was, according to informants' accounts, the most prominent organization that facilitated interaction between the PKK-line movement and the arts scenes (foremostly music, but also dance, theater, and film). Tahir, a former member, has referred to The Center as being established as a result of the movement's efforts to "represent itself" in the arts scene. Ismail, also formerly a member, told me that in addition to providing education and opportunities for collaboration, The Center also financed album production costs in the 1990s. All informants have noted the close relation – what some have termed an "organic connection" (*organik bağ*) – between the Kurdish movement and The Center, but they have also taken care to discursively delineate The Center's activities from the armed factions of the PKK, arguing that everything done within The Center was within the boundaries of legality. Nonetheless, activities taking place in The Center drew heavily from the frames of Kurdish identity and resistance that were generated by the movement.

Some groups and individuals that had already been making music before 1991 also became involved with The Center – in Metin's words, they became part of the "organized" social movement (*örgütlü*) and also more "aware" (*bilinçli*) of the political implications of the work they were doing. The Center served as a home, or a "roof" (*çatı*), as a common phrasing goes. Newcomers to Istanbul, who may or may not be involved with the performing arts, came to The Center to learn more about Kurdish issues, to listen to music, to buy political books and magazines, and to socialize with other Kurds. Students/participants at The Center formed bands - called "*kom"*s ("group" in Kurdish), many of which became prominent and were seen by

the audience as closely associated with the pro-Kurdish struggle in the 1990s. The Center thus served as a hub, especially throughout the 1990s, for the politically-minded artists and aspiring artists to get together, learn how to play musical instruments (or receive education in the other arts), and also become educated in left-wing and pro-Kurdish ideology.

The Center doubled as a home and educational institution for some Kurdish artists, with some people even sleeping at The Center. Ismail recalls that they would give its address if they were detained by the police – which happened numerous times with many of the artists. Daily life included not only lessons and activities regarding their artistic endeavors, but also "theory" workshops, which involved, in Ismail's words, "discussions on daily events, evaluations of the [political] processes taking place at that moment, lessons on philosophy, sociology, and, in general, meetings during which we discussed politics". It is easy to see that The Center thus educated its members in terms of the movement's frames and discourses – which many of them incorporated into their musical activities, as well as into their daily conduct. In other words, performers as well as visitors were habituated into a shared political orientation, and turned into activists.

For Kurdish audience, on the other hand, while the political affiliations and inclinations of performers and cultural centers was appealing to many, it could also be alienating to others. Sami, one of my "illegal circulation" informants, noted that the Center was on one hand, an "oasis" for young Kurds arriving in Istanbul, but that it could also be somewhat intimidating for those who were not as politically active, or as convinced about some of the tenets of the Kurdish movement, as some of the core members of the Center. He, for instance, went there every once in a while, to

buy cassettes and take a look at the publications that were issued, but never felt that he quite belonged there.

The notion of collaboration in the music market, or in a broader sense, in art scenes, is hardly new. Becker (1974) famously coined the term "art worlds" and detailed the cooperation and collaboration that went into both the production of art that is "artistic" (i.e., in bringing out the skills and gifts of the artist) and also in terms of business. The coordination of these collaborations depend highly on well-established "conventions" that pertain to a specific form and field. How these "conventions" are shaped by political-normative frames, and how they also translate to a market culture are my concerns in this section.

Amongst the Kurdish market actors, while competitiveness or personal disputes may have existed, there was also an overarching sense of "being together" in an upstream struggle. While this type of mutual trust and the willingness to even forfeit bureaucracy, at times (see e.g., Walsh 2009) may be observed in other markets, it should be noted that non-Kurdish actors did not feel this sense of trust towards the Kurdish producers (possible reasons for this include business concerns, such as the Kurdish producers' inability to repay debts; holding anti-Kurdish sentiments; or fear of appearing to be supportive of pro-Kurdish politics to authorities and other businesses). Kurdish actors, on the other hand, often tried to look out for each other, motivated by their political orientations and aspirations - their having been habituated into a shared emotional structure, their common identity as "yurtsever" market actors, their affiliation to political organizations, and their commitment to being "activists" for the pro-Kurdish cause.

These actors were involved in the market "even though they didn't have to," in Tahir's words. This speaks back to the issue of "choosing" to produce Kurdish music as choosing to take a particular political and moral stance. The actors actively and voluntarily take on the stigma associated with performing, producing and selling Kurdish music (as in Sandıkcı and Ger 2010). It is a desirable choice because of this morality that has infused the production and performance of music: these people are "yurtsever" and thus, it almost naturally follows that they will share a certain normative-political orientation with regards to how business shall be done. This does not mean that they create a non-competitive environment – but a sense of camaraderie and common purpose surpassed competition amongst the companies.

An important and somewhat challenging issue was that of finding professionals who would be willing to work on producing albums for Kurdish artists: this involved not only finding the right production company for a performer, but also to find studios to do recording and people who would arrange and "engineer" the music. Performers who came into Istanbul to record music would visit the offices of Kurdish producers and try to find the company with which s/he could have a better fit. An informal system of "referrals" was at place amongst producers - if they felt that the performer might have better success with another company, they might send the performer over.

According to my informants, there were not many Kurdish individuals who were equipped to perform recording-studio roles such as arrangers, sound engineers and tonmeisters, in a "professional manner." A prominent non-Kurdish arranger/ sound engineer (*aranjör*), however, was willing to work on Kurdish recordings – his name is Oğuz Abadan, and he had worked with Şivan Perwer, in Europe, as early as

the 1980s, using the pseudonym "*Bozo Çerkes*." Using his real name, according to Abadan, would have been a "Quixotic act"[21] during this period in which people affiliated with Kurdish cultural production were held under scrutiny and, depending on their involvement with political movements (such as the Kurdish movement, or the left-wing movement), could get into legal trouble. Berdan notes that Bozo Çerkes was the go-to guy, particularly in the early years of the legal market, due to his experience with Kurdish music:

> We preferred to work with an arranger who knew Kurdish music well … and who could also contribute to us, musically. Friends from the group *Koma Mezra Botan* … were working with Bozo Çerkes, and you know, Bozo Çerkes is a very important person in terms of Kurdish music in Turkey, he worked on many of Şivan's albums, and he made a large contribution to Şivan's musical career. When you look at it from this perspective, [we thought], what should we do, he has a studio in Turkey, and he is open to [working with Kurdish musicians], so we worked with him. [Other groups] also worked with him, many Kurdish musicians did so. (Berdan, performer, founding member at The Center)

In Unkapanı, the company generally involved with producing and issuing these albums was Emre's company. While other companies gradually entered the scene following 1991, Emre had a longer history with Kurdish music production and circulation. He had also been working with Şivan Perwer, as well as other Kurdish groups and artists, some of whom had international renown (such as the group *Kamkars* from Iran). From 1991 up to 1997, he was the "go-to" person for The Center artists. In 1997, however, two significant developments took place. Some young musicians who trained with Oğuz Abadan established their own recording studio. Additionally, a new music company - which I refer to as [A] Muzik - was

[21] Interview with Abadan, http://www.edebiyatdefteri.com/yazioku.asp?id=90715, accessed online November 28 2014.

founded by individuals affiliated with The Center. The reason for establishing a new company has been explained to me as a result of the increase in volume of production by artists from The Center - to the extent that Emre, who represented other groups and artists outside of The Center, was having difficulty meeting the needs of artists from the Center. This account was corroborated by Utku from [A] Muzik, as well as Emre himself and musicians (formerly) based in The Center such as Ismail and Tahir. I was not told if there were any other reasons. It is my understanding that the "parting of ways" with Emre's company was a friendly one, Emre continued to assist [A] Muzik and artists from The Center when help was needed. In 2012, when I wanted to interview Emre, I was introduced to him by an employee from [A] Muzik.

The founding of [A] Muzik, and the way it is framed, is particularly evocative of the political ethic and collective identity that characterized the 1990s market – these aspects surpassed the economic competition between companies. Moreover, its forming is seen as a collaborative act with the involvement of performers from The Center. Ismail, who was based in the Center in the 1990s, and who still produces albums with [A] Muzik, explains:

> I: There was a serious support from people in *Unkapanı.* Maybe if it weren't [A] Müzik, [but just some music company], those guys would just see it as a commercial firm and would defame it, or would try to compete with it. But because [A] Müzik had a political stance, because it was [affiliated with] a political organization, what happened was the exact opposite. They supported it, they made [the members of A Muzik] feel that they were standing next to them, they helped them in many ways.
> A: In what ways did they help, could you give examples?
> I: When we established [A] Müzik, [we] didn't know anything about the market, it was strange [to us]. How is an album issued? How do you apply to the ministry of culture? What types of paperwork do you need? [A] received

> a lot of help in such instances. In fact, other firms helped out by doing things that [A] would not be able to do itself, they acted as mediators, or loaned personnel to do things for them…They also helped out in terms of [sharing] music archives… And I really should emphasize, of course there was a factor of humaneness in such support, but for the most part, it was because of [A]'s political stance.

[A] Muzik's impeccable embodiment of the *yurtsever* ethos leads to it being heralded, and also assisted, by other companies. Support was similarly lent to performers who embodied the *yurtsever* identity. While the political-normative framing was common amongst producers, and formed the basis for the "*yurtsever*" collective identity, there was nonetheless a hierarchical structure within the subfield. Companies were valorized in connection to the importance they were perceived as attributing to the moral-political frames of producing music, as opposed to pursuing commercial or other interests.

Young performers in music scenes, in general, rely on networks and relationships based on friendship, mutual benefits - lacking economic capital, they often try to convert other forms of capital (M. Scott 2012). This in some ways parallels, yet is also distinct from the way in which collaborations and alliances took place in the Kurdish music market. The "lack of economic capital" was certainly true for the Kurdish music market in the 1990s; many young artists came from lower-income families, some had only recently migrated from the "region" in order to pursue musical careers, many were trying simultaneously to attain university degrees. The purpose of collaborations, of helping the younger artists (as well as the organizations that supported these artists) was framed as related to serving the pro-Kurdish cause, in addition to serving artistic or business purposes. So it is possible to

talk about the organizations – companies, cultural centers, and other intermediaries – accruing moral capital through "helping" the artists, which in turn translated to economic, cultural, and social capital for all parties involved. This process did not preclude exploitation (as I shall discuss shortly below) but nonetheless was distinct from the ways that capital was accrued in other music markets.

The "politically correct" way to be involved in the music market, as mentioned previously, meant that market actors framed themselves as taking upon the role of a political activist. Thus, they approached aspects of production – including collaborations and assisting other people in the field – as part of this politically motivated agenda. The manner in which The Center operated a case in point. Funded mainly by donations, The Center helped finance the costs for recording, publishing, and distributing music. [A] Muzik was thus funded as a direct outlet through which these business activities could take place, as was [The Studio]. While [The Studio] would go on to work on many non-Kurdish recordings, becoming more prominent in the Turkish music industry - [A] Muzik remained focused on Kurdish albums.

3.3.2.4 Business Practices: Alternative Media Outlets and Word-of-Mouth

In the absence of access to more mainstream distribution channels and retail opportunities, especially in the 1990s, producers established their own networks, formed by companies and actors who were themselves Kurdish, or at least willing to be associated with the Kurdish music scene. Emre notes that through such a network, he was able to distribute his albums to every corner of the country where Kurds

lived, including places where Kurds did not comprise the majority of the population. Formed very much through personal connections, these networks often relied on direct contact with and purchase from the companies in Unkapanı. (Arguably, this was the case for many smaller firms operating in Unkapanı, but was more pronounced for Kurdish music, as not all channels and retailers were willing to sell/ be associated with Kurdish music).

In the scarcity of advertising and promotional activities, word-of-mouth was the most powerful means of spreading the word. Berdan explains:

> A: So in the beginning of the 1990s, when your album came out, how did you distribute it, how did you reach the people?
> B: For one … it was from hand to hand … people would come to the Center, buy [cassettes], take them and sell them.
> A: Was that the case for cassettes with *bandrol*?
> B: Yes, for both those with bandrol and those without bandrol, which were illegal … but loved by the masses, such as Şivan, Ciwan, Koma Berxwedan, and the ones that had the themes of the Kurdish national movement, those emotions and musical themes, those were mostly sold under the table, people would buy 20-30 blank tapes and reproduce them, and circulate them.
> A: So would people come here [to the Center] and buy them…
> B: Yes, yes of course … for example, someone would say to his [acquaintances], Koma Ciya has made a new album, or Koma Amed, or Koma Azad, he would organize people around him. He would come to the Center and buy 30 or 40 cassettes, and would sell them [through his acquaintances]. The Center was new, the situation regarding music was new[ly legal], so in both the region and here cassettes would be mostly sold through pushcarts and under the table. In the region the situation was worse, because some groups were identified as being allies of the Kurdish movement for freedom, so they were illegal[ized], so what happened, they went under the table. They were sold [from under] the counter. (Berdan)

In addition to the legal and physical "prices" that were paid, thus, more practical issues also contributed to the construction of a difficult, contentious scene.

Finding venues to give concerts, and to advertise and sell recordings was yet another issue. Weddings and political "nights" (gatherings) were two of the most common places for both tasks, and they also served as platforms through which people could be informed about and recruited to the movement. Berdan again explains:

> Berdan: The situation was very tough, it was so tough that you had to find stages to perform on one hand, then you had to make cassettes on the other hand, then you had to work on selling the cassette on one hand and also advertise on the other…
> Interviewer: How did you advertise?
> Berdan: There were no advertisements, I mean *you* were the advertisement. Which means, you had to meet the people, both inside the Center [and elsewhere]. We used to go to [perform at] weddings, and at those weddings we would sell sometimes 50, 60, 70, 80 or 100 cassettes. We sold them by hand. At each event, we tried to get results with many different arguments…
> Interviewer: With different arguments…?
> Berdan: I mean, you go on stage and sing, you get off stage and sell cassettes, and while you're selling cassettes you form a relationship with the people, you invite them to the cultural center, and ask them to be involved with cultural matters.

Singing and selling were thus both seen as instruments to forming a relationship with the audience. Such acts served to cultivate an audience, and thus played a part in generating the "social imaginary of the market" (Spillman 1999), they also simultaneously serve to generate a political imaginary of the (pro-)Kurdish community. The pro-Kurdish community, on the other hand, supported the market by purchasing the products, by spreading the word around, by donating funds, by hiring pro-Kurdish performers, musicians, and bands to perform at their weddings or other organizations, and by collaborating in various other ways both within and also from outside of the market.

Nizam also notes the roles played by pro-Kurdish newspapers, especially Özgür Gündem, as well as radios that were sympathetic to the Kurdish cause:

> : … so how were you able to announce that you had new albums?
> N: Well there was the newspaper [Özgür] Gündem, Radyo Umut … as I said, there was Cem Radyo but later it was shut down… for a period Radyo Gün also ran commercials. We [especially advertised with] the newspapers. And then it was from ear to ear, and by [hearsay]… the people were paying attention. They were interested in every album we produced, there was a lot of attention, there was a lot of [word of mouth] advertising.
> A: That is an effective form of advertising I suppose?
> N: It was very effective… any audience member who bought our album was advertising for us. When an audience member bought a cassette, s/he would say, to everyone s/he talked to, look there is this album which just came out, you should buy it too. … In all of Anatolia, even in the Black Sea region, I was selling [a lot of] albums for a period. … people would go and ask the cassette stores there, "do you have *Kazo's* album, do you have *Aydın's* album?" And so the retailer would call me and ask if so and so album had come out, and would say, "send me 50 or 100." So in the Black sea, in the Aegean, in the Mediterranean, and there always was a lot of sales in the Marmara region... so we would sell a lot of Kurdish albums without commercials, through word of mouth. (Nizam, producer)

Another very important alternative channel for playing and advertising music was established in the mid-1990s: Med TV started broadcasting in 1995 (Hassanpour 1998) with headquarters in London, and production studios in Brussels, Berlin and Stockholm. This was a breakthrough: since the channel was not based in Turkey, none of the legal restrictions (such as surveillance by RTUK) applied. Programs ranging from clips of the lives of PKK members (*gerilla* - emic term) in the mountains, concert performances of famous Kurdish singers, performances of *dengbej* were aired. The channel was outside of the jurisdiction of Turkey's TV-Radio broadcast controller (RTUK). However, watching MED TV was not a legally

sanctioned act. It was not part of any cable TV package available in Turkey – thus people had to purchase an additional satellite dish, apart from the legally available satellites and antennae. Installing this second dish was, according to Talat, admitting to Turkish officials that MED TV was watched in the household – an act which was, in the mind of officials, associated the PKK and terrorism. Owners of the dish would set MED TV at an obscure channel number on their TV set – such as channel number 935, so that in the case of a raid in their home, the enforcement might take a long time to find the channel, or give up on it altogether. However, the presence of the satellite dish was, in general, the largest giveaway and was sometimes counted as evidence towards affiliation with illegal acts, and at other times (depending on the situation) treated with a blind eye.

For Kurds, watching MED TV was yet another instance of everyday acts of counter-hegemonic nature. To share the costs (both monetary and in terms of security risks) households would often share a single satellite dish. Talat notes that one household would buy one (in Talat's case, his uncle had bought one) and the neighbors would connect their TVs to this dish with a simple cable. This design had one caveat – the owner of the dish had the control over what the other households watched. If the owner changed the channel, the TVs in the other homes would also switch channels. Talat recalls, with humor, that this often sparked fights. Watching the TV programs with families and neighbors is a memory that several Kurds have talked about.

MED TV's programs featured a great deal of music videos and concert recordings. Most videos were shot in a more or less amateur manner, and depicted scenes from the region. Nature figured an important place, the mountains of the

South/Eastern regions (the places that is commonly imagined and referred to as "Kurdistan") were featured prominently, along with rivers, livestock, the scenes of daily life in the villages. There were also videos – some accompanying music, but some standing alone – depicting the life of the PKK in the mountains. Importantly, many singers and groups that were loved by the people appeared not only in these videos. Concert recordings were often specially made for MED TV, and featured some of the most beloved groups and artists. Talat, an NGO employee, talks about the significance of these concerts as follows:

> T: It was so [amazing] for us, there would be Kurdish New Year's, that is Newroz concerts on Med TV. When we [saw] Şivan Perwer live on New Year's, it was an incredible thing.
> A: What was it like?
> T: One felt, on one hand, there was a kind of rebellion about it. Like, "[the authorities] can't stop us, despite everything [they try] we're still doing this" kind of feeling. But there was also this … sadness about not being able to [have those concerts] here, you can't do it in your own country, but you're still not giving up on the [resistance], there's this protest about it. (Talat, NGO employee)

Many informants referred to MED TV's early broadcasts with a similar mixture of awe, sorrow, and anger. The broadcasts constituted the first time these well-known singers appeared "in the flesh" before the eyes of the audience. Like the (ongoing) circulation of cassettes, these broadcasts served to unify people in both the real and the imagined sense. Watching TV also served as common experience and generated common repertoires, similar to the cassette sessions. Moreover, they were instrumentalized by the political movement. Utku, who worked for the pro-Kurdish party HADEP (which was operational between 1994-2003) before working in the music business, recalls the central role the TV channel played in the daily lives of

many Kurds, and how it constituted a turning point for the music business. Moreover, the political party provided space for people to watch TV:

> It was a turning point, not only for Kurdish music and musicians, but a turning point for the whole public, a historic event ... I had just finished high school ... I think it was the HADEP period. At the time we were working for its youth commission, around the age of 16, 17. That's when Med TV was established. The broadcast initially only consisted of archival shots: mountains, valleys, villages... streets... and [accompanied by] the music. No story, no nothing. Hundreds and hundreds of people would file into [HADEP's district headquarters] just so they could see this, every day. And we, the members of the youth commission, would serve them tea the whole day long. After that, music groups also started thinking about visuals, and the audience started seeing [the owners of the voices] that they already knew very well from the cassettes, and then things changed completely. After that, those involved in music started producing [music videos] and television influenced production in this direction. Groups started going very frequently to Europe, to make television programs [produced] in Europe. And anyone who went [on tv] became famous. Because people see them on television, and also you cannot find any [representation] on any other [Turkish] channel. (...) that was what we watched [all the time], I mean there was that music and nothing else. I remember so many people who watched [the music videos on TV] and cried. (Utku, producer)

In terms of the market, then, MED TV provided a new venue for artists to showcase their works, to advertise their music and new albums, and to also participate in the recruitment of adherents to the movement. For the public, it served as a means of creating communitas: both physically – in the sense of watching together, but also in the imagined sense, of seeing and dreaming about a shared, "national" geography (supported by the imagery of landscapes shown in the music videos). It moreover served the very practical means of learning & sharing language/ vocabulary. Aktan (2012) argues that Kurds became more self-confident about speaking Kurdish in public after MED TV broadcasts, it took away some of their

self-perceptions of stigma, and moreover helped them use a richer vocabulary and fewer Turkish words thrown in between Kurdish conversations (Grabolle-Celiker 2009). Addressing this issue of "emboldening" after MED TV, Berdan notes:

> The environment changed, the political conjectures changed, the Kurdish movement gained an even larger following and gained more freedom [for the Kurds]. These are gains that were made on a public level, otherwise there was no change in terms of legalities. Especially after 1995 … the developments in Kurdish media, … particularly with Roj TV and Medya TV[22], music groups started going to Europe [to appear on TV], and masses started to see [the groups], so therefore demand increased [tenfold], because now [we]'ve been seen in the media, [our] works have been seen, [our] artistic productions have changed the auditory culture of the public… this has increased demand for [us] … and people stop thinking about the bans, they started to invite [us] without hesitation to their weddings, they started to play [our music] on the streets. (Berdan)

While television broadcasts had this type of impact on the Kurdish constituency, the Turkish government, aware of the role of TV in recruiting adherents to the movement and drawing more support for the PKK, successfully pushed to revoke MED TV's license. Shortly after MED TV was shut down by the Belgian government, Medya TV was established – which the Turkish government also succeeded in having shut down. Roj TV, the final broadcaster in this chain, had its headquarters in Copenhagen. However, its license was similarly revoked as of January 2014[23].

3.3.2.5 Section Summary:

[22] Successors of MED TV

[23] http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/294388--turkiye-danimarka-yuksek-temyiz-mahkemesinin-kararindan-memnun

In this section, I examined the emergence and strengthening of a collective identity in the market, and illustrated how this collective identity was reflected and reinforced through business practices. There were a limited number of companies and other organizations (e.g., studios, distributors, retailers) that were willing to take on the task of making and circulating Kurdish music. A somewhat convivial atmosphere characterized the relationship amongst these actors. Common backgrounds in underground performance/production, experiences in dealing with the state, and support for the Kurdish movement were some of the elements that informed a collective identity and the moral stance that accompanied this identity.

The participants in production, exchange and consumption were thus constituted as moral-political subjects. Norms of business relationships and exchange (Spillman 1999) were importantly shaped by this stance. Producers and audience were viewed as inhabiting a community (Penaloza and Venkatesh 2006). Alignments and boundaries are (re)produced, in part, through market-mediated relationships and practices. Informal contracts, assisting other businesses and performers, forming alliances along networks of recording, printing, distribution, and sales are some ways in which the collective identity is both forged and reflected in the marketplace.

Yet, accompanying this collective identity and sense of communality within the market, there is a sense of status and hierarchy within the field, that I started to explain in this past section and will further explicate in the following section and chapter. This hierarchy manifests itself particularly in discussions regarding the the companies' political service and thus the "pureness" of their political-normative orientation. While commercial logics and artistic logics are also at play in the field, the "style" with which they are embodied by market actors is what generates

distinction: making profits and pursuing aesthetic superiority are desirable if they are held in pursuit of serving the Kurdish community and the pro-Kurdish (and, in particular, pro-PKK) political cause.

3.3.3 Competing Logics in a Field of Artistic Production

In fields of artistic production - including music markets - the central tension is often conceptualized as being played out through the contradiction of two central institutional logics: artistic, or aesthetic with commercial, or market logic (e.g. Cave 2000; Craig and Dubois 2010; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). In the field of Kurdish music, I have detected this tension as well - yet this tension, I find, was to a great extent negotiated in the 1990s through the employment of field-level frames and the emergence of the proto-institutional logic: a political-normative logic grounded in such frames as national consciousness, grievances, patriotism, and resistance. This proto-institutional logic was employed in a rather flexible manner to justify the adherence to, as well as the ignoring of, both artistic and commercial concerns.

3.3.3.1 The Emergent Political-Normative Logic

As discussed earlier, performers and music groups in the period of illegal circulation took on the Kurdish movement's agenda to transform the "everyday conditions" of the Kurds, to instill in them a sense of "national" identity, and a sense of "liberation" from both the [Turkish] state and the feudal relationships. This agenda was also appropriated and reworked by the actors of the formal market. One way in which it is possible to trace the presence of this frame is in debates regarding the difficulty in

addressing concomitantly "artistic concerns" (*sanatsal kaygı*) in music while "relaying a message" (*mesaj verme kaygısı*) at the same time.

The emergent and dominant political-moral frames, and in particular the frame of "raising consciousness" shaped not only the way in which market actors networked, but also the style and lyrical content of the music produced. This application of the frame sometimes took place at the expense of artistic concerns - which some of my informants today note in retrospect. In Emre's experiences:

> With artists who wanted to make albums, we weren't thinking in artistic terms, [this includes] myself as a producer. We all had one purpose, and that was this community's [political] awakening, their demands... it was a political phase. That's why we weren't really thinking about the artistic dimension. It was more about political discourse, [articulated] through the lyrics. (Emre, producer)

The style of music that Emre talks about, and his explanation of their motives for performing, recording, and producing music in the early 90s is quite similar the role that has been attributed to music by other pro-movement actors. As explained earlier, Koma Berxwedan was one of the forerunners of the style of music termed "agitative." Berdan, one of the founders of the Center, provided even further context, noting that Istanbul in the early 1990s was a vital locale in a "renaissance" for Kurdish cultural production. In this urban setting, the younger generation had better access to education compared to their parents – and they were (and still are) more politically engaged. Thus, they were seeking out different sounds - and different ideals - when compared to the generation of their parents. It was at this particular junction of time and place that the Center was founded, in 1991, and this style found popularity:

> The 1990s were the years in which Kurds were forced out of their lands, when they were forced to migrate. There were burned and destroyed villages there, and along with the national consciousness that was generated by the Kurdish movement, a cultural [legacy] was forced to move from there to here, the large cities. And when you look at it from that vantage point … Istanbul was the city that received the largest Kurdish cultural and political migration. [The migrants] had discussions amongst themselves, in order to find a place where they could congregate and work on [cultural production] … as a result of these discussions, in the beginning of the 1990s we established [the Center]. With this group, we decided to focus on [creating a space for] communal living, and with this community to take different sounds, different instruments to the people, to carry the developing Kurdish consciousness to the people. To take these cultural values, that Kurds were recreating, and to present it [to the people] in new folk music formats. (Berdan)

Thus, the translation of political ideals and agendas into the music scene resulted in a period dominated by music performed with an "agitative" purpose. Lyrics, melodies, and album covers were part of this "agitative" music. However, due to restrictions on certain words and imageries, the performers, songwriters, and producers took a number of tactical (DeCerteau 1988) measures to make the music "safe" for passing inspection. A repertoire of code words and images was generated and employed: for example, the word *Gülistan* (rose garden) was commonly used in lieu of *Kürdistan*. (A semi-official ban on the public usage of the word was in place until recently, and its usage is still a somewhat contentious issue amongst Turks.) Allusions to the mountains were disguised within lyrics on the nature and the land, but often constituted references to the PKK, who were based in the mountainous areas of the Southeastern regions of Turkey. The word "*Adare*" (March) was sometimes an allusion to Newroz, as well as the liberatory and "self-governance" ideals that the "Newroz myth" was perceived to entail. The colors green, yellow, and

red, often referred to as the "Kurdish colors," were used both as words in lyrics - *kesk u sor u zer* - and were featured prominently on album covers. While these "codes" were sometimes detected by officials, or cassettes were recollected despite having (allegedly) no political references, their usage still constituted a means of tactical evasion (De Certeau 1988; Scott 1990).

The emphasis on politically charged music-making also led to the marginalization of certain genres within the market. For example, the *dengbej*, while still popular, were somewhat derided by younger audience, particularly those who were adherents of the movement. Dicle explained that the *dengbej* were seen, by younger pro-movement Kurds ,as representatives of an archaic order – one that was, in fact, at odds with the (initially) Marxist-Leninist central ideologies of the PKK-line politics at the time. Many of the stories told in the *dengbej* songs were seen as linked to the "primitive" and "regressive" tribal past of the Kurds, which did not aspire to a national unity – this past being precisely what held the Kurds "behind." The politically charged music performed by the *Koms* were perceived as more culturally and politically relevant:

> After the 80s, there were these more professional people who made music, the groups. … the *Kom*s. These were groups that were influenced by Turkish left-wing groups. Back then left-wing groups would have their cultural organizations, and the cultural organization's groups would have cassettes, they would sing folk songs about this comrade and that comrade. Kurdish cassettes in a similar vein started emerging. It was both that [folk] style, but also more modern, Western music, even march-style things, influenced by the Soviet [marches]. We found them really nice, we'd listen to them. The *dengbej*, we thought they were very primitive. That's how most of the younger generation saw them, as primitive. Friends who were revolutionaries (*devrimci)*, for example, they would say to my uncle … you keep listening to this stuff, where [the *dengbej*] talks about these events where this guy killed

> that guy, and then this happened, there is always some story about honor. [The revolutionaries] would say, you keep listening to this, and then you go and kill each other. Why don't you oppose the state instead? All you do is engage in blood feud… that's what they thought, that this [*dengbej* music] directly represented feudalism. (Dicle)

Despite the heavy circulation *dengbej* cassettes enjoyed in the 1980s, their non-adherence to the political norms of the 1990s scene led them to be briefly delegitimated. Rather, music that was seen as more politically relevant and also in line with (what was imagined to be) urban and "global" tastes was more actively promoted and represented within the Kurdish music market. I continue by examining how market actors framed "good music" as adhering to various criteria - through more "modern" instrumentation as well as lyrics - that adheres with the pro-Kurdish cause.

3.3.3.2 Frame 6: Good Music as "Taking Kurdish Music Forward"

The notions of artistic quality/merit and concerns are also closely linked to the political-normative proto-institutional logic that shaped the market and its products. With respect to "*sanatsal kaygı*" (artistic concerns), some of the music produced by the *Kom*s at The Center in the 1990s is evaluated in a very positive light, for having lived up to certain ideals and evolving tastes. One way of doing so is by employing the frame of "taking the music forward" (*ileriye götürmek*). For example, synthesizing "traditional" sounds with "Western" sounds and polyphonic instrumentation is evaluated in accordance with this frame. Several informants used phrases akin to "different sounds" (*farklı sesler*) to explain what performers based inThe Center aimed to create. Utku notes that many of the early music groups engaged in such re-interpretations of traditional songs and melodies and explains:

> [The artists at The Center] took the songs that the people would sing without a [definitive] melody line, without rhythm or *maqam*, they modernized them and performed them in more Western-oriented ways. This was the point where Kurdish music encountered the guitar. (Utku)

Metin explained further:

> [The Center]'s artists … were pioneers in the re-mixing and re-interpretation of traditional works, which are called *geleri* [anonymous]. But they also were aware that Kurdish music could move forward through creating new compositions, and not just sticking to and re-voicing traditional structures. So people started to say, yes, the *dengbej* tradition is the foundation of Kurdish culture, yes folk music is its foundation, but we can build new things on top of this. … Initially this was done within groups, then after 95-96 more personal (solo) initiatives emerged, and some started pursuing even newer musical quests, now there are hip-hop and electronic musics in the mix, and many other different sounds. The quest [for new sounds] is ongoing today. (Metin)

Berdan's following narrative complements the above excerpt from Metin, noting how, as artists, they found inspiration in various different musical genres in order to accomplish a normative goal of "developing" Kurdish music.

> On one hand you need to … stay within the traditional Kurdish music forms, but those forms also need to be developed and transformed. Let's say, [you ask] can we add some Western instruments, and if we do so, would we deform its origins, would we degenerate it? Would we alienate [Kurdish music] from itself? We were having these discussions, we were discussing how we could preserve the main themes [in the music] and add different instruments, more Western [sounds] and open up Kurdish music to new venues. There were some examples before us, [within Turkey] there was Koma Denge Azadi, and [outside of Turkey] there were some experimentations done by Ciwan Haco, Nizamettin Ariç, and Şivan Perwer. I mean, we wanted to do similar things [to those] but, how should I put it… by taking a more radical [political] stance. So we wanted to preserve the traditional themes but also develop them, and make it a Kurdish music. (Berdan)

These excerpts both indicate the intermingling of aesthetic and political concerns of the music-makers: New sounds were sought, not only for artistic innovation, but with a politically-motivated mission in mind: taking "Kurdish culture" or "Kurdish music" *forward*, making it sound more "modern", but making/ keeping it "Kurdish" – not "degenerating" it to the extent that it became "something else." Tahir's narrative particularly illustrates this understanding of "forward"ness as a necessity, and also as something that needs to be accompanied by appropriate academic support and technical specialists:

> I mean, there was this problem, there were [artists with] good voices, but few could even play an instrument. So there was this need in our community, we saw that one could not just rely on the *dengbej* tradition to make art. So this turned into collective, group works. … we saw that to be a group, to produce collectively, would create a much richer musicality. And we saw that the studio was also a need, as art started to make progress. It all came from the [community's] needs. The Kurds started to play the *saz*, but [we] saw that only a *saz* on the stage is also too weak, one also needs a guitar and a bass guitar, and percussions, and then you see that even symphonic [music] can also be made. So accompanying this progress in terms of instruments, there was a need for [progress] on the technical and technological side of things, as is the studio. And Kurds started to make progress in that arena as well. Because in the past, [we] used to go to [arrangers, engineers, and other studio people] who didn't know anything about Kurdish music, they would make arrangements that made the melody sound more Turkish, or more Western, and only the lyrics were in Kurdish. So Kurds started to question this. How can we make this right, [Kurds] needed to acquire the technology, so this meant that [we] needed [our] own arrangers. (Tahir)

Informants believe that more progressive, "fusion" music was (and is) not only in sync with the global music scene, but it is (and to some extent relatedly) more relevant to young Kurds, some of whom grew up in the large cities and did not have

strong ties with a "traditional" life depicted in *dengbej* songs, or other traditional musical styles.

Other informants have also noted that the younger generations, rather than listening to *dengbej* music, preferred to listen to Turkish protest, pop, or arabesque music. The music produced by artists from The Center, on the other hand, was welcomed as a fresh alternative. In Talat's words:

> … [their music is] more modern, you hear a cleaner sound, and it's music that includes a more diverse set of instruments, such as percussions and guitars. Because with Kurds, I mean with Kurdish traditional music, the [human] voice is the main element. The prominent instrument is the voice. There are very few [other, mechanical] instruments [in traditional music] but [with Koma Amed], we started to really pay attention to the instrumentation. The percussions, for example are very lively in the *Derguş* album. After that album came out, I stopped listening to Turkish protest music and started listening to more of this type of music.

Two popular groups of the 1990s, which was also often cited in interviews, were Koma Amed and Agire Jiyan. While Koma Amed's repertoire leaned more heavily on polyphonized traditional songs - particularly dance (i.e., halay) music - Agire Jiyan's repertoire was more of the "agitative" kind.

It was not unusual for songs with political lyrics, or songs about the martyrs, to be performed even at celebratory occasions - such as weddings. In fact, according to Sırrı, a retailer and former political activist, guests at a wedding might get angry at the wedding band if they didn't perform political songs. Talat likewise noted that people would dance the halay to songs about death. As evidenced earlier from Dicle's comments, younger audience particularly demanded political songs over songs about love, or traditional dengbej songs. Utku, producer with [A] Müzik, notes that especially in the 1990s, people "needed" these politically relevant songs, in

concert with the rising influence of the political movement amongst common people. This also translated into sales success for [A] Muzik, which took on the production of the politically charged albums after 1997. Utku notes that "practically all of the albums that [A] produced would sell out."

The intensity of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military was an integral part of the institutional environment that shaped the types of music that was produced and demanded during the 1990s and beyond. The conflict and political/ regulatory/cultural grievances prevailed through most of the 1990s, but there were intermittent periods characterized by relative peace. In 1993, the PKK declared unilateral ceasefire for a period, for instance, and during such periods, Ismail notes that the artists at the Center were unsure of what their role would be if peace were declared once and for all.

> Well in that period, during times when the war paused, we would discuss what sort of art we would make if the war stopped for good … would we still be using agitative discourses [in the lyrics] if the war came to an end? Those discussions would start and get to a certain point, but then there was a return to the 1990s after the Rome processes… after [Abdullah Öcalan] was brought to Turkey from Nairobi, and the war inflamed again. I mean, the period after 2001, 2002. I mean, initially there was a serious relaxation [period] in both Kurdish politics and the Kurdish movement, and in the Kurdish cultural movement as well, there was a feeling that no one is interfering with us anymore, we are singing our songs, so there were [experimentations] in different musical [genres], rock and pop. This had happened once before, during the 1993 ceasefire as well. I mean, whenever there was ceasefire, when the forces retreated, when the war stopped for certain periods, we would start discussing why are we doing art, what kind of art should we do … but when the fighting and chaos would resume, we would go back to saying, we have to do something, so we'd make agitative songs again. … So what I mean is, these cycles really constructed our artistic stance, our identity. (Ismail)

The strong link between politics and the workings of the music scene are evident from this quote: changing social and political conditions were evaluated by performers and producers, and were reflected in music-making practices. Thus, as the conflict ebbed and flowed, so changed the form and content of the music that was produced. While the "agitative" songs fit well with the turbulent times, the more peaceful times led the performers to question "the role of the artist" and, as I shall further discuss, to pursue aesthetic/artistic concerns as well as audience demands for something "different."

Emre's quote from earlier on ("With artists who wanted to make albums, we weren't thinking in artistic terms…") indicates that trying to be politically active and relevant sometimes came at the expense of pursuing artistry. The politically charged atmosphere likely influenced this: Tahir, for instance, notes that artists who met with success in the 1990s were those in close affiliation with the movement (and hence those that produced more politically significant music) – which led to a monopolistic situation. Several informants also mentioned the "repetitiveness" of the music of that period – that is, the abundance of "agitative" songs that sounded similar to each other. Kerem, a rock musician, notes that while that type of music may have served the political needs of the early 90s, in terms of aesthetics it was insufficient. He recounts a friend's "I've heard all of this before" attitude in response to the popular songs of the 90s:

> I was in prison for a short period, and when I was there I had [a guitar] with me, I would play [agitative songs]. My friend in the prison ward, a guerilla, said to me, [Kerem], don't do this to me (laughs) To whom are you [singing these lyrics], to me? Play me some [real] music. (Kerem, performer)

In addition to Emre's earlier comments about the artistic concerns taking backseat during the 1990s, some other market actors and audience members have expressed their unease and criticism regarding some of the music that was performed in the 90s. Zeynel, a linguist and the director of a literary center, for instance, laments the low-quality of some of the productions in that period, and particularly poor usage of Kurdish language in much of the early efforts:

> In the beginning this was done a lot, there was a lot of supply and demand, so people and companies approached [production] in a somewhat careless manner. When you look at the language, the pronunciation was bad, [the artists] were not fluent in Kurdish, they were singing lyrics and playing the music incorrectly. [Back then] we wrote about this [in magazine and newspaper articles]. Ranging from some very popular singers to the local ones, we saw many errors being made. A lot of them also lacked musical knowledge… at least the companies should have worked with experts who knew [about the music], they could have also checked whether the pronunciation was correct. Some of the songs [that were performed incorrectly] had already been recorded by [artists living in exile in Europe], so people already knew these songs, but when they were re-interpreted, you see that they were damaged, they were sung carelessly, the lyrics became incomprehensible.

Countering this type of critique is the argument that making Kurdish music in such a tumultuous period is in itself worthy of applause and thus, such "mistakes" should be excused and not dwelled upon. In a published interview, Nilüfer Akbal, who performed throughout the 1990s, but was not affiliated with The Center, exemplifies this argument:

> Me and a few of my artists friends, during those difficult times in Turkey, kept making Kurdish music, even though there were only a few of us in number, and despite all the difficult situtations. Naturally, there were times when we sang incorrectly and we frequently made pronunciation errors. Perhaps that was a very important mistake. But back in those days, it was more important that we were making music with Kurdish lyrics. This can be

> seen as a political attitude. Moreover, we didn't receive that much criticism from Kurdish intellectuals [back then] when we sang incorrectly or incompletely. On the contrary, we were supported, assisted, and applauded. Those who listened, were proud that we were singing Kurdish. The applause we received was for making Kurdish music… (Interview by Latif Epözdemir, 2005)

Attitudes about what constituted "good" music, not only in the context of the 1990s, but also for the later period, are often entwined with a moral and political stance. Importantly, artistic concerns for making "good music" are often expressed in conjunction with political (pro-Kurdish) agenda: "good music" is what informants emphatically designate as "Kurdish." This "Kurdishness" of the music comes from the language of the lyrics as well as the imagery and values that are embedded in the music: it should refer, somehow to issues and sentiments that have some significance to the Kurds. As such, this "Kurdish" music should be a viable alternative to Turkish or foreign-language music. Making "good" and "Kurdish" music is a moral issue – the morality being tied, in the expressions of informants, to "representing" Kurdish culture, mainly to the Kurds, but also potentially to other constituencies (such as an international audience). The making of "bad" music is often tied to the oppression of the Turkish state: a result of the deprivation of Kurds from the right to establish cultural institutions - such as academic settings (e.g., conservatories) that focus on Kurdish music; and, moreover, many informants believed that Turkish arabesk was actively promoted by the hand of the state in the region. "Bad" or "degenerate" music – such as arabesk, which rose in popularity particularly after the 1980 military coup, as well as cheaply produced "halay" music that has surged after 2000 – are seen as trends that benefit the Turkish state: it is framed as depoliticizing and

inactivating the masses, putting them into a lulled state in which they do not aim towards "progress." "Good" music is thus framed as music that is not necessarily overtly political, but still serves a political agenda: it is either faithful to oral musical traditions, and/or is in tune with musical developments around the world – thus it constitutes music that the Kurds "can be proud of" on a national and global scene.

Mirroring these discussions on good/bad music in the early years are discussions on good/bad music in the more recent years. Several people I interviewed are very unhappy about what they perceive as "a drop in quality" in the music scene during the recent years – this drop refers not only to cheap productions, but also to music that is made only for weddings or other forms of entertainment. Albums made by producers and artists who don't care much about the politics and see the music as a way of making money – and particularly those who have not "paid the price" in the 1990s are perceived as the culprits. In a sense, these people have no excuse - whereas the early 90s performers and producers were burdened with the difficulties and restrictions and thus sometimes had to forego "quality," in recent years this is no longer the case - thus, "just anyone" can become involved in production and performance.

On the other hand, performers who are able to attain "world standards" of quality and musical success are lauded. Cem, an informant with no affiliation with the music industry, for instance, talked with pride about Şivan Perwer's success abroad. As an example, he showed me the video of Perwer performing a number of his famed songs with an Austrian TV singer and TV presenter. Another evocative example is the success of the group *Trio Mara*, which has been featured at a prominent world music festival. They recorded their latest album, "Deri/ Behind the

Doors" at Rudolf Oetker Halle, a well-regarded performance hall in Germany. A documentary about the recording process (Yarar 2013) features an interview with the director of the music hall, who praises the group and their music. At a screening of this documentary at a cultural center in Istanbul, there was a palpable pride, in the predominantly Kurdish audience, regarding the group's accomplishments on the world scene.

Thus, the normative-political logic negotiates the logic of aesthetics/artistry by linking artistic merit and concerns to a political purpose: taking the music "forward," encouraging young Kurds to listen not to Turkish music but to Kurdish music, and demonstrating to the Others, including the Turks and a (possibly) global audience, that Kurds have "good music" too. While "good" music has a positive influence on generating communal feelings, upholding the resistance, and taking the culture "forward," "bad music" is seen as regressive and assimilative. I illustrate next how the emergent political-normative logic similarly negotiates "commercial concerns" by linking sales success to market representation and furthering the pro-Kurdish cause.

3.3.3.3 Frame 7: Sales as Service versus Commercial Orientation

In informants' accounts, "*maddi kaygılar*" (material concerns), "*kar kaygısı*" (profit concern), or more generally "*ticari kaygılar*" (commercial concerns) are a few emic terms that arose. There were two ways in which these concerns were adopted or negotiated: One type of account relates to the profit-making concerns held by non-Kurdish as well as some Kurdish producers – opportunists, as framed by pro-Kurdish actors, who tried to capitalize on the high early sales of Kurdish music, as well as

later entrants who became producers, artists, or other types of actors, in order to "make profits." This framing largely coincides with what has been referred to as a logic of commerce, or a market logic (Bourdieu 1996; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005) which is associated with "non-aesthetic economic concerns" (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005: 1040). The framing of certain actors as pursuing these concerns, and thus adopting a commercial/market logic, is used in these cases as a boundary-making device. The other account, which is is more complex, relates to generating sales as a way of "reaching the people" and also "financing new productions and helping performers." Framed in this manner, "making money" then becomes morally sanctioned and is also subsumed by the political-normative logic of serving the Kurdish people.

According to informants, the linking of the music "market" with financial concerns took place after legalization. While money did change hands sometimes during some of the pre-legal circulation of the 70s and 80s, the monetary returns to the performers in this scheme was usually none, and there were no professional "producers" to make a profit out of their productions. Zeynel notes that artists were not concerned at all with making money in the pre-legal period:

> When there were no *bandrol*s [issued to Kurdish music], there was a lot of piracy. What I mean is, piracy did not start when [legal] Kurdish music was introduced to the market, piracy [of Kurdish music] preceded that. Of course, back then artists didn't have such concerns as, "I made an album, I will put it on the market, then I will receive [royalties]", there was nothing [the artist] could receive, they were making music illegally. Their only purpose then was, no matter how, these products must reach the people. So it would be sold under the table, and those who did so would duplicate the cassettes and sell them. So artists had no expectations. [Expecting royalties] started after the 90s, when it became legal to [make Kurdish music], and the artists now were

> able to receive royalties from the sales of their works. To do so they began to sign contracts with the firms. (Zeynel, director of a cultural center)

However, despite the possibility for making profits out of producing Kurdish music, the commercial activities were still framed with political terms. As mentioned earlier, during the very first years of legalization, a large number of companies in *Unkapanı* produced Kurdish albums, and many of these were businesses that primarily produced Turkish music. Emre notes after he and some other Kurdish producers had produced Kurdish albums, *Unkapani* realized that there was large demand for Kurdish music, but, to repeat some of the points made in the previous sections, this initial enthusiasm could not be sustained, due to the political complexities of the time.

> E: … to know that there was such a [public] reception, that there was a commercial demand, this triggered all the other [companies in Unkapanı] as well. So in the following year, Raks, for example, which was a very large company, even they produced 7 or 8 albums. I think there were very few people here who didn't produce any Kurdish albums, because there was a demand, an economic demand.
> A: Did those people continue to produce Kurdish music?
> E: No, they didn't, what happened was they realized, they saw that producing Kurdish, was so political, that it used to be impossible to even speak it… they at first didn't know that it was loaded with political and ideological meanings. They just thought, oh look it's being sold, and just like they could produce *Ankaralı Turgut*, they thought [producing] Kurdish music would be something like that. But then they saw that it's a political thing, and when you do it you might have to go to the DGM courts, and they realized, this is not what they thought it was. So most of them stopped producing [Kurdish music] after a couple of albums, after realizing that [producing] had a political dimension, they all left it and only a few firms remained.

The distinction that Emre makes between making Turkish music with a commercial orientation and the production of Kurdish music is particularly

evocative: Emre's reference to *Ankaralı Turgut* is not coincidental – Ankaralı Turgut was a singer from a working-class background, whose initial grassroots popularity in the *türkü bar*'s of Ankara's periphery in the early 1990s converted into widescale and national market success in the late 90s. However, Ankaralı Turgut, despite not fitting traditional appearances and expectations of "stardom," was nonetheless "unmarked:" Turkish songs, sung by a Turkish singer with no overt political proclivities, didn't attract the type of surveillance, censorship, or lack of retail space that was so often the case for Kurdish music. Therefore, this comparison is particularly significant: Kurdish local performers, despite having similar backgrounds (in terms of economic and cultural capital) with their Turkish counterparts, were unable to hope for a similar degree of mainstream success or acceptance. Thus, Emre draws attention not just to the undesirability, but in his view, the impossibility of making Kurdish music by embracing a predominantly commercial logic.

Money *was* made in many cases following 1991, although several market actors claim that this was not the main purpose, nor was it always the case. Emre, for example, argues that for many of the Kurdish albums he produced and supplied to the market, he barely made a profit. Sometimes the costs incurred through legal issues surpassed the profits he made. But, he argues that he was stubborn about continuing to produce the music - thus, he found the solution through make money via other musical endeavors: procuring and selling the European distribution rights for popular artists singing in Turkish, such as Muazzez Abacı, Burhan Çaçan, and İbrahim Tatlıses. He "made a lot of money this way," he says, "so I no longer cared if I lost money when I made Kurdish music and it was recollected from the market." This account is also a clear example of how Emre devised a tactic (De Certeau 1988)

or a form of "local knowledge" (Scott 1998) in response his encounters with the state: by making money on other types of business ventures, he was able to keep the practice of producing Kurdish music apart from the commercial concerns that went along with keeping a business afloat. Informants also noted that some producers were willing to "engage in piracy" - that is, if their productions were recalled from the market, or failed to pass inspection, they would find ways to illegally distribute their albums via informal vendors, or through retailers who were willing to undertake under-the-counter sales.

That being said, placing some effort to sell cassettes and generate profits was not necessarily perceived as a bad thing, either. Once again, it has been treated as a "moral issue", related to furthering Kurdish music and reaching the Kurdish public. Companies who do not take the necessary steps to ensure some market success are failing not only the performers, but their audience as well. Ismail noted that sometimes he would receive messages from fans in smaller towns in the region, asking when his new album would reach the shops in their towns. This frustrated Ismail, who felt that he was having a hard time reaching these people:

> For example, we can't see our albums on the shelves [in the region]. You can go to many places that sell albums, and you won't find mine, for instance. There is definitely a problem regarding distribution. They say they send the album to Diyarbakir but it's not there. [Other music companies] don't do that – they go and deliver the album, sometimes with their [personal] vehicles… of course, that's because they want to make money, because they need to deliver it [to the retailer] to be able to make money. [A] does not have such concerns, but should [A] have those concerns? I think it should! Because you need to take your products [to the retailer and the customer], not in order to make money, but to deliver the product. … I think this is something to be criticized about [A]. You can't do these things just by phone, this is a market and if you want to exist in this market, you need to place some effort. You

> might have an identity, fine, use that identity, but also do what other companies do. … Look at [X] Müzik, their albums are sold even in Europe, at the airports. Kalan as well. But our albums are not there. So we are a bit distressed. (Ismail)

Ismail's words express the (potential) way in which the tension between commercial interests and a political-moral framework can be negotiated: the morally correct way of having commercial aspirations is to transcend materialistic aims, but rather, to think about commercial success as a service to the artists and the audience - and thus, to the Kurdish public. Service and "existence" in the market is justified by reaching people – and this is vital in the political sense. Moreover, being able to sell many albums verifies the broad interest in Kurdish music, and is seen as a step towards recognition as a distinct, and very large community within Turkey - many times, the "hundreds of thousands" of albums that were sold for so-and-so artist were recounted, which I think indicates the "presence" of Kurds and is shown as evidence of their actively seeking Kurdish music. Thus, this is a community that will not "make do" with Turkish (or other non-Kurdish) music, they want Kurdish music, and they do, indeed, buy it. The market's existence is thus also justified. [A]'s reluctance to become commercially oriented is, in Ismail's mind, a disappointment not in the commercial sense, but in the political sense – thus the "yurtsever" ethos is not divorced from commercial success, but is delineated from an overtly commercialistic orientation.

3.3.3.4 Pure versus Mixed Employment of Logics

[A] Müzik is perceived, despite its relatively late entry, as having embodied and demonstrated the strongest dedication to "reviving" Kurdish culture and producing

music that is politically relevant to the Kurdish cause. Owners of other companies (with the moral-political orientation) at Unkapanı often admit that [A] Müzik has a "special place" (*yeri ayrı*). Murat (owner of another company) for instance, explained:

> [A] is foremost amongst all the companies producing Kurdish music. They are involved one hundred percent with Kurdish music. I mean, I am talking about a company which produces *only* Kurdish music albums, and they hold the majority of the market. Well-regarded artists who make high quality music work with [A] today. Of course, in the past a lot of them also worked with [Emre's company]… and now there are other companies heavily involved in Kurdish music, such as … [names of some companies in Unkapanı]. (Utku)

Emre's company also receives special recognition, particularly because he had been willing to push the limits and to produce the albums of groups from the Center during the more tumultuous times. When I interviewed Utku at [A] Muzik, for instance, he emphasized that I needed to interview Emre, and took me to his office to introduce me at the end of our interview - despite, as I will discuss in the next chapter, Emre having shifted his orientation more recently towards the employment of "artistic logics." [A] Müzik, however, received a special reverence from affiliated artists and other actors in the field – and this reverence moreover translated into consumer interest in whatever [A] produced. In the words of many artists affiliated with [A], but also according to other producers, [A] was the *only* company that had no commercial concerns. Freed from the claws of commercial interests, the company was thus seen as the most morally and politically "pure." In general terms, this "pure" political agenda meant that whatever the company did, it

did in the name of the pro-Kurdish cause. Thus, artistry as well as commercial success were framed in moral and political terms, as I shall further discuss.

Some other companies and producers, on the other hand, are seen as having employed more "hybrid" agendas – a mixture of commercial and political concerns, and are thus viewed not *quite* as "heroic" as others. The amount of *"bedel"* paid, and the degree of "*yurtseverlik"* that is demonstrated through various practices, as well as the "quality" of the music they produce, have an impact on the position a company and actor enjoys within the market. For instance, referring to a company owner in Unkapanı, Tahir (performer and sound engineer) made the remark "yes, he's a *yurtsever*, but…" and indicated that no company was as purely dedicated to the Kurdish cause as [A] Muzik. This valorization of [A] Muzik, however, also made it somewhat immune to critique - as I discussed with Ismail's account, some performers complained that [A] was not as dedicated as promoting and distributing its performers as some of the more commercially-oriented firms. [A] Muzik was, according to these performers, confident of its being a "brand" (several informants referred to [A] Muzik as a brand, "*marka*") and relatedly its ability to sell on account of its valuable name.

3.3.3.5 Section Summary

So far, I have tried to illustrate the different framings that formed a basis for an emergent market culture. These morally charged and politically significant framings, widely shared among the producers that "survived" the 1990s, constitute the central logic of what has been referred to as a "proto-institution" (Lawrence et al. 2002). In other words, a political-normative "proto-institutional logic" emerged and came to

take a central role in the market. While the tensions that are generated by artistic and commercial logics were also relevant to the market for Kurdish music, they were to a large extent negotiated by placing weight on the political-normative logic. Both logics were, when convenient, ignored or justified through the employment of political-normative frames. As such, the market actors tried to demonstrate a fit, not so much with the normative and cultural structures of the broader (and predominantly Turkish) society, but more so with those of a largely pro-movement Kurdish public. The market served as another space where an ideal "Kurdish nation" was imagined.

That being said, within the market, all producers are not considered as equal. Amongst the "yurtsever" producers and companies that I examined in this chapter, a certain hierarchy also exists. The political-normative proto-institutional logic also serves to delineate which companies and actors have been more "purely" devoted to a political agenda, and which ones have pursued a mixed political-commercial agenda.

3.4 Discussion

In this chapter, I set out to understand how the socio-political dynamics of stigma and domination influenced the process of market emergence. In contrast to processes of market creation that result in mainstream legitimation (Humphreys 2010a,b; Press and Arnould 2011), an alternative and ideologically-charged (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010; Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007) market culture, with close ties to an oppositional social-movement (Lounsbury et al. 2003; Sine and Lee 2009; Weber et

al. 2008) emerged and evolved. This market emerged in a context characterized by multiple constituencies with different demands (Pache and Santos 2010).

I found that stigmatization, domination, and marginalization were reflected, at the level of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Swartz 1997) of music production, as barriers towards mainstream inclusion - that is, in attaining adherence to mainstream normative, cognitive, and regulative orders, and thus being perceived as "legitimate" (W.R. Scott 1995) by broader society. Rather, market actors were "marked," through legal restrictions, close surveillance of market activities and products, (arbitrary) recalls of "offensive" materials, longstanding court trials, and at times, through physical violence. Despite the state's conferral of legal status upon the market in 1991, the lack of cultural and normative legitimacy of Kurdish identity, language, and music are reflected in difficulties finding recognition in the mainstream culture and representation in mainstream retail and media outlets. This is in contrast to other cases where the state's conferral of legality engendered mainstream acceptance (e.g., Humphreys 2010a,b). The conferral of legality led to centralized production, but also, accordingly, centralized state surveillance and restriction.

The "tensions" that characterize the emergence of this market are, importantly, twofold: market actors engaged in a field-level struggle over "meanings and resources" (Lounsbury et al. 2003: 72); and this struggle was also bi-directionally linked to a broader, societal-level struggle - particularly contra the dominating state. The marginalized and "marked" position of the actors, and the ongoing struggle, in turn, cultivated a resistive response in actors. With many of them already habituated into a particular pro-Kurdish political orientation and

accordant collective identity, market actors - including producers/company owners, performers (singers, musicians), sound engineers and other studio personnel, as well as distributors and retailers - reacted to stigmatization by constituting themselves as activists of the Kurdish political movement, by framing their experiences and injuries in the marketplace, accumulating repertoires of shared knowledge and marketplace tactics (J.C. Scott 1990, 1998), and interacting with the pro-Kurdish political movement, often constituting themselves as "activists" of this movement.

I detected seven frames that were generated and narrated by actors in describing their situation and activities in the 1990s: Raising national consciousness and awareness; grievances; lineage of illegal circulation; market actors as activists; collective and collaborative action; good music as serving progress; sales as service. The first three frames were generated in relation to the illegal era of circulation. The findings that I present regarding illegal circulation in this chapter emphasize the emergence of a politicized collective identity (Simon and Klandermans 2001) that accompanied the generation of a unifying and boundary-delineating emotional habitus (detailed in Chapter 2, see also Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014), and which shaped the collective identity of producers (Weber et al. 2008) in the formal market. Once the market was legalized, the frames from the illegal era were revised and adapted in accordance with the changes in the socio-political atmosphere. Frames were also generated and adapted from the Kurdish movement. Codes that relate to "liberty," "resistance," "sacrifice," "national consciousness," and "service to the community" were particularly adapted from the movement articulated in ways that would shape actors' political orientations and, accordingly, business decisions.

Grievances and conflict, rather than dissuading actors from entering the market, had the unintended consequence of persuading them to "join in the fight" and to embody a moral, political, and resistive common stance that informed, and was articulated through, the production, performance, and circulation of music. As such, producers were "produced" (Weber et al. 2008) - entrepreneurs were convinced to partake in market activities, not just "despite" but also "because of" the struggle. The object of exchange - the music (albums) - were loaded with political and normative lyrics, imagery, and emotions. Producers and performers engaged in tactics - including using allusions and code words in lieu of explicit political content, and sometimes distributed their albums outside of the legal market, so that it would reach the audience. The audience and the producers were imagined as part of a community - an "awakened" Kurdish public. Some companies were seen as embracing these norms and practices in a manner that is more pure, and disentangled from commercial concerns - those were the companies that were regarded with more respect amongst the producers, as being better "patriots." Those were, moreover, the companies whose products received most interest from the audience.

The frames related to artistic and commercial concerns - in emic terms, "good music" and "sales" - were notably formulated after legalization, in response to the tension between artistic and commercial logics (Bourdieu 1996; Caves 2000; Glynn and Lounsbury 2005). The frames reflect that the resolution to this tension was sought through the employment of political normativity: when both concerns are framed within the political agenda of serving the Kurdish community, and representing the progress of Kurdish cultural production to "others," and ensuring the continuation of the market, then they are deemed as acceptable for this market. The



Figure 2 - The Emergent Market for Kurdish Music

other five frames were more specific to the field of Kurdish music production, and were "built" consequentially: throughout the illegal circulation era, and encompassing the day to day experiences of the actors, in dealing with the state, in their frustrations regarding the broader dynamics of the music market in Turkey (including Unkapanı, distributors, retailers, and the mass media); and through their communications and collaborations with each other.

To summarize, and as illustrated by figure 2, these framings - drawn from movement codes, as well as everyday experiences and interactions, informed the ways in which actors collaborated with each other, shaping their business and artistic decisions in ways that serve the resistive pro-Kurdish political cause. As such, actors generated a political and oppositional market culture within the broader market for music in Turkey. With these findings, I link two streams of research on collective

action in markets: one that treats social movements as a "metaphor" for the collective and collaborative efforts of framing, resource mobilization, and collective identity formation that takes place *within* markets and market organizations (e.g., Fligstein 1996; Navis and Glynn 2010; Swaminathan and Wade 1999; Weber et al. 2008); and one that addresses the interaction of markets with social movements that originate in broader society (e.g., Lounsbury et al. 2003; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013; Sine and Lee 2009). I argue that the "codes" and "frames" that fuel collective action within the market are drawn from multiple sources - both from actors' experiences "within" the market and through the interactions and co-constitutive relationship with the political movement that originated "outside." The generation, adoption, appropriation, and articulation of frames, and the ensuing actions taken by the market actors enact a link between the "inside" and the "outside," rendering a bi-directional bridge between the movement and the market.

The emergent literature on the creation and institutionalization of markets (e.g., Giesler 2008, 2012; Humphreys 2010a,b; Karababa and Ger 2011) acknowledges that market actors employ discursive devices - such as framing in overcoming cultural, normative, and/or legislative barriers to becoming widely recognized. Framing thus justifies the emergence and activities of the market to the dominant institutional order. Yet, this perspective does not take into account the multiple orders and constituencies, which exist in contention and do not enjoy the same status in society. I thus contribute to this research by examining how frames generated within the market can oppose the dominant institutional order. Such frames shape a market that caters to a dominated and stigmatized constituency - constituting, concomitantly, a "social imaginary" of a unified community.

I draw inspiration from the creation of a "parallel taste structure" by a stigmatized community (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010), and the deployment of "countervailing ideologies" (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007) that structure a non-mainstream market. My fieldwork did not encompass taste and "lifestyle" outside of the market for music, thus I cannot generalize my findings to indicate the emergence of a "taste structure," in addition to a music market. The ideology that fuels this market, moreover, is not popular enough in society to warrant the usage of the term "parallel." Thus, I refer to the market culture as "alternative."

As such, I also contribute to research that addresses the market-mediated and recognition-seeking activities of disadvantaged social groups. While disadvantaged groups may wish to be served in an equal manner by mainstream markets (Scaraboto and Fischer 2013), this may not be possible, due to ideological conflicts that characterize the source of disadvantage. The chasm between dominant ideology and "minority" ideology, for instance, often blocks the acceptance of marginalized social groups into "mainstream" dominant culture (Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner and Thompson 2012). Yet, a dominated position does not necessarily lead to "shattered dreams," as Ustuner and Holt (2007) seem to suggest: domination and stigmatization often engender resistance. My findings support Sandıkcı and Ger (2010)'s argument that stigmatization may lead to the emergence of a parallel - or, in my case, alternative - order that is shaped by oppositional political norms. I contribute to Sandıkcı and Ger (2010) by explicating how this normative structure is shaped by producers, and by detailing how market-level framing contributes to this process.

In chapter 4, I explore how the market continued to evolve in the gradually more relaxed political atmosphere of the 2000s. The most important outcome of this period is the segmentation of the market: The political-normative logic continued to

evolve, and remained relevant for some market actors, while other actors also drew from competing ideologies and logics. I also discuss how segmentation was accompanied by competing social imaginaries of "Kurdish" identity; and social distance was cultivated amongst these competing segments.

CHAPTER 4:

THE SEGMENTATION OF THE MARKET

> "In the past there was more of a monopolistic [situation], and the reason for this was the oppression [from the state]. For instance back then I was working for a publishing house and it was a political one - I mean, it wasn't independent, it was a *Kurdish* publishing house. Because back then you could get arrested, and then someone else would have to replace you. You couldn't do that unless you were part of a political organization. The publishing business was like that, the music business was like that, everything was like that. These were not things you could do [independently]. … after the 2000s, though, after Abdullah Öcalan was brought to Turkey, some things started to change in Turkey… and then you started to have independent ventures." (Dicle, publisher)

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed how the illegal and informal circulation of Kurdish music transitioned into a legal market with a distinct market culture. I argued that an emergent moral-political proto-institutional logic was the dominant logic in shaping this market culture - influencing the types of music that was produced as well as the ways in which business was conducted. This framework, in turn was influenced by the pro-Kurdish movement (mostly PKK-line) with which

many actors in the market ideologically aligned, and also (inter-connectedly) through repertoires of knowledge, experience, and tactics that were accumulated in experiences and encounters with the state. The other two logics which were at play in the field - the logics of commerce and artistry/aesthetics, were often ignored or negotiated through employing the normative-political logic.

Scholars have drawn attention to the linkages among market segments and institutional logics. Organizations respond to multiple institutional logics in different ways - i.e., by engaging in different practices, which also accounts for heterogeneity in a field (Greenwood et al. 2010). This heterogeneity may correspond to different "segments" (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005). While there was, as discussed in the previous chapter, a degree of diversity in practice in the 1990s, and thus a hierarchy amongst actors in the market; it was still possible to talk about a more unified and politically oriented market culture - in the accounts of market actors, that was the *only* way available to do business then, given the tense and restrictive political environment. Yet, starting in the early 2000s, this tableau started to change.

This chapter is a mostly descriptive account of how the market changed and became fragmented in the 2000s, in conjunction with the changes in the political, social, as well as technological environment. This is somewhat akin to the fragmentation in a "rebellious subculture" that results in "multiple forms and expression" (Martin and Schouten 2013). With the state relaxing some restrictions on the public use of Kurdish language, I shall argue that a wider space and more opportunities were available for a more varied type of market cultures in the market. Moreover, changes in digital technologies - particularly mp3s and streaming media -

dramatically changed the way and volumes in which music was sold on the legal marketplace, which in turn had created difficulties regarding the financing and production of new albums. I thus analyze the changes in market dynamics in light of changes in the broader institutional environment, arguing that a number of new "segments" emerged.

The "political segment" is constituted by the normative-political logic that developed in the 1990s - yet this logic has also evolved in certain ways. Grievance frames have shifted focus from oppressive policies of the state to a more general sense of having unequal status in mainstream culture, and finding it still difficult to sell, broadcast, advertise, and perform the music in mainstream channels and venues. Collaborations and a convivial atmosphere amongst market actors exists, but have lost their urgency and necessity. Moreover, illegal circulation has now become recast as "immoral," as it leaves the producer-actors without the revenues necessary to produce new works. The aim is no longer to "circulate the music, no matter what." The existence of other segments also means that producers do not have to subscribe into the political-normative frames and logic that are espoused by the political segment and the pro-Kurdish movement: different producer identities, definitions of objects, and exchange relationships are possible. Yet, for the political segment, the political-normative frame of "*yurtseverlik* and *orgutluluk* as collective identity" becomes more salient in this period: with new entrants to the market, these identifications become more important in terms of making and maintaining boundaries against the "internal other"s.

The "world music segment" is shaped by a higher weight placed on the "artistic logic" and also emerged concomitantly with the rise of Istanbul and Beyoglu

as a center for world/ethnic music. Kurdish music is recognized as a cultural product emerging from a multi-cultured Turkey/Anatolia, rather than produced/performed with a specifically pro-Kurdish political agenda. The two other segments, which I detected mainly through research in print/online media and through the framings of actors in the political and world music segments, are the "commercial segment" and the "challenger segment." The commercial segment employs a commercial logic and is more profit and entertainment oriented. The "challenger segment," which emerged after the government's "Kurdish initiative" in 2009, comprises actors that are pro-government.

The creation of new segments also had implications that go beyond "multiple forms and expressions" and relates to the types of audience that is "imagined" as being the constituents of the market. Markets, in Spillman's (1999) framework, are "social imaginaries" constituted by (potential) partners in exchange. With segmentation, sub-markets, each with their own culture, emerge - and this involves the generation of separate and sometimes competing social imaginaries of "who" the producers and consumers are. As I shall discuss, in the case of the Kurdish music market, the segmentation in the 2000s also involved the generation of sometimes conflicting constructions of appropriate "Kurdishness" amongst the Kurdish constituency. I thus ponder upon the creation and erection of moral boundaries (Lamont 1992, 2000; Saatcioglu and Ozanne 2013) that not only delineate the Kurds from the external Other - the Turks and in particular the State - but also serve to generate segments of "Internal Others."

Segmentation and the accompanying salience of "internal others" also draws attention to both the tenacity and also, simultaneously, the lack of fixity in the

"relation between social distance and affective orientations" (Karakayali 2009: 545). While I detailed the emergence of an emotional structure that unified *the Kurds* and delineated them from their others - in particular, the State, but also relatedly the Turkish public - I did not find that social distance *within* the Kurdish community was a salient aspect of this circulation. Narratives on the market during the 1990s, similarly, overwhelmingly focus on the unity and collective identity within the market, in the face of the restrictive state, rather than on differences and distances amongst Kurdish producer-actors within the market. Thus, the findings I present in this fourth chapter necessitate further pondering on how/when "strangeness" that is associated with "negative affect" (Karakayali 2009) is cultivated amongst those who are "alike." I discuss how multiple political orientations/ affiliations, which accompany the changes in the socio-political atmosphere, may account for the salience in boundary-making moral discourses and territorial conflicts amongst Kurdish actors that go along with segmentation within the market.

4.2 Changes in the Social-Political Environment

There were a number of important political developments in the late 90s and early 2000s that are relevant in terms of their impact on the market for Kurdish music. First of all, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured and imprisoned by Turkish authorities in 1999. The PKK declared unilateral ceasefire following this event (this ceasefire would last until 2004). Secondly, there were several changes in legislation - including at the constitutional level - accompanying negotiations for Turkey to enter the EU. These involved the reform packages that were termed "*AB*

uyum paketleri" (EU harmonization packages) and included amendments to TV and radio laws, made it possible to establish of Kurdish language courses, and legalized the usage of Kurdish language by politicians in political rallies. In practice, however, full-time broadcasting in Kurdish language would not be possible until the "Kurdish initiative" of 2009, which implemented a number of other reforms related to language and cultural production. An important element of the 2009 initiative was the start of state-run Kurdish television broadcasts.

With respect to the broader musical production field in Turkey, this period coincides, also, with rising interest in "ethnic music" and the emergence of a "world music scene" in Istanbul. This interest had implications for Kurdish music as well. In this chapter, I detail the rising discourses on "pluralism" or "multivocality" in this period – particularly as they are co-constructed and utilized by the music market – and how Kurdish music figures within in this scheme.

Finally, the advancements in digital technologies had a monumental impact on the music industry in general. First through sharing, copying, and downloading of MP3s, it became much easier to copy and distribute large bulks of music (with one CD or VCD able to carry hundreds of songs), and later through streaming sites (such as youtube), music was easily accessed for free. This, in turn, translated to severely decreased sales in albums – and thus lower revenues that impacted the funds available to finance new album production. Illegal circulation was recast as an immoral (rather than political-tactical) practice, and it also put smaller companies at a disadvantageous position when compared to multi-national companies (and their subsidiaries).

The problems of finding venues for performance, outlets for album sales, and channels to air music and videos persisted throughout the 2000s. Censorship and strict regulations on musical content and lyrics were, to a large extent relaxed – court cases dealing with "divisive music" became quite rare, according to producers. That being said, stigma on Kurdish identity and usage of Kurdish language in public did not necessarily subside. Somer (2005) has noted that while the presence of distinct ethnic identities – such as Kurdish identity – slowly became publicly recognized throughout the 1990s, "mainstream beliefs regarding the desirability or acceptability of any Kurdish ethnic-cultural and political rights and expressions did not necessarily change" (74).

A number of cases demonstrate the potential for contention that the issue of Kurdish music continued to carry throughout the late 90s and 2000s. One was the near-lynching of Ahmet Kaya, a very popular folk/ arabesk singer during the "Magazin Gazetecileri Derneği Ödülleri" in 1999. The awards ceremony was set up as a dinner-event. Ahmet Kaya, recipient of the "artist of the year" award, made an acceptance speech which included a statement that he would record a Kurdish song, and make a music video for it. " I know that there are brave people who will broadcast this video," he said. The venue erupted in protest. Many people in the audience started throwing their silverware at the singer. During the event and in its aftermath, very few individuals voiced or demonstrated support for Kaya, and mainstream press went on to circulate allegations of his affiliation with PKK – including images of him performing, in the past, at a PKK-affiliated event in Europe. Ahmet Kaya eventually fled the country that year, but reports on his traitorship continued to circulate - a mainstream newspaper famously deemed him

"dishonorable" (*şerefsiz*) in 2000. Kaya passed away within a year, believed, by his friends and family, to have lost his health due to disappointment and heartbreak over what had ensued.

The atmosphere did start to change in the matter of a few years, however. Stokes (2011) notes that as little as two years after the Ahmet Kaya-Kral TV incident, Sezen Aksu, a very popular Turkish singer, embarked on a concert tour in Turkey and Europe, accompanied by a large orchestra and many music ensembles representing some of Turkey's ethnic minorities: "the choir of the Ferikoy Vatanart Armenian Church in Istanbul, the Los Pasaros Sephardic Jewish Music Ensemble, the Oniro Greek Music Ensemble, and the Diyarbakır (Kurdish) City Council Children's Choir" (Stokes 2011: 135). Aksu herself performed a song in Kurdish during these concerts. While these concerts were met with criticism from Turkish nationalist factions, they also received broad support, and were very well-attended. Moreover, the tour was sponsored by the Ministry of Culture (Stokes 2011). By the end of the decade, the "climate" changed to the extent that, many people who participated in protesting Ahmet Kaya started to speak out about their regret regarding what happened that night. Around 2013 and 2014, as this dissertation was being written, the Ahmet Kaya incident was still being discussed in mainstream as well as Kurdish media.

Public (rather than convert) music concerts, featuring both Turkish and Kurdish performers, began in the 2000s. Starting with 2000, Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır were permitted by the authorities[24] and featured several prominent

[24] http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=664636&CategoryID=96

performers. Sezen Aksu participated in the Diyarbakır Newroz celebrations in 2002[25], amidst extreme security measures. The following year, Ciwan Haco, a very popular Kurdish singer from Syria (but with roots in Mardin in Turkey) performed his first concert in Turkey, in Batman. The audience for this groundbreaking occasion reportedly totalled 300,000. The second concert, which took place a few days later in Diyarbakır, attracted more than one million people. The experience is covered in the documentary "The Road to Diyarbekir" (Ahmed 2010), which shows the celebratory and optimistic atmosphere that surrounds the "return" of the artist to his symbolic "homeland", and its significance for the Kurds of Turkey.

Despite the loosening of restrictions around Kurdish music, there were still grievances about perceived inequities that were commonly shared by a number of interviewees in the political segment. There is still inequality with respect to the representation of Kurdish music in the "marketplace": in terms of shelf space, advertising, interview-articles in mainstream media, broadcast of music videos on nation-wide broadcasting stations, radio airplay, and also in terms of opportunities for live performance. Until the beginning of the 2010s, most venues in Beyoğlu were still unavailable to most Kurdish performers, and live performances (in Istanbul) were limited to weddings, *türkü bar*s[26], and political events. A number of Kurdish-owned venues that emerged in Beyoğlu in the early 2010s provided a outlets for performance, but the division between places where Kurdish artists perform, and where they don't perform remains significant. As Veysel, a performer, pointed out,

[25] http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2002/mart/26/g10.html and http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/03/26/haberler/h2.htm for accounts of the concert

[26] pub/winehouse type establishments where folk/ folk-protest type music, as well as *arabesk* and was performed. Often owned/ managed and also patronized by left-wing supporting or leaning individuals - particularly students, as well as lower-middle and lower income clientele (Aytar and Keskin 2003), *türkü bar*s were spaces where Kurdish music could be heard.

festivals organized by private organizations or by municipalities tend not to feature Kurdish performers and groups - with the exception of municipalities in the predominantly Kurdish-inhabited towns and cities.

The AKP won the general elections and thus led the government in 2002, a few years following the imprisonment of Öcalan. While the EU-Adaptation amendments had been instated by the previous coalition government (headed by the now-defunct, DSP, the Democratic Left Party), they were continued by the AKP. AKP's policies, and prime minister Erdogan's public speeches regarding the Kurdish issue also seemed to continue on the track to affording a broader range of cultural rights and recognition to the Kurds. According to Somer and Liaras (2010), AKP's efforts were rewarded in the 2007 elections, when AKP gained a sizable vote from the Kurdish-dominant areas, following which, AKP "declared itself "the real representative" of the country's Kurds" (pg. 154), which led to debates that also translated into contention within the music market.

The Kurdish "Initiative" or "Opening" ("*açılım*") took place in 2009, as part of the AKP government's efforts to offer a "solution" to the "Kurdish problem" in Turkey. While many of the terms initially proposed by this initiative were left untended (see Cakir 2010) - and, moreover, its name was changed in the following months to become the "Democratic" rather than the "Kurdish" opening - one amendment that did take place was to make necessary arrangements to remove all legal barriers from Kurdish television broadcasts. While the EU-adaptation package amendments had legalized Kurdish broadcast in 2002, barriers on full-time Kurdish TV programming had still remained up to 2009, allowing only a limited number of hours of broadcast in Kurdish. Legally amending this situation, the government also

announced its plans to start broadcasts in Kurdish, on a channel named TRT-6 (referred to as TRT- "*şeş*", the Kurdish word for six), and started test broadcast in January 2009.

Discussions on the "Kurdish initiative" (*açılım*) and TRT-6 took place in a very public manner in 2009. On one hand, there was a sizable resistance from the Turkish public (White 2013), which Somer and Liaras (2010) argue is based on the widespread belief that recognizing ethnic pluralism – especially "Kurdish" ethnic identity, which for so long has been associated in public discourse with "terrorism" – is a ploy backed by "foreign powers" that would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the nation-state. Amongst the political parties, the leaders and parliament members of CHP and MHP were both vehemently opposed to the initiative, with the leader of MHP referring to some journalists who attended Opening-related workshops as traitors (Cakir 2010). An incident referred to as the "Habur Incident" in the press seemed to dampen the progress of the initiative amongst the AKP as well. In this incident, a number of PKK-members returned to Turkey entering through the Habur border, turned themselves in to authorities, and were released after questioning, as part of a deal struck within the Initiative Processes. This turning in and release was designed to be the first step in a broader amnesty encompassing many PKK members. However, the celebratory manner in which these initial returnees were greeted by Kurdish public and politicians, and the fact that the PKK-members were making victory signs upon their arrival, created a strong reaction amongst the more nationalistic factions of the Turkish constituency. Cakir (2010) notes that following this event, the initiative was, at least for a while, off the table.

It should be noted, however, that Turks did not comprise the only constituency to resist the initiative. A significant portion of the Kurdish constituency was likewise skeptical and/or dismissive of these efforts. The closure of the pro-Kurdish political party, DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – Democratic Society Party) by constitutional court, within a year of the announcement of the "Opening;" and continued arrests of many individuals on allegations of association with the PKK (referred to as the *KCK Davası*) were perceived among the Kurdish constituency as proof of the government's insincerity. As of 2014, discussions on the government's sincerity, the Kurds' willingness to give up arms, and the possibility of "peace" continue amidst increasing turmoil in Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

As of 2014, there are several TV channels broadcasting in Kurdish - a number of them owned and operated by pro-movement groups or individuals, but others also by groups with different affiliations. The field has thus broadened - and thus, also, groups that make claims on representing "Kurdishness" have also multiplied (Gürbüz 2012). This, as I shall discuss, has implications on the boundaries constructed within the music field as well.

I decided to divide the music scene in the 2000s, into four different segments: The "political segment," which corresponds to the evolution of the market that I discussed in the previous chapter; the "world music segment", an emergent scene comprised of a very limited number of groups and performers but which also garnered attention from mainstream media, Turkish audience, and the world music scene; the "commercial music segment" that is comprised of singers and musicians which mostly perform as wedding bands; and finally the "challenger segment,"

comprised of actors who are perceived as challenging or making alternative claims on Kurdish identity.

4.3 Findings

4.3.1 Segment 1: The "Political Segment"

The political music segment, which dominated the music scene in the 1990s, continued to have a significant presence after the 2000s. Yet, its stronghold in the market started to become somewhat challenged by a number of other actors and developments. With the relaxation of legal limitations, it was no longer as vital to have the collaborative support of other actors in the music market, as it used to be, nor was it as necessary to be backed by a political organization. Moreover, difficulties in financing album production (which influence the whole music market in Turkey) as well as certain artistic bottlenecks have led to a period that several of my interviewees are complaining about. I will thus explain how the market culture - such as the ways of doing business, the content of music - transformed, in conjunction with the strengthening of boundaries contra certain "other" Kurdish groups.

Several producers and artists who noted, in our interviews, that the 1990s especially was a time when making political statements – not only through lyrics, but also by the sole virtue of singing in Kurdish – was considered, by movement and market actors, to be more important than taking artistry into serious consideration. The results, however, in the 2000s during a period, particularly, when the movement had "lost tempo," the music market found itself in a void. Ismail's quote that I relayed in the previous chapter particularly referred to this "problem" of not quite

knowing what to do in times of "cease-fire". While the political music segment has been trying to change and vitalize its artistic ethos, the results have been somewhat mixed, compounded by financial difficulties following the introduction and proliferation of digital media. The actors in this segment continue to employ grievance frames - they continue to justify the work they do by referring to past and continuing difficulties that they encountered within and outside of the market. At a panel I attended as an audience, in 2013, a number of actors from the arts and music scene (including a representative from "The Center") spoke about their experiences as performers and cultural producers. Stories of restrictions, police custody, and censorship were relayed enthusiastically - I took two pages of notes, adding a comment that these were all "things I've heard before." One panelist humorously noted that "they [authorities] used to say, you're making this music, you're inciting the young people to go to [join the PKK in] the mountains." He paused. "Well, I have to admit, they were right!" The venue erupted in laughter.

As Ismail mentioned, during periods of political change (such as cease-fire) musicians and other actors, particularly at The Center, would get together to discuss the implications of such change for their music-making practices. I found evidence of such discussions in a number of publications where artists and market actors wrote opinion pieces (I was able to come across a number of such Turkish-language articles spanning the mid-2000s in the monthly publication *Tiroj*). Additionally, a conference on Kurdish music was held in Diyarbakir in 2006, and these issues were discussed there as well. One result that emerged from these discussions was a shift away from agitative music towards building more "folkloric" repertoire. The focus, in these efforts, was on unearthing and (re)creating "cultural resources" (see also Sarıtaş

2009). There was also a shift from groups (i.e., *Kom*s) to individual performers: The music groups of the Center started dissolving; while some members reconvened and formed new groups, a large number of them continued to perform as solo artists. Amongst the younger, more recent entrants to this scene, some have been experimenting with forms that are relatively "new" to Kurdish music, such as rock and hip-hop. It should be noted that while these developments parallel certain trends in the "world music" segment, the political segment continued to frame their activities and motivations with a pro-Kurdish normative and political ethos.

At the same time, artists based in Europe unbounded by, and also more skeptical of, governmental interventions, continued to produce more politically overt and reactionary music. The albums of these artists were distributed (legally) by producers in the political segment. When conflict between the PKK and the military started re-escalating in 2004, agitative music in the local scene also became somewhat popular again. There was, significantly strong interest for a music band formed by PKK-members called *Avaze Çiya* ("the sound of the mountains"). While their albums were not available on the legal market, they were heavily featured on the pro-Kurdish TV channels (Med TV, replaced by Medya TV and later Roj TV) as well as through other informal means (mp3 CDs and later through internet channels such as Youtube).

The Center, according to some criticism I've heard, has become too "cliquey." Kerem, a singer and guitarist in an independent (i.e., unaffiliated with any production company) rock band, notes that he and his band-members spent a year at The Center during which they went almost every day, spent time at the cafeteria, drank tea, and conversed with other people going there, but were never admitted into

an “inner circle” which would lead to them producing albums and taking stage at Center-related events. He notes that the Center had been a very important “first step” in the 1990s, but it was unable to follow up on its initial promise:

> You open up a cultural center, but if you cannot turn that into a conservatory or an academy, if you cannot turn this into a serious perspective and spread it to the whole public, then all that you did is in vain. That is kind of what has happened here, and it is a serious problem. On one hand, there is a huge cultural and public movement, but when you look at the field of arts and culture, that is still stuck between the first and second steps. (Kerem)

[A] Muzik remains the “central” actor in this segment - framed as producing a higher ratio of Kurdish productions compared to other companies (many of which also produce Turkish music as well). In our interviews, Utku highlighted their archival efforts, as well as the “un-orthodox” (e.g., rock and hip hop) music they had started to produce as of late. One album he showed me was a collection of songs that had been originally Kurdish, but became renowned through their Turkish-ified versions. With this collection, he noted that they hoped to bring attention to the original forms and languages of the songs. Another archival album he showed me was a collection of lamentations, performed by women – some of whom, he said, may not be alive in a few years, but with this collection, would live on forever. (The album he referred to was prepared by a singer/performer based at The Center, and came out in 2013).

Utku also played me a rock music album that was, at the time, still being prepared. “In the past you couldn’t get people to listen to [rock or blues]. They were accustomed only to *dengbej* songs, or lamentations, or the familiar [agitative] Kurdish music styles … but now there are new styles, many new sounds” he said, noting that there are even groups in Diyarbakir composing symphonic music. Kurdish hip-hop is yet another genre that has gained popularity, particularly through

the songwriter- performer *Serhado,* who lives in Europe, but performs occasionally in Turkey. His songs involve quite overtly political, reactionary and sometimes nationalistic lyrics.

Actors affiliated with [A] continue to frame the company as embodying a non-profit ethos that is geared to "serve" the Kurdish people. They view some of the other companies as having moved in a more commercial direction. Utku, discussing the positioning of [A], and the types of tensions they deal with, delineates [A] Muzik from the "rest" as follows:

> I can say this with ease, that no matter how illogical this sounds, [A] Muzik is the only organization [in the market] that is not commercial. But of course even [A] Muzik is subject to a certain economy. I mean, even if [you have] the world's most beautiful music and composition, if you don't pay anything, you can't get the [album art] made, you can't get it [published as a CD] and so on. But there are certain [standards] that we can't do without. For one, we make sure that [the music] is worthy of this culture, that it makes proper use of language, we pay attention to its content. … you can't have a situation where you say, just because it's Kurdish, [ok let's produce it]. In Kurdish right now, there are some productions that are so bad you can't listen to them … You have to be respectful of the values, it has to be useful to this culture, it will develop this culture. … Of course you may ask, are all your products of the same [high] quality? Of course you can't always approach it with this precision, or then you wouldn't have anything left to produce.

Again, this quote exemplifies the association of "high quality" music with being "respectful of the values" - of not only the public, but the movement - and to serve the development of the culture. These are the standards through which [A] differentiates itself from the "rest."

Economic difficulties – due to significantly lower revenues from album sales, following prevalence of illegally downloaded/shared digital media – have meant that performers are now expected to pay for the bulk of the costs of producing music

albums. While this is the case for most companies in the music market in Unkapani (Turkish ones included), Utku argues that [A] Muzik is different from other companies in the field, and is trying to maintain its "high standard." In order to do so, [A] is still shouldering a significant amount of costs and production-related labor (if not the complete costs of the album), and does this for projects that they find worthy, even if they don't have a guarantee of earning the money back from sales. The "worthiness" of new productions is still judged in terms of its propriety with the normative structure of the segment, particulary in connection with the frame of "making good music to serve the cause."

> Some of the people who come here [to make albums], they really don't have much money, there are albums from last year for which we still haven't received payment, because they don't have the money, but they need to express themselves somehow. But since [A] does not have commercial concerns, we are able to do some things within the company, for example, we make our own graphic art, we don't add any extra cost for the graphics, we try to do it ourselves. … we have such options. Other than that, we are a company that is in tune with, and respectable to, the values of the public. Because if [a product] carries the [A] label… we have a very large responsibility in the emotional sense. There are many people who are no longer with us, but we [hold the rights to] their recordings. There are people who lost their lives because of these struggles, who paid great prices, there are people whose hands and fingers were smashed because they played Kurdish music. [A] Muzik carries the responsibility of all of this, as a whole. So [A] is unlike the other firms, the other firms that make Kurdish music. [Utku]

The "other side of the coin" is that this ethos sometimes translates to a lack of interest in pursuing commercial concerns - which, as detailed in the previous chapter on the political music scene, is also problematic as it means difficulties for artists to reach their audience, and also to make a living through music. Muhsin, one of the

best-selling artists and who started his musical career at The Center, noted that his most recent album had been produced by a Kurdish-owned European-based company. While this European company is does have business deals with [A] Muzik, it is, in Muhsin's words, more "formal" in its dealings with performers, as it operates within the EU; whereas deals with [A] Muzik have been verbal as opposed to written, and grounded in interpersonal relationships, which could, depending on the situation, be to the benefit or the detriment of an artist's financial interests.

Emre, one of the leading producers in the 1990s, chose to disengage from the political music scene to a large extent, and prioritize the artistic logic in deciding what to produce. He explained;

> As I said, in the 90s, until the 2000s, … it was a time when all the music and arts had a more hardline political approach. But those [political] concerns no longer held much meaning to me after 2000. So I don't see much of a point in making [those kinds of albums] anymore. I would like to go artistically deeper from now on. I would like to look into the musical, the more artistic aspects of Kurdish music, I want to continue with cultural concerns. (Emre)

In our interview, Emre noted that he had recently been producing a very small number of Kurdish albums (he gifted me with two of those albums, both featuring individual young singer-songwriter-musicians) and he was only going to work with (mostly young) artists that he thought to be "special." Thus, he was distancing himself from an overtly-political stance of producing political music for the sake of the movement, as well as a more commercial approach of producing numerous albums for performers who could afford to take on production costs. His comments on the lack of relevance of political music also implies a moral choice: it is no longer in the best interests of the Kurdish people to produce such music, what Emre feels

"needs" to be done is to produce fresh and original sounds that are still decidedly "Kurdish."

Changing Boundaries

Amongst the more hardline pro-movement performers and other actors, the sense of communality and boundaries against other segments and outsiders became not weaker but stronger. Tahir argued that this actually translated into a stronger influence of the movement amongst its adherents - and adherents of the movement formed a very sizable portion of the Kurdish community in Turkey. Tahir notes that the movement "has a cultural dominance in addition to a political one," admitting that this sometimes leads to a monopolistic situation in which those who don't quite possess certain qualities and sensibilities are ostracized. This is increasingly so, according to Tahir, in the 2000s:

> … today the movement is even more dominant [among the Kurds], it is an even larger movement for freedom, and this has implications for every domain, including the market. If you look at the market, for an artist, what is the field in which the market's products will be consumed? It is the Kurdish public, and today 70 percent of the Kurds are adherents of this movement, or they have actively participated in it. … even [among the Kurds in] Europe the movement has dominance. So of course, [the movement] shapes life, and it promotes its own artists, so therefore the artists [that the movement] endorses are able to survive. (Tahir)

Tahir's comments also point towards the way that a particular type of Kurdish community - with political inclinations and artistic styles - was imagined by the movement and, relatedly, by the market for Kurdish music:

> "… this war has been going on for the past 30 years, and it has also created its own artistic style … it is a structure that [influences everything] from hair styles to clothing styles, it is a cultural structure [*bir kültürel yapılanmadır*], a

> Kurdish society has been created [*artık bir Kürt toplumu yaratıldı*]. I don't say this in a positive or negative sense, but [as a matter of fact] … it has become a life style." (Tahir)

Those who did not conform to the "life style" could have a hard time entering or staying with the political segment. I heard several stories in which disputes and political disagreements within music groups led to some artists pursuing individual careers within the political segment, or also disengaging from this segment completely. While these cases were often not discussed openly, it was often possible to read between the lines, or to trace these "departures" through the companies that the performer recorded with, the venues where s/he performed. For instance, the lead singer of a popular group from the 1990s was no longer part of this scene, but continued to perform in concerts at university festivals. When I inquired about her, several people from the political segment responded "I don't know what she is doing or where she is, we are no longer in touch."

There are different types of moral boundaries erected and enacted (or not enacted) against those who are not part of the pro-movement field. The relationship between actors in the political music segment and the world music segment, for instance, is more or less cordial. Even though actors may point out their ideological or artistic differences and criticize one another for what they perceive as lacking in those areas, various collaborations have also taken place or have been attempted. On the other hand, as I shall detail further in the "challenger segment," performers and other actors who collaborated with the state, as well as Kurdish organizations that are not aligned with the PKK, were often marked as "traitors" by the pro-movement community. Thus, in the 2000s, the political-normative frames served not only to

unify the political actors around a collective identity, but took on a perhaps more important role of "excluding" actors - particularly through branding them as traitors- when they did not conform to the political ideals that this segment continued to espouse. This could translate into a hostile stance, and even physical threats towards artists who were seen as stepping over boundaries.

The normative-political boundaries of the political segment expanded, on the other hand, to include the (somewhat ideologically re-oriented) *dengbej* music.

The re-invention of dengbej as part of the political music scene

Dengbej music, in the 2000s, underwent a "re-invention," with endorsement and support from the Kurdish movement (Hamelink and Baris 2014; Scalbert-Yucel 2009). My informant Dicle argued that this was, in part, an obligatory shift from the "jacobin and modernistic attitude" held by the movement. As mentioned earlier, the ethos of the period included a move towards "seeking the roots" of "Kurdish culture," and to this end, the *dengbej* were an ideal repository of music and tradition. Dicle noted that Kurdish *dengbej* music was, despite being beloved by the older generation, frowned upon and even mocked by the younger and more politically active generation as a "backwards" relic of feudal times. In the post-2000 era, the *dengbej* was recast as a vessel of "public memory" and as "transmitting" cultural heritage. By 2012, I would often hear a version of this sentence about the *dengbej* being recited - for example, at a dengbej concert I attended in Istanbul, in the row behind me, a (presumably) Kurdish man was telling his Turkish companion: "Since Kurds had no written culture, it was the *dengbej* who orally transmitted legends and history."

This re-invention not only included the valorization of *dengbej* by Kurdish politicians, thought leaders, and pro-movement activists, but also included a number of material developments: for example, the establishment of *dengbej houses* in the region and the employment of *dengbej* by the pro-Kurdish municipalities. The *dengbej house* of Diyarbakir (M*ala Dengbejan Amed*) is a venture that has also received funding from the ministry of culture and tourism as well as the EU (Scalbert-Yucel 2009). Thus, the *dengbej*s regained their cultural and normative legitimacy (W.R. Scott 1995) amongst the pro-movement constituency. The *dengbej house* is a popular tourist destination: during my visit in 2013, groups that had come to Diyarbakır on business or for conferences were brought in masses to the house. The *dengbej* greeted these groups enthusiastically, performed a selection of their songs, and also gave brief explanations in Turkish.

The re-popularization and re-legitimation of the dengbej, however, also entailed a "re-orientation" of the tradition into a somewhat pro-movement mold. Stories told by *dengbej*, according to Hamelink and Baris (2014), and as also relayed to me by Dicle, historically did not refer to a common "Kurdish" national cause, but were characterized by much more local affiliations (such as to a feudal lord), and in fact are somewhat resistive to being incorporated within "state structures" regardless of the state or state-like structures being Turkish, Kurdish, or otherwise. Yet, such a tendency towards such alliances with tribal structures – which, for instance, are evidenced in songs about internal (e.g., tribal) fights – have been deemed, by activists and Kurdish studies academics alike, as "primitive" (Hamelink and Baris 2014). Thus, songs that are about love and about rebellion against the Turks have been given more visibility by the *dengbej* projects in the 2000s, and dengbejs

sometimes refuse or are prevented from singing about "internal battles" (Hamelink and Baris 2014). Moreover, Hamelink has noted (personal communication) that it is difficult to find and contact any *dengbej* today who are not politically aligned with the movement. However, such *dengbej*s must exist: there are *dengbej*s who perform on the state TV (TRT6), for instance. Moving through networks of actors that are affiliated / aligned with the movement means that access to these "other" dengbej is more difficult to attain.

Dengbej albums, as noted in the first part of the thesis, were mostly recorded in homes (especially in the 1970s) and circulated covertly in the 80s and 90s - but many (remaining) dengbej also recorded albums in Unkapani after the legalization of the market - thus, they also became a part of the formal market. Moreover, some home recordings have also been digitally cleaned and remastered. While [A] has issued a number of dengbej recordings, a larger portion of recordings have been issued by other companies in the political segment (producers Nizam and Mehmet, whose interviews I quote from throughout the dissertation, have produced a large number of *dengbej* albums.) That they are managed in a way to serve the pro-Kurdish political cause has also meant that their entry into the world music scene is very limited. Nonetheless, several artists who perform in the political music as well as world music segments have drawn from dengbej repertoires, "covering" or re-interpreting these songs, and performing them at concerts.

Continued Marginalization and Lack of Representation in the Market

Actors in the political segment continued to draw attention to their marginalized position in mainstream culture. Productions of Kalan, Sony and Ada (from the World Music segment) could be found in some (and not all) mainstream music stores (such

as D&R, Dost, Remzi Kitabevi) when I started to write this dissertation - although it often took me a while to locate them, as they were placed either under "Turkish folk music" or "Other." Towards the end of the dissertation, there was more variety in these stores, including a few albums produced by [A] Muzik and some other companies from the Political and World Music segments. In contrast, at "cassette shops" in (1) the region and (2) in Kurdish-inhabited neighborhoods in large cities, it was possible to find a large selection of Kurdish music. One of my informants was the owner of a cassette shop in Esenler, in Istanbul - I met the owner while he was visiting a company in Unkapani, purchasing CDs to sell at his shop. He was a Turkish man, but aware that most of his clientele is Kurdish, sold both Kurdish and Turkish music in his shop. The relative absence of Kurdish music in the "mainstream," however, is still a sore point for many actors I talked to - Nizam, for instance, told me that I wouldn't be able to find the albums he produced "at music shops in Etiler or Beşiktaş," drawing attention perhaps to not just a marginalization in terms of language/ethnicity, but also in terms of social class: Etiler, in particular, is one of the upper-class neighborhoods in Istanbul.

Another issue actors in the political segment complained about was the continuing absence of venues to perform live music. While the artists in the world-music also have difficulty finding places to perform, the stage is even narrower for the political music segment actors. This partly has to do with their own preferences – some artists in this segment, for example, prefer not to perform in venues that sell alcohol. As explained by Musa, this is a political stance. Kurdish music and language are seen as pure and politically sacred – and alcohol is perceived to be a contaminating influence. The few venues that are still available to the artists, then,

include weddings and political gatherings (sometimes called "political evenings" – *siyasi geceler*). While such performers avoid *türkü bars*, restaurants seem to be viable – the "album presentation" (*lansman*) of a former member of *Koma Berxwedan*, for example, took place at a restaurant (which regularly features live music with dinner) in Esenler, a predominantly Kurdish-inhabited district of Istanbul. These types of venues also lend themselves more readily to musical genres that are oriented towards "entertainment". As Kerem notes, in such contexts, even the more politically active artists have fallen prey to the trends in "dance" music:

> There are night [events], for [political organizations], and what do the [political] groups play? They take a *saz* and play, *şemmame şemmame*[27], le le lo lo, [as if] this constitutes our music. This is not your music. Your music kept itself alive in the hardest conditions, even when it was said to be finished and destroyed, in the villages, in the towns. If you want to keep this music alive, you need to create something new, but when you turn it into tavern music, just so that people can dance the *halay*, you mustn't really think you're keeping it alive. But that's what's being done now. … I think Kurdish art is experiencing an internal struggle these days. As much as it has been in a struggle with the state that denies its presence, it is also in a struggle within itself. (Kerem, performer)

Thus, Kerem draws attention to the replacement of state policies with an internal crisis of not figuring out "where to take the music."

Finally, the political-normative frames changed with regards to the ways in which royalties and "making money" were viewed. Whereas illegal circulation and piracy were viewed as normal and necessary during the 1990s, they started to be viewed in a very negative light, particularly in terms of standing in the way of making sales and generating the revenues necessary for (1) performers to make a living and (2) producers for financing new productions. Ismail, who has sustained his popularity as

[27] Şemmame is a popular *govend,* i.e., dance song.

a performer since the late 1980s, recalled a time he went for a concert in the region. He was walking on the street when he was approached by a teenaged fan who told him "*ape* [uncle, used as a term of respect and endearment] I love you so much, I downloaded all of your songs and albums from the internet." Ismail was torn between his appreciation of being loved so much, and a disdain that fans were downloading, rather than buying, his albums.

The distinction among the two major and more visible (at least from a mainstream point of view) segments – the world music segment and the political music segment - is also reinforced by legal arrangements made regarding the payments of royalties that are accumulated through legal internet streaming channels. The institutionalization of royalty payments is relatively new in the context of the music market in Turkey, and still a work in progress. There are three unions that are responsible for the distribution of royalties to members: Mü-Yap, the union for music producers; MESAM, the union for "authors" of musical products (i.e. composers and lyricists); and Müyorbir, the union for performers of music. In the case of many of these unions, there are two different types of membership –primary and secondary. While I was conducting my fieldwork, there were three "primary members" which were involved in producing Kurdish albums: Kalan, Ada, and Sony (i.e. the parent of the "Pel" division) and none were from the "Political Music Segment." Moreover, the owners of Kalan and Ada are both currently on Mü-Yap's board of directors. The other companies – including [A] Muzik – are "secondary" members. The way that Mü-Yap works is through the collection and subsequent division of *all* royalties incurred through various channels, amongst the primary and secondary members. Some of the main sources of royalties are the GSM operators (such as Turkcell and

Avea) and a major internet service provider (TTNet) which provide download or streaming access to most albums produced in Turkey. According to producers who are secondary members, the larger part of royalties are divided amongst the primary members, with the secondary ones receiving a much smaller fraction of royalties. Moreover, according to producers, Kurdish music albums are not properly labeled or represented on royalty-paying streaming/download services. Emre expresses his frustrations with this system in the following excerpt:

> In the digital arena, TTNet for instance pays royalties for all music albums. People can listen to [albums through the TTNet website]. In terms of categories, they have ethnic, *arabesk*, pop-*arabesk*, *fantazi-arabesk*, everything… but not even the K of Kurdish. Within the ethnic [category] they have people like Neşet Ertaş but [no Kurdish]. [Kurdish music] is in the "other" section. Other… If you already possess some knowledge about Kurdish music, if you can spell Kurdish [names], like Şivan Perwer or Ciwan Haco ... then you can find them. If you write v instead of w, you cannot find them. So… it's not just the physical space, but also in digital spaces… In the avea or turkcell [services] also, now people mostly consume music through digital spaces and that's where revenue comes from. … but there are very few actors in the digital arena [which pay royalties],. … Today in the digital arena in Turkey, they collect royalties of approximately 70-80 million TL … but when you compare it with the number of albums, and then think about the Kurdish population of the country, and look at the number of Kurdish albums, the royalties that Kurdish music receives is probably not a thousandth of that money. I also quit MÜYAP membership 2 years ago. I've produced 22 or 23 albums by Şivan Perwer and he's a great star, but I don't receive 1% of the royalties that Ankaralı Turgut's producer receives, whoever that producer might be. So when you look at the [Kurdish music] scene, it's economically under siege and impossible to repair. So once upon a time there was DGM (state security court) and there were the [prohibitive] laws. Today neither of those exist, but Kurdish music also does not exist in [the minds of the majority] … it doesn't exist as a category.

This excerpt not only indicates the actor's grievance regarding the continued marginalization of Kurdish in the marketplace, but also the marginality of Kurdish

(language and identity) to the extent that it still has not become "normalized:" still lacking cultural legitimacy, despite having gained some regulative legitimacy.

4.3.2 Segment 2: The World Music Segment

Istanbul was, historically, a multi-ethnic city housing numerous musical traditions and performance venues, particularly centered in the *Pera* (now Beyoğlu) neighborhood. An "entertainment enclave of non-Muslims, especially Jews, Greeks, Armenians and Levantines" (Aytar and Keskin 2003: 147) during the [late] Ottoman era, and housing many cafes and *meyhane*s (winehouses), it remained a popular – and socio-economically diverse - center for entertainment after the foundation of the Republic as well. The number of "entertainment" spaces and venues started to multiply and diversify particularly after the mid-1980s (Aytar and Keskin 2003).

The (re)emergence of Istanbul (and within Istanbul, to a large extent, Beyoğlu) as home to a "multi-cultural" entertainment scene took place more or less in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Degirmenci 2008; Stokes 1999). A number of actors contributed to this process. For one, were some music companies, such as Pozitif Yapım/ Doublemoon Records, Kalan Muzik, and Ada Müzik. Second, there were a number of performance halls, bars, cafes, and other commercial ventures. *Babylon*, a bar/performance hall specializing in jazz/fusion was one of the primary "cultural intermediaries" to set the stage for a world music scene in Istanbul (Degirmenci 2008), and was followed by other similarly minded venues established throughout the next two decades. Publications and periodicals promoted the concerts and night-clubs/ performance halls and lauded the "diversity" that this scene featured. German-

Turkish director Fatih Akın's internationally successful 2005 movie *Gegen die Wand* (Head-On) featured some of the musicians based in / performing in Beyoğlu. Akın later made the documentary *Crossing the Bridge*, which focused solely on this music scene, drawing even more attention to the venues, performers, and production companies that co-created the scene.

Degirmenci (2008) cites two different approaches to the world music scene in Turkey. One approach involves creating "fusions" of "local" sounds and Western instrumentation. The company Doublemoon Records (affiliated with concert promoter company, Pozitif Organizasyon), has been active in this genre, promoting Turkish "world music" on the global scene as well as the local one. A few prominent examples of this type of music in the Istanbul scene include "dance music" performed by Roma musicians (clarinet performers Selim Sesler and Hüsnü Şenlendirici are two prominent artists in this genre), "sufi-electronica" (fronted by "Mercan Dede", a DJ who also performs with the *ney*), and "oriental hip-hop" (an example cited in Degirmenci [2010] is the performer Ceza) among others - many of which have been featured in the aforementioned *Crossing the Bridge* movie.

On the other hand, performances and productions of folk music (including that do not make any claims of synthesizing "Western" sounds) have also come to be framed as "world music." Degirmenci (2008) has noted that this has involved the re-articulation and re-construction of "locality," "ethnicity," and "spirituality." A good portion of Kalan's productions fall into this category - the company has re-mastered and re-issued recordings from the early to mid-20th Century, has sponsored projects of ethnomusicological research throughout Thrace and Anatolia, and has issued the results as anthological CDs accompanied by informational booklets.

This "world music scene," particularly the branch headed by Kalan, does involve a number of artists or groups performing Kurdish music – yet, this number was somewhat limited[28]. Performers from the political segment have been, to a large extent, absent from the "world music" stage. The few Kurdish performers who did become a part of the "world music" scene/ stage positioned themselves - or were guided by producers to be positioned- in a manner that is symbolically distinct from the collective ethos of the political music segment. While personal relationships and collaborations between the actors in these two segments have taken place, this has been on a rather limited scale. The production aesthetics and lyrical content of the music was also quite distinct from the "agitative" music style. Musical arrangements and sound engineering in the "world music scene" were highly influenced by trends in "world music/world beat" (Degirmenci 2008). A small number of studios and musicians worked on the majority of "ethnic/ world" music productions that were made in this period (Bates 2008), whereas the political segment worked with the studio founded by artists from The Center, or smaller, more amateur recording studios.

In Turkey, discussions on multi-culturalism, pluralism, or ethnic/ religious minorities have often been entwined with and branded as involving "politics" – yet the normative/political frames and discourses associated with multi-culturalism are markedly distinct from those associated with the pro-Kurdish movement. This was reflected in the attitudes, public speeches, and musical productions of actors in the "world music" segment – including the Kurdish actors in that scene. An emphasis

[28] In Fatih Akın's movie, for example, the inclusion of Kurdish music was limited to Aynur Doğan, performing a *kılam* (a *dengbej* song) inside a Turkish bath (the justification being for acoustic purposes). Hasan Saltık was also interviewed for his contributions to the field with Kalan.

was made not on exclusively Kurdish cultural and political rights and liberties, but on a multi-cultural heritage of Anatolia. The approach by some of the actors in the world music scene – particularly as represented by Kalan Muzik – often stated intentions to "save from extinction" and "represent" the cultural artifacts and musical heritage of these communities.

In contrast with the ethno-political orientation of the political segment, this "world music" sound, and "multivocality" oriented political approach in the music scene arguably succeeded in making some Kurdish music and artists more accessible to a non-Kurdish audience. The audience members in the world music segment were mainly well-educated, urban Turkish citizens; concerts took place in jazz festivals as well as smaller live music venues that catered to a middle/upper-middle income constituency. In terms of audience, there were overlaps amongst the constituents of the audience for the "political segment" and the "world music segment" - but for some Kurds, the world music segment was both politically undesirable (not sufficiently radical or pro-Kurdish) and also, in terms of concert prices, economically difficult to access. On the other hand, for Kurds with more moderate political views, the world music scene offered a middle-ground and possibilities for dialog with the Turkish and Kurdish constituencies. The case of Kalan Muzik - the way they frame their production ethos, and the way the company has been received by audience and mainstream (Turkish) media, and their somewhat limited success amongst the Kurdish audience is quite exemplary.

The Case of Kalan Muzik: Kurdish Music and Mainstream Success

Kalan Müzik was established in 1991 by Hasan Saltık, a producer of mixed ethnic (Turkish and Alevi-Kurdish) background, and his wife, Nilüfer Saltık (also of

Turkish and Kurdish background). Hasan Saltık had previously been working for a company owned by a relative in Unkapanı, and had been involved in the production of an instrumental album of Kurdish music which featured, on its cover, an elderly person with his mouth covered with tape (as relayed to me by producer Emre from Unkapanı). Saltık started working with *Grup Yorum*, a band affiliated with the radical left-wing movement, in the late 1980s, before establishing his own company. Grup Yorum had attained some notoriety due to its politically charged song lyrics, and also for performing a Kurdish song live at a political event before 1991 (Kahyaoglu 2010).

The Saltıks' decision to enter the music market is quite different from the way that the producers in the political music segment framed their entries. Nilüfer Saltık, in our interview, talked about the confluence of commercial opportunities and artistic concerns that presented themselves in the early 1990s:

> During that period, the music sector was very active ... also [profitable] in terms of income... there were all these people who would sell their land and arrive here [in Istanbul] and open up a shop in *Unkapanı*, we were able to catch that time at its very end... we caught that time while the producers of the 70s and 80s were still active and the *türkü* (folk music) singers from Urfa and Diyarbakir were famous. … Hasan [Saltık] was working for another company at the time, and one of the albums [he produced] there became very successful. We were young and newly married, we said, why don't we establish our own company, because the company owner is making money on these things we work on... so we said let's do it ourselves! (N. Saltık)

Hasan Saltık has added that while he worked for the other company, the owners/managers did not always allow him to produce the albums he wanted to make – thus he was motivated to break away and establish his own company. Once he did so, a chance encounter set him on the path that would come to define the company:

> I travelled abroad and was able to examine the music markets. The Greeks have made a series out of Rebetiko music, the music of the people who migrated from Anatolia. The Spaniards recorded flamenco pieces from the 20s and 30s onto CDs. The Americans made a CD about *Tanburi Cemil Bey*. I thought, why not do something like this in Turkey? We started to research opportunities for [re-mastering] music belonging to Anatolian cultures, and also for producing new music. We started out with the idea that we would be an alternative company. (Interview with Gülru İncu Çeler, Star Newspaper, February 16 2005)

The decision to produce the albums of artists – both past and present – performing Anatolian musical repertoires was, in part Nilüfer Saltık's idea. In our interview, she talked of growing up listening to folk poet/singers such as Neşet Ertaş. Ertaş was virtually unknown in the Turkish music scene in the early 1990s. He had migrated to Germany, and was making a living by performing at weddings. Even though many "folk singers" in Turkey were performing and recording songs that he and his father (Muharrem Ertaş) had composed or compiled, he wasn't receiving recognition or royalties. The Saltıks, in Nilüfer Saltık's words, brought him back to Turkey and helped him receive some of the respect, recognition, as well as the royalties he rightfully deserved.

Nilüfer Saltık is somewhat scornful of what she refers to as "the Turkish elite perspective" that has valorized Western classical music at the expense of local talents and traditional repertoires. She frames their work in Kalan as a cultural service: helping to bring some balance to the scene, by producing music that represents the co-existence of multiple ethnic and/or religious communities and musical traditions. In her words:

> Throughout the Republican era, people have been sent abroad for Western musical education, for violin and piano, as part of the "gifted children"

> projects… of course, this [rightfully took place], it wouldn't be right to reject that at all, but we already had so many gifted people in Anatolia. People like [Aşık] Mahsuni, Neşet Ertaş, Muharrem Ertaş, Çekiç Ali, these were already gifted people and they were nourished by this land [*bu topraklar*], they experienced the pain and love and tragedies of this land and created their musical works. My heart lies on [their] side, I see myself closer to them. Of course, we have produced albums for [artists who make Western-influenced music], and we will keep doing so, that's something else. But we also made albums for the Anatolian folk poets, and we made [albums] for the other communities that have lived in Anatolia, the Assyrians, the [Y]Ezidis, the Armenians, the Kurds, the Pontians… The kind of perspective we have is, even if it is only a community of 100 people, if they are different in some way – in terms of language or religion or whatever it might be, we [produce their music] to serve the idea of pluralism, and for its archival value. And don't think we make money out of all these albums, we don't. For example there's the *Ezidis* album, it is accompanied by a book of 100 or 200 pages, and it consists of 2 CDs. There is no way we can make [profit] selling that. But the purpose is to provide documentation of something that belongs here, to present it to the future generations. It is a cultural service.

Some of the keys to understanding how Kalan has been "branded" by themselves, their audience, and by the media can be found in this passage: an artistic logic that is based on promoting the ethnic, religious and cultural "pluralism" – including the Turkish and ethnic minority "masters" who have been neglected by official policies at the expense of Western classical music; the "non-commercial" ethos which governs these efforts to preserve and transmit Anatolian multi-cultural heritage. These are reflected in several media reports throughout the years that Kalan is performing a "cultural service" – akin to being an "unofficial ministry of culture", an epithet employed by several local and foreign journalists.

Two important turning points in Saltık's career, related to his involvement in such productions, was receiving the Prince Claus Fund award in 2003, and being

featured in Time Magazine as an influential "anthropologist of music" in 2004. These two distinctions arguably brought a new type of spotlight onto him in Turkey – that of "cultural ambassador". Nilüfer Saltık noted that these distinctions also led to albums produced by Kalan presented to foreign dignitaries as gifts – as "proof" that ethnic minorities enjoyed equal rights in Turkey, that they were able to produce and disseminate their music. This was ironic, she said, "considering that in 2004, Kurdish music was yet to be broadcast on television."

Kalan has also actively sought to representation and recognition on the global world music scene. One way has been through arranging appearances at world music festival - annual organization – in 2012, for example, Café Aman, a Greek (*Rum*) - Turkish Rembetiko ensemble represented by Kalan, was the only participant at WOMEX (the World Music Exposition) from Turkey. Selda Öztürk, a member of *Kardeş Türküler*, a Kalan-produced music group, has noted in a published interview[29] that Kalan Müzik sends promotional albums to international music agencies and companies. On one occasion, the music supervisors of the Hollywood film "Kingdom of Heaven" received and listened to Kardeş Türküler's "*Hemavaz*" album and were intrigued by the song "*Suleymano*". They got in touch with Kalan and Kardeş Türküler, and commissioned new compositions to be used as part of the score in the movie and also issued in the soundtrack. Kalan's visibility in the world scene has led Charles Gillett, director of BBC's world music program, to comment that [he] "learned about the music of Turkey through Kalan" (Hürriyet Newspaper, 16 May 2009).

[29] Selda Öztürk interview, conducted by Ferid Demirel in Özgür Politika newspaper. June 7 2005.

Hasan Saltık has framed his venture - in both our interview and in published interviews - as a "non-profit foundation" rather than a "profit-seeking business" but as a kind of "non-profit foundation." In a published interview, he noted:

> We received many offers of financial help, from organizations in Germany, The Netherlands, and the USA. But we never take sponsorships from outside sources, we don't want anyone to say "Wow, they are doing business with so-and-so's money". Kalan works with its own resources and even provides resources, it works with the mentality of a [non-profit] foundation. We're not a wholly commercial business. We also don't sign [binding long-term] contracts with our artists. We don't force them to stay with us for five albums, we don't ask for 20 percent of their concert income.[30]

This does not mean that the company does not try to sell their albums, but Hasan Saltık told me in our [unrecorded] interview that they seek a balance between productions that will potentially become bestsellers - such as movie or TV soundtracks. The company uses the profit they accrue from these more "commercially oriented" productions to finance the "non-commercial" productions (e.g.,anthologies, folk music, young performers from ethnic minority communities) that he personally cares about. Thus, even within the company's own catalogue, Saltık constructs a boundary between the "profane" music that appeals to the mainstream audience and the "sacred" - read: politically significant - music that will have a limited following. Producing the profane is morally justifiable only because it serves the sustenance of the sacred.

The sacred is perpetuated and reproduced not only through producing anthological or archival albums, but also through new and contemporary productions. When working particularly with younger artists, Hasan Saltık – and in

[30] Hasan Saltık interview with Menderes Özel, Milliyet May 30 2012

some projects, Nilüfer Saltık as well – and other producers, musicians, and researchers working for the company, have a great deal of influence on how the "end product" will sound. In our interview, Hasan Saltık described his role with some artists as a work of "re-invention." Some of this work of reinvention he has done, particularly with younger artists, includes changing the artists' outer appearance and dress styles, teaching them how to stand and act on stage while singing, how to respond to questions - particularly ones regarding politics - in interviews. Nilüfer Saltık described the careful work the company puts into creating "sounds" in the following excerpt from our interview, and emphasizes the company's and producers' strong influence in this process as a distinction from other companies in the market:

> ... [the performer] might have the resources, like an ore, a flicker of light. [the performer] might have a voice, a composition …. You take it, it is already there, but you present it in such a way, you prepare a repertoire, make [the musical] arrangements. You do things that haven't been done, that haven't been tried, but do it in a way that doesn't spoil what's already there, but rather, that supports and strengthens it. … so it really has to be formulated well, it really has to be processed well, just like you know you might have very good vegetables, organic tomatoes and all that. But what type of food will be prepared, that's the producer's job. What kind of arrangement should be made for this voice, which instruments will be used, where will the voice rise and where will it fall. Which song will be the one to make an entry [to the market]… Producers generally do not leave these decisions to the artist, because the artist's, or the soloist's personal views or considerations might be different. The producer has a more objective viewpoint. Of course, I'm only talking about Kalan, not about other companies. (N. Saltık)

I have heard of cases in which musicians sent a finished "master copy" to Kalan, and Hasan Saltık agreed to publish it under the Kalan label – however, these have been exceptions rather than the rule. Kalan has its own studios, and produces its own distinctive sound (Bates 2008 discusses how different types of "sound"s are

produced in different recording studios in Istanbul) and has its own distinctive "style" in terms of how the music should be arranged and promoted. The company's preference is to be involved in producing albums from scratch, and reflect its owners'/producers' criteria and artistic vision with each artist and album. In one case, a well-known performer affiliated with Kalan wanted to exercise more control over who would work on the album and how the end-product should sound - this performer ended up deciding not to work with Kalan any longer. This type of contract does not fit into every artist's or group's idea of an ideal relationship with the production company. Yet, for those who do, the end results are often critically received as sounding "different" and of "higher quality" when compared to the rest of the music scene. This distinction is reproduced at points of sale - Kalan's albums are sold in many mainstream chain book and music stores (such as D&R, Dost Kitabevi, Remzi Kitabevi etc - all of which carry very few, if any, Kurdish music albums from the political segment). Interestingly, Kalan's albums often have their own separate section, setting them apart from Turkish mainstream music as well.

Kalan and the Kurdish Music Scene

Two of the more popular Kurdish-singing acts in Kalan's roster have been Kardeş Türküler and Aynur [Doğan] (although the latter started working with a different record company in recent years.) Kardeş Türküler grew out of a folk-music ensemble at Istanbul's Boğaziçi University. Performing songs in a number of languages - including Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, among others - their first album came out in 1999, issued by Kalan. They rose to prominence in the early 2000s, however, after recording a soundtrack for the movie "Vizontele," which achieved box office success. Their concerts at university festivals in major cities, as well as their "Eastern

Turkey tour" in the 2000s were very successful. And, since then, they have also been performing annually at the "Harbiye Açıkhava Tiyatrosu," a major open-air concert venue in Istanbul.

The response of Kurdish audience to Kalan-affiliated artists – including Kardeş Türküler and Aynur – in the region as well as living in the major cities – has generally been very warm. Concerts in the region have drawn large numbers of audience, and continue to do so. Several of my Kurdish informants – including some of the producers – have spoken enthusiastically about Kardeş Türküler. Cem and Talat (both without any ties to the music industry) have argued that Kardeş Türküler contributed to the relative "normalcy" of Kurdish language and music within Turkey today. Members of Kardeş Türküler, aware of this role that has been attributed to them, have also been active in promoting and raising awareness for the pro-Kurdish cause, with some members going as far as voicing support for the pro-Kurdish political candidates.

Distinction of the World Music Scene

The consumers who buy Kalan's (and the albums produced by the other companies in this segment) are perceived to be mostly well-educated Kurds, and also, importantly, Turks – importantly, a certain "type" of "Turk," as relayed by informants, who lives in the large cities, has received higher education, is "politically sensitive" about issues related to ethnic and religious minorities. The Kurds who listen to this music are also perceived as embodying similar characteristics and dispositions to the aforementioned Turkish audience. The music also serves to unite constituencies of different ethnic backgrounds, but of similar concerns, or a willingness to learn more about the multicultural heritage. When I asked Veysel, a

performer with Kardeş Türküler, about whether they and the *Kom*s (of the political segment) have the same audience constituency, he emphatically replied that they did not. He said:

> There are overlaps, of course, but on the other hand it's impossible that we have the exact same audience. For example, when there's a Kardeş Türküler concert, the concertgoers are composed of people from all of the [ethnic] communities [in Turkey]. Of course an important part of that is the Kurds. There are a lot of Alevis, and I'd say especially of the unjustly treated [*mağdur*] world: the Armenians, the laborers [emekçiler] … Kardeş Türküler brings many different segments [*kesim*] together, and especially when we first started, we saw a lot of things such as a Turk coming to our concert and hearing Armenian music or Kurdish music for the first time." (Veysel, performer)

Thus, rather than being divided by ethnic lines, this audience constituency is united around this "shared" music, which also sometimes corresponds to or generates camaraderie and a shared political orientation. This is particularly observable during live performances of Kurdish artists at a select few venues in Istanbul. Musa, the owner of a bar & performance hall - and one where Kalan performers and other "world music" type performers give concerts, reflects on the type of audience who comes to the venue:

> The people who come to hear Kurdish music [at my venue] are mostly university students. Because the music performed here is an urban music. So it appeals to that type of audience ... who [also goes to] the theater, the cinema, the opera. For example [name of artist] is a very different color in Kurdish music. But not every Kurd prefers to [listen to him]. It is a very specific segment. So it's mostly urban Kurdish youth, urban Kurds. For example at [another artist]'s concert I made some observations about who was there. It was mostly students. There was a group of academics, and they were speaking Kurdish. A group of lawyers. Women, feminist women. Professionals. It was a very interesting mix. The common ground was that

> this is [artist's name]'s concert, and it is this specific [polyphonic, urban] music. We also have customers who are foreigners, at almost every concert. ... and of course the people of other communities in this country, who are not Kurdish. They come, they listen very carefully, and even though they do not understand Kurdish [language], but they listen to the music with even more interest. This is about the music, the universality of the music, the language of music... so it's not just Kurds [in the audience], but of course, the Kurds [dominate] the audience. (Musa, venue owner)

Musa is very much involved with the customer base of his performance venue - he chats with customers, and is open to holding "event nights" for causes and organizations, including for LGBTT groups, feminist organizations, and pro-Kurdish causes. He moreover wants to be involved with promoting young and promising performers who, in his words, have "musical pursuits" – that is, who experiment with different sounds, and appeal to a more urban audience. In his words:

> When I opened this place, I didn't think of it as a venue for Kurds, but as an alternative stage. Kurds are one part of this, maybe the most dominant part, but as a part of multiplicity. [I am] selective, I don't just let any Kurdish artist on stage just because s/he is a Kurd.

In the interview, Musa took care to express the differences of his venue from the completely commercially-oriented *türkü bar*s (which I shall mention further). and also noted that some of the more politically oriented artists do not appear on stage at his venue because it is an alcohol-serving place. Even though Musa himself struggled with the decision to serve alcohol, it is easy to see that he is distancing himself, to some extent, from the exclusively political and agitative music background. In order to cater to the type of young, well-educated audiences in mind, an alcohol-serving venue is more appropriate.

While the "world music" producers and performers do not align themselves with the political music scene, neither do the "political music" actors perceive of this segment, including Kalan, as part of their scene. I have heard a variation of the statements "Kalan doesn't really make Kurdish music/ Kalan is not a Kurdish music company, they only produced a few Kurdish albums" from a number of informants. Kalan, similarly, does not make any claims on focusing on Kurdish music more than others. The way Kalan positions itself seems to be a somewhat unique standing, though with some similarities to one other company in particular, Ada Muzik. Ada also positions itself as "embracing" the musical wealth of Anatolia, by working with "artists of different cultures and different languages, and continuing to produce albums in Kurdish, Circassian, Homshetsi, and Greek languages"[31]. Kalan and Ada have also collaborated on a number of occasions, and the owners of both companies are in the directorate of the Trade Association for music producers, Mü-yap. In our interview, Nilüfer Saltık also mentioned Ada as the another company which operates on principles similar to those of Kalan.

Some collaborations were attempted between the actors of the "world music" segment with the actors of the "political music" segment – a noteworthy attempt was between the members of the music group Koma Amed, based in The Center and Kardeş Türküler of Kalan. Vedat Yıldırım, one of the lead singers of Kardeş Türküler, noted in Akkaya (2008) that the two groups disagreed artistically with regards to the extent to which one should experiment with traditional forms: The members of Koma Amed found some of Kardeş Türküler's re-interpretations/ fusions

[31] http://adamusic.com.tr/Hakkimizda.aspx

of traditional works to be a "distortion" of traditional forms. This sentiment was repeated to me by a number of performers - particularly those who had started their artistic careers at The Center. While performers at The Center also experimented with fusion and Western instrumentation, they felt that the way in which Kardeş Türküler did this- sometimes mixing a number of songs, or writing new lyrics altogether - was taking it too far. This, it seems, fell against their moral-political understanding of "preserving" the heritage.

Moral Boundaries Amongst Political Segment and World Music Segment

The relationship between actors in the world music segment – in particular, Kalan - and actors in the political music segments is somewhat ambiguous. There have been (attempts at) collaborations between musicians, and a degree of sociability seems to characterize most of their interactions – which includes playing backgammon in the "courtyard" of the 6th block in Unkapanı, where all the companies are located. But, upon inquiries in interviews, some of the tensions come to fore. During my very first interview with regards to Kurdish music – before I had any idea about the presence of differences between the different companies - a producer in Unkapanı, remarked, when I commented on how I'd seen Kalan's Kurdish productions in D&R (a chain bookstore):

> It's not only from you, but I've heard it from other [Turkish] friends as well. I like Kalan Müzik, I respect Hasan [Saltık] and he's a good friend. But Kalan Müzik has not really produced [that many] Kurdish albums. He's produced Aynur's albums, and our Turkish media especially paid attention to Aynur. ... I'm not criticizing Aynur either, Aynur is also our friend, but we have albums that have sold ten times more than Aynur's albums. But since the Turkish media does not pay any attention, [Aynur] is what people know. But go to the

> places where [Kurdish] albums are sold, I mean, go to the region[32]. If you see 100 CDs in a shop, perhaps 50 of them are [my productions]. But here [in Istanbul] for example, in certain places – such as Etiler, or in Beşiktaş, maybe you can see Aynur's CDs. But today, [name of a Kurdish singer] sells much more than Aynur. Kalan Müzik has produced a few albums, but the media has paid a lot of attention. (Nizam)

Reactions to Kalan's work did involve praise at Hasan Saltık's vision and success in being "at the right place at the right time" – particularly with respect to supporting the Kardeş Türküler project, which, according to one producer, was an innovative and fresh approach to both Kurdish and other ethnic musics. However, this "right place, right time" also meant, in the perceptions of some interviewees, that he was not "present" when the persecutions faced due to producing Kurdish music was high. Dicle, a book publisher – and thus an "outsider" to the field with many "insider" contacts, explained some Kurdish artists' and producers' disdain for Kalan and the others who entered the scene "later" (i.e. in the post-2000 period), as follows:

> as far as I know, [Kalan] started to produce and sell that kind of music once the price [*bedel*] to be paid had subsided and the gains were higher. And maybe that's why they're recognized by the Turks as well. But these other organizations that I'm talking about, they started doing this work when the *bedel* was high and the profit was none. And they're still doing it. I mean, back then you would get arrested for doing this work, forget about the money, there was no money in it. This was like a field of combat, I mean, some people wrote books and went to jail, some engaged in politics and got killed, and there was the sense that "this is what we're doing." So during that period, when the losses surpassed the gains by manifolds, you couldn't do it on a personal [independent] level, so that's why it was done by organizations. Kalan started doing this after the 90s, after 95, after Ozal's time and after the restrictions had been loosened. (Dicle)

[32] When talking to non-Kurdish individuals, Kurds often use the term "bölge" to refer to the highly Kurdish-populated Eastern and Southeastern provinces. However, amongst themselves – and after I'd conducted fieldwork for a while - I've heard the usage of "Kurdistan" more often.

Kalan has not been completely divorced from controversy or from being on the receiving end of legislative restrictions. Since it was founded, Kalan has been producing the albums of *Grup Yorum*, a band affiliated with a radical left-wing organization. The members of this band have, throughout the years, been arrested several times and their albums have been intermittently banned (Kahyaoglu 2011 for a detailed account of Grup Yorum's legal entanglements.) In his role as the producer for *Grup Yorum,* Hasan Saltık was also tried at the state security courts in the 1990s. Moreover, some of Saltık's Kurdish-language productions also created legal issues. Kalan's first Kurdish language production in 1992, an album named "Umut Yüklü Bahar" contained Kurdish songs and thus led to court proceedings[33]. The company also lost its license for a period in 2002 due to the usage of the word "Kurdistan" in an album that had been issued back in 1993. Hasan Saltık has described this problematic period as "I was stopping by the *DGM* courthouse every day on my way to work".

Moreover, individual artists and groups have experienced discrimination, not unlike the artists and groups of the political segment. Even though Kalan's albums were sold at mainstream music shops, the Kurdish performers found that they still could not get their albums to be played on radio and television. The singer Aynur noted in a published interview[34] that despite legality, "owners of TV stations, producers of tv programs and general editors of newspapers individually prohibit something that is legally free. These are people with prejudices." In the same interview she recalls how the producers of TV programs would tell her that she could

[33] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,703446,00.html

[34] http://www.kurdishmagazin.com/km/aynur-turkiyede-hala-keyfi-yasaklar-var.html

appear on their program if she agreed to sing only Turkish songs. Hasan Saltık, echoing Ahmet Kaya's declaration from 1999, ran paid ads in a number of newspapers, declaring that they had shot a music video for a Kurdish song and were looking for "brave people to broadcast this video" (relayed to me by Nilüfer Saltık). The video they produced was for Kardeş Türküler's rendition of a popular folk song "Kara Uzum Habbesi" (a version that was sung with both Turkish and Kurmanji Kurdish lyrics) in 2004, the news channel CNN Turk ran it once. Other channels refused to do so. Producers, editors, TV-station owners were, at the time, still worried about repercussions they might face (e.g., complaints from viewers, loss of advertisers from more nationalistic companies etc) were they to run or advertise Kurdish music. In 2013-2014, at the time of the writing of this dissertation, further progress seems to have been made with regards to featuring Kurdish music (particularly of the variety produced by Kalan) on television – artists such as Aynur, Rojin, and Şivan Perwer have appeared on television shows in which they performed music, and were also interviewed.

That being said, there have been a number of occasions in which Kalan has demonstrated a more symbiotic relationship with authorities. Saltık supervised the campaign music for future prime minister Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the DSP (*Democratic Left Party*). During this government's tenure, however, Kalan faced the aforementioned period of difficulties and closure. Later, when AKP was in power, Saltık was able to strike a deal giving him access to re-master recordings and produce albums from the archives of TRT - although this deal fell through after a few albums were produced. (Nilüfer Saltık told me that Hasan Saltık was unhappy with the "bureaucratic" and restrictive culture of TRT that he had to deal with while trying

to work with the archives). Pointing out such collaborations, producers and performers in the political segment told me that Kalan has always been on "good terms" with the government -regardless of which political party is in charge. This also falls contrary to the political segment's oppositional stance, where the government is, at best suspected of trying to assimilate the Kurds, and at worst, repressing them completely. Kalan's legal difficulties do not lend themselves to a camaraderie from the political actors' perspective - they feel that the "price" they, as the pro-Kurdish actors paid, has been much higher.

On the other hand, Kalan's political stance has been perceived as more of a "middle ground" position by actors and audience who find the political-moral framing of the political segment to be too hardline and alienating. Moreover, a number of informants (particularly audience members who do not define themselves as particularly aligned with the Kurdish movement) have commended Kalan's ability to attract Turkish audience. The following quote from Talat is an exemplary critique of the political segment limiting itself to a narrow artistic space:

> The Center, for instance, could have converted that place into something larger, such as an academy, and could have doubled the [artistic] productivity in the period after 1995. If you look at today, does the same productivity even exist? There are no groups that I can think of, that comes out of The Center and that we can say makes really great music. For example, [group name], I think, is at a standstill. After [name of popular album], they made an album called [name of another popular album]. But after that, I don't think they produced anything good. I think this is something that has decreased musical productivity … with all the experience they gave, they could have become at least as popular as *Kardeş Türküler*. … I mean when [a popular Kurdish group from the political segment] plays a concert in the West of Turkey, the audience that goes to listen will still be [mostly] Kurds. But *Kardeş Türküler* has a much broader audience. I think when this politicization takes place at the extreme, the groups become buried somewhere. They could have done

> things differently, they could have played a different role towards solving the Kurdish problem, or in making Kurdish music more popular. For example, whose music video was first shown on Turkish television? It was Kardeş Türküler's, not some some group from The Center. (Talat)

Sony Music, which also entered the business of producing Kurdish music with a subsidiary label, *Pel Records* (based in Germany, although they have an office in Beyoglu and not in Unkapani) has produced (a) the latest albums of some of the world-wide famous artists of Kurdish music, such as Şivan Perwer and Ciwan Haco and (b) taken over some of the younger popular Turkey-based artists, such as Aynur and Rojin. Sony's entrance to the market has been interpreted by most of my informants - particularly by producers and performers - in both the political segment and the world music segment as opportunism.

The "Independents" - A Subsegment of The World Music Scene

There are a number of groups/artists who, rather than pursuing longstanding agreements or contracts with recording companies (and the ideological / political stance or financial entanglements that such affiliations bring about), produce and perform music in a more "independent" manner. A common ground amongst these artists/groups is that they are somewhat critical of the way music is produced and Kurdish culture is "represented" by the companies in Unkapanı and, and are looking for novel ways in which they can engage in self-expression. This is, perhaps, best explained by a quote from Kerem, the rock musician. He complains that all of the companies in Unkapanı have a certain opinion on what Kurdish music should "sound" like – if a Kurdish music album does not feature any *bağlama*, for example, the producers are unlikely to produce it. When he and his band-members took a

demo to a number of companies, none of them were interested, because their work did not conform to certain stereotypes:

> There is an understanding, with which people want to dress Kurdish music, to dress the Kurdish arts. And this is, at least to some extent, accepted (by the artists). What is this? Kurds sing songs with le le lo lo. … everybody expects that you take your *saz* in your hand, and you start to sing and play. But this is no longer the case, we tried to explain, along with some other other artists, that this was no longer the case. … I suppose [it will be different for future generations' musicians]. (Kerem, performer)

The independents have a hard time finding ways to "sell" their work (through albums or live performances). Opportunities for performance are still irregular, and sometimes do not even generate any revenue. Many bands and artists still perform at festivals on a volunteer basis, or they "rent" concert spaces and try to bring in revenue from ticket sales. Because being a professional musician does not provide a steady income, many musicians are obliged to hold regular day-jobs. Other options that might be available to non-Kurdish musicians – such as busking – are also not perceived to be feasible. Political events ("evening programs") often hire artists and groups that are affiliated with the political music segment. Kerem notes that he and his band are able to perform live very infrequently, and these performances require a lot of effort on their part:

> Kerem: We recently gave a concert in Diyarbakır. We usually take stage at events held by this organization and that... at the latest one, *Diyarbakır Sanat Merkezi* (Diyarbakır Center for the Arts) invited us. It was a concert without a budget. They say, we'll pay your travel expenses, can you come? We said yes… but some of our friends there are people who try to make a living out of music… You go from here to Diyarbakır, you give a concert, then you come here and organize a concert for yourself. And there are two concerts you can give per year, one is a concert in Diyarbakır without even a budget, and the

other is here where you rent a bar and give a concert there. You try to survive, somehow.
A: That's how you did the concert at [well-known performance hall that features world music]?
K: Yes we went there and had a talk, then we gave some tickets at our friends at the universities, asked them if they could sell them, and they did.
A: So you basically rented the hall?
K: Exactly. A friend who lives abroad came in the summer and said, "you should rent a minibus, put your instruments in it, and take it all with you, go around the country and give concerts on every town square." Yeah right [laughs] He thinks it's all so easy, he lives in America, that's [what they do] there. No way you can do that here!

While Kerem and his band members are personally politically supporters of the Kurdish movement (one member of the band is the vice-mayor of a city in the region), other independent artists who do not demonstrate political engagement with the movement might have an even more difficult time. A published interview with Jan Axin in 2006 hints towards tensions between an independent artist and the political music segment :

Interviewer: Do you think dominant Kurdish politics is systematically opposed to musicians like yourself who are not engaged [with the movement]?
Jan Axin: This is a very difficult question. Well, who am I [what is my significance] that they should maintain a systematical political stance against me? But, this much is for sure, a politician always looks at whether you are on the same side as him/her and acts accordingly. Of course, anyone who is involved with the arts tries to build his own structure, within his own world. Despite the presence of a politics that ostracizes this, I am trying to persist. But at the end of the day, we all share the same past. Therefore I don't want to say that they are trying to ostracize us. We are pretty much bothered by the same things in this world. What more could you ask for? But I would have liked to receive some support … I'm not doing anything wrong, after all.

Artists and groups who work in closer association with production companies and cultural are sometimes able to make use of the producers' connections – one producer noted that artists sometimes ask them for help, and producers find themselves acting as agents, managers, and publicists for the artists and bands. However, Kerem's band is completely independent – having no affiliation with production companies, recording studios, and other organizations, they rarely get invited to the events in which other groups perform, and therefore have to hunt out performance opportunities, often renting venues with their own resources and hoping to make a profit through their share of ticket sales. Once again, this situation is quite different from what young, and "independent" Turkish artists experience. Jale, an Arab-Turkish artist currently affiliated with Ada Müzik, has narrated how her earlier years were also full of struggles to receive recognition from a recording label. Her earlier experiences included regular performances as the lead singer of a "house band" at a jazz club, writing jingles for commercials, and singing at promotional events, finally being signed on by a major record label, thanks to connections that led her to become "mentored" by a famous singer-songwriter. However, this story of "ascent" includes elements that are unavailable to most, if not all, singers who perform in Kurdish. Thus, artists and groups un-affiliated with any recording company, and performing in Kurdish, have even more difficulties in becoming full-time artists and receiving recognition, when compared to (a) Turkish artists/groups, and (b) Kurdish artists/groups who are affiliated with organizations or record companies.

In the case of Kerem's band, however, they have managed to form a following. Kerem notes that, during their first "major" concert, at the performance

hall they rented (which often features Balkan music), the audience was quite sizable, and were singing along to their songs. The venue's managers, surprised by and delighted at this level of attention, actually asked them how soon they could schedule their next performance. Kerem's band went on to perform at a few other similar performance halls, including Musa's performance venue. However, Kerem was still somewhat pessimistic about the future of the group. They had produced three albums on their own efforts – working on every single aspect of the process on their own, recording in their "home studio" (to the complaint of neighbors), making their own graphics for the album cover, promoting themselves through the website *Myspace*, selling their CDs through their own connections. He doubted that they would ever make a fourth album.

Another "independent" group I interviewed was composed of four young men in their early 20s (two of whom were not Kurdish) who had yet to produce any albums. They were at a stage where they had a repertoire, but were trying to decide how to proceed. Unsure whether they fit into either the world music or the political music segments, they were seeking advice from a more senior musician who worked with Kalan (and whom I interviewed, which is how I came to meet them). Quite distinct from many other musicians I interviewed, they sang in a mix of different languages and dialects: their songs, they told me, mixed Kurmanji and Zazaki (Kurdish dialects) with Turkish, English, and French. Describing their style as a musical analogue of "Brechtian" theater – incorporating many different musical styles and samples in one song, they were obviously outside the more "typical" or "mainstream" segments of wedding singers, political musicians, and even world music- actors. They described their music as follows:

> We do make music that is somewhat close to traditional Kurdish music, but it also does not fit certain molds, so we can't really call it a completely traditional Kurdish music. I mean, there are some traditional forms of Kurdish music, we use them, with an emphasis on Zazaki, Asım is from *Hınıs* and I am from *Kiğı*, so there is a musical world that we grew up in... so we do have a tendency towards Kurdish music, but we also don't want to be limited by Zazaki, we don't think our style is quite like that. We make a music that is quite avant-garde. (Hüseyin, performer)

Another group member, Hasan, explained their style even further:

> We took inspiration from Brecht, on his concept of alienation, and how it has been used in theater, how we can use it in music … we try to apply that on some of our compositions. Our aim is, whether on stage or whether someone turns on the music and starts to listen, we don't want to trap that person inside the music. If there is pain there is pain, but we don't want to leave that person inside the pain, we want to leave them outside of it. Because in the mainstream forms, when people [start listening to] tonal music, they get lost in it. … in a Hollywood movie, if a thousand people enter the cinema they emerge as one. But with the Brechtian cinematic language, a thousand people …emerge as a thousand. In cinema, Godard has applied this style, in theater, Brecht has applied this. We question how we can do this with music. (Hasan, performer)

The reason I present a detailed description of this group's activities is to draw a comparison between the concerns and logics (social, political, and artistic) of musicians who came of age with the strong influence of political organizations and the social movement, with younger musicians who were not necessarily involved with these organizational structures, or the ethos of the political movement. While they have somewhat similar musical influences – the young musicians often also count Şivan Perwer, Ciwan Haco, the *dengbej* and prominent Alevi musicians among the music they grew up on – they "problematize" their identities and express their relationship to their communities in different ways. These young musicians, who

grew up in Istanbul, are much more concerned with artistic expression on a more individual level. The older musicians I interviewed, particularly those performing music that drew from the "agitative" tradition, were concerned with a political and communal Kurdish identity. The younger musicians see this politicized and populistic approach inevitable for the 1990s: "Had we been doing music 20 years earlier, we probably would have had the same mentality" says one group member, but they do not find this approach as relevant today as it used to be.

4.3.3 Segment 3: The "Commercial Segment"

The findings I present in this section are based on my interviews with actors from the "political segment" and the "world segment." According to these actors, there is a segment in the market that produces "easy to consume" commercial music. The production values are "low," the albums cost significantly lower to produce, the songs are not necessarily original but are re-interpretations of popular songs. Moreover, many performers in this segment do not record albums, but merely play music live at weddings, celebrations, and at *türkü bar*s. With the exception of an informal conversation with a performer, I did not interview any actors from this segment. Yet, I felt it is necessary to discuss here how the more "dominant" actors in the field perceive of this segment, and how they distinguish themselves, morally and politically as well as artistically by referring to themselves as *contra* this segment.

The actors of the political segment - particularly those who were active in the 1990s - see the commercially orientation as adopted by producers and artists who don't care much about the politics and see the music as a way of making money. These are, incidentally, people who who have not "paid the price" in the past. In a sense, these

people have no excuse - whereas the early 90s performers and producers were burdened with the difficulties and restrictions and thus sometimes had to forego "quality", in recent years this is no longer the case. Thus, "just anyone" can become involved in production and performance. Ismail notes how the relationship between market actors in this model is a purely financial one, and ends his observation on a moral note:

> You see that some have really turned it into a [profit-making scheme], and there are some channels, local TV channels [that broadcast such music]. It's like whoever pays [gets their video to be broadcast], we see all these absurd music videos, and absurd songs, bad voices, really terrible things. But this public does not deserve this! [*E bu halk buna layık değil*!] (Ismail)

"This public" deserves to be bequeathed with proper music - What is unspoken but understood is that this public, that has undergone such difficulties and repression and taken part in a great struggle, hence this deserving status.

Arabesk and Halay

Two genres that surged in the 2000s, the arabesk genre and some versions of govend/ halay (dance music), were cast as artistically and morally problematic, particularly by actors in the political segment. By directing critiques at the arabesk and "wedding music" performers, the actors in the political segment were able to constitute themselves as morally correct actors as opposed to those that they perceived and demarcated as commercially motivated. This demarcation is linked to the changing meanings of "success" in the post-2000 period. In the 1990s, when the political ethos was dominant, actors based success in relation to their ability to awaken patriotic feelings, to mobilize support for the movement, and the ability to keep performing in a politically tense atmosphere. Artist Ismail's narrative that I quoted in the previous

chapter, on how people applauded them, not just for the music, but for their part in a (cultural) struggle, gives an idea of at least one way that "success" was evaluated. Other factors such as album sales, concert attendance, requests to appear on Roj TV, and an artist's/ group's ability to make money were lesser measures of success in the 1990s, or were deemed as "success" to the extent that they indicated the support of the public for the pro-movement musical activities. Yet in the post-2000 era, these "typical" market-based measures of success seem to play a stronger role in encouraging people to take part in the music scene & market. Thus, the political actors are foremostly disdainful of what they see as a "dilution" of the meaning of success, and are also upset that such parameters of success (which they refer to as a "lack of standards") leads to the prevalence of "arabesk", "halay" forms of music that they see as "easy to consume."

Many performers who entered the scene in the 2000s, by engaging in commercially motivated musical production, are blamed for benefiting from the "prices paid" by the actors of the 1990s music scene. In Ismail's words:

> … we started to see that there were people just coming out, taking advantage of this [peace] process and who have no affiliation with any organization or anything, they are one by one making albums and that atmosphere, which had been created by all that sacrifice and all that labor, in a sense that atmosphere started to be used by others. And in that period, people who had previously never opened their mouths, let alone [express] their Kurdishness, suddenly they started to become the kings and queens of Kurdish music. I don't want to name any names, but I think you can see for yourself, when you look back at the years 2001, 2002, who emerged, people who hadn't been in the market before, and suddenly they took over all that [history] as if they had carried [Kurdish music] to this day, as though they had been the ones who labored. So then it became a market, a serious economic market. These artists who did this only for the money, who made songs just for weddings, only *halay* albums, started to emerge. Of course, perhaps some of them were true artists,

> but I'd say 70 to 80 percent are people who don't know anything about this [past struggle], they started becoming known with one song, one music video. (Ismail)

Ismail's terming the post-2000 period as "so then it became a market" [*pazar haline geldi*] is particularly noteworthy here - he sees the political scene of the 1990s as somehow transcending, or existing outside of, "the market." In contrast to the politically motivated producers who emphasized their lack of interest in making profit from Kurdish music, the commercial segment actors were blamed for having produced/performing solely with the commercial intentions, or attaining fame. These companies are often accused of making low-quality productions and for not paying royalties if they used songs that have already been registered in the names of other artists. Moreover, as the argument goes, these performers and companies were able to find a place in the market thanks to the efforts of the pioneers in the past who had "paid the price." Ismail's quote is exemplary in this sense:

> There are so many [small] companies, many of them very make-shift, they are owned by a single person, the guy goes and establishes a company in his own name and distributes [the productions] by hand. Maybe they're not even legal, they might even use fake *bandrol*s. They do it informally, they form local studios, production companies, and both produce and distribute the albums … like piracy, on the local level. You don't even need to form a company, you buy an original CD and you make copies, distribute personally … you can make a color photocopy [of the album cover] … there are lot's of these makeshift companies. This also means that our labor is stolen. (Ismail)

A number of different factors are cited, by the political music segment actors, behind the popularization of "commercially-oriented" music and the emergence of these makeshift companies – including, especially, the "halay singers". One is that the Kurdish public actually encourages this type of commercial production, which is

easy to listen and dance to. Ismail to a certain extent blames the public who has not quite grasped what the "right" music should sound like - in other words, the audience of this music is seen as lacking cultural capital:

> The public has not really understood [what art is about], the public doesn't really know. The public likes popular stuff, love [songs]. They haven't yet reached an artistic [maturity], and thus they [don't know] what kind of music they need, what kind of music it should be… they don't know what is the type of music, or art, or type of artist that is appropriate to their life styles. They look at it very spontaneously. They look, and if they like the song, they don't even really look at the lyrics, but if they find the music pleasant. Or if the song contains some [words or phrases] that they like, they say, oh how lovely, and they support [the singer], they hire [the singer] for their wedding, they even sponsor [the singer]. They sponsor what they like, but not the right thing. I've witnessed that many wealthy, economically well-off people have supported not Kurdish artists, but other people.

"Arabesk" on the other hand is blamed for being regressive, and for being grounded in Turkish influence. Some interviewees cited Abdullah Ocalan's claim that the Turkish state promoted certain arabesk singers (such as Emrah, Ceylan, Ibrahim Tatlises) who were of Kurdish origin, to perform arabesk in Turkish, as a way to pacify Kurds. Xemgin Birhat, in a published interview, explains the reason for arabesk's popularity - and the problems that are associated with this popularity - as follows:

> … in the 90s, the Kurds migrated to the metropoles, and met with serious economic and social problems. At the same time, the leadership [*önderlik*, which refers to Abdullah Öcalan] was arrested and the movement for freedom underwent political transformations. This led to a serious depression in the Kurdish community. … arabesk music [became popular] because it addressed these feelings. [In this music] what addressed our community's feelings were such themes as the unfairness of life, sometimes a fatalistic attitude and sometimes suggestions for solutions. So what is the problem here? The problem is that this lifestyle and the music that is associated with this type is

> distant from the authentic Kurdish culture and fighter personality. If you look at these friends who perform arabesk music, you will find arabesk motifs in their appearances, their lifestyles, the cars that they drive. So what is being criticized here is not the music but actually the life philosophy it represents. (interview with Yeni Özgür Politika, cited online[35])

In both critiques, it is possible to see the dissatisfaction as part of a failed attempt to shape Kurdish lives and identities in a way that aligns with the Kurdish movement. Nonetheless, in addition to the demands of the audience, the dynamics of the market are also blamed for the abundance of low-quality, low-cost productions. As several informants have admitted, working as a band/artist "for hire" is an economically viable option. In the 90s, when cassette sales were plentiful – despite pirated copies (which, allegedly, sometimes were put in circulation by the producers themselves) – the revenues from sales were almost guaranteed to exceed production costs. In such a context, firm owners/ producers were willing to finance the production of new albums, especially if it was an artist that they trusted would "make money". But after digital media (first mp3s, then later online streaming) created a heavy dent on album (now CD) sales, producers stopped being willing – or, in some cases, able – to finance productions. Rather, they expected the artist to shoulder most of the cost, and would share in the revenues after the album was in the market. Within this scheme, artists and production companies alike complain that they make very little to no money.

Performers in the "commercial segment" sometimes produce one album or two that they use as a "business card," as one performer from this segment noted. The album gives potential hirers an idea of what the music sounds like. Thus, the

[35] http://www.agire-serhildan.com/xemgin-birhat-ile-roeportaj-t20490.html, accessed Dec 9 2014

performer, who often has to finance the album costs, thinks of it as an investment for making a living through performing at weddings and other celebrations. There are many performers who do not even produce a single - yet they may have a music video that they circulate on the internet or on the increasing number of Kurdish-language private television channels broadcasting locally or through satellite. Word of mouth and informal networks are still an important device for these performers to gain commercial success.

It should be noted, moreover, that several of the performers within the political segment also make a living through performing at weddings, bars, and political events - otherwise they have to hold "day-jobs" to be able to perform music as a second career. As mentioned, there are a limited number of venues where Kurdish groups and singers were able to perform. Ismail notes that four or five weddings a month can contribute to making a decent living. These "wedding singers", he notes, "don't have any concern for going somewhere, giving concerts, saying 'look this is what Kurdish music is like'." Yet, the political segment singers, even if they have to make a living through similar means, are seen as embodying political ideals, and working to instill them in their audience.

In addition to weddings, music is often performed live at "*türkü bar*s," which are venues in which a singer and musicians perform a mix of popular folk music – often starting with Turkish, and through the long night, mixing it up with Kurdish, ending with long rounds of *halay.* Musa, the owner of a bar/performance hall that features performers from the world music segment (as well as some political-segment), for instance, frames his venue as the opposite of the *türkü bar.* He says, of the younger, more urban audience:

> People are disgusted by the bar culture, they are disgusted because they have observed how those places are money traps [he literally calls them "storage units for making money", *para kazanma deposu*], they are disgusted because of the bad music, the low quality music that they feature. An alternative [was] necessary. (Musa, venue owner)

Thus, performing particular types of music both problematized in moral terms - their failure to contribute to "Kurdish culture" and their non-adherence to the "Kurdish identity" that is favored by the movement, as well as their purely commercial intentions, are reasons that they are kept outside the boundaries of this field. Yet, working with the state-run TV channel is perceived as an even worse and more direct affront to the movement in addition to being opportunistic. Thus, it is a greater cause for disbarment.

4.3.4 Segment 4 - The Challenger Segment

Tahir's quote that I presented in the beginning of the section - that the war has created its own "lifestyle" amidst widespread support from the Kurdish society, and that a "Kurdish society has been created," as well as Xemgin Birhat's comments on arabesk not adhering to the fighter ethos, are both grounded in the idea that there is a morally "right" kind of Kurdish society and Kurdish individual: one that embodies the ideological and moral tenets of the pro-Kurdish movement, and which enacts this pro-movement orientation in different aspects of their lives, from the music that they choose to listen to the way they present themselves in terms of bodily and other consumption practices. Yet, there are obviously alternative and competing "Kurdishness"es that are at play within Turkey - and these "other" Kurds are also envisioned as the internal (as opposed to the Turkish-external) Others. Gurbuz (2012)

has noted that prominent Kurds, or pro-Kurdish figures, who receive the "traitor" label in the recent years are those who were perceived to be collaborating or ideologically aligning with the AKP - the ruling political party which, according to several of my interviewees, has its own agenda of creating "proper Kurdish citizen" subjects who are pro-Islam, pro-government and anti-separation (which can refer to federation / autonomy / …). The Kurdish politician, Emine Ayna, has been quoted as stating "No one who becomes a [parliamentary] candidate through the AKP can [rightfully] say 'I am a Kurd'. This is unacceptable, because AKP's policies deny the Kurds" (quoted in Tezcur 2009). Thus, the traitor (in Kurmanji, "*ceş*") trope has been employed as a powerful way of drawing moral boundaries amongst "rightful" Kurds and those who are not. Thus, the market is another place where proper Kurdishness is embodied and enacted - whereas the boundaries are drawn against those who do not embody and enact this propriety.

The state, in the late 2000s, took on a new role - in addition to its place as the "oppressive other," it also became more involved in Kurdish cultural production, particularly through TRT-6, the state-run television channel. On one hand, many Kurds signed up to work with/for TRT-6 and saw it as a favorable development. On the other hand, TRT-6 was disparaged, particularly by pro-movement actors, as yet another effort by the state to "assimilate the Kurds" – this time, by instrumentalizing Kurdish language as a tool for assimilation. Kurdish individuals who joined TRT-6 were likewise disdained, with some prominent individuals labeled as "traitors" by pro-movement actors and media, and TRT Şeş dubbed as "TRT Ceş" in a humorous twist. An exemplary pro-movement reaction to TRT-6 can be found in a press release issued by the MKM (a Kurdish cultural center in Istanbul). This press release was

read by a Kurdish stage actor, and was attended by artists, members of BDP (the pro-Kurdish party) including MP Sebahat Tuncel. The release directly addresses the state and expresses anger towards various policies which, throughout the years, restricted the usage of Kurdish language and the performance of Kurdish music. The recurring theme in the speech is one of skepticism: that the initiative and the TV channel are mere ploys employed by the AKP to receive more votes from the Kurds. This statement serves not only to voice opposition against the state, but also to warn the Kurdish public - the moral boundaries thus are re-enforced.

In a morally precarious position, in the eyes of the political segment, are performers and public figures who choose to work with TRT. The singer Rojin, who accepted the offer to present a daily talk show, for example, was subject to much disdain. In interviews, she states that she has even received threats - an account that was, in fact, verified by an acquaintance of mine affiliated with The Center. The decision of Nilüfer Akbal to host her own program on TRT-6 was also met with surprise amongst the political-actors: one musician told me that he and Ms. Akbal used to be friends, but following her deal with TRT, he had "stopped saying hello to her." Artists who work with Kalan, Ada, or Sony (or other companies that are outside the political segment) on the other hand, did not provoke such strong reactions from the pro-movement actors. For instance, Aynur was referred to as producer from the "political music" segment as a "friend." While some disdain existed amongst some artists and producers with regards to the attention she received from Turkish mainstream media, she was not referred to, as a person or an artist, in negative terms. (According to an informant from the "world music" segment, Aynur was offered to present her own music program on TRT-6, but she declined).

Rojin's involvement with TRT started on an optimistic declarations from pro-government sources as well as the artist herself. Noting that she saw the establishment of TRT-6 as a sign of goodwill, Rojin also put symbolic distance between herself and the pro-movement actors:

> My purpose has always been for all the [audience] in this country to hear me. That's why I sang my songs in Turkish and Kurdish, despite having stones thrown at me. … Some of the people who criticized me [later] also sang in both Turkish and Kurdish. This means I was doing it right. I was criticized for wearing comfortable clothes, and for putting on makeup, when I taught lessons at some organizations. Now I see that those who criticized me are walking around dressed in punk attire. What TRT has taken is a historical step. Artists who were previously unable to make their voices heard in Turkey will be able to do so through the state channel. (Quote from Özarslan 2009[36])

Only a few months later, however, Rojin's contract with TRT was terminated. While TRT blamed the artist for her consistent tardiness, Rojin denied these claims, and issued a press release in which she argued that she was given no agency in her "own" program:

> … there were such pressures on me and my program that it was evident [they] were trying to empty the program of all its content and cause it to finish its life cycle. Imagine a program presenter, who goes into her own program without knowing what the topic will be and who the guests will be. That the programmer's – that is, my - recommendations for guests are completely disregarded; many things I say on air are [censored], everything is interfered with. That [they] treat the program as a potential crime, and me as a potential criminal. Of course this station was one of the most important steps in the historical process of the Kurdish problem, one of the most important developments, and it was expected that not everything could happen at once. It wasn't hard to imagine that some limitations would be placed, but I could

[36] http://www.zaman.com.tr/cumaertesi_rojin-orgutu-degil-annemi-dinledim-ve-trtye-ciktim_801745.html

not accept these [limitations] to exceed [a certain point] and that I would be completely disregarded[37].

It seems – at least according to Rojin herself – that neither the Center, nor the TRT allowed her to "present" herself and her program in a manner that she found suitable – in effect, it can be read that she has, at different times, resisted both sides of these "hegemonic" forces (Turkish state and the Kurdish Movement) that have tried to shape Kurdish subjectivities. However, she was unable to fit into either of these spheres. After Rojin left, her program was taken over by singer Berdan Mardini. One of my informants expressed anger at Mardini, noting off the record that Mardini had never sung a word of Kurdish before 2009, yet now he was being promoted by the state as "the prince of Kurdish music."

An account somewhat similar to Rojin's was told to me by Melih, a journalist who worked for TRT-6 when it was initially founded. He noted (in an unrecorded informal conversation) that even though he had a pro-movement history, he felt that the government's move, through the establishment of a TRT station, was a step in the right direction. He moreover felt that TRT-6 provided jobs for Kurdish speakers, which was a positive development. However, after working there for a number of months, he too quit, as he had a hard time getting along with the (Turkish) management.

The pro-movement stance has argued that the state, via TRT, is attempting to pacify and "water down" the Kurdish identity, by featuring only *halay* or "folkloric" music, and not very high-quality ones at that; i.e. with simplistic musical instrumentation relying on electrical instruments rather than virtuosity of acoustics,

[37] http://www.bugun.com.tr/haber-detay/65970-trt-6-da-rojin-depremi-haberi.aspx

and also sung with incorrect lyrics or diction. This type of music, as the argument goes, is simplistic and easy to consume – both alienating audience from stylistically more complex genres, and also encouraging musicians to produce this type of easy-to-sell music. Thus, a pro-movement morality, which is dedicated to the "advancement" of Kurdish culture to higher, "global" standards, frowns upon such production and consumption. Moreover, they framed the channel as refraining from the word "Kurdistan" and demonstrating support for the Turkish military. An overarching theme in their criticism was that TRT-6 was not "really" Kurdish- it was an epitome of an assimilated and pro-government – and thus inauthentic - version of Kurdishness.

Another issue that infuriated pro-movement actors (as well as some world music segment actors) was TRT's usage of their copyrighted material without paying royalties. While TRT, in the beginning, had requested music videos from production companies, and asked if their affiliated artists would prepare programs for TRT, most of the *Unkapanı* firms had not complied. When I asked the reasons, in an interview in 2011, Nizam noted:

> [TRT-6] emerged suddenly and we still don't know exactly what they're doing. I mean, right now still some words, some letters are prohibited, other people can't use them anywhere else, but they are allowed to use them on TRT-Şeş. Now, in some places, some letters, like w, q and x, they are prohibited, but TRT-Şeş is allowed to use them. That is inappropriate. (Nizam, producer)

Despite the companies' refusal, TRT-6 aired songs performed by many popular Kurdish-singing artists – including Aram Tigran, Ciwan Haco – accompanied by "music videos" put together in the TRT studios consisting mostly of

stock footage of the Kurdish-populated cities. One such example is the video for *Ay Dilbere*, performed by Aram Tigran, which is accompanied by scenes of daily life from the historical sites and markets in Diyarbakir, Urfa, and other towns in the region. The video has been uploaded by a user onto the streaming video site *youtube*, and several commentators draw attention to the allegation that the government did not allow Aram Tigran to be interred in Diyarbakir (he passed away in Armenia) as had been proposed by the BDP-led Diyarbakir municipality. Yet, according to the commentators, the government (which they felt was being represented by TRT) shamelessly broadcast Tigran's song.

Other actors also have entered into the efforts to "define" different "Kurdishness"es through arts and television broadcasting. One such effort is Dünya TV, which, admittedly, was rarely mentioned in my interviews (with the exception of Nizam, who mentioned that Dünya TV also played their music without permission or paying royalties) – the "Other" was, most commonly, TRT-6. Dünya TV is reportedly owned by the Gülen Foundation (Gurbuz 2012), and broadcasts culture and music in addition to religious programs in Kurdish. One interviewee (Dicle) also mentioned that the TV station Kurdiyek, founded by the Kurdish Cultural Institute in Paris (whose pro-Kurdish orientation is somewhat distinct from the pro-PKK line), was also opposed by PKK. Dicle thinks this is to be expected within the flow of things – "they are opening a new shop right across the street from your shop" – an analogy for describing the rivalry between efforts to hold the authoritative position in terms of arts, culture, and identity – and such rivalry is often marked by each of the opposing parties calling the other a traitor or a poseur.

A final and significant observation I made regarding the government's foray into the Kurdish music scene was the "return" of Şivan Perwer to Diyarbakır in late 2013. Perwer made a series of public appearances with then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Throughout the years leading up to 2013, Perwer had had a number of falling outs with the PKK-line Kurdish movement. An informant told me that PKK members had even accosted Perwer on the street in Europe, once, and had broken his *bağlama*. ("It was a good bağlama, too" noted my informant, with slight bemusement.) Perwer's visit was seen by some Kurds as an unnecessary alignment with the government, and a betrayal of the "struggle." Some reactions I read in the social media went as far as proclaiming that "[they] would throw away every single Perwer recording [they] own and never listen to him again" whereas others were less harsh but equally sorrowful. Journalist and academic Mahmut Çınar, for instance, lamented Perwer's return as "someone else" and not his true self (Çınar 2013[38]).

This turn of events forms a stark contrast to the initial "return" of Ciwan Haco – a singer and songwriter who never lived within the borders of Turkey, to begin with, but was from a family that was originally from the city of Mardin. Haco was raised in and exiled from the neighboring town of Qamishlo across the border of Syria. His first concert in Turkey took place in 2003, in the city of Batman, and was attended by 300 thousand people (which was more than the city's population). His second concert in the hometown of his musical imagination, Diyarbekir/Diyarbakır, was reportedly attended by 1 million people. The documentary "The Road to Diyarbekir" depicts the excitement and wild energy surrounding his "return," juxtaposing the joy, anxiety, and sorrow of Haco with an overflow of emotions from

[38] http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/151398-hazin-bir-donus-hikayesi

the Kurdish audience, some of whom are seen wearing colorful dresses that are normally reserved for weddings and *Newroz* celebrations, on the way to the concert. One imagines that under different circumstances, and after following a different trajectory, Perwer's return would have generated double or triple the audience and emotions. Yet, it generated tentative appreciation from pro-government Kurds at best, and moral indignation from Kurds who distance themselves from the government, at worst.

Kurds perceived to be pro-state or pro-government were deemed "traitors" and sometimes targeted by the PKK-line movement in the 1990s, as well - as in the examples of village guards who were executed by the PKK. However, a pro-state "producer identity" did not emerge as part of my data regarding the 1990s. There were singers of Kurdish origin in the marketplace - some of them performed music that was adapted or translated from Kurdish songs (traditional as well as newer compositions), but many of them did not overlap into performing Kurdish music until the 2000s. Such singers as Ibrahim Tatlises, Mahsun Kirmizigul, Ozcan Deniz (who, incidentally, is the nephew of Sakiro, a famed dengbej) are often viewed in a rather negative light by the pro-movement Kurds and the "political segment" actors.

4.4 Discussion

In this chapter, I explored the changes - and in particular, the segmentation of - the market that accompanied the gradual lessening of state-imposed restrictions during the 2000s. With the relaxation of restrictions, producing, performing, and circulating Kurdish music ceased to carry some of the risks it carried in the 1990s. Following the

gradual lessening of surveillance, censorship, album recalls, and court cases, the scene became more open to a variety of producer-identities, rather than being limited to those who were politically motivated and thus willing to bear the risks. I detailed that, while the political-normative logic continued to be influential for some companies, performers, and other actors; a variety of other companies, employing different (combinations of) logics, emerged in the scene. This is in line with the argument that the heterogeneity of logics held within an industry accounts for different practices and also is linked to the segmentation of the market (Goodrick and Reay 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Thornton, Jones, and Kury 2005).

While there was a degree of diversity in the market in the 1990s, there was still a more or less "market culture" (Spillman 1999) around which the actors and audience united. Thus, I find that segmentation is contingent upon changes in the institutional environment in ways that provide opportunity space for the market. In the case of Kurdish market, this was brought about by changes in legislations, which was also followed by gradual changes in societal norms and understandings regarding Kurdish music. Developments in the social and political sphere were, moreover, accompanied by changes in the broader music market, and in particular, the popularization of a world music/ ethnic music scene in Istanbul. With a growing number of Kurdish artists also finding a place within this scene, a "world music segment," which attributed a higher weight to the artistic logic, also emerged. The producers and performers within this segment, moreover, are gradually becoming included in the more mainstream music and nightlife scene: thus, one of the emergent segments is slowly heading towards widespread recognition and legitimation. The

pro-government "challenger" segment emerged after the government's "Kurdish Initiative" project, and in particular in connection with the state-broadcaster, TRT, establishing a Kurdish language channel. Finally, the more relaxed political atmosphere also led to the emergence of a "commercial segment" shaped predominantly by a commercial logic.

Segmentation also corresponds to different audiences - and thus, to different rules, regulations, and "social imaginaries" (Spillman 1999) of the market. The political segment envisions a constituency that is more pro-movement. The actors of the world music segment envision a more educated audience that, while it may have ethnic affiliations, also is united by urbane-ness and the ethos of several ethnic groups "living together in harmony." While there are overlaps amongst the audiences of these first two segments, they both also have distinct audiences. The commercial segment appeals to audience of lower cultural and economic capital - Kurds living in the "margins" of large cities, as well as some of the smaller cities and towns in the region. It is a convenient type of music - consumed at weddings, celebrations, or even for dancing on the street. The "challenger" movement envisions a "citizen" that is faithful to the Turkish government, and keeps a distance to the pro-Kurdish political-normative logic.

Sandıkcı and Ger (2010), in discussing the emergence and normalization of a parallel normative (taste) structure, also note that a diversity of "styles" started to emerge within this structure. By elaborating on the different processes that generated the different segments within the market, I contribute to this research. Moreover, by noting that the changes in political-normative logics and the emergence of different ideological positions in the market, I also show how the changing environment not

only leads to a "softer" style, but also to somewhat "softer," if not less firm, practices. The agitative style losing its relevance, the lesser sense of collective identity among producers, the departures of some actors into other (e.g., world music) segments include some of these instances of "softening." However, while the "surface" of this segment may have become somewhat softer, the boundaries remain erected, particularly against those who are perceived to be pro-government traitors. The lessening of marginalization and stigmatization both led to and also followed this "softening." But, particularly for the performers and producers of the Political Segment, an "integration" into the mainstream market has not been possible. This is reflected in actors' accounts on still finding it difficult to sell their music through mainstream retailers, or finding performance halls other than weddings, political events, and *turku bar*s for their performers. In contrast, the (albeit limited number of) performers from the World Music segment have found more success: large-scale concerts, mainstream TV appearances became more common around the beginning of this decade. I conclude by noting that the relative inclusion of this segment is possibly due to the guiding logics and ethos being of a more "palatable" political variety. The political segment's political orientation, in contrast, may still be perceived as too threatening, the world music scene may provide more space for common political grounds with a more mainstream audience.

The frames and meanings that shape the political-normative proto-institutional logic (which is still influential in the political segment) have also changed since the 1990s, and are somewhat contingent upon the political status quo. Frames of grievances, activism, and national consciousness, in particular, tend to become more important during periods of high tension, although these frames are not

quite as strong as they were in the 1990s. The collective identity and, in particular, practices of collaboration have shifted somewhat, in connection to the drop in revenues and the difficulty in financing new albums. Yet, normativity remains a powerful tool for distinguishing amongst the collective identity within the segment, contra its others, in line with discussions on the role of morality in generating and maintaining social distinction (Lamont 1992, 2000; Saatcioglu and Ozanne 2014) within a market that is seemingly unified by its actors' ethnic background and dominated-ness. In the 2000s, while the state remains as the external "Other" to be resisted against, there are now internal "Other"s that also are opposed. In other words, boundaries against "internal Other"s gained salience in the 2000s - whereas an emphasis on unity amongst actors, contra the state (and, relatedly, the Turkish public) was visible in my data on the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. Performers (or other actors) in the "challenger" segment, as well as other performers who did not partake in the struggles of the 1990s, are castigated to different degrees. While pro-government actors receive the label of "traitor," the other "internal others" are not derided as harshly.

The increased salience of boundaries towards "internal others" after the 2000s, and the variety of the intensify and nature of these boundaries, also necessitates a discussion on affective distance (Karakayali 2009) within the Kurdish community. This salience seems to point towards two dynamics occurring simultaneously. On one hand, the emotional structure that is constitutive of the political segment, and the pro-movement public, remains strong - and continues to intensify, powered by continued grievances and the still somewhat contentious political atmosphere. Yet, the emergence of other segments also points towards the

lack of fixity of emotional structures. Even actors who were habituated into these structures may, for various reasons, change their political orientations - and in turn, the pro-movement actors in the market may orient themselves in a "negative" and exclusionary manner with regards to actors in these other segments. Thus, the harshness of boundaries erected amongst market segments indicates both the dynamics of "intensification" of some emotional alignments, but also the shifting of alliances and the accompanying changes in emotional orientations.

The social distance (Karakayali 2009) between the political segment and the three new segments seems also to be of varied intensity and nature, in accordance with the disjuncture between the PKK-line political orientation and the ideologies/ logics which shape these "other" segments. For example, there is some "disdain" from the political actors towards some of the World Music actors - particularly in terms of the attention they receive from Turkish media, and their broader opportunities in finding mainstream shelf space and performance venues. Nonetheless, the political actors characterize their relationships with world music actors as "friendly," mentioning how they "like" or "respect" the world music actors. With some of the world music actors also participating in pro-movement concerts and events, the social distance between these two groups is not high, and is characterized by cordiality. Yet, the relationship between political and pro-government (from the "Challenger segment") actors openly hostile. Moreover, the way that political actors talk about the pro-government actors conveys a cultivated strangeness. In more than one occasion, emphasis was made on the "difference" of the actors in the challenger segment: they dress and behave "differently," for instance. Or, refraining from "saying hello" to a performer who used to be in the

political segment, but who "sold out," indicates that this performer has been relegated to the status of an unrecognized stranger. The changes in the socio-political environment seems to have laid the groundwork for competing social imaginaries of Kurdishness to gain visibility - with some posing more direct threats to the pro-movement political imaginary. However, more research is needed - particularly to understand the ways in which members of these "other" groups perceive of their own alignments and their social distance. The "legitimation" of certain groups, individuals, and organizations, as mentioned earlier, may also be related to their fit with emotional structures - thus the delegitimation of certain individuals, groups, and organizations may also be linked with affective distance, enacted through a cultivation of strangeness. Thus, how and when affective orientations change, "strangeness" is cultivated, and even escalates into tension and violence within proximate groups (Karakayali 2009; see also Block 1998) within a community deserves further scrutiny.

CHAPTER 5: EPILOGUE

5.1 Conclusion

This dissertation is concerned with the emergence and evolution of a market for Kurdish music in Turkey, detailing the market's entwinement with the political processes of community-building and its co-constitutive relationship with a resistive political movement. I start from the emotionally-charged, illegal, and dispersed practices of cassette circulation, and follow with the legal - and also centralized - market activities. In chapter 2, I detailed the practices of circulating cassettes that constituted tactical resistance (De Certeau 1988; J.C. Scott 1990) and emotionally shaped the "imagining" (Anderson 1983) of a community and its boundaries. I showed that an emotional structure that is constitutive of a resistive "community" - in its alignments with "us" as well as its delineation from the "other(s)" - are in part shaped through the emotionality generated by the circulation of music cassettes. A politicized collective identity thus emerged. In chapter 3, I detailed how, after legalization, the circulation of music encountered the dynamics of a formal music market, and the emergent market culture (Spillman 1999) was shaped by actors' framings of their experiences as well as by their appropriations of frames from the Kurdish political movement. A proto-institutional logic, centered by these political-normative frames, coordinated business and artistic practices, and also negotiated

field-level tensions. In chapter 4, I explored the segmentation of the market, following changes at the broader socio-political environment.

Chapter 2 is based on a standalone article (Kuruoğlu and Ger 2014) detailing the illegal circulation of Kurdish music cassettes in Turkey during the 1970s, 80s and 90s. I demonstrated the entwinement of materiality and emotionality, and discussed the structuring potentiality that this entwinement generated. Cassettes, as they circulated, materialized relationships – real and imagined, inter-personal and communal, associative and disruptive – and in so doing, became "sticky" (Ahmed 2004) with the emotions they elicited. Through time, and through circulation, this "stickiness" intensified. As such, a *nexus* of materiality and emotionality emerged. As cassettes circulated, they also "affected" those with whom they came into contact, infusing people with their positive and negative emotionality, orienting them toward acting and feeling in ways that struck bonds as well as disconnections, and also perpetuated circulation. Thus, resistive practices of cassette circulation played an important part in shaping collective dispositions: a "structured and structuring" (Swartz 1997) emotional structure, or in other words, an emotional habitus (Kane 2001) emerged and intensified. A repertoire of cassette-centered experiences served to generate a sense of a unified "us" as well as of distance to the "other," the state – the contentious relationship which significantly shaped the emotional habitus that structured this emergent community. In this way, I argued that objects and consumption experiences serve not only harmonious, but also divisive, oppositional, and resistive relationships and communalities. In that process, just as ideologies can be experienced as "structures of feeling" (Williams 1977, 1979; see also Thompson 2005), a person's engagement with ideology and politics may be

shaped by emotions. Finally, I suggested that the "stickiness" and intensification of an emotional structure may help explain the enduring affiliations people uphold with certain communities and the perseverance of resistance. I thus noted that materialities, markets, and consumption can serve the generation and intensification of emotional structures that relate to the unification of communities, and the enactment of resistance – processes of great political import.

The imagining of a resistive community and its boundaries also relate to the cultivation of a "politicized collective identity" (Simon and Klandermans 2001) - one that was significantly shaped by tense and combative relationships with the state, and feelings of being stigmatized and marginalized (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) or, in other words, of being dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Tactical, infrapolitical (DeCerteau 1988; Scott 1990) as well as organized resistance (Tarrow 2012) - and accompanying movement ideologies - emerged as a response, and shaped circulation as well. While circulation helped to cultivate a resistive stance, a resistive political movement, led after the 1980s by the PKK, was also involved with music circulation while trying to disseminate its ideological agenda. With legalization in 1991, circulation was legalized: carried out in a centralized, but also state-regulated (and restricted) manner: thus, circulation became a "business" that took place at the juncture of state regulation and the resistance against the state. How a market culture emerged and evolved, and how actors navigated this process at this juncture was my concern in chapter 3.

The stigmatization and domination of the Kurdish constituency translated into difficulties gaining access to and attaining legitimacy (W.R. Scott 1994) within "mainstream culture." Market actors who had been habituated into the resistive-

politicized collective identity, however, continued to enact their roles as producers, performers, arrangers, studio engineers, distributors, and retailers of Kurdish music. "Framing" stands out as a rhetorical device that shaped market culture. Pre-legal experiences of music circulation, as well as the lived "local" experiences after legalization, were framed: market actors "diagnosed" their situation - particularly their grievances related to their disadvantaged position both in larger society and within the music market - and they also "prognosed" appropriate market practices and activities. Moreover, interactions with the Kurdish political movement took place - while the movement's frames were appropriated by market actors, the movement also appropriated music circulation toward its pursuits. Music - the "object" of exchange -was seen as an important device for disseminating ideology, awakening political consciousness, and for serving and showcasing Kurdish "culture" - particularly in terms of "progress." Grievances, particularly as experienced with the state, served as motivation rather than deterrence, for engaging with the market. Business practices were accordingly shaped in ways that would serve the collective goals of the community: producers perceived of themselves as "activists" of a political cause; collaborations were made and networks were formed, motivated by this politically-grounded collective identity. Artistic and commercial decisions similarly took on a political bend.

As such, I detailed how a market that does not adhere to broader level societal norms, values and understandings, and only partially sanctioned by the law can nonetheless exist as an "alternative" marketplace. Its "alternative"ness is not necessarily volitional - but is inherently linked to the socio-political environment, and the way that its actors frame and respond to the structural conditions that both

enable and restrain them. I showed that the political-normative frames that actors generate, adapt, and articulate, became entrenched in the market throughout the 1990s, and shaped the "normal" way of performing Kurdish music, producing Kurdish-language albums, and in general, doing business in the market for Kurdish music. An alternative "legitimate" order, an accordant political-normative "proto-institutional" (Lawrence et al. 2002) logic, and a particular market culture thus emerged. The political-normative logic not only addressed the tensions at the societal level - particularly as experienced in relation to the state and in terms of stigmatization and exclusion from mainstream culture - that are reflected at the level of the field of music production; but also addressed and negotiated the field-specific tension amongst artistic and commercial logics. Importantly, I also demonstrate that the workings of "formal" markets may be linked to informal / illegal practices of circulation / exchange. The moral and emotional structures that shape illegal practices, as evidenced in the second chapter, also greatly influence the emergent logic that shapes business and artistic practices, as I detail in the third chapter. I note that the frames which shape and legitimate the market culture are also grounded in and shaped by the emotional structures that characterize and delineate that market's core constituency. I propose to explicate the role of emotionality and emotional structures in the legitimation of new social ventures - such as markets - as future research.

In chapter 3, I also contributed to consumer research literature on stigmatized and marginalized (consumer) communities: I note how a constituency's dominated and stigmatized position in society may shape the terms through which a new market emerges, and that the market's (oppositional and resistive) culture may be shaped by

its very lack of legitimacy. Rather than seeking inclusion (Coskuner-Balli and Thompson 2013; Scaraboto and Fischer 2013; Ustuner and Holt 2007; Ustuner and Thompson 2012) into mainstream culture, the stigmatized constituency may instead engage in the creation of an alternative market culture, in a manner that is similar to the generation of a "parallel taste structure" (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) or a "countervailing market" (Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007). While the role of ideology in the shaping of such parallel/countervailing markets is evident from the extant literature, the emphasis has been on the community-building and oppositional practices of consumers. How producers collectively partake in constructing an alternative/ oppositional / counter-cultural normative orders and, accordingly, a new market culture; and how they appropriate and (re)produce ideology in doing so is less clear. I explicate how market actors engage in framing processes: drawing from their past and present, personal and collective experiences of circulating music / doing business in the market; and also drawing from and adapting the frames of the neighboring social movement. Thus, both existing political ideologies (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004) as well as "partisan knowledge" (J.C. Scott 1998) shape the frames that market actors employ. Frames are, moreover, re-articulated and re-produced in relation to changing political, socio-economic, and technological conditions. Thus, multiple ideological and experiential resources shape the market culture, as well as market actors' political and communal alignments.

In chapter 4, I detail the segmentation of the market, linking it to the shifts in the socio-political as well as technological environment. The relaxation of legal and normative restrictions on Kurdish music production, performance, and broadcast; the emergence and popularization of a "world" and "ethnic" music scene; the changes in

album formats and the availability of online streaming contributed to the changing atmosphere in which music production took place. Particularly with the relaxation of restrictions, spaces opened up for market actors to disengage from the political-normative logic, and engage with different logics, and thus different business and artistic practices. The four segments that emerged in the 2000s - the "Political," "World Music," "Commercial," and "Challenger" segments - I argue, not only relate to different norms of doing business and different meanings attributed to the "objects" of exchange, but also to different "social imaginaries" (Spillman 1999) of the Kurdish audience-public.

The political-normative logic continued to be dominant in the "Political Segment," yet the logic and its constitutive frames were adapted in a way to address the changing environment. The Kurdish performers and companies within the "world music" segment, on the other hand, adapted an ideological stance that was informed by frames of "cultural heritage" and "multiplicity." I noted that this more accessible ideological positioning, which was also reflected in artistic decisions, was influential in constituting this segment as more "palatable" for a middle-class, well-educated Turkish audience - thus enabling inclusion into mainstream culture, to some extent. On the other hand, the more contentious political-normative orientation of the "Political Segment," as well as the accordant imaginaries of "Kurdishness," may still be seen as mainstream Turkish audience as too extreme. I propose that a further inquiry into the structural conditions and the internal dynamics that are required for a politically contentious field / organization / product to become integrated into the mainstream, is necessary.

With segmentation, the boundaries between, rather than unity amongst, market actors became more salient. Particularly for actors in the Political Segment, in addition to the State as the "external" Other, actors of different segments are constituted as "internal" Others. This is particularly prominent in the way that actors enact boundaries towards the actors that they perceive as collaborating with the state (as with those who work with the state-run television) or rival Kurdish organizations. These actors, cast as "traitors," are seen as cooperating with the state's efforts to generate de-politicized and anti-movement Kurdish subjects. Symbolic boundaries are also erected and enacted against actors who entered the scene after 2000 - including the actors in the World Music and Commercial segments - although to a lesser extent. More research is necessary to address how actors in different segments differentiate themselves from their others. However, the findings in chapter 4 suggest that each segments actors' engage in different framing processes. Political-normative frames are thus relevant in generating and maintaining moral boundaries that constitute social distinction (Lamont 1992, 2000; Saatcioglu and Ozanne 2014) within the market.

With chapters 3 and 4, I thus contributed to the emergent literature on market creation and evolution within the discipline of consumer research (Giesler 2008, 2012; Humphreys 2010a,b; Karababa and Ger 2011; Press et al. 2014). I show how paths that do not involve legitimation within the mainstream culture are possible to the creation of a new market, and detail the role of producer-actors in navigating this process, by creating, adopting, and employing ideological frames. Like Karababa and Ger (2011) as well as Humphreys (2010b), I draw attention to the importance of the state as an actor in market creation and in shaping market culture, but note also that

the state can shape the market by the very limitations and delegitimating influence it imposes. While an alternative market may, in time, be normalized (Sandıkcı and Ger 2010) or legitimated (Karababa and Ger 2011; Humphreys 2010a,b), I note that environmental changes, as well as the adoption of more "palatable" ideological frames, may be necessary for this to happen.

5.2 Limitations

I am aware that there are many limitations to this research - taking a particular theoretical orientation regarding market formation and institutionalization, for one, has meant that I did not engage with a broad range of literature on cultural production as well as music performance - including the confluence of music with social movements. Shifting the focus away from the music "itself" to material circulation (chapter 2) and the legal market (chapters 3 and 4) was the reason for this, but I also feel that further discussion on music production and arts/aesthetics may have benefited my analysis.

In writing this dissertation, I relied on the memories of my informants regarding events and emotions that transpired in the past - some dating back as early as the 1970s. My other data sources - printed interviews and articles, as well as informal conversations - were mostly also based on memories. The emotionality that is generated by and associated with the cassettes comes out strongly in informants' narratives, and are very similar across accounts. Thus I think the accounts of the informants are representative of the "emotional economy" that circulation generated, and that the oral historiography does not pose a limitation.

For the third and fourth chapters, however, this reliance on actors' narratives potentially poses a limitation. The data I collected are not supported by "hard facts" such as court documents, contracts, sales figures, revenues, or other statistics, which would help me assess, a la Humphreys (2010a, b), the shifts in legitimation. However, even if I had found the opportunity to gather such data, I am not sure of how "factual" this data would be: there was a great deal of "off the record" activity; in terms of sales, contracts between companies and artists, as well as in dealings with law enforcement. Yet, I think I negotiated this potential limitation by placing emphasis on how actors "framed" ideologies, experiences, and activities. The "market culture" (Spillman 1999) is shaped by the frames that are shared amongst market actors. Detecting and analyzing the "frames" draws attention to how the actors perceive and narrate the market culture - and thus, justify the market and its activities to what actors see as their constituency, the "social imaginary of the market" (Spillman 1999).

While I tried to gain some understanding into how the frames and ideologies of the Kurdish movement figured into the music market, a more thorough reading and understanding would have been beneficial. Moreover, with comprehension of Kurdish language, I might have been better able to track references or allusions to movement frames and ideologies as they figured in the "product," the music.

In chapter 3, discussed the emergence and shaping of a "collective identity" of Kurdish market actors in the 1990s as opposed to the state - yet, comparing these findings with those I present in chapter 4, I wonder if there were other "internal others" (e.g., Kurds who cooperated with the state) and what, if any, involvement they had with the music market. This did not emerge from my data on the 1990s, but

upon reflection, I realize that it is not something I asked about or prompted for. Moreover, the majority of the primary data regarding the 2000s was gathered from interviews with actors from the political and world music segments, as well as observations at concerts and events attended by actors (particularly performers) from these segments. Published materials - in particular, interviews - with actors from the Challenger Segment were also helpful in my analysis. However, particularly for future research, a better emic understanding of the experiences of the Challenger and Commercial segments is necessary.

Another limitation of this research is the dearth of female interviewees. The overwhelming majority of producers, sound engineers, and other studio personnel are men. Most musicians are also male, but there are many female singers. I contacted three singers, but we were unable to schedule interviews - busy schedules and vacations were cited as reasons. While I did draw from printed interviews with female performers, and engage in some unstructured conversations with female audience, only four of my informants were women. One worked as a producer, and was the wife of the owner of a company in the world-music segment, while the others had more marginal involvement with the music scene as professionals. While my focus was not on gender in the music market, how gender figured into the emergent political-normative structure that shaped the market would have made an interesting component to this research.

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