

CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF THE UK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
FROM EUROSCEPTICISM TO BREXIT

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ABSTRACT

CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF THE UK AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: FROM EUROSCEPTICISM TO BREXIT

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The Conservative Party of the United Kingdom has shown differing attitudes towards European integration. Conservative Governments in the early 1960's strived for UK's membership to the European Economic Community (EEC). Membership to the EEC was eventually achieved with a Conservative government led by Prime Minister Edward Heath in January 1973 and the Conservatives supported membership to the EEC in the 1975 referendum. However, aversion towards further European integration (i.e. Euroscepticism) started to become more prominent in the Conservative Party during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and onwards. Rising Euroscepticism continued in the Conservatives under subsequent party leaders John Major, William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith, Michael Howard and David Cameron. Prime Minister Cameron vowed to hold a referendum regarding the UK's membership to the EU, which resulted in a leave the EU vote (i.e. Brexit) in 2016. The recent two Conservative Governments, led

by Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson, have vowed to fulfil the leave result.

This thesis shall present the divisions in the Conservative Party regarding European integration. It shall explore the reasons for rising Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party and the debates between the Pro-Europeanist and the Eurosceptic factions from the 1950's to today.

Keywords: UK Politics, European Union, European Integration, Euroscepticism



ÖZ

BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK MUHAFAZAKÂR PARTİSİ VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ:

AVRUPA ŞÜPHECİLİĞİ'NDEN BREXİT'E

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Birleşik Krallık Muhafazakâr Partisi, Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilişkin farklı tutumlar sergilemiştir. Muhafazakâr Hükümetler, 1960'ların başlarında, Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğuna (AET) üye olması için çabalamıştır. Sonunda AET üyeliği, Ocak 1973'te Başbakan Edward Heath başkanlığındaki Muhafazakâr bir hükümetle sağlanmış ve Muhafazakârlar, 1975 referandumunda AET üyeliğini desteklemiştir. Bununla birlikte, daha fazla Avrupa bütünleşmesine yönelik karşıtlık (yani Avrupa Şüpheciliği), Muhafazakâr Partide Margaret Thatcher'ın başbakanlığı (1979-1990) ve sonrasında daha belirgin olmaya başlamıştır. Muhafazakâr Parti'de artan Avrupa Şüpheciliği, parti liderleri John Major, William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith, Michael Howard ve David Cameronın dönemlerinde devam etmiştir.

Başbakan Cameron, Birleşik Krallık'ın AB üyeliğine ilişkin bir referandum düzenleme sözü vermiş ve 2016'da sözkonusu referandum AB'den çıkış oylamasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Yakın dönemde Başbakan Theresa May ve Boris Johnson liderliğindeki iki Muhafazakâr hükümet, AB'den çıkış oylamasını yerine

getirmeye söz vermiştir. Bu tez, Muhafazakâr Parti’de Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilişkin bölünmeleri sunacaktır. Muhafazakâr Parti’de yükselen Avrupa Şüpheciliğın nedenlerini ve 1950’lerden günümüze Avrupa yanlısı ve Avrupa Şüphecisi gruplar arasındaki tartışmaları ele alacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Birleşik Krallık siyaseti, Avrupa Birliğı, Avrupa bütünleşmesi, Avrupa Şüpheciliğı



To my dear family members who have always supported me...



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Brexit	British Exit from the European Union
EC	European Communities
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
ERM	European Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
MP	Member of Parliament
MEP	Member of European Parliament
NHS	National Health Service
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UKIP	UK Independence Party
VAT	Value Added Tax

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the UK) has had a long tradition of government and democracy.¹ Their Westminster system of representative democracy has influenced several major democracies throughout the world. In British politics, the Conservative Party stands out as a major actor.

The two topics of research of this thesis are the Conservative Party of the UK, one of the most rooted political parties in the history of democracies, as well as the phenomenon known as “Euroscepticism”, a partial or complete rejection of the European Union. The Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party has become a notable topic widely reported in the media, especially since the Maastricht Treaty debates and this has continued with the on-going Brexit (British Exit [from the European Union]) process.

The issue of European integration has always caused debates in the United Kingdom. In this vein, research has illustrated that Euroscepticism in the UK is quite high (for instance, 48% of the British opposed the EU while 44% supported

¹ This work was prepared in the author’s personal capacity, entails his personal views and does not reflect the views of the institution he is employed by.

it in 2016)². Similarly, suspicion of the European integration project was always present in some form in both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. In order to compare the narratives put forward by the Eurosceptic Conservatives since the beginning of the European integration debates, this thesis illustrates their arguments and goals.

It can be agreed upon that there has been a noticeable surge and spread in Euroscepticism in recent years. This can be seen in the support given by voters to Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP, AFD (Germany) and Front National (currently Rassemblement National) (France). Euroscepticism's popularity in current politics, both national and international, is intriguing and has been the main reason behind the topic selection of this thesis.

After presenting Euroscepticism's voluminous literature including the academic debates regarding its origins, definition, and scope, this thesis presents the academic toolkit on Euroscepticism provided by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. While discussing the nature of the Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party at various stages, this thesis utilises Szczerbiak and Taggart's categories of soft and hard Euroscepticism.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the Conservative Party was a party in open support of UK membership to the then European Economic Community in the 1960s and 1970s and was the first party in the UK to apply to it. Thus, the Conservative Party has been one of the primary actors in the UK's accession to the EC and, ironically, in its current efforts to withdraw from its successor organisation, the European Union.

² Bruce Stokes, "Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit", Pew Research Center, 7 June 2016 <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/>, accessed on 20 July 2019

As this thesis will highlight, most of the members of the Conservatives opposed deeper political integration with Europe, particularly from the late 1980's onwards. The Conservative Party has been considered Eurosceptic since that period. Open opposition to the general direction of European integration, i.e. Euroscepticism, continued while the Conservative Party was in opposition (1997-2010) and became a policy that the Conservatives, under Party leaders William Hague, Iain Duncan-Smith and Michael Howard, used in their campaigns.

After a successful result in the 2010 general election, the new Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron also opposed to further political integration with the EU but he and his cabinet as well as most Conservatives did not consider initiating a British withdrawal from the EU. Therefore, the Conservatives could be still considered Soft Eurosceptic up until this point.

Purportedly acting against the advice from some of his colleagues³, Prime Minister David Cameron promised, in 2013, to hold a referendum on the UK's membership to the EU which was held on 23rd of June 2016. The reasons for Cameron's decision shall be explored in this thesis. Although notable Conservatives, including Cameron, had campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU, the vote resulted with a "Leave the EU" result. Conservative Governments since then have been preparing the necessary legal arrangements for Brexit. The uncertainty regarding this process continues and as this thesis is being written, it is not possible to provide a definite date for the UK's official withdrawal from the EU.

It must be noted that the current Conservative government under Prime Minister Boris Johnson is hard Eurosceptic, as the Prime Minister does not consider another referendum on the issue of European integration. Hence, the majority of the

³ Henry Mance and Jim Pickard " How David Cameron could have avoided an EU Leave vote," The Financial Times, 25 June 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/4f8634c6-3873-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7>, accessed on 10 September 2019

Conservative party has now become Hard Eurosceptic and the “remain in the EU” group is but a small fraction of the Conservatives.

One can notice that the on-going Brexit process has received considerable attention due to its unique nature. No other EU member state has initiated a formal withdrawal procedure and has come this far in withdrawing from the European Union. Brexit is the culmination of a long-standing debate within the UK on the nature of her membership to the EU.

1.1. Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question of this thesis is “How did the Conservative Party change from a Party desiring EEC/EC membership to actively trying to exit the European Union?”

There are two secondary research questions pertaining to this point. These questions . First, ”Is the Conservative Party a hard or soft Eurosceptic party?”.

Second, “Is there continuity or change in the Eurosceptic arguments raised by the Conservative Party members?”.

This thesis argues that while Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party has followed a pattern and trend, recent developments have also shaped Eurosceptic Conservatives. As shall be presented in the upcoming chapters, the rhetoric by “anti-marketeer” (later known as Eurosceptics) Conservatives that had appeared in the 1970’s continued to be utilised by Eurosceptics in the 1980’s, 1990’s and the 2000’s. They continue to cite these arguments even today. As this thesis shall underline, this continuity is an aspect that is shared by other Eurosceptic parties in Europe.

The basic elements of the rhetoric of the Eurosceptics, namely national control and sovereignty, have been added upon with newer arguments such as opposition to immigration and the perceived ineffectiveness of the European Union in solving economic problems. On the other hand, given the UK's unique history and geography, the lack of association with Continental Europe is another Eurosceptic argument that has been incorporated by the Conservative Eurosceptics since the naissance of the EEC.

There are some factors for the rise in Euroscepticism in the UK, which in turn have shaped some of the recent arguments of the Conservative Eurosceptics. In recent years, economic considerations and immigration can also be considered in this perspective. This thesis argues that one of the most important events that led to the adoption of a hard Eurosceptic position by the Conservatives was the “Leave” result in the 2016 Brexit referendum. This, in turn, also emboldened the hard Eurosceptics such as Nigel Farage, former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP). In an interview with former prominent Conservative Michael Portillo, Farage stated that Prime Minister Cameron's referendum vow caused the UK general public to legitimise the Hard Eurosceptic cause:

Yesterday we [UK politicians] thought Nigel Farage was a nutcase because he wants a referendum. Now the Prime Minister thinks perhaps, in the right circumstances there should be [a referendum]. Far from ‘shooting the UKIP fox’, all it did was legitimise me! ⁴

Therefore, with the Vote Leave campaign in 2016, the Brexit desiring “Hard Eurosceptics”, which also included some members of the Conservatives, were able to share their views to the public on a united platform.

⁴ Michael Portillo, *Portillo: The Trouble with the Tories*, (Channel 5 Broadcasting, 2019)

1.2. Data, Methodology and Methods

This thesis primarily utilises qualitative research, which aims to gain understanding the facts and details of the subject through documentary analysis. In this view, the primary sources of this thesis are the party manifestos and other documents of the Conservative Party such as their websites or booklets, speeches by Conservative Party members in the House of Commons and other meetings, and statements by Conservatives in the media. This thesis also availed from the Hansard records of the House of Commons. This work was able to use documents available on the official website of the EU. It is fortunate that these primary sources were available online, as it made the necessary research accessible.

The main secondary sources of this work are books and academic articles written by notable academics that have studied the Conservative Party, Euroscepticism and European integration such as Nicholas J. Crowson, Anthony Forster, Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak, Agnès Alexandre-Collier, Stuart Ball, Philip Lynch, Timothy Heppell, Oliver Daddow, Chris Gifford, Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson. In addition, this thesis has also made use of the works of academics found on the London School of Economics online blog as well as other online websites

In addition, this thesis has also used articles from news sources such as the BBC, The Guardian, The Telegraph and The Sun. The author is fortunate for the numerous media available.

This thesis utilises an approach that aims to describe the evolution of the Conservative Party's policy towards European integration. The post-Second World War European integration phase starting with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the UK's response to it is important as it demonstrates the view of Conservatives regarding European integration. Therefore, Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's preliminary efforts towards European Economic Community membership in 1961 will be one of the

starting points of analysis for this thesis. Another important point of analysis will be the efforts of Conservative Prime Ministers Edward Heath, Margaret Thatcher and John Major for European integration and the effects that caused to the Conservative party. The thesis shall also delve into the debates before and after the Brexit referendum. The final part of this thesis will present the post- Brexit vote period.

1.3. Structure of the Thesis

In the 2nd Chapter, this thesis will assess the history, philosophy and policies of the Conservative Party, one of the most prominent political parties in the United Kingdom. The Chapter will explore some characteristics of the Conservative Party such as the role of the party leader and the influence of other Members of Parliament (MPs). It will also illustrate the various traditions and beliefs of the Conservative Party. These various aspects are important as they form the basis of the different debates in the Conservative Party regarding European integration.

The 3rd Chapter presents the literature review on Euroscepticism in political parties in the EU as well Euroscepticism in the UK. It focuses on the work of several academics such as Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak, Petr Kopecký, Cas Mudde, Andrew Forster, Nicholas J. Crowson, Chris Flood, Agnès Alexandre-Collier, Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker. Szczerbiak and Taggart's toolkit on determining the nature of Euroscepticism of a party⁵ and its policies is utilised throughout the thesis due to its ability to be operationalised. The chapter explores

⁵ Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, Volume 1, (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008)

the reasons for an increase and spread in Euroscepticism and its advocates in the recent years.

The 4th Chapter explores the first stages of the UK's political integration to the European Economic Community/European Communities in 1961. The chapter begins with the Conservative Party's enquiry for a possibility for membership and continues with the efforts of Prime Ministers Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath to achieve membership. The chapter presents the intra-party debates in the Conservative Party, and emphasizes the arguments raised by the Eurosceptics/anti-Europeanists.

The 5th Chapter of the thesis delves into the events following the UK's membership to the EC in 1973. It highlights the shift from a pro-European Conservative Party to an openly Eurosceptic one. It shall first note the pro-European policies of Prime Ministers Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher. In line with this, the chapter continues with the Conservatives' open support to continued membership with the 1975 Referendum and the efforts of Prime Minister Thatcher regarding European economic integration. It follows with the Party's shift towards Euroscepticism with her Bruges speech in 1988, the conflicts Prime Minister Thatcher had with her fellow Conservatives and the controversy regarding the Maastricht Treaty during Prime Minister John Major's term. The chapter shall present to the reader the main arguments formulated by Europeanist and Eurosceptic Conservatives. This chapter will also investigate the general sentiment of the Conservative Party while it was in opposition from 1997 to 2010. To that end, the Euroscepticism of Conservative Party leaders William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard as well as the views of notable Eurosceptic Members of Parliament will be evaluated. It will conclude with the election in 2010 that brought David Cameron to government.

The 6th Chapter will explain the main events pertaining to the Brexit referendum, namely, then Prime Minister Cameron's promise for a referendum on UK's membership to the EU, the 2015 general election and then Prime Minister

Cameron's initiatives to renegotiate the UK's membership to the EU. It continues with the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, then Prime Minister Cameron's resignation and the rise of Theresa May to premiership as well as her failed attempts for a negotiated Brexit with an agreement ("soft Brexit"). This Chapter is concluded with the election of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister and on-going debates and arguments arising in British politics as a result of the Brexit referendum. This chapter attempts to determine the general policies of Conservative Party leaders and MPs before and after the Brexit referendum and presents evidence on if the Conservative Party is a Hard or Soft Eurosceptic party at this stage.

The 7th and final Chapter is the conclusion of this thesis. It presents the arguments of this research in summary.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

This chapter will present the general political system of the United Kingdom, the history of the Conservative Party, the patterns in the Conservative Party regarding leadership and party structure and the principles, beliefs and traditions of the Conservative Party.

2.1. The Political System in the United Kingdom

According to the Cabinet Manual, an official source of information on the laws, conventions and rules that affect the procedures of British Government; the United Kingdom is a Parliamentary democracy which has a constitutional sovereign as Head of State (currently Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II), a sovereign Parliament (consisting of the House of Commons and the House of Lords) that is “supreme” to all other government institutions, as well as an executive that is derived from and accountable to Parliament and an independent judiciary.⁶

Regarding elections, the Cabinet Manual states,

⁶ The Cabinet Manual, A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government, , gov.uk, 2011 pp.2
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60641/cabinet-manual.pdf accessed on 21 July 2019

elections are held at least every five years to ensure broad and continued accountability to the people. Candidates can stand independently but they usually represent political parties, and party numbers in the House of Commons determine the composition of the Government.⁷

It must also be noted that the UK does not have a codified constitution (i.e. there is no single document that explains the structure of the state and its relation to the people). Instead, there are statutes (such as Magna Carta 1215, the Bill of Rights and Scottish Claim of Right Act in 1689, and the European Communities Act 1972), the Royal Prerogative, judicial decisions, conventions and European and international law.⁸

2.2. The Party System of the UK

The party system of the UK political sphere is divided among many parties; two of them are more prominent than the others: the Conservative and Unionist Party (typically referred to as the Conservative Party but also often colloquially known as the “Tory party” and their supporters as “Tories”) and the Labour Party. Throughout most of the UK’s modern political history, these parties have been at the forefront of UK politics. In fact, for the entire post-Second World War political history of the United Kingdom, government has shifted between the centre-right

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid, pp. 2-3

Conservative Party and the centre-left Labour Party.⁹ Thus this is why the UK political system is often known as a “two-party” system.¹⁰

There are also smaller parties such as the Liberal Democrats, the Democratic Unionist Party, Ulster Unionist Party, Green Party, Co-operative Party, UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Scottish National Party. These parties have different views on the political spectrum and concentrate on different issues. This aspect of party politics and the fact that smaller parties have had electoral successes has had some observers argue that the UK is actually a “multi-party” system.¹¹

There are 650 seats in the lower house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom (the House of Commons) and theoretically parties must obtain more than 325 seats to govern alone.¹² There have been examples of minority governments in the UK political system, such as the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition from 2010-2015 and the support given by the Democratic Unionist Party to the Conservatives from 2017 to today. This gives smaller parties great influence in politics. Therefore, Karnazes highlights that the party system in the UK could be best explained with the ‘two-and-a-half-party system’ model, which he defines as “*two major parties and one especially significant minor party*”.¹³

⁹ Alan Siaroff, “Two-and-a-Half-Party Systems and the Comparative Role of the ‘Half’”, in *Party Politics* 9, no.3 (May 2003), pp. 267–290, pp. 276.

¹⁰ Noam Gidron and Daniel Ziblatt, “Center-Right Political Parties in Advanced Democracies”, in *Annual Review of Political Science* 22, no:1 (May 2019) pp. 17-35.

¹¹ Jack Blumenau and Simon Hix, “Britain’s evolving multi-party system(s)”, British Politics and Policy blog, LSE, 31 March 2015, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/britains-evolving-multi-party-systems/>, accessed on 3 March 2019

¹² BBC News, “Election results: What happens next?”, 8 May 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-32235317>, accessed on 27 June 2019

¹³ Alexander John Peter Karnazes, “Three’s A Crowd in Two-And-A-Half-Party Systems: How Third Parties Have Undermined Their Own Policy Objectives in Five Post-War Democracies”, (Vancouver:University of British Columbia, 2014) pp. 1

The Conservative Party, the main research topic of this thesis, is typically classified as a centre-right political party. For instance Gidron and Ziblatt classify the Conservative Party as “Centre-Right”¹⁴ and the academia agree that the Conservatives have a political programme similar to other centre-right parties. The various positions taken by Conservatives regarding differing policies will be explained in this chapter.

Ball underlines that the Conservatives are viewed by many people and by themselves as the party of government¹⁵ of the United Kingdom. They were so prominent in 20th century UK politics that it was known as the “Conservative Century”. In fact, they were in power for 35 years between 1951 and 1997.¹⁶ They were forced in opposition by the Labour Party in 1997 but the Conservative Party has led the UK since 2010 unabatedly.

Stuart Ball identifies several objectives and the goals of the Conservatives. For instance, Ball notes that according to most Conservatives until the 1960s, the main principles of the Conservative Party were, as summarized by former Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (21 December 1804 – 19 April 1881) himself, “*the maintenance of the constitution, the preservation of the empire and the improvement of the condition of the people.*”¹⁷ Despite the demise of the UK’s colonial empire, preserving Britain’s place in the world is still one of their

¹⁴ Gidron and Ziblatt, “Center-Right Political Parties”, pp. 34

¹⁵ Stuart Ball, “The Conservatives in opposition, 1906-79: a comparative analysis”, in *The Conservatives in Crisis, The Tories after 1997*, ed. Mark Garnett and Philip Lynch (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 7-28, pp. 7

¹⁶ Timothy Heppell and David Seawright, “Introduction”, in *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government*, ed. Timothy Heppell and David Seawright, (London:Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.1-15, pp. 1

¹⁷ Stuart Ball, “The Principles of British Conservatism from Balfour to Heath, c.1910-75” in *The Foundations of the British Conservative Party: Essays on Conservatism from Lord Salisbury to David Cameron* ed. Bradley W. Hart and Richard Carr, (London:Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 13-38, pp. 36

ambitions. On the other hand, some Conservatives in the 1920s added the importance of family, the security of the country, honesty in public life and loyalty to our friends to this list. Keith Feiling, a Tory himself, summarized Conservative objectives in 1913 as '*order before wealth, the balanced life before uniformity, self-sufficiency before dependence*'.¹⁸ Ball believes that most Conservatives would agree with the objectives stated.¹⁹

One aspect of the Conservative Party that stands out is its tendency to have intra-party debates in a matter of topics, ranging from European integration to pensions to the role of the state in the economy. Therefore, the party is noted for having different factions in many topics. According to Kevin Hickson, the Conservative Party has often been considered to be “non-ideological”, which is the main reason why he believes the political thought of the Conservatives has not been studied academically too much.²⁰

2.3. History of the Conservative Party

2.3.1. The Tory Party

According to some historians, the history of the Conservative Party can be traced back to the Tory Party.²¹ This also provides an explanation for the usage of both Conservative and Tory to describe the aforementioned Party. Ball notes that British politicians, namely Henry St. John of Bolingbroke, the Younger Pitt, Burke,

¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 36-38

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 38

²⁰ Kevin Hickson, “Introduction” in *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945*, ed. Kevin Hickson, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan,2005), pp.1-7, pp. 1

²¹ Stuart Ball, *The Conservative Party and British Politics 1902-1951*, (New York:Routledge, 2013) pp. 1

Liverpool, Peel and Disraeli have been “*claimed as its [the Conservative Party’s] founding spirit*”.²² According to Ball, some historians have found evidence for the Tories during King Charles II reign (1660’s) and after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.²³ The Tories, under the leadership of Robert Harley of Oxford and Bolingbroke, were successful during Queen Anne’s reign in 1710-1714. However, the affiliation of some Tory members with the Stuart Pretenders and Tory involvement in the Jacobite risings (1715-1745) led to decrease in popularity for the Tories. However, the rise of the notable politician William Pitt the Younger in 1783 to prime minister revived the party’s popularity. According to Ball, the political sphere of the Kingdom from 1783 to 1830 was dominated by Pitt the Younger and his followers.²⁴ Gradually, politicians that gave importance to the defence of property and a strong authority of the state became affiliated with Pitt’s group. Pitt considered himself “*within a Whig tradition*” but he has been widely regarded to be a Tory after his death. He and his followers were known as “*supporters of the crown and of social stability*”.²⁵ In addition, they were against radicals and reformers.

As Ball states, “*Pitt’s followers and successors gradually became known as the Tory party. In both attitudes and personnel this body has often been identified as the origin of modern British Conservatism.*”²⁶

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Arthur Burns, “William Pitt the Younger (Whig/Tory 1783-1801, 1804-1806)”, gov.uk History of government blog, <https://history.blog.gov.uk/2015/09/16/william-pitt-the-younger-whigtory-1783-1801-1804-1806/>, accessed on 27 November 2019

²⁶ Ball, *The Conservative Party*, pp. 2

Since the French Revolution of 1789, Ball describes the history of Conservatism as marked by “division and dispute”.²⁷ After Pitt the Younger’s unexpected death in 1806, UK politics was in disarray. Afterwards, a unity government known as “The Ministry of All Talents” was formed in 1807. Ball describes the Portland, Perceval and Liverpool administrations from 1807 to 1827 as “recognisably Tory”.²⁸

Ball argues that the Tory administrations between 1783 and 1830 did not consider themselves as a ‘party’. In that sense, Ball identifies that Pitt, Liverpool, Wellington and Peel viewed themselves as ‘governing men’, which meant that their loyalty was to the crown, and not simply as a member of the party.²⁹ Referring to the main figures of the Conservatives, Ball identifies that, ironically, Pitt “*shaped Toryism*” but did not call himself a Tory; Peel shaped “*the Conservatives as a parliamentary party*” even though he was ambivalent towards that concept, and Disraeli added “*permanent organisational structure*” but also did not give great importance to the organisational structure of the Conservative Party.³⁰

Conservative leaders and supporters began to use the term “Conservative” instead of “Tory” after 1830. By 1835, “Conservative” had replaced “Tory” as the general name for the party.³¹ The expression “Tory” is still being used today by the British by both supports and opponents. Ball notes that the term “Tory” implies an “*instinctive and uncompromising brand*” of Conservatism.³²

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid, pp. 3

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid, pp. 4

³² Ibid.

2.3.2. The Conservative Party

The first openly declared Conservative government was formed by Prime Minister Robert Peel in 1834. In his letter sent to his electorate in Tamworth, (the Tamworth Manifesto) Peel summarized the main tenets of his party. Historians underline that Peel's Tamworth Manifesto is the first statement of Conservative principles.³³ In this Manifesto, Peel desired reforms, law and order, a proper system of taxation, and the rights of landed interests and trade and industry.³⁴

After experiencing infighting due to disagreements over the Corn Laws³⁵, the Conservative Party was reorganized by Benjamin Disraeli (1868, and 1874-1880). In order to strengthen his party, Disraeli set up the Conservative Central Office in 1870 while the National Union (1867) would continue to unite local associations.³⁶ Disraeli was able to widen the support of the Conservative Party from the middle class and workers due to the National Union and Central Office. With this, Ball identifies that the Conservative Party *"was becoming a genuinely national party with an appeal to all communities"*.³⁷

With the support of the Liberal Unionists, the Conservative Party continued to run the government for about 20 years (1886-1906) with the leadership of Robert Gascoyne-Cecil (Lord Salisbury) and Arthur Balfour. Lord Salisbury is noted for

³³ Marjorie Bloy, "The Tamworth Manifesto: text", March 2016, <http://www.historyhome.co.uk/peel/politics/tam2.htm>, accessed on 15 March 2019

³⁴ Lord Norton of Louth and Paul David Webb, "Conservative Party", Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Conservative-Party-political-party-United-Kingdom>, accessed on 27 February 2019

³⁵ The Corn Laws were restrictions on imported cereal grains that was applicable from 1815 to 1846. The tariffs made imported grain more expensive, therefore supporting local grain producers. The Corn Laws increased the price of food, and the Laws were eventually repealed by Robert Peel. This caused a major debate and division in the Conservative Party.

³⁶ Ball, *The Conservative Party*, pp. 8

³⁷ Ibid, pp.7

supporting women's enfranchisement.³⁸ On the other hand, Geoffrey Searle underlines that Balfour was a "*traditionalist who believed that his primary duty was to hold the Conservative party together at almost any cost*".³⁹ According to Searle, Balfour believed that the stability of civilisation is based on the "*survival of the established church, the Lords, and landed privilege*", which could only be protected with a strong Conservative party.⁴⁰

The Conservatives lost power after an election in 1906 as a result of debates over tariff policy but they joined a coalition with the Liberals during the First World War. In the 1918 election, most of the elected candidates in the coalition were Conservatives. Austen Chamberlain became party leader in 1921 but had to resign in October 1922 because his idea to continue the coalition under Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George was rejected by his fellow Tories at a party meeting.⁴¹

Headed by Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain and later Winston Churchill throughout most of the interwar years and the Second World War, the Conservative Party continued to remain in power until 1945. Baldwin advocated "the new Conservatism" which aimed to increase support of the middle classes.⁴²

³⁸ Martin Pugh, "Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquess of Salisbury", in *Biographical Dictionary of British Prime Ministers*, ed. Robert Eccleshall and Graham Walker, (London:Routledge,1998), pp.213-222, pp. 216

³⁹ Geoffrey Searle, "Arthur Balfour" in *Biographical Dictionary of British Prime Ministers*, ed. Robert Eccleshall and Graham Walker, (London:Routledge,1998), pp. 231-239, pp. 237

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Stuart Ball "Neville Chamberlain" in *Biographical Dictionary of British Prime Ministers*, ed. Robert Eccleshall and Graham Walker, (London:Routledge,1998), pp.289-295, pp. 290

⁴² Andrew J. Taylor and Stanley Baldwin, "Heresthetics and the Realignment of British Politics" in *British Journal of Political Science* 35, no.:3, (July 2005), pp. 429-463, pp. 451

Winston Churchill lost the 1945 elections to the Labour Party led by Clement Attlee but the Conservatives were able to gain power in the 1950s. Churchill was elected Prime Minister in 1955 and the Conservatives also won the 1959 general election. Churchill's call for a united Europe in 1946 is of significance for this thesis, as it was a statement still debated today by Conservatives.⁴³ The recent history of the Conservative Party, especially regarding European integration, shall be explained in detail in the following chapters.

The current leader of the Conservative Party since 23rd of July 2019 and the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is Boris Johnson, the former Foreign Secretary and former Mayor of London. In the political traditions of most countries, the leader of a political party is the main actor in policy-making and its most important figure.

According to the literature, the Conservative Party is no exception. In that sense, Ball describes the head of the Conservative party as the place where executive power is concentrated.⁴⁴ Generally speaking, MP's follow the directives of the party leader in voting for bills but may have their own, differing opinions.

In the British political tradition, however, it must be noted that the party leader's chair is not a stable one. This demonstrates the crucial fact that the Conservative Party is not a monolithic party- the party leader lacks the ability to enforce full compliance with the his/her policies. This has led to the rise of fervent vocal advocates that may demand policies in full opposition to the leader. Conservative

⁴³ Quentin Peel, "Historic misunderstanding underlies UK-EU relationship on Churchill anniversary", Financial Times, 19 September 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/3d6bbabc-7122-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926>, accessed on 12 October 2019

⁴⁴ Ball, *The Conservative Party*, pp. 11

Party Leaders have indeed been removed from power for several reasons illustrated below.⁴⁵

Unsuccessful electoral results: For instance, during the Conservatives' time as an opposition party from 1997-2010, the party had gone through 4 different party leaders, namely William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith, Michael Howard and David Cameron. The former three men were voted out from power by their fellow Conservatives. Prime Minister Cameron, for instance, resigned after a "Leave" vote in the 2016 referendum.

Intra-party criticism over major policies: In cases that shall be presented to the reader in the upcoming chapters, the issue of European integration became a major point of contention in the Conservative Party. It can be seen that the decisions and policies of some Conservative leaders (such as Prime Ministers Major and Cameron) regarding Europe were met with major criticism from the Eurosceptic factions of their party. On the other hand, Europeanists such as Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke have argued for a pro-European position far beyond their leaders. One of the arguments of this thesis is that intra-party conflict has been one of the main reasons behind former Prime Minister Cameron's call for a Brexit and the ongoing uncertainty.

2.4. Principles and Philosophy of the Conservative Party

Former Prime Minister John Major, in his first speech as Party Leader in 1991, describes the beliefs of the Conservative Party as "*rooted in the instincts of every individual*". He summarizes these beliefs as "*A strong Britain, confident of its position, secure in its defence, firm in its respect for the law. A strong economy,*

⁴⁵ Timothy Heppell, *Choosing The Tory Leader: Conservative Party Leadership Elections From Heath To Cameron*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), pp. 1-5

free from the threat of inflation, in which taxes can fall, savings can grow, and independence is assured.”⁴⁶ In her article published in the Telegraph, Priti Patel, the current Home Secretary (a position equivalent to Minister of Interior of other countries), lists the fundamental values of Conservatism: freedom, enterprise and opportunity⁴⁷.

The British philosopher Edmund Burke’s concepts and notions of society, state and government shape the ideology of the Conservative Party and centre-right politics in general. Burke’s critique of the French Revolution formed the Conservative reflex of avoiding change.⁴⁸ According to Ball, Britain’s famous Prime Minister Lord Disraeli’s definition of Conservative principles in 1872 (summarized earlier) continued to shape the Conservative Party’s goals until the mid-20th century. Disraeli’s principles were the defence of the established order and constitution, preservation of the Empire and the improvement of the condition of the people⁴⁹. This view is shared by Lynch who refers to the Conservatives as *“the patriotic party supporting national institutions, the Union and Empire”*.⁵⁰

On the other hand, some Conservatives in the 1920s added the importance of family, the security of the country, honesty in public life and loyalty to our friends to this list⁵¹. For Keith Feiling, a Tory himself, Conservative objectives were

⁴⁶ John Major, “Leader’s speech, 1991 John Major (Conservative)”, British Political Speech <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=137> , accessed on 2 August 2019

⁴⁷ Priti Patel, “It’s time to make the Conservative Party Conservative again”, The Telegraph 29 May 2019, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/05/29/time-make-conservative-party-conservative/> accessed on 4 July 2019

⁴⁸ Ball, *The Conservative Party*, pp. 1

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 28

⁵⁰ Philip Lynch, *The Politics of Nationhood: Sovereignty, Britishness and Conservative Politics*, (Hampshire:Macmillan Press, 1999), pp 1

⁵¹ Ball, *Principles of Conservatism*, pp 36-38

“order before wealth, the balanced life before uniformity, self-sufficiency before dependence”. Ball believes that most Conservatives would agree with the objectives stated⁵².

In the economic sphere, the Conservative Party has campaigned for fewer taxes while also vouching less government involvement in the social life of UK citizens. This policy would place it in line with other centre-right parties. For instance, party leader William Hague, in a Conservative Party manifesto released in 2001, announced that the Conservatives *“aim to release the wisdom, decency and enterprise of British citizens”* by giving the British *“the ability to shape their own lives and communities”*.⁵³ The manifesto then refers to *“... from endless political interference”* which demonstrates that the Conservatives believed the Labour government of Tony Blair was too involved in private affairs.⁵⁴

According to Garnett and Hickson, most commentators and academics studying the Conservative Party have neglected its political thought and have only focused on its electoral performance or its pragmatic policies.⁵⁵ Therefore, Garnett and Hickson note that many commentators have argued that the Conservative Party has no ideology; in the academia, the most notable conception of this point of view was formed by James Bulpitt.⁵⁶ In line with Bulpitt, Robert Saunders argues that *“historically, the Conservative Party has been a party of ideas, but not of*

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ The Conservative Party, 2001 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/2001/2001-conservative-manifesto.shtml>, accessed on 24 March 2019

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson, *Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributions to the political thought of the modern Conservative Party*, (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2009), pp. 1-7 pp 1

⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 2

ideology".⁵⁷ According to Garnett and Hickson's account of Bulpitt's "statecraft" thesis, the Conservative Party is essentially a "*pragmatic movement committed above all else to winning elections and maintaining power*".⁵⁸ However, they argue that Bulpitt's view has several problems. They note that the idea of statecraft as solely limited politics is out-dated because the policies of post-Second World War Conservative governments continued the welfare reforms and economic management of the Churchill coalition and the Labour government of Attlee, at least until Margaret Thatcher's rise to party leader in 1979.⁵⁹ However, Garnett and Hickson underline that Thatcher's reforms in the economy and welfare system (under Thatcherism) required "*a very active form of government*".⁶⁰ They note that the political actors in the Conservative party were motivated by beliefs or ideology. They therefore stress that "*we cannot understand the development of the Conservative Party without an accurate understanding of its ideology*."⁶¹

As Garnett and Hickson argue, the Conservative Party's policies have not been set in stone but were able to change throughout the years according to the shifts in the political system and the beliefs of the Party's leaders.⁶²

⁵⁷ Robert Sanders, "The closing of the conservative mind", The New Statesman, 12 June 2019 <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/06/closing-conservative-mind> accessed on 18 October 2019

⁵⁸ Garnett and Hickson, "Conservative Thinkers", pp. 1-2

⁵⁹ Ibid, pp. 2-3

⁶⁰ Ibid pp. 3

⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 3-4

⁶² Ibid, pp. 3

2.5. Traditions in the Conservative Party

In line with what was stated earlier, Hickson argues that the Conservatives have indeed several ideological views and competing perspectives on various topics ranging from the “*constitution, Europe and the wider role of Britain in the world to economic policy, welfare and social morality*”.⁶³ According to him, this aspect makes the Party worth studying. He also asks if there is a ‘true’ Conservative tradition or if there is a “*core value that unites all Conservatives*”.⁶⁴ Hickson et al. identified four main ideological traditions present in the Conservative Party since 1945: traditional Toryism, Centrist, One Nation and New Right/Thatcherism.⁶⁵

2.5.1. Traditional Toryism

According to Hickson, many ideas of the traditional Toryist approach were developed by Lord Salisbury.⁶⁶ The traditional Toryists desire a minimal state which “*people will be ‘let alone’*” and which will maintain “*individual freedom within traditional social structures*”.⁶⁷ This, according to Arthur Aughey, is a part of the British national identity.⁶⁸ The important aspects of traditional Toryism are a determination to preserve the current social order, a strong attachment to the nation and maintaining the authority of the state.⁶⁹ Also, Pugh identifies the

⁶³ Hickson, *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party*, pp. 1

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 1

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp. 1-7

⁶⁶ Garnett and Hickson, “Conservative Thinkers” pp. 4

⁶⁷ Hickson, “Conservative Thinkers”, pp. 2

⁶⁸ Arthur Aughey, “Traditional Toryism” in *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945*, ed. Kevin Hickson, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp 7-27,

⁶⁹ Hickson, *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party*, pp. 4

traditional Tory causes as the Anglican Establishment, religious education, private property, monarchy and empire.⁷⁰

2.5.2. Centrists

On the other hand, Garnett and Hickson identified the “Centrists”, a group within the Conservatives that believe unity of the party and loyalty to the leadership are necessary to be successful in elections.⁷¹ Garnett and Hickson believe that only the Centrist ‘strand’ of the Conservative Party could be considered a “reasonable approximation” to Bulpitt’s statecraft thesis.⁷²

2.5.3. One Nation

The One Nation tradition has its “mythical origins” in Benjamin Disraeli’s novel *Sybil; or, The Two Nations*.⁷³ Disraeli believed that the rich and the poor people of the UK needed to make a union⁷⁴; therefore Beech notes that the One Nation tradition is derived from Disraeli’s view that Britain can only prosper as one nation.⁷⁵ One Nation politics involved active participation of the state in governance as an important player in repairing social problems. One Nation entails the continuation of the “*post-war* [the Second World War] *consensus*” set by the Labour Clement Attlee governments (1945-1951) of the welfare state, the mixed

⁷⁰ Pugh, “Third Marquess of Salisbury” pp. 216”

⁷¹ Garnett and Hickson, “Conservative Thinkers” pp. 4

⁷² Ibid, pp. 5

⁷³ David Seawright, “One Nation” in *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945*, ed. Kevin Hickson, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp.69-90, pp. 70

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 70-71

⁷⁵ Matt Beech, “Cameron and Conservative Ideology” in *The Conservatives Under David Cameron Built to Last?*, ed. Simon Lee & Matt Beech, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp 18-27, pp. 21

economy and the “tripartite” approach to industry (this meant that there was, in addition to employers and employees, the state). They believed that the welfare state was, in the words of Stephen Driver⁷⁶, “*a public good underpinning freedom in the society by addressing poverty and enlarging security.*”

According to Matt Beech; Harold Macmillan, Rab Butler, Ian Gilmour, Iain Macleod and Edward Heath are notable politicians that “personify” One Nation conservatism.⁷⁷ This tradition was most salient in the Conservative Party from 1945 to 1975 due to the adherence of Conservative Prime Ministers Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath to the One Nation tradition.

Therefore, despite being members of a right-wing party, One Nation conservatives had supported policies that would certainly be considered left-wing. Beech noted that One Nation Conservatives were the group most in favour of European integration, particularly Prime Minister Heath.⁷⁸ Driver also agrees with Beech and notes the intent of members of the One Nation group like Prime Minister Heath, to modernize the Conservatives and the UK by seeking membership to the EC.⁷⁹

Similarly, Driver has noted that the Post-war Conservative politics, led by Macmillan and Butler, had favourable results for economic growth and social three major political parties (the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Party) were in consensus regarding its success. With Britain’s economic decline by the late 1960s, however, some Conservatives started to question the One Nation path.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Stephen Driver, “‘Fixing Our Broken Society’: David Cameron’s Post-Thatcherite Social Policy” in *The Conservatives Under David Cameron Built to Last?*, ed. Simon Lee & Matt Beech, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 80-97, pp 81-82

⁷⁷ Beech, “Cameron and Conservative ideology”, pp. 21

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Driver, “Fixing Our Broken Society”, pp. 81

⁸⁰ Ibid.

During the Margaret Thatcher era, the One Nation supporters were known as the ‘wets’ while the Thatcherites called themselves ‘the dries’.⁸¹

According to Beech, One Nation conservatism was considered to be sympathetic to the idea of a supranational entity that could cooperate on many issues to solve mutual problems, namely the European Union. This created a division in the Conservative Party which became more noticeable during Thatcher’s Premiership.⁸² Beech underlines that One Nation Conservatism was no longer one of the prominent approaches to Conservative politics under the premierships of Margaret Thatcher and John Major.⁸³

2.5.4. New Right/Thatcherites

Exploring the Party’s shift to the Right, Driver notes that a rising free-market advocating group in the Conservative Party began to emerge in the late 1970s. Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Health and Social Services of the Heath government in 1970, was one of the major Conservative figures that developed the change in this ideology.⁸⁴ Joseph criticised Heath’s social policies, which eventually lead to Joseph’s replacement by Margaret Thatcher. When Thatcher became leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 and Prime Minister in 1979, the Party was more right-wing. This group was known by several names such as “The New Right”, “Thatcherites” and “The Dries”.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Beech, “Cameron and Conservative ideology”, pp. 21

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ Driver, “Fixing Our Broken Society”, pp. 81

⁸⁵ Ibid, pp. 83

As defined by Driver, the Thatcherites

challenged the basic assumptions of the social democratic welfare state: wealth creation should come before welfare provision; individuals should be self-reliant rather than dependent on collective state services; freedom and choice should take priority over equality and social justice; and, wherever possible, markets rather than hierarchies should be deployed to allocate resources, whether or not assets were privatized or not.⁸⁶

On the other hand, Matt Beech has used 3 categories to analyse the Conservatism of Party Leader and Prime Minister David Cameron. In addition to One Nation conservatism, and New Right/Thatcherite conservatism, Beech adds Cameron's own version of thought: his liberal conservatism.⁸⁷ Timothy Heppell argues that David Cameron's liberal conservatism neither repudiates nor fully endorses Thatcherism but is also based on "*a marriage between social and economic liberalism and soft Euroscepticism*". Heppell illustrates his point by underlining that "Cameronism" follows Thatcherism's neo-liberalism and Euroscepticism but goes against its socially conservative ideas for a more liberal approach.⁸⁸

This chapter has explained the broad political scene of the United Kingdom and emphasised the Conservative Party. It has noted the different ideologies and traditions in the Conservative Party.

⁸⁶ Ibid, pp. 82

⁸⁷ Beech, "Cameron and Conservative ideology", pp. 18-27

⁸⁸ Timothy Heppell "Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers" in *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15, no. 3, (August 2013), pp. 340-361, pp. 341

CHAPTER 3

EUROSCEPTICISM IN EUROPE AND THE UK

This thesis argues that there have been opposing voices to the European economic and political integration project since its first steps in the late 1950s. However, it is crucial to note that arguments raised by political parties against European integration (the “Eurosceptics”) have shown similarities, and as this chapter shall demonstrate, the arguments of Eurosceptic members of the UK Conservative Party have not been an exception. Intriguingly, despite the overall rise in Euroscepticism in Europe, the United Kingdom is the only member state out of 28 that is trying to withdraw from the EU.

In the literature review for this thesis, it has been determined that the academia had first regarded Euroscepticism as a “British phenomenon”, especially in its nascent years.

In recent years, it has been agreed by the academia and observers that there has been a noticeable surge in Euroscepticism in European political parties and the European public and the support received by Eurosceptic political parties. Generally, most such parties are either on the far left or the far right of the political spectrum. The Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the ensuing Eurodebt crisis shook the support for the EU. Ensuing economic problems made economically marginalised groups such as blue-collar workers feel that globalisation and the EU

had not benefited them. Such groups began supporting Eurosceptic parties leading to their rise as major political actors.

The rise of populist parties such as UKIP and the Brexit Party in the UK, Alternatif für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, Front National in France and the Five Star Alliance in Italy must be evaluated from this perspective.

After presenting the literature on Euroscepticism, the chapter shall continue with a brief explanation on Europeanism in the UK and then delve into Euroscepticism in the UK.

3.1. Defining Euroscepticism

For the literature review of this thesis, it has been determined that there is not a common definition for Euroscepticism. For example, in terms of approaches, Nicholas J. Crowson has sought to find a historical continuity in Euroscepticism in the UK.⁸⁹

Broadly speaking, as illustrated by Forster, Euroscepticism is a generic label that defines a negative point of view towards the European Union.⁹⁰

A narrower and UK-based definition of a “Eurosceptic”, by the online Cambridge Dictionary, is “*a person, especially a politician, who opposes closer connections between Britain and the European Union*”.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Nicholas J. Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945: At the heart of Europe?*, (Oxon:Routledge, 2007)

⁹⁰ Anthony Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945*, (London:Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-2

⁹¹ The Cambridge Dictionary, “Eurosceptic” <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/eurosceptic>, accessed on 14 September 2019

For Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat, Euroscepticism “- as a reactive phenomenon- indicates a negative perception of the increase in community integration, EU institutions and the assessment of its performance”.⁹² He has noted that while opposition to European economic and political integration (Euroscepticism) was present from the mid-1950s onwards, Eurosceptic public opinion was only around 10-15 per cent. Around 70 per cent of Western public opinion was in support of European unification.⁹³ At that point, the main arguments of Eurosceptics were encroachment of national sovereignty by a foreign power and economic concerns. These arguments became more salient in the early 2000s, with the rejection of an “European Constitution” in the Netherlands and France. As this thesis shall underline, these points also constituted the rhetoric of Eurosceptic UK politicians.

Academics have also asked whether the public or the elite cause the rise of Euroscepticism. Liubomir K. Topaloff highlight their arguments by asking “*Do they merely reflect voter preferences by ‘diversifying’ their political portfolios with a measured amount of anti-EU dissent and resentment, the bottom-up approach or do they actually cue the general public in a specific eurosceptical direction in a top-down approach?*”.⁹⁴

On the other hand, according to Agnès Alexandre-Collier, ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in the House of Commons gave rise to opposition, in the Conservative Party, on the principles of economic and monetary union and the

⁹² Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat, *Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism: The Radical Parties of the Right and Left vis-à-vis the European Union*, (Brussels:Peter Lang S.A., 2012), pp. 32

⁹³ Ibid, pp. 24

⁹⁴ Liubomir K. Topaloff, *Political Parties and Euroscepticism*, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.6

European policy of Prime Minister John Major.⁹⁵ She notes that the MPs of the UK that voted against the ratification of the TEU despite being instructed to vote in favour were known as the Eurosceptics.⁹⁶ It must be underlined that unlike Forster, Alexandre-Collier makes a crucial link with Euroscepticism in the UK and the Treaty of Maastricht. In fact, she argues that the Maastricht event “*provides a restricted and contextualised definition of Euroscepticism*” which she calls the “Maastricht pattern”. She applies this framework to explain Euroscepticism from the party organisation perspective throughout political parties in the UK and the EU.⁹⁷

Noting the encompassing definitions of Euroscepticism that focus on party politics such as by Forster and comparisons with other European countries such as Szczerbiak and Taggart, Alexandre-Collier defines British Euroscepticism as “*a general attitude ranging from scepticism to outright hostility as regards Britain’s involvement in moves towards supranational European integration.*”⁹⁸

Like Alexandre-Collier, Chris Flood stresses that Euroscepticism originated in Britain to describe the intra-party division particularly salient in the Conservative Party.⁹⁹ Flood defines Euroscepticism as a “*broad generic label which covers*

⁹⁵ Agnès Alexandre-Collier, “Le phénomène eurosceptique au sein du parti conservateur britannique” in *Politique européenne* 6, (2002/2) pp. 53-73

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Agnès Alexandre-Collier, “Reassessing British Conservative Euroscepticism as a Case of Party (Mis)Management”, in *The UK Challenge to Europeanization The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 99-116, pp. 101-102

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Chris Flood, *Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept*, Panel: France’s Relations with the European Union UACES 32nd Annual Conference and 7th Research Conference, (Belfast:Queen's University, 2002), pp. 2

varying degrees and kinds of resistance to EU integration from within any Member State or candidate country."¹⁰⁰

On another note, Forster believes that Alexandre-Collier's "*rather narrow and contemporary [the early 2000's] understanding*" of British Euroscepticism should be expanded.¹⁰¹ Forster argues that Alexandre-Collier's approach implies that Eurosceptics are found only in the Conservative Party in the UK.¹⁰² On the contrary to what Alexandre-Collier has argued, Forster underlines that both of the main UK political parties (Conservative and Labour) have Eurosceptic elements and that there are "*similarities and continuities*" in sceptic arguments since the Second World War¹⁰³. In sum, Forster notes that Eurosceptics "*share many of the same core concerns, above all in terms of a focus on sovereignty, national identity and the need for economic and political independence*".¹⁰⁴

Rodríguez-Aguilera has determined that the phrase Eurosceptic "*appeared in British press in the mid-1980s to qualify the reservations and criticisms that the Premier Margaret Thatcher had of the European Community*".¹⁰⁵ He then argues that term Eurosceptic came to be known as being "*anti-common market*" and later "*intense, direct criticism of European integration*".¹⁰⁶ Rodríguez-Aguilera also notes that while the concept of Euroscepticism originated in the UK, it has been a fact of European politics. He has argued that criticism of the EU by Eurosceptics

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 2

¹⁰² Ibid

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Rodríguez-Aguilera, *Euroscepticism, Europhobia and Eurocriticism*, pp. 21

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

must have some limits and therefore believes that Euroscepticism “*implies a continuum...from serious doubts to clear rejections*”.¹⁰⁷

In Paul Taggart’s first major work on Euroscepticism, he emphasises that opposition and support for European integration is “*rarely either binary or absolute*” and that there are several differing stances.¹⁰⁸ According to Taggart, there are 3 different Eurosceptic positions vis-a-vis the EU.¹⁰⁹ First, there is the “anti-integration position” that opposes the idea of European integration and therefore the EU. Second, there are the ones that are not opposed to European integration in principle but are “*sceptical that the EU is the best form of integration because it is too inclusive*” They argue that elements that are too diverse to be compatible are being forced together by the EU. Third, some are sceptical of the EU because they find it to be too exclusive on geographical and social grounds. Taggart defines Euroscepticism as “*the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration*”.¹¹⁰

Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak’s often cited and notable work on the concept of Euroscepticism forms the theoretical main guideline of this thesis because of reasons that shall be explained below. Their work is a binary distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, pp. 22

¹⁰⁸ Paul Taggart, “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems” in *European Journal of Political Research* 33, no:3, (April 1998), pp. 363-388, pp. 365.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, pp. 365-366

¹¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 366

¹¹¹ Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe” in *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of*

3.2. Szczerbiak and Taggart's Definition of Hard and Soft Euroscepticism

Szczerbiak and Taggart note that their conception of Euroscepticism was designed as a tool to assist “*basic, comparative empirical research on the manifestation of Euroscepticism in European party systems*” but was also intended to encourage more academic debate and differing conceptualizations.¹¹²

Hard Euroscepticism, as defined by Szczerbiak and Taggart is

where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.¹¹³

Szczerbiak and Taggart identify “*two shorthand methods*” to determine whether a party is hard Eurosceptic.¹¹⁴ First is whether the party is mobilising against the EU in terms of principle, meaning that it would entail a total rejection of membership to the EU. Second is if the party is expressing “*conditional*” support to the EU but

Euroscepticism, Volume I: Case Studies and Country Surveys ed. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.1-15, pp.7-8

¹¹² Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Introduction: Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Research Agenda” in *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume II: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-27, pp. 2

¹¹³ Szczerbiak and Taggart, “Opposing Europe? Volume 1”, pp. 7

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

on such conditions that are “*so unattainable that it is tantamount to being de facto opposed to EU membership*”.¹¹⁵

Other the other hand, “Soft” Euroscepticism is defined as

where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.¹¹⁶

Szczerbiak and Taggart highlight that one of their main assumptions regarding soft Euroscepticism is that European economic and political integration is a continuing process. Hence, if a party desires to remain in the European Union but opposes further European integration, they are defined as Eurosceptic (“soft Eurosceptic”) because they oppose the current direction of the EU.¹¹⁷

3.3. Criticisms Directed to Szczerbiak and Taggart

However, it must be noted that Szczerbiak and Taggart’s distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism has received some criticism from several academics that shall be presented below. These academics have also come up with their own categories of Euroscepticism.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 8

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

3.3.1. Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde's Types of European Integration and Their Criticisms of Szczerbiak and Taggart

Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde argue that Szczerbiak and Taggart's definition of soft Euroscepticism is so broad that "*virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included*"¹¹⁸. Kopecký and Mudde also underline that the difference between soft and hard Euroscepticism may be blurred due to what Szczerbiak and Taggart note as "*principled objections to the current form of European integration in the EU*".¹¹⁹ In addition, Kopecký and Mudde raise the argument that the criteria to define soft and hard Euroscepticism is unclear and that Szczerbiak and Taggart's two classifications of Euroscepticism "*do not do enough justice to the subtle, yet important, distinction between the ideas of European integration, on the one hand, and the European Union as the current embodiment of these ideas, on the other hand.*"¹²⁰

Therefore, Kopecký and Mudde put forth a different way to categorise sentiment towards Europe. They determine two dimensions for the support and scepticism about European integration. The first dimension covers "support for the ideas of European integration" and contains the Europhiles and the Europhobes.¹²¹ The Europhiles include both advocates of a supranational state but also the ones that consider European integration only in economic terms. Hence, Kopecký and Mudde argue that both Jean Monnet¹²² and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

¹¹⁸ Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe", in *European Politics* 3, no. 3 (2002), pp. 297-326, pp. 300

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid, pp. 301

¹²² Jean Monnet was one of the most important figures in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and is widely considered to be one of the founding fathers of the European Union.

could be considered in the Europhile group, which is found intriguing by the author of this thesis. As this thesis shall highlight, Prime Minister Thatcher's open criticism of the European Community has been widely considered as one of the major Eurosceptic arguments in history.

Meanwhile, the Europhobes do not support, or often oppose the general ideas of European integration. Kopecký and Mudde argue that they may be nationalists, socialist or isolationist, or that they believe that European integration is incompatible. It can be understood that this classification is a rather ideological one. Kopecký and Mudde argue that UKIP is an isolationist party that *"technically do[es] not oppose the current process of European integration, or the EU, but do[es] not want to be part of it."*¹²³

Kopecký and Mudde's second dimension, "support for the European Union" entails what they call the EU-optimists and the EU-pessimists. Adherents to the former are satisfied with the integration of the EU and its direction while the latter group do not support the current situation of the EU or *"are pessimistic about the direction of its [the EU's] development."*¹²⁴

Combining Kopecký and Mudde's two dimensions results in *"four ideal-type categories"* regarding party stances on Europe: Euroenthusiasts (who are Europhile and EU-optimist), Eurosceptics (who are Europhile and EU-pessimist), Eurorejects (who are Europhobe and EU-pessimists) and the Europragmatists (who are Europhobe and EU-optimist).¹²⁵

¹²³ Kopecký and Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism" pp. 302

¹²⁴ Ibid, pp. 302

¹²⁵ Ibid, pp. 302-303

3.3.2. Chris Flood's Categories of European Integration

Chris Flood's research has given the academia six main categories with further subcategories regarding the attitude towards European integration.¹²⁶ His six categories are the Rejectionists (i.e.: those who are opposed to EU membership as a whole or reject major policies), Revisionists (i.e.: those that desire a reversal of a treaty regarding the EU), Minimalists (i.e.: those that accept the status quo but resist further integration in its entirety or some policies), Gradualists (i.e.: those that desire slow and careful integration as a whole or in some areas), Reformists (i.e.: those argue that current EU institutions should be improved) and Maximalists (i.e. those that argue that the EU integration process should continue as fast as possible to attain higher levels of integration).¹²⁷

In another work, Flood underlines that Szczerbiak and Taggart's binary hard and soft Eurosceptic definition "*truncates analysis by sealing off Euroscepticism from positions reflecting varying degrees of support for the EU in its present form and/or its current direction of development.*" . Also, Flood argues that a simple hard and soft dichotomy is inadequate to explain Euroscepticism and more strata are needed. Similar to Kopecký and Mudde's argument, Flood states that "*In particular, this raises problems in handling the concept of soft Euroscepticism, because there is scarcely any political party which does not object to some feature of the EU as presently constituted.*" Therefore, Flood notes what he believes is a flaw in Szczerbiak and Taggart's definition because even very slight criticism of an EU policy may cause a party considered in the Soft Eurosceptic camp.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Flood, *Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept*, pp. 5

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Chris Flood, "Dimensions of Euroscepticism" in *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47, no. 4, (August 2009), pp. 911–917, pp. 912

3.3.3. Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker's Approaches of Euroscepticism

Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker argue that Conservative Eurosceptics “*are to be found on a spectrum*”.¹²⁹ Lynch and Whitaker have split Szczerbiak and Taggart’s hard and soft Euroscepticism into two approaches each, making 4 approaches in total. Their hard Eurosceptic spectrum ranges from “*outright rejectionists*” (what Lynch and Whitaker define as favouring withdrawal, which is the general definition of hard Eurosceptic today) to maximalist revisionists (“*favouring a ‘Norway plus’ relationship based on free trade and the single market*”). Their soft Euroscepticism ranges from maximalist revisionists (“*favouring a limited repatriation of competences*”), and minimalists “*taking a ‘this far but no further’*” position regarding European integration.¹³⁰

3.3.4. Szczerbiak and Taggart's Responses to Criticisms

Szczerbiak and Taggart have noted the criticisms raised towards their hard/soft distinction of Euroscepticism. They have responded by first noting that their distinction was “*formulated very much as a work in progress with explicit objective of stimulating further debate and we [Szczerbiak and Taggart] have never been theologically attached to it*”.¹³¹

Szczerbiak and Taggart give some credit to Kopecký and Mudde’s conception and the criticisms that they have directed. Szczerbiak and Taggart accepted that their definition of soft party-based Euroscepticism (as stated above) was “*too broad and*

¹²⁹ Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker, “Where There is Discord, Can They Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party” in *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15, no.3, (August 2012), pp. 317-339, pp.318

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, *Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement and Causality*, (Sussex:Sussex European Institute (SEI) Working Paper No 69)(August 2003), pp. 6

included parties that were in essence pro-European integration".¹³² Szczerbiak and Taggart underline "*the weakness of using attitudes towards EU membership as the key definitional variable separating different party positions towards Europe*",¹³³ which was one of Kopecký and Mudde's criticisms. Szczerbiak and Taggart agree that party attitudes towards EU membership can change according to the events and public support for membership, and thus therefore agree "*that party attitudes towards EU membership do not necessarily tell us what that party's deeper position is on the broader underlying issue of European integration through the EU*".¹³⁴

Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that their distinction of soft and hard Euroscepticism is effective because it is easy to use and operationalise. This is also why they have rejected classifications with several different categories (Kopecký and Mudde's comes to mind). Szczerbiak and Taggart also argue that the more "*complexed and fine-grained the typology*" the harder it is to operationalise the political parties being researched.¹³⁵ This thesis agrees with Szczerbiak and Taggart's points and has employed their toolkit in that sense.

Despite the criticisms illustrated above, Szczerbiak and Taggart have continued to use their binary hard and soft distinction of Euroscepticism as recently as 2018.¹³⁶

¹³² Ibid, pp 6

¹³³ Ibid, pp 7

¹³⁴ Ibid, pp. 8

¹³⁵ Szczerbiak and Taggart, "Opposing Europe? Volume 2", pp. 5

¹³⁶ Paul Taggart & Aleks Szczerbiak "Putting Brexit into perspective: the effect of the Eurozone and migration crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European states" in *Journal of European Public Policy* 25, no.8, (May 2018), pp. 1194-1214, pp. 1198

3.4. Europeanism and Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom

3.4.1 Europeanism in the UK

Since 1945, there have always been some British politicians, including members of the Conservative Party, that have desired European integration. Academics have used different names to describe these advocates of Europe such as “pro-Europeanists”, “Europeanists”, “European integrationists”. This thesis will alternate these terms. According to Oliver Daddow, the Conservative Party came closest to the supranational conception of European integration was during Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath’s tenure¹³⁷.

Nicholas Crowson argues that the Europeanists cannot be defined as a group because that would imply more unity than what were. Hence, Crowson describes the Europeanist Conservatives as a “*tendency*” rather than a group. In addition, some of the Conservative Europeanists were advocates of integration because it was politically beneficial for them at that time¹³⁸. The Conservative Europeanists sometimes advocated their cause despite their party leadership’s negative view towards it. From 1997, however, these Europeanists have been in a fast withdrawal and only a few Conservative politicians openly state they are ‘Europhiles’¹³⁹.

According to Crowson, the most extreme Europeanist Conservatives advocated the idea of European integration as well as its later stages in the military, economic

¹³⁷ Oliver Daddow, “Delusions and meddling: 30 years of Tory Euroscepticism are coming to the fore”, London School of Economics Blog, 9 May 2017 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/09/delusions-and-meddling-30-years-of-tory-euroscepticism-are-coming-to-the-fore/> accessed on 1 November 2019

¹³⁸ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 105

¹³⁹ Ibid.

and political sphere¹⁴⁰. These Conservatives dismissed the concerns about sovereignty by arguing that Britain has enhanced her world influence by ‘pooling’ sovereignty with other European powers. In addition, some prominent Conservative Europeanists such as Kenneth Clarke¹⁴¹ and Michael Heseltine¹⁴², both MPs and once holders of important offices, have vouched for British membership of the Euro. Therefore, at times, they have sometimes gone beyond the policy of the party leader.

On the other hand, Crowson identified a group he calls more “centrist”¹⁴³. These Conservatives believe that the European integration process is inexorable but actions can be taken to change some aspects of this process that have been somewhat undesirable such as the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Commission or the European Courts of Justice. The centrists have sometimes wanted integration more than their leadership, but Crowson highlights that they often followed the party position.¹⁴⁴

3.4.2 Euroscepticism in the UK

The United Kingdom became a member of the European Communities (the predecessor of the current European Union) on 1 January 1973. It is crucial to note that the UK’s application to join the European Community was supported by both the Conservative and Labour Parties and by most of their parliamentarians in 1973. Despite this enthusiasm for the UK membership, the entry of the United Kingdom

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 106

¹⁴¹ BBC News, “Euro worth the ‘risk’ – Clarke”, 17 July 2000 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/836661.stm, accessed on 5 September 2019

¹⁴² Nicholas Watt, “Heseltine warns of euro damage”, The Guardian, 4 May 2000 <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2000/may/04/uk.euro> accessed on 5 July 2019

¹⁴³ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 106

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

as a member to the EC had created a great debate in the UK for several decades. Hence, this thesis shall present the view that opposition to UK's membership to the EC/EU has been a feature of some elements of both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party.

It is important to note that although Euroscepticism is often viewed as a recent phenomenon, suspicion of European integration has a long history in the United Kingdom. Despite this, the first overt appearance of Euroscepticism on a large scale was during the UK's policy towards European integration especially from the late 1980s onwards. European integration and therefore Euroscepticism has affected the political debates in the UK significantly and Euroscepticism constitutes the core element of the on-going Brexit process. Furthermore, the prominence of Euroscepticism in the UK has resulted in a "Leave" vote in the 2016 referendum, greatly affecting national, regional and global politics.

In addition, Euroscepticism has caused divisions in the Conservative and Labour Parties as well as in the general British population. For instance, Euroscepticism caused a new party to split from Labour in the early 1980's and inner clashes in both parties, especially the Conservatives, throughout several decades.¹⁴⁵ It has also provided an impetus for rise of the hard Eurosceptic parties such as the Referendum Party, UKIP and the Brexit Party.

Forster notes that opposition to Europe in the UK has ebbed and flowed¹⁴⁶ while Crowson also points out that Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party has changed over the years¹⁴⁷. As stated earlier, Agnès Alexandre-Collier has argued

¹⁴⁵ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 1-2

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. pp. 1

¹⁴⁷ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp.152 .

that Euroscepticism has been primarily associated with the Conservative Party¹⁴⁸. On the other hand, it is crucial to underline that Euroscepticism in the UK is not limited to parties on the right.

In his observation of Conservative Euroscepticism, Crowson emphasises that although the arguments raised against European integration have shifted according to the international system and Britain's place in it, the core themes have not changed.¹⁴⁹

Similar to Szczerbiak and Taggart's model of soft and hard Euroscepticism, Crowson lists 3 types of Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party¹⁵⁰: moderates who *"have doubts but express these in the party structure"*, the confirmed sceptics who sometimes rebel against the party and the irreconcilables, which cannot be convinced at all about the positive aspects of European integration.

According to Crowson, Euroscepticism is *"largely perceived as a right-wing phenomenon, which is populist, chauvinistic and reactionary"* because of its association with individuals who adhere to that ideology. Crowson names Gerald Nabarro, Anthony Fell, Ronald Bell, Enoch Powell and Edward Leigh as Eurosceptics.¹⁵¹ Regarding the later years, he also adds Neil Martin, John Biffen, Bill Cash and Michael Spicer as prominent Eurosceptics.¹⁵²

On the other hand, David Baker et al. identified four distinct phases of British Euroscepticism.¹⁵³ The first phase was the period between the end of the Second

¹⁴⁸ Alexandre-Collier, "Le phénomène eurosceptique", pp. 60

¹⁴⁹ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 152

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid, pp. 152-153

¹⁵³ David Baker, Andrew Gamble, Nick Randall, and David Seawright. "Euroscepticism in the British Party System: 'A Source of Fascination, Perplexity, and Sometimes Frustration'" in

World War until the ratification of UK's entry to the EEC in 1972, in which most of the British elite was Eurosceptic. Baker et al. note that the "*pragmatic economic rationale*" for membership was not able to "*undermine*" Euroscepticism. The second phase was the efforts of the Eurosceptics for a "no" vote in the 1975 referendum regarding continued EC membership; they sought to remove the UK from the EC. Furthermore, Baker et al. argue that the third phase is from 1975 to 1988, where Euroscepticism became a "*latent feature*" of British politics. Ultimately, the fourth phase is from the late 1980s to today. Baker et al stress that in the fourth period, Euroscepticism became "*fundamental to the contemporary configuration of British politics*". This thesis argues that this is relevant for today's Brexit debate.

In recent years, this thesis argues that Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher, John Major, David Cameron and Theresa May as well as former leaders of the Conservative Party Iain Duncan Smith, William Hague and Michael Howard were "soft Eurosceptic". After the result of the Brexit referendum of 2016, despite desiring to remain in the EU, May and her successor "Leave" supporter Prime Minister Boris Johnson are evaluated as hard Eurosceptic. The 6th chapter shall illustrate the reasons behind the hard Eurosceptic shift of the Conservative Party.

This chapter has explored the literature on Euroscepticism and Eurosceptic party politics as well as the views of the Conservative Party towards the EC/EU. Szczerbiak and Taggart's hard and soft Eurosceptic toolkit was introduced. Notable Eurosceptic figures were presented to the reader.

Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume I: Case Studies and Country Surveys ed. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 93-116, pp. 94

CHAPTER 4

EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY ON THE PATH TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP (1945-1973)

This chapter will focus on the post-World War II debate on British membership to the EC and will discuss the debates between the factions desiring European integration and the factions sceptical of the European Community/Union.

4.1. The Conservative Party on the Road to European Community Membership and Its Opponents.

According to Crowson, the idea of European integration forced Conservatives to face many of their essential ideological notions, listed in the 2nd Chapter. Broadly speaking, British leaders before 1988 attempted to show Europe to the British people as a purely economic issue that was required to prevent Britain's reducing importance in several spheres such as in the global politics and economics. However, European integration eventually led to the on-going debate regarding Britain's role in the world, peace and prosperity, national sovereignty and patriotism, its economic basis, and its political and legal system. The pro-Europeans were successful in this debate until the late 1980s.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 71

As the emphasis of this thesis shall focus on the post-World War II dynamics of the Conservative Party regarding European integration, this chapter provides a detailed explanation of the process of the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community.

4.2. European Integration and UK Policy Towards It

According to Forster, the first fifteen years after the Second World War were characterized by scepticism toward closer European integration (Euroscepticism, but it was not referred to as such at that time) by the Labour Party government of Clement Attlee (1945-1951) and the Conservative governments of Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan from 1951 to 1961¹⁵⁵. During the late 1940s and 1950s the Conservative leadership both in opposition and in government generally viewed the issue of Europe as a matter of foreign affairs¹⁵⁶. In addition, most of their members of parliament (MPs) and party activists were also sceptical of European integration¹⁵⁷ and anti-Europeanism (as stated by Forster, “a rejection of anything to do with supranational Europe”) was common. In fact, Forster underlines this observation by stating “*the possibility of the government participating in supranational integration were unthinkable to most in the political establishment.*”¹⁵⁸

However, Forster takes note of a shift in this attitude on 31st of July 1961, when Prime Minister Harold Macmillan declared that his Conservative government would make an enquiry about the possibility of applying to the European

¹⁵⁵ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 10

¹⁵⁶ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 128

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 10

Communities¹⁵⁹. The Labour Party opposed Macmillan's policy vis-à-vis the EC, but interestingly Harold Wilson's Labour government also applied for opening negotiations when they came to power in 1966. Both applications were unsuccessful primarily due to de Gaulle's veto on both occasions.

Forster highlights that European integration became one of the most important topics in UK politics, affecting the relations between both parties and their inner dynamics¹⁶⁰.

During 1945-1969, according to Forster, UK foreign policy gave importance to the British Empire, the Commonwealth and the English speaking world first and put engagement with Western Europe second. The UK wanted to have a leadership role in Western Europe, but avoided European regional co-operation based along federalist lines¹⁶¹. The UK was involved in several regional institutions such as the defensive Brussels Treaty, the Washington Treaty which set up NATO, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe¹⁶².

Neill Nugent underlines that the Inner Six¹⁶³ *“were willing to permit, even to encourage”* movement towards supranationalism, which is defined by him as *“states working with one another in a manner that does not allow them to retain complete control over developments.”* Nugent points out that with supranationalism *“states may be obliged to do things against their preferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop decisions. Supranationalism*

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 11

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ The Inner Six refers to the six first members of the European Coal and Steel Community, namely Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy and France.

thus takes inter-state relations beyond cooperation into integration, and involves some loss of national sovereignty.”¹⁶⁴ Ultimately, by the 1960s, the Inner Six had accepted the general terms of supranationalism.

On the other hand, the UK advocated intergovernmentalism over supranationalism, in order to protect British interests. Hence, in November 1951 the Conservative government’s Foreign Secretary (later Prime Minister) Anthony Eden proposed that the European Defence Community and the European Coal and Steel Community should be controlled by the Council of Europe, an intergovernmental institution¹⁶⁵.

This plan was viewed with suspicion by the Europeans and was not accepted. As Lieber records, they thought it was ‘*a method of granting Britain the advantages of participation without its responsibilities*’¹⁶⁶. Similar criticism shall be levied by the European Union towards the UK before, during and after the Brexit negotiations.

With the 1957 Treaties of Rome, the founding members of the ECSC gave up some of their sovereignty to supranational organisations and hence created the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), collectively known as the European Communities. The British formed an intergovernmental Free Trade Association (EFTA) for European countries¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, (Hampshire: The Macmillan Press, 1999), pp 502-503.

¹⁶⁵ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 12.

¹⁶⁶ Robert J. Lieber, *British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp 24

¹⁶⁷ Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. These countries were known as the “Outer Seven”, in contrast to the Inner Six.

unable or unwilling to join the Six members of the EC (Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg).

4.3. UK Interest in EEC Membership

According to Forster, both Macmillan and Wilson's initiatives regarding the EC were merely to explore and enquire the possibility of applying to the EC¹⁶⁸. The nature of their bids was vague and not "concrete" so it would have been difficult for opponents of European integration to criticize them. In this way, he argues that they followed this course of action intentionally¹⁶⁹.

Crowson argues that the first application to the EEC was decided by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan after he witnessed that the EFTA was not as successful as had been predicted and that Britain had lost its position as a world superpower¹⁷⁰. One of the reasons for this was the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956-1957¹⁷¹.

Macmillan appointed Edward Heath as Lord Privy Seal in July 1960. This is of great importance for the UK's membership to the EEC as Heath was a known Europeanist and personally strived for the UK's membership to the EEC. In fact, in his first 1950 speech in the House of Commons, Heath stated that Britain must

¹⁶⁸ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 12-13

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 28

¹⁷¹ The Suez Canal Crisis started when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956, triggering a conflict that involved Israel, France and the UK. The UK was unable to protect its claim over the Suez Canal and the USA was unsupportive of UK ambitions. After US pressure, the other forces and the UK withdrew from Egypt in late 1956 and early 1957. The Suez Canal Crisis is often cited in history as an event that demonstrated the UK's weakened influence in international relations.

join the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)¹⁷². This cemented Heath as a notable Europeanist as it had only been a month since Robert Schuman's famous 9th of May speech¹⁷³ and because neither Conservatives nor Labour had any major interest in the EEC at that period.

In 1960 Prime Minister Macmillan considered membership to the EC, but the government considered the possible effects in detail. The government conducted talks with the United States and the Commonwealth before the decision to seek negotiations in 1961. Lynch notes that Conservative Ministers emphasised the special interests of the UK during the negotiations, including agriculture and Commonwealth ties¹⁷⁴.

On 13 of July 1960 the Cabinet had decided that Britain should 'draw closer' to the EEC but refused to commit to an application. Macmillan announced Britain's intention to seek accession to the Treaty of Rome on 31 July 1961 in the House of Commons. Macmillan delivered a short statement in which he noted three problems that the negotiations with the Six that needed to be solved: "*the relationship of the other EFTA nations with the EEC, the agricultural exports of the Commonwealth to Britain and the position of domestic British agriculture.*" Crowson notes that Macmillan did not speak much about sovereignty and that entry to the EEC was presented as a matter of free trade¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷² Daddow, "30 years of Tory Euroscepticism", accessed on 1 November 2019

¹⁷³ In what came to be known as the Schuman Declaration of 1950, French foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented the idea of the creation of the ECSC to the Inner Six. Member states of the ECSC would pool coal and steel production and the institution would be the first supranational entity that led up to the European Union.

¹⁷⁴ Lynch, *The Politics of Nationhood*, pp. 25

¹⁷⁵ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 28

Macmillan's attempt to join the EEC was anticipated by 3 Eurosceptics namely, Derek Walker-Smith, Robin Turton, and Peter Walker and they formed an anti-EEC group called the Common Market Committee on 25 July 1961.

In order to understand the position of the Eurosceptic Conservatives in the 1960's, this section shall now present their main arguments.

4.4. Euroscepticism in the 1960's: Opposition to Macmillan's Application to Enquiring Membership to the EEC/EC

As stated earlier, Derek Walker-Smith was a Eurosceptic and was, according to Crowson, *"from the beginning profoundly concerned about the implications for British sovereignty of any EEC entry"*.¹⁷⁶ In a speech he made in August 1961, he summarized the main points of the Eurosceptic Conservatives of that era. Crowson underlines that Walker-Smith's main points were "rehearsed" in later years and this thesis argues that the same overarching themes continue today, after Brexit vote¹⁷⁷.

At what he called a "momentous debate" in his aforementioned speech in the House of Commons, Walker-Smith raised the issue of sovereignty by stating that *"It is not just a debate about economics, important as they are. It is acknowledged that it raises great political issues: issues which concern our constitutional practices, our national institutions and our future as a sovereign State."*¹⁷⁸ This

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, pp. 153

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ House of Commons Hansard 1508, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

sentence forms the main argument of Eurosceptics regarding the concept of sovereignty for the UK's entry to the Common Market.

In addition, Walker-Smith portrayed the possibility of accession as an unclear path *"We must ask to view the distant scene; for one step in this case might be far too much. It might, indeed, be fatal if we do not know the direction and destination in which it is leading us."*

Walker-Smith also gave a very accurate prediction of UK European integration to the EC and the Eurosceptic position for the later years:

If we adhere to the Economic Community now and the Six proceed, as they are entitled to proceed, to the next stage of political union, what then is our position? If we do not want to go along with them on the political side, could we stay in on the economic side, or could we get out at that stage even if we wanted to?¹⁷⁹

He further illustrates his point by noting the future of integration:

what is the intention of the Government in this regard? Do they want to take a step forward into political union or not? If we tried to come out of the Community in those circumstances, would not the Six be justified in saying to us, 'But you knew all along of our enthusiasm for the next political step. If you did not share it, why did you join us in the first place?'¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ House of Commons Hansard 1514, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

Derek Walker-Smith questioned the necessity of a relinquishment in UK sovereignty. In line with this he stated that,

...I come to the question of sovereignty; and here again we must look at it from two points of view. First, the derogation of sovereignty which arises expressly from the Treaty of Rome; and, secondly—and inescapably—the consequences of those contemplated further arrangements on the part of the European Community, acceptance of which would be implied by our adherence to the Community now.

To further his argument Walker-Smith underlines;

Article 3, which lists the functions of the Community, and paragraph H of that Article, which requires the member States to approximate their municipal law...to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market. Thus, there is some immediate surrender of sovereignty expressed in that.¹⁸¹

He questioned if it had been possible to sign agreements regarding economic relations instead of giving up sovereignty and he could not accept why the economic reality required the UK to join a supranational organisation like the EEC. In addition, inability to control the movements of capital transfers, services and workers would entail a great loss in sovereignty. Walker-Smith accepted that there

¹⁸¹ House of Commons Hansard 1509, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

may be some economic advantages due to membership but stated that nobody had been able to see the Community's "*balance sheet*".¹⁸²

Walker-Smith openly stated that a common external tariff, which is a supranational obligation by the EC, would be required against all other countries and he thus stated that it "*impinges upon our obligations to the Commonwealth*".

He referred to an EC report and identified many uses of the word "political", which lead Walker-Smith to predict that the economic union of the EC is a harbinger to political union. He stated that he does not view that political union in a negative way but with reference to Britain's "*special and separate position that Britain has served the interests of Europe and of the world*" [British exceptionalism] he says that "*what may be good for them is not necessarily good for us.*"¹⁸³

Referring to the constitutional heritage inherited by the "native genius" of the British forefathers, he did not believe it would be right to sacrifice their heritage by turning it into a "*postscript*" beneath the economic agreements¹⁸⁴. Thus, we can see that Derek Walker-Smith's speech entailed some elements of Conservative Party thought mixed with the seminal arguments of Euroscepticism.

Walker-Smith succinctly summarized his position by urging the government to

¹⁸² House of Commons Hansard 1510, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

¹⁸³ House of Commons Hansard 1512, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

¹⁸⁴ House of Commons Hansard, 1513, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

tell the Six that we wish them well and that we want the maximum co-operation with them which is compatible with our own independent sovereignty and duty to the Commonwealth. Remind them of the difference between our position and theirs, and tell them that we do not wish to renounce our heritage but to use it for the common good. Seek an association with them under Article 238 of the Treaty¹⁸⁵ which can bring the maximum honour and advantage to all.¹⁸⁶

Prime Minister Macmillan's answer to Eurosceptic criticism and the sovereignty argument raised by Walker-Smith was a rather pro-European argument. Macmillan underlines that sovereignty in his time had become less absolute than in the past due to the changing international arena (such as the United Nations) and increased interdependence. He notes that accession to the Rome treaty would not be surrender of sovereignty but a "*pooling of sovereignty*". The relevant portions of Macmillan's speech is provided below.

Accession to the Treaty of Rome would not involve a one-sided surrender of 'sovereignty' on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty by all concerned, mainly in economic and social fields. In renouncing some of our sovereignty we would receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by other members. Our obligations would not alter the position of the Crown, nor rob our Parliament of its essential powers, nor deprive our Law Courts of their authority in our domestic life. The talk about loss of sovereignty becomes all the more meaningless when one remembers that practically every nation,

¹⁸⁵ Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, 1957: The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an international organisation agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures. These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the Assembly [European Parliament]. Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these amendments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 236.

¹⁸⁶ House of Commons Hansard 1514, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

including our own, has already been forced by the pressures of the modern world to abandon large areas of sovereignty and to realise that we are now all inter- dependent.”¹⁸⁷

According to Philip Lynch, Prime Minister Macmillan’s answer generally downplayed Walker-Smith’s criticisms.¹⁸⁸ In addition, this thesis argues that Macmillan’s interpretation of European accession has left out the future as he argues that the powers of Parliament shall not be robbed but this is yet another Eurosceptic argument.

4.5. Macmillan’s Failed Application to the EEC

Prime Minister Macmillan and several MPs both from Conservative and Labour verbally declared that they respected the main points of Walker-Smith’s notable speech. For instance, Labour MP Arthur Woodburn said that the speech presented all the arguments against British entry into a united Europe¹⁸⁹.

Despite that, the Macmillan government was able to pass the vote of motion by 313 yes to 5 no on 3 of August 1961 and one can notice that a significant number of MPs abstained. Prime Minister Macmillan stated that the Conservative MPs that abstained formed two groups, one of them abstained due to their beliefs and the others that abstained to exploit the situation against him.

¹⁸⁷ Robert Schütze and Stephen Tierney, *United Kingdom and The Federal Idea*, (Oxford:Hart Publishing, 2018), pp 157.

¹⁸⁸ Lynch, *Politics of Nationhood*, pp. 25-26.

¹⁸⁹ Hansard, 1514 https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 accessed on 17 July 2019

Negotiations finally began in May 1962 but the EEC was somewhat slow as they had to agree on policies appropriate for all 6 members. Crowson highlighted that the speed of the negotiations caused difficulties from the beginning.¹⁹⁰ The EEC was also dealing with forming the Common Agricultural Policy and political co-operation. On the other hand, British agriculturalists were concerned about the EEC entry because of anti-Marketeters' propaganda and the Macmillan government was not able to explain the benefits of entry to the EEC.¹⁹¹ Macmillan wanted most ministers to adopt an unaggressive position regarding the EEC membership, and several scandals led to a drop of support for his government.

In a press conference on 14 January 1963, French President de Gaulle's declared his disapproval of UK's EEC membership. Heath tried to revive the talks but to no avail. A final meeting between the UK and the 6 members on 28-29 January confirmed the failure. Heath had concluded that de Gaulle would continue to veto UK membership as long as he was in power. De Gaulle's veto disappointed the Europeanist Conservatives.

Macmillan retired several months later and was replaced with Alec Douglas-Home. Home was not able to win the 1964 general election, which ended with the victory of Labour Party's leader Harold Wilson. After his defeat, Home stepped down from the leadership of the Conservative Party and Edward Heath was elected leader. Edward Heath strived for UK's membership to the EEC and is generally recognised as one of the main actors for its entry.

The Labour Party's 1967 application to the EEC was also unsuccessful due to another veto by President de Gaulle. The Conservative Party's policy regarding Labour's membership was to avoid becoming too associated to the talks in order

¹⁹⁰ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp 30.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

to avoid being a part of this unsuccessful application.¹⁹² In fact, Crowson quotes a document prepared by the Europeanist Conservative Gordon Pears: “*Our main concern here must be to avoid being tied too closely to the actual conduct of the negotiations and so being associated with their failure if they do fail.*”¹⁹³ The Conservatives also criticised the economic policy of Labour Party and tried to depict them as incompetent.¹⁹⁴ It can be seen that Conservative criticism of Labour’s economic policy has generally been a trend that continues even today. In addition, Heath stressed that Wilson was moving ‘*along the path we have urged him to take*’.¹⁹⁵

As stated aptly by Crowson,

Heath adopted a dual strategy: to secure credit for the Conservatives as the pro-European party, but also seeking to strike a blow blaming any veto on Labour because they had misunderstood many of the issues, issues that the Conservatives had foreseen and with their past experience of the 1961–3 negotiations would have resolved.¹⁹⁶

4.6. Heath’s Efforts for EEC Membership as Prime Minister

12 days after the Conservatives won a general election in June 1970, Edward Heath applied for EEC membership on the 30th.¹⁹⁷ The new French President Georges

¹⁹² Ibid, pp.34

¹⁹³ Ibid, pp. 34-35

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 35

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 33

Pompidou was less unfavourable to UK membership to the EEC, which provided an impetus for Heath to continue membership efforts. This attempt would be the last and would finally succeed.

According to Philip Lynch, Heath's desire for membership to the EC was the focal point of his policies. Heath considered membership a way to revitalize the UK economy and identify the UK's role in an interdependent world.¹⁹⁸ Daddow notes that Heath always believed that the UK should be 'inside Europe' for economic and political reasons, in addition to economic and trade issues. Most importantly however, Heath believed that the UK shared the values of Europe.¹⁹⁹

To that end, Lynch identifies that Heath was supporting the pooling of sovereignty to the EC by quoting him: *'the unity of Europe will in the end be achieved by European governments forming the habit of working together...it is inconceivable to me that the unity of Europe could now be established on any other basis'*.²⁰⁰

On the other hand, the Conservative Party's 1970 manifesto²⁰¹ states that

if we can negotiate the right terms, we believe that it would be in the long-term interest of the British people for Britain to join the European Economic Community, and that it would make a major contribution to both the prosperity and the security of our country. The opportunities are immense. Economic growth and a higher standard of living would result from having a larger market.

¹⁹⁸ Lynch, *The Politics of Nationhood*, pp. 29

¹⁹⁹ Daddow, "30 years of Tory Euroscepticism" accessed on 1 November 2019

²⁰⁰ Lynch, *The Politics of Nationhood*, pp. 30

²⁰¹ The Conservative Party, 1970 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1970/1970-conservative-manifesto.shtml>, accessed on 20 June 2019

In evaluating the paragraph above, it can be seen that the Conservatives campaigned for EC membership by primarily focusing on the economic benefits for the UK. In addition, this thesis argues that despite Heath's Europeanist direction, the Party's manifesto was structured very cautiously. It only declares the determination to negotiate, as stated below.

But we must also recognise the obstacles. There would be short-term disadvantages in Britain going into the European Economic Community which must be weighed against the long-term benefits. Obviously there is a price we would not be prepared to pay. Only when we negotiate will it be possible to determine whether the balance is a fair one, and in the interests of Britain. Our sole commitment is to negotiate; no more, no less. As the negotiations proceed we will report regularly through Parliament to the country.²⁰²

The accession negotiations span from the late June 1970 until 22 January 1972, the date Prime Minister Heath signed the accession treaty in Brussels. During the second reading of the European Communities Act at the House of Commons, Heath declared his position by saying²⁰³

I believe that our friends would find it incomprehensible if we were to tear up the agreement—the very agreement we have struggled for more than a decade to achieve... Our influence in world monetary and trade discussions would be destroyed. These questions would be settled by the United States, the European Community and Japan. The Community would not be broken up if we were to defect. It would suffer a bitter shock but it would survive

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Hansard 751, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1972/feb/17/european-communities-bill#S5CV0831P0_19720217_HOC_234 accessed on 12 June 2019

and go on. But Britain would not benefit from the progress it was making.... It has been a central policy of three successive Governments, irrespective of party, and of all three main parties in this House that Britain should join the European Communities if suitable arrangements could be negotiated.

It must be noted that an influential member of the Conservative Party, Enoch Powell, was against the EEC membership. According to David Shiels, Powell could be regarded as the “*founding father of modern Tory Euroscepticism*”. Shiels highlights that Powell’s influence is still felt today and that his views formed the Conservative criticisms of European integration²⁰⁴. During his speech at the second reading, Powell argues that once the accession to the Treaty of Rome is achieved, Parliament will lose its “legislative supremacy”, the British executive will lose its control over taxation and expenditure, and that the judicial independence of the UK will be forfeited²⁰⁵. This thesis argues that the main points of Powell’s speech have been repeated by the recent Eurosceptics in their Leave campaign. Powell’s emphasis on sovereignty is one of his main points²⁰⁶:

In future, if we join the Community, the citizens of this country will not only be subject to laws made elsewhere but the applicability of those laws to them will be adjudicated upon elsewhere; and the law made elsewhere and the adjudication elsewhere will override the law which is made here and the decisions of the courts of this realm.

²⁰⁴ David Shiels, “How Enoch Powell helped to shape modern Tory Euroscepticism”, 3 June 2016 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/03/how-enoch-powell-helped-to-shape-modern-tory-euroscepticism/> , accessed on 2 July 2019

²⁰⁵ Hansard 700, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1972/feb/17/european-communities-bill> accessed on 12 June 2019

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

Ultimately, after the third and final reading, the UK House of Commons approved the entry of the UK to the EC in July 1972 with 301 for and 284 against. Great Britain along with Ireland and Denmark became members of the EC on 1 January 1973.



CHAPTER 5

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION (1973-2011)

Conservative dissent on European integration is an important case study for understanding intra-party divisions. The Conservatives are the leading example of a mainstream Eurosceptic party and one experiencing significant divisions on European integration. The Conservatives survived the divisions of the 1990s, emerging as a soft Eurosceptic party.²⁰⁷

This chapter shall outline the shift of the Conservative Party's pro-European policy towards European integration to an openly Eurosceptic position. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the ideology, values and principles of the Conservative party would lead one to assume that they were intrinsically against European integration but this was not the case. The Conservative leaders, particularly the One Nation Conservatives, were able to convince most of the party to assume a pro-European position towards integration. In fact, due to several issues illustrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, Crowson underlines that nearly all Conservatives believed that this course of action was "*not only advisable but necessary: the only option*".²⁰⁸

The UK has been an exceptional member of the EU. Under the Treaties regarding UK membership to the EU, the United Kingdom has been granted several

²⁰⁷ Lynch and Whitaker, "Where There is Discord", pp. 335

²⁰⁸ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 71

exceptions (known as “opt-outs”) from conditions normally required by other member states. Hence, the UK is not entitled to adopt the common European currency, the Euro, and can thus keep the British Pound Sterling. Also, the UK is not required to participate in the Schengen area, which obliges EU member states’ citizens the freedom of movement without checkpoints or passport control. In addition, the UK is not obliged to participate in common freedom, security and justice policy of the EU and need not apply Union legislation in the field of policy and judicial cooperation.

According to the overwhelming view of the academia, the opt-outs and therefore exceptional nature of the UK’s membership were the results of the efforts of UK Eurosceptic governments. Many of those opt-outs were achieved in the tenure of Conservative Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major. This thesis argues that Conservative Euroscepticism noticeably shaped the UK’s position vis-a-vis the EU.

Several notable events, such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s open scepticism towards further European political integration; the divisive Maastricht Treaty negotiations and its resultant debates; the Black Wednesday controversy of 1992; the success of the pro-European Labour Party in the 1997 election and the shift of Conservative rhetoric to counter it made it clear that the Conservatives had become a Eurosceptic party.

5.1. UK Accession to the EC and the Fall of Edward Heath

The Treaty of Accession, the primary document completing the UK membership, was signed in Brussels on 22 of January 1972. This event crowned the British desire to join the European Community on the third attempt and it was a great milestone for the Conservative Party. EEC membership was finally achieved on 1st of January 1973. As stated in the previous chapter, this was an accomplishment

largely achieved by Prime Minister Edward Heath, as he played a crucial role in the talks that had continued for more than a decade. European accession took the UK almost 25 years with a large amount of uncertainty but with this event the Conservatives were defined as “a party of Europe”²⁰⁹. From 1974 to 1979 the Conservative party could be considered as the most unified pro-Europe and pro-EEC party²¹⁰.

After a series of economic problems such as rising food prices and conflicts with coal miners²¹¹ and his own party, Heath called a general election in February 1974. The Conservative Party actually received more votes than the Labour but as a result of the first-past-the-post voting system of the UK, the Labour Party, headed by Harold Wilson, won more seats. The resultant hung parliament caused another election in October of that year, where Labour gained a slim majority and formed a government, albeit a weak one.

After these successive defeats, Heath called a leadership election in January 1975. During the Conservative Party leadership elections on 4th of February, Margaret Thatcher, the former Secretary of State for Education and Science (1970-1974), gained 130 votes against Edward Heath’s 119. Heath resigned and Thatcher won the second ballot on the 11th and became the Leader of the Opposition.

5.2. The Events Leading to the 1975 Referendum

In opposition to Heath, Eurosceptic MPs began to question the benefits of UK’s membership. They, much like Eurosceptics today, were trying to prevent the EC

²⁰⁹ Ibid, pp. 14

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, *The 1975 Referendum*, (London: The Macmillan Press, 1976), pp. 24

membership or seek a different form of relations with Europe. It is important to shortly note the Labour government's criticism of the Heath government regarding the EEC membership negotiations of the UK. This thesis argues that it bears some resemblance to the pre-Brexit events. This thesis will draw parallels to this in the upcoming 6th Chapter. Labour criticised the conditions of membership imposed on the UK during its membership period. In the Labour election manifesto of February 1974, it stated that the Heath government brought the UK into the EEC "*without the consent of the British people.*", which essentially meant that the Labour questioned its legitimacy. It also notes that entry has reduced "*the power of the British Parliament to settle questions affecting vital British interests*". This can be seen as another reference to the concept of sovereignty.²¹²

In his visit to Luxembourg for an EEC Foreign Ministers' meeting in April 1974, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan (later Prime Minister from 1976 to 1979) openly stated that his Labour government was against the terms of entry negotiated by Heath and that they desired a renegotiation to his European counterparts.²¹³ In his statement, he generally brought forth economic concerns such as the details of the Common Agricultural Policy and the effects it may cause to the Commonwealth, financing of the Community Budget, the fixed parity necessary for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the imposition of the Value Added Tax (VAT). In line with his party's election manifesto, he argued that "*The retention by Parliament of those powers over the British economy*

²¹² Labour Party, "Labour Party General Election Manifesto February 1974", in *Labour Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997*, ed. Iain Dale, (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 181-192

²¹³ James Callaghan, "Statement by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at the Council (Luxembourg, 1 April 1974)" http://www.cvce.eu/obj/statement_by_james_callaghan_luxembourg_1_april_1974-en-49bcefb2-4a53-4fbd-a33b-144e566699e4.html, accessed on 18 July 2019

needed to pursue effective regional, industrial and fiscal policies” was necessary.²¹⁴

In particular, Callaghan argued that the UK had to pay an unfair amount of money in contribution in the EEC: *“We are not asking for charity. We seek a fair deal.”*²¹⁵ He noted that the UK would be paying a contribution according to the ratio equivalent to over 19% of its GNP by the end of the transitional period. Callaghan underlined that the expected GNP of the UK in the EEC would be equivalent to 16.5% of the EEC’s total GNP, so therefore he argued that they were paying too much.²¹⁶

Also, British economic growth and income per capita were, as he described, *“lower than in many of your [EEC member] countries”*.²¹⁷ Criticism of the money being paid to the EC/EU continues to be one of the main arguments of Eurosceptics.

5.3. The 1975 Referendum

The Labour Government advocated a referendum on the UK’s continued participation in the European Community. The Labour government “renegotiated” the UK’s membership to a limited extent; but it was impossible to change the primary documents of membership. An Act was passed in Parliament in May and the European Communities membership referendum took place on 5 of June 1975.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

The referendum was intended to be simple, so the voters had to tick “Yes” or “No” on the ballot paper. The question²¹⁸ presented to the voters was:

“The Government has announced the results of the renegotiation of the United Kingdom's terms of membership of the European Community.

Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?”

The “Yes” campaign was organised by the “Britain in Europe” group which was officially supported by Prime Minister Wilson and most of his cabinet, including his three most important ministers (Chancellor of the Exchequer Healey; Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Home Secretary Jenkins). It’s important to note that some Labour members were against membership in principle while others argued that it was necessary to ask the people for their view²¹⁹.

On the other hand, Thatcher underlined that most Conservatives supported a “Yes” vote: *“The majority of the Conservative Party both in Parliament and the country— the vast majority— is in favour of staying in Europe...”* In addition, she provided evidence for this by presenting the results of a free vote in Parliament in April, in which 249 out of 275 Conservative MPs voted in favour of continued membership.²²⁰ We can therefore see that the majority of the Conservative Party was supportive of the EEC.

In fact, the Conservatives officially supported “Yes” (Remain in the EC) while Labour was ambivalent.²²¹ Interestingly, this has been partially repeated in the

²¹⁸ Butler and Kitzinger, *The 1975 Referendum*, pp. 61

²¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 25

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

2016 Brexit referendum, as the Conservative leader David Cameron and some of his ministers supported Remain in the EU, while the Labour did not have a clear policy. On the other hand, parties that supported “No” in 1975, such as the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru and the Ulster Unionist Party actually were against British exit in the 2016 Brexit referendum.²²²

The result of the referendum was a resounding “Yes” with 67.23% and “No” 32.77%, showing the desire to remain in the EC. According to Forster, the support of most of the Conservatives to remain in the EC and the positive result in the referendum make 1975 a critical year for Euroscepticism. The Eurosceptic Conservatives had to accept the EC membership but were compelled to work from within to diminish what they considered was the EC’s intrusion. The anti-Marketeers in the Conservative Party were weakened in the wake of the 1975 referendum.²²³

5.4. The Premiership of Margaret Thatcher

Under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership, the Conservative Party won the 1979 elections against the Labour. Tournier-Sol identifies that Thatcher had a strong influence and leadership in policy-making²²⁴. She notes that Prime Minister

²²² Amanda Ferguson, “UUP to campaign against Brexit”, The Irish Times, 5 March 2016, <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/uup-to-campaign-against-brexit-1.2561908> accessed on 2 November 2019

²²³ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 45

²²⁴ Karine Tournier-Sol, “Leadership and the European Debate from Margaret Thatcher to John Major” in *Leadership and Uncertainty Management in Politics: Leaders, Followers and Constraints in Western Democracies* ed. Agnès Alexandre-Collier and François De Chantal, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 127-140, pp. 127

Thatcher's leadership and determination was "*epitomised in the appellation 'the Iron Lady'*".²²⁵

As noted by Wade, the Conservatives under Thatcher had been influenced by pro-market economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman.²²⁶ Thatcher openly declared her intent to deregulate the British economy and pursue supply-side economic reforms. Her tenure coincided with a process of deindustrialisation, which reduced the local production capabilities of the British economy. She weakened the authority of the state in the economy by privatizing state-owned industries (which Wade calls her "*flagship policy*") and she reduced the power of the trade unions.²²⁷ Interestingly, Thatcher, despite preferring supply side economics and deregulation and privatisation, increased the budget of the National Health Service significantly.

As this thesis shall demonstrate, Thatcher was sceptic towards further political and economic integration with the EC. Despite criticism from her Conservative peers and her opponents on issues ranging from the economy and others, she was able to lead her party to several successes in the general elections of 1983 and 1987.

²²⁵ Ibid, pp. 128

²²⁶ Richard Wade, *Conservative Party Economic Policy: From Heath in Opposition to Cameron in Coalition*, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan,2013), pp. 70

²²⁷ Ibid, pp. 48

Historians explain her success by noting her crucial leadership in the Falkland Islands War²²⁸ of 1982²²⁹ and the deep divisions in the opposition.²³⁰

According to Tournier-Sol, Margaret Thatcher consistently presented herself as pro-European in her first years of premiership. As noted above, she had supported a “Yes” vote in the referendum of 1975. Tournier-Sol argues that Thatcher’s view on Europe was based on pragmatism rather than enthusiasm and was essentially a minimalist one.²³¹

Tournier-Sol also adds that Thatcher regarded the European Economic Community (EEC) as a large market in which she could apply her neoliberal economic policies. It is for this reason that Tournier-Sol argues that the UK played a crucial role in creating the Single Market even though they had significant concessions. Thatcher regularly stressed her pro-European views and her support for the single market to keep the support of pro-European Conservative MPs.²³²

Meanwhile, the 1980s was a turning point for European integration, as the influential European Commission President (1985-1995) Jacques Delors set out to establish the single market and began the “*far more ambitious goals of economic, monetary and political union*”.²³³ This coincided with Thatcher’s tenure in the UK,

²²⁸ In the Falklands War, the UK fought Argentina over the Falklands Islands, a overseas territory of the UK near Argentina. The UK won the war.

²²⁹ Paul Reynolds, “Thatcher's war: The Falklands”, BBC News, 8 April 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10377114>, accessed on 29 November 2019

²³⁰ Andy Beckett, “The fight for Labour’s soul-what the party’s brutal 1981 split means today”, The Guardian, 16 July 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/19/the-fight-for-labours-soul-what-the-partys-brutal-1981-split-means-today> accessed on 30 November 2019

²³¹ Tournier-Sol, “Leadership” pp. 131-132

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Giles Merritt, “A Bit More Delors Could Revamp the Commission”, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 January 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/21/opinion/IHT-a-bit-more-delors-could-revamp-the-commission.html>, accessed on 4 November 2019

however, Thatcher considered Delors to be too federalist regarding the final European goal of political union. Therefore, she did not accept Delors' conception of Europe. Despite this, Prime Minister Thatcher supported integration in the economic field.

Thatcher picked Francis Arthur Cockfield, an expert in economic affairs and Secretary of State for Trade, to be appointed European Commissioner for International Market and Services. Due to his efforts, Lord Cockfield eventually became known as the "The Father of the Single Market". In December 1985, EEC member countries agreed to a political commitment of Monetary Union and the precursor to the monumental Maastricht Treaty. This agreement, known as the Single European Act (SEA), was an important step for European integration and required member states to change their domestic legislation to comply with it.²³⁴

Interestingly, according to Helene von Bismarck, Thatcher had actually supported the SEA. As noted by von Bismarck, converting the EC into a free trade area with no internal barriers to trade was compatible with Thatcher's home policy of liberalization and deregulation. According to Bismarck, Thatcher's goals for European integration were in line with her domestic priorities— economic growth and tight budgetary discipline.²³⁵ We can see a period of active engagement regarding Europe.

5.5 Margaret Thatcher's Speech at Bruges

Margaret Thatcher's advocacy of EC membership while in opposition and her support of the SEA had discouraged the Eurosceptic Conservatives. They had to

²³⁴ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 84

²³⁵ Helene Von Bismarck, "Margaret Thatcher: the critical architect of European integration", *The UK in a Changing Europe*, 4 May 2016, <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/margaret-thatcher-the-critical-architect-of-european-integration/>, accessed on 28 July 2019

deal with a leader that did not agree with them. However, with Thatcher's notable Bruges speech on 20 September 1988, the Eurosceptic Conservatives had a new opportunity to gain support from the UK population. Her speech is noted as a dramatic shift from her earlier views.

In her speech at Bruges, Thatcher provided a different view on European unity of nation states, in contrast to the integrationism of Delors. According to Tournier-Sol, Thatcher advocated "...*Thatcherisation of Europe – nothing new in substance, but the style and tone had definitely changed.*"²³⁶ Thatcher aimed to send a message to her European partners and to the members of her own government who wanted her to continue European integration.²³⁷ As put by FitzGibbon, Prime Minister Thatcher warned of the dangers of federal Europe.²³⁸

This thesis shall now present the main argument of Prime Minister Thatcher in her speech²³⁹: "*Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.*"

According to many academics such as Tournier-Sol, John FitzGibbon and Alexandre-Collier as well as contemporary media, the Bruges speech is generally considered to be the main speech for Euroscepticism and has become a reference

²³⁶ Tourier-Sol, "Leadership" pp. 132

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ John FitzGibbon, "Extra-Parliamentary Eurosceptic Actors in the UK" in *The UK Challenge to Europeanization, The Persistence of British Euroscepticism*, ed. Karine Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 177

²³⁹ Margaret Thatcher, *The Bruges speech*, 20 September 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332>, accessed on 5 July 2019

point for many British Eurosceptics. According to Tournier-Sol, Margaret Thatcher became an inspiration for all British Eurosceptics.²⁴⁰

In fact, her speech was so influential that it stimulated the formation of an influential extra-parliamentary “Bruges Group”. This group aimed to secure the withdrawal of Britain from the EU, which is, in essence, the concept of “Brexit” before the 2016 referendum. Therefore, the Bruges Group could be defined as “hard Eurosceptic”, which contradicts the general “soft Euroscepticism” of the Conservative Party until recently.²⁴¹

It is important to note that in the analysis of news and media sources²⁴² taken place for this thesis, it has been determined that both the “Remain”²⁴³ and “Leave” camps of the 2016 Brexit referendum have wondered which side Margaret Thatcher²⁴⁴ would support. Hard Eurosceptics have directly referred to her policies that were against European integration in legitimising their own actions, while Europeanists noted her intention for European states to co-exist under the European Union and her steps that formed the SEA. This thesis finds this seemingly contradictory aspect of Prime Minister Thatcher to be intriguing.

²⁴⁰ Tournier-Sol, “Leadership”, pp. 132

²⁴¹ FitzGibbon, “Extra-parliamentary Eurosceptic Actors”, pp. 177

²⁴² Rob Mudge, “Would Margaret Thatcher be in favor of Brexit?”, Deutsche Welle, 7 April 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/would-margaret-thatcher-be-in-favor-of-brexit/a-43252699>, accessed on 21 November 2019

²⁴³ Toby Helm, “Margaret Thatcher would not have supported Brexit, says top aide”, The Guardian, 3 September 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/03/margaret-thatcher-would-not-have-supported-brexit>, accessed on 22 November 2019

²⁴⁴ Ben Judah, “Thatcher’s ghost lurks over Brexit campaign”, 22 June 2016, Politico, <https://www.politico.eu/article/margaret-thatchers-ghost-haunts-brexit-campaign-eu-referendum-england/>, accessed on 27 November 2019

5.6. Resignation of Margaret Thatcher

Despite her political clout, Margaret Thatcher had to resign from power. Interestingly, as Heppell underlines, she had significant electoral successes, a parliamentary majority, no notable parliamentary defeats and wanted to continue to lead the Party and Britain.²⁴⁵ Her downfall was caused not by the voters of the UK but her own MPs and ministers. Thatcher was generally considered to be an authoritative figure and she had several quarrels with some members of the government such as Geoffrey Howe. Her proposed flat-rate “poll tax” was highly unpopular. One critical event leading to Thatcher’s downfall was the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Howe in November 1990 after a major disagreement over the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).

Thatcher was challenged by former Defence and Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine and won with a slim majority against him in the first ballot on 20 of November 1990. After that result against Heseltine, she realized that most of the Conservatives would vote against her in the second ballot, so she resigned on the 22th. According to Heppell, Thatcher resigned to protect her political legacy.²⁴⁶

5.7. John Major and the EC

After’s Thatcher’s resignation, the ensuing political race resulted in the leadership of the young Chancellor of the Exchequer John Major to the Conservative Party and the Premiership. He wanted to break from his predecessors’ strong leadership style which caused divisions among the Conservatives. Major was more conciliatory and negotiated with his cabinet. He did not continue some unpopular

²⁴⁵ Timothy Heppell, *Choosing the Tory Leader*, pp. 82-85

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

policies of Thatcher, such as the Poll Tax and he put more emphasis on public services. David Haigron summarizes Major by noting that he “*tried to strike a balance between continuity (building on the Thatcherite legacy) and change (a return to the rhetoric of “One-Nation Toryism”)*”.²⁴⁷ As Haigron notes, Major’s social policy and emphasis towards moral values bears resemblance to the One Nation tradition, while his economic policies was reminiscent of Thatcher.²⁴⁸

Regarding his views on the EC, this thesis finds it crucial to research his maiden speech as Party leader (and Prime Minister) in early 1991. In his speech, Prime Minister Major openly stated that the Conservatives desired “*closer union between states. Not a federal merger of states.*” Major also opposed “*any treaty which sought to impose a single currency- at however distant a date*”, which is an open rejection of the Euro as a common currency. Major also noted that his Conservative government will “*in no circumstances*” give up “*the right, our national right, to take the crucial decisions about our security, our foreign policy and our defence*”.²⁴⁹

This thesis finds it difficult to easily define John Major according to Szczerbiak and Taggart’s model; he supports closer union of states but openly rejects a federal system for Europe. He could be considered a “soft Eurosceptic” and most academics and commentators agree that he was pragmatic toward European integration. This is a view shared by Forster who notes that Major was a leader willing to “*take a more pragmatic line on Europe*”.²⁵⁰ Philip Norton described

²⁴⁷ David Haigron, ““Caring” John Major: portrait of a Thatcherite as a One-Nation Tory” in *Observatoire de la société britannique* 7, (2009), pp. 177-196, pp. 180

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Major, “Leader’s speech”, accessed on 2 August 2019

²⁵⁰ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 64

Major as “*a Euroagnostic, adapting his position to whatever appeared to be in Britain’s interest at the time*”.²⁵¹

Major struggled with an economic recession and high unemployment, “Black Wednesday”, mine closures, and further infighting in the Conservative Party over European integration. His emphasis on moral issues backfired when his government became known for several scandals. This chapter will now investigate the debates in the Conservative Party pertaining to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.

5.8. Euroscepticism in the Major Government

According to Forster, after Thatcher’s resignation, Euroscepticism developed so quickly in the Conservative Party that it directly affected the pursuit of the government’s policy towards Europe.²⁵² In November 1991, before the Maastricht summit regarding further European integration, Major decided to hold a debate in the House of Commons in order to gain approval for his negotiations and increase the support of his cabinet and the Conservatives. Specifically, Major negotiated the Social Chapter and Single Currency opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty, and he ensured that there was no mentioning of a "Federal" Europe in the Treaty.

John Major was able to win the 1992 general election (he had called it) with a record breaking 14,000,000 votes. Unfortunately for Major, several events would result in increasing criticism towards him and his party.

One of the most critical events regarding the UK relations with the European Community was the decision of United Kingdom to leave the ERM and devalue the pound on Wednesday, 16 of September 1992. Billions of pound sterling were

²⁵¹ Philip Norton, "John Major", in *Biographical Dictionary of British Prime Ministers*, ed. Robert Eccleshall and Graham Walker, (London:Routledge,1998), pp. 384-392, pp. 387–389.

²⁵² Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 83

spent to stabilise the value of the currency. “Black Wednesday” greatly reduced the popularity of European integration among the British population and shook the Conservative Party significantly.²⁵³

In fact, Philip Lynch has argued that the shift of the Conservative Party from a pro-European position to Euroscepticism occurred at this point in time.²⁵⁴ Lynch notes that Thatcherism had a conflict between the support given to the Single Market due to the adherence of neo-liberal economic policies and the opposition towards further European integration on the basis of the ideology of the Conservatives. This led to a rise in Euroscepticism among the Conservatives because, as said by Lynch, *“a potent combination of concerns about the impact of European integration on political economy, nationhood and executive autonomy”*.²⁵⁵

5.9. The Maastricht Rebels

Criticism of the Maastricht Treaty and the divisions it caused in the Conservative Party has led some academics such as Alexandre-Collier and commentators to argue that the Maastricht ratification process was the true beginning of Euroscepticism. This view was presented in the 2nd Chapter. Conservative MPs such as Michael Portillo, Michael Howard and Peter Lilley joined forces to oppose Prime Minister Major’s Maastricht deal. They were known as the “Maastricht Rebels”.

The Maastricht rebels divided the party and it was one of the reasons for a major defeat for the Major government in the upcoming elections. Major’s government

²⁵³ Alexandre-Collier, “Reassessing British Conservative Euroscepticism”, pp 104-107.

²⁵⁴ Philip Lynch, “The Conservatives and the European Union: The Lull Before the Storm?”, in *The Conservatives Under David Cameron Built to Last?*, ed. Simon Lee and Matt Beech, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp.187-207.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

also struggled with political scandals and lost the 1997 general election against Labour headed by Tony Blair in a landslide defeat. As a result, Major immediately resigned from the leadership of the Conservative Party after the results of the 1997 election were announced.

5.10. Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party Under William Hague

When evaluating the 5 Tory candidates (Michael Howard, Peter Lilley, John Redwood, Kenneth Clarke and William Hague) in the 1997 leadership race it was understood that the former three were known Eurosceptics, while Clarke had a pro-European position. Before his election to leader of the Conservative Party, Forster stated that William Hague “*probably had the least-defined definition of Europe*”²⁵⁶ but tried to “confirm” his “*Eurosceptic credentials*”.²⁵⁷ After becoming the Leader of the Conservative Party in September 1997, Hague introduced important reforms to the Conservative Party’s structure such as the method used in selecting its leaders²⁵⁸ and he tried to reorganize the Party’s approach beyond the typical Conservative voters.

In contrast to Major’s pragmatic approach to the EU, the Conservatives under Hague adopted an openly Eurosceptic program. In the 2001 Conservative Party election manifesto, it can be seen that Hague was, like his predecessor Major,

²⁵⁶ Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics*, pp. 64

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Heppell, *Choosing the Tory Leader*, pp 175

against the adoption of the Euro²⁵⁹. In the manifesto, one can see that the Conservatives opposed the supranational integration of the EU²⁶⁰:

The guiding principle of Conservative policy towards the European Union is to be in Europe, but not run by Europe. We will lead a debate in Europe about its future, promoting our own clear and positive vision. The European Union has, with the prospect of enlargement, reached a fork in the road. Down one route lies a fully integrated superstate with nation states and the national veto disappearing. The [Labour] Government is taking us down this route.

In the paragraph above, one can notice the similarity with Thatcher's views towards the EC/EU and the "*fully integrated superstate*" that the 2001 Conservative manifesto warns about.

The Conservatives under Hague also underlined their desire to continue to opt-out from EU treaty obligations: ²⁶¹

We will insist on a Treaty 'flexibility' provision, so that outside the areas of the single market and core elements of an open, free-trading and competitive EU, countries need only participate in new legislative actions at a European level if they see this as in their national interest.

²⁵⁹ The Conservative Party, "The Conservative Party 2001 Election Manifesto" <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/2001/2001-conservative-manifesto.shtml> accessed on 29 September 2019

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

William Hague based the Conservative 2001 general election campaign on ‘Save the Pound’, rejecting the adoption of the Euro and further European integration.²⁶² However, Hague did not declare an intention to withdraw the UK from the EU. He, like most Conservatives, primarily wanted to halt the further integration of the UK with the EU. Hence, this thesis argues that Hague could be considered “Soft Eurosceptic” according to Szczerbiak and Taggart’s model.

According to Heppell, in spite of their efforts, the Conservatives under Hague remained very unpopular with the electorate, as demonstrated by their opinion poll rating shifting between 23 and 33 per cent throughout the 1997 to 2001 parliamentary term. Labour led the opinion polls by about 20 per cent in that period.²⁶³ Ultimately, the Conservatives experienced a major defeat against the Labour Party yet again in the 2001 general election, winning only 165 seats (35.2 per cent of the popular vote) compared to Labour’s 323 seats (41.4 per cent).

5.11. Conservative Leaders Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard

William Hague resigned from leadership of the Conservative party after the poor electoral results of the 2001 election. His resignation caused another leadership election process from June to September of that year. In a close race between pro-Europeanist Kenneth Clarke, Eurosceptics Michael Portillo and Iain Duncan Smith, Duncan Smith won the final leadership vote against Clarke with 61 per cent of the votes. A Eurosceptic himself (and a former Maastricht rebel), Duncan Smith’s election showed that his beliefs on European integration was shared by majority of Conservatives.

²⁶² George Jones, “Two weeks to save the pound, says Hague.”, *The Telegraph*, 26 May 2001 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1331662/Two-weeks-to-save-the-pound-says-Hague.html>, accessed on 19 August 2019

²⁶³ Heppell, *Choosing the Tory Leader*, pp. 115

One of Iain Duncan Smith's immediate acts was to form his frontbench shadow cabinet including Eurosceptic Conservatives, such as Michael Howard (former Secretary of State for Employment) and Michael Ancram. According to the research undertaken within the scope of this thesis, it has been determined that the Conservatives at the time had been considered as the "Eurosceptic Party" by the British media. For instance, the BBC's online website page dated 14 September 2001 wrote "Eurosceptics prosper under Duncan Smith"²⁶⁴, in reference to Duncan Smith's appointments.

Similarly, Kenneth Clarke, in an interview with BBC, stated that he was actually glad to lose the leadership election to Duncan Smith. Clarke noted that this was because most members of his party had become Eurosceptic, which was at odds to his pro-Europeanist views and that it would have been difficult for him to work with his party members.²⁶⁵

However, Iain Duncan Smith was viewed as 'uncharismatic' by the electorate and his fellow Conservatives. For instance, Heppell stated that *"Nearly seventy per cent of Conservative parliamentarians had identified that Duncan Smith lacked the necessary experience, profile, aptitudes, and potential electoral appeal to be their party leader."*²⁶⁶ Duncan Smith referred to himself as *"the quiet man"* and had expected to stay leader for an extended amount of time. However, several Conservatives initiated a vote of no confidence against him in October 2003, which, in the November of that year, resulted in Duncan Smith's fall from power after only 2 years as party leader.

²⁶⁴ BBC News, "Eurosceptics prosper under Duncan Smith" 14 September 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1543765.stm, accessed on 26 October 2019

²⁶⁵ Nyta Mann, BBC News, "Ken Clarke two-time lucky loser", 13 September 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1535458.stm, accessed on 1 November 2019

²⁶⁶ Heppell, *Choosing the Tory Leader*, pp. 155

In the 2003 Conservative Party leadership election, Michael Howard, another known Eurosceptic, was elected leader. Howard has recently supported Leave in the 2016 Brexit referendum. The Conservatives only gained a small increase in their share of the vote in the 2005 general elections and Howard stepped down. Thus began another intra-Conservative election to determine the party leader.

5.12. David Cameron

Among the emergent four candidates (Kenneth Clarke, Malcolm Rifkind and David Davis) was the young David Cameron, an inexperienced member of parliament of only 4 years.²⁶⁷ According to Heppell, it “*seemed implausible*” that Cameron would become party leader²⁶⁸ and most commentators assumed that he was playing for a leadership bid in the future²⁶⁹. The Guardian called Cameron ‘*the dark horse in a leadership contest Mr. Davis seemed certain to win*’.²⁷⁰

Despite these odds, Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in December 2005. The Conservative Party had a great success in the 2010 general election and won 307 seats, becoming the largest party in the House of Commons. However, 307 seats were insufficient for a majority government so the Conservatives formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats (dubbed the “Lib-Con” coalition) and David Cameron became the Prime Minister while Nick Clegg, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, became the Deputy Prime Minister. Their

²⁶⁷ Brian Wheeler, “How Cameron won Tory crown”, BBC News, 6 December 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4361098.stm, accessed on 15 September 2019

²⁶⁸ Heppell, *Choosing the Tory Leader*, pp. 178

²⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 179

²⁷⁰ Matthew Tempest, “Tories crown Cameron their new leader”, The Guardian, 6 December 2005. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/dec/06/toryleadership2005.conservatives2> accessed on 27 November 2019

victory changed British politics greatly as the Labour Party, after ruling the country for the last 13 years, was forced into opposition.

5.13. Rising Euroscepticism in the UK

On another note, the accession of former Eastern Bloc countries in 2004 to the EU caused increased immigration from these countries to the UK.²⁷¹ In addition, the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis caused a noticeable increase in Euroscepticism in the EU and the UK as the general population did not see the advantages of European integration. The effects of these crises ended the Labour government's dominance over UK politics. Most analysts believe that the 2008-2009 financial recession greatly reduced the popularity of Gordon Brown's Labour government.

As this thesis has illustrated, discontent had been growing among the Conservatives over the United Kingdom's membership in the European Union. The Conservatives and their coalition partners experienced losses in the 2012 local elections and the Conservatives also suffered a defeat in the 2014 European Parliament elections. In the May 2014 European Parliament elections, the hard Eurosceptic, far-right UKIP led by the charismatic Nigel Farage finished in first place, while the Conservatives were in third place. This result illustrated the rising Euroscepticism in the UK population, which shall later ring alarm bells for the Conservative Party.

²⁷¹ Erica Consterdine, "The huge political cost of Blair's decision to allow Eastern European migrants unfettered access to Britain", *The Conversation*, 17 November 2016, <http://theconversation.com/the-huge-political-cost-of-blairs-decision-to-allow-eastern-european-migrants-unfettered-access-to-britain-66077>, accessed on 2 November 2019

CHAPTER 6

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND BREXIT (2011-2019)

In the referendum on 23 June 2016 – the largest ever democratic exercise in the United Kingdom – the British people voted to leave the European Union. And that is what we will do – leaving the Single Market and the Customs Union, ending free movement and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in this country, leaving the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, and ending the days of sending vast sums of money to the EU every year. We will take back control of our money, laws, and borders, and begin a new exciting chapter in our nation's history.²⁷²

On 23th of June 2016, the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland voted to withdraw from the European Union with a referendum known as “Brexit”, (British Exit [from the European Union]). The “Leave” result of the referendum caused shockwaves through the UK, EU and beyond.

This chapter will delve into the reasons for the Brexit referendum of 2016, the Conservative Party's attitudes towards Brexit, and effects it has caused in Conservative Party. Under leaders Iain Duncan Smith, Michael Howard and David Cameron, the Conservative Party continued its soft Eurosceptic stance. Therefore,

²⁷² Department for Exiting the European Union, “The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786626/The_Future_Relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union_120319.pdf July 2018, pp. 1, accessed on 20 September 2019

the overall attitude of the members of Parliament from the Conservative Party towards the EU integration has been generally soft Eurosceptic.

Crowson once argued that Euroscepticism (at least until the publication of his book in 2007) had failed to produce a notable figure that dominated the UK politics at large and that was known to the British people outside of Parliament.²⁷³ This thesis argues that much has changed since Crowson's findings 12 years ago. Since the events before the Brexit referendum to today, the UK media has been bombarded by notable hard Eurosceptics. From Farage to prominent members of the Conservative Party such as Boris Johnson, the current Prime Minister and Party leader; Michael Gove, a holder of several high offices such as Justice Secretary and Environment Secretary and Jacob Rees-Mogg, current Leader House of the Commons as a member of Parliament for North East Somerset and also leader of the hard Eurosceptic European Research Group.

Hard Eurosceptics could also be seen in the Labour party such as in the hard Eurosceptic Labour Leave campaigners. It included Labour members Brendan Chilton, MP Kate Hoey and MP Frank Field.²⁷⁴

Lynch and Whitaker have determined that Eurosceptics were a minority amongst the Conservative MPs in the 1970s.²⁷⁵ This thesis has argued that this can be seen with respect to the pro-European direction of the party. Lynch and Whitaker have also underlined, as this thesis has presented, that the 1990's were signified by struggle between the pro-European and Eurosceptic members of the Party.²⁷⁶ This has been illustrated by the Maastricht rebels. By the time Conservatives were voted

²⁷³ Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration*, pp. 153

²⁷⁴ Labour Leave, "Labour Leave Supporters" <https://www.labourleave.org.uk/supporters>, accessed on 6 December 2019

²⁷⁵ Lynch and Whitaker, "Where There is Discord", pp.318

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

out of government and became an opposition party in 1997, they had become largely Eurosceptic. From then onwards, this thesis argues that a division arose between the soft Eurosceptic majority and the hard Eurosceptic minority in the Conservatives, culminating in the divisions of the party before and after the Brexit referendum.

6.1. The Events Leading to Brexit

In the previous chapter, it has been presented that the Conservative Party became a Eurosceptic party and was generally recognised as such. This was a result of several factors namely, the effects of Margaret Thatcher's Bruges Speech, opposition to Prime Minister John Major in the House of Commons, the Conservatives being voted out in the 1997 general election and the rise of the pro-European Labour Party to power and the strengthening of the hard Eurosceptic UKIP as an electoral rival. In addition, rising Euroscepticism in the UK population caused by increased immigration from Eastern European countries, the eurozone crisis of the late 2000's and the "Great Recession" could be seen. As this chapter shall illustrate, the Conservative party was yet again struggling with inner debates over the European Union.

6.2. Prime Minister Cameron's Promise to Hold a Referendum on Brexit

Just a year and a half after the start of David Cameron's term as Prime Minister, a considerable number of Conservative MPs wanted a referendum on the UK's membership to the EU. They were hard Eurosceptic and their numbers were large enough to cause concern for Cameron but small enough to be temporarily ignored. Prime Minister Cameron and Foreign Secretary Hague argued that the issue should be dealt with later and therefore instructed Conservative MPs to vote against the bill of the aforementioned hard Eurosceptics. As highlighted by Lynch and

Whitaker, 81 MPs of the Conservative Party MPs (27 per cent) rebelled against Cameron and Hague's directives in October 2011, insisting that they would like to have a referendum on the issue of European integration.²⁷⁷

However, it is crucial to notice that the vast majority of Conservatives did not vote along with the Conservative Rebels in 2011. Therefore, Prime Minister Cameron was able to leave the topic aside for about a year before deciding, in 2013, to announce a referendum on the UK's membership to the EU.

Cameron's vow on 23rd of January 2013 was a notable event in both the UK and the EU history. Before the 2015 General Election, Cameron announced that if his Party were to win the election, he would negotiate with the European Union for a new deal more favourable for the United Kingdom.

In addition, despite personally desiring to remain in the EU, Cameron promised to hold a referendum on Britain's membership to the European Union. Cameron's promises caused a shockwave in British and EU politics. When one analyses Cameron's speeches and policies according to Szczerbiak and Taggart's concepts of Euroscepticism, it can be determined that he is a soft Eurosceptic. He personally did not want the UK to exit the European Union but he wanted a new relationship.

Therefore, at this stage we can consider the Conservative Party to be a "soft Eurosceptic" party because of the official policy of Party Leader Cameron and the vast majority of Conservative MPs.

This chapter shall now present the main arguments of Cameron's 23rd of January 2013 speech.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ David Cameron, "EU Speech at Bloomberg", Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, 23 January 2013 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>, accessed on 2 July 2019

6.3. Cameron's Speech

In his speech, Cameron declared that the European Union must change in order “*deliver prosperity*” and to “*retain the support of its peoples*”. Using similar rhetoric to the notable Eurosceptics that Prime Minister Macmillan faced over 40 years ago, Cameron noted that the English are “*independent, forthright, [and] passionate in defence of our sovereignty.*”²⁷⁹ This aspect of Prime Minister Cameron's speech provides evidence for the hypothesis of this thesis, namely that the discourse of sovereignty has been the main argument of the Eurosceptics.

Cameron called the European Union “*a means to an end*”; he believed that the EU can provide prosperity, stability, of freedom and democracy both in Europe and beyond. But he said he did not see the EU as an “*end in itself*”. Also, he stated that he wanted Britain to play a “*committed and active part*”, “*with a positive vision for the EU*”. In addition, he stated that the UK would never embrace the goal of “*much closer economic and political integration*”. This would highlight his Soft Eurosceptic credentials.

David Cameron stated his vision for a new EU of the 21st Century with 5 principles. In order to understand his position as the Conservative party leader regarding reforming the EU, this thesis will be briefly express his 5 principles in the following paragraph.

His first principle was competitiveness in the single market, trade, services and the economy, which he argued could be established with a “*leaner, less bureaucratic [European] Union*”. Second, flexibility, which means that he desired “*a structure [the EU] that can accommodate the diversity of its members*” and that the EU should not insist on a “*one size fits all approach*”. Third, Cameron wanted the flow of power back to the Member States, meaning that not all EU legislation is

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

compatible for the UK and that not everything can be harmonized. Fourth, Prime Minister Cameron argued that there should be democratic accountability, namely a stronger role for national parliaments instead of the EP. His fifth and last principle was fairness, which he used to illustrate that any new arrangements for the Eurozone must be fair for member states and third parties, regarding fiscal coordination and banking.²⁸⁰

Cameron mentioned the disillusionment in the British towards the EU (which he said is the highest it's ever been) which had been caused by what he referred to as "*unnecessary rules and regulations*". Summarizing the general Eurosceptic view in the UK, he highlighted the notion that people wanted to join what was essentially a common market but have faced something much more political and with noticeable effects on everyday life.²⁸¹

David Cameron then proceeded to announce that he will hold a referendum pertaining to the membership of the UK to the EU at a future date. He stressed that holding this referendum immediately would be wrong due to the economic crisis that the EU had been experiencing and he underlined the need for it to recover first.

Thus, this thesis argues that Cameron's speech confirms that he is a textbook example of a soft Eurosceptic as determined by Szczerbiak and Taggart's model of Euroscepticism.

This thesis also argues that despite the fact that Prime Minister Cameron's decision to hold a Brexit referendum was intended to end the disagreement over European

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

integration in the Conservative Party²⁸², the Leave result caused the majority of the party to shift to a hard Eurosceptic position, as what can be seen now.

In the research that has been taken place within the scope of this thesis, it has been found that Cameron's referendum decision was generally agreed upon by most Conservatives.

For instance, in his final address to the Conservative Party as a MP, William Hague declared his support for the referendum by saying²⁸³:

And it is why we believe that, with the passing of five major treaties governing our membership of the European Union since the last national referendum on this issue nearly 40 years ago, this is the time for a major political party to be committed to a national referendum so the British people can again have their say, and to hold it in the first half of the next Parliament... On top of an improving economy, on top of falling unemployment, on top of welfare under control, on top of improved education, the only way to secure a referendum on Europe is to vote Conservative on 7th May [2015].

On the other hand, the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne was “not keen” on a referendum and only agreed to it in order to support his close ally Prime Minister Cameron.²⁸⁴

²⁸² BBC News, “David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU”, 23 January 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282>, accessed on 19 July 2019

²⁸³ William Hague, “William Hague: Speech to Conservative Party Conference 2014”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1koG2zbrV8Y>, Youtube, uploaded on 28 September 2014, accessed on 5 August 2019.

²⁸⁴ BBC News, “George Osborne 'regrets' mistakes that led to Brexit vote”, 31 October 2018 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46039623>, accessed on 3 August 2019

According to Daddow's analysis of the UK media's interpretation of Cameron's speech, Cameron had intended on achieving several aims. First, as can be seen in his speech, he had been aiming to remodel the UK-EU membership according to the UK's interests.²⁸⁵ This is line with his Soft Eurosceptic ideas towards the EU.

Second, despite rising Euroscepticism in the UK, Prime Minister Cameron had expected public support for the EU to remain high enough to continue membership²⁸⁶. He did not believe that a remain vote was likely.

Third, aware of the rising competition in his own party, as illustrated in the 81 Conservatives that rebelled against the government, Cameron believed that a "remain" vote would dissuade them.²⁸⁷ A "Remain" vote would demonstrate the desire of the UK population to remain in the EU, rendering the Hard Eurosceptic Conservatives' goal unattainable. Hence, Prime Minister Cameron would be able to take full control over his party. John Todd²⁸⁸ cites Mike Gapes, an MP of the Labour party, in his evaluation of Cameron's referendum pledge. *"This [referendum pledge] is a political ploy to try to assuage the Europhobic wing of the Tory party and to keep them on board."*²⁸⁹

²⁸⁵ Oliver Daddow, "Performing Euroscepticism: The UK Press and Cameron's Bloomberg Speech" in *The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp 151-171, pp. 161

²⁸⁶ Lionel Barber and George Parker, "David Cameron puts trust in 'Remain dividend' after EU referendum", Financial Times, 23 June 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/7e503fd6-37c4-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7>, accessed on 6 October 2019

²⁸⁷ Daddow, "Performing Euroscepticism", pp.162

²⁸⁸ John Todd, "The British Self and Continental Other: A Discourse Analysis of the United Kingdom's relationship with Europe", (Norwegian University of Life Sciences, 2014) pp. 80

²⁸⁹ House of Commons Hansard 566, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131129/debtext/131129-0002.htm#13112934001340>, accessed on 10 August 2019

Fourth, with a referendum, Cameron believed that a “Remain” vote would increase the Conservative Party’s support because he would be able to reach out to the British population as the leader who listened to them and gave them what they had been asking for.²⁹⁰

Finally, and possibly most importantly, Cameron felt alarmed by the popularity of the hard Eurosceptic UKIP. He therefore felt pressured to satisfy the rising hard Eurosceptic sentiment in the UK population. Todd²⁹¹ cites Labour MP John Denham: “*There is no doubt that this whole exercise is driven by the Conservative party’s terror of UKIP.*” and also Ian Davidson: “*it is really UKIP that has to be congratulated on this Bill. This would not be coming forward in this way if the Conservatives were not under pressure from UKIP*” .

UKIP’s increasing popularity caused an imbalance in the UK political sphere, as it attracted centre-right voters that usually voted for the Conservative Party.²⁹² Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless, both Conservative MPs, defected to UKIP in October and November 2014, which demonstrated that UKIP shared “*a common ground*” with the Conservatives.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ Cameron, “EU Speech at Bloomberg” accessed on 1 August 2019

²⁹¹ Todd, *The British Self and Continental Other*, pp.81

²⁹² Chris Stafford, “The Road to Brexit: how euroscepticism tore the Conservative Party apart from within”, 18 December 2018, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/the-road-to-brex-it-how-euroscepticism-tore-the-conservative-party-apart-from-within-108846>, accessed on 14 August 2019

²⁹³ Karine Tournier-Sol, “The UKIP Challenge” in *The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 134-150, pp. 136

6.4. The General Election of 2015

Opinion polling before the May 2015 UK election indicated a close race between the Conservatives and the Labour but the Conservatives managed to secure a surprising victory and gained 331 seats in the House of Commons. That victory allowed Cameron to form a majority government and therefore did not need the electoral assistance of the pro-Europeanist Liberal Democrats.

After succeeding in the 2015 election, Cameron fulfilled his election promise regarding the referendum on the United Kingdom's membership to the European Union. According to Daddow, the Conservative Party had become generally Eurosceptic and wanted a new framework of relations between the UK and EU.²⁹⁴

6.5. Prime Minister Cameron's Renegotiation of UK Membership

In line with Prime Minister Cameron's election promise, the UK and the EU began re-negotiating some elements of the UK's EU membership. In the referendum, a "Remain" result would mean that the UK electorate agreed on the EU membership within the framework of David Cameron's negotiated arrangements.

On 19 February 2016, the European Council announced the²⁹⁵

set of arrangements, which are fully compatible with the Treaties and will become effective on the date the Government of the United Kingdom informs the Secretary-General of the Council that the United Kingdom has

²⁹⁴ Daddow, "Performing Euroscepticism", pp. 151

²⁹⁵ European Council, "European Council meeting (18 and 19 February 2016) – Conclusions", 19 February 2016, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21787/0216-euco-conclusions.pdf>, accessed on 17 November 2019

decided to remain a member of the European Union, constitute an appropriate response to the concerns of the United Kingdom.

The set of arrangements mentioned incorporated many opt-outs and exceptions for the UK. For instance, the text noted that the UK “*is not committed to further political integration into the European Union*”²⁹⁶, that countries outside the Eurozone (such as the UK) would not be required to pay for euro bailouts and that the UK could limit the amount of workers from EU states to some extent. In addition, the deal also referred to lowering administrative burdens coming from the EU i.e. reducing bureaucracy. Prime Minister Cameron argued that this new arrangement was propitious for the UK’s interests vis a vis the EU²⁹⁷:

I believe we are stronger, safer and better off inside a reformed European Union...And that is why I will be campaigning with all my heart and soul to persuade the British people to remain in the reformed European union that we have secured today.

However, hard Eurosceptics found Cameron’s deal lacking. They argued that the deal did not decrease the amount of immigration that the UK had to take in and that it did not alleviate the concerns of the UK regarding fishing and monetary contributions to the EU budget. Cameron’s arrangement was thus unable to stop the hard Eurosceptics’ arguments.

²⁹⁶ BBC News, “EU reform deal: What Cameron wanted and what he got” 20 February 2016 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35622105>, accessed on 19 November 2019

²⁹⁷ Jan Strupczewski and Elizabeth Piper, “Cameron hails EU deal to give Britain ‘special status’, battle looms”, Reuters, 19 February 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-idUSKCN0VS153>, accessed on 4 November 2019

6.6. The Causes of Brexit

The main reason for the “Leave” result was, naturally, the rising Eurosceptic sentiment in the British population. This thesis shall now present the contributing factors for this sentiment, identified by the academia.

6.6.1. Immigration

A major destination for legal and illegal migrants, the UK has experienced more immigration since the mid-1990s. Jonathon Wadsworth et al. note that a sizeable amount of the growth of immigration came from the “A8”²⁹⁸ Eastern and Central European countries that acceded to the EU in 2004.²⁹⁹ Wadsworth et al. identify that

between 1995 and 2015, the number of immigrants from other EU countries living in the UK tripled from 0.9 million to 3.3 million. The share of EU nationals grew from 1.5% to 5.3% of the total population and from 1.8% to 6.3% of the working age population (adults aged 16-64).³⁰⁰

It is crucial to underline that all EU member states at that time except the UK, Ireland and Sweden adopted a “transitional period” for labour market entry

²⁹⁸ A8 countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

²⁹⁹ Jonathan Wadsworth, Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano and John Van Reenen, “Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK”, London School of Economics and Political Science, (May 2016), CEP Brexit Analysis No. 5, pp. 2

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

restrictions towards the newer EU member states.³⁰¹ These restrictions were applicable for several years following the accession of the Eastern European member states.³⁰² As mentioned above, Tony Blair's Labour government, did not apply restrictions and decided to freely welcome migrants from the A8 countries.³⁰³ This decision was supported by all the parties in the House of Commons, including the Conservatives.³⁰⁴ The prevailing view amongst politicians was that increased immigration from A8 countries would benefit the UK, as the migrants would be a significant boon to the UK economy.³⁰⁵

By 2015 (a year before the Brexit referendum) citizens from the ten Eastern European member states (the A8 along with Bulgaria and Romania) in the UK had reached 1.714 million, with 855,000 of them from Poland.³⁰⁶ It was understood that the migrants would take undesirable jobs that the British would not desire to work in.³⁰⁷ The growing UK economy also required a larger labour force.³⁰⁸ As mentioned, British politicians had a positive view on immigration but there has been a noticeable resentment and unhappiness for immigration amongst the UK population. The Migration Observatory referred to IPSOS surveys which identified

³⁰¹ Saara Koikkalainen, "Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present", Migration Policy Institute, 21 April 2011, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present> accessed on 10 December 2019

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Consterdine, "The huge political cost of Blair's decision", accessed on 2 November 2019

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ David Coleman and Robert Rowthorn, "The Economic Effects of Immigration into the United Kingdom", *Population and Development Review* 30, no.4, (December 2004), pp. 579-624

³⁰⁶ John Salt, "International Migration and the United Kingdom: Report of the United Kingdom SOPEMI correspondent to the OECD, 2015", (London:SOPEMI,2015), pp. 66

³⁰⁷ Coleman and Rowthorn, "The Economic Effects of Immigration", pp. 584-585

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

that around 60 per cent of the UK population agreed or strongly agreed to the statement “*There are too many immigrants in Britain*” from 2007 to 2015.³⁰⁹

Therefore, Wadsworth et al. present the predominant view amongst the UK eurosceptics by stating “*Many people are concerned that high levels of immigration may have hurt their jobs, wages and quality of life.*”³¹⁰

Notably, the hard Eurosceptic UKIP was able to capitalise on the increasing resentment in the UK population towards immigration.³¹¹ According to Karine Tournier-Sol, UKIP called immigration the “*biggest single issue facing this country*”.³¹² Tournier-Sol stresses that immigration has been very important for the UK electorate and that UKIP blamed the EU and its open-door policy for immigration from Eastern Europe.³¹³

6.6.2. The Refugee Crisis of 2015

A notable event that occurred just several months before the Brexit referendum was the Refugee Crisis of 2015. This was when over 1 million refugees arrived in

³⁰⁹ The Migration Observatory, “UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern”, 7 June 2018, <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/#kp1> accessed on 6 December 2019

³¹⁰ Wadsworth, Dhingra, Ottaviano and Van Reenen, “Brexit and the impact of immigration”, pp. 2

³¹¹ Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo, “Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no.3, (June 2017), pp. 450-464, pp. 451

³¹² Tournier-Sol, “The UKIP Challenge”, pp.138

³¹³ Ibid.

Europe by sea in that year, fleeing conflict areas in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.³¹⁴ Crossing several Southern and Eastern European member states of the EU, many refugees went to Germany and Sweden, while several thousand were detained at the northern French port city of Calais, immediately across the English Channel.³¹⁵

UK Eurosceptics such as Farage and UKIP resented the increased immigration from the A8 countries but they notably did not refer to identity politics. However, Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo stresses that the religious and ethnic differences of the 2015 refugees became an element of the Eurosceptics' arguments against the European Union.³¹⁶ Many groups referred to the refugees as a "threat to EU unity" and "...democratic values of 'the West'"³¹⁷ and Helen Hintjens argues that the EU itself³¹⁸ became securitised, into what is known in security studies as a 'referent object'. This thesis has argued that the Refugee crisis of 2015 was one of the major reasons for a rise in Euroscepticism and anti-immigration sentiment in the UK.

6.6.3. Economic Concerns

The Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the subsequent Eurozone economic crisis must be mentioned. Catherine MacMillan stresses that the eurozone crisis has been

³¹⁴ Stefan Lehne, "How the Refugee Crisis Will Reshape the EU", Carnegie Europe, 4 February 2016, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/04/how-refugee-crisis-will-reshape-eu-pub-62650>, accessed on 18 December 2019.

³¹⁵ Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo, "Britain, the European Union and the Referendum: What Drives Euroscepticism?", Chatham House, 9 December 2015, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20151209Euroscepticism_GoodwinMilazzo.pdf pp. 4, accessed on 15 December 2019

³¹⁶ Goodwin and Milazzo, "Taking back control?", pp.453

³¹⁷ Helen Hintjens, "Failed Securitisation Moves during the 2015 'Migration Crisis'", *International Migration* 57, no.4, (May 2019), pp. 181-196, pp. 183

³¹⁸ Ibid, pp. 189

a “*crisis of European identity*” and has “*provoked a general increase in Euroscepticism in public opinion across the EU*”.³¹⁹ This also affected the UK, which has caused UKIP to strengthen and gain 27.5 per cent of the vote and secure the election of 24 MEPs in the 2014 European Parliament elections.³²⁰

6.6.4. Eurosceptic UK Media

Also, most of the popular newspapers in the UK have a noticeably Eurosceptic view on European integration. Oliver Daddow’s comments deserve mention here: “‘*Hard*’ Euroscepticism remains the default setting for the vast majority of UK newspapers, with different forms of ‘*soft*’ Euroscepticism pervading the rest of the coverage”.³²¹ In his analysis of the UK media, Daddow underlines that the UK media have had a significant effect in directing the UK public opinion against the EU³²²:

the UK press has been a significant factor in agenda-setting on European issues policy through the ‘climate of fear’ it has generated against the public espousal of pro-European narratives. Comparatively speaking, Britain is home to an ‘unusually Eurosceptical media market’ especially on the press side: this goes for the volume of Eurosceptical coverage and the bombastic, nationalistic and sometimes xenophobic tone of that coverage.

³¹⁹ Catherine MacMillan, “British Political Discourse on the EU in the Context of the Eurozone Crisis”, in *The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol and Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 191-209, pp.191

³²⁰ Ibid, pp. 197-198

³²¹ Daddow.”Performing Euroscepticism” pp. 166

³²² Ibid, pp. 151

It also must be noted that as stated in Chapter 1, prominent Eurosceptics such as Farage, the Conservative former Mayor of London Boris Johnson, cabinet member Michael Gove and MP Jacob Rees-Mogg had attracted media and public attention and had received legitimacy due to the referendum.

6.7. The Brexit Campaigns- “Remain” and “Leave”

In the Brexit referendum, UK voters had to vote between the continuation of the UK membership to the European Union (Remain) under Prime Minister Cameron’s newly negotiated terms, or withdrawal from the European Union (Leave). Prime Minister Cameron and most members of the Conservative cabinet such as Home Secretary Theresa May and Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond campaigned for “Remain” while other Conservatives such as Boris Johnson, Andrea Leadsom and Michael Gove supported “Leave”.

6.7.1. The Remain Side

The official Remain campaign group (titled “Britain Stronger in Europe”) focused on the economic advantages of EU membership and the anticipated negative economic effects of Brexit.³²³ They also highlighted the notion that a non-EU member UK would be at a disadvantageous position in its international relations.³²⁴ These main arguments were underscored on the Britain Stronger in Europe’s website.³²⁵ It has been agreed upon by the academia that argued that the “Remainers” focused much of their attention to economic issues. They argued that

³²³ Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin and Paul Whiteley, *Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union*, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 33

³²⁴ Ibid, pp. 48

³²⁵ Britain Stronger in Europe, “Get The Facts”, Britain Stronger in Europe official website, 2016, https://www.strongerin.co.uk/get_the_facts, accessed on 21 December 2019

withdrawal from the EU would cause a notable depreciation of the UK Pound Sterling and would hurt UK businesses.³²⁶ For instance, Chancellor Osborne said *“This isn’t some amusing adventure into the unknown. A British exit would hurt people’s jobs, livelihoods and living standards – it’s deadly serious.”*³²⁷ In fact, the Remain campaign had started to be referred to as “Project Fear” by the Leave supporters.³²⁸ As stated by Clarke et al., *“Cameron and his team were seen by many as trying to scare voters into supporting Remain”*.³²⁹

Christopher Fear identified that the main political parties of the UK avoided the issue of immigration³³⁰, which was a major consideration for voters in the UK. Noticing that many Leave supporters were older citizens, Cameron tried to win them over by saying *“As you take this decision whether to remain or leave do think about the hopes and dreams of your children and grandchildren.”*³³¹

Although many notable Conservatives opted for Remain and campaigned as such, the Conservative Party was officially neutral. Clarke et al. pointed out that out of the 329 Conservative MPs in the House of Commons, 185 were “Remain” supporters while 138 supported “Leave”.³³² Therefore, since roughly 56 per cent

³²⁶ Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, *Brexit*, pp. 36-38

³²⁷ Ibid, pp. 38

³²⁸ Larry Elliott, “Brexit Armageddon was a terrifying vision-but it simply hasn’t happened”, The Guardian, 20 August 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/aug/20/brexit-eu-referendum-economy-project-fear#maincontent> accessed on 19 December 2019

³²⁹ Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, *Brexit*, pp. 51

³³⁰ Christopher Fear, “The Road to Brexit: how did the UK end up here?”, 4 April 2019, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/the-road-to-brexit-how-did-the-uk-end-up-here-114661> accessed on 20 November 2019

³³¹ BBC News, “Cameron urges voters to ‘think of children’ before EU choice,” 21 June 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36587819>, accessed on 5 December 2019

³³² Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, *Brexit*, pp. 30

of the Conservative MPs supported EU membership, the Conservative Party could still be considered a soft Eurosceptic party at this stage.

Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that an important result of the Brexit referendum was the ability of hard Euroscepticism to pass from the “*fringes*” of the Conservatives to mainstream Conservatives such as Johnson and Gove.³³³

Like the Conservatives, the Labour Party officially supported “Remain” but Party Leader Jeremy Corbyn did not have a very active pro-Europe stance in the campaigns.³³⁴ Many have attributed this to his inherently Eurosceptic left-wing views.³³⁵ Hence, the two major parties of the UK were divided on the issue and it has been argued that the Remain campaign lacked unity.³³⁶

6.7.2. The Leave Side

The Leave campaigners (officially organised under “Vote Leave”) was a large coalition that extended amongst parties. It included Conservatives like Johnson, Gove, Leadsom and Rees-Mogg as well as Labour members such as Gisela Stuart. This thesis believes that the arguments presented by the Leave campaigners were very effective in influencing public opinion.

³³³ Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, “Hard choices and few soft options: The implications of Brexit for Euroscepticism across Europe”, 5 August 2016, The London School of Economics Blog <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2016/08/05/hard-choices-and-few-soft-options-the-implications-of-brexit-for-euroscepticism-across-europe/>, accessed on 6 August 2019

³³⁴ Ibid, pp. 50

³³⁵ Georgina Lee, “Corbyn’s changing Brexit stance”, Channel 4, 18 September 2019, <https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-corbyns-changing-brexit-stance> accessed on 18 December 2019

³³⁶ Kirsty Hughes, “Neither tackling lies nor making the case: the Remain side”, EU Referendum Analysis 2016, <https://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-5-campaign-and-political-communication/neither-tackling-lies-nor-making-the-case-the-remain-side/> accessed on 22 December 2019

Swales summarises the main arguments of Leave as “‘taking back control’ of borders, law-making, and the money Britain contributes to the EU budget.”³³⁷ One of the most notable arguments of the Vote Leave campaign were the vast amounts of money “sent” to the EU, which was allegedly 350 million UK pounds weekly.³³⁸ Vote Leave also argued that, once out of the EU, the “350 million pounds” could be spent partially or entirely to improve on the National Health Service (NHS).³³⁹ This allegation was discovered to be erroneous and was defined by the government’s UK Statistics Authority as misleading, as the 350 million figure did not consider the monetary benefits the UK received from the EU as a result of its membership.³⁴⁰

Like other Eurosceptics, Leave supporters were able to use the Refugee Crisis of 2015 and immigration effectively in their campaigns. Leavers wanted to “take back control” of their borders. One notable event was when UKIP Leader Nigel Farage campaigned in front of a large poster depicting a great number of refugees en route to Europe. The poster was titled “BREAKING POINT. The EU has failed us all. We must break free of the EU and take back control.” This was criticised by many in the political spectrum, including Vote Leave, as being racist.³⁴¹ Thus, as stated

³³⁷ Kirby Swales, *Understanding the Leave vote*, (London: NatCen Social Research, 2016) pp. 5

³³⁸ Jon Henley, “Why Vote Leave’s £350m weekly EU cost claim is wrong”, *The Guardian*, 10 June 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/reality-check/2016/may/23/does-the-eu-really-cost-the-uk-350m-a-week> accessed on 22 December 2019

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ UK Statistics Authority, “UK Statistics Authority statement on the use of official statistics on the contributions to the European Union”, 27 May 2016, <https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/news/uk-statistics-authority-statement-on-the-use-of-official-statistics-on-contributions-to-the-european-union/> accessed on 22 December 2019

³⁴¹ Heather Stewart and Rowena Mason, “Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police”. *The Guardian*, 16 June 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants>, accessed on 11 December 2019.

earlier, possibility of the refugee crisis of 2015 to affect the UK was one of the main reasons for a Leave vote.

6.8. The Results of the Brexit Referendum

Ultimately, the British electorate voted “Leave”, in a close vote by 17,410,742 votes for Leave (51.89 per cent) and 16,141,241 votes for Remain (48.11 per cent) with a turnout of 72.2 per cent.³⁴² Several hours after the victory of the Leave vote, Prime Minister David Cameron stated he would resign before the October 2016 Conservative Party conference. After the results were announced, several Conservatives, namely Home Secretary May, Justice Secretary Gove, Minister of State for Energy Leadsom and former Mayor of London Boris Johnson competed for leadership of the Conservative Party.

As stated before, Leadsom, Gove and Johnson had supported 'Leave', while May was a ‘Remainer’ in the Brexit referendum. Theresa May was elected leader of the Conservative Party on 11 July and became Prime Minister on the 13th. Boris Johnson became the Foreign Secretary.

6.9. Prime Minister May’s Brexit Policies

Despite her background as a “Remain” advocate, Prime Minister May announced her desire to fulfil Brexit and has stated "Brexit means Brexit" on several occasions.³⁴³ In line with this, she categorically rejected several requests for a second referendum on the UK’s membership to the EU. For instance, Mark

³⁴² BBC News, “Results”, 24 June 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results accessed on 23 October 2019

³⁴³ Mark Mardell, “What does 'Brexit means Brexit' mean?” BBC News, 14 July 2016, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36782922>, accessed on 21 October 2019

Mardell identified that May, in her first speech as party leader, insisted that there would be no backtracking.³⁴⁴

There will be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it by the back door, and no second referendum. The country voted to leave the European Union, and as prime minister I will make sure that we leave the European Union.

Prime Minister May officially initiated the process of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU (Brexit) on 29 of March 2017 by triggering Article 50 of the TEU, which was enacted by the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. The Article provides a procedure for an EU member state to withdraw from the EU.³⁴⁵ May then proceeded to negotiate a “withdrawal agreement” with the EU.³⁴⁶

May decided to call a snap election in April 2017 to unify the Conservatives before the Withdrawal Agreement negotiations with the EU. The elections took place on the 8th of June 2017. The Conservatives were able to increase their share of the vote from 36.9% to 42.4% but the first past-the-post election system in the UK resulted in losses of seats for the Conservative Party.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Jennifer Rankin, Julian Borger and Mark Rice-Oxley, “What is article 50 and why is it so central to the Brexit debate?”, The Guardian, 25 June 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/article-50-brexit-debate-britain-eu> accessed on 29 November 2019

³⁴⁶ Paragraph 2 of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon states: “*A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.*” <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12007L%2FTXT>, accessed on 6 December 2019

The Conservatives lost 13 seats in the House of Commons (from 330 to 317) compelled them to gain the support of another party to stay in power. As a result, May formed a “confidence and supply deal” with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).

This is an important detail as the DUP has been staunchly for Brexit and supported “Leave” during the referendum, while most of Northern Ireland had supported “Remain”. According to Danaher, the strong Hard Eurosceptic influence of the DUP over the Conservatives regarding Brexit³⁴⁷ could be likened to the “*tail [the DUP] wagging the dog [the Conservative Party]*”.³⁴⁸

6.10. Types of Brexit - “Hard” and “Soft”

It soon became clear that actually achieving Brexit would be a difficult task. Much of the media's attention (British and international) has been on how "Brexit" would take place. One such form of Brexit is the so-called 'Soft Brexit' where the UK retains some of the elements of her EU membership but is officially not a member of the EU.³⁴⁹ In such a scenario, for example, the UK be obliged to ensure most of the “four freedoms” of the EU, remain in the EU Customs Union, which would continue to aid trade with the Bloc, but would lose membership and its seat on the

³⁴⁷ Sean Danaher, “The DUP Tail Wagging the European Dog”, Progressive Pulse, 10 October 2018, <http://www.progressivepulse.org/brexit/the-dup-tail-wagging-the-european-dog>, accessed on 28 September 2019

³⁴⁸ The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines this idiom as *a situation in which an important or powerful person, organization, etc., is being controlled by someone or something that is much less important or powerful*”, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the%20tail%20wagging%20the%20dog>, accessed on 19 November 2019

³⁴⁹ The Economist, “How a soft Brexit differs from a hard one”, 25 June 2018 <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/06/25/how-a-soft-brexit-differs-from-a-hard-one>, accessed on 10 November 2019

Council of the European Union, its MEPs and its European Commissioner³⁵⁰. Hence, freedom of movement for the EU nationals in the UK and the UK nationals in the EU would continue, much to the dismay of the hard Eurosceptics.

On the other hand, 'Hard Brexit' entails the UK's withdrawal from the EU and the EU's Single Market and a customs union with the EU. Therefore, Hard Brexit would force the UK to renegotiate trade agreements with all countries that the EU has negotiated with. Also called the WTO option, under Hard Brexit, the UK's trade relationship with the EU would be diminished to that of a third-party country such as Argentina because the EU and the UK products would be subjected to tariffs and vice-versa.

Hard Brexit would also result in the full withdrawal of the UK from nearly all EU programmes. However, Sims notes that this *"would prioritise giving Britain full control over its borders, making new trade deals and applying laws within its own territory."*³⁵¹ This has been the preferred option for the hard Eurosceptics such as Jacob Rees-Mogg³⁵² and his group, the hard Eurosceptic European Research Group (ERG).³⁵³

Another point of contention during the Brexit talks has been the "backstop issue". Northern Ireland, a country of the UK sharing a border with an EU member state

³⁵⁰ Alexandra Sims, "What is the difference between hard and soft Brexit? Everything you need to know", The Independent, 3 October 2016 <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-hard-soft-what-is-the-difference-uk-eu-single-market-freedom-movement-theresa-may-a7342591.html> accessed on 6 November 2019

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Palko Karasz, "Jacob Rees-Mogg, New U.K. Minister, Greets Staff With an Imperial Edict", The New York Times, 27 July 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/world/europe/jacob-rees-mogg-rules.html> accessed on 20 November 2019

³⁵³ Rob Mudge, "Is the Brexit hard-liner European Research Group running the UK?", Deutsche Welle, 26 July 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-brexit-hard-liner-european-research-group-running-the-uk/a-44835382>, accessed on 2 October 2019

Ireland, had voted to remain in the EU. Northern Ireland also has a special relationship with Ireland originating from the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.³⁵⁴

Several politicians from Ireland and Northern Ireland fear that Brexit would result Ireland which would cause a return to the pre-Good Friday Agreement status quo, which in turn may reignite the tensions in Northern Ireland.³⁵⁵ However, "Leavers" reject any sort of Brexit in which the UK cannot control all of its borders, the Northern Ireland-Ireland border included.

6.11. The Reaction of the House of Commons to May's Withdrawal Agreement, May's Resignation and the Rise of Boris Johnson to Leadership

After much debate, Prime Minister May's government was able to negotiate a 585-page Withdrawal Agreement with the EU on 14 November 2018³⁵⁶. Henry Mance at the Financial Times, implied that May's agreement was somewhat a "hard" Brexit because that amongst the possible Withdrawal Agreements, *"the middle-ground option is a soft Brexit-Mrs May's deal plus membership of the customs union and possibly single market."*³⁵⁷ In order achieve Brexit, Prime Minister May had to secure the acceptance of the Withdrawal Agreement in the House of Commons.

³⁵⁴ The Good Friday Agreement (officially the Belfast Agreement) ended the insurgency in Northern Ireland, known as The Troubles. It gave Northern Irelanders devolved government and a new government was formed with the Unionists and the Nationalists.

³⁵⁵ John Campbell, "Brexit: What are the backstop options?", BBC News, 16 October 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-44615404>, accessed on 23 October 2019

³⁵⁶ House of Commons website, "The UK's EU Withdrawal Agreement", 8 July 2019 <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8453>, accessed on 29 October 2019

³⁵⁷ Henry Mance, "What next for Theresa May and her Brexit deal?", Financial Times, 24 March 2019 <https://www.ft.com/content/784f1f70-4e29-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294> accessed on 28 October 2019

However, Prime Minister May was unable to get her deals accepted in the House of Commons. The Commons rejected the Withdrawal Agreement by a vote of 432 to 202 in January 2019³⁵⁸, rejected the Agreement again on 12 March by 391 to 242³⁵⁹, and rejected it yet again on 29th of March by 344 votes to 286.³⁶⁰ It must be stressed that hard Eurosceptic Conservatives such as Johnson, Rees-Mogg, and Dominic Raab voted against the first two Meaningful Votes but supported May's Withdrawal Agreement bill the third time.

After the rejection of her deals on three different occasions in the House of Commons, May resigned as the Conservative Party leader in June 2019 and as Prime Minister in July. After a leadership election in the Conservative Party, Boris Johnson was elected Prime Minister on 24 July 2019. Prime Minister Johnson has vowed for a Brexit with or without a deal if necessary³⁶¹ and has brought notable "Leavers" to important positions such as Rees-Mogg to the Leader of the Commons, Priti Patel as the Home Secretary and Dominic Raab as the Foreign Secretary. Similar to his predecessor, Johnson has promised to "get Brexit done".

³⁵⁸ BBC News, "Brexit: Theresa May's deal is voted down in historic Commons defeat", 15 January 2019 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46885828> accessed on 29 October 2019

³⁵⁹ Alice Tidey and Rachael Kennedy, "British MPs reject Brexit deal by 391 to 242 despite May securing changes to backstop", Euronews, 14 March 2019 <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/12/watch-live-mps-set-to-debate-brexit-ahead-of-crucial-vote> accessed on 1 November 2019

³⁶⁰ Rob Picheta, Lauren Said-Moorhouse and Bianca Britton, "Theresa May's Brexit deal defeated for third time", CNN News, 1 April 2019 https://edition.cnn.com/uk/live-news/brexit-withdrawal-deal-vote-gbr-intl/h_750cf25beeb4bc8a0e12e86a67eeb46f, accessed on 28 October 2019

³⁶¹ Richard Pérez-Peña, "Brexit Under Boris Johnson: Deal or No Deal?", The New York Times, 23 July 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/world/europe/brexit-boris-johnson-explainer.html> accessed on 30 October 2019

6.12. International Repercussions of Brexit

It is difficult to predict the post-Brexit future of the UK. This thesis argues that Brexit will have far-reaching effects. It has upended UK politics, shaken European politics and has caused international reverberations.

Regarding the national level, Prime Ministers May and Johnson, and Foreign Secretary Raab have, on many occasions, argued that Brexit would result in new opportunities for the UK in its international relations.³⁶² They assert that Brexit shall give the UK freedom to seek deeper bilateral relations with many countries around the globe, not just EU member states.

This thesis points out that the UK's relations with the USA have the potential to develop further. Many have noted the similarities in ideology and style between Prime Minister Johnson and US President Donald Trump.

Jon Allsop argues that Johnson is "*in genuine awe of the raw global power of the United States*". Allsop recalls Johnson's comments on Johnson's view of the USA: "*America...the greatest country on earth*" and the "*closest ally*" of the UK.³⁶³ Ros Taylor asserts that the UK-USA special relationship will likely deepen after a successful Brexit.³⁶⁴ Singh underscored the Atlanticist character of Johnson's cabinet and Johnson's deep reverence for Trump.³⁶⁵ Therefore, this thesis argues

³⁶² Dominic Raab, "A truly global future awaits us after Brexit", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 August 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-truly-global-future-awaits-us-after-brexit-dominic-raab> accessed on 19 December 2019

³⁶³ Jon Allsop, "How Boris Johnson Fell For America," The Nation, 14 October 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/brexit-johnson-trump-america/> accessed on 6 December 2019,

³⁶⁴ Ros Taylor, "The Anglo-American 'special relationship' in the post-Brexit era", London School of Economic Blog, 4 June 2018, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/06/04/the-anglo-american-special-relationship-in-the-post-brexit-era/> accessed on 21 December 2019

³⁶⁵ Robert Singh, "Friends Without Benefits: The 'Special Relationship' After Brexit", The American Interest, 13 September 2019, <https://www.the-american->

that a post-Brexit United Kingdom under Prime Minister Johnson shall be closely aligned with the USA.

Meanwhile, Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that Brexit's effect on party-based Euroscepticism has been less than the hard Eurosceptic sentiment arising from the Eurozone crisis and the 2015 migrant crisis.³⁶⁶ On the other hand, Szczerbiak and Taggart, stress that hard Euroscepticism in the EU has the potential to increase again, especially if the UK withdraws from the EU on terms more favourable for her. This would make withdrawal more attractive for the hard Eurosceptics in other EU countries.³⁶⁷ Regardless, it is difficult to predict the future.

[interest.com/2019/09/13/friends-without-benefits-the-special-relationship-after-brexite/](https://www.interest.com/2019/09/13/friends-without-benefits-the-special-relationship-after-brexite/) accessed on 19 December 2019

³⁶⁶ Szczerbiak and Taggart, "Putting Brexit into perspective", pp 1194-1210

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Conservative Party is complex, with differing factions and ideologies. Some Conservatives are socially conservative, while others are economically libertarian. However, Conservatives can surely be considered a centre-right party due to their support of right-wing economic policies, the importance they give to national sovereignty, their social conservative policies and their attachment to nationalism.

Electoral failures usually lead to the resignation of the Party Leader of the Conservative party (seen in cases of Prime Minister Edward Heath and William Hague). However, inner party conflict can also cause changes in leadership (as in the examples of Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Theresa May). Hence, even though the Party Leader is the source of policy, he/she may always face criticism from his/her own party and may lose power at any time.

This thesis has underlined that the Conservatives initially supported European integration due to the economic benefits it would bring. They first considered UK's membership to the European Economic Community in the 1960s to be primarily economic and supported it to ameliorate the UK's declining political and economic situation. The Conservatives at that time, such as Harold Macmillan, were largely aligned with the One Nation tradition, who are more sympathetic towards Europe and to left-based social and economic policies. Most Conservatives were less enthusiastic about a political union with Europe but that was the intended result of European integration according to their European counterparts. Although

opposition to membership to the EEC was declared by several notable Eurosceptic Conservatives such as Derek Walker-Smith primarily on the basis of national sovereignty, they were not able to prevent accession.

The thesis has portrayed the vast body of academic writings on Euroscepticism, which is a feeling of aversion towards the EU or European integration. It presented Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak's idea of soft and hard Euroscepticism.³⁶⁸ It also discussed the other notions of Euroscepticism such as Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde's ideal types³⁶⁹ as well as Chris Flood's³⁷⁰ definition. This thesis used Szczerbiak and Taggart's soft and hard Euroscepticism to evaluate the views of Conservative Eurosceptics at different periods. Hard Euroscepticism, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart, is a principled opposition to the EU³⁷¹ and European integration while soft Euroscepticism is the presence of concern on one (or a number) of policy areas that leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU.³⁷²

Opposition to the EU has increased both in the UK and in EU member states in recent years. This has been attributed to the economic problems arising in the EU in the late 2000's and the mid-2010's refugee/migrant crisis. However, the UK is a unique case as the only EU member actively trying to withdraw from the EU (a process known as "Brexit").

This thesis has illustrated the main reasons for the shift to Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party. These reasons are notable events such as Prime Minister

³⁶⁸ Szczerbiak and Taggart, *Opposing Europe? Volume 1*

³⁶⁹ Kopecký and Mudde, "The two sides of Euroscepticism", pp.300-304

³⁷⁰ Flood, "Euroscepticism. a Problematic concept" pp. 5

³⁷¹ Szczerbiak and Taggart, "Opposing Europe? Volume 1", pp. 8

³⁷² Ibid. pp. 7

Thatcher's continued criticism towards Europe, economic difficulties such as 1992 Black Wednesday, the loss of the Conservatives in the 1997 general election to the pro-European Labour Party and the electoral rise of populist nationalism with UKIP led the Conservative Party to adopt a Eurosceptic position.

Therefore, despite actually achieving the EC membership for the UK as a result of a Conservative government application, the Conservative Party has primarily become a 'soft Eurosceptic party' throughout the years and has transformed into a "hard Eurosceptic party" after the Brexit referendum of 2016.

This thesis has argued that Eurosceptic arguments raised by the Conservative Eurosceptics from the 1960s to today have shown both continuity and change. The argument that has remained the same are the concerns over sovereignty. This argument is largely in line with other Eurosceptic parties in Europe.

From Derek Walker-Smith's speech in 1961 to Prime Minister Thatcher's Bruges Speech in 1988 to the Leave campaign's arguments in 2016, it is possible to determine that one of the overarching narratives on Euroscepticism is national sovereignty. In short, Eurosceptic arguments have referred to the maintenance and protection of British sovereignty and the aversion to pool sovereignty to a higher, supranational body.

After achieving EEC membership for the UK in 1973 during Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath's term, the Conservatives continued to support EEC membership while in opposition (1974-1979). During the 1970s and the 1975 referendum on EEC membership, the Conservative Party under Heath was considered to be the most pro-Europe political party in the UK

Conservative Prime Minister Thatcher (1979-1990) was first openly supportive of the European integration process and headed major steps in economic integration, such as the Single European Act. However, this changed significantly after a watershed moment in 1988 at Bruges. Thatcher suddenly declared her opposition

to further and deeper EC political integration. Although the nature of British politics precludes a party leader from forcing all MPs to agree with his/her policy, Thatcher's speech at Bruges demonstrated that a significant number of MPs supported her view. Her speech continues to be referenced today by Eurosceptics. This was the first publicly notable shift of the Conservative Party to what Szczerbiak and Taggart refer to as "soft Euroscepticism".

The Conservatives continued to have inner struggles over the EC and European integration under Conservative Prime Minister John Major (1990-1997). Euroscepticism amongst Conservative MPs increased in the Major Government while he negotiated 'opt-outs' for the UK in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Major asserted that the UK would never adopt the Euro, which was another "soft Eurosceptic" policy. The massive devaluation of the UK pound sterling during Black Wednesday (16 September 1992) increased Eurosceptic sentiment amongst the Conservatives and the fervent opposition of some of the Conservatives (the "Maastricht Rebels") to the Maastricht Treaty demonstrated how Eurosceptic the Conservative Party had become.

The Conservatives' losses in the 1997 general election caused them to become the opposition party for the next 13 years (1997-2010). During this time period, elements of "soft Euroscepticism" could be seen in documents of the party such as election manifestos. Conservative leaders like William Hague (1997-2001) and Michael Howard (2003-2005) were assuredly "soft Eurosceptic", as they denounced the possible adoption of the Euro during the Conservatives' general election campaign of 2001 and rejected the supranational direction of European integration. The Conservatives spoke out against the pro-European policies of Prime Minister Tony Blair's Labour government and formulated their arguments accordingly.

Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron (2010-2016) was also a soft Eurosceptic: he desired to renegotiate the UK's EU membership. He believed that

a reformed membership would alleviate some of the concerns felt in the British population towards the EU, such as immigration and national sovereignty. Cameron felt compelled to call a referendum on the UK's membership to the EU in 2013. This thesis has argued several reasons that led Cameron to make that decision, namely, the sizeable number of hard Eurosceptics in his party and the division it caused in the Conservatives, the rise of the hard Eurosceptic UKIP and its leader Nigel Farage as a major electoral rival for the Conservative Party, and increasing Euroscepticism in the UK population.

Despite being Eurosceptic, most of the Conservative Party Cabinet members including Prime Minister Cameron and Home Secretary Theresa May did not desire Brexit. Both preferred continued membership in the EU under terms more favourable for UK interests and were therefore soft Eurosceptic. The Brexit referendum was to be held in June 2016 and Prime Minister Cameron negotiated a new deal with the EU several months before, which gave the UK further exemptions from a number of aspects of EU membership such as the adoption of the Euro and the obligation to financially bailout other EU members. If "remain in the EU" had prevailed in the 2016 referendum, Cameron's deal would have been applicable as a new framework for UK-EU membership. On the other hand, hard Eurosceptic groups criticised Cameron's agreement for not being enough to placate their concerns.

The Brexit referendum resulted in a "Leave" vote. The main cause of the "Leave" vote was the rising Eurosceptic attitude of the UK population. In their arguments, the hard Eurosceptic Vote Leave supporters somewhat misleadingly but effectively used immigration and the 2015 refugee/migrant crisis as well as the large payments to the EU to campaign for a "Leave" vote.

The result of the referendum caused major changes in the Conservative Party, UK politics and politics in the EU. Cameron announced his intention to resign immediately after the results of the vote and was replaced by Home Secretary

Theresa May (2016-2019). Prime Minister May asserted that another referendum on the issue of the UK's EU membership would not be accepted. She underlined that "Brexit means Brexit" and that she would achieve withdrawal of the UK from the EU. This thesis has argued that it is at this time that the Conservative Party can be considered a hard Eurosceptic party. This is both due to the policy of the party leader as well as the general sentiment of the party.

However, May's Withdrawal Agreement bills were rejected in the House of Commons on three separate occasions. Hard Eurosceptics argued that the deals did not achieve their desired level of independence from the EU. May resigned and was replaced by hard Eurosceptic "Leave" supporter Boris Johnson in July 2019, who promised to "get Brexit done". Prime Minister Johnson formed a cabinet with "Leave" supporters and uncertainty continues in the UK three years on from Brexit.

The "Leave" result also shook up the European Union, as no country had ever began the process of leaving the organisation. At first, academics and the media noted that the "Leave" result emboldened hard Eurosceptic political parties and the anti-EU agenda of such parties like Front National (France) and Alternatif für Deutschland (AfD, Germany). Interestingly, post-Brexit uncertainty demonstrated to the public the ineffectiveness of hard Euroscepticism. However, hard Euroscepticism may increase in the long term, which would severely jeopardise the European integration project.

The post-Brexit foreign relations of the UK are also difficult to predict. Many have cited the close personal relationship between US President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Johnson. The UK is expected to form closer ties with the USA and Transatlantic relations are likely to strengthen.

This thesis has stressed that Eurosceptic arguments have both a continuity and change. Conservative Eurosceptics referred to national sovereignty in the 1960s

and have continued this argument. This is a “continuity” aspect. Meanwhile, Conservative Eurosceptics added immigration and the economic difficulties experienced by the EU. This constitutes the “change” aspect of their arguments. Both aspects of this rhetoric can be seen in the speeches of Conservative Eurosceptics.

To summarise, this thesis has determined that the Conservative Party of the UK transformed from a pro-European political party to a hard Eurosceptic one.



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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK MUHAFAZAKÂR PARTİSİ VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ:

AVRUPA ŞÜPHECİLİĞİ'NDEN BREXİT'E

Birleşik Krallık'ın siyasi parti sisteminde birçok parti bulunmakta olup, bunlardan ikisi öne çıkmaktadır: Muhafazakâr Parti ve İşçi Partisi. Birleşik Krallık'ın modern siyasi tarihi boyunca bu partiler siyasetin ön saflarında yer almıştır. Bir merkez-sağ parti olarak tanımlanan Muhafazakâr Parti, Birleşik Krallık siyasi tarihinin en önemli partilerindendir. Bu partinin 23 Temmuz 2019'dan bu yana lideri ve şu anki Birleşik Krallık Başbakanı Boris Johnson'dır.

Avrupa ile bütünleşme, Birleşik Krallık'ta her zaman tartışma konusu olmuştur. Ancak Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Topluluğu'na katılım başvurusunun hem Muhafazakâr ve İşçi Partileri hem de 1973'teki milletvekillerinin çoğu tarafından desteklendiğinin belirtilmesinde fayda görülmektedir. Hatta Muhafazakâr Parti'nin 1960'larda ve 1970'lerde Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'na (AET) üyeliğine açık desteğinin yanı sıra AET'ye başvuran Birleşik Krallık'ın ilk siyasi partisi olduğu belirtilmelidir.

1 Ocak 1973'te Avrupa Toplulukları'na (AT, Avrupa Birliği'nin selefi) katılan Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyeliğinin diğer AB üyelerinden oldukça farklı olduğu belirtilmelidir. Birleşik Krallık, AB üyeliğinin bazı boyutlarından (Şengen bölgesine katılım, Euro'nun para birimi olarak kullanımı vb.) muaf tutulmuştur ("opt-out"). Bu muafiyetlerin büyük bölümü Birleşik Krallık'taki Muhafazakâr hükümetlerinin çabalarının sonucu olup, Margaret Thatcher ve John Major'ın başbakanlığı sırasında gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Birleşik Krallık halkı, 23 Haziran 2016'da düzenlenen "Brexit" (Avrupa Birliği'nden Britanya'nın çıkışı) referandumunda AB'den ayrılma yönünde oy vermiştir. Referandumun "Ayrıl" sonucu Birleşik Krallık, AB ve ötesini etkilemeye devam etmektedir. Brexit süreci, kendine özgü doğası nedeniyle yerel, ulusal ve uluslararası kamuoyu tarafından büyük bir dikkatle izlenmektedir. Zira, daha önce hiçbir AB üyesi AB'den ayrılmamıştır.

Avrupa bütünleşmesinin genel yönüne karşı açık muhalefet (Avrupa Şüpheciliği), 1980'li yıllardan itibaren günümüzdeki Brexit sürecine kadar, Birleşik Krallık siyasetinde öne çıkan bir husustur. Bu tezin yazıldığı sırada Brexit süreci halen devam etmektedir. Birleşik Krallık halkındaki Avrupa Birliği karşıtlığı yüksek oranlara ulaşmıştır³⁷³ ve Brexit, Birleşik Krallık'taki Avrupa bütünleşmesi tartışmasının sonucudur.

Bu tez yedi bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm Giriş bölümüdür. İkinci bölümde Muhafazakâr Parti'nin tarihi ve siyasi düşünceleri ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde Avrupa Şüpheciliği hakkında literatür taraması yapılmıştır. Dördüncü bölümde Muhafazakâr Parti'nin Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu ve Avrupa bütünleşmesine bakışı ve ilk adımları sunulmuştur. Beşinci bölümde Muhafazakâr Parti'nin Avrupa yanlısı bir partiden nasıl Avrupa Şüphecisi bir parti haline geldiği

³⁷³ Bruce Stokes, "Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit", Pew Research Center, 7 Haziran 2016 <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/>, 20 Temmuz 2019'da erişildi

ele almıştır. Altıncı bölümde ise Brexit referandumuna giden yoldaki önemli gelişmeler sunulmuş ve Boris Johnson'ın Muhafazakâr Parti lideri olarak seçilmesiyle tamamlanmıştır. Yedinci ve son bölüm ise tezi özetleyen sonuç bölümüdür.

Muhafazakârların çoğu, özellikle 1980'lerin sonlarından itibaren Avrupa ile daha derin siyasi bütünleşmeye karşı çıkmışlardır. Muhafazakâr Parti, o dönemden bu yana Avrupa Şüpheli olarak kabul edilmiştir. Bu tez, Muhafazakâr Parti'nin nasıl Avrupa Şüpheli haline geldiğini araştırmıştır. Ayrıca, Avrupa Şüpheli Muhafazakârların Avrupa bütünleşmesi tartışmalarının başlamasından bu yana öne sürdüğü argümanları ele almak da bu tezin amaçlarındandır.

Bu çerçevede; Muhafazakâr Başbakan Margaret Thatcher'in Bruges konuşması, Maastricht Antlaşması müzakereleri sırasında ortaya çıkan tartışmalar, 1992'deki Kara Çarşamba olayı, Avrupa yanlısı İşçi Partisi'nin 1997'deki seçimlerdeki başarısı ve Muhafazakârların söylemlerini buna görev değiştirmesi, Muhafazakârların Avrupa Şüpheli bir parti haline geldiğini açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Muhafazakârların Avrupa Şüpheliliği, parti muhalefetteyken de (1997-2010) devam etmiştir. Parti liderleri William Hague, Iain Duncan-Smith ve Michael Howard, Avrupa Şüpheliliği siyasetine devam etmiştir.

Avrupa Şüphelilerin bütünleşmeye karşı ortaya koydukları argümanların benzerlik gösterdiği belirtilmelidir. Son yıllarda, akademisyenler ve gözlemciler tarafından Avrupalı siyasi partilerde ve Avrupa hakkında Avrupa Şüpheliliği ve Avrupa Şüpheli siyasi partilerinin aldığı destekte gözle görülür bir artış ve yayılma olduğu kabul edilmektedir. Genel olarak, bu tür karşıt partilerin çoğu politik yelpazenin ya en solunda ya da en sağındadır. 2008-2009 yıllarında yaşanan resesyon ve ardından ortaya çıkan Euro Bölgesi krizi, AB'ye olan desteği sarsmıştır. UKIP (Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi-Birleşik Krallık), AfD (Alternatif für Deutschland-Almanya) ve Rassemblement National (Fransa) gibi popülist partilerin yükselişi bu açıdan değerlendirilmelidir. Avrupa Şüpheliliğine

hem ulusal hem de uluslararası mecrada artan destek merak uyandırıcıdır ve bu konunun seçilmesindeki ana nedendir.

Muhafazakâr Parti'nin Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilişkin görüşleri çeşitli aşamalarda ele alınırken, bu tezde Aleks Szczerbiak ve Paul Taggart tarafından geliştirilen yumuşak ve sert Avrupa Şüpheciliği kavramları kullanılmıştır.

Szczerbiak ve Taggart'a göre "sert" Avrupa Şüphecisi partiler ya da siyasetçiler, AB ve Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilkesel olarak muhalefet etmekte, ülkelerinin AB üyeliğinden çekilmesi gerektiğini düşünmekte ya da Avrupa bütünleşmesi projesine tümüyle karşı çıkmayla eşdeğer sayılabilecek bir politika önermektedir.³⁷⁴

Öte yandan, Szczerbiak ve Taggart'a göre "yumuşak" Avrupa Şüphecilerin, Avrupa bütünleşmesine veya AB üyeliğine ilkeli bir itirazları bulunmamakta, ancak AB'nin bazı politikalarına muhalefet etmekte ya da ülkelerinin ulusal çıkarlarının AB siyasetiyle o dönemde uyumlu olmayabildiğini düşünmektedirler.³⁷⁵

Bununla birlikte, Szczerbiak ve Taggart'ın sert ve yumuşak Avrupa Şüpheciliği arasındaki ayrımının bazı akademisyenlerce eleştirildiği belirtilmelidir. Örneğin Petr Kopecký ve Cas Mudde, Szczerbiak ve Taggart'ın yumuşak Avrupa Şüphecisi tanımının çok geniş olduğunu düşünmektedir. Kopecký ve Mudde daha detaylı bir model geliştirerek Szczerbiak ve Taggart'ı eleştirmiştir.³⁷⁶ Chris Flood da

³⁷⁴ Aleks Szczerbiak ve Paul Taggart, "Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in Europe", *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume I: Case Studies and Country Surveys* ed. Aleks Szczerbiak ve Paul Taggart (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2008), s.1-15, s.7-8

³⁷⁵ a.g.e

³⁷⁶ Petr Kopecký ve Cas Mudde, "The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe", *European Politics* 3, no. 3 (2002), sf. 297-326, s. 300

Szczerbiak ve Taggart'ın yumuşak Avrupa Şüpheliği hakkında benzer bir eleştiri yöneltmiştir.³⁷⁷

2010 genel seçimlerinde elde ettiği başarılı sonuçtan sonra iktidara gelen Muhafazakâr Başbakan David Cameron, AB ile daha fazla siyasi bütünleşmeye karşı çıkmış, ancak çoğu Muhafazakâr milletvekilinin yanı sıra kabinesi de Birleşik Krallık'ın AB'den çekilme sürecini başlatmayı düşünmemiştir. Bu nedenle, Muhafazakârlar bu noktaya kadar yumuşak Avrupa Şüpheliği olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

David Cameron'ın 2013 yılında Birleşik Krallık'ın AB üyeliği konusunda referandum yapma sözünün ardındaki sebepleri bu tezde ele alınmıştır. Cameron ve diğer önemli Muhafazakârlar, Birleşik Krallık'ın AB'de kalması için kampanya yapmış olsa da oylamada “AB'den çıkış” (Brexit) sonucu çıktı. Bu sonuç, ulusal, bölgesel ve küresel siyaseti kayda değer ölçüde etkilemiştir. Muhafazakâr hükümetler o zamandan bugüne Brexit için gerekli yasal düzenlemeleri hazırlamakla uğraşmaktadırlar. Bu sürece ilişkin belirsizlik devam etmekte ve bu tezin yazıldığı sırada Birleşik Krallık'ın AB'den resmen çekilmesi için kesin bir tarih vermek mümkün olamamıştır.

Bu tezin ana araştırma sorusu “Muhafazakâr Parti, Birleşik Krallık'ın AET / AT üyeliğini arzulayan bir partiden, nasıl AB'den çıkmaya çalışan bir parti olarak değişmiştir?” şeklindedir.

Bu bağlamda iki ikincil araştırma sorusu bulunmaktadır. Bu soruların ilki, “Muhafazakâr Parti sert ya da yumuşak bir Avrupa Şüpheliği parti midir?”.

³⁷⁷ Chris Flood, *Euroscepticism: A Problematic Concept*, Panel: France's Relations with the European Union UACES 32nd Annual Conference and 7th Research Conference, (Belfast:Queen's University, 2002), s. 2

İkincisi, “Muhafazakâr Parti üyeleri tarafından dile getirilen Avrupa Şüphecisi argümanlarında süreklilik veya değişiklik var mıdır?”.

Bu tez, Muhafazakâr Parti’deki Avrupa Şüpheciliğinde devamlılık görülebildiğini savunmaktadır. 1970’lerde Ortak Pazar karşıtları (daha sonra Avrupa Şüphecisi olarak anılacaklardır) tarafından geliştirilen söylemler, Avrupa Şüphecisi Muhafazakârlarca 1980’lerde, 1990’larda ve 2000’lerde kullanılmaya devam edilmiştir. Egemenliğin AB üyeliğiyle kısıtlandığı iddiası ve kontrolün geri alınması gerektiği gibi Avrupa Şüphecisi söylemler bugün bile kullanılmaya devam etmektedir.

Bu tezde, Muhafazakâr Parti’deki Avrupa Şüpheciliğinde devamlılık görülebildiği ifade edilmekle birlikte, 2010’lı yıllardaki gelişmelerin Muhafazakâr Avrupa Şüpheciliğini etkilediği savunulmaktadır. Söz konusu argümanlar, AB ekonomisinde yaşanan sıkıntılar ve AB’nin ortaya çıkan bu ekonomik sorunları çözmedeki başarısızlığı ve Birleşik Krallık’ın aldığı göç olarak özetlenebilir.

Bu tezde, Birleşik Krallık Muhafazakâr Başbakanlar Margaret Thatcher, John Major, David Cameron ve Theresa May (Haziran 2016’dan önce) ile Muhafazakâr Parti eski liderleri Iain Duncan Smith, William Hague ve Michael Howard’ın yumuşak Avrupa Şüphecisi olduğu savunulmuştur. 2016 Brexit referandumunun öncesinde AB’de kalmak istemesine rağmen Theresa May ile halefi “Ayrıl” taraftarı Başbakan Boris Johnson sert Avrupa Şüphecisi olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Tezde, Muhafazakâr Partinin Avrupa bütünleşmesine ilişkin görüşlerini değerlendirebilmek için Birleşik Krallık’ın AET üyelik süreci ve sonrasındaki gelişmeler ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, 1940’ların ve 1950’lerin sonlarındaki Muhafazakâr liderler, Avrupa bütünleşmesini genel olarak bir dış ilişkiler meselesi olarak görmüşlerdir. Ayrıca, Muhafazakâr milletvekillerinin çoğu, Avrupa bütünleşmesine şüpheyile yaklaşmışlardır.

Forster'a göre, 1945-1969 yılları arasında Birleşik Krallık'ın dış politikasının öncelikleri arasında birinci sırada Britanya İmparatorluğu, İngiliz Milletler Topluluğu ve İngilizce konuşan dünya; ikinci sırada Batı Avrupa'yla ilişkiler yer almıştır.³⁷⁸ Birleşik Krallık, Batı Avrupa'yla ekonomi ve güvenlik gibi alanlarda iş birliğine açıldı, ancak aynı zamanda Avrupa ile federal iş birliğine gidecek adımlardan kaçınmıştır.³⁷⁹

Birleşik Krallık'ın AET'ye ilk başvurusu Muhafazakâr Başbakan Harold Macmillan tarafından 1961 yılında yapılmıştır. Crowson, Macmillan'ın, EFTA'nın (Birleşik Krallık'ın da taraf olduğu Avrupa Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması) öngörüldüğü kadar başarılı olmadığını ve Birleşik Krallık'ın süper gücü konumunu kaybettiğine şahit olduktan sonra AET'ye başvuru yapmasına karar verdiğini savunmaktadır.³⁸⁰ Macmillan, Temmuz 1960'ta Edward Heath'i Lord Privy Seal (ferman mührü emini - yani bir üst düzey Britanya kamu görevlisi) olarak atamıştır. Heath, herkes tarafından Birleşik Krallık'ın AET üyeliğine büyük önem veren birisi olan bilinmekteydi. 1950'de Avam Kamarası'ndaki konuşmasında Heath, Birleşik Krallık'ın o sırada yeni kurulan Avrupa Kömür ve Çelik Topluluğu'na (AKÇT) katılması gerektiğini vurgulamıştır.

13 Temmuz 1960'da toplanan Bakanlar Kurulu, Birleşik Krallık'ın AET'ye daha fazla yakınlaşması gerektiğine karar vermiş, ancak başvuruda bulunmayı ileri bir tarihe ertelemiştir. Başbakan Macmillan'ın Muhafazakâr hükümetinin 31 Temmuz 1961'de Avrupa Topluluğu'na başvuru olasılığı hakkında bir girişim yapacağını açıklamıştır.

³⁷⁸ Anthony Forster, *Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945*, (Londra:Routledge, 2002), s. 60

³⁷⁹ a.g.e.

³⁸⁰ Nicholas J. Crowson, *The Conservative Party and European Integration Since 1945: At the heart of Europe?*, (Oxon:Routledge, 2007), s. 12-13

Macmillan'ın AET'e taraf olma girişimi sonrasında üç Avrupa Şüpheli milletvekili (Derek Walker-Smith, Robin Turton ve Peter Walker), 25 Temmuz 1961'de Ortak Pazar Komitesi adında bir AET karşıtı grup oluşturmuştur.

Derek Walker-Smith'in Avam Kamarası'nda Ağustos 1961'de yaptığı AET karşıtı konuşmasında, AET üyeliğinin Birleşik Krallık'ın ulusal egemenliğini kısıtlayacağını ve Milletler Topluluğu'yla ilişkilerinin önemini azaltacağını belirtmiştir.³⁸¹

Başbakan Macmillan, Walker-Smith'in eleştirilerine oldukça Avrupa yanlısı bir argüman ile yanıtlamıştır. Macmillan, AET'yi kuran Roma Antlaşması'na Birleşik Krallık'ın taraf olmasının, egemenliğinin teslim edileceğinin anlamına gelmeyeceğini, aksine “egemenliğin bir havuzda toplanacağını” belirtmiştir.³⁸²

Bu çabalara rağmen, Birleşik Krallık, iki ayrı defa Fransa lideri Charles de Gaulle tarafından veto edilmiş ve AET'ye 1970'li yıllara kadar üye olamamıştır.

1970 yılı seçim manifestosunda Muhafazakâr Parti'nin AET üyeliğini desteklemeye devam ettiği görülmektedir.³⁸³

Doğru şartları müzakere edersek, Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu'na katılmasının Britanya halkının uzun vadeli çıkarına olacağına ve hem refahımıza hem de güvenliğimize büyük katkı sağlayacağına inanıyoruz. Ülkemiz için fırsatlar çok büyüktür.

³⁸¹ Avam Kamarası, Hansard 1508-1513, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1961/aug/02/european-economic-community#S5CV0645P0_19610802_HOC_242 17 Temmuz 2019'da erişildi

³⁸² Robert Schütze ve Stephen Tierney, *United Kingdom and The Federal Idea*, (Oxford:Hart Publishing, 2018), s. 157

³⁸³ Muhafazakar Parti, 1970 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1970/1970-conservative-manifesto.shtml> , 20 Haziran 2019'da erişildi.

Böylelikle Muhafazakârların AET üyeliği sürecinde Birleşik Krallık kamuoyundan destek için üyeliğin Birleşik Krallık ekonomisine olabilecek faydalarını öne çıkardıkları anlaşılmaktadır.

Muhafazakâr Parti'deki Avrupa Şüpheciliği bağlamında Muhafazakâr Avrupa Şüpheci Milletvekili Enoch Powell'ın görüşleri önem taşımaktadır. Shiels'e göre Powell, modern Muhafazakâr Avrupa Şüpheciliğinin kurucusu olarak görülebilir.³⁸⁴ Shiels, Powell'ın etkisinin bugün bile hala hissedildiğini ve onun görüşlerinin Muhafazakârların Avrupa bütünleşmesine yönelttikleri eleştirilerinin bazılarını oluşturduğunu vurgulamaktadır.³⁸⁵ 1971 yılında Avam Kamarası'ndaki konuşmasında Powell, Roma Antlaşması'na taraf olunduğunda; Parlamento'nun yasama üstünlüğünün, yürütme erkinin vergi ve harcamalar üzerindeki kontrolünün ve Birleşik Krallık mahkemelerinin bağımsızlığının kaybedileceğini ifade etmiştir.³⁸⁶ Powell'ın egemenliğe vurgusu, Avrupa Şüphecilerce kullanılmaya devam edilmektedir.

Nihayetinde Birleşik Krallık, 1973 yılında AET'ye üye olmuştur. Bunda Başbakan Edward Heath'in önemli katkıları olmuştur. 1975 yılında düzenlenen AT referandumunda, Muhafazakâr Parti, Birleşik Krallık'ın AT üyeliğinin devam edilmesi tarafını desteklemiştir. O sırada muhalefette olan Muhafazakâr Parti Lideri Margaret Thatcher'in AT üyeliğini savunması ve Tek Avrupa Senedi'ni (SEA) desteklemesi Avrupa Şüpheci Muhafazakârların hevesini kırmıştı.

³⁸⁴ David Shiels, "How Enoch Powell helped to shape modern Tory Euroscepticism" 3 Haziran 2016 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/06/03/how-ench-powell-helped-to-shape-modern-tory-euroscepticism/>, 2 Temmuz 2019'da erişildi

³⁸⁵ a.g.e.

³⁸⁶ Avam Kamarası, Hansard 700, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1972/feb/17/european-communities-bill>, 12 Haziran 2019'da erişildi.

Ancak, Başbakan Thatcher'ın önceki görüşlerinden büyük bir sapma olarak görülen 20 Eylül 1988'deki Bruges konuşmasının önemi not edilmelidir. Bu konuşmada Thatcher, Avrupa bütünleşmesinin siyasi boyutlarına karşı olduğunu belirtmiştir.³⁸⁷ Böylelikle Thatcher, Szczerbiak ve Taggart'ın yumuşak ve sert Avrupa Şüpheciliği görüşüne göre yumuşak Avrupa Şüphecidir.

Birçok akademisyene göre³⁸⁸, Margaret Thatcher'ın Bruges konuşması Britanyalı Avrupa Şüpheciler için bir ilham kaynağı olmuştur.³⁸⁹ Avrupa Şüphecisi Muhafazakârlar, Britanya halkından davalarına destek almak için Thatcher'ın Bruges konuşmasını yeni bir fırsat olarak görmüştür. Bazı Muhafazakârlar, sert Avrupa Şüphecisi "Bruges Grubu"nu kurmuştur.³⁹⁰

Kabinedeki bazı bakanlarıyla sorunlar yaşayan Thatcher, 1990 yılında istifa etmiş ve Maliye Bakanı (Chancellor of the Exchequer) John Major Muhafazakâr Parti Başkanı ve dolayısıyla Başbakan seçilmiştir. John Major, AB üye ülkeleri arasında özellikle ekonomik konularda daha yakın bir birliğini desteklemekte, ancak federal bir sistemi açıkça reddetmekteydi. Bu sebeple Major, bu tezde yumuşak bir Avrupa Şüphecisi olarak kabul edilmektedir.

Başbakan Major, Birleşik Krallık'ın AB'yi oluşturan Maastricht Anlaşması'nın sosyal konular ve tek para birimine ilişkin hükümlerinden muaf tutulmasını ve anlaşmada "federal" bir Avrupa'dan bahsedilmemesini sağlamıştır. Maastricht

³⁸⁷ Margaret Thatcher, *Bruges Konuşması*, 20 Eylül 1988, Margaret Thatcher Foundation <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332>, 5 Temmuz 2019'da erişildi.

³⁸⁸ Karine Tournier-Sol, "Leadership and the European Debate from Margaret Thatcher to John Major", *Leadership and Uncertainty Management in Politics: Leaders, Followers and Constraints in Western Democracies* ed. Agnès Alexandre-Collier ve François De Chantal, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), s. 127-140, s. 132

³⁸⁹ John FitzGibbon, "Extra-Parliamentary Eurosceptic Actors in the UK", *The UK Challenge to Europeanization, The Persistence of British Euroscepticism*, ed. Karine Tournier-Sol ve Chris Gifford, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,2015), s. 177

³⁹⁰ a.g.e.

Anlaşması görüşmeleri sırasında Major'a karşı çıkmak için Michael Portillo, Michael Howard ve Peter Lilley gibi Muhafazakâr milletvekilleri güçlerini birleştirmiş ve "Maastricht Asileri" olarak anılmışlardır.

Sonucunda Maastricht Asileri, Muhafazakâr Parti'yi Avrupa bütünleşmesi boyutunda bölmüştür. Maastricht Antlaşması'na yöneltilen eleştiriler ve Anlaşma'nın Muhafazakâr Parti'de yol açtığı tartışmalardan dolayı Alexandre-Collier, bu süreci Birleşik Krallık'taki Avrupa Şüpheciliğinin gerçek başlangıcı olduğunu savunmaktadır.³⁹¹

Ayrıca, Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Topluluğu ile ilişkilerindeki en önemli günlerden biri, "Kara Çarşamba" olarak anılan 16 Eylül 1992 tarihidir. Birleşik Krallık, o tarihte Sterlini Avrupa Döviz Kuru Mekanizması'ndan (ERM) çıkarmıştır. Sterlin'in değerini dengelemek için milyarlarca sterlin harcanmıştır. "Kara Çarşamba", Avrupa bütünleşmesine olan isteğin büyük ölçüde azalmasına neden olmuştur.³⁹²

1997 genel seçimlerinde Tony Blair'in İşçi Partisi'ne karşı kaybeden Major, Muhafazakâr Parti liderliğinden istifa etmiş ve yerine William Hague seçilmiştir. Hague açıkça bir Avrupa şüphecisi bir yaklaşım önermekteydi. 2001 genel seçimleri için yayımlanan Muhafazakâr Parti'nin seçim manifestosunda, Hague'un selefi Major gibi Euro'yu kabul edilmesine ve sınırları ortadan kaldırmasına yol açacak entegrasyona karşı olduğu görülebilir. Ayrıca Hague, bahse konu genel seçimlerindeki kampanyalarında "Sterlini koru!" sloganıyla Birleşik Krallık'ı dolaşmıştır.

³⁹¹ Agnès Alexandre-Collier, "Reassessing British Conservative Euroscepticism as a Case of Party (Mis)Management", *The UK Challenge to Europeanization The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol ve Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), s. 99-116, s. 101-102

³⁹² a.g.e s.104-107

Sözkonusu manifestoda³⁹³:

Muhafazakâr siyasetin Avrupa Birliği'ne yönelik ana ilkesi Avrupa'da olmak ancak Avrupa tarafından yönetilmemektedir. Avrupa'nın geleceği tartışmasına önderlik edip net ve olumlu vizyonumuzu destekleyeceğiz. Avrupa Birliği, genişleme hedefiyle yolda bir kavşağa ulaştı. Bir yolda, tam entegre olmuş bir Avrupa süper devleti ile ulus devletler ve ulusal vetonun kaybedilmesi yer alıyor. [İşçi Partisi] Hükümeti bizi bu yola doğru götürüyor.

2001'deki Muhafazakâr Parti'nin manifestonun bahsettiği ile Thatcher'in görüşleri arasındaki benzerlik fark edilebilir. Hague liderliğindeki Muhafazakârlar ayrıca AB anlaşmalarından muafiyetlerini sürdürme isteğinin altını çizmiştir.³⁹⁴

Yukarıdaki sıralanan Avrupa Şüpheli tutumuna rağmen Hague'in, Birleşik Krallık'ı AB'den çıkarma niyeti bulunmamaktaydı. O dönemdeki Muhafazakârların çoğu gibi, öncelikle Birleşik Krallık'ın AB ile bütünleşmesini durdurmak istedi. Dolayısıyla, bu tezde, Hague'in Szczerbiak ve Taggart'ın modeline göre yumuşak Avrupa Şüpheli olarak tanımlanabileceği değerlendirilmektedir.

William Hague, 2001 seçimlerindeki başarısız seçim sonucunun ardından Muhafazakâr Parti Liderliğinden istifa etmiş ve Iain Duncan Smith, Muhafazakâr Parti Lideri seçilmiştir. Öne çıkan bir Avrupa Şüpheli olan Duncan Smith'in seçilmesi, Avrupa bütünleşmesi konusundaki inançlarının Muhafazakârların

³⁹³ Muhafazakar Parti, "The Conservative Party 2001 Election Manifesto" <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/2001/2001-conservative-manifesto.shtml> 29 Ekim 2019'da erişildi

³⁹⁴ a.g.e.

çoğunluğu tarafından paylaşıldığını göstermiştir. Son dönemde Duncan Smith, Birleşik Krallık'ın AB'den ayrılması tarafını savunmuştur.

Iain Duncan Smith; Michael Howard ve Michael Ancram gibi Avrupa Şüpheli Muhafazakârlarla yakinen çalışmıştır. Bu tez kapsamında yapılan araştırmaya göre, Muhafazakârların dönemin İngiliz medyasında “Avrupa Şüpheli partisi” olarak kabul edildiği tespit edilmiştir. Örneğin, BBC'nin 14 Eylül 2001 tarihli internet haberinde Duncan Smith'in yönetiminde Avrupa Şüphelilerin öne çıktığını yazmıştır.³⁹⁵ Benzer şekilde, 2001 parti seçimlerini kaybeden Avrupa yanlısı Muhafazakâr Kenneth Clarke, BBC ile yaptığı röportajda, liderliğin Duncan Smith'e geçtiğine sevindiğini belirtir. Zira Avrupa yanlısı Clarke, partisinin çoğu üyesinin Avrupa Şüpheli olması sebebiyle parti üyeleriyle birlikte çalışmasının zor olacağını belirtmiştir.³⁹⁶ 2003 yılındaki Muhafazakâr Parti liderlik seçimini Avrupa Şüpheli Michael Howard kazanmış, ancak Howard, İşçi Partisi'nin zaferiyle sonuçlanan 2005'teki genel seçimlerin ardından parti liderliğinden istifa etmiştir. Adıgeçen, 2016 yılında düzenlenen Brexit referandumunda “Ayrıl” tarafını desteklemiştir.

Aralık 2005'te lider seçilen genç Milletvekili David Cameron'ın liderliğinde Muhafazakâr Parti, 2010 genel seçimlerinde 307 sandalye kazanarak Avam Kamarası'nın en büyük partisi olarak büyük bir başarı elde etmiştir. Muhafazakârlar, Liberal Demokrat Parti ile koalisyon kurmuştur.

David Cameron'un Başbakan olarak göreve başlamasından sadece bir buçuk yıl sonra 81 Muhafazakâr Parti milletvekili (yüzde 27) Ekim 2011'de Birleşik Krallık'ın AB üyeliğine ilişkin bir referandum yapılmasını talep etti. Başbakan

³⁹⁵ BBC News, “Eurosceptics prosper under Duncan Smith” 14 Eylül 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1543765.stm, 26 Ekim 2019'da erişildi

³⁹⁶ Nyta Mann, BBC News, “Ken Clarke two-time lucky loser”, 13 Eylül 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1535458.stm, 1 Kasım 2019'da erişildi

Cameron, konunun daha sonra ele alınması gerektiğini savunmuş ve bu nedenle Muhafazakâr milletvekillerine sert Avrupa Şüpheli olarak tanımlanabilen söz konusu talebe karşı oy kullanma talimatı vermiştir.³⁹⁷ Muhafazakârların büyük çoğunluğunun Cameron’u dinleyerek olumlu oy kullanmaması önemli bir husustur.³⁹⁸ Bu nedenle, Başbakan Cameron, Birleşik Krallık’ın AB üyeliği hakkında bir referandum yapılması hususunu bir yıl daha erteleyebilmiştir.

Ancak Başbakan Cameron’ın 23 Ocak 2013’teki konuşması hem Birleşik Krallık hem de AB tarihinde kayda değer bir olaydı. Bahse konu konuşmasında Cameron, partisinin 2015 genel seçimini kazanması halinde, Birleşik Krallık’ın çıkarları için Avrupa Birliği ile yeni bir anlaşmayı müzakere edeceğini açıklamıştır.³⁹⁹ Ayrıca, kişisel olarak AB’de kalmak istemesini belirtmesine rağmen, Cameron, Birleşik Krallık’ın AB üyeliği konusunda referandum yapma sözü vermiştir.⁴⁰⁰ Cameron’ın verdiği sözler, Birleşik Krallık ve AB politikalarında bir şok dalgasına neden olmuştur. Cameron, bu kararı almasında, Birleşik Krallık kamuoyunda artan Avrupa Şüpheli, UKIP’in seçimlerdeki başarıları, Muhafazakâr Parti’de Avrupa konusunda anlaşmazlıklar ve Cameron’ın Birleşik Krallık-AB ilişkisini Birleşik Krallık’ın çıkarlarına göre değiştirme hedefinin etkili olduğu değerlendirilmiştir.

Konuşmasında ifade ettiği üzere Cameron, Birleşik Krallık’ın Avrupa Birliği’nden çıkmasını istememiş, bununla birlikte AB üyeliğinde yeni bir ilişki hedeflemiştir. Szczerbiak ve Taggart’ın sert ve yumuşak Avrupa Şüpheli kavramlarına göre

³⁹⁷ Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker, “Where There is Discord, Can They Bring Harmony? Managing Intra-party Dissent on European Integration in the Conservative Party”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15, no.3, (Ağustos 2012), s.. 317-339, s.318

³⁹⁸ a.g.e.

³⁹⁹ David Cameron, “EU Speech at Bloomberg”, Başbakanlık, 10 Downing Street, 23 Ocak 2013 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>, 2 Temmuz 2019’da erişildi

⁴⁰⁰ a.g.e.

analiz edildiğinde, Cameron ve Muhafazakâr milletvekillerinin çoğunluğunun AB’de kalmayı tercih etmeye devam etmesi Muhafazakâr Partinin halen yumuşak Avrupa Şüpheli bir parti olduğunu göstermektedir.

2000’li yıllarında başında Birleşik Krallık’ta AB üyeliğine karşı hoşnutsuzluk artmaya devam etmekteydi. Bunun sebepleri aşağıda sunulmuştur. Eski Doğu Bloku ülkelerinin 2004’te AB’ye katılımı, bu ülkelerden Birleşik Krallık’a göçün artmasına neden olmuştur. Wadsworth ve diğerlerine göre, Birleşik Krallık’ta yaşayan göçmenlerin sayısı 1995 ve 2015 yılları arasında 900 binden 3 milyon 300 bine çıkmıştır.⁴⁰¹ 2015 yılında ise 10 Doğu Avrupa AB üyesi⁴⁰² ülkelerinden gelenlerin göçmenlerin sayısının 1 milyon 714 bine çıktığı tespit edilmiştir.⁴⁰³ IPSOS araştırmasına göre Britanya halkının yüzde 60’ının göçmenlerin sayısının fazla olduğunu düşündüğü belirtilmektedir.⁴⁰⁴ Ayrıca 2015’deki mülteci krizi, Avrupa ve Birleşik Krallık’ta Avrupa Şüpheliğin yükselmesine yol açmıştır.⁴⁰⁵ Göçmenlere duyulan hoşnutsuzluk, UKIP tarafından etkilice kullanılmış ve güçlenmiştir.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰¹ Jonathan Wadsworth, Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano ve John Van Reenen, “Brexit and the Impact of Immigration on the UK”, London School of Economics and Political Science, (Mayıs 2016), CEP Brexit Analysis No. 5, s. 2

⁴⁰² Çek Cumhuriyeti, Estonya, Macaristan, Letonya, Litvanya, Polonya, Slovakya, Slovenya, Romanya ve Bulgaristan

⁴⁰³ John Salt, “International Migration and the United Kingdom: Report of the United Kingdom SOPEMI correspondent to the OECD, 2015”, (Londra:SOPEMI,2015), s. 66

⁴⁰⁴ The Migration Observatory, “UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern”, 7 Haziran 2018, <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/#kp1> 6 Aralık 2019’da erişildi

⁴⁰⁵ Matthew Goodwin ve Caitlin Milazzo, “Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 19, no.3, (June 2017), s. 450-464, s. 451

⁴⁰⁶ a.g.e s. 453

2008-2009 yıllarındaki ekonomik resesyon ve ardından Euro Bölgesi ekonomik krizinin etkilerinden bahsedilmelidir. MacMillan, Euro Bölgesi krizinin “*Avrupa kimliği krizine*” neden olduğunu ve “*AB kamuoyunda Avrupa Şüphecilğinde genel bir artışa*” yol açtığını vurgulamıştır.⁴⁰⁷ Bu aynı zamanda UKIP’in 2014 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerinde oyların yüzde 27,5’ini alarak 24 Avrupa milletvekiliyle AP’ye girmelerinden görülebilir.⁴⁰⁸

Öte yandan Daddow, Birleşik Krallık basınında Avrupa bütünleşmesine yönelik Şüpheci görüşün hakim olduğunu tespit etmiştir. Böylelikle Daddow, Birleşik Krallık basınının Avrupa Şüpheci görüşleriyle kamuoyunu etkilediğini savunmaktadır.⁴⁰⁹ Bu tez, Daddow’ya katılmakta ve basının Avrupa Şüphecilğinin artmasına neden olan bir husus olduğunu belirtmektedir.

Başbakan Cameron’un seçim vaadi doğrultusunda Birleşik Krallık ve AB, 2016’daki Brexit oylamasından birkaç ay önce Birleşik Krallık’ın AB üyeliğine ilişkin bazı hususları yeniden müzakere etmeye başladı. Referandumda “Kal” sonucunun çıkması halinde, Birleşik Krallık’ın AB üyeliğinin Cameron’ın müzakere ettiği düzenlemeler çerçevesinde devam edeceğine mutabık kalınmıştı. Bu düzenlemeler, örneğin, AB içi göçle ilgili hususlar ve Birleşik Krallık’ın resmen daha fazla bütünleşmeye dahil olmayacağını belirtilmesini içermektedir.⁴¹⁰ Bazı sert Avrupa Şüpheciler, Cameron’ın anlaşmasını yeterli bulmamış ve eleştirmişlerdir.

⁴⁰⁷ Catherine MacMillan, “British Political Discourse on the EU in the Context of the Eurozone Crisis”, *The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol ve Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), s. 191-209, s.191

⁴⁰⁸ a.g.e. s. 198

⁴⁰⁹ Oliver Daddow, “Performing Euroscepticism: The UK Press and Cameron’s Bloomberg Speech”, *The UK Challenge to Europeanization: The Persistence of British Euroscepticism* ed. Karine Tournier-Sol ve Chris Gifford, (Hampshire:Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), s. 151-171, s. 161

⁴¹⁰ BBC News, “EU reform deal: What Cameron wanted and what he got” 20 Şubat 2016 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35622105>, 19 Kasım 2019’da erişildi.

Brexit referandumunda Başbakan Cameron, İçişleri Bakanı Theresa May ve Dışişleri Bakanı Philip Hammond gibi Muhafazakâr kabine üyelerinin çoğu “Kal” (Remain) için kampanya yaparken, eski Londra Belediye Başkanı Boris Johnson ve kabine üyeleri Andrea Leadsom ve Michael Gove gibi diğer Muhafazakârlar “Ayrıl” (Leave) tarafını desteklemişlerdir.

“Kal” tarafı, AB’nin ekonomik faydalarını ve “Ayrıl” kararının yaratacağı ekonomik sıkıntıları öne çıkartarak kampanya yürütmüştür.⁴¹¹ Ancak görülebileceği üzere, Muhafazakâr Parti AB konusunda bölünmüş ve “Kal” tarafının kampanyada etkili olamadığı görüşü hakimdir.⁴¹² “Ayrıl” tarafıysa, kanun koymada egemenlik, sınırların kontrolünün geri alınması ve AB’ye ödenen yüksek meblağı öne çıkartmıştır.⁴¹³ Ayrıl taraftarları, 2015 Mülteci Krizini de mitinglerinde kullanmıştır.

23 Haziran 2016’daki Brexit referandumunda “Ayrıl” sonucu çıkmış ve Başbakan Cameron istifa edeceğini duyurmuştur. Muhafazakâr Parti’nin liderliğine getirilen Theresa May Başbakan olarak seçildi. May, Brexit konusunda ikinci bir referandumu kesinlikle reddetmiştir. Brexit sonrası Muhafazakâr Parti üyelerinin çoğunluğu artık sert Avrupa Şüpheli hale gelmiş ve “AB’de kal” grubu, Muhafazakârların içinde ancak küçük bir grup olarak yer almaktadır.

Ülkesinin AB’den ayrılma sürecini başlatan May, Brexit için AB ile görüşmeye başlamıştır. Bu sırada Birleşik Krallık’ta AB’den ayrılışın detayları hakkında tartışmalar yaşanmaktaydı. Bazı gruplar, AB ile kurulan ilişkilere benzer bir ilişki

⁴¹¹ Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin ve Paul Whiteley, *Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union*, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2017), s. 33

⁴¹² Kirsty Hughes, “Neither tackling lies nor making the case: the Remain side”, EU Referendum Analysis 2016, <https://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-5-campaign-and-political-communication/neither-tackling-lies-nor-making-the-case-the-remain-side/>, 22 Aralık 2019’da erişildi

⁴¹³ Kirby Swales, *Understanding the Leave vote*, (London:NatCen Social Research, 2016) s. 5

talep etmekte (yumuşak Brexit); bazı gruplarsa AB'den tüm boyutlarıyla ayrılmak istemiştir (sert Brexit). Başbakan May, AB ile müzakere edilerek hazırlanan anlaşmaların Avam Kamarası'nda üç defa reddedilmesinden sonra istifa kararı almıştır. Temmuz 2019'daki Muhafazakâr Parti liderlik seçimini Boris Johnson kazanmıştır.

Başbakan Boris Johnson'ın liderliğindeki mevcut Muhafazakâr Hükümetin Brexit'i her ne koşulda olursa olsun yerine getirmeye söz vermesi sebebiyle May dönemindeki sert Avrupa Şüpheli siyasetine devam ettiği vurgulanmalıdır. Ayrıca Johnson, kabineye Jacob Rees-Mogg, Dominic Raab ve Priti Patel gibi sert Avrupa Şüphelileri dahil etmiştir.

Başbakan Johnson'ın, ABD'ye hayran olduğu⁴¹⁴ ve ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'a saygı gösterdiği⁴¹⁵ muhtelif yazarlarca tespit edilmiştir. Böylelikle bu tez, gelecekte Brexit'in gerçekleşmesinin sonrasındaki dönemde Başbakan Johnson'ın, Birleşik Krallık'ın ABD ile ilişkilerini derinleştirmeye ve daha da geliştirmeye çalışacağını savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, Dışişleri Bakanı Dominic Raab, Brexit sonrası dönemde Birleşik Krallık'ın küresel bir aktör olacağını vurgulamıştır. Raab, AB'den ayrılmanın Birleşik Krallık dış politikasına tüm ülkelerle iş birliği ve anlaşma imzalayabilme imkanını vereceğini savunmaktadır.⁴¹⁶

Sonuç olarak, halen devam eden Brexit süreci belirsizlikler barındırmaktadır. Bu tezde Muhafazakâr Parti'nin Avrupa bütünleşmesini destekleyen bir pozisyondan Birleşik Krallık'ı AB'den ayrılma sürecine götürmesi ele alınmaktadır. Brexit'ten

⁴¹⁴ Jon Allsop, "How Boris Johnson Fell For America," The Nation, 14 Ekim 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/brexit-johnson-trump-america/> 6 Aralık 2019'da erişildi

⁴¹⁵ Robert Singh, "Friends Without Benefits: The "Special Relationship" After Brexit", The American Interest, 13 Eylül 2019, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/09/13/friends-without-benefits-the-special-relationship-after-brexit/> 19 Aralık 2019'da erişildi

⁴¹⁶ Dominic Raab, "A truly global future awaits us after Brexit", Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 11 Ağustos 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-truly-global-future-awaits-us-after-brexit-dominic-raab> 19 Aralık 2019'da erişildi

ıkan “Ayrıl” sonucu sonrası Muhafazakârlar, halkın kararına saygı duyan bir parti olarak kendilerini tanıtmış ve sert Avrupa Şüpheçiliğini benimsemiştir. Bu tez, Muhafazakâr Parti’deki Avrupa Şüpheçiliğinde devamlılık görülebildiğini tespit etmektedir. Ayrıca tezde, Euro Bölgesi’nde yaşanan ekonomik kriz ve Birleşik Krallık’ın aldığı göçün, Avrupa Şüpheçilerin yeni argümanlarını oluşturduğu belirtilmektedir.



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