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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROGRAM
MASTER’S THESIS

**THE ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS IN WEST AFRICA**

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
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İZMİR-2019

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TEZ ONAY SAYFASI

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Enstitü : Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Adı ve Soyadı : SARP KAYRAK
Öğrenci No : 2016800284
Tez Başlığı : The Assessment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa
Savunma Tarihi : 28/06/2019
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this master's thesis "The Assessment of The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa" has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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ABSTRACT

The Assessment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa Sarp KAYRAK

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The United Nations (UN) has taken initiative in the resolution processes of both inter-state and intra-state conflicts since its establishment in 1945. The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations deployed between 1993 and 2018 in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, all of which are located in Mano River basin sub-region of West Africa. The six peacekeeping missions mentioned in the three case studies aimed at solving intrastate conflicts triggered by several factors such as ethnic diversities and lack of economic, political and social infrastructures. The UN peacekeeping missions under focus are namely, UNOMIL and UNMIL in Liberia, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and MINUCI and UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire.

The case studies were analysed on the basis of theoretical and historical framework and the information gathered from the sources provided by the UN in the first place. The contributions of the major regional organisation, ECOWAS and its military arm, ECOMOG were also taken into account to reach an objective conclusion. It can be concluded that the UN peacekeeping operations in these three case studies were overall effective as they met the primary objectives of the UN operations such as the maintenance of a peaceful atmosphere accompanied with the reconstruction of economic, political and social infrastructures in relevant war-torn countries.

Keywords: The United Nations (UN), Conflict Resolution (CR), Peacekeeping, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire.

ÖZET

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

**Birleşmiş Milletler'in Batı Afrika'daki Barışkoruma Operasyonlarının
Değerlendirmesi
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Anlaşmazlık Çözümü Programı

Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) kurulduğu tarih olan 1945'ten beri uluslararası ve devletiçi çatışmaların çözüm süreçlerinde girişimci bir rol üstlenmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı 1993-2018 yılları arasında, Batı Afrika'nın Mano Irmağı havzasında yer alan Liberya, Sierra Leone ve Fildişi Sahilleri'ndeki BM barışkoruma operasyonlarını değerlendirmektir. Üç vaka çalışmasında bahsedilen altı barışkoruma misyonunda amaç; etnik farklılıklar ve ekonomik, politik ve sosyal altyapıların eksikliği gibi birçok faktörden kaynaklanan devletiçi çatışmaları çözüme kavuşturabilmektir. Bu çalışmada ele alınan barışkoruma misyonları, Liberya'da UNOMIL ve UNMIL, Sierra Leone'de UNOMSIL ve UNMASIL, Fildişi Sahilleri'nde MINUCI ve UNOCI'dir.

Vaka çalışmaları teorik ve tarihsel çerçeve temelinde ve öncelikle BM tarafından sağlanan kaynaklardan edinilen bilgiler ışığında analiz edilmiştir. Objektif bir sonuca varmak için önemli bir bölgesel organizasyon olan ECOWAS ve onun askeri kolu olan ECOMOG'un katkıları da dikkate alınmıştır. BM operasyonlarının temel amacı olan savaştan zarar görmüş ülkelerde ekonomik, politik ve sosyal altyapıların yeniden inşasıyla barışçıl atmosferin sağlanması ilgili vaka çalışmalarında karşılandığından, bahsi geçen ülkelerde BM'nin barışkoruma operasyonlarının etkili olduğu sonucuna varılabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler (BM), Anlaşmazlık Çözümü (AÇ), Barışkoruma, Liberya, Sierra Leone, Fildişi Sahilleri.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AU	African Union
CR	Conflict Resolution
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICR	International Conflict Resolution
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO(s)	International organisation(s)
IR	International Relations
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMEE	UN Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations came into being in 1945, following the devastation of the Second World War, with one central mission: the maintenance of international peace and security.¹

The economic and military destructions and political instability caused by the Second World War led to an awareness to prevent conflicts and problems from expanding to neighbouring regions and other areas and to provide world stability and security. In this perspective, the United Nations (UN) was established on the principles of San Francisco Conference on 24 October 1945. The UN is the intergovernmental organisation (IGO) which has the greatest number of member countries in the world and all member countries are supposed to fulfil the decisions and provisions of the UN so that diplomatic means and methods can work in interstate relations and international political balance can be ensured.

The nations of the world have always needed a regulatory IGO like the UN. Shimko emphasises the significance of interventions taking place under the auspices of international organisations (IOs) such as the UN as they increase legitimacy and reduce opportunities for abuse.² On the other hand, some UN operations such as peacekeeping operations targeting ethnic conflicts, which are the primary subjects in this study, have been controversial in world politics. Although the UN's intervention to ethnic conflicts is sometimes criticized by some scholars and diplomats in academic and diplomatic circles, the fact that the UN is the most eligible international organisation to intervene in ethnic conflicts has been proved in various cases.

The Cold War period and the post-Cold War period have remarkable political differences. While ideological differences played a decisive role in interstate relations in the Cold War period, cultural and ethnic differences have proved to be more dominant than ideological differences in interstate relations in the post-Cold War period. Based on this information, the UN has had more difficulty in managing the conflicts in the post-Cold War period than those in the Cold War period. This situation

¹ The United Nations, Maintain International Peace and Security, **What We Do**, 24.10.1945 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-international-peace-and-security/>, (12.05.2019)

² Keith Shimko, **International Relations Perspectives, Controversies and Readings**, Cengage Learning, Wadsworth, 2013.

affected the UN's peacekeeping operations negatively because the UN used its traditional approaches while dealing with the conflicts in the post-Cold War period. During the transition from the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period, the UN confronted a number of conflicts including the Somali Civil War, the Rwandan Genocide and the Yugoslavian Wars. Because the UN could not adapt itself to the coercive political conditions of the post-Cold War period, it failed to manage these three violent conflicts.

Brahimi Report, which emphasises the deficiencies of the UN in its peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, is in a way considered to be one of the indicators of the beginning of the post-Cold War period. The Brahimi Report provides the assessment of the setbacks of the UN peacekeeping missions held in the 1990s and calls for sincere and realistic recommendations to compensate for these failures. The Brahimi Report highlights the significance of involving regional and sub-regional organisations in order to restore a peaceful and secure atmosphere in conflicting regions.

The failures of the UN in its peacekeeping operations were firstly indicated in Brahimi Report with a special emphasis on the need for urgent change to make up for these failures. In the Brahimi Report, it was emphasised that the UN was in such a position that it could not protect its officers and troops assigned in peacekeeping operations in conflict areas and thus remained desperate against current developments. In the words of the 2000 Brahimi Report:

Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today. Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years.³

Lack of funds, equipment and personnel have been among the reasons underlying the failures of the UN. For example, in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone there

³ Lakhdar Brahimi, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, **The United Nations**, 21.08.2000, <https://undocs.org/A/55/305> (16.05.2019) p. 1.

were only five staff appointed in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to cope with 12.000 troops in the field.⁴

Another significant concept to be discussed in this thesis is conflict resolution. Based on the competitive human nature and commonness of conflicts in human life, we can understand that conflict resolution is quite necessary in coping with conflicts. Conflict resolution helps conflicting parties to agree with each other by providing the necessary conditions. It can also be adapted to all conflict levels and types, but there are significant differences in the application of conflict resolution methods to conflict levels and types. The term 'conflict resolution' is also used to define the resolution processes of conflicts in international relations and a good conflict resolution process needs time, good conflict management and conflict transformation processes. Conflict resolution is also used so as to include other broader concepts/processes such as conflict management and conflict transformation. Oliver Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall unveil the confusing terminology of these three concepts. According to these authors, conflict resolution is a more comprehensive term, which refers to the deep-rooted sources of conflicts. Conflict management, which is a more limited way of handling and containing violent conflict plays an important role to the whole range of positive conflict settlement. They define conflict transformation as an important step beyond conflict resolution which involves a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that lead to the reoccurrence of violence.⁵

Jacob Bercovitch, Kremenjuk and Zartman suggest that conflict resolution is associated with all aspects of conflicts, no matter within or between families, organisations, communities, or countries.⁶ Conflict resolution is also used as an alternative method to handle ethnic conflicts internationally. Conflict resolution is the third stage of conflict resolution process achieved following the diplomatic steps aimed at changing the approaches and attitudes of conflicting ethnic groups. At this stage, conflicting ethnic groups try to find out the most appropriate and useful solutions

⁴ The United Nations, "Brahimi Report" Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, **Conferences, Meetings and Events**, 13.11.2000, www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml (20.09.2018)

⁵ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, **Contemporary Conflict Resolution**, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2016, pp. 34-35.

⁶ Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenjuk and I. William Zartman, **The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution**, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles, 2009, (TSHCR), p. 15.

for their conflicts under the control of a third party. Third parties enable conflicting parties to reach solutions on their problems by finding a midpoint. According to Bercovitch and Jackson, conflict resolution has something to do with the following three principles: 1) to accept the presence of conflict, 2) to recognise the resolution possibilities of conflict and 3) to find a decent way of coordination without which these goals cannot be reached.⁷

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is another concept that the UN makes use of while intervening in problematic countries to prevent hot conflicts from transforming into ethnic cleansing or genocide. The UN fulfils R2P by arranging peacekeeping operations when humanitarian violations and crimes against humanity are observed in conflict areas. In this sense, we may conclude that Brahimi Report has led to R2P and that the UN deals with conflicts through the principles of R2P.

Nowadays, there is an increase in the number of nation-states and that cultural differences rather than ideological ones are determining in world politics. There are several elements such as the ability of solving problems, economic development, democracy and human rights levels and types of state administration which affect the emergence of intra-state conflicts. If countries have the following basic five democratic rights out of thirty rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), their possibilities of having intra-state conflicts will be decreased dramatically. These five rights are as follows: 1) The Right to Life, 2) Freedom of Thought, 3) The Right to Public Assembly, 4) The Right to Democracy and 5) No One Can Take Away Your Human Rights.⁸

Whereas the traditional approaches and methods of the UN are peacekeeping, negotiation and mediation, the new ones are preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, and nonofficial diplomacy. The UN had only been using its traditional approaches and methods in dealing with ethnic conflicts and other issues since its establishment. In time, it needed new approaches and methods because of the transition from the Cold-War period to the post-Cold War period and the changes in political conditions.

⁷ Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, **Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century Principles, Methods, And Approaches**, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2009, (CRTFC), p.1.

⁸ The United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, **Documents**, 10.12.1948, www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (22.09.2018)

The transition from the Cold-War period to the post-Cold War period and the changes in political conditions brought about new challenges in military and political issues. For this reason, the UN had to struggle with relevant issues in the Post-Cold War period by means of its new approaches and methods which provided the UN with an opportunity to be more dominant and active in dealing with problematic areas effectively. The UN mostly benefits from peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy in coping with ethnic conflicts.

The current peacekeeping operations by the UN are as follows: five of them are Asia and Middle East, seven of them are in Africa and one of them is in Balkan Peninsula/Europe. Having a look at the current numbers of the UN's Peacekeeping operations based on geographical regions and continents in the world, we may conclude that the UN conducts several peacekeeping operations in different countries throughout the world. In the light of these indicators, we may conclude that the economic, cultural, and political conditions of these three geographical regions have had a significant effect on the UN's peacekeeping operations.

Political groups coming into power in Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries have in general tended to take their opponents under pressure. As the focal point in this study is the UN peacekeeping operations in West Africa, the following three countries are chosen for analysis:

- United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (September 1993-September 1997) and United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (September 2003-March 2018)
- United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (July 1998-October 1999) and United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (October 1999-December 2005)
- United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) (May 2003-April 2004) and United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) (April 2004-June 2017)⁹

As these political issues in Africa challenged the stability and peace in the region, African countries became more subject to the military interventions of the UN and other IGOs. These countries which have suffered from ethnic conflicts and civil wars ever since, could not establish their economic and political systems appropriately.

⁹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Past Peacekeeping Operations, **Where We Operate**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations> (22.09.2018)

That is why, when compared to Asian countries, African countries have always been at a more difficult political position because of their worse economic conditions and more vulnerable political structures. All in all, African countries have suffered from several conflicts with different origins such as interstate, intrastate and ethnic conflicts because of not being able to complete their economic and political systems.

This study will focus on inter-state and intra-state conflicts and ethnic conflicts in Africa in the light of the UN's past and current peacekeeping operations by analysing the economic, political and cultural factors. While examining the UN's current peacekeeping operations and their effects on conflicting areas, there will also be an attempt to evaluate the UN's effectiveness by comparing the past and current UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. The UN is aware of the need that it should support African countries economically and politically to help them improve their economic and political infrastructure.

As the central focus in this study is peacekeeping, the definition of peace is significant. Hence, there will be an attempt to define the term 'peace' on the basis of the distinction between positive and negative peace. The distinction between these two concepts was first introduced by Johan Galtung, one of the founders and key figures in peace research. The concepts of positive and negative peace play an important role in analysing the conflicts in international relations. Johan Galtung makes a distinction between negative peace and positive peace by suggesting that negative peace is observed when there is no violence.¹⁰ He claims that negative peace does not necessarily have a negative meaning and that it is so called because something unwanted stopped happening.¹¹ On the other hand, positive peace has something to do with positive concepts such as the resolution of potential conflict and restoration of peace. Therefore, positive peace serves positive issues like the improvement of relationships and social systems so as to settle conflicts.¹² While negative peace means that the factors causing various problems between conflicting groups still exist and the possibility of hot conflict is still present, positive peace means that the factors causing

¹⁰ Johan Galtung, An Editorial, **Journal of Peace Research**, Vol.1, No.1, 1964, (AE), pp. 1-4.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Claske Dijkema, Negative versus Positive Peace, **Irenees.Net**, 01.05.2007, http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-notions-186_en.html (23.03.2019)

various problems between conflicting parties have completely ended and that there is no possibility of a hot conflict between them.¹³

This study highlights past peacekeeping operations in Africa with references to the roles of the UN, regional organisations, IGOs and international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs). It analyses the differences between past peacekeeping operations in Africa and their effects on the relevant countries. In order to analyse the differences and purposes between peacekeeping operations in Africa, economic, political and cultural conditions of relevant conflict areas will be taken into account.

Regarding thesis outline, the first chapter presents the conceptual structure so that further information on the assessment of the UN peacekeeping operations can be understood better. The first chapter reviews the key concepts on the subject. While doing so, the UN's empirical documents are used to support the arguments. The first chapter assesses the facilitating effects of international conflict resolution (ICR) on conflicts in international relations and the assessment of the UN intervention to such conflicts as a third party. While doing so, there is a special focus on peacekeeping as a traditional method of the UN intervention to ethnic conflicts. There is also the explanation of the reasons for the UN to be the most eligible third actor caring about the conflicts in international relations in a detailed way in the same chapter. The same chapter reviews the UN's roles in world politics with a special emphasis on the use of force and the Brahimi Report. The first chapter also provides detailed information on the evolution of peacekeeping as a traditional approach.

The second chapter of this thesis discusses the reasons why Africa is chosen by providing information on specific conflicts and associating them with economic, political and social problems in Africa. There is detailed information on ethnic conflicts as the major reason for intrastate wars in the three case studies was ethnic diversity, which in time led to ethnic conflicts. The same chapter also highlights some historic events such as decolonisation and the post-Cold War period to evaluate the underlying causes of the potential problems in West Africa. In the end of the chapter, there is the analysis of peacekeeping operations in Liberia to provide an overall assessment of the UN peacekeeping operations with respect to the economic, social and political conditions of conflicting areas. The reason why a single chapter is

¹³ Galtung, pp. 1-4.

devoted to the Liberian case is that Liberia remains the only West African country, which was not colonised. Moreover, Liberia was the first country among other relevant countries to suffer from intrastate conflict and to experience UN intervention via UNOMIL on September 1993. Liberian case study is assessed in three steps: background of the problem, the UN intervention, and the conclusion.

The third chapter presents detailed information on the other two case studies in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire respectively. The case studies are evaluated following the same steps as in the Liberian case study. Information on African Union (AU), the most important regional organisation in Africa, besides other regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) are provided by emphasising their highly influential roles in African politics in the same chapter.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the conclusion which presents an overall summary of this study. It also provides detailed analysis of three case studies based on their similarities and differences and gives me an opportunity to express my point of view over the assessment of the UN peacekeeping missions in relevant case studies.

This thesis aims at conducting an objective and scientific study on the assessment of the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa to cope with ethnic conflicts. Throughout this thesis, arguments will be supported with appropriate scientific methods. There are several academic studies on the UN and its peacekeeping operations calculating their effectiveness, which will shed light on the arguments. This thesis has a significant focus on the UN's intervention to the international conflicts as a third party. In order to understand the correlation between the UN peacekeeping operations and ethnic conflicts better, the forms of intervention by the UN to ethnic conflicts should be examined via the concepts provided in the first chapter. An analytical framework for the thesis is put forward reviewing the practical and theoretical benefits in the same chapter. The summary of the roles of the UN in intervention to ethnic conflicts highlights information on the missions and purposes of the UN peacekeeping operations.

This study utilises independent and dependent variables. While the independent variables in this study are a country's domestic context besides its

economic, political, and social conditions, the dependent variable in this study is the UN peacekeeping operations' impact in different contexts. This thesis focuses on peacekeeping, which is one of the most effective methods of the UN. The UN conducts several peacekeeping operations throughout the world to resolve the cases internationally. This study aims at assessing the UN's peacekeeping policies in the light of relevant cases. It benefits from different sources and concepts in the analysis of independent and dependent variables. For example, the rise of nationalism in Africa, economic, cultural and political factors in Africa, the important historical events such as the Second World War, the decolonisation, the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods and the empirical documents of the UN shape the dependent variables. In addition, the current policies of African countries, the increase in the number of nation-states in Africa, their lower economic development levels, the unstable political atmosphere leading to ethnic tension, the deficiencies in economic, sociological and political infrastructure respectively shed light on dependent variables in this study.

In addition to the UN peacekeeping as a focal point, the relations of the UN peacekeeping with new and other traditional approaches and methods are expressed in the first chapter. Generally speaking, this study benefits from the qualitative research method. The case studies in this study help reflect the political and periodic differences related to the UN peacekeeping operations. This research also utilises official diplomatic documents to strengthen the argument throughout the thesis via basic important international relations and conflict resolution concepts.

While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the legal base for the humanitarian dimension of the UN's peacekeeping operations, the Brahimi Report clarifies the features and purposes which contemporary peacekeeping operations should have within the most appropriate organisational structure. While the information on peacekeeping and ethnic conflict will be provided deductively, the analysis on whether the UN peacekeeping operations are effective or not will be done inductively in this study.

As the gist of the methodology in this study is to measure the effectiveness of the past UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, this may be achieved on the basis of the following criteria suggested on the UN peacekeeping website. The following factors among several others play a key role to contribute to the effectiveness of UN

peacekeeping operations. To begin with, a UN peacekeeping mission must be conducted on the basic three principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Next, the establishment of the political and peace process and the protection of civilians in relevant host country should be accomplished via the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Thirdly, the organisation of presidential and legislative elections or any referendum required should be provided. The last but not the least, the protection and promotion of human rights should be achieved via the restoration of the rule of law and state administration.¹⁴

Overall, this study attempts to find out whether the UN has a favourable role in managing ethnic conflicts in Africa. While doing so, it restricts the case studies so as to be able to evaluate the nature of relevant ethnic conflicts. This study also provides the comparative analysis of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa with a special reference to three case studies.

¹⁴ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our Successes, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 30.06.2017, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-successes> (30.09.2018)

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The major focus in this study is to assess the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations. While doing so, it needs to address some key words such as peacekeeping as a method utilised in ICR, UN peacekeeping as a kind of Third-Party Intervention and the UN as the third-party to the conflicts as they are basic elements comprising the UN peacekeeping operations. The main argument in this study is that all peacekeeping operations held to cope with ethnic conflicts are to be conducted by the UN.

1.1. THE UNITED NATIONS

We have a globalised and interconnected world today and the UN is an international organisation contributing to that in a great deal. The UN emerged on 24th October 1945 on the principles of San Francisco Conference in which Turkey was one of the signatory countries. As a matter of fact, the contributions of the UN to the world citizens make the UN an IGO, which has the greatest member countries in the world. Throughout this study, there is a special emphasis on the role of the UN in dealing with conflicts.¹⁵

The basic principles of the UN Charter have been an inspiration for many people. For example, the report ‘We the Peoples-The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century’ (also known as the Millennium Report) released by Kofi Annan at the end of March 2000, comprises a good sample for such inspiration.¹⁶ In that report, Annan emphasises the following six values: Freedom, Equity and Solidarity, Tolerance, Non-violence, Respect for Nature and Shared Responsibility.¹⁷ During an interview with Spiegel in 2010, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan points out that a progress report over the Millennium report reveals that there are still many

¹⁵ The United Nations, History of the United Nations, **About the UN**, 01.01.1942, www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/ (30.09.2018)

¹⁶ Kofi Annan, **We The Peoples-The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (Millennium Report of the Secretary-General)**, The United Nations General Secretariat, New York, 2000, (WTPT).

¹⁷ Ibid.

countries which are not carrying out their obligations to comply with the Millennium goals. On the other hand, Annan expresses his faith in world citizens to make their governments fulfil the Millennium Goals in the same interview.¹⁸ The success of UN peacekeeping operations may well have something to do with the fulfilment of these values as they contribute to the peace aimed by the UN peacekeeping operations. In contrast, the need for the UN to intervene in several conflicts reveals the fact that many countries have failed to fulfil the Millennium Goals.

The UN tries to prevent the conflicts experienced internationally from deteriorating by finding appropriate and effective solutions in accordance with human rights. The main purpose of the foundation of the UN was to prevent wars like the First and Second World Wars from expanding to neighbouring and other geographical regions of the world to protect world stability and peace by controlling conflicts in the areas where they occur. The UN needs to intervene in conflicts by taking decisions in its sub-organs which provide itself with political authorisations to be involved in conflicts via its traditional and new approaches and methods.

The major emphasis in this study is on ethnic conflicts. In this perspective, the UN is the most eligible IGO to intervene in ethnic conflicts because it is believed that the UN is effective in dealing with different kinds of conflicts experienced internationally. As mentioned above, the UN was established at the end of the Second World War to resolve conflicts between nations. As a matter of fact, the major motivation behind its establishment was to compensate for the failure of the League of Nations (LoN), which could not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War.¹⁹ Even though the intervention forms of the UN are debated in terms of the sovereignty rights of all countries, the absolute authority of the UN on all member countries is still recognised by all countries.

Because the UN needs to deal with several dimensions of world matters, it has six sub-organs regarding different dimensions of world matters including ethnic conflicts and other events and these six sub-organs are assigned to take decisions on

¹⁸ Petra Bornhöft, Kofi Annan on the UN Millennium Goals: The People 'Will Force their Governments to Act', **Spiegel Online**, 20.09.2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/kofi-annan-on-the-un-millennium-goals-the-people-will-force-their-governments-to-act-a-718424.html> (24.03.2019)

¹⁹ Khan Academy, The United Nations, **Arts and Humanities**, 01.09.2008, <https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/rise-to-world-power/us-wwii/a/the-united-nations> (01.10.2018)

their interest areas. As indicated on the UN's website, the six sub-organs of the UN are: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice (ICJ) and United Nations Secretariat.²⁰

While these six sub-organs of the UN have particular effects on decision-making mechanism of the UN; UN Secretariat, UNGA and UNSC are more dominant sub-organs of UN in decision-making processes on the UN's intervention to ethnic conflicts as a third party. Etain Tannam points out that the UN Secretariat's main function is to mediate between conflicting parties via diplomacy in order to resolve a conflicting situation.²¹ Although the UNSC has only 15 member countries including five permanent member countries and temporary two-yearly elected 10 member countries coming from different continents and geographical regions in the world, UNSC is the primary sub-organ of UN which discusses proposals regarding current world affairs and follows the flows of relevant proposals. For this reason, as understood from its name, UNSC is the most authorised sub-organ of UN in security subjects. The proposals on current world affairs are firstly discussed in UNSC and the proposals approved by at least 60 percent majority (nine member countries) of UNSC on the principle that permanent five member countries of UNSC do not use veto rights are transferred to UNGA.

In the second stage, the relevant proposals which are transferred from UNSC meet with all member countries of the UN. In this way, all member countries participate in decision-making processes regarding proposals and international dialogue and discussion platform emerge in the UNGA. The proposals regarding current world affairs are supposed to be approved by at least 66 percent majority of UNGA. The proposals approved by at least 66 percent majority of UNGA are finally legalised. On the other hand, proposals regarding other affairs require simple majority.²² The UN Secretariat especially takes important responsibilities in determining UN's agendas and conducting legalised proposals.

²⁰ The United Nations, n.d.

²¹ Etain Tannam, **International Intervention in Ethnic Conflict: A Comparison of the European Union and the United Nations**, Kindle Edition, Palgrave Macmillan UK, Hampshire, 2014.

²² The United Nations, Functions and Powers of the General Assembly, **About**, 24.10.1945, <http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml> (24.03.2019)

1.1.1. The United Nations Security Council

The UNSC is responsible for maintaining international peace and security and all UN members must consent to agree and fulfil the decisions taken by the UNSC under Article 25 of the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the UN Charter has a special focus on the peaceful resolution of conflicts without using force. Chapter VI specifies a wide range of techniques to be used as a means of peaceful settlement such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or other peaceful means.²³ Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on the other hand, authorises the UNSC to determine the source of any threat to the international peace and security and make all UN members take enforcement measures such as economic sanctions or the use of armed force.²⁴

The UNSC made use of peaceful resolution techniques under Chapter VI to deal with many conflicts on its agenda during the Cold War period. There were only two occasions before 1990 when the UNSC had to use its enforcement powers under Chapter VII.²⁵ On the other hand, the UNSC used peaceful resolution means to respond to several conflicts under Chapter VI before 1992. Currently, the UNSC mostly uses enforcement measures to respond to relevant disputes on its agenda under Chapter VII.²⁶

The formation of new UN Peacekeeping missions by the UNSC normally takes place on the basis of the following criteria. To begin with, initial consultation takes place when the UN has consultation from several actors such as all relevant UN actors, the relevant host government and the parties in the field, UN member states besides the ones that can contribute to the peacekeeping missions, regional and other intergovernmental organisations, or any other relevant actors. Based on this information, the UNSC determines the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission.²⁷

Technical field assessment is the second phase which takes place when the UN Secretariat deploys a technical assessment mission to the country or territory in question. The technical field assessment mission involves the overall evaluation of

²³ The United Nations, Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes, **Charter of the United Nations**, 24.10.1945, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html> (24.03.2019)

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Karen A Mingst and Margaret P Karns, **The United Nations in the Twenty-First Century**, 4th Edition, Westview Press, Boulder, 2012, p. 31.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. pp. 31 - 35.

military, political, humanitarian and human rights circumstances in the field. Based on the information provided by the technical field assessment, the UN Secretary-General is supposed to issue a report to the UNSC. This report includes options for a potential UN peacekeeping mission with special reference to the mission's size, resources and estimated cost.²⁸

Security Council resolution is the next step which takes place once the Security Council determines to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission, which is authorised via a resolution. The resolution includes all details such as the mission's mandate, size and potential cost.²⁹

Appointment of senior officials is the next step which takes place when senior officials such as relevant mission's Force Commander and Police Commissioner, and senior civilian personnel are appointed by the Secretary-General. The Head of Mission who is supposed to direct the UN peacekeeping operation is generally appointed by the Secretary-General. DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have the responsibility for employing the civilian staff of the potential UN peacekeeping operation.³⁰

Planning for the political, military, operational and support aspects of the UN peacekeeping operations in question are administered by the Head of Mission, DPKO and DFS. The planning phase requires the foundation of a mutual working group located at the Headquarters or a coordinated operation task unit with relevant UN departments, programmes and funds.³¹

Deployment of relevant UN peacekeeping mission takes place on as soon as the previous steps are fulfilled and the political and security circumstances in the field are taken into consideration. The relevant operation is generally initiated by an advance team which is responsible for setting up mission headquarters.³²

As the UN has no army or police force of its own, UN member states are supposed to provide the needed military and police staff for each mission. In other

²⁸ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Forming A New Operation, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/forming-new-operation> (24.03.2019)

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Mingst and Karns, p.134.

³² The United Nations Peacekeeping, Forming A New Operation. **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/forming-new-operation> (25.03.2019)

words, they need to take initiative in the recruitment of peacekeepers. The UN peacekeepers wear the uniforms of their native countries apart from a UN blue helmet or beret and a badge, which signals their identification as UN peacekeepers. On the other hand, the recruitment of international civilian personnel is fulfilled by the UN Secretariat.³³

The Secretary-General is responsible for reporting to the Security Council by preparing reports concerning the details of the operation on a regular basis. The Security Council decides on either renewing or adjusting the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission based on the evaluation of the reports by the Secretary General.³⁴

1.2. CONFLICT RESOLUTION

As the UN peacekeeping operations aim at resolving conflicts, the definition of conflict is prioritised in this study. As Ramsbotham et al point out, conflict is a universal trait of human society which may have different origins such as economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organisation.³⁵ Morton Deutsch et al argue that conflicts can take place between individuals and within or between groups or nations.³⁶ Unlike the common belief, M. Afzalur Rahim claims that there is not a fixed meaning of conflict and thus it cannot simply be defined as an interactive situation when incompatibility, disagreements, or dissonance occurs within or between social elements.³⁷ According to Rahim, a conflict occurs when it goes beyond the threshold level of severity even before the conflicting parties encounter or notice it.³⁸

Regarding the background of conflict resolution, Ramsbotham, et al suggest that conflict resolution first emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, at the height of the Cold

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ramsbotham et al, p. 9.

³⁶ Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman and Eric C. Marcus, **The Hand Book of Conflict Resolution-Theory and Practice**, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2006, p. 533.

³⁷ M Afzalur Rahim, **Managing Conflict in Organizations**, Quorum Books, London, 2001, p. 32.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 19.

War period, when human beings were being threatened by the development of nuclear weapons and the potential conflict between the superpowers.³⁹

According to Peter Wallensteen, there are seven ways to resolve a conflict. To begin with, the warring parties can change their priorities, which may help the other party to reciprocate. This also provides party leaders with a chance to alter their targets based on the results of the elections in a democratic system.⁴⁰ The second way is that while the parties do not quit their priorities, they may still negotiate a way regarding the division of the resources.⁴¹ Thirdly, the parties may try out horse-trading, which means that each party satisfies their demands on different issues. This may also be called a compromise as while one party satisfies their demands on one issue, the other does so on another.⁴² The fourth way refers to the shared control, which often takes place in a coalition government, where the consent of both parties is essential.⁴³ The fifth way refers to externalising control, which means that when the warring parties cannot negotiate over the use of the resources themselves, they may need to leave the control to an external power.⁴⁴ The sixth way is to make use of conflict resolution mechanisms, particularly arbitration or other methods on which all parties can negotiate. Making use of a legal mechanism could be beneficial as it works on the principle of neutrality.⁴⁵ The seventh way is to delay the disputes to a later period or even to oblivion. By doing so, some matters may benefit from being postponed, as their importance can fade away in time.⁴⁶

Conflict resolution theoretically refers to the resolution processes of conflicts. According to Taras and Ganguly, it is very important to control and eventually resolve conflict in a quick and peaceful way so that it will not turn into deadly violence.⁴⁷

³⁹ Ramsbotham et al, p. 5.

⁴⁰ Peter Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, 2nd edition, SAGE Publications, London, 2002, p. 54.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 54-55.

⁴² Ibid. p. 55.

⁴³ Toni Pfanner, Interview with Peter Wallensteen, **International Review of the Red Cross**, Vol. 91, No. 873, 2009.

⁴⁴ Peter Wallensteen, **Understanding Conflict Resolution**, 4th Edition, SAGE Publications, London, 2015, p. 57.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 58.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, **Understanding Ethnic Conflict**, 4th Edition, Routledge, New York, 2016, p. 86.

While fulfilling the resolution processes of conflicts, different CR methods differing from courts because of their unique features are used.⁴⁸ Conflict resolution is a field of study involving conflicting parties to solve their problems via third-party intervention. Because the decision-making process of conflict resolution requires the consents of conflicting parties, the voluntary participation of conflicting parties to the meetings of conflict resolution methods enables conflict resolution to work better. The major three conflict resolution strategies used to settle the conflicts between or within states are peacekeeping, peace-making and peacebuilding respectively.

1.2.1. Peacekeeping

As peacekeeping, the initial stage in conflict resolution, is the focal point in this study, there is a broad review of it in the rest of the chapter under the heading of the UN and peacekeeping. On the other hand, information on peace-making and peacebuilding is provided below.

1.2.2. Peace-Making

Peace-making, which is often conducted by an international third-party is regarded as a political-diplomatic activity. According to Taras and Ganguly, the objective of peace-making is to convince the leaders of the conflicting parties to participate in conflict resolution process via negotiations.⁴⁹ The writers add that peace-making aims at convincing the leaders of conflicting parties to sign a peace agreement by either inducing or coercing them. In peace-making process, an international third-party has the role of an intermediary making use of arbitration, mediation and facilitation. Arbitration refers to conflict resolution process involving the participation of a third party in order to convince the conflicting parties to reach an agreement when they cannot do this by themselves.⁵⁰ Mediation by an international third party, on the other hand, enables the adversaries to begin political dialogue in order to evaluate the current situation from each other's point of view.⁵¹ In other words, international mediators can cause a difference in the way conflicting parties perceive each other.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid. pp. 87-90.

⁵⁰ Christopher W. Moore, **The Mediation Process**, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2014, p.10.

⁵¹ Taras and Ganguly, pp.87-90.

Facilitation, on the other hand, is the process when the international third party facilitates the interaction between the parties by provoking their creative thinking. In other words, facilitation which is a cooperative and non-coercive method, helps the adversaries to find a self-sustaining settlement.⁵²

According to Stephen Ryan, a conflict resolution strategy without peace-making would not be efficient as the perceived conflicts of interest leading to the disputes would not be settled down then.⁵³ He points out that peace-making, which is often used in the resolution of ethnic conflicts, focuses on political elites and that has a tendency to neglect grass-roots action. Ryan adds that any settlement of violence without peace-making would be short lived.⁵⁴ He, therefore, concludes that ineffective peace-making is likely to undermine both peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes as when elites are not ready to negotiate over the disputes with other parties, they may be suspicious of ordinary people and avoid having contacts with them. Hence, elites may even either block any interaction attempts or show reaction against those intermediaries of international communities.⁵⁵ The UN makes use of arbitration, mediation and facilitation as conflict resolution tools during a peace-making process in international diplomacy.

1.2.3. Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding simply refers to the capability of a community to cope with conflict via non-violent means.⁵⁶ As a matter of fact, peacebuilding has something to do with making various actors from both outside and inside a conflict get involved in the process of rebuilding a country.⁵⁷ Peacebuilding is an aspect of conflict resolution which focuses on the restoration of war-torn societies. Taras and Ganguly point out that peacebuilding is administered by an international third party and aims at masses with the objectives of cultivating mutual understanding among conflicting parties,

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Stephen Ryan, **Ethnic Conflict and International Relations**, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Aldershot, 1995, (ECIR), pp.98-123.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ International Organization for Peacebuilding, What is Peacebuilding, **What We Do**, 01.05.1994, <https://www.interpeace.org/what-we-do/what-is-peacebuilding/> (27.03.2019)

⁵⁷ Ibid.

restoration of societies collapsed by wars and the development of such communities socioeconomically.⁵⁸ The writers also argue that the success of peacebuilding activities depend on the financial resources of the international third party along with its patience and determination in what is supposed to be an exhausting process.⁵⁹

The failures encountered in coping with conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia signalled the urgent need for the institutionalisation of peacebuilding in the UN system. Ramsbotham et al point out that there were also two reports in favour of the advancement of peacebuilding. These two reports were as follows respectively: the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December 2004 and Kofi Annan's In Larger Freedom in March 2005.⁶⁰ Eventually, the World Summit agreed to set up a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), an advisory intergovernmental unit in the UN System, in September 2005.⁶¹ It aims at coming up with strategies to be used in post-conflict peacebuilding process and helping bring together relevant parties of a conflict.⁶² Ramsbotham et al highlight that the PBC was mandated to arrange operations on three conditions: to begin with, to provide consultancy via integrated strategies during post-conflict peacebuilding and restoration; secondly, to provide finance for the restoration in short term and sustained resources in the long term; finally, to help advanced peacebuilding operations in cooperation with the actors from several occupational areas such as political, security and humanitarian.⁶³

Ramsbotham et al highlight that the PBC comprises of an organisational committee with thirty-one members, backed by a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), located in the UN Secretariat in New York, and a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).⁶⁴ The PBC's initial operations were to evaluate Peacebuilding requirements in Sierra Leone and Burundi in October 2006 and the PBC had already taken an active role in promoting peace processes in twelve active projects such as the Central African

⁵⁸ Taras and Ganguly, pp.88-90.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ramsbotham et al, p.269.

⁶¹ The United Nations, The United Nations Security Council, **About the Council**, 24.10.1945, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/peacebuilding-commission> (28.03.2019)

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ramsbotham et al, pp.266-269.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Kenya, the Comoros Islands, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Nepal by late 2009. Despite over 100 challenging projects conducted in these twelve countries, the budget set aside for peacebuilding was only \$165 million.⁶⁵

Mingst and Karns sum up the major aims of peacebuilding as follows: to rebuild and train police and judiciary, organise elections and promote civil society, and repatriate refugees.⁶⁶ They point out that the PBC works in cooperation with the governments of several countries on its agenda to consolidate peace. They emphasise that the fund, PBF, even backs projects in non-PBC countries where the potential problems are likely to turn into conflicts.⁶⁷ The fund also contributes to the implementation of peace agreements besides empowering peacebuilding attempts.⁶⁸

In the report, 'No Exit without Strategy', the UN Secretary-General also stresses the importance of peacebuilding in conflict resolution by listing three goals to be fulfilled in order to achieve comprehensive peacebuilding as follows: consolidating internal and external security; strengthening political institutions by increasing effectiveness and participation; promoting economic and social reconstruction.⁶⁹

1.3. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

'As conflicts become more complex, 'mediation is no longer an option; it is a necessity.'

The United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres

Resolving or handling conflicts in international arena is very important and the UN as a global IGO plays an important role in fulfilling this target. As the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres expressed in his address to the UNSC, ICR is no longer an option but a must.⁷⁰ Having said so, the Secretary General emphasised the

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Mingst and Karns, pp.115-135.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, **An Agenda for Peace in 1992**, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, New York, 1992.

⁷⁰ The United Nations News, As conflicts become more complex, 'mediation is no longer an option; it is a necessity', UN chief tells Security Council, **Peace and Security**, 29.08.2018, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/08/1018012> (31.03.2019)

significance of diplomacy for peace via mediation means.⁷¹ There are both traditional and modern approaches to manage a conflict. Traditional approaches include: negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping. On the other hand, new approaches include: preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention and nonofficial diplomacy.

Conflicts can be encountered in all relationships, organisations, and states. According to Christopher W. Moore, conflict should not necessarily be regarded as bad, abnormal, or dysfunctional as it is a fact of life. Moore argues that the negative and destructive dynamics of conflict emerge when conflict loses the aspect of a competitive behaviour and starts giving physical or psychological harm to other people, groups or communities.⁷²

ICR which deals with international conflicts is a specialised sub-field of CR. The focal point in my thesis is conflicts in international relations. As CR refers to the resolution process of local conflicts in all conflict levels, ICR refers to the resolution process of international conflicts at different conflict levels. According to Cate Malek, the term ‘international conflict resolution’ refers to conflicts between different nation-states, and conflicts between people and organisations in different nation-states.⁷³ Cate Malek also adds that the term ‘ICR’ may be applied to intergroup conflicts in a country when one group is fighting for independence or better social, political or economic power, as observed in Iraq, Syria, Sudan and South Sudan.⁷⁴

The UN used to apply traditional approaches and methods to deal with interstate conflicts before the Post-Cold War period. However, the changing world conditions and the newly faced conflicts in international arena led the UN to seek new approaches and methods in the Post-Cold War period.

As Ramsbotham et al point out, the number of interstate conflicts was at its peak in the Cold War period. That was when the development of nuclear weapons and conflicts between the superpowers threatened the humanity.⁷⁵ On the contrary, the closing years of the Cold War period witnessed a dramatically different climate for conflict resolution. That is, by the improved relations between the superpowers and

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Moore, p. ix.

⁷³ Cate Malek, International Conflict, **Beyond Intractability**, 01.05.2013, <https://www.beyondintractability.org/coreknowledge/international-conflict>, (18.05.2019).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ramsbotham et al, pp. 5-7.

decrease in the number of ideological and military challenges triggering several regional conflicts, there was a radical progress in international relations. Ramsbotham et al also argue that the number of internal conflicts, ethnic conflicts, conflicts over secession, and power struggles within countries has increased in the 1990s.⁷⁶

Ethnic conflicts reflect the conflicts caused by cultural and ethnic differences. When compared to interstate conflicts, managing intrastate and ethnic conflicts may be more difficult. For this reason, the UN has begun using the new approaches in the Post-Cold War period. As a matter of fact, the UN makes use of both traditional and new approaches to deal with conflicts in the international arena. The UN's traditional approaches include peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation. On the other hand, the UN's new approaches are preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, nonofficial diplomacy and reconciliation.

Although the capability of a country to administer crises has something to do with the background and severity of conflicts, the countries with better economic situations and higher democracy and human rights levels are observed to be more successful at administering crises.⁷⁷ Value-based conflicts may be more destructive and violent than interest-based conflicts. The reason for this argument is that while interest-based conflicts are related to economic and political concerns, value-based conflicts have something to do with people's emotions, cultural elements, and historical feuds. That is why, third parties taking part in the resolution of ethnic conflicts try to seek interest-based solutions so that conflicting ethnic groups can be more willing to cooperate in resolution process.

Another dimension of conflict resolution is based on multi-track diplomacy, which can simply be defined as an abstract means to assess the concept of international peace-making as a living system.⁷⁸ Multi-track diplomacy involves various sectors of a community to cooperate in order to fulfil a peaceful atmosphere.⁷⁹ In this perspective, the UN works with international nongovernmental and regional organisations.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Dan Reiter, *Democratic Peace Theory*, **Oxford Bibliographies**, 25.10.2012, www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml (08.10.2018)

⁷⁸ US Legal, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, **Legal Definitions**, 01.01.1997 <https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/multi-track-diplomacy/> (29.03.2019)

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Nonofficial diplomacy can also play an important role in conflict resolution process. It can better be practised in conflicting societies via the following supportive elements such as religious communities and societal organisations which have positive effects on conflict resolution process. Such organisations can contribute to conflict resolution education programs and conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

There are several nongovernmental organisations in Africa which help to resolve conflicts with various sources by involving all portions of conflicting ethnic groups to the resolution process. This study focuses on the role of AU which is a regional organisation with a significant role in conflict resolution process. As a matter of fact, not only regional organisations but also INGOs play an important role in relevant conflict resolution processes in Africa. As a matter of fact, as Africa has unique economic, cultural and political conditions, the UN in addition to the regional organisations and INGOs is also supposed to take part in conflict resolution processes in Africa to gain ultimate success.

1.4. THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION

Third-party intervention basically aims at achieving a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflicts between two parties. As Taras and Ganguly highlight, third-party intervention can be defined as follows: “the intervention into a dispute of a person or an agency whose purpose it is to act as an instrument for bringing about a peaceful settlement to that dispute, while creating structures whereby the foundations of a lasting settlement can be laid”.⁸⁰ Third-party intervention is required when conflicting parties cannot solve their problems via their own efforts. Third parties help conflicting parties to agree with each other by changing their perceptions and ideas on their problems and creating new concrete interests to make them participate in CR processes.

Another condition for third-party intervention to be more effective is that all conflicting parties should accept the relevant IO, IGO or INGO as a third party. The roles of third parties in ICR methods are similar to those in ADR methods. Third parties can have different roles such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, negotiator or reconciliator depending on the ADR methods used. Third parties mostly create

⁸⁰ Taras and Ganguly, p.86

concrete interests to persuade the conflicting parties to meet by means of CR methods. In this way, conflicting parties may have the motivation to participate in the meetings. On the other hand, Christopher W. Moore argues that in addition to the competing or contradictory needs and interests, the conflicting parties may have compatible needs.⁸¹ He adds that the identification of such common interests is so important as it may facilitate the cooperation in conflict resolution process.⁸² Moore also emphasises that the identification of common needs and interests enables the conflicting parties to fulfil their expectations mutually.⁸³

The characteristics of third parties are so important. In this study, there is a special emphasis on the UN as a legitimate third party in the UN peacekeeping operations held to cope with ethnic conflicts. The way the UN is considered to be one of the most respected international organisations mainly relies on its unique legitimacy which is reflected in the decisions of the UNSC. The legitimacy of the UN also depends on the fact that it is the only international organisation with the greatest member states. The reason why the UN is mostly preferred as a third party among the other alternatives is that the UN is considered to be the most eligible IGO as a third party dealing with the conflicts in international relations because of several reasons such as its historical background, experience and significant effect on the member countries and most importantly, being impartial. This is an argument which echoes by Ryan (1995, p. 157), who claims that the UN can play a more constructive third-party role than the government of the multi-ethnic state itself or other states as the government of the state experiencing ethnic conflict often turns out to be a party to that conflict, or somehow fails to devise the necessary strategies to reduce ethnic violence.

1.5. THE UN AND PEACEKEEPING

The UN has made use of its traditional approaches such as peacekeeping, mediation and negotiation since its establishment in 1945. Although mediation and negotiation can be used to resolve various kinds of conflicts, peacekeeping can only

⁸¹ Moore, p.127

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

be used to resolve conflicts between or within states. The major emphasis in this study is on peacekeeping, which is one of the traditional approaches and methods that the UN uses besides negotiation and mediation. Peacekeeping has been used to settle conflicts between countries within the concept of ICR since 1956 while negotiation and mediation have been applied to settle conflicts between countries for hundreds of years. While peacekeeping has a protective feature, negotiation and mediation have a curative feature. Bercovitch et al emphasise the curing function of peacekeeping operations by saying that they prevent the recurrence of a conflict.⁸⁴

The evolution of peacekeeping is of vital importance as it sheds light on why the UN Peacekeeping operations have been effective or not. The first peacekeeping operation by the UNSC involved the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East in 1948.⁸⁵ The reason for this operation was to observe the ceasefire period between Israel and its Arab neighbouring countries. This operation is called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).⁸⁶

Peacekeeping as a traditional approach has been applied in several operations to deal with conflicts by the UN since its foundation. The first two peacekeeping operations were UNTSO and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). UNTSO, which was set up in May 1948, was the first peacekeeping operation administered by the UN.⁸⁷ Since then, the UN have maintained UNTSO military observers in the Middle East to help with the monitoring of ceasefires, the supervision of armistice agreements and provide assistance to other peacekeeping operations in order to bring stability in the region. On the other hand, UNMOGIP, which was responsible for the supervision of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, arrived in relevant region on 24 January of 1949.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Bercovitch et al, (TSHCR), p.535

⁸⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our History, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (02.04.2019)

⁸⁶ The Better World Campaign (BWC), Background, **Middle East (UNTSO)**, 29.05.1948, <https://betterworldcampaign.org/u-n-peacekeeping/middle-east-untso/> (09.05.2019)

⁸⁷ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our History, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (29.03.2019)

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Stephen Ryan draws the framework for conflict resolution in a simple way. He claims that when the problem is violent behaviour, the strategy to be applied is peacekeeping (military activity), targeting armed groups (warriors).⁸⁹ When the problem is perceived incompatibility of interests, the strategy to be applied is Peacemaking, targeting decision-makers (leaders).⁹⁰ On the other hand, when the problem is negative attitudes and socio-economic structures, the strategy to be applied is peacebuilding, targeting ordinary people (followers).⁹¹

As Taras and Ganguly put forward, the end of Cold War triggered the number of UN's peacekeeping operations, which can be divided into three categories.⁹² The first category comprises of Peacekeeping operations attempting to control unresolved conflicts between states such as the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq (1988-1991).⁹³ The second category comprises of Peacekeeping operations aiming at the implementation of already negotiated settlements of long-lasting conflicts such as those in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola.⁹⁴ The third category includes the Peacekeeping operations targeting the management of hot ethnic conflicts such as those in Somalia, Rwanda and Congo.⁹⁵

Although UN peacekeeping seems to be the most effective means to deal with conflicts in international arena, it still has some drawbacks. Stephen Ryan points out that as UN peacekeeping forces are not enforcement forces and that they only have small unarmed units, they depend on the cooperation of the conflicting parties in order to be efficient.⁹⁶ That is, if one or more parties deteriorates the current situation by escalating the violence, there is almost nothing that UN Peacekeeping forces can do to prevent them. For example, there was not much the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) could do to prevent the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982.⁹⁷

⁸⁹ Ryan, ECIR, p.104

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Taras and Ganguly, p.93

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ryan, ECIR, p.188

⁹⁷ Associated Press, UN: Lebanon, Israel at Risk of Renewed Conflict, **Voanews**, 30.08.2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-lebanon-israel-at-risk-of-renewed-conflict/4551901.html> (30.03.2019)

According to Stephen Ryan, there are three problems that could prevent the UN peacekeeping forces from being effective and by adding that the first problem is observed in the issues of preparation.⁹⁸ In several missions, the UN forces were not deployed soon enough to implement a ceasefire agreement. Ryan claims that the second problem is caused by lack of an efficient financial system to support the UN peacekeeping missions and he emphasises that several peacekeeping operations which were funded efficiently are still observed to be in deficit on the UN documents.⁹⁹ Ryan argues that the third factor leading to the ineffective UN peacekeeping operations is that the UN does not provide any formal training for military staff in UN Peacekeeping missions and that the training of military staff in UN peacekeeping operations are up to the contributing governments. That is why, while some contributing governments provide training for soldiers, the others refuse to do so.¹⁰⁰

Peacekeeping is applied as an improvised mode of CR and the initial version of peacekeeping is called traditional peacekeeping which was applied in missions between 1948 and 1988. Taras and Ganguly highlight that despite temporary advantages such as short phases of relief from the ongoing conflicts in some missions, most UN peacekeeping operations failed to provide long-lasting peace.¹⁰¹ The authors mention the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960, when the crumbling state authority led to the outbreak of conflict.¹⁰² They say that the fighting in the country continued for the next three years in spite of the presence of the UN peacekeepers.¹⁰³

The UN peacekeeping originated during the period when Cold War rivalries made the UNSC powerless.¹⁰⁴ The motivation behind the early peacekeeping operations was only to maintain the armistice period and provide a peaceful atmosphere to resolve the relevant conflict in the field.¹⁰⁵ Generally speaking, the peacekeeping operations held in the early years of UN peacekeeping history are called first-generation or traditional peacekeeping missions having mainly a limited

⁹⁸ Ryan, ECIR, 1995, pp.187-189

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Taras and Ganguly, pp.92-93

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ramsbotham et al, p.175

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

motivation besides unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops aiming at monitoring and reporting of the operations so as to build a peaceful atmosphere in the conflict areas.¹⁰⁶ Despite all the drawbacks encountered in peacekeeping operations deployed by the UN, the UN restored its positive reputation by the end of the Cold War period.¹⁰⁷ The UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, which was a significant indicator of the common trust in peacekeeping forces.¹⁰⁸

By the end of the Cold-War period, the UN traditional peacekeeping operations with monitoring tasks requiring unarmed or lightly military personnel turned into complex multidimensional missions involving several actors such as administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers and communications and public information experts. As the nature of conflicts had altered in time, UN peacekeeping which basically targeted inter-state conflicts had to deal with intra-State conflicts and civil wars as well. As a result, the Post-Cold War peacekeeping missions had to conduct several complex tasks such as assisting in building institutions of governance and security sector reforms, observing human rights and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants. The major motivation behind these missions was to implement long-lasting peace agreements so as to provide sustainable peace.¹⁰⁹

The second generation or phase of peacekeeping practised between 1989 and 1994 is called humanitarian intervention. It mainly involved humanitarian and security issues with political targets.¹¹⁰ There was a sharp increase both in the number of peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers during relevant period. While the number of missions in this period had reached 20, the number of peacekeepers had reached from 11.000 to 75.000.¹¹¹ Some of the operations conducted during that period were

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ The United Nations, United Nations and the Nobel Peace Prize, **About the UN**, 12.10.2001, <https://www.un.org/en/sections/nobel-peace-prize/united-nations-and-nobel-peace-prize/> (04.04.2019)

¹⁰⁸ The Nobel Prize, The Nobel Peace Prize 1988 was awarded to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.", **The Nobel Peace Prize 1988**, 29.09.1988, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1988/summary/> (02.04.2019)

¹⁰⁹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our History, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (18.05.2019)

¹¹⁰ Ramsbotham et al, p.176

¹¹¹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our History, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (02.04.2019)

Cambodia-UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Angola-UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) and UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) and Mozambique-UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). The operations held in that period basically had the following targets:¹¹²

- Assisting in implementing peace agreements;
- Balancing the security situation;
- Providing the reorganisation of military and police;
- Electing new governments and helping the institutionalisation of democracy.

The turn of the 21st century refers to the period when the UN had to undergo some reforms in order to compensate for the setbacks of the operations in the 1990s.¹¹³ The motivation behind the reforms was to regain the favourable reputation of UN peacekeeping operations in the light of the challenges experienced during the period in question. These reforms basically involved enforcing the capacity of the UN so as to be able to fulfil the demand for more complex missions.¹¹⁴ This period was initiated in 1999 when the UN had the role of the administrator for both Kosovo in the Former Yugoslavia-UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)¹¹⁵ and in East Timor (now Timor-Leste)-UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the process of obtaining independence from Indonesia.¹¹⁶ The UN Security Council conducted complex Peacekeeping operations in several African countries such as Burundi-UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)¹¹⁷, Chad and the Central African Republic-UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)¹¹⁸ and

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Sebastian Von Einsiedel, David M. Malone and Bruno S. Ugarte, **The UN Security Council in the 21st Century**, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2015, p.2

¹¹⁴ Ibid. pp.2-5

¹¹⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Fact Sheet, **Where We Operate**, 10.06.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmik> (04.04.2019)

¹¹⁶ The United Nations Peacekeeping, The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), **Completed Peacekeeping Operations**, 30.08.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/etimor/etimor.htm> (04.04.2019)

¹¹⁷ The United Nations Peacekeeping, The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), **Completed Peacekeeping Operations**, 21.05.2004, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onub/> (04.04.2019)

¹¹⁸ The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Closure of MINURCAT, **Home**, 31.12.2010, <https://minurcat.unmissions.org/> (04.04.2019)

Eritrea/Ethiopia-UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)¹¹⁹ in the following years. Most of the operations including the ones mentioned above have now been concluded. The first decade of the 21st century was when the UN Security Council had to manage more complex operations in faraway geographies with unstable political structures.¹²⁰

Third-generation operations, on the other hand, are often called peace support operations (PSOs), or, simply 'peace operations' so as to emphasise their distinction with traditional peacekeeping operations.¹²¹ The key difference between the second and third generations of peacekeeping is that the basis of humanitarian intervention is gradually consolidated in the latter. Peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention provide other international actors such as regional organisations and coalitions of willing states with an opportunity to participate in the UN's operations. Although the functioning of peacekeeping matches with both traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, the ideal version of peacekeeping to cope with interstate conflicts still remains to be traditional peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping relies on the three principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force, which must be preserved at all costs.¹²² These principles make the UN an outstanding actor and traditional peacekeeping an efficient method in dealing with conflicts between states.

The UN is currently in charge of 14 peacekeeping operations with a total number of 110.000 military, police and civilian personnel involved in the continuing missions aiming at securing some areas stricken by conflict by at least stopping violence and oppression via negative peace.¹²³ The current peacekeeping operations of the UN are as follows: Five operations in Asia and Middle East, seven operations in Africa, one operation in Balkans and Europe and one operation in North America.¹²⁴ The significant decrease in the numbers of both operations and the personnel involved in these operations reveals the fact that the challenges threatening the UN are

¹¹⁹ The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea is withdrawn, **About**, 30.07.2008, <https://unmee.unmissions.org/mandate> (04.04.2019)

¹²⁰ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our History, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (04.04.2019)

¹²¹ Ramsbotham et al, p.174

¹²² Mingst and Karns, p.114

¹²³ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Where We Operate, **Home**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate> (30.03.2019)

¹²⁴ Ibid.

decreasing. On the other hand, the occurrence of new conflicts threatening boundaries domestically or universally confirms the essential need for the UN to continue with its peacekeeping operations. The concept of peacekeeping has so far changed in such a way that peacekeeping operations today, referring to third-generation peacekeeping, serve a multidimensional task aiming at several duties such as the protection of civilians, the provision of assistance in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, the enhancement of human rights and reestablishment of rule of law.¹²⁵

Peacekeepers act as mediators trying to maintain peace by mediating conflicts. On the other hand, the focus in this thesis is on the UN as a peacekeeper. Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII in the UN Charter enable the UN to intervene in a conflict to contribute to world peace and security. Chapter VII of the UN allows the UNSC to take action based on the principle of collective security when needed.¹²⁶ The basic condition for peacekeepers working within the body of the UN to be deployed in conflict areas is that they must be invited and guaranteed full cooperation by conflicting parties. When peacekeepers begin to work in the field, they should become impartial observers and allow the conflicting parties a high level of control in the settlement process as peacekeeping operations respect state sovereignty and power.

Peacekeeping has a long background dating back to the Second World War. As a matter of fact, peacekeeping was also practised in pre-Second World War period by the League of Nations to resolve international conflicts. For example, the League of Nations applied peacekeeping in several operations throughout the world such as the Upper Silesia region between Poland and Germany, the Vilna Province between Lithuania and Poland and the Saar Region in Germany.¹²⁷

As observed in the number of current Peacekeeping operations, we may conclude that Asia and Africa are the continents suffering from ethnic conflicts more. As the focal point in this study is the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, it would

¹²⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Our History, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history> (04.04.2019)

¹²⁶ The United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, **Charter of the United Nations**, 24.10.1945, www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html (16.10.2018)

¹²⁷ The United Nations, History of the United Nations, **About the UN**, 01.01.1942, www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/index.html (16.10.2018)

be appropriate to examine the reasons why Africa suffers from intra-state conflicts. According to Cilliers and Bello-Schünemann, the following factors mainly lead to intrastate conflicts experienced in most African countries.¹²⁸ To begin with, poverty causes instability and thus poor regions seem to be suffering from conflicts more often. Secondly, the transitions from autocracy to democracy in most African countries has proved to be inefficient. Unfortunately, many African countries today are considered to have got stuck between autocracy and democracy. Thirdly, lack of democracy accompanied with lack of education and income seems to be fuelling instability in relevant regions suffering from intrastate conflicts.¹²⁹ Another reason is the correlation between violence and high number of young population seeking employment opportunities in urban areas. As the economies in most African countries is not developed enough, such young people are not able to find job opportunities and thus have the potential to cause problems. Having neighbours suffering from conflicts is another factor to trigger conflicts in African countries. When all these factors are accompanied by weak governments, inadequate political settlements, high range of corruption and citizens deprived of basic social rights such as being secured by the government, most African countries become more vulnerable to intrastate conflicts.¹³⁰

As indicated on the UN Peacekeeping website, the six basic purposes of peacekeeping operations are as follows:¹³¹

- Protecting civilians,
- Preventing conflicts,
- Building Rule of Law and Security Institutions,
- Promoting human rights,
- Promoting women, peace and security,
- Delivering field support.

While the first and second purposes of peacekeeping operations have something to do with countries' primary responsibilities for their citizens, the third and

¹²⁸ Jakie Cilliers and Julia Bello-Schünemann, *The Future of Intra-State Conflict in Africa*, **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**, 15.05.2013, <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-intrastate-conflict-in-africa-more-violence-or-greater-peace> (19.05.2019)

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, *What We Do*, **Home**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-we-do> (18.10.2018)

fourth purposes of peacekeeping operations relate to the political principles which all countries should have. The fifth purpose of peacekeeping operations clarifies the economic and social necessity that women take place in economic areas more. The fifth purpose also emphasises women's economic independence from men and their employment and participation in production processes and their rights to equal salaries with male employees and their political representation in countries' assemblies and senates and thus increasing the number of female political leaders. In other words, the fifth purpose contributes to the social advancement regarding the perception and place of women in their societies. The sixth purpose, on the other hand, is directly associated with the principle that the UN follows military, political and social processes in problematic areas within a particular period by providing people in such areas with financial and tangible support.

These six purposes of peacekeeping operations are compatible with the four purposes of the UN indicated on the UN Charter. The UN attempts to make the world globalised and interconnected through specific purposes stated in its Charter, Chapter I (Article I). These four purposes are listed below:¹³²

1. To maintain international security and peace, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.¹³³

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ The United Nations, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, **Charter of the United Nations**, 24.10.1945, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>, (20.05.2019).

1.6. INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

Kriner points out that the nature of conflict has changed dramatically in time on the basis of the significant transition from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict during and after the end of Cold War period.¹³⁴ There may be several reasons for intrastate conflicts, that is, conflicts within a state. According to Michael E. Brown et al, the underlying causes of internal conflict can be classified into four groups:¹³⁵ Structural factors are: weak states, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography. Political factors are: discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics. Economic/social factors are: economic problems, discriminatory economic systems and economic development and modernisation. Cultural/perceptual factors are: patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories.

The structural factors fuelling the intrastate conflicts could refer to many once colonised states such as the ones in Southeast Asia and Africa and several others which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as they lacked political legitimacy, political borders, and efficient political institutions to manage relevant territory. Brown et al indicate that some external factors such as having less foreign aid from powerful international states and financial organisations and the falling commodity prices also play important roles in intrastate conflicts. They, on the other hand, list other internal factors triggering intrastate conflicts as endemic corruption, inefficient state administrations and inadequate economic progress. Another structural factor triggering intrastate conflicts lies in the security problems observed when weak states suffer from security problems as the state administration is too weak to cope with security threats. In such a case, some groups have the incentive to do so, causing further problems in relevant community. Brown et al point out that such security concerns are especially observed when empires or multi-ethnic states collapse, as a result of which ethnic conflicts may emerge. As a third structural factor, the editors suggest that states having different ethnic geographies are more likely to suffer from internal conflicts. Most states created out of former empires have ethnic demographics

¹³⁴ Michael Kriner, **Intrastate Conflict Resolution: Case Studies and Applications for a Globalized World**, Providence College, Providence, 2011.

¹³⁵ Michael E Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr, **Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict**, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 5-11.

leading to ethnic problems. They point out that the arbitrary borders may cause the division of ethnic groups with secessionist demands.¹³⁶

Brown et al categorise political factors under four headings. To begin with, the editors suggest that the discriminatory political attitudes of some authoritarian states may cause resentment in some groups as such attitudes satisfy the interests of some ethnic groups while others are neglected. They add that resentment can even be observed in more democratic states when the unfair representation of some groups is observed in several state and political institutions such as the courts, the military and the political parties. The second political factor lies in the predominant national ideology in relevant country. In some parts of the world, nationalism and citizenship are considered to be peculiar to a specific ethnic group and thus other groups may not have the same rights as the privileged ethnic groups do. Brown et al argue that not only the exclusionary national ideologies but also fundamental religious attitudes may trigger internal conflicts in some areas. The third political factor to fuel internal conflicts is based on the dynamics of groups with various political, ideological, religious or ethnic objectives within a country. The fourth political factor is provoked by politicians with elite politics aiming at internal challengers in periods of political and economic chaos.¹³⁷

Regarding the political and economic factors fuelling internal conflicts, Ho-Won Jeong argues that the likelihood of a country with a stable political institution to experience a violent conflict due to a short-term failure in its political and economic system is quite low.¹³⁸ Jeong adds that social revolts and street riots in Western countries do not turn into violent conflicts thanks to the shared values and institutions in the population.¹³⁹

According to Brown et al, there are three economic and social factors leading to internal conflicts. To begin with, economic problems are often considered to provoke intrastate conflicts. Economic problems are often experienced when a country's economy cannot grow as fast as before, or if the economic growth is not

¹³⁶ Ibid. pp. 5-8.

¹³⁷ Ibid. pp. 8-10.

¹³⁸ Ho-Won Jeong, **Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis**, SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 2008, p. 35.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

satisfying enough for people living in relevant country. High rates of inflation, unemployment and lack of resources may also cause frustrations in the society. Secondly, unfair economic policies in favour of some specific groups in the society may also provoke potential internal conflicts. These unfair policies can emerge themselves in various ways such as providing disadvantaged groups with unequal economic opportunities to reach resources which may cause dramatic differences in people's living standards in relevant societies. On the other hand, Brown et al emphasise that even a country with a good economic picture could suffer from intrastate conflicts as long as it had discriminatory economic systems causing inequities in the society. Thirdly, economic development and modernisation can also trigger internal conflicts as they cause people to have higher economic and political expectations and when these expectations are not fulfilled, it may cause conflicts in the society.¹⁴⁰

Brown et al suggest that there are two cultural and perceptual factors to provoke internal conflicts. To begin with, cultural discrimination which may cause unfair educational opportunities, political restrictions regarding the use and teaching of minority languages and oppressions on the practice of religion can be given as the potential ways of cultural discrimination against minorities. Similar discriminatory policies have been observed in the policies of Bulgaria against ethnic Turks. How groups perceive themselves and others also plays an important role as an underlying cause for intrastate conflicts. While groups adore their own histories, they resent the parties they are having conflicts with based on the problems experienced in the past. For example, while Serbs see themselves as legendary defenders of Europe, they blame Croats for being fascist thugs. On the contrary, Croats regard themselves as victims of Serbian genocidal hostility.¹⁴¹

As the Post-Cold War period altered the political dynamics of the world from ideological differences to cultural differences, newly established countries caused by the dissolution processes of the USSR and Yugoslavia were concluded by the re-emergence of ongoing ethnic conflicts and the emergence of new ones. On the other hand, because authoritarian countries in Asia and Africa tended to disregard ethnic

¹⁴⁰ Brown et al, pp. 10-11

¹⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 12-13

problems and did not grant basic democratic rights to their minority groups, they are more inclined to intrastate conflicts. Although the number of interstate conflicts was normally higher than that of intra-state conflicts in the poor countries in Asia and Africa until 1991 when the Post-Cold War period had started, there were still several factors which triggered the risks of intrastate conflicts in these countries.¹⁴²

The conflicts in the Cold War period were generally ideological conflicts rather than ethnic conflicts and they mostly had the features of inter-state conflict structurally. On the other hand, these ideological conflicts especially damaged the African countries some of which were former colonies of European countries which had not completed their economic development and political systems yet. Taras and Ganguly argue that the Post-Cold War period triggered the explosion of ethnic conflicts.¹⁴³ They add that ethnic conflict has so far become a basic subject of international relations discipline, which is related to several issues such as war and peace, human rights, democratisation, and the global order.¹⁴⁴

This study has a focus on ethnic conflicts in Africa based on their historical and political features. Africa hosted groups that had different religions and ethnicities. Those who had come to settle were from South Africa and Zimbabwe and those coming from Malaysia, Kenya and the Caribbean countries were brought as workers and slaves by colonial countries.¹⁴⁵ The sub-Saharan Africa, which is the common location of the case studies in this study, had state emphasis on ethnicity rather than religious diversity.¹⁴⁶ The political issues in Africa have begun to take a significant place in world politics since decolonisation period which began with the withdrawal process of prosperous and rich Western countries from their colonies in Africa after the Second World War. When we take the fact that inter-state and intra-state conflicts and ethnic conflicts are inevitable because of the competitive human nature along with interest and value differences into account, developing conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict resolution mechanisms is so important. However, as

¹⁴² Taras and Ganguly, p. 26.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, **Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict**, 1st Edition, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 72

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

mentioned before, realising this target in all regions throughout the world is not easy at all.

Being an IGO, the UN is mainly supposed to take care of the interests of its members. That is why, it cannot be expected to react positively to ethnic conflicts within states or across state borders. On the other hand, once ethnic conflicts turn out to be a threatening factor for international peace and security or if such conflicts do not comply with the internationally accepted norms of behaviour, it cannot remain abstained.¹⁴⁷ Decisions of military intervention to ethnic conflicts and other issues including serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity are taken via its sub-organs when necessary conditions regarding decision-making processes of the UN are fulfilled. The UN may intervene in ethnic conflicts either as a peacemaker via mediation and resolutions of UNGA and UNSC or a peacebuilder to restore both socioeconomic infrastructure and the peaceful atmosphere between the warring parties.¹⁴⁸ When the UN gets involved in ethnic conflicts or other violent conflicts, its priority is to halt hot conflicts between conflicting groups by applying temporary ceasefires. The UN should take the features and motivations of conflicting ethnic groups into account to remain fair during ethnic conflict resolution processes. The basic reason for this is that if a resolution proposal regarding relevant problem is not accepted by the great majority of conflicting ethnic groups, it cannot completely fulfil the expected results within conflicting ethnic groups. Taking these into account, when compared to inter-state conflicts, practising conflict resolution processes in intra-state conflicts may be harder to achieve for the UN.

As mentioned above, the UN is the most eligible IGO to intervene in ethnic conflicts; however, the intervention form to relevant ethnic conflict used by the UN determines the success of the UN. The timing of the UN as to when to intervene in ethnic conflicts is also so important to reach success. Although all ethnic conflicts have unique economic, political, and social structures, the basic purpose of the UN intervention to ethnic conflicts is to stop hot conflicts to fulfil negative peace in the areas where ethnic conflicts occur.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Stephen Ryan, **Ethnic Conflict and the United Nations**, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.13, Issue:1, 1990, (ECUN), pp. 25-49.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

1.7. MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

Multi-track diplomacy refers to the international peace-making process comprising of the web of institutions, citizens and communities that interact with one another for the world peace. Multi-track diplomacy has played an important role in the conflict resolution field for the last ten years.¹⁵⁰

While track one diplomacy refers to the official diplomacy between governmental actors such as UN, international and regional organisations, governments and international financial institutions, track two diplomacy refers to the unofficial interaction of nongovernmental actors such as INGOs, churches, academics and private business.¹⁵¹ Some scholars even use the term ‘Track 1.5 Diplomacy’ to refer to a situation when governmental and nongovernmental actors cooperate to handle conflicts. According to Oliver Wolleh, the main emphasis of track 1.5 diplomacy is to contribute to the mediation process of a negotiated conflict.¹⁵² Wolleh suggests that track 1.5 processes are closely related to track one diplomacy due to having similar objectives regarding the settlement of conflicts.¹⁵³

Multi-track diplomacy emerged to compensate for the inefficiency of ‘Track One Diplomacy’ which failed to cope with intrastate conflicts in the 1990s.¹⁵⁴ Having observed the inefficiency of ‘Track One Diplomacy’ in resolving conflicts, there was a need for the involvement of a civil actors besides the governmental ones. Dr. Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald invented the phrase ‘Multi-Track Diplomacy’ which involves both private citizens and governmental officials in the process of conflict resolution.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy, **About**, 01.05.1992, <http://imtd.org/about/>, IMTD describes their purpose as “... *We approach peacemaking as a living system. Since 1992, we have worked to improve the web of interconnected relationships that operate together for a common goal: a world at peace. We seek to strengthen the interconnection of activities, individuals, institutions, and communities together to globally improve systems and lives.*”, (20.05.2019).

¹⁵¹ Ramsbotham et al, p. 32.

¹⁵² Oliver Wolleh, Track 1.5 Approaches to Conflict Management: Assessing Good Practice and Areas for Improvement, ‘**Lessons Learned**’ **Retreat**, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, Konolfingen, 04-06.03.2007.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ramsbotham et al, pp. 28-29.

¹⁵⁵ John W McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy, **Beyond Intractability**, 01.09.2003, https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/multi-track_diplomacy, (20.05.2019).

There are so far nine tracks in the Multi-Track Diplomacy, each of which contributes to the resolution of international conflicts. Dr. Diamond and Ambassador McDonald emphasised the correlation between the various tracks by claiming that no one track is more crucial than the others, and no one track is independent from the others.¹⁵⁶ In other words, each track has its own dynamics, but as they are all connected, they can operate more efficiently in coordination.

As conflict resolution is a time-consuming process with a wide scope, I believe it is very important to involve different portions of the conflicting society into the resolution process. Ramsbotham et al highlight that multi-track diplomacy, comprising of various levels and tracks of mediation, can be used in peace processes effectively. The writers claim that the Northern Ireland case can provide a good example for Multi-Track Diplomacy as it had involved different tracks of mediation between various actors such as political parties, official and unofficial mediators.¹⁵⁷ Ramsbotham et al. indicate that Multi-Track Diplomacy has also been used in several other cases such as in attempts to resolve the long-lasting conflict between Israel and Palestine and attempts to cope with problems with criminal gangs in El Salvador.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ramsbotham et al, p. 218

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO

INTRODUCTION TO THREE CASE STUDIES AND LIBERIAN CASE STUDY

As this thesis aims at assessing the UN's past peacekeeping operations in West Africa, understanding the economic, cultural and political factors triggering conflicts in relevant region is so important. The way Africa is a continent with a population of diverse religions, ethnicities and sociocultural backgrounds makes it vulnerable to conflicts.¹⁵⁹ That is why, almost half of the current states in Africa have suffered from conflicts having devastating consequences such as the death of millions of people, massive displacement of residents, collapsed economy and infrastructure, unstable state administration, corruption, and so on.¹⁶⁰

The case studies in the thesis have so far been restricted to three internal conflicts encountered in the Mano River Basin, the sub-region of West Africa, which has hosted a series of severe internal conflicts since the mid-1990s.¹⁶¹ According to Nancy Annan, the twin factors fuelling conflicts in sub-Saharan West Africa are notably bad governance and corruption.¹⁶² The way sub-Saharan countries which gained independence in post-colonial period failed to have stable governance due to mismanagement of natural resources and poor state administration led to the fragile atmosphere underlying conflicts in relevant region.¹⁶³ Annan argues that there are several other challenges such as human rights violations, poverty, ethnic marginalisation and small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation triggering conflict in subregion.¹⁶⁴

The internal conflicts in this region first started in Liberia and then expanded to Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, causing devastating problems such as the dissolution of state authority, the destruction of governmental institutions and the

¹⁵⁹ Julie Kwach, Causes of Conflict in Africa, **Tuko**, 01.10.2018, <https://www.tuko.co.ke/286140-causes-conflict-africa.html#286140>, (20.05.2019).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Mano River Basin, 25 Years of Peacekeeping, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mano-river-basin-25-years-of-peacekeeping> (05.04.2019)

¹⁶² Nancy Annan, Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects, **Stability: International Journal of Security and Development**, Vol.3, Issue:1, 2014.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

displacement of millions of residents. All these unfortunate incidents caused instability and eventually the UN had to intervene in these conflicts to prevent the deterioration of the conditions in relevant region.

The UNSC conducted the first UN peacekeeping operation in relevant region under the name of UNOMIL in 1993. The second operation in relevant region was UNOMSIL, which was conducted in 1998. UNAMSIL was authorised in 1999. MINUCI and UNMIL were conducted in 2003. Finally, UNOCI was authorised in 2004.¹⁶⁵

In order to be able to analyse these three cases in West Africa, we need to have a closer look at ECOWAS as it is a leading regional organisation in West Africa. Based on the information given on the website of ECOWAS, this organisation was founded on May 28, 1975.¹⁶⁶ Its initial mandate was to promote the economic integration among its fifteen member states. The member states of ECOWAS are as follows: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo.¹⁶⁷ As a trading union, its major aim is to create a comprehensive trading bloc via economic cooperation. While trying to promote the economic integration among its member states by means of economic activities, ECOWAS is also concerned with social and cultural issues in relevant region.¹⁶⁸

According to Wallenstein, ECOWAS has acted both as a peacekeeper and peacemaker in the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea although its initial mandate was economic rather than security.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Mano River Basin, 25 Years of Peacekeeping, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mano-river-basin-25-years-of-peacekeeping> (01.11.2018)

¹⁶⁶ Alexandre Marc, Neelam Verjee and Stephen Mogaka, **The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa**, World Bank and French Development Agency, Washington DC, 2015.

¹⁶⁷ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Basic Information, **About ECOWAS**, 28.05.1975, www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/ (05.04.2019)

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Wallenstein, 2015, p.206.

2.1. CASE STUDY: LIBERIA, 1993-2018

Liberia, officially the Republic of Liberia, is located on the West African coast and it remains among very few African states, which have not been colonised.¹⁷⁰ African-American slaves who were brought to the region by American Colonisation Society established the Republic of Liberia after having declared their freedom from the US authorities by whom they were brought to the region.¹⁷¹ As the newcomers were seeking ‘liberty’, they called the newly established country Liberia, which means: ‘Land of the Free’ in the Latin.¹⁷² Being the oldest republic in Africa, Liberia became independent in 1847 and its capital is Monrovia, which is modelled after the US and thus given the name of the 5th US president, James Monroe.¹⁷³ The country had relative stability until a rebellion in 1989, which turned into a devastating internal war in 1990s.¹⁷⁴

Liberia has plenty of natural resources such as iron ore, diamonds, gold, lead, manganese, graphite, cyanide and barite. Although Liberia was one of the leading producers of iron ore in Africa, its production almost stopped during the internal war.

2.1.1. Background of the problem

The roots of the internal conflict which has struck Liberia date back to 1820s, when the American Colonisation Society, backed by the U.S. Navy, brought freed slaves to the Coasts of Liberia.¹⁷⁵ The newly arrived slaves were called ‘Americo-Liberians’. Although these people did not consist of more than five percent of the whole population, they managed to obtain the control of the country politically via ‘True Whig Party’, which was founded after Liberia became independent in 1847 and

¹⁷⁰ World Atlas, Liberia, **World Map**, 01.01.1994, <https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/lr.htm> (06.04.2019)

¹⁷¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, American Colonization Society: Abolitionist Organisation, **Topic**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/American-Colonization-Society#ref292287> (06.04.2019)

¹⁷² Whit Frazier, Land of the Free-Liberia and The United States, **Catachreses**, 02.11.2016, <https://catachreses.com/2016/11/02/land-of-the-free-liberia-and-the-united-states/>, (21.05.2019).

¹⁷³ World Atlas, Liberia, **World Map**, 01.01.1994, <https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/lr.htm> (06.04.2019)

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Abeodu Bowen Jones, Holsoe, Svend E and Petterson, Donald Rahl, Liberia, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Liberia> (08.11.2018)

they ruled the country until 1980.¹⁷⁶ Liberia is a country with rich natural resources such as iron ore, timber, diamonds, rubber and gold.¹⁷⁷ Having a coercive geography and divided demography, Liberia consists of seventeen ethnic groups, none of which have more than 20 percent of the whole population.¹⁷⁸ Apart from Americo-Liberians, three major ethnic groups in Liberia are as follows: the Mano and Gio in the north, the Mandingo in the west and the Krahn in the northeast.¹⁷⁹

Samuel Doe, who was the head of the government in Liberia had come into power in 1980 following a military coup and he had ruled the country until 1990 in a fierce way, which further triggered the ongoing conflict.¹⁸⁰ Herbert Howe argues that Doe politicised and ‘ethnified’ the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), which in the end turned into a Krahn Presidential Guard as Doe himself belonged to the Krahn tribe.¹⁸¹ The AFL executed approximately 3,000 Mano and Gio civilians to fight against the attempted coup against Samuel Doe, who was backed by the U.S. administration in financial terms in spite of all the apparent indicators of human rights violations and corruption. Samuel Doe, in return, enabled the Americans to exploit the natural resources in Liberia for their own geostrategic benefits.¹⁸² Oil-rich Nigeria, which was the most powerful country in West Africa then, also supported Doe Administration financially out of political concerns. Howe suggests that Nigeria was against the domination of France in the sub-region and that it also wanted to become the leading actor in black Africa against the apartheid administration in South Africa.¹⁸³ Charles Taylor, who was a former Doe administration official and was accused of embezzling \$900,000 from the government, invaded the country from Cote d’Ivoire and obtained control of most of Liberia until the outskirts of Monrovia on the eve of Christmas

¹⁷⁶ Brown et al, pp.267-269.

¹⁷⁷ Wilmot A Reeves, Why Liberia Has Not Been Able to Break its Resource Curse, **Oilprice.Com**, 24.11.2012, <https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Why-Liberia-Has-Not-Been-Able-to-Break-its-Resource-Curse.html> (06.04.2019)

¹⁷⁸ Brown et al, pp.267-269.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Herman J Cohen, Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor, **Hank Cohen’s Africa Blog**, 01.01.1994, <http://www.cohenonafrika.com/samuel-doe-and-charles-taylor-liberia> (06.04.2019)

¹⁸¹ Brown et al, pp.267-269.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid. pp.267-271.

1989.¹⁸⁴ Taylor's forces were supported by National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPLF), which divided into a new faction in August 1990. Prince Johnson was in charge of the new faction which was called the Independent National Patriotic Front for Liberia (INPFL).¹⁸⁵

The Christmas invasion signalled the advent of a brutal internal war which would devastate Liberia from several aspects.¹⁸⁶ This was a period when over 200.000 people were killed besides one million others who had to flee to neighbouring countries and over one million individuals were internally displaced.¹⁸⁷ During the Liberian internal war, some regional actors such as ECOWAS took the initiative to settle the long-lasting conflict. Peter Wallenstein highlights the significance of ECOWAS as a peacekeeper and ECOMOG, which was responsible for monitoring ceasefire period as the military arm of ECOWAS in the conflicts taking place in Liberia and Sierra Leone.¹⁸⁸

ECOMOG, having gained the contribution of states such as Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Mali and Senegal regarding the provision of contingents, was predominantly backed by Nigeria. Stephen Ryan points out that ECOMOG was established despite the fact that the conflicting parties refrained from a ceasefire and adds that it had reached the capacity of 9.000 by October 1990 thanks to being funded by the United States.¹⁸⁹ As Charles Taylor regarded the establishment of ECOMOG as an attempt to back the Doe administration, his forces fired the Nigerian Embassy in Monrovia a short while before the deployment of ECOMOG.¹⁹⁰

ECOMOG proved to be ineffective in dealing with the conflict in spite of the fact that it had the full control of Monrovia and managed to evacuate foreign citizens. Although Doe had surrendered to ECOMOG's forces, he was kidnapped and executed

¹⁸⁴ Fred P M van der Kraaij, President Charles Ghankay Taylor 1997-2003: The Warlord President, **Liberia Past and Present**, 26.03.2018, http://www.liberiapastandpresent.org/charles_taylor.htm (07.04.2019)

¹⁸⁵ Brown et al, pp.267-271

¹⁸⁶ Fred P M van der Kraaij, President Charles Ghankay Taylor 1997-2003: The Warlord President, **Liberia Past and Present**, 26.03.2018, http://www.liberiapastandpresent.org/charles_taylor.htm (07.04.2019)

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Wallenstein, 2002, p.212.

¹⁸⁹ Ryan, ECIR, p.185.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

by soldiers loyal to the faction of Prince Johnson in 1990.¹⁹¹ Following this incident, ECOWAS gave support to Amos Sawyer as the President of Liberia during the transition period. Therefore, ECOWAS backed the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) out of its efforts to resolve the Liberian conflict. Dr Amos Sawyer was inducted as the President of the Interim Government in Liberia.¹⁹² ECOWAS brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, covering the stages in the implementation of the peace plan. These stages involved the encampment and disarmament of warring factions and the foundation of transitional institutions to conduct fair and free elections. On the other hand, the former supporters of President Doe established another group called the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) in 1991, a year after his death.¹⁹³

As the conflicts between several armed forces deteriorated during early 1991 and 1992 and Taylor's forces even surrounded Monrovia and attempted to close the airport in October 1992, ECOMOG had to take initiative towards taking severe precautions which even involved shooting members of the armed forces violating the curfew between 6 pm and 8 am in Monrovia.¹⁹⁴ Despite the tough precautions taken by ECOMOG, the ongoing conflict worsened in relevant region and that the West African states eventually had to invite UNSC to intervene in the conflict in Liberia, which was declined by the UN claiming that it was only a regional problem.¹⁹⁵

By the time the UN declined the invitation of West African countries to intervene in Liberian conflict, even the West African states themselves had been divided into two groups.¹⁹⁶ On one hand, there were Francophone countries backing Taylor and NPFL. On the other hand, there were Anglophone countries supporting Sawyer. As Nigeria also backed Sawyer, Francophone countries withdrew their forces from the organisation in the end of 1992. By then, ECOMOG had only Anglophone

¹⁹¹ Richard Carver, 'Liberia: What Hope for Peace?', **Refworld**, 01.10.1994, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6bc0.html> (21.05.2019)

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Liberia-United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL): Background, **Sites**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomilFT.htm#JUL> (15.11.2018)

¹⁹⁴ Ryan, ECIR, p.185

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. p.186

¹⁹⁶ Richard Carver, 'Liberia: What Hope for Peace?', **Refworld**, 01.10.1994, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6bc0.html>, (21.05.2019).

member states to deal with the conflict which had cost the lives of 60.000 people.¹⁹⁷ Meanwhile, the UNSC enforced an arms embargo on Liberia apart from military equipment to be used by ECOMOG and appointed a Special Representative to supervise in talks between warring parties in 1992.¹⁹⁸

ECOMOG started a huge attack against Taylor's forces in May 1993.¹⁹⁹ While this attack forced Taylor to negotiate, it also increased the number of casualties. Two months later, the parties to the bloody conflict were at last convinced to sign the Cotonou Peace Agreement on 25 July 1993 in the capital of Benin.²⁰⁰ Cotonou Peace Agreement signalled a progress from ceasefire to national elections. Based on this agreement, Sawyer would pass the power to a state council comprising of five members and that a 35 member-interim parliament having nominees from all parties would be formed.²⁰¹ The Cotonou Peace Agreement also included alterations to lessen the effects of Nigeria on ECOMOG.²⁰²

2.1.2. United Nations Intervention

ECOMOG could play an effective role in the resolution of Liberian conflict only to some extent. Consequently, the UN had to intervene in the ongoing conflict in Liberia. UNOMIL was established by the UN Security Council resolution 866 in September 1993.²⁰³ The primary target of this operation was to implement the Cotonou Peace Agreement in cooperation with ECOWAS and the Liberian National Transitional Government.

As stated on UN Peacekeeping website, Cotonou Peace Agreement was signed between IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO on July 1993, following a three-day meeting which was held under the supervision of the co-chairmanship of the Secretary-General's

¹⁹⁷ Ryan, ECIR, p. 186

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Richard Carver, 'Liberia: What Hope for Peace?', **Refworld**, 01.10.1994, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6bc0.html>, (21.05.2019).

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ryan, ECIR, p. 186.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ The Information Technology Section Department of Public Information (DPI), Completed Peacekeeping Operations: The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomil.htm>, (07.04.2019)

Special Representative, President Canaan Banana of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Mr. Abass Bundu, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.²⁰⁴

The Cotonou Peace Agreement had both political and humanitarian effects. Regarding the political effects, the reaffirmation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord was provided. There was an agreement on the constitution of a single Liberian National Transitional Government with legislative, executive and judicial branches.²⁰⁵ This agreement also involved the organisation of general and presidential elections under the supervision of a reconstituted Electoral Commission in seven months.²⁰⁶

With respect to the humanitarian effects, the delivery of the humanitarian assistance complying with the embargo provisions of the Agreement would be supplied throughout Liberia via the most direct routes available. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was required to enable the rapid return and reintegration of refugees into their countries.²⁰⁷

In addition to this, UNOMIL had several other motives such as to inquire into ceasefire and human rights violations, to support the demobilisation of combatants, to observe and verify elections, and to provide humanitarian aid. UNOMIL was a unique deployment in that it was the first time the UN had worked in cooperation with another already established Peacekeeping organisation.²⁰⁸

The initial mandate of UNOMIL was as follows:

- To receive and investigate all reports on alleged incidents of violations of the cease-fire agreement and, if the violation cannot be corrected, to report its findings to the Violations Committee established pursuant to the Peace Agreement and to the Secretary-General;
- To monitor compliance with other elements of the Peace Agreement, including at points on Liberia's borders with Sierra Leone and other neighbouring countries, and to verify its impartial application, and in particular to assist in the monitoring of compliance with the

²⁰⁴ National Legislative Bodies/National Authorities, Liberia: Cotonou Agreement, **Refworld**, 25.07.1993, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5796.html>, (21.05.2019)

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ The Information Technology Section Department of Public Information (DPI), Liberia – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL): Background, **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomilFT.htm>, (17.11.2018)

²⁰⁸ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Past Peacekeeping Operations, **Where We Operate**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations> (12.11.2018)

embargo on delivery of arms and military equipment to Liberia and the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of combatants;

- To observe and verify the election process, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement;
- To assist, as appropriate, in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in the field in conjunction with the existing United Nations humanitarian relief operation;
- To develop a plan and assess financial requirements for the demobilization of combatants;
- To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the Secretary-General;
- To train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance and, in cooperation with ECOMOG, coordinate the identification of mines and assist in the clearance of mines and unexploded bombs;
- Without participation in enforcement operations, to coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG's separate responsibilities both formally, through the Violations Committee, and informally.
- The UN Security Council took a decision to adjust the initial mandate of UNOMIL by resolution 1020 in November 1995. The adjusted mandate of UNOMIL was as follows:
- To exercise its good offices to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) to implement the peace agreements and to cooperate with them for this purpose;
- To investigate all allegations of violations of the ceasefire reported to the Ceasefire Violations Committee, to recommend measures to prevent the recurrence of such violations and to report to the Secretary-General accordingly;
- To monitor compliance with the other military provisions of the peace agreements including disengagement of forces, disarmament and observance of the arms embargo and to verify their impartial application;
- To assist, as appropriate, in the maintenance of assembly sites agreed upon by ECOMOG, the LNTG and the factions, and in the implementation of a programme for demobilization of combatants, in cooperation with the LNTG, donor agencies and non-governmental organizations;
- To support, as appropriate, humanitarian assistance activities;
- To investigate and report to the Secretary-General on violations of human rights and to assist local human rights groups, as appropriate, in raising voluntary contributions for training and logistic support;
- To observe and verify the election process, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS, including the legislative and presidential elections to be held in accordance with provisions of the peace agreements.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), "Liberia – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL): Mandate, **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomilM.htm> (12.11.2018).

Although the primary aim of UNOMIL was to implement the Cotonou Peace Agreement, this was hindered by the delays and restarting of fighting among Liberian factions. The following months witnessed a period when there were several additional peace agreements to recover the Cotonou Peace Agreement. On the other hand, it was not before July 1997 that the first elections were held and Mr. Charles Taylor was elected as Liberia's 22nd President by winning 75% of the total votes. On the other hand, Taylor's main opponent, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (Unity Party) could only win about 10% of the votes.²¹⁰ Although the elections were held under intimidation, they were still declared to be 'fair and free' by international observers.²¹¹ The democratically elected government in a way symbolised the end of the bloody war which had cost the lives of 150.000 people (mostly civilian) besides 850.000 others who had been displaced. UNOMIL's primary target had been fulfilled in this way.²¹²

In November 1997, the UN founded a supplementary office immediately after the fulfilment of UNOMIL's mandate on 30 September 1997. The name of the new office was: the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL). The aim of this office was to empower the UN peace-building efforts, to provide aid in enhancing human rights, and to endorse the mobilisation of international support regarding reconstruction and recovery.²¹³

UNOL, directed by a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, was the first post-conflict support office deployed during a peace-building process, the principal targets of which were to enable the improvement of national reconciliation via efficient state administration and provide assistance to international aid organisations in charge of reconstruction and development plans.²¹⁴ The initial mandate of UNOL, which authorised the office to provide assistance in human rights issues and arrangement of elections, was revised on 23 April 2003 by UNSC.²¹⁵

²¹⁰ Fred P M van der Kraaij, President Charles Ghankay Taylor 1997-2003: The Warlord President, **Liberia Past and Present**, 26.03.2018, http://www.liberiapastandpresent.org/charles_taylor.htm (07.04.2019)

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), "Liberia – United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL): Background", **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomilS.htm>, (12.11.2018).

²¹³ Kofi Annan, **Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council**, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), New York, 2003, (RSGSC).

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

UNOL was unfortunately ineffective in realising its peacebuilding objectives due to incompetent state administration and the ongoing conflict between opposition parties over important matters. The series of dramatic incidents such as human rights abuses and exclusion of political rivals made the tragic atmosphere even worse. All these factors led to the resumption of civil war, making the international community get involved in the long-lasting conflict between warring parties.²¹⁶

On 8 July 2003, the Secretary-General appointed Jacques Paul Klein of the United States as his Special Representative following the severe clashes between warring factions.²¹⁷ Mr. Klein was supposed to carry out the coordination of United Nations forces and provide assistance in transitional arrangements.²¹⁸ The appointment of Mr. Klein by the Secretary-General was significant in that it signalled both the termination of UNOL and the foundation of a new UN mission, involving a three-phased deployment of international troops to Liberia on 29 July 2003.²¹⁹ On 1 August 2003, the UNSC adopted resolution 1497, which marked the foundation of a multinational force in Liberia before 1 October 2003 based on the intention of the UNSC to terminate UNOL and transfer its functions to UNMIL.²²⁰ The Resignation of President Charles Taylor on 11 August 2003 along with the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) in August 2003 signalled the need for the deployment of a multinational force in relevant region.²²¹

On 18 August 2004, the warring factions in Liberia; Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) along with political parties and the civil society signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) under the patronage of ECOWAS, by which they required the UN to establish a mission in Liberia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.²²² They

²¹⁶ The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Background, **About**, 19.09.2003, <https://unmil.unmissions.org/background> (17.11.2018).

²¹⁷ Kofi Annan, 'UN SG appoints Jacques Klein as his Special Representative for Liberia.', United Nations General Secretariat, New York, 2003, (UNSG).

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Background, **About**, 19.09.2003, <https://unmil.unmissions.org/background> (07.04.2019).

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ The Global Peace Operations Review, Liberia, **Peace Operations Review**, 01.01.2008, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2008_liberia_mission_reviews.pdf, (22.05.2019).

²²² Ibid.

wanted the new mission to provide aid in the implementation of the peace agreement and back the National Transitional Government of Liberia.²²³

The UN Secretary-General stated that UNMIL would be a multi-dimensional mission having several aspects such as political, military, civil affairs, human rights, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and added that UNMIL would work in cooperation with ECOWAS, the AU and other United Nations missions in relevant region.²²⁴

UNMIL would be administered by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would be in charge of carrying out the mandate of the Mission in accordance with the UN System in Liberia by the assistance of a number of personnel with different responsibilities including an HIV/AIDS policy adviser, who would work for the prevention of HIV transmission with his supporting staff in relevant region.²²⁵ The UN Secretary-General pointed out that the international community would do whatever was necessary to back the peace process. On the other hand, he emphasised that it would still be the major responsibility of Liberian parties to implement the Peace Agreement efficiently.²²⁶ The UN Secretary-General added that the power of President Charles Taylor was to be transferred to the Vice-President Moses Blah. He also emphasised that the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would be a unique chance for the Liberian parties to build a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the sub-region struck by a long-lasting conflict.²²⁷

UNMIL was deployed via Security Council resolution 1509 on 19 September 2003 and the Mission took over the authority from ECOWAS forces on 1 October 2003.²²⁸ In addition to the US, the Governments that contributed to the UNMIL were as follows: Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.²²⁹ UNMIL was established after a peace agreement in 2003, which signalled the termination of two civil wars which cost the lives of about 250.000 people leaving the

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Background, **About**, 19.09.2003, <https://unmil.unmissions.org/background> (08.04.2019)

²²⁵ K. Annan, RSGSC

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Antonio Guterres, **The Story of UNMIL**, The United Nations General Secretariat, New York, 2018.

²²⁹ The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Background, **About**, 19.09.2003, <https://unmil.unmissions.org/background> (08.04.2019)

country in total devastation.²³⁰ UNMIL had the following objectives: to provide assistance in carrying out the ceasefire agreement and the peace process, to keep United Nations personnel and civilians safe, advocate humanitarian and human rights activities, and to provide assistance in national security reform.²³¹ The UN Secretary-General was confident that UNMIL would play a key role in the maintenance of law and order throughout Liberia, which would eventually lead to the settlement of the long-lasting dispute in Liberia as long as all parties remained in cooperation with UNMIL and international forces kept supplying the required equipment.²³²

The initial mandate of UNMIL lasted 12 months. On the other hand, the mandate of UNMIL was extended several times, the last of which was supposed to last until 30 March 2018, which signalled the termination of UNMIL. The final mandate of UNMIL was as follows:²³³

(a) Protection of Civilians

(i) To protect the civilian population from threat of physical violence within its capabilities and areas of deployment, particularly in the event of a deterioration of the security situation that could risk a strategic reversal of peace and stability in the country, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Liberian authorities for the security and protection of its population;

(b) Reform of Justice and Security Institutions

(i) To advise the Government of Liberia in developing the leadership, internal management, professionalization and accountability mechanisms of the LNP, with a particular focus on elections security;

(c) Human Rights Promotion and Protection

(i) To support the Government of Liberia in carrying out promotion, protection and monitoring activities of human rights in Liberia, with special attention to violations and abuses committed against children and women;
(ii) To support the strengthening of efforts by the Government of Liberia to combat sexual and gender-based violence, including its efforts to combat impunity for perpetrators of such crimes;

(d) Public Information

(i) To continue to communicate, including through UNMIL Radio, with the people and Government of Liberia to promote sustainable peace through the October 2017 elections and 2018 transfer of power and also to raise awareness about UNMIL's transformation, eventual closure and the United Nations' continuing engagement in Liberia;

(e) Protection of United Nations Personnel

²³⁰ Guterres.

²³¹ K. Annan, RSGSC.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Mandate, **About**, 19.09.2003, <https://unmil.unmissions.org/mandate> (19.11.2018).

- (i) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel.

UNMIL, which was established upon the signing of the CPA in August 2003, completed its final mandate on 30 March 2018 in accordance with the UNSC Resolution 2333 after having achieved its objectives in almost 15 years.²³⁴ On a statement released on 30 March 2018, the UN Secretary-General congratulated Liberian Government and people for their commitment to constituting a peaceful atmosphere in the country.²³⁵ The Secretary-General also highlighted that the United Nations would continue supporting Liberia following the departure of UNMIL and that UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes were determined to back the Liberian Government with the implementation of reform activities so that the country could preserve the hard-won peace.²³⁶ Regarding the departure of UNMIL, Farid Zarif, UNMIL's Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, pointed out that the departure of UNMIL signalled that Liberian people could relatively enjoy a peaceful atmosphere within the country. He also expressed his confidence in Liberian people by saying that Liberia was capable of accomplishing lasting stability, democracy and prosperity.²³⁷

2.1.3. Conclusion

Liberia went through two brutal civil wars, costing the lives of almost 250.000 people, mostly civilians, between 1989 and 2003, during which almost half of the population were forcibly displaced and two-thirds of women were exposed to sexual violence.²³⁸ On the other hand, the country has made a remarkable progress over the course of UNMIL's deployment, which lasted 14 years.²³⁹ UNMIL protected civilians by means of humanitarian and human rights activities and contributed to the training

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ K. Annan, RSGSC.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ K. Leigh Robinson and Shpend Bërbatovci, UNMIL Press Release, **Strategic Communications and Public Information**, 30.03.2018, <https://unmil.unmissions.org/unmil-completes-its-mandate-now-peaceful-liberia> (20.10.2018)

²³⁸ Shpend Bërbatovci, UN Peacekeeping Finishes Its Mission in Liberia, **The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)**, Monrovia, 2018.

²³⁹ Guterres.

of national police forces and reconstruction of a new military unit. Over 126.000 military, 16.000 police and 23.000 civilian personnel were assigned in UNMIL.²⁴⁰ While the number of disarmed combatants was 100.000, the figure for secured weapons was over 21.000. Moreover, thousands of displaced people and refugees were helped to come back home.²⁴¹ UNMIL also supported the strengthening of Liberian security forces, involving women's integration besides providing assistance in holding presidential and legislative elections in 2005, 2011 and 2017.²⁴² As a result of the first two elections, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was the first female President to be elected in Africa and she was succeeded by George Weah in 2017 election.²⁴³ As a matter of fact, the UNSC in a way helped President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to restore the war-torn Liberia by extending the mandate of the peacekeeping mission.²⁴⁴

UNMIL fulfilled its mandate thanks to the following reasons. To begin with, Liberia had at last re-established its state administration throughout the country. In addition to this, the restoration of justice and security institutions was achieved. While the borders were secured, the country witnessed an economic recovery compensating for more than 90% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) observed during the conflict.²⁴⁵

Regarding what is next, the UN Country Team aims at working in cooperation with Liberian national and local authorities, and civil society on the following issues:²⁴⁶

- Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
- Human Rights and Transitional Justice
- Law Enforcement capacity building
- Social cohesion

²⁴⁰ Shpend Bërbatovci, 2018.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Guterres.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Patrick Hayford, A Special Partnership with the UN: An African Perspective, **The UN Chronicle**, Vol.10, No.1, 2007, pp.14-15.

²⁴⁵ Shpend Bërbatovci, 2018.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CASE STUDIES OF SIERRA LEONE AND COTE D'IVOIRE

3.1 CASE STUDY: SIERRA LEONE, 1991-2002

Sierra Leone, which is located on the coast of West Africa, played an important role in the history of transatlantic slave trade as thousands of West African captives used to depart from there.²⁴⁷ Freetown, its capital, was established to be a new settlement for former slaves who were brought back to their native land in 1787.²⁴⁸ Sierra Leone is a mining center with rich resources such as diamonds, gold, bauxite and rutile. The beautiful country was unfortunately struck by hostile internal conflicts dating back to late 1980s. The internal conflicts in time turned into a hostile war which lasted 11 years between 1991 and 2002. The Government of Sierra Leone has been working on strengthening both the physical and social infrastructures of the country ever since the termination of civil war.²⁴⁹

3.1.1. Background of the Problem

In 1787, the first group of freed slaves from England tried to establish a settlement in the region. The newcomers were called Creoles, most of whom had taken part in the British Army during the American Revolutionary War and therefore been rewarded with freedom.²⁵⁰ There are contradictory views over why freed slaves were brought to Sierra Leone. While some scholars claim that the sole motivation of the British was to help those slaves to get to their native land, others claim that the British were only trying to locate those people far from England out of racial concerns, which were later on shared with Americans too.²⁵¹ Although the attempt of the newcomers to form a settlement had failed initially, it was later on supported by the private Sierra Leone Company, which was a commercial company backed by English people who

²⁴⁷ BBC, Sierra Leone Country Profile, **BBC News**, 05.04.2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094194> (09.04.2019).

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol, Christopher Fyfe and Shekou M. Sesay, Sierra Leone, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone> (25.11.2018).

²⁵⁰ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, **Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.280.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

were against the slave trade.²⁵² These settlers were later on followed by other groups coming from Nova Scotia in 1792 and Jamaica in 1800 and those coming from Jamaica were known as ‘Maroons’. The English-speaking newcomers were mostly literate and Christian.²⁵³ They were supported by the private Sierra Leone Company until 1808, when Sierra Leone was transformed into a crown colony by Britain. That was because the slave trade was made illegal by the British Parliament in 1807.²⁵⁴ The following year the British Government took over Sierra Leone and transformed it into the headquarters, from where slaves brought across the Atlantic could be set free.²⁵⁵

By 1864, the British navy had brought over 50.000 slaves, who were also called ‘liberated Africans’. These people were deprived of features such as a common language, culture, and religion. Hence, the government had to implement a policy to turn the heterogeneous society into a homogenous one. Consequently, these people in a way formed the West African elite, who were mostly educated with good jobs and contributed to the prosperity of the country during colonial administration.²⁵⁶

It was during the 19th century when the British Colonial Government gradually gained authority over the coastline by signing agreements with the neighbouring countries. It was also during this period when the minority of British and Creole elite managed to gain control over the local population by even using violence to increase trade and convert the predominantly Islamic people to Christianity.²⁵⁷ The neighbouring borders were then delimited with the French and Liberian Governments. The protectorate of Britain was affirmed in the borderlines in 1896 when there was the prevalent effect of the European partition in Africa. The funds to support the administration of the protectorate came from a hut tax which was imposed accordingly.²⁵⁸ The chiefs in charge of the colony refused to pay the hut tax as they

²⁵² Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, “Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation”, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ The Commonwealth, “Sierra Leone : History”, **Member Countries**, 27.04.1961, <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/sierra-leone/history>, (10.04.2019)

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, “Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation”, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

²⁵⁷ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, pp. 281-282

²⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 282

had not been involved in the establishment of the protectorate. There was a severe riot led by Bai Bureh against the protectorate in 1898, and it was taken under control by the end of the year. While Creols who occupied the senior positions were expecting to have an absolute power in the administration, they ended up being removed from their posts. Both the colony and protectorate were eventually administered by British authorities.²⁵⁹

It was after the Second World War that the British Government had to yield to the waves of nationalist demands affecting the whole West Africa. As a result, new democratic institutions were established and by the 1951 Constitution the Creole minority had lost their power in state administration.²⁶⁰ The new government was administered by Milton (later Sir Milton) Margai, who was a member of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), a prevalently protectorate party.²⁶¹ The country was then introduced to the new parliamentary institutions based on the British System. Sierra Leone gained independence within the Commonwealth as the last phase of the parliamentary system on April 27, 1961.²⁶² The country experienced a welfare period thanks to the rich mineral resources and that the revenue earned was also used to improve the educational system during the earlier years of the independence.²⁶³

Following his death, Sir Milton Margei was succeeded by his brother, Sir Albert Margai.²⁶⁴ The 1967 general election was won by All-People's Congress (APC), which represented the opposition administered by Siaka Stevens.²⁶⁵ The new government could not last long due to the intervention of the army to set up a military government, the National Reformation Council (NRC) led by Lieut. Col. Andrew Juxon-Smith.²⁶⁶ The military government also could not last long as the privates and

²⁵⁹ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, "Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation", **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

²⁶⁰ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, p. 282

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² The Commonwealth.

²⁶³ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, "Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation", **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

²⁶⁴ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, p. 282

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, "Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation", **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

non-commissioned officers rebelled against them in order to establish the parliamentary system under the APC led by Stevens the following year.²⁶⁷

By the time Sierra Leone became a republic in 1971 led by Stevens as an executive president, the country had gone through severe conflicts emerging from the opposition against the government.²⁶⁸ While all the rivalry was suppressed by the government, the country faced economic problems due to the exhaustion of iron ore and smuggling of diamonds. Moreover, the supporters of the government were taking advantage of having power at public expense. All these factors led to the dissatisfaction among the opposition, which ended up in student protests against the government. The government's reaction to all the protests was to assign one-party rule in 1978.²⁶⁹ After Stevens got retired in 1985, he was succeeded by Joseph Saidu Mamoh, who was formerly the head of the army. The country then kept facing corruption in accompaniment with deteriorated economy.²⁷⁰

The already worsened conditions escalated when the borders of Sierra Leone were exposed to attacks from both rebels of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor and forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh on its borders.²⁷¹ Mamoh reacted to these attacks by deploying troops to the border region. His troops were also supported by ECOMOG of ECOWAS. These events signalled the beginning of a long-lasting civil war.²⁷²

In April 1992, Mamoh was removed from authority in a coup led by Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser, who held Mamoh responsible for the inadequate conditions in which the troops had to fight against the rebels.²⁷³ Consequently, a National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Strasser was established.²⁷⁴ The current situation even got worse under Strasser's administration and that the RUF started

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ The Commonwealth.

²⁶⁹ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, "Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation", **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

²⁷⁰ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, p.283

²⁷¹ Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, "Sierra Leone – Sports and recreation", **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation#ref214572> (10.04.2019)

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, p.283

²⁷⁴ Ibid. pp.283-284

controlling a larger territory having rich diamond resources. The conditions escalated based on the reports of severe violent incidents against civilians by both rebels and some government forces. Strasser was removed from authority on the fear that he would refuse to transfer authority to a civilian government against the prior agreement. Brig. General Julius Maada Bio was assigned the authority provided that he would agree to hold the elections soon.²⁷⁵ Meanwhile, the RUF insisted on the postponement of the elections until it could reach an agreement with the government. As this demand was declined, the RUF even escalated the level of violence it exposed. The elections were held despite all the negative conditions and that Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP was elected the President and took the office on 29 March 1996. Meanwhile, the long expected agreement known as Abidjan Agreement signed between Kabbah and Sankoh on November 1996 could not last long.²⁷⁶

There was another coup in May 1997, which was conducted by Maj. Johnny Paul Karoma who blamed the current government for not being able to implement the Abidjan Agreement.²⁷⁷ Having established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with the members of the RUF, Karoma started ruling the country by sending Kabbah into exile as the first thing to do.²⁷⁸ On the other hand, the AFRC experienced opposition both domestically and internationally. Domestically, its forces were hindered by Kabbah's troops. Internationally, Sierra Leone was suspended by the Commonwealth and sanctions were imposed on the country by UNSC.²⁷⁹

3.1.2. United Nations Intervention

The United Nations first got involved in the Sierra Leonean Civil War in November 1994 when the Head of the Government formally wrote a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General and required them to have an active role in the resolution of the conflict between the Government and the RUF. The UN Secretary-

²⁷⁵ Encyclopaedia Britannica, History: Civil War, **Sierra Leone**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Civil-war>, (11.04.2019)

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Resource Information Center, "Sierra Leone: Background information on the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) and the conflict in Sierra Leone in general", **Refworld**, 22.12.1999, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3dee45d14.html>, (17.06.2019)

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Sierra Leone – Civil war.

General sent an exploratory mission to Sierra Leone in order to facilitate the negotiations between the parties on 15 December 1994.²⁸⁰ By the time this mission was established, the Sierra Leonean Internal Conflict had been going on for three years with some drastic consequences.²⁸¹ By then, 10 per cent of the population had become refugees in the neighbouring countries with approximately 30 per cent of others who were displaced domestically besides a severe destruction in the infrastructure and dramatic deficit in the national budget.²⁸²

Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) was assigned as a Special Representative by the UN Secretary-General in February 1995 based on the reports of the exploratory mission to cooperate with OAU and ECOWAS in order to resolve the ongoing conflict.²⁸³ Although the parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February 1996 and that Dr. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was chosen as the President, the RUF did not recognise the results of the elections as it had not even taken part in them, which further deteriorated the long-lasting conflict.²⁸⁴ Meanwhile, Mr. Dinka persuaded the conflicting parties to sign a peace agreement and finally Abidjan Accord was signed in November 1996.²⁸⁵ On the other hand, the agreement could not last long as there was another military coup in May 1997, in which the RUF was accompanied by the army forces to establish a ruling junta, as a result of which President Kabbah was sent into exile.²⁸⁶

The attempts to resolve the ongoing conflict such as appointing a new Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo (Uganda) and sending other representatives all

²⁸⁰ The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), "Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background", **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

²⁸¹ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, p.283

²⁸² The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), "Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background", **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, pp.285-286

²⁸⁵ The Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), "Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background", **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

failed and that they could not convince the junta to resign.²⁸⁷ A peace plan was signed between the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing the head of the junta on 23 October 1997.²⁸⁸ The peace plan involved the monitoring of a ceasefire by ECOMOG and the assistance by the military observers of the United Nations. President Kabbah expressed his willingness to accept the agreement and work in cooperation with ECOWAS, ECOMOG and international organisations.²⁸⁹ On the other hand, the junta wanted to be in charge of the agreement procedures. Yet, there were some key issues the junta would refuse to accept. As a result, the agreement could not be implemented.²⁹⁰

Following an attack by junta forces, ECOMOG initiated a counterattack resulting in the collapse of the junta in February 1998, as a result of which, President Kabbah regained the control of the government.²⁹¹ Meanwhile, the UN Security Council abolished the embargo regarding the oil and arms and also made the office of the Special Representative more powerful by including liaison officers and security advisory staff under his control. UNOMSIL was established by the UN Security Council on 13 July 1998.²⁹² The UN Secretary-General authorised Mr. Francis G. Okelo (Uganda) as the Special Representative and Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi (India) as Chief Military Observer in accompaniment with 70 military observers in the initial mandate.²⁹³ The initial mandate of the mission involved monitoring and providing consultancy on the disarmament of the combatants and rebuilding of security forces. As UNOMSIL personnel were unarmed, they were supposed to be

²⁸⁷ The United Nations Department of Public Information, Francis G. Okelo appointed as UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, **Reliefweb**, 04.09.1997, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/francis-g-okelo-appointed-un-secretary-generals-special-envoy-sierra-leone>, (17.06.2019)

²⁸⁸ The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), "Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background", **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Sierra Leone – Civil war.

²⁹² The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), "Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background", **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

²⁹³ Ibid.

secured by ECOMOG. Meanwhile, the initial reports of the mission revealed the long-lasting cruelty and human rights violations against civilians.²⁹⁴

The rebel alliance forces got the control of most of Sierra Leone after regaining Freetown, the capital, by an attack in January 1999, as a result of which, UNOMSIL staff were withdrawn to Conakry and the numbers of both military and civilian staff were decreased.²⁹⁵ On the other hand, the Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer remained in their offices and worked on the resolution of the deteriorated conflict. ECOMOG forces regained Freetown and authorised the civilian government later the same month despite the potential of thousands of rebels hiding away temporarily.²⁹⁶

Thanks to the attempts of the Special Representative Okelo and West African States, the parties to the conflict at last agreed to put an end to the ongoing conflict and that they signed the Lome Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.²⁹⁷ The Lome Peace Agreement strengthened the role of UNSC in terms of its humanitarian and administrative resources.²⁹⁸

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General reported the current situation in Sierra Leone to the UNSC and asked for the expansion of UNOMSIL temporarily and the UNSC approved the expansion of UNOMSIL to up to 210 military observers in accompaniment with increased administrative and medical resources in accordance with his demand via its resolution 1260 (1999) on 20 August 1999.²⁹⁹

On 23 September 1999, the Secretary-General wrote another report to the Security Council asking for the termination of UNOMSIL and its replacement with a larger mission to be able to implement the Lome Peace Agreement.³⁰⁰ On 22 October

²⁹⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Sierra Leone – Civil war.

²⁹⁵ The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), “Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background”, **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ World Peace Foundation, **United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Brief**, African Politics and African Peace, Medford, 2017, pp.1-2

²⁹⁸ Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, p.295

²⁹⁹ The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), “Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background”, **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

³⁰⁰ World Peace Foundation, p.2

1999, the Security Council approved the deployment of a new mission, UNAMSIL with 260 military observers out of maximum 6000 military staff.³⁰¹

UNAMSIL had the following initial mandate based on the Security Council resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999:³⁰²

- To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement
- To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan
- To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel
- To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein
- To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning
- To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
- To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers
- To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone

The UN Security Council decided to revise the initial mandate of UNAMSIL via resolution 1289 (2000) on 7 February 2000. The revised mandate of UNAMSIL was as follows:³⁰³

- To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport
- To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares
- To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme

³⁰¹ The Information Technology Section/Department of Public Information (DPI), “Sierra Leone – United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL): Background”, **The United Nations Peacekeeping**, 13.07.1998, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm>, (11.04.2019)

³⁰² The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone- United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Mandate”, **Sites**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/mandate.html> (10.12.2018)

³⁰³ Ibid.

- To coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities
- To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction

UNAMSIL was authorised to fulfil the additional tasks in the revised mandate, which involved the expansion of both military components and civilian affairs. On the other hand, in case of the discharge of its mandate, the mission had to secure the freedom of both its staff and civilians against any potential violence.³⁰⁴

Following its resolution 1299 of 19 May 2000, the UNSC increased the capacity of UNAMSIL even higher from 13.000 to 17.500, retaining 260 military observers via its resolution 1346 on 30 March 2001.³⁰⁵ UNAMSIL, which is considered to be a successful mission having fulfilled several tasks such as the disarmament of combatants and providing assistance in holding elections and the restoration of the infrastructure as indicated in its mandates, was also a prototype for peacebuilding. In addition, the mission managed to terminate illicit trading conducted by the combatants using the money they gained from selling diamonds to buy weapons.³⁰⁶

UNAMSIL also survived some unfortunate events. For example, the mission would almost collapse when hundreds of UN peacekeepers were kidnapped by the RUF combatants and the implementation of the ceasefire was cancelled in May 2000.³⁰⁷ This incident in a way damaged the reputation of the mission dramatically. As a result, the international community forced the rebel groups to comply with the ceasefire while imposing sanctions on RUF advocates.³⁰⁸ Eventually, UNAMSIL managed to start negotiations between the conflicting parties. Following the violation of the ceasefire by the RUF, the United Kingdom sent a troop to the region to restore

³⁰⁴ World Peace Foundation, p. 2

³⁰⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone- United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Mandate”, **Sites,** 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/mandate.html> (10.12.2018)

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ World Peace Foundation, p. 2

³⁰⁸ Ibid. pp. 2-3

the army. Meanwhile, the international community was in charge of restoring the local police force.³⁰⁹

3.1.3. Conclusion

The war in Sierra Leone was declared to have been officially finalised by the Sierra Leonean government in early 2002 when UNAMSIL had already succeeded in the disarmament and demobilisation of more than 75.000 combatants.³¹⁰ Some of these combatants were child soldiers.³¹¹ It was also during that period when the Mission helped the government with the organisation of the first ever free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections and the local elections arranged two years later by means of supplying logistics.³¹²

UNAMSIL fulfilled several other duties such as providing assistance in the voluntary return of more than 500.000 refugees and domestically displaced people.³¹³ It backed the government to reestablish its authority along with the social services which were once under the control of rebel forces and helped the police staff by providing them training and assistance with the construction of police stations.³¹⁴ The Mission also monitored and trained people regarding human rights issues. It even helped the Government with the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in order to make those in charge of war crimes face their victims.³¹⁵

UNAMSIL was also in cooperation with other UN agencies to provide job opportunities for the thousands of desperate unemployed young people and ex-combatants. The mission also played a significant role in the restoration of schools and clinics. Although the mission had done a lot to compensate for the negative effects of the long-lasting conflict, there was still a lot more to do with respect to human rights

³⁰⁹ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Sierra Leone – Civil war.

³¹⁰ World Peace Foundation, p.6

³¹¹ Marda Mustapha and Joseph J. Bangura, **Sierra Leone beyond the Lomé Peace Accord**, First Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, p. 49.

³¹² The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Background, **Sites**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/background.html> (13.04.2019)

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ World Peace Foundation, p. 3.

issues, which mainly stemmed from the unfair share of the income besides other economic and social issues.³¹⁶

To handle these issues, the UNSC authorised a new mission, the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) by resolution 1620 in August 2005, which started working in January 2006 and it was followed by the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), which was authorised via resolution 1829 in August 2008 and was terminated in March 2014.³¹⁷ The major mandate of the mission was to stabilise the peaceful atmosphere in Sierra Leone by helping to develop the country in terms of human rights on the basis of the Millenium Development Goals and assist in the organisation of free and fair elections in 2007.³¹⁸

3.2. CASE STUDY: COTE D'IVOIRE, 2002-2017

Cote d'Ivoire, officially the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire is also located on the western coast of Africa. While the administrative capital of the country is Yamoussoukro, its economic capital is Abidjan.³¹⁹ Cote d'Ivoire hosts more than 60 ethnic groups, each of which has an attachment to a larger group outside the country. While these ethnic groups were once conventionally independent from each other. They lost the group identity over time due to widespread intermarriage and internal migration.³²⁰

Offshore reserves of petroleum and natural gas which have actually been exploited since 1995 are the major resources for the country. Diamonds and gold, the main mineral resources in the country, have also been exploited. As a matter of fact,

³¹⁶ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Background, **Sites**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/background.html> (13.04.2019)

³¹⁷ World Peace Foundation, p. 3.

³¹⁸ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Background, **Sites**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/background.html> (13.04.2019)

³¹⁹ Oishimaya Sen Nag, What Is The Capital Of The Ivory Coast?, **World Atlas**, 15.10.2018, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-capital-of-the-ivory-coast.html> (14.04.2019)

³²⁰ Jean L. Comhaire, Côte d'Ivoire (Climate) – People – Ethnic groups”, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-d'Ivoire/Climate#ref55123> (23.12.2018)

the country has also suffered from the exploitation of its forests and that today it is regarded to be among one of the countries with highest deforestation rates.³²¹

The country witnessed a religious and ethnic harmony besides having a well-developed economy for thirty years after it had gained independence from France. The country was even regarded as a model of stability until it was divided by an armed rebellion in 2002.³²²

3.2.1. Background of the Problem

The initial European interest in the country was limited to the coastal areas, where French and Portuguese merchants were seeking ivory and slaves. Due to the hastened division of Africa by the European countries, Cote d'Ivoire was colonised by France in 1893 and Ivoirians resisted the colonisation and settlement of the French on their native land until their leader Samori Ture was captured in 1898.³²³ Following the military occupation by Gov. Gabriel Angoulvant in 1908, there were increasing rebellious activities among some ethnic groups such as the Anyi, Abe (Abbey) and Baule because of the imposition of forced labour.³²⁴ The way France forced a large number of Ivoirians to take part in the First World War along with other West African soldiers fuelled even fiercer revolts and that the country was not totally controlled until 1918 in spite of the superior military force of France.³²⁵

It was after the World War I that the country went through advancement in economic terms. For example, there was a significant improvement of the railways. In addition, it was during this period when the country was introduced to new schools and Western-style health services and that Ivoirians were persuaded to grow cash crops

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² BBC, Ivory Coast country profile, **BBC News**, 15.01.2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13287216> (23.12.2018)

³²³ Legal Language Services, Understanding Ivory Coast: History and Basic Facts, **Legal Language Blog**, 08.12.2016, <https://www.legallanguage.com/legal-articles/ivory-coast-history-facts/> (14.04.2019)

³²⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica, Precolonial Kingdoms, **Côte d'Ivoire**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-d'Ivoire/Precolonial-kingdoms> (14.04.2019)

³²⁵ Benita van Eyssen, World War I: The 'Black Army' that marched in from Africa, **Deutsche Welle**, 10.11.2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/world-war-i-the-black-army-that-marched-in-from-africa/a-46239274> (14.04.2019)

for export.³²⁶ On the other hand, during the same period the exploitation of the forests was observed to have increased dramatically. Ivoirians are also recorded to have produced 90% of the cocoa and 80% of the coffee in the colony by 1939.³²⁷

Although Ivoirians supported the Vichy government along with the rest of French West Africa (AOF) during the Second World War and thus about forty thousand of them fought for the French army between 1940 and 1942, there was still an increasing dissatisfaction among them for several reasons such as racist legislation, unfair treatment towards Africans, imposed forced labour and a period of economic contraction following the British naval blockade.³²⁸ Hence, African elites were ready to welcome the Free French regime, the French resistance movement, which was led by Charles de Gaulle.³²⁹ The country was, therefore, transferred from Vichy to Free French control in 1943.³³⁰ In 1944, the first native political group, African Farmers Union (SAA), which represented African farmers and landowners and thus ensured the fair treatment of African planters, was established by Félix Houphouët-Boigny.³³¹ Félix Houphouët-Boigny won the local elections in 1945 and the following year he was elected to the French Assembly by Cote d'Ivoire part of the French Union, where he pioneered the abolishment of the force of labour throughout the empire.³³² By the way, French Union was a political entity which had taken the place of French colonial empire with a semi-federal entity to include all the colonies overseas. French Union provided former protectorates with a restricted local autonomy in the decision-making processes in Paris.³³³

In 1949, Houphouët-Boigny assisted the establishment of the African Democratic Rally (RDA), which was a western Africa-based umbrella organisation

³²⁶ Encyclopaedia Britannica, March toward independence, **Côte d'Ivoire**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-d'Ivoire/Precolonial-kingdoms#ref55142> (14.04.2019)

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Guatemala, **Refworld**, 01.01.2018, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce19c.html>, (17.06.2019)

³³⁰ Alistair Boddy-Evans, A Very Short History of Côte D'Ivoire, **ThoughtCo**, 21.03.2019, <https://www.thoughtco.com/very-short-history-of-cote-divoire-43647> (25.05.2019)

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Encyclopaedia Britannica, Côte d'Ivoire – March toward independence.

³³³ Encyclopaedia Britannica, French Union, **French History**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/French-Union> (14.04.2019)

aiming at securing equality for all Africans.³³⁴ The Ivoirian branch of the RDA, the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), realised most of its targets despite all the initial oppression against it.³³⁵ Cote d'Ivoire became independent on 7 August 1960 and Houphouët-Boigny, the former cabinet minister in two French governments, was elected the President in the newly independent country.³³⁶ By the time Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, he had already fulfilled his seventh term in office. It was also during his rule that the country had survived the coup attempts in 1963 and 1973.³³⁷ Houphouët-Boigny always sought a state of harmony with his opponents, which in turn resulted in having thriving and peaceful relations with France and the neighbouring countries of Cote d'Ivoire.³³⁸

Following the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, the country was dragged into a prolonged conflicting atmosphere, which ended up in a coup led by General Robert Guéï, who terminated the rule of President Henri Konan Bédié.³³⁹ The intense struggle over the presidential elections deteriorated and even turned into a violent controversy costing the lives of over 50 people after the elections of October 2000, as a result of which Mr. Gbagbo of Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) was declared as the President.³⁴⁰ The municipal elections, which were held in March 2001, were significant as they enabled all political parties to field a candidate.³⁴¹

After the municipal elections, President Gbagbo backed the organisation of provincial elections in order to decentralise state authority.³⁴² In October 2001, the President organised a forum to strengthen the national reconciliation as there were several factors leading to the polarisation in the country.³⁴³ Some of these factors such

³³⁴ Boddy-Evans.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Nancy Ellen Lawler and Robert John Mundt, Cote d'Ivoire: Cote d'Ivoire Since Independence, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-d'Ivoire/Cote-d'Ivoire-since-independence> (14.04.2019)

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Boddy-Evans.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire-United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) –Background, **Sites**, 13.05.2003, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minuci/background.html> (14.04.2019)

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, **U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2002 - Cote d'Ivoire**, United States Department of State, Washington DC, 2003.

as national unity, landownership, the controversial legitimacy of the current government and the state of the security forces were addressed in that forum.³⁴⁴ The forum attended by President Gbagbo, Mr. Bédié, General Gueï and Mr. Ouattara was finalised on 18 December 2002, during which the four leaders had agreed on several issues such as the establishment of a new government to reconcile national unity, being against all undemocratic practices of power and making the security forces professional.³⁴⁵

Most of the recommendations of the forum such as forming a new government of national unity was fulfilled. A broad-based government, including all main opposition parties, was established on 5 August 2002.³⁴⁶ The allocation of portfolios in the new cabinet was as follows: 20 portfolios to the ruling FPI, 4 to Ouattara's Rally of the Republicans (RDR), 7 to Mr. Bédié's former ruling PDCI, 2 to the Ivorian Workers Party (PIT) of Francis Wodié, and 1 to General Gueï's Union for Democracy and Peace in Cote d'Ivoire (UDPCI).³⁴⁷ In addition, the conflict over Mr. Ouattara's nationality was also settled by giving him a nationality certificate on 26 July 2002.³⁴⁸

Despite all the efforts to provide national unity and put up with the ongoing tensions, the country was dragged into the current crisis which started on 19 September 2002 following the attacks on military installations in Abidjan and Bouaké, which in a way signalled a civil war and revealed the fact that the country was divided into two as: the rebel-controlled north and the government-controlled south.³⁴⁹

Although the loyalist security forces managed to regain the control of Abidjan, during which General Gueï and the Minister of the Interior were killed, the rebels gained the control of new towns besides retaining the control of Bouaké and Korhogo. There were rumours that the uprising was actually a coup attempt backed by foreigners. That is why, foreigners including workers from nearby countries were exposed to prevalent harassment and that about 20.000 people were displaced in

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Nancy Ellen Lawler and Robert John Mundt, Cote d'Ivoire: Civil war and its aftermath, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-d'Ivoire/Cote-d'Ivoire-since-independence> (14.04.2019)

Abidjan.³⁵⁰ On the other hand, the attempts of the loyalist security forces to remove the rebels from the captured places ended up in failure and that by the end of September, the rebel forces acting under the umbrella of a movement called the Patriotic Movement of Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI) had already gained the control of the northern half of the country.³⁵¹ The main requirements of MPCI were as follows: the resignation of the President Gbagbo, having national elections and the termination of the domination of southerners in national issues.³⁵² The current situation even got worse when the two new movements, the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) emerged. The motivation behind these two movements was to take the revenge of General Gueï and realise the resignation of President Gbagbo.³⁵³

ECOWAS, the sub-regional organisation, soon got involved in the current conflict by organising an emergency summit meeting in Accra on 29 September 2002, when a contact group including Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Togo in accompaniment with the AU agreed to cooperate to settle the long-lasting conflict between the rebel groups and the Government of Cote d'Ivoire.³⁵⁴ Following the summit, there was a meeting of the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission on the necessity of the deployment of ECOWAS troops to Cote d'Ivoire, the mandate of which would involve watching over a proposed ceasefire, providing the disarmament of the rebel forces and ensuring their disengagement from the places once under their control.³⁵⁵

The ECOWAS Contact Group on Cote d'Ivoire, which initiated its resolution attempts on 30 September 2002, had to leave the country on 6 October 2002 as the government had put off signing the ceasefire agreement thrice by then claiming that such an agreement would legitimise the rebel forces and divide the country.³⁵⁶ Eventually, the attempts conducted in the chairmanship of ECOWAS to resolve the

³⁵⁰ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Global Security, Mouvement Patriotique de Côte-d'Ivoire (MPCI)-Patriotic Movement of Côte-d'Ivoire, **Military**, 11.07.2011, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mpci.htm> (21.04.2019)

³⁵³ Ibid.

³⁵⁴ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

ongoing conflict led to the signing of the ceasefire by MPCl on 17 October 2002.³⁵⁷ While the ceasefire facilitated the further peace talks between MPCl, which controlled most of Northern Cote d'Ivoire and the government, it did not contribute to the recovery of conflict in the Western Cote d'Ivoire, which was controlled by MPIGO and MJP.³⁵⁸ The agreement signed on 31 October 2002 was the first positive step taken during the Lomé peace process, involving the commitment of both parties to the ceasefire and the prevention of human rights abuses besides respecting the institutions in order to preserve the territorial integrity in the country.³⁵⁹

The Lomé peace process was eventually halted for various reasons. While the rebel forces insisted on the resignation of the President Gbagbo along with the holding of new elections, the government forces asked for the disarmament of rebel forces so as to contribute to the integrity of the country. Meanwhile, the attempts of the ECOWAS leaders to terminate the stalemate between the two parties and to convince them to return to the Lomé talks ended up in failure. At a meeting held in Dakar on 18 December 2002, ECOWAS leaders decided on the deployment of ECOWAS Peace Force for Cote d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE) by 31 December 2002. They also required the African Union and the United Nations to support ECOWAS in its attempts to settle the long-lasting conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.³⁶⁰ Meanwhile, President Eyadéma managed to persuade the two rebel movements, MPIGO and MJP to terminate the hostilities and take part in the ceasefire agreement of 17 October 2002.³⁶¹

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was signed on 23 January 2003 at Linas-Marcoussis, France following the roundtable meeting which had started on 15 January 2003.³⁶² The Agreement was signed by the following Ivorian political forces: FPI, The Movement of Future Forces (MFA), MJP, MPCl, MPIGO, The Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire-African Democratic Party (PDCI-RDA), PIT,

³⁵⁷ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, **Côte d'Ivoire: Follow-up Committee welcomes advances, deplors attacks**, The Africa-English Service of the UN's Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) Humanitarian Information Unit, Abidjan, 2003.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² International Relations and Security Network (ISN), **Linas-Marcoussis Agreement**, Primary Resources in International Affairs (PRIA), Zurich, 2003.

RDR, The Democratic Union of Cote d'Ivoire (UDCI) and UDPCI.³⁶³

This agreement enabled the establishment of a government of national unity headed by a Prime Minister assigned by the President. The Prime Minister would be in charge of the current government until the next elections planned for 2005. On the other hand, the Prime Minister would not be eligible to be a candidate in the next elections.³⁶⁴ An annex to the agreement had a special reference to the potential factors such as the problem of citizenship, the status of foreigners and the way certain media provoked hatred and xenophobia underlying the unstable atmosphere in the country along with some proposals such as the establishment of a human rights commission having representatives from all parties, organising a voters roll, and the provision of a transparent justice system to resolve the instability.³⁶⁵

There was a meeting held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, during which the former Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, was authorised to head the new government of national reconciliation by President Gbagbo.³⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the cabinet portfolios were delegated among the Ivorian parties, allocating the key portfolios of defence and the interior to rebel movements.³⁶⁷ The UN played a key role in both the implementation of the Agreement and chairing the Follow-Up Committee, which was founded in Abidjan by the representatives of local and global organisations to facilitate the implementation of the agreement.³⁶⁸ As a matter of fact, the Agreement required the endorsement of the new government by the UN, ECOWAS and France regarding the key issues such as the restoration of the defence and security forces besides the reintegration of armed forces. In addition, the heads of State asked for the further support of the UN with respect to the issues such as human rights, humanitarian assistance and the deployment of military and civilian observers. They also required the UNSC to back the peacekeeping operation conducted by ECOWAS and France by

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁶⁶ The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, **Cote d'Ivoire: Protests continue; politician's death blamed on death squads**, The Africa-English Service of the UN's Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) Humanitarian Information Unit, Abidjan, 2003.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

securing the freedom of movement and safety of its staff and protecting the civilians against any probable threat of violence.³⁶⁹

The implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement following the Paris Summit was hindered in several ways. To begin with, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Seydou Diarra, had great difficulty in going to Cote d'Ivoire to take over the new government due to a number of violent demonstrations targeting the authorisation of rebel movements in key portfolios of defence and the interior. Meanwhile, the French interests and installations were exposed to deliberate attacks.³⁷⁰ Moreover, the leaders of Cote d'Ivoire defence forces and key political parties expressed their disapproval regarding the allocation of key posts to rebel movements. The current situation even deteriorated when the incumbent Minister of the Interior declared the Agreement invalid.³⁷¹ In his address to the nation on 7 February 2003, President Gbagbo mainly asserted the appointment of Mr. Diarra as the new Prime Minister asking him to establish a new government.³⁷² Meanwhile, the President declared that he would maintain all his constitutional privileges and that he would not carry out the provisions of Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as he thought it was in contradiction with the Constitution of Cote d'Ivoire.³⁷³ On the other hand, he expressed his approval of the two provisions of the Agreement regarding making the appointment of the Prime Minister irreversible and the disarmament of national armed forces.³⁷⁴

The President's address to the nation soon had positive effects such as the cessation of the street demonstrations in Abidjan.³⁷⁵ Moreover, the leaders of the defence and security forces declared that they would not be against the inclusion of rebel movements in the new government on the condition that they quit the portfolios of defence and the interior. Meanwhile, seven political parties having signed the Agreement expressed their support regarding the participation of rebel movements in the new government.³⁷⁶ The attempts of the ECOWAS Contact Group on Cote d'Ivoire

³⁶⁹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Kofi Annan, **Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire (S/2003/374)**, The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), New York, 2003, (RSGCI).

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

had also some positive effects regarding the ongoing dispute and that there was a summit in Yamoussoukro on 10 February 2003 attended by the Presidents of several countries in Africa, mainly West Africa besides regional organisations.³⁷⁷ The priority of the summit was to negotiate a solution that could be agreed by all parties. On the other hand, the rebel movements declined to participate in the summit by claiming that they did not want to negotiate new terms to replace the old ones gained in Paris summit.³⁷⁸

The attempts of the Prime Minister, Mr. Diarra, to compose a government of national unity were all in vain as the rebel movements insisted on retaining the Defence and Interior Ministries and also because President Gbagbo refrained from allocating the essential authority to the Prime Minister contrary to the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.³⁷⁹ The deadlock was eventually broken at a meeting attended by 10 signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement under the current chairmanship of ECOWAS between 6 and 8 March 2003.³⁸⁰ All the parties attending the meeting agreed on the foundation of a broadly based National Security Council including the army, the gendarmerie, the police besides the representatives of 10 signatories, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Diarra to supervise the controversial portfolios of defence and the interior.³⁸¹ The members of the Council wanted the candidates proposed by the Prime Minister for the disputed Ministries to be assigned out of mutual agreement.³⁸² In the meantime, in the decree issued by President Gbagbo on 10 March, the Prime Minister was authorised to carry out the terms of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement for six months.³⁸³ Despite the positive improvements, the attempts to assemble the new government in Yamoussoukro on 13 March 2003 failed as the cabinet members representing the three rebel movements and Mr. Ouattara's RDR Party declined to take part in the meeting alleging some security concerns.³⁸⁴

³⁷⁷ GhanaWeb, President Leaves For Cote d'Ivoire, **News**, 10.02.2003, <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/President-Leaves-For-Cote-d-Ivoire-32619> (18.04.2019)

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ K. Annan, RSGCI.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire – MINUCI – Background.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

3.2.2. The UN Intervention

Despite the fact that the Ivorian Armed Forces (FANCI) and the rebel groups agreed upon a complete ceasefire for the entire territory of Cote d'Ivoire on 3 May 2003, the current situation in the country deteriorated remaining a threat for both the regional and universal peace and security, which forced the UN to get involved in the long-lasting dispute as a third party.³⁸⁵ Hence, MINUCI was established via Security Council resolution 1479 (2003) on 13 May 2003.³⁸⁶ The Mission was deployed with a mandate to fulfil the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and to complement the peacekeeping operations conducted by ECOWAS and French troops by means of the instalment of a military unit.³⁸⁷

MINUCI had the following initial mandate based on the UNSC resolution 1479 (2003) of 13 May 2003:³⁸⁸

- Providing advice to the Special Representative on military matters;
- Monitoring the military situation, including the security of Liberian refugees and reporting to the Special Representative thereon;
- Establishing liaison with the French and ECOWAS forces for the purpose of advising the Special Representative on military and related developments;
- Establishing also liaison with the Forces armées nationales de Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the forces nouvelles, in order to build confidence and trust between the armed groups, in cooperation with the French and ECOWAS forces, in particular concerning helicopters and combat aircraft;
- Providing input to forward planning on disengagement, disarmament and demobilization and identifying future tasks, in order to advise the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and support the French and ECOWAS forces;
- Reporting to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the above issues.

³⁸⁵ L. Gberie and P. Addo, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d'Ivoire, **Expert Workshop by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)**, The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Center for International Peace Operations, Accra, 31.05-02.06.2004.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire-United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) –Mandate, **Sites**, 13.05.2003, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minuci/mandate.html> (17.01.2019)

The UNSC mission suggested that MINUCI would benefit from the lessons gained from the similar experiences in Sierra Leone.³⁸⁹ The first obstacle MINUCI faced was when Forces Nouvelles, one of the rebel movements in Cote d'Ivoire, left the Government of National Reconciliation which was established to conduct the terms of Linas-Marcoussis Agreement signed by all Ivorian political elements on 23 January 2003.³⁹⁰ The Secretary-General required them to take part in the Government again and suggested seeking solutions to their objections via the good offices of the Monitoring Committee, which was supposed to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement under the leadership of Albert Tevoedjre, the Special Representative of the Secretary General.³⁹¹ Due to the slow down encountered in the implementation of the Agreement and the escalation of violence in the country, Security Council members had to call up on all parties to stick to the terms of the Agreement on 3 October 2003.³⁹² On 13 November 2003, Security Council extended the mandate of the mission for three months until 4 February 2004 via resolution 1527.³⁹³

Here is what happened in chronological order following the extension of MINUCI's mandate, which eventually led to the establishment of a UN Peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire. On 24 November 2003, a delegation of Ministers from ECOWAS went to the Headquarters of the UN to call upon the empowerment of ECOWAS forces in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) and their transformation into a UN peacekeeping mission.³⁹⁴ Meanwhile, the Secretary General expressed his intention to deploy an assessment mission to Cote d'Ivoire to evaluate the current atmosphere in the field.³⁹⁵ Consequently, an assessment mission led by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations paid a short visit to Cote d'Ivoire between 3 and 11 December 2003.³⁹⁶

³⁸⁹ Gberie and Addo.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Côte d'Ivoire-United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) –Chronology", **Sites**, 13.05.2003, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/minuci/chron.html> (18.04.2019)

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), **Resolution S/RES/1527 (2004) on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI)**, Refworld, New York, 2004.

³⁹⁴ MINUCI: United Nations Mission In Côte D'ivoire – Chronology.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

On 4 December 2003, the Security Council expressed concern with respect to the violation of ceasefire by the armed forces on November 29 and 30 2003.³⁹⁷ Subsequently, the Secretary General in his report (S/2003/1147) of 5 December 2003, emphasised the emergency for the strengthening of MINUCI and its transformation into a UN peacekeeping mission.³⁹⁸ Meanwhile, after releasing 40 FANCI and police staff kept as war prisoners on 7 December 2003, the Forces Nouvelles began removing the checkpoints and heavy weapons from the 'zone of confidence' together with the FANCI on 13 December 2003.³⁹⁹ Subsequently, on 22 December 2003, the Forces Nouvelles made an announcement regarding the termination of its boycott of the Government and attended the meeting of the Cote d'Ivoire Council of Ministers for the first time since September 2003. The Secretary General welcomed the progress made by the parties and signalled (S/2004/3) the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation on the condition that the progress towards the resolution of the conflict continued until 4 February 2004.⁴⁰⁰

On 4 February 2004, the UNSC extended the mandate of MINUCI until 27 February 2004 besides renewing the authorisation of the ECOMIC and Licorne (French peacekeeping forces) for their current deployment in Cote d'Ivoire until the same date. On 13 February 2004, the military leaders of three peacekeeping missions MINUCI, UNMIL and UNAMSIL met in Abidjan to debate the measures to be taken to promote the cooperation among these missions.⁴⁰¹

The Secretary General reported to the UNSC that the conflicting parties in Cote d'Ivoire had made a significant progress towards the resolution of the conflict and thus recommended the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission to maintain the remarkable advances in the country on 27 February 2004.⁴⁰² Based on his recommendation, the UNSC adopted resolution 1528 (2004) to deploy UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months, beginning from 4 April 2004.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁷ Kofi Annan, **Progress report of the Secretary-General on the recommendations of the Security Council mission to West Africa**, The United Nations General Secretariat, New York, 2003, PRSG.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ MINUCI: United Nations Mission In Côte D'ivoire – Chronology, 2004.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), **Resolution S/RES/1528 (2004)**, The United Nations, New York, 2004.

⁴⁰³ The United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1527 (2004).

The Secretary General would be responsible for both the transformation of authority from MINUCI and ECOWAS forces to UNOCI and the renewal of the current mandate of MINUCI until 4 April.⁴⁰⁴ The latest mandate of MINUCI would comprise of several targets such as monitoring the ceasefire of 3 May 2003 in coordination with the French forces, providing assistance in the issues of DDR of former combatants and supervising the promotion of human rights.⁴⁰⁵

Following the termination of MINUCI on 4 April 2004, the UNSC established UNOCI by its resolution 1528 (2004). The initial mandate of UNOCI was to supervise the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 23 January 2003.⁴⁰⁶

In his first report of 2 June 2004 to the Security Council on UNOCI, the Secretary General stated the positive developments in Cote d'Ivoire leading to the establishment of the new mission, UNOCI.⁴⁰⁷ According to the Secretary General, the way the Forces Nouvelles Ministers returned to the Government of National Reconciliation on 6 January 2004 and took part in the following meetings of the Council of Ministers signalled the impetus towards significant legal reforms under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.⁴⁰⁸

UNOCI was mainly deployed to restore the state authority in Cote d'Ivoire, which seemed to have been torn apart by the civil war which broke out in 2004.⁴⁰⁹ The positive developments in the peace process were hindered by multiple incidents throughout the six-year period and that the peak of the crisis in the country was during the 2010 Presidential election, when 3.000 Ivoirians were killed and more than 150 women were reported to have been raped.⁴¹⁰ Following this unfortunate development, UNOCI decided to stay in the field to provide protection to civilians besides backing

⁴⁰⁴ The United Nations Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1528 (2004).

⁴⁰⁵ MINUCI: United Nations Mission In Côte D'Ivoire – Chronology, 2004.

⁴⁰⁶ The United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI), **Sites**, 04.04.2004, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unoci.shtml> (21.01.2019)

⁴⁰⁷ Kofi Annan, **First report of the Secretary – General on the United Nations**, The United Nations General Secretariat, New York, 2004, (FRSG).

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ The United Nations News, **FEATURE: Mission Accomplished – UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, Peace and Security**, 01.05.2017, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/05/556382-feature-mission-accomplished-un-operation-cote-divoire> (19.04.2019)

⁴¹⁰ Rafael Jimenez, **They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing'-The Need for Justice for Côte d'Ivoire's Post-Election Crimes**, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2011.

the Ivoirian Government in issues regarding the DDR of former combatants and the enhancement of human rights.⁴¹¹

While the UN missions in three case studies were effective in gaining concrete results as summarised in the end of each case study in this thesis, the missions also went through some unfortunate incidents which cost the lives of hundreds of peacekeepers taking part in the UN missions deployed in Mano River Basin between 1993 and 2018.⁴¹² Out of 45.000 UN peacekeepers who were in the service of peace in the region during the relevant period, approximately 18.000 in Sierra Leone, 16.000 in Liberia and 11.000 in Cote d'Ivoire, 547 peacekeepers lost their lives while trying to ensure that peace was maintained in the region.⁴¹³

3.2.3. Conclusion

By the time UNOCI completed its mandate with success on 30 June 2017, it had already fulfilled several targets thanks to the contribution of peacekeepers whose number in the mission increased from over 6.000 in 2004 to 11.792 in 2011.⁴¹⁴ UNOCI monitored the organisation of two presidential and legislative elections in 2011 and 2016 besides a referendum.⁴¹⁵ The way the opposition took place for the first time in 2016 elections was noteworthy. Another target gained was that the reported number of human rights violations decreased from 1726 in 2011 to 88 in 2016.⁴¹⁶ UNOCI also provided assistance with the disarmament of 70.000 combatants and their reintegration into society.⁴¹⁷ As well as providing support for 250.000 refugees who had returned by 2016, 1000 UN Peacekeeping Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) were designed to build social unity in the country, as a result of which inter-communal conflicts were reported to have declined by 80%.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹¹ The United Nations Peacekeeping, UNOCI - United Nations Operation in Côte D'Ivoire.

⁴¹² The United Nations Peacekeeping, Mano River Basin, 25 Years of Peacekeeping.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), **UN Peacekeeping Mission Completes Job In Cote d'Ivoire**, The United Nations (UN), Abidjan, 2017.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Basile Zoman, Hien Macline and Patricia Esteve, **FEATURE: Mission Accomplished – UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, The United Nations Refugees and Migrants**, 01.05.2017, <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/feature-mission-accomplished-%E2%80%93-un-operation-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire> (16.05.2019)

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

There are a number of other achievements gained leading to the departure of UNOCI. To begin with, the Ivorian Administration is currently available in all 108 local departments.⁴¹⁹ UNOCI also provided the empowerment of Ivoirian security forces with a special focus on the integration of women in national gendarmerie. By the time, UNOCI was completed, peace and stability were reconstructed.⁴²⁰ The mission also contributed to the development of the economy and that the country was among the fastest growing economies in Africa at over 9%.⁴²¹

Now that the mission is completed does not necessarily mean that the UN will not be monitoring the progress in the country. Therefore, namely, the UN Country Team will be in the field in cooperation with the national and local authorities in Cote d'Ivoire to ensure that the already made progress in several issues such as social cohesion, human rights and transitional justice, security sector reform, DDR, defence, security and law enforcement, and restoration of state authority throughout the country are maintained in the years to come.⁴²²

Regarding monitoring the progress in the region after the termination of peacekeeping operations, the UN missions are also backing the enforcement of justice for those who were once victims of the long-lasting conflicts in the region. For example, Foday Sankoh is recorded to have died as he was expecting trial by Special Court for Sierra Leone.⁴²³ On the other hand, Charles Taylor of Liberia is still serving a fifty-year imprisonment in the UK for having committed war crimes.⁴²⁴ Finally, Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d'Ivoire is presently facing charges of crimes against humanity at The Hague.⁴²⁵

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Jim Wormington, Cote d'Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping Mission Ends, **Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 30.06.2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/30/cote-divoire-un-peacekeeping-mission-ends> (24.05.2019)

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ The United Nations Peacekeeping, Mano River Basin, 25 Years of Peacekeeping, **What Is Peacekeeping**, 22.09.1993, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mano-river-basin-25-years-of-peacekeeping> (20.04.2019)

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

CONCLUSION

The six peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire mentioned in this study are all analysed with a focus on the similarities and differences among them. To begin with the similarities, the three case studies covered in this study belong to the Mano River Basin, which is the sub-region of West Africa. Another common point among them is that they all suffered from civil wars, also called intra-state wars, as in each case study, there was a war between organised groups within the same country.

The violent conflicts observed in these three case studies started in Liberia and soon spread to Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s. The civil wars in this region affected the relevant countries dramatically by causing the collapse of the governments and institutions, thus costing the lives of individuals or forcing them to flee their native countries.

The long-lasting conflicts in these three countries were at the beginning dealt with sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS and ECOMOG, comprising of West African countries, seeking resolution to the long-lasting conflicts encountered in the region. In the case of Liberia, on the other hand, there was the predominant impact of Nigeria on the resolution process besides the global actor, the US. By the way, Liberia is the only country which was not colonised by European countries. Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire were colonised by the United Kingdom and France respectively.

The origin of the civil wars in all three cases in this study seems to have been based on ethnic conflicts, emerging from ethnic diversity which is peculiar to most countries in Africa. As a matter of fact, the reason why there were ethnic conflicts in Africa is because the state borders in Africa were mostly determined by European colonial countries in an artificial way, which further triggered the conflicts on the basis of ethnicity, kinship, religion, and other factors influencing the identity.

Speaking of ethnic diversity, the relevant countries in this study were all comprised of different ethnic groups which hindered the settlement of long-lasting violence as these countries lacked strong national identities. The lack of widespread education was another significant factor leading to disputes in these three poverty-stricken countries.

In addition to the arbitrarily drawn borders, ethnic diversity and pervasive lack of education, the way the colonial powers sought economic interests in the countries which were once their colonies were among the main factors leading to the conflicts in West Africa. Regarding relevant countries in this study, they all had natural resources which had provoked the initial interests of European colonial powers in the past. What is ironical is that the advantage of having rich minerals and natural resources in time turned out to be a disadvantage for these countries as these resources were exploited by colonial powers, governments, elites and rebel groups for their own advantage. That is why, the underdeveloped economy observed in these three countries can be said to rely on the exploitation of the available resources.

The region witnessed the intervention of colonial powers, which were once greedy to take advantage of the resources in relevant area. For example, the UK and France which were once interested in the natural resources of Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire later on took the initiative to intervene in relevant cases to resolve the long-lasting disputes in these regions. The UK enabled Sierra Leone to gain independence within the Commonwealth in 1961. Sierra Leone went through a welfare period during which both the educational and administrative systems were restored based on the British system. Moreover, when the ceasefire period was violated despite the attempts of UNAMSIL, the UK decided to send a troop to the region to support the Army of Sierra Leone. Likewise, France played a key role to terminate the long-lasting conflict in Cote d'Ivoire by sending troops to the region and taking part in the establishment of the peacekeeping operation led by ECOWAS.

The sub-regional organisations such as OAU, the ECOWAS and the ECOMOG took initiative to settle the conflictual atmosphere in the sub region. As a matter of fact, they conducted local peacekeeping operations, some of which were supported by European powers. For example, in the Civil War of Cote d'Ivoire, ECOWAS conducted a peacekeeping operation with France to resolve the relevant dispute. Likewise, Britain took the initiative in the resolution processes of the conflicts which took place in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

As the attempts of regional organisations were inadequate to settle the violent atmosphere, there was a call for the intervention of IGOs, namely, the UN. The UNSC deployed the first UN peacekeeping operation in the Mano River Basin in Liberia via

UNOMIL in 1993, which signalled the impact of the UN in the region for the next 25 years. UNOMSIL in 1998 was followed by UNAMSIL in 1999. MINUCI and UNMIL were authorised in 2003. Eventually, UNOCI was established in 2004.

The six peacekeeping operations in the Mano River Basin between 1993 and 2018 led to the achievement of a number of targets such as the restoration of peace and justice in accompaniment with the protection of civilians. The contribution of the UN in the region was also apparent in the progress made against Ebola crisis of 2014 in relevant region. The UN peacekeeping missions in this region also helped with the disarmament of armed combatants besides securing stocks of weapons and ammunition leading to the return of millions of displaced people. Above all, these missions advocated the processes of nine presidential and legislative elections in the region over the course of 25 years.

Another common point among these three case studies is that even after the UN missions were fulfilled, the UN went on to observe the progress in relevant countries to make sure that these countries were fulfilling the criteria to consolidate the peaceful atmosphere via organisations such as UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone and the UN Country Teams in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. The UN missions in the region also supported the enforcement of justice for the sake of the victims of the long-lasting disputes in the region. That is why, those who are known to have fuelled the conflicts in the region are currently facing charges of crimes against humanity. Regarding the frequency of human rights violations witnessed in the Mano River Basin over the course of 25-year peacekeeping missions, this is quite important so as to be able to prevent potential violations in the future.

Another common point among these three case studies is that they all took place in countries which were all deprived of a democratic system. That is why, the UN missions in relevant countries aimed at establishing democracy as a major target. As a matter of fact, the priority of the UN missions in the relevant region was to supervise the implementation of ceasefires in an efficient way, which would lead to the establishment of a democratic system via fair and free presidential and legislative elections. The establishment of democracy in a country is invaluable as it helps the enforcement of rule of law along with the restoration of security forces on the way to a peaceful atmosphere. Another similarity observed in relevant case studies lies in the

way they all relied on external control by the UN as local organisations were insufficient in their resolution attempts. In each case study, there was an official call for the UN to get involved in relevant intrastate conflicts as an external third party.

A closer look at these three case studies reveals a remarkable detail underlying the conflict in Liberia. As mentioned earlier, the roots of the Liberian civil war dated back to 1820s, when freed slaves were transported to the coast of Liberia by the ACS supported by the U.S. Navy. Although these slaves, also called American-Liberians, comprised of not more than 5 percent of the whole population, they soon gained the control of the whole country by means of 'True Whig Party', which was established after the independence of the country in 1847. This situation is ironical as those American-Liberians, who were once slaves themselves, turned out to be a potential triggering factor for the long-lasting conflict because of their unfair attitudes towards the rebel forces and the way they used the privilege of being in the government for their own advantage.

All in all, in relevant case studies, it is observed that the UN made use of peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as the strategies aiming at preventing disputes from turning into a civil war. The UN mainly refrains from intervening in internal conflicts as it does not want to appear to be an occupier. That is why, the way the UN got involved in relevant case studies was a facilitator. In each case study, the UN deployed an observer mission to ensure that its intervention to current conflict was necessary. After the peacekeeping missions during which the UN acted as a facilitator to help warring factions to comply with peace agreements leading to elections, the UN started acting as a peacebuilder dealing with the reconstruction of war-torn countries from several aspects.

The aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of the UN as a third party in dealing with relevant civil wars in West Africa. Taking the tangible achievements of the UN in three countries mentioned in this study into account, it may be concluded that the UN was quite efficient in the conflict resolution processes of relevant case studies. What is even more noteworthy is that the UN did not make do with only the achievements until the termination of its missions but it also took some precautions to ensure that these relevant countries went on to strengthen the peaceful atmosphere by fulfilling the targets set by the UN.

The interstate wars which were common before World War II were afterwards mostly replaced by intrastate wars emerging from cultural and ethnic differences. The establishment of the UN on 24 October 1945 was, therefore, crucial as it signalled the importance of the diplomatic ways to cope with such conflicts. The UN's intervention to intrastate conflicts as a third party was also important as it was a legitimate international organisation (IO). This study mainly aims at assessing the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations based on three case studies taking part in the Mano River Basin, West Africa.

As the aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in West Africa, there is great focus on the UN and its sub organ, the UNSC, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security throughout the thesis. The UN mainly uses three strategies in dealing with conflicts in international arena. Peacekeeping, the initial stage in conflict resolution, has mostly been used to resolve conflicts since 1994 and it is covered in a comprehensive way with a focus on its third generation in this study. Peace-making, which is the second strategy used in ICR, involves diplomatic means of resolving disputes and peacebuilding, the third strategy, deals with the reconstruction of the war-torn states in post-conflict period. The UN is expected to intervene in international conflicts as a third party when the warring parties may not resolve their problems by their own efforts. As a third party, the UN may have the roles of a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, negotiator, or reconciliator depending on the characteristics of the relevant conflict.

There is a comprehensive emphasis on the ICR methods of the UN, namely, peacekeeping to settle intrastate conflicts mostly emerging from ethnic diversities in three case studies chosen from the Mano-River Basin. This study also sheds light on other potential reasons to trigger intrastate conflicts in relevant region. The case studies take place in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire respectively.

This thesis is devoted to three case studies, all chosen from Mano-River Basin in West Africa. The case studies take place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire respectively. The economic, cultural and political conditions in accompaniment with ethnic diversity made these countries vulnerable to intrastate conflicts lasting a long time. Despite the similarities, there were also some differences among these

countries⁴²⁶. For example, unlike Sierra Leone, colonised by the UK and Cote d'Ivoire, colonised by France, Liberia was not colonised at all. It is interesting that although Liberia was not colonised, it still shared the same destiny with the other two countries and ended up in an intrastate war.

As mentioned earlier, the end of the Second World War was a remarkable period as it helped people to have a more conscious attitude regarding the prevention of conflicts and their expansion towards neighbouring countries. Being an intergovernmental organisation with members from all over the world, the UN has been a legitimate third party to cope with both interstate and intrastate conflicts despite all the criticism it received regarding the failures experienced in Somalian Civil War, Rwandan Genocide and Yugoslavian Wars, which had taken place during the transition period between the Cold War and Post-Cold War. Brahimi Report shed light on the failures of the peacekeeping operations in relevant countries by emphasising the involvement of regional and sub-regional organisations in peacekeeping operations led by the UN. Based on the suggestions of the Brahimi Report and the lessons gained out of the failures experienced in relevant countries, the UN started working in cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in the following peacekeeping operations. The cooperation of the UN with such organisations may well be observed in the relevant case studies in this thesis.

ECOWAS and its military branch, ECOMOG, took the initiative as both peacemakers and peacekeepers as regional actors to resolve the long-lasting conflicts in Africa. As the conditions deteriorated, these regional organisations worked in cooperation with both other local and international organisations. As a matter of fact, the intervention of the UN in relevant conflicts meant that the UN took part in peacekeeping operations which had already been conducted by regional organisations. The way local and regional actors participated in resolution processes helped the local people to avoid regarding international interveners as dominant occupiers.

To resolve the intrastate conflicts in relevant region, the UN made use of various conflict resolution strategies such as peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding to settle ongoing conflicts. After the warring parties were convinced to sign peace agreements and comply with the terms of the agreements, the UN took over

⁴²⁶ See tables 1 and 2.

the significant role to rebuild relevant countries in several aspects and help them to achieve full democratisation. As these countries lacked democracy, it was not easy for local, regional and international actors to make the conflicting parties to adapt to democracy even after the arrangement of elections. That is why, the peacebuilding period aiming at the reconstruction in these war-torn countries required great effort.

The way three case studies are chosen from West Africa is because it is a region hosting several problems such as underdeveloped economy leading to poverty, lack of democracy resulting in weakened state administration, inadequate social infrastructure caused by ethnic diversity and most importantly, pervasive lack of education, which prevented residents in relevant case studies to take precautions against the deteriorated atmosphere where they lived.

The aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, which are all located in Mano River Basin. Based on the comprehensive information provided in United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) website, we may conclude that the missions conducted in relevant countries were effective and that the UN took the necessary steps to ensure that the achievements gained as a peacekeeper would be maintained in the period of peacebuilding as well.

In order to improve the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions, the UN authorities can speed up the decision mechanism at the UNSC with respect to the deployment of the peacekeeping operations in conflict-stricken regions. The UN can also act as a mediator along with the representatives of local organisations to prevent the escalation of potential conflict even before the deployment of the UN Observer Mission in relevant regions. The peacekeepers from the contributing countries can be trained in terms of the socioeconomic dynamics of the regions they will be deployed at. Once relevant mission proves to be effective, the peacekeepers can be awarded in order to encourage further participation of the new peacekeepers. The budget reserved for the UN peacekeeping missions can be increased by finding new resources such as reserving funds from international organisations such as Olympic Games and World Cup tournaments. The coordination among the peacekeepers and their commanders can be improved to ensure that everything goes on smoothly to secure the peaceful atmosphere in relevant war-torn countries. Most importantly, the sovereignty rights of

the countries where the UN conducts peacekeeping missions can be prioritised by being determined in a concrete way to avoid any potential debates. I hope the findings in this study will shed light on the debate whether the UN is an efficient actor in the process of conflict resolution.

Table 1. Comparison of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire⁴²⁷

	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Cote d'Ivoire
Location	West African coast, west of Mano River	West African coast, Mano River basin	West African coast, east of Liberia
Neighbours	Guinea, Liberia (SE)	Sierra Leone (NW), Guinea, Cote D'Ivoire (E)	Liberia (W), Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana
Ethnic Groups	Temne, Mende, Limba, Kono, Fullah, Loko, Koranko, Sherbro, Mandingo, Creole.	Kpelle, Bassa, Grebo, Gio, Mano, Kru, Lorma, Kissi, Gola, Krahn, Vai, Mandingo, Gbandi, Mende, Sapo.	Akan, Voltaiques / Gur, Northern Mande, Kru, Southern Mande.
Religion	Islam (78%), Christianity (21%)	Christianity (85.6%), Islam (12.2%).	Islam (42.9%), Christianity (33.9%), Animism / Non-religious (22.8%).
Natural Resources	Palm oil, timber (forest products), rice. Diamonds, chromite, rutile (titanium dioxide), iron ore	Rubber, coffee, cocoa, rice, cassava (manioc, tapioca), palm oil,	Coffee, cocoa beans, bananas, palm kernels, corn, rice, cassava (manioc, tapioca), sweet potatoes,

⁴²⁷ The resources used in this table:

- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Africa: Sierra Leone, **The World Factbook**, 18.09.1947, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html> (16.05.2019)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Africa: Liberia, **The World Factbook**, 18.09.1947, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html> (16.05.2019)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Africa: Cote d'Ivoire, **The World Factbook**, 18.09.1947, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html> (16.05.2019)
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, Resources and power, **Sierra Leone**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Resources-and-power> (16.05.2019)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Africa: Liberia, **The World Factbook**, 18.09.1947, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/li.html> (16.05.2019)
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, Resources and power, **Côte d'Ivoire**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-dIvoire/Resources-and-power> (16.05.2019)
- Davidson S.H.W. Nicol and Shekou M. Sesay, Sierra Leone-Sports and recreation, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Sports-and-recreation> (16.05.2019)
- History.com Editors, **Liberian independence proclaimed**, A&E Television Networks, New York, 2010.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, March toward independence, **Côte d'Ivoire**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-dIvoire/Precolonial-kingdoms#ref55142> (14.04.2019)
- Nancy Ellen Lawler and Robert John Mundt, Cote d'Ivoire: Cote d'Ivoire Since Independence, **Encyclopaedia Britannica**, 01.01.1768, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Cote-dIvoire/Cote-dIvoire-since-independence> (14.04.2019)

	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Cote d'Ivoire
	reserves (no longer commercially mined), bauxite, columbite (a black mineral of iron, manganese, and niobium), gold, platinum.	sugarcane, bananas; sheep, goats; timber. Mining (iron ore and gold), rubber processing, palm oil processing, diamonds, hydropower.	sugar, cotton, rubber; timber. Petroleum, natural gas, diamonds, manganese, iron, bauxite, gold, hydropower.
Colonial History	British colony from 1808 to 27 April 1961, declaration of independence.	Settlement by the American Colonization Society: 1822. Liberian Declaration of Independence: July 26, 1847. Recognition by the United States: 1862	French colony from mid-19th century to 1960, declaration of independence.

Table 2. Comparison of UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire⁴²⁸

	Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone	Peacekeeping in Liberia	Peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire
Interval	1991-2002	1993-2018	2002-2017

⁴²⁸ The information within the Table 2 has been quoted from the UN infographic documents where the relevant missions are summarized categorically. The content has been slightly rearranged to enable side-by-side comparison. The resources used in this table:

- Bërbatovci.
- The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), **UN Peacekeeping Mission Completes Job In Cote d'Ivoire**, The United Nations (UN), Abidjan, 2017.
- World Peace Foundation, **United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Brief**, African Politics and African Peace, Medford, 2017.
- The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), **Facts and Figures**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/facts.html> (01.05.2019)
- The Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI), **Fact Sheet 1: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration-Thousands of Ex-Fighters Disarmed and Reintegrated**, The United Nations Peacekeeping, New York, 2005.
- Mary Kaldor and James Vincent, **Evaluation of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries**, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Evaluation Office, New York, 2006.
- The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Background, **Sites**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamsil/background.html> (01.05.2019)
- The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), The Conflict in Sierra Leone and the Engagement of the United Nations, **Background**, 01.10.2008, <https://unipsil.unmissions.org/background> (02.05.2019)
- The United Nations Peacekeeping, Sierra Leone-United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)–Background, **Mission**, 22.10.1999, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/background.html> (01.05.2019)
- The United Nations Peacekeeping, Fatalities, **Resources**, 29.05.1948, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities> (16.05.2019)

	Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone	Peacekeeping in Liberia	Peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire
Operation	UNAMSIL was established on 22 October 1999 as part of UN Security Council resolution 1207.	UNMIL was established 1 June 2003 under UN Resolution 1509 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process.	UNOCI was established in 2004 under UN resolution 1528 to monitor and support the peace agreement signed by the Ivorian parties a year earlier.
Motives for the Operation	Sierra Leone was plagued by poor governance and exclusionary politics since the early days following its independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. As of 1991 RUF's (Revolutionary United Front) decade-long violence in Sierra Leone was marked by the murder, rape, and forced amputation of civilian victims and fuelled by rebel control of Sierra Leone's diamond resources. Between 60,000 and 100,000 people are thought to have been killed, approximately 4,000 suffered from severed limbs, 50,000-64,000 internally displaced women may have suffered sexual violence, and 20,000 people were abducted.	Liberia went through two civil wars between 1989 and 2003. Conflict in Liberia claimed the lives of almost 250,000 people, mostly civilians. GDP per capita dropped by more than 70% due to conflict. 1/2 of the population was forcibly displaced 2/3 of women were subject to sexual violence during displacement.	UN Security Council authorized UNOCI because of lack of state authority in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2004, the country was divided in half by a civil war. During the 2010 presidential elections crisis, 3,000 Ivorians were killed and 300,000 became refugees.
Performance	UNAMSIL protected civilians (especially against RUF), supported humanitarian and human rights activities and assisted in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military. Also helped organize presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections.	UNMIL protected civilians, supported humanitarian and human rights activities and assisted in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.	UNOCI protected civilians, enabled inclusive political dialogue and supported the Ivorian Government in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.
	Deployment: Maximum (31 March 2002): 17,368 Military, 87 UN Police, 322 international civilians; 552 local civilians As of 30 November 2005: 1,043 total uniformed personnel, including 944 troops, 69 military observers and 30 police supported by 216 international civilian	Between 2003 and 2018 over 126,000 military, 16,000 police and 23,000 civilian staff served in UNMIL.	Deployed over 6,000 peacekeepers in 2004 and increased them to 11,792 in 2011.

	Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone	Peacekeeping in Liberia	Peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire
	personnel, 369 local civilian staff and 83 United Nations Volunteers.		
	Disarmed and demobilized 75,490 combatants (including 6,845 child soldiers -506 girls- and 4,651 women.) Secured 42,330 weapons and over 1.2 million rounds of ammunition.	Disarmed over 100,000 combatants and secured over 21,000 weapons as well as over 5,000,000 rounds of ammunition.	Disarmed 70,000 combatants and re-integrated them into society.
	Supported the repatriation and resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees – some 300,000 returned in that period.	Enabled hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons to return home, including over 26,000 to Côte d'Ivoire.	Over 250,000 refugees returned by 2016.
	The Mission helped organize Sierra Leone's first ever free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections. Two years later, the mission supported the local government elections.	Held three peaceful presidential and legislative elections in 2005, 2011 and 2017.	Two presidential and legislative elections in 2011 and 2016 and a referendum. The opposition participated for the first time in the 2016 elections.
	Contributed the development of national security forces.	Supported the strengthening of Liberian security forces, including integration of women.	Strengthened the National Commission on Human Rights and helped decrease human rights violations.
	Launched quick-impact and income-generating projects to provide jobs to thousands of unemployed youths and ex-fighters. Almost 55,000 ex-fighters received reintegration benefits. Troops reconstructed schools and clinics, launched and funded agricultural projects, and sponsored free medical clinics in far-flung areas.		Supported social cohesion through 1,000 Quick Impact Projects. Inter-communal conflicts were decreased by 80%.
Closure of the Mission	31 December 2005	30 March 2018	30 June 2017
Post-closure Missions	UNSC authorised below new missions: The United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) by resolution 1620 in August 2005 to assist the Government in consolidating peace and national stability building	UN Country Team together with Liberian national and local authorities, and civil society will continue progress on: • Social Cohesion • Human Rights and Transitional Justice	UN Country Team together with Ivorian national and local authorities, and civil society will continue progress on: • Social Cohesion • Human Rights and Transitional Justice

	Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone	Peacekeeping in Liberia	Peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire
	upon the foundation laid by UNAMSIL. UNIOSIL started working in January 2006. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), which was authorised via resolution 1829 in August 2008 to provide political advice to foster peace and political consolidation, offering support and training to the national police and security forces, and building the capacity democratic institutions in furtherance of good governance and the promotion and protection of human rights. UNIPSIL was terminated in March 2014 and transferred its responsibilities to the UN Country Team. These missions aimed to stabilise the peaceful atmosphere in Sierra Leone by helping to develop the country in terms of human rights on the basis of the Millennium Development Goals and assist in the organisation of free and fair elections in 2007.	• Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration • Law Enforcement capacity building • Sustainable development	• Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration • Defence, Security and Law Enforcement • Restoration of state authority throughout the country
Fatalities	UNAMSIL 192 UNIOSIL 4 UNIPSIL 1 Total 197	UNMIL 204	UNOCI 151

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