

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER(ING) BİLİM DALI

**THE ROLE OF
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL
ORGANIZATION: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN IN SAARC**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

MOHAMMAD MIA

ISTANBUL, 2020

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ÖZET

BÖLGESEL ORGANİZASYONUN GELİŞİMİNDE SİYASİ LİDERLİĞİN ROLÜ: SAARC'TA PAKİSTAN ÖRNEĞİ

SAARC'ın gelişimi dalgalı bir süreçtir. Bazen kuruluş, bazı çığır açan başarılarla tanık olurken, bazen gelişme süreci çıkmaza girmiştir ve bazen kuruluş, yıllık toplantılar gibi ilkesel konularda dahi hareketsiz kalmıştır. Pakistan ve Hindistan'ın ikili ilişkiler durumu SAARC'ın gelişimi için bir motordur. Pakistan'ın siyasi liderlerinin çatışma politikasını dengeleyerek Hindistan'a karşı durması veya bandwagoning stratejisini takip ederek Hindistan ile işbirliği yapmaları SAARC'ın gidişatını önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir. Bu nedenle tez, Pakistan siyasi liderliğini bir vaka çalışması olarak ele alınmıştır. Hindistan'daki siyasi liderlik durumunun, ayrı bir çalışmanın konusunu teşkil edebileceği düşünülmektedir.

Bu çalışma, SAARC'ın gelişiminde Pakistan siyasi liderliğinin rolünü belirlemeyi ve değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde, siyasi liderlik terimi Oran Young'un yapısal liderlik düzeyinde ele alınmaktadır. Andrew Moravcsik'in üçlü işlevleri çerçevesi –politika başlatma, arabuluculuk ve seferberlik– SAARC'ın geliştirilmesinde Pakistan'ın siyasi liderlik rolünü belirlemek için kullanılmıştır.

Tezde, SAARC'ın gelişiminde Pakistan'ın siyasi liderliğinin rolünün, yalnızca SAARC içi gelişmelere odaklanmak yerine Hindistan ve Pakistan'ın ikili ilişkilerine odaklanarak daha iyi belirlenebileceğini ileri sürülmüştür. Ayrıca tez, üye devletlerin SAARC gelişiminin ve ikili ilişkilerinin birbirleriyle korelasyona sahip olduğunu ve üye ülkelerin ikili bağları olmadan SAARC'ın gelişimini değerlendirmenin düşünülemez olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Hindistan ve Pakistan, hem bölgede hem de SAARC'da her açıdan en önemli ve önde gelen aktörlerdir. SAARC'ın gelişiminin Hindistan ve Pakistan arasındaki ikili ilişkilerle doğrudan bir bağlantısı vardır. Başka bir deyişle, Hindistan-Pakistan ilişkilerindeki uzlaşma veya yakınlaşma SAARC'ın gelişimini olumlu etkilerken, gerilimin tırmanması SAARC'ın gelişimini tam tersi yönde etkilemiştir.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN IN SAARC

The development of SAARC is a fluctuating process. While sometimes the organization witnesses some breakthrough achievements, its development process has been timely deadlocked, and sometimes the organization could not act in principle matters such as the annual gathering. Pakistan and India's bilateral relations situation is an engine for SAARC development. Pakistani political leadership stance toward India if they pursue the policy of conflict to India by balancing her or cooperate with India by following the strategy of bandwagoning, significantly impact the course of SAARC. Thus, for this very reason, the thesis takes the Pakistani political leadership as a case study. The Indian political leadership case can be a separate specific study.

This study aims to determine and evaluate the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC. The thesis approached the term political leadership on a structural political leadership level in the class of Oran Young that stands for national leaders. The triad functions framework of Andrew Moravcsik –policy initiation, mediation and mobilization –was used to determine the Pakistan political leadership role in the development of SAARC.

The thesis asserts that the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC can be determined better by focusing on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan, rather than focusing solely on Intra-SAARC developments. Also, the thesis claims that SAARC development and bilateral relations of the member states have a correlation with each other, and it's unthinkable to evaluate SAARC development without bilateral ties of the member countries. India and Pakistan are the major and leading players in all aspects both in the region and in the SAARC. SAARC development has a direct linkage with the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. In other words, while détente or rapprochement in the India-Pakistan relations positively impacts the SAARC development, tension escalation influences SAARC the vice versa.

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ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BIMSTEC	The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CBMs	Confidence Building Measurements
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
ECAFE	Asian Economic Planners Conference which the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECM	European Common Market
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FTA	Freed Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission,
IJI	Islamic Jumhuriyet Ittihad
IPA	Integrated Plan of Action
IR	International Relations
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MFN	Most Favored Nation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MRD	The Movement of Restoration of Democracy
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement

NAM	Nonalignment Movement
Non-LDCs	Non-Less Developed Countries.
NSA	National Security Advisor
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SAPTA	South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
SARSO	South Asian Regional Standard Organization
SAS	South Asian States
SDF	SAARC Development Fund
TLP	Trade Liberalization Program
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

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INTRODUCTION

The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 afterwards of several years of negotiation among the regional countries such as India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. The process of negotiations was led by Bangladesh –a comparatively small country in the region. The members agreed on cooperating in nonpolitical issues such as cultural, economic, social, technical and scientific fields by preserving the principles of non-intervention in internal affairs, respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other.

Article Ten of SAARC charter states that “decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity” and “bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations.”¹ Thus, all bilateral disputes that South Asian States (SAS) have cannot be discussed in the platform of SAARC. Furthermore, any decision of SAARC needs the unanimity of the member states.

Even though SAARC Charter excludes all bilateral political issues from its framework, SAARC development has been undermined by the bilateral issues of its members. According to the SAARC charter, member states are required to participate in the annual SAARC summit.² However, due to bilateral disputes, member states generally refuse to participate in the annual summit for one or other reasons that they have with other countries. For instance, during the first decade of SAARC, Sri Lanka rejected participation in the SAARC summit due to her tension with India. Similarly, for the last two decades of SAARC, India and Pakistan relations have cancelled or postponed the SAARC summit for several times due to their troublesome relations.

The development of SAARC is a fluctuating process. While sometimes the organization witnesses some breakthrough achievements, its development process has been

¹ “SAARC Charter Provisional Rules of Procedure,” *SAARC Secretariat*, accessed February 6, 2020, http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-charter-provisional-rules-of-procedure

² SAARC Charter, Role 1 of the Composition of Delegation from the Chapter of Provisional Rules of Procedure. “SAARC Charter Provisional Rules of Procedure,” *SAARC Secretariat*.

timely deadlocked, and sometimes the organization could not act in principle matters such as the annual gathering. The first hypothesis of the thesis is that the oscillation process of SAARC development is a dependent variable to the India-Pakistan bilateral relations. The second hypothesis of the thesis is that in order to determine the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC, it is needed to focus on how the Pakistani political leadership approaches India instead of focusing on intra-SAARC developments. In other words, the secretariat of SAARC or the Standing Committee of SAARC cannot act independently on prime issues; it is the annual summit of SAARC that decides and states led by political leadership are the players in the summits.

Pakistan and India's bilateral relations situation is an engine for SAARC development. Bearing in mind, in addition to the internal and external dynamics, social and political structure, historical legacy, and population of these two countries, the main actor, which highly dominate the course of the bilateral relations is the head of the government or state. Indeed, some other actors would influence the bilateral relationship too, such as the opposition parties, military, economic elites, epistemic, and culture circles. However, political leadership, which is directly elected by the people and is responsible for the people, is the leading player in the fate of SAARC as they do the final say.

Major players in SAARC are India and Pakistan. On the one hand, India by sharing her border with all the members except Afghanistan gives her a geostrategic advantage, and her enormous territory and population, natural resources, military capacity, ideational power and economic capacity make India a dominant state in South Asia. The population of India is 74.9% of total South Asian population, while her territory is 64% of the overall South Asian region, and her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 82% in total of SAS.³ To add her military capacity to this calculation, India is unquestionably a dominant player in the region.

³ Danish A. Hashim and Mohammad A. Razzaque, "Revisiting South Asian Integration: Trade Flows and Implied Distances between Members," *International Trade Working Paper*, (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, November 2016).

On the other hand, Pakistan, a secondary power in the region occupies 15.5% of total South Asian region and his share of GDP and population in the region is 8.1% and 10.9% respectively.⁴ “This structural imbalance [between India and Pakistan] has led policymakers to pursue contrasting policy objectives. While India desires to maintain a hierarchical regional order, Pakistan and other [SAS] are opposed to this design.”⁵ Thereby, Pakistan position and stance toward India is much more significant in the light of ‘contested leadership.’⁶ Pakistan political leadership stance toward India if they pursue the policy of conflict to India by *balancing* her or cooperate with India by following the strategy of *bandwagoning*, significantly impact the course of SAARC.⁷ Thus, for this very reason, the thesis takes the Pakistani political leadership as a case study. While the Indian political leadership case can be a separate specific study.

SAARC has received relatively less attention of the scholars, and there is a lack of literature that examines the organization sufficiently. Most of the current literature about SAARC focuses on the dimensions that SAARC is a victim of India-Pakistan rivalry, or some of this literature discuss the potentiality of SAARC in case of a peace settlement occurs between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the work of Kishore Dash is valuable and significant as he goes beyond the scope of India-Pakistan rivalry centric analysis. He evaluates the South Asian regionalism by taking into consideration the domestic politics factor.⁸

Similarly, the role of political leadership in a regional organization is not sufficiently studied by scholars. Siti Darwind’s work is both leading and significant. She compares the role of political leadership in both the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) cases.⁹ Siti’s work has inspired me for selecting the current topic of

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures* (London: Routledge, 2008), 114.

⁶ Daniel Flesmes and Thorsten Wojczewski, “Contested Leadership in Comparative Perspective: Power Strategies in South Asia and South America,” *Asian Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, no. 1 (2011): pp. 1-27.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*.

⁹ Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda,” Conference paper for the 5th Oceanic Conference on International Studies, Sydney, 2012.

the thesis. As both SAARC and the role of political leadership in a regional organization are areas of research yet to be explored by scholars, this thesis, mainly using primary sources for the bilateral relations of India-Pakistan, would have a modest impact to fill these gaps.

The objective of the thesis is to analyze and determine the role of the political leadership of Pakistan in the development of SAARC. The questions which I will be trying to answer throughout the thesis are: what do I mean of political leadership? And what is the role of political leadership in a regional organization? And finally, what is the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC?

In this context, the thesis uses the qualitative research method of analysis by not only accepting that the antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan is an obstacle for the development of SAARC in terms of widening and deepening the organization, but also, this relationship is a gauge for the development of SAARC. Therefore, the posterior thesis analysis is done by looking into the situation of India and Pakistan bilateral relations on a structural political leadership level by using the triad functions framework of Andrew Moravcsik on the following order.

In the first chapter, a theoretical framework analysis, along with a historical background of South Asian regionalism, will be done. This chapter will not only discuss the establishment of SAARC and Pakistan approach to SAARC but also a brief overview will be done on region-building initiatives before SAARC. The second chapter will discuss political leadership and its role in a regional organization. The case of Pakistani political leadership will be evaluated comprehensively in this chapter. The last chapter discusses the correlation between SAARC developments and India-Pakistan bilateral relations developments.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONALISM

Andrew Hurrell discusses the sophistication of defining regionalism from a specific International Relations (IR) theory. He argues that “regionalism is best viewed as an unstable and indeterminate process of multiple and competing logics with no overriding teleology or single endpoint.”¹⁰ Thus, the author argues that “given this complexity, it is very unlikely that any single theory will be able to explain complex regionalism.”¹¹

Conventionally, regionalism was a debate between neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism within the context of European integration.¹² While regionalism on the lens of neo-functionalism is the cooperation of parties in one sector may spread to other sectors by the spill-over effect, from the aspect of liberal inter-governmentalism, regionalism is the engagement of parties to harmonize interests.¹³ Moreover, for liberal inter-governmentalist scholars “economic interdependence” is a “strong precondition for integration.”¹⁴ In the context of EU integration, supranational governance theorists emphasize “four main actors in pushing forward European integration: national states, transnational transactors, the European Commission, and the European Court of Justice.”¹⁵

However, Tanja A. Börzel underlines that the “dominant theories of regional cooperation and integration share a bias towards taking states as the main drivers of regionalism and focusing on processes of formal institution-building at the regional level.”¹⁶

¹⁰ Andrew Hurrell, “The Regional Dimension in International Relations Theory,” In *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, eds. Mary Farrell, Hettne Bjorn, and Luk van Langenhove (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 38–53.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² K. Raman Pillai, “Tensions within Regional Organizations: A Study of SAARC,” *Indian Journal of Political Science*, 50, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): pp. 18–27.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Andrés Malamud, “Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of MERCUSOR: An Empirical Examination,” *Latin American Research Review* 40, no. 1 (2005): pp. 138–164.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Tanja A. Börzel, “Theorizing Regionalism: Cooperation, Integration, and Governance,” In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, eds. Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016)

The author argues that the ‘comparative regionalism’ approach which explores “the role of non-state actors and informal institutions” may overcome the biased approach which focuses on “a particular (Western, EU) model of state-led formal institution-building.”¹⁷

Since the end of World War II, there was a significant increase in the number of regionalism which “vary greatly in terms of size, scope, purpose and institutional arrangements.”¹⁸ For instance, “large intergovernmental organisation ...such as the African Union, Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to small micro-regional organisations like the Zambezi River Basin Initiative or cross-border initiatives such as the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum.”¹⁹ Thus, the scholars argue that “the rapid increase and growing complexity of regional arrangement spurred a continuing academic debate about the role and nature of regionalism.”²⁰ Hettne brilliantly summarizes the complex nature of regionalism by stating that “different theories illuminate different dimensions of a multidimensional phenomenon.”²¹

Frederick Soderbaum underlines that “one of the main characteristics of the study of regionalism is that regionalism means different things to different people in different contexts and time periods.”²² He adds that instead of defining regionalism on a “particular theorists, themes, and regions,” it is needed to emphasise “on the evolution and the intellectual history of the field in a general sense.”²³ Thereby, he divides regionalism into four phases –early regionalism, old regionalism, new regionalism, and comparative regionalism.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Timo Behr and Juha Jokela, *Regionalism & Global Governance: the Emerging Agenda*, (19 rue de Milan, 75009: Notre Europe, 2011), 3.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Björn Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,” *New Political Economy* 10, no. 4 (2005): pp. 43–571.

²² Fredrick Söderbaum, “Old, New, and Comparative Regionalism: The History and Scholarly Development of the Field,” In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, eds. Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Riss (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016).

²³ Ibid.

Early regionalism for the author is the prior period as he traces back to ancient Greece. During this time, several “empires, kingdoms, alliances, trade leagues, pacts, unions, and confederations” were existed.²⁴ In contrast, old regionalism is the post-World War II era which was started with the European integration process in the late 1940s. New regionalism is the period that was started in the mid-1980s with the activism of business and civil society and gained speed in 1990s with the changing global structure. And finally, for the comparative regionalism, the author argues that with the change of the new millennium and developments such as the war on terror, rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and current financial crisis, it is time “to move beyond the new regionalism.”²⁵

Some scholars make a differentiation between regionalism and regionalization. Regionalism on this aspect is defined as “a political process marked by cooperation and policy coordination, whereas regionalization is an economic process in which trade and investment within the region grow more rapidly than the region’s trade and investment with the rest of the world.”²⁶ Pempel, for instance, highlights that regionalization is “a bottom-up, societally driven process” and regionalism “is the intentional product of interstate cooperation.”²⁷ While some other scholars define regionalism as a “state-led projects of cooperation that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and treaties.”²⁸ For these scholars, regionalization is a “process of integration which... derive their driving force from markets, from private trade and investment flows, and from the policies and decisions of the companies.”²⁹

The definition and theoretical framework of regionalism need “elasticity.”³⁰ In the fact that “there is no ideal region, or any single agenda to which all regions aspire. Regions,

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Edward Mansfield and Etel Solingen, “Regionalism,” *Annual review of political science* 13 (2010): pp. 145–163.

²⁷ Pempel TJ, “Introduction: Emerging Webs Of Regional Connectedness,” In *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, ed. TJ Pempel Cited in Edward Mansfield and Etel Solingen, “Regionalism,” *Annual review of political science* 13 (2010): pp. 145–163.

²⁸ Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, “Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing the New,” *New Political Economy* 5, no.3 (2000): pp. 333–352.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective,” in *Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice*, eds. Mary Farrell, Bjorn Hetne and Luk van Langenhove (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 21–37.

like states, are of varying composition, capabilities and aspirations. They may also be fluid and changing in their make up.”³¹ Moreover, Fawcett provides the argument of Maalouf that “regionness, like identity, is not given once and for all: it is built up and changes.”³² This definition of the region is supported by some other scholars too. For instance, Jetschke and Saori highlight that “regions are constructs of physical, psychological, and behavioural traits and at each temporal stage, such constructs are defined and redefined.”

Similarly, Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein note that “A border... is not a geographic fact that has sociological consequences, but a sociological fact that takes geographic form. The same can be said of regions. Neither the North Atlantic nor Southeast Asia existed as geographical facts. Both were politically constructed.”³³

While defining regionalism is so complex and changing, as discussed so far, determining the role of political leadership in the development of a regional organization became further complicated as political leadership is by itself a complex and changing concept. For instance, for Ikenberry, political leadership means institutions, while for Dent and Webber, political leadership can be a state, for instance, the United States (US) and its role in East Asia, whereas for scholars such as Andrew Moravcsik and Oran Young political leadership can be individual leaders.³⁴ Thus, while there is no scholarly consensus on one definition of regionalism, there is also no consensus on one definition of political leadership too. Nevertheless, the thesis approaches political leadership on an individual level as Andrew

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): pp. 575-607.

³⁴ G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of International Leadership,” *Political Science Quarterly* 111, no. 3 (1996): pp. 385-402. ; Douglas Webber, “Regional Integration in Europe and Asia: A Historical Perspective,” in *Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe Convergence or Divergence?* ed Fort, Bertrand, and Douglas Webber (London: Routledge, 2006); M. Christopher Dent, “Regional Leadership in East Asia: Japan and China as Contenders,” in *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism* eds. Beeson, Mark, and Richard, Stubbs (London and New York, 2012): pp. 263-274. ; Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): pp. 267-306. ; Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society,” *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991): pp. 281-308.

Moravcsik and Oran Young define, which will be discussed in the coming paragraphs in detail.

S. Chee cited in S.D.M.Pero argues that the role of political leadership is crucial in “determining an institution’s aims and agendas, deciding about membership issues, and by providing options if a common agreement is impossible to achieve.”³⁵ Therefore, it would be impossible to create or survive a regional organization if there is no willingness, courage, and vision of political leadership. For instance, the role of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in the EU project, and Adam Malik, Tun Abdul Razak, S. Rajaratnam, Thanat Khoman, and Narciso Ramos in ASEAN project was a driving force for these projects.³⁶ Similarly, Milward provides the term ‘lives and teachings of European saints’ for the outstanding efforts of Monnet, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Spaak, and De Gasperi.³⁷ These elites were the driving force for the regional integration in Europe whom they witnessed war, and they were the catalyst for the reconciliation process among the enemies in Europe.³⁸

Political leadership has the leverage to influence the regional project by making policies happen or to prevent them from happening.³⁹ Tallberg illustrates three forms where political leadership influence: 1) agenda-setting, 2) agenda-structuring, and 3) agenda exclusion.⁴⁰ While for Chee, political leadership is essential to “determine the institution’s aims and agendas, deciding about membership issues and by providing options if a common

³⁵ Stephen Chee, *Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects*. Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (1991) cited in Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Hartmut Mayer, “Historical Narratives as Normative Drivers of Integration and Disintegration in Europe and Asia,” in *Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative Perspectives* eds. Louis Brennan and Philomena Murray (London: Routledge, 2017), 52-68.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Jonas Tallberg, “The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidency,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): pp. 1–19.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

agreement is impossible.”⁴¹ For Boin, leaders can “set the political agenda, advancing creative progress, and ensuring progress.”⁴²

Andrew Moravcsik provides his triad functions framework to determine the role of political leadership in the EU development process. The first function is ‘policy *initiation*,’ which means “informal agenda-setting,” while the second function is ‘*mediation*,’ which “entrepreneurs intervene in ongoing interstate negotiation,” whereas the third function is ‘*mobilization*’ that stands for mobilizing “domestic social support for an agreement.”⁴³

In this regard, the thesis will determine the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC through the triad functions framework of Moravcsik by focusing on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. The following reasons make me stick with this conceptual framework. First of all, concentrating solely on SAARC to determine the role of Pakistani political leadership is faulty for the reason that SAARC is an inter-governmental organization, not a supranational organization. Thereby, states make the final say in SAARC development, not the institutional bodies of SAARC. More precisely, the secretariat of SAARC or the Standing Committee of SAARC cannot act independently on prime issues; it is the annual summit of SAARC that decides and states led by political leaders are the players in the summits.

Secondly, SAARC can only act in each issue when unanimity among members has occurred. For instance, a SAARC summit can only be materialized whenever all member states give consent to participate in the summit. This situation can only happen when there are peaceful bilateral relations among all members. Thus, bilateral relations come first, and SAARC follows the bilateral relations of the states. Last but not least, Pakistan and India are

⁴¹ Stephen Chee, *Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects*. Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (1991) cited in Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

⁴² Arjen Boin, *Crafting Public Institutions: Leadership in Two Prison Systems* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) cited in Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

⁴³ Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” pp. 267–306.

not only the two major players in the region but also the ups and downs in the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan directly impacts on the speed and scope of SAARC.

In a nutshell, the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC can be determined better by focusing on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan, rather than focusing solely on Intra-SAARC developments.

1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.2.1 Region Building Initiatives before SAARC

Regionalism in South Asia is not a novel notion. Muni defines the geography as a “region which is sandwiched between ASEAN and Gulf region, is characterized by political disharmony and strategic schism.”⁴⁴ Efforts in the direction of cooperation in the region happened before the eighties. However, the SAS were colonialized, the states could not act independently toward agreements between the countries in their vicinities, despite having geographic connectivity, cultural similarities, share a history and somehow common language for communication. However, the aftermath of World War II and the independence of SAS created a long era of bilateral and multilateral conflict in addition to the delicate issue of sharing sovereignty.

India, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, attempted for the formation of an Asian Union afterwards of the Dutch invasion of Indonesia in 1948. India organized a conference on January 20, 1949, in which 18 Asian countries participated in negotiating the Indonesian issue. Three resolutions were agreed, two resolutions condemned the Dutch occupation and called on the UN to take action against the Dutch invasion. The third resolution was about to establish an organization of Asian countries to cooperate.⁴⁵ These attempts were further formalized when the Indian Council of World Affairs explained the

⁴⁴ S. D. Muni, “SARC: Building Regionalism from Below,” *Asian Survey* 25, no. 4 (1985): pp. 391–404.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 80.

structure of the Organization of Asian Countries by publishing an article. However, these attempts were interrupted during the late 1940s when the communist regime was established in China, and the Cold-War of two blocs was triggered.⁴⁶

The premier of Sri Lanka, John Kotelawala, invited the Asian leaders to Colombo to negotiate on common interests in April 1954. Burma, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia participated in the Colombo Powers Conference. The issues of the Indochina, nuclear bomb tests, China representation in the UN, Tunisia, and Morocco problem and the Palestinian issues were discussed.⁴⁷ The position of Pakistan was particularly vital while he tried to bring the Kashmir issue into the agenda of the conference.⁴⁸ Thereby, a diverse perception of the leadership undermined the efficiency of the conference, and the members of the conference never came together again.

Dash underlines that the political leadership of the SAS discussed the idea of South Asian regionalism through different international platforms such as the Nonalignment Movement (NAM) and the United Nations (UN). He provides the example of the September 1961 Asian Economic Planners Conference which the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) sponsored the conference to discuss regional cooperation for the economic activities.⁴⁹ However, Sri Lanka and Pakistan opposed to the prospect while they apprehended that India may dominate their market. This stance of the states continues until today inside SAARC.

1.2.2 Establishment of SAARC

SAARC was established in 1985 afterwards of several years of negotiation among the regional countries such as India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ For more details on Colombo conference see A. W. Stargardt, "The Emergence of the Asian System of Powers," *Modern Asian Studies* 23, no. 3 (1989): pp. 561–95. ; "The Colombo Conference: Neutrality the Keynote," *The World Today* 10, no. 7 (July 1, 1954): pp. 293–300.

⁴⁸ "The Colombo Conference: Neutrality the Keynote," *The World Today* 10, no. 7 (July 1, 1954): pp. 293–300.

⁴⁹ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 81.

Bhutan. The process of negotiations was led by Bangladesh, a comparatively small country in the region.

The aim of the organization is:

*To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life; to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals with the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potentials; to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia; to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and to cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.*⁵⁰

To enhance these objectives, member states agreed on the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of each other, respect to territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other.

The establishment of SAARC in 1985 was crucial and critical. On the one hand, the upcoming member of the organization –Afghanistan–was invaded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1979.⁵¹ The expansionism of the Red Army made the regional countries apprehensive in general and Pakistan in particular. On the other, both in the west and east, significant initiatives for the construction of regional cooperation were going on, for instance, the European Community and ASEAN in west and east, respectively. As a result, these developments had a substantial influence on bringing the member states whom they had deep apprehension from each other.

In late 1979, the president of Bangladesh –Ziaur Rahman –propounded the idea of South Asian regional cooperation –there is a consensus that SAARC is a product of Bangladesh initiatives. In this regard, several prior meetings were held for the creation of a regional organization. There were several reasons why General Ziaur Rahman attempted to

⁵⁰ SAARC Secretariat. Accessed August 19, 2019. <http://saarc-sec.org/about-saarc>.

⁵¹ Afghanistan became the member of SAARC in 2007

establish a regional organization. First of all, the military regime of Ziaur Rahman, which he came into power through a coup d'état against the civil government of Mujibur Rahman, needed legitimacy in the region, mainly Indian support. Secondly, through regional cooperation, he aimed to improve economic activities as Bangladesh was suffering from unemployment and low economic growth. Last but not least, through a regional platform, Ziaur Rahman tried to solve the bilateral disputes with India through this platform instead of a bilateral negotiation.⁵²

Additionally, during the late 1970s, slow economic growth of the SAS which was 2.2 percent –the lowest of all time, the political leadership of these countries preferred to “look inward the region and toward each other to seek new options for preparing themselves to meet the then prevailing challenges.”⁵³ Thereby, this joint low economic performance of the countries brought the leadership of the smaller countries of the region together by preferring ‘logrolling strategy,’ which means “I will vote for your issue if you vote for mine.”⁵⁴

In the aftermath of the willingness of Pakistan and India to the proposal of Bangladesh, the process of establishing a regional institution was initiated. The first move was the consultation of the foreign ministers of SAS in the UN headquarter between June and September of 1980. They informally discussed the proposal of Bangladesh, and the motion was reformulated heavily. Thereby, a consensus was occurred in building regional cooperation from below in areas where the seven members did not have controversies. Furthermore, political aspects were mainly hold exempted.

The ministers agreed that Bangladesh would prepare a draft of the detailed initial proposal. Bangladesh immediately prepared and circulated the draft. It is significant to say that all security and political issues were eliminated, and only areas of non-political and non-disputed were added. The draft identified 11 areas for cooperation, such as economic, cultural, scientific, etc. New areas of cooperation were added after several initial meetings.

⁵² Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 83.

⁵³ Ibid, 84-85.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 85.

For instance, the Colombo meeting of April 1981 determined agriculture, rural development, telecommunication, meteorology, health and population as new areas of cooperation. Further, the meeting agreed to establish a Committee of Whole to work on an Integrated Plan of Action (IPA) under the leadership of Sri Lanka.⁵⁵ The Kathmandu gathering of November 1981 determined transport, postal service, technology, and science as new areas of cooperation. In the third meeting of foreign ministers in Islamabad in 1982 arts, sports, and culture were identified as new areas of collaboration.

These preliminary meetings were held for the purpose to consolidate the cooperation and make it formalized and institutionalized. Finally, the regional cooperation of SAS was officially institutionalized by the Dhaka Declaration afterwards of the Dhaka Summit on 8th December 1985 with a charter and seven members –Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The secretariat of the organization was set up two years later in 1987 in Kathmandu, Nepal.

1.2.3 Pakistan's Approach to SAARC

Initially, all SAS have different reservations to join the organization of SAARC. As Padmaja Murthy notes that “each of these countries had a specific set of expectations –some bilateral and some regional –from the association.”⁵⁶ The small states of SAARC had somehow similar expectations as these countries were suffering from the economic crisis, which was further aggravated due to the 1974-75 oil crisis along with the domestic turmoil they were confronted.⁵⁷

Murthy analyzes the reservations of Pakistan toward SAARC in detail. The author argues that Pakistan had two concerns in the initial steps of SAARC. First of all, Pakistan was concerned that SAARC would consolidate the hegemonic manner of India “in an

⁵⁵ Amzad Hossain, “K-Economy in the SAARC Integration: a Comparative Study among the Member Countries,” *Competitiveness Review* 22, no. 1 (2012): pp. 28–47. ; Arndt Michael, “Sovereignty vs. Security: SAARC and Its Role in the Regional Security Architecture in South Asia,” *Harvard Asia Quarterly* XV, no. 2 (2013): pp. 37–45.

⁵⁶ Padmaja Murthy, “Pakistan and SAARC,” *Strategic Analysis* 22, no. 10 (January 1, 1999): pp. 1537–1560.

⁵⁷ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 84.

institutionalized manner.”⁵⁸ Secondly, “Pakistan was also weary of deeper involvement in the South Asian region since it might cast doubt on the credibility and seriousness of its effort to develop closer ties with the Islamic countries of West Asia.”⁵⁹

Furthermore, Pakistan was concerned that the idea of Bangladesh for regional cooperation could be an initiative of India to maintain its domination in the region. Thereby, Pakistan joined SAARC in order not to leave a regional platform alone to India by “preferring a step-by-step approach” of cooperation.⁶⁰ Similarly, India was apprehensive that the idea of regional collaboration “might provide an opportunity for the small neighbors to regionalize all bilateral issues and along with Pakistan, they might “gang-up” against India.”⁶¹

Concisely, all SAARC member states in general and India and Pakistan particularly joined the organization, not on the perception of trust on each other but mistrust on each other has brought these two antagonists together. Therefore, SAARC thenceforward is directly under the influence of bilateral relations of its members in general but India and Pakistan mainly.

⁵⁸ Padmaja Murthy, “Pakistan and SAARC,” pp. 1537–1560.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 87.

⁶¹ Ibid.

1.2.4 Structure of SAARC




Figure 5

The organizational Structure of SAARC

Note: The structure is draw by the author from the sources of SAARC Secretariat and the work of Dash (*Regionalism in South Asia*)

2. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ITS ROLE IN A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE CASE OF PAKISTANI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SAARC

2.1 POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ITS ROLE IN A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

For Ikenberry, political leadership means institutions, while for Dent and Webber, political leadership can be a state, for instance, the US and its role in East Asia, whereas for scholars such as Andrew Moravcsik and Oran Young political leadership can be individual leaders.⁶² The comparative analysis was done by many scholars based on the role of the states; particularly the US factor is widely taken into consideration in the context of Franco-German and China-Japan relationship. However, this literature fails to explore the influence of individual leaders in a regional project building.⁶³

Paraphrasing the work of Ikenberry which he notes that despite the decline of the US in the world-system order, the system and institutions that the US has created in the aftermath of World War II –Bretton Woods system, NATO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO) –will be stable. He adds “although much of the material power of American hegemony has eroded, the institutions of reciprocal and legitimate joint governance remain.”⁶⁴ He also argues that the system will be steady despite the economic and military threat emanating from the rising powers. However, if the challenge is “both power and social purpose,” the established system may diminish.⁶⁵

⁶² G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of International Leadership,” pp. 385-402. ; Douglas Webber, “Regional Integration in Europe and Asia: A Historical Perspective.” ; M. Christopher Dent, “Regional Leadership in East Asia: Japan and China as Contenders,” pp. 263-274. ; Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” pp. 267-306. ; Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society,” pp. 281-308.

⁶³ Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

⁶⁴ G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of International Leadership,” pp. 385-402.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Ikenberry split political leadership into three-level –‘*structural, institutional, and situational.*’ For the author, structure leadership is the capability of a state –such as “natural resources, capital, technology, military force, and economic size” –to direct and shape the world order.⁶⁶ According to the author, the state is the prime actor for structural leadership.

Institutional leadership for Ikenberry is “the rules and practices that states agree to that set in place principles and procedures that guide their relations.”⁶⁷ In both *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* the liberal approach of Britain and US by opening their market not only to demonstrate its coercive power but also persuasive power to others, as Ikenberry labels it as “the power of ideas.” For instance, the abolition of the Corn Law by Britain in the 19th century for the sake of free trade and the US neoliberal approach in the mid-20th century to increase free trade.⁶⁸

Lastly, situational leadership for Ikenberry is “the action and initiatives of the states that induce cooperation quit apart from the distribution of power or the array of institutions.”⁶⁹ The author notes that in this type of leadership individual is in the core, while he or she may catch or create new opportunities in the system for the state interests. For instance, the role of Otto von Bismarck in the late 19th century for unifying the states in German confederation.⁷⁰

Scholars such as Douglas Webber, Hidetaka, and Christopher M. Dent approach political leadership on a state level.⁷¹ These authors widely focus on the political leadership and regional integration processes in East Asian by considering several states, such as China, Japan, and Korea. For instance, Dent underlines in his work the position of China and Japan in the East Asian regionalism, and he argues that China and Japan are the two primary

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ For a detail analysis of political leadership in a state-level see Douglas Webber, “Regional Integration in Europe and Asia: A Historical Perspective.”; M. Christopher Dent, “Regional Leadership in East Asia: Japan and China as Contenders,” pp. 263-274.

possible powers in the region by taking into account the “material, technocratic, ideational and agential” capacity.⁷²

Andrew Moravcsik does his analysis on his theoretical framework of “two-level network manager” by demonstrating the flawed belief of exaggerating the role of supranational entrepreneurs in a regional organization.⁷³ He mainly focuses on the EU and asserts that the role of Monnet in the 1950s Rome treaty; Walter Hallstein in the 1960s creating common market; Jenkins in the 1970s finding the European Monetary system; and Delors in the 1990s Maastricht treaty were “generally late, redundant, futile, and sometimes even counterproductive.”⁷⁴ Instead of getting into the more in-depth analysis of the author, the core factor of analysis for him is individual leadership.

Regime theorist Oran Young highlights that political leadership is individual and he argues that students of IR usually look into the success of an organization and base on it they look to the role of the political leadership from one or other party. He argues that it’s a ‘fatally flawed’ approach.⁷⁵ Therefore he notes that what is needed to do is to define the “conception of leadership focusing on well-defined forms of behavior that can be identified without references focusing on the outcomes flowing for institutional bargaining.”⁷⁶

Young further emphasizes that recent works widely concentrate on the “structural determinant of collective outcomes” in ‘institutional bargaining,’ through hegemony framework analysis, and it is “diverting the attention from the roles that individuals play as leaders in institutional bargaining.”⁷⁷ Thereby, the author argues that:

It is important to bear in mind the relationship between individuals and collectives entities, such as states and international organizations. Those who become leaders in institutional bargaining frequently act in the name of or as agents of states or international organizations. But in the final analysis, leaders are

⁷² M. Christopher Dent, “Regional Leadership in East Asia: Japan and China as Contenders,” pp. 263-274.

⁷³ Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” pp. 267–306.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society,” *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991): pp. 281–308.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

*individuals, and it is the behavior of these individuals which we must explore to evaluate the role of leadership in the formation of international institutions.*⁷⁸

Oran Young divides the political leadership into three forms such as ‘*structural leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership*,’ by taking into account the leadership behavior, leadership action, and interaction of leadership. For the author, structural leadership “is an individual who acts in the name of a party (ordinarily a state) engaged in institutional bargaining.”⁷⁹ While an entrepreneurial leader is “an individual who may or may not act in the name of a major stakeholder in institutional bargaining but who leads by making use of negotiation skill to influence the manner in which issues are presented in the context of institutional bargaining”, and intellectual leader “is an individual who may or may not be affiliated with a recognized actor in international politics but who relies on the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake.”⁸⁰

For the sake of making the distinction of these forms of political leadership, Young notes that structural leadership is trying to “translate power resources into bargaining leverage,” while both entrepreneurial leadership and intellectual leadership “rely on their wits to make their efforts felt.”⁸¹ Entrepreneurial leader “is an agenda-setter and popularizer who uses negotiating skills to devise attractive formulas and to broker interests; however, an intellectual leader is a thinker... accordingly, entrepreneurial leaders often become consumers of ideas generated by intellectual leaders.”⁸²

Coming to the role of political leadership in a regional organization, Ernst Haas notes that:

Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

*activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.*⁸³

The author uses the term ‘elite’ for political actor and ‘political elites’ for him “are the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties.”⁸⁴ Thus, in the definition of Haas, political actor is an indispensable factor for a regional project. Political actors are the driver to create, shape, reshape, promote or impede a regional integration project.

S. Chee cited by S.D.M.Pero argues that the role of political leadership is crucial in “determining an institution’s aims and agendas, deciding about membership issues, and by providing options if a common agreement is impossible to achieve.”⁸⁵ Therefore, it would be impossible to create or survive a regional organization if there is no willingness, courage, and vision of political leadership. For instance, the role of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in the EU project; Adam Malik, Tun Abdul Razak, S. Rajaratnam, Thanat Khoman, and Naciso Ramos in ASEAN project was a driving force for these projects.⁸⁶

Looking to European integration example, in the post-war era, the role of individual leaders in the founding member countries of the EU was tremendously influential. Therefore, Milward provides the term ‘lives and teachings of European saints’ for the outstanding efforts of Monnet, Adenauer, de Gaulle, Spaak, and De Gasperi.⁸⁷ These elites were the driving force for the regional integration in Europe whom they witnessed war, and they were the catalyst for the reconciliation process among the enemies in Europe.⁸⁸

⁸³ Ernst Bernard Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 17.

⁸⁵ Stephen Chee, *Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects*. Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (199s1) cited in Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

⁸⁶ Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

⁸⁷ Hartmut Mayer, “Historical Narratives as Normative Drivers of Integration and Disintegration in Europe and Asia,” pp. 52-68.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Similarly, “in Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the successive Argentine and Brazilian presidents since 1985 have carried out the presidential diplomacy with a free hand to accommodate issues at stake in the way they saw fit.”⁸⁹ Malamud adds that “both the embryonic (1985-1991) and the post foundational stage (from 1991 onwards) of MERCOSUR have been characterized by a remarkable degree of presidential activism.”⁹⁰ Thereby, the author argues that, for the creation of MERCOSUR, Argentine’s president Raul Alfonsin and Brazil’s president Jose Sarney played significantly. Whereas Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello the presidents of Argentina and Brazil respectively played critically to widen the organization by inviting Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991.⁹¹ The scholar concludes that “presidents acting not only as decision-makers but also as dispute settlers and guarantors of commitments.”⁹²

With the change of leadership in the member countries of a regional organization, the interpretation of the regional organization simultaneously changes base on the understanding and behavior of the leadership. NAFTA was established among USA, Canada, and Mexico for several reasons in which trade and economic integrity was the first and crucial aim. Similarly, the EU establishment was based on several reasons, but the USSR expansionism was the most crucial. ASEAN establishment was also a political cooperation base on inter-governmentalism to have common behavior against communist China and Vietnam. However, the change of leadership in member countries and the implication of international conjuncture has tremendously changed the belief of member countries toward the regional organization in which they are holding the membership.

For instance, the Trump administration has labeled NAFTA as a threat to the USA economy. While in the EU, the financial crisis of 2009-2011 has raised concerns against the supranational EU project and trigger nationalist sentiments in some member countries, most

⁸⁹ Andrés Malamud, "Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of MERCUSOR: An Empirical Examination," pp. 138-164.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

importantly, the vision of solidarity of the EU has eroded.⁹³ For ASEAN, the 1997 financial crisis has made pessimism in the leadership of the member countries toward ASEAN. Coming to SAARC, the leadership of each member state has been manipulating each positive or/and negative development for their political survival.

The outstanding work of S.D.M.Pero, which she compares the role of political leadership in ASEAN and EU, she tries to fill the gap of literature in the area of the role of political leadership in regional projects. The author underlines that “political leadership was, and still is, the ‘driver’ and the ‘engine’ for both ASEAN and the EU. The degree of influence it has had on the ASEAN and EU community-building efforts is significant.”⁹⁴ S.D.M.Pero defines the term ‘driver’ and ‘engine.’ ‘Driver’ means that “the leadership task is to drive and direct the regional organization to achieve the desired objectives,” while ‘engine’ stands for “the leadership duties include ensuring the organization’s survivability and cohesiveness in any condition and situation that regions face.”⁹⁵

The definition of Chee cited in S.D.M.Pero highlights that “political leadership role in a regional project can be empirically observed among others, by determining an institution’s aims and agendas, and by providing options if a common agreement is impossible to achieve.”⁹⁶ Moreover, S.D.M.Pero provides two reasons why the role of political leadership is significant in ASEAN and EU, which both projects have sought diverse paths.

First of all, in the case of ASEAN and EU, it is widely accepted that the role of external power and norm have tremendously influenced the direction of regional project construction. However, political leaders are the final factor whom they “decide, control, allocate, learn, and innovate any decision-making pertaining to their institutions.”⁹⁷

⁹³ Michael Reiterer, “East Meets West: Will the Rise of Asia Lead to Europe’s Decline –Lesson to be learnt?,” in *Drivers of Integration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative Perspectives* eds. Brennan, Louis, and Philomena Murray (London: Routledge, 2017): pp. 384-404.

⁹⁴ Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

Secondly, as Acharya argues that “norms developed in Asia were [the] powerful force behind the design and building of institutions in post-War Asia.”⁹⁸ However, these norms were developed by the political leaders’ preferences, beliefs, personalities, and the agendas that were provided by the leaders in time.⁹⁹

Political leadership has the leverage to influence the regional project by making policies happen or to prevent them from happening.¹⁰⁰ Tallberg illustrates three forms where political leadership influence: 1) agenda-setting, 2) agenda-structuring, 3) agenda exclusion. While for Chee, political leadership is important to “determine the institution’s aims and agendas, deciding about membership issues and by providing options if a common agreement is impossible.”¹⁰¹ For Boin, leaders can “set the political agenda, advancing creative progress, and ensuring progress.”¹⁰²

Tallberg’s classification for the political leadership role in the regional organization is constructed based on the EU Council. Political leadership in the EU Council enjoys not only the independency they have but also access to information. Furthermore, the EU is an organization of several stable countries in terms of socio, political, and economical. It would be a flaw to compare the political leadership of any other regional or international organization with the political leadership inside the EU institutional structure.

More interestingly, Andrew Moravcsik notes that the role of the supranational entrepreneurs such as Monnet, Hallstein, Jenkins, and Delors in the European Community or the role of Tommy Koh in the Law of the sea, and Mustafa Tolba in UN Environmental program is not only exaggerated but also “the conjuncture between supranational activity and

⁹⁸ Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? : Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 28.

⁹⁹ Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

¹⁰⁰ Jonas Tallberg, “The Agenda-Shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidency,” pp. 1–19.

¹⁰¹ Stephen Chee, *Leadership and Security in Southeast Asia: Institutional Aspects*. Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (1991) cited in Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

¹⁰² Arjen Boin, *Crafting Public Institutions: Leadership in Two Prison Systems* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) cited in Siti Darwinda Mohamed Pero, “Political Leadership in Asean and the EU: Towards a Comparative Research Agenda.”

interstate agreement is said to demonstrate a causal relationship.”¹⁰³ Therefore, the author provides his triad functions framework. The first function is ‘policy *initiation*,’ which means “informal agenda-setting,” while the second function is ‘*mediation*,’ which “entrepreneurs intervene in ongoing interstate negotiation,” whereas the third function is ‘*mobilization*’ that stands for mobilizing “domestic social support for an agreement.”¹⁰⁴

Moravcsik concludes that in the Treaty of Rome in 1950s for the creation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and soon after the establishment of European Common Market (ECM), Monnet - the French citizen who was the president of the European Commission aftermath of ECSC –has been widely regarded as an impetus for these developments. However, the scholar argues that taking into account the triad functions framework “Monnet’s interventions were redundant, futile, and sometimes even counterproductive.”¹⁰⁵ He adds that for an ECM creation, “key compromises that were struck directly among the national leaders, particularly Adenauer and Moller, occasionally with the mediation of the Belgian and Dutch foreign ministries.”¹⁰⁶

Similarly, the author codes that during the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Delors - the president of the EC Commission in time –has been credited immensely for the success of the EU. However, the author adds that based on the triad functions framework, it was not the Delors factor but the national government leadership entrepreneurship that led to success. For instance, German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand.¹⁰⁷

In a nutshell, Moravcsik not only takes political leadership on an individual level, but he also asserts that an organization’s development should not only be read on supranational entrepreneurship by not taking into account the national leaders and states domestic circumstances. In this regard, throughout this thesis, the term political leadership is considered as an individual level, and the concept of political leadership will be examined

¹⁰³ Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,” pp. 267–306.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

according to the definitions of Moravcsik and Young. Moreover, on the individual level, the thesis analysis will be done in the class of Young's 'structural leadership' that stands for the national leader.

Accordingly, the thesis will not focus on how the agendas are raised inside the SAARC annual or ministerial summits, which is not vitally important for a doomed organization. However, the bilateral relations among India and Pakistan, which have been undermining the efficiency of the organization since its inception will be taken into consideration for the posterior analysis. The Pakistani political leadership approaches toward India and how does it impact on the SAARC development will be the centre of attention.

Thereby, the triad framework of Andrew Moravcsik will be applied to determine the role of the Pakistani political leadership role in SAARC development. The role of Pakistani political leadership will be evaluated through functions such as policy *initiation*, *mediation*, and *implementation*. Looking at the historical background of the India-Pakistan bilateral relations, many agreements, declaration, and accords have been issued and exist. However, if today the bilateral ties are at the minimum level, this means that either side does not comprehensively and willingly implement all these agreements, declarations, and accords. Thereby, instead of the third function *mobilization* in the framework of Moravcsik, the function mobilization will be replaced with the function *implementation*, for the purpose of determining to what extent the political leadership of Pakistan implements the agreements. Some fundamental reasons to choose this framework are as follows.

First of all, in SAARC, India and Pakistan are the two major members in terms of both material and immaterial capacity. For instance, both countries' population, number of army personnel, geography magnitude, spend of GDP on defense overpass other member countries. Therefore, the relation between India and Pakistan is a gauge for the development of SAARC. In other words, a rapprochement of the two parties accelerates the speed and scope of SAARC while tension escalation influences the vice versa.

Secondly, rivalry termination or tension escalation between India and Pakistan from the aspect of Pakistan is on the shoulder of political leadership and army. Since its establishment, the military has played a significant role in the external and internal affairs of Pakistan, notably the country policy toward India and Afghanistan. How the army and political leadership plays a role in the development of SAARC will be discussed in the upcoming chapters.

Thirdly, for the development and consolidation of a regional organization, peace among antagonists or at least trust on each other is a prime reservation. For instance, the rapprochement and consequently, peace among Germany and France consolidated the European integration project. Similarly, Indonesia has managed its problematic issues with the regional countries, and this has put impulse in the development of ASEAN.

Last but not least, the charter of SAARC puts the bilateral issues among the members aside, and due to these bilateral issues among the members, it has been suffering a lack of development. While in ASEAN, for instance, it widely puts the bilateral issues inside for the purpose of finding a solution. Therefore, the organization has gone into more deep integration compare to SAARC.¹⁰⁸

In this context, the thesis not only accepts that the antagonist relationship between India and Pakistan is an obstacle for the development of SAARC in terms of widening and deepening the organization, but also, this relationship is a gauge for the development of SAARC. Therefore, the posterior thesis analysis is done by looking into the situation of India and Pakistan on a structural political leadership level by using the triad functions framework to determine the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC.

¹⁰⁸ Faizal Yahya, "Pakistan, SAARC and ASEAN Relations," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no. 2 (2004): pp. 346–75.

2.2 THE ROLE OF PAKISTANI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH INDIA

Evaluating the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC via the triad functions framework –*policy initiation, mediation, and implementation*, would be a flaw to focus on the intra-organizational structural as Tallberg does for the EU by focusing the European Council.

Concentrating solely on SAARC to determine the role of political leadership could be hard to achieve since SAARC is an inter-governmental organization, not a supranational organization, likewise, the EU which the states have transferred a part of their sovereignty to the EU in some fields. Therefore, states make the final say in SAARC development, not any institutional body of SAARC. More precisely, the secretariat of SAARC or the Standing Committee of SAARC cannot act independently on prime issues. Major decisions are taken at the annual summit of SAARC and states led by political leadership are the major player in the summit.

India and Pakistan are the two significant members of the organization, and they are also the dominant players in the South Asian region. Their rivalry and competition is a prime challenge for the organization of SAARC. To overcome this challenge, Confidence Building Measurements (CBMs) between India and Pakistan is needed for establishing rapprochement, conflict resolution, and maintaining peace in the region. Therefore, the first parameter to determine the Pakistani political leadership role in the development of SAARC is *constructing CBMs with India*.

The second area to determine the role of Pakistani political leadership in the development of SAARC is *increasing Trade and Economic Activities with India*. The persistence and evolution of an organization need both or at least one of the *utilitarian support* or *affective allegiance*. Thereby, an increase in trade and economic activities will provide *utilitarian support* toward the institution, and this would spill-over into other sectors in the long-run.

South Asian region is sharing a common colonial history, and the people of the region share a linguistic, ethnic, and religious commonality. For the sake of establishing *affective allegiance*, communication and contact among the people is a must. This will not only override the misperception toward each other but will also be a domestic driving force for the development of the organization. Thereby, the third sub-chapter will discuss and determine the Pakistani political leadership role in the development of *increasing people-to-people contact with India* through the triad functions framework.

In this regard, the next sub-chapters of the thesis will evaluate SAARC development in the sense of India-Pakistan relations by determining the Pakistani political leadership role through the triad framework of Moravcsik. Specifically, CBMs between India and Pakistan, increasing trade activities between India and Pakistan, and people-to-people contact of India and Pakistan are comprehensively discussed on the belief that SAARC development and the state of India-Pakistan relations closely correlate.

2.2.1 Constructing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) with India

Karl Deutsch's theory of 'regional security community' remarks that base on the realistic calculation, states do not consider war and fighting as a solution for the common dispute.¹⁰⁹ The theory was revisited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett who assert that for the establishment of a security community, 'transaction –interaction –and communication' is necessary between people and states.¹¹⁰ Thereby, "sustained interactions invite reciprocity, which promotes trust and a sense of community between governments and peoples" and in the long-run, via this process, a 'stable peace' would be established.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Ryan W. French, "Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan," *The Round Table* 108, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): pp. 121–144.

¹¹⁰ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) cited in Ryan W. French, "Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan," pp. 121–144.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

India's historical position as a 'big brother' for the smaller SAS and her aggressive interventionist regional foreign policy until 1995 which she intervened militarily in the internal affairs of Pakistan (1971), Sri Lanka (1987) and Maldives (1988) have increased the doubt of SAS on New Delhi. Thus, regional integration initiatives in the region are on a 'stop-and-go' manner. The asymmetry of power in the region and historical sentiments cement and maintain the mistrust among the members of SAARC, particularly between India and Pakistan.

India shares doubt on the army establishment of Pakistan by alleging that the army supports terrorist and separatist groups in India. Dash underlines that the "ideology of Islamic Nationalism has intensified India's mistrust toward Pakistan and has become counterproductive for the growth of regional cooperation."¹¹² Moreover, the active role of the Pakistan army in both internal and external affairs, especially toward Afghanistan and India, strengthens the mistrust of Indian decision-makers.

Mistrust between India and Pakistan has emerged the 'security dilemma' which rises the phenomena of 'dilemma of interpretation' and 'dilemma of response.'¹¹³ Thereby, the movement of any party is interpreted on the beliefs of the other party. On that regard, the action of the first party is reciprocated. The massive average GDP consumption of both India and Pakistan on armaments is a prime sample (see Figure 2).

¹¹² Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 131.

¹¹³ Nicholas J. Wheeler, "I Had Gone to Lahore with a Message of Goodwill But in Return We Got Kargil: The Promise and Perils of 'Leaps of Trust' in India-Pakistan Relations," *India Review* 9, no. 3 (2010): pp. 319-344.




Figure 6

Source: World Bank Data Last Updated on 9/19/2019

There is a considerable consensus among scholars of regionalism that confidence-building among the regional countries is a must for the development of a regional organization. The lack of confidence among the members of the regional countries could impede the productivity and progression of an organization. SAARC is an excellent example of this. In other comparatively developed organizations such as ASEAN, the initial years of the organization were consumed to establish confidence-building among the previous antagonist states in the region.¹¹⁴ “Indonesia’s ‘Konfrontasi’¹¹⁵ with Malaysia and Singapore ... [The] Philippines dispute with Malaysia over Sabah, and the ousting of Singapore from

¹¹⁴ Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation,” *The Pacific Review* 11, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): pp. 183–194.

¹¹⁵ The confrontation between Sukarno’s Indonesia and Malaysia between 1963 and 1965. For further details see Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation,” *The Pacific Review* 11, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): pp. 183–194.

Malaysia, the first decade of ASEAN necessarily was spent mostly on confidence-building and preventive diplomacy.”¹¹⁶

The path of SAARC development passes through the creation of a ‘stable peace’ between India and Pakistan and maintaining ‘stable peace’ needs CBMs. To put it in other words, “if peace is established in South Asia, first there must be peace between India and Pakistan.”¹¹⁷ What does CBMs mean? Or what are the criteria and parameters of CBMs? The thesis in this particular chapter will find answers to these questions. Soon after, the role of Pakistani political leadership will be determined and evaluated through the triad functions framework in relation to India.

The term CBMs lacks an exact definition in the academic literature. For instance, for John Jorgen Hoist, CBMs means that “any set of unilateral and multilateral actions or procedures that act to reduce military tensions between a set and sets of states, before, during or after actual conflict.”¹¹⁸ While for Chari, CBMs stands for “military and non-military initiatives undertaken by antagonistic states to reduce tensions and enhance mutual confidence.”¹¹⁹ Ryan French argues that “the traditional Western View characterizes CBMs as a peacetime agreement to enhance military transparency and proscribe certain destabilizing activities.”¹²⁰

The origination of military-centric definition of CBMs was due to the bipolar world order during the Cold-war era, where several of CBMs took place among the two blocs, such as the Helsinki Final Act (1975), Stockholm Document (1986) and Vienna Documents (1990,

¹¹⁶ Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation,” *The Pacific Review* 11, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): pp. 183–194.

¹¹⁷ Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ana Ballesteros Peiro, “Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan,” *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* 8, no. 4 (2004): pp. 40–54.

¹¹⁸ T. Najmudheen and Kausar Farhana, “Importance of Confidence Building Measures in India-Pakistan Relations: A South Asian Perspective,” *Asia-Pacific Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): pp. 61–91.

¹¹⁹ P.R. Chari, “CBMs in Post-Cold War South Asia,” *Stimson Center*, published June 14, 2012, <https://www.stimson.org/cbms-in-post-cold-war-south-asia>.

¹²⁰ Ryan W. French, “Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan,” pp. 121–144.

1992, 1994, and 1999).¹²¹ The basis of these initiatives was to pre-inform another side of military exercise and military deployment by putting a particular military size threshold.¹²²

According to Ryan French, in the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan, the most significant agreements are on the area of “increase military transparency or prohibit confrontational actions in peacetime.”¹²³ The author adds, despite these agreements avoid miscalculations and accidental wars, they are unable to “dissuade deliberate escalation by either side—for instance, the possibility that New Delhi might order punitive airstrikes against Pakistan [if] the next time a Pakistani terrorist outfit attack on an Indian city.”¹²⁴

In this regard, Ryan French contends that many of the existing CBMs between India and Pakistan are qualitatively ‘negative’ rather than ‘positive.’ He defines negative CBMs as an obligation of *inaction* by “promises to eschew provocative behavior and avert miscalculation.”¹²⁵ For instance, the prohibition of the use of force in the Simla Accord (1972) and the prevention of violating airspace agreement in 1991 could be exemplary for this. Whereas positive CBMs are an obligation of *action* that “entail tangible cooperation in the military, diplomatic, or economic domains.”¹²⁶

Before the SAARC establishment in 1985, several negative and positive CBMs took place in India-Pakistan relations. Thereby, it would be better to have a brief look at these initiatives for a better understanding of the CBMs that will take place in the aftermath of SAARC creation.

The Delhi Pact was signed by Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru the prime ministers of Pakistan and India, respectively, on April 8, 1950, after six days of negotiation.¹²⁷ The agreement aimed to ensure and protect the rights of minorities in both states. There are some

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ For the details of the pact see “Agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan Regarding Security and Rights of Minorities,” *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreement*, Volume 1 (8 April 1950): pp. 243-248.

claims that the Pact's primary purpose was to avoid another war between the two parties.¹²⁸ Both sides agreed on the following articles: (1) freedom of movement and protection in transit, (2) freedom of transfer of moveable property, (3) preparation of a receipt from a bank to migrant if he/she does not wish to carry with, (3) prevention of harassment in the custom, (4) the right of ownership of moveable property, (5) in case of not willing to return, the immovable property rights belong to the migrant.¹²⁹

The *policy initiation, mediation, and implementation* of the agreement took place in the tenure of Liaquat Ali Khan (1947-51). He visited New Delhi for *initiating* the policy regarding Security and Minorities Rights, and he *mediated* in the policy which he involved in a six-day negotiation with the Indian administration for shaping the final draft of the agreement. Finally, the *implementation* of the agreement to some degree also took place in his period that decreased the fear of minority in Pakistan to some scale.¹³⁰

The Indus Waters Treaty was the first of its kind that took place between these two rivals with the mediation of an international organization –World Bank –on 19th September 1960 between Nehru and Ayub Khan.¹³¹ According to the World Bank, it is the first international treaty that has survived through several large and small conflicts and disputes, and the agreement has been maintaining order and share of water for irrigation and hydropower for more than half a century.¹³² The Treaty comprises defining the Eastern and Western Rivers; the provisions of Eastern and Western Rivers; financial provisions; exchange of Data between the parties; future cooperation; establishing the Permanent Indus Commission; settlement of difference and disputes; and emergency provisions.¹³³

¹²⁸ Archana Subramanian, "Sealing the Deal," *The Hindu*, April 7, 2016.

¹²⁹ "Agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan Regarding Security and Rights of Minorities," *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreement*, Volume 1 (8 April 1950): pp. 243-248.

¹³⁰ Archana Subramanian, "Sealing the Deal," *The Hindu*, April 7, 2016.

¹³¹ Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-1969) as the president of Pakistan is the signatory on behalf of Pakistan.

¹³² "Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank," *World Bank*, published June 11, 2018. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank>.

¹³³ See the Indus Waters Treaty in details: "Treaty between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan Concerning the Most Complete and Satisfactory Utilization of the Waters of the Indus System of Rivers," *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements*, Volume 3 (19 September 1960): pp. 427-539.

The *policy initiation, mediation, and implementation* for the Indus Waters Treaty took place in different periods. For the *policy initiation* function, the Indus Waters Treaty was the outcome of prior agreements such as 1955 and 1959 Water sharing agreements, and for the *mediation* function not only Ayub Khan Administration but also World Bank was involved in the formation of the Treaty; and the *implementation* of the Treaty took effect in 1960 under Ayub Khan leadership.¹³⁴

In the aftermath of the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the two parties reached an agreement with the mediation of the USSR by declaring the Tashkent Declaration on 10th January 1966.¹³⁵ Alexie Kosygin, General Ayub Khan, and Lal Bahadur Shastri were representatives on behalf of USSR, Pakistan, and India respectively. The Tashkent Declaration put both parties under the obligation of (1) the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other (2) discouraging propaganda against each other (3) normal diplomatic relations need to be restored, and the High Commission of both sides should return to their posts (4) some steps required to be taken for the development of cultural, trade and economic activities (5) and both parties should repatriate prisoners of war.¹³⁶

The war of 1965 occurred in the era of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. Thereby, the ceasefire and diplomatic initiatives were also *initiated* in his tenure. Furthermore, *mediation* during the bilateral negotiation was also under the authority of Ayub Khan. However, the *implementation* of the Declaration by looking to the aftermath developments in the bilateral relationship was not thriving. For instance, the Declaration carried out the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, which the same principle was reaffirmed in the Simla accord (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999). Yet, both sides blamed each other for

¹³⁴ For the details of the 1955 and 1959 Water-sharing agreement see “Inter-Governmental between India and Pakistan for Ad-Hoc Transitional Arrangements for 1955 on the Use of Indus River Waters,” *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements*, Volume 1 (21 June 1955): pp. 376-378. ; “Agreement between India and Pakistan on Ad-Hoc Transitional Arrangements for the Irrigation Use of the Waters of the Indus System of Rivers,” *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements*, Volume 3 (17 April 1959): pp. 149-160.

¹³⁵ Nikolay Murashkin, “The 1966 Tashkent Declaration: A Helping Hand for Institutional Memory?,” *Russian International Affairs Council*, published August 2, 2016. <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/columns/nikolay-murashkin/the-1966-tashkent-declaration-a-helping-hand-for-institution/>.

¹³⁶ “Tashkent Declaration Signed by Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan,” *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements*, Volume 5 (10 January 1966): pp. 309-311.

interfering in the internal affairs of each other thenceforward. The hardliners on both sides yet carry out propaganda against each other.¹³⁷ Nevertheless, the principle of repatriating the prisoners of war has been functional until today, and Ryan French categorizes this initiative as a positive CBMs.¹³⁸

Rising resentment of Bengalis in Eastern Pakistan against the dominating role of Punjab in Western Pakistan by controlling and dominating the military, politics, and economy entered the country into internal conflict afterwards of the October 1970 election.¹³⁹ Awami League Party of Eastern Pakistan led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won the majority of seats in the parliament, and the Party instantly requested for the implementation of six points where an autonomy will be given to Eastern Pakistan.¹⁴⁰ However, Western Pakistan rejected the request, and an army assault was started against Eastern Pakistan. India actively participated in the war on 5th December 1971 when the Pakistan army hit eleven Indian airspaces.¹⁴¹

Indira Gandhi played a significant role in the intervention of India in the internal conflict of Pakistan that culminated with the independence of Bangladesh. Stanley Wolpert underlines that:

Indira understood Bengali, having studied music and other arts at Rabindranath Tagore's rural Shantiniketan College, north of Calcutta. She could speak with Mujib in his own language, which brought them closer together, both before and after the birth of Bangladesh. The only Pakistani leader who understood just how close Indira Gandhi was to Mujib was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who told Yahya that

¹³⁷ Ryan W. French, "Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan," pp. 121–144.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 62-63.

¹⁴⁰ The Six Points were the request of the Six-point Movement which was started in June 1966. The movement claimed for: (1) a federal government structure, (2) the central government should only have the authority of defense and foreign affairs, (3) two separate reserve banks should be made, one on each side, (4) taxation should be done by federate not central government, (5) for foreign exchange reserve, there should be separate account for each region, (6) to maintain security in the Eastern region a paramilitary force will be made. See Syed Badrul Ahsan, "June 1966, Six Points, and the Making of History," *Dhaka Tribune*, June 7, 2018.

¹⁴¹ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 63. ; "1971 War: The Story of India's Victory, Pak's Surrender, Bangladesh Freedom," *Business Standard*, December 16, 2018.

*Mujib was “Indira’s puppet” before he flew to Dhaka to try to persuade Mujib to accept his plan.*¹⁴²

The Simla Accord was signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Bhutto, the premiers of India and Pakistan, respectively, in 1972. The two parties agreed on the following principles. (1) The charter of the UN shall govern the bilateral relations, and differences and disputes shall be settled on peaceful means. (2) Parties should respect to territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, maintaining durable peace and good-neighbouring. (3) Both sides should also restrain propaganda against each other. (4) And to restore bilateral relation, each side should take steps in developing areas such as communication, postal, telegraph, travel, trade and economy.¹⁴³

The Simla Accord has been carrying out its importance in bilateral relations even today. The Accord was taken as a reference in the aftermath developments, for instance, Benazir Bhutto in 1988 and Nawaz Sharif in 1999 revived the spirit of Simla.¹⁴⁴ Diplomatic initiatives for Simla Accord were *initiated* under the authority of Zulfikar Bhutto to resettle the war and disputes of 1971, and the *mediation* process of the accord was also conducted under his jurisdiction. The *implementation* process of the Accord was not very impressive. For instance, recrimination for interference in the internal affairs of each other continued. Trade, economic, and cultural activities were shallowed, and more significantly, the countries went into war in 1984 (Siachen War) and 1999 (Kargil War). These developments undermined the affectivity and existence of the Accord.

To evaluate the Pakistani political leadership role in constructing CBMs with India through the triad framework –*policy initiation, mediation, and implementation* – afterwards of SAARC establishment, the thesis will focus on all the dimensions taken in this regard without making a differentiation between positive and negative CBMs. In other words, both military and non-military steps taken by the Pakistani political leadership for constructing

¹⁴² Stanley Wolpert, *India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 33.

¹⁴³ “Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Bilateral Relations (Simla Agreement),” *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements*, Volume 7 (2 July 1972): 244-246.

¹⁴⁴ Denholm Barnetson, “Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Her Indian Counterpart, Rajiv...,” *UPI*, December 30, 1988.

CBMs with India will be taken into consideration, as even a handshake between the leadership of the two countries, impact significantly on the conjuncture of the region. Indeed, this leads to an impact on the speed and scope of SAARC. In this regard, the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif factor in constructing CBMs with India will be discussed first as both of these mainstream parties' leaders are the outlier. Then the army stance will be evaluated that how it opposes to CBMs initiatives with India.

2.2.1.1 The endeavours of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif for constructing CBMs with India

Since the creation of SAARC (1985), the mainstream parties of Pakistan – *Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz* (PML-N) and *Pakistan Peoples Party* (PPP) –under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto respectively took bold steps in normalizing relations with India. The first government of Bhutto and the second government of Sharif are salient examples of this. The elected governments of the mainstream parties since the death of General Zia Ul Haq in 1988 have attempted diversely to solve differences with India. These attempts will be analyzed here in detail by firstly evaluating the steps taken by Bhutto and then the steps taken by Sharif.

The first elected government of Pakistan (1988-90) since the inception of SAARC was headed by Benazir Bhutto just after the death of General Zia Ul Haq in 1988. The 11 years of authoritarianism of Zia transformed the structure of Pakistan significantly, and it carried out its implication in the post-Zia terms. It is out of the scope of this thesis to discuss all the developments. However, a brief overview will be given here to enlighten the later analysis better.

First of all, under Zia's leadership, the army was tremendously involved in both domestic and foreign affairs of Pakistan, and unlike General Ayub's period, the military excessively dominated internal and external affairs. For instance, military officers were

appointed as chief of diplomatic missions in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, Libya, and UAE; and thousands of military personnel were appointed in bureaucracy.¹⁴⁵ Thereby, in the later years, the nationally elected governments would periodically face military intervention as the military enjoyed the power of authority for long years, it would be difficult for the military to abandon it completely.

Secondly, the democratic values of Pakistan were widely overshadowed by the policies of *Islamisation*, which Zia believed in an Islamic Pakistan with Sharia rules. However, it was not only domestically challenged, for instance, the Movement of Restoration of Democracy¹⁴⁶, but also there was severe international pressure on Pakistan owing to his violation of human rights and developing nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, due to the USSR intervention in Afghanistan and Pakistan's strategic importance during this particular time, all these concerns were appeased internationally.

Last but not least, the strong opposition of the PPP party under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto against the military expanded the gap between PPP and military.¹⁴⁸ Thereby, in the aftermath of Zia's death, in the 1988 election, the alliance of military with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan used all means to stop her party from winning the election. However, they were unable to stop her, and she formed the first national government in 1988 after the death of Zia.

In December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited Pakistan for the fourth summit of SAARC. He was the second prime minister to travel to Pakistan approximately 30 years later. The gesture was a catalyst for both developments in bilateral relations and SAARC progression. Rajiv praised Bhutto by stating, "Your energy and dynamism carry the promise of a new

¹⁴⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History* (London: Hurst Publishers., 2005), 245-286.

¹⁴⁶ This was the movement against the agitation of Zia's regime formed in 1981. Alliance of several leftist parties including the Benazir's led-party PPP. For more details see Nadeem F. Paracha, "The 1983 MRD Movement: The Flasher's Version," *DAWN.COM*, September 24, 2015. ; Ian Talbot, "Chapter 9," in *Pakistan: a Modern History*.

¹⁴⁷ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 245-286.

¹⁴⁸ The founder of PPP (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) was hanged and the activities of PPP was strongly oppressed during the Zia era. Therefore, Benazir was the very last political figure for the army to trust on.

impetus to our cooperation” during his speech.¹⁴⁹ While Bhutto highlighted that mutual suspicion and competition among us separated us in the past and precluded us from cooperating for the prosperity of the people.¹⁵⁰

Both leaders were the children of murdered parents. The Simla Accord was signed by their parents Zulfikar Bhutto and Indira Gandhi. Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto agreed on to solve all the differences in accordance with the Simla Accord. This was a new hope for the region afterwards of the military regime. Moreover, both sides agreed on a ‘constructive dialogue’ for the Kashmir issue.

The first PPP government signed the Cultural Cooperation Agreement and the Agreement on Prohibiting of Attacks against Nuclear Installations with India on 31st December 1988. In the Cultural Cooperation Agreement, both sides agreed on several non-political principles such as (1) to facilitate and encourage activities such as cultural, art, archaeology, education, mass media information and sport (2) allowance to establish Cultural Centers in the opposing party territory in accordance to the law and regulation (3) encouraging and facilitating the visits of academia and epistemic communities (4) parties should provide facilities and scholarships for students and (5) facilitate the exchange of musician, poets, writers, and other exhibitions.¹⁵¹ While in the Agreement on Prohibiting of Attacks against Nuclear Installations, the parties agreed to “refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility of the other country.”¹⁵²

Benazir Bhutto was at the center of both the *initiation* and *mediation* of these two agreements. However, the *implementation* step was not very impressive for both agreements. Despite preventing the attack on nuclear installation, the lists of the location

¹⁴⁹Denholm Barnetson, “Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Her Indian Counterpart, Rajiv...,” *UPI*, December 30, 1988.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ “Cultural Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, 31 December 1988.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

of nuclear facilities that were shared between two parties were usually questioned for its integrity.¹⁵³ Similarly, the Cultural Agreement, which triggered several soft diplomatic initiatives (Track II diplomacy) such as ‘cricket diplomacy,’¹⁵⁴ which it carries out its efficiency even today, the agreement also inspired more progressive steps subsequently. For instance, the 2006 agreement to host the festivals of movies of each other, and the agreement of Pakistan in 2008 for allowing the Indian theatre and movies in Pakistan.¹⁵⁵ Yet the *implementation* of the Cultural Agreement is not very accomplishing, and the agreement has been overlooked by various regimes. This agreement will be further elaborated in the section on *people-to-people contact*.

In addition to these two agreements, the Bhutto administration created the first Prime Ministers Hotline in 1989 for direct communication of the prime ministers of both states for crisis management and to prevent misunderstandings.¹⁵⁶ Despite the existence of a Military Hotline, which was established in 1971 afterwards of the East Pakistan crisis, the productivity of that Hotline was not very impressive as both countries had come to the edge of the war several times.

The Hotline agreement was *initiated* and established by the *mediation* of Bhutto administration first. Then the Hotline was reestablished by the *initiation* and *mediation* of the Nawaz Sharif administration in 1990.¹⁵⁷ However, the *implementation* of the Hotline was not very fruitful as the line was disconnected several times when a tension escalation erupted. For instance, communication was deactivated during the Kargil crisis in 1999.

These steps were taken just after the death of General Zia. The rapprochement of Pakistan and India was not only a surprise domestically but internationally too. The military was still dominant in both the internal and external affairs of Pakistan. Bhutto's approach to

¹⁵³ Ryan W. French, “Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan,” pp. 121–144.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ “India and Pakistan Set up Hotline,” *BBC New*, June 20, 2004.

¹⁵⁷ Mohammed Badrul Alam, “In Pursuit of Peace: A Micro Study of Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan,” *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 23, no. 1/2 (2010): pp. 41-60.

India was not only unacceptable for the army, but it was also interpreted as a severe national security problem. Thereby, her first administration was dismissed by the president. Nevertheless, Bhutto's short-term positive rapprochement with India directly influenced the developments regarding SAARC as SAARC triggered negotiation on SAPTA in the very annual summit [1988] of the organization.

Saeed Shafqat underlines that the military and Bhutto in her first tenure experienced hostile relations, and the military agreed with her to share power rather than transferring. However, four cases widened the gap between the army and Bhutto.¹⁵⁸ First of all, her intervention in the replacement of the chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) against the army suggestions.¹⁵⁹ Secondly, Bhutto confrontation stance with the opposition made her administration fragile. For instance, in the province of Punjab where the Islamic Jumhuriyet Ittihad (IJI) under Nawaz Sharif leadership was controlling it, Bhutto instead of cooperating with Sharif chose to confront against him in Punjab. Thereby, IJI reciprocated in the national assembly against PPP. Thirdly, Bhutto instead of operating the socialist economic agenda which she promised during her election campaign, her government provided extensive opportunities to PPP's supporters and sympathizers.

Last but not least, her foreign affairs agenda in general but particularly her government's attitude towards India was different from the Military.¹⁶⁰ The military wanted the government to undermine the 'regional policemen' position of India by internationalizing the Kashmir issue. However, Bhutto's stance toward India was to cooperate and expand relations by seeing India as a democratic state.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ Saeed Shafqat, "Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7 (1996): 655-672.

¹⁵⁹ Bhutto accused several times the ISI that it was "a state within a state" and she also accused the army for listening for her telephone calls. For further details see Joshua Hammer, "After Musharraf," *Atlantic*, October 1, 2007.

¹⁶⁰ Saeed Shafqat, "Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7 (1996): 655-672; See also Ian Talbot, "Chapter 10," in *Pakistan: a Modern History*.

¹⁶¹ Saeed Shafqat, "Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 7 (1996): 655-672.

Thereby, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in August 1990 dismissed Bhutto's first government through the power of the Eighth Amendment.¹⁶² The government was blamed for corruption and failure to enforce law and order.¹⁶³ Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was appointed as a caretaker prime minister. However, the PPP came to power for the second time when the Nawaz Sharif government was dismissed by the same president, with the same charges which were employed against Bhutto under the same constitutional Amendment in July 1993.¹⁶⁴

Benazir Bhutto formed her second government after the 1993 election. Her second government (1993-1996) was comparatively powerful than her first government. She could control the most critical state –Punjab –through cooperation with Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo as the Chief Minister of Punjab. Furthermore, her candidate –Farooq Leghari –became the president after the presidential election in November 1993. However, three years later, the president “dismissed her amid bitter recrimination.”¹⁶⁵

Bhutto's second government faced many domestic challenges such as the clashes and civil-war in Karachi which the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and government officials were involved.¹⁶⁶ The unrest in frontier areas which the Islamist groups, mainly the veterans of Afghan-war, favoured and wanted a Sharia law in Pakistan.¹⁶⁷ Besides, economic depression and high-tax along with inflation and the inter-family dispute of Bhutto with her brother Murtaza Bhutto which culminated with

¹⁶² Barbara Crossette, “Bhutto Is Dismissed in Pakistan after 20 Months,” *New York Times*, October 25, 1990

¹⁶³ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 310.

¹⁶⁴ Edward A. Gargan, “Pakistan Government Collapses; Elections Are Called,” *New York Times*, July 19, 1993.

¹⁶⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 333-335.

¹⁶⁶ Aftermath of allegations that a sixteen-year-old *Muhajir* girl was gang-raped by PPP's supporter, the already tense situation was tremendously escalated. Consequently, hundreds were killed and several private and public properties were vandalized. For details see Shahid Iqbal, “Karachi Violence,” *UPI*, June 24, 1995. ; Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 342-344.

¹⁶⁷ The involvement of Pakistan in the Afghanistan during the USSR occupation and afterward of the USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan not only deteriorated the situation in Pakistan fragile frontier states but also major states such as Punjab confronted with severe violence. Furthermore, the Jihadist whom had fought against USSR, attempted to bring a similar regime likewise the Taliban in Afghanistan as they were chanting “after Kabul, Islamabad ... Taliban, Taliban.” For further details see Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 339-341.

the death of Murtaza.¹⁶⁸ While on the global arena, the country was under intense pressure for corruption, making nuclear arms and violation of human rights.

Bhutto's role in constructing CBMs with India in her second tenure was not thriving. The relations with India were tense and at a minimum level during this particular period. It can be argued that Bhutto was acting cautiously in taking no steps toward India for the purpose of not deteriorating relations with the military as it might cause dismissing her from power likewise her first administration. However, her administration was dismissed anyway as the military had lost trust in her since her first government.

President Leghari, in 1996, using his constitutional power derived from 18th Amendment, dismissed Bhutto's second government for the charges of mismanagement and corruption.¹⁶⁹ She left Pakistan on a self-exile, and her case in the court was continued for corruption until 2007. She returned to Pakistan in 2007, and during an election campaign, she was assassinated in Rawalpindi, which is the nerve-base of the army.¹⁷⁰

Pakistan held general elections with a month delay in February 2008, and the PPP secured 119 seats in the National Assembly (30.79%). The party was co-chaired by the widower of the Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari.¹⁷¹ A coalition government between PML-N and PPP was founded, and Yusuf Reza Gilani was appointed as the prime minister. Furthermore, the coalition forced Musharraf to resign from the presidency, and they started an inquiry to

¹⁶⁸ Murtaza Bhutto, the brother of Benazir Bhutto who was in exile to Damascus, returned to Pakistan in 1993. Both Murtaza and Benazir competed for that who will be the real heir for the party [PPP]. The inter-family fight became explicit when Murtaza accused Benazir's husband Zardari that he influenced his sister. In 1996 Murtaza was killed in a gunfight with police and allegations were circulating that Zardari was behind the case. Reuters, "Estranged Bhutto Brother Dies in Fight with Police," *New York Times*, September 21, 1996.

¹⁶⁹ Kathy Gannon, "President Dismisses Bhutto Government," *Independent*, October 22, 2011.

¹⁷⁰ Severe violence and protests were ignited throughout the country by the PPP supporters. There were serious speculations that Musharraf was behind the case. Even Bhutto herself had claimed several times that "a sinister cabal of intelligence officers and presidential aides were plotting to kill her, and that Musharraf should be blamed if anything were to happen to her." Sune Engel Rasmussen, "Musharraf Declared Fugitive as Bhutto Murder Trial Ends in Pakistan," *Guardian*, August 31, 2017.

¹⁷¹ After the murder of Benazir Bhutto, her son Bilawal Bhutto was appointed as the chairman of the PPP. However, due to his studies and age limitation, his father Zardari took the leadership of PPP.

impeach the president. Musharraf finally resigned from the presidency on August 18, 2008.¹⁷²

In terms of constructing CBMs between India and Pakistan during Zardari era (2008-2013), we cannot witness bold developments in bilateral relations, despite the fact that the PPP government was willing to have a compromise with India as “the foreign minister [Shah Mahmood Qureshi] ... called a comprehensive settlement with India.”¹⁷³ Moreover, India continually forced Pakistan to trial the culprits of the Mumbai attack.¹⁷⁴ The following two reasons seem to have blocked Zardari in taking no steps toward India to normalize relations.

First of all, Zardari's background and his ill-famed made his position shaky and weak domestically.¹⁷⁵ For a Pakistani leadership, in order to take bold steps in approaching to India, a strong domestic position is imperative as had been the case with Sharif and Bhutto previously. Zardari was anxious about his domestic standing and approaching India was making his position further fragile. Therefore, Zardari kept aloof himself from India for the purpose not to destabilize his situation domestically.

The second reason that blocked the path of Pakistani political leadership for taking CBMs with India was the 26/11 Mumbai attack. This was not an issue just for Zardari administration but for the third Sharif administration too. India consistently stipulated that taking any initiative in bilateral relations should come afterwards of a judicious trial of the

¹⁷² Musharraf, by the end of 2007, became alone. He was not only pressurized by the mainstream parties but the army also quit him alone. For further details see Farhan Bokhari, "Army Walks Away from Musharraf," *Financial Times*, Aug 14, 2008.

¹⁷³ Ejaz Ghani, Sadiq Ahmed, and Saman Kelegama, *Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA* (Sage Publications, 2010), 19-20.

¹⁷⁴ A group of militants (Lashkar-e-Taiba based in Pakistan) carried out a series of attacks in Mumbai on 26th November 2008 (26/11) which lasted for four days and killed 160. The mastermind of the attack Zaki-ur-Rahman and Hafiz Saeed were arrested a month later in Pakistan but the High Court of Islamabad released them on bail. Yet Lashkar e Taiba operates freely in Pakistan. Arijit Mazumdar, "Narendra Modi's Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles," pp. 37-46. ; Taha Siddiqui, "Why Is Pakistan Reluctant to Bring Lashkar-e-Taiba to Justice?," *Al Jazeera*, November 26, 2018.

¹⁷⁵ Zardari did not have a good reputation in Pakistan. He was known as "Mr. 10 Percent" for the reason that he was taking a commission from each government project during the tenure of Benazir in the 1990s. Also, he was accused of murdering the brother of Benazir Bhutto. For more details see John Bingham, "Asif Ali Zardari: Life and Style of Pakistan's Mr. 10 Per Cent," *Telegraph*, August 3, 2010.

culprits of Mumbai attacks in Pakistan. This condition puts the political leadership of Pakistan in an unsolvable paradox. More precisely, India wants the political leadership of Pakistan to trial the culprits of the Mumbai attack in order to go further in normalizing relations. The culprits of Mumbai are under the protection of the army.¹⁷⁶ Thereby, trialing the culprits of Mumbai attack in Pakistan, the Pakistani political leadership is not only supposed to apply the justice but the army too as the army decides about the fate of the culprits.

Nevertheless, two CBMs were made during the Zardari era. These were not new initiatives in nature, but they were an extension of previous efforts. India and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cultural Cooperation, and both sides reached an agreement to cooperate in Custom Matters in 2012. Both of these CBMs were an extension of previous CBMs steps. The MoU on Cultural Cooperation was an act to reaffirm the 1988 Cultural Cooperation agreement. Similarly, Cooperation in Customs Matters was an extension of the 1983 Joint Commission on Socioeconomic Cooperation.

To evaluate the role of Zardari in CBMs with India, through the triad functions framework, Zardari did not *initiate* new and bold steps in relation to India, and the previous political leaderships initiated the aforementioned two CBMs steps. In terms of *mediation*, Zardari was in the core of MoU on Cultural Cooperation and the Agreement in Cooperation in Customs Matters. However, Zardari administration, likewise the previous political leaderships was ineffective in *implementing* both the new CBMs and the previous CBMs.

Coming to Nawaz Sharif factor in constructing CBMs with India, his all three tenures are an outlier and remarkable likewise the first tenure of Bhutto was. Moreover, Sharif's second tenure was a peak in relations with India. The developments in bilateral relations of India-Pakistan in the first government of Bhutto and the first and second governments of

¹⁷⁶ Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of Mumbai attack, for instance, who is designated as a terrorist both by the US and UN, move freely around major cities in Pakistan. Hussain Nadim, "Why Pakistan Won't Give up Hafiz Saeed," *Foreign Policy*, March 29, 2013.

Sharif directly impacted the speed and scope of SAARC. Henceforward, Sharif's three tenures will be evaluated comprehensively.

Mian Nawaz Sharif with having Kashmir-Punjab family roots, he was the Chief Minister of Punjab under the IJI coalition following Zia's death in 1988. He then enjoyed the assistance of both the army and the president as a contender against Bhutto's PPP party during the 1988 election. As a Chief Minister of Punjab, not only did he consolidate himself in the Punjab province, but he also gained the support of the military and bureaucracy.¹⁷⁷ However, his relations became shaky with both the president and the military when he "sought to carve out an independent political agenda."¹⁷⁸

Sharif became the premier of Pakistan for the first time in 1990 after the November election, with an overwhelming triumph.¹⁷⁹ He was the first premier of Pakistan from Punjab province, while his predecessors were all from Sindh.¹⁸⁰ His first government [1990-93] confronted with several challenges. Domestically, the violence in Sindh province; economic collapse¹⁸¹, the crackdown inside IJI coalition of parties; the challenges of Islamic groups and parties against the government policy of Gulf Crisis; and the Sharia Bill were some of them.¹⁸²

Internationally, when the government announced to support Saudi Arabia by dispatching 12000 troops for the protection of the holy sites –Mecca and Medina, and Operation Desert Storm against Saddam, the decision was seriously challenged domestically

¹⁷⁷ John Bray, "Nawaz Sharif's New Order in Pakistan," *The Round Table* 80, no. 318 (1991), pp. 179-190. ; Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 290-293.

¹⁷⁸ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 292.

¹⁷⁹ Barbara Crossette, "Bhutto Defeated in Pakistan Vote; President Sees Orderly Transition," *New York Times*, October 25, 1990.

¹⁸⁰ John Bray, "Nawaz Sharif's New Order in Pakistan," pp. 179-190.

¹⁸¹ The country economy afterward of the Cold-war was in a great depression. Throughout the 1980s, the country became not only widely dependent on foreign aids but also, the economy was not diversified to increase export and decrease unemployment. Further, the country was sentenced by the US –the main strategic partner during the USSR occupation of Afghanistan –by imposing embargo due to developing nuclear weapons and assisting terror groups. For further details see Ian Talbot, "Chapters 9 and 10," in *Pakistan: a Modern History*.

¹⁸² The Bill aimed to revisit the Sharia Law for the purpose of Enforcement and expanding the scope of Sharia Law. The Bill was passed in the Senate despite opposition from several sides. For details see Charles H. Kennedy, "Repugnancy to Islam—Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (1992): pp. 769-787.

by both Islamic groups and army. Internally, there was significant support for Saddam, as he was regarded as the protector of Islam against non-Muslims.¹⁸³ Consequently, the first government of Sharif collapsed in July 1993, and both the president and prime minister resigned.¹⁸⁴

In the first tenure of Sharif due to many issues and challenges as mentioned in the previous paragraph, his administration couldn't take bold steps for the construction of CBMs with the country's main rival –India. Moreover, due to the destruction of the Ayodhya Babri mosque¹⁸⁵ and the Kashmir 'intifada' during 1992, bilateral relations were tense, and the usual recrimination policy continued. The pragmatism of Sharif to revive the collapsing economy of Pakistan would be explicitly noticed during his second term in office in 1997. He wished to expand relations with the whole world, including India.

Nevertheless, during the first tenure of Sharif, Pakistan and India agreed on the following agreements: (1) Advancing Notice on a Military Exercise, Maneuvers and Troops Movement in 1991; (2) Prevention of Airspace Violation in 1991; and (3) Code of Conduct for the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel in 1992.¹⁸⁶ For the triad functions framework, Sharif both *initiated* and *mediated* in the agreement of Code for the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel. However, for the other two agreements, he only revisited and reiterated the previous existing agreements. For the *implementation* function, Sharif's first government did not last for a long time and therefore, the *implementation* of these CBMs became the task of the then-forthcoming governments.

¹⁸³ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 315-326.

¹⁸⁴ Edward A. Gargan, "Pakistan Government Collapses; Elections Are Called," *New York Times*, July 19, 1993.

¹⁸⁵ The site which is located in the state of Uttar Pradesh of India is a disputed point between Muslims and Hindu nationalists. Muslim believe it as mosque build in the 16th century by the Moghul emperor Babur. Whereas, the Hindu nationalists believe it as a site which is the birthplace of Rama. A campaign was started in 1992 by the Vishva Hindu Parishad aimed to reconstruct the temple. Consequently, the mosque was demolished and hundreds of people were died and injured.

¹⁸⁶ "Code of Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India and Pakistan," *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, 19 August 1992.

The second tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1997–99) was a milestone in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.¹⁸⁷ Both countries not only exploded their atomic bomb, which heightened tension but also, the countries reached the most significant level of positive relationships. Despite the prior détente promises which were made in May 1997 with the famous handshake of I.K.Gujral and Sharif¹⁸⁸, these expectations were overshadowed when India exploded its atomic bomb in May 1998, and nearly two weeks later Pakistan reciprocated by detonating his nuclear bomb successfully.¹⁸⁹

The situation in the region was alarming, and the ‘enduring rivalry’ was transformed and equipped on atomic arms. However, a positive atmosphere established afterwards of the Colombo summit of SAARC in July 1998, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee accepted the request of Sharif to visit Pakistan and the famous bus trip –‘Bus Diplomacy’ –of Vajpayee occurred in February 1999.

Vajpayee was the newly elected prime minister of India from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP with carrying out the ideology of Hindutva¹⁹⁰ and holding strong nationalistic sentiments. Some scholars believed that it might raise the tension between the two countries. However, the very first government of the BJP under the leadership of Vajpayee demonstrated the failure of these arguments.

The ‘leap of trust’ triggered by Vajpayee and positively reciprocated by Sharif even for the short-term culminated with significant breakthroughs achievements. For instance, Memorandum of Understanding signed by the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, the

¹⁸⁷ Nawaz Sharif secured 135 seats in the National Assembly which was a crushing defeat to the PPP. For the first time since 1985, a party won the majority of the Assembly seats. Therefore, this domestic success had encouraged Sharif to maneuver independently both in domestic and foreign policies.

¹⁸⁸ Sharif and I.K.Gujral met for the first time in Male, Maldives at the summit of SAARC in 1997. The leaders held a direct meeting for 120 minutes. This was the first time since the tense relations for nearly five years that both leaders met directly. The handshake of the leadership was a symbol of détente in the bilateral ties. For further details see John F. Burns, “India and Pakistan Shake Hands over Detente,” *New York Times*, May 13, 1997.

¹⁸⁹ John F. Burns, “India Detonated a Hydrogen Bomb, Experts Confirm,” *New York Times*, May 18, 1998. ; John Ward Anderson and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan Sets off Nuclear Blasts,” *Washington Post*, May 29, 1998.

¹⁹⁰ Hindutva ideology believes and describes the values of the Indian culture as Hindu ideas, beliefs and values.

Lahore Declaration signed by the premiers, and the visit of Vajpayee to the Minar-e-Pakistan were all occurred in February 1999 during the visit of Vajpayee to Lahore.

In the MoU, both sides pledged (1) to reaffirm their commitment to the principles and Charter of UN, (2) to implement “the Simla agreement in letter and spirit”, (3) to resolve all issues including Jammu and Kashmir, (4) to promote a stable and peaceful environment, (5) bilateral consultation on security, nuclear, and conventional issues to avoid confrontation, (6) advance notification for ballistic missiles tests.¹⁹¹ The two sides also promised to reach an agreement in matters of sea navigation control, implementation of existing CBMs, revision of existing communication on the military level, and “engage in bilateral consultation on security, disarmament, and non-proliferation.”¹⁹² While through the Lahore Declaration, a Bus Service commenced between Lahore and New Delhi, and both sides agreed on to release fishers and civilian detainees.¹⁹³ Moreover, the Lahore Declaration set out “the general principles to regulate the India-Pakistan relations in the new nuclear security environment of South Asia.”¹⁹⁴

However, the positive atmosphere did not last for a long period. Two months later of the Vajpayee visit, around 3000 Islamic militia illegally infiltrated to the territory of India through the international border to occupy the highlands in Kashmir [Kargil]. Thereby, India reciprocated, and a full-scale arm war erupted between India and Pakistan [Kargil War] in May 1999.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, a coup d'état of General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the Sharif government in October 1999 and sent him on exile to Saudi Arabia.¹⁹⁶ Ishtiaq Ahmad and

¹⁹¹ “Lahore Declaration February, 1999,” *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, February 2, 1999.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Nicholas J. Wheeler, “I Had Gone to Lahore with a Message of Goodwill But in Return We Got Kargil: The Promise and Perils of ‘Leaps of Trust’ in India-Pakistan Relations,” pp. 319-344.

¹⁹⁵ Tatiana Shaumian, “Indo-Pak Armed Conflict in Kargil: Causes and Consequences,” *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol. 4*, no. 2 (2000): pp. 16-34.

¹⁹⁶ The relations of Sharif and General Musharraf became tense when the Sharif government did not let the flight of Musharraf land in Karachi. Initially, Sharif was sentenced on death. However, international pressure and Saudi mediation made Musharraf free him for exile. For further details see Tim Weiner, “Countdown to Pakistan's Coup: A Duel of Nerves in the Air,” *New York Times*, October 17, 1999. ; Luke Harding, “Pakistan Frees Sharif to Exile in Saudi Arabia,” *Guardian*, December 11, 2000. ; “Pakistan Army Seizes Power,” *BBC News*, October 12, 1999.

Hannes note that “Sharif’s attempt to fast track the peace process with India was a major catalyst for his removal from power in the 1999 military coup.”¹⁹⁷

The gap between the army and the second government of Sharif was widened on several grounds. First of all, Sharif terminated the notorious Eighth Amendment of the constitution, which gave the power to the president to dissolve the assembly and government. Thus, Sharif’s this move “clipped the wing of the presidential authority,” which was several times before [1988, 1990, 1993, and 1996] used against the elected government by the president with the incorporation of the army.¹⁹⁸

Secondly, the conflict of the executive and judiciary in 1997, which Sharif dismissed the Chief justice, apprehended the army. Thus, this activism of the government in the judiciary made the army skeptical about the government.¹⁹⁹ Last but not least, when Sharif appointed his man as the director officer for the ISI [Lt General Ziauddin] and criticized the army due to the adventurism of the Kargil war in 1999, concerned the military further that the government intervenes in their affairs.²⁰⁰

To evaluate the role of Sharif through the triad functions framework in making CBMs with India, Sharif role can be easily noticed in the policy *initiation* and *meditation* in both MoU and the Lahore Declaration. His administration launched and reached an agreement to resolve all principle issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, through a bilateral dialogue. However, these agreements were not *implemented* due to the Kargil war occurred just three months later of the Lahore Declaration, and the Sharif government was overthrown only eight months later of the Lahore Declaration.

¹⁹⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert, “Breaking the Equilibrium? New Leaders and Old Structures in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 42, no. 1 (February 2015): pp. 46-75.

¹⁹⁸ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 377. ; Ian Talbot, “General Pervez Musharraf: Saviour or Destroyer of Pakistan’s Democracy?,” *Contemporary South Asia* 11, no. 3 (2002): pp. 311-328, ; Anwar H. Syed, “Pakistan in 1997: Nawaz Sharif’s Second Chance to Govern,” *Asian Survey* 38, no. 2 (1998): pp. 116-125.

¹⁹⁹ Anwar H. Syed, “Pakistan in 1997: Nawaz Sharif’s Second Chance to Govern,” pp. 116-125.

²⁰⁰ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 378. ; Ian Talbot, “General Pervez Musharraf: Saviour or Destroyer of Pakistan’s Democracy?,” pp. 311-328.

In the third tenure of Sharif (2013-2017), taking into consideration domestic, regional, and international developments, the Prime Minister's policy toward India was influenced by several dynamics. First of all, the arrival of Sharif into power through an election [May 2013 election] was the first of its kind in the entire history of Pakistan in which a civil government handed over power to another civil government through a general election. Therefore, this domestic characteristic dominated the leverage of Sharif on policy construction and implementation.²⁰¹

Secondly, the long-term role of General Musharraf transformed the social and political structure of the nation that raised the motion of democratization in the nation.²⁰² Furthermore, significant constitutional reforms like the 18th Amendment empowered the leverage of the Prime Minister.²⁰³ Thirdly, relations of Pakistan with the US aftermath of the operation of the US against Bin Laden sanctuary in April 2012 in the territory of Pakistan – Abbottabad²⁰⁴ –and a fire incident of November 2011 that had killed several Pakistani soldier²⁰⁵ became into the lowest level. Pakistan closed the supply rout of NATO and US forces to Afghanistan, and the US responded to by banning several financial aids on Pakistan.²⁰⁶ As a result, the country's economic situation exacerbated while Rupee was losing value. Thereby, a significant social class consisted of the business community sought to expand trade with the regional countries, including India.²⁰⁷

Fourth and a regional factor, the election of India in 2014 that led to the success of Narendra Modi from the BJP influenced the policies of Islamabad toward India. Based on Modi election rhetorics, his anti-Pakistan agenda concerned the decision-makers in Pakistan. Last but not least, the pullout plan of the US Army from Afghanistan by the year 2014 raised

²⁰¹ Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert, "Breaking the Equilibrium? New Leaders and Old Structures in the India-Pakistan Rivalry," pp. 46-75.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Adrian Brown, "Osama Bin Laden's Death: How It Happened," *BBC News*, September 10, 2012.

²⁰⁵ "Pakistan Buries 24 Troops Killed in NATO Airstrike," *BBC News*, November 27, 2011.

²⁰⁶ Frederic Grare and Reece Trevor, "Discussing the Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October 22, 2013.

²⁰⁷ Michael Kugelman, "The Pakistan-India Trade Relationship: Prospects, Profits, and Pitfalls," in *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs To Be Done? What Does It Matter?* (The Wilson Center, 2013), pp. 1-18.

the apprehension of Pakistan. A vacuum of power might occur in Afghanistan, and it would also exacerbate the fragile domestic situation of Pakistan. Or the worst scenario, an Indian proponent administration in Kabul would encircle Pakistan, which Pakistan will be forced to balance India in two wings –Kashmir in East, Afghanistan on West.

Both leadership–Sharif and Modi –were keen to cooperate in bilateral economic ties base on the pragmatism of both leaders as both states were suffering from the fragile economic situation. However, the hope of normalization and stabilization of relations immediately sank by late 2014 when border tension revived again. Arjit notes that three development occurred: (1) Pakistan’s insistence upon the All Hurriyat Conference²⁰⁸ participation in the India-Pakistan Dialogue, (2) the stalled trial of 2008 Mumbai attack culprits in Pakistan, and (3) international border skirmishes.²⁰⁹

The relations of India and Pakistan by the year 2014 during the third tenure of Sharif contained the standard issue of Kashmir, along with not granting the Most-favored-nation (MFN) status of WTO to India, trans-border terrorism, and stalled trial of Mumbai attack culprits. Pakistan was also suffering from severe terrorist attacks carried out by the Pakistani Taliban domestically. Therefore, Sharif's third tenure was more complicated, unlike his second tenure. Additionally, after the Shanghai Cooperation Summit of 2015 in Ufa, Russia, where Modi and Sharif met, both sides agreed to re-launch the talks on the National Security Advisor (NSA) level. However, in his return to Pakistan, Sharif became under pressure from both army and Islamist groups that he agreed “on issues concerning terrorism without getting India to talk about Kashmir.”²¹⁰

Sharif had a conflictive and divergent agenda regard to the military establishment in the late 1990s, and he was the signatory of the Lahore Declaration. Thereby, for the military,

²⁰⁸ All Hurriyat Conference or (Tahreeki Hurriyat) is the alliance of 26 political, social and religious groups which was established in 1993 for the purpose of a united front in the Kashmir conflict. Currently, its lead by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq after the resignation of Syed Ali Shah Gilani.

²⁰⁹ Arijit Mazumdar, “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles,” *The Round Table* 106, no. 1 (February 2017): pp. 37-46.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

Sharif was in the same position as was Benazir Bhutto. In this regard, before letting him go into other rapprochement steps, likewise the Lahore Declaration, he was domestically challenged.

The rise in terrorist attacks, unrest in Karachi, the ‘Freedom-March’ of Imran Khan toward Islamabad –supported by the army²¹¹, depression of economy, and the Operation of Army in the frontier area of Pakistan under the name of Zarb-E-Azab all weakened Sharif position domestically.²¹² Similarly, Modi was under pressure for his rapprochement stance toward Pakistan from the nationalistic groups and opposition parties.²¹³ This decline in bilateral relations tremendously impacted the SAARC development, as the organization could not manage to act in materializing the annual summit since 2014.

The leak of Panama Documents in April 2016 further violated the position of Sharif, and he became under the investigation of the Justice.²¹⁴ Consequently, he was disqualified from holding public office, and he was sentenced to seven years in jail, along with his daughter Maryam Nawaz Sharif for corruption and money-laundering.²¹⁵

In terms of Sharif’s role in constructing CBMs with India, apart from some bilateral meetings with Modi and his attempts to *initiate* a ‘New-chapter’ with India, there are no significant breakthroughs that occurred throughout this period. For the functions *mediation* and *implementation* of existing CBMs, he was unable to take essential steps in which structure establishment encompassed him. Furthermore, on the Indian side, the Modi administration was following ‘on-off’ track diplomacy toward Pakistan, and it also established an ambiguous environment.²¹⁶

²¹¹ The Freedom March (Azadi March) continued for 120 days, and Imran Khan criticized Sharif on vote-rigging in the election and wanted him to resign. Jon Boone, “Imran Khan Warns Pakistan Ministers His Supporters Could Storm Parliament,” *Guardian*, August 17, 2014.

²¹² Farhan Bokhari, “Army Chief General Raheel Sharif Grows in Power in Pakistan,” *Financial Times*, January 1, 2016.

²¹³ “Pak Probe Team Heads to Pathankot Today, Political Storm Erupts in Delhi,” *Indian Express*, March 29, 2016.

²¹⁴ The leak showed that three of Nawaz Sharif’s children were having offshore companies, and it was not included in the family wealth record. “Panama Papers: Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif to Face Investigators,” *BBC News*, April 20, 2017.

²¹⁵ Haseeb Bhatti, “Nawaz Sharif Steps down as PM after SC’s Disqualification Verdict,” *DAWN.COM*, July 28, 2017. ; “Ex-Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif Sentenced to 7 Years for Corruption: *DW*, 24 September, 2018.

²¹⁶ Arijit Mazumdar, “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles,” pp. 37-46.

To sum up the overall analysis, the elected governments of the mainstream parties since the death of General Zia, acted saliently in constructing CBMs with India. The capacity and volume of steps taken by the political leadership [Sharif and Bhutto] were distinctive in nature. For instance, while the first government of Bhutto and the second government of Sharif acted more muscularly toward India, the second and third governments of PPP and the third government of PML-N could not manage to act confidently likewise in their previous administrations. Not only domestic factors could be the reason that blocked the path of Bhutto and Sharif but also regional and international developments too.

For instance, Bhutto in her first tenure and Sharif in his second tenure were relatively powerful domestically, so were both leadership reciprocated positively from the Indian side. Rajiv-led India's positive relations with Bhutto-led Pakistan and Vajpayee administration stance toward Sharif administration can be significant examples. However, when Pakistani political leaderships were domestically weak, and they were not confidently reciprocated by India, constructing CBMs became an impossible task. As an example, while both Zardari and Sharif in his third tenure were confronted with abundant domestic issues, weak and no motivation from the Indian side failed their attempts drastically.

Nevertheless, while Bhutto's first government and Sharif's second tenures could be peak points in making CBMs with India; Bhutto's second government, Zardari's first tenure and Sharif's third administration were also relatively successful in constructing CBMs compare to the military eras. Moreover, Sharif and Bhutto are the reference points for the next administrations to guide and shape their agenda toward New Delhi. Likewise, the Simla Accord had guided this leadership before. For instance, the famous Composite Dialogue, which was initiated in 2004, is the fruit of the Lahore Declaration.²¹⁷ These bilateral CBMs certainly influenced the development of SAARC positively while a decline in bilateral relations influenced SAARC vice versa. A thorough analysis will be done in the next chapter.

²¹⁷ The rapprochement of India and Pakistan after the ceasefire of 2003, both parties pledged to establish a dialogue for all the issues. As a result, all the bilateral problems have been discussed through the Composite Dialogue until today. The proposal of *initiating* this dialogue was an agenda of the Lahore Declaration.

2.2.1.2 *The Resistance of the Military Against CBMs Efforts with India*

The powerful military of Pakistan is an indispensable factor and player in both the internal and external affairs of the state. Holding power three times [1958-1971, 1977-1988, and 1999-2008], the military has intensely consolidated its position in the politics of Pakistan. Furthermore, the first constitution writing process in Pakistan afterwards of its partition in 1947, “was not promulgated until 1956, and within two years it was abrogated through a military coup d’état.”²¹⁸

The Indian factor is the core of the Pakistani military’s strategies, agendas, and plans. Thus, countering the Indian threat both regionally and internationally has not only maintained the activism of the military in the politics of Pakistan but also, it provides legitimation to the lion’s share of the army from the country’s GDP. Vali brilliantly underlines that “the military’s budget and size have been justified by the Indian threat, as has the military’s need to keep the civilian political order in check.”²¹⁹

To check-and-balance the civil politician, the military has gone into alliances with different groups but mainly the Islamist throughout the history of the country. One reason why the military cooperates with Islamist groups is that “the ideology of Islamism [in Pakistan] is anti-Indian in that it rejects both the secularism and Hindu cultural and political domination of post-partition India.”²²⁰ Thereby, “an alliance between the military and Islamist parties provided a cadence between domestic and the regional politics.”²²¹

While some other scholars argue that:

*Though the alliance between militant Islam and the military may have arisen from a desire to keep politicians at bay, it now provides the main justification for the ‘parallel state’ (the military) to be the ‘defender of the communalist/separatist discourse and India-center definition of Pakistan’s self-perception.’*²²²

²¹⁸ Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 13.

²¹⁹ Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India–Pakistan Conflict,” in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* ed. T.V. Paul (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 178-201.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 153

The interception point that effectuates the ‘military-mullah’ alliance is *Islam*, and this “alliance provided Islamism with regional perspectives and encouraged them to use the doctrine of Jihad to propagate their ideals – which were identified as Pakistan’s interests now that the country was Islamic.”²²³

Taking the anti-Indian or countering Indian characteristic of the Pakistan army into consideration, cooperation with India or normalization of relations with India would not only decrease the leverage of the army in domestic politics but also, the lion’s share from the GDP of the country would also be called into question. Thereby, the efforts of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif for constructing CBMs with India for the purpose of normalizing relations were severally challenged by the army. This resistance of the army to the rapprochement of India and Pakistan has declined the speed and scope of SAARC. To better comprehend the army stance, the periods of Zia and Musharraf will be evaluated below in detail.

The preliminary attempts for the creation of SAARC were started in the late 1970s. However, member states agreed to establish the organization several years later. One of the reasons for the delay was the political leadership stance toward regional cooperation during the 1970s and mid-1980s.²²⁴ The political leadership of both India and Pakistan, Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto respectively, was sharing suspicious, and bias sentiments toward each other. As both leaders were at the core of the 1971 East Pakistan War, and both leaders were consuming strong nationalistic discourses against each other.

In Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq staged a coup against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1978 and stayed in power until his mysterious death in 1988.²²⁵ Rajiv Gandhi became the premier after the assassination of his mother in 1984 in India.²²⁶ The change in

²²³ Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India–Pakistan Conflict,” pp. 178-201.

²²⁴ S. D. Muni, “SARC: Building Regionalism from Below,” pp. 391–404.

²²⁵ On 17 August 1988, the plane which Zia and American ambassador –Arnold Raphel –were travelling by, was exploded in the air. Zia, Arnold Raphel and 31 other crews in the plane were all died. For further details see Lally Weymouth, “Who Killed Pakistan’s Zia: The Fears and the Theories,” *Washington Post*, August 28, 1988.

²²⁶ Indira Gandhi was assassinated on 31 October 1984 by his two trusted Sikh bodyguards due to her declaration of sending Indian troops to Golden Temple which was taken by the Sikh extremist group to take autonomy.

the leadership of both countries gave positive momentum to regional cooperation efforts which culminated in the establishment of SAARC in 1985.

The creation of SAARC was a significant development, and the credit for *initiating* the process of creating SAARC was given to Bangladesh. On behalf of Pakistan, *mediation* and *implementation* of the SAARC establishment occurred in the Zia era. In terms of CBMs, India and Pakistan agreed for the first time to construct a regional cooperation body despite suspicious sentiments.²²⁷ The gathering of the leadership in Dhaka and the informal face-to-face meeting of Zia ul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi was a remarkable moment. Several decades later, the region could witness such a memory. Moreover, Rajiv invited Zia to visit India, and he gladly accepted the request. These events may look tiny and less critical. However, a region where several wars such as 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 had erupted, and the states had tense relations by following combative policies and strategy against each other; this meeting was extremely significant.

Apart from the creation of SAARC and the three consequent SAARC summits, which were held in 1986, 1987, and 1988, we cannot notice significant breakthroughs in the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. Therefore, Zia's three years in the existence of SAARC, no CBMs took place in relation to India. As a result, the triad functions framework –*policy initiations, mediation, and implementation* was not in action.

The reason for no positive development in bilateral relations of India-Pakistan was the conservative Pakistan army's stance toward India [countering India and anti-Indian approach]. As argued before, the establishment of SAARC was a breakthrough development both for the region and for the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. However, Zia-led Pakistan joined the organization on purpose not to leave the regional platform alone to India.

²²⁷ The reluctance of Pakistan was that India was trying to maintain its domination in the region by establishing a regional institution. Whereas, India's main reservation was that Pakistan and other small South Asian states were trying to gang-up against India to recognize the bilateral disputes in a regional organization. For further details see Kishore C. Dash, "The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia," *Pacific Affairs* 69, no. 3 (January 1, 1996): pp. 185-210.

Thereby, the lack of enthusiasm of Zia in normalizing relations with India caused no CBMs in the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.

By the end of the 1990s, Pakistan was in the worst period of its history since the 1971 crisis. The country was suffering and struggling with numerous domestic, regional, and international issues. To elaborate it briefly, domestically, violence and civil-war in each state but mainly in Sind, Karachi; the struggling economy; the growing Islamist groups which sought to establish a Sharia Law in Pakistan likewise in Afghanistan –the Taliban regime; and the confrontation politics among political parties instead of accommodation politics.²²⁸

Regionally, the country military force was in eyeball-to-eyeball on international Line of Control with the Indian army. Subsequently, the two countries entered into war [Kargil War] when the Islamist militant infiltrated to the Indian controlled region of Kashmir through the international border in 1999. Internationally, rising Islamic terrorist activities around the world put pressure on countries that were in cooperation with bold states such as the regime of Taliban in Afghanistan, which Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates recognized it. The pressure on these countries was further heightened in the aftermath of the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 by the notorious Osama Bin Laden leading terrorist organization of Al-Qaida.

By mid-October 1999, Sharif announced the retirement of Pervez Musharraf while he was on his army trip to Colombo and appointed Ziauddin Butt as the new army chief.²²⁹ However, in the military, he was not accepted as the chief of command-chain. Thereby, Sharif and Ziauddin sought not to let the plane of Musharraf to land in the Karachi airport.²³⁰ By the intervention of the army, the Musharraf plane was successfully landed, and the army seized power by overthrowing the government of Sharif. However, Sharif argued that “Musharraf had carefully planned the coup.”²³¹

²²⁸ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 327-358.

²²⁹ “Pakistan's Coup: The 17-Hour Victory,” *BBC News*, November 11, 1999.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 376.

General Pervez Musharraf was the mastermind of the Kargil war. In his first television public speech on 13 October 1999 after the coup, he stated that “you are [the nation] all aware of the kind of turmoil of and uncertainty that our country has gone through in the recent times,” and adds that the state institutions were destroyed, the economy was in a collapsed status, and the self-serving policies had damaged the Foundation of Pakistan.²³²

Pervez Musharraf became the president of Pakistan after the April 2002 referendum, which around 98% of the turnout said “yes.”²³³ There were severe vote-rigging claims, election irregularities, misuse of state-machinery, and physical abuses in the referendum. Latterly, the president himself accepted that some misdoings occurred.²³⁴ Furthermore, the large turnout [nearly 70%] of constituencies was also questioned for the reason that the “officials stuffed boxes with Yes vote.”²³⁵

Musharraf held both the position of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in the army and the president until 2007 and 2008, respectively. Shortly after being elected as the president, he restored the power constitution amendment that gives the power to the president to dismiss the assembly and prime minister. He also settled a decree that prohibited the persons who had already served as the prime minister, chief minister of a state even if the person had not finished the tenure. By this, he blocked both Sharif and Bhutto to participate in the 2002 election.²³⁶

India and Pakistan were on the edge of war during the first years of the 21st century as several terrorist attacks happened in India. The attack on the Indian parliament in 2001,

²³² “General Musharraf Address to Nation 13 October 1999,” *President Musharraf Wordpress*, Posted in July 10, 2007. <https://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/07/10/address-nation-13-oct-1999/>.

²³³ Even the opposition parties claimed that the turnout was 5 to 15 percent not 70 percent as Musharraf claimed. For further details see M. A. El-Khawas, “Musharraf and Pakistan: Democracy Postponed,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (January 2009): pp. 94-118. ; Rory McCarthy, “Flawed Referendum Gives Musharraf Victory,” *Guardian*, May 2, 2002.

²³⁴ The Human Rights Watch claimed in a report that the entire election process of Pakistan was “Deeply Flawed.” For further details see *Human Rights Watch Background Briefing*, October 9, 2002. ; Rory McCarthy, “Flawed Referendum Gives Musharraf Victory,” *Guardian*, May 2, 2002.

²³⁵ Ian Talbot, “General Pervez Musharraf: Saviour or Destroyer of Pakistan’s Democracy?,” pp. 311-328. ; Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 381-385.

²³⁶ “Three Years Hard Labor for Bhutto,” *CNN*, July 9, 2002. ; Terence N. Cuhasing, “Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf: Deceitful Dictator or Father of Democracy?,” pp. 621-648.

and the 2002 Kaluchak attack in Jammu and Kashmir which were carried out by the Pakistan-based terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.²³⁷ Despite Musharraf condemned the attacks immediately, international pressure was immense, and subsequently, he banned the activities of several terrorist groups in Pakistan.²³⁸ With the mediation of both the US and Britain, the tension between India and Pakistan was deescalated.

The first step of CBMs with India in the era of Musharraf (1999-2008) was the July 2001 Agra summit, where Musharraf and Vajpayee met for the first time since the Kargil war.²³⁹ An official spokesperson declared on the end of the two-day summit that "I am disappointed to announce that through the commencement of a process and the beginning of a journey has taken place, the destination of an agreed joint statement has not been reached."²⁴⁰ However, the leaders were able to have a face-to-face meeting. Pakistan blamed the hardliners in India as a spoiler of the summit while Vajpayee criticized Pakistan for sponsoring 'cross-border-terrorism' in Kashmir.²⁴¹

These initiatives were followed by the SAARC summit of Islamabad in January 2004 which Musharraf and Vajpayee agreed on initiating a Composite Dialogue on all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir. Further, SAARC members reached the agreement of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Thereby, the brinkmanship of India and Pakistan was converted to rapprochement by mid-2004.²⁴²

Composite Dialogue, which was a proposal of 12 CBMs propounded by the Vajpayee administration in October 2003 to Islamabad to normalize relations with Pakistan.²⁴³ Ryan

²³⁷ Sanjeev Miglani, "12 Die in Indian Parliament Attack," *Guardian*, December 14, 2001.

²³⁸ "Pakistan's Leader Comes down Hard on Extremists," *CNN*, January 12, 2002.

²³⁹ For further details about Agra summit see J.k. Baral, "The Agra Summit," *International Studies* 39, no. 3 (2002): pp. 289-302.

²⁴⁰ H.Y. Sharada Prasad, "Agra Summit, in Brief," *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, July 25, 2001

²⁴¹ "Vajpayee Blames Musharraf for Failed Agra Summit," *Voice of America*, October 30, 2009.

²⁴² Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: a Modern History*, 410-420. ; Faizal Yahya, "Pakistan, SAARC and ASEAN Relations," pp. 346-375.

²⁴³ The 12 CBMs suggested by India are (1) resumption of dialogue on the civil aviation (2) resumption of rail (3) resumption of support activities including cricket (4) issuing of visas in other cities along with capital cities (5) allowing people who are over 65 age to cross into India on foot (6) increasing the (Lahore-Delhi) bus service (7) establishing link between coastal guards before fishing season (8) preventing the arrest of fishers in definite areas (9) providing medical treatment to 20 Pakistani children (10) increasing of staff in the both countries embassies (11) review a ferry line between Karachi and

French cites the work of Dalton that “Composite Dialogue is a series of bilateral talks on delinked subject areas, allowing each side to raise issues of great concern without prejudice to progress in other areas.”²⁴⁴ Four rounds of dialogue occurred from 2004 to 2008, and the fifth round of Composite Dialogue in 2008 was disrupted by the 26 November Mumbai terrorist attack. The Dialogue was resumed between 2011 and 2012 and was stopped again in 2013 with the criticism of India for the stalled prosecution trial of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks culprits. It was resumed again in 2015 when Sushma Swaraj –the External Affairs Minister of India –visited Islamabad and Sharif government pledged to accelerate the trial of the 26/11 Mumbai attack culprits.²⁴⁵

Since 2004, almost all issues among India and Pakistan have been negotiated through the Composite Dialogue. Ryan French highlights that “the dialogue has spawned many CBMs and covers eight distinct issue clusters: (1) peace and security, (2) Kashmir, (3) the Siachen Glacier, (4) water management, (5) Sir Creek, (6) terrorism and drug trafficking, (7) economic cooperation, and (8) cultural management.”²⁴⁶

Composite Dialogue was the product of the Lahore Declaration. The Lahore Declaration designed the mechanism of negotiation and agreement in all security and non-security issues. Thereby, the proposal of *initiating* the Composite Dialogue was not the initiative of Musharraf, but Sharif through the Lahore Declaration was the main factor. Musharraf played a significant role in the *mediation* process. Not only he recommenced the stalled Dialogue, but also he assured India with building steps such as preventing the activities of several terrorist organizations in Pakistan. Whereas for *implementation*, during

Mumbai (12) initiating new bus-line between Srinagar and Muzafarabad. For further details see Nabiha Gul, “Pakistan-India Composite Dialogue,” *Pakistan horizon* 61, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): pp. 11–17.

²⁴⁴ Ryan W. French, “Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan,” pp. 121–144.

²⁴⁵ Suhasini Haidar and Kallol Bhattacharjee, “7 Years after Mumbai Attacks, India, Pakistan Resume Dialogue,” *Hindu*, August 31, 2016.

²⁴⁶ Ryan W. French, “Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan,” pp. 121–144.

the tenure of Musharraf, four rounds of Composite Dialogue occurred, and both sides reached agreements on some issues as follows.

India and Pakistan agreed on Pre-notification of Flight-Testing of Ballistic Missiles in 2005; Agreement on establishing a Hotline between Indian and Pakistan Coast Guard in 2005; and Agreement On Reducing the Risks from Nuclear Weapon in 2007. Also, a Joint Anti-terrorism Mechanism in 2006 and a Joint Judicial Committee on Prisoners in 2008 was made. However, the *implementation* process of all agreed issues was not very impressive. For instance, the Mumbai terrorist attack occurred despite the presence of a Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism.

Concisely, the military anti-India and countering Indian stance both while the generals were in power such as Zia and Musharraf or while they were not in power has challenged the CBMs initiatives by one or other means. Thereby, in both Zia and Musharraf eras, we could not witness any steps to be taken primarily by these generals, to normalize relations with India. Further, as it is continuously discussed in this chapter that the *implementation* function of the triad functions framework is not impressive for the CBMs, one reason is the army conservative stance. In other words, the army has not only blocked the civil leaders' path to approach India to normalize relations, but it has also pressurized the political leadership not to *implement* the existing CBMs entirely.

2.2.2 Increasing Trade and Economic Activities Between India and Pakistan

The persistence and development of a regional organization are subjected to the support of the socio-political and economic circles. David Easton's model illustrates that the support of the public toward the political institution is based on *affective allegiances* and *utilitarian support*.²⁴⁷ In other words, utilitarian support is the calculation of the benefit

²⁴⁷ David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4 (1975): pp. 435-457 cited in Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 38.

gained by the people from the existence of an organization. On the other side, affective allegiance is the commonality of shared values, attachment, sympathy, and trust.²⁴⁸ In this regard, for the development of regional cooperation, the existence of affective allegiance and utilitarian support is essential.

Linderberg and Schiengold put the analysis of Easton on the development of the EU to examine which support comes first for the progression and development of the EU. Based on their findings, the scholars argue that it was utilitarian support of the parties in which all the involved parties were cooperatively gaining more rather individually in the European integration process.²⁴⁹ However, some other scholars believe that there is vice versa process regarding Linderberg and Scheingold work in which affective allegiance comes first.

The hypothesis of Linderberg and Schiengold is supported by the work of Maurizio Cotta and Federico Rusco. The scholars provided some compelling qualitative arguments and reached to the belief that “economic elites in the EU are more in favor of moving forward with unification” with having a positive attachment to the EU.²⁵⁰ This support from the economic elites in the EU for further unification emanates from the advantages and benefits they have achieved so far from the EU project.²⁵¹

There is neither utilitarian support nor affective allegiance toward SAARC in the SAS. Despite the shared history, shared values and beliefs, and somehow, linguistic similarity has not made an affective allegiance toward SAARC yet in the region. Thereby, it can be assumed that affective allegiance can exist unless there is utilitarian support. Affective allegiance will be further elaborated in the next subtitle –*people-to-people contact*.

Dash notes that in South Asia, apart from some large-scale Indian industry groups – such as Tata groups, Bharat Forge, Ranbaxy, Infosys, and Wipro –which they support

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 171.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 39.

²⁵⁰ Maurizio Cotta and Federico Russo, “Europe à La Carte? European Citizenship and Its Dimensions from the Perspective of National Elites,” In *The Europe of Elites*, (Oxford University Press, 2012): pp.14-42.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

regional trade liberalization, small-scale firms from all member states oppose trade liberalization due to the fear of losing their market.²⁵² The author adds that India exports 53% of its goods to NAFTA and the EU market, while the export of India in SAARC is on a very small scale.²⁵³ Textile is the strongest traditional sector in South Asia. India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are the major producer of textile products, and all the parties compete in the same global market. For the sake of protecting their firms, these states prevent imports from each other through taxes, quotas, import tariff, and label requirement.²⁵⁴

Dash notes the following factors that slow down intra-SAARC trade. First of all, except Pakistan and India, “SAARC countries do not have a diversified product base.”²⁵⁵ Secondly, there are several trade barriers, such as high rate tariff and non-tariff. The transportation from Kolkata to Khulna is higher than Kolkata-Singapore transportation. Similarly, the freight from Karachi to Mumbai is higher than that of Karachi-Hong Kong transportation, and the shipment transportation among intra-SAARC trade is subject to a tremendous amount of bureaucratic procedures.²⁵⁶ Lastly, the existence of political distinction and lack of eagerness of political leadership to establish a complementarity trade in the region put intra-regional trade low.²⁵⁷

Both Pakistan and India have several reservations toward liberalizing trade and economic activities. First of all, India granted the MFN status of the WTO to Pakistan in 1996. However, India still holds several constraints on the Pakistan merchandise such as tariff and non-tariff applications.²⁵⁸ Thereby, the lack of political will in the Pakistani political leadership to grant the MFN status to India has not only strengthened the presence of India barriers, but it has also pushed India to look for other regions. For instance, the Indian policy of ‘Look East’ or India sub-regional trade agreements such as the Bay of Bengal

²⁵² Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 147.

²⁵³ Ibid, 148

²⁵⁴ Ibid, 148-149

²⁵⁵ Ibid, 154-156

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Dash notes that for most of the South Asia countries tariff revenues are a substantial government income. He adds that this revenue is essential for political leaders to retain power. Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 154.

Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) are the examples.

Secondly, Pakistan, instead of reciprocating the MFN status to India, the military leadership of Pakistan favours the policy of 'Kashmir-first-and-trade-later.'²⁵⁹ This stance of the army is also timely supported by civil leadership when they try for political survival. For instance, Bhutto, in her second term, Sharif in his third term and Imran Khan currently followed this path. Thereby, Pakistani political leadership in general and the military particularly has sought to combine each political and non-political issues to Kashmir, and this has deepened the mistrust of India. Indeed, reciprocating the MFN status to India is not just a Pakistan-closed issue. The decision-makers in Pakistan do a calculation on the equation of India-Pakistan-Afghanistan-Central Asia. By this, Pakistan is not just liberalizing its market to India, but this would also open the door for India to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which Pakistan is already concerned about the influence of India in Afghanistan.

Last but not least, Pakistan concerns that the large-scale Indian industry would dominate the Pakistan market by harming the domestic producers.²⁶⁰ Not only Pakistan but all the small SAS share the same concern.²⁶¹ Lack of complementarity in trade further deepen this apprehension. Dash notes that the "slow growth is a lack of trade complementarity between two the countries [India and Pakistan]."²⁶² However, the Pakistan market has been already dominated by Chinese products since the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of Pakistan and China in 2007.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Kishore Dash, "India-Pakistan Trade: Opportunities and Constraints," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): pp. 169–180.

²⁶⁰ Ejaz Ghani, Sadiq Ahmed, and Saman Kelegama, *Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA* (Sage Publications, 2010), 19.

²⁶¹ Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ana Ballesteros Peiro, "Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan," pp. 40–54. ; Naheed Memon, Faiza Rehman, and Fazal Rabbi, "Should Pakistan Liberalize Trade with India against the Backdrop of the FTA with China? A Comparative Advantage Analysis for the Manufacturing Sector," *The Lahore Journal of Economics* 19, no. Special Edition (January 2014): pp. 327–348.

²⁶² Kishore Dash, "India-Pakistan Trade: Opportunities and Constraints," pp. 169–180.

²⁶³ Not only Pakistan has a massive deficit with China but also Bangladesh suffers. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan are the main South Asian countries which share the apprehension that Indian industry would dominate their market. However, Sri Lanka, a relatively small country in the region, has been significantly enjoying from the trade-liberalization with India through the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) which was implemented in 2000. For Sri Lanka, not only the

Discussing the challenges or prospects of liberalization of bilateral or regional trade in South Asia is out of the scope of this thesis. It needs issue-specific works for better enlightenment. Thereby, the posterior analysis will be done to determine the role of Pakistani political leadership in increasing trade and economic activities with India. To do this, the main initiatives that have been taken in trade liberalization until today by evaluating the Pakistani political leadership role through the triad functions framework will be taken into account.

It is significant to mention that the export of Pakistan to India afterwards of partition was 56% of its total export, while her import from India was 32% of its total import.²⁶⁴ India was the major trade partner of Pakistan until the war of 1965 and eight custom routes were operating during this particular time.²⁶⁵ Additionally, until the creation of SAARC India and Pakistan had signed several overlapping trade agreements for the purpose to facilitate, increase and resume trade and economic transactions. To name some of them, India and Pakistan agreed on the Agreement to Avoid Double Taxation in the era of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1947.²⁶⁶ To permit importation and exportation to the market of both countries, the parties signed a trade agreement in 1949 during the tenure of Liaquat Ali Khan.²⁶⁷

Pakistan and India signed three agreements on trade in 1951, 1952 and 1957. During the 1960s both parties signed two trade agreements more. In the tenure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973–77), Pakistan signed three more trade agreements with India. Despite the existence of several trade agreements between India and Pakistan, the *implementation* of all these

import of the country has increased but also its export. For further details see Indra Nath Mukherji, "India's Trade with Its South Asian Neighbours: Conflict or Confidence Building?," In *Conflict and Peace in South Asia*, 5:285–298, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008. ; Dushni Weerakoon, "SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects," in *Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA*, eds. Ejaz Ghani, Sadiq Ahmed, and Saman Kelegama, (Sage Publications, 2010), 71–88.

²⁶⁴ Maria Syed, "Pakistan-India Trade: Rationale and Reality." *Pakistan Horizon* 65, no. 3 (July 2012): 85–101. ; Zafeer Mahmood, "Moving Toward Pakistan-India Trade Normalization: An Overview," in *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs To Be Done? What Does It Matter?*, eds. Michael, Kugelman and Robert, M. (Wilson Center, 2013), 18-30.

²⁶⁵ Currently the Wagah-Attari route is just in operation.

²⁶⁶ "Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation," *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, December 10, 1947.

²⁶⁷ "Trade Agreement between India and Pakistan," *India Bilateral Treaties and Agreements*, Volume 1, (24 June, 1949): pp. 154-158.

agreements was not very impressive. Furthermore, trade volume was further declined after the four consecutive wars [1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999].

Since the inception of SAARC in 1985 until today, three breakthrough steps have been taken in trade liberalization. First of all, the agreement of SAARC states on the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1992 and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004. This will be discussed comprehensively in the upcoming chapter –the development of SAARC. Secondly, the recent measurements that have been taken for avoiding cost and custom difficulties such as the Agreement of India and Pakistan on custom matters 21 September 2012 and the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding between the Pakistani and Indian Commerce Chambers. Last but not least, India granted the MFN status to Pakistan in 1996 and Pakistan has yet to reciprocate. Pakistani political leadership attempted several times to give the MFN status to India, but they could not manage. The steps taken in this regard will be mainly discussed during this chapter.

When India granted the MFN status to Pakistan in 1996, the burden of Pakistani political leadership was further increased. Inversely, they became more ambiguous in terms of liberalizing market. In other words, decision-makers in Pakistan contemplated that India, by liberalizing her market, would not only divert attention from fundamental disputes, but she would also make Pakistan dependent in the long-term to her market as the trade volume equation was changed from Pakistan favor to Indian favor in 1993 (see figure 3).²⁶⁸

²⁶⁸ The trade transaction since the partition of India and Pakistan was in favor of Pakistan. India was its primary importer state. Afterward of the Wars that occurred will dramatically decrease the volume of trade. For further details see Maria Syed, “Pakistan-India Trade: Rationale and Reality.” pp. 85–101.




Figure 7.

Note: The volume of Export is on Million US dollars.

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Macroeconomic and Financial Data*. Accessed October 23, 2019.

During the Musharraf era (1999-2008), Pakistan did not take any step to raise the agenda of granting MFN status to India. Furthermore, the *implementation* of the SAFTA agreement by herself was a stalled process (see figures 4 and 5). Granting the MFN status to India first came to the agenda of Pakistan in 2012 under the Zardari tenure. During his visit to India in April 2012, he had a discussion with Manmohan Singh on the issues of security, trade, and Kashmir.²⁶⁹ A month later, Zardari put into the Pakistan agenda that Pakistan would grant MFN status to India by stating in a news conference that “we have made significant progress on trade and economic cooperation with India. We are moving towards the grant of MFN-status to India despite some hurdles.”²⁷⁰ Further, Zardari administration a month before the MFN agenda switched the positive trade-list of Pakistan with India into a negative trade-list which was a symbol of trade expanding.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Jason Burke, “Pakistani President Visits Indian Shrine after Talks with PM,” *Guardian*, April 8, 2012.

²⁷⁰ “Pak Is Moving towards Granting MFN Status to India: Zardari,” *DNA India*, May 9, 2012.

²⁷¹ Pakistan and India has a list of goods that are allowed to the market of each other. The switch from positive list into negative list means that the number of goods that are allowed to the market expands. “Pakistan Switches over to Negative List Regime for India Trade,” *DAWN.COM*, March 21, 2012.

However, Zardari could not manage to give the MFN status to India. Sharif third government adopted the policy of the Zardari government too. Sharif was on the brink of giving MFN status to India, which the Pakistani *Dawn* newspaper reported that Pakistan might grant MFN status to India on Friday –May 2014.²⁷² However, the process was blocked. There were some allegations that the army was blocking trade normalization and granting MFN status to India.²⁷³ The issue of MFN status has not solved until today, and the Imran Khan administration made a U-turn in the policy of MFN from his predecessors. An advisor of Khan confirmed that Pakistan does not have an agenda of granting MFN status to India.²⁷⁴



Figure 8:

Note: The volume of Export is on Million US dollars.

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Macroeconomic and Financial Data*. Accessed October 23, 2019.

²⁷² Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Pakistan May Grant India MFN Status on Friday," *DAWN.COM*, March 18, 2014.

²⁷³ Shahbaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz Sharif who was the Chief Minister of Punjab during this time, blamed the army establishment of both India and Pakistan that block trade normalization. For further details see Jon Boone and Jason Burke, "Military Blocking Pakistan-India Trade Deal, Says Shahbaz Sharif," *Guardian*, February 13, 2014.

²⁷⁴ "No Plans to Grant MFN Status to India: Pakistan," *Economic Times*, November 14, 2018.



Figure 9.

Note: The Percentage is calculated based on exports of both states to the world and to each other. The statistic of Pakistan export for the years 2000 and 2001 does not exist in the archive of Trade Map. Therefore, years 2000 and 2001 are empty for Pakistan.

Sources: "Trade Statistics for International Business Development," Trade Map - Trade statistics for international business development.

For the triad functions framework analysis, it can be argued that as a *policy initiation*, both Zardari and Sharif *initiated policies* to grant the MFN status to India, and both leaders were also in the *mediation* process with the Indian government. However, they failed to fulfil. While for the shift from positive trade-list into negative trade-list, the Zardari government was both in the middle of *policy initiation* and *mediation*. The *implementation* process was followed by the administrations of Sharif and Khan, subsequently. Whereas, for the Musharraf administration, apart from the SAFTA, which was the result of the Lahore Declaration and Sharif's bold leadership, no breakthrough steps were taken to facilitate and increase trade and economic activities.

The current trade volume of India and Pakistan is around \$2 billion.²⁷⁵ Some experts argue that this volume can be \$8 to \$10 billion if free-trade occurs.²⁷⁶ More disappointingly,

²⁷⁵ Ishrat Husain, "Managing India-Pakistan Trade Relations," in *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs To Be Done? What Does It Matter?*, eds. Michael, Kugelman and Robert, M. (Wilson Center, 2013), 59-74.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

the unofficial trade which has been taking place through smuggling or third-countries is also around \$2 billion.²⁷⁷ Thereby, the amount of unofficial trade indicates the essentiality of trade liberalization.

Unauthorized trade has not only deprived governments of income revenues but also third-countries enjoy immensely from this process. Some scholars even argue that smuggling has been providing the “funds for the *jihad* factories.”²⁷⁸ Distressingly, the cost of trade barriers or the cost of transportation through third countries has been all reflected in the last consumer, which is the nation of both countries. For instance, a study in 2011 revealed that the “annual welfare gains to Indian consumers by importing certain products from Pakistan would be around \$4 billion and similarly importing certain products from India would benefit Pakistani consumers by \$280 million.”²⁷⁹

Concisely, the civil political leadership in general but Bhutto and Sharif particularly sought to increase trade activities with India. For instance, Bhutto endeavours in her first term and Sharif bold steps in his second term were a catalyst to trade activities. The struggles of both Zardari and Sharif in his third term were also significant, despite the fact that both leaders were unable to normalize and increase trade with India by granting the MFN status. On the contrary, the army consistently and stubbornly challenged the endeavours of the civil leaders in trade liberalization by reviving border tension with India or weakening them domestically. Also, while Musharraf was in power, neither he intended to take novel steps in increasing trade with India, nor did he attempt to implement the existing CBMs that were taken previously.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ana Ballesteros Peiro, “Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan,” pp. 40–54.

²⁷⁹ Pradeep S Mehta and Abid Suleri, “A Win-Win Trade for India & Pakistan,” *Financial Express*, October 18, 2011.

2.2.3 Increasing people-to-people contact

As mentioned earlier that for the persistence and development of a regional organization, there is a need for *affective allegiance* and *utilitarian support*. *Affective allegiance* is the commonality of shared values, attachment, sympathy, and trust.²⁸⁰ This commonality of shared values or collective identity can be generated by a common feeling of 'we' and for a 'we' feeling, people-to-people contact is a must. Therefore, SAARC needs a 'South Asia identity' for the development and consolidation of its structure, likewise the ASEAN or EU collective identity.

However, the South Asia region lacks a sense of collective identity. India and Pakistan, along with Bangladesh, despite the states, were one before the 1947 partition, there are "contested national identities constructed by member states."²⁸¹ Furthermore, there are several sorts of barriers that intensify the sense of 'we and they.' Such as the lack of land, sea and aviation transportation, complicated visa process, harassment of visitors, and others. For an Indian citizen living in Amritsar, travelling to Lahore, which is approximately 50 km far away from Lahore, is more challenging compared to visiting Singapore or New York.

Similarly, for a Pakistan citizen travelling to Mumbai is harder compared to travelling to Kuala Lumpur or Istanbul. This case is not just India and Pakistan specific. The people of other SAS have similar difficulties too. In addition to this low communication of people, generally, the media coverage and social media platforms contain hatred propaganda against each other. This can be particularly seen in the media coverage of India and Pakistan. Hatred propaganda not only decreases the awareness of people on regional cooperation but also nationalistic sentiments are enforced.

Quoting the words of Dash, "it is widely acknowledged that people who travel to another country often develop both a deeper understanding and a deeper appreciation for it.

²⁸⁰ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 171.

²⁸¹ Kunal Mukherjee, "The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: Problems and Prospects," *Progress in Development Studies* 14, no. 4 (July 2014): pp. 373-381.

People who maintain person-to-person contacts and friendships across borders seem to be less favourably disposed to regional conflicts.”²⁸²

Ernest Haas notes that socially constructed knowledge which it shapes the worldview of the policy-makers significantly influence on the attitude of the decision-makers.²⁸³ However, Dash shows that in Bangladesh 45%, India 46%, Nepal 39%, Pakistan 38%, and Sri Lanka 29% of the elites do not know what SAARC is.²⁸⁴ Further, “the vast differences in the nature of individual states, preoccupation with domestic issues, lack of cross-border travel, less or negative press coverage of South Asian affairs, distorted history textbooks, and limited interaction among South Asian government” have widely influenced on the perception of people toward other each other.²⁸⁵

In this regard, this chapter will try to find answers to the question of what steps have been taken until today for facilitating and increasing people-to-people contact between two principal SAARC members [India and Pakistan] by determining the role of Pakistani political leadership role through the triad functions framework after the year 1985.

Till the creation of SAARC, India and Pakistan had agreed on several agreements and protocols for the purpose of increasing people-to-people communication. All these agreements and protocols overlapped with each other. To name some of them, India and Pakistan signed the Agreement Relating to Air Service in 1948 and the Agreement on Resuming Rail Traffic in 1955. On September 1974, both parties signed a Protocol which constituted the Agreement on Religious Shrine Visiting, Agreement on a Visa Regime, and Agreement on Telecommunication. And in 1976, India and Pakistan agreed on the Agreement of Rail Service and the Agreement of Air Service. Despite the existence of all these agreements and protocols, the political will on both sides was tremendously low in the

²⁸² Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 209.

²⁸³ Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 73-75.

²⁸⁴ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 182.

²⁸⁵ Ibid, 183

implementation process. Therefore, periodically, new overlapping agreements and protocols were signed.

The first bilateral cultural cooperation agreement between India and Pakistan in the existence of SAARC was the 1988 Cultural Cooperation Agreement which was signed under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi. Both parties agreed to “facilitate and encourage cooperation in the field of arts, culture, archaeology, education, mass media of information, and sports.”²⁸⁶ This agreement was also a reference point for the 2006 Agreement of Hosting to Display each other’s Movies and the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation.²⁸⁷ Ryan French notes that the “cricket diplomacy, which has helped in easing tensions in the following periods of crisis” was an outcome of the 1988 Cultural Cooperation Agreement.²⁸⁸

Bhutto’s first government (1988-1990) was both in the core of *policy initiation* and *mediation* of the 1988 Cultural Agreement. While the *implementation* process was carried out by different regimes under different leadership. Yet the agreement has not been *implemented* genuinely till today as the people of both countries find it easier to display a cultural ceremony in a third country, and they could visit more easily to third countries.

The diplomatic personnel of both India and Pakistan have been suffering from harassment on each other’s territory. This issue exists since the independence of both states. To put a solution for the matter, India and Pakistan agreed on the ‘Code of Conduct for the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel’ in 1992 by pledging that in accordance to the international law and practices “there should be no interference in the conduct of their

²⁸⁶ “Cultural Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, 31 December 1988.

²⁸⁷ Ryan W. French, “Constructing Cooperation: A New Approach to Confidence Building between India and Pakistan,” pp. 121–144.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

[diplomatic personnel] legitimate activities and no offences against their dignity and person.”²⁸⁹

On behalf of Pakistan, Sharif’s first government (1990-1993) was in the *policy initiating* and *mediation* process. The *implementation* process of the Code was carried out by different governments in Pakistan. Likewise, other agreements, the Code *implementation* was also not fruitful. India and Pakistan recommitted to the Code of Conduct for the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel in 2018. However, yet both parties have been accusing each other of harassment and inadequate treatment of their diplomatic personnel even today.²⁹⁰

The milestone for the people-to-people communication was the 1999 Lahore Declaration, in which a bus-line service started operating between Lahore and New Delhi for the first time. Needless to say that Sharif’s second government (1997-1999) was in the centre of the Lahore Declaration in terms of *policy initiation* and *mediation*. The number of bus-line services was increased by the year 2005 and 2006 by adding the line of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and the line of Rawalkot-Poonch respectively.

The bus-line operated even during the Kargil War. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in 2001 and the 2002 Jammu and Kashmir, both countries deployed their armies to the border. Thus, both the bus-line and rail operation was suspended.²⁹¹ The bus-line service resumed on the 16th July 2003 while the rail service resumed on the 15th January 2004.²⁹² Currently, due to the tension of India and Pakistan aftermath of the revoke of Article 370 by the Modi in August 2019, rail and bus-line operation have been suspended by Pakistan.²⁹³

²⁸⁹ “Code of Conduct for Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India and Pakistan,” *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, 19 August 1992.

²⁹⁰ Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistani, Indian Diplomatic Staff Claim Harassment,” *DAWN.COM*, January 15, 2019. ; “India, Pak Agree to Resolve Issues about Treatment of Diplomats,” *Economic Times*, March 31, 2018. ; Geeta Mohan, “India Protests over Harassment of Diplomats in Pakistan,” *India Today*, January 15, 2019.

²⁹¹ “India, Pakistan Relations Worsen: Rail and Bus Links Suspended - 2001-12-21,” *Voice of America*, October 27, 2009.

²⁹² “India and Pakistan Resume Bus Link,” *Guardian*, July 11, 2003. ; “India, Pakistan Resume Train Link,” *BBC News*, January 15, 2004.

²⁹³ “Railways Cancels Samjhauta Express on Indian Side of Border after Pakistan's Suspension,” *India Today*, August 11, 2019.

In brief, bold and breakthrough steps for the purpose to increase people-to-people contact between India and Pakistan are the 1988 Cultural Cooperation Agreement, the 1992 Code of the Conduct for the Treatment of Diplomatic Personnel, the Bus-line service operation, and the South Asian University. The first agreement was *initiated* by Benazir Bhutto, while Sharif's governments initiated the other two's. And the South Asian University was the proposal of Manmohan Singh which will be discussed in the next chapter in detail.



3. THE CORRELATION OF SAARC DEVELOPMENT WITH THE BILATERAL RELATIONS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Article Ten of SAARC charter states that “decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity” and “bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations.”²⁹⁴ Thus, all bilateral disputes that South Asian countries have could not be discussed in the platform of SAARC. Furthermore, any decision of SAARC needs the unanimity of the member states.

Even though SAARC Charter excludes all bilateral political issues from its framework, SAARC development has been undermined by the bilateral issues of its members. According to the SAARC charter, member states are required to participate in the annual SAARC summit.²⁹⁵ However, due to bilateral disputes, member states generally refuse to participate in the annual summit for one or other reasons that they have with other countries. For instance, during the first decade of SAARC, Sri Lanka rejected participation in the SAARC summit due to her tension with India. Similarly, for the last two decades of SAARC, India and Pakistan relations have cancelled or postponed the SAARC summit for several times due to their troublesome relations.

The summit cancellation and postponement is a standard phenomenon that SAARC faces since its inception. A bilateral or multilateral tension among the members ultimately causes the cancellation or postponement of the summit. The rivalry between Pakistan and India is at the core of this phenomenon. Both states have been trying to use its card to gain more in the zero-sum game with all costs. SAARC is the first regional platform that is usually the victim of this tension.

²⁹⁴ “SAARC Charter Provisional Rules of Procedure,” SAARC Secretariat, accessed February 6, 2020, http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-charter-provisional-rules-of-procedure

²⁹⁵ SAARC Charter, Role 1 of the Composition of Delegation from the Chapter of Provisional Rules of Procedure. “SAARC Charter Provisional Rules of Procedure,” SAARC Secretariat, accessed February 6, 2020, http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-charter-provisional-rules-of-procedure

According to the charter of SAARC, members should gather once a year for the summit of the organization.²⁹⁶ In this case, the organization is supposed to arrange its 34th summit in 2019. However, SAARC has been trying to organize its 19th summit in Pakistan. The 19th summit was planned to be held on 15-19 November 2016, but it was canceled in the aftermath of a terrorist attack on an Indian army camp in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁹⁷

The first SAARC summit was held in December 1985 in Dhaka. During the first 15 years (1985-2000) ten SAARC summits were held, and for the next 18 years (2000-2019), eight SAARC summits were held [see appendix 1 for further details]. Issues that cause the cancellation, postponement or change the venue of the summit are the bilateral disputes [India-Sri Lanka or India-Pakistan], the internal problem of the member states [political instability], or the shortcoming of the infrastructure of the host country to hold the summit – for instance, Bhutan could not hold a SAARC summit in 1986 and 1987.²⁹⁸

The primary cause for the cancellation or postponement of the SAARC summit until the year 1998 was mainly the India-Sri Lanka disputes on the crisis of Tamil. However, after the year 1999, almost all cancellation and postponement of the summits are India-Pakistan dispute centric. From the year 1999 to 2002 no SAARC summits were held due to the Kargil War and the terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament. While afterwards of the year 2008, the summit postponement or cancellation is due to the 2008 Mumbai attack and the trial case of culprits of the attack in Pakistan.

The thesis asserts that SAARC development and bilateral relations of the member states have a correlation with each other, and it's unthinkable to evaluate SAARC development without bilateral ties of the member countries. India and Pakistan are the major and leading players in all aspects both in the region and in the SAARC. SAARC development has a direct linkage with the bilateral relations

²⁹⁶ In the 18th summit (2014) the members agreed on holding the summit once in two year instead of annual summit.

²⁹⁷ After the Uri terrorist attack, first India announced for call of in the summit and later Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka followed to not attend in the summit. Therefore, Pakistan announced the cancellation of the 19th summit. For further details see Kallol Bhattacharjee, "SAARC Summit to be cancelled," *Hindu*, November 3, 2016. ; Elizabeth Roche, "Pakistan Postpones SAARC Summit after India-Led Boycott over Uri Attack," *Livemint*, September 30, 2016.

²⁹⁸ Manzoor Ahmad, "SAARC Summits 1985-2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon," *IPRI Journal* XVII, no. 1 (2017): 43–71.

between India and Pakistan. In other words, while détente or rapprochement in the India-Pakistan relations positively impacts the SAARC development, tension escalation influences SAARC the vice versa.

The development of SAARC is a fluctuating process. While sometimes the organization witnesses some breakthrough achievements, its development process has been occasionally deadlocked, and sometimes the organization could not act in principle matters such as the annual gathering. The first hypothesis of the thesis is that the oscillation process of SAARC development is a dependent variable to the India-Pakistan bilateral relations. The second hypothesis of the thesis is that to determine the Pakistani political leadership role in the development of SAARC; we need to look into the Pakistani political leadership role in the development of its relations with India instead of looking into intra-SAARC developments.

As the Pakistani political leadership role is determined through the triad functions framework in the bilateral relations with India in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the development of SAARC by demonstrating the hypothesis of the thesis. To do this, the thesis focuses on the main events that SAARC has gone through so far. For instance, a successful annual summit gathering, the establishment of SAPTA and SAFTA, and the widening and deepening process of SAARC.

This would be better to clarify that the SAARC summit gathering decides for each development of the organization. Agreement on cooperation in a new field or accepting the full or observing membership of a state or a regional organization are all discussed and decided in an annual summit of SAARC. Manzoor Ahmad notes that the SAARC summit:

*Gives regional leaders an opportunity to meet regularly and provides them an environment to deliberate on issues of common interests; decide on matters related to regional cooperation and bilateral issues in formal or informal meetings; start or resume talks and negotiate or sign agreements.*²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

The summit of the SAARC is the highest and significant authorized body of the SAARC. As the member states have not transferred some amount of their sovereignty to the organization likewise in the EU, where the Commission plays a role in setting agendas, the annual summit of SAARC is the body where plans, issues, and objectives are discussed, transformed and certified. Thereby, the thesis asserts that a successful SAARC summit is a development of SAARC by itself, whereas postponement and cancellation of a summit is a challenge for the organization.

3.1 The First Decade of SAARC (1985-95)

In the first decade of SAARC (1985-1995), eight SAARC summits occurred. The first, second, and third summits were materialized during the era of General Zia Ul Haq. The fourth summit of SAARC happened in the first tenure of Benazir Bhutto while the fifth, sixth, and seventh summits occurred in the first government of Sharif, and the eighth summit came true in the second government of Bhutto.

In the first SAARC summit, which held in Dhaka in 1985 with the participation of Zia on behalf of Pakistan, the Dhaka Declaration was announced. The declaration mainly concentrates on the principles and founding reasons of SAARC. It contains issues such as economic and social development; optimization of the human and material resources; promote welfare, prosperity, and quality of life of the people; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in the internal affairs; and to increase people-to-people contact and communication.³⁰⁰ All these objectives were announced under an Integrated Plan of Action (IPA) with a 14 points article and a joint press release.

The second Summit was hosted by India (Bangalore, 1986), which on behalf of Pakistan and India Prime Minister Juenjo and Rajiv Gandhi, participated respectively.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ "First SAARC Summit Dhaka 1985," SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/first-saarc-summit-dhaka-1985.

³⁰¹ Zia Ul Haq appointed Juenjo. He was not elected through a general election. Moreover, he was dismissed by Zia in 1988 by dissolving the assembly on the claims that the lawmakers are unable to maintain law and order. "Pakistan's Zia Dissolves Assembly, Fires Prime Minister," *Los Angeles Times*, May 30, 1988.

Member states agreed on establishing the SAARC secretariat. The secretariat went into operation on 16th January 1987 in Kathmandu, Nepal. New areas of cooperation such as (a) radio and television broadcasting (b) facilitating tourism to increase people-to-people contact (c) SAARC scholarships for students and researchers (d) SAARC documentation centre (e) SAARC Organized Volunteer Program, and member states agreed on establishing SAARC secretariat were added to the IPA.³⁰²

The third summit of SAARC occurred in Kathmandu, Nepal (1987). Natural disaster and degradation of the environment were the primary concerns of the declaration. Besides, members agreed to create the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and a South Asian Food Reserve. On August 1988, they were operationalized.³⁰³ Likewise, in the India-Pakistan bilateral relations during these three years, no significant development was recorded. This can be noticed in the development process of SAARC also, which lacks bold measurements.

The forth summit occurred in Islamabad (1988).³⁰⁴ India's Prime Minister (Rajiv Gandhi) visited Pakistan.³⁰⁵ The member states expressed satisfaction to implement the IPA and to increase people-to-people contact. For this, they "decided that Supreme Court Judges and Members of the National Parliaments of each Member State would be entitled to a special SAARC travel document which would exempt them from visas."³⁰⁶ Additionally, the parties welcomed to establish a SAARC Agriculture Information Centre. The centre became operationalized in 1989 in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

This summit was followed by the three consecutive summits of (1990, 1991, and 1993) during the Sharif first government. In the fifth summit of SAARC in Male, 1990,

³⁰² "Second SAARC Summit Bangalore 1986," *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/second-saarc-summit-bangalore-1986.

³⁰³ "Third SAARC Summit Kathmandu 1987," *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/third-saarc-summit-kathmandu-1987.

³⁰⁴ India, during this summit, desired to add Afghanistan as a member of SAARC. However, Pakistan rejected the proposal on the grounds of that Afghanistan was under the occupation of the USSR.

³⁰⁵ This was after 30 years that an Indian Prime Minister traveled to Pakistan.

³⁰⁶ "Fourth SAARC Summit Islamabad 1988," *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/fourth-saarc-summit-islamabad-1988.

SAARC members agreed on the Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The objective of the convention “is to promote cooperation among Member States, so that they may address more effectively the various aspects of prevention and control of drug abuse and the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which are specific to the SAARC region.”³⁰⁷

Except for the IPA and extensive amounts of unimplemented objectives, with the proposal of Sri Lanka³⁰⁸, the member states, for the first time agreed for the establishment of a SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) in 1993 “to promote and sustain mutual trade and the economic cooperation among the Contracting States.”³⁰⁹ Until the creation of SAFTA, “three rounds of negotiations [SAPTA1, SAPTA2, and SAPTA3] were completed under SAPTA where the consolidated list of concessions covered 3,857 tariff lines, including special concessions (2,762 tariff lines) offered to Less Developed Countries (LDCs).”³¹⁰

All these developments in SAARC would not have occurred if the steps had not been taken place in the bilateral relations of India-Pakistan. More specifically, the creation of SAPTA and the four successful SAARC summits with deepening attempts would not have materialized if the CBMs had not taken place between India and Pakistan during the first governments of Bhutto and Sharif.³¹¹ Needless to say, it was Sharif and Bhutto to play the role of *policy initiation* and *mediation* in the CBMs with India. However, likewise, bilateral CBMs *implementation* process was not impressive; the *implementation* of IPA objectives and SAPTA by itself were not fruitful. As Dushni notes that “SAPTA had little or no impact in

³⁰⁷ Article 2a of SAARC Convention on Narcotic Rugs and Psychotropic Substances. “SAARC Convention on Narcotic Rugs and Psychotropic Substances,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-convention-on-narcotic-rugs-and-psychotropic-substances.

³⁰⁸ “Sixth SAARC Summit Colombo 1991,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/sixth-saarc-summit-colombo-1991.

³⁰⁹ Article 2a of SAPTA. “Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA),” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-on-saarc-preferential-trading-arrangement-sapta.

³¹⁰ Dushni Weerakoon, “SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects,” pp. 71–88.

³¹¹ The Cultural Agreement (1988); Prior Notification of Military Exercise (1991); Prevention of Airspace Violation (1991); Code of conduct for the treatment of Diplomatic personnel (1992); Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1992).

changing the existing trade patterns in South Asia,” and he adds that “intra-SAARC trade continued to stagnate in the region at 5 percent of total trade with the rest of the world.”³¹²

3.2 The Second Decade of SAARC (1995-2005)

In the second decade of SAARC, expectations were high during the last year of the 1990s. Five SAARC’s summits were materialized in these ten years. Two summits [ninth in Male and tenth in Colombo] were arranged in the second tenure of Sharif (1997-99), and three summits [eleventh, twelfth and thirteen] were arranged during Musharraf’s era (1999-2008).

In the summit of Male (1997), the states reiterated the importance of SAPTA and agreed that under the Third Round of Trade Negotiation the structural impediments should be removed for the creation of a SAARC Free Trade Area (SAFTA).³¹³ Additionally, several other areas such as poverty eradication, empowerment of women, children, nutrition, youth, persons with disabilities, shelter, literacy, environment, terrorism and drug trafficking, science and technology, people-to-people contact, and tourism, were all discussed to increase cooperation in these areas.³¹⁴ While in the Colombo summit (1998), commitments likewise in the Male summits were made and discussed. However, the importance of this summit was that both India and Pakistan's political leadership could have a face-to-face meeting chance aftermath of the detonation of a nuclear bomb by both sides in 1998.

All these steps were followed by the bold Lahore Declaration of 1999 between India and Pakistan. However, this rapprochement and the positive environment was immediately ended through the Kargil war and a military coup of Musharraf in Pakistan in 1999. SAARC summit was delayed for more than two years due to the tension of Pakistan and India on

³¹² Dushni Weerakoon, “SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects,” pp. 71–88.

³¹³ “Ninth SAARC Summit Male 1997,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/ninth-saarc-summit-male-1997.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

several issues such as the Kargil War, a military coup in Pakistan, the hijack of Indian Airline plane from Kathmandu,³¹⁵ the terrorist attacks on Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, and the India parliament.

The 11th SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu, Nepal in 2002. The summit “appeared to have broken ice between the two leaders [Musharraf and Vajpayee] and eventually led to the resumption of dialogue on bilateral issues between the two countries, which was suspended after the failure of Agra Summit in 2001.”³¹⁶ During this summit, the states agreed to increase cooperation in the economic sector by “moving quickly [toward] SAFTA” and for the protection and promotion of the rights of Child, SAARC signed the Convention on Regional Arrangement for the Promotion of Child Welfare,³¹⁷ alongside the SAARC Convention On Preventing And Combating Trafficking In Women And Children For Prostitution.³¹⁸

The 12th SAARC summit was held in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2004. Member states signed SAFTA “to promote and enhance mutual trade and economic cooperation among the Contracting States” and eliminate “barriers to trade in, and facilitating the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of the Contracting States.”³¹⁹ This was a milestone for SAARC as the countries took a significant step for the creation of a free-trade area with a unique characteristic that a special treatment position for the small and LDC will be adopted.³²⁰ Commitments such as poverty alleviation, cooperation in science and

³¹⁵ The aircraft was hijacked by militants which India put the responsibility on Pakistan in 1999. For more details see Maya Sharma, “The Hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814,” *NDTV*, August 30, 2009.

³¹⁶ Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 178-179.

³¹⁷ “Eleventh SAARC Summit Kathmandu 2002,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/eleventh-saarc-summit-kathmandu-2002.

³¹⁸ “SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-convention-on-preventing-and-combating-trafficking-in-women-and-children-for-prostitution.

³¹⁹ Article 3, Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area SAFTA. “Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA),” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-on-south-asian-free-trade-area-safta.

³²⁰ The Less Development Countries (LDC) of SAARC are Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Nepal. While the non-LDC are India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Thereby, two different timetables were made for SAFTA implementation. SAFTA was planned to be fully implemented by the year 2013 and 2016 for non-LDC and LDC respectively. For further details see Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures*, 159-165.

technology, cultural and environmental cooperation, and combating terrorism were remade and reiterated.³²¹

Additionally, SAARC Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation³²² which was firstly proposed in the third SAARC finance minister in 2002, the proposal was approved in the twelfth SAARC summit of Islamabad in 2004 alongside the SAARC Social Charter. The purpose of the Charter was to put the people of the region in the centre of development by responding the prime needs of the people such as poverty alleviation (article 3), health (article 4), education, human resource development and youth mobilization (article 5), promotion of the status of women (article 6), promotion of the rights and well-being of the child (article 7), population stabilization (article 8), and drug de-addiction, rehabilitation and reintegration (article 9).³²³ These steps were followed by welcoming the proposal of Afghanistan for full membership of SAARC and the willingness of SAARC countries to give the observer status to China and Japan in the Dhaka summit of SAARC in November 2005.³²⁴

Agreement on SAFTA, accepting the proposal of Afghanistan for full membership in 2005³²⁵, willingness to give observer status to China and Japan in 2005, and readiness in cooperating in new areas were all came true during the era of General Musharraf. In other words, during the Musharraf era, SAARC recorded the peak point in organizational developments. However, these achievements of SAARC would not have occurred if the ‘leap of trust’ was not initiated during the Sharif’s second government. More specifically, the Lahore Declaration and the MoU in 1999, which was a peak for India-Pakistan

³²¹ “Twelfth SAARC Summit Islamabad 2004,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/twelfth-saarc-summit-islamabad-2004.

³²² “SAARC Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-plan-of-action-on-poverty-alleviation.

³²³ “The Social Charter of SAARC,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/uploads/digital_library_document/10_Social_Charter.pdf.

³²⁴ “Dhaka Declaration, Thirteenth SAARC Summit 2005,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/uploads/digital_library_document/13_-_Dhaka_-_13th_Summit_12-13_Nov_2005.pdf.

³²⁵ Afghanistan was given full membership in 2007 during the Delhi summit of SAARC through the Joint Declaration of the Admission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to SAARC. See the declaration in details: “Declaration of the Admission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan into SAARC,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/declaration-on-the-admission-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-into-saarc

rapprochement, facilitated the path for these developments of SAARC as both India and Pakistan engaged in finding solutions for their differences under the Composite Dialogue.

The bold Lahore Declaration emphasized on principle to put a commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC 2000 vision by promoting the welfare and life quality of people and increase economic growth. Thus, the creation of SAFTA and the widening of SAARC was the fruit of the India-Pakistan détente period of the late 1990s via the Lahore Declaration. Needless to say that both the *initiation* and *mediation* of the Lahore Declaration occurred during the Sharif's second government.

To sum up, during the second decade of SAARC, five SAARC's summits occurred; SAFTA was signed, Afghanistan was given full membership status, and China and Japan observer status were accepted. Compare to the first decade and the third decade of SAARC, the second decade of SAARC was more fruitful in terms of developments, and the driving force behind these developments was the Lahore Declaration, which was occurred in the second tenure of Sharif.

3.3 The Third Decade of SAARC (2005-2015)

The third decade of SAARC is the most unproductive period in comparison to the first and second decades in terms of achievements and development. Even though SAARC arranged six summits during this period, all previous commitments in general and SAFTA mainly were not fully implemented, and SAFTA under the current circumstances is a far reality. Clearly saying, SAFTA does not have a binding instruction to enforce trade liberalization program (TLP) immediately. Instead, SAFTA urged the members to reduce the

tariffs periodically.³²⁶ However, even today, SAARC members have a huge list of negative trade items, and intra-SAARC trade is at a minimum level (see figures 6 and 7).

Likewise, in the ups and down in India-Pakistan relations during this period, SAARC also witnessed a similar fluctuating nature in arranging its annual summit. For instance, relations of India-Pakistan during 2005-2008 was constant with no severe damages, so was SAARC able to materialize three summits during this period.³²⁷ However, when bilateral relations reached its deepest afterwards of the Mumbai attack, the SAARC summit was also not gathered until 2010. Furthermore, the stalled trial of Mumbai attack culprits, which is the main factor that deteriorates bilateral relations even today, SAARC was only able to arrange three summits since 2010, and the 19th summit has been cancelled for nearly four years.

³²⁶ The Non-LDCs were supposed to reduce the tariffs to 20 percent over two years and the LDCs in 3 years. Also, the non-LDCs were supposed to reduce the tariffs to 0-5 percent in the next five years while the LDCs were needed to do it in the next seven years. For further details see Dushni Weerakoon, "SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects," pp. 71-88.

³²⁷ 2005 Dhaka summit, 2007 New Delhi summit, and 2008 Colombo summit.



Figure 10.

Notes: 1) the amounts are on thousand US Dollar. 2) For years 2001 and 2002, there is no statistics for Pakistan's Export in the Trade Map Database.

Sources: "Trade Statistics for International Business Development," Trade Map - Trade statistics for international business development.



Figure 11.

Notes: The amounts are on thousand US Dollar

Sources: "Trade Statistics for International Business Development," Trade Map - Trade statistics for international business development.

To “provide a legal framework within the region for fair and efficient settlement through conciliation and arbitration of commercial, investment, and such other disputes,” the Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council was signed by the parties in 13th SAARC summit in 2005.³²⁸ Furthermore, the member states agreed to establish SAARC Energy Centre in Islamabad for the purpose “to promote the development of energy resources, including hydropower; and energy trade in the region; to develop renewable and alternative energy resources, and promote energy efficiency and conservation in the region.”³²⁹ The centre got enforced in 2006.

The member countries approved the proposal of India in the 14th summit of SAARC (Delhi, 2007) for establishing a South Asian University.³³⁰ The university, “which shall be a non-state, non-profit self-governing international educational institution with a regional focus”³³¹ aims to “bring together the brightest and the most dedicated students from all countries of South Asia”³³² and “to build a South Asian community.”³³³ Moreover, the SAARC Food Bank, which would “act as a regional food security reserve for the SAARC Member Countries during normal time food shortages and emergencies” was also approved by the member states in this summit.³³⁴

SAARC member states agreed to establish a South Asian Regional Standard Organization in the 15th summit, 2008. By this, it will “promote and undertake harmonization of national standards of the SAARC Member States to remove the technical barriers to trade

³²⁸ Article 2a of the Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council. “Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-for-establishment-of-saarc-arbitration-council.

³²⁹ “Dhaka Declaration, Thirteenth SAARC Summit 2005,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/uploads/digital_library_document/13 - Dhaka - 13th Summit 12-13 Nov 2005.pdf.

³³⁰ “Fourteen SAARC Summit New Delhi 2007,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/fourteenth-saarc-summit-new-delhi-2007.

³³¹ Article 1 of the “SAARC Agreement for Establishment of South Asian University,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-for-establishment-of-south-asian-univeristy

³³² Ibid, Article 2a.

³³³ Ibid, Article 2b.

³³⁴ Article 1a of the “Agreement On Establishing the SAARC Food Bank,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-on-establishing-the-saarc-food-bank

and facilitate the flow of goods and services in the region.”³³⁵ Further, it will also “encourage the use of international standards published by international organizations such as ISO, IEC, etc. by way of adoption.”³³⁶

In the 16th summit of SAARC in 2010, states agreed on the Agreement on Trade Services “to promote and enhance trade in services among the Contracting States in a mutually beneficial and equitable manner by establishing a framework for liberalizing and promoting trade in services.”³³⁷ Additionally, “to promote cooperation among the parties in the field of environment and sustainable development, on the basis of equity; reciprocity and mutual benefit, taking into account the applicable policies and legislation in each Member State” SAARC has signed the Convention on Cooperation on Environment.³³⁸ Also, SAARC Development Fund (SDF) was created in 2010 for the purpose to “to promote the welfare of people of the SAARC region, to improve their quality of life and to accelerate economic growth, social progress and poverty alleviation in the region.”³³⁹

The SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters was materialized in 2011 during the 17th SAARC summit in the Maldives, to establish a joint regional mechanism to respond effectively during a time of disaster by reducing the loss of lives, and economic and environmental assets.³⁴⁰ Member states also signed the Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Seed Bank in this summit, “to provide regional support to national seed security efforts; address regional seed shortages through collective actions and foster inter-country partnerships.”³⁴¹ Parties also agreed on the SAARC Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement

³³⁵ Article 2a of the “Agreement on the Establishment of South Asian Regional Standard Organization (SARSO),” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-on-the-establishment-of-south-asian-regional-standards-organisation.

³³⁶ Ibid, Article 2c.

³³⁷ Article 2a of the “SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS),” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-agreement-on-trade-in-services

³³⁸ Article 1 of the “SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-convention-on-cooperation-on-environment

³³⁹ Article 1 of the Charter of SAARC Development Fund (SDF),” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/charter-of-the-saarc-development-fund.

³⁴⁰ Article 2 of the “SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/uploads/digital_library/document/28_Rapid_response_to_Natural_disasters.pdf.

³⁴¹ Article 2a of the “Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Seed Bank,” *SAARC Secretariat*. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/declaration-on-the-admission-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-into-saarc.

on recognition of Conformity Assessment “to facilitate the Parties to accept results of conformity assessment with a view to eliminating technical barriers to trade within SAARC.”³⁴²

Modi in his first SAARC summit in Nepal 2014 pledged that India would open a “new chapter” with the neighborhood. To solidify the commitment, India will launch a South Asia Satellite that will bring the SAARC nations together for “effective communication, better governance, better banking services, and better education in remote areas” which Modi underlined in his speech in satellite launch gathering.³⁴³ Modi was in the centre of the *policy initiation* of South Asia Satellite, and member countries agreed and became part of the project including Pakistan.

However, when the tension erupted between the two countries aftermath of the Uri attack, Pakistan pulled out from the project and India carried out the initiative with the rest of the members. This mini-Indian project brings the regional countries together to cooperate and collaborate in diverse sectors in the frame of SAARC. Pakistan exclusion from the project put Pakistan in an unfavourable situation. The project not only isolated Pakistan in the region, but India has also taken all the SAARC member countries into its side while once they were beside Pakistan against India.

Unlike the first swearing-in ceremony of Modi in 2014 which the SAARC members’ head of state or government participated, the second swearing-in ceremony in 2019, the head of states or governments of BIMSTEC participated. This movement can be interpreted that the SAARC will be not the focus of the Modi government in the near future. Even though he highlighted that the ‘Neighbor First’ policy would continue, the neighbor will be the partners of BIMSTEC, not SAARC.³⁴⁴

³⁴² Article 2 of the “SAARC Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment,” SAARC Secretariat. Accessed November 6, 2019. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-agreement-on-multilateral-arrangement-on-recognition-of-conformity-assessment.

³⁴³ PM Narendra Modi’s space diplomacy turns satellite launch into mini-SAARC summit.

³⁴⁴ Mujib Mashal, “Modi Begins Second Term as India’s Prime Minister After Crushing Victory,” *New York Times*, May 30, 2019. ; “Narendra Modi: BIMSTEC Leaders to Attend Modi’s Swearing-in Ceremony.” *Times of India*, May 27, 2019.

To sum up, likewise, the low or no progress in bilateral relations of India and Pakistan from 2005 to 2015, SAARC also recorded low or no progress throughout this period. SAARC, despite signing new conventions or agreements in this period, the implementation process of all these measurements was ineffective and a far reality. For instance, SAFTA by itself, is just an objective with no implementation so far.

SAARC already canceled 19th summit of Islamabad will be not held shortly if Modi focuses on India neighbors except Pakistan. There would be a chance for the summit arrangement if the summit venue was another country except for Pakistan. Modi will not put himself under question for his constituency by visiting Pakistan in case a SAARC summit occurs. Moreover, the current developments in India –revocation of Article 370, citizenship amendment bill and the supreme court verdict on Ayodhya—which has escalated tension among India and Pakistan, the 19th summit of SAARC will not occur shortly.

Furthermore, currently, the tension between India and Pakistan is at a serious level. Imran Khan's military favored stance toward India and the Modi's anti-Pakistani approach tremendously declines the possibility of constructing CBMs. Indeed, the current tension and Modi's and Khan's antagonistic attitude against each other is manipulated by both leadership for their political survivability.

4. CONCLUSION

The term political leadership, throughout this thesis, is considered as an individual level, based on the definitions of Andrew Moravcsik and Oran Young. On the individual level, the thesis analysis is done in the class of Young's 'structural leadership' that stands for the national leader. Whereas, for determining and evaluating the role of Pakistani political leadership in SAARC, the thesis takes the triad functions framework of Moravcsik –*policy initiation, mediation and mobilization* –as a conceptual framework by focusing on the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. Thereby, the thesis not only accepts that the antagonist relationship between India and Pakistan is an obstacle for the development of SAARC in terms of widening and deepening the organization, but also, this relationship is a gauge for the development of SAARC.

The thesis also asserts that SAARC development and bilateral relations of the member states have a correlation with each other, and it's unthinkable to evaluate SAARC development without bilateral ties of the member countries. India and Pakistan are the major and leading players in all aspects both in the region and in the SAARC. SAARC development has a direct linkage with the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.

Concentrating solely on SAARC to determine political leadership could be hard to achieve since SAARC is an inter-governmental organization, not a supranational organization, likewise the EU which the states have transferred a part of their sovereignty to the EU. Therefore, states make the final say in SAARC development, not any institutional body of SAARC. More precisely, the secretariat of SAARC or the Standing Committee of SAARC cannot act independently on prime issues. Major decisions are taken at the annual summit of SAARC and states led by political leadership are the player in the summit.

The elected governments of the mainstream parties since the death of General Zia Ul Haq acted saliently in constructing CBMs with India. The capacity and volume of steps taken by the political leadership [Sharif and Bhutto] were distinctive in nature. For instance, while

the first government of Bhutto (1988-90) and the second government of Sharif (1997-99) acted more muscularly and confidently toward India, the second and third governments of PPP (1993-96 and 2008-2013 respectively) and the third government of Sharif (2013-2017) could not manage to act confidently likewise in their previous administrations. Not only domestic factors could be the reason that blocked the path of Bhutto and Sharif but also regional and international developments too.

For instance, Bhutto in her first tenure and Sharif in his second tenure were relatively powerful domestically, so were both leadership reciprocated positively from the Indian side. Rajiv-led India's positive relations with Bhutto-led Pakistan and Vajpayee administration stance toward Sharif's administration can be significant examples. However, when Pakistani political leaderships were domestically weak, and they were not confidently reciprocated by India, constructing CBMs became an impossible task. As an example, while both Zardari and Sharif in his third tenure were confronted with abundant domestic issues, weak and no motivation from the Indian side failed their attempts drastically.

Nevertheless, while Bhutto's first government and Sharif's second tenures could be peak points in making CBMs with India; Bhutto's second government, Zardari's first tenure and Sharif's third administration were also relatively successful in constructing CBMs compare to the military eras. Moreover, Sharif and Bhutto are the reference points for the next administrations to guide and shape their agenda toward New Delhi. Likewise, the Simla Accord had guided this leadership before. For instance, the famous Composite Dialogue, which was initiated in 2004, was the fruit of the Lahore Declaration. These bilateral CBMs certainly influenced the development of SAARC positively while a decline in bilateral relations influenced SAARC vice versa.

On the contrary, the military anti-India and countering Indian stance both while the generals were in power such as Zia and Musharraf or while they were not in power challenged the CBMs initiatives by one or other means. Thereby, in both Zia and Musharraf eras, we could not witness any steps to be taken primarily by these generals, to normalize relations

with India. Further, as it is continuously discussed throughout the thesis that the *implementation* function of the triad functions framework is not impressive for the CBMs, one reason is the army's conservative stance. The army has not only blocked the civil leaders' path to approach India to normalize relations, but it has also pressurized the political leadership not to *implement* the existing CBMs entirely.

In the first decade of SAARC (1985-95), four consecutive successive SAARC summits [1985, 86, 87, 88] were materialized. Also, except for the IPA and extensive amounts of unimplemented objectives, with the proposal of Sri Lanka³⁴⁵, SAARC members, for the first time, agreed on the establishment of SAPTA in 1993. The aim of SAPTA was "to promote and sustain mutual trade and the economic cooperation among the Contracting States."³⁴⁶ Until the creation of SAFTA, "three rounds of negotiations [SAPTA1, SAPTA2, and SAPTA3] were completed under SAPTA where the consolidated list of concessions covered 3,857 tariff lines, including special concessions (2,762 tariff lines) offered to LDCs."³⁴⁷

All these developments in SAARC would not have occurred if the steps had not been taken place in the bilateral relations of India-Pakistan. More specifically, the creation of SAPTA and the four successful SAARC summits with deepening attempts would not have materialized if the CBMs had not taken place between India and Pakistan during the first governments of Bhutto and Sharif.³⁴⁸ Needless to say, it was Sharif and Bhutto to play the role of *policy initiation* and *mediation* in the CBMs with India. However, likewise, bilateral CBMs *implementation* process was not impressive; the *implementation* of IPA objectives and SAPTA by itself were not fruitful. As Dushni notes that "SAPTA had little or no impact in

³⁴⁵ "Sixth SAARC Summit Colombo 1991," SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/sixth-saarc-summit-colombo-1991.

³⁴⁶ Article 2a of SAPTA. "Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA)," SAARC Secretariat. Accessed February 6, 2020. http://saarc-sec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/agreement-on-saarc-preferential-trading-arrangement-sapta.

³⁴⁷ Dushni Weerakoon, "SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects," pp. 71–88.

³⁴⁸ The Cultural Agreement (1988); Prior Notification of Military Exercise (1991); Prevention of Airspace Violation (1991); Code of conduct for the treatment of Diplomatic personnel (1992); Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1992).

changing the existing trade patterns in South Asia,” and he adds that “intra-SAARC trade continued to stagnate in the region at 5 percent of total trade with the rest of the world.”³⁴⁹

Similarly, during the second decade of SAARC (1995-2005), five SAARC’s summits occurred. SAFTA was signed, Afghanistan was given full membership status, and China and Japan observer status were accepted. Compare to the first decade and the third decade of SAARC, the second decade of SAARC was more fruitful in terms of developments, and the driving force behind these developments was the Lahore Declaration, which was occurred in the second tenure of Sharif.

The low or no progress in bilateral relations of India and Pakistan from 2005 to 2015, SAARC also recorded low and no progress throughout this period. Furthermore, SAARC, despite signing new conventions or agreements in this period, the implementation process of all these measurements was ineffective and a far reality. For instance, SAFTA by itself, is just an objective with no implementation so far.

A nightmare for SAARC development is that the SAS, instead of implementing the existing trade agreements of SAARC such as SAPTA or SAFTA, they concentrate on bilateral trade engagement [‘noodle bowl’] by signing bilateral FTA. For instance, India has FTAs with Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal and trying to reach a deal with Bangladesh and Maldives by marginalizing Pakistan here.³⁵⁰ In contrast, Pakistan has FTAs with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Additionally, both Pakistan and India, instead of South Asian centric policy they focus on other regions. For instance, India’s policy of ‘Look East’ which was reciprocated by Musharraf under the title of ‘Eastward Looking Policy.’³⁵¹

In this regard, SAARC will continue its existence, unlike some scholars argue that it will demise shortly. As both India and Pakistan entered into the organization on the reservation they had against each other, the same reservations also adhere both countries to

³⁴⁹ Dushni Weerakoon, “SAFTA: Current Status and Prospects,” pp. 71–88.

³⁵⁰ Faizal Yahya, “Pakistan, SAARC and ASEAN Relations,” pp. 346-375.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

SAARC. In other words, India joined SAARC on the concerns that Pakistan was ganging-up the small regional states against her. Pakistan, on the other hand, believed that SAARC was a plot of India and he joined SAARC on the concern that his non-presence in the organization would let the platform alone to India and India would use it against him. Thereby, these particular reservations will also fasten both states to the organization. Pakistan will not let SAARC alone to India and India will also not make Pakistan alone to gang-up all regional states against her. However, the development process of SAARC will be fluctuating by following the ups and downs of bilateral relations of India and Pakistan and the main player behind the ups and downs will be political leadership of India and Pakistan.

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Appendix A:

Summits	Planned date	Actual date	Planned Venue of the summit	Actual venue of the summit	Leadership in Pakistan	Leadership in India
First	1985	7-8 December 1985	Dhaka, Bangladesh	Dhaka, Bangladesh	General Zia-Ul-Haq	Rajiv Gandhi
Second	Nov. 16–17, 1986	Nov. 16–17, 1986	Bhutan	Bangalore, India	General Zia-Ul-Haq	Rajiv Gandhi
Third	1987	2–4 November 1987	Thimphu, Bhutan	Katmandu, Nepal	General Zia-Ul-Haq	Rajiv Gandhi
Forth	1988	Dec. 29–31, 1988	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Islamabad, Pakistan	Benazir Bhutto	Rajiv Gandhi
Fifth	1989	Nov. 21–23, 1990	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Male, Maldives	Nawaz Sharif	Chandra Shekar
Sixth	Nov. 7–9, 1991	Dec. 21, 1991	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Nawaz Sharif	Narashima Rao
Seventh	Dec. 1992	Apr. 10–11, 1993	Dhaka, Bangladesh	Dhaka, Bangladesh	Nawaz Sharif	Narashima Rao
Eighth	1994	May 2–4, 1995	New Delhi, India	New Delhi, India	Benazir Bhutto	Narashima Rao
Ninth	1996	May 12–14, 1997	Male, Maldives	Male, Maldives	Nawaz Sharif	Inder Kumar Gujral
Tenth	July 29–31, 1998	July 29–31, 1998	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Nawaz Sharif	Vajpayee
Eleventh	a) Nov. 1999 b) 2000 c) 2001	Jan. 4–6, 2002,	a) Katmandu, Nepal b) Katmandu, Nepal	Katmandu, Nepal	Pervez Musharraf	Vajpayee

			c) Katmandu, Nepal			
Twelfth	Jan. 2003	Jan. 4 – 6, 2004	Islamabad, Pakistan	Islamabad, Pakistan	Pervez Musharraf	Vajpayee
Thirteenth	a) Jan. 9–11, 2005 b) Feb. 6–7, 2005,	Nov. 12 – 13, 2005	a) Dhaka, Bangladesh b) Dhaka, Bangladesh	Dhaka, Bangladesh	Pervez Musharraf	Manmohan Singh
Fourteenth	April 3–4, 2007	April 3–4, 2007	New Delhi, India	New Delhi, India	Pervez Musharraf	Manmohan Singh
Fifteenth	2008	August 2–3, 2008	Male, Maldives	Colombo, Sri-Lanka	Asif Ali Zardari	Manmohan Singh
Sixteenth	Sept. 2009	April 28–29, 2010	Male, Maldives	Thimphu, Bhutan	Asif Ali Zardari	Manmohan Singh
Seventeenth	Nov. 10–11, 2011	Nov. 10–11, 2011	Addu City, Maldives	Addu City, Maldives	Zardari	Manmohan Singh
Eighteenth	a) Nov.–Dec. 2012 b) Nov.–Dec. 2013,	Nov. 26–27, 2014	Katmandu, Nepal	Katmandu, Nepal	Nawaz Sharif	Narendra Modi
Nineteenth	Nov. 09-10, 2016	Not Held Yet	Islamabad, Pakistan			

Note: The yellow colour in the table indicates the period of the military regime in Pakistan, while the red colour shows the summit cancellation or postponement. Moreover, some summits are postponed or delayed several times. Therefore, some cells in the planned date column contain several dates.

