



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of American Culture and Literature

**STIGMATIZED FACES AND IDENTITIES IN CECILE PINEDA'S
FACE AND ARIEL DORFMAN'S *MASCARA***

Fatma EREN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2018

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KABUL VE ONAY

Fatma Eren tarafından hazırlanan “Stigmatized Faces and Identities in Cecile Pineda’s *Face* and Ariel Dorfman’s *Mascara*” başlıklı bu çalışma, 13 Haziran 2018 tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından yüksek lisans tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.



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
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ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Tez Danışmanının Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Zeynep Ayça GERMEN danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.

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To my beloved parents . . .

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ÖZET

EREN, Fatma. “Cecile Pineda’nın *Face* ve Ariel Dorfman’ın *Mascara* Romanlarında Damgalanmış Yüzler ve Kimlikler.” Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2018.

Bu çalışmada, Cecile Pineda’nın *Face* ve Ariel Dorfman’ın *Mascara* adlı eserlerinde biçimsiz yüz özelliklerinden dolayı sosyal çevreleri tarafından dışlanan karakterler Erving Goffman’ın “damga kuramı” çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Goffman damga(lanma) kavramını kişilerin fiziksel ve/veya ahlaki özelliklerinin toplum tarafından kabul edilen standartlara uymaması nedeniyle toplum dışı bırakılma süreci olarak tanımlamıştır. *Yüz* romanında Helio Cara ve *Maskara* romanında isimsiz anlatıcı, “normal” olduklarına inanan çoğunluk tarafından damgalanmış iki karakterdir. Bu karakterler yaşama fırsatlarının önemli ölçüde kısıtlandığı aşağılayıcı ve onur kırıcı bir muameleye maruz bırakılmışlardır.

Damganın ortaya çıkışı ve sürdürülmesi güç dinamiklerini de içeren daha karmaşık bir sürece işaret eder. Güç, kişinin kendisi ve başkaları hakkında sahip olduğu bilgiyi düzenleyen normlar aracılığıyla işlemektedir. Bu bakımdan, damganın toplumun alt kesimi olarak inşa edilmesi ve kişilerin buna uygun olarak sınıflandırılması, insanların hayatına dil, bilgi ve yasa gibi bir dizi sosyal kurumlar aracılığıyla sızan güç ilişkileriyle yakından ilgilidir. Benzer şekilde, bu romanlar öznelere arası ilişkilere hükmeden ve onları toplum tarafından atfedilen damgalanmış özne rolüne teşvik eden güç ilişkileri ile ilgilidir.

Jacques Lacan öznenin kimlik oluşturma sürecine dair geliştirdiği fikirleri aracılığıyla toplumsal ve kültürel bir özne olma sürecinde bireyde oluşan varoluşsal eksikliğe ve yarılmaya dikkat çekmektedir. Öznenin toplumsal normlara uyma eğilimi kendi varoluşsal eksikliğine bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan amansız bir “arzu” ile yakından ilgilidir. Bu eksiklik aynı zamanda özneyi, kendisine bir ideal olarak sunulan ve eksiksiz bir birey olması için özdeşleşmesi gereken toplumsal “Öteki” kavramının bir parçası olmaya yönlendirir.

Bu çalışmada yer alan damgalanmış karakterler için söz konusu eksikliğe bağlı olan yük iki katına çıkmıştır çünkü onlar hem varoluşsal bakımdan hem de kişiye bir kimlik atfetmekte en belirleyici role sahip organ olan yüz bakımından eksiktir. Toplum tarafından inşa edilen gerçeklik ve yaygın bir şekilde uygulanan yöntemler sonucunda, *Yüz* romanında Helio Cara'nın ve *Maskara* romanında yüzü olmayan karakterin kendisine normatif modelleri referans alan bir toplumun kurbanı oldukları ortaya çıkar. Yine de alışılmadık biçimde Helio Cara ve yüzü olmayan karakter damgalanmış kimlikleriyle ilişkilendirilen temsilleri benimsemek yerine sözde farklılıklarının ve yabancılaşmalarının üstesinden gelecek ve böylelikle kendilerini damga kategorisinin kısıtlayıcı tanımlamalarının dışında konumlandırarak bir yol bulmayı başarmışlardır.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Yüz, *Maskara*, Pineda, Dorfman, Damga, Güç, Kimlik, Öteki

ABSTRACT

EREN, Fatma. “Stigmatized Faces and Identities in Cecile Pineda’s *Face* and Ariel Dorfman’s *Mascara*.” Master’s Thesis, Ankara, 2018.

In this study, the major characters in Cecile Pineda’s *Face* and Ariel Dorfman’s *Mascara* who are excluded from their social environment because of their facial disfigurement are analyzed within the framework of Erving Goffman’s “stigma theory.” Goffman defines the concept of “stigma(tization)” as a process of disqualifying people when their physical and/or moral characteristics fall outside the standards of society. Helio Cara in *Face* and the unnamed narrator in *Mascara* are characters stigmatized by the majority who deem themselves to be “normal.” These characters are exposed to humiliating and degrading treatment that greatly limits their life choices.

The creation and maintenance of stigma points to a more complicated process that involves power dynamics. Power acts through a system of norms that mediate knowledge about oneself and others. In this sense, the construction of stigma as an inferior social category and the classification of people according to it is closely related to the relations of power which penetrate people’s lives in a range of social institutions such as language, knowledge, and the law. Similarly, these novels are preoccupied with the power relations that govern relationships among subjects and encourage them to occupy the stigmatized role prescribed to them by society.

Through his critical ideas on the formation of the subject, Jacques Lacan draws attention to an existential lack and a necessary split in the individual in the process of his/her becoming a social and cultural subject. The subject’s tendency to conform to the norms of society is closely intertwined with a continuous “desire” that arises in relation to this existential lack. This lack also leads subject to be a part of the symbolic “Other” of society, which is presented to the subject much like an ideal with which to identify in order to be a full-fledged human being.

For the stigmatized characters in this study, the burden based on this lack is doubled because they lack both in being and in the face, the most critical body part in assigning identity to an individual. Because of socially constructed realities and widely practiced

methods, Helio Cara in *Face* and the unnamed narrator in *Mascara* turn out to be victims of societies taking normative models as points of reference. Exceptionally, however, instead of embracing representations of their stigmatized identities, Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator manage to find a way to overcome their so-called difference and outsider status, which ultimately positions them outside the restrictive definitions regarding stigma.

Key Words

Face, Mascara, Pineda, Dorfman, Stigma, Power, Identity, Other.



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INTRODUCTION

Forget your perfect offering. / There is a crack in everything. / That's how the light gets in.

Leonard Cohen, *Anthem*

In our image-conscious society, facial features play a significant role in determining one's relationship to the world. As the most immediate, visible, and accessible part of the human body, the face becomes the basis upon which a sense of social and individual identity is constructed. As Heather Laine Talley states in *Saving Face: Disfigurement and the Politics of Appearance* (2014), the face is “a powerful biosocial resource” informing “others about who we are” (13). Facial features have a physical, psychological and social importance that affect the whole human experience in interpersonal relations. Using Talley's words again, facial appearance “determine[s] our status in social relations and systems of power. Its lines, colors, features, and adornment are all evidence upon which people are labeled, differentiated, and potentially stigmatized or celebrated” (13).

Just as a face plays a crucial role in constructing one's identity socially and culturally, any form of facial disfigurement indicates a deviation from the normative expectations of society. In society where “so much seems to depend on appearing normal” (Talley 5), the set of widely shared values and norms provides the criteria by which an individual's facial and bodily features are evaluated. This set of values and norms justifies the act of relegating people with “an undesired differentness from what we have anticipated” to the position of outsiders (*Stigma* 15). People with facial disfigurements, in fact with any kind of bodily disfigurement, are obliged to endure a set of discriminatory practices and negative attitudes, including fear and prejudice. In other words, the disdain for those who have features outside the norm often results in their stigmatization and exclusion from society.

Distinguishing people from other members of society and classifying them as stigmatized on the basis of appearance is a complicated issue which involves power relations. In most

cases, people grasp their subjective truth in line with the socially constructed reality, shared beliefs, values and customs of group. In other words, society is a form of collective power, an authority operating through social institutions and shaping the consciousness of people as well as their cognition, attitudes and morality. It penetrates into people's lives in a range of guises such as language, knowledge, and the law to maintain the status quo or existing power relations. To put it differently, stigma(tization) is a social process closely intertwined with power dynamics which compel subject(s) to embrace socially imposed identities.

Facial appearance is a common thread in literature and cinema.¹ *Face* (1985) by Cecile Pineda and *Mascara* (1988) by Ariel Dorfman are two novels which present two characters, Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator respectively, with significant facial anomalies. Helio Cara of *Face* has to go through the experience of living with a severely distorted face after falling off a cliff. The unnamed narrator of *Mascara*, on the other hand, is born with a missing face. Both of these novels center on the experiences of characters whose facial features are outside the normative expectations of society. Through their social encounters, they are made to confront negative reactions and internalize stereotypical depictions based on widely held norms and values by, and within, society.

Both *Face* and *Mascara* engender a rich variety of interpretation and raise many issues concerning human experience through the human face ("Cecile Pineda at the San Francisco Library"). Though she is a writer of Hispanic origin, Pineda resists the idea of identifying her text with the experiences of a particular group, including her own, asserting that the novel is "*hors catégorie*" (Pineda and Rocard 592, "*Hors Catégorie*").² In this respect, besides manifesting her immense sympathy for "the dispossessed and the disenfranchised," Pineda's work represents those groups in any community who have to live by standards against which they fall short (592). As Anne Connor also notes, *Face* narrates the story of "the suffering of those marginalized by society" ("Desenmascarando

¹ *The Elephant Man* (1980), *The Man without a Face* (1993), and *Wonder* (2017) are among the films that feature facial anomaly as their theme, which are adapted from literary works. The facially marked characters in these movies are grievously excluded, discriminated and stigmatized by the members of the society who act on the established stereotypes and bias. In this regard, it can be said that face serves as a site which dramatically shapes the quality of one's life and relationships.

² An expression in French which means "beyond categorization."

A Ysrael” 156). Interestingly, while Astrid M. Fellner remarks that Pineda’s narrative displays “the extent to which the human condition is sexed, gendered, and racialized” (62), Carlos Gallego reads *Face* as “the representation of catastrophe and non-identity,” and as a great example of “the will power required to endure the difficult truths that emerge from such experiences,” rather than a classical triumph of an ethnic identity (“Universality at the Margins” 178).

In the same vein, *Mascara* reflects Ariel Dorfman’s views on “alienation; the use of deception in relation to the public and the private world; memory, the need of memory; the erasure of memory as a form of control” (“Interview with John Incledon” 103), despite Dorfman’s claim that, contrary to his previous books, *Mascara* is not an explicitly political novel. Significantly, as Sophia A. McClennen argues, Dorfman’s exile trilogy which includes *Mascara* along with *Widows* (1981) and *The Last Song of Manuel Sendero* (1983) focuses on the problem of “belonging . . . and identity” (122) placing a great emphasis on “the element of evil and the capacity for cruelty that exists within all human beings” (*An Aesthetics of Hope* 123). In particular, McClennen adds, *Mascara* probes into profound questions about the nature of human relations, and their motivation and desire to control each other (143). Similarly, Robert Atwan regards Dorfman’s novel as an attempt to dig into the problem of identity, “an excursion into a world where human identity, as in a skillful composite photograph, no longer refers to verifiable identification” (“He with No Face, She with No Past”).

This thesis analyzes Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator of *Mascara* as “discredited” individuals who are marked and targeted by society for having facial features (or a featureless face as in the case of the unnamed narrator) outside the acceptable norms of appearance (Goffman, *Stigma* 14). Stigmatization implies a form of power exercise. In this sense, power dynamics, from a Foucauldian stance, play a significant role in the creation and maintenance of stigma as an inferior category. Erving Goffman’s stigma theory and Michel Foucault’s notions of power bear a subterranean chord to Lacan’s views of identity as a social construct. To this end, this thesis will analyze the condition of having a facial anomaly from the perspective offered by Goffman in his “stigma theory.”

Having its origins in the Greek practice of marking “a slave, a criminal, or a traitor—a blemished person . . . to be avoided,” stigma is defined by Goffman as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” (*Stigma* 9). When the physical or moral condition of the subject falls outside the standards of one’s social group, s/he is promptly stigmatized. Stigma, therefore, stands for a method of distinguishing people according to their physical and/or moral characteristics. It is a process involving societal forces which inform the individual about his/her category or identity within society and determine the nature of social relations among people. In this respect, the whole process of stigmatization is based upon its practice in social interactions. Through established norms and standards, communities limit equal life chances for all people regardless of how the stigmatized feel about themselves.

Originally, the term stigma³ is used to refer to the visually apparent body mark which suggests something negative regarding the moral stance and social status of the bearer. In his *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963), Erving Goffman identifies stigma as “an undesired differentness” (15), “an attribute that’s deeply discrediting” and extends its definition to include the person who is subjected to a hostile, humiliating and degrading treatment because his/her physical or moral characteristics are outside the shared preferences of a particular group. To put it differently, the term stigma denotes the victimization of the stigmatized person who turns from “a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (13).⁴

Goffman identifies three main instances in which people are usually stigmatized: the first consists of people who have “abominations of the body;” that is, people with physical abnormalities. The second involves the character traits of those who are associated with “weak will,” such as alcoholics or people with mental disorders. The third is the “tribal

³ Stigma also has a religious connotation: stigmata. Stigmata, the plural form of stigma, are defined as “the bodily marks or pains resembling the wounds of the crucified Jesus Christ and sometimes accompanying religious ecstasy” (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stigmata>). In Christianity, having stigmata is considered to be a “blessing” which is only given to those who have the capacity to endure the suffering it inflicts (*New International Version*, Rev. 5.12).

⁴ In recent years, the definitions of the stigma concept seem to focus more on the multidimensional impacts of stigma and the role of social and cultural context in enacting stigma. In “Stigma: Introduction and Overview” (2000), Dovidio, Major and Crocker propose two components of stigma: “(1) the recognition of difference based on some distinguishing characteristic, or ‘mark’; and (2) a consequent devaluation of the person” (3). They refer to stigmatization as a “personally, interpersonally, and socially costly” process that affect intimately the way people experience their lives (1).

stigma” which refers to the hereditary conditions of those associated with a particular race, nation, or religion (13).

Goffman studies stigma as a process that is “based on the social construction of identity” (Kleinman and Clifford 418). In characterizing the process of stigmatization, Goffman calls attention to two aspects of an individual’s social identity. According to this definition, stigma is the result of the disparity between a person’s virtual social identity, that is, “the character we impute to individual,” and his/her actual social identity, or, “the category and attributes he[she] . . . proved to possess” (*Stigma* 12). He states that

an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he[she] meets away from him[her], breaking the claim that his[her] other attributes have on us. He[she] possesses a stigma, an undesired differentness from what we had anticipated. (15)

The gap between the perceived characteristics of the individual and those projected by the “normal⁵,” “who do not depart negatively from the particular expectations,” results in stigmatization (*Stigma* 15). Goffman further states that “[t]his discrepancy, when known about or apparent, . . . has the effect of cutting him/her off from society and from himself/herself so that s/he stands a discredited person facing an unaccepting world” (31). Correspondingly, the stigmatized person is treated as a member of socially inferior categories and is exposed to prejudice and discriminatory behavior which negatively affects the nature of social encounters between the normal and the stigmatized.

Social interactions play a vital role in the formation of stigma affecting both the stigmatized individual’s self-perception and the perception of the society. Goffman notes that “[a]n attribute that stigmatizes one type of possessor can confirm the usualness of another, and therefore is neither creditable nor discreditable as a thing in itself” (13). Baldly put, a stigma does not carry a negative value in itself; rather, it transforms into a mark of disgrace in social contacts and is closely associated with stereotypes formed by

⁵ The “normal,” or the “normate” a term coined by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson to define “the social figure through which people can represent themselves as definitive human beings” (*Extraordinary Bodies* 8). In this study, however, I prefer to use Goffman’s phrasing, the “normal(s)” to refer to those who act as a part of a larger society and expect everyone to live by accepted standards.

society. It can be argued, therefore, that the creation of stigma is largely pertinent to one's social context. The individual is stigmatized and is therefore exposed to discriminatory attitudes due to his/her physical or moral characteristics according to the normative and restrictive expectations of the majority.

Besides being subjected to a dehumanizing treatment, the individual is confined to negative stereotypes due to the assumption that "the person with a stigma is not quite human" (*Stigma* 15). As Kurzban and Leary suggest,

people are stigmatized not simply because they are evaluated negatively or possess a spoiled identity but rather because they possess a characteristic viewed by the society or a subgroup as constituting a basis for avoiding or excluding other people. Thus, stigmatization is based on the shared values and preferences of members of a particular group. (188)

Similarly, Goffman calls attention to the role of society and particularly the social groups in creating and sustaining stigma by categorizing its members according to various factors such as race, class or physical traits. The "normal" who view themselves as superior to others and who "strongly support a standard of judgment" set up the principles of living and conducting oneself and expect everyone to live by these socially accepted standards (*Stigma* 16). People who develop a sense of belonging to their community in the process of self-formation tend to associate themselves with the ascribed group. In the case of the apparent stigma, the stigmatized individual is considered to have failed to conform to the norms "associated with physical comeliness, which take the form of ideals and constitute standards" of the majority (*Stigma* 153). As a result, the larger society or, to use Goffman's phrasing, "the normal" situate(s) the stigmatized as "unworthy, incomplete and inferior" on the basis of shared normative expectations:

The special situation of the stigmatized is that society tells him he[*she*] is a member of the wider group, which means he[*she*] is a normal human being, but that he[*she*] is also "different" in some degree, and that it would be foolish to deny this difference. This differentness itself of course derives from society, for ordinarily before a difference can matter much it must be conceptualized collectively by the society as a whole. (*Stigma* 149)

Consequently, stigma is a socially constructed process which emerges as a result of the failure to fulfill the norms of “identity and being” (*Stigma* 152). Social expectations that are transformed into “ideals” and “standards” determine the norms of physical appearance (*Stigma* 153). On the other hand, the variety of these descriptive and prescriptive norms implies the potential threat of being stigmatized for everyone in society. Therefore, Goffman contends that “the role of normal and the role of stigmatized are parts of the same complex, cuts from the same standard cloth” (*Stigma* 155). The relativity and the changeability of norms and shared values undermine the justification of stigmatizing representations and practices. Goffman states that

stigma involves not so much a set of concrete individuals who can be separated into two piles, the stigmatized and the normal, as a pervasive two-role social process in which every individual participates in both roles, at least in some connexions and in some phases of life. The normal and the stigmatized are not person but rather perspectives. These are generated in social situations during mixed contacts by the virtue of unrealized norms that are likely to play upon the encounter. (*Stigma* 163-4, emphasis added)

Having been marked as “different” for having an undesirable attribute, the stigmatized people experience a change in the self-concept (45). To put it another way, learning that s/he falls short from “the stand-point of the normal,” the stigmatized individual simultaneously comes to understand “the consequence of possessing it” (*Stigma* 45). There are some models to which the stigmatized people adjust their conditions. For instance, a person with an inborn stigma such as being deprived of a family as the primary caregiver can adapt him/herself to his/her environment by learning to fend for him/herself. However, the identities assigned for those who become stigmatized later in life do not comply with the identity the individual envisions for him/herself. Therefore, it is highly possible that this kind of a stigmatized individual will have a problem in “re-identifying himself[herself]” (*Stigma* 48):

[W]hen the individual first learns who it is that he[she] must accept as his[her] own, he[she] is likely, at the very least, to feel some ambivalence; for these others will not only be patently stigmatized, and thus not like the normal person he[she] knows himself[herself] to be, but may also have other attributes with which he[she] finds it difficult to associate himself[herself]. (*Stigma* 50)

Significantly, Goffman remarks that people who have “a new stigmatized self late in life” can have a confusion in their relations about the “[p]ost-stigma acquaintances” and “pre-stigma acquaintances” on account of their responses (49). Post-stigma acquaintances may regard the stigmatized person “simply as a faulted person” while pre-stigma acquaintances may “be unable to treat him[her] either with formal tact or with familiar acceptance,” vacillating between showing courtesy or sympathy (*Stigma* 49).

Responses of the stigmatized individuals to the threats against their social identities may vary. In the long term, the stigmatized person can make a straightforward effort to fix his/her “failing” such as undergoing a medical procedure or receiving compensatory training to remedy the failure (*Stigma* 19), or, alternatively, s/he can try to compensate for the shortcoming by specializing in a range of physical activities. Eventually, Goffman notes, the person who is excluded from society due to any kind of difference can perform “an unconventional interpretation of the character of his social identity” (21). An example would be a stigmatized individual who employs his/her stigma for “secondary gains,” such as perceiving his/her suffering “as a blessing in disguise” by virtue of the fact that “suffering can teach one about life and people” (*Stigma* 22).

To further explain the varieties of responses to stigma, Goffman addresses the daily encounters between “normal” and stigmatized individuals. Both sides can have a problem in managing the tension and resentment arising from the ambivalence of being “in one another’s immediate physical presence” (*Stigma* 23). First of all, even the slightest possibility of such encounters can induce normal and stigmatized people to organize their lives in a way to “avoid” each other (23). In such cases, the stigmatized individual could end up being “suspicious, depressed, hostile, anxious, and bewildered” without “the salutary feed-back of daily social intercourse with others” (24). On the other hand, when stigmatized and normal individuals engage in mutual interaction, the stigmatized may feel the externally imposed stigmatizing identifications. Nevertheless, the “normal” one tends to behave and judge the stigmatized person on the basis of stereotypical images. In the worst case, the normal treat the “discredited” individual as a non-entity “as if he[she] were a ‘non-person’, and not present at all” in daily interactions (*Stigma* 30).

As such, stigma and stigmatization turn out to have varying outcomes both for the stigmatized person and the “normal (stigmatizer). However, encountering such contacts more frequently, the stigmatized individual becomes better at handling such situations. In order to protect him/herself from the damage arising from the internalization of the negative images, the stigmatized person could abstain from or fail in building a relationship with others. S/he could even improve such coping mechanisms as “defensive cowering” (social withdrawal) or “hostile bravado” (challenging “normal” by actively engaging social interactions) (28-29). Goffman underlines that,

in social situations with an individual known or perceived to have a stigma, we are likely, then, to employ categorizations that do not fit, and we and he[she] are likely to experience uneasiness. Of course, there is often significant movement from this starting point. And since the stigmatized person is likely to be more often faced with these situations, he[she] is likely to become more adept at managing them. (*Stigma* 31)

The stigmatization of the social identity is also correlated with the “ego identity,” a term Goffman borrows from Erik Erikson to refer to “the subjective sense . . . that an individual comes to obtain as a result of his[her] various social experiences” (*Stigma* 129). The stigmatized person is told to “see himself[herself] as a fully human being like anyone else” (140) on the one hand, but on the other, he[she] is described as “someone set apart” (133). To resolve the contradiction within society, the stigmatized individual is advised to follow a pattern of behavior to contribute to the construction of a positive self and to participate in daily life. In Goffman’s words, the larger society presents an ego identity to the stigmatized individual and asks him or her to follow the “right line” to be “a whole man [person] . . . with dignity and self-respect” (149). As Goffman states:

The stigmatized are tactfully expected to be gentlemanly and not to press their luck; they should not test the limits of the acceptance shown them, nor make it the basis for still further demands. Tolerance, of course, is usually part of a bargain. The nature of “good adjustment” is now apparent. It requires that the stigmatized individual cheerfully and un-self-consciously accept himself as essentially the same as normal, while at the same time he voluntarily withholds himself[herself] from those situations in which normal would find it difficult to give lip service to their similar acceptance of him[her]. (*Stigma* 146)

Leading to exclusion and avoidance, stigmatization threatens the psychological well-being of the stigmatized individual. Examining the connection between stigma and self-worth in her “Social Stigma and Self-Esteem,” Jennifer Crocker argues that “the consequences of stigma are dependent on the immediate social context and the meaning of that context for the stigmatized person” (90). The feedback from our daily social interactions is a significant factor in the construction of a positive sense of self. From the viewpoint of wider society, no matter how s/he feels about oneself, the stigmatized individual is described as “someone set apart.” At this point, stigmatization turns inevitably into a serious threat to one’s “experience of the self” and often results in a “lowered self-esteem” (Crocker 90):

[T]he self-concept is a product of both one’s awareness of how others evaluate the self and the adoption of those others’ views. According to this perspective, members of stigmatized and oppressed groups who are aware that they are regarded negatively by others should incorporate those negative attitudes into self-concept and, consequently, should be lower in self-esteem. (Crocker, Major 610)

Taking all these into account, it seems reasonable to conclude that stigma leads to a classification of human beings based on the unanticipated physical and moral attributes outside normative boundaries. This process, also known as stigmatization, induces discriminatory treatment including exclusion, avoidance, and intolerance towards members of a particular social category. In this respect, possessing a stigma has negative social and psychological consequences for the stigmatized individual as his/her relationships to his/her social groups are severely damaged because of the conflict between his/her real attributes and the expectations of wider society.

As stated before, stigma and the definition of stigmatizing attributes are linked with sharing a single set of normative expectations of the society. Power is the reason behind stigmatization. As Link and Phelan have pointed out, “for stigmatization to occur, power must be exercised” (“Conceptualizing Stigma” 363). The stigmatized are compelled to align themselves with those devalued identities designed by the norms of the society. In this sense, power acts through a system of norms that mediates reality and knowledge presented to individuals and reinforces conformity to socially constructed roles.

Given that stigma is based on socially established norms and requires power to be exercised, it seems critical to focus on the correlation between the modern forms of power and how power operates through these norms. In his analysis of power, Michel Foucault portrays a distinct form of power that differs from other classical power theories in its function and productivity. In lieu of a direct and undesirable force applied on human life from the top by various institutions, he defines a form of power which is “exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” (*The History of Sexuality* 94). Consciously or not, individuals are all surrounded with this diffuse “omnipresence of power” since it is “produced from one moment to next, at every point, or rather in every relation in one point to another” (93). For Foucault, “[p]ower is everywhere” (93).

In his account of power and the subject, Foucault underlines that power “makes individuals subjects” (“The Subject and the Power” 781). He explains the two meanings of the term “the subject” as being “subject to someone else by control and dependence,” and being “tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (781). Either way, the subject seems to be surrounded by a mode of power which, as Foucault proposes, “categorizes the individual, marks him[her] by his own individuality, attaches him[her] to his[her] own identity, imposes a law of truth on him[her] which he[she] must recognize and which others have to recognize in him[her]” (781). Therefore, it can be suggested that power imposes individuality on the subjects and situates them “both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (*Discipline and Punish* 170).

Crucially, Foucault approaches power as a “technique” that is deeply entrenched in human life (“The Subject and The Power” 781). Always in charge and in existence, this type of power sustains itself on the basis of everyday relations. In other words, power cannot be reduced to institutional sanctions dictated by legal practices or to the structural superiority in a given society. It is more a matter of relations and practices through which people are encouraged to occupy, or at times made to embrace, socially prescribed roles. He sums up his argument by saying that

By power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do

not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. . . . [P]ower is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society. (*The History of Sexuality* 92-3)

As the quotation illustrates, Foucault does not envisage a repressive or didactic model of power. Rather, he characterizes power by its “productive role” in interpersonal, social or economic relations (94). Power, which operated through “[s]igns of loyalty to the feudal lords, rituals, ceremonies . . . and levies in the forms of taxes, pillage, hunting, war etc.” in feudal societies, transforms into a productive service with the emergence of the modern state (*Power/Knowledge* 125). Within this context, the exercise of power serves to control the institutional and social practices that arrange the actions of individuals and shape the conception of who they are.

Stigma is a question of group relations performed by the normal, who are conditioned by stereotypical depictions and generalizations. Therefore, the maintenance of stigma is related to the exercise of power which, as Foucault claims, “brings into play relations between individuals (or groups)” and “designates . . . an ensemble of actions which induce others to follow from one another” (“The Subject and Power” 786). In this sense, power extensively affects the nature of commonly held values, ideas, beliefs and activities and implies a willing consent to what is presented as fact. Power also has a strong tendency to conform to socially grounded norms. Generally speaking, power plays a pivotal role in the social construction of stigma as an inferior category.

In *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (1978), Foucault expresses the view that a transformation in the mechanisms of power has been happening since the Classical period (136). From a traditional power structure that makes use of an explicit display of force, or, better put, a political authority that is justified by the law and/or law-like regulations, there is a transition to a more democratic power system. Starting from the seventeenth century, Foucault notes, power appears in two forms, or more precisely, there emerged “the two poles around which the organization of power over life is deployed” (139). The first pole is what he calls the “disciplinary power;” “a type of power that is characterized

by “the *disciplines*” and “center[s] on the body as a machine” (139). The second pole is the “biopower” which is mainly concerned with “the regulations of populations” (139). He writes,

[t]he old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life. During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various disciplines—universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving *the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations*, marking the beginning of an era of “biopower.” (139-140, emphasis added)

In Foucault’s account, disciplinary power and biopower were the two independently functioning power modes during the Classical period until they merged to feature “our current situation” in the beginning of the nineteenth century (Dreyfus and Rabinow 134). In that sense, they are the two separate yet interrelated poles of the same power. While the former prioritizes the daily lives and practices of people, operating at the level of body within spatial arrangements, biopower primarily engages in “the taking charge of life” (*The History of Sexuality* 143). Biopower acts on the population as a political and scientific problem for the sake of enhancing life chances and improving the welfare of society. Importantly however, these two modern forms of power, disciplinary power and biopower, intersect and overlap through the norm which functions in a normalizing context and promotes the exercise and circulation of power.

The classification of people and the construction of stigma as a category is closely related to the techniques and practices of power. To put it differently, the practice of stigma as a method of categorization is an outcome of power practices which spread through knowledge and encompass every aspect of human life. In this respect, power relations represent “the immediate effects of divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums” (*The History of Sexuality* 94). On the production of truth, Foucault argues that:

The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ representation of society; but he[she] is also a reality fabricated by this

specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’. We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” it “masks,” it “conceals.” In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him[her] belong to this production. (*Discipline and Punish* 194)

According to Foucault, the modern form of power manifests itself through some techniques which he associates with discipline. Disciplinary power produces individuals through institutional and cultural practices. Disciplinary power manifests itself primarily through a system of knowledge imposed on the individuals regarding their position in relation to others.⁶ As a specific technique of power, the technology of discipline basically aims “to ‘train’” individuals employing techniques such as examination, surveillance and punishment (*Discipline and Punish* 170). Furthermore, discipline or disciplinary power, terms which Foucault uses interchangeably, approach(es) the human body “as an object to be manipulated” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 134). Through such institutions as schools, army, and prison, people are submitted to a process of training which is reflected in “tactics, apprenticeship, education, and the nature of societies” (*The History of Sexuality* 140).

Disciplinary power is enforced through some simple yet efficient complementary methods. First, disciplinary power utilizes a hierarchical observation or a mechanism that seeks to “make surveillance as an integral part of production and control” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 156). Generally speaking, it refers to a form of surveillance which organizes individuals through architectural arrangements. The second feature of the disciplinary power is to normalize judgment, which functions as “a small penal mechanism” (177), and induces a differentiation “of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level or their value” (181). Normalization essentially comes to mean a sort punishment. Finally, Foucault characterizes the third feature as “the examination,”

⁶ Foucault’s concept of biopower is widely discussed within the field of disability studies. The characters with facial anomalies in these two novels can also be examined within the framework of disability studies offered by Rosemarie Garland Thomson who provides an extensive account on disability in her books such as *Extraordinary Bodies* (1997), *Staring* (2009). This study, however, focusing on stigmatization of face through Goffman’s theory, aims to analyze the effects of social and cultural elements in labeling physical differences as stigma and constructing stigma as an inferior social category and will utilize the techniques of disciplinary power defined by Foucault in analyzing the characters.

which embodies these two given components. In other words, observation and judgment establish “a normalizing gaze” that allows one “to qualify, to classify and to punish,” creating “a visibility” which “one differentiates them and judges them” (184).

To illustrate the effects of discipline in a larger context, Foucault explains his view of the “Panopticon” as a form of modern imprisonment. Originating from Jeremy Bentham’s idea of a circular building with a central watch tower, this type of institutional building is used as a metaphor by Foucault with regard to the subject under perpetual surveillance. The panopticon epitomizes “power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (205). It represents the proliferation and anonymity of power embedded in the practices of individuals. This continual sense of surveillance creates an unconscious pressure on the individual to internalize sociocultural standards and results in his/her attempt to normalize and self-regulate him/herself. The individual is thus caught in his/her own subjection. Through surveillance and normalization, power constitutes “the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge” (*Discipline and Punish* 192).

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. (*Discipline and Punish* 202-203)

Disciplinary power is closely connected with classifying people rather than “bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass” (*Discipline and Punish* 170). The modern subject thus finds him/herself taking normative models as points of reference in judging him/herself and others, and therefore contributes to his/her own subjection since “[a]t the heart of the procedures of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected” (184- 185).

The sense of surveillance related to discipline and the fear of social exclusion render conformity and uniformity an integral part of personal and social life. If an individual develops an attitude or an attribute outside the norm, s/he could be considered a “deviator and, . . . his/[her] peculiarity, as deviation,” as is the case for stigma (*Stigma* 167). The subject’s full participation in social, economic and civic life is thereby restricted. In this

respect, as an effective technique of power, disciplinary power ultimately creates “subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies” (*Discipline and Punish* 138).

Aside from the techniques and practices of disciplinary and biopower, Foucault is also concerned with the way power functions in a normalizing context. Power comes in the form of “a normalizing gaze, a surveillance” and serves as a self-regulatory mechanism through which people adjust their behaviors to fit in the roles that the majority approves (*Discipline and Punish* 184). Normalization draws its strength from “the Norm,” instrumental both in “individualiz[ing]” and “shading of individual differences” (*Discipline and Punish* 184). In this sense, the oppressing and particularizing aspects of normalization compel people to follow norms regarding the conduct of everyday life. Foucault points out that normalization emerges as a form of punishment in the disciplinary power:

[T]he art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power . . . refers individual actions to a whole that is at one a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum towards which one must move. It *measures* in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the “nature” of individuals. It introduces, through this “value giving” measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal . . . [It] compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*. (*Discipline and Punish* 182-3, italics in the original)

Accordingly, normalization is the process which ultimately controls the behaviors and activities of the subject in line with the given norms. Moreover, through the strategy of normalization, power produces the truth about the subject, which essentially has a decisive function in detecting and labeling the normal and abnormal. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that normalization is actually a form of control mechanism of the power that promotes sameness and presents difference as a problem to be regulated/solved.

The human face is “the prime symbol of self,” and aside from presenting biographical characteristics such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, it is the basis upon which personal identity is constructed (Synnott 607). Erving Goffman argues that the face has the function of distinguishing a person from other members of society on the basis of appearance. Through an account of the function of the face in individuals’ personal and social conduct in “On Face-Work” (1967), Goffman identifies the face as the “positive social value a person effectively claims for himself” (5). He then draws attention to the multiplicity of faces that empower an individual to create the desired impressions on his/her social relations. Consequently, face-work has come to refer to the manner in which an individual makes use of the faces s/he chooses in accordance with the feedback given during social encounters. On the fluidity of faces, Goffman states,

a person may be said to have, or be in, or maintain face . . . [and] presents an image of him[her] that is internally consistent, that is supported by judgments and evidence conveyed other participants, and that is confirmed by evidence conveyed through impersonal agencies in the situation. At such times the person’s face clearly is something that is not lodged in or on his[her] body, but rather something that is diffusely located in the flow of events in the encounter and becomes manifest only when these events are read and interpreted for the appraisals expressed in them. (italics in the original, 6-7)

Face-work alternatively grants the individual a chance to preserve a self-image or image beside the projected one, and brings the possibility of a misleading or delusive face. Taking his argument one step further in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956), Goffman develops a dramaturgical approach to social life that resembles social interaction in a play. Like actors on the stage, people play various roles and go out into the world and give their best performances. Goffman maintains that people seek to present their most desired self in interpersonal encounters. In this sense, face transforms into “a mask that he[she] employs in face-to-face interaction” (73).

In his wide-ranging sociological investigation of the face, Anthony Synnott traces views on the face and explains that “the face reflects the character of the individual” and that “beauty is goodness” are two linked beliefs. In other words, a beautiful face is considered to be direct evidence of inner beauty. Conversely, physical ugliness is associated with

inner ugliness. He reveals the fallacy of equating appearance with moral values, which contributes to “the original stigmatization of the ugly,” or the undesired (56).

Synnott also argues that “the face may *mispresent* the self, and the body *disguise* the soul” (italics in the original, 60). In their daily lives and encounters, individuals may prefer not to show their private faces because they “are expected to present [them]selves, and thus [their] faces, in culturally approved ways” (61). He points to the notion of “social face,” which arises out of “the social necessities of wearing a mask in public”:

The social face is the face we “put on”; it is part of getting dressed. This is the public face, the decorated face, the created face . . . It is also the particular face we select from a range of possible options, depending on our self-definition, the person we wish to project, our artistic skill and our interests in impression management. (61-62)

When the face is visually impaired or marked by an atypical appearance, its social impact is also damaged, as is the case with stigma. Though sometimes useful, the social face, the appearance or the presented image of the self, causes unfair treatment. In other words, “face-ism,” or judging people on the basis of facial features, causes inequalities just like other forms of discrimination such as sexism, racism and ageism (“Is Face-ism Spoiling Your Life?” *BBC Future*). In a broader sense, it signals the power of the majority and the institutions.

For Heather Laine Talley, facial appearance retains its value, just like currency. An attractive face can be considered as a form of physical capital that can secure privileges and assign social status to its holder (13-4). As she notes, “appearance functions as a vector of inequality similar to that of race and ethnicity, sex and gender, sexuality, age, disability, and citizenship” (198). Facial anomaly of any sorts, whether it is a disfigurement or a congenital disorder, not only comes to mean a negative label or stigma for the individual, but also confers a lower rank in the social order (14).

More importantly, concepts related to normality intensify the negative outlook on people with facial differences to such an extent that their lives are not “worth living” (41). As a consequence, facially divergent people become socially dead, or as Talley puts it, they

are subjected to “a profoundly dismal and subjugated status that is deeply intertwined with one’s status as biologically living” (39). Despite being biologically alive, these individuals’ social connectedness is greatly limited.

Drawing on Goffman, Talley defines facial work as a process that “aims to recover a ‘disfigured’ face or to transform facial difference into an appearance that is unremarkable or perceived as normal” (28). She defines medical intervention—esthetic or reconstructive surgery—as a form of facial work. Talley suggests that beyond restoring the damaged body part(s), “surgical facial work is *a technique of social interaction and a material practice deployed to cope with bodily stigma*” (italics in the original, 29). To put it simply, the idea that the medical treatment of a facial anomaly is a requirement in order to become a part of society is reinforced by the normative expectations of the members of a society.

[U]nlike some forms of medical treatment, facial work is not simply framed as repair, but as a form of normalization. Facial difference is refashioned to approximate a new, aesthetically “normal” face. Obviously, facial work is geared to facilitate facial functioning, but it is also oriented to craft an aesthetic that more closely approximates cultural standards of appearance. Unlike repair, normalizing techniques often take on coercive dimensions for patient populations. . . . In a social context which thoroughly stigmatizes bodily differences broadly and appearance disabilities specifically, pursuing normal is often experienced as requisite for navigating life. (31)

In her analysis of the meanings attributed to the face, Talley also points out the issue of medical intervention. She maintains that positioning a facially disfigured person as socially dead brings along the assumption that plastic surgery is “lifesaving” for that person to continue living (19). However, marked by a desire to have a “normal” appearance, facial work is essentially an effort to return to “normalcy,” and therefore an instrument of implementing social norms (37). This approach ultimately leads to the objectification of the physically deformed individual who becomes the object of scorn and is ranked as a second-class citizen by society, at large.

Goffman’s arguments regarding the discriminatory practices of social formations and Foucault’s view of the subject who is caught up in his/her own subjection because of the

power relations in which s/he is necessarily involved, are related to Jacques Lacan's formulations of the subject. Lacan gives an extensive account of the process of the individual's becoming a subject and the positions this subject takes in relation to the social structures that govern social practices. Lacan proposes three different concepts; need, demand, and desire that correspond to three different phases of the development of the individual: The Real Order, the Imaginary Order, the Symbolic Order. To begin with, the term Real Order, which precedes the Imaginary and Symbolic Orders, is used by Lacan to describe the state of the individual as a baby with no knowledge of the outside world and driven solely by biological needs such as food, warmth and other physiological necessities. The Real accounts for the "presymbolic or prelinguistic moment in the development of *homo sapiens* or in our individual development" before we are "instructed in the ways of the world" (Fink 24, italics in the original). At this stage, the infant's physiological drives result from "purely organic reasons" which correspond to the concept of "need" in Lacan's terminology (Evans 125).

In Lacan's account, an individual's identity formation begins with "the transformation" which s/he experiences through his/her first identification with the self-image reflected in the mirror between 6-18 months. Lacan refers to this phase as the "mirror stage" where the baby is in the Imaginary Order (*Écrits* 4). The imaginary realm indicates "the infant's earliest pre-verbal and 'pre-social' interactions with the mother" as in the Real since the baby has not yet developed an idea of separation from the world s/he inhabits (Hook 61). However, at a moment somewhere between 6 and 18 months, the baby, who sees the outside world as an extension of his/her body since birth, experiences his/her first identification with "the visual gestalt of his[her] own body" in the mirror (*Écrits* 20), which will be "the rootstock of secondary identifications" (*Écrits* 4). In other words, the infant who does not have any sense of selfhood as an autonomous being perceives itself in the mirror as an integrated and functioning being for the first time with the contribution of parental encouragement.

The baby who supposes that the reflected image is his/her real existence ends up forming "the agency known as the ego" (*Écrits* 4). As Lacan points out, "[i]t is in this erotic relationship the human individual fixates on an image that alienates him[her] from

himself[herself], that we find the energy and the form from which the organization of the passions that he[she] will call his[her] ego originates” (*Écrits* 21). This very moment of recognition essentially amounts to a (mis)recognition of (and an alienation from) the self because the baby acquires his or her first sense of being through a virtual representation. When the baby looks in the mirror, what is given to him/her is only an external image to identify with, thus, “[t]he function of the mirror stage. . . is to establish a relationship between an organism and its reality” (*Écrits* 6). The sense of being, internalized by the child, is constituted by a mirror image. In this respect, the mirror stage marks the beginning of the formation of an identity (an ego identity) dependent on a seemingly ideal, yet visual, image that is mainly appertaining to the Other’s appreciation and cooperation, rather than the corporal unity of the being. In its imaginary relation to the other (image) in the mirror, the individual is divided between his/her living and fictitious being in the presence of the Other.

The “Other” is a multi-faceted concept which has “many faces or avatars” in Lacan’s terminology (Fink 13): “We must distinguish between two others, at least two” says Lacan (*Seminar II* 236), listing “the little other” and “the big Other” (Evans 135-136). While “the little other” is meant to be the ego formed in the imaginary order, “the big other” introduces the “radical alterity” which is beyond “the illusionary otherness of the imaginary” (Evans 136). The kind of otherness suggested by the radical alterity cannot be reduced to an identification with the specular image but is established as a site that operates more like an ultimate authority in disguise of family, friends or law, and institutions (Evans 136). Likewise, in this thesis, the notion of the Other refers to an ideal for the subjects to be a part of, or a center that offers representations regarding the social positions of the subject who is in essence a “lack-in-being”: “O [in uppercase] represents the social Other of society but as a complete and consistent whole with nothing lacking. This complete Other produces an incomplete or lacking subject (\$) that can be completed with identification with the Ideal” (Moncayo 16). The Other mediates the place of the subject in society and it is the basis over which power (in Foucauldian sense) inflicts its cultural and social practices through agents such as language, law and social institutions.

Importantly, ego formation simultaneously heralds “the awakening of his[her] desire for the object of the other’s desire” (21). During the mirror stage, the child not only recognizes his otherness from the mother but, encountering his/her being as a separate entity, s/he also moves from having need—to be fulfilled by an object—to having demand, which is marked by its “double function” (Evans 38). Apart from divulging biological need, demand also gives rise to “a craving for love” directed towards the Other (38). The Other is preoccupied by the mother as the closest family member to the child at this stage (39). In this case, the mother, as the first Other for the child, will be the person whose object of desire the infant will try to be:

Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from need, this margin being the one that demand—whose appeal can be unconditional only with respect to the Other—opens up in the guise of the possible gap need may give rise to here, because it has no universal satisfaction. . . . Nevertheless, it is this whimsy that introduces the phantom of Omnipotence—not of the subject, but of the Other in which the subject’s demand is instated. (*Écrits* 299)

Constituting the center of the Lacanian thought, desire is “continuous force” that arises unconsciously out of the subject’s relation to lack (Evans 37). Lack is first constituted during the mirror stage when the child identifies with a mental picture and disconnects from the illusory unity with the mother. Motivated by the desire to be “the desire of the Other,” the child will relentlessly try to fill this gap throughout his/her life (*Écrits* 300). The focal point here, however, is the fact that the subject desires what the other desires “not so much because the other holds the keys to the desired object, as because his first object(ive) is to be recognized by the other” (*Écrits* 58). As a consequence, the subject not only constitutes itself in terms of the Other’s desires but also lets her/himself be assimilated by “becom[ing] engaged in the system of concrete discourse of those around him” (*Écrits* 101). To put it another way, the ontological lack—or gap—forces the subject to take his/her position in the web of social relations and power relations with an urge to be a part of the Other.

In his/her endeavor to be the object of the mother’s desire, the child vainly tries to identify with something which Lacan defines as the phallus. In his account, the phallus does not refer to a physical human trait such as penis but an imaginary object that is beyond the

child's reach. It has a symbolic function as "the signifier of the Other's desire" (*Écrits* 279). No sooner, however, has s/he realized the lack, the child steps into the language because "a lack or loss of something is required to set the Symbolic in motion" (Hook 67). The subject has to be marked by a lack in order to take a position in the society conditioned by the desire of the Other. Accordingly, Derek Hook states that the phallus could be correlated with "many, many different possible things, activities, relationships that seem to hold the desire and fascination of the parents" (72-73). What is desired is actually the "being" itself.

The child's recognition of the lack in the Other (as mother) momentarily characterizes the subject's entry into the Symbolic realm and his/her turning into a speaking (social) subject in language, culture and law which account for what Lacan calls castration. The step into language also signifies the split of the subject symbolized by (\$) and its lack of wholeness: "The subject is nothing but this very split" (Fink 45). What is implied by castration here is the fracture from the mother and becoming an object of language and thus the system.⁷

In the Symbolic Order which Lacan also terms as *the name of the father*⁸ the child meets the figure of the father. The *name of the father* does not refer to the father as a biological entity; rather, it indicates the existence of a system of regulations and law (*Écrits* 66, italics in the original): "the Name-of-the-Father is the structural Symbolic element that serves to separate the mother and the child" and is "symbolic in nature" (Hook 76-77). In Hook's words, the child "come[s] to recognize in the figure of father that a wider familial and social network exists" (63). The loss of the original "mother-child unity" and the acquisition of language push the individual into the world of norms which grants a position to the child.

⁷ The concept of castration has been examined in psychoanalytic terms. In the Lacanian/Finkian sense, however, the word castration refers to the subject who occupies the positions envisaged by the social order.

⁸ "The Name of the Father" has a religious connotation just as "stigmata." As a representative of authority in the regulation of social structure, "the Name of the Father," has an implication beyond being an element of "simple human nature" and is "something symbolically ordained by 'divinity'" which leads "the representative of that authority to be God-like and thus fearfully obeyed" (Goldasich and Liu 26).

To put it succinctly, the world of the Symbolic and the acquisition of language break the mother-baby bonding and serve to bestow subjectivity to the child while transforming it into a castrated subject. On the other hand, the function of desire, and therefore the phallus, is closely related to the power which serves as a self-regulatory mechanism. People adjust their behaviors to fit in the roles approved by the majority, and they also strive to be recognized and to protect themselves from social exclusion perpetuated by practices such as stigma. At its heart, power contributes to the lack of variety among people (with regard to physical, moral or hereditary conditions) which originates from the “lack of being.” As for the castrated subject, Fink notes that

The castrated subject is the subject that is represented. The castrated subject is always presenting itself to the Other, looking to win attention and recognition from the Other, and the more its presents itself, the more inescapably castrated it becomes as it is represented by the other and in the Other. The castrated subject . . . is a product of every attempt and intent to signify to the Other. (73)

In its traditional sense, the Symbolic Order signifies the entry of the child into the pre-established world in which “his place is already inscribed at his birth, if only in the form of his proper name” (*Écrits* 140). The child who is born into “world of symbolic exchanges and meaning” comes into contact with language in this Order as an attempt to overcome that sense of lack which is entailed by the loss of original unity (Hook 61). It also signifies the subject’s entry into the human culture where s/he meets with “a theme of the discourse of “normal” men” (*Écrits* 70). Lacan grants much authority to the Symbolic Order itself for its potency to determine and constitute the subject by way of representations filtered through language because the castrated subject is “limited in his or her abilities, incapable of deciding between different courses of action, subjected to the whims of the Other, at the mercy of his or her friends, lovers, institutional setting, cultural-religious upbringing, and so on” (Fink 72).

Moreover, the individual, entering the symbolic realm, becomes an object of language. Lacan notes that “I identify myself in language, but only losing myself in it as an object” (*Écrits* 84). As Lacan states “it is from the Other’s locus where he[she] situates himself” (*Écrits* 297). The nature of the relations in the Symbolic Order is also summed up by Fink

who states that “Symbolic relations are those with the Other as language, knowledge, law, career, academia, authority, morality, ideals, and so on, and with the objects designated (or more strongly stated, demanded) by the Other: grades, diplomas, success, marriage, children” (Fink 87). The symbolic relation establishes the individual as a subject and modifies his/her perceptions, behaviors and existence (identity) according to the Other which operates like a system to be conformed or an ideal to be attained.

In this respect, ego formation serves as the foundation of potential identifications when the parents assure the child that the mirror reflects him/her. From then on, the child learns to adopt “[societal] ideal images” obtained by “the parental Other” (Fink 36). At this point, in order to achieve his/her subjectivity, the baby is divided between his/ her conscious mind wishing to attain unity with the “Ideal I” (*Écrits* 4) seen in the mirror and the unconscious part of the psyche which is presumed to be filled with “the Other’s discourse (with a capital O)” (163). Hence, for Lacan, the act of identification can be understood neither without the concept of “the Other” whose role in the realization of the subject is pivotal, nor without “desire” which signals the subject’s demand for a place in the Other. Lacan argues that

it is always a matter of identifying oneself in accordance with or in opposition to what one thinks is the desire of the Other. As long as this desire can be imagined, . . . the subject will find there the necessary reference points in order to define himself, either as the object of the desire of the Other or as an object refusing to be the desire of the Other. In either case he will be able to locate himself, *to define himself*. (*Seminar IX* 236, my emphasis).

In a social group which is organized around certain rules and standards the subject comes to assume predetermined positions. These positions are presented as fixed and absolute by the promoted ideology of the group. Being incapable of self-determination, the subject needs the Other to confirm his/her existence and is expected to adopt the perspective of the societal Other. Within this context, in the creation and maintenance of stigma the wider society, as the Other, confers a devalued status to physically marked people. The prevalence of norms operates in the unconscious levels of individuals and the stigmatized usually tend to conform to the position or lines offered by the majority. As Goffman states,

By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often un-thinkingly, reduce his life chances. We construct a stigma theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents, sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on other differences, such as those of social class. We use specific stigma terms such as cripple, bastard, moron in our daily discourse as a source of metaphor and imagery, typically without giving thought to the original meaning. (14)

Stigma, then, could be regarded as an act of categorization that involves placing a group of people at a disadvantageous position because of their physical, hereditary or moral condition in the Symbolic which is epitomized by the society, family, or the institutions. The knowledge or reality regarding the subject provided by the language is filtered through pervasive power relations. In an attempt to be recognized (to fill this lack) in pursuit of being the desire of the Other, the individual tends to situate him/herself in the place offered by the society (the Other). Conformity is required and is tried to be achieved by the majority. The crux of the matter lies in herd mentality. The normal is desired because it is desired by others. No matter how much one strives, there is no chance of being the phallus because the ideal, as the Other, “by definition, can never be found in this world” (Davis 2). The sense of superiority derived from scorning the other amounts to a mere, hollow gratification of being.

When regarded from the standpoint of the stigmatized person, “[i]t is a question of what is often, if vaguely, called ‘acceptance’” (*Stigma* 19) among the “discredited” subjects depending on the tolerance of their social groups. Apathy or an overt sympathy towards the stigmatized who are made to “meet the narrow criteria of the idealized form” results in confusion, stress and ambivalence about their identification and participation processes (Thomson 32). They mostly have to conform to “a single set of normative expectations by all participants, the norms being sustained in part because of being incorporated” (*Stigma* 152). Those representations given by the society might be the basis of the discrepancy between “an individual’s virtual and actual identity” (*Stigma* 31). There may be some “oscillations” “in support of, identification with, and participation among” one’s stigmatized category (51). As Goffman adds,

Also, it seems possible for an individual to fail to live up to what we effectively demand of him, and yet be relatively untouched by this failure; insulated by his alienation, protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a full-fledged human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human. (*Stigma* 17)

As suggested by the quotation, it is the subject who can break the cycle to improve the conditions and reverse the derogatory representations related to their being. The subject who realizes that “[t]his differentness itself of course derives from society” (*Stigma* 149) could resort to a new form of subjectivity to overcome the dominance of the fixed subject positions.

Within the theoretical framework outlined above, this thesis argues that the facial anomalies of Helio Cara in *Face* and the unnamed narrator in *Mascara* become the reason for their stigmatization and turn them to socially unacceptable and morally blemished individuals. Both Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator are perceived as a threat to social cohesion by those who deem themselves to be normal. To put it in Foucauldian terms, these characters suffer from the objectification of their faces by society, whose evaluation depends, for the most part, on the commonly held norms and is therefore linked to the exercise of power. In addition, Cara’s deformed face and the narrator’s absent face deprive them of the fundamental need to have a “desire,” a place in the Other to be recognized and to confirm their existence as subjects.

The first chapter of this thesis will focus on the stigmatization of Helio Cara with respect to his acquired facial deformity. He will be analyzed as a stigmatized character who has been made to internalize a set of norms and values established and maintained by and within the society. As a stigmatized character who is very often exposed to stereotypical depictions regarding his social identity and despite the overlapping misfortunes, Helio Cara, with a great resolution and determination, eventually constructs a new face by himself and thus manages to find a way out of the conventional perceptions related to stigma.

The second chapter will examine the unnamed narrator in *Mascara* who has a congenital facial peculiarity that causes him to be stigmatized and to be regarded as having a lesser

social value beside the majority. As a representative of the society, the family of the featureless narrator plays an active role in his stigmatization and exposes him to a relentless disinterest which incites the narrator to organize his life and cope with his stigmatized identity through his own means. Being highly conscious of the use of multiple faces related to social life, the narrator has the potency to tip the scale in his own favor until his very last breath. In other words, the absence of a physical face does not exempt him from getting what he demands for, that is, remembrance.

Instead of embracing the representations imposed on them, however, both Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator find out a way to overcome the hegemony of the dominant subject positions. In other words, their differences and their status as outsiders enable them to transform into literally and figuratively transparent subjects and subvert the procedure of stigmatization. It would not be wrong to suggest that, in the final analysis, each of these characters, Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator, has the power to counter and cope with their stigmatization, proving Goffman's claim that ultimately "the normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives" (*Stigma* 163-164).

CHAPTER 1

We are judged on our faces.

Robert Hoge, the author of *Ugly*

1.1. STIGMATIZATION OF HELIO CARA

Published in 1985, *Face* is the debut novel of the Mexican American novelist and playwright Cecile Pineda whose works are often regarded as examples of socially conscious fiction. By her own admission, much of Pineda's motive for writing has been her inclination to find metaphors for the challenges she has confronted and obstacles she has had to overcome in her life. She reveals that just like the protagonist of *Face*, Helio Cara, whose loss led him to reconstruct his place in the community, she struggled to reconstruct her career and her identity as a writer after the loss of her theatre company. As such, the novel signifies its author's search for an absent community, which was rediscovered after its publication: "Stitch-by-stitch . . . I tunneled my way back word-by-word into the artistic life I had had to abandon" (Pineda and Lomelí 159).

Pineda explains that *Face* was inspired by the real-life story of a Brazilian barber which was published in *San Francisco Chronicle* in 1977 ("Cecile Pineda at the San Francisco Library"). The novel narrates the struggles of Helio Cara, a man in his early forties with a deformed face, who yearns to be (re)admitted to society. The first half of the novel takes place in a favela in Rio de Janeiro where Cara, upon hearing from his dying mother, sets out for the post office on a rainy spring day. On his way, he falls off a cliff and his face is severely injured. Cara not only suffers from having to live with a monstrous face, but also has to face unemployment after having worked as a journeyman barber for sixteen years, just before he obtains his certificate to start his own barbershop. His new, distorted face causes him to lose everything he has including his job, girlfriend, friends, acquaintances and ultimately his home.

With no money to have a plastic surgery, Helio Cara is obliged to wear a horrible mask made of rubber. When he finally gets opportunity to have plastic surgery, he discovers that house had burned down. Moving into his dead mother's house in the hinterlands, he decides to construct a (new) face by/for himself. He leads a hand-to-mouth existence for days to be able to purchase the medication necessary for self-surgery. He carries out seventeen different operations to repair his damaged face, and eventually succeeds in constructing a new face and identity for himself as a full-fledged human being.

Helio Cara's case in *Face* can be analyzed through the lens offered by Erving Goffman in *Stigma: Management of a Spoiled Identity*. Helio Cara's unusual appearance causes him to be ostracized by the community in which he lives. Abandoned by his friends, girlfriend, and everyone else, Helio Cara is sentenced to live as a stigmatized individual. In Pineda's word, "he becomes a pariah, an outcast . . . his whole social context disappears. It is lost" ("Cecile Pineda at the San Francisco Library").⁹ Goffman distinguishes stigmatized individuals from "normal" ones on the basis of the "visibility" of the stigma. In this sense, the first category includes "the discredited" individual whose "differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot" (*Stigma* 14), while the second indicates "a discreditable, not a discredited person" whose stigma attribute is not apparent, as in the case of mental problems, sexual orientation or HIV infection (*Stigma* 57). The discredited individual has to deal with a potential uneasiness in social situations while the discreditable is concerned more about disclosing his/her stigma attribute.

With his severely deformed appearance after the accident, Helio Cara becomes a "discredited" man for his visible stigma and is punished for not conforming to commonly accepted standards (14). He is caught up in a network of power that subjugates him to his stigmatized identity. The nature of his social relations has to be redefined over his stigmatized identity. Moreover, he is expected to accept the socially constructed devalued identity assigned to him in accordance with commonly held convictions about stigma. The "visibility" of the stigma attribute is thus of primary importance in determining the

⁹ It might as well be argued that stigmatization of Cara is associated with his ethnicity related to Pineda's Chicana background. However, since Pineda considers her work as "*hors catégorie*" and the faceless narrator's experience is meant to represent the universal struggle of the marginalized, the suffering of these characters is not viewed from their ethnicities in this thesis.

way both normal and stigmatized individuals engage with one another, and the way the stigmatized individual copes with his/her stigmatized identity.

The title of the novel, *Cara*,¹⁰ which is also Helio's last name, derives from the Portuguese word "face" and refers to his deformed face—*cara*—as the marker of his differentiated individuality. At the same time, it signifies his stigma, which distinguishes him from others, as a part of his identity. Helio, on the other hand, derives from the sun god in Greek mythology, Helios, known for "giving lights both to gods and men" (Smith 219). After falling off the cliff, he possesses a stigma which is visible, one that is immediately spotted by those who look at him (*Stigma* 14). This visible stigma attribute, to use Goffman's phrasing, inevitably turns him into a "discredited" person. Significantly, in his foreword to *Face*, J. M. Coetzee asks:

What is this thing, this structure of skin and bone and gristle and muscle, that we are condemned to carry around with us wherever we go? Where does it begin, where does it end? And why does everyone see it rather than seeing me? . . . Who is this I that dares to think of itself as concealed behind its face, other than its face, so that its face is not it? (XI)

The disfigurement of his face strips off his humanness which is evaluated, in most cases, according to one's physical attributes. Though the fall was beyond his control, Helio Cara experiences the immediate negative effects of the terrible damage to his face. He is excluded from the society and rejected by those around him. Cara's stigmatization begins among the health care staff in the hospital to which he is promptly taken in Whale Back. He becomes the subject of contempt and derision during the process of medical treatment after falling off the cliff. The distress caused by his appearance among the staff is accompanied by "the swallowed giggles of the medical students" (Pineda 24), as they speak in a tactless manner about Cara who is yet to understand the severity of his condition:

The patient (*ah, the patient, yes*), the patient is a thirty-six-year-old man of mixed birth (*ah, mixed, yes*), a barber by trade (*ah, by trade, yes*), who happened to descend the harbor stairs one too often (*ah, yes, the relieving joke*)! Once too often. Never, never has the trauma service seen such an

¹⁰ Cara also means "dear" in Italian (<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/italian-english/caro>). So, Helio Cara can also be translated as "Dear sun," or by extension, a pun on "Dear son" which might be a reference to the Bible.

injury. A surgical nightmare. The face not simply (*ah, yes, “simply”*) unrecognizable . . . A distressing sight, Gentlemen. But unfortunately it’s too early to see it today (*the immense sigh of relief*). (20, italics in the original)

Upon his release from the hospital, Cara realizes that the psychological and social impact of his injured face far outweigh the pain of his physical impairment: “[s]uch an injury. . . How was he to know? How was he to know it was nothing? Not compared to what was to come, nothing compared to what was to come” (Pineda 25). In the poverty zone of Brazil, he finds himself in a stigmatized position at the center of people whose “heads nodding, . . . turning to stare; arms gesturing, fingers pointing” (Pineda 37).

Goffman argues that the “normals” reserving themselves the right to interfere with the life-chances of stigmatized individuals, categorize and enforce stereotypes about them (Stigma 15). Apart from being qualified as undesirable, the stigmatized person can be labeled as “quite thoroughly bad, or dangerous, or weak” (Stigma 12). With his destroyed face, Helio Cara is regarded as someone who “fail[s] to live up to what we [society] effectively demand of him” (Stigma 17). On his arrival in Whale Back, Cara receives hatred and contempt from the townspeople which turns into a deliberate marginalization in time. He finds his shed ransacked and his bedding stolen. His plea for food and water is rejected by his neighbors who, with each passing day, drive him to despair with their callousness. Because of the unexpected change in his appearance, Cara’s presence disturbs people who either pay no attention to him or treat him in a dehumanizing manner:

It perplexes him more and more in the days following. But the most curious thing is meeting them, in the dusty alleys, between the corrugated tin, the tar paper. They begin not to recognize him. . . . “It’s me, Helio.” He tries to say it: “It’s me. Helio.” But no matter how he says it, they answer less and less. Their grunts of fading recognition give way to silence. He becomes one visible. Finally it seems to him they no longer even see him. (Pineda 34)

Apparently, the visibility of stigma is an important factor which adds to devaluation of the individual’s impaired social identity and the way s/he should behave in social encounters as suggested by Goffman and Kurzban and Leary. Kurzban and Leary state that “[t]he more visible a stigmatizing condition, the greater its (negative) impact on interactions” (190). In such circumstances, the stigmatized individual may be asked to

conceal the stigma feature in order not to disturb others and to gain social acceptance. One such strategy employed in these circumstances is using “stigma symbols” to signify “a debasing identity discrepancy” which results in the social devaluation of the individual (*Stigma* 59). Conversely, stigma symbols such as name change, or any kind of physical equipment could be used to conceal the social information the stigmatized individual conveys about him/herself.

The severe damage to Cara’s face has a direct negative influence on his attempt to re-enter society and take his place in social relations. Due to the lack of available rehabilitation and resources, Cara cannot get the public funding for facial reconstruction. As the surgeon asserts, “the face . . . is a cosmetic matter, cosmetic at best” (29). As a result, Cara has been assigned a mask of rubber, a historical method implemented on the veterans of the First World War who returned from the war with wounded faces. To be able to “walk in public without shocking or provoking gawking,” the soldiers were issued sculpted masks (Meiser “The Sculptor Who Made Masks for Soldiers Disfigured in World War I”). In a similar vein, Cara’s mask functions to “preserve the privacy of their [his] deformities, and to spare the feelings of those near them, or who are forced to have dealings with them” (*Stigma* 29). In other words, his facial appearance troubles and scares people and hence he is forced to wear a mask by those who position themselves as speaking from the perspective of wider society.

The mask could be regarded as a “stigma symbol” which marks Cara’s stigmatized identity, and which serves to “mitigate the ‘primary’ impairment of some handicaps” (*Stigma* 115). However, the mask does not work the way it is supposed to. For Helio Cara, the mask is “worse than useless” and “probably makes things worse” (Pineda 36). As Goffman points to the probable “desire to reject using it,” Cara refuses to wear the mask as it restrains his breath and reinforces his stigmatization (*Stigma* 115). Putting a white cotton handkerchief instead, after “the first stone seemed to fly through his window,” Cara tries to rebuild his life and his social relationships behind a piece of cloth (Pineda 8).

Cara's use of handkerchief functions as a means of self-protection (Fellner 66). Cara chooses to wear it in order to keep himself aloof from the social sanction of stigma and to preserve his self-worth. Besides, as a discredited person who is liable to manage tension, Cara employs a white, cotton, and importantly, not a "linen" handkerchief, which is the textile used for medical uniforms (Pineda 7). The softer texture of the cotton handkerchief compared to linen provides a space for Cara to reconcile his stigmatized face and gives him a chance to deal with his feeling of alienation in Whale Back where "the silence, the averted gaze have become a condition of living" (Pineda 36). As Fellner argues,

The handkerchief provides a hiding space, supposedly offering a protective shield from a society that has abjected him as the other. More importantly, however, the handkerchief fulfills the function of masking the outsider within him and protecting him from the stranger that he has become to himself. It creates a distance between himself and his distorted body image, offering a means to deal with his otherness. (66)

The act of camouflaging his unrecognizable face with the handkerchief also reflects the learning process of his devalued social identity, or, as Goffman terms it, his "moral career" to manage the stress he faces (45). Acquiring his stigma later in life, Cara is acutely responsive to the distortions in people's perceptions of him. For instance, on his way back to Whale Back after three months, he braces himself for repulsion by his neighbors by repeating to himself: "He [I] should have been prepared" (Pineda 31). Estimating the commotion he will create, Cara also refrains from walking outside with his bare face. In other words, like the changes in his appearance and social identity, he tries to adapt to the change in his self-concept.

Occasionally, however, Cara falls into trouble in "re-identifying" his stigmatized self (*Stigma* 130). As Goffman expresses, "the stigmatized individual tends to hold the same beliefs about identity that we do; . . . his[her] deepest feelings about what he[she] is may be his[her] sense of being a 'normal person,' a human being like everyone else, a person, therefore, who deserves a fair chance and a fair break" (*Stigma* 17). In the prologue, which is taken from a talk at a conference of plastic and reconstructive surgery, Dr. T. Godoy recounts the incident and the seven-month period before the man disappears stating that

“he became known to his neighbors as a *bruxo* (3).”¹¹ Sadly, Cara could not predict the disapproval and opposition he would encounter.

This “uneasiness” felt by the “[p]ost-stigma acquaintances” for the newly acquired stigma also leads to the prejudice and rejection among “pre-stigma acquaintances” (*Stigma* 49). As Goffman puts it, due to “being attached to a conception of what he[*she*] once was,” they fail to behave the stigmatized in a respectful and ethical manner (*Stigma* 49). In the novel, after the initial shock of their first encounter at the barber shop where Cara’s boss and his apprentice “put up their hands in mock terror,” his boss, following a short silence, wants Cara to take his leave immediately (Pineda 39). Caught unprepared by his boss’s decision, Cara insists on taking his job back for the sake of reversing the expectations about his stigmatized identity. However, when Cara “[d]eliberately” exposes his deformed face for a moment, his boss and his friends are confounded: “He lifts the handkerchief off his face. He watches the boss’ eyes narrow, sees them falter, hears the low whistle escape him. / ‘God!’ The boss turns away. / ‘it’s not . . .’” (41).

David E. Johnson posits that the ellipsis at the end of the sentence can be completed in multiple ways. However, the most likely ending to his exclamation is “not human” (“Face-Value” 81). The degree of Cara’s facial disfigurement disrupts the very nature of his interpersonal relationship; it affects the way others deal with his stigmatized status. Because the clients in the refuse to be shaved by him, the short probationary period in the barber shop ends in failure. His boss fires him, alleging the comfort of his customers. Goffman explains the motives behind such discriminatory action towards the stigmatized as follows:

We normals develop conceptions, whether objectively grounded or not, as to the sphere of life-activity for which an individual’s particular stigma primarily disqualifies him[*her*]. Ugliness, for example, has its initial ad prime effect during social situations, threatening the pleasure we might otherwise take in the company of its possessor. We perceive, however, that his[*her*] condition ought to have no effect on his[*her*] competency in solitary tasks, although of course we may discriminate against him[*her*] here simply because of the feelings we have about looking at him[*her*]. (*Stigma* 66-67)

¹¹ A Portuguese word means “wizard” in English.

His girlfriend Lula's reaction to his disfigurement is conditioned by prejudices against the stigmatized. Though she initially looks as if she sympathizes with Cara's distress and pain, Lula, who works as a waitress in a café, merely seeks to attain better prospects for the future by marrying Helio Cara. Recognizing that Cara can no longer realize her dreams since he loses his job, she cannot endure his presence saying, "everything is spoiled now" (Pineda 62). She treats Helio like a "monster" to be avoided (Pineda 62):

HELIO: I want you. Can't you tell me I want you?

LULA: Let go! Just leave me alone. She pushes against his chest to get free. He staggers backward. She stands there, breathing hard. The morning catches fire in her hair.

HELIO: Why? His voice hisses. Can't you tell me? Is it someone else? Is that why you can't tell me?

LULA: Why? Because I can't stand it, she blurts. I don't want to look at you. I can't stand to look. I don't want to be close to you. I want to be far, far away. . . . Please. . . . Don't ask me. I can't. Please! (62)

Lula's emotional disengagement, distancing, and reluctance to sleep with him drive Cara to exert physical force. In a momentary loss of self-control, he beats and rapes her. Afterwards, Cara undergoes a reasoning process that echoes Synnott's argument that "the face reflects the character of the individual" ("Part I" 608). Cara questions whether his intention to hurt Lula mirrors his personality. In a way, his public ugliness generates self-doubt about his personality:

He lies there a long time thinking himself awake. He remembers her face, the look of surprise when he hit her, her childlike disbelief. Why her? he wonders, why her, when it was the boss he should have hit? Had he saved it for her because women are weak, their softer flesh? Because she wouldn't hit back? Had he hit her like that because he wanted someone to share in his ugliness? Because the monster he had become wanted company? . . . Did a man's face point to what he would become? Is he such a man now? (Pineda 65)

The loss of his face and the insult and avoidance incidental to it causes Cara to internalize his stigmatization to a certain extent. To put it in another way, Cara's stigmatization has a more traumatic effect on his self-conception than his disfigured face. Cara's questioning

of himself about his moral-character and self-concept could be recognized as an outburst of his repressed, silent rage that emerges from the shame of rejection and the feeling of inadequacy. In other words, it is the expression of the psychological damage the stigma label laid on him. His anger stems from the lack of compassion and connection that he believes to deserve as a human being.

Commenting on the transformation of the self that the stigmatized experience, Goffman puts forward that “[t]hese perceived changes [whether it be in the personality or life style] seem to be a result of the individual’s being placed in a new relationship to the contingencies of acceptance in face-to-face interaction, with consequent employment of new strategies of adaptation” (157). When human life does not provide him with a place to live in Cara ends up being a “creature of the night” (Pineda 73) and his living space is narrowed down to the underground in the outskirts of the city. As a result, he gradually begins to feel disconnected from the majority and finds an affinity with other living organisms in the dark:

In the city at sleep, in the deserted alleys, or in the Whale Back, he had come to know them, the creatures that roamed the night, parasites that fed, like himself, on the leavings of the day, of those not afraid to show their faces in the back alleys, or even streets. He had never imagined this underground when he had been one of them, the small mice and occasional rats he had come to discover, hunting like himself, some alone, or in packs, always on the move, some (like him) covering their traces, others leaving mounds of disorder to mark their passing. But of other creatures, those of his own kind, he is less knowing: Indians from the Interior living on the outskirts, . . . [t]he mill hands locked out since the strikes, and the fugitives from the police squads, some of them, too, must roam the same streets, but in a night different from his. His night is of a separate kind. Either way, with the white handkerchief, or without its protection, he has learned to come and go unseen. (Pineda 74)

Under the cover of darkness, he wanders through the streets counting on the inoffensiveness of nighttime creatures. His motivation for survival causes him to be a part of the world of nocturnal animals and to alleviate his feelings of humiliation and loneliness. Underground, which is usually perceived as a hostile territory, provides a shelter for the stigmatized Cara with its promise of the comfort of darkness. Pineda’s description of Cara as the only participant of his kind in this realm also shows that he

belongs to a category of being other than race, ethnicity, gender or class. To put it in a different way, his mutilated face and stigmatized social identity separate him from yet link him to, socially disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities, outlaws, and low income workers. They all share one thing in common though: both Cara and those people are expelled from the community and experience a deep poverty and emotional violence.

To highlight the peril/detriment of stigma, Goffman further claims that “we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human” (*Stigma* 15). Cara’s failure in his attempt to return to his older life and Lula’s response to Cara’s disfigurement comply with Goffman’s notion. The emotional and mental pain of becoming stigmatized overwhelms him to such an extent that he begins to search for a new face; surgery that will give him back his former life. The first place he applies to is a rehabilitation center run by the government. Again, the apathetic and cynical behavior of the employee at the rehabilitation center contributes to his feelings of unworthiness. His face becomes an object of extreme insult for the employee at the center which is a place, ironically, visited by people who are in the same situation as Cara. For example, the janitor who acts like the window clerk at the rehabilitation center teases Cara by talking about his appearance:

“Seems like they put you through the wringer, hunh? And I’ll bet you were a lady-killer once.” The clerk continues writing without looking up. “We see ‘em here all the time. Other day, guy comes in here. Got caught in a threshing machine or something. ‘Oh man, oh man,’ I say. ‘You get to date the gorilla of your dreams.’” He snickers at the memory, then catches himself. “Nothing personal, you know. Don’t think nothing of it.” The clerk returns the card to him through the window. (54)

He is not regarded as “eligible” for government funding and the staff try to dissuade him from seeking surgery. They tell him that he can get a public aid only if he proves that his disfigurement really poses an obstacle in his “ability to earn a living” (Pineda 58). Nevertheless, Cara does not give up. He goes to a hospital to apply directly for an operation. After two weeks of negotiation, the hospital staff agree to help him thinking that Cara’s case is worth the risk. However, Cara’s joy does not last long because his shack is burned to the ground on the same night. On the whole, this incident signifies the stigmatized individual’s decreasing chance of survival and his/her profound dependence upon the judgment of community members. Cara’s house is burned down for he is seen

as “compromised, and somehow less than fully human” (Dovidio, Mayor and Crocker 3). He has been “smoked out” just like “vermin” (Pineda 91). His friends and neighbors shut their doors on him and destroy his chance to have surgery. He later thinks to himself: “Even animals had a burrow, a nest of one kind or other. But he? Nothing anymore to call home” (91).

Having no place to go, Cara moves to his deceased mother’s home in Rio das Pedras in the rural hinterland of Rio de Janeiro; a place he left at the age of eighteen. Predictably, the same stigma is experienced there. The psychological and verbal harassment start as soon as he enters town:

A man, unknown to him, stands watching him. A woman comes up from behind to join to him. He would have preferred to pass without notice. They look while he fumbles with the knot, trying to hide his face, not quite succeeding, as he masks himself again. Still they stare as he replaces the fedora, retrieves the suitcase, and continues up the alley. Already he can hear, thinks he can hear, their whispering. (Pineda 102)

The narrative structure of *Face* is, in Pineda’s terms, “in the form of sine waves” (Lomeli 164). The italicized sections after the catastrophic accident function either as flashbacks to an earlier, happier time with Lula or to his dreams. Pineda proposes that these scenes represent “Cara’s delayed stress when he revisits the moment of falling” (164). The second part of the book, which takes place in his hometown, is similarly interwoven with flashbacks related to his painful past, illuminating the gaps related to his family and revealing a part of his emotional confusion and anxiety in times of sorrow.

Revisiting his mother’s remnants, Cara sinks into a melancholic mood wandering through his poor and painful childhood memories. From the parts related to his childhood, it is understood that Cara had an unhappy childhood, spent in poverty. After his father who “smelled of earth” (106) is killed in a street fight, Cara has to grow up with his step-father Juliao, who is “smelled of toilet water” (106). Rio das Pedras is also the place where he first works as a barber’s apprentice at Cardoso’s shop. He is the one who first introduces Cara to the anatomy of the face as a barber surgeon. Cardoso spends his days “[r]emoving

wens with his studied look, or extracting a rotted tooth, setting a fracture with builder's plaster or applying leeches sold to him by country folk" (46-7).

Returning to his hometown as a stigmatized person, Cara sets out to look for a job again to live but first returns empty-handed. His failure plays a significant role in his taking the biggest decision of his life: "He would make himself a face" (110). Therefore, his search serves a greater cause; buying the surgical instruments to perform self-surgery—the process of which will be examined in the following chapter in detail. He luckily finds a night-time irrigation job at the mansion of an established family for "fifty cruzeiros" per day (114).

His stigmatized face alarms people in the hinterlands and scares them away when he accidentally drops the handkerchief. One night, when he is working, someone in the dark tries to shoot him. After that incident, his employer fires him for safety reasons. Cara's insistence on finding a job and living a life as a human being is seen as an act of overstepping the accorded limits of his devalued status. Goffman states that marked by their difference, stigmatized individuals are advised to follow some particular "codes or lines" (133) which comprise "a platform and a politics," an "instruction as to how treat others" and also "recipes for an appropriate attitude regarding the self" (135). His trampled dignity is bounded up with these "advocated codes of conduct" (135).

The psychological, emotional and at times physical abuse owing to his stigmatized face leads him into a perpetual state of anxiety. At one occasion, in the pharmacy where he goes to buy anesthetic drugs (for the self-surgery) he grows restless because of the curious and suspicious glances of the women in the store and then the druggist's dubious interest in the process. Cara thinks, "What kind of interest is it anyway that wants to probe his secrets? . . . Was it only a matter of time before they smoked him out here, too?" (132). The internalization of his stigmatized identity entails suspicion about his physical safety.

As a stigmatized person, Helio Cara is automatically placed outside "a shared, socially maintained and determined conception of normal individual" (Thomson 31). His social identity which is "discredited" due to his disfigured face diminishes the quality of his

interpersonal relationships as it reduces his life-chances. He becomes a menace to be avoided and is forced out of his home by a fire. The continual attack on his reputation and well-being by the “normal” impels him to engage in self-fashioning and construct a face which is “made by him, by the wearer of it” (Pineda 153).

1.2. POWER AS THE DRIVING FORCE IN STIGMA

As discussed in the introduction, stigma is a kind of classification/categorization of individuals into groups that is informed through social contacts in which the stigmatized is labeled from “the stand-point of the normal.” On the other hand, functioning in various ways such as norms, power works to regulate the nature of social relationships through institutional and social practices and forms the individual’s self- concept. Regarded from these perspectives, it is possible to state that power is the propelling force in the construction of stigma as an unfavorable (sub)group. It shapes not only the way people evaluate each other, and behave towards one another, but also how they view themselves.

Power is not a system of oppression which endows a certain group with a privileged status over others. The expectation of obedience is not coercive but more of an interplay among individuals. Foucault argues that power is exercised on the daily basis on the individual who is infinitely free. It affects life through the production of “reality” and manipulates perception through this produced reality. Moreover, Foucault associates power with the relations and practices that force people to occupy or embrace socially prescribed roles. An individual who is made into a subject is successively objectivized.

Cara’s injured face, as the most visible and accessible part of his body, is stigmatized and therefore is a stage on which to exercise power. He is treated as if his humanness depends on his facial appearance and he loses it together with his face. The government does not cover his expenses for the surgery. Without any financial help or insurance policy, Cara suffers from the disadvantage of having a disfigured face for a long time. As explained by Talley, the face does not merely “confer a low status on a person” (12) but also “determines our status in . . . systems of power” (13). An “unremarkable” face thus turns into a precious commodity to be obtained by Cara to regain his humanity (Pineda 71).

During his relentless search for surgery, at one point, he ponders: “How much would he need to win to buy a face? he turns the page. The place hurts in the middle of his chest” (Pineda 67).

During his stay in the hospital, he observes the mechanical routine of the medical students who explore, in Cara’s own words, “the exhibits” by “exclaiming or muttering in hushed voices” (19). From a Foucauldian perspective, Cara’s identification of the patients as “the exhibits” denotes the objectification of human body: “*And here we see. . . / And to the right we find. . . / In the next bed we have. . .*” (19). Directed by “the commanding tone of the chief surgeon,” the students come to examine the injured part/s of each patient in turn: “*And here we have the knee . . . , the arm. . . the abdomen. . . the scrotum*” (19). As the most catastrophic injury of the surgery service, Cara’s face waits for two months to be seen: “‘Never has this service seen such an injury. Mr. Cara . . .’ and the swallowed giggles of the medical students, standing at white starched attention, suppressing the whispering of their linen, ‘ . . . such an injury’” (24).

Arranging his living routine and limiting his living space, power—or disciplinary power as a modality of power—restructures his stigmatized life. As proposed by Foucault, the individual is “a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power” which he calls “‘discipline’” (*Discipline and Power* 194). Without knowing, and having been labeled as stigmatized, Helio Cara is constituted “as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge” and expected to behave in accordance with this socially given identity (192). In other words, he is ascribed a stigmatized identity which inflicts a relative “truth on him” or his identity as acknowledged by others (“The Subject and Power” 781).

Considering the role of society in the creation of stigma and the role of power in generating certain behavior patterns and codes of conduct, it can be argued that Cara does experience the effects of power in the web of social relations. As Foucault suggests, power designates “an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another” (“The Subject and Power” 786). For example, his neighbors in Whale Back refuse to share their food with him: “So it has been from that first knock, the first evening following his return to Whale Back, without water, with nothing to eat. “‘Wait here.”

And sometimes, much later, ““She says we can’t,”” or ““Sorry. Nothing, today”” (34). When he appears at the door of his former workplace, the barber shop, his boss, his friends, and the customers respond to his presence in the same way. Deliberately ignoring him, they all pretend “as if they had seen nothing” (Pineda 42).

Being normal is something created through social interactions, just like stigma itself. However, from the viewpoint of the “normal,” and according to the norms of appearance, Cara is labeled “a monster,” an abnormal person with a disfigured face (Pineda 62). There is a real change in the way people look, perceive and treat Cara after the accident. He is regarded as unqualified to take part in social life and is not allowed to maintain his previous lifestyle. Despite the fact that the appearance has almost nothing to do with his quality of work in barbershop, he is shamed by his boss for not looking “confident” (Pineda 40). The nature of his social connections determines Cara’s course of action as seen in when his boss enjoins Cara to “[f]ind out” a way to cultivate a confident presence to retain his basic human relations (40).

Cara is led to believe that he is a socially discredited person. As a result, he internalizes self-regulatory mechanisms and arranges his life under the mental and emotional burden of the norm limits. To begin with, apart from his personal trauma, Cara’s damaged appearance causes discomfort, anxiety and pain for those around him. The government, consequently, supplies a mask which is “shapeless, rust-brown, like a balloon, punctured and inert” (Pineda 35). Refusing to use it, Cara uses a handkerchief as a substitute for the mask. From another perspective, it might be argued that he abstains from appearing bare-faced outside, which signifies his subconscious tendency to act in accordance with the power that generates certain codes of conduct. In other words, being “caught up in a power situation” and acting as one of its “the bearers” (*Discipline and Punish* 201), Cara engages himself in proper actions, assimilating social mechanisms of power. Similarly, he spends most of his time in his shack and goes out at night to feed like a monster as Pineda points out, “More and more, he takes refuge in the night, in darkness, . . . before the sun is up” (Pineda 34).

Furthermore, the link between power and stigma places Cara at the center of the “normalizing gaze,” or better put, his stigma sets visibility to him so that he is differentiated and judged according to normative standards (*Discipline and Punish* 184). At first sight, the idea of surveillance seems to work in a reverse direction for Cara because meeting the undesired, the supposedly normalizing gaze turns into the “averted gaze” upon contact:

He boards the streetcar to the general hospital. With the handkerchief held in place by the fedora, his hand on the brim, he vaults onto the outside runner as the car begins to move.

...

The car rights itself. The straphangers to the right and left of him appear to look elsewhere. They are too busy with their thoughts to notice him. He looks straight ahead, turning neither right or left. He catches a furtive movement deep in the left field of his vision. Turning, he trades a quick glance with the passenger at his elbow. On contact, the gaze is broken. The passenger now appears to focus on something at the far side of his view. The look passes quickly. Now looking, now turning away. The gesture repeats itself. It has become the coin his personal marketplace. (Pineda 66)

A closer look, however, reveals that the normalizing gaze prompts Cara to be involved in “a state of conscious and permanent visibility” which “assures the automatic functioning of power” (*Discipline and Punish* 201). His facial look outside the standards compels him to stay away from everyday activities and restricts the circle of his social networks. In that sense, surveillance, as an effect of disciplinary power, objectifies Cara in his subjection to the normalizing gaze and eventually leads him to engage in a self-regulation process (188). In time, Cara learns to organize his daily routine in such a way as to distance himself from those who avoid looking at him and accelerates the process of having surgery.

The manners and attitude of the personnel during the process of searching for plastic surgery are even worse than those of his acquaintances. They exemplify institutional and interpersonal exercises of power. Acting in an insensitive manner, they represent larger society—those who deem themselves to be normal—people who disapprove of Cara’s facial atypicality. He is punished because “[t]he whole indefinite domain of the non-conforming is punishable” (179). He receives a reprimand for not having his mask on:

It's designed to give people seeing it immediate recognition that the wearer is . . . *facially impaired*. It doesn't matter what the reason is. It could be from a tumor, an operation, a burn, a birth defect. . . . They don't care. Just as long as you wear the mask. It lets everyone know right away there's nothing wrong with you. You are an ordinary human being, only with a . . . *facial impairment*. (Pineda 57)

As the quotation suggests, Cara is asked to use a mediator in order to continue having limited contact with society. Moreover, he is held responsible both for concealing the disturbing stigma on his face, and for sparing others' feelings about his appearance. For instance, the staff at the medical center authorize themselves to decide on Cara's behalf that his face is "a cosmetic matter" (29) and that since Cara is not a model, he does not need a face. He is persistently advised to join instructive government programs which teach skills like "'Getting a job, 'What to Tell Your Boss,' etcetera" (57). In order to attend these rehabilitation programs, he must wear the mask. To decide whether he is "worth a face," the clerk asks Cara to bring a letter from his boss to prove that his disfigurement prevents him from earning a living (59).

The sudden transformation in his life appalls Cara, especially since he cannot recall the chain of events that led up to his fall. In his mind, his life is split into two separate parts: before and after the fall. He associates life with his face and envisions it as an outfit that appeals to society and gives hints about his social status and identity. His "taking it [his old life] off like a coat and leaving it" signifies the loss of identity and belonging (8). His stress is multiplied by the fear that anyone with a wearable face in daylight might replace him and take possession of what once belonged to him, like his girlfriend and his job: "Would someone find it, try it on perhaps, enter it seamlessly, wear it like a sleeve – Lula, the barber shop – without thinking about it?" (8)

Cara's occasional contemplation of his face reflects his internalization of institutional and social codes, which causes emotional vacillations about his self-concept. When he is asked to state his complaint on the medical examination form at the hospital, he cannot decide whether what he needs is a face "to live" or "to have a normal impression to live" (Pineda 69, emphasis added). To say the least, he needs "a face, not even necessarily

much like his had been before, but a face that could be worn, even in daylight-at noon perhaps-in the street” (8).

Too ugly. How many of them even thought about it, even knew what it was. Too ugly for living. “No, not ugly,” they would correct him. “Disfigured.” Ah, that was better. Disfigured was a better word. It offended no one. But ugly. Really ugly. Not unattractive (they said that of women), but ugly. Sickening beyond imagining, so monstrous that were he to approach each of them as they sat there, stand in front of them one by one, and deliberately take off the handkerchief for each one of them to see, they would back away in horror, shield their eyes, cry out perhaps. (68)

However, as Synnott also acknowledges, “[p]rejudice and discrimination against the ugly are virtually a cultural norm” (56). Cara’s stigmatization results from a collective elision by society that focuses on eradicating differences which pose a threat to its homogeneity. Society does not show any consideration for his feelings or his potential as a human being. He is assessed by unexamined, culture-bound assumptions, regardless of what he feels: “It is not his face, this handkerchief. He knows it. . . . But the clerks at the windows, the armies of men standing in the endless lines of rehabilitation center, none of them know it. For them, he has always been like this” (37). Talley explains how disfigurement, notwithstanding its narrow definitions, leads to unjust behavior:

Disfigurement has no static intelligibility, no objective point of reference, no stable shared meaning. It is not a health status or condition clearly defined by, . . . [n]or is there a shared collective understanding of what kinds of appearances might be deemed disfigured and what might simply be called unusual. Like “normal,” which shifts historically and culturally, “disfigured” is also rife with multiple meanings. Yet despite the term’s ambiguity and elasticity, it has very definite, deeply felt social reality. (15)

In Cara’s case, the plastic surgery, or “facial work” in Talley’s words, becomes “a vital intervention” (38). Apart from his exclusion, the continual attack on his life such as the burning of his house and the gunshot in the hinterlands makes his intervention lifesaving. After spending a great deal of effort to have free facial surgery, Cara achieves his goal. Teofilho Godoy, a doctor of plastic and reconstructive surgery, agrees to operate on him since he regards Cara as a “motivated, an excellent subject” to be studied (Pineda 79).

The doctors think of Cara as a subject,—or a medical specimen— a worthy challenge to test their abilities. He states:

“We have decided.” Godoy is talking. They are all assembled, he, Godoy, the interns, the residents, the nurse, the technicians. They crowd into the small examining room. . . . “We have gone over the reports, reviewed the tests. We think you are a good risk. You understand what we need to do. You are motivated. We want more people like you. You will challenge our best skills. We have all talked it over carefully. We have decided to accept you (Pineda 85).

In broader terms, the doctor’s consent to repair Cara’s appearance reveals the general mindset about disfigured people who are seen as “objects” (Talley 10). Cara’s face, which symbolizes his body, becomes a field of intervention for the doctor. In other words, social norms objectify Cara, who is viewed to be in urgent need of intervention, for being outside the norms of appearance. On the other hand, as Foucault states, normality itself is a totalizing exercise which punishes individuals to eradicate individual difference. Cara senses the invisible heaviness of power in his life. Godoy pays “no attention” to him and “his haughtiness” is evident: “People like that had talent, all of them. And with it came the power to make people wait. It was natural” (Pineda 78). Godoy holds the advantage of being normal, like the majority.

Appearance hierarchizes individuals. The problem is primarily about the expectation of a compulsory conformity to “what is presented as natural, necessary, and normal . . . like the norm itself” (Taylor 46). Human beings are categorized within a system of norms and normality that includes the ways in which discourses and knowledge are produced and shape reality. The principle cause of society’s inhumane treatment of Cara originates from a conventional understanding of normality without an objective basis. In other words, Cara is among those who are “condemned,” for he violates the socially enforced, unwritten rules through his injured face (Pineda 22). It is in fact the totalizing aspect of power that decides on behalf of Cara whose deformed face is presented to be a huge obstacle in terms of the quality of his life.

1.3. HELIO CARA AS A LACANIAN SUBJECT

As Pineda notes, the main focus of *Face* is identity; a pattern of losing and finding it. Cara, as the protagonist, undergoes one of the most awful experiences that can happen to a person when he falls off a cliff. The severe impairment of Cara's face not only stigmatizes his social identity but also literally keeps him away from participating in society and having basic human relations. Cara is enforced to wear a rubber mask and his social position is restructured by the majority, which mediates Cara's recently acquired stigmatized identity through its social institutions.

Face offers an extensive chance to observe the reactions of people towards a subject, Cara, with a visible stigma, which can be regarded as an example of the human tendency to kick someone when s/he is down. Despite the continuous humiliation, insult and outrage which nearly cost him his life, Cara unceasingly strives to gain attention and be included in the social order. Cara's efforts can be explained by Lacan's concept of desire, which is "a social product . . . [that] is always constituted in a dialectic relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects" (Evans 39). Lacan notes that "for this desire itself to be satisfied in man requires that it be recognized, through the accord of speech or the struggle for prestige, in the symbol or the imaginary" (*Écrits* 67). Considering the fundamental importance of social interaction in informing the subject, Cara, as a stigmatized yet social being, tries to obtain recognition by acting in accordance with the existential necessity of his human nature and in defiance of the proffered reality concerning his identity.

The loss of a typical, proportional face effaces Cara's human existence and his experience with the Other's recognition. Cara fixes his disfigured face and, to use Coetzee's wording, "becomes the author of his own life" (Pineda XI). However, Cara's suddenly altered social position initially bewilders him and puts him through a state of strain. Cara goes through a tedious process in which he tries to comprehend what has happened to him and at times, acclimates himself to the position he is placed by others.

After the initial shock of falling, Cara has trouble remembering the moment of the incident. Pineda informs the reader about the event and its aftermath through distressing flashbacks. When he is taken to the hospital Cara is grievously wounded, unable to move, talk and even smell. In the hospital room, he lays bedridden for a period of time during which he tries to make sense out of his situation by looking at the reactions of the hospital staff. In their eyes Cara “can see something” that he cannot define: “He remembers thinking is it so bad as that?” (14). In the scene where he finally pulls himself up and stands for the first time in front of the mirror, Cara gets the shock of his life by “not finding a face there” (17):

He tries to get up. It is night now. A cold fluorescent light pulses in the corridor. In the obscurity of the room, he can make out the nightstand and the darkened entrance to the toilet.

His legs are made of lead. He slides them over the cool of the bedsheets till his feet hang over the edge.

...

In the sudden light, someone stands weaving before him on unsteady legs, something without nose and mouth, eyes dark purple splotches, sealed almost shut, particles tattooed onto the skin.

His groin goes hot.

Not me! Not me! His voice gargles in his throat. No sound comes, no sound at all. (Pineda, italics in the original 17)

The scene brings to mind Lacan’s formulation of the mirror stage whose function “is to establish a relationship between an organism and its reality” (*Écrits* 6). Like a baby who does not have the physical coordination and ability to stand on his/her feet, Cara faces with his physical existence for the first time since the disastrous fall. He experiences his body with an “absence which frightened him the most” (Pineda 17). Cara’s mirror confrontation, in a sense, indicates his first awakening to the new stigma identity he will assume, as is the case with the mirror stage, which not only marks “a moment in the life of the infant” but also “represents a permanent structure of subjectivity” (Evans 118).

Carlos Gallego refers to Cara’s encounter with his mutilated face and his painful cry as the moment of “castration” which Cara attempts to “repress” upon realizing “the truth of his being” (“Universality at the Margins” 188). Faced with the lack of a face, Cara, as opposed to an ordinary child who (mis)recognizes and identifies his/her seemingly

autonomous image with great eagerness, denies the veracity of what he sees. However, despite his refutation, his experience renders Cara as a stigmatized (and also a split) subject with a horrible face, beyond his imagination. As Gallego suggests:

When Helio's "groin goes hot" upon viewing his image in the mirror, it is as if he is re-experiencing the original trauma of castration, no longer able to repress its truth. Though his cry of "not me" seems a correct rejection of the mirror's false reality, Helio's negation is not a response to the gestalt fantasy most of us accept as truth when we look in the mirror, but rather a predictable reaction to the horrifying alterity, the facelessness, reflected back at him—the embodied nothingness that he simultaneously could and could not recall. (188)

It can thus be stated that Cara's access to his new subjectivity occurs through a traumatic alienation which leads up to a turbulent transition for Cara in line with society's symbolic order. This transition negotiates a "fading recognition" of his existence that within time "gives way to silence" (Pineda 34). Cara falls into a state of non-recognition against the social Other which denies his access to fundamental human needs, love and attention, because "[h]is castrated condition is horrible to others" (Gallego 191). The consternation at the hospital is replaced by the disparaging attributes of his social circle. Cara internalizes the attributes of his girlfriend, friends, colleagues, and neighbors who spurn his authority as a subject and expose him to denigration because of his "discredited" social identity.

Cara becomes accustomed to his newly acquired identity by positioning himself (unconsciously) according to the Other's discourse, which is dominated by "'normal' men" (*Écrits* 70). The "normal" acting as the unblemished part of the ideal Other, discourage Cara from social participation through various practices. One such practice is the enforcement of the mask which the Other stipulates to make sure that Cara is a still human. In this sense, the Other preserves the right to designate the patterns of life. He rejects wearing the mask, and substitutes it for a handkerchief to conceal his disfigured face which, besides offering protection, signifies his demand to be recognized since "[t]hey begin not to recognize him" (Pineda 34). He takes the mask off, believing that "with the handkerchief he will be noticed, even recognized" (83). However, it soon turns

out that the handkerchief causes Cara to be a man with an increasing feeling of shame and doubt about his appearance.

Because of their potency to determine and constitute the subject through various means, the social institutions of the Symbolic decide on behalf of Cara and disqualify him from major life activities including his right to earn money. Due to the uncanny impression he gives, his boss wants Cara to leave his job. One such other instance is the disavowal of the surgery by the government agencies that direct him to rehabilitation programs instead of an operation. The window clerk states: "Surgery can be approved only if you have public assistance, and if your impairment seriously interferes with your ability to earn a living. If you were a model, for instance" (58). Although his deformed face interferes with his living as a barber, Cara is not qualified for the surgery. In this sense, Cara's social environment functions as a mirror making him occupy a passive and unhuman position in relation to society, which results in Cara's further alienation from his own humanness. Becoming a part of the night, Cara internalizes the negative effects of his stigmatized identity in line with the ungracious images provided by the Symbolic. As Fink notes "it is the symbolic order that brings about the internalization of mirror and other images" (Fink 36).

While waiting for customers who explicitly show their reluctance to be shaved by him, Cara incidentally looks through magazines that feature the processed and photoshopped pictures of bodies. Leafing through the pages, Cara becomes impressed with those flawless images and moves away from being human to a being who, as Lacan terms it, is "in the process of becoming" (*Écrits* 84). Although he strives to get his life back on track, Cara has not yet come to the realization of the unlikely likelihood of perfection, or as Lacan puts it, of "an ideal unity" (*Écrits* 20) which is unreal. Looking through the pictures, Cara thinks to himself:

Who are they, these men? He reads their names. But who are they really? Where did they come from? Did they have a mother - all to be so perfect? Where did they live? Did they sleep in a bed? Did they have to work to stay alive, or just play soccer? Did they ever beg for bread? Had they learned a trade? Or are they paid only to play on their teams, to pose for these pictures, dressed in sports shirts, open at the neck, displaying gold chains at their

throats? . . . Do they look like that every day –those same expressions, carefully set and held – or are they sometimes trapped by the unexpected, caught by joy or accident? [he answers] No, not these. They are too clean, too well groomed with the latest hair styles. They had always been perfect, never caught unawares. They are mannequins after all, without surprises, in lives where one pose succeeds another, trained to look perfect as though they float on floors of glass. (Pineda 43-44)

Lacan argues that “[w]hat is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since it is no more, nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future anterior as what I will have been” (84). The images in the magazines seemingly represent an ideal unity and perfection as a part of the Other from whose “locus” the subject, that is, Cara “situates himself” (297). However, being a split subject of language who is and will always experience a “lack of being,” an individual is subjected to the ascriptions of his/her social or personal status as in the case of Cara’s sudden stigmatization. He must recognize the truth society attributes to him in order to be recognized in his social and cultural relationships.

Comparing himself to those who are “arrested in a state of perpetual well-being, in some perfect state, free of tears, or frowns, or catastrophe” (Pineda 44), Cara tries to cope with the pain and suffering inflicted on him. He wonders whether what happened to him could happen to anyone or is he chosen to be a victim for a specific reason. He appears to be dazzled by the splendid mannequins in magazines; yet, his fascination displays Pineda’s overt criticism of society’s unrealistic beauty standards, built on ludicrous images and the objectification of the human body. Cara’s tendency to believe in the possibility of their reality stems from his naïveté and helpless situation. For Cara, the figures in these magazines symbolize the desired, but never fulfilled, ideal the Other demands.

Cara turns to his girlfriend, Lula, for comfort. However, already burdened by the traumatic castration and suppression of his subjectivity, he is frustrated by Lula’s rejection and abuses Lula’s body. The dream section following beating and rape demonstrates the beginning of Cara’s “embracing the truth of his condition,” of his monstrosity (Gallego 198). With a “*suddenness*” accompanied by an “*awareness*” Cara keeps a mental mirror in which he tries to figure out who he is and who he has become (Pineda 64):

He could see the limp piece of torn newspaper, the letters floating on the water. It seemed once to have been folded in half, then opened, smoothed out beneath the surface. He tried to peer at it, but it tantalized, eluded. It retreated even as he reached for it. Ripples of water moved across the surface, eddies of light and shadow scurried across the face of it. Certain letters still stood out.

It was as familiar as the inside of his eyelids shut against the noonday sun. . . His whole name seemed to be disappearing beneath the waters. And he let it go. He had no feeling. There was nothing wrong, or fearful, or remotely uncomfortable. The words disappeared beneath the waves as they had appeared.

A TERRIBLE ACCIDENT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM. (italics in the original, 64)

In the same dream in which Cara is rowing on an immense lake with Lula, the successive events that make a major shift in Cara's life are foreshadowed by an allusion to the lines from Robert Frost's well-known poem, "The Road Not Taken." As Pineda writes, "*[t]he lake was large, limitless. There was no shore, no matter where he looked, and yet, here and there were the familiar outcroppings, gulls in flight (although the lake was an inland sea), clouds, the straight road that stretched north into the desert, the one not yet taken*" (italics in the original, 64). It seems possible that "the straight road" that Cara has "not yet taken" signals the start of a journey after his self-confrontation. Furthermore, it characterizes Cara's coming to terms with his stigmatized identity before he is molded by society which spurs the drive to prove himself by raping and beating Lula.

Nevertheless, Cara's surrender to the stigmatized role can be attributed to his unconscious conditioning in relation to the desire of the Other as Cara's unconscious, in the Lacanian sense, is "*overflowing with other people's desires*" (Fink 9, italics in the original). To put it differently, Cara's demand to have a face, more precisely "[a]ny face, so long as it was unremarkable" is directly connected to the desire of the majority (Pineda 71). In this respect, the effort to obtain a reasonable position beyond the socially given stigma category exposes Cara more to "the weight of the Other" (Fink 66). Cara "wills himself to look" (Pineda 43), for his objective is to be recognized by the Other though "[t]he object of desire is continually deferred" (Evans 39). Cara devotes himself to seeking

plastic surgery that will allow him to “have looks again” (Pineda 43) and thus, to reclaim his lost place in the symbolic. The face and the recognition it assigns, then, becomes the “phallus,” “the signifier” through which he could obtain the Other’s desire (*Écrits* 279).

A lottery! That was it! A lottery where a face would be assigned. A door would open. A number would be called. Someone would be standing there – holding a basket, perhaps, or a metal tray with a sterile face. Each would receive a face, each one waiting there. How would they know which was meant for which? Would his name be on it? Or would they be distributed at random, with no attempt to match the new face to the old? (Pineda 69)

While searching for his vanished community membership as symbolized by the loss of his face, Cara finds an alternative solution to his desperation by constructing a face. Constructing a face will situate him closer to the Other’s sphere of interest, but it will also place him beyond the Other’s estimation. Starting from his rejection of the mask, which is an institutional and social imposition, Cara admirably persists in using his agency, largely overlooked by society, as a subject. As Connor notes, the mask may stand for “a false identity, or the identity imposed by an outside force . . . by the dominant society” (161). Moreover, Astrid M. Fellner argues that the mask “institutionalizes his face, obliterating any individuality by making him look anonymous. It defies personal recognition, denying the protagonist personal history” (66). Cara’s determinacy in rejecting the mask and his continual search for surgery instead of attending the rehabilitation programs exemplify his potency to diverge from what is presented as his only option, and his attempt to unearth his unconscious which is presumed to be filled with the Other’s discourse.

During the intense process of his search for surgery, Cara’s conversations with the employees and waiting in lines at doctors’ offices prompt him to ponder the notions of ugliness and normality. As a result, he ends up creating a vision of an “earthly heaven” (Pineda 70). He situates his being outside this earthly heaven as he thinks that “[p]aradise was somewhere else – in an autoclave, sterile, waiting to reshape someone, himself, perhaps – into more human form” (Pineda 70). The significance assigned to appearance further subjects him to the Other.

These processes prepare him for the most compelling yet miraculous process that will mark the radical transformation of his life and his being. In the beginning, Cara comes to know the basic outline of the human face, exploring the intricate diagrams on the walls with great care and attention as if to discover the particular method of building a face: “They show the skin being peeled away to reveal an underground of nerve pathways and blood vessels. He stands examining these closely, absorbed in their design” (71). In the subsequent scenes, specifically in the one where he meets with T. Godoy, he looks at the panels to discover the essential features of facial reconstruction: “He begins slowly to read the words alongside the arrows, forming the syllables with his lips silently, under his breath. His decipherment is careful and plodding. Some words he repeats again and again until he supposes he has them right. Slowly he moves along the wall” (77).

Importantly, these scenes are blended with his memories of Cardoso, his first master who remains in Cara’s memory as a barber surgeon. Cara “remembers holding the basin for Cardoso once while he removed a cyst” and he deduces that “This [surgery] is much like he remembers, only more complicated” (77). His face becomes a means to regain control over his life. Similarly, his name Cara, apart from being a marker of his physical distinction, is closely related with his social position, which is “a place-marker or place-holder” in the symbolic (Fink 52).

Could someone ordinary like himself remake his face? Was it even possible? And what sort of face? Not the one he was born with, surely, or one like some hero or movie star. At best, one with just the minimum: a recognizable nose, a mouth with identifiable teeth, eyes whose expression would at the least be reassuring, a kind of utility face. And skin, skin free of the thousand little black particles still embedded in it, where the rocks had stamped him with the place-name of his calamity – skin that would glow normally, or if not glow, at least be free of distinguishing marks, a slate wiped clean. (133)

Cara’s exile to his mother’s home in the hinterlands gives him the opportunity to dig into his unconscious and brings him closer to the reality of his subjectivity. His return to his mother’s home is a return to a state of being before he became a subject of society. Cara’s isolation and confrontation with the nostalgic reminiscences of his childhood move him away from the stigmatized identity which is founded on the perspective of the Other. The

experience of lack, in both senses, leads Cara to start building a face by himself using every possible means to regain a sense of normality that isolate him from wider society.

Returning empty-handed from his search for facial surgery, Cara decides to reconstruct his face by himself. He steals the book “*Basics of Dermatologic Surgery*” from the library and begins to study the anatomy of the face. He adds what he learns from the book to the knowledge he acquired from Cardoso and from the panels on the waiting lines at the clinics (Pineda 126). Soon after his extraordinary decision, he finds an irrigation job at a mansion and spends the scarce money he earns on buying the necessary equipment, such as procaine and suture thread. The average face he is going to make will enable him to fulfill his physical needs, such as appeasing his hunger. He says,

Carefully he props the piece of mirror against the wall. In it he studies what he sees there. Calmly, for the first time, he forces his eyes to take the measure of his mangled face. . . . He would make himself a face. He did not have to wait. He would make it here, where he knew no one anymore, where no one could tell him how he had to look, what he had to be – now that he had fallen – now he no longer belonged, even to himself. There was no one here to say it, to say it could not be done. Or that he might not to do it, that he had no right. No one at all. (Pineda 110)

Through a continuous and praiseworthy effort “[a]lmost every night . . . under the oil lamp” Cara operates on himself with the care and attention of a doctor (127). In his opinion, the pain he is subjected to by society far outweighs the pain of surgery. “Hunger, rage, despair” (130) do not prevent him from making a face which is “his, his alone” (153). Crucially, Cara manages to elude the identifications with which the symbolic bombards him through its discriminatory practices. The psychological and physical threats force him to make a resolution to find his way out of the dilemma inflicted on him by society. As Pineda expresses, “there are moments when punishment seems to yield some kind of beneficent transformation” (Biggers, “Pineda Unbound”).

In the last scene, Cara takes a seat on the tram at the end of an exhausting day with his reconstructed face, where he comes across Lula just like he had been dreaming of during the tedious process of reconstruction. Though he is not sure whether the woman he sees is really Lula, Cara cannot get her attention at first glance. Pineda does not reveal whether

the woman Cara sees is really Lula or “a stranger” (Pineda 153). Neither does she reveal the reaction of the woman. In the final analysis, despite the extensive damage impairing the subject’s desire to be recognized by the Other, Cara manages to disassociate himself from the image reflected in the mirror by fabricating a face which is “sewn . . . stich by stich” by himself (153).



CHAPTER 2

Masked, I advanced.

René Descartes

2.1. STIGMATIZATION OF THE UNNAMED NARRATOR

Ariel Dorfman is an Argentine Chilean American Jewish author, playwright, poet and essayist, whose works of fiction and nonfiction garnered him an international reputation. His third novel, *Mascara*, which tells the story of a man with a featureless face, published first in Spanish and later in English in 1988, is one of his works written in exile along with *Widows* (1981) and *The Last Song of Manuel Sendero* (1983). As in *Face* by Pineda, *Mascara* by Dorfman centers on the human face, or its lack thereof, and the significance of the face in conferring recognition on the individual in social encounters. The lack of a face exposes the unnamed narrator to unfair treatment that severely impairs the quality of his life. Just as Helio Cara in *Face* is left with the pain of social injury after having lost his face in a catastrophic accident, the unnamed narrator's featureless face in *Mascara* disqualifies him from social participation and he is afflicted with grievous suffering and gloom.

Born in Argentina in 1942 to a Jewish family who escaped from ethnic and political persecution in Eastern Europe, Dorfman moved to the United States at the age of two when his father left Argentina because of financial concerns. However, he eventually had to leave the US for Chile since his father became associated with communism during the McCarthy era. When the 1973 military coup led by Augusto Pinochet broke out in Chile Dorfman was forced to leave Chile for the United States after temporary stays in the Netherlands and France. During the immigration process, Dorfman adopts three different names; Vladimiro, Edward, and Ariel with regard to three countries he has been to, respectively, Argentina, the United States and Chile. Living in the United States, he rejects bilingualism and speaks English only for almost ten years. The act of renaming himself and his reluctance to speak his native language may be connected to his self-

perception and his vested interest in identity in his works. It might also be argued that his turbulent life, his constant exile, and the resulting instability led him to disidentify with his origins. In this respect, Hernán Vidal deduces that “Dorfman has no identity, except for the Americanness he forged for himself . . . in resentment against his parents” (13). Similarly, McClennen notes that Dorfman’s attempts to find belonging in a particular community also reveal his oscillation “between understanding the self as a subject of free will or as a socially and historically determined entity” (4).

Similarly, the unnamed narrator in *Mascara*, a faceless man, tries to figure out his place in his community while struggling with the ignorance of larger society. Significantly enough, as Erving Goffman associates “name” or the act of naming with “fixing identity” in his stigma theory (77). However, Dorfman intentionally refrains from giving the name of the narrator throughout the novel which universalizes his struggle as a nameless, faceless man. Moreover, the narrator calls the doctor by different names such as Maravirelli (3), Mierdavelli (4), Maravillo (4) to allude to the triviality of the names which “are no more than ‘a muddled and precarious mixture of syllables’” (Dorfman 70).

Containing three main chapters and an epilogue, *Mascara* is narrated from the perspective of three characters who cross each other’s lives in striking ways. The first chapter, which incorporates the major storyline, is told by an unnamed, faceless narrator, who is not recognized by others literally and metaphorically but who has a superhuman ability to remember the faces he has seen before. Due to his facial anomaly, he has been left in the lurch by his family and his girlfriend Alicia. Alicia undergoes a plastic surgery by Dr. Mavirelli, then she leaves the country and dies after a short while. Despite his deep grudge against the doctor for having destroyed Alicia, the faceless narrator invites the doctor into a partnership when Oriana suddenly enters his life. Being an amnesiac herself, Oriana tells her own traumatic story in the second chapter. She witnessed her father’s murder, was sexually violated by the secret police and she has remained mentally frozen since her childhood. Although her physical body keeps growing with age, her mental and emotional development seem to be stuck at the age of four. Her exceptional naivete and obedience impress the faceless narrator. In order not to lose the only woman he can control, he wants Doctor Mavirelli to make Oriana look like a four-year-old. Mavirelli, who is obsessed

with power, is a successful plastic surgeon who remodels people's faces in accordance with the latest beauty trends and the current political climate. As an ambitious and greedy surgeon, Doctor Mavirelli is highly conceited in his tone and supplies society with the perfect images/faces he constructs. In the third chapter Dr. Mavirelli addresses the unnamed narrator announcing that he has agreed to operate on Oriana's face in return for the transparent skin of the unnamed narrator. The details about their confrontation is given in the epilogue by one of the assistants of the doctor, Maya Lynch, who reports that after Oriana runs away from the clinic, the doctor and the unnamed narrator engage in a fierce dispute. At the end of the dispute, the narrator dies of cardiac arrest, and the doctor emerges from the operating room with the skin of the narrator, leaving him with peaceful smile on his face.

In the afterword to Dorfman's novel, J. M. Coetzee states that "[h]is [the narrator's] facelessness is not a physical deformity such as we find in medical textbooks. It is rather a nullity, an absence of feature" (131-2). Nevertheless, the narrator's physical difference causes him to be stigmatized for "his[her] possessing an attribute that makes him[her] different from others . . . and of [being] a less desirable kind" (*Stigma* 12). The narrator's congenital condition, a non-existent face, ascribes him with a stigmatized social identity and lesser social value (15). From the moment he is born, he receives bizarre treatment as there is "something strange about" in his face (Dorfman 104). In an unintentional manner the maternity nurse in the hospital "forget[s] the most elementary tasks" with respect to him: "She was not giving him his bottle on time, she wasn't bathing him on schedule, she wasn't taking his temperature" (104).

For the rest of his life, as McClennen suggests, the unnamed narrator is "completely disconnected from society, totally outcast and totally forgotten" (41). He is marked by "a face without a skin" which renders him invisible and impossible to be remembered (Dorfman 9). Throughout the first chapter, which proceeds like an interior monologue that he addresses to Doctor Mavirelli and in a broader sense to the conscience of society, the narrator reveals how he is treated as a "nonentity" since his early childhood (Dorfman 54). The tone of the narrator's voice turns out to be bitter and cynical. Dorfman states that "the man, arrogant as he was, was somehow incredibly hurt, terribly damaged and

twisted” (Dorfman and Incledon 103). While the narrator seethes with silent resentment, he pretends to accept the indifference towards him:

You won’t recognize me, either, Doctor, when you inspect me through the split-second frame of your door. Your eyes will slip over my face as if they were made of soap, sliding through my features like a rain on a darkened waterfall. It’s been happening to me since I can remember. Before I can remember. There’s proof that they used to forget to give that kid his bottle. What’s that brat squealing? Suppose he’s hungry? Impossible—we gave him his—and then they realized that no, they hadn’t given that baby a piss of milk. These are not guesses, Doctor. I’ve read my own medical record (Dorfman 5).

In addition to his peculiar appearance, the narrator has a rare characteristic attribute that reinforces his stigma and thwarts his opportunities to build and develop meaningful relationship with others. He shows an “indifference to the noises and jabbering” (13) and is unable to distinguish the sex of the person without establishing eye contact. To put it more clearly, he does not recognize the owners of the voices without seeing them. Nevertheless, he possesses a kind of photographic memory that enables him to retain the images of people with great accuracy. Once he sees a face, he is “absolutely unable to forget” it (13). Still, his “forgettable face” (33) is the most basic reason that greatly limits his chances in his private and social life and provides the base for his stigmatization.

The narrator’s featurelessness turns out to be unwelcomed by his family who completely ignores the narrator’s existence for as long as he remembers. His father, who is bitterly disappointed that his son is born without a face, neither acknowledges the narrator’s presence nor identifies him at a random encounter. His mother, on the other hand, is far from developing an instinctive mother-child attachment and treats him without any motherly affection or care. The narrator states, “she (his mother) would not even deign to pronounce my name” (31). His negligence, of which he becomes fully aware with his sister’s birth, is furthered by the school which presages his never expanding social circle. He gently falls into oblivion and spends a certain period of his life being “nothing, no one, less than one” (20):

I lived as if I were missing. The teachers were surprised when I returned my written tests—as if, for an instant they realized that I did exist . . . [S]urprised

that I was in their class, because they never spoke me or asked me a question, they never expelled me, they never called on my uplifted hand. Anybody sitting next to me at the cafeteria was always talking to the kid on the other side. What I would have given, like a used-up cigarette butt, for someone to have put me to their lips for a last—or in my case, a first—puff. For someone to put their lips to the ashes of my lips. (29-30)

Having no recognizable feature on his face “that anybody could register, not a surface on which some improvement could be imagined, not the rag of a possible alteration,” the faceless narrator is left alone without care, attention and love of his parents (Dorfman 24). His stigmatized identity, which is initially given to him by his family, plays a significant role in his understanding of himself as a “discredited” person whose social growth is hindered, and requests of any sort are repeatedly rejected. Like Helio Cara in *Face*, the unnamed narrator is denied dignity and respect. He encounters prejudicial reactions and is positioned in a lower rank than socially disadvantaged groups, as he conveys:

I was aware—no doubt it—that nobody remembered me, that the world acted as if I had not been born. Less visible than an Indian or a nigger, much less visible than one of the tramps sleeping in the street. At least people don’t walk on one of those; they side step the smell from the shit glued to their unwashed asses. They take them into account. But not even that, for me. People I have known for years stumble against me, push me. If I’m lucky, they’ll apologize: Oh, so sorry, they say, without faintest show of familiarity, never able to tell who I am. (21)

His emotional distress by his family’s reluctance to provide the emotional nurturing continues and even increases during his adolescence. It is coupled with his failed love affairs starting from a very early age. Not being fully aware of his stigmatized situation yet, the narrator at the age of six falls in love with Enriqueta; “the most popular of all the girls” (20), who is going to have a birthday party with her schoolmates. Because his father refuses to give him allowance to buy a gift for Enriqueta, he sends her some drawings to catch her attention. Enriqueta’s disinterest in him and his discovery that Enriqueta used those drawings as toilet paper for her doll severely damage his psyche and leaves an adverse effect on the formation of his identity.

His drawings, which are a part of his desperate attempt “to be invited,” (Dorfman 22) is “a way of asking for attention” (22) and an “effort to find a way out of his dilemma”

(*Stigma* 133) for the narrator who, as a stigmatized child, has been trying to fill the hole created by the emotional and physical neglect of his parents. Without “the salutary feedback of daily social intercourse with others,” (*Stigma* 24) the narrator attempts to find his place in society, in a solitary state and with feelings of “shame,” for “fall[ing] short of what he really ought to be” (*Stigma* 18). Enriqueta’s taking those drawings home nurtures his hope to be “noticed” (Dorfman 23). However, her insolent response, and the emotional scar it creates in the narrator, take almost ten years to heal. It damages his self-worth when he is only six years old: “Nobody paid any attention to me, and why should she, the most popular of all girls I knew, with her wealthy parents . . . I was nothing, no one, less than one” (20). From that time on, the narrator’s timidity is replaced by a sense of vengeance fueled by the wrath and diffidence he has harbored alongside the psychological burden of stigma. Goffman emphasizes the role of society and social and institutional arrangements in transforming a characteristic into an undesirable “deeply discrediting attribute” by stating that (*Stigma* 13):

Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories. Social settings establish the categories of persons likely to be encountered there. . . . We lean on these anticipations that we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righteously presented demands. (11-12)

The narrator is acknowledged neither by his parents nor by others because his characteristic featureless face does not measure up to the demands of society (*Stigma* 17). His desire to have a camera is seen as “a waste of good money” by his father who despises his son’s request. He thinks it is “[l]ike giving an armless man a piano” (33). The narrator is blamed for not being able to measure up to what his parents expect him to be. His family does not accept or include him in family constructs and relationships. He states: “Their denial was merely to punish me for having called attention to my existence, for having bothered them with my presence” (Dorfman 32).

Left alone and hurt, the stigmatized narrator “longs to be loved, but more fundamentally he longs to be seen” (135). When Alicia—known by her chosen name—a political militant enters his life short-term, his dreams about becoming an ordinary person and

leading a normal life seem to come true. However, when Alicia jilts him after a week's stay and has plastic surgery by doctor Mavirelli, his disappointment and mistrust culminate. Alicia, "the only" woman by whom the narrator is recognized, is an outsider herself who is "left out and on the side lines at school" (12). In this respect, she could be described as the narrator's "fellow stigmatized" as termed by Goffman (130). She approaches the narrator who is "on the edge of invisibility" (Dorfman 12) with an extremely familiar phrase, "Remember me?" (12):

That was my phrase, the question I had been repeating all these years, first timidly and then with despair—remember me? Remember me? —until finally it was transformed into, I know you don't remember me but . . . and of course they never remembered and in my case did not even pretend to remember (13-4).

Goffman states that "the stigmatized individual can present to others a precarious self, subject to abuse" (*Stigma* 161). Highly aware of his status as an outsider, the narrator believes that it is possible for him to become visible and ordinary through someone's love. In other words, he thinks that gaining attention and recognition will erase his sense of alienation and ease some of his emotional burden. Alicia represents the spark of life that will allow him to make his way through the world and help him gain a "permanent look" (24). However, Alicia's abandonment increases his insecurity and marks him as a pessimist and antisocial person.

As a stigmatized individual, the unnamed narrator feels confused about "what he ought to think of himself" (*Stigma* 150). The disinterest and rejection he is subjected to incite him to seek attention to reduce his feeling of loneliness while simultaneously implying the growing frustration with his rejection-related experiences. In the eyes of others, he is worthless and has the potential to be ridiculed. This ambivalence creates a negative effect on his peace of mind and his sense of self-worth. As Jennifer Crocker explains, "self-worth, or the lack of it in the stigmatized is not a stable, deep-seated personality characteristic. Rather, it emerges in the situation and is a function of the meaning given to that situation" (91). The stigma has a negative effect on the reciprocal relationships with his family and his friends and adds to the vulnerability of his psychological state and his decreasing self-esteem. When he sees Enriqueta, his childhood love, using his

romantic drawings as toilet paper for her doll, he feels insulted and on the verge of despair. He laments that “if she had used them for her own rivulets and apertures, I might have convinced myself that she was attempting at least some sort of intimacy. But the doll” (28). Identifying himself “less substantial than a shadow” (43) the unnamed narrator internalizes his stigmatized condition:

A candy bar in an old shop where no one buys anything, anymore, a candy bar which always remains for some reason in even next year’s stock, which grows stale, which is on sale and discounted over and over again, until it goes for free and still nobody wants it, not even a beggar touch it. Clearance sale and everything is sold, except that item. There I am, waiting for anyone, in the empty shop that the carpenters begin to dismantle. Nobody to take me home. Nobody to take me to some plastic surgeon so I could grow the face I needed. (29)

Dorfman’s career choice for the parents of the unnamed narrator is worth considering. Being a make-up artist and a medical equipment sales representative by profession, the parents of the faceless narrator help people detect and repair internal and external “flaws,” but not their son. His mother, who equips people with necessary appearances for daily encounters, fails to provide the necessary image and protection to fill “the blank blackboard,” a metaphor the narrator uses as for his face. He says, “The woman who had spawned me was too busy with the faces of strangers to make that special effort to rescue me, and so I sunk ever more into anonymity” (26). On the other hand, his father who supplies various healthcare products to hospitals could not help him figure out the reason “why nobody paid any attention to [the narrator]” (26).

My father sold medical equipment to hospitals: hypodermic needles, stethoscopes, things that penetrate the body and try to emerge with a representation of what is happening inside. I had heard him talk about something called an X ray, which took photographs of people’s innards. I wondered if maybe those photos might reveal why nobody paid any attention to me, if they would reveal that something was wrong. In order to get them taken, I faked tremendous tummy pains. (26)

Furthermore, addressing the probable negative conditions in their social settings, Goffman remarks that the “normal and the stigmatized . . . [could] arrange life so as to avoid” such stressful contact (23). Having been deprived of familial ties and excluded

from co-living spaces, the unnamed narrator becomes estranged from his family and obsessed with the idea of living a life apart to avoid the tension arising from his contact with others, including his family.

[G]aining independence from my family was, by then, an obsession: I wanted never again to listen to my father outraged at a toneless voice protesting once more that someone had put a visiting relative to sleep in my bed, never again to watch my mother, wondering what stranger had placed those dirty trousers and shirts in the hamper to be washed, and then meticulously leaving them aside. (Dorfman 47)

Erasing all records, including the traces of his presence, the unnamed narrator begins to live a secluded life far from the company of others. He uses a name other than his birth name and becomes a private investigator: “I destroyed every last file that contained a reference to my existence. I had been born as if dead. I would live as if dead, without leaving so much as a fingerprint on the world’s surface” (50). At a family gathering where he is selected to take the family photo instead of taking part in the portrait, he discovers the joy of taking photographs. His family’s refusal to buy him a camera led him to take control of his life and he starts to sell information about people’s private lives that he is able to collect via his “camouflaged face” (43). After buying his camera, he roams around the city taking sneaky and voyeuristic shots and composes/establishes “an authentic gallery of human privacy” capturing “thousands of faces at their worst, their most intolerable” condition (82). In this regard, photography constructs, as he himself declares, “the most absolute harmony between my [his] brain and the world” (32) and provides him “a bulwark against time” (29).

As indicated by Goffman, with no prospect of social integration, the narrator uses “his disadvantage as a basis for organizing life” (32) and views his misfortune “as a blessing in disguise, especially because of what it is felt that suffering can teach one about life and people” (21-22). Accordingly, as a stigmatized person, the narrator, with his sharp memory and ability to remember faces, takes a job as a photograph archivist at the Department of Traffic Accidents and begins to identify those who try to apply for a driving license under fake names.

Importantly however, his life suddenly changes when an apparently amnesiac woman, Oriana, enters his life. As a traumatized person who is sexually assaulted after witnessing her father's murder by the secret police, Oriana undergoes a kind of split with her body and her self. In other words, while her physical body keeps growing with age, her mental and emotional development seems to be stuck at a particular time. Thereafter, Oriana devotes herself to listening and securing the stories of those hunted by the police. Her effort and devotion to ensure the survival of history puts her life in danger and gets her into trouble with police. Therefore, she is taken to the so-called safe house of the unnamed narrator who is impressed by Oriana's image as a defenseless and helpless woman in need of care. For the faceless narrator, she is "transparent and enigmatic and entirely disrobed of all protection" (60). Due to her amnesia, she gives the impression that she depends on his guidance to survive: "with no memories to orient her, she is grateful that somebody else should guide her existence" (64). The image she projects as a "docile" and "submissive" person is also supported by her attitude (10). However, the narrator is worried that Oriana might become a "normal, orthodox, uninteresting being, one of those millions that stroll along the streets" (62) which induces him to destroy any chance of Oriana's taking action. Working as an archivist, he finds the photo of Oriana at four and a half years old and asks Doctor Mavirelli to restore her childhood appearance in order not to lose the only woman he can control.

In the last few days of the narrator's life, Oriana's presence holds an important place in the sense that Oriana's arrival to his house gives him the hope that one can heal regardless of his/her difference. The narrator sanguinely states: "For once, I didn't mind if somebody didn't recognize me: she treats everybody the same way" (62). On the other hand, the narrator thinks that, though in Oriana's case it is only on the surface, he and Oriana resemble each other in terms of having problems with identity. These problems will allow them to unite against social forces which place them in a disadvantaged position: "I with no face and she with no past, the two mirrors reflecting nothing more than each other and the other again" (61). For the narrator, Oriana is the symbol of the face, life and of being a regular member of society. Oriana's escape triggered by the impact of her traumatized history interrupts the narrator's plans and costs him his life.

Living in a society which places considerable emphasis on appearance, the unnamed narrator is perceived as a stigmatized subject that is a part of “pervasive two-role social process in which,” as stated by Goffman, “every individual participates, . . . at least in some connections and in some phases of life” (163). This being the case, he experiences the negative consequences of his stigma on his mental and emotional health that prevent him from forming healthy and secure attachments with others.

2.2. NORMALITY AS AN ILLUSION

From the point of those who deem themselves to be normal, the unnamed narrator is abnormal with his missing face. He is part of a power network in his family and his social relations, which denies him interpersonal relationships and pushes him to the edge of society. His family, which is a microcosm of the society in which he lives, initiates and actively perpetuates his stigmatization by inducing him to assume a devalued identity.

The way the unnamed narrator establishes his relationship to his family and recognizes himself as “less substantial than a shadow” (43), and the way he aligns himself with the stigmatized identity forced on him, can be defined as an example of the subject who, in Foucault’s formulation, is “tied to his[her] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (“The Subject and Power” 781). His internalized, trivialized inner worth, internal conflicts, and his subordination are also a reflection of the power embedded in his limited social contact with his environment. The featureless narrator is stigmatized because he is assumed to possess a characteristic outside the ideal appearance norms in line with the majority’s perspective. Nevertheless, Goffman maintains that:

Failure or success at maintaining such norms (being sustained in part because of being incorporated) has a very direct effect on the psychological integrity of the individual. At the same time, mere desire to abide by the norm – mere good will – is not enough, for in many cases the individual has no immediate control over his[her] level of sustaining the norm. It is a question of the individual’s condition, not his[her] will; it is a question of conformance, not compliance. (Stigma 152-3)

Being one of “those who are with an inborn stigma,” the faceless narrator is largely affected by the intense pressure of the norms in the society and accepts the reality generated by norms. As Goffman suggests, stigmatized individuals “become socialized into their disadvantageous situation even while they are learning and incorporating the standards against which they fall short” (46-47). He has been surrounded by the norms of the middle class starting with those of his parents, who are depicted as “successful members” of the middle class (Dorfman 132). Contrary to what might be expected, his parents discourage him from social integration. In one of the scenes, the narrator is chosen to take the family picture after the annual family reunion, but he fails to get good pictures and finishes the film roll in the camera due to the excitement of taking pictures for the first time. At this point, his mother’s reaction illustrates the social attitude towards the stigmatized who is judged by group norms that originate from a reality unique to the group itself: “This brat can’t do anything right. . . . Everything this brat does comes out wrong” (Dorfman 31). He is considered incapable of doing the simplest tasks given to him.

Another example would be the inconsiderate approach of his father who rejects giving financial support to his son, thinking that his son is using his forgetfulness to cheat him. The narrator receives continual scorn in compliance with the mechanisms of power: “That’s how it always was with me: not only did people refuse to see me, but when I protested, they would cram me into their invented reminiscences so as to quickly get rid of me. I was inserted, over and over, into a past that they convinced themselves existed but that I had never lived” (Dorfman 22).

On the other hand, the absence of a self-image makes him vulnerable to the intricacies of normality which descend like a nightmare on his life and his self-concept. He lacks the “positive social value” (“On Face-work” 5) he needs in order to assert himself because of “the hollow of my [his] face” (Dorfman 52). The indifference by his family is perpetuated by other members of his community such as his friends, his teachers who act in a similar fashion towards him, reflecting the pervasiveness of power that “designates . . . an ensemble of actions which induce others to follow from one another” operating at the level of daily life (“The Subject and Power” 786). The women, Alicia and Oriana

respectively, get in touch with him solely for their own interests. The narrator, due to his yearning for at least a “*phantom acceptance/normalcy*” cannot escape their allure, which in turn makes him more subject to the very power that he is always already a part of (Stigma 148, italics in the original).

As a result, without parental support, he leaves the school without a framework that would help him overcome the psychological and social forces of the normality with minimum damage to his psyche. Instead, he identifies with the stigmatized role imposed on him by the power relations derived from socially agreed standards, conventions and expectations. After discovering that his estrangement emanates from his featureless face, the narrator begins yearning deeply for a tangible face that will enable him to participate in every aspect of life as a full and ordinary member of society. He says,

[b]ut initially my intuition about the future was still darkened by an illusion that continued to prey upon me. Normality. That illusion. Yes, I still dreamt of betrothing Enriqueta, of becoming my parents’ prodigal son, of arriving with fanfare at a party. In a word, I was still submitting myself to the fiction that it was possible, and even desirable, for me to become permanently visible, a loyal member of your world, doctor, the world where you reign.”
(33)

To fulfill the normative expectations of society which provoke his desire to be a normal person seems, at least for a period, possible with Alicia. When Alicia chooses to have the operation that will grant her an “artificial face” (35) the faceless man cuts her out of his life. To be abandoned by the woman who might bring him “a permanent look” makes him feel devastated (24). Being forced to face up the reality of being a stigmatized individual, he is once more exempted from forming an emotional bond to a person:

She [Alicia] was restoring for me that obscene phrase, almost as if someone wanted to make fun, at this late date, of what I had once desired: to be a man like any other man, who misplaces one person and remembers another one, who is recognized by most people and is ignored by a few. Alicia made me feel like that man. . . . If she had been able to avoid the temptation of your propaganda, Doctor, . . . perhaps this would have been a different story. Perhaps I would have grown to love someone who would accept me as I was.
(Dorfman 14)

His isolation and new life can be regarded as a practice of self-regulation, a practice of disciplinary power. Similarly, the conflict between the narrator and his parents appears to be the direct consequence of power relations as his father and mother act as the representatives of the larger society and assign him the role of the stigmatized. Additionally, they fail to pay him his just due as an ordinary person with rare condition. Consequently, the narrator breaks his family ties and spends his life holding the delusional belief that he is “un-worthy, incomplete and inferior” (*Stigma* 153). This is, in fact, one of the main modes of the working of power which, as Foucault suggests, “is exercised through its invisibility” (*Discipline and Punish* 187). The continual sense of surveillance which functions in the form of negligence in narrator’s case, brings about the unconscious internalization of the sociocultural standards of physical appearance and steer him toward wishing for normality: “If someone like you, Doctor, a genius such as you, had seen me at the beginning, who knows if my life might not have changed. Or if some woman, many years later, Alicia perhaps, had given me birth with a permanent look instead of chasing the mirage of a face promised by the unhealing hands of the surgeons of this world” (Dorfman 24).

His stigmatization is further reinforced through spatial arrangements which is embodied in the family and social organizations from which the narrator is intentionally left out, as seen in his exclusion from family photo and Enriqueta’s party. Unlike Helio Cara, in whose case the supposedly normalizing gaze lays visibility on him, the narrator is placed within a web of deliberate negligence. This disregard determines his position in society even if it is on the margins. By and large, the narrator’s status as an outsider and the “gray indifference” (42) towards him can be regarded as the reflection of power intervention on the basis of the preconceived idea of normality.

In the novel, Doctor Mavirelli who is depicted as a Machiavellian villain manipulating people for his own benefit, is famous for making “the most pre-eminent faces in the country, the public faces with which the powerful governed, the looks that the history books would gather for the admiration of future generations” (57). With his pretentious cosmetic surgery operations, he manufactures “features [which] offered stability to the social order” (109). In this regard, he stands for the normal, or more precisely, he

represents the power which triggers the emergence and perpetuation of stigma. The doctor explains his vision of the “discredited” people as follows,

[a]s a child, I had always hated ugly people, with their defective eyes, their tortured nostrils, their repugnant pelt. It was an unfair imposition, especially if they happened to be the sort person who acquired some degree of notoriety. Repulsive insects like them, I told myself, should conceal themselves, or at least should make the effort to transfigure their visage. I would be, I swore, the instrument for that transfiguration. I would be the provider of embellishment and grace for the pre-eminent men and women of our time. Quite a responsibility, wouldn't you say? (Dorfman 107)

Discovering the special skin of the narrator when he is a newborn baby, the doctor is astonished to see how “a human being would be able to fuse with his ever-changing background, could mix in to the point of invisibility” (105). Instead of restoring his patient's health and finding a cure for him as the doctor-patient relationship ethically requires, the doctor focuses only on the “infinite” commercial potential that the narrator's “magical” skin will offer him in the future (105). When the narrator erases all the traces of his existence, the doctor, having lost the track of him, assures himself that he will find the narrator someday. He exaggerates his “ability to operate on someone with no countenance” in advertisements in order to be able to find the narrator. The two meet finally when their cars crash into each other twenty years later (111).

The narrator's hatred is intensified after the doctor operates on Alicia and destroys the narrator's dreams of her. In fact, the faceless narrator's deep grudge against the doctor stems from the nature of Mavirelli's job and everything it represents, including the shallowness and superficiality of the society which places so much value on appearance. He accuses the doctor of being a skilled trickster charming and deceiving people. The doctor grants his patients “an additional momentary visibility,” an anonymity per se required to “wield more power than they had ever conceived of” (105). Rather than helping those in need of help, his operations serve to the interests of those in authority and eliminate any threat to the stability of institutions. For instance, he remodels the face of a politician with “a curious blend of juvenile features with a serene and mature gaze” in accordance with public demand (108). The faceless narrator sees Mavirelli and others like him hold power both to play with it and to distort people's perceptions of reality:

The instinctive hatred of plastic surgeons—the worst of the lot, because they do not even respect the outer trimmings, because all their efforts are made in order to suppress a revelation. Not that the others are any better, with their god of pills, their smell like a pharmacist's thumbs, believing that they can sound out what moves slowly in our depths, inserting their instruments into the mouth and beyond their asshole and under the fingernails, into the swamp of a heart we have each inherited. Cleavers that open you as if you were a can of food. To open, to open, to make you bleed, to enter and then—what? Then, nothing. Then they proclaim that they have discovered what is corrupting us, when *they are the ones responsible for having made us sick in the first place*. That's *their strategy*—to make people suffer, . . . in order to explore a sickness that was no more real than the one I had feigned, and all so that the patients would be grateful (Dorfman 27, emphasis added).

The narrator's description of surgeons as responsible for the outbreak of health-related problems brings to mind Foucault's notion of "medical gaze."¹² Tracing the history of modern medicine and the variations in medical practice between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Foucault coins the term "medical gaze" to explain the power of transforming the subject into an "object of knowledge," by the physician. "Medical gaze," therefore, is a method used by the physicians through which the subject is granted "the status of object" (*The Birth of the Clinic* XIV).

Foucault capsulizes the change in the manner the physician treats the patient through the question posed by the physician to the patient in the 18th century, "'What is the matter with you?'" which later became "'Where does it hurt?'" (XVIII). As Hsuan L. Hsu and Martha Lincoln put forth, "[f]acilitated by medical technologies that frame and focus the physician's optical grasp of the patient, the medical gaze abstracts the suffering person from her sociological context and reframes her as a "case" or a "condition"' (Biopower, "Bodies . . . the Exhibition", and the Spectacle of Public Health 23). The changing nature of the options and the manners in the doctor-patient relationship leads the way to viewing the body as an object to be examined and results in objectification of the patient.

¹² Susan Sontag, an American philosopher, literary critic, academic, political activist of the 20th century, also discusses the role of social and cultural institutions in excluding those who do not fit into mainstream on the basis of their health conditions. As an example, Sontag, a cancer patient herself, refers to stigmatization of illness through social and cultural metaphors in her *Illness as Metaphor* (1978).

In the novel, Mavirelli places a “small apparatus like a metallic clitoris” on the patient during his operations, which is designed to remove all the memory of the patient’s past along with his/her skin. It can be suggested that the doctor embodies the dichotomy within the system that supports “the sharing of a single set of normative expectations,” even if they do not apply to all members of society (*Stigma* 152). By using the instrument resembling to “metallic clitoris” as a medical apparatus, he holds the power to erase his patients’ memories and alienate them from their individual history.

Lacking the inherited physical traits or genetic makeup, the narrator nevertheless grasps the contradiction in the workings of system which imposes a normative power on the individual. Normality that ostensibly “proceeds from an initial premise of formal equality among individuals” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 158) ends up in the differentiation of people in terms of their capacities and even inborn qualities. Normality accounts for a kind of penalty which is exercised to incite compliance with widely shared beliefs by the society members, therefore, it evolves into antithesis of its promise. From then on, his desire to be “normal” is replaced by a feeling of disaffection towards the idea of normality from which he later deduces that “the quest for normality was definitely a mistake” (Dorfman 33). The narrator’s realization of this fact mainly through Oriana changes his perception of life and people:

But all too soon I understood that not all the make-up in the world would have saved me. I understood it, to be precise, they day on which my little sister was born. I had encouraged the illusion that when she arrived she would fulfill two of my desires. The first was that she should have no face. And the second, that she should bring me mine, the one that had perhaps been forgotten back there, in those moist ashes inside my mother’s stomach. (24)

The discrepancy between the real and presented image/self/appearance (of faces) is a theme recurring throughout *Mascara*. Society anticipates a status for him due to his congenital disorder but the narrator questions and hypothesizes about the legitimization of these socially grounded realities about face and appearance. This discrepancy is created and maintained by people like Doctor Mavirelli who serves in the front line of a “crusade for a society in which power would be exercised with the accountability of beauty” (107) by making “counterfeit faces” (27).

The title of Dorfman's novel in English, *Mascara*, denotes a cosmetic which is used to improve the look of one's eyes. As such, it connotes the false and artificial effect on one's physical appearance. The book's Spanish title, *Máscaras*, on the other hand, highlights the multiplicity of faces or identities people take on. When the Spanish word is divided into two parts as "mas" and "caras" it means "many faces" (Delgado and Stefancic 41). In this sense, the title refers to the multiplicity of faces people can wear, depending on their social encounter. Furthermore, living in a world where "the face is no longer part of our natural self but belongs instead to culture" a face can be fabricated by people like Doctor Mavirelli (Dorfman 134). The unnamed narrator, however, suffers from the absence of a particular image of himself which threatens his sense of being and belonging. His realization of the fact that the face is nothing more than a social construct brings him to the conclusion that his quest for a permanent face and thereby a coherent identity is meaningless. Social cohesion can be achieved under varying guises in accordance with public expectations. The contradictions and hypocrisy prevalent in society stirs up his hatred towards people who, in his own estimation, delude themselves into believing in the legitimacy of their assessments about each other. As J. M. Coetzee explains, in *Mascara*

the face is no longer part of our natural self but belongs instead to culture. The face is a mask that we inherit, largely from our parents. . . . Our face is part of our self-presentation, like our clothes, but we cannot take it off as we take off our clothes. Yet it is an error to think that beneath the face we wear is our true self, for there is no such thing as not wearing a face. One exception to this rule is a young child whose face has not yet set, particularly a young girl child like Oriana. Another is the faceless man. But neither a young child nor a faceless man can participate in the social order. (134-5)

As Coetzee states, in the novel the face is transformed into a medium that functions as an indicator of social status and/or social class. In a society where appearances and looks are equated with success, the most "valuable asset" of people is their face (108). Accordingly, physical and particularly facial attractiveness shape the daily life and behavior of the members of society. The unnamed narrator is stigmatized for his "anomaly" and is subjected to grueling ignorance connected with power and commonly held values, ideas, and beliefs. In other words, his unusual appearance works "as a vector of inequality" that imperils his equal participation and treatment in interpersonal engagements (Talley 198).

Goffman's approach to the face as "on loan" to anybody "from society" and later his dramaturgical approach to social relationships that lead the individual to create the desired impressions on his/her relations recall a situation similar to that of the unnamed narrator. For Sophia McClennen, "Dorfman's writing investigates how our self-perceptions are often out of sync with our public selves" (7). In *Mascara*, the unnamed narrator suffers from a kind of "disconnect" that manifests itself in his internal voice, which revolts against the unreasonable comparison between the members of society on the basis of the appearance and worth of the individual (7). He is exposed to unfair double standards for being devoid of a face and the impression a face creates on others.

The narrator longs for basic human needs such as love and a sense of belonging. The meaning he attributes to his temporary relationships with Alicia and Oriana and their behavior towards him as an ordinary human being fosters an optimism that he could receive the care and respect he has always expected. Unlike Enriqueta and Alicia, Oriana is not in search of an artificial look that society and/or the doctor is ready to offer her: "Oriana is the first woman I have ever met, Doctor, whom I do not need to photograph. The first in which the photo would reveal less than what she already has written all over the fullness of her face" (59).

His internalization of the norms of normalizing society and the effects of power can be best explained in terms of his relationship with Oriana. Oriana mirrors the narrator in the sense that they are both outside the expectations and norms of society, which makes them more vulnerable to exercises of power. The signs of her adult self disturb the narrator and cause him to exercise the very power from which he himself suffers as a stigmatized individual. The idea of her becoming normal again frightens the narrator because Oriana's normality will separate them from each other. This is exactly the claim Foucault makes about power: "it individualizes" (*Discipline and Punish* 184). The narrator tries in vain to protect her from the boundaries of normality both because of her innocence and the absence of the "recesses and duplicity as that of any other human being" in her (Dorfman 59). Besides, he does not want to let go of the feeling of being accepted by her:

Oriana's previous existence is not registered in that report alone. Her true history is also known by some adult Oriana who is crouched within that child

Oriana who stretched out her arms to me so that I could protect her. That older woman is determined to come back to the surface and transforms my loved one into a normal, orthodox, uninteresting being, one of those millions that stroll along the streets with their jeans . . . Normal: someone with a past, with a mask, with a piece of lipstick. (Dorfman 62)

The narrator's view of normality as signifying hypocrisy and corruption does not diminish the degree of the narrator's victimization. In a way, his relationship with taking photographs which he thinks is "the exact and mathematical replica of what" he sees (32) enables him to maintain his inner stability in a normalizing society. He sees his camera as a vehicle to get rid of the filters put between reality and appearance. Still, however, at times he abuses the advantage of photography. He catches people's most intimate moments and blackmails them to force them to do what he wants to lessen the frustration of his stigmatized identity. After a while, he realizes that the power of taking photographs does not please him anymore. He receives mysterious calls after the car crash which cause excitement in him because these calls suggest the possibility of achieving prominence. However, since the doctor manipulates all the events, the narrator becomes a victim of his stigmatized identity.

2.3. THE UNNAMED NARRATOR AS A LACANIAN SUBJECT

Unlike Helio Cara who is stigmatized because of his deformed face, the unnamed narrator of *Mascara* has a congenital missing face which turns him to an "unmemorable body" (Dorfman 24). The featurelessness of the narrator adds an extra layer of complexity to his condition because he is denied the right to have an image whereby he could situate himself in the social sphere which is the realm of Symbolic in Lacan's account. In other words, the absence of a face in its physical form deprives him of an opportunity to achieve self-knowledge and subjectivity.

His stigmatized social identity which constitutes a disadvantage for him induces him to identify with the negative portrayals held by the majority. In Lacan's formulation, the subject acquires his/her first identity through a requisite (mis)recognition of parental support. The infant obtains self-representation during the mirror stage. Becoming a

subject of language and a member of society, the human being turns towards a pursuit of recognition, which can only be achieved through recognition by the Other.

The narrator is deprived of an identification with the “Ideal-I” which enables an individual to function as an ordinary human being in his interpersonal relationships. Being bereft of an “imago” does not make the narrator exempt from the necessary identifications the Other provides. The role of his parents in his internalization of the impacts of stigma is immense because “the parents’ attention is what has the highest value in the child’s universe” (Fink 101). Therefore, in a slightly different manner from what Lacan predicts in his analysis, the ideal, which is to be offered by the support and guidance of the parents, is given to the narrator over continual abasement and humiliation. In a similar vein, Dorfman places emphasis on the prominence of the family in terms of providing a protective capsule for the child’s adaptation to life:

The first face a little one sees is not something far away, outside, like a mirror in the sky. Not so. The first thing any child sees is the inside of his father’s face, he sees the maneuvers that his own features must start rehearsing and that are constantly being sewn onto him like an umbrella of skin against the rain. In order to keep out other, possibly worse, invaders, he adopts his father’s shell. Human beings are trapped inside the dead faces of their remote ancestors, repeated from generation to generation. From inside that chain, the grandparents of our grandparents watch us. Adults are their envoys, Doctor, the incessant, invisible remodelers of each baby born. So what every child inspires in the world is not a blessing, but a face lift. Every child, that is except for me. (25)

There seems to exist a dependency between generations which awaits the child before s/he acquires his/her position as a social being. The narrator compares this process which is a kind of rehearsal for life to a surgical operation in which the child is prepared for future action. He, however, is deprived of this privilege. His transition to the social structure adds up to his acquaintance with the stigmatized identity that he is assumed to embark on. The narrator experiences “castration” and falls within the axis of the Other. This process is characterized by the permanent search for the Other’s love which Lacan terms “desire.” Desire, on the other hand, means the opening of a void which is impossible to fill because it is not a desire for a material object, but “a desire for being” (Evans 41).

It can thus be stated that the unnamed narrator is marked by a double lack; his being “a lack of being” in the Lacanian sense and his lack of a face in the concrete sense. Lacking the necessary salutary image even if it is imaginary, the narrator is enforced to identify with injurious representations of his stigmatized identity and therefore “remains subjected to the Other” (*Écrits* 299). He remarks, “It’s been so many years since I have had that sort of experience, people denying me what I demand” (Dorfman 3). It is true that the narrator’s physical needs are not satisfied because his family members “used to forget to give that kid his bottle . . . a piss of milk” (5), but the demand he articulates here is not a physical demand that would be gratified with a feeding bottle. Rather, it is a demand for “what the Other does not have . . . [and] what is known as its love” (*Écrits* 276):

Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is the demand for a presence or absence. . . . Demand already constitutes the Other [society] as having the “privilege” of satisfying needs, that is, the power to deprive them [individuals] of what alone can satisfy them. The Other’s privilege here thus outlines the radical form of the gift of what the Other does not have—namely, what is known as its love. (*Écrits* 276)

The narrator’s demand of attention, love and care can be interpreted as his efforts to seek a place and a representation in the Other, or a “desire for recognition” (*Écrits* 163). As Lacan notes “[t]he subject has never done anything but demand, he could not have survived otherwise” (243). His stigmatized face prevents him from being recognized, but his desire is to be recognized, which means, in this context, the desire to be the desire of the Other. For the narrator, the face has a symbolic function which corresponds to the “phallus” in Lacan’s formulation as a never fulfilled “signifier of the Other’s desire” and a signifier of lack (*Écrits* 279). It is “a token of what the child does not have” yet carries an “overwhelming importance to the child” (Hook 73). Being aware of his “untouched face,” the narrator tries to win his parents’ affection in vain (Dorfman 24). He wants his ignored existence to find a place in the arms of his mother who is the first “Other” for the narrator.

His mother, herself a “lack of being,” is a makeup artist “too busy with the faces of strangers” (26). In a way, she may be said to offer faces concealed with cosmetics to be

identified by the Other. It is his mother's neglect that nourishes his vigilance against the adult world more than anything else:

[T]he woman who should have succored me did not do so. That she brought me into the world, that lady who cloaked faces, of that there was no doubt. But she had not continued with me for the rest of the voyage. She left me there, featureless, abandoned on the wharf—or on the ship that was departing—and I had to defend myself alone. Because what is superimposed upon the blank blackboard children bring with them is their parent's face. That's why—and not for some stupid biological reason—they look more and more like their fathers and mothers as the years grow by. At birth, parents and relatives and lovers coo, flattering themselves with some conceivable resemblance. Lies. For a real similarity, mere fornication, pressing one seed into service so it becomes an unwilling body, is insufficient. In order to secure that face, the adult must keep on interposing himself between the just-born baby and the world. For the rest of its life, the child will pay for that protection against alien eyes. (Dorfman 24)

The narrator alludes once more to the role of parental intervention in a child's development for one's place in society has to be consolidated by the Other by parental stimulation. Yet, he could not inherit the "capacity for camouflage that people learn from their parents" (27) and his need to relate to others manifests itself in his vulnerability to gain attention. He says "what I needed was a loving hand to shed upon me a benediction of colors" (26). It is interesting to note that Lacan confirms the nature of relationship between the mother and the child when he says that it "is constituted . . . not by the child's biological dependence, but by its dependence on her love, by its desire for her desire" (*Écrits* 188). As a stigmatized individual, the narrator's desire is to be desired by others; by his family, by his friends, by members of society, even if his stigmatization and the power relations that connect him to this identity prevent him from claiming such a right on the grounds of commonly held social representations of disadvantaged groups.

Ideal images are derived from the prevailing notions of "normality." Since the unnamed narrator fails to take part in the social structure as a "normal" person, he has to confine himself to the representations offered by the society. His statement on his own condition, in fact, exemplifies the condition of human beings in general:

I had no better defense against people than to become more submissive, to await someone's remote generosity and to start licking his shoe. It was the lap dog's hope of nuzzling into the nook of somebody's affections. But not even a speck of dust bothering an eyelid, not even a draft that makes you get up to shut the door—I was less than those things to them. *I was trapped in the worst of dependencies: at the mercy of someone else's love.* (Dorfman 29, my italics)

When he gives up hope of being loved by his parents, his desperation to be recognized turns into a struggle to communicate with the opposite sex. He tries to be recognized by Enriqueta, Alicia and Oriana respectively. He supposes that “the permanent look” will mitigate the existentialist alienation coupled with the alienation stigma confers on him. Though repulsive as he also admits, his drawings “to be invited” to Enriqueta's birthday party is “a way for asking attention” and a way of exposing his demand as a human being (22). His desire to be “normal” blends with his dream “of betrothing Enriqueta, of becoming my [his] parents' prodigal son, of arriving with fanfare at a party” (32). In this respect, becoming normal would seem to be granted to him only by a face with proportional features. Remarkably, the way the narrator defines his drawings about Enriqueta evokes a similar experience the child has during the Mirror Stage in which the parental Other convinces the child and him/herself that the idealized image in the mirror is equal to the child's material entity. His infeasible dream of winning Enriqueta's heart manifests itself in his drawing Enriqueta “as magnificent and benign, generous as a smiling sun” while Enriqueta herself “was frivolous, cruel, merciless” (22). He underlines that “the more illusions you have about someone, the more captive you are” (22).

Although the narrator defends the nullity of names, everyone in the novel except for the narrator has names. The name of the featureless narrator, however, is never mentioned in the course of the novel. The name(lessness) of the individual actually refers to his/her stigmatized being in the Symbolic order (Fink 53). To put it differently, Dorfman implies the rare condition of the narrator by not giving him a name. Fink states that:

[T]he subject's proper name . . . is often selected long before the child's birth, and it inscribes the child in the symbolic. A priori, this name has absolutely nothing to do with the subject; it is as foreign to him or her as any other signifier[symbol]. But in time this signifier—more, perhaps, than any other—will go to the root of his or her being and become inextricably tied to his or

her subjectivity. It will become the signifier of his or her very absence as subject, standing in for him or her. (Fink 53)

As Fink stresses, one's name does not have a connection to the his/her being. Rather, it functions as a symbol that might be used to address the subject in verbal communication. However, "this signifier" locates the subject's existence in social encounters which, in the narrator's case, does not seem probable. His mother's avoidance to utter the narrator's name indicates his appearance that will never grant him an ordinary subject status:

We require somebody to look at us in order to exist. As nobody can imagine me or even conjecture the possibility that I may be present, as this mistake that I turned into should not be there in front of their eyes, as it is clear to me that my mother should have aborted and maybe did, as my father instead of opening a bottle of champagne at my birth overlooked my existence and went to sleep, because of all this, since then, since before then, I have been an erasure. (Dorfman 45)

The absence of his parents marks a problematic entry into the Symbolic Order that adversely influences his self-perception. The narrator thus devotes all his efforts to specialize in a profession unusual for someone in his situation and age, that is, photography. His perennial struggle renders him in part a common human being in the Lacanian sense because he supposes that photography, which he defines as his "calling" (32) will ensure "the most absolute harmony" between his body and his surroundings as well as his rejection, "the solitude to which the rest of my [his] being had reigned itself" (30). Without enough money to buy a camera, he starts to blackmail people, which he prefers defining as "war reparations" (44), using his schoolmate as a means to persuade people. After buying a camera, the narrator builds an information network and uses it against people: "[o]ne face after the other that I classify inside my own filing system so that they will never have a chance to manipulate me" (61). Coupled with the power photography provides, the narrator's remarkable memory about faces grants him the privilege to protect himself against the profane effects of the stigma. Interestingly, as a subject who is devoid of the "Ideal-I" he is able to recognize people no matter how many operations s/he has and "identify every person immediately without needing to know what sad, fragile sounds their parents gave to them—like branding cattle" (70). In a way, he exhibits his difference from people who "are trapped by what others start to expect of

them; trapped . . . by the image they themselves have tied to introduce into everybody else's pupils. Do you understand now why I am slave to no one?" (45)

Although he initially tries to dissociate himself from his ego cursed by his stigma, he manages to turn it into a disadvantage for others. Using the inappropriate photos he takes, the narrator sexually abuses Enriqueta, taking vengeance on her for his traumatized self-esteem in childhood. His defiance of mainstream representations about his stigmatized identity is also appreciated by Dr. Mavirelli who addresses the narrator with a "paternal tone" (Dorfman 113). As Dorfman points out, between the doctor and the narrator, "the theme of father and son . . . repeats itself over and over again" (Inclendon "Liberating the Reader" 103).

As the representative of the system which ensures the functioning of power, Dr. Mavirelli could be associated with Lacan's concept of "the name-of-the-father" in whom the narrator "recognize[s] the basis of symbolic function, which since the dawn of historical time, has identified his person with the figure of the law" (*Écrits* 66). Doctor Mavirelli pioneers "in the promotion of law" to which he contributes by carrying out plastic surgeries and thereby manufacturing ideal images on which people base their being (*Écrits* 208). He is very much aware of the innate human passion to seek "the Other's desire" that directs the course of people's lives to a large extent. This awareness has apparently determined his career choice. He states, "I had chosen my specialization precisely because I knew that people kill, lie, betray, accumulate millions, decide who they will marry and who will be their friends, with the sole objective of achieving prominence, of being seen" (Dorfman 105). Apart from his sneaky plans for the narrator's face, the doctor introduces the narrator to the social system stimulated by materiality and cupidity: "Show me a beggar who does not dream of becoming an emperor" (105).

It is apparent that the doctor appreciates the endurance of the narrator and his efforts for survival for he "feel[s] proud" of the narrator (111). He finds it "admirable" that the narrator contrives a way of securing himself by utilizing his peculiar ability to distinguish faces and to turn them into objects through the lens of his camera. In a similar manner, with the name-of-the-father who is "the structural symbolic element" that outlaws a

precarious intimacy between the mother and the child, the doctor warns the narrator against his relationships with women and especially with Oriana who, the doctor claims, deceives the narrator with false hope. The women in the narrator's life induce the narrator to lower his guard that he maintains to protect himself from society's reflections of his stigmatized identity.

The narrator's feelings related to the unconscious call of the subject for at least a dose of care and affection coincides with Lacan's view of the residuary quest for the recognition of one's being when a woman called Patricia brings Oriana to the narrator's house. Disregarding her efforts (or others') to communicate with him, the narrator speaks out the human tendency to be captivated by the allure of someone. In his stigmatized position, the narrator's experience conjoins with his internalized devalued self-esteem:

There's something that still melts, still becomes tender all over, Doctor, when a woman speaks to me softly. Even if I know it's hypocrisy, that it was Patricia's press agent spouting the words, that all gentleness was cosmetic and calculated, even so . . . That someone in this world would treat me with the semblance of affection . . . It must happen to you all the time: being sucked in by somebody's splendor although you are absolutely aware that, underneath the bronzed skin, one skeleton is just about as unenticing as another. (Dorfman 6)

In many aspects, the narrator may be said to resist these representations and what is expected of his stigmatized identity. Though he manages to find alternative solutions to alleviate his suffering, after a while, he realizes that the power photography gives him over others does not fulfill his ambition to overcome the socially enforced deficiency that inexorably overwhelms him. As an example, the happiness and the notice which he hopes to acquire, yet he fails to accomplish, when he gets in bed with Enriqueta could be associated with the Lacanian desire which, by definition, does "not seek satisfaction." It is characterized by "its own continuation and furtherance" (Fink 90). Because of its relation to the experience of lack, there is no way to satisfy this desire for human being. He questions:

Did I want to live the rest of my life extracting love from other people as if I were milking a cow? What value could her glance at me have if it depended on something as transitory as a photograph, if it was produced by her

primitive, inexplicable fear of the photograph that she did not even know existed but that gave me power over her? What value is that, if she forgot me immediately? (Dorfman 34)

Being bereft of the simplest love and affection a child should naturally be given, he detests make-up which he refers to as “shields,” (25). With their “manufacture[d]” (105) faces the adults claim attentiveness for themselves. The artificial covers such as daily make-up or voluntary plastic surgery are to make a feign sympathy and serve to carry out their mutual interests with people whom they regard as “a good investment” (61). To be approved and gain acceptance, people become “too absorbed in that self-love which they disguise as love for someone else” (45). His alienation or estrangement from his family, in this respect, could be regarded as a display of his effort to come to terms with his existence, which has no place in the outside world.

The arrival of Oriana with her simplicity gives the narrator the hope that his demand for love may be satisfied. What he wants to do with Oriana is return her to her childhood appearance to secure her obedience. The narrator deconstructs the original mirror stage between the child and its reflection on the mirror and equates it in his mind with Oriana. He says, “I with no face and she with no past, the two mirrors reflecting nothing more than each other and the other again” (61). He believes that he can overcome his stigma by achieving the missing unity between his body and reality through Oriana. To the narrator, his missing face and Oriana’s missing past complement each other and nourish his sustained demand for visibility: “the girl I loved and protected was gradually turning me into a visible man, I felt, of a sudden, as if a sign or scar had started to grow in the absence I call my face, something that would identify me” (75).

To force the doctor to operate on Oriana, the narrator plans on taking some photos of the doctor in the middle of one of his famous operations, which could bring public backlash, in case the doctor reverses his decision. In the planning stage, when detective Jarvik, who is one of his business partners, consults the unnamed narrator’s memory to find Oriana, the narrator decides to take action because of the anxiety triggered by the possibility of Oriana’s entrapment. At that point, their exchange of view with Jarvik on beauty and appearances reveals one of the major themes of *Mascara* and touches on an important

matter about a physically stigmatized person's indignation against society, which places utmost value on appearances. Throughout his life, the narrator tries to recover himself from the damage caused by the label of stigma. Warning the narrator against the dangers most innocent faces may seemingly hide and the untold realities behind "people's secret faces," (75) Jarvik provides valuable counsel which the narrator knows innately but is not carried into effect by society: "to be beautiful all you need is the love of one person" (76).

In Lacan's view, as a member of society, the subject is castrated, therefore the legitimization of those representations derives from the subject's "presenting itself to the other, looking to win attention and recognition from the Other" (Fink 73). In a way, the subject's taking position in the society is a manifestation of his attempt to cover the ontological lack in being. It is this lack and the necessity to articulate the need that causes the individual to be the object of language as well as the system and determines his stigmatized status. As the narrator states: "Each human being has around him a hive of almost infinite relationships, people stuck to his life as if it were flypaper, people mixed into his jam, his clothing, his checkbook, his toilet paper. The things people have been told that they need to live, the things somebody else always has to furnish" (Dorfman 51).

The identity offered by the family derives from misrecognition and there is no way to reach "the ideal-I" since it does not exist. It appears then that the human being builds his/her being on a dream which is never to be fulfilled. This being the case, the construction of stigma is a fairly unfair act that draws its strength from unreasonable judgments. The narrator's stance against the setbacks of his stigma proves his capacity to hold the ropes of his life even if he dies at the end. Although there is no way to fill the lack, being a Lacanian subject, the smile on his face at the moment of his death in the doctor's clinic reveals that the narrator has fulfilled his desire to be remembered even if it is momentary, since "[e]verybody remembers somebody who smiles" (79). In this sense, it can be suggested that as a stigmatized person, the featureless unnamed narrator leaves Earth leaving his indelible footprint on it just as he had hoped.

CONCLUSION

The face is of utmost importance and holds a critical place in informing the social identity of a person and his/her social position in interpersonal relationships. Apart from its social aspect, a proportional face is a significant factor in determining the degree of an individual's psychological well-being. Regarding the value attributed to appearance in present-day society, a potential "anomaly" is perceived as a deviation from the expectations of society and it negatively affects the whole individual experience in one's social milieu.

Erving Goffman terms the situation of an individual who is "disqualified" from his/her social environment as "stigma." He lists three main cases when an individual can potentially be stigmatized: these are physical abnormalities, undesirable moral habits and hereditary conditions. Additionally, Goffman distinguishes among stigmatized people according to the "visibility" of their stigma. While the first category comprises of those "discredited" individuals whose difference is already detected or immediately recognized the second category belongs to those "discreditable" persons whose stigma attribute is not obvious and the decision to reveal his/her stigma is left to his/her discretion. As such, the act of classifying and categorizing people into groups on the basis of their physical, moral and genetic attributes indicates a stigmatization process through which a certain group of people is placed in a disadvantaged status. The stigmatized person is necessarily enforced to endure socially imposed stigmatizing identifications and stereotypical behaviors of the society members based on social bias.

Face by Cecile Pineda and *Mascara* by Ariel Dorfman center on the human face and its significance in conferring recognition on the individual in social encounters. The deformity or the lack of a face exposes the characters, Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator, to a stigmatization process that severely impairs the quality of their lives. Helio Cara in *Face* is left with the pain of social injury after having lost his face in a catastrophic accident. The unnamed narrator's featureless face in *Mascara* disqualifies him from social participation and he is inflicted with grievous suffering and gloom. Due to their physical conditions outside the standards of their communities, Cara and the narrator are

“discredited” subjects who are thus made to confront and deal with the negative consequences of their socially given stigmatized social identities.

As Goffman crucially states, a stigma attribute does not carry a negative connotation in itself but rather transforms into a mark of disgrace by means of the social relations. In other words, stigma is created and perpetuated by the nature of social interactions. Similarly, Cara’s and the narrator’s stigmatization stem from the conflict between society’s expectations and the physical attributes they essentially possess. They are perceived to be unable to fulfill their roles as ordinary members of society. In accordance with socially determined beliefs and widely shared practices, Cara and the narrator are subjected to a set of discriminatory practices by those who deem themselves to be “normal.”

Considering the gap between the normative expectations of society and the attributes an individual truly possesses, Kurzban and Leary suggest that the subject whose identity is in question is “assumed to be incapable of fulfilling the role requirements of social interaction” (187). Stigmatized people are intentionally precluded from many aspects of daily life including “employment, housing, and life itself” (Link and Phelan 382). In the case of such visible stigmas as facial disfigurement, the stigmatized individual could also be subjected to “social avoidance and rejection” (Major, Crocker 5). In this vein, Link and Phelan, who conduct a detailed study on this process in their “Conceptualizing Stigma,” convey that stigma relies on four interrelated components which are “labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination” (363):

In the first component, people distinguish and label human differences. In the second, dominant cultural beliefs link labeled persons to undesirable characteristics—to negative stereotypes. In the third, labeled persons are placed in distinct categories so as to accomplish some degree of separation of “us” from “them.” In the fourth, labeled persons experience status loss and discrimination that lead to unequal outcomes. Finally, stigmatization is entirely contingent on access to social, economic, and political power that allows the identification of differentness, the construction of stereotypes, the separation of labeled persons into distinct categories, and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, exclusion, and discrimination. (367)

Link and Phelan outline the gradual process in the creation and application of stigma with reference to social connections and structures of power. The web of power functioning in social relations and the effect of culture-bound practices reinforce differences and generate categorizations. As a result, stigma becomes an instrument of classifying people and creating minorities because of “[t]he taken-for-granted nature of these categorizations” (367). The stigmatized is subsequently left to confront the negative outcomes in terms of status, money, relationships, and life opportunities.

Helio Cara becomes a stigmatized character due to his unrecognizable face after a tragic fall from a cliff. Being a journeyman barber by profession, Cara encounters severe social humiliation and sudden exclusion from his social environment. He has been fired from his job and is deserted by his lover. His “post-stigma acquaintances” and “pre-stigma acquaintances” play a significant role in informing Cara about his stigmatized identity in terms of their disparaging reactions and inhuman attitudes. With great shock and sorrow, Cara himself has a trouble in adapting himself to this socially given identity.

Unlike Cara in *Face*, the unnamed narrator in *Mascara* is born with a featureless face that situates him as a stigmatized person because his missing face “makes him different from others in the category of persons available for him to be” (*Stigma* 12). The narrator’s congenital missing face causes him to be invisible. With their extremely insensitive apathy towards his existence, the narrator’s family plays a significant role in his internalizing the stigmatized identity conferred on him. He tries to overcome the psychological burden of stigma through a couple of failed love affairs.

Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator are caught in the workings of power which function over them in the form of a normalizing gaze and spatial arrangements. They are intentionally excluded from the public places. While in Cara’s case the normalizing gaze brings an extra visibility to him that he wants to abstain from, in the narrator’s case the normalizing gaze reveals itself as an intentional ignorance that he tries to reverse the course of his life. In either case, Cara’s and the narrator’s facial feature(lessness) determines their stigmatized social positions as a result of the normalizing demands of society. In this sense, the stigmatization of Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator

corresponds to a universal overlooking of individual differences and imposition of a constructed normality.

With his disfigured face, Helio Cara is viewed “disqualified” to continue his former life and is expected to act in accordance with his stigmatized identity with the effect of power exercised on the basis of his everyday relations. Upon his release from the hospital he is provided with a mask to cover his deformed face, which in fact, functions to restructure his social position and shape his self-concept. The mask, in a way, symbolizes his disappearing social contact. Moreover, by his friends, boss, and lover he is inflicted with a “normalizing” concern which compels him to regulate himself as a result of which he becomes a “night wanderer.” In a similar vein, the normalizing concern puts him in a relentless search for a plastic surgery which will grant him an “unremarkable” face to regain his former life. In this respect, his face becomes a field of power exercise in which the society somehow claims right to intervene. From a Foucauldian perspective, he becomes a “bearer” of power who “is caught up in his subjection.”

In the unnamed narrator’s case, the absence of a self-image leads him to be caught in a dream of normality that he deeply wishes for. He believes that he can attain normality by gaining the attention of a woman. His family’s reluctance to include him in familial relations is also perpetuated through their despising attitudes and discouraging statements related to his capacity. As a result, he ends in leaving the school and alienating from the society. In this respect, the unnamed narrator “is tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.” Both Cara and the faceless narrator become creatures of the shadows. However, upon realizing the inconstancy and the baseless demand of the society for normality, the unnamed narrator comes to understand that “the quest for normality was definitely a mistake” (Dorfman 33). He hence diverts his effort to turn his situation to his advantage using photography as a means of protecting his mental health.

The ontological lack positions the members of society subjected to the Other’s appraisal and the power relations it embodies. Cara’s and the narrator’s existential lack, coupled with the lack of a proportional material face, deprive them of their possessing an ordinary social position and make them more exposed to the pejorative portrayals related to their

stigmatized faces. Likewise, their desire to be object of the Other's love related to this double lack intensifies at times as being stigmatized subjects.

Losing his face, Cara initially awakens to his stigmatized identity encountering his mutilated face in the mirror while he is still at the hospital. His distressing confrontation marks his problematic transition to the society's symbolic Other which automatically disqualifies him from social acceptance. Due to his missing face, the narrator is devoid of an ego formation through which he identifies with his "ideal" image. However, he receives identifications/representations related to his stigmatized identity through his ignored status in his immediate familial relations.

In this vein, for these facially stigmatized characters, a face and the recognition it is going to confer become the phallus symbolizing their effort to gain attention to their existence. Therefore, there are times that Cara and the narrator both consciously or unconsciously submit themselves to "the discourse of the 'normal'" and conform to these stigmatized positions related to their desire to be desire of the Other's love as split, social and stigmatized subjects.

Surprisingly however, despite of all difficulties caused by those who put themselves in the relevant authority, Helio Cara finds his way out of all the suffering he is inflicted, by constructing a face for himself. He rejects having "the false recognition" the mask offers and attending to the rehabilitation programs as is advised by the government staff. The unnamed narrator, on the other hand, gets a job as a photograph archivist in the Department of Traffic Accidents, owing to his astonishing memory to remember faces. Moreover, realizing the psychological protection photography offers him, he buys a camera using the privilege his "camouflaged face" grants him and he reorganizes his life in relative isolation from the others.

Bearing all this in mind, it seems safe to assume that stigma is a social practice based on the devaluation of a number of people for their developing a set of undesired attributes beyond general public anticipation. As stigmatized subjects, Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator are actually victims of a mentality conditioned by a set of expectations that are

transformed into “ideals” and “standards” to which people are obliged to conform. As a center mediating the knowledge intertwined with power, or an ideal the subject aspires to be a part of, society and its members as the Other is the primary reason for the occurrence of stigma as a subordinate social category. The members of society as castrated subjects of the Symbolic are themselves unavoidably characterized by an experience of lack by becoming social subjects. Labeling people as stigmatized in compliance with publicly accepted standards accounts for a piteous attempt of the “normal” to gratify his/her ego in an imaginary state of completeness.

Despite their occasional pessimism, Helio Cara and the unnamed narrator have the potential to question and unsettle the conventional depictions tied to their stigmatized identity. Rather than being passive victims of their fate, these characters are resilient and resolute subjects in terms of their capacity to transform their socially determined subject positions. Ultimately, each character adopts an alternative and subjective space that ensures their psychological survival and thus they display a contrasting stance against stereotypical depictions. They position themselves in a more advantageous situation compared to those who assume themselves to be “normal.”

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APPENDIX 1: ORIGINALITY REPORT



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
MASTER'S THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT**

Date: 02/07/2018

Thesis Title : Stigmatized Faces and Identities in Cecile Pineda's *Face* and Ariel Dorfman's *Mascara*

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 29/06/2018 for the total of 94 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 1 %.

Filtering options applied:

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I declare that I have carefully read Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports; that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

02/07/2018

Date and Signature

Name Surname: Fatma EREN

Student No: N13227651

Department: American Culture and Literature

Program: American Culture and Literature

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Dr. Zeynep Ayça GERMEN



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
AMERİKAN KÜLTÜRÜ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 02/07/2018

Tez Başlığı : Cecile Pineda'nın *Face* ve Ariel Dorfman'ın *Mascara* Romanlarında Damgalanmış Yüzler ve Kimlikler.

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 94 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 29/06/2018 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 1 'dir.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1- ☒ Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
- 2- ☒ Kaynakça hariç
- 3- ☒ Alıntılar hariç
- 4- ☒ Alıntılar dâhil
- 5- ☒ 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

02/07/2018

Tarih ve İmza

Fatma EREN

Adı Soyadı: Fatma EREN

Öğrenci No: N13227651

Anabilim Dalı: Amerikan Kültürü ve Edebiyatı

Programı: Amerikan Kültürü ve Edebiyatı

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Zeynep Ayça GERMEN

Dr.Öğr.Üyesi, Zeynep Ayça GERMEN

APPENDIX 2: ETHICS WAIVER FORM

 HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS COMMISSION FORM FOR THESIS
HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT
Date: 02/07/2018
Thesis Title: Stigmatized Faces and Identities in Cecile Pineda's <i>Face</i> and Ariel Dorfman's <i>Mascara</i> . My thesis work related to the title above: 1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people. 2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.). 3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity. 4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development). I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true. I respectfully submit this for approval. Name Surname: Fatma EREN Student No: N13227651 Department: American Culture and Literature Program: American Culture and Literature Status: ☒ MA ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Combined MA/ Ph.D. 02/07/2018 Date and Signature 
<u>ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL</u>  Dr. Zeynep Ayça GERMEN



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
AMERİKAN KÜLTÜRÜ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 02/07/2018

Tez Başlığı: Cecile Pineda'nın *Face* ve Ariel Dorfman'ın *Mascara* Romanlarında Damgalanmış Yüzler ve Kimlikler.

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, mülakat, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kurul/Komisyon'dan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

02/07/2018

Tarih ve İmza

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