

ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
DRIVERS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

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Environmental Social Movements: Drivers of Success and Failure

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ABSTRACT

Environmental Social Movements: Drivers of Success and Failure

This dissertation asks why some environmental movements succeed in their resistance against energy projects and why others fail. It unpacks the drivers that determine the differences in outcomes of environmental social movements, examining energy conflicts that emerged in Türkiye in the 2000s. Departing from studies focusing on limited cases, this comparative research presents a comprehensive account of the divergent trajectories of success and failure in environmental social movements. Using process tracing, it compares four distinct energy conflicts, enabling a nuanced understanding of the drivers leading to different outcomes and the conditions producing similar ones. Empirically, this dissertation demonstrates that the success and failure of environmental social movements are shaped by the interplay of internal and external threats and opportunities. Findings highlight the critical role of strong local support, sustained CSO engagement, and legal protections in fostering resistance, while corporate strategies, the spontaneous ideology of localism, and political crises contribute to failure. Additionally, the dissertation extends the understanding of repression and co-optation by illustrating how these strategies are actively deployed by corporate actors in energy conflicts. Theoretically, it introduces the triadic nexus of success and failure, conceptualizing movement trajectories as the result of dynamic interactions among the state, companies and resistance. Hence, it offers a more comprehensive perspective on movement success by integrating empirical insights into a broader analytical framework.

ÖZET

Çevreci Toplumsal Hareketler: Başarı ve Başarısızlığın Dinamikleri

Bu tez, bazı çevre hareketlerinin enerji projelerine karşı direnişlerinde neden başarılı olduklarını ve diğerlerinin neden başarısız olduklarını sorgulamaktadır. Türkiye'de 2000'li yıllarda ortaya çıkan enerji mücadelelerini inceleyerek, çevreci toplumsal hareketlerin sonuçlarındaki farklılıkları belirleyen etmenleri ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Sınırlı vakalara odaklanan çalışmalardan ayrılan bu karşılaştırmalı çalışmalı tez, farklı başarı ve başarısızlık sonuçlarına dair kapsamlı bir açıklama sunmaktadır. Süreç izleme yöntemiyle analiz edilen dört farklı enerji mücadelesi üzerinden, hem farklı sonuçlara yol açan dinamikler hem de benzer sonuçları doğuran ortak koşullar derinlemesine ele alınmaktadır. Çevreci hareketlerin başarı ve başarısızlıklarının içsel ve dışsal tehdit ve fırsatların karşılıklı etkileşimi ile şekillendiğini ampirik olarak gösterilmektedir. Bulgular, güçlü yerel desteğin, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının sürekli ve düzenli desteğinin ve yasal olarak korunan alanların direnişi güçlendirmedeki kritik rolünü vurgularken, şirket stratejilerinin, yerelliğin kendiliğinden ideolojisinin ve siyasi krizlerin başarısızlığa yol açtığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca tez, şirket stratejilerinin enerji çatışmalarında nasıl aktif olarak kullanıldığını göstererek baskı ve kooptasyon kavramlarını genişletmektedir. Teorik olarak, başarı ve başarısızlığın üçlü dinamiği kavramsal çerçevesini ortaya koyarak, hareketlerin seyrini devlet, şirketler ve direniş arasındaki dinamik etkileşimlerin bir sonucu olarak kavramsallaştırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, ampirik bulguların analitik çerçeveye bütünleştirilmesi, hareket sonuçlarına dair daha kapsamlı bir bakış açısı sunmaktadır.

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
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To those who have found the courage to resist...

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
ARIP	Agricultural Reform Implementation Project
BOO	Build-Operate-Own
BOT	Build-Operate-Transfer
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EML	Electricity Market Law
EPDK	Energy Market Regulation Authority (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu)
HEPP	Hydroelectric Power Plant
IMF	International Monetary Fund
İYİP	Good Party (İyi Parti)
KİT	State-owned enterprises (Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri)
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organizations
NSM	New Social Movements
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)
SP	Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
TEAŞ	Turkish Electricity Generation Transmission Cooperation (Türkiye Elektrik Üretim İletim Anonim Şirketi)

TEDAŞ	Turkish Electricity Distribution Cooperation (Türkiye Elektrik Dağıtım Anonim Şirketi)
TEİAŞ	Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (Türkiye Elektrik İletim Anonim Şirketi)
TEMA	Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats (Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları Koruma Vakfı)
TEK	Turkish Electricity Authority (Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu)
TOR	Transfer of Operating Rights
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The neoliberalization of energy policies, through deregulation, privatization and market expansion, has led to profound changes in the social and economic structures of societies worldwide. The expansion of industrial and extractive activities by both global and domestic corporations has significantly impacted local communities, whose lands have been transformed into assets subject to the dynamics of capital. The consequences of these developments extend beyond the economic well-being of affected communities; they also have irreversible environmental implications. Local communities have been struggling to defend their rights and protect their livelihoods against the effects of industrial activities, energy projects, and other kinds of extractive activities.

A parallel phenomenon has been witnessed in Türkiye, akin to the broader global trend. The escalating implementation of neoliberal policies and a developmentalist approach has given rise to a rapid proliferation of energy projects across the country, some of which have resulted in significant intervention in the living spaces of local communities. This dynamic has also given rise to local communities' defense of their living spaces. Consequently, there has been a notable increase in the number of environmental movements in Türkiye. Yet, in some cases, the communities have successfully halted the realization of these projects, while others have been unsuccessful in their actions, ultimately unable to overcome the institutional and economic power structures supporting the projects.

The research question of this dissertation is “Why are some environmental movements successful and why do others fail?” This dissertation examines the factors determining the outcome of environmental movements in Türkiye, particularly those that have emerged in opposition to energy supply projects under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - AKP). Given the same historical and political context, it addresses a significant question: Why have some energy conflicts have resulted victories for protestors, allowing them to achieve their primary goals, while others have faced defeats? My dissertation aims to identify drivers that influence the success or failure of environmental social movements. To address this question, I trace the factors that influence the outcome of these movements.

The thesis employs a comparative qualitative research design based on process tracing. Initially, a mixed methodology combining fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and process tracing was planned to analyze 16 environmental movements against energy investments in Türkiye. However, due to the limitations inherent in the QCA data and its significant deviation from field observations, the analysis was restructured to be based solely on in-depth process tracing. The cases examined in the thesis are the movement against the Yırca thermal power plant, the movement against the Dokuzhöyük thermal power plant, the movement against the Arhavi Kavak Hydroelectric Power Plant (HEPP) and the movement against the Loç Valley HEPP. The selection of these four cases for detailed field research was based on the QCA results. The Arhavi movement is a failure, the others are successful cases. These cases were selected to represent patterns of success and failure, energy types (HEPP and thermal power plants), companies’ proximity to government, geographical variations, and political

preferences of local communities. The fieldwork was conducted in 2023, and 76 semi-structured interviews with related actors were triangulated with archival data. This methodological approach enabled the identification of the causal patterns behind the different outcomes of environmental movements in the context of Türkiye's post-2001 neoliberal energy policies. The research design and fieldwork are presented in detail in Chapter 4.

In this chapter, I first justify evaluating the cases in the thesis in the context of social movements and define social movements. Then, I discuss the definition of success and failure. Subsequently, I offer a summary of the theoretical contribution of the thesis, the framework I developed to understand success and failure, and its contribution to the literature. Finally, I give an outline of the thesis.

1.1 Defining social movements: Conceptual choices and terminological distinctions

This section outlines the key conceptual and terminological choices that underpin the analysis in this dissertation. It explains how social movements are defined within study, why the selected cases are conceptualized as instances of resistance, and how the term environmental movements is employed to describe collective actions against energy projects in Türkiye.

The distinction of social movements from other social phenomena is their methods through which the actors undertake sustained collective action (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 20-22). The collective action is driven by common objectives (Tarrow, 1998, p. 9). Moreover, it takes place primarily beyond institutional frameworks and the everyday practices of social life (Diani, 1992, p. 7). By means of collective action, actors attempt to challenge authority, power structures, or prevailing cultural beliefs and practices (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015, p. 4) to advance

their collective interest (McAdam, 1982, p. 37). The persistence of actions relies on organizations, the use of networks, shared traditions and solidarity (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 53). Lastly, there is a maintenance of ongoing interaction with opponents, elites and authorities (Tarrow, 1998, p. 9).

Building on above points regarding the conceptualization of social movements, the definition of social movements revolves around following dimensions: (i) collective action, (ii) change-driven objectives, (iii) reliance on non-institutional forms of action, (iv) a degree of organization, (v) some level of temporal persistence, and (vi) interaction with other actors such as opponents and power holders.

The cases within the context of this thesis are environmental social movements which emerged because of ecological distribution conflicts in Türkiye after the neoliberalization of energy resources, which is marked by privatization, market deregulations and a shift towards corporate-led governance. They are the challenges to the both the policies of state and the companies' activities in their living spaces. Since such movements share the dimensions of social movements, I adopt the conceptualization of social movement literature. Drawing on the literature of social movements, the cases in this thesis are social movements which reflect sustained collective actions that advocate a claim with a social solidarity through non-institutional forms of organization. The rationale behind excluding other terms, such as 'blockadia', which is transnational grassroots movement of local communities, indigenous groups and activists against fossil fuel extraction and environmental destruction that contribute to climate change (Klein, 2014, p. 294-295), lies in their restrictive and context-specific nature. In contrast, social movements offer a more

inclusive and comprehensive framework. That is why I define the cases within the thesis as social movements.

Although this dissertation is situated within the broader theoretical field of social movement studies, the term resistance is employed throughout the analysis—particularly within the formulation of the triadic nexus—to refer to the specific forms of mobilization observed in the empirical cases. This terminological distinction is intentional and serves to reflect the grounded, heterogeneous, and often reactive nature of the collective actions examined. While resistance refers to the empirical manifestations of contestation that arise in response to energy infrastructure projects, social movements refer to the broad analytical category that has its roots in theory. It is important to note that environmental movements have been known to employ a variety of self-identifying terminology, including "struggle" or "action." Thus, by avoiding the formal coherence or ideological unity frequently associated with traditional social movement frameworks, the use of "resistance" enables a more accurate engagement observed in the field.

In addition, in line with an understanding of environmental movements as inherently political, this dissertation explicitly conceptualizes the cases under study as environmental movements. This is not merely a descriptive choice, but a theoretical and analytical one: the mobilizations examined here respond not only to environmental degradation, but also to processes of dispossession, authoritarianism, and uneven development. Situating them within the broader tradition of social movement studies allows for a systematic engagement with the political consequences of environmental struggles—particularly in contexts like Türkiye, where such conflicts intersect with broader issues of democracy and right to land, livelihood and spatial justice. This choice reflects an expanded understanding of the

environment itself—not as a static or purely ecological space, but as a lived, contested, and meaning-laden terrain. What is being defended, in most cases, is not only nature, but also water access, agricultural areas, cultural landscapes, and communal life. In this sense, although many of the actors involved refrain from self-identifying as "environmentalists"—instead employing terms such as "defense of living spaces" (*yaşam alanı savunusu*)—this dissertation adopts the term environmental movements to highlight the environmental dimension and broader implications of these mobilizations.

1.2 Defining success: Measuring the immeasurable

Since the study's primary research question is to determine the drivers of success and failure of environmental social movements, engaging with different approaches in the field on success assists in understanding the related discussions and the importance of this study. There are different and sometimes unintended consequences of social movements. Therefore, it seems ambitious to categorize the consequences in such a dichotomous way, in which there are only two paths: success and failure. As the title suggests, this is akin to measuring the immeasurable. However, ‘which factors influence the success of social movements?’, ‘What are the challenges and opportunities for social movements to achieve their goals?’ are plausible questions for both the scholarship and the participants of movements. Therefore, since the operationalization of this study requires a clear definition of success, I delved into the existing definitions of success in the literature.

The methodological and conceptual challenges in analyzing the consequences of social movements became more apparent in the case of success and failure because of its dichotomous nature. Although “success is an elusive idea” (Gamson,

1990: 28) if one can precisely set the boundaries and define the concept – what is meant by success and failure – it is possible to analyze social movements' success. Although there are debates around both the definition and essence of the success and failure of social movements, there are valuable attempts to analyze movements through their success. They primarily try to explain the factors influencing success.

The success and failure of social movements have been analyzed since Gamson's (1975) famous book *The Strategy of Social Protest*. He (1975: 28-37) interprets the success of social movements under a set of outcomes in which there are acceptance by the antagonists and the new advantages gained by the challenging group. If the challenging group is accepted by the antagonist and gains new advantages, it means full response, and Gamson conceptualizes it as success. The exact opposite position is collapse, which is a failure. In the collapse, the challenging group cannot gain new advantages and is not accepted by the antagonists. The mixed categories do not sign an unambitious success of movements and they are classified as preemption or co-optation by Gamson (1975).

Gamson's approach to the success and failure of social movements has been criticized on two grounds. The first line of criticism is about conceptualization itself. Amenta and his colleagues (1994: 681) argue that Gamson does not consider the collective benefits gained as a result of movements in his conceptualization of new advantages. The movement would only be successful if the challengers could gain collective benefits (Amenta et al., 1994: 681). Even a policy change is insufficient to conceptualize a movement as successful. It is essential that the result yields benefits for all (Giugni, 1999: xxii). As another option for the conceptualization of success, scholars also make use of Schumaker's (1975) concept of responsiveness. He proposes five types of categories to examine the degree of policy responsiveness

without directly referencing neither Gamson's study nor success and failure.

However, the reason why the literature has used his category for the success-failure discussions is that the analysis directly focuses on the impact of social movements on the political sphere. The first one is access responsiveness, indicating the access or the will of authorities to listen to the demands and concerns of the challengers.

Second, agenda responsiveness observed when a political system integrates a given issue into its formal agenda. The third responsiveness, named policy responsiveness, represents the adaptation of related legislation for the challengers' concerns. The fourth level is output responsiveness which displays policies that turn into action.

Nevertheless, some societal concerns, such as cultural concerns, may prevent a change in the underlying reason for the grievances of the challengers despite the adaptation of legislation and policy change. Therefore, the political system alleviates the grievances only with the last stage of responsiveness, which is the impact responsiveness (Schumaker, 1975: 492-495). Schumaker helps us conceptualize the success and failure of social movements in this way. The movement can be successful if all levels of responsiveness are attained.

The second line of criticism toward Gamson's definition is about whether we are able to classify the movements as successful or unsuccessful and assess their outcomes accordingly in the first place. Firstly, there are shortcomings in searching for the success of social movements because categorizing them as successful, unsuccessful, or partially successful signifies a homogeneous entity. However, since social movements are complex, there are different strategies, groups, and actions in movements for reaching the goals (Giugni, 1999: xx). Therefore, the dynamics and interactions of social movements require a comprehensive analysis of actions, claims, events, and outcomes (Özkaynak et al., 2021: 414). In addition, searching for

success and failure inevitably leads researchers only to emphasize a certain change. Yet, there are unintended consequences of movements that can be negative and positive for the challengers. Lastly, success is a subjective concept. It is likely to have different perceptions of challengers and external observers about the success of the movements (Giugni, 1999: xx-xxi).

Within the thesis, I define success with reference to the definition of social movements. The primary objective of social movements is to achieve a collective interest. Therefore, I follow the methodology proposed by Amenta and his colleagues (1994: 681) and evaluate whether the collective benefits initially identified by the movement have been achieved. The collective benefit of the cases presented in the thesis is the prevention of external interference in the living spaces of the communities involved. To operationalize success, this study addresses the question of “what the challengers seek” as the foundational step. In all cases, the primary goal is to cancel the construction of an energy project. Therefore, success is being able to stop or cancel the construction of the energy project in this thesis. In this way, I can eliminate the ambiguity of the concept of success. In addition to setting aside the ambiguity of the definition, the collective benefits gained as a result of the mobilization are observable in my cases since everyone could observe whether the project is constructed. Although environmental movements are also complex, some of them provide such a worthwhile base to search for success and failure.

1.3 Explaining key dynamics behind the drivers of success and failure

Despite the extensive literature on the conditions that lead to the emergence of social movements, such as relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a), and political opportunity structures (Tarrow, 1998), the question of which

factors affect their success and failure receives little scholarly attention, with mostly single-case studies. This results in limited understanding of the broader structural and relational factors that shape these outcomes. In this dissertation, an analysis of the extant literature on the factors that influence the success and failure of environmental social movements is presented. This analysis is informed by three main theories, which are resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structures and framing. Theoretically, while resource mobilization theory examines the success of social movements, primarily regarding the various resources they obtain, political opportunity structures take a structuralist perspective, positing that institutional or structural openness or closure affects success. The notion of framing theory underscores the role of interpretative schema, thereby emphasizing the significance of how movements articulate their objectives and the way they aspire to change.

I posit that the factors conducive to success in the extant literature concerning these three predominant theories are shaped by two primary categories: external drivers and internal drivers. While external drivers stand for the institutional and structural drivers such as democratic openness of the system, internal drivers are the ones primarily emphasized by resource mobilization theory, such as material resources of movements. The combination of these two is conceptualized as multidimensional drivers.

This categorization of the existing literature provided a solid framework for the analysis of cases in the thesis. In that way, there is an opportunity to systematically analyze the factors affecting the success and failure of the cases. However, one of the original contributions of this thesis is not only to analyze the studies in the literature through these two main categories, but also to classify the factors affecting the success of the movements as opportunities and threats of the

movements under these two main categories. The concepts of opportunities and threats, which are the foundation of political opportunity structures, are expanded by incorporating other theoretical frameworks, notably resource mobilization theory. I argue that the success or failure of social movements is contingent upon a more dynamic balance between opportunities and threats. An examination of the balance between opportunities and threats, which does not directly refer to the theory of political opportunity structure, presents a framework for interpreting the success-failure dynamics of environmental social movements. A comprehensive examination of this framework, particularly through the lens of an internal-external distinction, reveals details that have been often overlooked in extant literature. The interplay between internal opportunities (e.g. local community support) and external threats (e.g. corporate strategies) adds a dimension to the implications of existing theories. In addition, this dynamic framework enhances the validity and generalizability of causal arguments on success of social movements by expanding its scope beyond the narrow confines of a single or limited set of causal arguments.

Moreover, the existing literature is often oriented towards an examination of the factors that lead to success. However, the drivers of failure must be addressed distinctly because of causal asymmetry in social phenomenon. Causal asymmetry is “the fact that substantial reasons might require us to use different causal factors for the explanation of the occurrence and the different types of non-occurrence of an outcome, respectively” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 109). Therefore, by analyzing the drivers of failure with a comparative study through unpacking the threats to social movements, this thesis addresses a significant lacuna in the literature.

1.4 A triadic nexus of success and failure

This thesis makes a novel theoretical contribution to the existing literature on both social movement and environmental movements studies with respect to the drivers of outcome, specifically their success and failure. By unpacking the interplay between state, companies and the resistance, it offers a dynamic framework of the triadic nexus of success and failure. This dynamic framework facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the drivers that contribute to the success of social movements, a topic that has been predominantly explored through the lens of a limited number of variables in the literature. I argue that the success and failure of environmental social movements are fundamentally shaped by a triadic nexus, which I define as the interconnected relationships among the state, companies, and resistance.

The Turkish state is the agent that sets the rules of the game through legislation, yet it is also the agent that alters these rules once the game has already started. This characteristic of the state has notable implications in its relationship with resistance and companies. The state exerts a significant role in shaping and modifying the strategic tools employed by social movements. While the state has the capacity to restrict the actions of social movements through restrictive measures such as protest bans, it can also create opportunities for these movements. In this regard, social movements can utilize the rights granted to them by legal documents. Additionally, social movements can also shape state decisions by exerting pressure through public opinion. Consequently, the relationship between the state and resistance is a reciprocal one.

On the other hand, the state also has a relationship with companies. It establishes the legal framework for the permits and licenses of companies engaging in energy investments. The bureaucratic processes required to obtain permits and

licenses can either weaken or strengthen a company's response to a movement. For instance, in the cases of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) that were terminated prior to 2009 by the court, companies were obligated to initiate the EIA process from the beginning. Consequently, while legal actions seeking the cancellation of EIAs served as a deterrent for companies due to the prolonged nature of the process, they served as a highly effective strategy for social movements. The utilization of urgent expropriation decisions for the implementation of energy projects, in conjunction with the persistent alterations in the EIA regulation that favor companies, underscores the state's strategic employment of legal instruments to promote such investments. Furthermore, the state plays a proactive role in the facilitation of energy investments through informal channels. Examples of this informal facilitation include the promises granted to companies in private and the efforts of governors and district governors to persuade the public by actively engaging in the process. The relationship between the state and companies is also reciprocal. How companies intervene in state policies is a frequently discussed and researched topic in the literature (e.g. Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012; Karadağ, 2010; Öniş, 2011).

The third relationship in the triad, that between the company and the resistance, constitutes the most significant contribution of this thesis to the existing literature on social movements. This relationship unpacks the role of the private sector, which has become an active actor with deep neoliberalism. It reveals how the private sector has effectively shaped the trajectories of social movements through corporate governance of the resistance. In this relationship, I posit that companies utilize two strategies to influence the outcomes of social movements. The first method is repression, wherein companies attempt to pacify the movement through

the use of force by their private security, the threatening of local people, or the filing of lawsuits to intimidate them.

The second strategy used by companies is co-optation. In essence, co-optation is utilized by the companies to mitigate financial loss of local communities. In this context, companies propose financial incentives, in addition to job offers. These offers may be accompanied by non-monetary forms of assistance, such as the construction of a local school or the renovation of the mosque of village. In some cases, a much longer-term relationship is established between company and the local community, where the company owners originate from the local community. In such cases, co-optation has a more embedded nature since the company consistently supported the local community by providing employment opportunities, offering scholarships to students, and making investments in the region through the municipality. In such a case, the companies' co-optation strategy tends to be more effective, thereby presenting significant challenges to the movement's initial growth.

This dynamic framework proposed in this thesis offers a more comprehensive approach to understanding the success and failure of social movements. While studies that focus on a single or a few variables in the literature enhance the contextual specificity of the study, they possess significant limitations in terms of external validity. By analyzing the interaction between the factors that determine the success of social movements, the dynamic framework proposed in this study increases the explanatory capacity of the theoretical contribution and strengthens its applicability to different contexts. Furthermore, this framework emphasizes not only the presence of specific variables but also their interrelationships and mutual positions. For instance, factors such as the state's position—whether it is repressive, supportive, or neutral—the involvement of companies, whether directly or indirectly,

and the utilization of repression or co-optation strategies by companies against social movements are crucial in determining the trajectories and outcomes of these movements. Consequently, the dynamic triadic nexus framework provides both a theoretical and methodological contribution to the extant literature on social movements by examining not only causal factors but also their interrelationships.

1.5 The neglected core: Rethinking the 'neoliberal' in neoliberal developmentalism

After 2001, the intensification of neoliberal policies led to two remarkable phenomena in the Turkish context. The first was the developmentalist agenda, which aimed at economic growth through investments in construction and energy. The second was the implementation of this agenda by the private sector (Paker, 2017). The policies of this new era are referred to as neoliberal developmentalism because of these distinctive features (Adaman et al., 2019). Therefore, energy policies and environmental movements in Türkiye are frequently interpreted through frameworks of neoliberal developmentalism.

In line with the intensification of such investments, in the years following their electoral triumph in 2002, the AKP confronted by mounting ecological protests. These demonstrations emerged as the government fully adopted a neoliberal agenda, leading to an escalation in popular mobilization concerning energy, construction, and extraction activities. This escalation was primarily driven by the adverse environmental consequences of these policies. According to the Ecology Almanac 2005-2016, a comprehensive documentation of public actions concerning ecological issues in Türkiye, the year 2005 signaled the emergence of a new era of environmental mobilization, accompanied by a resurgence in attacks on nature (Aksu & Korkut, 2017; Kurtiç, 2022).

The literature on environmental policies and environmental movements in Türkiye's deepening neoliberalism policies after 2001 are discussed through two main planes. The first plane of analysis focuses on the developmentalist policies themselves, while the second focuses on environmental social movements. In addition, despite the proliferation of environmental movements and the increasing number of studies on these movements, only a limited number of studies have examined the factors that lead to the outcomes of these movements (e.g. (Arsel et al., 2015; Aydın & Turhan, 2025; Işıl, 2012a).

In addition, the implementation of the neoliberal developmentalist agenda has been predominantly executed by the private sector, thereby resulting in the rise of corporations as the new key players (Paker, 2017, p. 112). However, the extant literature has focused on the roles of the state and the movements themselves and the influence of corporate actors within these dynamics remains underexplored. Therefore, this dissertation presents an original contribution regarding the comprehension of the outcomes of environmental social movements by unpacking the neglected core of neoliberal developmentalism through delving into the key players which are corporate agents for Turkish studies.

Utilizing environmental social movements on energy conflicts of Türkiye as a case study, this thesis underscores how the strategies, alignments, and conflicts within this triadic nexus give rise to movement trajectories. By underscoring the hitherto unacknowledged role of corporations in these dynamics, I aim to address a significant lacuna in the extant literature with this thesis, thereby I offer a more comprehensive framework for understanding the drivers that enable or hinder the success of environmental social movements.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

In the first chapter of the thesis, I introduced the research question, purpose, the rationale for conceptualization and termination of the cases as social movements, environmental movements and resistance. Then, I presented the operationalization of the success in the research. Additionally, I addressed the lacuna in the existing literature and provided an introduction to the contributions of the thesis to addressing this gap.

In the second chapter, I present an overview of the extant literature on the subject as well as the theoretical framework of the study. I provide a brief overview of the theoretical foundations underpinning the existing literature on the success and failure of social movements. I examine the extant literature on success and failure, categorizing studies on success and failure into two categories: internal and external drivers. I also situate the study within the relevant scholarly debates. Furthermore, I analyze the literature on the outcomes of social movements, with a particular emphasis the political nature of environmental social movements. Consequently, I position the study within the broader context of research that examines the political outcomes of social movements.

In the third chapter, I provide the sociopolitical context of the environmental social movements under the study. To this end, I give the three phases of energy policies in Türkiye in accordance with the neoliberalization policies. Then, I outline the history of environmental movements on energy. This chapter is of particular significance to the study, as the context of the cases is essential for comprehending state policies, the resources of the movements themselves, civil society ties, and corporate strategies.

In chapter four, I present the methodology and research design of the thesis, with the details about the fieldwork, and interviews conducted.

In chapter five, I provide a comprehensive overview of the energy project in each case study, the socio-economic and political context in that region, the political preferences of local people, the pre-existing conditions before the movement started, the factors that led to the movement's emergence, the movement's repertoires of contention, the movement's threats, and the factors that led to the end of movements. Although this section adopts a narrative approach, it is critical for the study's findings, as each of the topics discussed has the potential to influence the outcomes of the cases.

In chapter six, I revisit my classification of internal and external drivers from the extant literature and articulate the internal and external opportunities and threats for the cases. In that way, I discuss the patterns of success and failure for the cases under the study.

In the seventh chapter, the original contribution of the thesis is discussed, namely, the triadic nexus of success and failure. The argument is made that the success of the environmental social movement is shaped by the dynamic relationship between three actors: the state, the company, and resistance. Furthermore, I extend the application of the concepts of repression and co-optation, which are frequently employed to describe the strategies of the state in empirical studies in the extant literature, to demonstrate how companies, as a private actor in neoliberalism, also utilize these strategies to pacify social movements.

The chapter eight is the conclusion chapter of thesis in which I summarize the findings from previous chapters along with an outline of the future research

prospects in the fields of both social movements and environmental social movements.



CHAPTER 2

EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The literature on why social movements succeeds or fail, as well as their consequences, is essential in answering the research question for this study. Analyzing the drivers of success and failure is intricate, and social movements have complex patterns. Therefore, it necessitates making use of a diverse array of approaches to understand the causes and consequences of movements and potential explanations for their successes and failures. In this section of the study, I examine the factors that theories of social movements highlight as the drivers of outcome. I first briefly outline the fundamental theories of social movements and examine the drivers of outcome as internal and external drivers. Then, I analyze the outcome of social movements, the literature in which this study is located, and address the position of the study in the literature.

2.1 Theories of social movements

This part gives information on three main theories of social movement: resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structures and framing. Despite the prevalence of the New Social Movements (NSM) literature as a foundational framework for the analysis of social movements, particularly in terms of identity and cultural representation (Melucci, 1980), this study does not directly draw upon the theoretical tenets of NSM. Two primary reasons underpin this decision. Firstly, NSM theory is mainly focused on understanding the movements of non-class actors in search of cultural identity in the Western European context (Pichardo, 1997).

However, the focal point of this study is the local communities' struggles against energy investments that directly threaten their livelihoods. In these struggles, the mobilization of resources, the configuration of political opportunity structures, and the strategic framing of issues are of paramount importance, rather than cultural representation. Secondly, the NSM theory provides a limited framework for understanding the relationships between actors and the structural context. Consequently, theories of resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, and framing are selected in this study since they offer a more comprehensive explanation of the successes and failures of movements.

2.1.1 Resource mobilization theory

The main assumptions of resource mobilization theory, which are different from earlier traditional approaches, can be comprehended under four headings. Firstly, as opposed to the traditional approach, resource mobilization theory takes social movements as an expression of human behavior. Therefore, they are not irrational. The protestors are rational actors, and the movement's actions are “adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action” (Jenkins, 1983, p. 528).

Second, grievances are assessed as secondary and constant in contrast to the traditional approach (Jenkins, 1983, p. 530). What makes social movements emerge is not the level of deprivation. It is “the amount of social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups, making it possible to launch an organized demand for change” (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977, p. 250). In other words, the level of grievances is insufficient to explain social movements' emergence. It needs resources such as money and labor to initiate the social movement and to participate in it (McCarthy &

Zald, 2001, p. 535). That is why McAdam (1985: 20) considers resource mobilization theory as an elite theory because the groups in a society diverge in terms of their power and resources. Although there are debates on which factors can be evaluated as the resources for social movements, there are various resources not limited to money and labor. They can be extended to moral, shared cultural norms and social-organizational resources (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007, p. 125-128).

Third, resource mobilization theory incorporates linkages and alliances with other organizations and movements. It includes conscience constituents and conscience adherents in their analysis (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1222). They are the people who support the movement, although they do not directly benefit from the outcome. Conscience constituents may increase resources available to protestors. In that way, those alliances and linkages could be used to achieve the goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1232).

Lastly, resource mobilization theory highlights the importance of mass media, which are television, print media, and radio, because social movements enlarge their sentiment pools and bystanders through media coverage (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 538). The role of media in social movements has been the subject of considerable theoretical analysis. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the utilization of media can not only facilitate the emergence and expansion of social movements, but also their outcomes. For instance, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) argue that social media usage in the Egyptian revolution in 2011 played a significant role in achieving the protestors' goals. Their study demonstrates that the mobilization expanded due to effective social media usage, and as a result, the country's leader resigned (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011a).

2.1.2 Political opportunity structures

The approach of political opportunity structures, a structuralist/institutionalist approach, evaluates the exogenous factors which influence both the enlargement and outcome of social movements (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p. 1457). According to Goldstone and Tilly (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, p. 180), political opportunity leads to insurgency if an event or a condition weakens the state or increases the resources of groups that want a change in society. That is why it “goes basically in one direction – from opportunity to action” (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001, p. 180).

Although the main idea behind the political opportunity structures is based on extending opportunities in a political system, the reality is more complex. Therefore, the theory also considers the threats. The assessment of the threats as the identical negative of the opportunities does not capture enough diminishing opportunities, countermovements, and tactical moves between the authorities and insurgencies in the political system (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001: 181). Hence, Tarrow (1998:32) defines political opportunity with political threats. He explains opportunity as “consistent –but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” and threats as “factors – repression, but also the capacity of authorities to present a solid front to insurgents– that discourage contention” (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015).

2.1.3 Framing

The third theoretical approach is the framing analysis of social movements. Since the 1980s, social movement scholars have included framing in their analysis. In this approach, social movements do not merely represent and carry ideas. They are also involved in producing and maintaining the meaning and ideas for themselves,

bystanders, and observers through framing (Snow & Benford, 1988: 213). Frame means the interpretive schema that clarifies the world because these interpretive schemas emphasize and codify events, experiences, and actions (Snow, David A. & Benford, 1992, p. 137).

Frames mainly have three functions: 1) drawing attention to a particular problem, 2) identifying who is or what is responsible for that problem, and 3) creating and offering alternative arrangements for the desired and potential change (Hunt et al., 1994, p. 137). Snow and Benford (1988, 200-204) conceptualize three different tasks of collective action frames. They are diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing helps to define the problem. Although it seems easy to identify the problem in a social movement at first, there are different points of view on the underlying reason for the problem within the movement (Snow and Benford, 1988:200). For instance, environmental degradation can be considered both as an outcome of governmental policies and as an outcome of inadequate technological investments. In such a case, identification of the threat and problem between governmental policies and technological investments is rendered by diagnostic framing. The second collective action frame is prognostic framing which is directly related to diagnostic framing. Prognostic framing is the framing of possible solutions and the identification of strategies, tactics, and targets. Whether to point to technological inadequacy or governmental policies as targets and assign strategies and tactics accordingly is contingent upon the diagnostic framing. Hence, prognostic framing is linked to the diagnostic one (Snow and Benford, 1988: 201). Yet, identification of the problem and setting targets and tactics towards the problem do not necessarily produce collective action. This brings framing analysis to the last collective action task, which is motivational framing. Convincing people to

participate in collective action is a common challenge for activists. Motivational framing shows the way how to prod people into action. (Snow and Benford, 1988: 203-204).

2.2 Drivers of outcome

I review the literature on the outcome drivers in this part. The previous part on the theories of social movement allows to comprehend the theories underlying the drivers of the outcome. The assessment of the drivers of outcome is a complex phenomenon. As stated by Bosi and his colleagues (Bosi et al., 2016), between the 1960s and the 1990s, scholars were mainly interested in the impacts of social movements by concentrating on the variables controlled by the movements themselves, such as their organizational capacity. Since the late 1990s, scholars have shifted their attention to the role of political and institutional contexts such as political regimes (Bosi, et al., 2016: 11). Not only the state authorities but also the change in the business and corporate policies have been examined by scholars since then (Balsiger, 2015; King, 2015; Kolb, 2007, p. 4). In the center of these different approaches, there is the perennial theoretical debate of agency and structure. The scholar's position on the agency and structure debate affects their unit of analysis and, as a result, changes the drivers of the outcome in their research. The social movements scholarship got its share of this debate, as well as the variables analyzed in the drivers of success. Although the variables are interwoven, it is possible to categorize the existing literature on drivers of the outcome of social movements into three parts: internal drivers, external drivers, and multidimensional drivers.

2.2.1 Internal drivers

In this line of scholarship, the drivers for the outcome are assessed through the activity of mobilizations and their organizational structure. In other words, the variables defining the success of social movements stem from the mobilization's internal factors. That is why internal drivers mostly are on the side of agency of the agency-structure debate in the scholarship. Internal drivers cover the organizational characteristics of the mobilization, their different kinds of resources such as funds and human resources, their tactics, strategies, and their ties with other social movements and organizations. These drivers shape the capacity of movements and determine their outcome.

One of the internal drivers of success that affect the outcome is the material resources of the challengers. Jenkins and Perrow's (1977) study on the farmworkers' movement in the USA reveals the importance of material resources. They compare two -one is successful, and the other is not- farmworker movements to unpack the reasons behind their different trajectories. Their study reveals the significance of sustained outside sponsorship of the Migrant Ministry in the outcome. While the National Farm Labor Union was not able to receive sustained contributions, the United Farm Worker got massive contributions supporting their boycotts which made their movement successful (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977: 266). Despite the material ones, the other resources available during mobilizations also impact the trajectory of social movement outcomes. The study of Abromaviciute and her colleagues (2019) done with regression analysis on the relation between the resources and the outcome of movements in Lithuania uncovers that access to more human resources, acquiring the support of local communities, and gaining media coverage positively correlated

with the success of movements in small and voluntary organizations (Abromaviciute et al., 2019: 13-14).

In addition to the resources of the challengers, the scholars emphasizing the internal drivers of success highlight the organizational characteristics of social movements. Gamson (1990), in his book on 53 social movements organizations in America between 1800 and 1945, argues that centralization, bureaucratization, and the usage of selective incentives are positively related to the success of movements. Therefore, his study reveals a link between the organizational capacity of the movements and the outcome. Although he has been criticized methodologically (Goldstone, 1980), his book is pointed out as the most systematic research on the effects of social movements (Giugni, 1998, p. 375).

Tactical repertoires of the mobilization are another dimension under internal drivers of success. Drawing on their analysis of fifteen homeless social movement organizations in the United States, Cress and Snow(2000, p. 1077-1078), identify a set of factors—including disruptive tactics, organizational features, the presence of supportive allies, urban-level support, and the use of diagnostic and prognostic framing—as potential causal determinants influencing movement outcomes. They code the framing processes under the movements' identification of the problem and culpable agents. For example, some movements define the culpable institutions as the government, and others define the targeted agents/institutions as the service providers. Their qualitative comparative analysis demonstrates that framing processes are crucial for successful outcomes, and viable organizations are vital for framing processes. Social movement organizations that can sustain themselves organizationally and engage in protest activities over a long period are considered viable in the study. Those organizations enable people to articulate framing by

providing a platform for alternative ideas, interaction, and mechanisms to meet (Cress and Snow, 2000: 1077 - 1099).

Some studies do not explicitly assess the framing processes but reveal their effects incidentally. For instance, in their study on a struggle against a coal power plant in Türkiye, Arsel and his colleagues (2015) argue that besides environmental concerns, protestors defined the problem as neoliberal developmentalism and a lack of democratic policy-making processes. This prognostic framing -although the authors do not conceptualize it as prognostic framing - led to a coalition of two distinct groups – peasants and a nongovernmental organization whose members are middle-class professionals living in urban areas. Arsel and his colleagues conceptualize this coalition as “environmentalism of malcontent” (Arsel et al., 2015, p. 375). They argue that such a cross-class coalition allowed the movement to succeed. Therefore, the action and the outcome are determined by the prognostic framing of the problem.

2.2.2 External drivers

In the social movement scholarship, the determining factors for the outcome have been discussed under the movements’ institutional and political contexts with the growing literature on political opportunity structures. As mentioned in the theories of social movements, the theory of political opportunity structures highlights the openness and closure of the political system, such as political input structures, elite cleavages, chances for alliances with political parties, political crisis, facilitation such as a change in the legal structures, repression such as arrests, surveillance, and co-optation as the factors that both mobilization and demobilization of social movements and determine their outcome. External drivers draw attention to the

political context, including the political and party systems. Therefore, whether the system is democratic or whether the party system has patronage linkages are vital for the analysis. Therefore, it is not always about the opportunities but also threats. That is why, from this perspective, it is crucial to unpack the effects of political opportunities on the outcome of social movements.

Kitschelt (1986) in his comparative study, questions the different trajectories of energy policies in France, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany. Although there were intense anti-nuclear movements in the 1970s in all these countries, the trajectories of the nuclear policies diverged. He argues that the reason behind different energy policies is countries' divergent political opportunity structures. In Sweden and the United States, social movements triggered new energy policies because the political input structures of these countries, which is the input processes of political decision making, were open to the demands of social movements. However, France and West Germany followed the existing policies because their structure was not open to the demands of the challengers. Moreover, he classifies state capacity as a variable as weak and strong. In countries with strong state capacity – Sweden and France – nuclear policies could be implemented despite the challengers. Yet, in the United States and West Germany, the implementation of nuclear policies was disrupted by the anti-nuclear movement because the state capacity of these countries was weak. As a result, for instance, the anti-nuclear movement in France influenced the nuclear policies less because France had closed political structures and strong state capacity. In other words, France was not open to the demands of challengers, and the state capacity was strong enough to insist on predetermined policy discourse. Yet, Sweden's policy innovation is greater since its

political structures was open to challengers and its state capacity was strong enough to implement new policies (Kitschelt, 1986: 84).

One variable that affects the openness of the political system, and thus the outcome of social movements, is the alliances of the challengers with political parties and elites. Böhm (2015), in his study on the German anti-nuclear movement, reveals that the alliance with political parties and intersection with political parties in parliamentary democracies are influential for the success of social movements because political parties can combine resources and offer new tactics to movements. Giugni (2004) examines ecology, anti-nuclear, and peace movements in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the US, and Italy by analyzing the relationship between protest events and changes in government expenditure. The results of the study show that government expenditures addressed by movements increase due to protests if there is public support and sympathetic political party elites (Giugni: 2004).

The legislation and the courts are considered different types of political opportunities for social movements as they directly determine the openness of the political system. They occasionally facilitate the actions of movements. In many democracies, the courts have become the participants of the political process which provides new opportunities to movements (Hilson, 2002). Wilson and Cordero (2006, p. 327) contend that despite lacking financial means and organizational infrastructure, marginalized groups—especially the LGBT community, labor unions, and individuals living with AIDS—were able to defend and advance their rights in Costa Rica through strategic litigation. Judicial reform in the country created legal opportunities for marginalized groups (Wilson and Cordero, 2006: 343-348).

Therefore, the legal system can also be an opportunity for social movements to defend their rights and affect the outcome of their actions.

Political crisis such as social revolutions and coups sometimes create political opportunities or threats for social movements. Skocpol (1979) in her influential analysis of social revolutions, posits that such transformations emerge from the interplay between political upheaval and the underlying agrarian sociopolitical frameworks. Political crisis typically involves increased international pressure, state military and fiscal crises, weakening of ruling elite control, and state inability to maintain social control by means of repression (Skocpol, 1979). Gamson (1975: 122) considers the periods of crisis as a condition leading to a successful outcome and finds out that crisis facilitate some types of social movements in their actions. Yet, there are also instances in which political crises, such as coups, result in the closure of these political opportunity structures, thereby contributing to the failure of social movements.

2.2.3 Multidimensional drivers

There is a need for a third category in addition to internal and external elements when categorizing the factors influencing the success of social movements in the literature. This category combines the internal and external drivers to unpack the determinants of success. In other words, under this category, I examine the research arguing that synthesizing internal and external factors lead to success.

The studies that use political mediation model fall under this category. The political mediation model underscores the significance of political opportunities. However, the efficacy of social movements hinges on their capacity to navigate these opportunities through strategic planning, organizational efficacy, and effective

framing (Amenta et al., 1999, p. 2-3). Therefore, the model presents a synthesis of the structuralism versus agency debate, integrating insights from both political opportunity structures and resource mobilization theory. For instance, Amenta and his colleagues (Amenta et al., 1994) contend that mobilization and group action alone is insufficient to achieve success. In addition to the ability to mobilize people, the political context should be favorable for the mobilization. Their study investigating whether Share Our Wealth influenced the Second New Deal in 1935 in the USA demonstrates that although Share Our Wealth was able to mobilize people for the demands for the redistribution of wealth, their success depended on a series of political conditions. There was a reform government and a congressional alliance of Democrats. The alliance was not from patronage-dominated political groups or the undemocratic South and this was in favor of the Share Our Wealth challengers. The high electoral struggle between Democrats and Republicans was another crucial political circumstance favoring Share Our Wealth because it promoted the openness of the political system (Amenta et al., 1994: 697).

Coalition formation is another multidimensional driver of success. According to Van Dyke and Amos (2017) there are five factors central to coalition formation, and they are both related to internal and external factors. The first one is social ties which facilitate interaction with activists and supporters. The organizational structure with broad goals focusing on multi-issues and a division of labor within the organization also expedites coalition formation. The third factor is cultural similarities, ideology, and identity. Alliances between groups that have cultural and ideological similarities are easier. The resources available for the challengers are also decisive for coalition formation, not only because of the pursuit of gaining resources after collaboration but also because of the goal of overcoming economic grievances

together. The last factor of Van Dyke and Amos (2017) is related to an external driver, which is the institutional environment. Expanded political opportunities facilitate coalition formation for the challengers. The potential threats can also trigger new coalitions between movements since they provoke collaboration against a common antagonist (Van Dyke & Amos, 2017). Therefore, incorporating with other civil society organizations (CSOs), elites, and political parties requires mobilizing internal and external factors.

Despite coalition formation being related to internal and external factors, studies also unpack that other factors influence success in addition to coalition formation. For instance, Kolb's (2007) case study on the anti-nuclear movements in OECD countries reveals the joint effect of elite support and public opinion. His Boolean qualitative comparative analysis uncovers that favorable public opinion towards anti-nuclear movements in 18 OECD countries and elite allies led to a reduction in the usage of nuclear energy (Kolb, 2007). By reexamining Gamson's analysis of 53 challenging groups in the USA with multivariate analysis, Steedly and Foley (1979) found out that a number of elements, including the absence of disputes in the organization and the number of coalition formation with other groups, determine the success.

The external and internal drivers of success of social movements in the existing literature and their theoretical ground are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Potential Drivers of Success and Their Theoretical Ground

	Drivers	Related Theoretical Ground
Internal Drivers	Organizational characteristics (e.g. bureaucratization, centralization)	Resource Mobilization Theory
	Resources (e.g. human and material resources)	Resource Mobilization Theory
	Media coverage	Resource Mobilization Theory/Framing
	Tactical repertoires	Resource Mobilization Theory/Framing
	Coalition formation with civil society organizations	Resource Mobilization Theory/Framing/Political Opportunity Structures
External Drivers	Elite Cleavages	Political Opportunity Structures
	Alliances with political parties/elites	Political Opportunity Structures
	Political crisis	Political Opportunity Structures
	Legislature/Litigation	Political Opportunity Structures
	Repression/Co-optation	Political Opportunity Structures

2.3 The outcome of social movements

A substantial body of extant literature has centered on the explanation of the factors that give rise to the emergence of social movements. However, comparatively less attention has been devoted to the factors that shape the outcomes of these movements. According to Guigni (2008: 1582), before the 1960s, it was normal to expect less research on the outcomes and their impacts as the movements were considered irrational in the literature. The scholars who came after had no excuse because the protestors were rational actors (Giugni, 2008: 1582), and the actions of social movements were “adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action” (Jenkins, 1983: 528). Nevertheless, one cannot encounter as many studies on the outcomes as on the emergence of social movements.

There are mainly two reasons for this scant attention on the scholarship. Firstly, it is always hard to demonstrate the causality between social movements and their outcomes because the consequences of movements are not static (Bosi & Uba, 2009: 410; Amenta & Young, 1999: 22-23). Moreover, scholars have difficulties defending their arguments against rival causes (Earl, 2000: 9) because the outcome of movements is not always related to the initial goals of the challengers. There are not only unintended consequences of social movements, such as the emergence of counter-movements, but also indirect outcomes like personal consequences (Cress & Snow, 2000: 1065). In addition, it is insufficient to lay out only the time correlation between the movement and the outcome. Scholars also need to explain “*how and in what circumstances* movement activities cause outcomes” (Earl, 2000: 9; emphasis in original). The second reason is the methodological difficulties in which the measurement and operationalization of variables become a challenge for scholars. Apart from the problem of defining the outcome itself, how to operationalize and measure the path toward the outcome, which is broad enough to cover different types of movements, has been a challenging task (Earl, 2000: 7-8). Despite its complexity, pinpointing the conditions under which social movements contribute to political and social change remains vital for the continued development of collective action research (Almeida, 2009: 609).

The reason activists, scholars, politicians, and communities have been curious about the consequences of social movements is that collective benefits are expected as a result of social movements. That is why, although it is relatively few, there are notable studies on outcomes. In this part of my study, I position my research into the outcomes of social movements literature by classifying existing literature under intra-movement and extra-movement consequences. The aim of the literature review

of the outcome of social movements is to position the thesis in the scholarship and to discuss why and how social movements are important for their political, cultural, and personal consequences.

2.3.1 Types of movement outcomes

Earl (2000: 4) divides the outcome of social movements into two main categories:

Intra-movement and extra-movement outcomes. The critical difference between these categories is what and/or whom the movement affects. While there are personal effects of social movements on challengers and the effects on the movement and the movement field in the intra-movement outcomes, extra-movement outcomes concentrate on political and cultural consequences of social movements as it is demonstrated in Figure 1 (Earl, 2000: 4-5).




Figure 1. Consequences of social movements
Source: (Amended from Earl, 2000: 4)

2.3.1.1 Intra-movement outcomes

Although there are different types of categorizations for intra-movement outcomes in the literature, such as activist level, within movement and movement field (Earl, 2000, p. 4) I classified them under two consequences which are (a) personal consequences and (b) within and between movement consequences since it provides a more comprehensive range. While the former accounts for the impact of social movements on the activists themselves, the latter represents the effects on other movements or the movement itself.

2.3.1.1.1 Personal consequences

Micro-level analysis questions the consequences of the movements on the individual level. The effects of social movements on individuals' personal lives, such as their income and potential activism in other movements, are also included. McAdam (1989) examines the personal consequences of social movements on two different levels. In the first level, which he calls conversion, there is a drastic change in personal life, including self-perception, worldview, and the social network that a person lives in. One of the most common examples of conversion is joining an extremist religious community. In contrast to conversion, the second level, conceptualized as alternation, does not bring a radical break with the past or the creation of a new self altogether. Social movements affect personal life between alternation and conversion, which depend on the level of activism of the individuals (McAdam, 1989: 745-746).

The study of McAdam (1989) on those who participated in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer project reveals that activism has political and personal consequences in both short and long run. Compared to the ones who did not attend

the summer project, the volunteers were more politically engaged even after 20 years. In addition, activism also affected their occupational preferences in the 1960s. For instance, the activists changed jobs more frequently than those who did not participate in the project (McAdam, 1989). Other studies also suggest that former activists are politically more radical in their future and remain politicized (Fendrich & Tarleau, 1973; Marwell et al., 1987). A more recent study on women protestors in 2011 Egyptian uprising reveals that participation in the protests changed women's family dynamics since the activist women started to challenge taken-for-granted norms within the society, such as wearing hijab. They began to discuss those norms with their families (Allam, 2022).

2.3.1.1.2 Within and between movement consequences

Social movements influence the subsequent movements in three ways besides their effects on personal life, culture, and politics. They may give rise to other movements, they may transform the subsequent movements by accumulating knowledge on tactics, identity, and frames, and they may generate counter-movements that oppose the former movements (Tarrow, 2011, Snow & Benford, 1992; Taylor, 1989, Zald & Useem, 1987).

Firstly, social movements may trigger other contentions and lead to a cycle of contention. A cycle of contention means a period of intensified conflict characterized by the diffusion of social movements from one area to other areas. It includes the diffusion of existing frames, the development of new ones, and heightened interaction between movements and the authorities (Tarrow, 2011: 1999). The cycle is recognized through a series of conflicts, raised more frequently than the normal levels, which occur almost simultaneously across the country in different sectors

with new actors and new frames combined with newly created action repertoires (Porta & Tarrow, 1986: 610-611). Tarrow (2011) defines the 1848 events in Europe as the first modern cycle of contention in which the protests spread to many European countries. The 1848 events created new opportunities in different countries for the protestors where there was a coalition formation between social groups. In addition, new repertoires for collective action emerged, such as barricades and public meetings (Tarrow, 2011: 195-198). Some of the anti-nuclear movements, peace movements, women's movements, student movements, and workers' movements have occurred as a cycle of protests.

Another important outcome of social movements is their ability to shape subsequent movements because social movements provide tactics, frames, and collective identity to the subsequent ones. Early movements are likely to serve as the creators of the master frame, which has a broader scope and influence than other frames. (Snow & Benford, 1992). For instance, Taylor (1989) suggests that the women's movement in the USA between 1940s and 1950s and the National Women's Party (NWP) formed by those activists shaped the subsequent women's movements. They provided networks for activism, and their long history has created a collective identity. Belmont House, the central office for the NWP, was one of those symbols representing their collective identity. Later, it remained a venue for the women's movements for celebration, lobbying, and research (Taylor, 1989). Nevertheless, early movements do not only enhance the subsequent ones. They can also restrict the latter through their master frame (Snow & Benford, 1992). For instance, Taylor's (1989) analysis of the women's movement continuity also suggests that the National Organization for Women, founded in 1966, was reluctant to include black and working-class women because the existing repertoires of action of the earlier

movement constrained the National Organization for Women. They hesitated to challenge the limitations imposed by the master frame of their predecessors (Taylor, 1989).

In addition to providing collective identity, tactics, and networks and triggering a cycle of protests, social movements may also create their own oppositional movements. These oppositional movements are named counter-movements in the literature. In countermovements, people are mobilized to oppose the initial movement or reverse its effects. For example, in the case of Soma Coal Power Plant resistance, one of this study's cases, a countermovement emerged. They were mobilized against the protestors who were trying to cancel the power plant, and they demanded the construction of the power plant¹. A counter-counter movement may also emerge against the countermovement. The movement against anti-abortion movements is a prevailing example of a counter-countermovement because anti-abortion movements initially emerged against the abortion rights movements (Zald & Useem, 1987: 249).

2.3.1.2 Extra-movement outcomes

Besides intra-movements consequences of social movements explained in the previous part, there are also extra-movement consequences, which are studied more than the intra-movements. Extra-movement consequences are analyzed under cultural and political consequences in this part.

¹ https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gunun-icinden/yircada-karsi-kampanya-775252/?utm_source=dahafazla_haber&utm_medium=free&utm_campaign=dahafazlahaber

2.3.1.2.1 Cultural consequences

The cultural consequences of social movements have been less studied than their political consequences (Giugni, 2008: 1591) because of conceptual and methodological challenges (Earl, 2004: 509). However, there are studies addressing the cultural consequences of social movements. Earl (2004) categorizes them under three different conceptualizations: (a) social-psychological approach, (b) cultural production and practices, and (c) worldviews and communities. The first two effects of movements on culture are on more micro elements of culture, while the last one is about the macro elements, such as the creation of collective identities.

While analyzing cultural outcomes, the social-psychological approach focuses on changing values, opinions, and beliefs due to social movements (Earl, 2004: 512). By changing opinions and beliefs, social movements make “the ‘unthinkable’ thinkable and the ‘unspeakable’ spoken” (d’Anjou & Van Male, 1998: 224). For instance, by providing a new view, abolitionist movements made people reconsider their values on the slave trade. After the abolition campaign, the slave trade became widely seen as immoral, whereas before, it was taken for granted as a moral act (d’Anjou & Van Male, 1998).

Secondly, social movements influence society's products and practices, such as literature, media, discourse, language, and music. For instance, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) analyze the media and public opinion on opinions about nuclear power. They unpack that the media and public opinion interact on nuclear power in a way that changes in public opinion on nuclear power also change the media discourse in the news (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). There are also studies showing the effects of social movements on cultural products such as fashion (McAdam, 1990), magazines (Farrell, 1995), and music (Eyerman & Jamison, 1995).

The third consequence of social movements on culture is the creation of collective identities and subcultures (Earl, 2004: 517). As a result of social movements, collective identities, and subcultures emerge, change, and transform. For instance, the lesbian feminist identity emerged from the internal dynamics of the feminist movement. Lesbian feminists' collective identity developed in opposition to heterosexual feminists, as many were reluctant to interact with lesbians because they feared it would undermine the feminist movement (Taylor & Whittier, 1992).

2.3.1.2.2 Political consequences

Social movements generate political effects by altering or challenging prevailing power relations. Although there are scholars who argue that the influence of social movements on political change is limited (Giugni & Passy, 1998) social movements scholarship addresses how movements matter and under which conditions they are effective for policy change.

What changes as a result of social movements ranges from structural ones, such as the extension of civil and democratic rights, to the intermediate changes that benefit challengers, which do not necessarily address state policies (Amenta et al., 2010: 289). For instance, feminist movements not only brought about civil and democratic rights for women, which led to an extension of rights in democracies but also altered the labor relations between employers and women employees (Paxton et al., 2006; Soule et al., 1999). LGBTQ movement has resulted in adjustments in some countries' legislation allowing same-sex marriages and child adoption of same-sex couples (Whittier, 2016). Environmental justice movements have proposed sustainable alternatives aimed at addressing the inequitable allocation of environmental harms and benefits across both urban and rural settings (Scheidel et

al., 2018). The examples can be extended to diverse movements such as labor, student, and urban social movements. However, the overall aim of the scholars analyzing the political consequences of social movements is to question whether social movements bring about change in power relations and policy and how they bring the change. Although scholars often disagree on the power of movements, this discussion is beyond the scope of the study. Therefore, I focus on how social movements bring change. While some scholars have highlighted the movement-related variables, others bring the political environment to the forefront (Giugni, 2008: 1588).

The traditional approach to social movements was based on individual grievances led by rapid social change, such as industrialization, before the 1960s (see for example: Gurr, 1968). It was assumed that grievances provide sufficient conditions that produce collective action (McAdam et al., 2009: 268). Nevertheless, in the 1960s, the social movements scholars (see for example: McCarthy & Zald, 1977), who were both influenced by the study of Olson (1965) and criticized him for the emergence of social movements, questioned the assumption of relative deprivation. Olson's theory of collective action, which is based on rational and self-interested behavior, argues that people will not cooperate even if they would gain because they do not want to pay the costs of action (Olson, 1965: 2). This view which arose from the discipline of microeconomics has triggered resource mobilization theory in the study of the social movements (McAdam et al., 2009: 265). Resource mobilization theory agreed with Olson's collective action problem. Yet, they argued the resources of the movements offers a solution to this dilemma (McAdam et al., 2009: 269). The theory emphasizes the role of resources such as money and labor, the linkages and alliances with other organizations, and the tactics

used by the movement itself and the authorities aiming to control the movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1213). The shift from traditional approaches to resource mobilization theory influenced the research on the outcomes of social movements. They started to focus on the variables controlled by the movements, such as organizational capacity and material resources, in addition to the media coverage (e.g., Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Gamson, 1990; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977).

Together with the new wave (Giugni, 2008: 1586), contextual factors such as political and cultural ones have been involved as variables for the emergence of social movements. In this line of scholarship, political opportunity structure has evaluated the exogenous factors which influence the enlargement and outcome of social movements (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004: 1457). Tarrow (2011: 164-165) conceptualizes opportunities under four aspects: (1) an increase in access to participation, (2) an increase in the instability of political alliances, (3) conflicts between and within elites, and (4) influential allies. These four aspects determine the openness of political opportunity, although their impacts change with political regimes and time. The factors determining the outcome have been discussed under the movements' institutional and political contexts with the growing literature on political opportunity structures. This approach considers the openness of the political system, such as elite cleavages, chances for alliances with political parties, political crisis, and a change in the legal structures, as the mobilizing factors for social movements. That is why, from this perspective, it is crucial to unpack the effects of political opportunities on the outcome of social movements. No matter how scholars consider the variables that lead to the outcome, there are noticeable studies in which it is possible to trace the causal chain between social movements and policy change.

2.4 Environmental social movements: Why and how are they political?

This thesis is about the outcome of environmental movements in Türkiye, questioning why they succeeded or failed in their actions. Although it looks as if the primary goals of the movements which are examined in the study do not directly point to the political area but rather to the industrial activities of companies, the ecological distribution conflicts that emerged between the local communities and the companies/the state are inherently political in nature. That is why the study is positioned under the political consequences of social movements. The political ecology literature assists in demonstrating this position.

The political ecology approach aims to understand power-laden processes of environmental change and to unpack power relations behind the environmental processes, change, decisions, and procedures. That is why political ecology asks questions of ‘who controls what?’, ‘who is allowed to decide on what?’ and ‘who has the power to impose decisions on environmental change like pollution, land use, and biodiversity?’. The study area focuses on the exercise of power in environmental conflict (Robbins, 2012: 11-24).

Ecological distribution conflicts emerge as a result of existing or emerging unequal distribution of costs of environmental change and benefits. It results from the change in social metabolism, which refers to society's energy and material flows. In other words, social metabolism refers to the manner in which societies structure and manage their increasing flows of energy and material interactions with the environment (Martinez-Alier et al., 2010: 1). For example, social metabolisms and their material basis are different in hunter-gatherer societies, agrarian communities, and industrial societies. Hence, social metabolism is shaped by social, economic, and political dimensions. Modern capitalism is among the main drivers in growing social

metabolism with rising extraction activities. However, there can be a decrease in social metabolism by other policies such as conservation.

Ecological distribution conflicts emerge as a result of a change in the social metabolism (Pérez-Rincón et al., 2018: 636) because they derive from the unequal distribution of costs of environmental change and environmental benefits. The study of Pérez-Rincón and his colleagues (2018) on Andean Countries exemplifies this relationship between social metabolism and the rise of ecological distribution conflicts. In Andean Countries, there has been an expansion in the primary sector, such as oil, mining, and soy, due to growing reprimarization processes since the 1990s. Consequently, there has been a transition from the biotic sector, such as agricultural and forest biomass, to the abiotic sector, such as fossil fuels. By using Environmental Justice Atlas², they also found that there is an increase in the number of environmental conflicts in these countries related to this transition. Therefore, they concluded that the change in the social metabolism, which is the transition from the biotic to the abiotic sector, has resulted in ecological distribution conflicts. Another case study conducted by Zografos and Martinez-Alier (2009) also supports the hypothesis of Pérez-Rincón and his colleagues (Pérez-Rincón et al., 2018). Their research is on a conflict in Catalonia, which was a result of the installation of a massive wind farm. The local community living in the area had produced agricultural products as the periphery, yet, with the installation of the wind farm, the area was rearranged to produce the center's energy demand (Zografos & Martínez-Alier, 2009). Consequently, the change in the social metabolism in which there is a

² Environmental Justice Atlas is a database that collects, documents and categorizes the social conflicts emerged as a result of environmental issues. For further information: <https://ejatlas.org>

transition from agricultural to energy production led to an ecological distribution conflict.

By mobilizing environmental justice movements, ecological distribution conflicts can trigger to generate alternative sustainable transitions which go beyond one-time fixes in technologies with a techno-managerial approach (Scheidel et al., 2018: 588). In that way, sustainable transitions reshape the social metabolism of societies. That is why environmental justice movements have transformative power. This power can be exemplified by alternative food initiatives and energy cooperatives. The main reason for the emergence of alternative food initiatives is the need to create solutions to injustices in the food production system (Kadirbeyoğlu & Konya, 2017: 207). La Via Campesina and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty are prominent examples of those alternative food initiatives. They contributed to the promotion of agroecology across the globe by supporting it against large-scale industrial agriculture (Scheidel et al., 2018: 592). The Energiewende project of Germany, which aims for low carbon transition, is the second example of an alternative sustainable transition through environmental movements. Although promoted as the success of Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and experts, environmental movements since the anti-nuclear movements of the 1970s are the origins of Energiewende. The protestors have formed energy cooperatives and energy networks with sustainable energy sources. All those initiatives and movements have pushed the government to take action (Hake et al., 2015: 534-536). It is estimated that farmers, households, and energy cooperatives have already owned about half of the renewable energy capacity (European Commission Directorate-General for Research and Innovation., 2018: 5). Energy cooperatives are crucial for commoning energy services.

I consider the environmental social movements that I have covered in the thesis as the movements that emerged because of ecological distribution conflicts. Although the thesis questions the conditions for the success and failure of those movements, why they have succeeded and failed is highly dependent on the power relations within the political context in addition to coalition building with civil society. Therefore, the result of the thesis contributes to the literature on political consequences of social movements and political ecology because it does not only demonstrate the conditions for the success of environmental social movement systematically but also reveals the impact of the political context in which they have emerged.

CHAPTER 3

SETTING THE SCENE: ENERGY POLICIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS ON ENERGY POLICIES IN TÜRKİYE

In recent decades, Türkiye has experienced major transformations in its energy sector due to the neoliberalization process. This has been marked by the deregulation of the energy market and privatization of public energy resources, besides inviting more foreign companies into the Turkish energy industry. The energy sector has emerged as a critical driver of Türkiye's economic growth and development, especially since the beginning of the 2000s.

Since the 1980s, the marketization process has extended worldwide, and it has accelerated environmental degradation. By using unique techniques, the process has also increased and broadened the degradation with neoliberalization (Erensü, 2016b: 38). Neoliberalization has also been associated with the rise of authoritarianism in Türkiye. Researchers contend that there is an inseparable connection between neoliberal authoritarian systems and environmental degradation, particularly in countries such as Türkiye, where the economy heavily depends on the construction and energy sectors (Erensü, 2018; Erensü & Alemdaroğlu, 2018a). Additionally, the privatization of state-owned assets has concentrated wealth and power among a few influential players in the energy sector, intensifying income inequality and sustaining a social hierarchy that safeguards the capitalist system (Erensü, 2018; Erensü & Alemdaroğlu, 2018b; Paker, 2017). In this context, energy policies in Türkiye are predominantly examined through neoliberal developmentalism.

This chapter analyzes the development of energy policies in Türkiye, focusing on the neoliberalization process. After examining the history of the neoliberalization of energy resources, it moves on to the environmental movements raised because of those policies. The aim of the chapter is to set the scene and to provide a context for the drivers of success and failure of environmental social movements in Türkiye.

3.1 Historical overview of energy policies in Türkiye

Despite its pervasive application in a variety of political and economic life stances, it is crucial to define neoliberalism before delving into the neoliberalization of energy policies. Nevertheless, a comprehensive discussion remains outside the scope of this study since there has been an intensified discussion on its definition and application. But a simplified definition is as follows. “Neoliberalism is a distinctive political-economic philosophy that took meaningful shape for the first time during the 1970s, dedicated to extension of market (and market-like) forms of governance, rule, and control across – tendentially at least – all spheres of social life” (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 28). Governmental tools to administrate neoliberalism includes selective deregulation, privatization, and outsourcing in which the state does not rollback but rather it restructures itself. As neoliberalism expands and intensifies, it becomes increasingly apparent that the agenda of neoliberalism requires specific governmental institutions and regulatory modes to control and manage marketization. Hence, neoliberalization necessities the simultaneous and repetitive process of removing current institutional and social arrangements while implementing restructured institutional configurations as a market-constructing activity. Therefore, it only refers to ‘less state’ theoretically; in practice, it requires a fundamental rearrangement of

governmental structures and the relationship between the state and the economy (Peck & Tickell, 2007: 29-33). Following 1980, there was a return to the market logic marked by this shift toward neoliberalism. This turn brought about structural, institutional, and social change after a departure from 40 years of Keynesian economic policies, which were relatively protectionist socio-economically (Erensü, 2016b: 39)

The current energy policies in Türkiye trace back to the 1970s economic crisis in which there was hyperinflation and negative growth. After January 24th, 1980 Program, the neoliberalization of energy policies began, and the relation of local communities with nature has also been influenced as a result of the neoliberal policies. Hence, Türkiye's story of neoliberalization of energy policies started in 1980. Yet, its full-fledged application became possible only in the early 2000s after the 2001 economic crisis and the implementation of Kemal Derviş's economy program when the AKP government came to power. Since the ecological distribution conflicts have mushroomed after the neoliberalization of energy policies, I concentrate on the period after 1983, when the neoliberalization adventure of Türkiye began. I follow the same strategy as Erensü (2016) for categorizing the history after the neoliberalization process into three phases: early neoliberal era (1980-2001), deep neoliberalization (2001-2013), and post-neoliberalization (2013-today).

3.1.1 Early neoliberal era: Restructuring the energy sector between 1980-2001

While approaching 1980, as a result of the economic crisis of the 1970s, there was hyperinflation, price controls, and a black-market economy. A parallel political crisis, which resulted in Ecevit's resignation and the Demirel government's formation, exacerbated the economic crisis even further. The first official move towards

neoliberalization began with the January 24th 1980 program of Turgut Özal, who would later become the primary person of economic policies as undersecretary of prime ministry, deputy prime minister, party leader of *Anavatan* Party (Motherland Party, ANAP), and prime minister (Boratav, 2007: 145-147). January 24th 1980 program targeted a comprehensive stabilization and economic liberalization plan. The goals included decreasing the inflation rate, enhancing the balance of payments with export growth, and restoring Türkiye's global creditworthiness. To shift Türkiye's economy from a state-led, import-substitution model to one that is more market-oriented and export-driven, several structural reforms were introduced in 1980s. The 1980s marked a departure from previous periods as Türkiye pursued policies for economic transformation and altered government-economic relations (Arıcanlı & Rodrik, 1990: 10).

Throughout the 1970s, state-owned enterprises (*Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri, KİT*) played a vital role in public-private cooperation. In this period, they were actively implementing strategies supporting developmental industrial policies. In line with those policies, Turkish Electricity Authority (*Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu, TEK*) was established in 1970 for energy production, transmission, distribution, and trade. TEK's responsibilities indicated that every energy sector stage is considered a public good (Kızıl Voyvoda & Voyvoda, 2019). Yet, the departure from the previous periods was also valid for the energy sector. The energy sector was a primary sector in the neoliberalization agenda. The responsibilities of TEK were shared with the private sector with the law entitled *Authorization of Enterprises Other Than the Turkish Electricity Administration to Produce, Transmit, Distribute and Trade Electricity* (Law no. 3096) in 1984. This law was the first regulation encouraging the private sector to build and operate the energy resources (Erensü, 2018: 150), and it

regulates the generation, transmission, distribution, and trade of electricity by both domestic and international companies. The legal framework and associated rules³ allow companies to produce energy in three different ways: (1) production of energy for self-consumption, referred to as auto-production, (2) the acquisition of state-owned facilities generation, transmission, and distribution rights by private companies, named as transfer of operating rights – TOR method -, and (3) granting authorization to construct, produce and operate for a duration not exceeding 99 years on the condition that all the rights be transferred at the end of the period to the state, known as build-operate-transfer – BOT method -.

Further regulatory changes in the energy sector, including new laws and executive orders, were enacted to liberalize the energy sector by considering the existing challenges explained above. Those attempts also paved the way for market-oriented reforms in the 2000s. One of those regulations was to separate TEK into two different state-owned enterprises with an executive order in 1993 (executive order no. 93/4739), in which Turkish Electricity Distribution Cooperation (*Türkiye Elektrik Dağıtım Anonim Şirketi*, TEDAŞ) was responsible for the distribution of energy and the Turkish Electricity Generation Transmission Cooperation (*Türkiye Elektrik Üretim İletim Anonim Şirketi*, TEAŞ) was responsible for the generation and transmission of it. The main goal of the executive order was to provide services more effectively and efficiently under the framework of privatization policies and to pave the way for the involvement of the private sector in the energy provision (TEDAŞ,

³ Türkiye Elektrik Üretim İletim Anonim Şirketi ve Türkiye Elektrik Dağıtım Anonim Şirketi Dışındaki Kuruluşlara Elektrik Enerjisi Üretim Tesisi Kurma ve İşletme İzni Verilmesi Esaslarını Belirleyen Yönetmelik, Resmi Gazete, 4.9.1985, No: 18858

2023). In the same year, with a law (no. 3974), TEK was tried to be privatized by selling its ownership rights. However, the Constitutional Court annulled the law on the grounds that electricity is a public good whose provision cannot be carried out by foreign private companies (Atiyas et al., 2012: 21). One year later, in 1994, a new law (no. 3996) in which BOT method was enhanced to other sectors like infrastructure and telecommunication beside electricity provision, was enacted. The law mainly aimed to encourage the private sector to invest with the BOT method through treasury guarantees and tax and fee exemptions. Article 5 of the law, which regulates the contract with the company and states that the contract is subject to the provisions of the private law, was annulled by the Constitutional Court in 1995. The idea behind the annulment was the same. The Constitutional Court emphasized that services addressing fundamental societal needs inherently constitute public services and, as such, fall outside the scope of private law regulations (Kızıl Voyvoda & Voyvoda, 2019).

While the attempts to transfer the electricity provision to the private sector were ongoing, Türkiye's first EIA bylaw (Official Gazette no. 21489) was enacted in 1993, besides Environment Law (no. 2872). The bylaw aimed to determine and evaluate the environmental impacts of the investments carried out by public and private institutions and to prevent potential environmental degradation (Article 1). This bylaw would be changed more than ten times until 2023. I discuss the significant changes in the upcoming parts of the chapter.

The legal framework until 1996 did not allow transferring the ownership rights of the energy to the private sector. The build-operate-own (BOO) method was introduced for that aim with executive order no. 96/8296 in 1996, later annulled by the Council of State on the grounds that the legal framework necessities a

parliamentary mandate (Erensü, 2016a: 54). Then with a law (no. 4283) was enacted named *The Establishment and Operation of Electric Energy Generation Facilities and Regulation of Energy Trade with Build-Operate Model* in 1997. Yet, the law permitted the usage of the BOO method only for thermal power plants.

Hydroelectric, geothermal, nuclear power plants, and other renewable energy resources were excluded. Even if only for thermal power plants, the necessity to transfer ownership rights for energy production to the government after a predetermined period was eliminated. Thus, private companies could have ownership rights in the energy resources (Kızıl Voyvoda & Voyvoda, 2019).

Türkiye also signaled its commitment to liberalize the energy sector not only by introducing new laws and executive orders but also with an international agreement that promotes the liberalization of energy trade and encouragement and protection of the investors besides energy supply security. The agreement was the Energy Charter Agreement signed by Türkiye in 1994 (Baklacı & Akıntürk, 2006).

Although law no.3096 allows for three different energy production methods; only a few minor hydroelectric power plants started their operations. The energy distribution was done by private companies only in two places until 1993 (Tanyelioglu, 1993). The lack of interest of the private sector in the new law is mostly due to some limitations imposed by the Constitution since it accepted electricity as a public service that state institutions must perform. That is why high courts continuously impeded the industry by annulling some regulations in the law (Erensü, 2018). Until some amendments in the Constitution in 1999, the BOT method was used to put into operation 22 generators with a capacity of 2275 MW until the end of 1999, while the overall capacity of the projects was done with the TOR method in that year was close to 5260 MW (Özkıvrak, 2005). With law no.

4446, the Constitution underwent some amendments, which permitted the privatization of services and investments by state institutions and state economic enterprises, subject to private law in case of any disputes in 1999. While, Figure 2 shows the annual development Türkiye's Installed Capacity between 1972 and 2001, Figure 3 visualizes the distribution of that capacity by the electricity utilities. As can be observed, the private sector's share in the installed capacity had only slightly increased despite a gradual rise by 2001.

From the law no. 3096 in 1984 to 2000, approximately 90% of the total gross generation of electricity was carried out by state institutions. The share of the private sector, which was around 8-9% during the 1990s, increased to about only 24% in 2000 (Kızıl Voyvoda & Voyvoda, 2019). This period marked the early stages of the neoliberalization of energy in Türkiye. Economic liberalization, the restructuring of state-owned energy firms, and the introduction of legal and regulatory measures to facilitate private sector engagement in the energy sector were the defining features of the period. Those attempts are the building blocks for the more extensive energy market reforms after the 2000s.




Figure 2. Annual development of Türkiye's installed capacity (1972-2000)
Source: Visualized by the author using Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation (TEİAŞ) data (TEİAŞ 2023a)




Figure 3. The distribution of installed capacity by the electricity utilities (%), 1984-2001

Source: Visualized by the author using TEİAŞ (TEİAŞ 2023c, 2023d) data

3.1.2 Deep neoliberalization: 2001-2013

The emerging markets are prone to crisis in their transition to neoliberal and financial globalization experiments. Türkiye was not an exception. Its first phase of neoliberalization witnessed three crises which are 1994, 2000, and 2001 crisis (Alper & Onis, 2003). The reason for those three consecutive crises was the weak state capacity that could not maintain macroeconomic stability. There was a lack of a regulatory framework which was a requirement for a more liberal economic environment (Öniş, 2009). Therefore, Türkiye's second phase of neoliberal evolution started with escalating inflation rates, an uncontrollable public debt rise, and an increased financial fragility (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003).

The remedy for the consecutive crises since 1994 was the agreements and regulations with International Monetary Fund (IMF), which aimed to deepen the neoliberal economy in Türkiye. Therefore, a comprehensive IMF program with two main aspects was implemented at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The first aimed to leave the labor and capital relations entirely to the market mechanism. The second aspect was to create independent institutions and regulatory agencies free from political interference. The objective of the second aspect was to prevent governmental authorities from favoring certain business groups (Boratav, 2007: 174-175). In that way, one of the functions of those independent institutions and regulatory agencies was to complete the liberalization process that was constantly interrupted (Sönmez, 2011: 152). In this new era of deep neoliberalization, there were two key players. The first one is Kemal Derviş, who was referred to as an above-politics technocrat. His experience in World Bank as a senior economist for over thirty years played a critical role in constructing the credibility and trust for the reform agenda of the IMF program. The second player is the AKP government, who

came soon after the economic crises of 2000 and 2001. As a single-party government, the AKP took a strong reformist stance and committed to fiscal discipline. Although political and economic reform processes had already been initiated during the final phase of the pre-AKP coalition government, the continuity and pace of these efforts might not have been sustained under a different government (Öniş, 2009: 419).

Energy provision also got its share from all those reforms. An independent regulatory agency that regulates and controls the electricity market was formed by the Electricity Market Law no. 4628 (EML). While the objective of the law is “to create a financially strong, stable, and transparent electricity market that operates under private law provisions within a competitive market while also ensuring independent regulation and supervision in this market” (Article 1), Electricity Market Regulation Authority formed with the law with broad authority to regulate the energy market, including granting licenses and determining pricing principles. Its name was later changed to Energy Market Regulation Authority (*Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu*, EPDK) when its authorities were expanded with the Natural Gas Market Law (EPDK, 2023). In the new structure, the main responsibility of the state is to regulate the energy market to maintain competition. Although the state still actively participates in the transmission, balancing, and settlement systems, its functions changed to a regulatory capacity in competitive areas, such as the production of energy and its trade under EPDK (Özkıvrak, 2005: 1345). The establishment of EPDK led the energy sector to adopt a complex institutional structure. Although the main function of EPDK was to complete the liberalization process of the energy sector, the government continued to maintain its control over prices. Moreover, although EPDK has substantial powers to regulate the market, the sectoral reforms

were delayed until 2007, after the second term of the AKP government. According to Sönmez (2011), “the reason for the delay is the desire of the government to protect its room of maneuver in the energy sector, which is a strategic area” (157).

The law no. 4628 was a regulation enacted during a severe economic crisis, which came soon after the 1999 earthquakes and the economic crisis of 2000 under the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP), ANAP, and the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) in February 2001. Therefore, it was even before the formation of the AKP. In fact, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* - FP), from which the AKP had split in 2001, has brought the EML to the Constitutional Court. Therefore, before assuming power, the cadres of the AKP had limited trust and experience in the private energy sector. Yet, after coming to power, the AKP eagerly supported the EML by taking further action to implement the law through supplementary legislation and encouraging the private sector to invest in energy projects (Erensü, 2018: 151). Thus, the election of the AKP as a single-party government signaled the start of a brand-new era for the trajectories of the economy and the energy industry in Türkiye. Alongside the neoliberal restructuring of the economic policies with re-regulation and de-regulation (Öniş, 2009: 420), the energy sector also liberalized under the consecutive AKP governments, which later brought about the ecological distribution conflicts between state and local communities. Yet, before moving to the ecological distribution conflicts, it is imperative to mention the political economy of the AKP since it is directly related to the ecological distribution conflicts within the scope of this study.

3.1.2.1 The energy policies under the political economy of the AKP

After their split from the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* – FP), which was a supporter of political Islam and then banned by the Constitutional Court, the reformist cadres of the party founded the AKP together with some of the cadres of the FP with a label of Muslim democrat (Hale & Özbudun, 2010). The AKP became a single party ruling the government with an unexpected electoral victory. As mentioned earlier, the historical context that resulted in the victory of the AKP was an era of consecutive economic crises. In addition to positioning itself in the reformist part of their roots, the AKP followed a strategy to execute and fully transition to the neoliberal economy (Erinç Yeldan & Ünüvar, 2016: 11), as opposed to the anti-capitalist stance of the FP with the motto of just order (*adil düzen*). Therefore, in the first phase of the AKP government, the goal was to liberalize the economy by integrating it into the global economic system (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 100). They achieved their goal with the help of both dominant position of neoliberal policies in the global economy and the European Union (EU) accession process. Yet, the dominance of the IMF's stand-by packages after severe economic crises. "The IMF's conditions were based on structural reform, first on a pegged, and then on the free floating of the Lira, fiscal tightening in the public sector through spending cuts, privatization, a more autonomous central bank and the overhaul of the banking sector" (Cizre & Yeldan, 2005: 405).

Like the neoliberalization attempts in the 1980s and 1990s, the energy sector was not an exception in this neoliberal restructuring. On top of that, it became one of the primary sectors driving the rule of the AKP alongside the construction sector. Energy generated power both symbolically and materially (Erensü, 2017: 122) for the AKP government, as well.

The first moves of the AKP government to liberalize the energy sector was through the supplementary rules and regulations to implement the EML enacted before their government. In addition, using different methods, it pursued different strategies. One of the prominent of these strategies is changing and stretching the regulations to encourage investments in the energy sector. Using the law on urgent expropriation is one of those strategies. Following its introduction in 1956 for extraordinary circumstances, it has turned into a tool that facilitated energy projects for the AKP government after 2001. Notably, over half of all urgent expropriation decisions are related to energy investments. In an environment characterized by privatization and marketization, expropriation has undergone a process of privatization, becoming a mechanism for capital accumulation (Kaya, 2011, 2014). This utilization of the legal system is typical with Harvey's theoretical framework concerning accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003, p. 137-183). Another strategy that has been implemented is Circular No. 2009/7 (T.C. Çevre ve Orman Bakanlığı, 2009), which was designed with the intention of reducing the length of bureaucratic processes related to the re-issuance of EIAs that have been previously canceled due to legal action. In the following years, this became an important tool to intimidate social movements in general, because in projects whose EIAs were canceled by court decision, companies easily obtained new EIAs, and the entire struggle for social movements started all over again.

As a result of above-mentioned policies, the installed capacity grew exponentially. As observed from Figure 4, the installed capacity has almost quintupled since 2000, reaching 99.819 MW in 2021 (TEİAŞ, 2023b).




Figure 4. Türkiye's installed capacity (MW), 1980-2021
Source: Visualized by the author using TEİAŞ data (TEİAŞ, 2023b)

It is not unexpected that the installed capacity of Türkiye has increased, given that its growth depends on the construction sector, such as real estate and wholesale trade. This dependency, in turn, has raised the energy demand since they are energy-intensive sectors (Şahin et al., 2016: 8). What is noteworthy for the study is the shift in the distribution of the installed capacity by the electricity suppliers, which is presented in Figure 5. Since 2001, there has been a noticeable increase in the private sector's involvement in energy production. For the first time since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, energy production by the private sector exceeded that of the state in 2009. The share of the private sector in energy production increased to 79 percent by 2021.




Figure 5. The distribution of installed capacity by the electricity utilities (%), 2001-2021

Source: Visualized by the author using TEİAŞ data (TEİAŞ 2023d, 2023e)

3.1.3 Post-neoliberalization: 2013 and onwards

The Turkish economy, which embarked on a national developmentalism path since 2009 (Dorlach & Savaşkan, 2018), has also moved into a period of democratic backsliding in political realm, especially since 2013 (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). This has impacted on Türkiye's energy policy, as well.

Economic growth, which has been expanding in line with IMF policies during the first term of the AKP government, was hit by the global economic crisis in 2008. As a result, Türkiye's annual GDP growth fell to -4,8% in 2009 (World Bank, 2022). This period also witnessed reversals from the reforms of the first period of the AKP government. The reforms of this period after 2009 contributed to the centralization of power and enhanced the political control in economic policies. Indeed, for instance, the dependence of the Central Bank to the government has become an enduring fact

for Türkiye. Therefore, it would be accurate to characterize the post-2009 period in the context of national developmentalism (Dorlach & Savaşkan, 2018).

Alongside all the economic decline, this period also exhibits authoritarian features. For instance, Sözen (2008) argues that Türkiye has moved “from tutelary democracy to populist competitive authoritarianism” (80) since the constitutional crisis of 2007. Although Türkiye’s transition to a competitive authoritarian regime is not usually attributed to such an early period, the literature on autocratization agrees that Türkiye transitioned to a competitive authoritarian regime following the 2013 Gezi protests (e.g. Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Özbudun, 2014). Its authoritarian features have accelerated after the coup attempt of July 2016.

A national energy (*Milli Enerji*) and mining policy, on the other hand, was launched in 2017 with the slogan “Türkiye’s future is national energy” (T.C. Enerji ve Tabi Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, 2017) as a reflection of national developmentalist paradigm in energy policy. The policy seeks to reduce external dependence on energy on the main axes of supply security, localization and predictability. Therefore, the main aim is to increase domestic production of energy resources (Karagöl et al., 2017). It is noteworthy that the emphasis on domestic and national matters in the presentation prepared for the introduction of the program is a reference to the July 15 coup attempt (T.C. Enerji ve Tabi Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, 2017). In this sense, Milli Enerji “is not simply a governmental capture of the governance of a free market economy, but a symptom of a new hegemonic order that the AKP scrambles to establish, especially in the aftermath of the June 15 failed coup attempt in 2016 (Erensü, 2018, p. 155).

3.2 Environmental movements on energy in Türkiye

This section elaborates on the environmental social movements emerged in response to energy projects in the history of Türkiye. A division of Türkiye's energy conflicts into four distinct periods, corresponding to the evolution of energy policies, facilitates a systematic overview of these conflicts. These periods are pre-1980 the emergence of environmental movements, 1980-2000 first major environmental movements in the era of neoliberalism, 2000-2013 diversified environmental movements under deep neoliberalization, and 2013 and onwards environmental movements in the post-neoliberal era.

Prior to the 1980s, Türkiye witnessed an increase in environmental degradation because of an increase in energy investments. These investments were driven by the escalating demand for energy resulting from industrialization, rapid urbanization, and population growth (Cerit Mazlum, 2011, p. 231). However, these developments did not result in the formation of a widespread environmental social movement cycle. In this era, environmental movements adopted a conservationist stance or had beatification agenda (Adem, 2005, p. 73).

The emergence of the anti-nuclear power plant movement in Türkiye occurred during this period, towards the end of the 1970s, when the general assembly of a fishing cooperative passed a formal resolution expressing opposition to the construction of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. This resolution was accompanied by the dissemination of informational booklets, the organization of panel discussions, and the mobilization of protest actions (Künar, 2002, p. 25-29)

The change in the social metabolism after 1980 with the economic liberalization policies in energy sector leads to ecological distribution conflicts. Following the rise in the provision of energy after 1980 and the shift of the energy

supply to the private sector with neoliberalization policies, there have emerged major environmental social movements. In addition, the movements began to adopt a more politicized approach. This transformation was marked by the emergence of Türkiye's very first Green Party, which emerged during this period (Duru, 2014, p. 1983).

The social movements that emerged as a result of energy provision were primarily due to the construction of nuclear and thermal power plants in this era. The movement against the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which emerged in the late 1970s, gained new momentum following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Demonstrations persisted and an antinuclear congress was held for the first time in 1993, with the participation of labor unions, domestic and international non-governmental organizations, and professional organizations such as chamber of environmental engineers (Künar, 2002, p. 39-56). In addition, this era is also characterized as the era of institutionalization of environmental movements as it was marked by the expansion of professional, project-based and urban-focused organization such as Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats (*Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları Koruma Vakfı*, TEMA) and Greenpeace (Paker, 2013).

During this period, opposition movements also began to emerge against state-led thermal power plant projects, including those in Aliğa, Yatağan, and Gökova. The movement against thermal power plants employed a diverse array of strategies, including public demonstrations, petitions, concerts, festivals and hunger strikes. The widespread use of the legal system in this era constituted the most significant development in the realm of environmental advocacy. This legal turn in environmental politics in Türkiye was influenced by two key factors: the activists' efforts to hold the state accountable and the Council of State's favorable stance toward green activism.

The Council of State's decisions exemplify this transformation, as they have deemed the construction of nearly all state-supported or state-driven power plants and gold mining projects to be either illegal or inadequate, apart from the Gökova project. The legal challenges were initiated by environmental organizations and local communities (Adem, 2005, p. 76-77).

Environmental protests intensified during 2000s and expanded various regions across country. This change is strongly linked to the rapid neoliberal turn that gained momentum after the 2001 economic crisis, accompanied by the liberalization of mining and energy sectors. This period marked a significant shift towards the unconditional utilization of natural resources, including minerals and water, for the benefit of capital accumulation (Özen, 2018). Thereby, market actors have begun to invest in ecological assets with the neoliberalization of nature (Çoban et al., 2015, p. 401). Consequently, the investments in the production of different energy resources (HEPPs, coal, wind, solar, geothermal) has increased. This rapid growth of energy infrastructures as a result of neoliberal energy policies has produced new energy geographies by transforming rural areas into energy landscapes (Sayan, 2019). As a result, some regions, such as Çanakkale, Zonguldak and Trakya, turned into ecological sacrifice zones (Aydin, 2019).

The investments in energy supply production that increased under deep neoliberalization, the most notable one in terms of environmental social movements was the vast investment in run-of-the-river HEPPs. In 1996, the HEPP projects initially came to the agenda in the Çamlıhemsin district of Rize and were abandoned due to public pressure, which is known as Fırtına Valley resistance, and they have become widespread in 2000s with the deepening of neoliberal energy policies. Such that the number of HEPPs in operation increased to 653 at the end of 2018 and installed

capacity, based on HEPPs, reached to 31,558 MW by end of June 2022, constituting 31% of the total installed capacity (Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı, 2025). However, more striking is the number of HEPPs, which, despite constituting 31% of the installed capacity, exceeds 600 due to the presence of numerous HEPPs with very small installed capacity. Even in some locations, multiple HEPPs are in operation along a single stream. Consequently, numerous local social movements against HEPPs have emerged, particularly in the Eastern Black Sea region where HEPPs are predominantly located to defend their livelihoods. These movements have emerged as the primary actors within environmental social movements in Türkiye since the mid-2000s.

The anti-HEPP resistance has employed a diverse array of repertoire of actions, including signature campaigns, street protests, construction site occupations, media and internet use, and lobbying activities (Işıl, 2012a). Some of them that were developed within the HEPP struggles were also adopted by other movements. For example, the practice of vigil tents, which was initiated during the struggle against the HEPP in Yuvarlakçay, was spread to all movements in the country. Citizens initiated the protection of natural assets that the state was unable to protect effectively by monitoring them (Özlüer et al., 2016, p. 31). Furthermore, a multidimensional network of struggle has emerged through the establishment of locally organized protection platforms. These platforms have been initiated to ensure the visibility of the struggle in metropolitan areas, as well as to facilitate collaboration with various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties. These platforms include *Derelerin Kardeşliği* (Fellowship of Streams Platform), *Karadeniz İsyandadır* (Black Sea Uprising) and *Suyun Ticarileşmesine Hayır Platformu* (No to the commercialization of water platform) (Işıl, 2012b). These platforms have also

functioned as channels for the dissemination of information and the expression of solidarity among local communities.

In addition to the anti-HEPP movements, another environmental movement that gained prominence after 2000 is the movements against the privatization of state-owned thermal power plants and the increasing number of new thermal power plant investments. It is evidenced by the designation of 2012 as the “Year of Coal” in the name of reducing energy dependency (Aydin, 2019). With the completion of coal power plant investments, there was a 65% increase in the capacity of coal-fired power plants between 2013 and 2023, and annual electricity generation from coal increased almost twofold (Gümüş, 2024).

The most notable of the struggles against thermal power plants was the resistance that emerged in Gerze in 2010. It prevented the construction of four thermal power plants and demonstrated its strong opposition to the centralized energy policies based on coal. As is the case with the Yuvarlakçay HEPP resistance, some of the action repertoires utilized in Gerze have served as a source of inspiration for other environmental movements. In addition to Gerze, platforms against thermal power plants have been established in different regions such as Amasra, Karabiga and Aliğa. These platforms established Climate Justice Coordination (*İklim Adaleti Koordinasyonu*) in 2010 with the objective of raising awareness about the issue of thermal power plants and their implications for climate change (Özlüer et al., 2016, p. 32-33).

One of the repertoires of action employed by these various environmental movements is the legal mechanism. Despite state’s unwillingness and incapability about the implementation of environmental legislation (Adaman & Arsel, 2012), with 1990s and arguably before 2013, legal arrangements have remain an effective tool for

environmental advocacy and the legal text in Türkiye is favoring the protection of environment,. Even a representative of a civil society organization stated that "there are places where we won without any resistance, places where we stopped with a single petition before 2013" (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 44). Yet, under the post-neoliberal era defined by its authoritarian features, the advocacy for the rights through legal channels has been a challenging process.

The reflection of national developmentalism and the authoritarian turn in energy policy is quite predictable. The increase in energy supply continues to lead to ecological distribution conflicts; however, the government has effectively suppressed these conflicts. The pressure on the environmental movements has already intensified with Gezi protests in 2013 and it reached its peak after the State of Emergency declared after the 2016 coup attempt. In 2017, the number of bans on protests reached its highest level since 2007 (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2020). Not only protest bans, but also environmental advocacy through legal channels has becoming a challenging task for local communities. The reasons for this deterioration are multifaceted, including the rotation of judges overseeing cases and the rise in litigation costs associated with expert examinations. Therefore, the legal system no longer serves as a viable means of addressing concerns of local communities (Lawyer Interview Participant No. 38). As Gönenç argues in her study on the Bergama and Cerattepe resistances, litigation is not an effective long-term strategy for environmental movements because of non-enforcement of decisions, changing legal regulations and inadequate sanctions (Gönenç, 2022)

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis adopts comparative qualitative study that aims both to theory testing and to theory building on a topic that receives little scholarly attention. In the beginning of the study, my intention was to adopt a mixed method, in which I would use a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis and process tracing. The objective of this study was to employ QCA to explain as much as possible about the social movements on energy projects in Türkiye, and at the same time to test the results of QCA with process tracing and to analyze the selected cases in depth, as some causal relationships may have been overlooked in QCA. In that way, while the QCA would allow me to find out the necessary and sufficient conditions for the success and failure of 16 environmental distribution conflicts, process tracing would expand the research with the primary cases that show the causality behind the QCA. For that aim, I first conducted a QCA analysis for 16 cases. Then I have chosen four cases amongst them and conducted field research, in which I used both most-similar and most-different systems design to compare those four cases.

However, my observations in the field were not in line with the QCA results and the field observations were in contradiction with the QCA. The main problem here may not be the lack of explanatory power of the QCA, but the data source of the study. As I explain in the fieldwork section in detail, my data collection method for the QCA relied primarily on newspapers and parliamentary minutes. However, I discovered a bias in newspaper coverage of politicians during my fieldwork, which affected my data of QCA. When media support or oppose particular political leaders or ideologies, this phenomenon is frequently referred to as media bias. Agenda-

setting, selective coverage and framing strategies are common ways that this bias manifests itself and shapes public opinion (Entman, 2007). This led to inaccurate assessments of events in my cases. Furthermore, my fieldwork became an excellent example of “correlation is not causation”. Some factors in the QCA showed a coincidental correlation. However, it would be unethical to omit it in my thesis, given that QCA significantly influenced the selection of cases in my fieldwork. Therefore, I elucidate the QCA variables, findings, and the lack of correspondence of these outcomes to the field. This is not only a record of the progress and development of this study but also an example for future QCA users. The results of QCA are in the Appendix A.

The exclusion of QCA from the study does not diminish the research quality as the comprehensive qualitative analysis I conducted sufficiently allows me to explain the drivers of successes and failures. To test my hypothesis, I relied on process tracing. This approach helped me to unpack the causal mechanisms and to carry out an “analysis of causal-process observation” (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012: 101). I use process tracing to eliminate some of the causal factors and to support others to understand the underlying causal mechanisms (Mahoney, 2000). Moreover, I adopted the Millian method of comparison and used both methods of Mill, which are most-similar and most-different systems design. In that way, I captured both the reasons for different outcomes, success and failure, and different conditions leading to the same outcome.

4.1 Dependent variables, independent variables and hypothesis

The dependent variable of the study is success and failure of environmental social movements. As will be mentioned before, the initial analysis of the thesis was QCA.

The independent variables of the QCA are media coverage, ties with CSOs, sympathetic political allies and construction company's proximity to government. I hypothesized that while high media coverage, strong ties with CSOs and strong sympathetic political allies positively influence the outcome in favor of the resistance, company's proximity to government would result in its failure. My initial objective was to provide a demonstration of the causality inherent to QCA with case study through process tracing.

4.2 Scope conditions

The scope of the research is the environmental social movements that emerged after the privatization of distribution and production of energy resources which was accelerated after the restructuring of energy market after 2001. The reason why I have chosen the conflicts on energy rather than including other environmental movements is to keep a variable constant. In other words, I argue that the openness of political opportunity structures and political context of Türkiye on energy policies is not the same as other ecological distribution conflicts such as air pollution and urban gardening. Hereby, I consider, restricting the scope as such allows me to omit an important variable.

The primary puzzle in the thesis is the causal mechanism behind the success and failures of environmental social movements in Türkiye. In line with the puzzle of the study, I would be able to classify the conflicts as "success" and "failure". Therefore, in the selected cases, the implementation of the projects had to be either fully completed or stopped as a result of the movement.

4.3 Details of the fieldwork

The cases for the field research were selected after conducting the QCA. Therefore, I would like to first address the cases I have selected in the QCA. Following the scope, I chose 16 cases, which are demonstrated in the Appendix B for the QCA. I used the Environmental Justice Atlas⁴ to identify appropriate cases. Taking into account the cases related to energy projects that fall within the scope, I have focused on three key aspects: (1) inclusion of conflicts related to different types of energy projects (coal power plants, HEPPs, geothermal power plants, and wind power plants); (2) inclusion of conflicts in different regions of Türkiye to reflect geographical, political, economic and social differences; (3) half of the cases result in success while the other half in failure.

I have selected cases based on three criteria for process tracing. Firstly, all cases selected for field research are either HEPP or thermal power plant projects. This is because civil society is more active against thermal power plants and HEPPs than against wind and solar energy, mainly because of their perceived effects on environment and society. While HEPPs have been criticized for altering river ecosystems and local livelihoods, thermal power plants are linked to significant carbon emissions and air pollution. I also exclude nuclear energy from my analysis because historically, nuclear energy investments and the anti-nuclear movement have diverged from other energy conflicts. In contrast to the political mobilizations, national security considerations, and long-term geopolitical concerns that have accompanied nuclear energy, the political landscape surrounding HEPPs, and thermal power plant projects has been characterized by a distinct set of dynamics. Notably,

⁴ Environmental Justice Atlas is a database that collects, documents, and categorizes the social conflicts emerged as a result of environmental issues. For further information: <https://ejatlas.org>

while local opposition to HEPPs and thermal power plant projects has often manifested in a more grassroots and localized manner, anti-nuclear movements have been observed to be more globally connected in nature. Secondly, I selected specific cases from regions where various political parties have a concentrated presence. Therefore, I aim to examine the effects of different political parties and ideologies on the movements of local communities. One of the key hypotheses of this study is that the power resources of the energy project company have an impact on the success of the movement. Hence, in the last criteria I considered the size and proximity of the companies to the government. The cases I selected for field research according to these criteria are shown in Table 2. In that way, the explanatory capacity of the study has been increased by enlarging the number of cases and the number of independent variables.

Table 2. Cases for the Field Research

	Projects Resisted by Social Movements	Location	Start Date of Resistance	Construction Company	Status	Outcome
1	Soma Kolin Coal Power Plant	Manisa	2014	Kolin Energy - Hidrogen	Stopped (but in operation in	Success
2	Loç Valley Cide HEPP	Kastamonu	2009	Orya Energy/Ümran Steel Pipe	Stopped	Success
3	Arhavi Kavak HEPP	Artvin	2010	MNG Holding	In operation	Failure
4	Kırklareli Dokuzhöyük Coal Power Plant	Kırklareli	2018	Deba Mining Company	Stopped	Success

The data collection for the study was carried out in two ways. The first one is the archival research on local and national newspapers, the database of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, the environmental impact assessment reports of the energy supply projects and existing academic research. Then semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with the local community, *muhtars*, CSOs who supported the movements, members of political parties, members of municipal councils, construction company officials, the lawyers of the cases which were brought to the courts, researchers and journalists who have closely followed the cases. In that way, the interview data was triangulated with the data collected through the first part.

The data collected through the in-depth interviews was analyzed by MAXQDA software. The QCA part of the study was conducted using fsQCA 3.0 software, which was developed by Charles Ragin and Sean Davey. The software uses the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. Besides the fsQCA 3.0 software, R Studio was used to evaluate the necessary conditions further.

I conducted interviews in villages and cities where resistances occurred in 2023. The places are shown in Figure 6. The detailed field research dates are given in Table 5. There are also people who either support the resistances as members of CSOs or from the local community itself in İstanbul and other places. Therefore, some interviews are held in İstanbul in person or via telephone or Zoom.



Figure 6. Map of the cases⁵

Table 3. Location and Dates of Field Research

Location	Dates
Yırca, Soma, Manisa	June 2023
Arhavi, Artvin	July – August 2023
Loç Valley, Cide, Kastamonu	August – September 2023
Dokuzhöyük, Kırklareli	September 2023

The fieldwork was conducted over a period of approximately four months in 2023. It was funded by Boğaziçi University Scientific Research Projects⁶. My first fieldwork was in Soma, Manisa, in 2023. I spent a week in Soma, during which I visited the village of Yırca for the first three days. After returning to Istanbul, I conducted further interviews pertaining to Yırca. In July 2023, I travelled to Arhavi, where I stayed for a week and conducted interviews both in the town's center and in

⁵ Google Maps is used to create the map.

⁶ Boğaziçi University Scientific Research Projects, Project Type D, Project Code: 19767

the neighboring Fındıklı, Rize and Artvin. I continued my interviews on the Arhavi movement upon my return to Istanbul. Subsequently, in August, I conducted my third round of fieldwork in the Cide, which is a district of Kastamonu. I spent two days visiting the villages of the Loç valley. I conducted my interviews within the Cide district for another two days. On returning to Istanbul, I continued the interviewing. In September 2023, I conducted my final fieldwork in Kırklareli, where I spent four days. Similarly, when back in Istanbul, interviews for Dokuzhöyük continued.

My initial contact with the Soma field was through a professor I knew. Then, using the snowball method, I contacted other interviewees through these people. In the cases of Arhavi, Cide and Dokuzhöyük, I reached out local people involved in the movement and supporting CSOs through social media and then used the snowball method. The in-person interviews were conducted in the houses of local community, in coffee houses or at the interviewer's workplace.

4.4 Interviews

I conducted 76 interviews. The general information on the interview participants is given in Table 6. In terms of the number of interviewees, Dokuzhöyük and Yırca differ from Arhavi and Loç. The first reason for the low number of interviewees in Dokuzhöyük is the short duration of the protests and the limited diversity in the repertoires of action. Moreover, I encountered a difficulty in interviewing with local community in Dokuzhöyük for two reasons. Firstly, the time of the fieldwork coincided with the villagers' intensive harvesting period and there was a major drought problem in the village. Secondly, there was a ghost of a researcher who had visited the village a few weeks earlier on the same topic. I was informed that the researcher caused irritation among the villagers with the questions (Local community

interview 75). As a result, acquiring an appointment from local community became a challenge for me in Dokuzh y k. Yet, it did not present an obstacle to my study as I had reached sufficient saturation in terms of the information I received from the interviews. The reason why the number of people interviewed is higher than the others in Yırca is that there was significant civil society support for the movement. Furthermore, the fact that the local community who participated in the resistance still reside in Yırca facilitated access to the interview participant. The details of the interview participants are listed in the Appendix B.

Table 4. General Information about the Interview Participants

Interviewed Group	Case			
	Yırca	Arhavi	Lo�	Dokuzh�y�k
Number of Local Community Interviews	15	8	11	3
Number of Other Interviews	13	11	8	5
Total Number of Interviews	28	19	19	8

The interviews were conducted in two ways, which are conceptualized as individual interviews and group interviews (Gaskell, 2000: 44-49). While in the individual interviews, I conducted the interviews one-to-one. Up to four interviewers attended the group interviews. In group interviews, I posed the questions and answers were provided by those who were willing to respond, occasionally I prompted answers by directly questioning participants to stimulate dialogue and conversation, or to involve the less active people in the group in the discussion. Yet, those group interviews are different from focus group interviews because unlike the

focus group, participants for the interviews were not intentionally selected but consisted of people who had volunteered to take part, either in their houses or at coffee houses. Group interview promoted a dialogue between the interviewees by encouraging them to talk. Since, it had been a considerable time since the movements took place, group interviews helped participants to recall certain events.

The interviews were concluded upon achieving sufficient saturation.

Saturation refers to the stage in research where conducting further interviews no longer produces novel insights, indicating that data collection can be concluded. At this stage, the researcher is unable to obtain any new information from the additional interviews (Bauer & Aarts, 2000: 34).

4.5 Limits of the study

The primary constraint of this study is the significant time elapsed since the social movements under research. The Arhavi and Loç movements took place almost 14 years ago, the Yırca movement nearly 9 years ago, and the Dokuzhöyük movement 5 years ago. This creates three main limitations to the study. Firstly, the interview participants may have forgotten some of the events, the times, and the processes. Secondly, some who were involved in the movement have either passed away or have moved to other places. Finally, there were some who declined my interview request, believing that due to the considerable time that had passed, they would be unable to recall the events. That is why, it is crucial for this study to triangulate the interview data with the other resources, which are local and national newspapers, the database of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, and the environmental impact assessment reports of the projects.

CHAPTER 5

NARRATIVES OF CONTENTION: UNFOLDING THE ENERGY CONFLICTS

The main purpose of this section is to provide detailed information on the cases within the scope of the study. In this regard, the details of the energy project, the reasons behind the local community's opposition to the project, emergence, development, and end of the movements are provided. In other words, all the processes of the movements are explained. Additionally, the analysis of the socio-economic context in which the movements occurred is included. Context and contextual factors allow us to figure out patterns in political process (Goodin & Tilly, 2006: 6). As McAdam and Tarrow (2019: 32) note the social movement studies has shifted its focus from external factors to internal factors which led the field has become movement-centric. In that way, the field is now significantly less concerned with the relation between context and movement (McAdam, Doug & Tarrow, 2019: 32-33). Yet, I argue that the context is matter particularly when explaining the processes that lead to their outcome. Therefore, in all sections about the cases, the process of the movements from the start to end is given with their context.

The chapter elaborates on the general overview provided by the word cloud (Figure 7) generated from transcripts of my interviews on all movement. Additionally, each case's word clouds are included in their respective chapters to demonstrate frequently encountered concepts and trace the processes.

essential to demonstrate the practical application of this approach in the field and to provide a rationale for categorizing these movements as environmental.

The energy projects at the center of these movements – HEPPs and coal-fired power plants – are not only economic resources of the local communities but also directly affect the ecological balance and natural habitats. The construction of HEPPs can result in significant environmental degradation, manifesting across a variety of dimensions. The construction of facilities designed to redirect water, such as regulators, has been observed to disrupt the uninterrupted flow of river systems and impede the natural movement of fish populations. Furthermore, channels constructed for the purpose of transporting water have the potential to restrict the movement of wildlife, thereby contributing to habitat fragmentation. Furthermore, decreased water availability for irrigation can have a detrimental effect on agricultural productivity, while the accumulation of water behind dams can result in microclimatic shifts (Okan, 2012).

The ecological implications of coal are more apparent and pervasive in comparison to those of HEPPs. Thermal power plants, which obtain energy by burning coal, known as the most harmful source of fossil fuels, are at the forefront of the list of industries that pollute the environment the most and cause poor air quality. In general, thermal power plants have been demonstrated to cause irreversible damage to the environment. This damage is caused by the pollution of air, water, soil, and consequently, food (Karababa, 2015).

These environmental aspects of the energy projects are clearly reflected in the interviews. In other words, although many of the participants refrained from labeling themselves as environmentalists, the interviews reveal that these movements are not only about defending their living space but also about

recognizing threats to nature as one of their core concerns. For example, one interviewee expressed the connection of the area of struggle with nature in the following words: “There would be a massive loss of natural resources there. If there would be a paradise on earth, those places were what we would call paradise” (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 45). Another participant questioned the interventions into nature by saying: “A person who destroys nature is not truly human” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 36). These statements illustrate that environmental degradation threatens not only livelihoods, but also the historical and spatial connections that communities have with the environment they live.

For some of the participants in the interviews, the struggle represents more than just an issue of individual living conditions; it also constitutes a position against the transformation of the surrounding geography. For instance, one participant described Cide as follows: “I don’t believe in heaven or hell. I believe that paradise exists on Earth, and for me, Cide is that paradise” (Political Party Interview Participant No. 52). Another emphasized that the destruction of water resources poses a threat not only to humans but also to all living beings, saying: “The animals will be left without water; the bear, the wolf, the jackals. What are they going to do?” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 58).

In the anti-HEPP movements, the destruction of valleys, the drying up of streams, and the disappearance of local species have been frequently mentioned. One participant described the extinction of the red-spotted trout, which once inhabited the region, as follows: “They destroyed the rivers and wiped out the streams. There used to be red-spotted trout here. Now they’re gone forever. They got rid of them by using dynamite and pouring concrete” (Local Community Interview

Participant No. 36). This illustrates how environmental degradation impacts not only natural resources but also results in the loss of local ecological knowledge.

The critique of thermal power plants was not also solely based on concerns for livelihoods or public health; it was also founded on the perception of a threat to environmental integrity. One participant summarized the impact of power plants on nature as follows: "If there is a power plant in a place, don't visit or even live there. There are petrochemicals, thermal power plants and cement. I don't know any other industry that pollutes the environment as much as these" (Local Community Interview Participant No. 1).

These statements elucidate the rationale behind the categorization of these forms of resistance as environmental social movements. The reactions extend beyond purely economic or political demands, signifying the awareness of environmental degradation. Consequently, what sets the cases in this study apart from other social movements is their basis in environmental concerns, leading them to be classified as environmental social movements. These movements are mobilized with the explicit objective of protecting the environment and are grounded in a comprehensive defense of living spaces.

5.1 Yırca movement

This part of the study focuses on the movement against Soma Kolin Thermal Power Plant construction occurred in Yırca Village of Soma, Manisa, Türkiye, which I call the Yırca movement. The aim of this section is to provide a detailed account of the development of the Yırca movement and the causal relationships that led to its success.

5.1.1 Description of the Area and the Project

In 2012, a leading construction and infrastructure company in Türkiye, Kolin Holding, signed an agreement with the Turkish Coal Enterprises (*Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri Kurumu*, TKİ). It was a kind of concession agreement (*Rödövens Sözleşmesi*) in which a contract is signed between the state and the third parties or entities to produce and utilize the mines in the license area. In addition, the project was a tendered project, and the company with the best offer got the contract of the concession agreement in which there was a construction of a thermal power plant with a capacity of 450 MWe. In 2014, Kolin Holding got its EIA. After its construction, the project was included in the National Energy (Milli Enerji) policy framework⁸. The project area is shown in Figure 8.



Figure 8. The planned Kolin Yırca thermal power plant site⁹

⁸ <https://www.hidrogenenerji.com.tr/hakkimizda>

⁹ Image created by the author using Google Earth Pro

5.1.2 Socio-economic and political context of Yırca movement

The village of Yırca is in the Aegean region of Türkiye, 5 km away from the Soma district of Manisa. The location of the village is shown in Figure 9. The village's proximity to Soma made it impossible for the villagers to remain outside Soma's agenda. In other words, the concerns that were expressed by the residents of Soma also represented the concerns of Yırca. The primary issue in Soma is that its economy now relies on the coal and coal-fired thermal power plant particularly since the neoliberalization of agricultural sector and the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) implemented in 2001 with which the agricultural subsidies were reduced (Adaman et al., 2019: 522-523).




Figure 9. Location of Yırca¹⁰

Both the neoliberalization process and the rapid development of coal industry in Soma led to depeasantization. Depeasantization is a critical concept to

¹⁰ Map was created by the author using Google Maps.

understand the case of Yırca movement since it serves as one of the primary factors behind the villagers' opposition to the power plant. It means the shift from rural to urban areas, which led to peasants to become urban proletariat in the industrial production system (McMichael, 2012:). In the literature, depeasantization usually referred with reference to migration to rural to urban areas. Yet, I find that defining this phenomenon only in terms of migration and its consequences overlooks the critical issue behind it, which is the peasants disconnected from the means of production and turned into urban proletariats. In the past, the people of Soma made their living from agriculture, in particular from tobacco. However, both neoliberal agricultural policies and ARIP reduced tobacco production and people switched to olive production. The fact that olives are not as profitable as tobacco, and that there is less need for labor, has pushed the villagers in Soma into the labor market (Adaman et al., 2019: 523), turning them into the urban proletariats.

Yırca villagers were possibly more experienced about the development of coal industry in Soma because of the Soma Thermal Power Plant, initially constructed and operated by the state. It was located on the agricultural area owned by Yırca villagers. The location of the previously state-owned power plant (Soma B Thermal Power Plant) is shown in Figure 8. The villagers' agricultural lands were taken to construct those power plants. Furthermore, they still remember the time before the plant was built. It is crucial for two reasons. All the people I interviewed from the village not only know the potential effects of a coal-powered power plant on their livelihoods, but they also either personally witnessed or were told about life before the plant was built. Before the construction, villagers could grow vegetables like tomatoes, peppers, and fruits like melons alongside tobacco in the village. However, due to the ash the thermal power plant brought, they have been unable to

grow these crops and tobacco. They decided to cultivate olives instead of tobacco in the village on two reasons. While the first one is the regulations of the government, the other is directly related to the power plant. The ashes do not harm the olive trees. That is why olive trees are also known as the tree of eternity. Secondly, when the first power plant was constructed, the state promised jobs to the young men in the village in exchange for their lands. However, only the first generation secured employment, leaving subsequent generations without opportunities. Consequently, the villages believed that the company's job commitment was limited to a single generation and short-lived.

5.1.3 Electoral preferences of Soma and Yırca

Analyzing the differences in electoral preferences between the cases and their impact on the movements was one of the selection criteria used in the study. One of the reasons why Soma Yırca thermal power plant was included in the scope of the study was that AKP was the leading party in Soma. Therefore, before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to present the voting preferences of both Soma and Yırca.

Since the movement occurred in 2014 and 2015, the election results are given between 2007 and 2015. Figure 10 shows that the AKP was the leading party in Soma between 2007 and 2015. However, Yırca diverges from Soma in this sense. the voting preferences of Soma and Yırca are not parallel to each other.




Figure 10. General elections in Soma, 2007-2015

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)

As shown in Figure 11, between 2011 and 2015, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) received the highest number of votes. In 2007, on the other hand, the AKP was ranked as the first party in the village. My fieldwork findings are consistent with the election results. Many interview participants described the village as politically more aligned with social democratic values than Soma. It even had a significant influence on the development of the struggle since the people who are not from Yırca were warmly welcomed by the local community. Thus, external support for the movement grew rapidly (Civil Society Organizations Interviews 19, 23, 24, 25).




Figure 11. General elections in Yırca, 2007-2015

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)

5.1.4 Pre-existing conditions before the emergence of Yırca movement

Beside the socio-economic and political context of Soma and Yırca Village mentioned in the previous section, there are three critical conditions might affect the trajectory of the Yırca movement. The first condition that I have already referred above is the collective memory and experience of the local community about the impacts of coal power plants. They do not only have witnessed the impacts of a coal thermal power plant on agriculture but also, they encountered dispossession of their lands.

The construction of the power plant on the olive groves of Yırca villagers was the second condition that may have influenced the trajectory of the Yırca movement. According to the EIA report of the company, “The thermal power plant consists of 110 parcels in total, and most of the parcels are identified as olive groves

in the land registry records” (Hidro-Gen Enerji İth. İhr. Dağ. Tic. A.Ş., 2014: 18).

The olive groves are protected with a particular law number 3573, known as Olive Law. Article 23 of this regulation stipulates that “no facility generating chemical wastes, dust, and smoke that may prevent the vegetative growth and reproduction of olive trees may be built or operated within olive grove areas and at least three kilometers away from these areas” (Zeytinciliğin Islahı ve Yabanilerin Aşılattırılması Hakkında Kanun, 1939). In the EIA of the company, it was stated that by taking precautionary measures, the power plant would not harm the olives (Hidro-Gen Enerji İth. İhr. Dağ. Tic. A.Ş., 2014: 106). In addition, the company official said “We knew that the area was olive grove. But it was expected that an exception would be granted regarding that. However, ultimately it was not acknowledged.” (Interview 28) Based on both the EIA report and statements of company officials, it is clear that there were no concerns of the company regarding the land being an olive grove. However, the company was quite inaccurate because the Olive Law would be the strongest tools in the hands of the villagers.

The third pre-existing condition before the emergence of Yırca movement is an external shock. It is the disaster in Soma on 13 May 2014, which lead to the death of 301 miners shortly before the mobilization in Yırca. This disaster, which is the mining disaster with the highest number of deaths in Türkiye's history, was going to form the basis of the support that Yırca villagers were waiting for because the spotlight of all of Türkiye was on Soma. For Yırca villagers, this would mean that the support from many diverse sources would already be in Soma. CSOs, opposition parties, and the national press were all in Soma during the movement's emergence. “At that time, there was a strong opposition, and after 301, they could not get their rights. Yırca can be regarded as a continuation of 301. That is why, it

was embraced” (Civil Society Organization Interview 24). Therefore, the disaster of the 301 miners, which culminated in tragedy, created a political opportunity for Yırca movement.

5.1.5 The process: Evolution and outcome of Yırca movement

Since this study is questioning the processes that lead to success or failure of environmental movements, it is highly significant to narrate the whole history of the movement from its beginning to end. That is why, this section of the study provides an overview of the evolution of the movement.

5.1.5.1 Emergence

Hidro-Gen Enerji, owned by Kolin Holding, obtained its energy license from the EDPK in 2013 and received its EIA approval in March 2014. According to the company's statement, before all these procedures, the company met with the *muhtar*, obtained the *muhtar*'s positive opinion, and reached an agreement with some of the landowners from the village and purchased their lands through private law. For the lands they could not buy, a decision for urgent expropriation was issued in May 2014. While the villagers have the right to raise objections during the EIA process, it appears evident that the villagers were not aware of the announcements. Additionally, the public participation meeting that was required for the EIA took place without the villagers' knowledge, as none of the villagers I interviewed mentioned the public participation meeting. The villagers learned about the project with the groundbreaking ceremony held with the participation of Taner Yıldız, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of the time. Some of them heard the news after their lands expropriated.

On 30 March 2014, local elections were held, resulting in the election of a new *muhtar* for the village. This also meant that the term of office for the *muhtar*, with whom the company had received a favorable opinion, ended. The new *muhtar* was skeptical about the power plant because of the pre-existing conditions I mentioned earlier. Specifically, the ash dam of the previous power plant caused damage to the village, and employment opportunities were limited in the power plant for the local community. That is why, the new *muhtar* took two different actions about the issue. One is to sign a letter of commitment with the company to protect villagers' rights. The *muhtar* asked a letter of commitment ensuring that one person from each household, whether they own land or not in the power plant area, would have a right to work at the power plant until they retired. Yet, according to *muhtar* although the company signed the letter, they did not provide a copy of it on the grounds that they were unable purchase the area where the power plant would be constructed. "It was a sign of the company's strength¹¹" said the *muhtar*.

(Interview no. 1). At the same time, the *muhtar* took another action that is to seek help from CSOs. He said:

I wondered whether I should contact Greenpeace and if my message would reach them. For the first and only time in my life, I sent them a message from my computer after finding their contact details provided with phone numbers. I included my own phone number and wrote a brief overview of the event. A week later, two people from Greenpeace came out to the village. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 1)

The representative of Greenpeace held meetings in the coffee house of the village and informed them about the process.

The skepticism about the project was not unique to the *muhtar*. More importantly, local community, particularly those with lands in the project area,

¹¹ "Şirket dışını gösterdi"

complained that the company was not paying the value of their land. This theme emerged in numerous interviews. Some of them even stated that the project could have been completed if the company had properly valued the lands (Local Community Interview 1, 2, 4, 14; Member of a Civil Society Organization 23, 24). In addition, some amount of money was transferred to their bank accounts in exchange for their lands without asking the villagers, and the payments were not made equally. Yet, their complaints were in actuality stemming from the value assigned to their land by the state as a result of the urgent expropriation decision as one of the representatives of a CSO states

In urgent expropriation, the age of the trees is calculated. There were 60 years old trees, while there were also the young ones. The age of the tree affects the productivity of them. That is why, the value of the lands was changing in accordance with the trees on them. But the villagers interpret that issue differently. (Civil Society Organization Interview 9)

Simultaneously with all these, the company surrounded the power plant area with a wire fence and began to cut down the olive trees. This was not welcomed by the Yırca villagers. As a result, some of them decided to resist against the construction of the power plant as they could get neither the value of their lands nor the employment guarantee.

5.1.5.2 The resistance and repertoires of contention

In this part of the study, I continue to give details about the evolution of the Yırca movement with a specific focus on their repertoires of contention. “Repertoires of contention are sets of tools for the people involved” (Tilly, 2006: 55). In the repertoires of contention, there are tactics, strategies and methods used by the insurgents and they vary depending on time and place (Tilly, 2006: 35). The reason

that the villagers had initiated a resistance, left-wing socialist groups in Soma began to visit the village. These left-wing socialist groups was already in Soma following the 301 miners' disaster.

As the company also cut the trees during night, it necessitated human labor to keep watch in the area at night. Therefore, an old garden house was turned in a watch house, named “the roof of resistance” (*direnış damı*). They had also set up a “watchtower” (*gözetleme kulesi*), from which they could observe the area above. Through that point, they could ascertain whether any unusual activity had taken place or not. Local community and the CSOs outside of the village began keeping a vigilant eye from the roof and the watchtower to prevent the cutting of trees until the lawsuit would be resolved.

Local journalists did not remain unresponsive to the events taking place in a village near Soma. Particularly during the cutting of the trees, they came to the village to take photographs. Since the national press already had a presence in Soma, it was not difficult for the Yırca movement to be reflected in the national press.

Not only the press, but also the villagers had reached Özgür Özel, who was one of the Manisa MP of the main opposition party (CHP) at the time. Özgür Özel had frequently travelled to Soma due to the 301 miners, and was present in Yırca, as well. Özel's phone number was widely distributed among the villagers and he always came when the villagers called him when there was an incident. Özel prepared the ground for a diverse repertoire of actions, as well as ensuring that they were covered by the press. One of the actions was to take the first 13 olive trees cut down with a truck in front of the Manisa Governor's Office and organize a demonstration with the villagers (Local Community Interview No. 13). The other

was to accompany a group of villagers to the parliament, Ankara, where they would attend a speech of the CHP President of the time about Yırca¹³.

The presence of Özel, the media's interest, and the numerous organizations on the ground drew the attention of many other civil society organizations to Yırca, prompting them to offer further support. The civil society groups provided a range of support, from keeping a vigil in the area, to writing reports on the damage caused by the coal-fired power plant, to donating olive seedlings, as one interview participant mentioned:

They came from all over the country. This place has become like a place of sacred value. You know how individuals visit the Virgin Mary because it is sacred, this place has become like that. (Journalist Interview No.18)

The villagers, on the other hand, welcomed the civil society that came to support them with a level of openness that we do not see everywhere. As it is discussed in some of the later cases, it is quite common to label those people as outsiders and to refuse their support. Key to this openness was the socio-economic and political context of the village mentioned before and the *muhtar*'s leadership. The gathering of numerous people in the village created a sense of solidarity between the villagers and the civil society organizations as one of the villagers mentions:

Large numbers of people came. Some days there were up to 400 people. We were collecting money among the villagers. We fed everyone who came with bread, rice, and ayran so that it wouldn't be too costly. We used our tomato paste and oil in our houses. For example, my stock of winter tomato paste ran out in September that year. (Local Community Interview No. 1)

Therefore, all these served to strengthen the struggle and the support for it like a vicious circle in which it is hard to determine which event triggered the other.

¹³ Milliyet (11.11.2014) Kılıçdaroğlu'dan köylülere zeytin ağacı,
<https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/kilicdarogludan-koylulere-zeytin-agaci-1968219>

5.1.6 Unpacking the threats to Yırca movement

The struggle of the peasants did not solely revolve around opportunities; it was accompanied by threats as well. In this section of study, I explain the threats of Yırca Movement since they have significant impact on the outcome of the struggle. Threats diminish the opportunities and discourage people from struggling (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011: 32).

The initial threat to the Yırca movement is that the project was considered as a state project and criminalization of the insurgents. Although this is a coal-fired power plant project, addressing Türkiye's energy deficit appears to be a crucial step forward in terms of state policies, which takes priority over climate change. The outcome of this situation has been observed through various incidents, including Taner Yıldız's attendance at the project's groundbreaking ceremony and his speech at the ceremony:

30 percent of the world's electricity is generated by coal, others will do it, we don't. Are we the crazy ones in the neighborhood? While they invest in coal, they criticize us for reducing the number of olive trees. 12 years ago, there were 91 million olive trees, today there are 161 million. We are not going to pollute the environment. We are investing with the environment, not despite the environment. (Enerji Günlüğü, 2014)

The argument that the power plant would reduce Türkiye's energy deficit was a prevalent view that even the company official claimed, “Greenpeace was accused of being aligned with the natural gas lobby”. Then she continued

During the private discussions in the company, Greenpeace was perceived as the natural gas lobby. Greenpeace provoked the villagers because they are the natural gas lobby, and the natural gas lobby does not wish this project to be done because it contributes to a current energy deficit of \$250,000,000. The movement emerged because the provocation of the local community by these lobby groups. (Company Official Interview No. 27)

Furthermore, aside from the government's interest in this project, the company also had tactics that posed a direct threat to the Yırca Movement. The firm

pursued two paths in their threatening strategies: repression and co-optation. But it is apparent that the company could not manage co-optation process. The company's attempts to co-opt with the villagers seem to have been limited to the lands they bought, and job promises that did not appear as secure to the villagers. The company's inability to manage this process played a role in changing trajectory of Yirca. As mentioned earlier, numerous villagers stated that if the company had paid enough for the lands, the power plant would have been constructed.

Once the resistance began, the company turned into the aggressive tactics. One of the reason why the Yirca movement has attracted such public attention. Since the first day, the company slowly started to cut down the olive trees¹⁴ and surrounded the land with wire fences. However, the local community was alarmed when the company used construction machinery to cut down the trees. They went to the area every time they heard a noise and tried to stop the cutting. Yet, this was not one single tactic of the company. When the company noticed people interfering with the cutting, they tried to cut the trees off with silenced tools. They added security cameras and a second fence around the project site to prevent the entrance, and a gate to control entrance to the land. One of the local describes the area by resembling it to a prison known with its bad reputation:

There is a prison, perhaps in Guatemala or somewhere in the United States, where political prisoners are detained. A film has even been made about it. Here, the company have built a spiral razor wire fence similar to this one. They built razor wire outside the normal wire fence both above and below. You can't do anything, you can't dismantle. It was like prison fences. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 1)

In addition, the number of private security guards was increased to such an extent that it occasionally reached to 400 people. It was harvesting time in the olive

¹⁴ See for the number of trees cut down: (Alphan, 2015)

groves. All these extraordinary measures were taken to control the people going in and out of the groves and to ensure there was no resistance when the olives were cut. The confrontations between the private security guards and the villagers sometimes escalated to the point that many of the photographs in the press were made up of these conflicts.

Villagers called the gendarmerie every time the company tried to cut down the trees. Although there was never any direct intervention by the gendarmerie against the villagers, most of them claimed that the gendarmerie was protecting the company. There are two reasons for that claim. The gendarmerie station is only 10 minutes away from the village. However, local community claimed that the gendarmerie came to the village after 1.5-2 hours and that the events were over by the time they arrived (Local Community Interview No. 11, 13, 17, 20, 23). Secondly, the gendarmerie also tried to remove the resistance members from the area by taking them to the police station to take statements or complaints (Civil Society Organization Interview No. 25).

On 7 November 2015, there was a great devastation in which around 6600 trees were cut down. The previous night, after the villagers had been removed from the area with the promise and guarantee of the gendarmerie that the cutting would not take place, the trees were cut down in the morning with 8-9 large excavators. The private security handcuffed three of the people who were staying in the *Direnış Damı* at that night for observation and took two of them to a place outside the village so that they would not be able to inform the villagers. The other one was locked in a container. That day is recalled by the villagers as a catastrophic day. Some of the interviews below reflects their grievances:

I opened the window of the bedroom. Though it may seem unbelievable, I remember it as if it was yesterday. The trees were broken, and the trees cried. Believe it or not, they cried. (Local Community Interview No. 13)

You can't imagine that sound. It hurts inside. The trees crackle as if someone is being broken or killed. (Civil Society Organization Interview No. 10)

The birds are screaming because they have their nests there too. They destroyed the birds' nests too. They didn't listen. They destroyed them. (Local Community Interview No. 11)

In addition to the company's threats against the movement, the women's wing of AKP organized a signature campaign in the center of Soma, demanding the construction of the thermal power plant. There was even a confrontation between the villagers and the AKP women's wing during the signature campaign (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 10).

On 7 November 2014, the same day in the afternoon with the cutting of 6600 trees, a stay of execution was issued in the lawsuit. The urgent expropriation decision was later cancelled in April 2015. The fact that the decision of stay of execution and their cutting of 6600 olive trees took place on the same day aroused suspicion among the villagers. They believe that the company had prior knowledge of the decision and cut the trees as an act of revenge or to force the villagers to give up their case. However, confirmation of this could not be obtained.

The narrative analysis showing conditions for the Yırca Movement is presented in Figure 13.




Figure 13. Narrative analysis showing conditions for the Yırca movement¹⁵

5.2 Arhavi Kavak movement

This part of the study focuses on the movement against Arhavi Kavak HEPP construction, which I call Arhavi Kavak movement. The construction of the HEPP

¹⁵ Boxes in red are potential threats for the movement

has been completed and its currently in production. Hence the movement was unsuccessful in their actions. The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed account of the development of the Arhavi movement and the causal relationships that led to its failure.

5.2.1 Description of the area and the project

In 2012, MNG Holding got its related permissions for the license and the EIA approval for a hydroelectric power plant with a capacity of 11,79 Mwe. Although the official name of the power plant is Kavak HEPP, it has been known as “Crazy HEPP” (*Çılgın HES*) since it was one of the first HEPPs that would be constructed inside an urban area in Türkiye. As can be seen from Figure 14, two branches known as Sidere and Orçi Streams would be intercepted with regulators constructed in the villages of Konaklı and Kemerköprü. Starting from the area known as Ciğani in the Konaklı village, it would be transferred through a 3500-meter tunnel to the Cumhuriyet neighborhood, one of the central neighborhoods of Arhavi.




Figure 14. Kavak HEPP site
Source: (Arhavi Elektrik Üretimi ve Tic. A.Ş., 2015: 16)

5.2.2 Socio-economic and political context of Arhavi movement

The HEPP is located in Arhavi, which is a district of Artvin in the Eastern Black Sea region. The economy of the region is mainly based on tea production. In addition to tea, hazelnut and kiwi cultivation and beekeeping are also undertaken. Industrial production in the district is based on tea production (Arhavi Belediyesi, 2018: 58).

Due to the hilly structure of the region and its rainy and humid weather, the existing agriculture and industry in the region cannot meet the needs of the population. For this reason, the local people migrate to cities such as İstanbul, İzmir, and Ankara, in which they can have different job opportunities. Thus, the region continuously immigrates, leaving the villages with depeasantization. As can be seen from the Figure 15, the urban population of Arhavi increased until 2007 and remained almost the same after then. The increase is parallel to the population

increase in Türkiye. Arhavi's rural population decreased dramatically since 1980. It is noted that urban population has migrated but this migration movement is mostly concentrated among the rural population (Arhavi Belediyesi, 2018: 49). However, this movement is predominantly among the rural population. The migration holds significance for this study because as a result of intensive migration, there are no people left to defend their living spaces against the mushrooming HEPPs in the region.




Figure 15. Arhavi urban and rural population, 1980-2010

Source: Prepared by the author using data of Institute of Statistics of Türkiye (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2023b)

5.2.3 Electoral preferences of Arhavi

Besides the study's selection criteria of the region's electoral preferences, it has significant implications for Arhavi. A notable number of interview participants expressed that Arhavi's political orientation is different from that of neighboring Hopa (one of the districts of Artvin) and Fındıklı (one of the districts of Rize). They

asserted that the weak left-wing tendency in the local community in Arhavi restricted support for the movement (Local Community Interview No. 29, 30,36, 47; Civil Society Organizations Interview No. 43, 44, 45, 46; Opposition Political Party Interview No. 34). One of the interviewees even stated that their main goal was to prevent the construction of HEPPs along the coast beyond Çayeli, as in the famous folk song (*Çayeli'nden öteye*). Still, Arhavi failed to achieve it for this very reason (Civil society organizations interview 44). Therefore, the election results of Hopa and Fındıklı are given with Arhavi's below in Tables 16, 17 and 18 (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023). The election results revealed a reflection of the situation in Hopa, but it was not directly observed in Fındıklı. As a result, the relationship between the historical tradition of the left in Fındıklı and the struggle against the HEPP is a subject for further research. However, almost half of the interviewees made this claim, and the high AKP vote share in Arhavi make this variable worth exploring for the future study.




Figure 16. General elections in Arhavi

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)




Figure 13. General elections in Hopa

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)




Figure 17. General elections in Fındıklı

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)

5.2.4 Pre-existing conditions before the emergence of Arhavi movement

There are two different pre-existing conditions, which might have affected the trajectory of Arhavi Movement. One of them is the strong penetration of the company to local community. The other is the pre-existing networks of struggle.

One of the hypotheses of the study while conducting the QCA was that the construction company's proximity to government would shape the outcome of the social movement. However, during the fieldwork, it became apparent that beside the proximity to government, company's management of all the processes from beginning to the end of the project play a significant role. Its penetration to the local community weakens the social movement. The Arhavi Kavak HEPP project provides an apt example.

The construction of the Arhavi Kavak HEPP project was carried out by MNG Holding, one of the leading construction companies of Türkiye. MNG Holding also operates in logistics and media. The owner of MNG, Mehmet Nazif Günel, is a businessperson born in Arhavi. At this point, the concept of fellow citizenship (*hemşehricilik*), which is a quite influential phenomenon for Türkiye, becomes central. The idea of fellow citizenship, which emerged with the rural-urban migration of the 1950s, has become a buffer mechanism to ease the adaptation of people to the urban areas (Kıray, 1964: 7). During the migration process, the central and local governments were unable to meet the basic needs of the citizens who migrated. These needs, from choosing the location to migrate to finding a house to live in and a job to work in, were met through these informal networks based on fellow citizenship (Kurtoğlu, 2005). As the primary focus of this thesis does not concern the networks of fellow citizenship, I do not discuss them in detail, but these

networks are still effective today. Thus, it holds great significance that the owner of MNG Holding is from Arhavi.

As the company has grown, MNG Holding's investments in the region have increased, and many people from Arhavi have been working for the company. Almost everyone I interviewed who was from Arhavi had a contact working for MNG Holding. MNG not only have created employment opportunities for the local community but also has a strong relationship with the municipality. Through its sponsorship of municipal projects, it has contributed substantially to the infrastructure of the region. It has built tennis courts, some facilities, floor tiles and fountains, all of which are municipal services (Local Community Interview No. 39, 40). There is even a street called MNG Street where the Mehmet Nazif Günel Primary School is also located¹⁶. The company has also supported some cultural activities such as sponsoring festivals and some expenses of Arhavi Sport (Local Community Interview No. 29). Furthermore, it has been awarding scholarships to around 400 students every year in the region (Local Community Interview No. 40, Civil Society Organization Interview No. 44, Opposition Political Party Interview No. 34). The company was in the construction of the section of the Black Sea coastal road project on the Arhavi side, as well. Therefore, MNG Holding is not a “stranger” to the region. On the contrary, it is a company that invests in the region and provides employment for the local people. Therefore, its penetration to the society was so strong that it did not rely on one-time donations and agreements.

The second pre-existing condition is the extensive network of struggle in the region. These struggle networks, which started with the Artvin Cerattepe resistance,

¹⁶ <https://arhavimngilkokulu.meb.k12.tr/tema/iletisim.php>

have developed with the resistance against the Black Sea Coastal Road and HEPPs. The Eastern Black Sea region is the region in Türkiye where hydroelectric power plants have mushroomed. For this reason, the collective memory of the HEPP struggle was quite strong. Hence, these networks of struggle offered a readily available network for the Arhavi Movement. However, I discuss in the next chapter whether this situation can be transformed into an advantage for Arhavi.

5.2.5 The process: Evolution and outcome of Arhavi movement

This section of the study provides an overview of the evolution of the movement.

5.2.5.1 Emergence

The emergence of the struggle dates to 2012, when the local community informed that the project would be built in the area. The idea of struggling against HEPPs first emerged among the members of the *Eğitim-Sen* Arhavi branch in 2012. After a few meetings, a platform called the Arhavi Nature Protection Platform (*Arhavi Doğa Koruma Platformu*) was established where the local community of the region could represent themselves. Then, they sued for the cancellation of the EIA. Following the distribution of leaflets about the HEPP, home visits to villages, and press releases, support for the movement gradually increased. The main reason for their opposition to the project was the damage that HEPPs would cause to the ecology.

The Arhavi movement was a long-standing resistance that typically tended to be more organized during the summer months. This is largely due to the fact that the pioneers of the resistance are mostly people who do not live in Arhavi but they are from Arhavi. These people usually visited hometowns during the summer months.

5.2.5.2 The resistance and repertoires of contention¹⁷

The word cloud of the movement is given below in Figure 18. The figure reflects the information that I give while tracing the process. The construction of the power plant at Konaklı, Kemerköprü, Dereüstü, Kavak villages and Cumhuriyet neighborhood is primarily affected by the project. This is why there was a serious reaction in these villages when they heard about the project, initially. In July, residents established a resistance tent (*direnış çadırı*) in the Ciğani area, in the middle of the villages of Konaklı and Kemerköprü. The villagers of Konaklı and Kemerköprü, in particular, resisted in this tent. During Ramadan, meals were served in the tent at *iftars* and *sahurs*. The protest persisted during July and August. Towards the end of September, a heavy rainfall caused a flood overnight, impacting the area where the tent was located. These three month-long protests ended with the flood.

The company received the EIA positive report on 29 November 2012 (Local Community Interview Participant No. 29). Meanwhile, company employees who came to the area to carry out measurements were chased out of the area. Moreover, a lawsuit was filed for the cancellation of the EIA.

There were also weaknesses in the struggle. Firstly, it was discovered that one of the spokespersons of the struggle got a job within MNG and gave up the struggle. As a result, the subsequent year, 2013, proved to be particularly weak for the resistance

¹⁷ In addition to the interviews, the notes of the Arhavi Nature Conservation Platform were also used to describe the narrative. The notes were taken by the interview participant no. 29.

Fellowship of Streams Platform, Black Sea Uprising, *Yeşil Artvin Derneği* (Green Artvin Association), *Halkevleri and Eğitim-Sen* Arhavi branch, the expert examination was conducted with the participation of approximately 1500 people. “This protest became one of the most highly visible environmental protests in the region” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 30). These civil society organizations also aided the resistance by sharing their experiences (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 31). Alongside joining the protests, they arranged some meetings and panels. In February of the same year, a demonstration and press statement were organized in Kadıköy, İstanbul (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 45).

In late February, the construction machine belonging to MNG was for the first time in the river. However, due to the intervention of the villagers, the machine was removed from the stream. In the same year, a protest was organized on a bridge built illegally by MNG. A physical confrontation occurred between the company's employees and the protesters. Such protests took place from time to time to prevent the company's machines from working by removing them from the stream in 2014. In addition to such protests, a resistance tent was re-established. A number of political figures also visited the resistance tent. CHP's İstanbul Deputy Melda Onur, Artvin Deputy Uğur Bayraktutan, Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) Chair Alper Taş, and CHP's Arhavi district organization were among them. “But this political support was never fully translated into being the locomotive of the movement” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 47) unlike Yırca movement

5.2.6 Unpacking the threats to Arhavi movement

In every movement, there are threats. However, the threats in Arhavi were much stronger than the opportunities, leading to the movement's failure. These are the social and political structure of Arhavi, the penetration of MNG Holding into the local community, the prolonged legal battles and the increasingly tense political atmosphere in the country. Since I have already highlighted the first two as pre-existing conditions, in this section I present a discussion on localism, the legal proceedings and the political atmosphere of the country.

Firstly, in Arhavi movement, the framing of the struggle as a purely local issue led to a strong “us versus them” dynamic, where external actors were perceived with suspicion and even hostility. This perception undermined potential alliances with broader networks and activists, eventually isolating the movement and limiting its capacity to expand.

In August 2014, the court issued a stay of execution of the project's EIA, and in October 2014, it cancelled the EIA positive decision on the grounds of violation of the law¹⁹. Although the company went for an appeal against the decision, it also initiated preparations to renew the EIA, using Circular 2009/7 and got its second EIA in 2015. However, the court also cancelled the second EIA soon after it was legally challenged in July 2015. However, MNG Holding remained determined to proceed with the HEPP project and restarted the process with the aim of obtaining a new positive EIA decision. This time the process would start from the very beginning, without using Circular no. 2009/7. However, the process was not completed as the Council of State overturned the decision to cancel the first EIA.

¹⁹ Hürriyet (07.12.2016). Şehiriçi HES’e Danıştay’dan Devam, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/sehirici-hese-danistaydan-devam-40114161>

The justification for this decision was that the preparation of the EIA did not violate the law²⁰. Consequently, the company was permitted to proceed with the project based on its first EIA report.

“Since there is no further legal action, we have decided to endure as much as physically possible” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 29). Yet, the resistance's resilience was weakened. They did not receive significant support from Arhavians. This support decreased even more in 2015. This diminishing support was due to two reasons. Firstly, the lawsuits were successfully won. But the EIA reports were received again by the company every time. It took about six years in total from the beginning to the end, for Arhavi HEPP resistance. The latest decision by the Council of State was quite a setback for the movement. The second cause was an external shock. The political climate in the country was becoming increasingly tense. The explosion in Suruç in July 2015, the rise in conflicts with the PKK, and the subsequent renewed general election deterred individuals from engaging in street demonstrations. The country's agenda underwent a dramatic shift in 2016. The 15 July coup attempt, coupled with the immediate declaration of a State of Emergency, marked a turning point in which the movement weakened while MNG Holding gained momentum. This ultimately brought the project's completion by August 2018.

The narrative analysis showing conditions for the Arhavi Movement is presented in Figure 19.

²⁰ Ibid.




Figure 19. Narrative analysis showing conditions for the Arhavi Movement²¹

²¹ Boxes in red are potential threats for the movement

5.3 Loç Valley movement

This section is about the movement against the construction of the Loç Valley HEPP, which I call the Loç Valley Movement. It aims to give a detailed account of how the Loç Valley Movement developed and how it came to be successful.

5.3.1 Description of the area and the project

The HEPP project planned by Orya Energy, which received an electricity generation license in 2008 and EIA approval in 2009, was located on the Devrekani Stream, used by four villages in the Cide district of Kastamonu. These four villages, Hamitli, Karakadı, Çamdibi and Şenköy, are in the buffer zone of the Küre Mountains National Park and they are located in the Loç Valley. Figure 20 shows the location of the project. The installed capacity of the project was 21,252 MWe.



Figure 20. Cide Loç Valley HEPP site
Source: (Orya Elektrik Üretim A.Ş., 2018: 22)

5.3.2 Socio-economic and political context of Loç Valley movement

The area in which the four villages are located is densely forested. For this reason, forestry used to be the livelihood of the villages. Yet, both Germany's intake of labor migrants from Türkiye and increased migration from rural to urban areas led to the depeasantization of the valley. Figure 21 shows the dramatic decline of population in the valley since 1980. The majority of people currently living in the valley is elderly.




Figure 21. Total population of Karakadı, Hamitli, Şenköy and Çamdibi, 1980-2010
Source: Prepared by the author using data of Institute of Statistics of Türkiye (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2023a)

Despite the proximity of Cide, the closest town to the valley, which is 30 kilometers away, it takes more than an hour to get there because the valley is very hilly, and the roads are not well maintained.

With the population of the four villages in the valley reduced to around 300 people. Therefore, the most likely scenario is that there is no manpower to defend the valley from the HEPP. In addition, because of the difficult access to the valley, travel to and from the valley is likely to be a challenge in the event of an

insurgency. Yet, these did not happen. On the contrary, the people to defend their living spaces came from Istanbul. They were originally from Loç. This is explained in pre-existing conditions.

5.3.3 Electoral preferences of Loç Valley

Voting preferences in Loç Valley differ significantly from other cases in the study. Although the AKP is also the primary choice in general elections in Arhavi, the percentage of voters supporting parties other than AKP is substantially lower in Loç Valley. In 2007, AKP's vote share was 87%, which dropped to 68% in both the 2011 and 2015 June elections. However, it increased to 78% in the November 2015 elections in the valley. Although Figure 22 loses its meaning when it is taken into account that the majority of the people living in the valley are elderly and that the Loç Valley struggle was led by Loç residents living in Istanbul, I was told in the interviews that most of the people who joined the struggle were initially AKP voters, as well (Local Community Interview Participant No. 48, 62, 63).




Figure 22. General elections in Loç Valley

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)

5.3.4 Pre-existing conditions before the emergence of Loç Valley movement

The Loç Valley is situated in a very peculiar area, due to its location. The region, which is surrounded on all sides by the Küre Mountains National Park, has a wide variety of endemic plants, canyons and caves. Thirty-three plant species that are endangered at European level are present in this area²². It is also home to many wild animals such as bears, wildcats and deers. The valley also borders the Valla Canyon, which is the second largest canyon in the world.²³

The region became as buffer zone with the declaration of the surrounding area as a National Park with the Council of Ministers Decree 2000/744 dated 07.07.2000

²² <https://bolge10.tarimorman.gov.tr/Menu/39/Kure-Daglari-Milli-Parki>

²³ <https://www.cide.bel.tr/foto/loc-vadisi-ve-seyir-terasi>

(Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı, 2000). The buffer zone is the area around significant protected areas. Such zones consist of rural settlements that interact with the national park. The purpose of creating such a category as buffer zones is to preserve biodiversity in the national park (Yıldız, 2019: 29-31). In addition, human life still continues around the national park:

Loç Valley was not declared a national park area so that life in the villages would not be difficult. Otherwise, we would not have been able to put a nail in it, otherwise this valley has no difference from a national park area. (Local Community Interview 48)

Therefore, it is essential for the continuation of human life that these rural areas are not directly declared national parks. The fact that the National Park surrounds the valley provided a significant advantage to the villagers during the litigation process.

The second pre-existing condition the determination of the local people to protect their living spaces. Although a similar situation was observed in other cases, I argue that the determination of the people of Loç was notably stronger. This is because they consider the valley an integral part of their livelihood, although they occasionally visit Loç. Despite the population of these four villages has decreased due to the migration to urban areas, the people who migrated to metropolitan areas have not been disconnected from the villages. One of the primary factors that strengthened the attachment of Loç locals from Istanbul to the valley was not only the fact that it was their hometown. A more significant factor was the way the stream in the Valley (Devrekani Stream) was used by the local community.

Swimming in Devrekani Stream every summer vacation has become a tradition:

Our people are not able to go on holiday to Antalya, they can't go on holiday to Marmaris or Bodrum, they all come to the Valley because of the stream, they all come on holiday to swim in the stream. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 61)

Even though the settlements lie in the same valley, the houses are a considerable distance apart due to the hilly terrain. Consequently, the stream has become a hub of social interaction for the locals. What a representative of a civil society organization from the Eastern Black Sea region said is worth noting:

When I went to the Loç valley, I thought there were villages by the stream, like we have in our hometown, Trabzon. Four villages are located at a distance from the stream, and there is no irrigation of agricultural lands through the stream. The purpose of this stream is unclear. These four villages meet and swim there, they spend their summer holidays there. That is why the need to fight for this stream seemed odd to me. In my village, the stream is situated just below the village. It provides many of our needs. But why do these villages value it so highly in Loç? Because when they go there in summer, they socialize by the stream. They meet there, they get married there, and most of the time they establish kinship there. (Civil Society Interview Participant No. 66)

For this reason, despite not residing in the village throughout the year, people's connection with the villages and the valley has never been dissolved. It is precisely for this reason that the movement in Loç Valley was organized by people living in Istanbul but from Loç and it was based on Istanbul. Cultural ties increased their capacity for resilience even in the absence of economic dependence. Therefore, communities that have strong cultural ties have the potential to increase their capacity for collective resilience, even in the absence of economic interdependence.

5.3.5 The process: Evolution and outcome of Loç Valley movement

This section of the study provides an overview of the evolution of the movement.

5.3.5.1 Emergence

After receiving a fax to their hometown association (*hemşehri derneği*) in Istanbul informing them that a hydroelectric power plant would be built in their hometown, Loç locals in İstanbul decided to investigate the hydroelectric power plants and their

impacts. As a result of their research, they were worried that the water in the region might be cut off, the environment would be degraded, and they would not be able to swim in the stream and socialize by the stream, which had become a summer ritual. They have also concerned about potential environmental degradation after the construction of HEPP:

Where will our animals drink water from? What will they do? They say they will build a fence where the dam is built, they say people will not be allowed to enter the area. How will the animals have access to water then? (Local Community Interview Participant No. 58)

The villagers do not have any direct economic connection with the stream.

Therefore, their reason for opposing the construction of the HEPP is not means of living but defending their living spaces (*yaşam alanı savunusu*).

Beside organizing among themselves and informing their relatives about the HEPP and its possible impacts, they tried to connect with a number of platforms involved in such struggles.

Meanwhile, the public participation meeting required by the EIA was held in the valley. The villagers were divided on the construction of HEPP in the valley.

The memories of one person who did not want the HEPP is an important reference point in the analysis chapter

Instinctively, I don't want this HEPP to be built. I want it to be investigated. At the time, I had the Firtina Stream resistance of 1996 in mind. There was also something I always sympathized with in my childhood, the Bergama Movement. I used to watch their resistance on television, a local resistance movement that I admired a lot. When I opposed the project at the EIA meeting, a company official said, "Are you resisting with these villagers?" pointing to the coffeehouse. I got up and said, "I'll bring in all the environmental organizations and I'm not going to let you do this". I was thinking of TEMA and Greenpeace. Yet, when we wrote to Greenpeace, they said we were only interested in nuclear power and Mediterranean seals in Türkiye. None of them came. They also offered HEPPs as an alternative to nuclear. In addition, Orhan Yavuz, the owner of Orya Energy, was on the board of trustees of TEMA. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 48)

Then they met with other organizations with their own efforts to make their voices heard and to be informed about the potential process ahead of them. These included the Black Sea is Revolt (*Karadeniz İsyandadır*) and the Munzur Protection Committee (*Munzur Koruma Kurulu*).

The villagers also invited the company to their hometown associations in Istanbul around the same time as the public participation meeting for the EIA in the valley. Their aim was to obtain information from the company about the HEPP and its implications. However, tensions between the company and the locals also occurred here, too:

The things they were saying about the project were exactly what I had researched, no different. People objected there, saying what are you doing? Everybody reacted. Of course, they left. But on the way out, someone heard a company official said, "I am not that kind of person who will give over the project to 3-5 marauders²⁴". That word affected people a lot. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 65)

After public participation meeting and the meeting at the hometown association, the resistance began.

5.3.5.2 The resistance and repertoires of contention

The word cloud of Loç Valley interviews is given below in Figure 23. The figure reflects the information that I give while tracing the process. The repertoire of actions in this case is quite diverse. The villagers' first action, before contacting civil society organizations, was to find a lawyer and file a lawsuit. They collated around 300 signatures to authorize the lawyer for the lawsuit against the company's EIA.

²⁴ 3-5 Çapulcu

we first met, the locals were saying ‘we don't know how to shout slogans, we don't know how to write banners, we don't even know what a banner is’” (Interview No. 66). The “*sarı yazma*” (yellow head scarf) symbol and many of their slogans emerged in their meetings with those organizations (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 44 and 66). They also learnt how to respond when security forces intervene in demonstrations:

The gendarmerie arrived on a day when we were attempting to retrieve the digger of the company from the river. The commander suddenly got rough with us. As the local community, we are afraid of the military forces. We don't raise our voices against the gendarmerie. One of the representatives of a CSO asked us to sit. The commander, who had been shouting at us, suddenly became as quiet as a mouse when we sit. This experience made us understand that it is not easy to touch us when we're only sitting. This made us recognize that we have no reason to be afraid of the commander, he is a human being and a civil servant like you and me. (Local Community Interview Participant 65)

Secondly, the local community in Istanbul started participating in environmental protests. Moreover, they became visible through CSOs and these protests, leading to other social movements involved in the protests getting aware of the Loç resistance. The Green Group in the European Parliament organized a conference in Brussels on 18 November 2010 to examine Türkiye's water management policy. The Loç Valley Protection Platform also participated in the conference, which was arranged by the Nature Association (*Doğa Derneği*) (Kılıç, 2020). In this way, they achieved international visibility through a CSO, as well. With all of these, the circle of support of the movement gradually expanded. They also attracted the attention of the press because of their colorful images of *sarı yazma*²⁶ and the *köçek*²⁷ they brought to the protests. It helped them to gain public

²⁶ A headscarf with a predominance of yellow, along with blue, green, and red

²⁷ Male dancers disguised as women

support. Figure 24 shows a photograph of a protest published in a newspaper for visualization purposes.

The mobilization of the local community was not limited to attending protests in Istanbul. As construction had already started in the valley, they had to prevent construction until the legal process was completed. That is why, almost every weekend for eight months, a couple of buses full of Loç locals traveled from Istanbul to Loç. As many of them work during the week, they typically planned bus trips departing on Friday evening and returning on Sunday evening.



Figure 24. An image from the Loç Valley Protests in İstanbul
Source: (Yoksu, 2017)

Tensions occasionally arose between the construction company, which wanted to proceed with its project, and the villagers, who wanted to prevent it. Although the gendarmerie never intervened directly with the villagers, they

sometimes detained some of them when those tensions arose. Since the lands of villagers, who did not voluntarily sell their property to the company, were expropriated through urgent expropriation decision, the company also entered these lands for construction work. This also led to tensions between the company and the villagers. According to a villager, during one such tension:

I questioned him while holding my land certificate, "What is your purpose here?" He replied, "Are you opposing the state?" Then I said, "I am not against the state, but this land is mine." Am I worried about this? No. Following this, the company contacted the gendarmerie and had me arrested on my own land. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 56)

In addition, the quarry license of the company, which should have been passed by the Kastamonu Provincial Assembly, was not approved through the initiative of an AKP member of the assembly. He convinced other AKP members and wrote a report against the construction of the HEPP. For this reason, he was even later excluded from the party

I joined the struggle not because I expected anything from anyone, but because I simply adore the nature. I would not have succeeded if I were not in the AK Party. It is often said that you cannot intervene in the ship without being on the ship. But later, they did not want me in the party. (Member of the Provincial General Assembly/Ruling Party Interview participant. No. 52)

The villagers also applied to the District Governorship and Kastamonu Special Provincial Administration on different grounds to raise their complaints about the project. However, when they could not get a response, they started a sit-in protest in front of Orya Energy in Kabataş, Istanbul on 6 December 2010.

We organized sit-in protests because we have nothing to do. We were right but no one was helping us. The authorities and even the company should be penalized because of their actions but they were not. We were alone. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 64)

After 28 days, the sit-in protests ended on 4 January after a series development.

Firstly, on the last day of the year, the Special Provincial Administration suspended the project on the grounds that there was no zoning plan. Four days later, the

Kastamonu Administrative Court issued a stay of execution in the case (Erensü, 2011). The protesters' resistance was on the point of collapse due to the cold weather, the prolonged duration of the protests and the lack of response from the authorities. “Fortunately, it did because the community almost gave up” (Civil Society Organizations Interview Participant No. 66).

The company received another EIA in 2018 under Circular no.2009/7 in 2018. The villagers who challenged both the EIA and the electricity generation license won the case again and company's license and the EIA were cancelled by the court.

5.3.6 Unpacking the threats to Loç movement

Although the Loç Valley movement was supported by many CSOs, covered by the mainstream media, attracted public attention, and became ultimately successful, it also contained many threats. These threats predominantly relied on the company's repertoire of actions, in which there are tactics based on co-optation.

The company's efforts to convince the locals started from the very first day with the purchasing of land on the riverside for a price far higher than it was worth.

They purchased the land for 12 million liras. However, it was only worth 2 million liras. I was in need of money at that time. I went to land registry and sold my land. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 50)

There are two primary reasons, both stemming from depeasantization, why this strategy of the company was likely to be useful in Loç Valley. Firstly, agriculture was no longer practiced in the village by the stream. In other words, the land that the company desired to purchase did not affect the means of living of the villagers.

Secondly, the villagers had low-income:

The fact that most of the people living in the villages [of Loç Valley] do not have a strong financial condition is already a factor that triggers this

situation. What do they have in the village? They don't have anything. They have two animals, one cow, five chickens and that's it! The companies know how to take advantage of people's weaknesses very well. (Journalist Interview Participant No. 55)

Some villagers did not accept these offering of the company. Their lands were taken by way of urgent expropriation rule.

The other way of co-optation strategy of the company with the villagers is to agree with the hometown association. These associations are important to persuade the local community since they create strong local networks based on trust (Kurtoğlu, 2005). Therefore, it is crucial for company that the management of the hometown association accepts the HEPP in the valley. Despite their initial opposition, the association eventually granted approval for the HEPP's construction within the valley. The company's purchase of a flat on the association's top floor in Şişli on behalf of the association must be facilitated this decision. In that way, the hometown association took actions in favor of the movement. These included persuading their connections who gave authorization for the lawsuit to withdraw their signatures and appending the association's favorable view in the case file. The company not only donated to the hometown association. It also renovated the communal areas of the villages in the valley, such as community kitchen and Quran courses. In addition, the villagers would also be able to use the new roads opened for the construction of the HEPP. The company spent a significant amount of money on the co-optation and until the case was concluded. An official from the company stated that "there was a total waste of 20 to 30 million liras" (Company Representative – Orya Energy Interview Participant No. 67).

Another threat to the movement is, as in other cases, the criminalization of the insurgents. Not only did the company's field staff assert that the project was a state project when they faced a struggle, but some of the villagers adopted the same

terminology. “They warned us not to stand against the state” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 65). In addition, some of the villagers in the Valley claimed that there were PKK terrorists among the CSOs who came to support the protests. The protesters were also accused of being part of the natural gas lobby

I was unfamiliar with the term "natural gas lobby" until the Secretary General of Kastamonu Special Provincial Administration used it in reference to us, The Secretary General asked us if we were part of the natural gas lobby, could you please explain what this means? I was 26-27 years old at that time, I have been doing the same job since I was born. But that guy asked us if we were part of the natural gas lobby. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 64)

All of these, as in other cases, led to the formation of three groups in the village.

Those who support the movement, those who support the construction of the HEPP and those who are indifferent.

The narrative analysis showing conditions for the Loç Valley Movement is presented in Figure 25.




Figure 25. Narrative analysis showing conditions for the Loç Valley Movement²⁸

5.4 Dokuzhöyük movement

This part of the study focuses on the movement against the construction of the Eren-1 Integrated Thermal Power Plant Project, commonly known as Dokuzhöyük

²⁸ Boxes in red are potential threats for the movement

Thermal Power Plant. It aims to give a detailed account of how the Dokuzh y k Movement developed and how it came to be successful.

5.4.1 Description of the area and the project

In 2018, Deba Energy, a company owned by Debateks Holding, applied for an EIA for a thermal power plant with a capacity of 245 MWe powered by domestic coal in an area near the town of İnce in the central villages of K rklareli. The location of the power plant is shown in Figure 26.



Figure 26. Dokuzh y k thermal power plant site
Source: (K rklareli Kent Konseyi, 2018)

5.4.2 Socio-economic and political context of the Dokuzh y k movement

Although migration from rural to urban areas has been experienced in K rklareli, as in all of T rkiye, the number of people living in villages and relying on agriculture and husbandry for their livelihoods is still high due to the fertility of the agricultural

land. In Kırklareli, 19 percent of the population lives in villages, which is higher than the national average (Kırklareli Çevre, Şehircilik ve İklim Değişikliği İl Müdürlüğü, 2023).

There was an active engagement in agriculture and husbandry in all the surrounding villages where the power plant was planned to be constructed. Dokuzhöyük village, in particular, produces to such an extent that 60% of Kırklareli's vegetable supply originates from this village (City Council Member Interview 68). For instance, a villager stated, "During the appropriate season, three truckloads of chili peppers are harvested daily" (Local Community Interview 71). Therefore, unlike many villages in Türkiye, rural-to-urban migration is limited. Means of living of many people in the region rely on their agricultural lands.

5.4.3 Electoral preferences of Dokuzhöyük, Karahalil and İnece

Since the movement emerged in 2018, the general elections in 2015, 2018 and 2023 is analyzed to provide the general political context of the region. The thermal power plant is commonly referred to as the Dokuzhöyük project, but informational meetings were also held in Karahalil and İnece, where people organized against the project. Therefore, the election results of Karahalil and İnece are analyzed alongside those of Dokuzhöyük. Figures 27, 28 and 29 demonstrate that the CHP, the main opposition party, is the leading party in all elections in the region. Accordingly, the CHP's share of the vote is as high as 65 per cent in the village of Dokuzhöyük.




Figure 27. General elections in Dokuzhöyük, 2015-2018

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)



Figure 28. General elections in İnece, 2015-2018

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)




Figure 29. General elections in Karahalil, 2015-2023

Source: Prepared by the author using data the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2023)

5.4.4 Pre-existing conditions before the emergence of Dokuzhöyük movement

In addition to the productive agricultural lands in the region and the wealth of the villagers through their income from animal husbandry and agriculture, the trajectory of the Dokuzhöyük movement was shaped by two other factors.

The first one was the existence of a highly effective city council²⁹ in Kırklareli. In 2005, the city councils were legalized by the Municipality Law (No. 5393) in line with the decentralization efforts that the AKP government made in its first term as a part of the European Union accession process. The purpose of the law is to enable CSOs and individuals to propose issues for the agenda of the municipal

²⁹ This concept, which is referred to *kent konseyleri* in Turkish, is translated into English as city councils by the author. It should be noted that the concept of city councils in this context does not refer to elected municipal decision-making bodies (municipal councils).

councils. The intention is to promote participatory governance (Kuyucu, 2017: 54-55). Despite the challenges in achieving the objective of the law (Çetinkaya & Korlu, 2012; Özdemir, 2011), some city councils are actively working towards it, such as Kırklareli City Council. The Kırklareli City Council Environment Committee, which is also part of the Trakya Platform established in 2012 to address environmental issues in the Trakya region. It takes action against projects that will lead to environmental degradation in Kırklareli. One measure taken is to monitor announcements of potential energy projects in the region. The Environment Committee of the City Council monitors proposed power plants in the region daily through official government websites such as the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. Thus, they are able to raise objections at the very early for projects they believe to be environmentally harmful. Therefore, it is fair to assume that there is a strong community engagement in Kırklareli.

Secondly, Article 14 of the Law on Soil Protection and Land Use (*Toprak Koruma ve Arazi Kullanımı Kanunu*)

The plains with high agricultural production potential, where soil loss and land degradation develop rapidly due to various reasons such as erosion, pollution or misuse are declared as large plain protection areas by the decision of the President by taking the opinion of the board or boards. Agricultural lands in large plains may not be used for any purpose other than their intended use (2005).

The only exceptions to the land use are the agricultural facilities and activities for which public benefit has been granted by the Ministry. In 2017, the Council of Ministers declared the Kırklareli plain as a large plain protection area. In other words, the plain has been declared a protected area with the decision (Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı, 2017) .

Figure 30 displays the location of the protected area and the thermal power plant. It is clearly visible that the thermal power plant is located next to the

protected area. The EIA report states that the project area was selected considering the protection area (Deba Madencilik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş., 2018: 23), as if the thermal power plants would have no impact on the surrounding area.




Figure 30. Plain of Kırklareli and project area
Source: (Deba Madencilik Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş., 2018: 23)

5.4.5 The Process: evolution and outcome of Dokuzhöyük movement

This section of the study provides an overview of the evolution of the movement.

5.4.5.1 Emergence

According to Article 8(4) of Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation, an announcement is published on the website of the Ministry that the EIA process has started, and that opinions and suggestions can be submitted to the Provincial Directorate or the Ministry until the end of the process (2022). One day, members of

the city council's environment assembly were looking at the ministry's announcements when they received the news that a thermal power plant would be built near Dokuzhöyük village. They announced the thermal power plant news on their social media accounts. The villagers also heard about it on social media at first. Then the city council members went to the villages one by one and gave information about the thermal power plant. Thus, the movement emerged.

5.4.5.2 The resistance and repertoires of contention

Dokuzhöyük thermal power plant resistance is a case that is quite different from the other resistances I have covered in the fieldwork because the Dokuzhöyük resistance did not continue for months or even years, as in other resistances. The movement has a limited repertoire of actions, consisting of capacity increase, objection petitions against the project and the cancellation of the public participation meeting required for the EIA. The word cloud I created through the transcripts of the interviews for the Dokuzhöyük movement reflects the information that I give in this part. Figure 31 presents the word cloud for reference.

To start with the capacity increase activities, after receiving the news about power plant, the city council members visited to the villages to inform them. Their aim was both to give information about the potential damages of the project, to convince them to write objection petitions and to organize against the public participation meeting. One of the City Council members describes that process by saying

It was not easy to convince people. Everyone is against it when we talk, but when we say let's do something, they hesitate a bit. But still, not many people wanted a thermal power plant because the villagers were earning very well from their land (Civil Society Organization Interview participant 70).



Figure 31. The word cloud of the Dokuzhöyük movement³⁰

The City Council did not only inform villagers by individual communication, but also held informational meetings in Dokuzhöyük, Karahalil, İnece and center of Kırklareli. Although the City Council led the organization of these meetings, they received assistance from both the Trakya Platform and the villagers. Through Trakya Platform, they invited professors and lawyers who were experts on the issue, while the villagers provided logistical support and helped to increase attendance at the meeting. The meetings were also supported by the municipalities of Kırklareli and İnece, which are governed by the CHP, and Karahalil, which was governed by the AKP. One of the interview participants claimed that “the mayor of Karahalil underwent internal exclusion within the AKP because of his support and was not nominated as a mayor again because of his support to the resistance” (Civil Society

³⁰ Created by the author using MAXQDA 2022

Organization Interview No. 73). CHP Kırklareli MP Vecdi Gündoğdu and the CHP provincial organization also attended the meetings. The first informational meeting in Dokuzhöyük village was particularly crowded, with many people coming from the surrounding villages. “There were between 2.500 and 3.000 people in the village at that time for the meeting. The population of Dokuzhöyük was 410” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 75).

The villagers also tried to increase their capacity by sending a young local man (interview participant no. 76) from the village to Muğla Yatağan Turgutlu. The purpose of his visit was to learn from Turgutlu villagers about their experiences with the coal-fired thermal power plant in the area. He spoke with the Turgutlu villagers, took various photographs, which he shared with his villagers upon his return.

The second action of the movement is the objection petitions against the EIA. As previously mentioned, local community can raise their objections against the EIA. In line with this, villagers submitted petitions to the ministry expressing their opposition to the construction of a thermal power plant in the region with their reasons. Total number of the petition reached to 13 thousand (Local Community Interview Participant No. 75). The villagers also campaigned to increase the number of these petitions.

The last action is the cancellation of the public participation meeting required for the EIA. On 3 August 2018, a public participation meeting for the EIA was scheduled to take place in İnece. The aim of the people opposing the power plant was to prevent the meeting. This would result in the legally required meeting and a delay in the process for the company

Do you know that the most dangerous thing is the public participation meeting? Let's say the meeting hall is arranged, the time is arranged, and the

date is set. When ten people show up in the hall, they say that it has been accepted. They write their reports later. What is the reflection on you after that?: The EIA is discussed and accepted. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 75)

Early in the morning, local community who do not want the thermal power plant to be built arrived at the hall, and they encountered the gendarmerie:

On that day, at 7 o'clock, we arrived at the meeting hall and find approximately 15-20 gendarmerie vehicles and iron barricades. I don't know exactly how many. It was evident that they had taken precautions to protect the meeting hall from us. They surrounded the area to prevent people from entering. When I saw the commander, I asked him, "Sir, who are you protecting and from whom? Here is the company that wants to construct the power plant and to poison the people. Are you protecting the company from us or are you protecting us from this harm? Now, I'll take 100 tractors and put them in front of your barricade. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 69)

Considerably large number of villagers, CSOs including members of the City Council, Greenpeace, Dayko, Trakya Platform) and members of opposition political parties along with more than 100 tractors were there to protest and cancel the meeting. According to gendarmerie records, 2.000 people were there, and according to the protestors, there were more than five thousand (Civil Society Organizations Interview No. 70, Local Community Interview Participant No. 75)

That evening, we worked until two o'clock in the morning to convince villagers to leave their work tomorrow because we told them that this would be the last chance for us to work in our lands. Our efforts were successful. On that day, we received a lot of support. People realized the problem through the informational meetings and our efforts. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 69).

The protest attracted considerable media interest because "such an event has never occurred in Kırklareli before" (Civil Society Organizations Interview No. 70). The EIA meeting was not held due to the reactions of the public and the meeting minutes were kept as the EIA meeting could not be held.

5.4.6 Unpacking the threats to Dokuzhöyük movement

In the case of Dokuzhöyük, in contrast to the other cases, the threats were not as diverse or as strong. As can be inferred from the other cases, the two main threats to the movements under study are the penetration of the company into the society and the restrictive political environment for social movements in the country. Despite Türkiye's limited openness to social movements in 2018, the Dokuzhöyük movement remained relatively unaffected. This is likely to be due to the early intervention in the construction of the project. In addition, the company did not even contact the *muhtars* to convince the villagers about the construction of the project. The company's only action was to distribute two kinds of flyers. One of them featured a quote from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk about coal, along with a portrait of him, and was distributed to the villagers (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 70). The other flyer promoted the benefits of thermal power plants and was distributed to the workers in their textile factories in Kırklareli (Local Community Interview Participant No. 69). Thus, the Dokuzhöyük movement was not actually threatened by the company, but rather by the governor who was in office at the time and the AKP provincial organization.

In the study, every movement is criminalized at some point by different groups. In Dokuzhöyük, criminalization is carried out by the Governor, who heads the provincial general administration. The governor at the time, in various statements, accused the villagers and the members of the City Council of being English agents, Bulgarian agents and enemies of investment, and was angry that the public participation meeting had not been held. He even argued with the members of the City Council during a meeting on this issue (Civil Society Organization

Participant Interview No. 70, 74 and Local Community Interview Participant No.

76). A villager expressed his opinion about the governor as follows

At that time, the governor even said that there were English agents behind this due to our resistance to the EIA meeting. He said that there were English agents in the organizations of the resistance. But we organized it. I have been a local for five generations, but we had only recently met the governor. He is not even from Trakya. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 76)

The provincial organization of the AKP posed an additional threat to the movement. A panel discussion organized by the AKP Women's wing on the benefits of the thermal power plant (Local Community Interview Participant No. 76). The Strategic Communication Advisor of the Ministry of Energy also participated to the panel, held in Kırklareli³¹.

As a result of all these objections, the General Directorate of Spatial Planning of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization stated that the project does not comply with the Environmental Plan of the area. In this opinion of the directorate, it was noted that the area where the power plant will be built cannot be used for a thermal power plant because it is an area where agricultural quality will be prioritized. Therefore, the EIA process of the company was canceled by the ministry and the movement ended. The narrative analysis showing conditions for the Dokuzhöyük Movement is presented in Figure 32.

³¹ Ak Kadın Kırklareli. *Dokuzhöyük'te Yapılması Planlanan Termik Santrale İlişkin Panel Düzenlendi*. Facebook, 18 Mart 2025, <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1F54JJFRL/>.




Figure 32. Narrative analysis showing conditions for the Dokuzhöyük Movement³²

³² Boxes in red are potential threats for the movement

CHAPTER 6

PATTERNS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE: INSIGHTS FROM CASE ANALYSIS

This chapter aims to comparatively analyze the drivers that led to the success or failure of the environmental social movements in the four cases detailed in the previous chapter.

I argue that the conditions lead to environmental social movement to succeed or fail lie in the balance between opportunities and threats. Therefore, the analysis is structured around two main axes: opportunities and threats. Therefore, it is essential to identify these opportunities and threats. They were also categorized as internal and external drivers in line with the literature.

Importantly, the themes conceptualized as opportunities and threats do not always correspond to the themes in political opportunity structure in the social movement literature. Specifically, the opportunities and threats identified in the internal drivers are not conceptually part of the political opportunity structure literature. In this context, I define opportunities as factors that potentially trigger the success of a movement and threats as potential barriers to success.

6.1 Internal drivers

This section discusses the internal drivers that strengthen or weaken environmental social movements based on the fieldwork findings. Internal drivers stem from the mobilizations' internal factors such as organizational characteristics. These conditions are presented under two separate headings: internal opportunities and internal threats.

6.1.1 Internal opportunities

The internal opportunities include two themes related to human resources that resource mobilization theory emphasizes: strong local community support and strong CSOs support.

6.1.1.1 Strong local community support

I argue that strong community support is significant to the success of environmental social movements. However, the emphasis on locality in my argument does not suggest an exclusionary locality, which has been criticized by Çoban (2018) and Aksu (2019), as it prevents the coalition formation with “outsiders”. The locality aspect I refer is limited to local support for the movement. In Çoban’s (2018) words:

the main actor in the movement should be the local community because as the project is constructed in a specific location, it is naturally necessary to locate the epicenter of the struggle at the local scale. It is a defense of living spaces (Çoban, 2018).

There are two main reasons for proposing this: the need for the human resources and identification of the diagnostic framing.

Human resources are essential for the success of any stage in the emergence and the development of resistance because without people committed to resistance, the durability of the resistance is diminished, and its resilience is likely to be weakened. Construction companies in the area are already investing large amounts of money. They are, therefore, willing to spend money on persuading local communities. Expropriation or direct land purchase fees are, in fact, a minor part of their investment. If the movement lacks widespread support within the local community, the antagonists are more likely to be able to weaken the movement. Shortly, support provided by the local community not only expands but also sustains the resistance.

In the scope of the dissertation, human resources are typically required for three grounds. Firstly, the flow of information between the local community and raising the awareness of them necessitates human resources. The circle of resistance is widened through the relations within the villages or through the fellow-citizen relations in the urban areas. This is not only speeds up the flow of information between villagers but also provides a rapid response to the need for capacity building, which is particularly important in the early stages of resistance. For example, in the case of Yırca, the circle of resistance expanded due to the *muhtar*'s role, who was active at the beginning of the resistance, as illustrated by the following statement by one of the villagers:

The *muhtar* acted as a person who gathered the masses and acted as a spokesperson for the people there. Without him, we would have been a disorganized group, with everyone in their own corner. This would have quickly weakened us. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 17)

I have observed parallel patterns of relationships in other successful cases, as well. The Loç movement was also similar as one of the locals said, “we started convincing the villagers from our own families” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 48).

Although there was not active involvement of *muhtars* like in Yırca, the circle of resistance in Loç was widened using kinship relations. In Dokuzhöyük, this was provided through a social media group. The widening circle of resistance makes it less likely that the company or the state could persuade the villagers.

Another reason for the need for human resources arises when the company starts construction works at the project site. Since the whole struggle is based on a question of temporality, human resources are required to prevent machinery from entering the river or to stop trees from cutting it down. That is why, people who reside in the area or have regular access to the power plant site are needed on an

ongoing basis. Leaving aside different tactics to prevent the machines from working, the struggle becomes stronger the more people there are in the field. I suggest this for three primary reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to be on alert to block the construction activities, as companies sometimes carry out construction work at night.

Furthermore, the area that requires defense is not often right next to the residential areas. As a result, a continuous monitoring of the area is necessary because companies sometimes operate during the night. To facilitate surveillance, insurgents have even set up resistance tents. For instance, in Yırca, they have identified a permanent place to stay near the project area and a vantage point to view the entire area as one interview participant mentioned:

There was a place where everyone gathered. The company had plans to cut down trees, but we consistently intervened to prevent it. There were also sentinels standing guard at the ash dam to see the whole area all day, as well (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 9).

In addition, sentinels were not always from local communities. Occasionally, members of civil society organizations or political parties also participated in the monitoring. Therefore, local community support is also crucial for the logistics of accommodating those coming from outside. This was managed in both Yırca and Loç. As an example, a villager from Loç stated “Everyone hosted environmentalists that they had never met in their homes.” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 61)

Yet, continuous maintenance of monitoring is crucial. For instance, resistance tents were occasionally set up in Arhavi, but they were not sustainable. As previously stated, the conflict between the company/state and the insurgents is a temporal issue. Therefore, it is essential that the guarding continues until the end of the process or until the desired action is taken, which is a process that is economically and mentally demanding as one of the interview participants mentioned:

It is crucial to prioritize the continuity of the resistance. Uncertainties surrounding the duration of the resistance, weather conditions, fatigue, and lack of sleep can lead to physical and mental exhaustion. To mitigate these factors, we arranged shorter shifts through careful scheduling. The responsibilities were divided into three sections: food, driving, and observation. The drivers circled the area while the observers waited on a hill that overlooked the entire region (Civil Society Organization Interview No. 28).

The continuity could be achieved both in Yırca and Loç. Yet, in Loç, the insurgents were almost unable to maintain continuity during the sit-in protests in Istanbul due to the cold weather and extended processes. The decision of the Kastamonu Provincial Assembly and the court, in favor of insurgents, were timely.

The last reason why more people are needed in addition to the observation of the project area and its continuity is related to the intervention of the security forces, including private security guards. The following dialogue between the insurgents and the gendarmerie in Arhavi is quite illustrative in this context. “A contact from the gendarmerie informed us that they would only monitor a protest if it was 500 or 1000 people, but if it was 30 people, they would block it.” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 40) Although the statement cannot be verified, based on the intervention of the private security forces in the case of Yırca, the presence of significant number of people in the area for monitoring seems to be an important point in preventing the construction activities of the company.

The second reason for the significance of strong community support for the success of environmental social movements is identification of diagnostic framing, which is the definition of the problem (Snow & Benford, 1988: 200). Although the diagnostic framing of a movement may change after the capacity increase of the villagers through the involvement of civil society organizations, experts, journalists, political parties and lawyers, the source of the problem could not be determined without the local communities, as they have been residing in the area where the

power plant will be constructed for many years. Diagnostic framing is crucial as it impacts two subsequent framing. In this context, when examining the reasons for resisting the power plants in four cases, the defense of living space in Arhavi and Loç and the defense of the livelihood in Yırca and Dokuzhöyük are prominent.

6.1.1.2 Constant and regular civil society organizations support

The second major finding of the study is that struggles in which CSOs are actively involved, and which are not based solely on localism, tend to be successful. The CSOs are conscience constituents who support the movement. They may expand the resources available to protestors (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1222-1232). The three main ways in which CSOs support the local community are: providing human resources, material resources, and repertoires of knowledge practices (Della Porta & Pavan, 2017). As I elaborate below, I argue that the decisive factor is not the locus of mobilization or bureaucratization, nor the centralization of the CSOs, or the number of CSOs actively supporting the movement, contrary to Gamson's (1975) argument. Rather, what is critical is the constant and regular support of the CSOs.

The initial reason why CSOs' support is crucial is that they provide human resources. The reasons were given for the importance of human resources in part

6.1.1.1. The presence of CSOs expands and strengthens the struggle, as does the support of local community. For example, in Dokuzhöyük, the members of City Council informed the villagers about the thermal power plant, ensuring the flow of information and increasing awareness. In Yırca, many of the people who regularly keep monitoring the power plant area were the members of CSOs.

Beside human resources, CSOs allocate material resources to local community in the case of Yırca movement. Yet, it is important to note that material support is not the same as direct funding support. In issues requiring material resources, CSOs acted on behalf of the local community. For instance, Greenpeace undertook the defense of the Yırca movement in their lawsuit. In that way, the local community did not have to pay a substantial part of the litigation costs. Yırca villagers received sapling support from many different CSOs, as well. Thus, they were able to replace the uprooted olive trees with new seedlings.

Thirdly, CSOs provides repertoires of knowledge practices, later would be enhance by the movement itself. Repertoires of knowledge practices is a concept defined by Della Porta and Pavan (2017) inspired by the concept of repertoires of contention of Tilly (2006). It means

the set of practices that foster the coordination of disconnected, local, and highly personal experiences and rationalities within a shared cognitive system able to provide movements and their supporters with a common orientation for making claims and acting collectively to produce social, political, and cultural changes (Della Porta & Pavan, 2017: 305).

The repertoires of knowledge practices are transmitted (Della Porta & Pavan, 2017). In the scope of this study, there are two types of knowledge transfer by CSOs to the local community: knowledge about the process and knowledge about the action network.

The first one is about capacity building through providing guidance to the local community from beginning to end. In the previous part, I presented examples of the involvement of CSOs in the movements, but I suggest that it would be worth adding a few more examples to illustrate. During the Yırca movement, the villagers engaged in discussion with CSOs on their tactics, how to respond to potential intervention of security forces and the consequences of their actions. For instance,

when they were told that only those who owned a land would be allowed to enter the olive groves, during such discussions the idea of entering the field by making a lease agreement with the landowners emerged. I have already mentioned how important entering the area is to prevent olive grove cutting. Many of the slogans, symbols and tactics of the Loç Valley movement were also formed during similar discussions between the members of CSOs and local community. In Dokuzhöyük, CSOs both worked on capacity building through informational meetings and guided the local community about the petitions of objections against the EIA. However, I did not observe any CSO in Arhavi that provided constant and regular support to the local community from the beginning to the end, apart from the platform they formed among themselves. The members of Eğitim-Sen, who were active at the beginning, stayed in the background, while the support of other CSOs was limited to either participating in street protests or sharing experiences through panel discussions. The potential explanations for this divergence of Arhavi is discussed part 6.1.2.1.

Therefore, the members of a CSO do not only participate in street protests of the movement but rather become members of the local community in Yırca, Loç and Dokuzhöyük. Thus, the movement transcends its local origins. In this way, an obstacle which is “the spontaneous ideology of localism”, defined as “a distorted understanding that exaggerates the democracy of the local, the specificity of the local problem and the uniqueness of that struggle” (Çoban, 2018) will also be prevented. Overcoming this obstacle is crucial since the spontaneous ideology of localism weakens the resistance through distorting effect of the partnership with the outside (Çoban, 2018). My observations in the fieldwork also support Çoban’s assessment. In all successful cases within the scope of the study, the guidance is provided consistently and regularly throughout the movement, and it typically extends beyond

capacity building. Therefore, I suggest that environmentalism of malcontent that Arsel and his friends (2015) conceptualized for the Gerze thermal power plant movement also applies to the successful cases in this study.

The knowledge about action network is the repertoires of knowledge practices transferred by CSOs. Knowledge practices also foster the circulation of knowledge about different networks, mobilizations, and resources. Thus, it generates extensive and coordinated networks between movements (Della Porta & Pavan, 2017). This results in two significant outcomes. Subsequent movements can utilize the effective actions. For instance, the villagers of Yırca based their struggle on the fact that they would be forced from their agricultural land, which is their source of livelihood, and turn into workers. The presence of active mine workers' organizations in Soma plays a role in this framing. It is supported by the statements made by a villager:

Let's say, I own four hectares of olive groves. You are interested in purchasing my land for 50 thousand liras. I will never get that money again for the rest of my life. But I earn 50 thousand liras from the land every year. Perhaps, the price of oil will increase, and I may earn 60-70 thousand liras. Why should I sell my land?

Secondly, coordinated movements can organize collective protests events. The 2011 "we will not give up Anatolia" march (*Anadolu'yu vermeyeceğiz yürüyüşü*) in Türkiye is an example of this. In that way, movements meet other movements and organizations through such events and the circle of resistance expands. Overall, the repertoires of knowledge practices transferred through CSOs strengthen the movements.

6.1.2 Internal threats

There are two internal threats to environmental social movements within the scope of the study. They are fragmentation within villagers and the spontaneous ideology of localism, which is a concept of Çoban (2018).

6.1.2.1 Fragmentation within villagers

When an energy project is planned in a village, not all the villagers are opposed to it. There are some who are neutral, but there are also some who are in favor of investing in the power plant. Based on my observations in the field, some villagers support the construction of energy project because either they have a developmentalist perspective or the company persuade them by some promises to support the project. Some other do not have a connection with the village affecting their livelihood. That is why, they do not concern with the consequences of the energy project to the village and its livelihood. This creates a duality among the local community, which is a potential threat to social movement. The duality is observed in all the cases except Dokuzhöyük. This is probably because Dokuzhöyük movement was relatively short in duration and the company never reached out to the villagers to persuade them.

The duality among local community causes frustration is the complex kinship relations. The local level, which is the epicenter of the movements, are the places where kinship relations are intertwined. The kinship relations also provide a basis for mobilizing support for the movement but opposing an energy project sometimes require opposing close relatives, even mothers and fathers. As a statement of an interview participant from Loç Valley resistance exemplifies:

The older members of the family hold a different perspective on the issue. They did not wish us to get involved in the movement. For that reason, some argued with their fathers or aunts, and I found myself in a similar situation with my own brother-in-law. He kept his own children from us. This was the

primary source of our problems, friction within the family. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 65)

In addition, as previously mentioned in part 5.3.5.2 , in Loç Valley movement, signatures were collected to grant power of attorney to the lawyer. Some of those signatories withdrew their signatures with the initiatives of people supported the HEPP through kinship relations, as reported by one of the villagers “They collected signatures to prevent the construction of the HEPP. We had 50 of those signatures taken back, just through of goodwill and friendship” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 50).

Even though Arhavi was not a village, there were similar experiences since “All of the locals are Laz³³ here and they have a very strong kinship relationship” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 29). For instance, even the name of the holding constructed the Kavak HEPP, “Mapa”, is in the Laz language and means “let me do it” (Local Community Interview Participant No. 44). As one of the interview participants reported, the intertwined kinship relations in Arhavi also posed a threat to the movement:

The community in Arhavi is closely linked due to kinship relations, which can sometimes lead to a reluctance to confront one another. Who are we going to fight against? They say, ‘He is my relative, she is my cousin’. That is why people avoid conflicts. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 30)

Furthermore, people involved in the movement sometimes faced criminalization from their friends and relatives, which is analyzed in part 6.2.2.2.

³³ An ethnic group lives in the Black Sea region of Türkiye. Their native language is Laz.

6.1.2.1 Spontaneous ideology of localism

Based on the fieldwork observations, the spontaneous ideology of localism, whose definition is given in part 6.1.1.2 (Çoban, 2018) pose a threat to the success of environmental social movements since it creates a new layer of duality by restricting external communication. In that way, in addition to the duality within local community, there emerges a division between ‘us’ or ‘locals’, referring to the local community and ‘others’ or ‘outsiders’, referring mostly to the members of CSOs who are not from the local community.

According to Aksu (2019), spontaneous ideology of localism stems from two dimensions. The first one is terrorization, which I categorize as an external threat in part 6.2.2.2. Environmentalists have been accused of being members of terrorist organizations by the president, ministers, or governors. Therefore, to dispel accusations of external influence and demonstrate their national identity, the local communities may refuse outside support. They believe this illustrates the purely ‘local’ nature of the movement. The second reason is the internal dynamics of the movement. The leaders of the movements may have concerns to maintain their own status. That is why, they do not accept outside support (Aksu, 2019). Although I concur with Aksu, his analysis is only partial without an understanding of the local dynamics. In other words, rejection of external support can result not only from the leadership style of the movement but also from local political dynamics.

The rejection of external assistance is also linked to the political structure of the local community in addition to the leadership style. It is possible to argue that terrorizing CSOs is more likely to be accepted where the majority of the locals supports the AKP since it is the ruling party. Even in Findıklı, known with their consistent resistance, it is the same. Their major concern is the politicization of the

movement since it hinders the support of locals who vote for the AKP (Local Community Interview Participant No. 32). I observed similar issues in Arhavi, where people did not want the movement to be politicized. However, the same concern was not present in the Yırca and Dokuzhöyük resistances, where the CHP was in the majority and in Loç Valley. In addition, the pioneers of the movement believed in the strength of CSOs support to the locals in these successful cases. The support of both the CSOs and opposition parties was well received by the villagers in those two successful resistances. In contrast, the distinction between outsiders and locals was quite profound in Arhavi that even the people who are originally from Arhavi but live outside Arhavi were labelled as ‘outsiders’. The difference in Arhavi is not only a result of the leadership styles. In fact, the leadership style in Arhavi was not exclusionary. In addition to the voting preferences, the profile of the construction company was a significant factor that reinforced the arguments of people supporting the HEPP. As previously mentioned, the company is owned by a local businessman. Further details on the issue were discussed under part 5.2.6.

6.2 External drivers

This section discusses the external factors that strengthen or weaken environmental social movements, based on the findings of the fieldwork. External drivers refer to conditions related to political and institutional contexts. These conditions are presented under two separate headings: external opportunities and external threats.

6.2.1 External opportunities

External opportunities are categorized under three themes related to political opportunity structures: external shock of 301 miners, institutional structure of protected areas and sympathetic political allies.

6.2.1.1 External shock of 301 miners

Political crisis occasionally creates openness of political opportunity structures for social movements. Although it did not radically weaken the political system as the social revolutions analyzed by Skocpol (1979), the death of 301 miners also created a political crisis for Türkiye. It is also possible to identify it as transformative event meaning “a crucial turning point for a social movement that dramatically increases or decreases the level of mobilization” (Hess & Martin, 2006: 249). Despite its temporal political consequences, the openness of political opportunities it created for Yırca Movement was later going to form the basis of the support that Yırca villagers were waiting for because the spotlight of all of Türkiye was on Soma. Therefore, external shock of 301 miners increased the level of mobilization for Yırca movement.

The tragic death of 301 miners on 13th May 2014 uncovered two points. The first one is increasingly diminishing nature of employment and workplace safety and transformation of small-scale agricultural producers into wage laborers as a result of accelerated neoliberalization policies (Erensü, 2018: 153-154). Secondly, although the government’s response to such a major disaster is considered relatively smooth in terms of its political consequences (Adaman et al., 2019), the death of 301 miners revealed the state’s inadequate regulations for workplace safety and control (Erensü, 2018: 153-154). In addition, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement referring to the

disaster as the will of God ³⁴ and his deputy's and footage of one of Erdoğan's advisors kicking a miner³⁵ raised the public interest on Soma.

Firstly, the spotlight helped Yırca villagers to get support from CSOs and political parties. The activists from all over the Türkiye were already in Soma because of the 301 miners when the Yırca movement started. Due to the extensive media coverage, more activists joined for Yırca. They mobilized the resources, including material resources and human resources, that the insurgents needed. In addition, it brought the repertoires of knowledge practices from a diverse channel and generated public support thanks to increased media attention. The resources it brought was so strong that nor the tactics of the construction company, known its proximity to government, or the efforts of distinct governor for persuasion of the local community were not enough to convince or discourage the insurgents.

Furthermore, the opposition parties, who were already active in Soma regarding the 301 miners, also directed their attention towards Yırca. As a result, the villagers of Yırca formed a coalition with political parties in opposition, gaining strong sympathetic political allies.

The coalition with both CSOs and political parties was effective in Yırca, as evidenced by the absence of fragmentation among the other three movements. There was fragmentation among CSOs over concerns about co-optation due to mostly based on sources of funding and professionalization of the CSOs. CSOs that are active on a more local level and rely on volunteerism tend to distance themselves from bureaucratized and centralized CSOs, such as Greenpeace, World Wide Fund

³⁴ Cnntürk (14.05.2014). Erdoğan Soma'da konuştu: "Bunlar olağan şeylerdir"
<https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/erdogan-somada-konustu-bunlar-olagan-seylerdir>

³⁵ Cumhuriyet (15.05.2014). Tekmeci Müşavir Yusuf Yerkel'in inanılmaz yükselişi
<https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/tekmeci-musavir-yusuf-yerkelin-inanilmaz-yukselisi-72363>

for Nature (WWF), Doğa Derneği and TEMA. The strength of the exclusion is such that, for instance, when Greenpeace is present to support a movement, local CSOs do not wish to be present, or they take action to prevent Greenpeace from being present when it seeks to support a movement. To illustrate with two quotations:

We have never collaborated with Greenpeace or allowed them to participate in our events as organizers. This is because we are aware that they fund their actions. Their organization operates like a company. Additionally, we have heard reports that they even sold some areas of struggle since they large corporations engaged in transactions with them. They receive external funding. They get paid to take action. There is no need for it as we are already doing it for free (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 66).

The system produced fake environmental organizations through some organizations such as TEMA, Greenpeace and WWF. Such organizations may seem to be advocating for the environment, but their boards of trustees consist of company owners. They pretend to be struggling and try to do something on behalf of the local community and cause them to lose there. This is what happened in İkizdere and Akbelen (Civil Society Organization Interview Participant No. 68)

It is an issue that deserves a particular attention because it affects the support and therefore the resources of the movements. The fragmentation limits the circle of support, but it does not necessarily lead to failure of a movement. It would be too bold to claim that fragmentation among CSOs leads to failure. The impact of it on success and failure of movements cannot be explained solely through examining the four cases studies under this study. However, it is worth noting that the external shock of 301 miners in the Yırca case had an overriding effect on the elimination of the deep fragmentation among CSOs. Therefore, I suggest that the external shock facilitated coalition formation and thus eased access to different resources such as material and human resources. However, a limited number of CSOs, with regular and consistent support, can also provide these resources. This is exemplified by the Loç Valley and Dokuzhöyük movements.

6.2.1.2 Legally protected areas

Legal system and litigation processes are potential opportunity structures for social movements. There are studies showing how the social movements use legal system and litigation effectively to defend their rights (e.g. Cichowski, 2013; McCann, 1994). Yet, there are also studies which demonstrate the restrictive or ineffective aspects of the litigation process and legal system (e.g. Videh Upadhyay, 2001). For instance, Gönenç (2022) examines the effectiveness of litigation in Türkiye for environmental movements by analyzing the resistances of Artvin Cerattepe and Bergama, and argues that litigation does not generate benefits for the movements in the long run. While I agree with some of the arguments of Gönenç (2022), the results of my study reveal that there is an exception of Turkish legal system that provides both short run and long run opportunities for environmental social movements. Despite threats resulting from the democratic backsliding in Türkiye, this exception is an effective tool for the movements. It is the legally protected areas.

In all successful cases within the scope of the field, the lands of the local community are protected by a particular law. In Yırca, this area was an olive grove; in Loç Valley, it was the national park; and in Dokuzhöyük, it was a priority agricultural area. Therefore, an area protected explicitly by law can create a political opportunity for social movements. Although Circular No. 2009/7 leaves the validity of court rulings open to question, areas explicitly designated as protected by law remain an important leverage in the hands of the local community.

6.2.1.3 Sympathetic political allies

Alliances with political parties and elites facilitates the outcome of social movement facilitates the outcome in favor of the insurgents (Böhm, 2015; Giugni, 2004). This claim in the literature is partially relevant to my cases.

As it was partially discussed in part 6.1.2.1, the political preferences of the local community may limit support of opposition parties. There are two cases where the majority of the local community vote for the AKP or center-right parties: Loç Valley and Arhavi. In the Loç Valley resistance, opposition parties refrained from actively supporting the resistance. On the contrary, although the resistance in the Loç Valley was not supported by the AKP district organization, the company's quarry license was not approved with the help of AKP members in the Kastamonu Provincial General Assembly. Yet, the support of opposition parties raised concerns among the pioneers of the resistance in Arhavi "since some of the villagers were afraid of being labelled as communists" (Local Community Interview Participant No. 40). That is why, it is overly simplistic to assume that political allies will always bring advantages for insurgents. On the contrary, support from the opposition can discourage the local community support that the movement need. The political preferences of the political elites are significant for the local community.

Sympathetic political allies became a significant external opportunity for the insurgents of Yırca, where the majority of local community vote for the main opposition party, CHP. One of the political elites who actively followed the agenda and travelled to Soma was Özgür Özel, a deputy of CHP -currently the leader of the party-, after the death of 301 miners. Coalition formation of the insurgents with the main opposition party through Özel raised awareness of the problem, brought the issue to the forefront of the political agenda and generated media coverage, as

mentioned in part 5.1.5.1. A villager remarked his presence by saying "Without Özgür we could not have achieved all these" (Local Community Interview 2).

Although not as strong as Yırca, a similar coalition formed in Dokuzhöyük, where the majority of the local community vote for the main opposition party. CHP district organization and CHP municipalities were supportive of the informational meetings. Moreover, the participation of CHP deputy Vecdi Gündoğdu to the meetings increased interest to the meetings (Civil Socceity Organization Interview Participant No. 74 and Local Community Interview Participant No. 75).

6.2.2 External threats

There are five external threats to environmental social movements within the scope of the study. They are (i) rural disengagement, (ii) criminalization, (iii) countermovements, and (iv) corporate strategies of repression and co-optation.

6.2.2.1 Rural disengagement

I mentioned the critical importance of strong local community support for resistances in the section on internal opportunities. Rural disengagement directly has an impact on strong community support, and it mainly depends on depeasantization. As a result of depeasantization, villages become less of a place for people to live. Yet, environmental social movements in rural areas emerged as a result of energy construction projects are ecological distribution conflicts. Therefore, they are basically defense of living spaces. The extent to which villagers perceive their village as their home and living space is related to rural disengagement. In all successful cases studied within the scope of the dissertation, the project area of the company was also seen as a living space by the villagers. That is why, they defended

their living spaces as they defend their home as the following quotations below demonstrate:

This is our only space, our home. Will you leave your home if someone arrives with machinery to demolish it? You will hold its windows and doors. Our mothers and grandmothers are in Loç Valley. We base our way of life on the products that are available in each season in Loç. Therefore, it is our land, it is our living space. How can we not oppose it? (Local Community Interview Participant No. 64)

The case was held in Manisa. I had intended to ask a question to the judge but refrained. My question was that “The judge, let’s assume that when passing through Manisa in the morning, you saw that Manisa had been destroyed. The day before, you were not permitted to enter Manisa despite owning a house there. If you were in this position, what would you think and do? (Local Community Interview Participant No. 20)

The villagers primarily earn their livelihood from agriculture and have no association with factories. The villagers are not willing to give up their livelihood. They aspire for their children to not to migrate to urban areas for employment opportunities. For instance, some children have already migrated to Burgaz to work in exchange for 100 animals, but their parents wish for them to return home soon. That is why they have never sold a land or anything like that. (Local Community Interview Participant No. 76)

Therefore, whether the reason is economic, as in the cases of Yırca and Dokuzhöyük resistances, or cultural, as in the Loç Valley resistance, this is a defense of living space. If people do not feel a sense of attachment to their habitat or livelihood, they may not be inclined to defend it with all their resources. This was not observed in Arhavi, where there was not any economic link between the stream where the HEPP was built. Additionally, the population living permanently in the villages was relatively low.

6.2.2.2 Criminalization

Tree plantation has been an important activity in political area since the foundation of the Republic. However, as opposed to conservationist approach of previous governments, the AKP governments have targeted and criminalized environmental

social movements under the guise of being eco-friendly (Kurtiç, 2022: 2). A similar discourse also found in Taner Yıldız's speech at the groundbreaking ceremony of the thermal power plant in Yırca (see: 5.1.6. Unpacking the threats of Yırca Movement).

Criminalization by the government officials may lead to the spontaneous ideology of localism (Aksu, 2019). This reflection of the language of criminalization used by the government on the local community deepens the duality the local community since the insurgents are also labelled criminals by those who support the energy project investment. It has a particularly deterrent effect in small communities and reduces the support of the local community for resistance.

In the study, insurgents in all four cases were criminalized by different actors. In Arhavi, they were accused of being terrorists, traitors, and communists; in Loç, they were blamed as PKK members and natural gas lobby; in Yırca, they were accused of being provocateurs; and in Dokuzhöyük, they were labelled as Bulgarian/English agents and enemies of investments. Criminalization was also carried out directly by state officials in Dokuzhöyük and Loç. Moreover, in Yırca, Greenpeace was also blamed for being a natural gas lobby and for manipulating the villagers. In Loç, rumors were spread that there were PKK members in the Valley, when one of the CSOs member visited the Valley. Even after 9 years from the resistance, during my fieldwork in Soma, I had a conversation with a Soma local who asserted that the villagers had been manipulated by outsiders. One of the interview participants in Arhavi, who already active in trade union activities, decided to withdraw supporting the HEPP resistance because of similar accusations. Therefore, these accusations were highly popular during the time of resistances and have not been forgotten even today.

6.2.2.3 Countermovements

As mentioned before, countermovements emerge as a reaction to the initial movements (Zald & Useem, 1987: 249). They are threats for social movements because they discourage contention (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001; S. G. Tarrow, 2011). During the fieldwork, I encountered countermovements in all cases, although they differed in scale. The countermovements were organized two different ways: those organized by the AKP party organization and elected officials, and those organized by the local community. In addition, the repertoires of action used by the countermovements are also varied.

The countermovement in Arhavi was the largest in scale among the four cases. It was a street demonstration organized by the mayor of Arhavi, who was a member of the AKP. The demonstration was a reaction to the decision of Rize Administrative Court, which suspended the implementation of the positive EIA report. Those in favor of HEPP investment in the region attended the protest with the slogans such as “Yes to HEPPs” and “Arhavi defends its businessman”³⁶. The protest attracted attention of the local community, and it was organized by the mayor himself because the company was MNG Holding. The company’s relations with the municipality and the local community have already mentioned in part 5.2.6.

The AKP Women’s Wings were active in Yırca and Dokuzhöyük thermal power plants against the insurgents. In Yırca, the Women’s Wing organized a signature campaign, while in Kırklareli, they held a panel discussion on the advantages of Dokuzhöyük thermal power plant for the region.

³⁶ 08 Haber, (28.08.2014). HES’e Evet Diyerek MNG’ye Arka Çıktı, <http://old.08haber.com/haberGoster.php?hid=11703>

It was quite different in Loç Valley. The AKP district and provincial organizations were not supporting the HEPP project investment in the area. They were in favor of the local community. As a result, they did not initiate a countermovement. However, the local community themselves engage in a series of action that are considered as countermovement. They did not organize a street demonstration or a signature campaign indicating that they support the HEPP investment. Rather, they have dissuaded people involved in the struggle and convinced them to withdraw their power of attorney for the lawsuit by using their connections and relatives and by actively going from door to door.

6.2.2.4 Strong corporate strategies of repression and co-optation

In the cases examined in this thesis, while the participants in the social movements are resisting against the effects of the neoliberalization of the state's energy policies in theory, their struggle on the ground is against energy projects that a company is developing. On the other hand, the tools developed by companies to persuade local communities or suppress resistance are the forefront of the narratives. Therefore, social movements frequently confront the companies rather the actors within the institutional structure of the state. This dynamic, in turn, positions the companies as the primary antagonists in the cases.

There are political threats for social movements as well as political opportunity structures such as legally protected areas that the state opens for the companies and energy projects. The most significant of these is the legal arrangements that facilitate the operations of the private sector by prioritizing its role in energy policies. Among the notable elements in this framework is the urgent

expropriation decision made for energy projects on the grounds of public interest, as well as the circular no. 2009/7.

Apart from the opportunities created by the state to the companies, there are two distinct categories of tactics employed by companies. The first type is repression. This form of repression entails the employment of direct and forceful strategies by companies, resulting in the manipulation or suppression of local communities to align with their objectives. These strategies encompass both direct physical violence carried out by private security forces and intimidation tactics employed through various channels to coercively influence local communities. Physical violence, a form of repression employed by the companies, was a recurring feature of the Yırca movement. In the Arhavi and Loç movements, while not as prevalent as in Yırca, the company and the insurgents occasionally engaged in minor physical confrontations. Intimidation tactics have been particularly evident in the Loç and Yırca resistances. In the Yırca resistance, local community were threatened with the loss of their employment if they joined the resistance (Local Community Interview participant no. 11). While in Loç, they were threatened with imprisonment, as one of the interviewees stated:

They lied to the villagers, scared them, and intimidated them. Don't oppose them, or you will be punished and go to jail. The state is doing it, not us. There were things like, "You will get in trouble." Let me put it this way: out of 5,000 people, maybe 15 to 20 sold their land or did something voluntarily, but other than that, they tried to threaten the villagers. This is the same everywhere, not just in Loç. It's the same in the east of the Black Sea and in the Aegean region. If you don't show up, you will be punished. What am I going to be penalized for? This is my own property, and if anyone should be penalized, it's you, since you're working here illegally. (Local Community Interview Participant no. 64)

In addition, companies also use legal system. They proceed against some of local people both to threaten the community and to prevent future potential uprisings.

The second type of tactics adopted by co-optation to persuade local community is compromise. In the context of this strategy, firms frequently offer financial incentives to local community. These incentives encompass a range of tactics, including the acquisition of local community's land at prices significantly exceeding its market value, the provision of financial support to the community association, the promise of employment opportunities in the power plant under construction, and the utilization of local community's labor and machinery in the power plant's construction. The financial incentives provided by the company have been identified as a pivotal factor, as opposed to the use of repression. I argue that this is the most significant company strategy that breaks resistance and prevents local community from resisting. This dynamic aligns with the observations made in the Arhavi case, where the local community's ownership and long-standing investment in the region, evident through numerous job opportunities, have emerged as significant barriers to the Arhavi resistance's expansion as one interviewee described with a famous proverb, "when the thief is inside, the door does not hold the lock"³⁷ (Local Community Interview Participant no. 29). Within the Yırca movement, many villagers repeatedly asserted that their compensation did not equate to the valuation of their land, suggesting a potential factor in the escalation of resistance. One interviewee even gave the price paid for the highway passing through the village just before the power plant as an example, saying that if the price had been the same for the power plant, the villagers would not have resisted (Local Community Interview Participant no. 2).

³⁷ *Hırsız içeriden olunca kapı kilit tutmazmış.*

6.2.2.5 External shock of 15 July coup attempt

External shocks such as political crises sometimes close the opportunity structures of social movements. The failed 15 July Coup Attempt was one such political crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, a state of emergency was declared, which remained in effect for a period of nearly 24 months. During this time, public demonstrations and other forms of political expression were highly restricted. In 2017, the number of bans reached their peak since 2007 (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2020, p. 7). These restrictions affected the momentum of Arhavi movement. Although the movement had already experienced a considerable loss of influence by that point, and the ban decisions further exacerbated this decline, leading to a complete dissolution of the movement.

6.3 Concluding remarks

The objective of this chapter is to analyze the influence of internal and external drivers on the success and failure of processes. The study examines the variation in the impact of these drivers and the divergent and convergent elements of these processes. The findings reveal that the factors do not all carry the same significance. Some elements, although present in almost all cases, do not play a decisive role. In particular, strong local community support, constant and regular CSO support, 301 miners' shock, and legally protected areas created critical opportunities for success to movements. On the other hand, strong corporate strategies of repression and co-optation, the external shock of the July 15 coup, and the spontaneous ideology of localism posed the strongest threats.

Dynamic interactions between different factors have also been a decisive feature. Some opportunities eliminated certain threats, while some threats could only

be overcome by very strong external shocks. For example, in the case of Yirca, the company's repressive strategies were successfully neutralized by the results of 301 miners' shock, thereby increasing the chances of success of local resistance. Such interactions illustrate the need to assess not only single factors, but also how they are positioned against each other in the process. The Table 7 below summarizes the general categories of these factors and their level of influence in a systematic way. The key drivers in the Table are the drivers that play decisive role in outcome, while the secondary drivers do not play a decisive role.



Table 5. Internal and External Drivers of Success and Failure

Category of Drivers		Key Drivers	Observed Cases	Secondary Drivers	Observed Cases
Opportunities	Internal Opportunities	Strong Local Community Support	Yırca Loç Valley Dokuzhöyük	-	-
		Constant and Regular CSOs Support	Yırca Loç Valley Dokuzhöyük	-	-
	External Opportunities	External Shock of 301 Miners	Yırca	Sympathetic Political Allies	Yırca Dokuzhöyük
		Legally Protected Areas	Yırca Loç Valley Dokuzhöyük		
Threats	Internal Threats	Spontaneous Ideology of Localism	Arhavi	Fragmentation within Villagers	Yırca Loç Valley Arhavi
	External Threats	Strong Corporate Strategies of Repression	Yırca Loç Valley Dokuzhöyük	Rural Disengagement	Arhavi
		Strong Corporate Strategies of Co-optation	Loç Valley Arhavi	Criminalization	Yırca Loç Valley Arhavi Dokuzhöyük
		External Shock of 15 July Coup Attempt	Arhavi	Countermovements	Yırca Loç Valley Arhavi Dokuzhöyük

CHAPTER 7

A TRIADIC NEXUS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE

Despite the extant literature that addresses the factors determining the success of social movements, these are often single-case studies, preventing the identification of a pattern. In addition, the outcomes and drivers of success of social movements are contingent upon complex patterns. Yet, I argue that the existing literature overly focuses on static and singular drivers for explaining the success. This focus renders the literature unable to capture the complexity of social movement success.

Therefore, I propose a more dynamic, relational and comprehensive framework to address this lacuna in extant literature building upon the existing literature and the findings of fieldwork. In this study, the term "triadic nexus of success and failure" is proposed as a theoretical framework to conceptualize the dynamic interplay to unpack the drivers determining the outcomes of environmental social movements arising from energy projects. As Figure 333 visualize, I posit that the drivers of success are contingent upon the interplay between three main actors. These actors are state, the companies and the resistance. The dynamics within these three actors, as well as the relationships between them, ultimately influence the success of environmental social movements. The impact of each actor in this relationship on the outcomes of the social movement is inherently multidirectional. That is to say, these actors have the potential to impact the success or failure of the social movements. All three actors—the state, the company, and the resistance—have the potential to contribute to the success or failure.




Figure 33. The triadic nexus of success and failure

It would be essential to begin by examining the actors involved in this triadic nexus before moving on their relationships. The first actor in the triadic nexus is the state. In contrast to the other actors in the triadic nexus, the state is not homogeneous. That is to say, the extent to which the state opens or closes the opportunity structures of social movements is contingent upon the specific position of various actors within the state apparatus. This variability is a consequence of the divergent positions of the central and local governments, as well as the internal conflicts among elites within the state. It is imperative to acknowledge this dynamic interplay among these actors within state since this relation can potentially create both opportunities or threats for social movements to succeed or fail. In Türkiye, for instance, the internal division within state during the 17-25 December 2013 political crisis had a significant impact on the success of environmental social movements in their legal battles (Local

Community Interview No. 1, Lawyer Interview No. 38, Member of Civil Society Organization Interview No. 44). A similar dynamic can be observed in the context of social movements emerged within municipalities governed by an opposition party. In these cases, opposition municipalities often provide logistical and legal support to the movements, thereby influencing the broader political landscape. This is exemplified by the resistance that emerged against the Dokuzhöyük thermal power plant, a case that was the subject of this thesis.

The second actor in the triadic nexus is companies, which are much more homogeneous compared to the state and the resistance itself. Companies are the actors investing in energy projects that the local community opposes. It exhibits a multifaceted relationship with both the state and the resistance. Moreover, the company usually is the first actor who engage with the local community regarding the project. This preliminary interaction is of critical importance in determining the subsequent response of the local community to the project.

The third actor is the resistance in the triadic nexus. The resistance refers to the local community in opposition to the energy project, as well as the external actors providing support to local community. These actors include but not limited to civil society organizations, members of professional organizations, lawyers and members of political parties. The primary objective of the resistance is to prevent the construction of the project in the region. The opposition's reasons may stem from a variety of concerns, including the potential ecological impact and the economic strain that the energy project would impose on the surrounding localities.

At this point, it is crucial to underline that the actors of resistance are not merely passive agents under the influence of other actors, namely the state and companies. They emerge as strategic agents capable of shaping outcomes. These

actors proactively engage in processes of success and failure through practices including knowledge production, legal strategy, coalition building and narrative framing. Such knowledge practices have the potential to reshape the balance of power within the nexus. In this context, the agency of resistance is not an external aspect of the triadic nexus framework but a constitutive part of it. They do not only react to existing power structures but also have the capacity to transform their relations between state and companies. The recognition of this relational agency is instrumental in moving beyond deterministic interpretations of structural constraints and in highlighting how movements actively shape political opportunities through different repertoires of action.

I argue that the opportunities and threats produced by the dynamic relationship between these three actors determine the success or failure of the environmental movement. A significant gap exists in the extant literature regarding the exploration of threats, which can also be referred as failure factors, to social movements. However, threats have been shown to play a pivotal role in determining the success of social movements, alongside the opportunities that these movements possess. In the next part of the thesis, I delve into an analysis of the relationship between each actor, in terms of its potential opportunities for social movements as well as the potential threats it poses to these movements.

7.1. State-resistance nexus: Political opportunity expansion and closure

Setting aside the heterogeneous nature of the state, the state is the primary agent who sets the rules of the game, as well as who modifies and change them over the process. To start with the relations between the state and the resistance, the impact of state-imposed regulations on environmental social movements is multifaceted. It

manifests through two distinct pathways: one that restricts political opportunity structures and another that opens them.

The primary cause of the rise in environmental social movements is, undoubtedly, neoliberal energy policies of the state. The implementation of these policies has facilitated the construction of energy projects, predominantly by the private sector, in various locations. This has resulted in the intervention into the living spaces of local communities, which has, in turn, led to their opposition to these projects.

Beyond its evident role, there are also other areas that state closes the political opportunity structures of movements directly. On the one hand, the increase in energy supply, consistent with neoliberal developmentalism, has resulted in a rise in ecological distribution conflicts. On the other hand, the state has implemented various measures to effectively suppress these movements. In addition to the efforts of the provincial or district governors to persuade the public to accept the construction of the energy project in the regions where social movements emerged, the state also implemented a series of legal arrangements to suppress social movements. Furthermore, environmental movements have come under increasing pressure, which escalated significantly following the 2016 coup attempt and the ensuing state of emergency. This period of heightened pressure began with the Gezi protests in 2013. Notably, in 2017, the number of bans on protests witnessed its highest point since 2007 (Arslanalp & Erkmen, 2020). In addition, the field findings of the study demonstrate that, despite the state's law enforcement forces (under the jurisdiction of the gendarmerie as these movements emerged in rural areas) not engaging in direct confrontation with the local population, they provided support to the companies through indirect methods. These methods include arriving late to the

area upon receiving reports from the resisters and taking the resisters in the area to the police station for interrogation resulting decrease in the number of resisters present at the site.

The relationship of state with resistance does not always close the political opportunity structures. As suggested by the theory of political opportunity structures, existing legislature can also create new legal opportunities for social movements (Hilson, 2002). One of the findings of this thesis supports this assumption. In each of the successful cases studied, legal opportunity has been a strategic asset in the hands of social movements. The fieldwork of the study has demonstrated that, in contrast to the findings in the literature (Gönenç, 2022), the designation of an area as legally protected constitutes a significant leverage for the local community in litigation processes. Hence, the relationship between the state and the resistance is also established in a manner that is favorable to resistance.

Up to this point, I have unpacked the relationship between the state and resistance as if it were a unidirectional dynamic, solely originating from the state toward resistance. Although the relationship between the state and the resistance is more evident, it is, in fact, bidirectional in theory. The inverse relationship, from the resistance to the state, is also observed in the context of Türkiye as public pressure. The actions of social movements have the potential to yield political opportunities. In the Yırca case, for instance, this public pressure was among the factors that led to the alteration of the project site.

7.2 State-company nexus: Regulatory privileges, informal ties, and corporate leverage

In addition to its relationship with resistance, the state also has a relationship with companies. Typically, the state facilitates the operation of companies in a variety of ways, against in the presence of a resistance. The nature of this relationship can be classified into two distinct categories. The first category is the official relationship between the state and the company, which is formalized through legal arrangements.

Among these legal arrangements, those regulations pertaining to environmental impact assessment stand as a particularly significant example. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been implemented in Türkiye since the first EIA regulation was published on February 7, 1993. Since then, there have been 17 revisions to the regulation and 8 amendments to the entire regulation (Karakaş Ulusoy, 2019). The EIA regulation that is currently in force is the one published on July 29, 2022. The regulation categorizes projects with environmental impacts according to their size and scope. Projects with potentially substantial negative environmental impacts are subject to EIA process, while other significant projects are subject to preliminary review. In 2014, the regulation was amended with the inclusion of a new article. This article stipulates the exclusion of projects that do not meet the criteria outlined in Annex 1 and Annex 2, or those projects falling below the specified thresholds. This amendment has resulted in an expansion of activities that are exempt from the EIA process over time and has weakened the regulatory strength of environmental legislation (Özkaya Özlüer, 2022, p. 520-521). In addition to these similar regulations that shorten the bureaucratic processes of investors, the state's practical operation of the EIA process also facilitates the activities of capital. In the context of the fieldwork, numerous interviewees asserted that EIA reports are often

characterized by a lack of meticulousness, often being merely copied and pasted reports that fail to accurately capture the unique characteristics of the region. The quality of these reports is often so deficient that they contain errors as obvious as misspelled names of provinces or coordinates that are completely misplaced. (Civil Society Interview No. 70)

Despite the numerous amendments that have been made to the EIA regulation, favoring capital, the regulation can play a significant role in the legal battle for projects that do not comply with the EIA, in the hands of social movements. Before 2009, the EIA processes of the companies were restarted for projects whose execution had been suspended or canceled as a result of judicial decisions. This constituted a significant regulatory challenge for the companies. However, Circular No. 2009/7 has significantly shortened these periods, effectively resolving the issue that had posed a substantial challenge to companies. Instead of starting the EIA process all over again, the regulation now stipulates the correction of parts deemed incomplete or inadequate due to judicial decisions, subsequent to their submission to the ministry.

Another document that establishes the relationship between the state and the company is the urgent expropriation decisions. The mechanism of urgent expropriation which emerged due to the extraordinary conditions brought about by the Second World War, has now been applied in areas such as infrastructure projects, urban transformation, and energy investments. It has evolved into a tool that facilitates the operations of capital.

The state's role in facilitating corporate operations extends beyond the realm of formal documentation. The state can also employ informal facilitation techniques including but not limited to informal promises to corporate entities. A notable

example of this is the practice of making unofficial commitments to private companies in private settings. In Yırca, for instance, a guarantee was provided to the company to remove the legal protection status of protected areas. The state also undertakes specific actions to influence public opinion. These efforts include the activities of governors and district governors, who attempt to persuade the local community and various pro-energy project campaigns by elected AKP mayors and AKP provincial and district organizations.

The dynamic interplay between the state and corporate entities is not one-directional, with the state acting in the direction of corporations and vice versa. The reciprocal character of this connection is further reinforced by the significant influence that corporate leverage has on market systems, regulatory frameworks, and governmental policies. State-corporate interactions are complex and reciprocal processes, as corporations are capable of actively altering governmental structures through lobbying, strategic alliances, and economic power. This active role of corporations in policies such as privatization policies has been a subject of extensive research in the academic literature (e.g. Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012; Karadağ, 2010; Öniş, 2011).

7.3 Company-resistance nexus: Corporate governance of resistance

The third relationship in the triadic nexus of success and failure framework is between companies and the resistance. As previously stated, the existing literature has inadequately explored the failure factors that influence the outcomes of social movements. I posit that the primary driver contributing to failure is the corporate strategies. How the company navigates these dynamics is as important as the internal dynamics of the social movement itself. I conceptualize this as “corporate

governance of resistance". While the term "governance" is often associated with participatory or democratic forms of relations, in this study the concept is employed critically. The conceptualization of "corporate governance of resistance" does not refer to a desired or ideal-type form of relationship. Rather, it refers to the complex, strategic, and often coercive ways in which companies seek to shape, regulate, or limit resistance. In this sense, governance is not taken as a matter of well-intended management, but rather as an arena of power and control over resistance.

Under the corporate governance of resistance there are two strategies, which are repression and co-optation. Companies employ these two primary mechanisms to control or suppress movements.

Both repression and co-optation are frequently employed to interpret strategies articulated by the state, even though, by definition, they do not inherently fall within the realm of state actions. I argue that it is essential to expand the scope of repression and co-optation to comprehensively grasp the underlying processes that yield the outcomes of social movements. In that way, this thesis provides an original contribution to the existing literature by providing empirical research that expands the theoretical framework of repression and co-optation beyond state apparatus. The central argument of this study is that the most substantial threat to the success of environmental social movements is corporate governance of resistance.

In addition, despite the prevalence of power asymmetries in the relationship between resistance and companies, this interaction is not a one-way relationship. Corporate attempts to weaken resistance through repression or cooptation are often met with strategic countermoves by resistance. This is a relational struggle in which the actors influence and reshape the strategies of each other rather than reducing actors to fixed and specific roles. The agency of resistance is manifested not only in

its organizational and knowledge production practices but also in the political, symbolic, and legal strategies it develops against the company's interventions. In this context, the relationship between the company and resistance should not only be conceptualized as a reciprocal influence but also as a dynamic process in which both parties test the limits of their power and seek to create room for maneuver.

7.3.1 Co-optation by companies

The first method is co-optation. With co-optation, the companies try to weaken the movement by convincing its leaders and local communities with different compensation methods. The process of formally integrating opponents into the system they are opposing, thereby transforming them from outsiders to participants, is referred to as co-optation. This process, while not necessarily resulting in a change to the existing status quo, aims to mitigate opposition by incorporating opposing voices into established power structures (Coy, 2013, p. 1).

Companies frequently undertake projects that necessitate the utilization of lands owned by local communities for the construction of energy projects. Therefore, the execution of these projects necessitates the transfer of land ownership to the company. In Türkiye, there are two primary methods for transferring ownership. The first method involves expropriation, a process in which the state seizes private lands through legal channels in the name of public use. Alternatively, companies may engage in direct purchase transactions with individual owners. Given the ongoing utilization of these lands by local communities for activities such as agriculture, it becomes essential for them to engage in negotiations with the local community. This marks the initial phase of co-optation. To prevent potential opposition, companies usually offer prices for the lands that far exceed its actual value. Even in some cases,

these prices exceed tenfold the market value of the land. In the village of Yırca, for instance, the Izmir-Istanbul highway intersects the land where the villagers engage in agricultural activities. However, the villagers have reported that the compensation provided for the land used for the construction of the highway was sufficiently high that any organized resistance from the villagers against the construction of the highway did not occur.

The co-optation strategies employed by companies are not limited to offering prices that exceed the value of the land. While this strategy is an effective method of preventing potential resistance, when resistance first emerges, they often employ additional co-optation strategies. These co-optation strategies include but not limited to the direct allocation of financial resources to the villagers, the investment in communal facilities in the village such as community kitchens, Quran learning school or the mosque, purchasing of a flat on behalf of hometown associations, and providing employment opportunities at the power plant that will be constructed. The material opportunities provided by companies to villagers in co-optation strategies are critical for understanding how resistance governed by the companies and change the trajectories of the movements at the micro level. In addition to providing economic resources, companies also gain legitimacy at the local level and mitigate potential resistance.

The strategies discussed herein can be classified as either strategic or reactive co-optation. The strategic co-optation refers to proactive and systematic co-optation practices that companies have deliberately planned to safeguard their long-term interests before the emergence of movement. Reactive co-optation describes companies' efforts to mitigate societal opposition by offering economic and social opportunities after the emergence of movement. But I posit that there is a third

strategy of co-optation, which is the most significant tool for the companies to pacify opposition. This third type co-optation strategy has a more embedded nature. It is a co-optation strategy in which a company leverages its existing long-term, institutional, and social ties with the local community to steer the community towards its interests through the facilitation of economic and social opportunities. Unlike 'external' forms of co-optation, where an external actor seeks to influence the community, this strategy relies on the company being historically intertwined with the local community. The company may be locally owned or managed. In that way, it utilizes existing relationships with the community to enhance its legitimacy. Moreover, it may have been investing in the area for years. Therefore, the relationship between company and the local community is based on long-term investments, which include ongoing economic and social support such as schools, roads, scholarships and municipal grants. In addition, the company may have become an indispensable actor in the economic life of the local community. These dynamic fosters the generation of legitimacy, thereby enabling the local community to perceive the company as an integral part of the community. These, in turn, has the effect of weakening or minimizing potential resistance. It is important to note that this type of co-optation can also reduce the need for the company to use to repressive measures or make repression appear more legitimate to local community.

The effectiveness of co-optation strategies is contingent upon a multitude of factors. The economic vulnerability of the local community is one of them. In the absence of alternative economic opportunities, such as alternative job options, local community may be more inclined to accept employment and economic assistance from the company. Small farmers and landless peasants, being more economically vulnerable, may become more dependent on the financial incentives offered by the

company. In cases where a company functions as the sole employer or the primary investor in the local economy, it wields a greater degree of influence over the community. The regulatory framework and the level of government intervention is the second factor that affect effectiveness of co-optation strategies. The state's role as a regulatory authority is a crucial factor in determining the strength of its influence over corporate entities. The absence of effective regulation by the state can result in a scenario where corporations are able to employ more assertive strategies. The co-optation process may be further exacerbated if municipalities actively promote the services provided by the company or incorporate them into official development projects. Lastly, the discursive and political tactics of companies determine the effectiveness of co-optation. The efficacy of strategies is enhanced when companies can establish their role as an organic element of the community or a catalyst for local development, thereby fostering local community support. Furthermore, it may employ strategies of co-optation by marginalizing, discrediting, or excluding dissenting voices within the community. Companies frequently engage in these actions by collaborating with influential figures within the community, such as *muhtars*, leaders of movements, religious leaders, and local politicians, thereby enhancing their perceived legitimacy.

In addition, co-optation is commonly used as a strategy to pacify or break resistance, but it does not always work within the company's control. Resistance can strategically leverage situations where the company is open to negotiation to their advantage, achieving gains far beyond what was originally proposed. For instance, the company's financial support or offers of co-optation can serve as a means of persuading the movement to accept its fundamental demands or to secure arrangements that encompass the interests of a broader community. In such instances,

the process of co-optation functions not only as a site of dissolution but also as a site of negotiation and the production of gains. In this process, resistance can not only react to the actions of the company, but also strategically utilize the opportunities offered by the company to gain stronger positions. This necessitates a reinterpretation of the concept of co-optation, moving beyond a static, one-dimensional understanding to acknowledge its role as a dynamic process involving reciprocal adjustments in positions and strategies by both parties involved.

7.3.2 Repression by companies

Hitherto, the discussion has centered on co-optation, which constitutes one of the two mechanisms employed by corporations to exercise control over or to suppress movements. The second mechanism utilized by companies is repression. Repression is conceptualized in two different manners within the academic literature. One conceptualization limits the definition of repression to the use of force, harassment, torture, bans, and killing (e.g. Davenport, 2007). The other expands the definition, characterizing repression as any action that increases the cost of protest (e.g. Tilly, 1978, p. 55). In the context of this thesis, I adopt the definition of Earl since it enables the differentiation between repression and co-optation while simultaneously broadening the scope of the concept beyond the realm of the state. Therefore, in this thesis, repression is defined as “state or private action meant to prevent, control, or constrain noninstitutional, collective action (e.g., protest), including its initiation” (Earl, 2011, p. 263).

There exist only a few empirical studies that argue for the role of non-state actors in the implementation of repression. One notable example is Ferree's (2004) article, which explores the role of gender-based movements in this context. In this

article, she broadens the conceptualization of repression, extending its definition beyond the realms of violence and coercion to include the notion of soft power. She further contends that forms of repression encompass not only direct physical violence but also include methods such as ridicule, stigma, and the silencing of gender-based movements by non-state actors (Ferree, 2004). Earl (2003) similarly argues that repression includes channeling by private agents, such as countermovements and threatening phone calls to activists. Although the authors do not explicitly categorize it as a form of repression, drawing upon Ferree's conceptualization, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) can also be considered a manifestation of repression. SLAPP refers to legal actions aimed at suppressing, intimidating, or deterring those who criticize, participate in democratic decision-making, or exercise freedoms of speech and assembly (Canan & Pring, 1988). Additionally, a report by Center for Spatial Justice (*Mekanda Adalet Derneği*) employs Canan and Pring's theoretical framework to assess legal actions initiated by corporate entities against environmental rights advocacy groups in Türkiye. The result of this report unpacks that there are various types of lawsuits to pressure and coerce movements, including criminal cases initiated by filing a complaint based on allegations of offenses such as insult, threat, and assault; compensation claims; and cases filed for violations of the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations (Boyacı et al., 2023).

Repression is a strategy that companies mostly employ when co-optation strategies fail to pacify social movements. Companies use three different mechanisms of repression against movements. The first one is the use of force, harassment and torture. Companies employ physical force through their private security guards. These private security guards whose responsibility is to ensure the security of the project site under the name of protecting private property. But in

practice, these security guards intervene in social movements with different tools to suppress and restrict the protests with different tools. These tools include the construction of high-security fences surrounding the project site to prohibit access, the establishment of a security checkpoint for entering and exiting the site, the surveillance of people entering and leaving the site, and giving the names of the people involved in the protest to gendarmerie or police. Additionally, direct intervention in protest events is employed, involving the use of force to demonstrators and remove them from the project site. They may even use handcuffs to remove the protestors from the site.

The first mechanism of repression strategy employed by companies can reach a level that approaches state-level repression. This is a particularly significant point, as private security forces employed by companies can function in a manner similar to that of state law enforcement agencies. Therefore, despite the absence of the gendarmerie employing such force against the protesters, I contend that private security forces have effectively filled the role previously occupied by the gendarmerie. This phenomenon can be termed the policification of private security.

It is evident that policification of private security cannot occur without the state's consent. The state provides support directly or indirectly through different mechanisms. It may facilitate actions of private security guards through legal regulations. The state's enactment of legislation that expands the capacity of private security while failing to establish adequate accountability mechanisms can be regarded as an illustration of such legal frameworks. State may also accept the de facto situation and knows that private security forces were applying pressure but not intervening. State may cooperate directly with companies, as well. The nature of this collaboration can vary, ranging from a joint operation by both entities to a scenario

where police or gendarmerie temporarily withdraws, thereby allowing private security to assume primary responsibility. Policification of private security has led to an expansion in the coercive capacity of companies and a shift in responsibility, allowing the state to limit its direct accountability. In this framework, the policification of private security emerges as a notable indicator of neoliberal authoritarianism. This phenomenon can be attributed to the strategic convergence of neoliberalism and authoritarianism, whereby the state employs a dual approach of liberalizing the market while simultaneously maintaining control over opposition.

As previously stated, corporations employ three distinct mechanisms of repression against movements. The first mechanism is the utilization of force. The threat posed by companies is also employed as the second mechanism of repression. In the cases within this thesis, the threat of loss of job is a common method used by companies. This strategy serves to reinforce the authority of the company without the need to employ direct physical force. In regions where there are limited job opportunities, the threat of job loss is especially significant. People fear losing not only their livelihoods, but also their social status and security for the future. Consequently, the threat can serve as a significant mechanism for deterring social movements. Its relation to co-optation may also be significant. If the company offers economic advantages to local community while simultaneously threatening them with dismissal, this could be considered a two-way strategy. This dynamic involves the use of economic incentives to control behavior, while also leveraging the threat of job loss as a means of suppressing potential opposition.

The final mechanism of repression employed by companies is strategic lawsuits, a subject that has been explored in the literature on SLAPP. Companies have the capacity to suppress opposition without need for direct physical violence or

explicit threats. Instead, they strategically utilize the legal system to their advantage, subjecting communities to costly, time-consuming, and intimidating legal proceedings. People who have been subjected to legal action frequently find themselves deficient in resources necessary to effectively cope with the judicial process. Consequently, the initiation of legal proceedings can be regarded as a form of repression. It is important to note that such legal action of companies is not intended to impose immediate punishment; rather, its primary objective is to serve as a preventive measure to discourage the repetition of protests in the future. The threat of legal action can potentially prevent individuals from exercising their rights. Therefore, it has chilling effect. Companies use diverse array of legal grounds. These legal actions include claims for damages, violations of private property rights, and violation of freedom of work.

During the fieldwork, many interviewees indicated that even after years, these cases remain unresolved. They noted that even if they have won the struggle, they are left alone in these legal proceedings. Furthermore, they indicated that they have faced significant economic and psychological challenges because of these legal proceedings. Therefore, it is important to note that SLAPP cases target not only specific activists but also to intimidate the entire community. The prosecution of a small number of individuals has the potential to create a chilling effect, leading others to refrain from speaking out due to the fear of reprisal.

While repression has been demonstrated to have a deterrent effect, research has also demonstrated an opposing effect. They suggest that irrespective of its consequences, repression fosters anti-regime hostility, particularly when it is extreme (Surdea & Plopeanu, 2024). In this context, different repression mechanisms used by companies to suppress resistance may not always have the intended effect. Attempts

at repression, especially when publicized, can have the effect of undermining the company's legitimacy and increasing support for resistance. For instance, the company's efforts to suppress resistance through repression can transform a local struggle into a national or international issue. In such instances, resistance can garner broader public support by strategically disseminating a narrative of grievance. The findings of this study unveil a parallel dimension. In the case of Yırca, where extreme repression was used by company, the repression backfired and became one of the factors that strengthened the movement. The company's use of force, when reflected in the media, resulted in a public reaction, thereby prompting support from various civil society organizations and politicians for the movement. As indicated in the interview with the company, they acknowledged that they did not effectively manage the process in this regard. Repression can therefore become a counterproductive strategy that not only weakens resistance, but in some cases creates space for its strengthening. This finding indicates that the impact of corporate repression is not uniform but rather exhibits variability, contingent upon the prevailing context and the strategic capacity of the resistance.

7.4 The triadic nexus of success and failure in practice: Empirical applications to case studies

The objective of this section is to apply the theoretical framework of the triadic nexus of success and failure to the case studies, thereby bridging the gap between theoretical abstraction and empirical manifestations of state-company-resistance dynamics. By systematically examining empirical cases, this analysis aims to demonstrate the practical application of the framework, highlighting its explanatory power. Each case study functions as a testing ground for the theoretical constructs

developed earlier, offering insights into the mechanisms of co-optation, repression, state-corporate strategies and internal dynamics of resistance within different socio-political and economic contexts. This empirical application serves two primary functions. First, it reinforces the theoretical contribution of the study. Second, it enhances its analytical precision by grounding abstract concepts in concrete instances. Consequently, this section reinforces the relevance and applicability of the framework, ensuring its continued theoretical strength and empirical validation. In Table 8, a detailed examination of these relationships is provided, including the key factors contributing to each case and their outcomes.

Table 6. Triadic Nexus of State-Company-Resistance Across Four Cases

	State-Company Relation	Company-Resistance Relation	Resistance-State Relation	Key Factors	Outcome
Yırca Movement	Strong relations between state-company Formal facilitation through legal arrangements such as urgent expropriation decision Informal facilitation through different channels such as behind-scene promises, support from distinct governor	Co-optation strategies such as job promises and offers for financial assistance Extreme repression strategies: extensive use of force, threat, SLAPPs	Limited capacity of state to impose repression because of 301 miners political crisis Legal opportunities of legally protected areas The public pressure imposed by the resistance on governmental decisions	Economic dependency of local community to their agricultural lands Failed co-optation strategies of company Vast external support of the resistance	Success

Arhavi Kavak Movement	Strong relations between state and company Formal facilitation through legal arrangement such as bureaucratic facilitation for cancelled EIAs Informal facilitation through counter-movements	Embedded co-optation strategies through existing long-term, institutional, and social ties with the local community SLAPPs	Pacifying the resistance with endless legal battles The state of emergency after July 15th	Spontaneous idea of localism and rural disengagement as the constraints on expansion of resistance Close economic dependency between company and local community	Failure
Loç Valley Movement	Weak relations between state-company Absence of both formal and informal facilitation	Co-optation strategies through in-kind donations	Legal opportunities of legally protected areas	Cultural ties and shared values as the motivation behind the sustainability of resistance Strong external support	Success
Dokuzhöyük Movement	Ambiguous relations between state-company Only local level support of state	No Communication between company and resistance	Legal opportunities of legally protected areas	Strong external support Proactive resistance strategy: intervention prior to the initiation of the EIA	Success

7.4.1 The case of Yırca movement: Extreme repression, state-company nexus and a resilient mobilization

In the case of Yırca, the relationship between the company and the state is characterized by a high degree of close-knit interconnection. In the QCA of the initial phase of the thesis, the highest calibration rate was attributed to the relationship between the company and the state. The rationales underlying this assessment are elucidated in Appendix A. Although this led the state to employ various strategies to suppress the movement, it could not prevent the movement from succeeding. The strategies of state included formal legal mechanisms, such as urgent expropriation rule, as well as informal channels, such as the behind-the-scenes assurance that the protected areas would be removed from their protected status. The primary rationale for selecting the olive grove area as the location for the thermal power plant centered on the objective of reducing the company's expenses. The selection of this site was due to its proximity to an existing thermal power plant, facilitating the utilization of its existing infrastructure, including transmission lines. In addition, the high-level participation in the groundbreaking ceremony, including senior officials such as ministers, is significant as it reflects the importance the government places on the project. The company also received support from both the district governor and the AKP district organization.

It is possible that the company has placed relatively less emphasis on co-optation strategies for these reasons. The negotiations initiated to persuade the villagers appear to have been unsuccessful. The company's close relationship with the state may have led to an overconfidence within the company, resulting in a heavy reliance on state-backed mechanisms rather than extensive efforts to secure local support. The company has expressed regret during interviews for its inability to

effectively carry out the negotiations with the villagers. This admission indicates that the company may have underestimated the significance of establishing trust and securing local support, potentially due to its excessive reliance on state-provided support. This overreliance on state-corporate alliances may have constrained the company's willingness or capacity to invest in more robust co-optation strategies.

In the side of resistance, it received support not only from local community itself but also from a vast network of external actors, including NGOs, the media, academics, and international organizations, among others. Two primary factors contribute to this phenomenon. Firstly, economic dependence of the local community to their lands poses limitations on the efficacy of classical co-optation strategies. This is due to the company's challenges in persuading villagers with material promises or new employment opportunities. If people continue to depend on their existing sources of income, the strategy of co-optation is likely to encounter obstacles. Consequently, the movement's core remained resilient due to direct economic conditions. Secondly, the recent political crisis of death of 301 miners in the region led to an increase in public discontent. The crisis produced an environment that calls into question the legitimacy of the government, and as a result, public reaction to the repression strategies increased. This dynamic, in turn, enabled the movement to garner increased support from media and civil society and exacerbated the state's already fragile social legitimacy, creating an opportunity for the movement to strengthen its rhetoric and message.

The repression strategies implemented by the company served to enhance the scale of the resistance. The violence carried out by the company's private security guards against the resistance, in addition to the felling of trees, was extensively covered by the media, thereby reinforcing the resistance. In addition to the use of

force, company used other two mechanisms of repression which are threats to local community and SLAPPs. Consequently, in the Yırca case, the extreme repression used by the company was backfired.

One important advantage that the resistance has is legally protected areas. This challenges the legitimacy of both the state and the company. The legal protection mechanism employed by the movement has the effect of framing it not only as a form of social resistance, but also as a struggle for legal rights. This strategic approach not only leads to an increase in public support but also attracts international attention, particularly from international CSOs. Legal protection, in turn, makes it more costly for the state and the company to engage in overly repressive strategies.

7.4.2. The case of Arhavi: local dynamics and embedded co-optation strategies

A multitude of factors based on the triadic nexus contributed to the failure of the Arhavi struggle. Primarily, the internal dynamics of the struggle itself played a pivotal role in its outcome. The existing resistance was characterized by a spontaneous ideology of localism that is not open to external interaction and the development of resistance within the local community was limited. In this case, localism functioned as a barrier to the expansion of resistance movements beyond their initial social constituencies. This dynamic resulted in the restriction of resistance to regional boundaries. This, in turn, constrained the movement's capacity to establish coalitions at the international or national level, thereby creating challenges in establishing connections with other social movements. The established connections were geographically constrained to the Black Sea region and were exclusionary to people not originally from Arhavi. Therefore, spontaneous ideology

of localism prevents the movement to generate a broader public opinion. It hindered the movement from reaching out to the broader public, limited its search for legitimacy in the political sphere, and made it vulnerable to state and corporate pressure. The local support, which was already limited due to rural disengagement, was further constrained in this manner.

Yet, the primary cause of the Arhavi movement's failure cannot be attributed solely to the spontaneous ideology of localism or rural disengagement. The primary cause was the embedded co-optation strategies of company. Despite the evident connection between the company and the state in the Arhavi case, it did not have to primarily rely on this relationship to its advantage. The company had already established significant connections with the local community, leveraging these relationships to constrain the movement's growth potential. The company utilized these strategic alliances to persuade key individuals or groups to align with its interests. This approach had the effect of weakening the leadership of the resistance by co-opting local leaders or influential actors within the community. Consequently, the movement experienced fragmentation within its own community, leading to its deterioration into a mere local struggle. Company also used SLAPPs as a strategy to pacify the movement.

State and company relations also contributed to failed result of the movement. The company's capacity to repeatedly renew its legally annulled EIAs, as well as the erosion of struggle in the the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, contributed to pacify the movement. In addition, counter-movements were organized by mayor of Arhavi, who was a member of AKP.

7.4.3 The case of Loç: A resilient mobilization and failed co-optation attempts

In this case, the presence of cultural belonging and shared values fostered the development of a network of collective solidarity among villagers, thereby ensuring the sustainability of resistance efforts despite the attempts of counter-movements to divide the movement within the community. In this regard, cultural ties emerged as a pivotal dynamic that serves to both unify and legitimize the resistance.

The durability of the movement can be attributed not only to strong local community support but also to the acquisition of external support. The movement's capacity to receive support from diverse actors, including actors in similar movements and CSOs is a strategic advantage stemming from its flexible and inclusive nature. This dynamic fostered a reciprocal benefit, contributing to the movement's resilience and impact in two ways. The first one is diversification of resources, in particular human resources and repertoires of knowledge practices. The second benefit is increased legitimacy, which can be defined as the support received from various groups, indicating that the movement is not merely a local conflict but rather part of a broader social justice framework.

Furthermore, it is important to note that this project is situated within the buffer zone of a national park. This geographical context serves to reinforce the movement's position in relation to the state, thereby providing it with a substantial legal foundation.

A notable aspect of the company's relationship with the movement is its employment of co-optation strategies. The company's co-optation efforts, manifested through in-kind donations such as community kitchen and the acquisition of an apartment for the village association, are intended to win over local communities.

However, two significant challenges emerged in this context. The first one is above-mentioned cultural ties of the local community to their region.

The second one about the company-state relation. The company's inability to secure the full support of the state at the central or local level limited the impact of these co-optation strategies. The company's lack of AKP support was reinforced by the refusal of a council member to pass permits at the local level. This weakened the company's relationship with the state and prevented co-optation strategies from being effective enough. This case underscores the notion that companies face challenges not only in economic but also in cultural and political contexts. It is evident that movements can generate opportunities within these contexts.

7.4.4 The Case of Dokuzhöyük: The strength of a proactive resistance and the lack of corporate control over opposition

This case is significant because it illustrates how social movements can achieve success by implementing proactive strategies. By proactive strategies, I mean the strategy that aims to shape or control the situation by acting before potential risks or threats arise. The objective of this strategy is to predict and prevent future developments, rather than reactively responding to events.

A critical dynamic in this case is the role played by CSOs, which is the reason of the development of proactive strategies. Given the community's limited familiarity with technical and bureaucratic processes, such as the EIA process, the information and guidance provided by CSOs in this regard proved to be a significant asset for the villagers. The organizational capacity facilitated by CSOs enabled villagers to intervene prior to the initiation of the EIA, thereby enabling them to take control of the process. Moreover, the local community still remain economically dependent on

their land, generating substantial incomes. Therefore, fundamental element that reinforces the motivations behind the resistance is that significant income generated by villagers from their land.

Typically, companies are expected to engage with local communities and implement co-optation strategies and attempt to weaken resistance through repression. However, it is not evident in this case. The company and the local community have never established a relationship, not even through the *muhtar*. The absence of any pressure or manipulation by the company made it easier for the local community to organize collectively.

It is important to note that the designation of the project area as a priority agricultural area has strengthened the legal foundation of the opposition's efforts against the state and the company. Despite legal opportunities of the movement, the project and the company received informal support from the governor and the AKP provincial organization. Yet, this informal support, however, was not reflected in official documents, thereby providing an additional advantage to the movement. The economic strength of the villagers serves as a mitigating factor, as informal support does not pose a more tangible threat.

7.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have provided a framework for analyzing the success and failure of environmental social movements. I have argued that to understand the complex and dynamic drivers of success and failure, it is necessary to adopt a dynamic framework. The triadic nexus of success and failure provides this dynamic analysis. I argue that the triadic nexus between three actors - state, resistance, and company - determines the outcome of social movements.

Next, I have examined four cases to unpack the key drivers influencing the success and failure of environmental social movements within the framework of triadic nexus of state-company-resistance. The results demonstrate that the local community's involvement in the resistance and its capacity to expand beyond to garner outside support are the most important factors influencing success of movements. Movements that successfully resist corporate cooptation and repression strategies, while taking advantage of political opportunity structures such as political crises that make the government more fragile and legal opportunities, have a much higher chance of success.

The analysis further shows that resistance can be successful even in the presence of strong state-company links if they are able to successfully mobilize public support and use public opinion to impose pressure. This, however, depends on the company's incapacity to put into practice successful co-optation strategies. On the other hand, resistance faces challenges in maintaining its resilience when corporate strategies, such as co-optation, are effectively executed. The function of proactive opposition strategies has been identified as another crucial element. The power dynamics can be significantly shifted in favor of resistance groups through early involvement, such as legal challenges during the bureaucratic phase of EIA before its adoption.

This chapter underscores the pivotal role of corporations, arguably one of the most prominent actors in the neoliberal era. By integrating corporate strategies into the analytic framework, it offers a more nuanced understanding of how capital influences the trajectory of development projects and the dynamics of resistance.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Since the early 2000, Türkiye has witnessed a significant increase in energy production, coinciding with the rise of neoliberal energy policies. Neoliberal energy policies facilitated intervention in the living spaces of local communities under the guise of economic development. However, these policies also catalyzed ecological distribution conflicts thereby resulting in an increase in environmental social movements. The presence of numerous movements resulting in divergent outcomes presents a puzzle of considerable interest from both an academic perspective and for various actors within the neoliberalism paradigm. In this thesis, I have traced the underlying drivers that lead to these varied outcomes by using a process tracing with a comparative study.

The initial step in the research process that I took was a comprehensive review of the extant literature, followed by the utilization of a theoretical framework to guide the analysis. My analysis focused on the literature surrounding social movements and the studies that examined the factors contributing to success or failure in the context of underlying theories. Moreover, I propose a systematic framework for analyzing the factors that influence success and failure in the literature. In the light of existing research, I have identified that the existing literature on the drivers of success is largely characterized by two predominant lines of inquiry in line with three social movements theories, which are resource mobilization, political opportunity structure and framing. The first category encompasses internal drivers, which are intrinsic to the movement. The second category consists of external drivers, which are typically beyond the movement's control and represent

more structural factors. While these factors have been discussed in various ways in the existing literature, they are not yet categorized in a clear internal-external distinction. This distinction provides a theoretical framework for systematic analysis of the processes in the case studies. The findings of the study facilitate a more coherent interpretation of the extant literature by comparing common and unique dynamics across different cases. This framework can be used to analyze similar processes in future studies and provide a useful analytical tool to explain the relationship between different actors in social movements and their outcomes from a more explanatory perspective. In this sense, with the categorization of internal-external drivers, a methodological contribution to the literature is presented by systematizing the fragmented discussions in the literature.

To contextualize the environmental social movements that are the subject of this study, I have delved Türkiye's energy policies since 2001 and the movements emerged as a result of energy investments to set the scene since the context in which movements emerge is, in essence, a critical factor that requires careful consideration. I have divided both the energy policies and the movements into three periods to provide insight into the evolution since 1980. This helped me both to explain the reasons for the substantial increase in social movements arising from energy policies since the mid-2000s and to identify potential drivers of success and failures of those movements. Yet, in a broader sense, by focusing on the outcomes of social movements through the lens of political ecology, I also reviewed the related literature and positioned the study under the political outcomes of social movements.

8.1 Methodological implications

In the initial stages of this study, I adopted a mixed methods approach, with the intention of employing QCA and process tracing method. I planned to use QCA to incorporate a comprehensive set of 16 cases and an extensive collection of data. The data of the QCA were sourced from various documents, including local and national newspapers, parliamentary records, and archival materials. However, during the field research process, I observed that the results obtained through QCA did not align with the actual situation in the field. Specifically, I discovered that the secondary data I collected (e.g., newspaper reports, official records) contain a certain degree of bias, which lead to determine the drivers of success and failure of the movements from the perspective of the media and official discourses rather than from the perspective of the actors themselves. Consequently, this bias resulted in misclassification of some cases and the neglect of certain dynamics. In this context, the QCA conducted at the beginning of the study was not considered reliable. Hence, the outcomes of QCA are presented in the Appendix A.

In that way, this study demonstrates that the QCA method is a highly effective instrument for large-N comparative analyses; however, its reliability is contingent upon the quality of the data utilized. It is crucial to acknowledge that potential biases, such as media framing, selectively presented narratives from official documents, and issues with missing data, may directly influence the outcomes of analyses conducted during the data collection process. Therefore, this study also reveals how critical it is to use diverse array of resources when conducting the QCA method. This is evidenced by Hug's (2013) comprehensive analysis, which demonstrated the impact of measurement errors and biased data on QCA outcomes. In this context, it is

essential for researchers to engage in data collection and selection processes with meticulous care to ensure the methodological strength of QCA.

The methodological incompatibility that was identified resulted in a revision of the underlying research assumptions. Consequently, I decided to adopt process tracing as the sole method of the study. This methodological shift did not compromise the study's strength, as process tracing enables detailed examination of the dynamics and interplay between different actors in social movements. Therefore, the factors contributing to the success or failure of these movements are assessed within the broader context of actors' strategies, state-corporate relations, and intragroup dynamics.

For process tracing, I selected four cases. I conducted fieldwork in each case and carried out in-person interviews. Two of the selected cases are the Yırca and Dokuzhöyük movements, both of which emerged against construction of thermal power plants. The other two cases are the Arhavi Kavak and Loç Valley movements, which were anti-HEPP movements. Process tracing is a method of causal inference that focuses on how events or circumstances evolve over time. Identifying a process requires being able to describe its essential steps. This enables a thorough examination of change and recurrence (Collier, 2011). Therefore, in Chapter 5, I provide a detailed description of the evolution of events, the involvement of actors, and the trajectory of processes. This chapter uncovers the mechanisms underlying the cases by delving into specific details, including the nature of the project, the state's intervention, the initial interaction between companies and villagers, the emergence and evolution of the movement, and the outcome of the process. This constitutes a pivotal element of the thesis, as it demonstrates not only the trajectory leading to a specific outcome, but also the reasons why alternative pathways did not occur.

8.2 Theoretical and empirical implications

The cases within the thesis are examined employing the framework previously categorized in the literature as internal and external drivers. The main aim is to identify patterns of success and failure with this analysis in Chapter 6. This analysis reveals not only the existence of factors that shape the outcomes of success and failure, but also how they interact with each other. It demonstrates that not all factors equally influence outcomes, and that certain threats, despite their presence in all cases, do not play a decisive role. The analysis identifies strong local community support, consistent and regular CSO support, the 301 miners' shock, and legally protected areas as critical determinants of success. Conversely, strong corporate strategies of repression and co-optation, the external shock of the July 15 coup attempt, and the spontaneous ideology of localism posed the strongest threats. However, some factors were able to counteract other threats in specific cases. For example, the strong local community support and their engagement with CSOs in Loç Valley resistance neutralized the company's co-optation strategies and strengthened local resistance. This dynamic analysis provides a robust framework to better understand how processes of success and failure were shaped in different cases.

The literature review and case studies conducted throughout this study led to a systematic examination of the determinants of success and failure. The distinction of internal and external drivers facilitated the identification of critical factors in the case studies. However, a broader phenomenon, examined in Chapter 7, was uncovered in the process: Success and failure are not solely determined by the presence of a couple of internal or external factors but rather by how these factors are shaped by the dynamic relationships between three key actors: the state, companies,

and local communities/civil society. I posit that the “triadic nexus of success and failure” is a model providing a nuanced explanation for the interactions observed in the cases. I argue that it is not the singular factors, but how these factors operate in this triadic nexus that is the main determinant. Therefore, the dynamic triadic framework addresses a significant gap in the literature and facilitating a more systemic analysis of success and failure of social movements. In this sense, the framework also makes a theoretical contribution to the literature.

This thesis not only develops the triadic nexus of success and failure framework to address the outcomes of success and failure in a broader perspective but also makes significant contributions to the repression and co-optation literature. Repression and co-optation mechanisms have usually been regarded as the instruments of state control and ignore the role of private agents. However, I extend the empirical use of repression and co-optation by analyzing how corporations implement these mechanisms and demonstrate that these strategies are effectively used not only by the state but also by private agents. In this context, I propose a new empirical and theoretical insights to the literature on social movements, particularly environmental social movements. I address this lacuna in the extant literature by demonstrating how capital plays an active role in processes of repression and co-optation and use these strategies to pacify social movements. In this sense, this thesis provides an empirical contribution to the existing literature by demonstrating how corporations actively utilize repression and co-optation strategies, thereby expanding the existing body of knowledge on these subjects beyond a state-centric framework.

By extending the literature on repression and co-optation, this study also contributes to the existing literature on environmental movements in Türkiye by

delving into a critical dimension. The prevailing academic studies on this topic are largely shaped by the neoliberal developmentalism framework and tend to analyze environmental movements within this conceptual framework, focusing on the analysis of environmental movements within the context of state policies concerning economic growth, infrastructure projects, and natural resource management. These studies examine how environmental movements mobilize or face pressure within this broader framework. However, a significant limitation inherent in the existing literature is that they fail to adequately address the role of neoliberalism in shaping the dynamics of environmental movements in Türkiye. They do not encompass the "neoliberal" aspect of neoliberal developmentalism, namely the role of capital as an active agent of pressure on social movements. This study fills this gap, demonstrating that companies are not merely passive actors protecting their economic interests, but strategic actors directly shaping the outcome of environmental movements. The private sector directly use force to local communities through different mechanisms, threaten local communities and use strategic lawsuits (SLAPPs) to pacify movements. Companies also integrate community leaders or civil society actors through co-optation strategies and weakens opposition by offering economic incentives. Therefore, this thesis reveals the "capital" factor in the literature on environmental movements in Türkiye and demonstrates that neoliberal developmentalism is not only a state-centered process, but also that private sector plays a direct role in environmental movements. These findings necessitate a more comprehensive evaluation of existing state-corporate-society relations in the literature and offer a critical contribution to our understanding of how environmental movements have developed resistance not only to the repressive policies of the state but also to the direct interventions of corporations.

8.3 Research limitations

There are two main limitations of this research. Firstly, this study provides a comparative analysis by examining multiple cases, all of which occurred within a specific period in Türkiye. Consequently, the findings are constrained by the prevailing political and economic context. It is noteworthy that cases analyzed in different geographies or periods may exhibit similar dynamics or reach divergent conclusions. Future studies should therefore assess the generalizability of the triadic nexus of success and failure framework by examining environmental movements and corporate strategies in various countries. It is particularly crucial to enhance comparative studies to investigate the efficacy of repression and co-optation strategies in diverse political regimes and institutional structures.

Secondly, although the analysis of companies' repression and co-optation strategies was possible, access to company officials or internal decision-making mechanisms was not available in two cases, which hinders in-depth analysis of how companies make strategic decisions and how they act in repression/co-optation processes from the company perspective. However, despite this limitation, through field data, media scans and interviews with local actors, it was possible to assess the role of companies in these processes. Future research must prioritize the acquisition of more detailed insights by conducting direct interviews with corporate actors.

All in all, this thesis demonstrates that success and failure are shaped not only by singular factors but also by dynamic relationships between the state, corporations, and local communities/civil society. In that way, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the academic literature and provides a robust theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of social movements. The findings of the study reveal the use of repression and co-optation mechanisms by private actors and offer

new insights into how these processes determine the outcome of social movements. By examining these dynamics in different contexts, future research can develop more comprehensive explanations of both the drivers of success of social movements and corporate strategies of repression and co-optation.



APPENDIX A

RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This section assesses the drivers of the success and failure of environmental social movements that emerged as a result of energy supply projects in Türkiye by using QCA with 16 cases, shown in Table A1. The reason why there is a research gap in the theoretical and empirical analyses of outcomes of social movements is mainly the methodological difficulties (Kriesi et al., 2002: 207) because of the complex patterns in the outcome. In that sense, QCA is a helpful tool for overcoming this challenge.

Table A1. Cases Selected for the QCA

	Projects Resisted by Social Movements	Location	Start Date of Resistance	Status	Outcome
1	Gerze Coal Power Plant	Sinop	2008	Stopped	Success
2	Loç Valley Cide HEPP	Kastamonu	2009	Stopped	Success
3	Yuvarlakçay HEPP	Muğla	2009	Stopped	Success
4	Kırklareli Dokuzhöyük Coal Power Plant	Kırklareli	2012	Stopped	Success
5	Soma Kolin Coal Power Plant	Manisa	2014	In operation	Success
6	Amasra Coal Power Plant	Bartın	2006	Stopped	Success
7	Orhanlı Seferihisar GPP	İzmir	2020	Canceled	Success
8	Aydın Sarı Zeybek JES (Kızılcaköy)	Aydın	2018	Canceled	Success
9	Cevizlik HEPP	Artvin	2010	In operation	Failure
10	Cenal Karabiga Coal Power Plant	Çanakkale	2013	In operation	Failure
11	Mersinli WPP	İzmir	2014	Under Construction	Failure

12	Erzurum Aksu Valley HEPP	Erzurum	2010	In operation	Failure
13	Arhavi Kavak HEPP	Artvin	2010	In operation	Failure
14	Pembelik Damı and HEPP	Elazığ	2008	In operation	Failure
15	İzmir Karaburun Yaylaköy WPP	İzmir	2015	In operation	Failure
16	Tortum Bağbaşı HEPP	Erzurum	2009	In operation	Failure

After explaining the calibration strategy and the raw data of the outcome and conditions, the truth tables, and the solutions of QCA, the chapter moves on to the raw data, truth tables, and solutions of QCA with an evaluation of the results by revisiting the cases. The research was conducted using fsQCA 3.0 software, which was developed by Charles Ragin and Sean Davey³⁸. The software uses the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. Besides the fsQCA 3.0 software, R Studio was used to evaluate the necessary conditions further.

A1. Data collection and calibration

A1.2 Outcome (OUTCOME)

The outcome of the research is the success and failure of environmental social movements. Although there are different approaches to the outcomes of social movements, a simplified definition of success and failure is adopted in this project. Resistance is assumed to be successful if the protestors stop or cancel the project. It is deemed a failure if the project has been completed and is in operation or under construction. Therefore, success is the presence of the outcome (membership score =

³⁸ The homepage of the fsQCA software: <https://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml>

1.0), and failure is the absence of it (membership score = 0.0). Table A2 shows the raw data and the calibration of the outcome. Names of the cases are only written with their location because of the practical reasons for the software.

Table A2. Raw data and Membership Scores of Outcomes

Case	Raw Data	Membership Score
Gerze	Success	1
Loç	Success	1
Yuvarlaçay	Success	1
Dokuzhöyük	Success	1
Yırca	Success	1
Amasra	Success	1
Orhanlı	Success	1
Aydın	Success	1
Karabiga	Failure	0
Mersinli	Failure	0
Arhavi	Failure	0
Pembelik	Failure	0
Yaylaköy	Failure	0
Tortum	Failure	0
Aksu	Failure	0
Cevizlik	Failure	0

A2.2 Condition 1: Media coverage (MEDIA)

The first condition of the study is media coverage. Türkiye's mainstream newspapers, *Milliyet* Daily Newspaper and *Hürriyet* Daily Newspaper were examined to explore the effects of media coverage on the outcome of 'success' and 'failure'. All the news on the cases was collected, and the news for each case was counted using their internet archives. The news reported after the completion of the

energy infrastructure for the unsuccessful cases and the news reported after the project's cancellation for the successful cases were not included in the dataset. In addition, the news in which the cases were only given as examples was not included either.

One source of the data for the QCA in all conditions is the local and national resources. Besides, archival research on the news of the *Cumhuriyet Daily Newspapers* was conducted for the condition of media coverage. Yet, the data on Cumhuriyet was not included in the study after determining a divergence between *Cumhuriyet* and the other two newspapers regarding their inclusivity of such events. It is not a convenient newspaper for the aim of the study because the study assesses the effect of mainstream news outlets on the success of environmental movements. These data collection processes on the research and the media coverage condition provide a base for the calibration of the media coverage, which helps to determine what it means to have high and low media coverage. The cases selected for the study are widely varied in terms of media coverage, and they represent the universe under the scope of the research. In that sense, it is coherent to compare cases among themselves to decide when determining thresholds for high and low media coverage by setting the membership score of 0.5 (neither in nor out) as the median of the coverage amount of the cases. Taking the average of them is not a reasonable option because it is already a challenging issue to be covered in those mainstream newspapers in Türkiye. That is why the median of the amount of news is taken as the cross-over point rather than the average amount of news. The coding schema is in Table A3. Table A4 reports both the raw data and the calibration of the cases. 1 is the full membership which means the highest media coverage, and 0 is the full nonmembership which signifies the lowest media coverage.

Table A3. Calibration strategy for Media Coverage

The total amount of news between	Calibration
1 – 5	0
6- 15	0,33
16-30	0,67
31-70	1

Table A4. Raw Data of Media Coverage and Calibration

Cases	Total Number of Media Coverage	Membership Score
Gerze	28	0,67
Loç	14	0,33
Yuvarlakçay	26	0,67
Dokuzhöyük	3	0
Yırca	67	1
Amasra	57	1
Orhanlı	5	0
Aydın	3	0
Karabiga	3	0
Mersinli	0	0
Arhavi	48	1
Pembelik	3	0
Yaylaköy	8	0,33
Tortum	70	1
Aksu	3	0
Cevizlik	3	0

A.2.3 Condition 2: Ties with civil society organizations (TIESWITHCSOS)

The second condition of the study is the ties with civil society organizations (CSOs) because they are conscience constituents who may increase resources available to

protestors and give rise to achieving the goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1222-1223).

The data on the ties with civil society organizations were collected through archival research on the local and national newspapers, websites, and social media accounts of the civil society organizations or the resistances, and the books and articles written about the resistances. A civil society organization is attributed as supportive if it participated in demonstrations and/or made a press release supporting protests.

Six value coding schema is followed to calibrate the condition of ties with CSOs.

The locus of mobilization of the CSOs (Kadirbeyoğlu et al., 2017) is also explored to include local, national, or transnational levels. Besides their locus of mobilization, their organizational capacities are also crucial to increase the resources of the resistance. Hence, the centralization and bureaucratization of the CSOs are also examined. If, for example, the resistance got support from local, national, and transnational organizations, and one of those organizations is a bureaucratic and centralized CSOs, its membership score is 1, representing the most substantial ties with CSOs. 0 illustrates the weakest ties. Getting the support of a bureaucratic and centralized CSO is a reason for higher membership scores. The number of CSOs is also evaluated comparatively among cases. Therefore, the calibration strategy is not a straightforward additive strategy. Table A5 shows the raw data of the condition and the six-value calibration for each case.

Table A5. Raw Data on Ties with Civil Society Organizations and Membership Score

Case	Local CSO	National CSO	Transnational CSO	Centralized bureaucratic CSOs	Membership Score
Gerze	Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu Munzur Çevre Derneği Sinop Çevre Platformu Sinop Nükleer Karşıtı Platform Samsun Çevre Birliği	Ekoloji Kolektifi Halkevleri, Atatürkçü düşünce derneği, Kültür ve Turizm Derneği, Eğitim Der, Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi, Esnaf Odası EMO Türk Tabipler Birliği TMMOB Halkevleri Sinop Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası EğitimSen Sinop Dernekleri Federasyonu Makine Mühendisleri Odası Ekoloji Kolektifi Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası Enerji-Sen Tüketici Dernekleri EğitimSen, Ülkü Ocakları, Gençlik Muhalefeti, Çarşı	Greenpeace 350.org	Yes	1
Loç	Bartın Platformu Derelerin Kardeşliği Munzur Koruma Kurulu Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu	TMMOB Peyzaj Mimarları Odası Halkevleri Doğa Derneği Karşı Bisiklet Topluluğu	Doğal Hayatı Koruma Vakfı (WWF)	Yes	1
Yuvarlakçay	Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu Batı Akdeniz Çevre Platformu Dalyan Turizm, Kültür ve Çevre Koruma Derneği Köyceğiz Turizm ve Doğayı Koruma Derneği Göcek Kültür ve Turizm Derneği Fethiye Tanıtım ve Araştırma Vakfı Ankara Kırsal Çevre ve Ormancılık	Türkiye Tabiatını Koruma Derneği TEMA EğitimSen Mimarlar Odası Çevre Mühendisleri Odası Orman Mühendisleri Odası Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği Doğa Sporları ve Çevre Koruma Derneği Muğla Barosu Biz Kaç Kişiyiz Derneği Ortaca Şubesi	-	Yes	0,8

	Sorunları Araştırma Derneği				
Dokuzh�y�k	Trakya Platformu	Kuzey Ormanları Savunması Dayko Vakfı (Doğal Yaşamı Koruma Vakfı)	Greenpeace	Yes	0,8
Yırca	İstanbul Validebağ G�n�ll�leri Ankara'nın Oyları Platformu Kuzey Ormanları Savunması Ankara Dayanışması	TEMA Anatolia Vosvos Derneği DİSK	Greenpeace	Yes	1
Amasra	Bartın Pedaldaşlar Derneği	Anatolia Vosvos Derneği TEMA EğitimSen Mimarlar Odası	-	Yes	0,6
Orhanlı	Ege �evre ve K�lt�r Platformu (EGE�EP)	TMMOB Doğa Derneği	-	No	0,6
Aydın	Aydın �evre ve K�lt�r Platformu (AY�EP) Menderes İnisiyatifi �ine Yaşam Platformu (�İYAP)	TEMA Aydın Barosu	-	Yes	0,6
Karabiga	Madra Dağı ve Kaz Dağı Belediyeler Birliğı, Biga �evre Derneği, �anakkale �evre Platformu	TMMOB'ye bağı Peyzaj Mimarları, �evre M�hendisleri ve Ziraat M�hendisleri Odası T�rkiye Barolar Birliğı	Greenpeace	Yes	1
Mersinli	Marmari� Ekolojik Yaşam Derneği (Kuruluř 2005)	-	-	No	0
Arhavi	Arhivililer Vakfı Derelerin Kardeřliğı Platformu Karadeniz İsyandadır	Halkevleri �ğrenci Kolektifi Birleşik Haziran Hareketi	-	No	0,4
Pembelik	Munzur Koruma Kurulu Dersimliler Dernekleri Karadeniz İsyandadır Platformu	KESK	-	Yes	0,6
Yaylak�y	Karaburun Yurttaş Davacıları Ege�ep Konak Kent Konseyi Mordoğan Yaşam Dostları	Ekoloji Birliğı ADD		No	0,4
Tortum	-	-	-	-	0

Aksu	Karadeniz İsyandır	-	-	-	0,2
Cevizlik	Derelerin Kardeşliği	TEMA	-	Yes	0,4

A2.4 Condition 3: Sympathetic political allies (SYMPATHETIC)

The third condition of the study is sympathetic political allies which refer to the presence of mayors, city council members, members of opposition parties, and deputy members of opposition parties who are supportive of local mobilization.

There are three dimensions in the condition, which are (1) alliances with mayors/municipalities, (2) support of members of opposition parties, and (3) parliamentary questions. A four-value coding schema for this condition is adopted, and an additive strategy is followed, shown in Table A6. If, for example, the protestors got the support of members of opposition parties and the municipality, the membership score is 0.67 since the resistance was not brought to the parliament. If the resistance got the support in all dimensions, their code is 1. Therefore, 1 represents the most substantive involvement of the sympathetic political allies.

Table A6. Calibration Strategy of Sympathetic Political Allies

Dimensions	Strategy	Calibration
Alliances with mayors/municipalities	Presence of none of the dimensions	0
	Presence of one of the dimensions	0.33
Support of members of opposition parties	Presence of two of the dimensions	0.67
	Presence of three of the dimensions	1
Parliamentary questions and/or minutes		

The data on the conditions were collected in two different ways. The archives of local and national newspapers, books, and articles about the cases were utilized to collect data on the support of mayors and municipalities and the support of members of opposition parties. The Grand National Assembly of Türkiye database was used to collect data on parliamentary questions and minutes. The parliamentary speech of deputies³⁹ and the parliamentary questions they asked the government⁴⁰ using different keywords for each case was examined. After defining the calibration strategy considering the support of opposition parties, membership scores to the cases are assigned, demonstrated in Table A7, together with the raw data.

Table A7. Raw Data and Membership Scores of Sympathetic Political Allies

Cases	Alliances with mayors/municipalities	Alliances with opposition party members	Parliamentary questions and/or minutes	Membership Score
Gerze	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Loç	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Yuvarlakçay	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Dokuzhöyük	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Yırca	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Amasra	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Orhanlı	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Aydın	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Karabiga	No	No	Yes	0.33
Merinli	No	No	No	0
Arhavi	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Pembelik	No	Yes	Yes	0.67
Yaylaköy	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Tortum	No	No	Yes	0.33
Aksu	No	No	No	0
Cevizlik	Yes	No	No	0.33

³⁹ <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Tutanaklar/TutanakSorgu>

⁴⁰ <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Denetim/Yazili-Soru-Onergeleri>,
<https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Denetim/Gecmis-Donem-Yazili-Soru-Onergeleri>

A.2.5 Condition 4: Proximity to government (PROXIMITY)

The last condition of the study is proximity to the government of the construction company. For this condition, three different proximities to the government are defined: the inner circle, the second circle, and the outside circle. The inner circle includes the companies known for their high number of public procurements after the AKP came to power. In addition, the speeches of both the representatives of the companies and the members of the AKP are examined. The calibration of the inner circle is 1, which signifies high proximity to the government. There are large construction companies that existed before the AKP government, and their revenues have not deteriorated with the AKP government in the second circle. The membership score of the second circle is assigned 0.33, which signifies low proximity to the government. 0 indicates the full nonmembership if no ties were found through the existing data source or the company is a Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) member at the time of the construction/resistance, following the same strategy as Çeviker Gürakar (2018).

By following the same strategy as Çeviker Gürakar (2018) to determine the companies in the inner circle, the initial aim of the study was to consider the members of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), and the Anatolian Tigers Businessmen Association (ASKON). Yet, by the time of the data collection of this study, the names of the members of these associations, known for their proximity to the government, were not open to the public. Therefore, an alternative strategy with archival research on the newspapers using the information gathered from the Turkish Trade Registry Gazette database was followed.

It is vital to note that the membership scores of the companies were assigned by examining the period of resistance. Their increasing or decreasing levels of proximity after the project was completed/canceled were not considered. Table A8 shows the calibration strategy of the proximity to the government. The raw data on the proximity to the government and their membership scores are illustrated in Table A9.

Table A8. Calibration of Proximity to Government

Proximity	Calibration
Inner Circle	1
Second Circle	0.33
Outside the Circles	0

Table A9. Raw Data on The Proximity to Government and Membership Score

Name	Construction Company	Proximity	Reason	Membership Score
Gerze	AG Anadolu Group	Outside circles	TUSIAD membership	0
Loç	Orya Energy	Outside circles	No ties found	0
Yuvarlakçay	Akfen Holding	Second circle	TUSIAD membership, but a high number of public procurements	0,33
Dokuzhöyük	Deba Mining Company	Second circle	Parliamentary minutes stating that the company is close to the government but not get a high number of public procurements	0.33
Yırca	Kolin Energy-Hidrogen	Inner circle	A high number of public	1

			procurements	
Amasra	Hattat Energy and Mining Company	Outside circles	TUSIAD membership	0
Orhanlı	Küçük Menderes Energy Company	Outside circles	TUSIAD membership	0
Aydın	Güriş Holding	Second circle	Founded in 1958, are large construction and energy company that existed before the AKP government	0.33
Karabiga	Alarko Holding and Cengiz Holding	Inner circle	A high number of public procurements	1
Mersinli	Yander Electric	Outside circles	Any ties found	0
Arhavi	Balsu Electric (MNG Holding)	Inner circle	A high number of public procurements	1
Pembelik	Limak Energy and Bilgin Energy	Inner circle	A high number of public procurements	1
Yaylaköy	Enda Energy Holding	Outside circles	No ties found	0
Tortum	Kayen Heta Energy	Outside circles	No ties found	0
Aksu	Borusan Holding	Outside circles	TUSIAD membership	0
Cevizlik	Sanko Holding	Second circle	Founded in 1094, large industrial company that existed before the AKP government	0.33

A.3 Raw data and truth table

After assigning all the membership scores of the conditions and outcome, the raw data of the study for both success and failure are as follows in Table A10 and Table A11.

Table A10. Raw Data Table

	Conditions				
Cases	MEDI A	TIESWITHCSOS	SYMPATHETIC	PROXIMITY	OUTCOME
Gerze	0,67	1	1	0	1
Loc	0,33	0,8	0,67	0	1
Yuvarlakcay	0,67	0,8	1	0	1
Dokuzhoyuk	0	0,6	1	0,33	1
Yırca	1	1	0,67	1	1
Amasra	1	0,6	1	0	1
Orhanli	0	0,6	1	0	1
Aydin	0	0,6	1	0,33	1
Karabiga	0	0,8	0,33	1	0
Mersinli	0	0	0	0	0
Arhavi	1	0,4	0,67	1	0
Pembelik	0	0,6	0,67	1	0
Yaylakoy	0,33	0,4	1	0	0
Tortum	1	0	0,33	0	0
Aksu	0	0,2	0	0	0
Cevizlik	0	0,4	0,33	0,33	0

Table 5: Truth Table for the Presence of Outcome (Success)

Media	Tieswith CSOs	Sympathetic	Proximity	# of cases	OUTCOME (SUCCESS)	Name of the Cases	raw consistency	PRI consistency	SYM consistency
1	1	1	0	3	1	Gerze (1), Yuvarlakcay (1), Amasra (1)	0.873077	0.873077	0.873077
0	1	1	0	4	1	Loc (1), Dokuzhoyuk (1), Orhanli (1), Aydin (1)	0.810881	0.810881	0.810881
0	0	1	0	1	0	Yaylaköy (0)	0.632411	0.632411	0.632411
1	1	1	1	1	0	Yırca (1)	0.626168	0.626168	0.626168
0	1	1	1	1	0	Pembelik (0)	0.34375	0.34375	0.34375
1	0	0	0	1	0	Tortum (0)	0.229885	0.229885	0.229885
0	0	0	0	3	0	Mersinli (0), Aksu (0), Cevizlik (0)	0.0769231	0.0769231	0.0769231
0	1	0	1	1	0	Karabiga (0)	0	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	Arhavi (0)	0	0	0

Table A11. Table for the Absence of Outcome (Failure)

Media	Tieswith CSOs	Sympathetic	Proximity	# of cases	~OUTCOME (FAILURE)	Name of the Cases	raw consistency	PRI consistency	SYM consistency
0	1	0	1	1	1	Karabiga (0)	1	1	1
1	0	1	1	1	1	Arhavi (0)	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	3	1	Mersinli (0), Aksu (0), Cevizlik (0)	0.923077	0.923077	0.923077
1	0	0	0	1	0	Tortum (0)	0.770115	0.770115	0.770115
0	1	1	1	1	0	Pembelik (0)	0.65625	0.65625	0.65625
1	1	1	1	1	0	Yırca (1)	0.373832	0.373832	0.373832
0	0	1	0	1	0	Yaylakoy (0)	0.367589	0.367589	0.367589
0	1	1	0	4	0	Loc (1), Dokuzhoyuk (1), Orhanli (1), Aydin (1)	0.189119	0.189119	0.189119

1	1	1	0	3	0	Gerze (1), Yuvarlakcay (1), Amasra (1)	0.12 6923	0.12 6923	0.12 6923
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A.4 Results

A.4.1 Analysis of necessary conditions

A condition “is defined as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to occur” (Ragin, 1987: 99). If in every outcome of Y, there is condition X, then X is a necessary condition. The fsQCA 3.0 software allows for conducting necessary conditions analysis.

In the analysis of both the necessary and sufficient conditions, consistency and coverage thresholds are crucial. Consistency is “the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions” (Ragin, 2008: 44), and coverage “assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination ‘accounts for’ instances of an outcome” (Ragin, 2008: 44). For a condition to be a necessary condition, its consistency level should be at least 0.9, and the coverage level should be at least 0.6.

The results of the necessary condition analysis are illustrated in Table A12 for the outcome of success. The relevance of necessity and XP Plot should be examined in addition to consistency and coverage levels to designate necessary conditions in QCA. It is to ensure whether the condition is trivial or not. Relevance of necessity shows the level of relevancy. In other words, a higher relevance score indicates a higher significance (Duşa, 2018: 114). Hence, the relevance measure of a necessary condition should be as high as possible, and it needs to exceed 0.5. The Relevance of necessity (RoN) of the condition of sympathetic political allies is 0.615, shown in Table A13.

Table A12. Analysis of Necessary Conditions for the Outcome “Success”

	Consistency	Coverage
MEDIA	0.458750	0.611667
~MEDIA	0.541250	0.433000
TIESWITHCSOS	0.750000	0.681818
~TIESWITHCSOS	0.250000	0.277778
SYMPATHETIC	0.917500	0.687910
~SYMPATHETIC	0.082500	0.123827
PROXIMITY	0.248750	0.374060
~PROXIMITY	0.751250	0.562734

Table A 13. Analysis of Necessity for the Condition of Sympathetic Political Allies

	inclN	RoN	covN
SYMPATHETIC	0.917	0.615	0.688

inclN: inclusion score for necessity, RoN: relevance of necessity,
covN: coverage of necessity

A trivial necessary condition is constant in all outcomes. In other words, we observe a trivial necessary condition in almost all paths, whether the outcome is absent or present (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 233-234). For instance, if one of the conditions of this study were being an energy project planned to construct under the AKP government, then it would be a trivial necessary condition. It is constant in all cases since it is a scope condition of the study. That is why the researchers should examine the XY Plot in addition to the relevance of necessity scores. In Figure A1, the distribution of cases for the condition of sympathetic political allies is shown. As observed from the table, the condition of sympathetic political allies is not constant in all cases. There are five cases in which the condition is either absent or more out

than in. In addition, there is not one single case in which the outcome is present, but the condition of sympathetic political allies is absent/more out than in. In other words, it is present in all the cases in which the outcome is present, which means the success of the resistance.




Figure A1. XY Plot – Distribution of cases for sympathetic political allies

Source: Processes by the author based on the truth table

The consistency and coverage levels, in addition to the reverence of necessity and XY Plot of the condition, shows that in the scope of the study, the substantive support of sympathetic political allies is a necessary condition for the success of environmental social movements. Yet, it is not sufficient alone to produce success.

The results of the necessary condition analysis for the outcome of failure are shown in Table A15. It displays that neither the absence nor the presence of the four

conditions is necessary for failure because of their low level of consistency and coverage for evaluating as a necessary condition.

Table A14. Analysis of Necessary Conditions for the Outcome “Failure”

	Consistency	Coverage
MEDIA	0.291250	0.388333
~MEDIA	0.708750	0.567000
TIESWITHCSOS	0.350000	0.318182
~TIESWITHCSOS	0.650000	0.722222
SYMPATHETIC	0.416250	0.312090
~SYMPATHETIC	0.583750	0.876173
PROXIMITY	0.416250	0.625940
~PROXIMITY	0.583750	0.437266

A.4.2 Analysis of sufficient conditions

A sufficient condition is a condition or a set of conditions that can produce the outcome. In other words, whenever there is a sufficient condition, there is a certain outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006).

While analyzing the truth table, a consistency level is used to separate the causal combinations which are not consistent subsets of the outcome. The consistency threshold for the fuzzy-set QCA should be at least 0.75 (Ragin, 2008). In the QCA analysis of the study, I used 0.80 for the presence of the outcome and 0.75 for the absence of the outcome as the consistency thresholds. The result of the QCA can be observed in Table A16. There is one pathway to the outcome of success.

Table A15. FsQCA Solution: The Causal Path Leading to the Success of Environmental Social Movements

	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
TIESWITHCSOS*SYMPATHETIC*~PROXIMITY	0.6175	0.6175	0.871252

$$\text{SUCCESS} = \text{TIESWITHCSOS} * \text{SYMPATHETIC} * \sim \text{PROXIMITY}$$

According to the analysis reported in Table 14, the environmental movements in the scope of the study are successful if their ties with the other civil society organizations are strong, the sympathetic political allies have substantively involved, and the construction company is not in the inner circle of the AKP government. Since there is a deviant case – Yırca – in the analysis, the causal path does not include all the cases. Therefore, the path is quasi-sufficient. In this path, while ties with civil society organizations and the absence of proximity to the government are neither sufficient nor necessary for success, these two conditions, together with the support of sympathetic political allies, are INUS conditions. Although the path is not the only path that leads to success, therefore it is unnecessary; because of the deviant case of Soma, the support of sympathetic political allies is a necessary part of the path, which is “a conjunctural condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 79). The path covers seven of the eight cases, which are Gerze, Loç, Yuvarlakçay, Dokuzhöyük, Amasra, Orhanlı, and Aydın.

The deviant case is Soma Coal Power Plant, which was expected to be deviant before conducting it because the outcome is not as clear-cut as the other cases. The initial project had canceled as a result of the protests. Yet, the company changed the power plant's location and completed its construction. Now, it is in

operation. Therefore, although Yırca resistance is defined as a successful movement, some may argue the contrary.

The notion of asymmetry in social phenomena is also accurate for this study. The reverse of the path shown in Table 14 is not valid to explain the causal path for the failure of the movements. Table A17 shows the parsimonious solution of the fsQCA Software with a consistency rate of over 0.9.

Table A 16. FsQCA Solutions: The Conditions Leading to the Failure of Environmental Social Movements

	<i>Raw Coverage</i>	<i>Unique Coverage</i>	<i>Consistency</i>
~SYMPATHETIC	0.58375	0.58375	0.876173

$$\text{FAILURE} = \sim\text{SYMPATHETIC}$$

The path depicts that without the substantive support of sympathetic political allies, the environmental social movements are unable to achieve their initial goals, which is the cancellation of the energy project. This solution is valid for five of the eight cases: Mersinli, Aksu, Karabiga, Tortum, and Cevizlik resistances. Arhavi, Pembelik, and Yaylaköy resistances cannot be explained through this path. Despite the sympathetic political allies' substantive support, they could not succeed in their action in those three deviant cases. Therefore, although the presence of sympathetic political allies is a necessary condition for the presence of the outcome, its presence cannot guarantee the success of environmental movements.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

Interview #	Gender	Group	Case	Date	Approx. Duration (min.)	Type of Interview
1	M	Local Community	Yırca	5.06.2023	70	Individual Interview
2	F	Local Community	Yırca	5.06.2023	60	Individual Interview
3	M	Opposition Political Party Member	Yırca	5.06.2023	30	Individual Interview
4	M	Local Community	Yırca	6.06.2023	120	Group Interview
5	F	Local Community	Yırca	6.06.2023		
6	M	Local Community	Yırca	6.06.2023		
7	F	Local Community	Yırca	6.06.2023	30	Individual Interview
8	F	Local Community	Yırca	6.06.2023	25	Individual Interview
9	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	6.06.2023	30	Individual Interview
10	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	6.06.2023	60	Individual Interview
11	M	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023	45	Group Interview
12	F	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023		
13	F	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023	25	Individual Interview
14	M	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023		

15	M	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023	60	Group Interview
16	F	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023		
17	M	Local Community	Yırca	7.06.2023	30	Group Interview
18	M	Journalist	Yırca	8.06.2023	50	Individual Interview
19	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	8.06.2023	75	Individual Interview
20	F	Local Community	Yırca	9.06.2023	55	Individual Interview
21	M	Opposition Political Party Member	Yırca	9.06.2023	40	Group Interview
22	M	Opposition Political Party Member	Yırca	9.06.2023		
23	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	9.06.2023	60	Individual Interview
24	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	9.06.2023	90	Individual Interview
25	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	15.06.2023	95	Group Interview
26	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	15.06.2023		
27	F	Company Representative - Kolin Holding	Yırca	17.06.2023	25	Individual Interview
28	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Yırca	29.06.2023	60	Individual Interview
29	M	Local Community	Arhavi	9.07.2023	120	Group Interview
30	F	Local Community	Arhavi	9.07.2023		
31	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi	10.07.2023	90	Group Interview
32	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi	10.07.2023		
33	M	Member of the Provincial General Assembly/Opposition	Arhavi	11.07.2023	25	Individual Interview
34	M	Opposition Political Party Member	Arhavi	11.07.2023		

35	M	Opposition Political Party Member	Arhavi	11.07.2023	40	Group Interview
36	M	Local Community	Arhavi	11.07.2023	60	Individual Interview
37	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi	12.07.2023	120	Individual Interview
38	M	Lawyer	Arhavi	12.07.2023	30	Individual Interview
39	M	Local Community	Arhavi	13.07.2023	120	Group Interview
40	F	Local Community	Arhavi	13.07.2023		
41	F	Local Community	Arhavi	13.07.2023		
42	F	Local Community	Arhavi	13.07.2023		
43	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi	13.07.2023	30	Individual Interview
44	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi/Loç	13.07.2023/30.08.2023	55	Individual Interview
45	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi	26.07.2023	45	Individual Interview
46	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Arhavi	28.07.2023	45	Individual Interview
47	M	Local Community	Arhavi	3.08.2023	60	Individual Interview
48	M	Local Community	Loç	7.08.2023	120	Group Interview
49	M	Local Community	Loç	7.08.2023		
50	M	Local Community	Loç	7.08.2023	25	Individual Interview
51	M	Local Community	Loç	7.08.2023	25	Individual Interview
52	M	Member of the Provincial General Assembly/Ruling Party	Loç	8.08.2023	25	Individual Interview
53	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Loç	8.08.2023	30	Individual Interview

54	F	Opposition Political Party Member	Loç	8.08.2023	30	Individual Interview
55	M	Journalist	Loç	8.08.2023	50	Individual Interview
56	F	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023	30	Individual Interview
57	F	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023	45	Group Interview
58	M	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023		
59	F	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023		
60	M	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023		
61	F	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023	60	Group Interview
62	M	Local Community	Loç	9.08.2023		
63	M	Lawyer	Loç/Arhavi	15.08.2023	30	Individual Interview
64	M	Local Community	Loç	23.08.2023	45	Individual Interview
65	M	Local Community	Loç	28.08.2023	60	Individual Interview
66	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Loç	31.08.2023	70	Individual Interview
67	M	Company Representative -Orya Energy	Loç	12.09.2023	15	Individual Interview
68	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Loç	14.09.2023	60	Individual Interview
69	M	Local Community	Dokuzh�y�k	4.09.2023	40	Individual Interview
70	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Dokuzh�y�k	4.09.2023	45	Individual Interview
71	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization/Lawyer	Dokuzh�y�k	5.09.2023	50	Individual Interview
72	F	Member of a Civil Society Organization/Opposition Party Member	Dokuzh�y�k	5.09.2023	45	Individual Interview
73	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Dokuzh�y�k	6.09.2023	30	Individual Interview

74	M	Member of a Civil Society Organization	Dokuzhöyük	6.09.2023	75	Individual Interview
75	M	Local Community	Dokuzhöyük	6.09.2023	90	Individual Interview
76	M	Local Community	Dokuzhöyük	11.09.2023	45	Individual Interview



APPENDIX C

HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 30.04.2022-64413

T.C.
BOĞAZİÇİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME
KOMİSYONU
TOPLANTI KARAR TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı : 31
Toplantı Tarihi : 28.04.2022
Toplantı Saati : 10:00
Toplantı Yeri : Zoom Sanal Toplantı
Bulunanlar : Prof. Dr. Ebru Kaya, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen
Bulunmayanlar :

Beyza Sankoç Yıldırım
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Sayın Araştırmacı,
"Environmental Social Movements: Drivers of Success and Failure" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığımız SBB-EAK 2022/41 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 28 Nisan 2022 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar tüm üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oybirliği ile alınmıştır. COVID-19 önlemleri kapsamında kurul üyelerinden ıslak imza alınmadığı için bu onay mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen tarafından bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin
SOHTORİK İLKMEN
ÜYE

e-imzalıdır
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik
İlkmen
Öğretim Üyesi
Raportör

SOBETİK 31 28.04.2022

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

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