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**CIVIL SERVICE REFORM DILEMMAS: POLITICIZATION AND
NORMATIVE LIMITS IN ETHIOPIA**

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SUPERVISOR: Prof. Dr. Gonca BAYRAKTAR DURGUN

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

AUGUST 2022

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KAMU HİZMET REFORMU İKİLEMLERİ: ETİYOPYA'DA SIYASALLAŞMA VE NORMATİF SINIRLAR

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ÖZET

Evrensel olarak kabul edilmiş bir tanımı bulunmayan kamu hizmeti kavramı genellikle yeterlilik, liyakat, idari süreklilik ve hesap verebilirlik gibi niteliklerle tanımlanmaktadır.) Kamu hizmetinin sadece kapsam ve işlevleri zamanla değişirken, onun önemi sürekliliğini korumaktadır. Kamu hizmetindeki değişiklikler genellikle kamu hizmeti reformu yoluyla gerçekleşir; bu, devlet memurlarının verimliliğini ve etkililiğini artırmak ve böylece kamu hizmetlerinin kalitesini iyileştirmek için geliştirilen ve uygulanan bir dizi müdahale mekanizmasıdır. Kamu hizmetinin merkeziliğine ve reformuna rağmen, siyaset ve yönetim arasındaki ilişkiye dair şüphecilik devam ederken, politikacıların kamu hizmetini politize etme arzusu ile bürokratların kendini büyütme arayışı arasında hassas bir denge kuracak kalıcı bir manevra bulunamamıştır. Sonuç olarak, KHR hiçbir zaman sorunsuz bir çaba olmamıştır. Bu tez, 1991-2018 dönemini kapsayan KHR sürecinde siyaset-yönetim ilişkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu amaçla, kamu hizmeti seçkinlerinin, seçilenlerin ve/veya atanmaların siyasi etkisi karşısında yasallık, doğruluk, mesleki standartlar ve siyasi tarafsızlık ilkelerini korumaya çalıştıkları ikilem durumları incelenmiştir. Kamu hizmeti reformunu teorik bir perspektif olarak kullanmış ve tanımlayıcı bir araştırma yöntemiyle tamamlanmıştır. Ayrıca, birincil ve ikincil kaynaklardan gelen verilerin üçgenleştirilmesine izin verildiği için karma bir araştırma yaklaşımı benimsenmiştir. Ayrıca bakanlık, komisyon ve kurumlardan seçilen 840 kamu yöneticisinden %95 güven düzeyinde ve %5 hata payı ile 211 örneklem alınmış ve vinyet anketi kullanılarak görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, sırasıyla kullanılabilirlik ve kartopu örnekleme kullanılarak derinlemesine görüşmeler için akademiden 10 ve politikadan 10 katılımcı seçilmiştir. Yapılan bu çalışmada, Etiyopya'nın kamu sektöründeki politikacıların KHR'da kamu hizmetindeki meslektaşlarından daha büyük bir rol oynadığı bulgulanmıştır. Araştırma, reform uygulamasına yönelik rehberlik mekanizmalarına rağmen, KHR sırasında siyasi ve kamu hizmeti seçkinleri arasında yukarı doğru yeterli bir iletişimin olmadığını göstermiştir. Ayrıca, çalışma, kamu hizmeti seçkinlerinin, KHR ile ilgili, siyasi liderlerin yasallık, doğruluk, profesyonel standartlar ve siyasi tarafsızlık gibi normatif sınırları zayıflatabilecek herhangi bir eylemde bulunma girişimlerine direnmek için ne ikilemin ne de cesaretinin olduğunu göstermiştir. Aynı zamanda, düşük maaş, itaatkar idari gelenek, bağımsız gözlemci örgütlerinin eksikliği ve demokratik kültür eksikliği, genel olarak kamu hizmetinin ve özellikle KHR'nin siyasallaşmasını daha da kötüleştirdiği görülmektedir. Gerçekten de, kamu hizmetinin siyasetten arındırılması ve reform süreci, siyaset ve idare arasındaki ilişkileri yasal ve ahlaki olarak kabul edilebilir sınırlar içinde tutmak için gerçek bir siyasi taahhüt gerektirmektedir. Çalışmada, kamu sektörünün yapısal olarak güçlendirilmesinin, temsiliyetin ve çeşitliliğinin uzlaşmacılığının sağlanması ve böylece gerçek bir meritokrasiye doğru ilerlemenin siyaset ve yönetim arasındaki ilişkiyi geliştireceği öne sürülmektedir. Ayrıca, bu çalışma, aşırı politizasyondan kaçınmak için baştan itibaren reform programlarının açıklığının ve bağlamsallaştırılmasının çok önemli olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Son olarak, kamu hizmetini keyfi siyasi müdahalelerden korumak ve resmi hesap verebilirlik sistemlerini geliştirmek için kamu hizmetinin kuruluş ve temel işlevlerinin ülkenin birincil yasalarında tanımlanması önerilmiştir.

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CIVIL SERVICE REFORM DILEMMAS: POLITICIZATION & NORMATIVE LIMITS IN
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Abstract

Though it lacks a universally accepted meaning & instead described by attributes such as competence, merit, administrative continuity, & political insulation, & accountability, Civil service originated with the existence of organized human life. While only the scope & functions of the public service change over time, its importance maintains its continuity. Changes in civil service usually occur through civil service reform, a set of intervention mechanisms developed & implemented to increase the efficiency & effectiveness of civil servants & thereby improve the quality of public services. Despite the centrality of the civil service & its reform, skepticism about the relationship between politics & administration persists, & no durable maneuver has been found to strike a delicate balance between politicians' desire to politicize the civil service & bureaucrats' quest for self-aggrandizement. As a result, CSR has never been a frictionless endeavor. This thesis aimed to examine the politics-administration relationships during CSR, covering a period between 1991 & 2018. To this end, it examined dilemma situations in which public service elites attempt to uphold the principles of legality, truthfulness, professional standards, & political neutrality in the face of political influence from those elected & appointed. The study used purposive civil service reform as a theoretical perspective & supplemented it with a descriptive research method. In addition, a mixed research approach was adopted because it allowed for data triangulation from primary & secondary sources. Furthermore, 211 samples with a confidence level of 95% & a margin of error of 5% were drawn from 840 public administrators selected from ministries, commissions, & institutions & interviews were conducted using a vignette questionnaire. In addition, ten respondents from academia & ten from politics were selected for in-depth interviews using availability & snowball sampling, respectively. The study found that political executives play a more significant role in CSR in Ethiopia than their counterpart bureaucratic elites, & political leaders set the critical reform criteria at the top. The research has also shown that despite guidance mechanisms for reform implementation, there is a lack of adequate upward communication between political & civil service elites during CSR. Moreover, the study shows that civil service elites have neither the dilemma nor the courage to resist any attempt by political leaders to take actions related to CSR that might undermine the normative boundaries of legality, truthfulness, professional standards, & political neutrality. Also, the poor pay, submissive administrative tradition, lack of independent watchdog organizations, & lack of democratic culture exacerbated the politicization of civil service in general & CSR in particular. Indeed, the de-politicization of the civil service & the reform process requires a genuine political commitment to keep the relationships between politics & administration within legally & morally acceptable limits. Moreover, it is suggested that structurally strengthening the public sector, ensuring representativeness & its diversity accommodativeness, & thus moving toward a true meritocracy would improve the relationship between politics & administration. Furthermore, this study suggests that clarity & contextualization of reform programs from the outset are crucial to avoid excessive politicization. Finally, it has been proposed that the establishment & main functions of the civil service be defined in the country's primary laws to protect it from arbitrary political interference & improve formal accountability systems.

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Key Words: Civil Service, Public Service, Civil Service Reform, Bureaucracy, Public Service Reform, Civil Service Elites, Civil Service Politicization, Civil Service Reform Politicization, Public Sector, Bureaucratic Elites, Political Executives

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Abbreviations/Acronyms:

CSA	Central Statistical Agency
CSA	Central Statistical Authority
CSO	Central Statistical Office
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSR	Civil Service Reform
CSRPs	Civil Service Reform Programs
DLDP	District Level Decentralization Program
ECSC	The Ethiopian Civil Service Commission
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
IC	Investment Commission
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JSRP	Justice System Reform Program
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoFEC	Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoSHE	Ministry of Science and Higher Education
MoTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry

NCABRP	National Capacity Reform Building Programs
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NPHC	National Population and Housing Census
NPM	New Public Management
OPHCC	The Office of Housing and Census Commission
ORS	Oromia Regional State
PDC	Plan and Development Commission
PMO	The Prime Minister's Office
PSCAP	Public Sector Capacity Building Programs
PSM	Public Service Motivation
SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SES	Socio-Economic Systems
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TAF	Technical Assistance Fund
TAL	Technical Assistance Loan
TPLF	Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front
TSRP	Tax System Reform Program
UMCBP	Urban Management and Development Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“On the one hand, we see policy-makers using administrative reform to displace accountability for public policy, on the other hand, we see the very same policy-makers trying to increase their control over the bureaucracy. Whilst there appear to be two inconsistent developments, they may reflect a general desire among elected politicians to increase their influence over bureaucracy while at the same time avoiding responsibility for the bureaucracy’s action.”

Pierre, 1995:3

Indeed, the origins of public service go far back in human history. The secret to the survival and success of ancient Egyptian civilization, which flourished as early as 3000 B.C., was public service, which became the historical model for all later bureaucracies. The waterways of civilization required a central administration, which required a body of civil servants. Once established, the civil servants found their second leg in the extensive construction activity, which was organized along military lines. It was only a matter of time before they took over the administration of the entire state (Lohit and Vishan, 2018:32).

It has also been affirmed that the origin of public service or administration goes back to the origin of organized human existence in general and the formation of government in particular. In this connection, Woodrow Wilson (1887) wrote in "the Science of Administration" that "administration is the most obvious part of government; it is a government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government, and is, of course, as old as government itself."

In line with this, it has been stated that public service is a key element of administrative capacity. Only a dedicated, well-trained, and competent staff, in short, a professional staff, can perform the increasingly complex tasks required of the government. In this regard, the civil service must meet two somewhat contradictory requirements. On the one

hand, it is responsible for achieving the goals set by the governing party itself. On the other hand, it must assist politicians with professional and objective advice and expertise in both policy formulation and implementation (Bekke and Meer, 2000:28, cited in Gajduschek, 2007).

Thus, the notion that public service is the lifeblood of any government is the least contestable. This is true because the implementation of public policies, programs, strategies, and development projects depends heavily on the shoulders of professional bureaucrats. In other words, a government that relies on a less capable civil service to implement its policies, programs, and strategies would face both institutional and political challenges. As a result, it would hardly be possible to meet the ever-growing needs and demands of society.

Regarding the political and administrative landscape, studies show that the establishment of the modern civil service in Ethiopia dates back to 1907 when nine ministries were established to ensure an orderly and efficient organization of the work of government agencies (MoCSGG, 2012). However, more emphasis was placed on political loyalty than merit, so the ministries that were established were unable to achieve their intended goals. At that time, the practice of public administration was determined by the free will of kings and princes without relevant rules and regulations.

By the mid-20th century, however, the civil service and public administration in Ethiopia had a legal framework that aimed to address the administrative shortcomings of the previous period. Nevertheless, the traditions of the previous regimes and nobility persisted, and substantial changes were not achieved as intended.

In addition, the military government that took power in 1974 attempted to modernize the country's public administration by filling positions with young and well-educated personnel. However, the military government's Marxist-Leninist outlook did not allow for bureaucratic autonomy for foreign-trained civil servants. The EPRDF government that came to power in 1991 claimed to have made numerous advances in the areas of public sector capacity building, decentralization, and civil service reform.

It is said that the world is an unstoppable element that evolves and becomes increasingly complex, making the management of organizations a demanding and difficult undertaking. Spontaneous and rapid changes produce or evoke confusing, contradictory, absurd, and real paradoxes. This reality of the world at large creates a paradoxical relationship between members and stakeholders of public sector organizations (Berman, et al., 2016:2). In particular, the relationship between elected political leaders and professional officials is always contested, as the normative boundary between political values and professionalism proves to be blurred in practice. However, the nature of government depends much more on the nature and form of the relationship between these two entities.

The quality of governance in societies where democratic culture and practice have matured requires a healthy and close relationship between elected political leaders and professional public servants. This interdependence depends to a large extent on the availability and practice of some institutional and policy mechanisms that ensure a delicate balance between public servants and political masters. The delicate balance between the two actors, therefore, requires that each party respect legal and other normative boundaries.

Nevertheless, research shows that in most developing countries, not only does the politicization of the civil service persist but so does the practice of partisan political systems (patronage and spoil). Ethiopia is one of the countries in the developing world with a long history of statehood, but the introduction and reform of the modern civil service is a relatively recent phenomenon. As a result, the Ethiopian civil service has stagnated, if not declined, in part due to the prevalence of partisan politics in the government bureaucracy.

According to Grinder (2010:19), reform pioneers promote civil service reform as a cure or tonic for corrupt practices, partisanship and discrimination, partisanship and bribes, lack of competence and professionalism, and maladministration in the functioning of public sector organizations. In contrast, professional officials are required to bring or manifest characteristics such as professionalism, merit, impartiality, value neutrality, rule

orientation, autonomy or administrative discretion, competence, and continuity and predictability of functions and outcomes.

Therefore, this study aims to highlight the historical, present, and future perspectives of the modern Ethiopian civil service in general and the political-administrative relations during the civil service reform (CSR) in particular. In other words, the objective of the study was to explore the forms, nature, extent, and dilemmas associated with the relationship between the political executive and the bureaucratic elites concerning civil service reform efforts. In other words, based on the theoretical and empirical literature on public administration, this study critically examined the dilemmas of civil service reform in Ethiopia.

Background of the Study

Notwithstanding its ancient origin and its prevalence in the contemporary world, there is no universal and standardized definition and meaning of the concept of public service and/or public official in the academic literature. This demonstrates the multidimensionality of the concepts under study (Evans 2008:8). However, most scholars agree on the commonalities of the characteristics or principles of public services, such as merit, competence, continuity, political insulation, and accountability, which underlie the traditional or basic model of public service (Ibid).

Although the term bureaucracy has long been known in the social sciences and by the general public, it is not precise enough to question the identity and affiliation of the phenomenon to which it refers. Indeed, we encounter bureaucracy as a phenomenon that everyone talks about and believes they have experienced in one way or another, and yet it strangely resists conceptualization (Lefort, 1986:89).

According to Pyper (1995:1), for a proper conceptualization and understanding of the terms public service and/or civil servants, some relevant general reference points are needed. In this context, it was noted that the demarcation is that civil service or civil servants work for "civil society," as opposed to engagements in the military, ministerial, cabinet, or judicial branches of the state.

On the other hand, different scholars use different terms for civil service: bureaucracy, civil service, administration, technocracy, and civil servants. According to Kemenka (1989), "bureaucracy" is a centrally directed, systematically organized, and hierarchically structured personnel engaged in the routine, regular, and economic management of complicated administrative operations according to the policy framework dictated by directors and political leaders outside and above the administration.

According to Kettl (2015), there are six main characteristics of bureaucracy. First, it is ubiquitous-Bureaucracies are ubiquitous because they are the chosen social instruments to regulate matters identified as or intended to be part of public life or the economy. Second, bureaucracies are known for their selective importance - they have varying degrees of importance at different stages of the policy-making process, although they dominate in the implementation of the same. Third, the civil service or bureaucracy has a social purpose that is extensive and diverse as per the diversity of public interests. The bureaucracy is enormous and complex, which can be seen in its operation and function in the context of complex and large public or government programs. Fifth, bureaucracy survives. It is argued that bureaucracies rarely die, i.e., their survival instinct is insatiable. Finally, the sixth and most important characteristic is that bureaucracies are not neutral in their choice of policies, nor are they fully controlled by forces outside their purview.

Christensen and Gazley (2008 cited in Enora et al. 2018:26) stated that civil servants (employees), their knowledge, skills, motivation, values, and work ethics, but also the way they are selected and managed (the human resource management system) are essential to the capacity and effectiveness of public administration.

Dillman (1982) argues that the civil service is an institution that is constantly condemned, reformed, and condemned. This shows that public service reform is never complete because there will be no static demand from service recipients.

According to McCourt (2013), civil service reform is a set of intervention mechanisms developed and implemented to change or influence the organization, performance, and working conditions of public servants paid from central, regional, or provincial government budgets.

In addition, Repucci (2014) notes that civil service reform is one of the most difficult yet important challenges facing governments and their supporters. It touches not only the very *raison d'être* of government but also some of its most sensitive, protected areas.

Chronologically, civil service reform can be divided into three phases. The first phase took place in the 1980s. In this phase, donors supported various aspects of institutional capacity building as they began to recognize the critical role of the civil service in changing public policy. In the second phase, which occurred in the 1990s, consensus grew that the key to effective civil service reform was to reduce the role of government. The lessons learned in the first phase (both the successes and the failures) led to the second phase of reform. The third phase of reform took place in the late 1990s. The third phase of reform was characterized by donors focusing their attention on fostering accountability systems whose leaders would manage the processes of public service reform with the necessary knowledge and facilitate the process to ensure the successful implementation of reform.

In general, civil service reform involves changes in areas such as compensation, personnel management, savings, and functional efficiency. In addition, civil service reform addresses policy making, governance, financial management, and public sector service delivery (Ibid).

Concisely put, civil service reform essentially involves political debates among groups and individuals who hold alternative philosophies, ideologies, or perspectives regarding the nature of responsible government in general and the healthy forms and patterns of relationships between political leaders and professional bureaucrats. It has been further argued that the outcomes of such policy debates are central to creating a system of public service that is politically neutral yet responsive, accountable to political leaders yet able to take initiatives, professionally competent yet representative (open to diversity), and sensitive to public ethics (Dillman, 1982).

On the other hand, the experience of countries that have successfully implemented their civil service reform programs confirms the centrality of political commitment in

facilitating and guiding reform activities from start to finish (Adamolekun et al., 1997; Numbering and Nellis, 1995, cited by Michael Seifu, undated).

Despite the centrality of the civil service and its reforms and contemporary developments, there is still skepticism about modern bureaucracy. This is not a new development. Wilson and Weber, considered the founding fathers of bureaucracy, were skeptical of the relationship between politics and administration. Weber (1958), for example, had expressed his fears about the power of professional bureaucrats over dilettante politicians, and Wilson (1887) also doubted that bureaucrats would develop into a separate class at a great distance from the rest of society (self-aggrandizement).

According to Aberbach et al. (1981), the earliest theory dealing with the intertwining of politicians and career civil servants was in many ways the simplest, i.e., it indicated that politicians are responsible for policy-making while bureaucrats carry it out and that politicians have the authority to make decisions while civil servants rarely put them into action.

In this context, Carboni (2008) notes that the relationship between political leaders and the civil service stems from numerous paradoxes, such as forms of party politicization that increase bureaucratic autonomy and reduce the scope for parochial control of the administration. It has also been argued that political appointments can undermine impartiality but do not necessarily lead to partisan administration and clientelism (Mattei, 2007, cited in Carboni, 2008).

In line with this part of Weber's thesis, it has been confirmed that at the level of power in the modern state are these two uncertain partners, the elected party politician and the professional state bureaucrat (Aberbach et al, 1981).

In addition, it has been noted that one of the uneasy partnerships in the modern state is the interlocking between appointed professional bureaucrats and elected and/or appointed political masters. Since Max Weber, studies have begun to examine the dilemma between institutions. To this end, political observers have theorized about the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and their contrasting approaches to shaping public policy (ibid).

As in most countries of the world, both developed and developing, but to varying degrees and in different forms, the interaction between career civil servants and political leaders presents two major challenges. The first challenge is the tendency for the bureaucracy to become politicized, with ministers remaining puppets of civil servants. The second challenge is the situation in which the highly politicized bureaucracy extends its political responsiveness to political leaders, which ultimately results in overstepping the normative boundaries established in legal provisions. The extent to which political leaders and professional bureaucrats can strike an appropriate balance between political responsiveness and neutrality is therefore an empirical question to which there is unlikely to be a permanent and definitive answer.

In the Ethiopian context, the existence of a paradoxical relationship between public service and politics is not a new phenomenon. For example, Zewdie (1991) notes that the first seven ministries established in 1907 in the history of the Ethiopian administrative apparatus faced the dilemma of serving the existing traditional authority (feudal powers) on the one hand and taking initiatives to bring about changes in the administration on the other.

One of the challenges in the Ethiopian Civil Service is the skeptical attitude of civil servants towards the civil service caused by the inappropriate use of civil service reform programs such as BPR (Business Process Reengineering) in separating capable civil servants from the workforce and the inappropriate politicization of the civil service and/or the parochial self-interest of civil servants (Tilaye, 2007, Mohammed, 2008, Taube and Patz, 2008 cited in Markos, 2013).

For example, Tesfaye and Atkilt (2011) found that employee dissatisfaction was due to a lack of transparency in recruitment and deployment processes in the wake of civil service reform in some selected civil service organizations in Ethiopia. Also, civil servants lacked the willingness to accept initiatives for change through civil service reform (Taube and Patz, 2008 cited in Markos, 2013). Paulos (2001) reinforced the idea that Ethiopian civil servants lacked the attitudinal change required for CSR.

Likewise, in the process of civil service reform in Ethiopia, a lack of accountability and transparency on the part of the institutions implementing the reform process has been observed due to the lack of clarity on the executive instruments required to implement the reform (Paulos, 2001 cited in Markos, 2013).

Nevertheless, Atkilt (1996, cited in Bersisa and Zigiju, 2014:42) notes that in most developing countries, the introduction of public service has played a key role as a driver of sustainable human development. Ethiopia is thus no exception in this regard. As part of the government, the civil service is responsible for translating government will into practice and implementing public policy. The civil service is tasked with both managing day-to-day tasks (administrative sustainability) and bringing about change (reform) to meet ever-changing demands.

However, the role that the civil service can play in transforming the social, political, economic, and technological aspects of a country's society is far from dubious. Yet, the achievement of reform goals depends on many factors, such as the prevailing social, economic, and political situation. On the other hand, an intuitively weak civil service that is organizationally unstable and dominated by political rulers would tend to lead to socioeconomic and political instability. As one of the African countries, Ethiopia is not exempt from this scenario.

In an attempt to overcome the problems of weak institutional capacity in the civil service over the past three decades, many developing countries have undertaken extensive reforms of their administrative organizations, both physical and functional.

Indeed, it is not difficult to justify the many reasons for the public service reform packages in Ethiopia. Among others, the widespread corrupt practices at various levels of the public bureaucracy, which have been the main cause of the limited and poor quality of public goods and services, have led to the implementation of the reform programs. In short, the lack of efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services combined with maladministration and the need to modernize public administration in Ethiopia necessitated the implementation of the civil service reform programs (Michael Seifu, undated).

More than ever before, in the history of Ethiopian public administration, a series of civil service reforms were implemented during the tenure of the EPRDF government, which came to power in 1991 defeating the communist regime. The CSRPs were implemented in line with the core objective of NPM, i.e., efficient and effective delivery of public goods and services. Despite the implementation of numerous Civil Service Reform Packages over the past almost three decades, the results can only be described as mixed - success and failure.

In other words, even though civil service reform is on the agenda in Ethiopia, it has yet to result in a comprehensive and well-designed reform that meets the needs and context of the country (Ibid). In general, Ethiopia has implemented reform programs in the areas of public financial management, public sector human resource management, service delivery, management systems, and ethical considerations. Nevertheless, reform efforts have failed to produce tangible results, partly due to political interference and partly due to the lack of an adequate incentive structure.

Most research conducted in Ethiopia addressed the impact of numerous public service reform packages on the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. Paulos Chanie (2001) made an initial observation of the content and processes of civil service reform in Ethiopia. He tried to identify some shortcomings in it and the way to overcome the challenges in the implementation of the civil service. Getachew Hailemariam (2006) examined the results and achievements of civil service reform in the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI). Thus, to the researcher's knowledge, the political dimension of civil service reform in general and the paradoxical relationships between political power holders and administrative elites in Ethiopia have been insufficiently researched, if at all.

The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, was to analyze and examine the paradoxical relationship between elected politicians and high-level civil service professionals in the context of civil service reform. The study will analyze the roles of each government body in the different stages of reform implementation.

This research identified and analyzed the controversial boundaries between the two actors in terms of their respective roles, the criteria to be applied, the legitimacy of the reform processes, and other dilemmas that challenge the duty of public service elites to be professional, truthful, and politically neutral. This research, therefore, identified the numerous demands and positions of appointed and elected politicians regarding civil service reform that would place civil servants in a quandary or dilemma state.

This study began with a review of relevant theoretical and empirical literature to help critically analyze and examine the context and practices of civil service reform and the relationship between political masters and administrative elites in Ethiopia. In addition, the introduction and development of the modern civil service in Ethiopia were examined through the analysis of relevant documents.

The Problem Statement

Since most governments are concerned with nation-building and socio-economic development, the bureaucracy, along with elected politicians, plays the role of adviser, inventor, and decision-maker, making a significant contribution to development (Panday, 2012 cited in Rahman 2017:02). Politics and administration are therefore inseparable units in governance. However, the relationship between politics and administration has always been paradoxical and controversial. The general view (Wilson, 1887; Weber, 1947 cited in Rahman, 2017:2) is that the bureaucratic or administrative control of the established political order provides a sound governance framework, but the bureaucracy is politically neutral and professionally beneficial. Therefore, it should be kept competent. Alternatively, the politicization of bureaucracy leads to administrative inefficiency as politicians and managers are driven by vested interests that severely influence the capacity of political institutions, especially governments (Suleiman, 2005 as cited by Rahman, 2017:2).

Indeed, it is crucial to define an appropriate role for the inevitably powerful bureaucracy. On the other hand, it is equally important for civil servants because they are part of a larger institution (the government) that has gained tremendous authority through regular elections. Bureaucrats, however, lack this authority because they are not directly elected

by voters. Consequently, the elected political rulers would define the role of the bureaucracy and limit it to the day-to-day and ongoing basis of governance (Dunn, 1997:1). As a result, both routines and change initiatives in the public sector are controversial and have been a recurring theme in the relevant literature.

According to Politt and Bouckaert (2013, cited in Greve et al., 2016:9), reforms are not one-size-fits-all. Instead, reforms differ across countries based on significant factors such as the administrative system, elite decision-making patterns, unexpected events, prevailing crises, political system, and socioeconomic determinants. Furthermore, they claimed that public sector management reforms are prone to contradictions, tradeoffs, and dilemmas.

In this regard, research shows that the implementation of civil service reform is not a smooth undertaking. For example, Grinder (2010) notes that in the course of public service reform there are two categories of individuals in a given organization, namely the reformers and the resisters. The interaction between the reform proponents and the resisting groups can lead to a deconstruction, construction, and reconstruction of the structure and process of the public sector undertaking a reform. In other words, the interaction between groups supporting and resisting the implementation of public sector reform can be explained in terms of opting-out, disestablishment, starvation, reclaiming, redefining, and reengineering.

According to Aberbach et al. (1981), the problematic relationship between the civil service and elected politicians is perhaps the characteristic conundrum of contemporary states, reflecting the conflict between the dual and contradictory requirements of technical efficiency and democratic responsiveness.

The public and intellectual debate about the dilemmas related to the normative form and scope of the relationship between public administration and policymakers remains relevant regardless of time and place. It is also argued that a well-designed relationship between professional civil servants and political elites is critical to the efficient and effective conduct of public policy. However, the degree of independence of the civil service, or the degree to which it is politicized, remains an undisputed and contested

issue. More specifically, the relationship between the civil service and elected politicians has been the subject of intense scholarly and intellectual inquiry for decades and continues to pose a dilemma.

In this context, the World Bank (1994) argues that many developing countries have failed to develop and maintain professional ethical standards, political neutrality, and a public service-oriented approach to their relations with the public in general and the bureaucracy in particular. This scenario has in turn contributed to the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public sector organizations.

According to Khan (2018:20), CSR in developing countries failed to achieve the goal of improving public service delivery, thereby establishing a welfare state due to contextual incompatibility of the tools implemented. In other words, he argued that such a reform attempt requires a market-led economy (capitalism) where smaller and cleaner states manifest or exist.

Nonetheless, it has been argued that elected politicians have the legitimate political authority to control the actions of appointed officials from a democratic standpoint. This is because elected political masters are directly accountable to the electorate, without which democratic assumption of political office is impossible, while bureaucrats are not subject to such direct and purposive accountability, strictly speaking. Here, then, lies the crux of the controversy.

On the one hand, most of the modern literature on public administration advocates politically neutral, professional public servants, and on the other hand, some of the literature provides logic and arguments from a democratic perspective that normalize the politicization of public service and political interference with administrative discretion (Peters and Pierre, 2004a and Rouban, 2012, cited in Birgitta, 2013:4).

Despite its size and shape, scholars agree on the importance and indispensability of public service. For example, Repucci (2014) argues that the civil service is the pillar of government that supports or undermines the entire system of government. Therefore, civil service reform supports the transformation of many other sectors in a given country.

Nevertheless, public service is never static. Its form, scope, tasks, and technical and operational aspects are subject to reform to meet constant changes. Therefore, civil service reform is one of the recurring activities of governments around the world - both in developing and developed countries. However, the case is more accentuated in developing countries because of acute administrative shortcomings; some are a legacy of the late colonial powers and others are local problems. These problems have in turn led to political confusion, instability, and dependence on foreign aid (Ali, 2002:1).

Indeed, civil service reform efforts in developing countries are often seen as serving merely political purposes, such as mobilizing popular support for the independence movement, fighting corruption, strengthening elites, expanding economic markets, exploiting cheap labor for international factories, meeting foreign requirements, and enriching the power of elites, both civilian and military (ibid).

In addition, Dillman (1982) states that civil service reform is prompted by the fact that the quality, nature, and structure of an organization's human resources would make a difference in achieving organizational goals and establishing and maintaining a responsible civil service organization.

Despite the long history of implementation and a series of reform packages, the Ethiopian civil service has shortcomings that hinder the achievement of the expected performance and level of modernization. More specifically, notwithstanding the many attempts at reform, the Ethiopian civil service suffers from irregularities resulting from the proliferation of various poor administrative practices, including discriminatory and partisan practices, lack of autonomy, nepotism, and violations of rules and regulations to benefit individual and group interests at the expense of the public interest.

Nonetheless, the natural and healthy discourse is that the civil service is the machinery upon which governments rely to design, formulate, and implement their policies, strategies, and programs, and perform all routine government functions. However, despite the formal commitment of the state to performance principles, as evidenced by the establishment of decentralized offices and civil service organizations even at the local

level and the entrenchment of bureaucratic matters in legal documents by the incumbent government, the politicization of the civil service in Ethiopia continued (Atkilt, (1996).

In addition, one researcher argues that not only a particular government but also a particular country resembles the nation's bureaucratic system. In other words, successful socio-political, economic, and technological revolutions are almost inconceivable without civil service reform. Therefore, a certain degree of political neutrality and administrative discretion is among the essential characteristics of a strong civil service, which is different from the one that serves political masters and maintains the status quo and comfort zone for its political bosses and itself. Moreover, it will not be an easy task to use modern, sophisticated machinery without improving and shaping administrative complexities and structures.

Moreover, one researcher believes that the failure to achieve the objectives of several public service reform packages is due to a lack of initiative, ownership, and commitment on the part of the bureaucracy, as these steps are taken for the sake of expediency in certain political situations. Mesfin (2009), for example, argues that reform initiatives such as Business Process Reengineering (BPR) were not part of the Civil Service Reform (CSR) sub-programs. Therefore, the introduction of reform tools without the involvement of technical and professional staff would lead to ambiguity and confusion in implementation.

In this context, it has been argued that the views and perceptions of top bureaucrats have significant implications for predicting the challenges and drivers of the civil service reform program, as well as the possibility of achieving the desired changes through effective implementation. It can thus be seen that professional bureaucrats have both formal and informal means at their disposal to undermine and/or facilitate the effective implementation of the civil service reform program, depending on their level of sympathy for it. Therefore, administrative theorists have recognized that reform plans can only be effective if they are accepted by top-level civil servants and actively involved in the process of initiating, selecting, and implementing relevant civil service reform packages (Naomi and Richard, 1979).

In addition, most of the research conducted in Ethiopia has focused on human resource functions and the success stories and challenges of implementing civil service reform in some selected public sector organizations. To the researcher's knowledge, this study, which focuses on the paradoxical relationship between the political and administrative elites, is the least researched area, if any.

There would be many theoretical perspectives from organizational theories that would lend a scientific quality to the present study. However, the organizational elite theory was selected as the main theoretical perspective that would guide the choice and use of the relevant theoretical perspective. The organizational elite theory assumes that a small minority, consisting of members of the business elite and political planning networks, holds most of the power - and this power is independent of democratic elections (Ali, 2002).

Peters (1994, cited in Ali, 2002:3) distinguishes three theoretical perspectives on administrative reform. These are the goal-directed or top-down model, the environmental model (bottom-up), and the institutional model.

The goal-oriented (top-down) models assume that certain actors - powerful individuals, elites, and authorities - have specific goals in initiating public service reforms. In other words, these models assume that political leaders perceive problems and develop innovative ideas to reform and reorganize public sector organizations. The goal-oriented model can be divided into two sub-models. The first is the "Administration as Usual" approach, which assumes that the perceived need for reform and restructuring is determined by the top. It is the "traditional and pragmatic" approach to administrative reform.

The second approach is the political science approach, which postulates the political reasons for "ungovernability" and "overburdening" of government as reasons for the need for civil service reform. The goal-oriented (top-down) approach to administrative reform has the strength of assuming that the leading actors in the process of administrative reform are "at the center of identifying, selecting and implementing administrative reforms". However, the targeting perspective of administrative reform also has

disadvantages as it takes a very elitist approach to reform and reorganization. It gives ordinary citizens and ordinary organizational members of the government little role and input in the processes of implementing civil service reform. Therefore, the whole idea of reform can be strongly dictated downwards (Peters, 1994 Ali, 2002).

Therefore, this study drew on the theoretical insights of the purposive or top-down model of administrative reform. This theoretical perspective is intended to support the arguments that the implementation of public service reforms in Ethiopia is highly politicized or politically induced and that professional civil servants, including the bureaucratic elites at the top, have little or no say in the identification, selection, and implementation of public sector reform programs. Despite differences in political ideologies and state structures, Ethiopia's modern regimes are all known for using civil service as a tool for political manipulation resulting in power consolidation.

Moreover, the parliamentary government introduced in 1995 exacerbated the ambiguous relationship between politics and administration. Political-administrative relations in Ethiopia are a delicate balance, due in particular to the nature of the parliamentary system, which is known for its amalgamation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, and Ethiopia's democratic culture, which is poor or still in its infancy. As a result, officials, including the top elite, speak the same political and jargon used by elected or appointed politicians. Politicians and civil servants in Ethiopia blame each other when reform efforts fail due to a lack of delicate balance and democratic relationships between them.

In other words, the researcher claimed that there are few studies on the relationship between the political executive and the civil service in Ethiopia. However, most of the studies conducted focused on the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service reform programs and in most cases dealt only with the instruments of reform. Therefore, the controversies that arise from the interaction between policy-makers and administrators in the course of civil service reform and the way civil servants deal with dilemma situations while striving to adhere to normative boundaries have not been adequately researched. More specifically, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, there was no research on

how frontline civil service elites respond to the dilemma situations that challenge normative boundaries with politics-administration relations in the course of civil service reform.

Therefore, this study examined the dilemmas faced by civil service elites during civil service reform in terms of the normative boundaries of legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality, as well as the opinions of civil service elites.

Research Questions

Based on the problem statements, two main groups of research questions were the focus of this study. The first main question is related to Normative Limits of public service reforms, while the second question relates to the dilemmas that arise from the politicization of public service reforms. The study also addressed the following specific research questions:

1. What is the nature of political-administrative relations in Ethiopia during the civil service reform?
2. How do political and civil service elites interact during civil service reform in Ethiopia?
3. How do the civil service elites respond to the legal dilemmas in the course of civil service reform?
4. How do civil service elites respond to the dilemmas related to professional standards during civil service reform?
5. How do public service elites maintain their truthfulness when confronted with dilemmatic issues during public service reform?
6. How do civil service elites respond to dilemmas concerning the principle of political neutrality during civil service reform?

Research Objectives

A. The general objective

The overall objective of this study was to analyze the paradoxical relationship between political leaders and civil service elites in Ethiopia in the context of civil service reform. In other words, this research aimed to examine the nature and patterns of interaction between elected political leaders and professional civil servants at the top level during the initiation, implementation, and evaluation of civil service reform programs.

B. Specific Objectives

In addition to the general objective stated above, the study had the following specific objectives about politicization and normative boundaries in the course of public service reform:

1. To explore the norm relating to the relationship between the civil service and political elites during civil service reforms:

The dilemmas arising from the relations between political elites and public service elites are inherent to the theory of the policy-administration dichotomy. This theory attempts to construct the boundaries of public administration and asserts the normative relationship between elected representatives and elected officials. In other words, the complexity of modern organizations and the overwhelming tasks of both politicians and bureaucrats have led to recurring dilemmas arising from the interaction between politics and the civil service in general, and civil service elites in particular.

To this end, this study aimed to add value to existing debates and explanations on the relationship between political elites and civil service elites by focusing on the interaction between the two in the process of civil service reform. The study examined the opinion of the civil service elites on the normative relationship between the political elites and the civil service elites in terms of roles, discretion (autonomy), reform criteria, political interference, and patterns of accountability between the political elites and the civil service elites in the Ethiopian context.

Therefore, this study attempted to analyze the relations between the political elites and the civil service elites during civil service reform from the perspective of normative boundaries.

2. To investigate dilemmas stemming from the politicization of civil service reforms in Ethiopia:

In democratic societies, effective governance requires close cooperation between political leaders and civil servants. This interface rests on a delicate balance between the political responsiveness of civil servants and the duty of both civil servants and politicians to respect legal, political, professional, and other normative constraints when carrying out matters related to public services.

In this regard, the present study aims to explore the dilemmas arising from the interaction between political and civil service elites during the period of civil service reform. In other words, this research aims to explore the dilemmas that top officials face when interacting with political elites in dealing with matters related to civil service reform.

Indeed, this research aimed to explore the dilemmatic opinions of civil service elites regarding normative boundaries such as legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality that arise from the relationship between political and civil service elites in the course of civil service reform.

3. To examine the institutional characteristics that influence the response of public service elites to dilemmatic situations during public service reform:

Civil servants' responses to dilemmas and normative boundaries vary according to the hierarchy of their respective positions, the institutional characteristics of their respective employers, and their educational backgrounds. Therefore, this study also analyzes the different responses of civil service elites to the dilemma situation and normative boundaries that define the relations between political and civil service elites during civil service reform.

The significance of the Study

Notwithstanding the importance of the policy-administration relationship in the policy-making process, little attention has been paid to the relationship between politicians and top professional officials in developing countries and how this relationship might influence the development and reform process (Dasandi and Esteve, 2017).

Examining the relationship between political elites and public service elites is important in two ways. First, the nature and patterns of relations between the two can describe the political characteristics of the state. Public service elites cannot escape politics, in part because they are closely tied to those in political power. Second, public service elites require the endorsement and blessing of political elites for their existence and function (Suleiman, 1984, as cited in Spanou, 2014:3).

Similarly, Arberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981, as cited in Dunn, 1997:1) stated that it is critical to examine the relationships between the "two uncertain partners" who hold positions of power in the modern state, i.e., elected and/or appointed political leaders and professional public servants. Therefore, it is crucial to collect information on such senior officials, as it is uncommon to interview political and civil servant elites about the relationship between politics and administration. Moreover, it is rarely common to interview academics on the topic at hand.

Moreover, the politicization of public service is a persistent and threatening reality that greatly affects the management and leadership of public sector organizations. Therefore, there is also a need to further study this phenomenon and its consequences (Fuenzalida and Riccucci, 2019).

On the other hand, civil service reform is one of the irregular undertakings of governments around the world, both in developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, civil service reform efforts in developing countries require more attention due to the severity of administrative problems in particular and socio-political and economic problems in general - some of which were inherited from the respective late colonial powers and some of which are local (Ali, 2002:1). This fact makes the research conducted in this field infinitely important.

This research aimed at finding out the actual reality and practices regarding the relations between the political elites and the civil service elites in the process of civil service reform. It also aims to analyze how the civil service elites respond to the political elites when confronted with a dilemmatic situation subject to the established normative constraints, i.e. legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality.

To this end, consideration is given to the relationship between the political and civil service elites during the civil service reform from the generic perspective and normative limits in Ethiopia. The patterns of relationship between political executives and bureaucrats are never clear; partly due to the dynamic nature and magnitude of modern societies' demands for public goods and services and complexities of institutional set-up established and operating to serve those demands and partly due to the overlapping or contradicting rationality of the two entities, i.e. politicians and civil servants.

Hence, this research is believed to have contributed to understanding the forms, nature, degrees, and effects of the relationship between political executives and civil service by exploring and reviewing pertinent theories and the empirical shreds of evidence relating to the subject under investigation. Hence, the findings of this research would serve as an addition to the existing limited works of literature on the politicization of civil service reform and civil service elites' reaction toward Normative Limits in Ethiopia.

In addition, unless supplemented by parallel research and inquiry, civil service reform is not an endeavor free from challenges as it carries different types of trajectories and dilemmas. Yet, indeed, it is hardly possible to think of realizing any kind of development without reforming the existing administrative structures and operational technicalities (Ali, 2002). In this regard, the findings of this research would serve as input to policymakers, political executives, and the top-level civil servants who would be in charge of the ongoing civil service reform programs or the reform initiatives to come in the future.

Nevertheless, this research does not strive to study the behavioral changes that the civil service elites may manifest as a result of dilemmatic situations created against Normative Limits that govern the relationship between the political and civil service elites when

dealing with civil service reform. However, the results of this research are believed to create a novel insight concerning the civil service elites' reaction when having to balance their duty of political responsiveness and the duty to adhere to some normative limits placed on the executive authority in the course of civil service reform. Moreover, the results of this study could be used as input in the efforts the government may make to create independent, capable and professional civil servants in the country. Therefore, the findings of this research are believed to serve as a benchmark for future research to come and the institutional and political decisions that the government may take.

Therefore, this research is a treasure trove of information relating to the politicization of civil service reform and Normative Limits vis-à-vis the politico-administrative relationships in Ethiopia. It contains information regarding the reaction of civil service elites when confronted with controversial situations in the course of public service reform. Indeed, future researchers who intend to investigate the politics-administration relationships at the federal level would find this piece an indispensable source of information and further analysis.

Delimitation of the Study

Public service (bureaucracy) is a multifaceted concept that deals with numerous issues. It seems to be only a task to define the scope of public service as defined in legal documents such as constitutions. However, the ever-changing and expanding nature of the role, responsibility, structure, size, and composition of an institution called a bureaucracy or civil service presents a challenge to academics and researchers in the field to determine its scope.

This study focused on Ethiopia's federal civil service because the operations, structures, laws, and practices of regional bureaucracies mirror the reality of the central government's civil service. Moreover, Ethiopia is not a decentralized and devolved state due to its fledgling democratic practices and other resource and educational problems. Therefore, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, the geographical limitation of the study to the federal civil service was convincing.

Among the many dimensions of the civil service, but not limited to them, are the following. It has the constitutional dimension, which is the formal establishment of the civil service as one of the institutions of the state authorized to execute the power and will of the government to manage public resources, provide public goods and services, and be the administrative interface between the public and the government. Civil service also has the dimension of professionalism, which refers to the professional role, status, and quality of individual officials or bureaucrats.

In addition, the civil service has a management or coordination dimension that indicates its responsibility for ensuring or maintaining management within all government institutions that supports the performance of the civil service system by ensuring harmonized management throughout the administration.

In addition, the civil service has a social dimension that concerns the rights, duties, integrity, and professional qualifications of civil servants. Finally, the civil service also has an important transition dimension. This dimension relates to how current civil servants can qualify as civil servants under the new system and to what extent the requirements that apply to future civil servants should also apply to current personnel.

In this regard, this study is limited to the aspects of the legal personality of the civil service and its contributions in the course of implementing civil service reform, as well as its handling of controversial issues in its interaction with the country's political elites. In other words, this study addresses the relationship between the civil service and politics in terms of legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality in the process of implementing civil service reform programs. In other words, this study addresses the dilemmas of civil service reform in terms of the interaction between bureaucratic elites and political leaders in the initiation, selection, implementation, and evaluation of reform programs. Therefore, middle- and lower-level civil servants are not included in the study.

The concept and practice of civil service reform are also multidimensional. Civil service reform involves redesigning government functions and organizational structures; improving human resource policies in central, local, and sectoral administrations;

revising the legal and regulatory framework for public administration; providing institutional support for government decentralization; managing the process by which these changes are implemented. To this end, this study examines the role of Ethiopian federal civil service elites in developing or initiating civil service reform ideas, planning for reform, and implementing and evaluating the reform processes. Therefore, it deals with the high-level civil servants with conceptual and comprehensive skills and responsibilities, as well as their relationship with political leaders in the process of implementing civil service reform.

In addition, according to Peters (1994 cited in Ali, 2002:3), three theoretical perspectives are used in the implementation of civil service reform. These are the goal-oriented or top-down model, the environmental or bottom-up model, and the institutional model. However, this research deployed the goal-directed model of administrative reform and its implications for the paradoxical position of civil servants in the communication process with policymakers when it comes to civil service reform issues.

In terms of temporal coverage, this research covers the periods between 1991 and 2018. The periods of the imperial government (1930-1974), the socialist government, and the United States government were barely considered to provide an overview of the historical aspects of the Ethiopian civil service.

Research Methods

This research aimed to explore and critically examine the controversial interlock between the elected political executives and the bureaucratic elites in the process of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia. Hence, the nature of this research is both theoretical and descriptive. In other words, researching considerations necessitates the review and analysis of germane theories that would make the formation of a conceptual framework possible. Besides, to triangulate and substantiate the various postulations or notions of pertinent theories, the research involved the review of empirical literature that added value to the descriptive nature of the study.

In this regard, the relationship between Political and Civil Service Elites, traditionally called politics and administration dichotomy, has a complex and controversial relationship that may depict interdependence and reciprocal influence on each other. Hence, to sharpen the theoretical framework and make the research have a clear direction, the researcher was convinced to deploy the Purposive Models of Administrative Reform and Reorganization. The Purposive Approach is also called a Top-Down Approach. Indeed, the commencement of the research at hand was based on the argument that civil service reform implementation in Ethiopia is highly politicized or politically induced and, bureaucrats including civil service elites at the top have no or little say in initiating and designing the public sector reform agendas.

According to Ali (2002:3), the Purposive Approach assumes that few powerful elites or political authorities set some purpose in the pursuit of reform processes. Hence, the top-down model postulates that political masters or elites (such as Ministers) could sort out and better perceive administrative problems of many types and come up with creative remedial ideas. This holds for assessing and analyzing the nature of the interaction between the elected politicians and the bureaucrats in the process of implementing Civil Service Reforms. Nonetheless, the research does not include an analysis of historical and pragmatic perspectives in detail. Rather, it explores the opinions of civil servants at the top on the dilemma situations that they face during civil service reform. In other words, the research aimed at investigating how the civil service elites deal with Normative Limits in the course of Civil Service Reform and the dilemma situations arising therein due to politicization efforts by elected and appointed leaders.

In this regard, a researcher claimed that the initiative to undertake Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia is taken by politicians. Yet, senior bureaucrats at the top passively engage in the course of CSR from inception to an end. This goes with a researcher's position substantiated by preliminary observation and previous studies. This can be explained by using the purposive civil service reform approach. This position was confirmed by reviewing and analyzing relevant theoretical and empirical literature and substantiated by the triangulation of opinions from Civil Service Elites, the academicians from Political Science, Law, Economics, and Public Administration, and the Political Elites working in

the selected public service organizations. Indeed, the researcher believes that mixed-method helps to employ a triangulation design that is undertaken to verify or confirm results with multiple sources of data.

On the other hand, by and large, the researcher is instigated by the readings of the Classical Public Administration. Yet, it is hardly possible to demarcate between classical and comparative public administration. This is the case as some principles of Classical Public Administration may appear to be relevant and complementary to the postulations and practices of modern public administration. In other words, the introduction and development of comparative public administration did not happen in a vacuum. Rather, principles and practices of classical public administration were used as milestones to commence the comparative public administration. Indeed, the research under consideration took perspectives from both traditional and modern schools of public administration.

Hence, the researcher is convinced to employ Case Study research method while not ignoring the attributes of comparativeness. The responses vary as respondents differ in terms of the organizations they work for and their demographic and educational backgrounds.

The researcher considered selected public sector organizations of Ethiopia at the federal level as a case for the study at hand. Nonetheless, the research was not confined to a single organization. Rather, for comparison, three categories of public sector institutions, i.e. Ministries, Commissions, and Agencies were considered. This helps to compare and contrast respondents' responses from these institutions.

The researcher is convinced to deploy mixed research methods to ensure the inclusivity of methods and tools for the collection and processing of pertinent data. In addition, a mixed research method is preferred as it is believed to capitalize on the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. According to Creswell (2003), a mixed research method allows the use of multiple research methods in investigating research problems. Hence, the mixed research approach is accommodative.

According to Greene (2007 cited by Creamer, 2018:68), it is the purpose, not designs or methods, that should be considered first in determining the appropriateness of using mixed methods. She was among the early adaptors of this method who argued for the preeminence of using purpose and rationale as justification for the deployment of mixed research methods. She stated that “[Social] inquiry begins with a substantive intention or purpose and a substantive set of questions. Hence, the methodology is ever the servant of purpose, never the master”. Using mixed research methods is believed to help to reach findings with credibility and confidence as it allows the use of two or more methods, designs, or tools in conducting research and the collection and processing of congruent or comparable data (Jick, 1979 cited in Creamer, 2018).

Moreover, Newman and Benz, (1998 as cited in Creswell, 2014:1) argued that qualitative and quantitative research approaches should have not been seen as rigid and distinct divisions or extreme opposites or dichotomies as they "represent different ends on a continuum. In fact, when researching any subject, variables of interest could be more qualitative or quantitative.

Hence, it is wise to use a mixed approach, which is in the middle of the continuum. Indeed, a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods helps in comprehending the dynamics of social elements manifested in the course of the interpersonal relationship between the political executives and the professional public servant at the top...it offers a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the subjects or units under investigation. See Table 1.1 below:

Constructs Addressed		Primary Purposes	Examples	Signal Words
Triangulation/Confirmatory (a single construct or phenomenon)		Enhances validity using various data to measure the same phenomenon	Close-and-open-ended Questionnaire	Confirm, corporate
Enhance/complementarities (different facets of the same phenomenon)		For wider & deeper understanding; to answer what, how, and/or why research questions to generate & test a theory	Consolidating or merging qualitative & quantitative data in one data set	Elaborate, illustrate, enhance, clarify, expand, deepen understanding
Development (same phenomenon or a subset of the same phenomenon)	Instrument development	Develop an instrument, enhance participant selection, and get information to customize an intervention to a setting	Qualitative focus group followed by development and pilot testing of an instrument	One phase informs or is directly linked to the other
	Sample selection			
Initiation (different facets of the same phenomenon)		Examine extreme or negative cases; test competing hypotheses or explore unexpected or contradictory results	Test competing hypotheses	Discover, explain, paradox, or contradiction
Multilevel/expansion (different but related constructs or phenomena)		Study multilevel systems such as a school or medical system; nested designs	Develop case studies for cross-case comparison	Multilevel
Evaluation/Intervention/Process-Oriented (different but related constructs)		Examine the effectiveness of an intervention; provide contextual understanding	Collect data from participants to design an intervention that suits the context	Improve recruitment; enhance the effectiveness of an intervention

Table 1.1: the typologies and purposes of Mixed Research Methods

Source: Elizabeth (2018:75).

Data Sources, Collection, and analysis

For undertaking this research, relevant data were obtained both from primary and secondary sources. To ensure the relevance and usefulness of the data collected, the secondary sources of data were systematically categorized into internal and external

sources while strictly ensuring the relevance of the data. The internal sources of secondary data entail the information that can be accessed from the organization (s) in question, i.e., the case study organizations. Hence, from this, policy, program, and strategy documents, organizational reports, memos, research, and other archival materials were considered and properly accessed. Also, the external sources of secondary data such as government sources, national and international institutions, associations and unions, scientific journals, research institutions, the internet, and library sources are systematically accessed to collect data that would address the objectives and the guiding questions of the research at hand. To this end, the primary sources of data are considered to be the major sources accessed. This holds as this research is mainly focused on the opinion and the reaction of the Civil Service Elites towards dilemmas that they face during Civil Service Reform vis-à-vis Normative Limits governing the relationship between politics and administration in Ethiopia.

The research mainly covered the period between 1991 and 2018. This is because the implementation of numerous reform packages has been witnessed during this period. Yet, the nature and context of Politics-Administration interaction in the course of civil service reform during the Imperial and Communist Regimes will not be ignored as the current politico-administrative relationships in Ethiopia could be the reflections of the political culture in the past. Hence, tracing back to the historical facts concerning issues under investigation requires the use of secondary data if not alone. However, investigating the issue at hand from a historical perspective is not the core concern of the research under consideration.

In addition to the secondary sources, primary sources were accessed to collect the opinion and reactions of the Civil Service Elites concerning the controversial situation they face during Civil Service Reform vis-à-vis the normative constraints of Law, Professional Standards, Political Neutrality, and Truthfulness. Besides, interview-guided vignette questionnaires were designed to obtain information about the civil service reform dilemmas vis-à-vis political responsiveness in the course of civil service reform in Ethiopia.

To substantiate the primary data collected from top-level civil servants, selected professors of Political Science, Law, Economics, and Public Administration were addressed through key informant interviews. Moreover, considering the comments and opinions of political executives from selected Ministries, Commissions, and Agencies at the Federal level enhance the diversity of the information collected relating to the matter under investigation. The researcher is convinced to include the political executives and addressed them through a Key Informant Interview and which helped to collect detailed information from different perspectives. The respondents or study participants for the key informant interview guide were individuals who are believed to know about the politico-administrative relationships in Ethiopia as they lived and/or worked with two or three different regimes in Ethiopia.

According to Geertz, (1973), the vignette questionnaire provides "thick descriptions" that divulge the pathetic attributes aspects of the problem at hand as perceived by a researcher. Yet, the vignette questionnaire is not rigid; rather its final version hinges on the quality of the observation and preliminary and specific data collected in the end. Greetz (1973) also describes the vignette questionnaire as "The third generation of data collection instrument that started to emerge in the late 1980s, and deals with neither data that are neither cross-tabulations nor data matrices, either because they have a different form, such as texts or narratives, or because dependence is a crucial aspect, as with spatial or social network data."

Vignette has three purposes in social sciences to which the research at hand belongs to-the research is of social sciences. Its first purpose is to allow actions in context to be explored, to clarify respondents' or study participants' judgments, and to provide a less personal and therefore less threatening way of exploring sensitive topics. In general, Vignettes have the potential to explore meanings and interpretations not easily accessible through other methods.

Therefore, the researcher believes the use of a vignette is relevant and appropriate because it offers several benefits such as; flexibility that allows the researcher to design an instrument uniquely responsive to a specific topic, enjoyment, and creativity for the

informant, and depersonalization that encourages an informant to think beyond his or her circumstances.

The purpose of the vignette questionnaire is to obtain information about the political dilemmas that could be noticed in the process of civil service reform implementation. In other words, the vignette questionnaire will help to collect data that can be used to analyze the relationship between the political executives and the civil service elites in the course of introducing and implementing different administrative reforms.

The hypothetical scenario guided the development of vignette questions to avoid one unequivocal response to the dilemma situations that civil service elites face during Civil Service Reform and make it applicable across ministries, commissions, and agencies. The vignette questionnaire does not address a specific task. It allows reaching a conclusion that can be generalized. Therefore, the vignettes are simplifications of the dilemmas that civil servants encounter and do not take into account the specific context where the dilemmas situations might occur. Yet, respondents were required to add text comments to the vignettes where further clarification or additional information is required.

To this end, four normative limits that guide the relationships between politics and administration were considered. These are Legality, professional standard, truthfulness, and political neutrality. To address the normative constraints of legality and professional standards, three vignette questionnaire items were designed. Besides, Truthfulness and Political Neutrality were addressed using two (2) items each. Furthermore, 13 generic questions were designed using a Likert scale (on 1-5 rate) and they were used to investigate the practice and the existing nature of relationships between political executives and civil service elites of the selected public sector organizations.

To substantiate the secondary data and information collected using vignette questions, the Key Informant Interview guide was prepared. It was conducted to collect detailed information regarding the civil service reform dilemmas and Normative Limits in Ethiopia on the interaction between Civil Service Elites and Political Executives in the course of Civil Service Reform. The researcher believes that the Key Informant Interview guide was designed to collect in-depth information relating to the nature of

relationships between politicians and civil servants in the course of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia. Indeed, considering comments from academicians when conducting this type of research is not a common practice. Yet, as academicians are endowed with both theories and practical experiences (their exposure to empirical aspects of reform) that they gained through education and research and working during different regimes in Ethiopia, the information they provide is vital and would help to capture a different perspective.

1.1.1. Data Presentation and Analysis

The collected data will be processed using varieties of data processing tools and techniques. The secondary data will be processed using re-analysis, interpreting, and reviewing techniques. In this regard, both re-analysis and review will help to reconcile the factual deviation between too-dated data and the recent developments in the dilemmas of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia. Yet, solid and appropriate data will be processed through narration, and interpretation to address the research questions and objectives.

In addition, data collected from the primary sources will be categorized, analyzed, and interpreted according to the principal research questions. Hence, simple statistical instruments will be deployed.

Sampling Techniques

To collect relevant information, the researcher has made an initial field observation. After thorough observation and preliminary discussions with relevant authorities and institutions, six (6) ministries were selected purposively. The selected ministries were the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MoFEC), Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI), Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MoSHE), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Besides, Federal Civil Service Commission (CSC), Investment Commission (IC), and Plan and Development Commission (PDC) were selected on the same ground (purposively). Moreover, the Diaspora Agency, Public Procurement Agency, Document Authentication Agency, Public Property Disposal Agency and Civil Aviation Agency, and Federal

Attorney-General were purposively considered as relevant organizations from where relevant data were collected.

According to the researcher's preliminary observation and pilot survey (conducted in January 2018), these organizations have undergone civil service reforms the most compared to other similar institutions. In these institutions, a series of civil service reform tools have been implemented at different times.

In this regard, the selection of different organizations at the Federal level was believed to help compare the responses of the participants working in different institutions of the government and measure variations and/or significances using various units of analysis and variables of the study.

The researcher came to learn from the Human Resource Department of each ministry, commission, agency, and the other selected federal level intuitions that there were 840 Civil Service Elites in Total. From this, 211 sample respondents were selected using simple computer computation. Hence, the total population (N) was 840; sample size (n) was 211; population portion was 24%; Confidence level was 95% and the margin of error was 5%.

In addition, to substantiate or compliment the survey information collected through Vignette Questionnaire, 10 Political Executives at the top were identified and addressed using an unstructured interview guide. The researcher was convinced to identify and contact these selected key informants using accidental or availability sampling. The deployment of this sampling design was made as most politicians are too engaged with programmed and emerging agendas in their respective offices. Contacting the political executives was not an easy task given their tight schedules and requisite protocol.

Moreover, 10 academicians were addressed using snowball sampling as their whereabouts were not certain. Relevant academicians were dispersed over different universities, colleges, faculties, institutes, centers, and units. Moreover, all academicians do not have an equal understanding of the issue at hand. Hence, through the network, academicians who have good exposure to the civil service and those who have conducted research in the area were identified as key informants and addressed with an open-ended

interview guide. Hence, in both cases, it is the first participant-directed researcher to address the other participant (s) in the group.

Most of the selected key informants from academia had an opportunity of working or studying the three modern regimes of Ethiopia-The Imperial Regime (1950-1974), The Communist Regime (1974-1991), and the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF-1991-2018).

Ethical Considerations

Webster's dictionary defines Ethics as conformance to the standards of conduct of a given profession or group. Definitions of Such standards are often made at a disciplinary level, sometimes enforced by the Institutional Review Board of university-level committees. Despite the absence of explicit provision of standards, indeed, there is the general expectation that researchers and scientists need to be aware of and abide by general agreements shared by the scientific community on what constitutes acceptable and non-acceptable behaviors in the professional conduct of science. For instance, scientists should not manipulate their data collection, analysis, and interpretation procedures in a way that contradicts the principles of science or the scientific method or advances their agenda (Anol, 2012:137).

More than research in hard science, conducting research in social science requires researchers to satisfy the ethical normative limits. This is due to the fact the human element in social science research makes not only inputs for the successful completion of the research, but also the complexity of the research processes and activities. Differently put, the manner we study society is not the same as the way we study inanimate objects. Moral perspectives and formal ethical bodies such as Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) put demarcation and limitations on how we approach and conduct research relating to people and societies.

More precisely, observing two aspects of ethics are the requirements for approaching and undertaking research. The first one is the personal values of the researcher relating to transparency and honesty throughout conducting the research from the inception to the end. The second aspect is related to how a researcher treats other people participating in

the study about ‘informed consent, confidentiality, anonymity and courtesy (Nicholas, 2011:43).

Therefore, at the center of social science research of this kind is the task of quantifying human behavior using appropriate measurement instruments in the observation and inquiring processes. Measuring human behavior to discern reality is the widely accepted position of the positivist view and empirical-analytic approach (Smallbone and Quinton, 2004 as cited by Drost, 2011). Hence, measurement instruments deployed in conducting social science research must be reliable and valid.

Reliability

Reliability is the degree to which measurements are repeatable – when different persons perform the measurements, on different junctures, under different circumstances, with apparently alternate instruments that measure the same thing. In essence, reliability is the steadiness of measurement. In other words, it is the stability of measurement over a variety of conditions in which obtaining the same results is possible (Drost, 2011).

Typical techniques used to ensure reliability in social science research are; test-retest, alternative forms, split-halves, inter-rater, and internal consistency tests. Besides, there are three principal aspects of the reliability test. These are equivalence, stability over time, and internal consistency. However, due to the nature of the subject under investigation, the test-retest technique was deployed to test the reliability of the instruments in this research.

Hence, data collection instruments from the primary sources were tested on small scale at different times before the actual collection process or stage. The test-retest will be made on the same group of respondents, using the same instrument, but at different times. In this research, the test-retest reliability test will be used to ensure the stability of the instruments and issues over time. Besides, for secondary data, pertinent sources were written and published in different periods by different authorities on the same topic through systematic identification, accessing, and collection of relevant data that would aid in the reliability and validity of the research at hand.

Generally, to ensure the overall reliability of the instruments and results of this research, efforts will be made to maintain clarity and neatness of writing items, stating understandable instructions, and providing orientation to the respondents ahead of the data collection process.

According to Taber (2018) and Berger and Hånze (2015), a reliability rate greater or equal to 0.5 is tolerable. In this research, the minimum rate of reliability was 0.61. Hence, the internal consistency of the instrument deployed was dependable. In addition, it has been argued that when there is an acceptable degree of association among items designed for the survey and the numbers of items are smaller, an alpha less than 0.60 is possible and tolerable (Cortina, 1993). Therefore, the study instruments were reliable with the tolerable and possible rate of internal consistency test.

Validity

Validity is a measure of quality that transcends the method (Onwuegbuzie and Johnson, 2006 cited in Creamer, 2018). In a general sense, 'validity' is a term used in both qualitative and quantitative research to refer to strategies that are employed during data collection and analysis that confirm the credibility, conformability, and justifiability of the findings and inferences drawn after a study.

The central aim of validity is to ensure the meaningfulness of the components of the research. Validity is apprehensive about the meaningfulness of research components. In other words, it requires a researcher to make sure that what he or she is measuring is as per what he or she originally intends to measure to meet the objectives of the study at hand and answer the guiding questions of the research.

Commonly, researchers are expected to consider the four types of validity in research. These are; statistical conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity, and external validity.

“Where there can be no trust between informant and researcher, there are few guarantees as to the validity and worth of information in an atmosphere where confidence is not respected”. (Fitzgerald and Hamilton, 1997; as cited by Israel and Hay, 2006:78).

It has been argued that scientifically valid research is likely to have both internal and external validity and a given research's capacity for generalization and extrapolation based on accurate data collected and interpreted. In other words, the internal and external validity of the research determines its scientific validity. The correctness and accuracy of the inferences drawn based on the primary study participants or technically termed respondents is an internal validity while the inferences drawn based on some categories or groups other than study participants are external validity (Loue, 2002:229).

As to Loue (2002), the internal validity of particular research can be affected by different types of research biases that could occur during data collection, analysis, discussion, write-up, and review of information that may result in conclusions that are fundamentally and systematically different from the truth or actual reality. Technically, there are three types of research biases. The first one is a bias that occurs due to the selection of wrong or irrelevant study participants. The second bias is information bias (missing the right information and/or collecting the wrong one), which may result in a distorted estimate of the results. Confounding bias can occur if the acquaintance of interest is closely linked to a different variable and the variable of interest. Confounding, bias refers to a bias in the estimate of the effect that results from a lack of comparability between the groups in the study.

In order to avoid or at least minimize the possibility of facing the above-mentioned research biases, due care was given to the process of selecting study participants, pertinent information to be collected, and relevant variables. Study participants were chosen solely based on respondents' relevance, experience, and knowledge about the issue under investigation.

In addition, data collection, analysis, and interpretation were checked and monitored based on the major questions and objectives of the research. Moreover, to overcome the confound search bias, a researcher's value-neutrality was maintained.

On the other hand, external validity refers to the generalization of the findings of the research under investigation. External validity refers to the appropriateness and relevance of the relationship between dependent and independent variables or the respondents' relevance to the issue at hand. It indicates the research's results capacity in implying other persons, settings, and times. Hence, to ensure the external validity of the research, the selection of respondents and identification of issues and instruments was made with all due care.

Operational Definition of technical jargon

- **Bureaucracy:** A structure with highly routine operational tasks achieved through specialization highly formalized, rules and regulations tasks that are grouped in functional departments centralized authority narrow span of control, and decision making that flows chain of command. In this study, bureaucracy refers to the executive arm of government. In the context of Ethiopia, the term bureaucracy refers to members of the civil service, which includes the "non-political" or "permanent executive" hired to serve the government in implementing policy through the administration and execution of government affairs (Ayenew & Chanie, 2000), and excludes elected officials, legislators, the judiciary, the armed forces, or the federal police ("Proclamation 262/2002," Ethiopia Federal Civil Servants Proclamation 2002, Article 2, Section 1 cited in Vogel, 2005).
- **Bureaucratic Management:** The management approach that views the entire organization as a rational unit and uses impersonal rules and procedures for decision-making.
- **Business Process Reengineering/Reengineering:** A management method that emphasizes fundamental rethinking of processes and challenges all assumptions to streamline organizations and focus on creating value in core processes.

- **Career Planning:** A support mechanism that helps employees plan their long-term goals. The deliberate process by which an individual becomes aware of his or her career-related characteristics and the lifelong series of steps that contribute to the fulfillment of his or her professional goals
- **Civil Servants:** According to the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 515/2007, "Civil Servant" is a person employed permanently by a federal government institution; provided, however, that it shall not include the following:
 - a. Government officials with the rank of state minister, deputy director-general, and their equivalent and above;
 - b. Members of the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of the Federation;
 - c. Federal judges and prosecutors;
 - d. Members of the Armed Forces and the Federal Police including other employees governed by the regulations of the Armed forces and the Federal Police;
 - e. Employees are excluded from the coverage of this Proclamation by other appropriate laws.
- **Civil Service:** This is the branch of the civil service, other than the legislative, judicial, or military, in which positions are usually filled based on competitive examinations. There is a professional civil service that is protected from influence and patronage (Berman, et al., 2016).
- **Civil Service Elites:** are those bureaucrats who hold the senior positions of "director-general," "director," "advisor," and "team leader" in Ethiopia's federal civil service. The ministries, commissions, and agencies are the main federal civil service institutions.
- **Civil service reform:** Civil service reform is a comprehensive process to develop the capacity of the civil service to fulfill its mandate, and includes issues of recruitment and promotion, pay, number of employees, performance appraisal, and related matters. It continues to form the bulk of national civil service reform programs. Civil service reform has historically focused on the need to contain the cost of public sector employment through downsizing and restructuring but has broadened to include the

longer-term goal of creating a civil service that is the right size, the right mix of skills, the right motivation, the right professional ethos, the right customer focus, and the right accountability (Ibid). More specifically, Civil Service Reform refers to efforts to modify the structures, processes, and functions of the civil service system (Berman, et al., 2016).

- **Civil Society:** Civil society is "a vast ensemble of ever-changing groups and individuals who have developed some awareness of their externality and opposition to the state" (Chabal, 1986), and Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) sum it up when they assert that "civil society is a place where citizens can engage one another in the kind of personal dialogue and deliberation that is the essence not only of community building but of democracy itself."
- **Cutbacks:** This is an act of reducing public sector spending by reorganizing the structure and functions of a particular agency.
- **Decentralization:** Decentralization is a process by which powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources are transferred from the central government to local governments and/or to other decentralized entities. In other words, decentralization is a process that balances the demands of the periphery with those of the center.
- **Downsizing:** This is the process of reducing the number of employees in organizations, often caused by actions such as downsizing, outsourcing, or site closures (Berman et al., 2016).
- **Ethics:** The norms that guide the behavior and actions of personnel in public institutions, which can be called moral laws.
- **The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP):** is an effort by the government to alleviate some of the problems associated with the low level of service delivery in the Ethiopian civil service, which is characterized by high levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.
- **Integrity:** UNDP states that integrity is a key element that completes the notion of accountability and transparency. It is defined as incorruptibility, unimpaired condition, or soundness, and is synonymous with honesty. In public service, integrity requires that holders of public office not make financial or other commitments to outside persons or organizations that might influence them in the performance of their

official duties. Integrity is not an end in itself, but a path that leads to the effective delivery of services and the performance of duties that the public can expect from those who govern them.

- **New Public Management (NPM):** New Public Management demands the Government to stick to accomplishing results rather than largely conforming and focusing on procedures and to adopt a market-like competition, innovations, and entrepreneurial strategies. To be market-like, Government and public administration generally are required to be customer-oriented and hinge on market-based tools to deliver public services (Osborne and Gaebler (1993).
- **Paradox:** Refers to a set of seemingly incompatible ideas or a clash between apparent ideas (Berman, et al., 2016).
- **Politicization:** Literally, Politicization of the Civil Service refers to the substitution of Political Criteria for Merit-Based Criteria in the processes of Selecting, Retaining, Promotion, rewards, and maintenance of disciplinary actions over members of the public bureaucracy (Meyers, 1985; Rouban, 1998; 1999; Clifford and Wright, 1997; Derlien, 1996). More specifically, politicization can be considered as appointments to public sector positions on personal or partisan criteria in exchange for loyal service to the appointing entity. The practice of politicization centers attention on the top of public sector hierarchies, where politicization is used for administrative control, and away from the lower-level positions. Precisely put, the term politicization refers to politicians' desire to influence the behavior of civil service officials and their decisions to ensure the consistency of the latter's conduct with the values, preferences, and political interests held by the former, and to change their administrative culture accordingly (Aberbach et al. 1981).
- **Position:** It refers to the job of a single person, as well as the particular duties and responsibilities of the job (Berman, et al., 2016).
- **Position Classification System:** Refer to systems that provide ranks or grades for all positions filled through merit principle as well as for non-merit positions (Berman, et al., 2016).
- **Public Administration:** Due to its comprehensive and interdisciplinary nature, Public administration has many definitions. Yet, literally, it is essentially concerned

with the organization of government policies and programs as well as the behavior of civil servants-usually non-elected, but employed based on merit principle and formally responsible for their conduct.

According to UNDP (1997), **Public Administration** has two closely related meanings:

- i. Public Administration is an aggregate government apparatus involving policies, rules, procedures, systems, organizational structures, and personnel whose operation is funded by the State budget and in charge of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the State, society and external environment;
- ii. Public Administration also entails the management & implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of laws, regulations, & decisions of the Government & the management relating to public services provision.
 - **Patronage:** Is the discretionary allocation of public sector jobs to reward followers and cement political and personal relationships
 - **Politico-Administrative Relations:** Politico-administrative relations refer to the relationship between top officials and political executives, and not between top officials and members of parliament.
 - **Public sector reform:** Public sector reform refers to deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations intending to get them to run better. Structural change may include merging or splitting public sector organizations while process change may include redesigning systems, setting quality standards, and focusing on capacity building (UN, 2006:7).
 - **Senior Civil Service:** “A Senior Civil Service (SCS) is a structured and recognized system of personnel for the higher non-political positions in government. In other words, “SCS is a system of personnel for high- and top-level management positions in the national civil service, formally or informally recognized by an authority, or through a common understanding of the organization of such a group. It is a framework of career-related development providing people to be competitively appointed to functions that cover policy advice, operational delivery or corporate service delivery”.

- **Temporary Civil Servant:** "Temporary Civil Servant" means a person who is employed in a government office for a job, which is not permanent in, nature, or where circumstances so require a permanent position; however, it shall not include, the following:
- a. Persons, employed as, daily laborers who are paid on daily basis;
 - b. Persons who are assigned for internship or training;
 - c. Persons who enter into a contract with a government office as an independent contractor for consideration;
 - d. Persons who enter into a contract with a government office due to their special skills and ability on a part-time basis for consideration (Federal Civil Servants Proclamation No. 515/2007).

Organization of the Study

The work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter addressed the introductory issues, including the literal and conceptual meaning of the main research parameters, the background of the study, objectives, research questions and goals, the rationale or significance of the study, the delimitation of the research, research methods and operational definitions of selected terminologies. The second and third chapters were devoted to the theoretical and meta-analysis or empirical review of the relevant literature. Discussion of theories and experiences related to public service, the politics-administration dichotomy, and public service reform formed the basic framework of these chapters, which was concluded with a draft conceptual framework. The fourth chapter focused on the data presentation, analysis, and interpretation. Finally, the fifth chapter provides a summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter contains a review of the relevant literature. The first part of the chapter deals with theoretical perspectives concerning the subject matter under study. It begins with the conceptualization of the central terms of this study. In addition, the first part of the chapter addresses the general theories of public service and bureaucratic administration intending to review and analyze the competing and overlapping ideas with the topic at hand. In addition, the first part of the chapter includes an overview of the theoretical approaches to political-administrative relations. Finally, the chapter discusses the role and power of the civil service from normative and strategic administrative perspectives in general and in the Ethiopian context.

The second part of this chapter deals with the empirical review of the relevant literature. More specifically, this part of the chapter addresses the introduction, evolution, and current state of civil service in general and civil service reform in particular. In addition, the relationship between politics and administration in Ethiopia is discussed and analyzed based on relevant authorities. The final part of the chapter presents the conceptual framework developed based on the theoretical and empirical review of related literature and parameters of interest to this study, as well as the conclusions drawn.

2.1. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL SERVICE AND RELATED TERMINOLOGIES

Public service is a multidimensional concept with different meanings and definitions. It has different meanings for different scholars, institutions, and countries. Conventionally, it refers to the appointed body of civil servants who carry out the business of government under the supervision of the head of government. This is true regardless of the character, form, or type of government, which may be democratic, dictatorial, monarchical, or

republican. This section, therefore, presents various literal meanings and conceptualizations of the civil service and related terminologies.

Notwithstanding its great age and widespread use in today's world, there is no universal and standardized definition and meaning of the concept of public service and/or public official in the academic literature. This demonstrates the multidimensionality of the concepts under study (Evans 2008:8). However, most scholars agree on the commonality of attributes or principles of public service such as merit, competence, continuity, political insulation, and accountability that underlie the traditional or basic model of public service (Ibid).

According to Pyper (1995:1), for the proper conceptualization and understanding of the terms public service and/or civil servants, some relevant general reference points are needed. In other words, to properly understand the concept of public service, some general reference points must be established. In this context, it has been noted that the demarcation point is that the civil service or civil servants work for "civil", as opposed to engagements such as the military, ministries, cabinets, or the judiciary of the state.

In this context, several criteria can be mentioned to distinguish civil servants working in the public sector from other types of occupation or employment. To this end, the World Bank (2009) identifies four broad criteria that would distinguish civil service employees from other types of employment and status. These are as follows:

Civil servants are public sector employees whose employment decision depends on the approval of the relevant government institution under the provisions of the country's civil service law. Therefore, the decision of a competent public institution to hire civil servants must be made by the established rules that govern the hiring processes;

Hired civil servants are safe from arbitrary dismissal. This makes it clear that civil servants have a constitutional role in a democracy. Civil servants are charged with serving the government of the day, regardless of its political ideology once it comes to power, and with maintaining and respecting sound administration and the continuity of

civil service institutions. Therefore, civil servants are free from short-term political expediency and pressures that would lead to inappropriate personnel management decisions.

Civil servants are generally subject to more constraints than other employee groups. This is because civil servants have both strategic and constitutional duties to perform. The duties of civil servants can be political in nature as well as include management or confidential advisory functions.

Unlike other types of government employment relationships, civil servants are involved with civil government at the central or sub-national level. Employment relationships with nearly similar duties may exist at different levels. Nevertheless, civil servants are civilian employees (Ibid).

On the other hand, different scholars use different terms for civil service: bureaucracy, civil service, administration, technocracy, and civil servants. According to Kemenka (1989), "bureaucracy" is a centrally directed, systematically organized, and hierarchically structured personnel engaged in the routine, regular, and economic management of complicated administrative operations according to policy frameworks dictated by directors and political leaders outside and above the administration.

According to Gladden (1957), civil service is a significant term for an important governmental institution consisting of members of the central administration of the government. He writes that the importance of civil service goes beyond its nomenclature, as it determines the success of modern government and democracy. It is also believed that civil service prepares government employees for the highest possible commitment to public service. In this context, the term "Civil Service" was initially used to distinguish between the military and civil sectors of government.

In the U.S. context, the term "Civil Service" refers to protected public sector employees as defined by executive order or statute. A civil service system in the U.S. context, therefore, includes activities to link personnel functions such as recruitment, selection, compensation, training and development, performance appraisal, and retention to performance or merit standards. In addition, the civil service system is concerned with

protecting human resources from any form of arbitrariness and insulating them from political interference in the performance of personnel duties and responsibilities and in decision making (Klingner & Nalbandian, 1998 cited in Stephen & Robert, 2001:15-16).

Usually, the term "civil service" refers to a group of civil servants appointed under the supervision of the head of government and charged with carrying out government business. This is true regardless of the different forms of government. However, there is no agreement on the scope of the civil service. Therefore, the inclusion or exclusion of military officers, judicial officers, and officers in the foreign service of the state is a highly controversial issue (Lienert and Modi, 1997).

According to some research, the concept of civil service in modern times is closely linked to the independence of African states. Moreover, the concept of public service in the African context is associated with a huge burden imposed on it by the transformation of the structures and processes of public sector organizations. In this context, the civil service is understood as an organization charged with the task of designing, formulating, and executing public policies and projects, and conducting government business and development programs economically and effectively (Bayo, 2012).

Broadly speaking, the civil service can be considered as those public servants or officials of the state whose affairs are governed by national laws and civil service laws. In the Ethiopian context, this is Proclamation No.: 515/2006 addresses the civil or public services of the country (Adebabay, 2011).

Thus, from the above meanings and definitions of public service, some generalizations can be derived that are relevant to the present study. First, public service is a vital and ever-expanding or growing institution of the state. Second, civil service in a modern democracy represents permanent employment based on merit, or the civil service law of the country determines merit and personnel management functions. Third, civil servants working in civil service organizations are entrusted with the strategic and constitutional task of maintaining and ensuring the administrative continuity of the government in general and the civil service in particular. Therefore, it is indeed a protected, vital or indispensable, expansive, isolated, and highly recognized institution of the State.

2.2. CONTENDING THEORIES OF CIVIL SERVICE

Although there is no intellectual consensus on whether the origin and development of bureaucrats and bureaucracies can be traced back to Max Weber or Karl Marx, there is no doubt about their long existence in the history of organized human life. Nevertheless, different scholars have taken different paths in defining and studying these phenomena. Some approached them from a social systems perspective (Garston, 1993:1). From the research and analysis of political scientists and economists, it can be deduced that bureaucracy itself is as old as a human enterprise on a large scale.

It has been argued that both the theoretical and empirical aspects of public service generate controversy among scholars in the field. Undoubtedly, this paradox will continue. For example, there is no consensus on whether the power of the bureaucracy grows over time or whether it faces challenges regardless of its numerical and functional expansion. In this regard, the pluralists believe that the pervasive growth of the civil service leads to more scrutiny and challenges as its power declined in contrast to its quantitative growth. The technocrats, on the other hand, believe that the bureaucracy has grown not only in terms of its numerical and functional complexity but also in terms of its power (Eva, 2010:2).

According to Daniel (2001), the consolidation of power and the legitimacy of the bureaucracy are due to its technical competence, its coalition, and its coherence with other affiliated professional organizations. Thus, the uniqueness of the bureaucracy's prestige and political diversity has led to the growth of the civil service, not only numerically, but also in terms of influencing decisions that are of national importance. The following section examines the classical and modern theories of bureaucracy.

2.2.1. Classical Theories of Bureaucracy (Karl Marx, Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Max Weber)

The term "bureaucracy" was first coined by Vincent de Gournay in 1745. This classical understanding of the term was primarily pejorative due to the character of the government of the time, which was run by civil servants, and its excessive power. The

negative connotation of the term stems from the perceived inefficiency and inertia of bureaucratic organizations. The classic theoretical perspectives dealing with bureaucracy are presented below:

Marx and Engels' theory of historical materialism states that bureaucracy comes from four sources, namely religion, the state-building process, commerce, and technology. In their theory of historical materialism, Marx and Engels considered that the bureaucracy consists of various individuals and groups from religious institutions (clergy), scribes, and officials engaged in the performance of various rituals, and armed functionaries or units charged with maintaining law and order (Tarikha, 2009:4).

On the other hand, the transition of human organization from egalitarian communities to civil society has involved the formation of classes and the division of functions. In this context, the state was entrusted with the formulation, imposition, and execution of laws and the collection of taxes, which ultimately led to the emergence of officialdom.

In addition, the growth and complexity of trade and commerce increased the importance and prestige of the bureaucracy in maintaining relevant accounting transactions. Moreover, the introduction and development of modern technologies for mass production required various standardized routines and procedural activities that required the hands of professional bureaucracies. In other words, even though machines are expected to reduce the number of people working in a given organization, bureaucrats are still seeking to develop, control, monitor, and operate the machines. This development led to the creation of technocracy with vital information and specialized expertise (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the Marxist perspective on bureaucracy has been criticized for being skeptical of the fact that it does not take into account the desire for continuity of administration and the maintenance of law and order, as well as the possibility of individuals putting their respective personal interests ahead of those of the community as a whole.

According to the classical Marxian view of bureaucracy, which is similar to that of the state, the bureaucracy's promotion of the general interest is not strictly altruistic. Rather, it maximizes its materialistic goals through concealment and its secretive properties. In

other words, the bureaucracy has the same nature as the state in that it has power over public offices and resources. In general, bureaucracy has the characteristics of being secretive, inward-looking, closed, and using hierarchy and domination. Marx attempted to address bureaucratic problems through class issues. Therefore, the bureaucracy is considered to manipulate outsiders as well as internal actors or members as long as it benefits its rationality (Eva, 1985).

On the other hand, Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) saw bureaucracy as a central object of study, representing a distinct type of political organization with its order. Unlike Karl Marx, Mosca considered the bureaucracy as a politically dominant class, and his ideas on theory development (*The Ruling Class*, written in 1895) were based on it (Eva, 2010:14).

According to Mosca (1989:302), there is a constant, fabricated, and glaring contradiction between the interest and duty of the one entrusted with ruling and the one who should have a say or judgment and set limits on the government. This is evident in the adversarial interaction between elected political masters and bureaucrats, which ultimately ends in corrupt practices and mutual denaturalization.

Mosca (1989:308) argued that the vicious circle of the dilemmatic relationship between politics and administration cannot be solved either by simply increasing the power of bureaucrats or by expanding the prerogatives of policymakers. He explained that the solution is to bring new political insights and social faces to practices that serve the public interest and to improve participation in legal advocacy in government agencies. This privilege should be available to all persons eligible for public service. The hiring and remuneration, promotion, transfer and suspension, and return to office of these personalities should not be subject to the will of elected ministers.

Robert Michels (1878-1936) held that the existence of the modern state depends on the existence of bureaucracy. He argued that it is this large bureaucracy that helps modern states secure domination over other classes. In other words, Michels explained that the modern state has chosen to empower officials (bureaucrats) primarily because of the increase in the size and complexity of its tasks. The consolidation of power and the active participation of the civil service in politics and the political affairs of society can

be attributed to several compelling reasons. These include the desire for an efficient decision-making process, the need to get things done through expertise, ensuring access to technical information and improving effective communication, and the acquisition of political and leadership skills by bureaucrats, partly because of their experience and partly because of their educational background, the need to ensure continuity of administration, and the bureaucrats' self-interest in power.

To this end, the state creates a variety of positions for bureaucrats. The state offers this favor because it knows that the highly educated middle class suffers from the insecurity of material existence. But the offer is not free; rather, bureaucrats are used as instruments to secure political power (ibid).

Weber is known for his study of the "bureaucratization of society," which addressed many aspects of modern public administration, i.e., a hierarchical and classical civil service, sometimes referred to as the Weberian civil service. He described this type of organization as ideal because, in his opinion, it is more efficient and rational. For him, bureaucracy is preferable to traditional and charismatic rule (Tarikha, 2009:8).

Max Weber believes that hierarchically organized or bureaucratic organizations are governed by the following seven principles (ibid):

1. Official business is conducted continuously;
2. Official undertakings are conducted in "strict accordance with the following rules:
3. The duty of each official to perform certain work is delineated according to impersonal criteria;
4. The official shall be vested with the powers necessary to perform the duties assigned to him;
5. The means of coercion at his disposal are strictly limited, and the conditions for their use are precisely defined.
6. The responsibilities and powers of each official are part of a vertical hierarchy of authority with corresponding rights of control and appeal;
7. Civil servants do not own the funds required to perform their assigned duties but must account for the use of those funds;

8. Official and private business and income are strictly separated;
9. Offices cannot be appropriated by their holders; and
10. Official business shall be conducted based on written records.

2.2.2. Modern Theories of Bureaucracy

Similar to the classical schools of thought, modern theories of bureaucracy do not offer universally valid statements or insights. They do, however, contribute to understanding the conception, nature, structure, practices, and functioning of bureaucracy from different points of view.

In this regard, the pluralist theory of bureaucracy provides explanations that contrast with the descriptions and delimitations of the Weberian School of Thought, which views bureaucracy as a coherent structure and effective in carrying out its assigned tasks.

Pluralist theory, on the other hand, views the bureaucracy and the state as structurally disjointed and cumbersome in their operations (Harvey, 1983).

Although the older version of pluralist theory faced criticism and contestation, its later version gained much acceptance in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the United States. The acceptance of the newer version was broadly related to the unprecedented "congestion" and "un-governability" of state affairs, which led to the acceptance of the inevitable role of bureaucracy in modern governments. Nevertheless, the pluralist theory did not limit the plurality of structures and interactions to the state and bureaucracy alone. Nonetheless, there is a complicated balance of power among many entities with overlapping occupational, economic, professional, and ethnic groupings (Ibid).

According to Peters (1995:203), politics in a pluralistic system may tend to resemble patronage relations across policy areas or sectoral policies. In this context, Dittmer (1983, cited in Peters, 1995:203) writes: "The modernization of communist political systems is associated with the emergence of quasi-interest groups" that engage in "crypto-politics." In this system, bureaucrats were not autonomous enough to have the resources intended for different interest groups, but they were able to exert more and more influence on politics in certain areas where they had expertise and competence.

Therefore, the pluralist system or view is praised as consultative, informative, and meritocratic, since it is hardly possible to exercise absolute authority, and each entity is given a relatively fair space.

From the pluralist theory of bureaucracy, it can be inferred that the source of power for bureaucratic institutions is hardly formal, but that information sources are important for their establishment, smooth operation, and continuity. For example, bureaucratic organizations need to attract the attention of legislative subcommittees dealing with sectoral issues to secure their support, which can ultimately influence the passage of favorable policies. Thus, in a pluralistic political system, it is hardly possible to provide absolute happiness; rather, it can provide only relative happiness to the government, the media, interest groups, and the public at large.

According to Rourke (1976, cited in Harvey, 1983), while bureaucrats are not capable of governing alone, neither can any other entity govern without them. Therefore, they are recognized or considered as one of the many veto units or groups in a pluralistic political system. The U.S. political systems are the best example here, but not limited to it. This demonstrates the inevitable coexistence between politically elected or appointed leaders and public servants selected based on merit and relevance to a particular public sector position.

2.3. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS

“Long gone-if ever existed-are days of the pure split between councils making policy and managers’ never making policy, and councils never administering and managers only administering. In many communities, there is a blend between policymaking and administration.”

The American City Manager (Mauritzen and Svara, 2002).

"That we are both beneficiaries and victims of the policy-administration divide is recognized. The divide provides room for maneuver. Its tensions, aberrations, confusions, and contradictions can and sometimes do serve the goals we value. Some of the goals we value have, in fact, arguably been created by the existence of the divide" (Waldo 1990; cited in Patrick, 2012:114).

It was noted that the distinction between fact and value, ends and means, charisma and rationality, policy and execution, democracy and management formed the foundations of the political-administrative relationship (Richard, 1985).

The distinction between politics and administration has never been clear-cut. However, it has served both administrators and politicians to maintain the myth of the separation of politics and administration (and, incidentally, to obscure the goals of administrative reform). The myth allows politicians to focus on electoral politics and other aspects of their role. It allows administrators to engage in politics and make policy decisions without being held politically accountable for the results of their actions (Wilenski 1979; cited by Richard, 1985).

According to Richards (1985), the relationship between politics and administration has never been flawless or smooth. Rather, their interplay is notoriously problematic and represents perhaps the characteristic conundrum of the modern state, reflecting the clash of the dual and conflicting demands of technical efficiency and democratic responsiveness.

Over the past half-century, political scientists have spilled as much ink about no other dilemma as the relative power and role of bureaucracies, on the one hand, and representative institutions such as parties and parliaments, on the other. Much of the debate rightly emphasized normative issues, while empirical contributions focused on institutional analysis (Ibid).

Political-administrative relations have attracted the attention of both scholars and practitioners. Several changes have taken place in the field of public administration in recent decades. In this regard, the introduction and practices of New Public Management (NPM) have brought about several changes that have affected the field of political-administrative relations (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). The conservative Weberian view of how public policies are formulated and executed, based on solid demarcation, has changed significantly. Instead, more hybrid interactions between policy and administration have emerged in the world of work.

The classic Weberian model of the dichotomy between policy masters and permanent civil servants implied that policy formulation was the sole responsibility of politicians, while implementation rested on the shoulders of public servants, with a strict division of labor with no overlap of functional areas (Weber, 1972; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockham, 1981).

In the real world, however, the relationship between politics and administration has changed in several ways. In this context, it has been argued that the hybrid model of interaction between professional bureaucrats and politicians has been favored over the classic dichotomous relationships between the two. It can be concluded that the roles of politicians and public servants are intertwined in the course of policy making and implementation.

At the same time, since the emergence of the modern form of politics and administration, the nature, form, and extent of the interaction between bureaucracy and politics have remained a topic of intellectual debate. It has been argued that the debate between practitioners and theorists in the field of public administration has been a key issue in the discipline since the emergence of political systems in their modern forms. In other words,

scholars have found that the nature of the relationship between elected politicians and elected bureaucrats (both de jure and de facto) has significant implications for the nature, processes, and practices of governance and the development of society in general. It is believed that a positive and mutually beneficial interaction between politicians and administrators increases the legitimacy and efficiency of government, while an adversarial relationship between them can lead to ineffective governance and a loss of legitimacy of government itself. Thus, it is the forms and nature of the interaction between the two entities that determine citizens' perceptions and understandings of public service and government (Tony, 2001).

In this regard, some scholars concerned with the relationship between the civil service and politics are eager to find institutional mechanisms to limit the seemingly infamous power of the bureaucracy to its normative boundaries. On the other hand, other scholars are interested in addressing the extended political interventions in the spheres of professional officials that can kill innovation and creativity if normative boundaries are not set (ibid.).

However, despite continued research into the nature, forms, extent, and characteristics of the relationship between political leaders and public administrators, no research finding is considered definitive in establishing a normative boundary between the two.

Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (1981, cited in Tony, 2001) explain policy-administration relations in the course of policy making using four explanatory pictures. The first picture is policy/administration, which represents the traditional policy-administration dichotomy introduced by classical administrative scholars such as the German sociologist Max Weber. According to the first explanation given regarding the interaction between politics and administration, politicians are responsible for policy-making, and implementation is left to professional bureaucrats. The second picture is that of facts/interests, which states that the involvement of officials in policymaking is limited to the provision of facts and knowledge based on neutral expertise.

In this regard, policymakers are primarily concerned with values and broader policy alternatives. The third picture (energy/equilibrium) asserts that the policy-making process

requires the participation of both officials and politicians, but in different dimensions. It affirms, "While politicians articulate broad and diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organized clientele." According to the third picture, which describes the relationship between politics and administration, politicians are seen as impulse generators, while civil servants are seen as stabilizers. The fourth picture is a pure hybrid. This view of relations between politics and administration is in direct contrast to the traditional politics-administration dichotomy perspective. According to the pure hybrid model, the classification or separation between the roles of politicians and civil servants in policy-making processes gradually disappears. Rather, the two groups converge as policy formulation proceeds. Convergence between the two groups is greatest at the level of senior civil servants.

Despite the common perception of the civil service as a monolithic "structure," its characteristics, structure, and operating principles and procedures can vary considerably from country to country. The nature of the relationship between politicians and civil servants may change due to changes in the prevailing political ideology of the time or major changes in political leadership. Therefore, the way the political sector interacts with the (public) administration is influenced by many variables, ranging from the political-administrative culture in a country to various sector-specific characteristics.

In the following, the nature and practices of political-administrative relations are described and reviewed from different theoretical perspectives.

i. The Constitutional Approach

The design and development of the constitutional approach to politics-administrative relations were influenced by two documents, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 and the Haldane Report of 1918, both of which predated Irish independence. The Report on the Organization of the Permanent British Civil Service (The Northcote-Trevelyan Report) is considered the first document to introduce the merit principle in appointments and promotions, which has been adopted by many other modern states.

The Haldane Report, on the other hand, is based on the principles of merit and permanency for state employees. According to the report, there is a flaw in the process of

policymaking that should ultimately affect civil service members. The Haldane Report, therefore, recognizes the need for close interaction between policymakers (ministers) and professional bureaucrats (civil servants). In other words, the Haldane Report argued for a fusion, rather than a separation, of politics and administration in terms of the roles to be played and the processes to be followed. Indeed, it recommended the partnership approach over the dichotomy (Cormaic, 2016:25).

Nevertheless, Connaughton (2006) argues that nowadays it is widely recognized that the traditional concept of ministerial responsibility itself is no longer acceptable and can no longer serve as the only constitutional standard of accountability. This is seen as one of the main reasons why civil service reform is needed to bring clarity to the relationship between politics and administration.

ii. The Rational Choice Approach

According to rational choice theorists, social decisions in real political reality are not chaotic but stable. This is a reflection of the nature of relations between politics and administration, which can change, but not from one moment to the next. In this respect, institutions play a major role in stabilizing social choices by providing a framework for interactions and articulation of interests among different actors.

The rational choice approach to the study of political-administrative relations assumes that both politicians and administrators act primarily in ways that maximize their respective benefits or interests. In the earliest form of this interaction, bureaucrats aim to maximize the budget, while politicians do everything they can to get reelected and expand their political power. Later theorists, however, confirmed that the current interests of bureaucrats are equally complex, involving an interest in shaping the office rather than simply maximizing the budget. In any case, the primary motivation behind political-administrative relations is the maximization of self-interest, which in turn forms the basis for the rational choice approach (Richards and Smith, 2004, as cited in Cormaic, 2016:28).

The rational choice approach takes a positivist approach to observing the interaction of ministers and bureaucrats. According to this approach, rules, regulations, practices, and

their respective institutions are static. This means that the manner, nature, and forms of the political-administrative relationship determine the nature and practices at the institutional level. In other words, institutional instructions and their characteristics are expressions of the characteristics of policy-administration interactions.

In this context, Scott (2001) identifies the following five concepts that summarize what institutions stand for:

- iii. "Institutions are social structures that have achieved a high degree of resilience";
- iv. "Institutions by definition imply stability, but are subject to processes of change, both incremental and discontinuous";
- v. "Institutions are transmitted through different types of vehicles, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts."
- vi. "Institutions operate at multiple levels of competence, from world systems to localized interpersonal relationships";
- vii. "Institutions are composed of cultivated-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.

According to Hood and Lodge (2006, cited in Cormaic, 2016), two principles in the literature address abstract modeling. The first category is referred to as "first principles literature" which deals with abstract modeling. The second category of work by the theorists of the rational choice approach has been referred to as "institutional public choice," which deals with more practical, applied, simple analysis. Proponents of the rational choice approach see political leaders and public officials in a "prisoner's dilemma game" in which both parties have the opportunity to cheat. In other words, some scholars have categorized the work of rational choice approach advocates. The rational choice approach uses positivist methods to make assumptions about the behavior of groups of individuals and then make assumptions about society as a whole, which in many cases is a very inexact science. Institutional public choice, however, has had more success because its proponents have conducted detailed studies of how democratic systems work in a more practical way (Dunleavy, 2002:2).

It can be deduced that the relationships between political leaders and professional officials are based on the self-interest of each party. The basic idea of political masters is to expand their political power through re-election, which cannot be achieved without the help of civil servants. Politicians' promises are translated into action by bureaucrats. On the other hand, civil servants follow the orders and instructions of politicians because they are also self-centered - they want to achieve more power, prestige, salary, and the amount of the available budget. In the same way, politicians take the initiative to reform the civil service intending to accelerate it to their political advantage. The same endeavor could serve as an opportunity for civil servants who are technically capable of planning, designing, and implementing reform measures. It is possible, then, for senior civil servants and politicians to overstep the mark aiming to facilitate the implementation process. This is where the controversial issues come in, as things are not limitless in democratic systems.

iii. The Materialist Approach

Perry Anderson (1964) and Tom Nairn (1977) developed the materialist approach that portrays civil servants as representatives of particular class interests historically associated with the development of the British state (Richards and Smith, 2004:779).

Anderson (1964 cited in Richards and Smith, 2004:780) saw the modern civil service as one that emerged in the mid-19th century, with civil servants at that time acting largely as servants of ministers rather than servants of the state.

iv. The Interpretive Approach:

According to Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller (2003b:191; 2003b:192), analyzing the meanings, beliefs, and culture behind social and for our purposes-political practices is the core concept of the interpretive approach. Although the interpretive approach is objective, it does not completely reject the positivist approach to the study of political systems and discourse between politicians and professional officials. Rather, he views the positivist approach as complementary to the objective approach. As for the interpretivist approach, political actions cannot be explained by legal definitions alone; rather, they must be studied in terms of behaviors, human actions, and interactions. This, in turn, can

help to understand the real meaning behind these human interactions and behaviors. The core of the interpretive approach, then, is the interpretation of beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas.

However, unlike the rational choice approach, in the interpretive tradition, there are no pure experiences that are one-dimensional and unaffected by their social environment. Actors may therefore have different beliefs about their social environment that influence their behavior.

v. The Public Service Bargain (PSB)

Notwithstanding the long period (150 years) that academics and practitioners have spent studying the relationship between politicians and career civil servants, the bargaining perspective in the study of the interaction between politics and administration is a recent phenomenon. In 1973, Schaffer attempted to examine the relationships and roles of politically appointed ministers and career civil servants in Britain from a bargaining perspective. According to Schaffer, civil servants have the task of providing factual and technical advice to their political superiors (ministers or secretaries) based on political neutrality or independence. They (civil servants) do this in return for official security and privileges (Hood, 2000a; Hood and Lodge, 2006; Houlberg Solomonsen, H. and Knudsen, T, 2011; Hood 2002; cited by Cormaic, 2016).

More recently, the consideration of the interaction between politics and administration, building on Schaffer's idea, has been advanced mainly by Christopher Hood. According to Hood, the notion of a public service bargain (PSB) involves an agreement between the two coexisting actors in the political-administrative system that relates to their respective responsibilities, roles, and entitlements within the system. According to Hood (2000a:8), this agreement can be either implicit or explicit and established through informal rules and guidelines or barely through conventions or a mixture of both. In his contributions, Christopher Hood challenges the understanding of the political-administrative relationship based on hierarchical and formal rules and guidelines, including Weber's concept.

Hood concludes that there is no single model that is universally applicable in dealing with political-administrative relations. Similarly, the public service bargain approach has various sub-approaches that depend on the context. Therefore, different countries, institutions, and environments require different types of PSB approaches.

On the other hand, PBS has been divided into two classifications, namely Trustee Bargains and Agency Bargains. In the trustee bargain PBS approach, career civil servants are considered trustees who serve the general public without any formal legal framework between them. In other words, public officials are not directly elected by the people but are responsible for providing goods and services to the citizens of the country. Therefore, their accountability is not limited to ministers or political superiors, but they are subject to the interests of the general public. The difference, however, is that the relationship between politicians and civil servants is governed by a formal legal contract. There is no formal legal framework for the interaction between bureaucrats and citizens in general.

The second type of public service bargain approach is the agency bargain, which governs interactions between political power holders, technically called principals, and civil servants (agents). The agency-bargain model has been adopted from the principal-agent model, which derives from rational choice theory. In this framework, career civil servants are accountable only to the political executive, and politicians in turn are ultimately accountable to voters as principals. In this respect, ministers are accountable for the actions of civil servants. Consequently, the political executive oversees the actions of civil servants, i.e., the authority. The careers and salaries of public servants are subject to a mechanism of control by the political masters or principals. Nevertheless, constitutional provisions protect civil servants from arbitrary treatment by their employers (ibid).

vi. The Institutional Approach

Before providing the conceptual explanation for the Institutional Approach to Politico-Administrative Relationships, it seems appropriate to briefly deal with the literal meaning of the concept “institution”. In this regard, Scott (2001 as cited in Brans, Schreurs, Steen, and Vandenabeele, 2011) puts the conceptualization of “Institution” into five dimensions. These are:

- i. “institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience”
- ii. “institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous”
- iii. “institutions are transmitted by various types of carries, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts”
- iv. “institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to localized interpersonal relationships”
- v. “institutions are composed of cultured-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”

The social-structural dimension of an institution implies that institutions and people are inseparable. In other words: Institutions are made by people, and their functioning takes place in a social environment, i.e. institutions are created and run by people. Moreover, the idea of resilience states that institutions depend on the path of interdependence, i.e., once a certain chain of action is established, the administrative relationship is inevitable and reproduces itself in the course of action (Offe, 1995:52).

On the other hand, the second aspect of institution shows the inevitability of the impact of institutional heritage on the evolution and development of human organizations and their interaction. Heritage determines the nature and pattern of political-administrative relations in institutions. Institutional recourse to the past provides stability to the present structure, but does not prevent change; rather, it determines the pace of future change (Nielsen et al., 1995:5).

The third dimension of institutional conceptualization is the extension of the second aspect, i.e., the transfer or transformation of an institution from one mode of operation to another requires succession. The fourth dimension states that political-administrative relations take place at different levels; thus, they can be said to be pervasive. The fifth and final dimension of the concept of institution shows that institutions contain pillars or a larger value framework that governs institutional functions from a bigger-picture perspective. Broadly speaking, there are three pillars in institutions. These are the

cognitive-cultural, the normative, and the regulative pillars. These pillars are not unidirectional; each has both formal and informal aspects (Soctt, 1995).

Within this framework, political leaders and senior officials (technically referred to as political-administrative relations) interact to pursue their respective goals from different perspectives. That is, political masters, do their best to maintain their political power, while civil servants in general and senior bureaucrats aim to maximize material benefits and enhance their professional standing and dignity.

The institutional approach to policy-administration relations is thought to stem from resource dependence theory. In this context, Pollitt et al. (2001, cited in Clarke, 2013:29) argue that various contextual factors influence the professional discretion or autonomy of bureaucrats and political control by political superiors or principals. Nevertheless, the institutional aspect of political-administrative relations plays a major role because it captures the fluidity and dynamics of socio-political interaction

In summary, the institutional approach provides a relevant explanation for describing and analyzing political-administrative relations between politicians and senior officials.

2.4. The Quality of ‘politico-administrative relations’

Separating politics and administration as per the classical authorities such as Weber and Wilson is hardly possible, yet it is recognized as an ideal scenario in political and administrative practices. The amelioration is to democratic politics that can address dilemma situations in order and diversity. Practices related to where public discussion and criticism, opposition, regulated competition, and conflicts are tolerated, even encouraged, and institutionalized are subject to argument (Olsen and Peters, 1996). Hence, properly addressing these debates determines the qualities of relationships between politics and the civil service in a given polity.

Scholars argue that ensuring quality ‘politico-administrative relationships require mutually beneficial guiding principles. In this regard, Brans et al (2011:25) have stated four principal guidelines that govern the relationships between politics and administration to be healthy and ultimately improve the quality of public services.

One of the principles is mutual trust and loyalty. They believe that mutual trust and loyalty between political masters and bureaucrats will lead to a mutually respectful and harmonious interaction between the two. This healthy interaction between the two parties is believed to lead to the establishment and practices of good politics-administration relationships in general and between politics and civil servants at the top. The second guideline necessitates both parties both politicians and administrators to come to terms with the goal of public service. Differently put, cooperation between the two is needed to ultimately serve the public at large. Hence, the two parties should agree on cooperating to serve the public interest as a common goal.

The third principle is related to symmetrically sharing pertinent information between the two parties. Hence, according to this guideline, there should be no hidden agenda as far as the relationship between the two is concerned.

Last but not least, there is a principle related to the importance of hiring public servants with the necessary level of expertise. Agreeing on this particular principle is needed to ensure that it would be possible to achieve the expected policy outcomes without deviation and frustration. Therefore, agreeing on the standard level of competence that the public servants should own helps in avoiding the doubtful relationship between politics and administration.

The relationship between politics and administration is not free from frictions and controversies. Nevertheless, if proper guiding principles governing the relationships between the two are set and put into practice, it would be possible to minimize the level of friction and doubts facing the two parties. On the other hand, the presence of the abovementioned guiding principles may prove the relevance of the Weberian idea of written rules and regulations (formality) governing interactions in organizations.

The research at hand investigates the relationships between the elected or assigned political masters and the civil service elites working at ministerial, agency, and commission levels in the course of civil service reform. In other words, the research under consideration is intended to analyze the controversial issues challenging the discourses interactions between politics and administration in general and the political

masters and the civil servant at the top. These controversies appear in the course of initiating, designing, implementing and evaluating civil service reform packages and tools. In nutshell, this research deals with dilemmatic issues steaming legality, truthfulness, professional standards, and political neutrality perspectives.

The extent of intermarriage between politics and civil service is always arguable and contentious among practitioners and academicians in the field. In other words, the relationship between politics and administration has been the most notorious and disreputable notion in public administration. Indeed, at the core of public administration is the interaction between civil servants on one hand and politicians and the public at large on the other hand. The nature of that relationship determines each party's role, which is a subject of considerable debate that existed for more than a century (Reza and Musavi, 2011). Hence, the politics–administration dichotomy “debate” must be the most slippery intellectual issue in public administration (Svara, 2008).

The Federal Civil Service in the USA used to have some element of professionalism before the presidency of Andrew Jackson, who pioneered the spoil system that he called “to the victors belong the spoils.” Public service employment was considered to be a reward for the affiliates of the political party in power. However, the Jacksonian systems resulted in wastage of resources, inefficiency, and corruption across the board. In an attempt to cure the problems of the Spoils System, Woodrow Wilson introduced the politics-administration dichotomy. He believed that a clear separation of roles as policy formulation (politics) and policy execution (administration) would lead to public service efficiency and stability of the administration. Frank Goodnow supported the idea of the politics-administration dichotomy. Nevertheless, the occurrence of the Great Depression has called for more improvement in the public service, which in turn necessitated the extended role of civil service. Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson introduced a reform called Great Society that has two dimensions, i.e., social justice and public improvement (Marc and Schwester, 2011)

Thenceforth, the introduction of the Welfare State, which is characterized by its emphasis on redistributive policies, enhanced the roles of the civil service to an extended level.

During the period, the solid separation between politics and administration was contended to be unrealistic, and Public Administration was perceived to be a combination of politics and management (Gabrielian, 1998 cited in Marc and Schwester, 2011). In the same line of thought, Appleby (1949 cited by Marc and Schwester, 2011) said that “arguments about application of policy are essentially policy arguments”.

Moreover, it has been argued that Public Administration research was grounded in political theory (Waldo, 1984). Long (1949, cited in Marc and Schwester, 2011) contended that “the lifeblood of administration is power”. These arguments underscored that public agencies (civil service) need to cultivate a clientele approach to ensure political survival. Hence, Waldo was not critical of the politics-administration dichotomy at its face value, but he was against the spirit of rigid or solid separation or demarcation between politics and administration (Svara, 2008).

“There is no doubt that the development of administrative agency in response to modern legislative need has placed severe strain on the separation of powers principles in its pristine formation” Byron White (1998; cited in Marc and Schwester, 2015).

Furthermore, Herbert Simon (1947/1997) demonstrated that facts and administrative realities drive not only how decisions are made but also how values are formed. Yet, some scholars oppose the extended role of the bureaucracy. Alan Keyes, a political activist said that “bureaucrats are inherently antidemocratic. Bureaucrats derive their power from their positions in the structure, not from their relations with the people they are supposed to serve. Rather, the people are not the master of the bureaucracy, but its clients” (Marc and Schwester, 2011).

In this regard, the different expectations put on the civil service may lead to confusion. On the one hand, civil servants are required to be loyal to the political executive and party-politically neutral and demonstrate professional integrity on the other hand. These two requirements create a contradiction. Hence, the dilemma situation that Civil Service Elites face in the course of Civil Service reform stems from this reality of contentious relationships between political and civil service elites.

Indeed, this research commenced by recognizing the nature of relationships between politics and administration. In other words, the researcher was instigated by more than a century-long debate on the interaction between politics and bureaucracy. Yet, studying the relationships between the descriptively was not the aim of the research at hand, it rather, investigates the dilemma situation that civil service elites face during CSR while attempting to deal with their responsibilities within the frameworks of normative limits of the law, professional standards, the principle of truthfulness, and political neutrality.

The Images of Relationships between Politicians and Civil Servants

“The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert,’ facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration.”

(Weber 1958)

Despite the common view of some scholars that the civil service is a monolithic structure, its characteristics, structure, and operating principles and procedures can vary widely from country to country. The nature of political-administrative relations may change due to changes in the prevailing political ideology of the time or important changes in political leadership. Therefore, the nature of interactions between the political sector and the civil service is influenced by many variables, ranging from the political-administrative culture in a country to various sector-specific characteristics (Sevic, 2001:2).

In this context, research indicates that two contradictory processes are at work concerning the relationship between politicians and civil servants. In some countries, political control over the civil service is increasing to ensure that civil servants embrace the new policy changes, while in others this control appears to be loosening to enable the public administration to adapt to the changes through institutional capacity (ibid.).

According to Hojnacki (1996; cited in Hacek, 2006:165), there are two basic configurations for the relationship between politicians and public servants. These are:

1. Politicians, in pursuing their political goals, seek to dominate civil servants, who have lost much of their independence and are merely instruments in their hands; and (2) civil servants seek to maintain a high degree of autonomy or independence and power, which they use in pursuing their goals as opposed to those of politicians.
2. The relationships between politicians and administrators can be interpreted based on their roles and responsibilities. This section presents the four continua or interpretations of the roles and responsibilities of politicians and public officials.

i. Image I: Policy/Administration

The Image I of Politics-Administration Dichotomy emerged in the last half of the nineteenth century, as the Weberian distinction between professional bureaucrats and party politicians was itself crystallizing (Aberbach and Rockman, 1981).

The first image represents the traditional “policy-administration dichotomy” of Wilson and Weber (Patrick, 2012:114). This image is a description of the earliest theory concerning the relationships between politicians and administrators, which in many ways was the simplest one. It entails that politicians make policies and civil servants execute them. In other words, politicians make decisions; civil servants are in charge of merely implementing them. An early generation of progressive reformers emphasized the sharp distinction between the spheres of politics and administration.

Woodrow Wilson, for example, wrote:

“Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions... The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics... It is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting-house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product.”
(Richard, 1985).

Woodrow Wilson argued that there should be a clear distinction between the spheres of politics and administration-the classic view of the relationship between politics and administration. Politics is responsible for dealing with public opinion, the work of

political parties, legislation, and the clash of different values and opinions. According to the classical school of thought, "administration" was viewed as the neutral implementation of public policy by public officials impartially and technically, referred to as the master-servant relationship (Waldo, 1968, as cited in Cameron, 2003:55).

In addition, Goodnow said that "the functions of the state are naturally divided into the expression of the public will (politics) and the executions of that will (administration)." Luther Gulick added that these functions must remain institutionally separate: "We are dealing with two heterogeneous functions, 'politics' and 'administration,' the combination of which is not possible within the structure of the administration without producing inefficiency. This picture shows the division of labor between politics and administration, which highlights the dazzling authority of politicians and cloaks the roles of bureaucrats in gray robes of anonymous neutrality (ibid.).

Classical scholars of public administration have tried to separate politics and administration as much as possible for normative and practical reasons. They tend to view the reality of government as bifurcated, that is, as policy and administration. In analyzing the interaction between politics and administration, they have used the functional approach. Wilson called it "the task for administration", while the role of public administration was to provide neutral expertise to the political process (Tansu Demir, 1993).

The challenge for Image I, however, is that the dichotomy of politics and administration is neither desirable nor possible, as even the pioneers Wilson and Weber admitted. Politicians bring broader policy ideas and goals to the table, but if not all, most politicians lack the expertise and experience to translate those policy ideas into concrete plans, implement them, and analyze the unexpected developments throughout the action and the period. Weber saw this very clearly: "Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always supreme. The 'political master' finds himself in the position of a 'dilettante' facing the 'expert,' the trained official who is in charge of the administration." In other words, Image I assumptions, such as the extent of the hierarchy of authority, the simplicity of decision-making, and the effectiveness of political control

over the civil service, are unrealistic (Aberbach and Rockman, 1981). Thus, at least at the higher levels of government, Image I is not sufficient to explain the division of labor between politicians and administrators.

ii. The Image II: Facts/Interests

The emergence of Image II the policy-administration dichotomy dates back to the first half of the twentieth century. The first image dates from the mid-twentieth century and allows for the role of officials in policymaking to some extent. The second picture, which relates to policy-administration relations, shows that both politicians and civil servants contribute to policy formulation, but in different ways. In this regard, politicians contribute politically valuable values and interests, while civil servants contribute knowledge and empirical facts that serve as input to the policy formulation process. Therefore, politicians' main focus is on policy responsiveness in terms of the constituency, while bureaucrats' focus is on efficiency from a technical perspective and customer satisfaction (Aberbach and Rockman, 1981).

In other words, the second typology of the policy-administration dichotomy shows that the contributions of politicians and civil servants to the policy formulation process differ in terms of their rationality and the nature of their respective policy contributions (Patrick, 2012:114).

As reflected in Figure II, the work of politicians reflects a conception of the public interest based on the right of competing interests to put forward their claims, while the role of public officials involves a comprehensive understanding of the public interest based on objectively established standards and informed judgment (Aberbach and Rockman, 1981).

iii. The Image III: Energy /Equilibrium

The "image III" was taken from the writings of the last decades and grants a more "political" role to the officials. According to image III, policy-making and politics are the concerns of both politicians and civil servants or professional bureaucrats. Both participate in the processes of policy formulation and policy discourse at different levels.

The difference between the two, however, is that politicians are concerned with the broad and diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, while bureaucrats are concerned with conveying the narrow and focused interests of an organized clientele.

It can be inferred that politicians are partisan, passionate, idealistic, and ideological, while bureaucrats, in contrast, are centrist, prudent, practical, and pragmatic. The goal of politicians is to attract attention, raise innovative issues, and create a stimulating or conducive environment for the political system, whereas bureaucrats tend to sit in the back room and are concerned with managing incremental adjustments and ensuring political balance. The picture from III shows that the distinction is even fuzzier and that the two groups differ primarily in their style of engagement (Aberbach and Rockman, 1981 Patrick, 2012:114).

According to Aberbach and Rockman (1981), senior officials' sensitivity to political interests is necessary and part of their job. However, the types of interests to which civil servants are sensitive tend to be quite narrow, as their world is usually defined by departmental boundaries. Thus, the role of civil servants is to register the outcome of the parallelogram of organized political forces.

The assumption of aggregation of administrative interests by Image III has three limitations. These are:

2. Mainly, the unorganized interests are ignored;
3. Bureaucrats do not usually bridge the divides between functional areas because they deal with a narrow and specialized clientele; and
4. Bureaucrats usually take the existing parallelogram of political forces for granted, while politicians can and often do relax this constraint.

iv. The Image VI: The Pure Hybrid

Image VI demonstrates how the traditional distinction between politicians and civil servants has virtually vanished. The "image VI" emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The realization of "Image VI" has led to a so-called pure hybrid. In this case, ministers (political masters) simultaneously assume two roles: internally as civil servants or administrators and externally as political leaders (Aberbach and Rockman,

1981). The VI image represents a situation in which the political and administrative roles are intertwined and merged into the same official. In other words, the IV image represents a situation where the political and administrative roles and tasks merge and overlap (Patrick, 2012:114).

The fourth typology of the politics-administration dichotomy is seen as a complete intertwining of political leaders and civil servants at a given time, or the movement of senior officials from administrative positions to political positions and sometimes back again. In short, the IV image represents the bureaucratization of politics and the politicization of bureaucracy (Lee and Raadschelders, 2008:429; Aberbach and Rockman, 1981).

Image IV has three (3) types. These are:

1. Image IV-1: represents the reactive career bureaucrats;
2. Image IV-2: the proactive civil servants who operate as policy professionals and who exercise cross-cutting gamesmanship; and
3. Image IV-3: the proactive, party-political bureaucrats with corner-fighting gamesmanship (Ibid).

From picture IV about the roles of politics and administration, it can be deduced that due consideration must be given to the state of fusion between the two. The overlapping roles and responsibilities of politics and administration can exacerbate the complexity of public sector tasks if proper coordination and management are not ensured. In such an environment, both politicians and civil servants must acquire the highest level of expertise and demonstrate genuine commitment.

v. The second Typology of Politics-Administration

Guy Peters (1987 and 1988) presented the five typologies of the politics-administration dichotomy. The first one is the Formal-Legal model. The formal/legal typology of the politics-administration dichotomy developed by Guy Peters denotes the classical politics-administration dichotomy relating to the one introduced by Woodrow Wilson. The second model typology is the ‘village-life’ model.

According to the ‘village-life’ model, civil servants and politicians work and live together and they constitute a cohesive single elite community at the apex of the hierarchy in government. The functional village-life model is the third typology of the politics-administration dichotomy. Except for the fact that here there are numerous “villages” that correspond to various operationally differentiated public policy sectors, the third model is very much similar to the preceding “village-life” model. The fourth typology is the ‘adversarial’ model. Different from other models, the adversarial model of politics-administration dichotomy depicts a situation in which antagonism and conflict prevail between the two actors. The fifth and final one is the Administrative State Model. The administrative state model of politics-administration dichotomy represents a situation where civil service dominates the political actors, and hence it is squarely contrary to the formal/legal model (Patrick, 2012:114). Table 2.1 below presents the features of the five models.

Type of relations	Tone	Winners	Conflict resolution	Style	Impacts
Formal-Legal	Integrative	Politicians	Command	Authority	Variability
Village life	Integrative	Both	Bargaining	Mutuality	Management
Functional village life	Integrative	Both	Bargaining	Expertise	Interest dominance
Adversarial	Adversarial	??	Power	Conflict	Variability
Administrative State	Integrative	Civil Service	Abdication	Expertise	Stability

Table 2.1. Characteristics of the second typologies of politics-administration relationships (Ideal-Type Models of Interactions)

Source: Peters (1988).

The five typologies of the dichotomy of politics and administration that Peters presents, however, cannot reduce the complexity and confusion of the relations between politicians and civil servants.

vi. The third typology of Politics-Administration (Principal-Agent Model)

Waterman and Meier (1998) have attempted to extend the principal-agent theory concerning the interaction between politicians and public officials. The principal-agent theory is based on three (3) dimensions - (1) goal conflict/consensus between politicians and officials, (2) high or low information level of politicians, and (3) high or low information level of officials (Patrick, 2012).

The last comprehensive typology of the politic and administration dichotomy was developed and gradually refined by Svara.

1. Dichotomy-Politics-Duality Model-Administration Dichotomy: Svara held that four functions characterize the relationship between politics and administration: Mission, Policy, Administration, and Administration. However, he considered that although there is a distinction between mission and management, it is integrated with management and administration (Svara, 1985, cited in Patrick, 2012: 115).
2. The complementarity model of the politics-administration dichotomy: was developed based on the degree of administrative independence and the degree of political control by elected politicians over the civil service or administration. Both administrative autonomy and political control by elected political executives can be classified as high or low. It envisions a government with complementary and cooperative relationships among officials that reflect democratic accountability and professionalism (Svara, 1998:53).
3. The dichotomy between politics & the executive: the third model is based on political control over the civil service & the distance & differentiation between them.

2.5. THE CORE VALUES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE DUTIES OF CIVIL SERVICE

According to Buchanan and Millstone (1979, cited in Tina Nabatchi, 2011:2), public administration is a field in which values not only play a role but also regularly lead to conflicts and dilemma situations where there is no clear winner or easy solution. Therefore, individual officials, administrative agencies, public administration scholars,

and the public sector, in general, play an important role in resolving such dilemma situations.

Although different camps of scholars sometimes advocate that one value or set of values dominates the others, most hold the more catholic view that multiple values are relevant guides to scholarship and practice, and that part of the complexity of public administration is finding an appropriate balance" (Ibid). The subsection deals with the review of the main values of public administration and the role that officials play in addressing the problems of society through the glass of these values.

2.5.1. The Values of Public Administration

The Practitioners and academicians in the field of Public Administration define values and related concepts such as ethics and principles differently. However, in a literal term, 'values' are enduring beliefs that the choices we make from among available as means and ends (Rokeach, 1973 cited by Kenneth, 1994:711).

The degree of adherence to some normative values determines the practice and endurance of good governance in public service. These values govern the operational boundaries of both politicians and civil servants. Preserving them is vital as they ensure the integrity and probity of the civil service in the course of actions taken to modernize the management of civil service to meet the demands of changing times. These values, which all civil servants are expected to share and uphold, include the following:

1. Commitment to the rule of law;
2. Honesty and integrity;
3. Accountability for decisions and actions;
4. Political neutrality;
5. Impartiality in the performance of public duties; and
6. Dedication, professionalism, and diligence in the service of the community.

2.5.2. The Duties for Public Service

According to Christensen et al. (2014), the core of normative limits is to regulate the interactions between parliamentary oversight and self-regulation of officials based on the principle of professionalism. In other words, civil servants' insistence on the merit system helps to strike a delicate balance between their policy responsiveness and the normative boundaries they are expected to respect in fulfilling their duties to serve clients. Civil servants' duties derive from the fundamental values of public administration.

On the one hand, political elites have the democratic right to use the civil service to develop, mediate, and implement public policies, which allows them to exert political influence on social development. However, such a prerogative is not unlimited. In other words, the civil service must loyally serve politicians, but not act as party politicians themselves (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018).

Building and reforming a modern civil service and professional bureaucrats require adherence to some general administrative principles and generally accepted core values of public administration. These principles and values must be enshrined in legal documents and recognized and respected by public servants in the performance of their duties, including the implementation of civil service reform (ibid.).

In short, public servants must essentially operate in a subordinate position to democratically elected officials and are expected to be responsive to the political agenda and policy goals of their governments. "Elected politicians have a legitimate interest in controlling what government organizations do," Dahlstrom claims (Dahlstrom and Niklasson, 2013 cited in Bischoff, 2018:66). However, the extent to which political leaders can exercise control over civil servants varies considerably across countries and policy areas even within a given public institution. Some enjoy a high degree of autonomy, while others may be forced to operate under more direct political control (Peters and Pierre, 2001, Yesilkagit and van Thiel, 2008, cited in Bischoff, 2018:66).

2.5.2.1. Civil servants' duty of legality

The job description of the civil servant includes the duty to be responsive to political elites and to strive to comply with Normative Limits of the law. However, civil servants may face a dilemma between complying with legal obligations and other core values such as "efficiency" and "effectiveness" (Bischoff, 2018). Therefore, both civil servants and political leaders must not act against the law; thus, civil servants must advise and assist ministers within the framework of existing written and unwritten laws. Also, civil servants must not provide the support that suggests a violation of existing law. Furthermore, civil servants must refuse any assistance if they receive an unlawful order (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018:488). Officers must choose between complying with the law and keeping their jobs (Hemmer, 2014).

Specifically, officers must act within the boundaries of the law. This is a fundamental principle in a democratic state committed to the rule of law. In this regard, civil servants should ensure legality both in advising political leaders and in executing actions and policy decisions. When civil service decisions are dictated by purely political measures that violate existing rules or are taken without legal authorization, civil servants must influence political leaders to change existing laws or introduce new laws (Norwegian Ministry of Modernization, 2019).

Furthermore, in 2005, the Ministry stated that ethical and normative limits on the attitude and functioning of civil servants are a prerequisite for ensuring public trust. Therefore, civil servants' compliance with normative boundaries and the existing rule of law would not only help improve the quality of public services but also increase customers' trust in public sector organizations (Christensen and Per, 2011:468).

This duty entails, among others, that the civil service:

- Must ensure that any draft legislation that the Government submits to the sorting does not contradict The Constitution of the country;
- Must ensure that the draft legislation submitted to the parliament or the council of ministers does not contradict the country's international obligations;

- Must ensure that the decisions made by the ministry are by the prevailing law;
- Must not give advice entailing that the political executive makes decisions that contradict the existing law;
- Proposes new statutory and regulatory provisions when necessary to implement the desired resolutions or measures;
- Must give clear notice if the cabinet minister or other superiors give orders that are contrary to the prevailing law.

According to Christensen and Opstrup (2018:488), as political executives are expected to act within the limit of the law, civil servants:

- ✓ Must provide the political executives with advice and assistance under existing written and unwritten law;
- ✓ Should not be allowed to provide assistance that presumes a violation of existing law; and
- ✓ Shall refuse any assistance if they receive an illegal order.

Therefore, the normative limit of Law governs the action and behavior of both politicians and civil servants as they are both required to abide by the law and undertake lawful actions in the public service operation.

2.5.2.2. Civil servants' duty of truthfulness

The second normative limit is truthfulness. Both politicians and civil servants have the duty of truthfulness when producing and/or disseminating information related to the operation of public services. In other words, the information they both produce and disclose to the concerned bodies must be accurate and correct. In this regard, the civil servants:

- ✓ Must not provide assistance implying communication of incorrect information; and
- ✓ Must not provide assistance implying communication of information that is misleading

Hence, the duty of truthfulness should not be the principle of honesty, secrecy, and integrity (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018:488).

The personal attribute of civil servants is of considerable concern in a polity. On the one hand, career civil servants have significant influence over policy outcomes. On the other hand, there is also a concern about bureaucratic responsiveness to elected officials (Golden, 1992).

Therefore, it is possible to infer from the literature that civil servants have the first and foremost duty of truthfulness regarding their relationships with political executives. Also, they must ensure that the agency or ministry or an individual politician does not produce and disseminate misleading information to any other concerned bodies.

2.5.2.3. Civil servants' duty of loyalty

In a modern democracy, civil service plays a critical role in formulating and implementing policies of the government. This entails loyalty of the civil service- a duty of civil servants to the political executives in carrying out public service work following the instructions and directions provided by the political leadership. Civil Servants are often required to demonstrate attributes of political and personal loyalty that are not normally included in the conventional conceptions of competency and yet are often more important than managerial and technical skills and calibers (Hood and Lodge, 2006:110).

Both politicians and civil servants, at all levels, are expected to take some sort of oath or declaration to confirm loyalty when assuming office or position. Indeed, this will help to ensure administrative continuity even when regimes change. Yet, the level of loyalty of the civil servants to the old and new government may not be the same in strict terms, which usually causes a handle to the smooth transition between old and new regimes (Ibid).

Type of Loyalty	Description
'Irritating' loyalty	Acts as a reality checker for rulers
Loyalty to the state and the law	Acts as a semi-autonomous player with loyalty to some higher entity
Loyalty within a specified brief	Acts to pursue defined goals in some limited and revocable space of action
Loyalty as confidant and co-ruler	Acts as interlocutor and collaborator with rulers, with the right to be heard

Table 2.2: The Four Aspects of Loyalty

Source: Hood and Lodge, 2006:111)

Under some situations, civil servants are obligated to remain politically loyal to their political masters in exchange for administrative autonomy or materialistic gain of civil servants. See Figure 2.1 below:




Figure 2.1 some standard features of politicians–Civil Servants ‘public service bargains vis-à-vis loyalty

Source: Hood and Lodge (2006).

2.5.2.4. Civil Service’s duty of professionalism and professional independence

Civil Servants' duty to provide technical assistance and advice to the political elites must not let the accepted professional standards of respective fields at the expense. Indeed, the content of the advice and assistance should rely on the pre-established professional standards relating to the field under consideration. Yet, it has hardly possible to put all civil servants from a particular field of study into a single bracket-there could be some level of acceptable differences. Hence, civil servants must be conscious of the situation involving factual information and established knowledge that may not create controversy

that leaves room for discretion. Therefore, a reference to professional standards must not be used to endow information with professional certainty when this information is based on political preferences for a certain policy or political position Christensen and Opstrup, 2018).

Therefore, there is a conviction that civil servants must act within the framework of generally accepted professional standards where their work appears to reflect professional assessments. In other words, civil servants' duty of professional standards applies to all types of valuation based on professional insight into circumstances and connections that are factual.

2.5.2.5. Civil Service duty of party-political neutrality and objectivity

It entails 'not being biased or taking sides: not favoring one side over another (Caiden, 1996). The concept of "Political neutrality" denotes the impartiality of civil servants in political matters. As per the principle of political neutrality, bureaucrats in their professional capacities of public engagements should not take sides when confronted with political controversies. It requires public servants not involve in activities that may impair or appear to impair their ability to discharge their official duties in a politically impartial manner (Kernaghan, 1986 as cited in Overeem, 2005:313).

In other words, the concept of neutrality entails the possibility of separating politicians from the administrative or public service employees in the government and the politicization of the civil service (Asmarom and Reis, 2016).

Kernaghan conceptualizes, or rather operationalizes, the concept of political neutrality using six general principles to overcome the problem of complexity:

1. Politics and policy are distinct from the administration. Thus, politicians make policy decisions; public servants execute these decisions;
2. Public servants are appointed and promoted based on merit rather than party affiliation or contributions;
3. Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities;

4. Public servants do not publicly express their personal views on government policies or administration;
5. Public servants provide straightforward and objective advice to their political masters in private and in confidence. In return, political executives protect the anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for departmental decisions; and
6. Public servants execute policy decisions loyally and zealously irrespective of the philosophy and programs of the party in power and regardless of their personal opinions. As a result, public servants enjoy the security of tenure through good behavior and satisfactory performance (Kernaghan, 1984; cited in Overeem, 2005).

According to the normative limit of loyalty, civil servants are not allowed to take into consideration their political preferences to influence their assistance to the political executives. Hence, civil servants must maintain a neutral appearance to the public in party political terms that limits:

- ✓ Assistance to the party-political activities of the politicians;
- ✓ Forbids assistance to the political leaders during electoral campaigns, and
- ✓ In the period up to a referendum, they must abstain from the provision of advice and assistance to them relating to the referendum agenda (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018:488).

The top civil servants are not in the same position concerning political neutrality. For instance, Temmes (1997:1) divides top-level civil servants into two. The first category of top civil servants is those who follow the traditional model of neutral civil service. The second category is the political civil servants who use the political functionary model. This categorization is believed to put a balance between political and technocratic influences on public policies. In the real world, it is the interest of every government to have an army of loyal, enthusiastic, hardworking, competent, and trustworthy civil servants who are committed to furthering its causes and faithfully executing its decisions under its command. In other words, there is recognition that competent, professional, and trustworthy civil servants are vital in running the government, proffering sage advice to politicians, and guiding them to get rid of the unwise way of governing or administering a country (Caiden, 1996; Asmarom and Reis, 2016).

While effectively utilizing their charismatic genius, expert civil servants are also required to institutionalize a strong and respected civil service system, which is open enough to all talents to blend the best of tradition with the best of innovation impartially and professionally (Ibid).

Therefore, energetic, and self-effacing civil servants who can work anywhere at any time to the best of their abilities to advance government objectives, promote social stability, and further consolidate government power are the backbone of modern democratic governance. Indeed, acknowledging human foibles, the best bureaucrats should not accept obedience to orders without the autonomy of questioning the politicians. Rather they should be reasonable and judgmental in denying unjust instructions and put the broader vision of the state above the narrow self-interest of any ruling faction (Caiden, 1996:20).

The conditions against which the practices of Civil Service Neutrality are assessed constitute the following:

- ✓ Politics and policy are separated from administration. Thus, politicians make policy decisions; public servants execute these decisions.
- ✓ Public servants are appointed and promoted based on merit rather than based on party affiliation or contributions.
- ✓ Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities.
- ✓ Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on government policies or administration.
- ✓ Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political masters in private and in confidence. In return, political executives protect the anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for departmental decisions.
- ✓ Public servants execute policy decisions loyally and zealously irrespective of the philosophy and program of the party in power and regardless of their personal opinions. As a result, public servants enjoy the security of tenure through good behavior and satisfactory performance (Kernaghan 1976 as cited by Caiden, 1996).

2.5.2.6. Civil service duty of openness and transparency

The UN member states have identified integrity, transparency, and accountability as the core principles of public administration at both individual and collective levels. Here, integrity refers to the trustworthiness and honesty of public servants in the discharge of official duties and responsibilities and countering the act of corruption and abuse of public office and resources.

On the other hand, transparency is conceived as the duty of the civil service to provide unfettered access by the public to authentic and timely information relating to the decisions and performances of the public sector organizations.

Moreover, herein, accountability refers to the obligation on the part of civil servants to report on the usage of resources and answerability for failing to meet the stated performance standards. Even if it is not put explicitly, the desire for transparency has been implied in the founding documents of the UN. More recently, the UN has recognized the need to foster access to information, procurement, and senior-level recruitment. Hence, the member states are required to follow the foot-step of the UN. For instance, South Africa sought to foster transparency by providing the public with timely, accessible, and accurate information (Armstrong, 2005:1).

Concretely, countries are expected to include principles such as transparency into their legal and ethical systems, organizational structures, and administrative procedures to ensure that civil servants will put the interest of the public above their own (Ibid).

2.5.2.7. Civil servants' duty of good public governance and management

Civil servants are required to actively contribute to carrying out the tasks, strategies, and goals established by the political executives. Within the legislative framework, they must comply with the directions they receive from the political elites under the distribution of responsibility in their organization.

Certainly, African bureaucracies are identified to be inefficient and unsustainable. Indeed, mismanagement and corruption of public resources are among the major hindrances to economic recovery in the continent. To overcome these impediments, introducing good governance through reform is highly promoted. Here, the concept of “Good Governance” is referred to as a set of policy measures to transform the “dysfunctional” aspects of public institutions to become efficient and transparent in the course of service provision. The ultimate introduction of good governance through civil reform is the creation of systems of management and self-control to improve “efficiency” and “transparency” (Gerhard, 2009:1).

In social sciences, the use of normative approaches is not to describe what is, but rather what ought to be. In this dissertation too, Normative Limits are chosen, not to sketch the relationship between politicians and civil service elites descriptively, but rather to analyze the opinions of the civil service elites concerning the dilemma situations created in the course of civil service reform (Cochran, 1974 cited in Denhardt and Denhardt, 2015:68). To this end, from the seven broader duties of civil servants, lawfulness, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality are chosen to analyze the dilemma situation they may create for the civil service elites when interacting with the political executives in the course of civil service reform.

Civil Servants are required to adhere to the commands of the political executives-political responsiveness. At the same time, they are also supposed to uphold normative limits such as; law, professionalism, political neutrality, and truthfulness. The conflict between political responsiveness and normative limits creates a dilemma situation.

In other words, in conditions where political executives require one thing that Normative Limits do not allow or stipulate another thing-this scenario creates a dilemma and civil service politicization. In a democracy, politicians are expected to respect normative limits while seeking political responsiveness from the public bureaucrats. This dissertation discusses civil service reform dilemmas-politicization and Normative Limits, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by considering civil service elites working at selected Ministries, Agencies, and Commissions of the Federal Government of Ethiopia.

2.6. THE ESSENCE AND FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL SERVICE

According to John and Eckhart (Editors) (1999:149), the actual impact of true authority is barely the speeches made neither in the parliament nor in the pronouncements of Monarchs, but rather in the way in which the administration works in the routine operations. Hence, in the modern state, this type of authority rests in the hands of professional civil servants. Indeed, progress towards a modern state is measured by the existence and practice of a professional body of officials whose employment, salaries, training, promotions, and responsibility are based on the merit principle. Therefore, it is possible to claim that both the establishment and continuity of a modern state highly hinge on the quality of its administration.

Differently put, Mosher (1982) puts four premises behind the vitality of administration (Civil Service) concerning the democratic type of government. First, decisions by the government and its manner therein have a tremendous significance on the social, economic, and policy aspects of society. Second, appointed civil servants pose a greater influence upon the bulk of decisions and actions taken by the government of the day. Third, the capabilities, orientations, and values of the civil service determine the types of decisions and actions taken in the public sector. The final premise was that the attributes of the civil service rely greatly upon the civil servants' background, training and education, and current affiliations or associations.

Civil Service Values

According to OECD (2008), major institutional values stem from a social partnership that exists between organizations and the society at large. In this regard, civil service is not an exception, i.e., the central values of civil service organizations are derived from the principal values of the community in a particular environment. In other words, civil service is an organization of human and material resources whose ultimate goal is to serve the interests of society. Indeed, civil service organizations, in the course of discharging their responsibilities of serving the public, are expected to adhere to the core values of the intuitions they belong to and the societal values at large. The degree of observance of the core values of the civil service institutions determines the level of trust

average citizens would put in them. Hence, the success of a particular organization barely relies on its technical and material capacities, rather, it also demands genuine adherence to institutional and societal values. This holds as the observance of institutional and societal values provides a framework for the behavior and judgment of individual members of the given civil service organization.

However, many scholars argue that civil services are not static; rather there is continuous conflict over their applicability and compatibility with the major traditions in their neighborhoods. Civil servants learn institutional values from their respective organizations and their predecessors and use what they have learned for further evolution and development. “It is fair to assume, therefore, that the interaction between civil servants and their ministers may on occasions challenge the values of the civil service” (Cormaic, 2016).

The OECD analysis of the U.K.’s government shows that the bridge that unifies diverse institutional operations, behaviors, and practices in a particular organizational setup is the shared values as to leadership and vision of the institution they work in the as fair, equitable, and ethical workplace (OECD, 1996:274).

Nonetheless, Peters (2001:171), states that during the 1980s and 1990s many of the reform efforts were more technical than structural. Instead, there has been a greater prominence of public management, contrary to traditional civil service values, as the means of directing action within organizations.

Differently put, nowadays, in many countries of the world, key values such as civil service neutrality and impartiality are being eroded partly due to internal conflicts. This is the case, especially for those career civil servants at the top who assist the ministers and politicians in policy and program formulation. In principle, these civil service elites with a high level of expertise and experience are supposed to assist politicians while not compromising reasoned and informed views on issues of national and public importance. It is argued that countries with these types of problems face a challenge in the course of reforming the internal organizational structures of their institutions to reduce internal discord among individuals and groups and enhance appropriate behavior and shared

institutional values. This requires the establishment and practices of training, code of conduct, and standards (Ibid).

Furthermore, if strongly adhered to and effectively implemented, civil service values greatly influence the quality of public services provided to both internal and external customers of public sector organizations. Civil service values must be living standards to guide experts, policies, attitudes, actions, and behaviors. These in turn enhance the level of civil servants' responsiveness to both internal and external customers (Daly, 2012).

2.6.1. Competence

Two perspectives are dealing with the politics-administration dichotomy-the normative and the empiricist perspectives. Nowadays, it is from "Weber's normative sense rather than from Wilson's empirical claim that we should derive the contemporary meaning of the politics-administration dichotomy". Also, researches show that for high-level civil servants in federal public service, neutral competence is a matter of a conscious behavioral norm, yet may not always follow in practice (Maranto and Skelley, 1992 as cited by Douglas, 2008:6).

The competency principle requires the hiring and selection of employees based on the person's demonstrated ability and caliber to function effectively in the position he or she currently holds or seeks to assume. More specifically, a person's "qualifications for employment are determined by a combination of educational attainment, position tests that predict a high level of knowledge about the job content, and a demonstration of job skills on the job" (Daly, 2012).

The surfacing of the concept of competency in the practices of human resource management was first evidenced in France in the mid-1980s as an instrument of criticizing the reduction of human resources to barely implementation of servile and mechanical tasks. The move granted the career civil servants operational discretion, which was believed to enhance innovation and creativity in public sector organizations (Jeannot G. and Lichtenberger Y., 2002).

According to the OECD (1996:73), competency forms a base for analyzing the desire for human resource development and evaluating the success of the training programs in a given organization. In other words, competence is not merely the personal quality of an individual employee working for a public sector organization. Rather, it is also related to the idea that recruitment and selection of civil servants should be solely based on the educational expertise and intellectual capabilities of applicants to the post of career public servants in particular. Hence, positions in the public bureaucracy must be filled based on merit principles.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that under some demanding situations, opting for solely merit-based recruitment and selection criteria may be compromised to achieve the goals of public sector organizations (Ibid).

According to William (2005) competent career, civil servants with nonpartisan objectivity character can effectively serve not only the interests of the public at large but also the interests of the political masters at the top i.e., the Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Ministers.

Top-level civil servants' competency and the nature and adequacy of their expertise, knowledge, and capacity is a recurring issue in public administration and a vital theme in the ideas of contemporary reformers about enhancing and modernizing state capacity (Hood and Lodge, 2004:313).

2.6.2. Accountability

According to Bovens (2007), the concept of accountability is one of the golden concepts that anyone does not disregard or go against. It depicts the presence and practices of transparency and dependability of institutions. Yet, 'accountability is an evocative concept (a concept with suggestive power), i.e., it is an elusive concept due to its being multidimensional. Hence, different people define it differently. However, in contemporary political discourse, 'accountability' is seen as equitable and fair governance (Ibid).

Relevant authorities argue that deficiencies of accountability in the public sector organizations undermine the degree of trust in the government institutions and ultimately result in poor performance and corrupt practices at the worst (IPA, 2014:6). Nevertheless, enhancing the level of accountability is not a straightforward engagement as inappropriate kind of it may cause a devastating problem. In this regard, Flienders (2012) stated that there have been cases in which a decrease in the degree of public trust in politics was witnessed despite the enhancements in the level of accountability. In addition, Baroness and O'Neill (2002) consolidate Fliender's idea. She proposed that "the 'quest' for greater accountability is undermining the sense of trust in government and society". Despite these typical cases, many scholars agree on the idea that the absence of accountability causes mistrust and lowers performance (Ibid).

2.6.3. Political Responsiveness

Political executives rely on career civil servants in two vital respects. First, they obtain technical and expert aid in the course of policy formulation and execution. Second, the political executives delegate part of their political responsibility and decision-making authority to civil servants at the top to relieve themselves of the executive burden. Doing this requires the political executive to make the crucial decision as to whether recruit civil servants on the merit principle or political loyalty. In nutshell, it is related to "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service" (Guy and Pierre, 2004).

According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as cited by Willima (2005), expecting civil servants to demonstrate both neutral competence and political responsiveness at the same time may not be realistic to materialize.

Nevertheless, the idea of civil servants' neutral competence has gained a great deal of currency in the literature on public administration regardless of the realization that politics and administration are intertwined in the real world. This implies the inevitability of political responsiveness of the bureaucrats through politicization mechanisms-formal, functional and administrative politicization.

Moreover, it has been contended that enhancing civil service entrepreneurial capability may lead to efficiency but lessens the political responsiveness of the bureaucrats (Cope, 1997).

Despite extensive works by relevant authorities, striking a satisfactory balance between civil servants' neutral competence and political responsiveness often proves to be extremely elusive (Colin, 1987). Therefore, political responsiveness and competence of public servants are among the required values in public service, yet, it is hardly possible to put a viable balance between the two.

2.6.4. Public Responsiveness

According to Daly (2012), the principle of Public Responsiveness requires that civil servants act according to the citizens' best interest. At the political level, the will of the public is expressed and exercised through popular elections. The elected representatives in turn enact policies by articulating the interests of the electorates. In this regard, civil servants' public responsiveness is practiced when they strictly follow the rules, policies, and directions of the elected public officials.

Nevertheless, under some compelling situations, civil servants may act contrary to the provisions of the elected representatives. Demanding exceptional situations include representatives' attempts to evade existing laws, taking actions that serve private interests or gain benefits for themselves at the expense of public interests, and manifesting disrespect to the professional or ethical standards of one's profession. Under these conditions, civil servants confront tougher professional and personal decisions. Yet, they are not any options. One of the recourses is boldly voicing against the anticipated or actual circumstance, i.e. whistle-blowing. The second option is to remain silent while resigning from one's position with the organization. The final recourse is to bring the situation to critical scrutiny and draw leaders' attention to the prevailing matter. To deal with such a perplexing situation, each option necessitates personal courage and strength. (Ibid).

Studies focusing on the factors affecting the public responsiveness of civil service from the dimension of public management are not numerous enough. Rather, much emphasis is

paid to the political responsiveness of civil service. In other words, political responsiveness is either equated with public responsiveness or is taken to be a substitute (Yang and Pandey, 2007).

According to Ostrom (1975 as cited in Yang and Pandey, 2007) responsiveness to citizens at large or, public responsiveness indicates government agencies' capacity to satisfy the needs and wants of the citizens, both customers, and noncustomers.

Public responsiveness has many dimensions. In this regard, Bryer (2007) identified six types of public responsiveness. These are: "dictated responsiveness to elected officials, constrained responsiveness to rules/norms/procedures, purposive responsiveness to administrator-defined goals, entrepreneurial responsiveness to individual customers, collaborative responsiveness to stakeholder consensus, and negotiated responsiveness to conflicting demands." This is the reason that measuring public responsiveness is hardly possible to materialize. Indeed, citizens' responsiveness is a fluid concept and what is satisfactory for one is not for another at the individual, group, and organizational levels.

However, both elected political executives and professional civil servants try to redesign administrative and operational processes to respond to citizens' demands and measure the achievement of greater public responsiveness in their respective jurisdictions (Michael, 2003).

2.6.5. Representativeness

There are two competing schools of thought in public administration. The first school contends or argues that the appropriate structure of civil service leads to representativeness, whereas the second contends that the objective of civil service is professional competence. Both schools are concerned with the interrelationship between the civil service and governance, and any discussion of bureaucratic values is necessarily influenced by the school selected as an approach (Berhanu and Elizabeth, 2006:207).

The concept of bureaucratic representativeness is related to the concept of affirmative action. This holds as the program affirmative action is usually supported by the representation guidelines of different groups of people in the civil service. The program

mostly follows quota or targeted representation. Theories dealing with human resource diversity in government organizations assume that institutions with more representatives of the public they serve are in a better position to foster an inclusive and conducive working environment in which persons from various sections of society can prosper (Andrews and Ashworth, 2014).

The composition and representativeness of civil service or bureaucracy and the degree to which its decision replicates the public interest has been debated among many relevant scholars for a long. It was in 1944 that Donald Kingsley coined the term ‘Representative Bureaucracy’ for the first time. Since then, Kingsley’s book by the title ‘Representative Bureaucracy’ has instigated concern relating to the composition and the extent to which bureaucracy reflects the diversity in the society at large (Jamil and Dangal, 2009).

The concern for representativeness of civil service is based on the postulation that more representativeness in bureaucracy guarantees that decision-making at the bureaucratic level takes into account the diverse interest of the society at large and that intimate linkages are fostered by the involvement or participation of citizens and clients. In other words, a bureaucracy that represents a particular section of the society or groups poses more threat to a democratic system than one with more representation of diversity. Hence, bureaucratic representativeness enhances the level of trust that the public puts on the government and its institutions; thereby permitting the proper functioning of democracy (Ibid).

According to Jamil and Dangal (2009), Kingsley’s concept of ‘representative bureaucracy’ has been extended to mean two things. First, it examines whether the demography of the nation is mirrored in the bureaucracy of the state, i.e., a reflection of the social composition of the society in the bureaucracy. Yet, this is a passive version of representative bureaucracy that contends that “the more representation there is, the greater the likelihood that diverse societal interests will be reflected in bureaucratic decision-making”.

The second and more active version of ‘representative bureaucracy’ necessitates both the inclusion of diverse demographic composition and the holding of values, attitudes, and

norms that enhance the articulation of the generic public interest. This is a proactive perspective of the ‘representative bureaucracy’ and it incorporates a societal interest in the policy formulation. This view highlights the internal dynamics and values of civil service and its attitudes towards politics and citizens. It also demands some form of socialization and indoctrination, whereby a bureaucracy progresses values and norms that are more amiable for democratic decision-making both within that bureaucracy and in the interface with society and politics.

The degree of bureaucratic representativeness affects not only the interest outside the organization but also determines civil servants’ commitment to ensuring responsiveness, i.e., political and public responsiveness. However, investigating the representativeness of the Ethiopian bureaucracy is not the aspect that the research under consideration covers. Yet, it is one of the values of the civil service and the healthy and smooth functioning of the democratic systems and institutions-democratic society.

2.6.6. Social Equity

Social equity emphasizes the fair treatment of all members of society including the public servants themselves. It stresses matters relating to employment that may affect various categories of people including; minorities, women, people with disability, people of color, veterans, and aging employees. More specifically, it deals with recruitment, selection, promotion, training and development, and administrative disciplines. Hence, the Human Resource department should act as a gatekeeper of fair treatment among competing interests (Daly, 2012).

Essentially, Social Equity is a fundamental principle in public administration that entails the broader values of justice and fairness. Merit principles and the social equity canons are considered to be enemies of each other. The proponent of equity doctrines promotes reasonable distribution of opportunities and rewards whereas, the merit camp connotes competitive excellence and elitism.

However, each camp claims to be consistent with the principles of democracy and justice and challenges each other on the same ground. This debate is not recent rather; it has been there in public administration and politics for a long. “The schism between

democratic "Jeffersonianism" and aristocratic "Hamiltonians" is sometimes exploited to shore up respective arguments". The battle between the two is getting fierce. The social equity camp remains to the plaintiffs against the proponents of merit principles (Eugene, 1974).

According to Wise (1990), a deal for the principle of social equity in civil service stem from three dimensions. First, public servants gain material rewards when employed in government offices, which in turn alter living standards at a personal level. In this regard, the composition of human resources in the public sector has implications on the accessibility of rewards and benefits of the civil service to all citizens alike. Second, employment in the public sector provides some unique intrinsic or non-material rewards that the private sector may not offer. The second ground entails the opportunity that public service offers individual bureaucrats for self-realization and attachment to the employer. Third, participation through public employment reflects the nature and practice of political representation substantively. This dimension "conveys the idea that the political system is open and responsive to the people regardless of their social standing or personal characteristics."

In addition, the discipline of public administration gained a real normative base as a result of the quest for social equity. Hence, the relevance of social equity is evidenced in new developments in the field such as New Public Administration, which shows the continuity of the traditional values of public administration. More specifically, social equity flows directly from the values that guided traditional public administration (Frederickson, 2010). Social equity is embedded with other values and principles of both classical and contemporary public administration. See Table 2.3s below:

Values to Be Maximized	Structural Means of Achievement	Managerial Means of Achievement
Responsiveness	✓ Decentralization (political & Administrative ✓ Contracting Neighborhood control over street-level bureaucracies	✓ Routine client interaction with employees and managers ✓ Managerial definition of democracy, including more than responsiveness to elected officials, but also to interest groups and disorganized minorities ✓ Training
Worker & citizen participation in decision-making	✓ Neighborhood councils with the power ✓ Overlapping work groups - Worker involvement in decision processes	✓ Acceptance of an ethic that insists on the right of workers and citizens to participate in those decision processes that affect their lives directly ✓ Training in organizational development
Social equity	✓ Area-wide revenue systems with local distribution systems ✓ Public service outputs and outcomes made equal by social class	✓ Professional codes of ethics spelling out equity ✓ The managerial commitment to the principle that majority rule does not overturn minority rights to equal public services
Citizen choice	✓ Devising alternative forms of services to broaden choice ✓ Overlap ✓ Contracting	✓ Reduction of managerial monopoly over a particular service, such as health care or education
Administrative responsibility for program effectiveness	✓ Decentralization ✓ Delegation ✓ Performance targets	✓ Measuring performance, not only on general organizational standards but also by social class ✓ Measuring performance for whom?

Table 2.3.: Values, Structure, and Management in Social Equity

Source: Frederickson (2010:40).

2.6.7. Employee Rights and wellbeing

Maintaining and practicing employee rights requires a thorough assessment of legal provisions that are pertinent and legitimate and a comparison of the same with other similar stakeholders. Hence, dealing with employee rights is a complex task demanding

procedural and legal preconditions that put human resource managers in the respective institutions under huge responsibility. The decisions to be taken should be sound both on legal and ethical considerations. Besides, the multiplicity of employee rights that employers are supposed to respect and provide makes it demanding and complicated. Employee rights include; among others, the right to a minimum wage, safety and health, due process, and privacy in the workplace (Rowan, 2000).

Employee rights defenders argue that employers and managers while having the right to hire and fire employees “at will”; cannot escape from moral responsibility and justification. Hence, they cannot ignore employees’ rights to take part in corporate-level decision-making (McMahon, 1995 as cited in Radin and Werhane, 2000). The moral foundation of employee rights is desirable as a mere reference to statutes may not cover the complexity of employee benefits and duties in ever-growing and multi-task industries and corporations.

As far as the theoretical review is concerned, it is considered that the present study offers multiple perspectives due to the nature of the theories reviewed. In other words, numerous theories dealing with political-administrative relations in general and with the nature, practice, and dynamics in the civil service have been partly contradictory and partly overlapping.

Thus, Marxist theory and its contemporary theories examined in this thesis have helped to emphasize the criticality of the object of study, i.e. political-administrative relations, with particular reference to the dynamics in the course of civil service reform (CSR).

Marxist analysis usually starts from the assumption that it is the economic factor that creates inequality and serves as a means for the class in the affluent class to gain political power. In contrast, contemporary theories of the civil service in general and the bureaucracy, in particular, assume that political power in itself is the most important, if not the only, factor contributing to the politicization of the civil service.



CHAPTER THREE

META-ANALYSIS OF THE ETHIOPIAN CIVIL SERVICE, ITS REFORM, POLITICIZATION AND NORMATIVE LIMITS: THE EMPIRICAL REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to back up the theoretical review presented in chapter two. Furthermore, the chapter is devoted to a meta-analysis of relevant empirical issues that occurred in the relevant context in general and the Ethiopian bureaucratic landscape in particular. Moreover, the chapter under consideration presented the study's methodological issues.

This section looks at the origins and patterns of controversies surrounding the practice of public service, as well as the evolving realities behind the changing positions of public servants in the course of their daily engagement in general and during the implementation of public service reform programs in particular. In general, the following section outlines how important the civil service is and also how bad it can be if not managed and controlled with some legal frameworks.

3.1. THE ROOTS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM

According to Pyper (1995), the evolution of civil service can be explained as organic development and this holds with the evolution and development of the lawmakers, executives, judiciary, cabinets, and other bodies of the government. In other words, the origin and development of the Civil Service cannot be explained strictly in terms of constitutional setup rather its evolution is obscure and has passed through stagnations, decay, and reforms and restructuring. It has been stated that this organic development of the civil service continues, and more twists and turns surely lie upon the evolutionary path ahead.

Other sources relate the origin of civil service in its modern form with the court servants who accompanied the Saxon Monarchs of Britain during their domestic travels across the

country. Those court servants were officials responsible for raising, recording, and storing on behalf of the government of the day (Central Office of Information, 1995:8).

The origin of public service goes back to human history itself. The secret behind the survival and success of ancient Egyptian civilization dating back to 3000 BC was the existence and contribution of civil service orchestrating this particular work of human civilization. Civil servants prospered and later became the historic model of all bureaucracy. Waterways for civilization required centralized control, which required a gathering of officials. Upon arriving at the site, authorities found a second area of activity in large-scale construction work by military organizations. It was only a matter of time before they took over control of the entire state (Lohit and Vishan, 2018: 32).

However, the origin and development of the civil service in its modern form came into being during the 1850s and the 1920s periods. Hence, until the mid of 19th century, government units and departments were generally independent fiefdoms whose recruitment methods were of various types and in which the prevalence of patronage, favoritism, and corruption as opposed to competency-based meritocracy was evidenced (Pyper, 1995:6).

3.1.1. Types of civil service systems

Civil service as a concept is different for different scholars so are the civil service systems. In other words, civil service systems vary based on the social, economic, political, and cultural contexts of the country. Heady (1996), goes far back to the beginning of the organized political life of human beings to describe the different types of civil service systems. See Table 3.1 below:

Aspects	Ruler Trustworthy	Party- controlled	Policy receptive	Collaborative
Relations to the political regime	Rule responsive	Single party responsive	Dominant party responsive	Military responsive
Socio- economic context	Traditional	Planned or corporatist	Pluralist corporatist	Corporatist or planned
Focus on personnel management	Chief executive or Ministry by Ministry	Chief executive or Ministry by Ministry	Independent Agency	Chief executive or Ministry by Ministry
Qualification requirements	Patrimony	Party patronage or loyalty	Professional performance	Bureaucratic determination
Sense of mission	Compliance or guidance	Compliance or guidance	Policy or constitutional responsiveness	Cooperation or guidance

Table 3.1: Heady’s Configuration of Civil Service Systems

Source: Heady (1996 as cited by Peters, 2021:8)

3.1.2. The Merit System

Conceptually, the merit principle refers to the assignment, selection, retention, and promotion of employees based upon her or their ability to perform and discharge their duties and responsibilities satisfactorily not based upon one’s political affiliation, ethnicity, race, religion, or any other extraneous considerations to the individual’s performing ability (ACIR report cited in Helburn and Bennet, 1972).

As to etymologists, meritocracy refers to rule by those who deserve to rule. From an academic perspective, it entails a combination of education, intelligence, training, effort, and attitude. In other words, the computation ‘IQ + Effort’ denotes education-based merit. Hence, merit is inseparable from professional training, education, and an effort to grow and progress professionally. “Meritocratic models assume that ability can be

quantified, separated from the social context, and attributed to the individual. When operating within this framework, one can define merit in different ways”. However, the definition and measurement of merit are not the same for public and private sector organizations as their management systems significantly differ (De Sario, 2003 as cited in Mateia and Catlin, 2014).

Often legal frameworks strictly regulate the civil service, i.e., recruitment, entry, promotion, career development, and human resource discipline and behavior are regulated by a variety of legal provisions. This generates a boomerang consequence relating to the principles of meritocracy. Yet, this may limit the civil servants’ capacity and discretion to grow by going beyond strict enforcement of the laws and attaining efficiency (Ibid).

Meritocracy presumes those with inborn and established aptitude can be elites in the civil service. In addition, the literature reveals that opting for a merit system has several advantages such as; improving good governance, enhancement of employees’ morale, developing public trust in government institutions, maintaining impartiality through adherence to professionalism and ethical standards, proper execution of public policies and rule of law (Hubbell, 2019).

Differently put, the introduction of merit-based human resource decisions was a cure to the major problems including; temporary contracts and lack of transparency and accountability in the course of hiring, recruitment for political motivation, and poor administration and control over the execution of civil service laws (Ganqu and Shkelzen, 2014).

Technically, a formal setup with a series of procedures put in place to execute the merit principle is a merit system. The essence and establishment of the merit system was the need to overcome the shackles of a spoil and patronage system in which political loyalty was favored over the personal merit of employees in the public sector organizations. “Consistent with the idea of political neutrality, the civil service reforms sought an organizational device which would minimize appointments and in-service activity from political influence ... To ensure its integrity it should be a multi-member body, preferably

representing both political parties so that no single leader might undermine its political neutrality (Mosher, 1968 cited in Helburn and Bennet, 1972).

3.1.3. The Patronage/Spoil System

Employment based on patronage had acceptance since the election of Andrew Jackson as US president in 1828. According to Graham (1968 as cited by Christina, 2008:173), the patronage system that developed after 1945 made the formal personnel system inoperative. The values of economy, efficiency, and rationality could not function in an administrative system responsive to the integrative needs of the political and social systems. Furthermore, they conflicted with the traditional values stressing personal and kinship with more recent ones emphasizing egalitarianism. Yet, by the end of the 19th century, Americans have changed rapidly and the system was challenged. Partly due to changes in the size of organizations in the urban center and partly due to the increase in the growth of formal organizational structure, the desire to employ professional workers grew. The purpose to hire educated and skilled manpower was to bring about efficiency, accountability, and change in the public sector, and to install a system that would address the growing human resources in government organizations (Daly, 2012:9).

In line with this, human resource selection based on patronage was criticized as recruitment and selections exclusively relied on who the applicant knew or affiliated to than what he or she knew in terms of knowledge, skill, and attitude relating to the job under consideration. In other words, selecting applicants for government offices was made as a reward for the applicant's contributions to getting the government elected (Ibid).

The struggle between competence and responsiveness in Public Administration has been a historical one. In the USA, from George Washington to John Quincy Adams- the small bureaucracies of the federal government valued competence and qualification. Nevertheless, the focus on civil service competence shifted in 1828 when Andrew Jackson, who ushered in a new public administration philosophy of the "spoils system" came to power. The vital concern to the spoils system was the belief in a more "responsive" bureaucracy. By the time, President Jackson thought that practically any

individual was capable of executing the “simple” tasks of public management, which were thought to be a matter of “common sense” (Marc and Schwester, 2011:174).

The Spoil system resulted in widespread inefficiency, profiteering, and recurrent scandals. The ill effects of the spoil system were pervasive not confined to the federal level but also throughout the states and local governments. Consequently, the country failed to provide even substandard public service administration. Hence, controlling corrupt practices and waste of resources wastage were the primary challenges. During the post-Civil War period, an efficient and honest government was appealed for by reformers. The prominent personality of the reformers was Woodrow Wilson, the then academia at Princeton University and the future president of the USA. He insisted on a politics-administration separation. Wilson championed a firm separation or a dichotomy between the formulation or determination and implementation of the policy. He believed that policy determination should occur via the political process, while its execution should be in the realm of apolitical administrators only. In other words, the policy stands as an expression of state will through elected officials, and public administrators should execute that expression of state will in a professional, competent, and apolitical manner (Ibid).

3.1.4. The Collective Bargaining System

The practice of collective bargaining is not a recent phenomenon. It was coined by, Beatrice Webb-the pioneer of the British labor movement in 1890. By this time, the bargaining and negotiations between employers and trade unions over wage structure has been established in Britain and several other countries. Since its establishment, collective bargaining has been used as a tool for labor-related matters in both developed and developing nations (Darcy, 2007).

Collective bargaining systems around the globe considerably differ in their attributes across countries. Not only in their characteristics but collective bargaining systems in different countries also varied in the level of coordination in the course of negotiations (Robert, 1999).

Collective bargaining is fundamental in the sense that it emanated from freedom of association and the right to assembly. As to Bruce et al (1991 cited by Koboro, 2014), collective bargaining takes place between employees and management of the organizations in the framework of industrial relations. It is attributed to the earnestness to decide economic, social, and legal matters.

Therefore, collective bargaining is not confined to remunerations and job-related issues. Rather, it includes fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and the right to organize and assemble. It is instrumental to ensure political and economic stability at both micro and macro levels.

Nevertheless, the rights and freedom elements in unionism and collective bargaining have led to the politicization of the practice in most developing countries-from African countries are no exceptions. In this regard, most developing countries have deployed diverse approaches to enact legal frameworks to deal with collective bargaining. Some have suppressed unions' activities, while others have opted for it. Only a few countries in these nations demonstrated a neutral position towards unionism and the practice of collective bargaining. Indeed, the establishment and operation of unions for collective bargaining are vastly politicized in developing countries. On the other hand, unions in developing nations have emphasized political activities than bargaining for the rights and benefits of their respective members (John, 1996).

Hence, the factor behind the politicization of unions and collective bargaining in developing countries stems from both the governments lacking democratic culture and overstretched nature of the unions themselves. Collective bargaining negotiations between employers and workers determine wages, working hours, working standards, and other labor practices. The two main aspects of collective bargaining are the level at which bargaining occurs and the coverage rate. While collective bargaining is not as multifaceted in developing countries as in developed countries, there are still fundamental differences among developing countries in the level of negotiation of collective bargaining and its coverage, with trends also varying.

Moreover, collective bargaining is approached and understood from a different perspective. Some see it from economic or material perspectives and others consider its political aspect. Economists consider collective bargaining as an instrument of facilitating or challenging alterations in the labor market. Oftentimes, collective bargaining follows the footsteps of dynamics and changes in the economic and market circumstances (Bechter and Brandl, 2019).

In a nutshell, “the national embedment of collective bargaining in specific national, economic and political systems and regimes became increasingly influential for shaping distinct national collective bargaining systems. As countries developed differing economic and political systems throughout the 20th century, so too did national collective bargaining systems change.

Indeed, collective bargaining systems proved to be quite adaptable and flexible and have transformed continuously and sometimes even dramatically since their birth in the wake of industrialization” (Bechter and Brandl, 2015 as cited in Bechter and Brandl, 2019).

Proper practice of collective bargaining has several merits. There are four possible outcomes of collective bargaining in the civil service, i.e., reaching a binding collective agreement, legally binding agreements imbedded in legal texts, agreement in the form of political commitment, and other forms of arrangements (Hodges, 1990).

3.1.5. The Affirmative Action

Affirmative Action is a multidimensional concept. Different scholars and institutions define it differently. It is sometimes denoted by rewordings such as ‘positive discrimination or positive action’, ‘corrective action’, or ‘reverse discrimination’ designed to correct historical and legal exclusions.

According to RSA (1998a cited in Omano, 2007), affirmative action can be considered as a counteractive dealing to safeguard the inclusion and representation of all genders, people with disability, races or ethnicities, and other previously excluded groups in the public sector organizations. Relating to equal employment opportunity, Affirmative Action is designed to warrant that a relevant and qualified person from specified groups

is entitled to equal employment opportunities and fairly represented across occupations and levels of human resources of the employer under consideration. In other words, concerning public service, affirmative action is “defined “as ...corrective steps which must be taken so that those who have been historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination can derive full benefit from equitable employment environment” (RSA, 1998b cited by Omano, 2007).

Implementing affirmative action in the public sector is a vital tool used to ensure equity in the distribution of employment opportunities, and symbolizes national commitment to bring description based on gender, color and number to an end and ultimately create responsive and proactive governance. The very essence of introducing affirmative action was to deal with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) concerns (Kellough, 1992).

Discriminations are not uniform across the globe as to the number and backgrounds of the target groups. In line with this, in most developed nations like the USA, discrimination is made against minorities. However, there are instances in most developing countries where exclusion is made against the majority. For instance, the introduction of affirmative action in South Africa was meant to reconsider the vast majority of black people who were the victims of discrimination and exclusions in the past (Kanya, 1997).

3.2. THE POLITICIZATION OF CIVIL SERVICE AND ITS REFORM PROCESSES

The meaning of "politicization" or "professionalization" may vary, as expectations and general knowledge about what the essence of "public administration" or "political neutrality" should be may vary from one time to another and from one country to another. Politicization can be understood in terms of the involvement of administrative staff in genuinely political (though not necessarily party political) activities. Here the concern is with the institutional role of the ministerial bureaucracy in the broader political-administrative system. In this sense, 'functional' or 'institutional' politicization is seen as a consequence of the closely intertwined spheres of the 'political' and the 'administrative' spheres at the ministerial level (Derlien 1985, 1987, 1996, and Peters and Pierre, 2004).

At a more micro-sociological level, the role perceptions, work-related attitudes, and political values of senior bureaucrats have been highlighted as crucial factors in shaping administrative action (Aberbach et al. 1981 as cited by Luc, 2004), so that cultural dispositions or 'attitudinal' politicization also deserve scholars' attention.

Finally, the extent to which party political patronage interferes with the supposedly 'neutral' or 'impartial' role of civil servants and threatens their professional expertise is a recurring theme and cause for concern in comparative public administration. Viewed from this angle of 'partisan politicization', the individual civil servant appears as a target of partisan mechanisms to control the professional bureaucracy. The inherent tension between the pull of politicization in all its variants on the one hand, and the 'tried and tested principles of professional civil service' on the other, will run like a thread through the discussion that follows. It will be argued that the political environment of federal ministries imposes political roles on top civil servants that require both a distinctive "political craft" (Goetz 1997, 1999 cited Peters and Pierre, 2004) and a corresponding understanding of the role. Seen in this light, 'functional politicization' may be consistent with the professionalism of the civil service.

Nowadays, politicians ask for support from the civil service to carry out their complex and demanding political tasks. They have become dependent on a responsive civil service to provide qualified political-tactical advice. There are two main strategies for 'politicizing' the civil service, i.e. making it receptive to the policy objectives of its leadership. On the one hand, "direct/formal politicization" involves the appointment of staff by politicians who are loyal to the politicians and/or their political agendas (Bauer and Ege, 2012 as cited in Bischoff, 2018). The risk with this strategy is that it undermines the neutrality of the civil service. Moreover, bypassing professional merit can backfire if unqualified applicants are hired (Kopecký et al., 2012 as cited by Bischoff, 2018).

The second is 'Professional politicization', on the other hand, implies that professional civil servants are responsive to the political agendas of those they serve (Peterson, 2006 as cited by Bischoff, 2018). It is about 'adapting performance officialdom in ways that

ensure a high degree of political responsiveness. (Christensen et al., 2014 as cited in Bischoff, 2018).

The politicization of the Civil Service over the last several decades has been a consistent development worldwide. Yet, the term “politicization” lacks clarity as to its exact meaning. However, from the general sense, it means that contemporary public service organizations should pay greater attention to politics. Also, it indicates that elected or appointed politicians are investing greater energy and time in ensuring that the members of the public services are adherent to their own partisan and policy preferences. This has become a reality even in countries such as the United States that have permitted a good deal of autonomy for political appointment to administrative positions, hence, there is a sense that these political control structures over the bureaucracy continue to “thicken” (Light, 1996 as cited by Peters and Pierre, 2004:1). These changes reflect a retreat from the institutionalized merit system that had (has) been the standard way of organizing employees in the public sector, in the United States, and elsewhere (Ingraham, 1995 as cited by Peters and Pierre, 2004:1).

Hence, conceptualizing ‘politicization of the Civil Service’ is not an easy task. This is partly due to its multifaceted nature. It has attracted the attention of many pertinent scholars but had different interpretations by different authorities. By the same token, from the real-world dimension, ‘Politicization of the Civil Service’ is not the same thing in developed and developing countries. In several less-developed nations, ‘politicization of the Civil Service’ is a replica of the patronage system deployed in the course of recruiting, selecting, retaining, promotion, rewards, and taking administrative measures in public services. On the contrary, the concept of ‘Politicization of the Civil Service’ in advanced countries implies an attempt to control the process of policy development and its executions (Peters and Pierre, 2004:3).

Numerous factors make the ‘politicization of the civil service’ different in different countries or systems. The first and the most important one is the country’s generic social, political, and economic landscape. Another factor could be country or system-specific, i.e., the criteria behind the implementation of politicization of the bureaucracy. For

instance, in the UK during Thatcher's administration, civil service politicization was followed as part of the government's commitment to radical reform in the country. Politicization in this case was not to include a greater number of party-affiliated individuals to dominate the policy process (Clifford and Wright, 1998, cited by Peters and Pierre, 2004).

In other words, it seems that it would be fair to say that the desire behind 'politicization of the civil service' in the developed countries is part of the government's commitment to ensure the success of the civil service reform than strict partisanship, which is the reality in the less developed countries such as the African nations. Ethiopia cannot be an exception when it comes to civil service politicization for partisan purposes.

According to Guy and Pierre (2004:310), at least two centuries elapsed during which fierce debate took place concerning civil service politicization in western democracies. The issue got attention from both bureaucrats and academicians/theoreticians but from different perspectives. The bureaucrats believe that politicization poses a threat to their respective professional endeavors and status and may lead to the state of imbalance between politics and administration for which they had to fight for many decades.

Yet, for academicians, politicization is a matter of enlarging the dimensions of civil service activities to be comprehensive enough and multidimensional. The theoreticians assert that public administration cannot be apolitical as it involves decisions of who gets what while dealing with society-government relationships. This is manifested in the course of public policy determination or service delivery.

However, the concept of 'politicization of the civil service' is not adequately researched. Rather, being an interdisciplinary matter, the Politicization of the Civil Service is at its exploratory stage. In other words, the quest for clarifying the politicization of civil service from both theoretical and practical or empirical perspectives relies on the quality of exploratory research to be conducted in the future. Also, understanding the 'politicization of the civil service' requires a review of countries' political cultures, social evolution, and history. Indeed, civil service politicization is not merely a complex phenomenon, but also a dynamic one that evolves even in a particular country at different

times. Hence, the whole political environment of a given country should be considered when investigating its civil service politicization (Ibid).

At its fundamental level, the politicization of the civil service refers to ‘the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards and disciplining of members of the public service’. However, it has been contended that keeping the civil service in general and the elite bureaucrats at the top in particular apolitical is hardly possible partly due to their contacts with the political executives daily (Peters and Pierre, 2004 as cited in Cormaic, 2016:18).

Based on the previous works with Pierre, Peters divided the politicization of civil service into six categories (Peters, 2013 cited by Cormaic, 2016):

- **Direct politicization:** whereby Ministers attempt to appoint people of a similar political persuasion to themselves to key jobs;
- **Professional politicization:** whereby career civil servants are appointed based on their loyalty to a particular political party;
- **Redundant politicization:** whereby a government creates redundant structures such as Ministerial cabinets to monitor the work of career civil servants;
- **Anticipatory politicization:** whereby civil servants choose to leave their positions following the election of a new government;
- **Dual politicization:** whereby a body other than the government, parliament, for example, attempts to assert a level of control over the bureaucracy; and
- **Social politicization:** whereby the government’s social partners may influence the career path of civil servants interacting with them.

Nonetheless, Peters (2013, cited by Cormaic, 2016), the politicization of the civil service is not limited to the above-listed six categories; rather there will be more classifications to be created. On the other hand, both the current or existing and potential categories of the politicization of the civil service may differ from one another in two respects. One is the tendency to create competition among actors over the control of public policy. The second scenario is the possibility of creating opportunities for public servants to dominate the course of public policy development.

There are two contending views on the politicization of the Civil Service. The first view sees it as having positive consequences while the second attributes the decline of the quality of civil service to politicization.

According to Rabrenovic and Verheijen (2005), politicization is one of the vital causes of the deterioration in the civil service systems of some Central and East European states. It brought job insecurity and led to politically-motivated decisions on recruitment, selection, promotion, and dismissal. Politicization also leads to the absence of career prospects for young employees due to the ever-increasing number of positions that are subject to the political attitude of the bureaucrats. Consequently, the number of qualified employees in public service is diminishing, and also job-related conditions such as rewards are getting worse. For instance, in Serbia, appointments down to the level of Department Head were determined primarily based on political criteria. In this regard, the lack of clear legal provisions on merit-based recruitment and promotions in civil service legislation, or the lack of enforcement of rules where they existed made it easier for politicians to use their office to reward loyal supporters with government positions.

Besides, the drive for more political appointments led to an expansion in the number of staff in the civil service, notably in small states with limited employment opportunities, such as Montenegro and Macedonia (World Bank, 2004a).

Many countries that inherited civil service systems from their respective former colonial powers have not been able to benefit from the institution that helped the former colonial powers achieve maximum socio-economic, political, and technological progress. What most developing countries have in common in this regard is inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corrupt practices, and the politicization of their respective public services (Wilder, 2009:19).

3.2.1. Civil Service Reform

Civil Service Reform is a thoughtful action intended to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, representativeness, professionalism, and democratic attribute of public service, thereby improving the quality of service provisions with an enhanced level of

accountability in the course. The reform aims at fine-tuning the existing scenario or redressing the problems by changing the system. Civil Service Reforms have different scopes. Some reforms aim at bringing a big-bang change, while others intend to improve the existing system without causing fundamental or root-pulling changes. In either case, collecting pertinent data, properly analyzing it and undergoing organizational rearrangements, and altering Human Resource Management Systems are all vital components of the reform process (Schultz, 2002 cited by Worku, 2019).

There are various models used in civil service reform. Worku (2019), identified three models used for reforming the public sector. These are: (1) The Radical Reform models-require fundamental or root pulling changes, (2) the Incremental reform models-requires bringing changes bits by bits, and (3) the Moderate reform model-requires a reasonable level of changes in the public sector organization.

According to Unsworth (2007) and Robinson (2007), thoroughly grasping the political dynamics of a context and foreseeing factors that motivate the pertinent stakeholders in the course of reform is vital. In other words, understanding the local political situation of the country ahead of implementing any reform program is fundamental to the success of the change process.

In the words of Girishankar et al. (1999), considering the technocratic approach than the political one or the combination of the two is one of the reasons for the failure of civil service reforms in several countries. The technocratic approach asserts that introducing formal rules is adequate to change behavior during civil service implementation. Yet, Grindle (2010) believes that the success of a new system is a function of the political conflicts and compromises that evolve around its execution. Moreover, Scott (2011) argues that more emphasis needs to be given to politics in both the design and implementation of civil service reforms.

Hence, without proper and adequate due consideration to politics, impediments to reform can arise as a result of organizational silos within the civil service, functional territorialism, unfamiliarity with working together, and perceived threats to authority as a result of the anticipated change (Turner 2013).

Bunse and Fritz (2012) argued that reforms may remain unfinished if the political costs incurred outweigh the anticipated achievements or gains. Yet, the patronage practice (politicians rewarding their supporters with employment or jobs) is often a notably critical challenge in the course of civil service reform (Grindle, 2010).

Robinson (2007) states that if political incentives are properly judged, the political pay-offs are continuously maintained, and reform momentum can remain strong. On the other hand, Grindle (2010) contends that it is likely that patronage systems will only be replaced with career civil service systems slowly, incrementally, and adaptively. Indeed, effective public organizations, such as the civil service, evolve through a political process of bargaining between the state and organized groups in society (Unsworth 2007), and reforms are part of an ongoing political process of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction (Grindle 2010).

3.2.2. The politicization of Civil Service Reform

The conception of civil service reform is dynamic as it changes from time to time. For instance, in the USA, the 1883 reform effort marked the beginning of the process of abolishing the spoil system and introducing a merit system, which requires filling positions in the public service with competitive examination and transparent recruitment processes. Nonetheless, the reform initiative of 1978 uncovered the continuity and danger of political subversion of the personnel system during Nixon's administration. In essence, the main objective of civil service reform is to make the practice of the merit principle a reality than a meaningless label for a personnel system that is so mired in bureaucracy, inflexible, and inefficient, and which is largely responsible for the government's failure to operate (Nigro, 1979).

According to (Moshonas, 2014), the politicization of public service reform is evident in the design and implementation of public sector reforms and changes. In most transitional economies in Africa, including Ethiopia, CSR has been used at most as an instrument of power capture and at least power-sharing. More specifically, reform efforts were driven by the respective national and local elections. The political party in power started rewarding the bureaucrats close to it with civil service reform projects.

There are several factors worth mentioning for the politicization of civil service reform. However, the decisive factor is the political-administrative legacy. In this regard, the bureaucratic legacy and strong centrifugal tendencies in public sector organizations paved the way for political leaders to control the reform process from beginning to end. This manifests itself in the course of recruitment of public servants either on the eve of elections or after elections. The broader literature on public administration in Africa shows that administrative issues have an eminently political significance that is closely linked to patterns of power and wealth accumulation and clientelism (Ibid).

Moreover, some research evidence indicated that Civil Service Reform efforts implemented in the last four (4) decades have served the ideological and political goals and objectives more than the purely performance-related targets (Brewer and Kellough, 2016).

Civil service reform has been a major item on the government's agenda for some time. Many of the most common reforms have several things in common: they usually target bureaucracy, although the problems in government tend to be systemic; they often require the introduction of performance-based pay systems, and they aim to weaken or dismantle traditional civil service systems by deregulating personnel policies and eliminating or reducing the protections afforded to employees by the merit system. The stated goal of such reforms is to improve organizational performance and productivity by streamlining personnel procedures, but often these reforms are proposed with other goals in mind. For example, elected officials may seek to increase their authority, or they may pursue these reforms for ideological or symbolic reasons (Ibid).

Therefore, it is possible to assert that civil service reform efforts are not confined to their explicit objectives rather; there are implicit objectives-political goals including the instrumentality of reform for power consolidation and winning elections. Besides, the politicization of Civil Service Reform is manifested by the overwhelming roles that politicians play and the huge influence they pose from inception to end.

3.3. THE INTRODUCTION OF CIVIL SERVICE & ITS REFORM IN ETHIOPIA

Abraham and Desta (2012) argued that a series of reforms were introduced in Ethiopia in the mid of the 19th century. They stated that, for the first time in the history of modern Ethiopia, emperor Tewodros had introduced reform efforts such as; the elimination of the slave trade, centralization of power and church's land, and civil service systems. These reforms were delegated to the local chiefs for implementation through regular remuneration mechanisms and official accountability. Nonetheless, the reform agendas of emperor Tewodros could not go beyond establishing a local police force and a regular army. In other words, the attempts to introduce agencies to deal with administrative issues had not succeeded.

However, it is fair to mention the four departments created by Emperor Tewodros as part of his reform agendas. The four departments created were:

1. The Army Commander-in-Chief
2. The Judge
3. The Secretary who writes all imperial order and keeps the emperor's seal and
4. The communication department (Ibid).

On the other hand, it has been claimed that Ethiopia introduced a civil service system that resembles the European kind of administration during the reign of emperor Minelek II between 1889 and 1913 (Solomon Markos, 2013). More specifically, the formal establishment of the modern Civil Service Systems in Ethiopia goes back to 1907, when nine ministries were established to ensure the orderly and efficient arrangement of the workings of government offices. The nine ministerial positions created by then were; the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Industry, Ministry of Public works, Ministry of war, Ministry of the pen, and Ministry of Pen (Abraham and Desta, 2012 and MoCSGG, 2012). See Table 3.2 below:

No.	Ministry (Position)	The Minister (Appointee)
1.	Minister of Justice	AfenigusNesibu
2.	Minister of Defense	FitawrariHabtegiorgis
3.	Minister of Interior	LikemekuasKetema
4.	Minister of Trade and Foreign Affair	NegadrasHailegiorgis
5.	Minister of Finance	BejrondMulugeta
6.	Minister of Agriculture	KentibaWoldetsadik
7.	Minister of Pen	TsehafeTizaz G/Sellasia
8.	Minister of Public works	KegnazmachMekonnen
9.	Minister of Palace Administration	AzajMetaferia

Table 3.2.: Ministers appointed in 1907 by Menelik

Source: Bersisa and Zigiju(2014).

However, due regard has been paid to political loyalty than merit from individuals holding those ministerial positions; hence, the established ministries could not achieve the intended objectives. At that time, the public administration was implemented based on the free will of the kings and lords without any pertinent rules and regulations. Moreover, recruitment and employment decisions were merely based on political allegiance and the army mobilization capacity of the applicants.

Besides the creation of the cabinet positions, Emperor Minelek divided the state into smaller and manageable sizes for administrative suitability (Paulos, 2001). Moreover, to ensure the continuity of his legacy and administration the emperor introduced some other reform activities. It is worth mentioning the three reforms carried out before his death. The first one was the setting up of an independent appellate court at the provincial levels. Second, he introduced an inheritance law, which was declared in 1908. The Inheritance Law was meant to guarantee the right to own property. Last but not least was the

establishment of the Prime Minister's Office and the institutionalization of a crown council (Adare Asssefa Mitiku, 2017). Nonetheless, the Civil Service System introduced during the reign of Emperor Minelek was small in size and limited to the compulsory factions of the state, i.e., maintenance of law and order.

By the mid-20th century, the Ethiopian Civil Service and Public Administration were granted a legal framework despite the persistence of the prior proprietors and nobility traditions in the system. It was the 1931 constitution (the first written constitution) that granted legal personality to administrative agencies. In Article 11, the constitution stipulated the power of the emperor in putting the foundation, organization, and operation of administrative agencies. The next vital development in the modern history of Ethiopian public administration took place in 1962 when the Central Personnel Agency (CPA) was established. By Order No. 23/1962, the establishment and operational powers of CPA were specified. Hence, the order gave the agency the power to recruit civil servants, undertake job classifications, determine pay structures, and issue regulations required to govern the establishment and operation of homogeneous public service (Abraham and Desta, 2012).

Also, the Military rule, which took power in 1974 attempted to modernize the public administration system of the country by filling positions with young and educated employees. However, the Marxist-Leninist view of the Military Government did not give bureaucratic autonomy to the foreign-educated civil servants. The EPRDF government, which came to power in 1991, claimed to have achieved numerous signs of progress in the areas of Public Sector Capacity Building, Decentralization, and Civil Service Reforms one of which is BSC (Ibid).

Despite remaining underdeveloped, the Ethiopian Civil Service has been transforming in the last century. The country had different state structures and government systems. The Feudal and Unitary government (the Imperial regime) stayed ruled Ethiopia between 1930 and 1974 followed by the Communist and Unitary governments that reigned over the state between 1974 and 1991. The Federal and parliamentary governments came to power in 1991. To understand the historical development of Civil Service in Ethiopia, it

is appropriate to present its introduction and development in chronological order alongside the last three regimes, i.e., the Imperial Regime, the Communist Regime, and the EPRDF. To this end, the following section deals with the nature of politico-administrative relationships in Ethiopia during the rule of three different regimes.

3.3.1. The Politico-Administrative Relationship and Reform in Ethiopia

The origin of modern public administration in Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon. Historians agree that Minelek II heralded the establishment of modern civil service when he appointed nine (9) ministers in 1907. Since then, the Ethiopian bureaucracy has grown enormously partly due to its vitality in consolidating the politics of the emperor through effective centralization and partly due to the desire of modernizing the country (Mesfin, 2008:373).

Hereunder, the civil service and its reform during the last three regimes of Ethiopia are presented.

3.3.1.1. The imperial regime and the civil service

According to Getachew and Richard (2007), the nature and attributes of the politico-administrative relationships in Ethiopia during the imperial regime were an extension of the old practices inherited from his predecessor Minelek II. In other words, Emperor Haileselassie had to capitalize on the civil service system introduced by his predecessor. Yet, his main concern was to undertake a series of restructuring and *institutionalization* of the existing civil service system in a way that helps to achieve efficiency and effectiveness by deploying homogeneous rules and procedures.

Markos (2013) stated that emperor Haileselassie (1930-1974) cherished a great deal of commendation as he broadened the modernization processes of Ethiopian Public Administration in relative terms. He has also created additional ministerial positions. Using the benchmark laid down by his predecessor, he attempted to make the process of centralizing and modernizing the civil service system to the next level.

Moreover, structural and functional changes had been made to the civil service system during the reign of Emperor Haileselassie. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the

enactment of Public Service Order No. 23/1961 that was subjected to amendment through legal Notice No. 28.1962. One of the key purposes of enacting this legal document was to create the Central Personnel Agency (CPA). The CPA was in charge of setting up a uniform Public Service across the board. This, in turn, has made Ethiopia among the few independent African states that implemented “Administrative Reform” to its civil service as early as the 1960s (Adebabay, 2011, Alemayehu, 2001 Paulos, 2001 as cited in Markos, 2013:237).

However, partly due to a great deal placed on the importance of political loyalty over the personal qualifications of the recruits and partly due to the government’s intervention into the discretion of bureaucracy, the civil service failed to deliver services to the expected and required standards and levels. In line with this, David Apter said that the political system in Ethiopia is characterized by ‘modernizing autocracy’-the discourse in the government and governance practices are exclusively determined by the ‘Monarch’ or an ‘Emperor’ as the state’s tradition (Dr. Nirmod, 1967). Despite this reality, the 1931 constitution of Ethiopia puts an enormous responsibility on the civil service to bring about a progressive change in the country.

Nonetheless, the aborted coup of 1960 revealed the slowness of the reform process in Ethiopia. The post-coup scenario also exposed the reality that the civil servants were not full-heartedly dealing with public affairs, distancing themselves from politics, at least to the normative level (Ibid).

In general, the major reform efforts made by emperor Haile Selassie were; the definition of Ministers’ Powers and Duties (in 1943), the establishment of the Public Administration Institute (in 1952), and revising the 1931 constitution to heighten the emperor’s complete control over the executive branch of the government (in 1955) and the establishment of Central Personnel Agency (CPA) in 1961 (Adare AsssefaMitiku, 2017).

Yet, it has been argued that the reform efforts by Emperor Haile Selassie and his predecessor Emperor Minelek were not successful partly due to the greatest emphasis given to the political loyalty of civil servants than their caliber to perform and deliver and

partly due to the fact they both have followed emulation approach-foreign practices for modernism were adopted. For instance, the 1931 constitution of Ethiopia was mainly based on the 'Maji Constitution' of the then Japanese Monarchy, the revised constitution of 1955 was a derivative of the 'British Constitutional Monarchy' and the establishment of the Central Personnel Agency (CPA) in 1961 was an imitation from the USA. Hence, the modernism efforts of those days lacked indigenous elements (Ibid).

From the accounts presented above, it is possible to draw a linkage between the earlier and recent civil service reform practices and their drawbacks in Ethiopia. In other words, like in many developing countries, the failure in the implementation of civil service reform packages in Ethiopia is partly due to the incompatibility between the country's context and the reform tools emulated from foreign lands. Therefore, coupled with the politicization of the civil service and its reform agendas and transplantation of reform tools without due consideration of the contextual reality, the Ethiopian bureaucracy remained underdeveloped. Indeed, no matter how effective a particular reform tool its origin, it may not produce the same results if implemented in a different and incompatible environment.

In nutshell, the successes in the civil service reform efforts during the imperial regime were not flawless. For one thing, the then civil service institutions failed to maintain standards and rules related to the professional attributes of their respective organizations due to political interference, nepotism, and stress given to political loyalty over personal qualifications in the course of recruitment and selection. Besides, the lack of participation from the relevant stakeholders in the course of position classification, pay structure, and job descriptions and the absence of educated manpower exacerbated the problems and led to failure in achieving reform objectives (Kassahun, 2000; Paulos, 2001; Tilaye, 2007 as cited in Solomon Markos, 2013:237).

Henceforth, the standing army and the civil service helped a great deal the imperial government in raising public revenue and transforming the old retinues system that ultimately significantly contributed to the consolidation of the Emperor's power. More specifically, the imperial regime paid a great deal of attention to the building of a

professional military, which would aid in consolidating the emperor's unquestionable power. To this end, the government had to allocate an overwhelming amount of the state budget to strengthen the professionalization processes of the army. As a result, by the early 1970s, the imperial regime had around 65,000 professional army personnel (Fouad Makki, 2011). Therefore, the need to have educated civil servants was not to modernize public administration, but it was to facilitate the professionalization efforts of the military. Hence, the civil servants were instrumental in sustaining the power and legacy of the government in power. This shows how chronic the politicization of the civil service is in Ethiopia.

Despite some achievements made in modernizing the administration of the Ethiopian state, the imperial regime encountered several challenges. Some of the main challenges were: the presence of nepotism in the recruitment and selection of public servants, failure to adhere to the established rules and regulations dealing with the conduct of the civil service, illegitimate and unwarranted political interventions into the domain, and discretions of the administrative agencies, and the focus given to political loyalty at the expense of the qualification or caliber to perform (Kassahun, 2007).

Generally, as early positive efforts in civil service modernization puts a foundation for the contemporary bureaucratic organizations in Ethiopia, political interventions, lack of skilled manpower, and politicization of the reform activities seem to be inherited from the past practices, i.e. political legacy sustained through bureaucratic instrumentality.

3.3.1.2. The communist regime (1974-1991)

The socialist regime that had overthrown the imperial government took power in 1974 using the power vacuum created as a result of successful students' and farmers' movements. Yet, after assuming power, the socialist government has not made any vital changes to the legal frameworks of the country's civil service (Solomon Markos, 2013:238).

During the Dergue Regime (1974-1991), no significant change was made to the Ethiopian Civil Service as the initial attempts were compromised for political ends. There

was, rather a regressive step that was taken, which was manifested in Civil Service's reflecting the regime's political ideology and policies through illegitimate ways. Hence, despite the civil service's numeric growth during this period (1974-1991), the then bureaucracy was not capable of delivering public services efficiently and effectively. On the contrary, the role and discretion of the Central Personnel Agency were overlooked or bypassed without changing the legal provisions by which the agency was established by the preceding regime (OPM, 2001 cited by Mesfin, 2008).

Differently put, Paulos (2001) argues that there was no fundamental change made to the management and operational aspects of the civil service during the reign of the Dergue (socialist-communist) regime. Hence, the legal provisions of the imperial regime were expedited for making administrative decisions by the civil service organizations. However, Dergue has taken a few reform measures such as; the horizontal or numerous expanding the public sector, amalgamation of previously independent government organizations and liquefying others, and the reshufflings of the members of the cabinet with relatively younger and literate individuals. Moreover, during this period, the central personnel agency (CPA) was renamed as Public Service Commission (PSC), and pay structures were adjusted-the starting salary scale of 25 Ethiopian Birrs was changed to 50 Birr, and the pay ceiling rose from 285 Birrs to 636 Birrs.

According to Solomon Markos (2013:238), despite this, numerous ministries, commissions, agencies, and local level administrative units were set up during the communist regime. Consequently, the number of public servants in the country rose from 100,000 to 200,000 within a few years of the communist administration. On the other hand, a few years later, the communist regime of Ethiopia substituted the initial quest for professionalism and the merit principle with military administration from the apex to the grassroots levels. Henceforth, the military administration helped the government to exercise absolute control over the public at large and the rebel groups such as Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).

In addition, Adejumobi (2007 as cited by Adare Assefa Mitiku, 2017), argued that the communist regime of Ethiopia lacked "a coherent ideological platform" from its very

commencement. The regime was not a principal agent for the struggle that had led to the overthrow of its predecessor. It rather hijacked the ‘revolutionary idea’ of the leftist Ethiopians. The proponents of the idea were mainly Ethiopian students and farmers. Originally, the movement aimed at bringing changes such as; the “separation of church and the state and equality of religious, regional and occupational and economic groupings”. Contrary to the initial ‘motto’ of the students’ and farmers’ movements in the country, the military administration opted for the ‘Marxist-Leninist’ line of dogmatic ideology and made socialism, together with its economic policies, the political ideology of the nation.

One of the factors that contributed to the expansion of the public sector organizations and the increase in the number of bureaucrats during the Socialist Regime was the nationalization of previously privately owned corporations and other forms of firms. Yet, the government did not change the legal frameworks that would govern the public sectors, existing and newly established. As to Kassahun (2000 cited by Solomon Markos, 2013), due to a lack of changes in the legal framework to deal with public sectors, civil servants were forced to execute new administrative decisions using regulations of the old system, i.e., the Imperial Regulations. It is like barely "changing the container, which may not change the content." In other words, the socialist regime was not well prepared for the level of bringing a root-pulling transformation in the country. Also, this strengthens the assertion that the then government was not the sole owner of the change that occurred in the country.

Moreover, the communist regime had made use of the typical patronage or spoil system of ‘hiring-and firing’ to fill positions of public service with politically loyal and affiliated bureaucrats. In this regard, educated middle and top-level officials with experience and skills were expelled and substituted with politically affiliated civil servants of military background. This, in turn, has exacerbated the acute and complex problems of public administration in the country. Consequently, this has led to a nationwide administrative disorder and fusion of the party, government, and state-level institutions. Hence, the civil service during the socialist regime of Ethiopia was characterized by a lack of confidence

in the public servants, an absence of merit-based human resources decisions and practices; poor pay structure, and increased corruption (Solomon Markos, 2013).

3.3.1.3. Civil service during the EPRDF era

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991 by defeating the socialist regime that has ruled the country for close to two decades (1974-1991) along with the Marxists-Leninist political ideology and economic policies. The EPRDF's coming to power marked the end of the civil war that took place for several years. Following the downfall of the Socialist Regime, the EPRDF formed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) under which the country was ruled between 1991 and 1994. In 1995, the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia came into an effect, by which the establishment of the Parliamentary form of government and federal state structure was endorsed (Solomon Markos, 2013).

According to the World Bank (2013), Ethiopia came out of two decades of civil wars, drought and famine, ethnic strife, military dictatorship, and a totalitarian regime in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1991 The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) deposed the military government headed by Mengistu Hailemariam. A Transitional government was set up beneath the decree of the Transitional Charter. This was followed in 1994 by the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), which replaced the Transitional Charter. This has granted the legal basis for establishing Ethiopia's federal system. The 1995 constitution of Ethiopia endorsed the formation of nine ethnically based regional states and two city administrations. Ethiopia has four layers of government: the federal, state, regional, district, and local ('woreda' and 'kebele') levels. Each tier has a legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of government. The country has a bicameral parliament consisting of the House of Federation responsible for interpreting the Constitution and for federal-regional issues, and the House of People's Representatives that passes legislation.

More specifically, it was the 1995 FDRE constitution that introduced a federal state structure in which the political power is shared between the central government and the field units technically termed as regional states or simply regions or states. The

constitution has introduced nine (9) regional states and two city administrations-Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa city. The central government is made up of the House of People's Representatives (HoPRs), which is the highest law-making organ, the head of the government (Prime Minister), and the Councils of Ministers, which is chaired by the Prime Minister of the country, and the Judicial Branch that has three levels, i.e., the first instance court, the high court, and the supreme court. The structures of the regional governments are the mirror of the structures at the federal level (Abreham and Desta, 2012).

However, the current constitution of Ethiopia does not explicitly address civil service. It is not directly or indirectly recognized by the constitution as part of the government system. Yet, the constitution stipulates a clear separation of powers between the three organs of the government, i.e., the law-making, enforcement, and interpreting organs. Hence, the legislative and judicial significance or powers of the administrative agencies remain unclear. For instance, the constitution does not provide any stipulations as to whether the law-making organ can delegate or transfer or share its law-making power with the civil service. Delegation of legislative power is spelled out only for the council of ministers. Indeed, it is hardly possible to put a theoretical justification regarding the existence and the foundation of civil service power.

In the Ethiopian context, there are two categories of administrative agencies-the independent and executive agencies. The independent agencies have constitutional recognition as to their establishment and operational mandates and they are accountable to the house of people's representatives. The independent agencies are the Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Auditor General, the National Election Board, and the Population Census Commission. On the other hand, the executive agencies are accountable to the Office of the Prime Minister, the superior minister, or the council of ministers. This clearly shows a lack of direct relationship between lawmakers and the civil service (Ibid).

Despite the lack of explicit provisions about the establishment and operational matters of the civil service at the federal level, regional states are legally mandated to establish

and deal with their respective administrative agencies. In other words, there is a general provision in the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia, which stipulates the rights of the states to establish their administration and enact laws pertinent to state-level civil service and conditions relating to their operational matters. In this regard, Article 52 (2f) states the rights of the regional governments to enact and enforce laws on the State civil service and their condition of work; in the implementation of this responsibility, it shall ensure that educational; training, and experience requirements for any job, title or position approximate national standards (FDRE Constitution, 1995).

From this, it is possible to say that lack of explicit stipulations as to the relationships between the civil service and the law-making organ undermines the legislative significance of the administrative agencies. On the other hand, the fact that the council of ministers can delegate its legislative power to the public service makes the civil servants vulnerable to the state of spoil or patronage. This could be the case as the council of ministers comprises the executive branch of the government-both elected and appointed political figures. The pivotal point is that legal provisions dealing with the relationships between the legislature and administration may serve as a check and balance to the interaction between the executive branch and the administration. A relationship of any type between the executive and the civil service is inevitable.

According to Paulos (2001), transforming Ethiopia's civil service and the effort to bring about economic development have been granted priority by the EPRDF government since its establishment. To this effect, a series of economic and political reforms have been conducted.

The reform processes, the necessary preconditions, and many other technical aspects of civil service reform were dictated by the donors. Even the timetable of reform initiatives was predominantly determined by multinational organizations such as the World Bank & the International Monetary Fund (IMF). See Table 3.3 below & the subsequent phases of the CSRP.

Reform Waves	Periods	Reform Objectives	Reform Strategies used	Output
Structural Reforms	From the 1980s to 1990	Reducing the scope and cost of government	➤ Privatization ➤ Downsizing ➤ Decompressing wages ➤ Capacity building	A small government that is mean, lean, and clean
New Public Management	From the mid-1990s to 2000	Service improvement	➤ Hands-on professional management ➤ Emphasis on explicit service standards and measurement of performance ➤ Focus on results rather than on inputs and procedures ➤ Greater competition & private style management	Effective, efficient accountable, and responsive public service provision
Reforms related to poverty reduction strategic plans	2000 to present	Attaining and sustaining millennium development goals	➤ Promoting good governance ➤ Environmental protection ➤ Enhancing social protection ➤ Redistribution of income and wealth ➤ Gender equality and community empowerment	Harmonious economic, social, and political development

Table 3.3: Public sector reform waves and strategies

Source: Habtom (2021:6) and reconstructed by the researcher

I. The “first generation” of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia (1991-1996)

The change of government from the ‘Military Junta’ of Dergue to a ‘Democratic Revolutionary’ government of EPRDF heralded the turning point for the Ethiopian Civil Service to deal with enormous social, political, and economic changes that occurred in the country at an unprecedented pace. According to Mesfin (2008), some of these fast-paced changes include:

- i. The decentralization policy and the System, human resources, and structural requirements needed to implement it;
- ii. Liberalization of political space and its execution for the bureaucracy in terms of ensuring values such as transparency and accountability;
- iii. The policy for economic deregulation and heightening of the private sector’s role in the economy and
- iv. The policy of having a “lean and affordable” government with inference on the magnitude and delivery culture of the civil service

According to some authorities (authors), the above-stated changes were called “the first generation” or “the first phase” of civil service reform during the early reign of the EPRDF government (Asmelash, 1998, Paulos, 2001 as cited in Mesfin, 2008:374).

Paulos (2001) referring to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), stated that during the “first generation’ of civil service reform, the EPRDF government took an overhauling measure to overcome the accumulated problems of the country’s bureaucracy.

In 1994, the Office of the Prime Minister identified key reasons to justify the need to undertake civil service reform in the country. By the time, the civil service reform program was required due to the following reasons:

1. The irrelevance of the rules and regulations governing the civil service due to inadequate scope and outdated system;
2. Civil Servants’ lack of experience to implement government policies and plans;
3. Lack of agreed-upon civil service structural setup for effective implementation and monitoring and controlling of government plans;
4. Poorly defined system and procedure for managing public personnel, finance and properties and
5. Insufficient managerial know-how, absence of standardized job classification, and weak manpower planning and deployment.

In this regard, the government has established a Task Force in which experts were represented from institutions such as the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the Public Service Commission. The mandate of the Task Force was basically to review the existing government structure and its relevance to the newly adopted economic and development policies. To this end, six sub-committees were established to deal with institutional structures, pay scale, position classification, public personnel directives and manuals, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, and training and development of the country’s civil service at the generic level. Concerning the aforementioned issues, the Task Force has submitted its proposal to the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. One of the suggested issues was the need to restructure

institutions at the federal level (Ministries and Commissions). Nevertheless, the remedies proposed by the Task Force were not exhaustively implemented (Paulos, 2001).

During the “first phase” of the civil service reform in Ethiopia, the quantitative aspects and macroeconomic stability were given due consideration. It was based on the NPM concepts and the Structural Adjustment Program’s orientation. It also has been argued that the “first generation” of civil service reform in Ethiopia was mainly conditioned by donors as part of the loan agreement. The aim of the reform at this stage was to minimize the costs of operating public services through merging redundant units and staffing, removing ‘ghost’ personnel, freezing unnecessary employment, and effectively controlling wage bills and expenditures. The ultimate aim was to make the public sector efficient in the use of available resources-financial resources in particular (Batley, 1999 as cited by Gebre and Melesse, 2014).

According to Dia (1993:6), it has been through Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that the World Bank has extended its generous hand to African Public Administration and made an attempt to assist the civil service reform efforts. To this end, the bank has deployed Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) as one of the tools to assist the implantation of the civil service reform process in Africa in general and that of Sub-Saharan African countries in Particular-of Ethiopia is not an exception. Hence, in this first category of reform operations, the Bank focused on the following two main components:

- I. Downsizing to reduce wage bill; and
- II. Reforming wage and employment policies to incentivize greater efficiency/productivity in the civil service.

The retrenchment instrument was deployed to achieve the following objectives:

- a. Censuses to eliminate ghost workers;
- b. Recruitment freeze;
- c. Early retirement and voluntary departures;
- d. Downsizing; and
- e. Redeployment and retraining programs

In implementing the reform packages, the World Bank extended its financial support to Ethiopia. Three factors contributed to the generosity of the World Bank to Ethiopia in this respect. These were:

1. A high degree of government ownership of reform policies and programs (accountability);
2. A political-driven decentralization (devolution) process and
3. The presence of coordination of donor support through Sector Development Programs (SDPs) in the Education, Agriculture, and Health sectors Gwin, 2005).

Yet, excluding the historical matters relating to the sources of civil service problems and a failure to link those problems with the 1970s economic crisis were among the main challenges encountered during the ‘first generation’ of reform in Ethiopia. Moreover, during this phase of reform, the motivational aspects of human resources and their significance in enhancing a sense of ownership and desire to perform were bypassed. Hence, the downsizing of the civil service to cut the costs of the public sector could not achieve the core objectives of the reform program (Ayee, 2008 cited in Gebre and Melesse, 2014).

Paulos (2001) sees the entrenchment of public servants as one of the controversial reform efforts of the “first generation”. The entrenchment policy came into an effect in 1993 and resulted in the removal of civil servants occupying relatively redundant positions or tasks. As to Paulos, the presence of a predetermined percentage of civil servants to be laid off per institution and the basic principle of job review to identify redundant positions are contradictory. For instance, the reform targeted the removal of 10% of the existing employees and public servants. It seems the government had a subjective interest to maximize through entrenchment policy.

Differently put, this may show an element of the patronage system in action. If critically seen, this attracts curiosity as to how it is possible to implement objective and subjective mechanisms in removing redundancy in organizations. Consequently, as of July 7, 1996, 553 employees were transferred to states, 435 were reemployed at different bureaus of

the federal government, 6397 were incorporated into a safety net program, 3961 retired early and 4114 left their positions with compensation.

By the same token, scholars such as; Taube and Patz (2008 as cited in Solomon, 2013) do not accept the idea or assertion that public sector performance improves through the entrenchment of civil servants. The case under consideration was Ethiopia, which by the time had a relatively small size of civil servants even by African standards. The ratio of the civil servants to the number of citizens it serves was 4 to 1000. The African countries had 30 civil servants per 1000 inhabitants.

However, during the early 1990s, the unique case was Uganda, which was able to achieve public sector efficiency through the entrenchment of employees and civil servants. By that time, the country had a relatively large size of civil service (McCourt, 1998; Polidano, 1999 as cited in Solomon, 2013).

Moreover, as a result of the retrenchment and institutional restructuring programs, the following additional measures were taken as part of the civil service reform (The Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, 1994 as cited by Pulos, 2001:

- ✓ Automatic employment of fresh university graduates to public service offices has been terminated;
- ✓ Prohibition of the periodic salary increments for those earning Birr 636 and above was lifted;
- ✓ The Per Diem rate for the civil servants was revised;
- ✓ The cancellation of policy that prohibits resignation from duty;
- ✓ Changing the lowest pay scale from Birr 50 to Birr 105;
- ✓ Salary increments for doctors, teachers, and university professors were endorsed and
- ✓ Except for some vital positions, recruitment of civil servants was suspended

According to Solomon (2013:238), the “first generation” of civil service reform has focused on the institutional structural adjustment of the public sector, and economic liberalization. Notwithstanding, it has been argued that the macroeconomic changes and

the institutional reforms introduced during the EPRDF government in the “first phase” of the civil service reform efforts were dictated by the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) with the ultimate aim of bringing a new institutional set up in line with the country’s policy preferences.

Nevertheless, the early 1990s reform efforts of Ethiopia have witnessed the intensive involvement of international financial institutions. Through the guidance and instruction of these institutions, the country has been advised to adopt two aspects of the structural adjustment program- macroeconomic policy and institutional reforms. Yet, the involvement of the international donor agencies was not without problems or frictions. Researchers have revealed that there was a poor relationship between the Ethiopian Government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1990s. It was put that their relationship had friction due to the negative perceptions held of the country by the International Monetary Fund officials (Getachew and Richard, 2007).

In this regard, it seems that there was a difference in terms of the country’s need and context and the pre-stated conditionality by the international financial institutions. For instance, one of the preconditions put forward by the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) was the privatization of state-owned enterprises. However, different from some of the African countries that complied with the conditions, Ethiopia has retained several public enterprises such as; Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (now renamed as Ethio-Telecom), Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), Sugar and Cement Factories, Shipping Enterprises, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and Development Bank of Ethiopia and recreational centers and hotels under the ownership and management of the government. This, in turn, helped Ethiopia to earn praise or credit as an effective way of commercializing the public sector organizations (ECA, 2004 as referenced by Solomon, 2013:239). Commercialization was one of the core reform requirements of New Public Management (NPM), which is part of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).

The major changes recorded during this period (1991-1996) include the transition of the political system from a single party to a multi-party system, and from a closed-door or

command economy to a free market or liberal economy (economic deregulation or liberalization) and the state structure was changed from a unitary state to federal state structure (Kassahun, 2000 as cited by Solomon, 2013).

To tackle the prevailing administrative problems, the EPRDF government established Civil Service Reform Task Force (TF) in 1994 to properly articulate the various and accumulated issues of the civil service. Besides, different sub-committees comprising experts from pertinent institutions were formed and, in the course, technical assistance was extended by relevant international consultants. The overall objective of the civil service reform Task Force was to produce reform packages that are compatible with the needs and contexts of Ethiopia thereby enhancing the performance and management of the civil service (Task Force Reports, 1996 as cited by Mesfin, 2008).

In consonance with this, a nationwide capacity building program (Public Sector Capacity Building Program) was launched in 1996 to enhance the capacity of the public servants in dealing with the newly set up federal structure of the state. The program was also aimed at increasing pay scale, enhancing human resource rationalization, and reorganizing and restructuring agencies, ministries, and commissions at the federal level. Moreover, the capacity-building program included; reforming the legal, judicial, and public sector financial management thereby improving the operational efficiency of the government institutions (Solomon, 2013).

The failure in the implementation of the civil service reform programs in most developing countries like Ethiopia can partly be attributed to the incompatibility between the reform packages and tools transplanted from the industrialized world and the national needs and contexts of the recipient countries.

For instance, the reform initiatives made during the “first phase” of civil service reform in Ethiopia could be considered as evidence for this argument. The tools were mainly suggested by donor agencies such as the World Bank and IMF as part of the preconditions for financial and technical support. Before the reform in the early 1990s, Ethiopia has been ruled under a communist regime along with close-door economic policies and strategies for nearly two decades. Coupled with poor infrastructure the

communist legacy of the state might have hindered the proper implementation of civil service reform packages as per the liberal ideology of the west. Indeed, it is not merely the capacity or the sources of the reform tools that matter, but also the local contexts and the nature and depth of the problems to be addressed through the reform programs.

II. The “second phase” of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia (1996-2003)

The ‘second phase’ of civil service reform was also called the era of capacity building in which governments in developing countries tried to take several intervention measures. According to McCourt (1998; cited by Solomon, 2013:93), the challenges encountered in implementing the “first phase” of the civil service reform efforts were acknowledged and specified during the commencement of the “second generation” of reform. Central to this phase was the need to enhance the capacity of the public servants through training and development programs. The bare stress made on the structural and cost-reduction in the “first generation” of reform was recognized as significant shortcomings.

While not undermining the problems observed in the “first phase” of the reform efforts, the government stated that reform is a continuous process, not a one-time achievement. Hence, the “second phase” was considered to be a continuation of the reform attempts made in the first and an enhanced commitment by the government to overcome the existing and potential uphill limiting effective implementation of the civil service reform program (The Government of Ethiopia, 1998; cited by Paulos, 2001).

According to the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia (1996 as cited by Solomon 2013), the need for the “second generation” of civil service reform in Ethiopia stems from the acute problems of the country’s civil service as identified by the Public Sector Capacity Building Support Project. Institutional hindrances limiting the fundamental functions of policy formulation, public service delivery, and lack of appropriate regulations were identified. The civil service system’s legal provisions and operational systems at both federal and states level were outmoded and they constrained the performance of public service institutions. Besides, lack of a medium-term planning and budgeting framework, ineffective human and financial management and controls, low pay structure, inappropriate position classification, and grading systems, poor decision-

making at strategic and cabinet levels, and inadequate attention to modern managerial approaches to civil service delivery. It was in response to these main shortcomings that the government of Ethiopia has introduced a comprehensive civil service reform program (CSRP) in 1996. The findings related to the above-mentioned public service problems were also backed up by the civil service reform Task Force (TF).

Consequently, apprehending the main public service problems identified by Task Forces and Project reports, the Ethiopian government launched the “second phase” of the Civil Service Reform Program in 1996, which was more comprehensive as compared to its precursor reform phase. The major objective of the “second generation” of the reform was to build a public service capable of producing and providing services as per the needs and desires of the citizens and complying with the overall operation or functions of the civil service per the principles of democracy, federalism, and good governance. In addition, it has been hoped that the civil service, if undergoing reform would support the government’s policies for social and economic change and the development of the public sector (Ibid).

According to Berhanu and Elizabeth (2006), the Ministry of Capacity Building reformulated the following objectives for the CSRP in June 2003:

- ✓ To shake off basic weaknesses ingrained in the existing Civil Service inherited from the past regime;
- ✓ To build the capacity of the Civil Service so that it will execute the policies and programs of the government successfully;
- ✓ To facilitate the Civil Service to provide efficient and fair services to the public;
- ✓ To enhance transparency and accountability in the Civil Service;
- ✓ To build a Civil Service that stands for gender and ethnic equality and rights and
- ✓ To build a Civil Service that is ethically sound and free of corruption, nepotism, and favoritism

The CSRP sought to establish and strengthen a just, transparent, efficient, effective, and ethical public service system primarily by enacting legal provisions that enable the reform efforts, developing viable operating systems, and capacitating the civil servants

through training and development programs in five (5) key areas: (1) Public Expenditure Management and Control, (2) Human Resource Management (HRM), (3) Public Service Delivery, (4) Top Management Systems and Civil Service Ethics and Judicial reforms (World Bank, 2004:2).

Paulos (2001) and Solomon (2013) have provided detailed descriptions and explanations of the five (5) civil service reform sub-programs implemented in the second wave of civil service reform in Ethiopia. These programs were aimed at improving the outputs and the outcomes of public service organizations.

The first one was related to the management and control of public expenditures. The public expenditure management and control reform program were introduced considering the inefficiencies resulting from unpredictable financial management, poor incentives, and lack of a strategic or performance orientation identified during the “first generation” of reform.

Also, erratic resource flows have undermined the allocation and operational efficiency of the public sector at the federal, regional, and local levels in Ethiopia. Moreover, the problems of public sector financial management and control were found to be pervasive. Poor management and control systems of public expenditure were observed at all levels of the government. In line with this, the need to ensure compliance with the financial calendar, strengthen political ownership of the macroeconomic fiscal framework and its indicative planning figures as a basis for integrated, medium-term planning; revitalize federal-level efforts to develop a Public Expenditure Program or Medium-Term Expenditure Framework including the proper incorporation of planning and financial functions in the newly merged MoFED were widely recognized. Also, strengthening internal and external audit systems; improving budget monitoring and fiscal reporting; reconciling fiscal and monetary accounts, and reducing the federal accounts and audit backlogs were among the areas to reform. Within regions, fiscal decentralization that has been introduced in the “first phase” has put further burdens on ‘bureaus’ and ‘woredas’ to bring their accounts up-to-date, roll out the new chart of accounts and accounting procedures, develop planning modalities and strengthen other critical functions such as

procurement and auditing. Similar efforts in urban and local jurisdictions remain. Hence, revenue performance remained weak across the tiers of government in part due to insufficient tax autonomy and poor administration (World Bank, 2004:3).

Developing a comprehensive legal document that deals with the entire financial management and control of the public service was the core objective of the program. It was chaired by the then Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). Ensuring a wise use of the financial and monetary resources of the state was the ultimate goal of this reform sub-program. In this regard, the program was intended to attract and retain public servants with the knowledge and skills of managing and controlling the financial resources of the public service. Indeed, the program was intended to emphasize the value of money incurred in the production and provision of public services.

The second was the HRM sub-program. It was pointed at modernizing the HRM system of the state. The ultimate purpose of the program was to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service. The Federal Civil Service Commission was mandated to handle the HRM sub-program. Hence, by the Fiscal Year 2000/01, the HRM sub-program was expected to develop a sophisticated system of just and equitable administration of the civil service and its employees, develop a merit-based pay and promotion, and effective system for executing government policies according to established priorities of the state, develop uniform rules and regulations for the HRM of the public service and retaining the sufficient number of civil servants with the required level of knowledge and caliber (Paulos, 2001).

Categorically, the framework for public personnel incentives also needed to be reformed, given the then needs and contexts of the civil service in the country. In terms of modernizing human resource management, the government has sought to introduce a performance management system through the development of a Results-Oriented Performance Evaluation that seeks to link individual performance with outputs laid out in institution-wide strategic plans. However, the underlying problems of low incentives across levels of government remained. Attempts to develop an affordable, medium-term public sector pay policy were also delayed, and civil servants at all levels—despite an

across-the-board salary increase in 2001-continued to receive low salaries. Personnel rules for ‘Woredas’; i.e., local government including procedures for hiring, firing, transfer, and promotion remained unclear. In municipalities, which sit outside the core civil service system, the government has identified the need to develop a distinct set of rules for setting wages, hiring, and firing municipal workers.

Especial attention was given to the sustainability of capacity-building investments, particularly in urban management and ICT, without complementary efforts to retain workers through adequate pay. Anecdotal evidence indicates an increased incidence of migrating talent to the private and CSO sectors, or brain-drain abroad (Government of Ethiopia, 2004).

In other words, the HRM reform sub-program included; among others; job evaluation and position classification/grading system, merit/performance-based recruitment and selection, employee performance appraisal, promotion and transfer, compensation and creation of a conducive working environment, setting up the human resource management information system, human resource planning, civil service law and complaint, and grievances-handling mechanisms and human resource development (Solomon, 2013:240).

The third reform sub-program was the top-management system, which was housed in the Office of the Prime Minister. The program worked on the selection and improvement of senior public officials. Ultimately, the program was expected to ensure adherence of the public service to the strategic approach in the course of planning, implementing, and controlling the overall operation of the public service at the federal level, improving the management practices concerning planning and controlling, delegation, and improve the structural set up of the Office of the Prime Minister.

The fourth sub-program was related to the quality of public service delivery. It was housed in the Prime Minister’s office. This reform sub-program was intended to enhance the quality of public services and their delivery. Part of the program was the establishment of complaint-handling mechanisms. By the Fiscal Year 2000/01, the program was expected to make the public service organizations strictly follow an

effective and improved system for quality service delivery. Providing public services in an efficient, effective, transparent, and impartial manner was the ultimate aim of the program. Hence, fairness, equality, equity, and justice were the central concern of the public service delivery sub-program (Ibid).

Last but not least was the ethics and judicial reform sub-program, which was headed by the Office of the Prime Minister. It was intended to create awareness on how to overcome the problems of embezzlement, corruption, fraud, and mal-practices in public service institutions. Besides, the program was aimed at enhancing civil servants' sense of belongingness and commitment to ensuring the wise use of public resources. Moreover, the program was designed to develop the required setup for ethical practices in the federal and regional institutions of the public services, and improve the capacity of police, attorneys, media, and courts to investigate legal and administrative issues of the public service ethically (Paulos, 2001).

The entire CSRP (the second generation of reform) was administered by high-ranking committee members chaired by the then PM of the country. The committee members were; the Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister, the Head of the Social and Administrative Division in the Prime Minister's Office, sub-program Directors, and high-level experts. This committee was in charge of making strategic decisions about the programs, enhancing the participation of the regional administrations and federal institutions, and reporting to the Parliament (Ibid).

The inspiring results achieved in the "second phase" were; the formulation of new legislation and modification of the existing legal frameworks dealing with public financial management, the Federal Civil Service, and the National Service Delivery and associated regulations and directives governing various matters. These proclamations and policies were lacking during the "first generation" of reforms. The positive results were achieved through this phase of Civil Service Reform. Besides, structure and process standardization were made and training was provided to federal and regional civil servants on the adoption and applications of new and improved systems. The "second

phase” of civil service reform was primarily based on the New Public Management Model (Solomon, 2013).

However, the Ethiopian Government itself has confessed that the “second generation” of civil service reform was of mixed results, in terms of the successes or progress achieved and the failures encountered. Despite encouraging results recorded in reforming the management and control system of the public sector expenditure, the effort could only bring a modest impact in relieving the institutional and capacity impediments of the public service. Besides, the core services were weak, functional efficiency remained poor, and weakness in the design of the reform initiatives was observed. The process was an overly top-down approach (World Bank, 2004).

Despite the number of remedial actions taken during the “second generation” of civil service reform in Ethiopia, problems were encountered in the course of implementation. Yet, the major one was the one-fit-all approach deployed that ignored the country-specific managerial characteristics of public service organizations. It seems that this was the persistent impact of the “first generation” of reform, which was by and large dictated by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF (Gebre and Melesse, 2014).

As precisely put by Adebaby (2011 cited in Gebre and Melesse, 2014:96), regardless of some progress made, the execution of the "second generation” of CSRP in Ethiopia has encountered fundamental shortcomings. These were lack of support and competence in the top-level leaders, low-level public servants’ morale and poor performance, inefficiency in service delivery, misuse of scarce public resources, and unethical practices in the course of service provision.

Therefore, it has been observed that both success stories and pitfalls encountered in the course of implementing the “second phase” of civil service reform were considered as inputs for the design and commencement of the “third phase” of reform programs.

III. The “third phase” of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia (2003-2018)

At the generic level, the “third-generation” reforms were put in place to restore coherence to government, and attention switched to horizontal coordination and integration. This phase of reform was focused on policy problems and the quality of public services as a whole rather than on narrower reforms (World Bank, 2012).

In the year 2003, the Ethiopian Government designed and started implementing the Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) at the Federal level. PSCAP was a five-year reform package composed of CSRP and other five (5) key reform sub-programs. The “third phase or generation” of reform in Ethiopia was commenced in the form of the ‘Five Year Public Service Delivery Capacity Building Program’ (Mohammed, 2008 as cited in Solomon, 2013).

It has been stated that during the commencement of the “third phase” of civil service reform, the Ethiopian Government has shown a strong commitment to overcome the challenges and impediments faced in the course of implementing the “second generation” of reform programs. Hence, in this phase, due consideration has been given to the quality of service delivery. Coincidence with the “third phase” of the reform program was the introduction of NPM. Primarily, NPM was intended to transform the civil service from being bureaucratic, unaccountable, inefficient, and ineffective to fair and flexible, responsible, participative, accountable, efficient, ethical, and transparent civil service institutions that promote accelerated and sustained socio-economic development to build good governance and democracy. Also, this stage was purposely premeditated to reinforce the working systems, progress organizational success, and swiftly enhance the human resource capacities in the public, private, civic society, and higher education (Ministry of Capacity Building, 2004 cited in Gebre and Melesse, 2014).

In nutshell, the “third phase” of the reform was aimed at enhancing the capacity of the civil service to implement government policies and programs efficiently and effectively. It was also intended to enhance attributes such as; transparency, accountability, and ethical conduct of the civil service. Moreover, the “third generation” of civil service reform in Ethiopia had the objective of creating a corruption-free civil service that serves

the public at large fairly and impartially (Getachew and Common, 2006 cited in Solomon, 2013). To this effect, various reform packages such as; Business Process Reengineering (BPR), Strategic Planning and Management (SPM), and Performance-Based Management System (PBMS) were introduced (Kassahun, 2007 as cited by Solomon, 2013).

The government has set up the administrative and political arrangements required to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the execution of the “third phase” of CSRP. In this regard, the Ministry of Civil Service, which replaced the former Ministry of Capacity Building, was in charge of supervising the implementation processes of the CSRP. The same modalities of implementation were deployed for all central and regional level public institutions in Ethiopia. Hence, all public institutions were required to implement the reform tool Business Process Reengineering (BPR) notwithstanding their differences in terms of missions, types of customers they serve, and their interfaces with other systems in the operational domain (Tesfaye and Atkilt, 2011 as cited by Solomon, 2013).

Contrary to the first and second phases, the third phase was taken up following the publication of the World Development Report 1997 focused on service delivery. The new Genesis of civil service reform programs since then has focused on setting up a sympathetic and effective service delivery system. Hence, for public servants, it pursued to take into consideration the opinions and demands of their clients and the public at large, to design their performance development blueprints that involve service delivery standards monitored by both responsible public managers and public servants. The 3rd generation CSR program allows civil servants to engage in self-appraisal exercises, in which they are supposed to meet and discuss customer feelings regarding the quality of their service and crop up with performance improvement plans, which would then form the foundation of a performance agreement with the government (Ayee, 2008 cited in Gebre and Melesse, 2014).

Nowadays, implementing civil service reform is both demanding and tiresome as it entails various genuine changes in the institutions. At its most basic level, it requires rearrangement of human conformation and altering their conduct. Thus, in the Ethiopian

context, in the course of implementing the “third phase” of civil service reform, plans for performance improvement and beneficiary surveys were not properly organized. Besides, service delivery to customers in the low-income bracket was far from adequate, regardless of efforts made to involve the stakeholders in the production process. Indeed, the strategic plan designed to mitigate poverty has not achieved its objectives and the quality of public services remained unchanged. Consequently, implementing public policies and strategies has become the concern of the modern government to ensure that the public interest is well articulated and served in the end. Therefore, there is a dire need for a competent civil service employed based on merit rather than political ground. Moreover, having a well-structured, right-sized and well-paying, accountable and relatively corruption-free, autonomous, representative and well-trained, performance-oriented, and open civil service system is vital (Satish, 2004; Kiragu, 2002 Peters and Pierre, 2004 as cited by Gebre and Melesse, 2014).

3.4. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The research under consideration intended to analyze the interaction between politics and administration in the course of Civil Service Reform. The researcher was instigated by research works dealing with both implicit and explicit purposes of public sector reforms. It seems that the explicit goals of civil service reform efforts are studied well. However, the politicization of CSR initiatives and the implicit and well-served goals of the reform programs are under-studied.

Thus, this research focused on the reaction of the civil service elites towards the dilemma situations that occur during CSR albeit their interaction with political executives that are elected and appointed based on the political lines of the incumbent government in Ethiopia. To this end, among seven key responsibilities of civil servants, four (4) normative limits were selected or chosen. These are Normative Limits of Legality, Professional Standards, Truthfulness, and the Political Neutrality. These were considered to be the dependent variables, the Civil Service Elites’ Professional Background, Positions, and Experience independent variables where the political influence manifests.

Moreover, the researcher tried to include moderating variables like sex and age. See Figure 3.1. Below:




Figure 3.1.: Politico-Administrative Relations in the course of Civil Service Reform

Source: The Author (2020).

In general, it seems that not all civil service reforms, changes, and innovations have yet found their way into the minds of citizens. Stereotypes about public organizations and officials persist, even though they were formed in a world that no longer exists. To this day, many have the perception that civil servants work in an environment that is separate from the private sector. In addition, many see civil servants as bureaucrats who lack flexibility and follow rules and processes and do not tend to serve individuals or the interests of citizens.

Another popular stereotype is that civil servants do not perform as well as they should, yet receive preferential treatment in terms of pay and working conditions in general. Furthermore, perceptions and stereotypes differ from job to job: "At one moment, public employees are praised for helping the less fortunate, protecting society, or participating in large projects designed to improve the well-being of all members of society."

On the other hand, public servants are accused of being more power-motivated, lazy, corrupt, and selfish. Organizational theory is "concerned with the conditions that maximize rational behavior, calculation, and performance within a given structural framework, or conversely, with the extent to which various structures and organizational factors constrain rational calculation and efficiency.



CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

Introduction

This chapter mainly deals with data presentation, analysis, and interpretations. It starts with the presentation of the reliability of the instrument used, and the response rate of the survey instrument. It also deals with an overview of Ethiopian Civil Service, Civil Service Reform practices in the country, and the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The chapter is devoted to data presentation, analysis, and discussion concerning the dilemma of civil service reform in Ethiopia.

More specifically, the chapter covers the presentation, analysis, and discussion of data related to the interaction between political leaders and civil service elites in the process of civil service reform. Thus, the controversies surrounding legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality in the wake of civil service reform are addressed in detail. In addition, the relationship between the political executives and the top civil service elites in terms of the roles they each play, the criteria they use in determining the civil service reform to be implemented, and other technical issues therein.

4.1. THE RESPONSE RATE AND RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRUMENT

The researcher distributed 211 Vignette Questionnaires of which 185 were duly completed and returned. However, after a thorough analysis, 5 questionnaires were found to be inappropriate and were eliminated. The total population of the study was 840 out of which 211 were included using simple computerized sample calculation ensuring a 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error. The response rate from this category of respondents was therefore 87%.

To ensure the internal consistency of the survey instrument used, a reliability test was conducted using SPSS version 25. More specifically, Cronbach's alpha was used to test the reliability of the scales used in this research. See Table 4.1 below:

No	Categories of variables	Reliability	Number of Items
1.	Generic Questions	0.74	
2.	Legality	0.67	
3.	Professional Standards	0.72	
4.	Truthfulness	0.62	
5.	Political Neutrality	0.61	

Table 4.1: Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Test of the research Items

According to Taber (2018) and Berger and Hänze (2015), a reliability rate greater than or equal to 0.5 is tolerable. In this study, the minimum reliability rate was 0.61. Thus, the internal consistency of the instrument used was reliable. Furthermore, it has been argued that an alpha of less than 0.60 is possible and tolerable when there is an acceptable level of association between the items designed for the survey and the number of items is less (Cortina, 1993).

4.2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEY RESPONDENTS

The purposely selected Civil Service Elites, i.e. General Directors, Directors, Advisers, and Team Leaders from relevant Ministries, Commissions, Agencies, and a few other Public Sector Organizations were addressed using the interview guide Vignette Questionnaire. The respondents in this category were provided with three (3) categories of questions. The first section was devoted to the relevant socio-demographic attributes of the respondents. The second section aimed at collecting general information about the nature and practices of Politico-Administrative Relationships in Ethiopia during Civil Service Reform. The third section was devoted to the dilemma situation that the Civil Service Elites may encounter in the course of Civil Service Reform regarding the normative constraints of Legality, Professional Standards, Truthfulness, and political neutrality. The raw data relating to the socio-demographic characteristics of the survey respondents are presented as follows.

Generic Attributes	Response Category	Frequencies	Percent
Sex	Female	38	21.7
	Male	137	78.3
Age	25-35	38	21.7
	36-45	70	40
	46-55	41	23.4
	56-65	15	8.6
	66 or more	1	0.6
Field of Study	Law	16	9.1
	Business and Economics	64	36.6
	Social Sciences	67	38.3
	Other	27	15.4
Level of Education	Below BA/BSc	2	1.1
	BA/BSc	60	34.3
	MA/MSc	109	62.3
	Ph.D. or above	3	1.7
Experience	1-10	19	10.9
	11-20	84	48
	21-30	45	25.7
	31-40	15	8.6
	41 and above	3	1.7
Position	General Director	19	10.9
	Director	102	58.3
	Advisor	30	17.1
	Team Leader	24	13.7
Employer	Ministry	90	51.1
	Commission	40	22.9
	Agency	38	21.7
	Other	7	4
Operational Duty	Policy and Institutional Change	45	25.7
	Administrative Execution	50	28.6
	Organization and Management	67	38.3
	Other	13	7.5
Total		175	100

Table 4.2.: Demographic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents

4.3. AN OVERVIEW OF ETHIOPIAN CIVIL SERVICE AND REFORM INITIATIVES IN ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is a federal state with a civil service system at the central, state, and local levels of government. Therefore, the Ethiopian bureaucracy includes many local government officials, nine regional state officials, two city governments (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations), one federal official, and several federal and state government agencies, parastatals, and corporations. An examination of the bureaucracy in this and subsequent chapters will focus largely on the federal civil service. It is, however, pertinent to point out that the nature and character of the bureaucracy at the central level give to some extent a general picture of what is to be found in the various States of the Federation.

The introduction of public administration in Ethiopia in its modern form is a recent phenomenon that came along with the desire to modernize the country and enhance the capacity of civil services to consolidate rulers' political power. According to historians, the appointment of 9 ministers by Emperor Menelik in 1909 marked the birth of modern public bureaucracy in Ethiopia (Bahiru, 2002:112).

Hence, the introduction and growth of the Ethiopian Civil Service are remembered along with the consolidation of the political power and processes and the modernization and centralization of the state powers. In other words, it was an instrumental intention that forced the then government of the country to introduce an administrative system (Modern Public Administration) in the country.

In this regard, key informants stated that “Emperor Haile Sellasie further strengthened the cabinet (Ministerial system) commenced during his predecessor. He appointed more ministers by introducing new sectors through differentiation and specialization. The position of Prime Minister and Council of Ministers was introduced during the reign of Emperor Haile Sellasie. These positions were introduced to effectively run the routine functions of the state.”

On the other hand, they argued that “Emperor Haile Sellasie introduced civil service laws while not compromising his intention of centralization and modernization of the government. In doing so, he got assistance from international consultants and hence was able to create organizations that execute the enacted civil service laws. Attempts were made to overcome the challenges of partiality and patronage in the civil service. Therefore, it has been stated that fundamental laws and rules used to create public sector institutions were introduced during the imperial regime of Ethiopia.”

In this regard, the key informants from the political executives argued that “the introduction of the Civil Service goes back to the pre-modern education period. According to them, Civil Servants were Military Men/members of the ruling family or Monarchy and there was a demarcation between politics and bureaucracy. Rather, they were the same. Later, Emperor Hailesellase (1950-1974) introduced modern education intending to modernize the government and its institutions. However, education at the time was accessible only to the children of the ruling family monarchy. Despite the limited access to education, Emperor Hailesellase was considered to be the modernizer and reformist partly due to his initiative for modernization and changed through education and consultation with foreign experts (Key Informants, 2021).”

“Nevertheless, few educated citizens with exposure to foreign countries including the children of the members of the Monarchy had started resisting the regime as there was an incompatibility between a desire for change and modernization and the political tradition of the then government. This small resistance grew into a high-scale students’ and peasants’ movement in the country. The incompatibility was due to the government’s commitment to a single religion and single language and its failure to attempt to accommodate diversity in the course of nation-state building. The government intended to homogenize the country along with state religion and language, i.e. Orthodox Christianity and Amharic Language. The key informants stated that the First Minister was Papas (a religious leader). On top of that was the practice that employment in the public sector was based on religion and language as major criteria. On the other hand, Landlords were members of the then parliament and most of the political elites were members of the ruling family-by-blood marriage (Ibid).”

Hence, the key informants stated that “educated persons did not have a place in the government (inherent incompatibility).” “The manifestation of the incompatibility was the fact that Haileselassie who was once considered to be the reformer and modernizer became anti modernization and reform efforts in the country. This has led to a new wave of resistance and challenges from the then-educated elites and peasants. The administrative systems introduced by Italy were aborted due to war with Ethiopia (educated bureaucrats were killed in the war field and there was a brain drain). Ultimately, the students’ movement led to the downfall of the Imperial Regime (Fieldwork, 2021).”

“Despite his overall failure in modernizing and furthering Civil Service Reform (CSR) efforts, Emperor Haileselassie was praised for introducing the Division of Labor, Position Classification, and Merit Principles. Yet, these principles were not practically put into action.”

However, no significant changes were made during the Communist Regime that had ruled the country for nearly two decades (1974-1991). Some argue that the civil service underwent regressive changes than progress. During this period, civil servants were required to adhere to Communist ideology and policies along its lines. Indeed, the civil service has been politicized and civil service laws were bypassed. Hence, despite its growth in size, the then civil service was not able to deliver public services partly due to excessive politicization (OPM 2001).

“The Communist Regime of Ethiopia was considered to be an opportunist government in two respects. The first is the fact that resistance movements were mostly led by students and peasants. Lack of coherence in the organizations of student and peasants’ movements had created a power vacuum created after the collapse of the imperial regime. The Dergue Regime used this as an opportunity to come to power. It had an institutional and organizational advantage over the unorganized movements. The second advantage of this regime was the fact that it started reorganizing civil service with relatively educated bureaucrats. Hence, in the beginning, the socialist-communist regime attempted to further the modernization process (Key Informants, 2021).”

“However, the modernization project of the Communist regime did not last long as it opted to homogenize the country along with Ethiopian Nationalism and Scientific Communism. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam, the leader of the Communist Party of Ethiopia followed a collectivist approach of resource sharing, punishment, rewards, and inheriting legacy. Hence, the modernization efforts were aborted in favor of the political ideology of scientific socialism that even the bureaucrats were required to preach about (Ibid).”

Nevertheless, it is important to mention a few Positive Changes made during the Military (Communist or Socialist) regime of Ethiopia.

- i. The regime tried to minimize the marginalization of language and religion by declaring secularism;
- ii. Employment of Civil Servants based on merit principles and
- iii. The Elites willingly joined the then government to assist the process of civil service modernization (installing systems) for the government has created conducive conditions in the beginning

Yet, “clashes occurred between political elites and bureaucracy. Military personnel is brought to command bureaucracy. Educated-pro-reform persons were killed/demolished through war. In addition, civil war, war with rebellion groups, and a war with neighboring Somalia caused a devastating multifaceted crisis in the country. These crises led to the end of the communist government in 1991.”

The year 1991 was a turning point in the history of the country. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in May 1991. The government had to face unprecedented demands for socio-economic and political changes including:

- ✓ The policy of decentralization and the accompanying needs in terms of human resources, systems, and structures;
- ✓ The political liberalization and its implication for the civil service in terms of accountability and transparency;
- ✓ The policy of economic deregulation enhanced the role of the private sector and

- ✓ The policy of having a "lean and affordable" government with implications on the size and the delivery culture of the civil service (Ibid).

The Ethiopian government (FDRE) calls these reform tools as “the first generation” or “the first phase” of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia. The government has made an effort to reform socio-political and economic reform which required going beyond structural changes and cost minimization attempts. The government was then confronted with the policy question of how to go about fundamentally reforming the civil service in such a way as to make it instrumental to bring about such transformation (Asmelash, 1998 Paulos, 2001).

Moreover, the Ethiopian Government has introduced successive Civil Service Reform programs in three phases or generations in the past three decades. Nevertheless, observations and studies show that such overambitious initiatives were found to be far from meeting their expectations enhancing operational efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organizations to the desired level. This research presumed that such a failure in reforming the public sector is partly due to excessive politicization of the Civil Service Reform Programs. Hence, this research attempted to explore the opinions of civil service elites on the dilemma situation that they may face in the course of civil service reform vis-à-vis their interactions with political executives.

Therefore, it has been argued that “since its establishment, the Ethiopian Civil Service has been confronted with huge challenges to effectively playing its expected role of providing timely and quality policy advice to incumbent governments, implementing approved policies and laws, and managing basic public services in such a way that is satisfactory for the citizens.”

According to the key informants, “the EPRDF government that came to power after a series of departures had its political thoughts and social base along ethnic lines. Hence, bureaucracy was reinstalled along with two values, i.e., representation and political affiliation based on ethnicity. The informants argue that the formulas/criteria used to this end were purely politically motivated. Yet, it has also introduced a new beginning, i.e.

reorganization of Bureaucracy, avoiding the continuation of the political legacy of its predecessors.”

Following the Civil Service Reform Need Assessment conducted in 1989, in which foreign experts have taken part helped the government to identify existing gaps and problems in the public sector organizations. The following problems were identified:

- i. Capacity issues of the Bureaucrats;
- ii. System problems;
- iii. Structural and organizational issues;
- iv. Attitudinal problems-including that of the political leaders;
- v. Poor working culture;
- vi. Rule-oriented Civil Service practice;
- vii. Corrupt practices and
- viii. The civil servants were barely record-keepers

However, the EPRDF has installed its version of political legacy (Revolutionary). It had a huge number of educated bureaucrats, institutions have been expanded rapidly, and these created opportunities for exploitation in the last nearly three decades. During the EPRDF administration, Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) which came from a minority had enormous power. The core (TPLF) used political manipulations of self-rule and representation to consolidate its power. The government did not show a genuine commitment to Civil Service Development and political democracy. In other words, CSRs were not meant to bring genuine changes in real terms. CSR evaluations were solely based on attitude or behavioral affiliations.

On the other, the key informants have stated some positive achievements made by the EPRDF government including the restructuring of the Civil Service Institutions and introducing self-rule at regional and local levels.

“Yet, the reform efforts of the EPRDF government have encountered many challenges. Among these was the enormous power of Party Affairs Offices and officials to which leaders of public sector organizations including ministers and commissioners were subordinated let alone the Civil Servants. Besides, state resources were used for political

purposes. For example, party offices advertise publicly that “unless you (the civil servants) participate in the demonstration supporting the government, you will be denied of your salary”. Sometimes, to the extent, that Civil Service Elites make announcements of this kind.”

According to the key informants, “the Civil Service and its Reform during the EPRDF government can be described as follows:

- ✓ Bureaucracy was a tool to implement the political agenda of the government;
- ✓ The relationship between politics and bureaucracy was not democratic;
- ✓ The emergence of New Bureaucracy and the collapse of Old Bureaucracy;
- ✓ The Creation of new institutions, some were privatized, and some were renowned by the state;
- ✓ Installed a child (Civil Service) that does not grow up
- ✓ Created new bureaucratic elites that can determine the future of bureaucratic development in Ethiopia;
- ✓ Political affiliation was the only criterion;
- ✓ Unqualified authority/irrelevant field of study and positions; and
- ✓ Democratic centralism with semi-professional civil servants”

4.3.1. The Growth of Civil Service in Ethiopia

It has been stated that around 20% of the National Income goes to Public Expenditure of which an enormous portion is spent on the wage and salaries of civil servants. The number of civil servants has grown rapidly since the EPRDF came to power in 1991. The number of Public Servants has grown from 223,733 to 1,899,429 in 2019 (Civil Service Commission, 2019). See Table 4.3 below:

<i>No.</i>	<i>Government Levels</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
1.	Federal Civil Servants	97,485	74,448	171,933
2.	Addis Ababa City Administration	53,908	66,838	120,746
3.	Dire Dawa City Administration	4,956	3,281	8,237
4.	Tigray Region	60,838	48,340	109,178
5.	Afar Region	25,267	10,455	35,722
6.	Amhara Region	227,366	159,950	387,316
7.	Oromia Region	353,760	184,971	538,731
8.	Ethio-Somali Region	92,396	25,590	117,986
9.	Benishangul Gumuz Region	20,919	13,765	34,684
10.	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPRS)	235,577	111,127	346,704
11.	Gambella Region	14,387	7,259	21,646
12.	Harari Region	3,795	2,751	6,546
<i>Total</i>		<i>1,190,654</i>	<i>708,775</i>	<i>1,899,429</i>

Table 4.3: The Number of Civil Servants at Federal and Regional Levels (1963-2019)

Source: Civil Service Commission (2019).

According to the FDRE Civil Service Commission (2020), the number of civil servants has been showing a nearly 7% average growth rate per annum since the commission's establishment in 1963. The commission stated that the fact that Ethiopia is the 2nd most populous country next to Nigeria would make a projection & the assessment of the prevailing size of the Ethiopian Public Service, i.e., the population growth directly affects the size of civil service in the country.

4.3.2. The Ratio of Civil Servants-to-Population at Federal and States Level

Enhancing the delivery of public services and enhancing the capacity of civil servants are vital issues that the Ethiopian government is striving to address through Civil Service Reform Programs. The Ethiopian civil service still ranks near the bottom globally on many social indicators, like physicians per 1,000 people and youth literacy rates. Despite the growth of Ethiopian Civil Servants over the last half a century, the ratio of civil servants to the population remains to be among the lowest. As indicated earlier, the

number of Public Servants has grown from 223,733 to 1,899,429 in 2019 (Civil Service Commission, 2019). See table 4.4: below:

Level of Government	Civil Servants	Population	Civil Servant-to-Population Ratio
Tigray Region	109,178	5,855,995	54
Afar Region	35,722	1,764,000	49
Amhara Region	387,316	21,225,471	55
Oromia Region	538,731	38,254,971	71
Ethio-Somali Region	117,986	5,937,712	50
Benishangul Gumuz Region	34,684	1,304,067	38
SNNPRS	346,704	21,126,789	61
Gambella Region	21,646	506,288	23
Harari Region	6,546	252,687	39
Addis Ababa City	120,746	3,510,361	29
Dire Dawa City	8,237	457,506	56
Federal Government	171,933	NA	NA
Total	1,899,429	100,195,847	53

Table: 4.4: The Ratio of Civil Servants to Population at Federal and States Level in Ethiopia

Source: Civil Service Commission (2019).

4.3.3. The Vision, Mission and Values, and Ethical Principles of the Ethiopian Civil Service Commission

According to Proclamation Number 8/1995, the FDRE Civil Service Commission was established to realize meritorious, efficient, productive, and value-neutral civil servants per the law.

The commission spires to see a Public Service that effectively and ethically achieves its mission by 2025. In addition, the commission has a mission of creating effective and efficient civil service that serves the nations, public, and citizens based on the principles of integrity, transparency, and accountability to implement the democratic development of government policies and objectives (FDRE, 2017). Moreover, the commission has introduced the following organizational values to be respected and embedded into the practices of Public Sector Organizations in the country. These are:

1. Honesty and integrity;
2. Transparency and Accountability;
3. Efficiency and Effectiveness;
4. Impartially serve the public and citizens;
5. Working industriously with commitment and Motivation;
6. Respect for our workers and Service Delivery;
7. Ensuring women's rights at all levels and
8. Building our human capacity.

The commission is mandated to observe and inspect the inclusion of these values into the conceptual and operational aspects of government institutions under its jurisdiction. Coupled with the above-stated organizational values, Ethiopian Public Sector Organizations are expected to operate considering the following ethical principles:

1. Integrity;
2. Loyalty;
3. Transparency;
4. Confidentiality;
5. Honesty;
6. Accountability;
7. Serving the Public Interest;
8. Exercising Legitimate Authority;
9. Impartiality;
10. Respecting the Law;
11. Responsiveness and
12. Exercising Leadership

It was to achieve the aforementioned core values that the Ethiopian Government introduced several reform packages including; National Capacity Building Reform Program (NCBRP), and Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP). In this regard, from PSCAP programs, enormous attention has been given to the Civil Service Reform Program. Generally, the CSRP is aimed at enhancing the capacity of public service at both central and state government levels. Indeed, the civil service reform program attempted to address the following:

- ✓ Shaking off the major flaws embedded in the contemporary Ethiopian Public Service inherited from the past regimes;
- ✓ Enhancing the capacity of the public sector to successfully execute public policies and programs;
- ✓ Facilitating the economic and impartial provision of public services to the citizens at large;
- ✓ Enhancing accountability and transparency in the public service;
- ✓ Building a public service that strives for the rights and equality of citizens;
- ✓ Building a public service that is ethically solid and free from malpractices such as; nepotism, favoritism, and corruption (Fetiya, Meskerem, and Selamawit, 2019).

4.4. THE DISCOURSE OF POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS DURING CSR IN ETHIOPIA

Regardless of the countries' level of economic development and other socio-political attributes of both developed and developing countries, Civil Service Reforms are inevitable practices in public sector organizations. However, it is a demanding but vital challenge for the government and public sector institutions (Repucci, 2014). In other words, despite the reality that changes are inevitable in public sector organizations, the questions of “what to change”, “which tool or program to deploy”, “when to execute them”, and “how to design and implement them” and “who should be in charge or participate” remain to be enduring issues requiring debates relating to civil service reform (CSR). Many researchers agree that most of the Civil Service Reforms were not successful partly due to the ill in the relationships between systems. Nevertheless, they have been misguided at their worst and ad hoc practices at their best (UNDP, 2004; Evans, 2008 Scoot, 2011 as cited by Repucci, 2014). This section is devoted to the presentation, analysis, and discussions of survey data relating to the practices of Politico-Administrative Relationships and generic controversial situations that the civil service elites confront in Ethiopia during civil service reform.

4.4.1. The Role of political and Civil Service Elites during CSR

Successful implementation of CSR is very much dependent on the nature and quality of politico-administrative interactions and the commitment of political and permanent executives. In this regard, the dedication and roles that the political elites play are vital in CSR. They create a favorable political environment and avail the required level of power base and resources to successfully undertake reform activities (Levy and Kpundeh, 2004 as cited by Thompson, 2020).

According to Ayee (2000 cited by Thompson, 2020), political commitment is vital in the course of civil service reform. In other words, successful implementation of Civil Service Reforms requires the political elites to surrender themselves to the disciplines and principles spelled out for a particular reform program. These entail that the political leaders should refrain from taking decisions contrary to the required principles and disciplines of reform. Indeed, bare declarations of intent of the political elites are empty promises unless it is backed by genuine political commitment in practical terms.

Under normal conditions, the civil service reform process shall include the following four principles:

1. The explanation of a clear vision of the role of the civil service and, based on this optimal role, the development of a wide-ranging reform plan;
2. The validation of rules and regulations for the civil service;
3. The devising modern management systems; and
4. The execution of the CSR program (Reid and Malik, 1994).

The prevailing dynamics and challenges may influence or change the role of public service, but not its importance (Maheshwari, 2006:2). In this regard, relevant Civil Service Elites were asked whether the role that the political executives play in the course of CSR outweighs the role they play. See Table 4.5 below:

No	Item	Response category	Frequency	Percent
1.	In the course of civil service reform (CSR), the roles played by politicians outweigh that of Civil Service Elites'	Strongly Disagree	6	3.4
		Disagree	19	10.9
		Undecided	24	13.8
		Agree	59	33.9
		Strongly Agree	65	37.4
2.	Both political and Civil Service Elites play relatively balanced roles in the course of CSR	Strongly Disagree	45	25.9
		Disagree	63	36.2
		Undecided	18	10.3
		Agree	40	23.0
		Strongly Agree	8	4.6

Table 4.5: Political and Administrative Roles in the Course of Civil Service Reform (CSR)

Table 4.5 indicates that an overwhelming number of civil service elites (71.3%) respondents agree that the roles that the political executives (elites) play in the course of Civil Service Reform (CSR) outweigh the roles that their counterparts, i.e. the civil service elites play. On the other hand, 14.3% of the respondents of this category contend the idea that the political elites play more roles in the course of CSR than the roles played by the Civil Service Elites at the top.

Besides, the respondents were asked if both political and civil service elites play a relatively balanced role during CSR. The majority of the respondents (62.1%) disagree with the assertion that both political and civil service elites play equal roles in the course of CSR. However, 27.6% of the respondents believe that civil service and political elites make a balanced contribution during CSR. The Civil Service Elites' responses seem to be consistent when comparing the statement that says the political elites have more roles and the one that says the two actors play relatively balanced roles during reforms. They agreed that political elites dominate the CSR process from inception to end and

contended the idea that there is a balance between the two in terms of the roles they play in the course of CSR. See Bar Chart 4.1 below:




Figure 4.1: The role of Political and Civil Service Elites during CSR

According to Taffese (2008:414), Starting from its establishment, the Ethiopian Civil Service has been facing massive challenges in effectively playing the role of advising the incumbent government, executing endorsed public policies and laws, and providing adequate and satisfactory public services to the citizens at large.

Besides, the key informants from both academics and political executives believe that “the civil servants including the elites at the top are subservient to the politicians. They stated that the relationship is between master and servant. The Civil Service Elites are supposed to manifest loyalty to the politicians. Indeed, the participants argued that the civil service elites are obedient to the political elites in their respective sectors. As per the opinion of the key informants, the Civil Service Elites either do not know their roles or

purposefully ignore them when they do their job. Hence, they argued that establishing professional civil service has never been the ultimate and genuine goal of the Ethiopian regimes in modern times.”

Perhaps this could be one of the reasons why most civil service reform initiatives didn’t bear fruits. Both Academicians and politicians who participated in this study agreed that "often the public service elites play a passive role by accepting and implementing reform initiatives that are hammered out and blessed by the political elites". Hence, the civil service elites play a limited role in the designing, planning, and evaluation of civil service reforms. Their involvements mostly include information provision, training the public servants, and reporting the implementation process (Fieldwork, 2020).

Moreover, key informants from the relevant field of studies stated that “the Ethiopian Civil Service would experience severe challenges in playing its part in the course of Civil Service Reform partly since the civil service system is a highly politicized institution subjected to both one-party pressure and an ethnic dimension as the major criterion for appointment and advancement as well as to enjoy job security particularly during the EPRDF reign.”

“Also, the absence of sufficient safeguards against political pressure from elected or party politicians increases the vulnerability of civil servants to reprisals by politicians should they prefer to play the roles that they are expected to play as per strict principles and disciplines of civil service reform programs.”

The key informants from the selected field of study have summarized the roles of politicians and civil service elites during the designing, planning, implementation, and evaluation of Civil Service Reform programs. The academicians involved in this study had a universal perspective in addressing the relationships between politics and administration. In substantiating this evidence, documents from the Office of the Prime Minister and CSR Task Force (1996) were referred to. See Table 4.6 below:

CSR activities	Politicians' role	Civil Service Elites' role
Designing and Planning CSR	✓ Selection of CSR tools/programs; ✓ Provide feedback on designing steps; ✓ Check relevant countries' experience; ✓ Provide feedback on sub-programs; ✓ Approve the action plan;	✓ Decide the CSR model to use; ✓ Benchmarking foreign experiences; ✓ Collect data from relevant actors; ✓ Design the CSR programs, sub-programs, and projects; ✓ Conduct discussions with leaders from different sectors; ✓ Prepare the project plan
Implementation and Evaluation	✓ Directing Civil Service Elites in different sectors; ✓ Monitoring the implementation; ✓ Evaluate the progress every week with the reform team and elites; ✓ Take action to manage challenges encountered;	✓ Work with each organization's leaders and appropriate units to implement the program in each organization ✓ Implement each program component ✓ Report every week to the steering team

Table 4.6: The Generic role of Political and Civil Service Elites in the CSR

Source: OPM (1996)

The key informants from the political executives were asked to describe and explain the nature of Politico-Administrative relations in Ethiopia in the course of CSR vis-à-vis the role of political and civil service elites in planning, designing, implementing, and evaluating the reform programs.

Similar to the position of the academicians, respondents from the political executives stated that “Civil Service Reform initiatives mostly come from a policy change or a political direction from the incumbent administration. They boldly argued that the processes of Civil Service Reform have never been any different in Ethiopia regardless of the ideological variations between the three regimes that the country had in its modern times-the Imperial Regime (1950-1974), the Socialist-Communist Regime (1974-1991), and the EPRDF (1991-2018). They argued that political leaders make a direct and significant influence in choosing reform tools to adopt. It is part of the police choice they make. Yet, the key informants from political elites agreed that civil service in general and the bureaucratic elites at the top should lead the implementation of the CSR program chosen by the political elites.”

“Nevertheless, in the Ethiopian context, it is hardly possible to demarcate between politics and administration. Hence, assigning reform roles to these actors is a tough job. They said that the two actors are fused and interlocked with each other since the establishment of the modern state and civil service system in Ethiopia.”

Furthermore, the key informants from political executives asserted that “Ethiopia has a big and interventionist developmental state since 1991. With these attributes, it is very natural to witness the immense role of the political executives in Civil Service Reform from its inception to its evaluation.”

Notwithstanding, few survey participants from political leadership argued that “politics and administration play an integrated and vital role in civil service reform, and the connection between them has become determinant. They had an assertion that the actual crafting activities of the Civil Service Reform Programs are made by professional civil service elites.” See **Table 4.7** below for the summary of responses of political executives relating to the role of politics and civil service elites in CSR.

No	CSR phases	Politicians' role	Civil Service Elites' role
1.	CSR initiation	Big	Little/no
2.	Planning	Big	Little/no
3.	Designing	Big	Little/no
4.	Implementation	Moderate	Big
5.	Evaluation	Big	Moderate

Table: 4.7: The degree/magnitude of roles of politics & civil service elites in CSR

Furthermore, the researcher attempted to analyze the mean responses to the questions relating to the role of political and civil service elites in the CSR processes. Also, the mean comparison between respondents' field of study and the degree of roles that each actor plays has been displayed in the following Table 4.8:

Field of Study		Politicians play more roles in CSR	Political & Civil Service Elites play balanced roles in CSR
Law	Mean	3.1250	2.6250
	N	16	16
	Std. Deviation	1.36015	1.40831
Business and Economics	Mean	4.0625	2.3281
	N	64	64
	Std. Deviation	1.11091	1.28551
Social Sciences	Mean	3.7879	2.4627
	N	66	67
	Std. Deviation	1.13022	1.15900
Other Please Specify	Mean	4.2963	2.5556
	N	27	27
	Std. Deviation	.66880	1.18754
Total	Mean	3.9075	2.4425
	N	173	174
	Std. Deviation	1.12198	1.22810

Table 4.8: Mean and standard deviation on the role of politics & Bureaucrats on CSR

As shown in Table 4.8, the mean score for whether political & bureaucratic elites play a relatively balanced role is low across all participants' fields of study. The average mean score is 2.4425. An attempt was also made to analyze the relationships between the educational background of civil servant elites and the role they play in civil service reform. In relative terms, the mean score of 3.9075 shows that the political elites play a greater role in the process of civil service reform. However, relatively, the survey data shows that the civil service elites with legal education backgrounds seem to play more roles in CSR (mean of 2.6250), followed by social scientists with a mean of 2.4627 and bureaucrats with business and economics backgrounds (2.3281).

Therefore, it is possible to infer that most of the CSR programs implemented in the last couple of decades had political motives behind them. The roles that the civil service elites play in the course of CSR were invisible partly due to the fusion between politics and administration and partly due to the overwhelming role of the political executives. It is also possible to deduce that Civil Service Reforms have failed due to the nature of relationships between political and civil service elites.

In some contexts, politico-administrative relationships can be examined to determine whether the two actors are formally separate and distinct or whether there is an overlap of tasks and responsibilities between them in the assignment of roles. Nevertheless, it can be deduced that the case in Ethiopia is unique in that this context examines whether civil servants in general and bureaucratic elites, in particular, are assigned roles and consulted in the course of initiating and implementing policy and institutional changes or reforms. Hence, civil service elites' engagement during CSR is up to the wish and demands of the political executive or how intimate a particular bureaucrat at the top to the politicians matters most.

Moreover, the researcher came to know that there was consent between politicians, academicians, and civil service elites who participated in this research that the roles of the political elites in CSR outweigh that of the civil service elites. Indeed, it is possible to conclude that the political elites in Ethiopia do not involve the civil service elites in the

course of CSR, or the Civil Service Elites themselves are not ready to seek the responsibility of dealing with reform agendas.

Furthermore, it can be deduced that the educational background of the civil service elites shows differences in the extent of the role that politics and administration should play in the process of civil service reform. Bureaucrats with law and social science degrees (especially political scientists) opt for a balanced role of politics and administration in the course of civil service reform efforts. However, the mean shows that differences in the educational background of civil servants do not make much difference at present, as the role of civil servants is limited due to political intervention (politicization) during reform activities and many other areas of the civil service.

4.4.2. Civil Service Reform Criteria (Political vs. administrative)

CSR intends to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector organizations, and improve professionalism, representativeness (inclusiveness or accommodativeness), and democratic attributes of the civil service systems. Yet, these are not ends by themselves. They are means of promoting quality provisions of public goods and services with a clear pattern of accountability. In turn, such actions require the collection and analysis of pertinent data, altering organizational structures, and enhancing human resource capacity through training and development programs. CSR also demands improved pay and benefits schemes while not overlooking the fiscal constraints of the country under consideration.

Moreover, CSR necessitates consolidating appropriate measures of performance evaluation, public engagement, transparency, and measures of combating maladministration and corrupt practices in public services.

Political and Civil Service Elites may propose different criteria for the same reform package. In this regard, respondents from the political elites stated that the political elites' ultimate goal in CSR is to get government policies implemented to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector and improve professionalism and accountability in

the public service. According to participants, galvanizing political support is another agenda behind reform.

On the other hand, Civil Service Elites view reform as a mechanism used to address the ever-increasing challenges that the public sector organizations face and promote the interests of the civil servants and their contribution towards the wellbeing of the nation as a whole.

According to key political executives who participated in this study, striving to balance the perspectives of politics and administration on CSR is vital.

With regards to the extent of political and administrative criteria used in CSR, the participants from political executives agreed that the political criteria dominate the ones set by the Civil Service Elites. The respondents' speculation that this imbalance may stem from the Civil Service Elites' being inefficient or there is purposeful discrimination in the course of CSR.

Yet, political manipulations during CSR are not explicit as the political elites put attractive values in the documents-the criteria were not political in clear terms. Nevertheless, by implication, those documents were used politically in punishing or rewarding Civil Servants engaged in the CSR processes. This can be seen as professional or reform hypocrisy. It is due to this reason that many civil servants who try to challenge the political influences in the public service could not go up the ladder due to implicit criteria that the politicians set during civil service reform.

In general, the political executives who took part in this research believe that the political criteria outweigh the administrative ones in the lapse of Civil Service Reform. The definitions and adoption of the reform criteria are highly centralized. Besides, there were reform tools brought to the country by an individual political executive. For instance, respondents stated that Tefera Walwa-the then Minister of the Ministry of Capacity Building in the 1990s initiated and put the influence of implementing the reform package called Business Process Reengineering (BPR). This tool was introduced at the Harvard School of Business in early 1990.

Hence, one can argue that the transplantation of reform tools from Western countries without considering their relevance to the country's context can be attributed to the politicization and centralization of reform criteria by political executives.

By the same token, the key informants from academics asserted that, in the case of Ethiopia, it is the political feasibility, not the administrative one that matters most when defining and adopting criteria for Civil Service Reform. Indeed, the respondents stressed that the reform criteria have been and still are political. According to them, this has a connection with the practice that most of the civil service elites are appointed to different positions based on applicants' affiliation or their loyalty to the incumbent government. These two variables are more important than knowledge, skill, experience, and ability. Administrative capacity and the notion of creating merit-based civil service have been lost sight of a long time ago.

Indeed, the position of the respondents in academics was found to be identical despite their differences in their respective fields of study. They believe that CSR criteria solely stem from party politics and its ideology. Besides, in the Ethiopian context, the individual political elite poses a huge influence in the course of determining to design and endorsing reform criteria that affect the selection of reform tools despite local reality.

Therefore, it is possible to imply that in a single-party system like Ethiopia, the boundary between the politics and the administrations is very much blurred and not at all clear. Coupled with the problem of infant democratic culture in the country, the civil service elites would be in an extremely difficult situation to stick to appropriate reform principles, disciplines, and relevant criteria.

Hence, as a highly politicized institution, the Ethiopian federal civil service system has a long way to go to strike a balance between the political and administrative, and political considerations will likely outweigh administrative discretion or neutrality or according to the law behavior or actions of civil servants because the latter are at the mercy of the former should they refuse to carry out political orders or decisions.

Furthermore, survey participants from civil service elites agreed with the assertion that CSR criteria are mostly political, not administrative. In other words, respondents believed

that civil service elites have little or no room in the determination and adoption of reform criteria. In this regard, the majority (58.6) of the participants had a conviction that political criteria determine CSR processes more than administrative ones.

Nevertheless, there seems to be an inconsistency of responses when addressing the question of whether the two actors have balanced engagement in the process of determining reform criteria. Nearly 50% of the survey participants agreed with the idea that politics and administration make an equal share when defining civil service reform criteria. See Table 4.9 below:

Item	Response category	Frequency	Percent
Political criteria are used to determine CSR Processes more than the administrative criteria	Strongly Disagree	10	5.7
	Disagree	34	19.5
	Undecided	26	14.9
	Agree	71	40.8
	Strongly Agree	31	17.8
Both political and administrative criteria are used in dealing with the processes of CSR	Strongly Disagree	13	7.5
	Disagree	43	24.7
	Undecided	33	19.0
	Agree	68	39.1
	Strongly Agree	17	9.8

Table 4.9: The Civil Service Reform Criteria

From this, it is possible to deduce that Civil Service Elites are extremely obedient to their political masters and have accepted the marginal position they are given when determining reform criteria. Indeed, fact-based technical criteria developed by civil servants at the top are equally important as value-driven political criteria.

4.5. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY & DECISION-MAKING IN THE COURSE OF CSR

Administrative autonomy refers to the extent to which bureaucrats have the space or freedom to perform their assigned tasks without political interference (Aucoin, 1990 cited in Dasandi and Esteve, 2017). In contexts where there is low bureaucratic autonomy, careerists are subordinate to politicians in the performance of their duties. Besides, politicians generally have a set of policy goals or mandates that they seek to achieve.

Contrary to this, where there is high administrative autonomy, politicians' mandates tend to be fewer in number and more general in kind, giving the bureaucracy the latitude to work out the details of how to achieve these policy goals (Fukuyama, 2013 cited by Dasandi and Esteve, 2017). Indeed, when civil service autonomy is low, situations can arise where mandates issued by the political executive set out detailed rules, with no independence or discretion given to the bureaucrats to carry out the mandate. Hence, administrative discretion is a key component of quality governance (Huntington, 2006 cited by Dasandi and Esteve, 2017). As Fukuyama (2013 cited in Dasandi and Esteve, 2017) notes, "a high degree of autonomy is what allows for innovation, experimentation, and risk-taking in bureaucracies." This innovation and experimentation were central to the development process. Moreover, excessive bureaucratic subordination is typically a major cause of poor or predatory governance (Evans, 1992 as cited in Dasandi and Esteve, 2017).

Civil Service Autonomy or Discretion entails the ability of the bureaucracy to decide on how policies will be executed. Administrative discretion is a vitally important power of the civil service. It is believed that a bureaucracy with an adequate level of autonomy could exhibit inclusive and accommodative diverse strategies for policy implementation. Hence, civil service elites can have multiple alternatives in civil service reform implementation if given a reasonable level of autonomy or discretion (Krause and Meier, 2009).

In line with this, Civil Service Reform tools such as NPM demanded the separation of politics and administration. This attempt is believed to have contributed to the creation of

responsive bureaucracy. For instance, Italy was able to create accountable public service following the implementation of NPM and the separation of politics and administration (Nadia, 2010).

Yet, the new demand for separation of politics and administration in the comparative public administration could not put the paradox stemming from the traditional public administration to an end. Differently put, there is no consent among practitioners and scholars of Public Administration on the degree of discretion to be given to the civil service.

According to the key informants from academics, it is arduous to uphold the principles of administrative autonomy where (as in the Ethiopian case) the executive and legislative branches of the government are fused. In other words, there is the political executive's dominance in the political and administrative process. In line with this, the majority of the respondents (53.4%) believe that the Civil Service Elites are not autonomous during CSR.

They have also stated that in the Ethiopian political party system, where we have one-party dominance/rule that has been practicing an entrenched role for a long period, it is burdensome to institutionalize administrative autonomy in politician-civil servant relations at all levels of government. They argued that since civil servants predominantly get their job based on political support or patronage, it will be difficult to maintain administrative autonomy because they are at the mercy of politicians, and refusing to carry their orders will have consequences, including the loss of their jobs. The informants added that, in the Ethiopian context, the distinction between party and government has practically vanished for a long time, and this also contributes to the problem of lack or absence of administrative autonomy. This has greatly undermined the independence of the civil service and the administrative autonomy it should enjoy (Fieldwork, 2020).

In the same fashion, a key informant from academicians boldly put that in Ethiopia, the EPRDF and its predecessors are powerful as there were no limits to their power. Hence, civil servants do not enjoy the normative level of administrative discretion that they deserve. As to the respondent, the Civil Service Elites are not exceptional. This is partly

due to the reason that civil servants are economically poor and their livelihood is highly dependent on the salary that the government pays them. Hence, they are under the strict control of the ruling party.

The respondent argued that coupled with these conditions, the cultures of worship for persons in authority make the relationship between political and civil service elites imbalanced. Moreover, the existing working system does not ensure the neutrality of civil servants, rather the civil service system is used as an agent of the ruling party, and its existence is very much dependent on the existence of the party itself.

However, few respondents from relevant fields of academics had the opinion that Civil Service Elites have autonomy over some trivial and routine matters of running their respective organizations (Ministries, Commissions, Agencies, and other forms of Public Sector Organizations).

Nevertheless, most of the key informants from academics believe that vital issues of the public service such as which Civil Service Reform program or tool to introduce, its scope, and the resources required to execute it are under the heavy control of the political executives. Consultation of the civil service elites on these matters depends on how loyal or intimate they are to the political elites, not how professional and experienced they are. In other words, the political elites consider the major operations of CSR as the sole business of the incumbent government.

The worst case is that the study participants indicated that there is no proof that the Civil Service Elites such as General Directors, Directors, Advisers, and Team Leaders are employed based on merit principles. In this regard, the researcher himself has noticed that the claim of the key informants is valid when addressing civil service elites with survey instruments. While conducting the interview-guided vignette questionnaire, few bureaucratic elites have confessed that it is unlikely to assume higher positions in public service in Ethiopia unless one becomes a party member or his or her loyalty is testified by someone else from the political executive at the apex.

On the other hand, if not for the difference of perspectives, the political executives' position was not quite remote from that of the academicians when it comes to the

autonomy of the civil service elites during reform. They agreed that putting a solid line between politics & administration boundaries has been a difficult task since the inception of modern civil service systems. They argued that this burden is exacerbated by the political executives' intentions to put more political control over the administration. Consequently, the boundary between politics & administration in Ethiopia is blurred and the two seem to be fused or embedded in each other.

By the same token, it is a tough task to put the right balance between the two executive bodies when dealing with civil service reforms as well. There is no agreement on whether they should be separated, integrated, or aligned during reform.

As reforms are first defined by the political leadership and executed by the Civil Service administration, they will always have a political component. For developing countries with a developmental state, the civil service is often considered an extension of the political administration than an independent institution.

The political executives interviewed believe that the intimacy between politics and administration has advantages in executing a given policy or CSR as per the intention of the government in strict terms. Yet, the fusion between the two may create difficulty during political and administrative reforms and changes.

The overall mean (as shown in Table 4.8) for role assignment can also measure the degree of autonomy given to civil service elites in carrying out civil service reform tasks. The overall mean was 2.4, indicating that bureaucratic elites at the top are given very little discretion in carrying out reform activities. In fact, civil service elites are rarely involved in major decisions about the implementation of civil service reform in an ad hoc manner, from planning to evaluation. Rather, decisions about staffing and reform-related task assignments are based on political leaders' knowledge of bureaucrats' skills and competencies, rather than on accurate information. The research also concluded that documentation on individual civil service elites is not up-to-date. This means that not all bureaucratic elites are deployed equally and may be assigned tasks for which they are not suited. This view was strongly supported by both political leaders and academics who participated in the interview guide.

Therefore, the relationship between politics and administration in Ethiopia can be described in terms of the pyramid given the marginal discretion that the civil servants assume. The CSR measures or initiatives purely stem from the apex (politics). Under such a situation, it is hardly possible to think of a responsive civil service that could take the initiative for reform and innovation in government organizations. Since most reform initiatives in the Ethiopian Public sector are initiated at the center, mainly at the Prime Minister's Office, the roles that ministers and civil servants play in modifying and changing the reforms to suit their respective offices and mandates are minimal. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the autonomy of the civil servants in general and that of the civil service elites is minimal.

Another issue that matters when dealing with politico-administrative relationships during CSR is decision-making. To this end, the study participants were asked about Civil Service Elites' participation in the key issues relating to reform.

In this regard, researchers such as Spanou (2014) argued that patronage practices are the results of the centralization of decision-making by politics and their interests to secure maximum flexibility for manipulations. This is believed to create a guiding condition for the prevalence of politicization of the civil service and the creation of patronage. These in turn obstruct the transparency and predictability of both political and administrative decisions. It can also impose difficulties in administrative planning activities.

Moreover, political centralizations of civil service decision-making could undermine the proper development of public servants and their capacity to excel. Hence, it is unlikely to expect the bureaucratic elites to engage in preparing long-term decisions and ensuring administrative continuity. Rather, they would be confined to running the daily administrative undertakings representing the political elites. This amounts to resisting changes at will and remaining in the vicious circle, i.e. they lack the initiative to do things other than what politics requires of them. Indeed, they would be constrained to dealing with minor issues. (Spanou 2014:3-4).

With regards to the decision-making stake of the civil service elites during CSR, survey data shows that decisions relating to reforms are centralized. Significant numbers of

respondents (46.6%) disagree with the idea that civil service elites participate in the key matters relating to a particular civil service reform program. Yet, the numbers of respondents (32.2%) who believe that the civil service elites participate in the major decisions of CSR are not extremely insignificant. See Table 4.10 below:

No	Items	Response category	Frequency	Percent
1.	In the course of Civil Service Reform, Civil Service Elites are autonomous while discharging their responsibilities	Strongly Disagree	27	15.5
		Disagree	66	37.9
		Undecided	31	17.8
		Agree	40	23.0
		Strongly Agree	10	5.7
2.	Civil Service Elites feel much participated in vital decision-making processes related to CSR, given their relationship with the Political Executives	Strongly Disagree	25	14.4
		Disagree	56	32.2
		Undecided	37	21.3
		Agree	45	25.9
		Strongly Agree	11	6.3

Table 4.10: Administrative Autonomy and Decision-Making during CSR

Therefore, it is possible to infer that participating in the Civil Service Elites on vital matters of CSR is not a custom practice in Ethiopian public service organizations- ministries, commissions, agencies, authorities, and other similar government institutions. Nevertheless, the survey results may not guarantee a conclusion that civil service elites' participation in matters of public sector reform is non-existent. Rather, one may speculate that their participation is either selective or limited. In either case, inadequate participation of professional civil service elites during CSR would be problematic in two respects. The first one is the issue of accountability and reward. In other words, it won't be a moral decision to hold accountable the civil service elites if reform efforts fail and praise the political elites if reform is successful. The second one is missing the expertise of professional civil servants with adequate experience and educational preparations.

Indeed, marginalizing the civil service elites would limit the evidence-based aspect of decision-making. Bare political values will not be enough to make major decisions on CSR that may affect the national sectors in the country.

4.5.1. Trust and upward communication

Survey participants were asked whether they trust the political elites and dare to take major decisions in the course of implementing CSR without having fear of possible risks therein.

In this regard, Geert (2012) stated that enhancing trust in the public sector organizations should be part of the civil service reform strategies. Geert (2012) defines three categories of trusts. These are:

1. “Trust from Society in the Public Sector (T1)”;
2. “Trust from the Public Sector in society (T2)”;
3. “Trust within the Public Sector (T3)”

It has been realized that trust was the vital objective and driver of the public sector reform. However, the cause-and-effect relationship between trust and civil service reform was not explicit.

According to Durant (1992 cited by Dunn, 1997:21), numerous factors determine the level of trust between the elected or appointed political executives. The following are inter alia:

1. The degree to which career civil servants positively perceive or identify with the agency or program mission they work for;
2. The Political clout or influence of their allies;
3. Their possession of expertise is valued by politicians in their respective institutions; and
4. The political mastery or prowess that they attribute the political executives

Therefore, the degree of cooperation and resistance between political and civil service elites vary as the above factors change.

In this respect, the majority of the study participants (57%) contended the idea that civil service elites can take risks while discharging their duties relating to the civil service reform as they trust their counter parts-the political executives.

Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the reason behind the limited participation of civil service elites in the key affairs of public sector reform could be a lack of trust between the two actors. Besides, the lower involvement of the professionals when defining reform criteria can also be attributed to the level of trust between politics and administration. Moreover, the claim that the key informants from academics put concerning the membership of the civil service elites in the political party in power deserves due consideration.

On the other hand, nowadays, a factor such as an increased number of elected and appointed political executives has thwarted the communication between politics and administration (Lauth, 1989 as cited by Dunn, 1997:26). To put it another way, communication strains and a longer chain between politics and administrative elites can be attributed to the size of the political appointees (Ibid).

In this research, in addition to the level of low trust that the Civil Service Elites have in the political executives, 68% of the vignette questionnaire participants believe that the civil service elites experience little upward communication. Yet, effective communication between the two actors determines the success of the Civil Service Reform. It is also possible to deduce that lack of proper two-way communication between political and civil service elites in the course of reform indicates that the approach deployed therein is a top-down approach, which makes it difficult for professional careerists to make their respective contributions toward the success of the reform efforts in the public sector. Nonetheless, passive upward communication between political and civil service elites during CSR does not signal the presence or possibility of administrative roles in real terms. Also, see Figure 4.2 below:




Figure 4.2: Trust and Upward Communication between Politics and Administration during CSR

4.5.2. Knowledge about Civil Service Norms

Civil service norms prescribe how careerists should behave while interacting with elected and appointed officials. These norms are double-tailed. One is the political responsiveness of the civil servants to the political executives. In this regard, professional careerists are required to demonstrate loyalty and cooperation in providing technical advice related to CSR by their sound judgment and desirability of the political goals to reach. On the other hand, this duty of civil servants' political responsiveness must be limited to acceptable norms (Fenger and Gram 2016).

Survey participants were also asked if they are aware of the civil service norms at their respective public sector organizations. In this case, an overwhelming number of respondents (64.6%) of participants replied that they lack knowledge of civil service-related norms in their organizations. On the other hand, 32% of the participants agreed

that they are certain about the civil service norms in practice in their respective organizations. See Figure 4.3 below:




Figure 4.3.: Civil Service Elites' knowledge of the public service norms

Chen and Hsieh (2015) postulated that there is a connection between civil servants' desire to contribute to policymaking, public service, compassion for work, and willingness to sacrifice self-interest would trigger them to share pertinent knowledge and information about public service. Their study was based on the theory of Public Service Motivation (PSM). Indeed, political readiness to involve civil service elites enhances healthy communication that in turn improves the knowledge-sharing experience in the public sector.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that Civil Service Elites' willingness to communicate with their political counterparts in the course of CSR could be affected by the level of motivation they have in their respective organization. Hence, Civil Service Elites' commitment to CSR is related to the practice of inspiration from political executives and the availability of space for both top-down and bottom-up communication.

4.5.3. Political Executives' guidance and supervision during CSR

Naturally, in any type of institution, executing reform or change is often confronted with a dismal fate, particularly due to resistance from change agents themselves (Gilley et al., 2009 as cited by Paul, 2010). This holds for most of the developing countries where several decades of civil service reform efforts have failed partly due to a bare focus on technology and reform contents not human behavior and organizational cultures (Schacter, 2000; Easterly, 2001; Polidano, 2001; IEG, 2008a as cited by Paul, 2010).

The political elites such as ministers provide guidance and framework for the civil service elites. The civil service elites, who are employed, based on merit principles are in charge of executing the commands of the political executives. They are accountable to the minister and the minister in turn is accountable to the parliament (Christensen, 1999). Ethiopia is a typical example in this regard. The country has a Parliamentary form of government. Hence, during CSR, political executives provide a generic framework and guidance to civil service elites.

In this case, Table 4.10 shows that political executives provide a framework and supervision for the civil service elites at the top regarding CSR activities. Here, 48% of the respondents agreed that civil service elites get a guiding framework relating to reform activities. Nonetheless, 34.9% of the participants contended the idea that political elites go the extra mile in supporting civil service elites during civil service reform for which the bureaucrats are personally responsible.

However, 69.8% of the participants argued that the political executives' supervision and consultation with their careerist counterparts concerning civil service reform are not adequate. Only 25.8% of the respondents supported the idea that consultation and supervision by political executives are conducted with pertinent civil service elites of relevant departments of a particular public sector organization. **See Table 4.11:**

In this regard, the researcher is informed by the interview participants that Ethiopia never had a civil service system in which the interaction between careerists and political executives is governed by principles. The key informants argued that political consultation and supervision of the civil service reform process is not exclusively related

to the undergoing reform programs. Rather, it is a mechanism of political manipulation and consolidating their political power. Hence, the provision of a guiding framework, supervision, and consultation with relevant civil service elites are politically motivated. They contend that pure reform-oriented political assistance to the civil service is minimal or non-existent.

Therefore, it is possible to infer that political support and assistance to the careerists at the top relating to civil service reform could be used as a means of politicization if not governed by formal limitations. Coupled with a low level of democratic culture in the country, consultation and supervision between politics and administration over CSR activities may further politicization. Thus, the importance of political commitment and civil service autonomy comes into play when it comes to the political consultation and supervision of bureaucratic elites during public service reform. See Table 4.10 below:

Items	Response category	Frequency	Percent
In most cases, Political Executives provide the framework for dealing with CSR activities on which I am personally responsible	Strongly Disagree	21	12.0
	Disagree	40	22.9
	Undecided	27	15.4
	Agree	70	40.0
	Strongly Agree	14	8.0
During CSR, I immediately consult my direct supervisor when the need arise	Strongly Disagree	54	30.9
	Disagree	68	38.9
	Undecided	5	2.9
	Agree	40	22.9
	Strongly Agree	8	4.6

Table 4.11: Guidance and Supervision during CSR

4.5.4. Horizontal Cooperation among Civil Service Elites during CSR

Success in the Civil Service Reform requires the cooperation of various actors-both internal and external. In other words, properly executing CSR demands extra effort and cooperation among all change agents involved (Drazen, 2000). Coordination is needed not only between politics and administration but also among peer civil service elites across the board. To this end, the study participants were asked if there is a culture of

cooperation among fellow civil service elites during CSR when confronted with ambiguity in the reform processes or contents.

In line with this, the majority of the Vignette Questionnaire respondents agreed that there is cooperation among peer civil service elites horizontally in a trice when there is a need for clarification relating to CSR. Yet, 22.8 of the respondents contended the adequacy of the practice of cooperation among fellow bureaucratic elites during CSR. Besides, 19.4% of the respondents replied undecided. See Figure 4.4 below:




Figure 4.4: Horizontal Cooperation among peer civil service elites during CSR.

In this case, it is possible to infer two things. One is that civil service elites would accept and implement reform tools endorsed by their political masters and don't have the guts to question its ambiguity. They are typically subservient to the political executives. The second inference is that there is a lack of trust between civil servants at the top the same as the case between political and bureaucratic elites. One can also infer that civil service elites fear questioning reform tools designed by elected and appointed officials. Therefore, this could be a typical manifestation of civil service reform politicization.

4.6. CIVIL SERVICE ELITES' PREDICAMENT ON PUBLIC INTEREST AND PROFESSIONAL DIGNITY

Nowadays, the general public service worldwide is negatively perceived by the public at massive (Ariely, 2011:998). Besides, Barry (2006) argued that bureaucratic elites, who hold higher positions in government, do not seem to possess any concern or sense of public interest. They appear to not be guided by essential ideals of public interest. With this regard, vignette participants were asked if they were committed to advancing the public interest during CSR once if they are needed to advance the political interests of the incumbent government.

As conferred in figure 4.5 below, the bulk of the respondents (75.4%) argued against the idea that civil service elites are willing and ready to advance the general public interests than the interests of the political elites throughout CSR. It had been solely 23.4% of participants believe that they'll value highly place public interests before the political goals of the government within the course of CSR.

Therefore, it's potential to deduce that civil service elites face challenges during advancing public interests ahead of the political goals of the government when there's overlapping or the two ends are in contradiction. In alternative words, in a state of affairs where civil service elites are needed to settle between advancing the general public interest or the political agenda throughout the reform process, they're not autonomous enough to decide on putting the society's demand before the political targets of the state. Besides, it's additional potential to infer that the bureaucratic elites are too materialistic and not willing to sacrifice their interests.

Hence, they opt for maintaining the harmonious relations they need with the political executives and have job security, which is the sole supply of their income. In a nutshell, this might be the manifestation of utmost politicization of the public service officials generally and therefore the reform processes in particular. In addition, the study participants were asked if they were in a position to strike to preserve their professional dignity than their material desires. Nonetheless, the bulk of the respondents (78.3%)

believe that they can't attempt to preserve the dignity of their respective professions more than their material interests.

Differently put, if Civil Service elites are given two alternatives, i.e., professional dignity and material benefits, they are compelled to opt for the latter not the first. This might reveal two possibilities. The primary one is that civil service was used as a political tool, not a change agent. The second speculation is that the link between political executives and careerist elites isn't democratic. Hence, choices at the official level are settled by the elected and appointed politicians. See Figure 4.5 below:




Figure 4.5: Civil Service Elites' concern for public interests and professional dignity.

4.7. Dilemmas and Normative Limits in the Course of Civil Service Reform

In discussing this section, the researcher found it appropriate to begin with the following case that presents the generic impressions obtained from key informants from academia and few political executives with regards to the excessive politicization of civil service and reform efforts in Ethiopia. See the following case:

Case

Academics from the chosen field of study agreed that Ethiopia lacks professional civil servants because party politics prevail at all levels. "It is not debatable that the Ethiopian civil service resembles the spoil or patronage system in this very modern time," they said. Civil servants are mimicking political masters by using politically sensitive expressions and vocabularies that are exclusive to political usage. For example, Emperor Haileselassie used to say, "God elects us," and then-public servants used the same phrase to uphold the political value of the day. Furthermore, the Derg Regime forced bureaucrats at all levels to teach Communism and Socialism from major urban centers to the grassroots. As a result, their performance was heavily influenced by the number of people they reached and taught the ideology of the day rather than the efficiency and effectiveness with which they provided public services to society as a whole. Worst of all, during the communist regime, the government executed thousands of foreign-educated civil servants simply because they refused to teach political ideology rather than serve as public bureaucrats. Indeed, public servants were forced to completely abandon their interests and dedicate their careers to serving the incumbent government of the time. Despite the EPRDF Government's (1991-2018) positive efforts in the beginning, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ethiopian public sector through civil service reform, little or no progress was made. Furthermore, the notion that the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1995 exacerbated the politicization of the public service in general, and CSR in particular, is debatable. On the one hand, bureaucrats have no direct relationship with the general public because they are not elected by popular vote but rather selected based on their credentials. On the other hand, civil servants are not immune to political pressure when it comes to carrying out the political wishes of their political masters." Furthermore, when asked to respond to the same questions forwarded to academia, the political executives participating in the key informant interview lack a clear and strong position. However, by probing further and interviewing a few civil service elites, the researcher obtained impressions that are nearly identical to the responses provided by professors from the chosen fields. Politicians and civil servants in Ethiopia blame each other when civil service reform efforts fail due to a lack of delicate balance and democratic relationships between them.

Civil service is seen as one of the vitally important institutions of modern states. From the early 20th century onwards, it has been identified based on the legal-rational model following the description of Weber. Hence, most scholars and practitioners agree that efficient, effective, and competent civil service is required to attain the complex demands and needs of modern society and the states.

Nonetheless, it is fair to mention that bureaucracy has a sinister side such as; red tape, rigidity, corruption, and incompetence (Kvashilava, 2019).

In this research, Civil Service Elite respondents were given hypothetical scenarios that may lead to dilemmas when interacting with political leaders in dealing with matters of public sector reform. However, the researcher believes that the response and reactions of the bureaucratic elite to these dilemma situations of legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality would show how politicized public service reform is in practice. To this end, the following section engages in an analysis of selected situations in which politicization manifests itself and its implications for the normative boundaries of legality, professional standards, truthfulness, and political neutrality.

4.7.1. The legality of the CSR processes

Part of civil servants' job description is both to be responsive to political leadership and to comply with legal norms. The question of legality should judge the reaction of public service elites when these two requirements collide, i.e., when legal norms dictate one thing, but the political leadership wants something else. In modern democracies, adherence to the rule of law is no less important than the conduct of elections. Adherence to legal norms by those who exercise government power is widely regarded as the cornerstone of democracy and good governance. The question is what role the bureaucracy plays in defending legal norms against political leaders (Bischoff, 2018).

In this regard, information concerning the reactions of bureaucratic elites to some legally dilemmatic situations was collected. In other words, Respondents were asked how the civil services elites react to the controversial situation of legal limits during civil service reform have been collected. See Table 4.12 below:

Item	Response category	Frequency	Percent
Commencement of CSR with an executive order not by Proclamation?	Accept with no reservation	21	12.0
	Accept, but I will present my reservation to the political executives	83	47.4
	Accept, only after a direct order and I will warn the Political Executive	34	19.4
	I will decline the order	37	21.1
CSR assignment with no legal authorization?	Accept with no reservation	14	8.0
	Accept, but I will present my reservation to the political executives	67	38.3
	Accept, only after a direct order and I will warn the Political Executive	40	22.9
	I will decline the order	54	30.9
Hiring civil servants in favor of political order not legal or merit considerations?	Accept with no reservation	9	5.1
	Accept, but I will present my reservation to the political executives	37	21.1
	Accept, only after a direct order and I will warn the Political Executive	51	29.1
	I will decline the order	78	44.6

Table 4.12: Legal dilemmas in the course of Civil Service Reform

The above vignette questions relating to the legal constraints were asked to assess if the CSR process was lawful and if the bureaucratic elites could stand the political influence posed by appointed and elected officials. In principle, both political and civil service elites are expected to abide by the law while discharging their respective responsibilities during CSR.

With this regard to the commencement of the CSR programs with the simple executive decree in the absence of the proclamation enacted by the parliament, 78.8% of the study participants responded that they will accept and start implementing the reform process.

Yet, their responses vary between accepting with no reservation (12%), accepting with reservation (47.4%), and accepting the order after warning the political executives in unequivocal language about possible risks to come due to the concerns of legality. Only 21.1% of the respondents reacted against the commencement of the CSR programs without laws enacted by the legislative organ of the government and they are of the idea that the request should be rejected or the careerists should decline the order of this kind.

Besides, the key informants' reaction to the commencement of the Civil Service Reform program with a simple executive decree or order, in the absence of the proclamation enacted by the legislative body of the government, i.e. the Parliament in the Ethiopian case has been assessed.

To this end, the key informants from academics believe that the civil service elites will have no choice than adhering to the political orders and will be following the letter and spirit of the decree as outlined.

The key informants also stressed that in the Ethiopian context, laws are used as the instrument of getting things to happen as per their interests. Relevant to this, it is worth mentioning that the multi-party system exists barely on the blueprint. Practically, the country is ruled by a single party. Hence, there is no challenge that the incumbent government faces up to in the course of making and enforcing laws in general and legal issues relating to civil service reform in particular. On top of that, due to the fusion of power, no practical mechanism exists to do checks and balances when undertaking the legal processes of public sector reform.

As the livelihood of the civil servants in general and that of bureaucratic elites' at the top, in particular, rely on the salary they obtain from the government, they are very much submissive to the political elites' order. Indeed, civil service elites (CSEs) are obliged to abide by the simple executive decree even if there is pressure from the above (POLITICS) to violate the normal legal procedures. But in reality, resistance to the pressure from above depends on individual strength, determination, and integrity.

It is also vital to mention that, some of the key informants from academics stated that civil service reform ideas emanate either from the interests of donor organizations such as

the World Bank and IMF or the political party in power. Hence, the legality of the reform process is secondary in practical terms.

Academics with a legal background had the idea that the start of a civil service reform depends on the type of reform a government wants to introduce. If it is a fundamental reform that changes the very structure and nature of the civil service, it would be good if it is initiated by a comprehensive law, such as parliamentary proclamations, then by a simple decree emanating from a particular ministry. In their view, parliamentary laws have a better chance of being debated and improved upon before enactment, and this would make reform efforts more apt to reflect the needs of the people through representation. Nevertheless, respondents argued that if the reform needed is small and technical, it would be better if it is initiated through a simple decree. This is because simple decrees allow flexibility in adapting them to the rapidly changing circumstances of the public service. Therefore, it is good to determine which type of civil service reform should be initiated by which level of the law. Both have their strengths and weaknesses.

Key informants of the law believe that there is a clear demarcation between politics and the realm of public service, however, politicians in the least Developed Countries (LDCs) in general and Ethiopia, in particular, are used to circumvent their sphere of power. Therefore, civil servants have no power to decide for themselves; including whether to accept or reject a particular civil service reform under consideration.

On the other hand, key informants holding political positions had the assertion that the best approach to mobilizing support for executive-mandated civil service reform is to give the Civil Service a voice in the design and implementation of reforms from the outset. They believe that civil servants are on the frontline of delivering services and implementing the government's development agenda. They know the challenges they face better than anyone else.

Yet, some respondents from the political elites argued that there is a clear demarcation between the legislative and executive branches and the civil service is in many ways an extension of the executive organ of the government. Hence, the need for Civil Service Reform should not come directly from the legislature it is rather about improving the

implementation capacity and efficiency of the bureaucracy to carry out the policies of the government. Therefore, political executives should always take the leading role in reforming the civil service in consultation with the civil service elites. They believe that a clear implementation roadmap, a tracking mechanism for the CRS, and a reward mechanism for the institutions are among the prerequisites to make the reform more successful.

Moreover, the political leaders who participated in the survey indicated that the problem regarding the legality of CSR stems from the source and the actors who initiate it. In terms of formality, they argued that there is no serious problem as logically sound legal documents are prepared to facilitate CSR processes from start to finish. However, the high involvement of politicians without sufficient knowledge and experience is a problem that needs attention. They claimed that even Civil Service Elites are not recruited and promoted based on Professional Criteria. Therefore, laws are abused and loopholes are created to hide corrupt and mismanaged practices in the name of CSR.

Furthermore, among the elected political leaders, the researcher found that there were reform instruments introduced into the country's public sector by a single politician. Then, it is very likely that the reform initiative of a single politician will be supported if at all it is introduced in the parliament. This is because the incumbent government won 100% of the seats in parliament and the executive. Therefore, the issue of the legality of CSR is undermined. Nevertheless, it is the legal aspect that differentiates between government and business, and some politicians have not hidden the fact that all instruments have been politicized.

Other key ministers interviewed asserted that in principle, beginning CSR with a legislative mandate would often mean that the Parliament is exercising its right to hold the civil service to account and is not satisfied with its performance. However, beginning civil service reform via a legislative mandate may also lead to resistance and sabotage. Previous attempts to reform the civil service via legislation have been met with the greatest resistance to change and have failed to transform the work. Therefore, the best approach to designing effective and sustainable CSR is to involve the civil service elites

in designing such laws and work from the bottom up rather than the top down. Whatever politicians initiate is approved by Parliament. The case of CSR is not an exception. Normally, CSR instruments are designed and planned in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and approved by the Council of Ministers. Referring CSR issues to the Parliament in Ethiopia is not common in reality.

In addition, the respondents were also asked whether the civil service elites should accept the assignment of CSR tasks to a particular department without legal evidence. In this regard, 8% of the respondents agreed that the assignment should be accepted without reservation, 38.3% with reservation, and 22.9 with a strong warning in clear words. However, 30.9% of the respondents think that such delegation of reform responsibility without supporting legal framework should not be accepted by the concerned civil elite in charge of a particular department within the public sector organizations.

The academics participating in this study had no information about reforms approved by the Parliament passing through genuine and strong public hearings. Rather, they argued that in Ethiopia, the initiative for new laws came exclusively from the executive, and all bills sent to parliament were ratified. Therefore, the centralization of power in the party system has reduced the role of parliament to focus on overseeing the implementation of reform programs and ratification of all bills submitted to it. They believe that laws approved by parliament are more defensible when they are violated by interference from higher officials (politicians).

Nevertheless, they believed that civil service reforms that have national and generational implications should be approved by the legislature. The executive should also be given sufficient discretion in the innovative and scientific implementation and evaluation of CSRs. To this end, Parliament should delegate functions. The delegated functions may be rule-making and adjudication, enforcing key laws and policies. Where the civil service does not conform to the will of Parliament, corrective action should be taken.

Concerning the question of whether civil service reform should be initiated by a proclamation issued by Parliament, by an ordinance of the Council of Ministers, or by a simple executive order, two conclusions may be drawn. One is the contention that

politicians in the present era are overwhelmed with the ever-increasing demands of the electorate. Therefore, it is likely that some legislative functions will be delegated to professional officials. Moreover, laws relating to civil service reforms are more relevant to bureaucrats than politicians. However, the research found that the civil service elites were not actively involved in the creation of laws dealing with reforms in Ethiopia. This shows a lack of trust between politicians and the administration or a nexus between the two actors.

The second important point is that the civil service elites in Ethiopia's federal organizations are not able to claim the proper place they deserve given their training and practical experience in dealing with legal issues of civil service reform.

Moreover, it can be concluded that the lack of constitutional recognition of the civil service in Ethiopia has undermined the contribution and role that the bureaucracy could have played in legislation in general and civil service reform-related legislation in particular. In other words, the Ethiopian civil service is not explicitly addressed in the country's constitution. Lack of proper check and balance among the three government organs another vital factor undermining the capacity of civil service elites to stand against political executives' attempt to overlook some legal requirements in the course of CSR.

Therefore, it can also be inferred that there are no safeguards or protection mechanisms in Ethiopia to protect civil servants from undue political pressure by party politicians when bureaucrats oppose political executives on the legality of reform processes.

Moreover, respondents were asked about the reaction of public service elites when faced with recruiting new careerists, which is one of the central and sensitive elements of the merit principle. In other words, the study participants were asked whether the public service elites should recruit applicants for the public sector offices by overriding some legal and performance requirements. In this regard, only 5.1% of the participants were in favor of accepting the policy directive for this purpose without resistance. On the other hand, 21% of the respondents thought that the policy order of this nature should be accepted with some hesitation and 29.1% responded that the request should be accepted only after a clear warning to the concerned officials.

Nevertheless, 44.6% of the study participants took the position that orders or commands from the political executive requiring public officials to hire applicants by disregarding the relevant legal and merit principles and requirements should not be accepted, but rejected or refused.

Recruitment and other personnel decisions are made by individual ministries, commissions, agencies and authorities, and other public sector organizations at the federal level, per procedures established by law and as directed by the Ministry of Public Service or offices of Public Service at the sub-national level. In principle, the merit-based selection is followed, and available data suggest that client recruitment is not as big a problem as in several other countries in the region. Rather, the main problems with recruitment appear to be that the public sector cannot consistently attract qualified applicants, on the one hand, and that some anecdotal evidence suggests that some selections are not based solely on merit-based criteria, but also on political considerations and other factors (World Bank, 2019).

On the other hand, it has been argued that the human resource capacity gap is one of the critical challenges that negatively affect organizational efficiency, effectiveness, and good governance in Ethiopian public sector organizations (Tesfaye and Atakilt, 2011 as cited in Assefa, 2018).

The researcher attempted to check if the position and educational backgrounds of the participants from civil service elites matter in reacting to political influence over the hiring of civil servants as reform agents. See Figure 4.6 below:




Figure 4.6: Legal dilemmas relating to hiring civil service applicants during CSR

In the case of Ethiopia, Article 13, Sub-Article 2 of the FDRE Civil Service Proclamation states that "a vacancy shall be filled only by a person who meets the qualifications required for the position and who performs better than other applicants" (FDRE Civil Servants Proclamation, 2007). There is also an implementation manual that shows the procedure of recruitment and selection that must be followed uniformly by all civil service institutions. The manual covers the issues of merit principles such as qualifications, work experience, knowledge, skills as well as other abilities, and the overall procedure to achieve fair and open competition. Thus, it can be said that at the policy level, except for the position-based system, the recruitment procedures and considerations are similar to those in other developing countries. However, in practice, various reasons are responsible for non-meritocratic recruitment in Ethiopia's civil service (Henok, 2018).

From this, it can be inferred that the political influence on the hiring of civil service officials is not explicit. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude that political leaders do not interfere with the discretion of bureaucratic elites in hiring new applicants by disregarding relevant merit principles and legal requirements. In other words, politicians influence the hiring of bureaucratic officials they believe would fit their political ideologies, but they do so in a systematic way.

In addition, the researcher tried to see if there was a significant relationship between the enumeration of legal dilemmas and the educational background of the respondents. This did not work. Therefore, the researcher calculated a cut point of 1 and below as low and 2 and above as high. Here, point 1 and lower indicates that civil service elites tend to accept and execute reform-related orders from the political elite despite legal controversies. On the other hand, cut points 2 and above indicates that civil service elites question and decline legally controversial commands coming from politics during CSR. Hence, the four scale items were designed to analyze the dilemma that Civil Service Elites face while interacting with political executives during Civil Service Reform. See bar chart 4.7 below:




Figure 4.7: The relationship between legal dilemmas and civil servants' field of study

As shown in Bar Chart 4.7 above, public service elites with legal backgrounds seek to challenge the politicization of reform efforts, but they are unable to refuse orders from political leaders. Moreover, it appears that business and economics professionals seem to be indifferent to political intervention during CSR. The data show that social scientists are more sensitive to the politicization of public service reform processes. However, the

assessment of an individual item and the reaction of respondents led to a different result. Hence, descriptive statistics were used to present the legal dilemmas of CSR. See Figure 4.8 below:




Figure 4.8: Legal Dilemmas confronting the civil service elites during CSR

Thus, the overall assessment shows that the Ethiopian civil service has two faces. One is the legal face which requires that personnel decisions must be made under relevant laws and merit principles. The second face is the real practice on the ground. This face shows that, despite legal requirements, party politics intrudes on the discretionary powers of the administration. Rather, legal documents are used as a tool to manipulate the entire organization of the public sector.

4.7.2. Professional Standards and Politics-administration relationships during CSR

According to Lane (1997 cited by Miruts, 2014), CSR has had a clear agenda of de-politicization in almost all countries of the world. In other words, CSR is aimed at professionalizing public service and striking a delicate balance between political and administrative criteria in public sector management. This has been the project in many developed and developing countries since the 1980s. Nevertheless, Civil Service Reform is a challenging undertaking in both developed and developing countries.

In Africa in particular, governance has been largely characterized by spoilers/patronage and authoritarian rules. Bureaucratic rationality has also been compromised by a high degree of centralization in the decision-making process. Ethiopia is one of the cases in Africa that shows a high degree of politicization of the civil service and poor implementation of Civil Service Reform. In other words, Ethiopia is no exception in terms of politicization of the civil service in general and civil service reform in particular. To answer this particular research question, three broader items were developed. The first item related to the challenges and controversial situations that frontline civil servants face while evaluating, analyzing, and selecting alternative instruments for civil service reform. Another item was related to the selection of an appropriate approach in presenting civil service reform matters. The third and final item in this regard was whether civil service elites set priorities in the course of reform based on political feasibility as dictated by political elites or based on the professional standards of their respective fields.

In this context, participants from selected public sectors were asked how they respond to the dilemmas they face when trying to maintain professionalism in Civil Service Reform. The researcher sought to identify respondents' reactions to questions about professional standards in the wake of public service reform by looking at the asymptotic significance between dependent and independent variables. Typically, a value of less than 0.05 is considered significant. Asymptotic significance is based on the assumption that the data set is large. Typically, a significance level of less than 0.05 is considered significant, indicating that some relationship exists between the row and column variables. For this

purpose, the respondents' field of study and the positions they hold were considered independent variables while the occupational standard was considered the dependent variable. See Table 4.13 below:

Items	Chi-Square Tests			
	Dimensions	Value	Df.	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
The relationship between the field of study and professional standards	Pearson Chi-Square	3.273 ^a	3	.351
	Likelihood Ratio	3.276	3	.351
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.826	1	.363
	N of Valid Cases	172		
The relationship between position and professional standards	Pearson Chi-Square	1.676a	3	.642
	Likelihood Ratio	1.651	3	.648
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.865	1	.352
	N of Valid Cases	173		

Table 4.13: The Chi-Square Tests of respondents' education and positions and their reaction to Dilemmas situations against professional standards

As shown in Table 4.13 above, there is a slight difference between the degree of relationship between the field of study and the position of the respondents with their respective responses to dilemma situations that would challenge the professional standards of the bureaucratic elite in the course of civil service reform. Hence, the researcher opted for the presentation of data relating to a dilemma situation challenging the bureaucratic elite's duty of maintaining professional standards in a descriptive form. See table 4.14 below:

Item	Response category	Frequency	Percent
Choosing a particular reform based on political intent than professional standard	Accept with no reservation	25	14.3
	Accept, with reservation	69	39.4
	Accept, only after a direct order & warn them	51	29.1
	Decline the order	30	17.1
Adopting CSR approaches not as per professional standards	Accept with no reservation	19	10.9
	Accept, with reservation	53	30.3
	Accept, only after a direct order & warn them	53	30.3
	Decline the order	50	28.6
Setting CSR priorities based on political values than the professional standard	Accept with no reservation	38	21.7
	Accept, with reservation	64	36.6
	Accept, only after a direct order & warn them	50	28.6
	Decline the order	21	12.0

Table 4.14: Dilemma Situations relating to Professional Standards of CSEs during CSR

In this context, interviewees from the political leadership indicated that many factors may cause civil servants to resist reforms. The first is that they do not understand the objective of the reform. Reform objectives are often defined at the political level, without prior consultation with the heads of Civil Service. The lack of clear understanding often leads to confusion and resistance to change. Second, Civil Servants are usually poorly paid, heavily overworked, and discouraged from taking on new challenges.

However, clear communication of the goal of the reform, as well as the benefits it would bring to civil servants, would lead to less resistance to the reform. Another challenge, according to key informants, is the fear of losing one's livelihood as a result of the reform. Reforms often result in streamlining and tightening the service, which can mean

demotion or job loss for civil servants. Not knowing what will happen at the end of the reform, therefore, makes civil servants fearful of approaching reforms without enthusiasm and determination. It is therefore important to make the objective of the reform very clear.

It is also worth noting that political leaders who participated in this research admitted that the hierarchy of authority in Ethiopia is not friendly to the practice of professionalism. They argued that hiring and promotion practices are not properly designed. There is also an element of subjectivity in the process of Civil Service Reform. The problem, therefore, emanates from the practice of employment and the use of resources. A key informant from the political elite stated that Ethiopia is the lowest-paid country in the world. According to this source, the country was second on the wage scale.

Other political elite stressed that few civil service officials bother to handle CSR according to the professional standards of their respective fields. Those who try to respect the dignity of their professional standards in the course of CSR are heavily targeted by political leaders. This is partly because political leaders are entrusted with positions that do not fit their respective educational backgrounds. A person with a biology degree heads a sector that requires leaders with diverse educational backgrounds.

In the same token, a professor of public administration, who took part in the key informant interview, stated that Civil servants in general and Civil Service Elites, in particular, will be compelled to compromise their professional standards under some of the following circumstances:

1. If there are no laws to protect them from reprisals by politicians for refusing to carry out their orders;
2. If the political system is opaque and not transparent or democratic;
3. If there are no laws to protect whistleblowers when they expose wrongs or political pressure on civil servants; and
4. If there are no independent, active, responsible, and professional media and civil society sectors that can expose such anomalies

Similarly, another informant stated that the most common reason for civil service officials' compromise of professional standards is "conflict of interest," when compliance with standards conflicts with personal gain. The other reason for compromising professional standards is pressure from the boss, who may be recalcitrant and disobedient in forcing the subordinate to compromise the standards.

Key informants from the Law School of Addis Ababa University indicated that in Ethiopia, several situations can cause public service elites to fail to meet professional standards. These include the backwardness and poverty of the country in general and the lack of public awareness that can force civil servants to do things that are not required by professional standards. In addition, the political independence of politicians could force a public official to disregard his professional duties and try to favor a particular political group.

Moreover, the informants believe that corruption could also be another circumstance in which a public official's professional standards could be disregarded. If the appointed politician forces the officials to do things that are against the principle, they will be discouraged from adhering to professional standards.

Furthermore, few officials compromise their professional standards for monetary gain. The majority of the latter groups are those who got employment only because of their affiliation with the ruling party. There is no professional standard for this group as their recruitment is based on political affiliation and they do not have the relevant qualifications required for a particular position. Thus, they are expected to take direct orders from politicians as their immediate superiors.

Another key informant from academia said that Ethiopian officials appear to be employed to serve the political will of the party in power, not the public. Therefore, he argued, the roles played by bureaucrats vary depending on the nature of the establishment of a civil service system. This particular informant advanced the contention that universities, not to mention other public service organizations, lack autonomy in the conduct of examinations, admission, and issuance of certificates to graduates. Indeed, he argued that

this is a typical manifestation of compromising professional standards, and the federal civil service is no exception.

Nevertheless, some academia advised the civil service elites that if they believe that their actions will not adversely affect the public interest; they must consider the issues that seriously compromise institutional ethos and personal professional responsibility. Therefore, (CSEs) must stay away from all other issues that would force them to compromise professional standards and legal accountability in the end.

It can be inferred that civil servants in general and elite bureaucrats, in particular, are not required to adhere to professional standards in their respective fields, partly due to the political culture of the country. It can also be concluded that Civil Service Elites are not strong and capable professionals due to the inability of the public sector to attract competent civil servants. This could be due to the poor pay in public sector organizations in Ethiopia.

Some key informants in academia believe that public service elites should not, under any circumstances, abandon their professional standards. They can maintain their professionalism while reforms are also politically correct if there are clear role divisions. Other informants indicated that it is fair for professional standards to be compromised in the public interest. Nevertheless, they agreed that it is utopian to see such a public service in reality.

In Ethiopia, research reveals that there is a severe shortage of technically competent civil service staff, referred to as capacity shortage, which threatens the performance of the civil service ("Ethiopia structural adjustment credit pre-appraisal mission aide-memoire", 2001; Ayenew & Chanie, 2000; Chanie, 1999; Ethiopian Delegation, 2003; World Bank, 1999 as cited by Vogel, 2005:9).

Besides, lack of capacity hurts a country's development and invites other problems such as partisanship, lack of transparency, and corruption (Adamolekun, 1999b; Bayart, Ellis, & Hibou, 1999; Cheru, 2002; Englebert, 2000; Evans & Rauch, 1999 as cited by Vogel, 2005:10).

Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the centralization of decision-making power and the absence of boundaries between political and administrative appointments give political appointees more power at the expense of professionals, and therefore there is little room for civil servants to resist the orders of politicians.

It can be inferred that the reaction of the bureaucratic elite to political influence on the proper exercise of professional standards during civil service reform is minimal. This in turn shows that the bureaucrats' concern for their profession is undermined by politicization.

4.7.3. The Duty of Truthfulness in the course of Civil Service Reform

This particular article governing politico-administrative relationships was drafted based on the assertion that both public service and political elites have to provide accurate, correct, and truthful information about public service reform. In other words, citizens, research organizations, think tanks, and many other concerned entities have the right to receive correct, accurate, and truthful information about a particular reform tool that is being executed or will be implemented in the future.

Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate their respective reactions when asked by the political elite to withhold or alter empirical data on CSRs that are being implemented, on the assumption that releasing such data could damage the reputation of a public sector that is implementing reform activities. See Figure 4.9 below:




Figure 4.9: The Challenges to the duty of Truthfulness during CSR

The intent of the two items presented in Figure 4.8 was to analyze the attitudes of selected public service elites toward hypothetical situations that would challenge their duty of truthfulness. In the first case, they were asked whether they would accept the instruction of the political executive to withhold some information about a particular civil service reform program being implemented because it was too early to disclose the negative impact of the reform. Even though the question is hypothetical, the number of respondents who said they would accept the order without reservation and with reservation and warning was 22.9% and 29.7%, and 21.1% respectively. Only 25.7% of the respondents answered that they would reject the order and would not support the politicians in this regard.

Similarly, the elite public servants who participated in this research were asked whether they would help the political rulers to adjust data regarding the reform, as the actual figures could damage the reputation of a particular sector that is implementing the reform

initiative. In this regard, the number of respondents who agreed that they would accept the request without reservation, with reservation, and with a clear warning was 14.9%, 22.9%, and 24% respectively and the remaining 37.7% believed that a political mandate of this nature should be rejected.

Despite the reality that the political executive is extremely powerful in Ethiopia, the reaction of the selected public officials at the top indicates that the issue of truthfulness is quite sensitive. Yet, they are not autonomous enough to reject or decline political commands that would undermine their duty of truthfulness.

In this regard, a key informant from academia (a professor from Public Administration at Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia) argued that public service elites must provide accurate information - very true and fair in terms of reform. But when confronted with a dilemma situation that may be created by political leaders, they need to support the information they provide with adequate and strong evidence, both quantitative and qualitative. In addition, he said they can share this information with other relevant organizations and institutions, such as the independent media, civil society, or other independent watchdog organizations, to achieve triangulation and adequately protect themselves against reprisals from politicians.

Another key informant from academia stated that human beings are largely rational and self-centered and therefore in situations where there is no protection for public officials and where there is no check and balance of power of politicians, a lack of safeguards for bureaucrats, one can hardly expect public officials to discharge their duty of truthfulness. Nevertheless, it is noted that the duty of public servants to be truthful depends very much on the determination of the individual public servant and his or her willingness to face any challenges that may arise from adherence to this particular principle.

Most of the academics who participated in the key informant interviews believe that the Civil Service Elites must do their jobs openly and truthfully, as stated in Public Oath they promise to do before taking or accepting public office. So they have to say no if there is anything that violates that. However, it was pointed out that "Truthfulness" is one of the

ethical principles of Ethiopian public service. In principle, both politicians and administrators should be guided by it. Yet, it is hardly a blueprint that exists only on paper or in a book. In fact, it is disregarded in reality. Civil service elites cooperate with political leaders in producing fictitious reports to hide the ugly side of what the government does in practice.

In general, key informants from academia believe that accuracy and truthfulness are rare these days, even in religious institutions and indeed, in offices; it is rather less expected. For example, if a civil servant produces an accurate report of his work, he is accused of laziness and criticized; but if the same person produces a false report exaggerating his performance, he is praised and given a promotion even though the superior knows the exact level of performance, which is even more appreciated by political leaders. According to the respondents, the public complains on several occasions that the information received from the civil service is inadequate, incomplete, and inaccurate.

Thus, the political elite forces civil servants to generate inaccurate, inflated, and even false information to show higher performance and cover up inefficiency. What is reported to higher levels and what is achieved on the ground are very different. Since the demand for higher and inflated performance reports comes from the political elite, the official is put in a dilemma of either providing accurate information as available on the ground or generating an inflated performance report to satisfy the political elite's need for good performance.

On the other hand, a key informant from politicians argued that the practice of the duty of truthfulness very much relies on politics and administrative commitment to creating an adequate understanding of the objective of the civil service reform and how that would make life better for civil servants while addressing inefficiencies in the public sectors. As to the informant, if that can be created from the onset, accessing information and input from civil servants will not be difficult. However, unilateral efforts by politicians to go ahead and reform without the consent and support of the civil service elites, in particular, will make the fact-finding mission difficult, if not impossible.

A key policy informant recalled that once the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) and the Ministry of Agriculture provided too different data on the same subject. The actual size of land prepared for agriculture was 200,000 hectares, but it was reported to be 2,000,000 hectares. In this case, Civil Service Elites are political. Moreover, the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)-related data revealed by officials on several occasions showed how unprofessional the Civil Service is, its capacity, resources, autonomy, accountability, training, and training relevance to the task for which they are responsible. Furthermore, the IMF report on Ethiopia's growth rate compared to the census produced and communicated by the Ethiopian technocrats and the media was another incident along these lines.

Moreover, key informants from academia and policymakers reminded us that Business Process Reengineering (BPR), which is one of the CSR tools, was declared 100% successful. Contrary to the governments' reports, the research results showed complete failure. As the informants said, the government itself finally admitted that the BPR implementation was a complete failure.

Unanimously, key informants from the political leaderships agreed that if politics and administration are separated to an acceptable extent and supported by technology, there can be no problem in living up to the principles of truthfulness. In this context, a key politician borrowed the quote from Michel Porter (2007)-Singapore "think ahead, think again, and think across". This meant that it is better to face the truth based on the raw data as it is and addresses the problem whether it is negative or not.

Drawing concrete conclusions is not easy when it comes to issues such as the duty of truthfulness of elites in public service. In other words, it is difficult to measure the commitment of public service elites in concrete terms. Despite the notion that political leaders and bureaucrats are interdependent for effective governance, this mutual functioning should not be without limitations. In this regard, the above analysis on the issue of truthfulness shows that misinformation, inflations, and underestimations of public service-related facts in general and data on CSR, in particular, are the serious problems of the public sector in Ethiopia that need national dialog and discussions to find

out strict political and legal solutions. The information from the vignette and interview guides indicates that both politicians and officials at the top are failing to fulfill the principle of truthfulness in the course of public sector reform. In other words, the failure to provide accurate, complete, and correct information promptly may indicate a deficit in democratic governance. We might also conclude that institutional reform should be preceded by reform of the human elements of public sector organizations and citizens in general.

In a nutshell, in countries like Ethiopia where the role of the two actors (politics and administration) is blurred and arbitrary interventions take place, this is a major challenge for professionals. Hence, the public service elites should use all legal and procedural means at their disposal to minimize the breach of their duty of truthfulness.

4.7.4. Political Neutrality and encountering Dilemmas during CSR

Both legal and ethical frameworks require civil servants working at different levels to do their jobs in a politically neutral manner. Political neutrality, in the sense of political non-partisanship in the public service, is a prerequisite for treating public servants fairly and equitably, regardless of their political orientation, by emphasizing the principles of professional ethics, competence, and overall merit.

In other words, Public Service Officials should serve the political executives (elected and/or appointed) and the incumbent governments with absolute loyalty and to the best of their abilities, regardless of their political beliefs. However, when expressing views, public servants should ensure that their views do not create a conflict of interest with their official duties or jeopardize the essential principles of maintaining impartiality and political neutrality in the conduct of their official duties. Hence, they must always ensure that their conduct does not interfere with the performance of their official duties fairly and professionally.

Ensuring the political neutrality of civil servants may require structural modernization of public organizations, strengthening of organizational capacity, and introduction of new mechanisms of oversight functions. These are the essential elements of CSR. Hence,

neutrality entails that administrative decisions are free from political rent-seeking. The secret behind civil service neutrality is therefore autonomy, competence, professionalism, ethics, harmony, equality, impartiality, responsibility and prosperity, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, and many other good symptoms. Therefore, to improve the efficiency and fairness of public service, it is necessary to protect the institution from direct forms of partisan control.

In this regard, the researcher intended to assess the reactions of civil service elites as well as the perspectives of relevant academia on dilemma situations involving bureaucratic neutrality during civil service reform. Table 4.15 shows how civil service elites reacted to a situation that called their political neutrality into question:

Item	Response category	Frequency	Percent
Assessing the political agenda of the opposition parties while assessing CSR alternatives	Accept with no reservation	29	16.6
	Accept, with reservation	50	28.6
	Accept, only after a direct order & warn them	31	17.7
	Decline the order	65	37.1
Expediting a particular CSR with Elections	Accept with no reservation	40	22.9
	Accept, with reservation	40	22.9
	Accept, only after a direct order & warn them	38	21.7
	Decline the order	55	31.4

Table 4.15: Challenges to Bureaucratic Neutrality during CSR

Adopting and implementing CSR is not an easy task. Several alternative reform instruments should be explored. In doing so, public service elites and policymakers should consult various stakeholders, including think tanks and opposition parties, before endorsing a particular reform instrument. Yet, the civil service elites' engagement to this end should be in a politically neutral manner.

In this context, bureaucratic elites were asked whether they would accept and support orders from their political leaders to evaluate the political programs and ideologies of opposition parties while asking them for their views on civil service reform to be introduced. As shown in Table 4.17 above, the number of respondents who agreed to accept the political command of this kind without reservation, with reservation, and with a clear warning was 16.6%, 28.6%, and 17.7% respectively. The remaining 37.1% of the respondents chose to reject.

In addition, respondents were asked if they would work with political leaders to push a particular ongoing reform in the upcoming elections so that the incumbent government could benefit. To this, 22.9%, 22.9%, and 27.1% of the respondents responded with the agreement, without reservation, with reservation, and with clear warning respectively. Only 31.4% of the respondents responded in rejection of such political order and were unwilling to help in this regard.

The researcher has also tried to analyze the correlation between some selected dependent, independent, and moderating variables. In this regard, Political Neutrality and Civil Service Elites' employers had significant relationships. However, due to the small number of the sample addressed, the figures are not very significant. It seems that Civil Service Elites, who work in ministries, are better able to warn and resist the political leadership's wishes that could jeopardize their neutrality.

In contrast, bureaucratic elites working for agencies and commissions appear to be softer when it comes to resisting and challenging politicians' orders that violate the principles of political neutrality of the civil service. In this regard, the research believes that strong relationships between dependent and independent variables of the study did not emerge, partly due to the sample size and partly due to the homogeneity of civil servants' perception of the politicization of civil service reform in Ethiopia. Hence, the researcher made the analysis and discussion mainly based on the descriptive data and the information collected from key informant interviews and other secondary sources. See Table 4.18 below:

Dimensions	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.595 ^a	3	0.055
Likelihood Ratio	7.843	3	0.049
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.978	1	0.160

Table 4.16: Chi-Square Tests for the correlation between Employers and Political Neutrality

Similarly, the views of key informants from academia and political leaders were collected and assessed. To start with the academics: Most of them believe that it is hardly possible for the public service elites in Ethiopia to maintain their political neutrality, partly due to the political culture of the country.

A key informant argued that public service elites should never collaborate with and support politicians in the act of spying on the opposition parties because it was dangerous to the very existence of the state. Unfortunately, the informant was not under the impression that the Civil Service Elites in Ethiopia dare to stand against such corrupting or patronage practices in reality. As for this particular respondent from academia, this is partly due to the fusion of politics and administration and partly due to the lack of alternative livelihood mechanisms besides employment in public sector organizations.

Respondents from academia also believe that there must be a culture of maintaining neutrality in the civil service; as such a system provides the necessary protection for civil servants to work in accordance with the requirements of professional standards and encourages innovation and creativity in the public sector organizations. They emphasized that public service elites must adhere to the design and principles of effectiveness and efficiency. They just need to do their best to implement CSR according to the design so that it will achieve its objectives. They argued that political aspirations such as elections have little to do with the role of civil servants. Unfortunately, they noted, there is no separation between party politics and public service in the Ethiopian context.

However, the key informants admitted that it might be difficult to maintain political neutrality as positions in the civil service become higher. For instance, they claimed that the administrative elite can advise the political executive without compromising their neutrality, which requires a strong political culture. In other words, the academics involved in this inquiry admitted that bureaucratic neutrality in the strict sense is neither desirable nor possible. Rather, they said that there must be an acceptable level of elitism in public service when it comes to policy and political decisions. This would help both politicians and bureaucrats to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of public sector management endeavors such as the implementation of civil service reform.

It was also argued that in political systems where there is a clear demarcation between party politics and public service, it is illegal to favor a party in power or opposition while holding a public office as a public servant. But in countries like Ethiopia, where the line between politics and public service is blurred, civil servants openly campaign for the ruling party and hasten its re-election. Thus, the solution is to separate the two actors-politics and the administration.

Correspondingly, key informants from the law school explained that the Ethiopian civil service had never been free from political influence and bias throughout most of its modern history. They argued that the separation between the ruling party and the government and the civil service had been a challenge. For them, this was one of the main complaints of the public and the opposition that the civil service was intertwined with the respective political leadership. Thus, Ethiopia has experienced three different governments in the last 70 years. Each government chose not to change the system of its predecessors. Instead, the bureaucrats hired by the previous government were "hired and fired", which in reality is the manifestation of a spoils system or patronage system. Therefore, the key informants indicated that the same scenario continues in the hiring and promotion of government employees.

Moreover, according to the key informants, the problem of neutrality of the civil service is magnified during the election period as the party in power uses the machinery of

government, especially the civil service, to garner votes, which is contrary to the essential existence and functioning of the public bureaucracy that serves different governments at different times, whose tenure is for life if they perform well.

Furthermore, legal scholars suggested that politicians should withdraw from public service; it would then be easier for bureaucrats to do their work in a way that accommodates both service providers and users/consumers. In addition, key informants argued that Ethiopia has never held a free and fair election that did not involve civil servants when it came to re-electing the incumbent government.

On the other hand, the researcher posed the same question of bureaucratic neutrality to selected participants from the political leadership to ensure a balance between the perspectives of academia, civil servants, and politicians while addressing the issue at hand.

In this regard, politicians did not have clashing ideas with the academic informants. They agreed that building consensus between Civil Service Elites and Politicians is a key to creating the right framework for government to work effectively. They asserted that often, civil servants have a way of doing their jobs, with well-established ethics and norms, and if politicians come up with ambitious reform plans that require more flexibility and efficiency to implement. Thus, they argued that before passing on instructions, political leaders should try to facilitate conversations to build a common understanding with their administrative counterparts at the top. Besides, political executives who took part in this research stated that while maintaining the neutrality of the civil service, politicians are equally responsible for understanding the role of the civil service and not asking them to do things that may compromise administrative neutrality. Hence, there should also be a clear accountability framework to prevent politicians from misusing the bureaucracy for political purposes. Ultimately, they put, that means getting real about allowing meritocracy and politics to coexist.

Nonetheless, some of the interviewees from the political leadership had bold and unique ideas about the political neutrality of the civil service elites in Ethiopia. They boldly

stated that the source (politics itself) is not neutral, which is also true at Civil Service Elites. In other words, they stated that as a matter of practice, the public service elites come into the system because of their political affiliation. This is the rule of the game in Ethiopia. It has been argued that the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats in Ethiopia are created by politicians. The political leaders call the shots. It was further alleged that the bureaucracy has been made instrumental in the process of introducing the practice of self-governance and regional politics. In other words, the federal government controls the regions through the bureaucracy.

Consistent with the issue of bureaucratic neutrality during civil service reform, political leaders themselves admitted to excessive politicization. Nevertheless, one can conclude that the reaction of civil service elites to the dilemma situations that would challenge their political neutrality is not as strong as the reactions of both academia and politicians. Therefore, it can be concluded that the politicization of civil service reform is a reality in Ethiopia despite the feigned reactions of the civil service elites.

Indeed, the neutrality of the civil service is a pillar that would guarantee the continuity of administration in a country. It is a value that could force both politicians and civil service elites to look at the big picture and not the short-term desires for political and material gains. Moreover, adherence to the principle of bureaucratic neutrality helps to maintain the institutional values of the civil service, which are the very reason for the existence of public service and the demarcation between public and private organizations.

4.8. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES RELATING TO CSR POLITICIZATION AND NORMATIVE LIMITS

Through follow-up questions, the researcher was able to capture some further impressions and reflections from study participants, especially those who participated in the in-depth interviews. In this regard, participants from academia argued that CSRPs have failed in most African countries, Ethiopia being no exception, partly due to the intention of governments to fast-track reform initiatives for political reasons and partly due to the lack of requisite knowledge and skills on the part of public servants. Yet, the

political executives who have participated in this study have attributed their blame to the academics as it lacks the required commitment to relate or bridge between theory and the actual context of the country.

Besides, it has been argued that despite the emphasis on Sub-Saharan African countries, of which Ethiopia is one, Civil Service Reform & change efforts have not been able to achieve the required results. This is partly because public service reform tools have too often been designed & implemented as palliative measures. The administrative problems in this region require a larger operation to maneuver the multi-faceted problems of the civil service. See Figure 4.10 below:




Figure 4.10: The distribution of CSR operations by regions, 1987-1998.

The following section discusses some issues related to the politicization of CSR and normative boundaries. The first issue discussed is the impact of CSR on the politicization of the Civil Service. Second, this section addresses the impact that conflicts of interest at Civil Service Elites have on the politicization of public service in general and reform initiatives in particular. In addition, this section presents the main factors influencing the politicization of CSR in the Ethiopian Public Sector Organizations at the federal level.

4.8.1. Civil Service Reform vs. Politicization in the Public Sectors in Ethiopia

According to some studies, public service elites show negative work attitudes when politics interferes with public service staffing, when they have little influence over policy matters, and when political actors interfere with their leadership activities. In particular, politicians' disdain for bureaucratic expertise had the greatest impact on work attitudes (Jung and Kim, 2021).

In most developing countries, the practice of clientelism and patronage is widespread as a means of managing the public sector and nations in general. It ensures that incumbent governments win elections and simplifies governability for them (Christian, 2016). Based on the assumption that Ethiopia is not an exception in terms of clientelistic/excessive politicization practices, the researcher intended to investigate the impact of civil service reform on the politicization of the civil service. To this end, key informants were asked whether Civil Service Reform reduced or exacerbated politicization. Besides, there is much evidence to suggest that frequently implemented reforms serve political or ideological goals rather than performance-related goals Brewer and Kellough (2016).

Interviewees from the political leaders argued that de-politicization had never been the main objective of civil service reform in Ethiopia's modern history. For example, they mentioned the developmental state declared by the EPRDF government, which did not consider bureaucrats as a non-political institution. Rather, the EPRDF made the civil service an important partner in political operations, more than in institutional reform and change. The bureaucracy was used as a tool to implement the political agendas of the ruling party.

They emphasized that membership and affiliation to a political party that governs the country were the only criteria for hiring and promotion. According to key informants, subordination or recommendation by the political leadership counted more than merit principles. Therefore, even in the process of civil service reform, merit-based progression was ruled out in favor of rewarding political participation.

Thus, the key informants from the political leaders agreed that Civil Service Reform has exacerbated the politicization of the civil service in Ethiopia. They also agreed that modern Ethiopian governments are no different in politicizing the civil service and using it as a tool for political manipulation. In other words, the politicization of the civil service in the name of reform has been a consistent practice of Ethiopian governments, despite differences in political ideologies and programs.

Assuming that this issue is about civil service reform in Ethiopia, the developmental state model in the past years has not seen the civil service as an apolitical institution, but as part of the political machinery to implement policies and political objectives of the government in office. Consequently, the de-politicization of the civil service has never been a priority. Often, party affiliation was a criterion for recruitment into the civil service and leadership was an imputation instead of merit.

It can be inferred that CSR packages implemented in the Ethiopian public sector organizations at the federal level served to consolidate the government's political power and make political intervention in the civil service easier and more spontaneous. In other words, although de-politicization has been one of the goals in implementing civil service reform in many countries around the world, the Ethiopian government has used it as a tool to intervene in the affairs of civil service institutions.

Therefore, the CSR programs that have been implemented in Ethiopia in recent decades have exacerbated the level of politicization of the civil service in general and reform efforts in particular. Indeed, the de-politicization of the civil service and the reform and change initiatives in the Ethiopian public service is an urgent and challenging project when it comes to making the government functional and purposeful.

4.8.2. Conflict of interest among civil service elites during the reform

Key informants from the political leadership admitted that there are conflicts of interest between careerists at the top when it comes to civil service reform. They indicated that the main cause is the lack of clear delineation of roles and responsibilities and personal stake in reform projects and programs. However, another policy informant insisted that

the prevalence of conflict of interest among public service elites in the course of public sector reform was due to ethnic politics along the lines of language, religion, economics, or material needs or desires.

In contrast, a key informant who holds a political position argued that the civil service in developing countries is generally; large, underpaid, and politicized. Therefore, he argued, inefficient and corrupt service delivery is quite common. However, the informant claimed that despite being underpaid, most civil servants have high moral standards and do not want to bring personal interests to their jobs. Yet, the informant opined that conflicts of interest do not exist in the civil service. They very much exist. For example, reform and change projects that are approved contrary to the outcome of a feasibility study only because of personal or group interests can be seen as typical cases of the practice of conflict of interest.

The political leaders who participated in the interview suggested that designing a robust accountability and transparency framework can make the civil service system and reform initiatives immune to abuse by personal interests.

In addition, it has been pointed out that the assignment of civil servants by donors such as the World Bank to engage in special reform programs and projects while retaining their respective regular jobs represents another enormous potential for conflicts of interest between civil service officials in general and the bureaucratic elites at the top. Hence, the demonstration effect can be devastating for those public employees who do not have access to top-up benefits Barbara and Nellis (1995).

The presence of conflicts of interest among public service elites in the course of public sector reform may therefore help political leaders exert more influence on matters of administrative discretion and domain. In other words, the political elites can take advantage of the competition among the bureaucratic elites for power and material interests while trying to enforce their policy orders during the reform. Therefore, the conflict of interests among careerists at the top leads to the loss of cohesion among the bureaucratic elites and consequently leaves loopholes for political leaders to politicize the

Ethiopian public administration in general and the civil service reform process in particular. The more cohesion, mutual understanding, and familiarity there is among the civil service elites, the more difficult it becomes for political leaders to manipulate and politicize the administration.

4.8.3. Factors affecting the politicization of CSR and Normative Limits

Both scholars and policymakers who participated in this research presented the main factors that cause the politicization of public service and public sector reform efforts. The researcher found that the responses from political leaders and academics were very consistent or similar in addressing this issue. Therefore, the main factors that cause and exacerbate the politicization of the institution of public service in general and reform efforts, in particular, are presented and discussed below:

1. The Political factor

They state that due to the lack of genuine connection between the public and the incumbent governments in Ethiopia, coming to power, staying in power, and maintaining the political legacy need the support of the public service. Hence, politicians use the public bureaucracy as a tool for political manipulation and governing the nation. Therefore, it is common for the respective government to use the bureaucracy as the main tool to implement their political agenda and maintain political power.

In this regard, both politicians and scholars agreed that the Imperial Regime of Ethiopia which ruled the country between the years 1930-1974 used the civil service to consolidate its power and inform the public about the project of unifying the country around the line of Orthodox Christianity and the single language (Amharic). However, the project of administrative modernization served to conceal the government's real political actions. Besides, key informants indicated that the Ethiopian communist regime deviated from its original plan to modernize the Ethiopian public administration through educated, qualified, and energetic young civil servants and used the bureaucracy to teach scientific communism and socialism.

Moreover, the EPRDF government used public servants as tools for political manipulation and destruction of opposition political parties. What is more, the key informants agreed that using the civil service as a tool to consolidate political power and preserve heritage was the common practice of modern Ethiopian governments. They all lack the genuine political commitment to ensure the neutrality and impartiality of civil service.

Furthermore, politicians and academia participating in this study argued that Ethnic Politics or the Politicization of Ethnicity might have led to the politicization of Civil Service and its Reform processes. They said that Language and Religion play significant roles in this respect. Some key informants from academia described this factor as mismanaged ethnic federalism. They claimed that the country is built based on language and religion that dominated most of the modern history of the country and its impacts can be evidenced even in contemporary Ethiopia.

2. The Economic Factor

Nowadays, public sector organizations in most developing countries face difficulty in designing a pay scale that would help them attract and retain talented and capable civil servants. This in turn would have a direct impact on the quality of policy and program implementation. This ultimately affects the quality of public services delivered to the population. Ethiopia is not an exception to this scenario.

According to the participants, public service employment is a prime means of survival in almost all developing countries and Ethiopia is not an exception in this regard. Besides, there is the inadequacy of pay that might have led to the inevitability of corruption to fill the gap therein and the politicization of the civil service. In other words, politicians would easily manipulate the civil servants as their monthly is by far lower than the living costs on the ground. The key informants indicated that Ethiopia is at the bottom of the list concerning pay scale even by sub-Saharan African standards. Therefore, the economic challenges might have compelled the civil servants to surrender their neutrality in exchange for survival and job security.

The Ethiopian public sector employees typically earn between 21 USD (minimum salary) and 513 USD maximum. This is the total monthly salary, including any bonuses and allowances. However, wages can vary greatly between job categories. See the following Table 4.17:

Grade	Base Salary	Step Salaries									Ceiling
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
I.	21	22	24	26	27	29	31	33	35	37	40
II.	25	27	29	31	33	35	37	40	42	45	47
III.	31	33	35	37	40	42	45	47	50	53	57
IV.	37	40	42	45	47	50	53	57	60	63	67
V.	45	47	50	53	57	60	63	67	71	75	79
VI.	53	57	60	63	67	71	75	79	83	88	92
VII.	63	67	71	75	79	83	88	92	97	101	107
VIII.	75	79	83	88	92	97	101	107	112	118	123
IX.	87	92	97	102	107	112	118	123	129	135	140
X.	102	107	112	118	123	129	135	140	146	153	159
XI.	118	123	129	135	140	146	153	159	166	172	179
XII.	135	140	146	153	159	166	172	179	186	193	200
XIII.	153	159	166	172	179	186	193	200	208	215	223
XIV.	172	179	186	193	200	208	215	223	231	239	248
XV.	193	200	208	215	223	231	239	248	256	265	274
XVI.	215	223	231	239	248	256	265	274	283	293	303
XVII.	239	248	256	265	274	283	293	303	313	323	334
XVIII.	253	274	283	293	303	313	323	334	344	355	366
XIX.	293	302	313	323	334	344	355	366	377	390	401
XX.	323	334	344	355	366	377	390	401	414	426	438
XXI.	356	366	378	390	401	414	426	438	450	463	475
XXII.	390	401	413	426	438	450	463	475	488	500	513

Table 4.17: Civil Servants' Salary Scale (in USD)

Source: Federal Negarit Gazette No. 93 (2019:11861)

3. Poor Capability of the civil servants

In this regard, respondents argued that poor training, education, and development programs led to a deficiency in skills development. They contended that the Ethiopian educational system offers barely a cognitive aspect. In other words, the participants stated

that the educational curriculums of the country are not connected to the real world of jobs in the public and private sectors. Hence, it is difficult for public servants to meet merit requirements if serious measures are to be taken. Hence, the public servants are obedient to the demands of the political elites in politicizing the bureaucracy and reform efforts as a means to cover up their skills deficiency.

4. The problem in the projects of 'Nation building'

The literature shows that the challenges of state and nation-building in Africa are due to the nature of the continent's states. Most states in Africa are highly centralized, authoritarian, self-interested, or serve the interests of the "state class" which includes politicians, the central civil service, military leaders, and regional officials (Keller, 1991 cited in Mengisteab, 1997:116).

In this respect, Ethiopia is no exception. In short, the project of nation-building in Ethiopia had three major obstacles to overcome. The first is the historical problem. Ethiopia has contested and unresolved historical legacies. The victorious and proud stories of a particular group could be a beam story for the other nationalities in the country. The second challenge is the lack of institutions that would serve all citizens without discrimination. In other words, the country lacks institutions that could address the challenges of a diverse group with competing and sometimes conflicting interests. The third challenge to nation-building in Ethiopia is the failure of leadership. Here, what is lacking from different leaders leading the country at different times are leadership attributes including; the personal qualities of integrity, honesty, commitment, and competence of individual leaders as well as the collective qualities of shared vision, focus, and desire for the development of the elites as a whole. According to the key informants, the country is built along with Christianity and Amharic language (one language, one religion, one Ethiopia project). And this led to the establishment of bureaucracy based on parochial political culture.

5. Administrative traditions

In Ethiopia, there is a culture of admitting that the government is the master of everything. Key informants in academia and politics believe that government employees in Ethiopia perceive pay as government charity. In reality, they are paid in exchange for the services they provide. In fact, the prevailing mentality in Ethiopia's public bureaucracy is that the government has unchallengeable power and any action it takes cannot be criticized or scrutinized. This can be confirmed by an Amharic proverb: “**ሰማይ አይታረክ ንጉሥ አይከሰስ**”; this can be roughly translated as: It is not possible to plough the sky, nor is it possible to accuse the king. This was the tradition both in society and in public sector institutions. Furthermore, key informants said that the acute problem in Ethiopia is that there are no active citizens to question both the government and the bureaucracy. Hence, the institutional intermarriage between politics and administration remained unquestioned.

6. Undemocratic and Authoritarian Government

Key informants in academia and politics had similar answers on this topic. They said that all modern governments of Ethiopia had been undemocratic and authoritarian. For example, the imperial regime came to power through divine means, the Communist-Socialist government through the military, and the EPRDF used ethnic descent.

In addition, key informants from academia believe that politicization of the civil service was present in these three regimes, but to varying degrees and in different forms. They argued that during the Imperial Regime politics and administration were at least formally separate or distinct. Positions above Deputy Minister or Assistant Minister were political, while administrative hierarchies were below civil service. However, according to scholars involved in this research, the communist regime that came to power and overthrew the imperial regime went to extremes in politicizing the civil service and reform initiatives along the ideological lines of Marxism and Leninism.

Moreover, informants indicated that the EPRDF, which took over political power from the Military Regime in 1991, followed an ethnic and leftist ideological line in politicizing

the Ethiopian Public Administration in general and civil service reform programs in particular.

7. Lack of Legal & institutional frameworks to ensure civil service neutrality & independence

In this regard, the informants stated that watchdog organizations, trade unions, CSOs, and other independent institutions would play an important role in building a strong, independent, and impartial civil service. In addition, participants emphasized that the process of depoliticizing the civil service and its reform efforts should begin with the establishment of a legal framework that enables independent institutions to critically monitor and question the operations and roles of politics and the civil service.

Also, the key informants agreed with the idea that the lack of strong and genuine opposition political parties left the government in power free to use the public resources including civil service for merely political ends. They argued that the opposition parties themselves are established along the parochial lines of ethnicity and religion.

In this regard, Professor Merera Gudina (2007) said, "A closer look at the source of what appears to be the bane of history can largely be explained by the political polarization and fragmentation between and among Ethiopian political parties that have repeatedly failed to establish a common agenda and mobilize millions for a common good." Hence, polarized political parties cannot guarantee the establishment of an independent and strong bureaucracy that would serve the nation without discrimination.

8. No strong and independent media in which public servants can voice their grievances

The key informants argued that in addition to the poor institutional endowment, the lack of legal protection for state employees from unhealthy treatment by political elites exacerbates the level of bureaucratic politicization in the country. According to the informants, like the public bureaucracy, the media in Ethiopia lacks protection from arbitrary and politically motivated actions by their respective governments. As a result,

public servants do not have access to independent media where they could voice their concerns.

Key informants boldly put that politicized civil service elites use state media or government-affiliated private media to further the political manipulation efforts of the incumbent government than sharing the concerns of the employees in the public sector.

9. Weak legislative oversight due to the amalgamation of power

According to Yamamoto (2007 cited by Zelalem Eshetu, 2015:119), legislative or parliamentary oversight is the "review, supervision and control of the incumbent government and public institutions, including the implementation of policies and legislation. This is an essential practice to ensure transparency and accountability in the functions of government and its institutions.

Ethiopia has a parliamentary form of government. Key informants believe that coupled with a lack of democratic culture, the fusion of power between the legislatures and the executives in Ethiopia might have exacerbated the politicization of civil service in the country.

More specifically, in Ethiopia, members of parliament (technically known as the House of Peoples' Representatives or HPR) can also be members of the executive branch of government, making parliamentary oversight difficult. On the other hand, the participants argued that there are no legal provisions specifying the practice and nature of legislative oversight of politico-administrative relations in the country. The participants from academia claimed that the committee observing the performance of the civil service in the country is ad hoc, which they believe cannot address the multifaceted problems of bureaucratic and public sector reform politicization.

From the above, it can be deduced that the politicization of public service in general and reform initiatives in particular in Ethiopia is caused by multifaceted and profound factors. It can also be deduced that the de-politicization of the civil service in general and reform efforts, in particular, requires political engagement at the national level, as the problems impeding the de-politicization of the civil service and reform efforts, are broader and

deeply rooted in the very structure of the country. In other words, mere political engagement by the government in question cannot help overcome the larger political, economic, and social challenges that exacerbate the politicization of the civil service, which in turn limits the success of reform initiatives despite the commitment of immense public resources.

4.9. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN CIVIL SERVICE AND REFORM INITIATIVES

This section discusses the future outlook regarding the Ethiopian civil service and upcoming reform initiatives, as well as the government's efforts to depoliticize institutions that provide public goods and services.

Eventually, the researcher learned that the incumbent government took power in 2018 following the youth-led resistance to the EPRDF administration. The current government is not new because individuals holding power now came from EPRDF. Nevertheless, those who called themselves progressive leaders joined the popular resistance and came to power, vowing that they would bring the desired changes to the country. Meanwhile, they have come up with a new party named “Prosperity Party,” which is expected to respond to numerous national questions raised by popular resistance. During the preliminary observation, the researcher realized that the government is undertaking a reform process to establish independent, capable and professional civil service that would the public at large and implement the policies of any government coming to power whose privilege of securing tenure is subject to merit and performance.

4.9.1. Initiatives for Reducing Excessive Politicization

According to the FDRE Civil Service Commission (2020), the Ethiopian bureaucracy needs to undergo a major reform if it has to effectively and fairly serve the ever-increasing demands of such a diverse society. The commission stated that an intensive need assessment has been conducted following the change and reform initiatives the government took in 2018.

In this regard, the interview participants from the highest authority of the commission stated that attempts are being made to rebrand the Ethiopian Civil Service based on the following core functional areas and the need to reform them:

1. Reforming the Human Capital Development Approaches;
2. Reforming and rebranding Public Service Provisions;
3. Resetting the Operational and working principles for the Civil Service Organizations;
4. Strict Application of Meritocratic principles in the course of recruiting, selecting, and promoting public servants
5. Civil Service from Ethiopia, by Ethiopia, and for Ethiopia.

The Commission argued that current public service reform and rebranding efforts are not aimed at making bureaucrats and their respective organizations so unique, but rather at improving the image of public sector organizations and the services they provide through improved capacity and greater commitment to serving the public. Hence, it can be inferred that reforming and rebranding such important functions of public service institutions can help change public perceptions of public sector organizations and the goods and services they provide. Moreover, civil service reform in the core areas identified above can lead to the creation of a civil service identity that is distinct from the political sphere. However, absolute separation of politics and administration is neither desirable nor possible.

4.9.2. The Establishment of Limits and Codes that Govern the Politico-Administrative Relationships

Survey respondents were asked whether there is an attempt to draw operational boundaries to separate the realm of policy from that of administration to avoid excessive politicization that would undermine the operational discretion of each party. In addition, respondents from the highest positions were asked whether there is a project to provide

codes for public sector organizations as one of the tools to distinguish politics from administration, with the ultimate goal of establishing an acceptable level of balance between the spheres of politics and administration.

In their responses, participants stated that efforts to rebrand and reform public service do not necessarily have to result in having codes in strict or concrete form, but that the ultimate goal is to create a public service system that is compatible with the local context and public service requirements. In other words, the public service rebranding project is necessary in order to have public servants who adhere to legal and institutional standards in carrying out their respective duties and responsibilities.



CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The overall objective of this study was to analyze the paradoxical relationship between political leaders and civil service elites in Ethiopia in the context of civil service reform from a historical and pragmatic perspectives. In other words, this research aimed to examine the nature and patterns of interaction between elected political leaders and professional civil servants at the highest level concerning the initiation, implementation, and evaluation of civil service reform programs.

The starting point for this study was the controversial description of the African civil service as inefficient, ineffective, corrupt, and highly politicized. On the contrary, African countries have implemented several public sector reform packages since independence and it was believed that these reform instruments have positively changed the bureaucracy in these countries.

In this regard, the researcher was convinced that Ethiopia is not an exception as the country has implemented a large number of civil service reforms despite widespread and persistent inefficiency, ineffectiveness, corruption, and political instrumentalization in the civil service.

In addition, this study considered the seven (7) widely accepted normative boundaries used to evaluate the degree of politicization when political-administrative relations come into play. These are the duty of legality, truthfulness, professional standards, political neutrality, loyalty, openness and transparency, and good public governance and administration. Of these normative parameters, the researcher adopted and used four, namely legality, truthfulness, professional standards, and political neutrality. Hence, in this research, legality, truthfulness, professional standards, and political neutrality were considered measurement parameters for analyzing and studying the interaction between political masters and civil service elites in the course of civil service reform (CSR).

Moreover, the landscape of political-administrative relations in Ethiopia was examined from a historical and contemporary perspective. To this end, the nature and practice of political-administrative relations and change initiatives during the imperial regime (1950-1974), the communist regime (1974-1991), and the EPRDF (1991-2018) were re-examined to capture the roots of the politicization of the civil service in the process of civil service reform.

In addition to time, resources, and other technical constraints, access to research in this area was a limitation. More specifically, the general relationship between politics and administration has not been explored. Investigating the nature, patterns, and practices of political-administrative relations in Ethiopia could have been an important resource for referencing and sharpening existing research. However, to overcome this limitation, researchers accessed studies in Africa and other countries with similar situations. Researchers also made extensive use of several research papers available in Ethiopia.

Furthermore, the nature of the subject matter under investigation presented challenges for mid- and lower-level public services. Vignette he struggled to grasp the essential problem of the political-administrative dichotomy, even among the top bureaucrats featured in the survey. Therefore, he endeavored to use plain and simple English in the study, and he used two local languages simultaneously during data collection.

Last but not least, the susceptibility of the studied subjects was another limitation that researchers faced from start to finish. During preliminary observations, several public service elites and political leaders advised researchers not to advance such controversial and thought-provoking topics.

Despite this, the researchers remained motivated and actively persuaded both the selected institutions and the research subjects to participate in the study. During subsequent data collection, politicians, key ministries, authorities, and commissions were convinced of the importance of the investigations conducted. Researcher was also informed that the government is taking similar initiatives to establish strong, independent and capable public service.

Because of the long history of civil service reform programs in Ethiopia, the researcher hoped to observe the dilemma situation that arises during civil service reform when bureaucratic elites are required to comply with political directives while crossing normative boundaries.

Nonetheless, in addition to resource and time constraints, the study encountered some technical limitations. For example, some civil service elites, who were considered for the vignette questionnaire, were unable to understand selected items, possibly due to their educational background, because recruitment and selection for some positions were based on political criteria other than merit. To avoid serious flaws, the researcher trained and deployed enumerators from the relevant field of study. Hence, the vignette questionnaires were not simply distributed to the respondents. Rather, the data collectors used them as an interview guide to clear up any potential misunderstandings while respondents were responding.

This study has shown that many of the civil service reform measures that Ethiopia has implemented in recent decades have been primarily driven by those in political power, such that the civil service has played only a minor role at the top and has been heavily subordinated by elected and appointed political leaders. Indeed, the role of the civil service elite has been invisible, partly due to the fusion of politics and administration in the country, but also partly since politics generally dominate the civil service and dominates reform measures from inception to end. This could also lead to the conclusion that the civil service reform programs have failed because of the nature of the relationship between the political elites and the civil service elites in the country.

The study also found that the FDRE Constitution does not have clear provisions on the establishment, mandates, rights, and operational limits of the civil service. However, the country has other legal frameworks that are used by politicians to argue that the civil service operates under legal constraints. Thus, the overall assessment shows that the Ethiopian civil service has two faces. One is the legal face, which dictates that personnel decisions must be made in accordance with relevant laws and performance principles. The second face is the actual practice on the ground. This face shows that, despite legal

requirements, partisan politics limit administrative discretion. Rather, legal documents are used as a tool to manipulate the entire organization of the public sector.

Besides, it is possible to deduce that Ethiopia lacks laws that would demarcate between politics-classically speaking, policy-making role and administration or those playing the policy execution roles. Besides, it has been stated that no clear determination from the government of the day is evidenced to prevent the prevalence or dominance of the spoil system in the public sector, which is manifested by the fusion of the two institutions called politics and administration.

In the absence of comprehensive legal documents that would protect the civil service in general and top civil servants in particular, bureaucrats, even from the legal profession, are left to determine whether the principles of legality have been violated during the CSR implementation.

Moreover, this research has revealed that the Ethiopian civil service system, as a highly politicized institution, still has a long way to go to strike a balance between politics and administration. In fact, the political considerations are likely to outweigh the discretion or neutrality of the administration or the law-abiding behavior or actions of civil servants, as the latter is at the mercy of the former should they refuse to carry out political orders or decisions.

Hence, it can be inferred that the civil service elites in Ethiopia are extremely obedient to their political masters and have accepted the marginal position assigned to them in setting reform criteria and discharging their responsibilities throughout Civil Service Reform Implementation. Indeed, fact-based technical criteria developed by top civil servants are as important as value-based political criteria.

The relationship between politics and administration in Ethiopia can thus be described as a pyramid, given the little discretionary power that civil service officials at the top have. The CSR measures or initiatives come exclusively from the top (the politicians). In such a situation, it is hardly possible to think of a responsive civil service that could take the initiative to reform and innovate in the state organizations. Since most of the reform

initiatives in the Ethiopian public sector come from the center, mainly the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), and ministers, the civil servants play little or no role in adapting reforms to their respective offices and mandates. Hence, it can be concluded that the autonomy of civil servants in general and that of the civil service elites is minimal and their discretion in making vital decisions is also marginal.

Concerning the existence of trust and appropriate communication patterns between policy-makers and administrators during CSR, it can be deduced that the reason for the limited participation of civil service elites in the main matters of public sector reform may be a lack of trust between the two actors. Moreover, the lower participation of professionals in setting reform criteria can also be attributed to the level of trust between policy-makers and administrators. Furthermore, the assertion made by key informants from academia regarding the affiliation of public sector elites to the political party in power deserves due attention.

The knowledge of public service elites about public service norms in general and reform measures, in particular, affects their willingness to communicate with their political partners in the context of CSR, which could also be influenced by their level of motivation in their respective organizations. The engagement of public service elites during CSR is thus related to the practice of inspiration by political leaders and the availability of space for both top-down and bottom-up communication so that they have adequate knowledge about the reform measures to be implemented.

Political support and assistance to careerists at the top in the course of civil service reform could be used as a means of politicization if not regulated by formal constraints. Coupled with a low level of democratic culture in the country, and poor horizontal cooperation among public sector organizations and their respective bureaucratic elites, collusion and control between politics and administration over CSR activities is believed to promote politicization.

On the hand, it has been noted that when public service elites have two alternatives, i.e. professional dignity and material benefits, they are forced to choose the latter rather than

the former. This could point to two possibilities. The first is that the civil service has been used as a political tool rather than a means of change and enhancing the qualities and accessibility of public services. The second suggestion is that the link between political leaders and careerist elites is not democratic. Therefore, decisions at the civil service level are made and/or influenced by elected and appointed politicians, so that the bureaucratic elites feel no dilemma or fewer dilemmas when they have to prove the violation of the legality of the reform process and the acceptable professional standards in their respective fields.

In other words, there is an indication that the overall activity of the civil service in general and the engagement in CSR in Ethiopia is mainly guided by the political norms and commands rather than the professional norms that apply to a particular field for which the civil service elites have been trained. It can be concluded that the elected and appointed people who run the ministries, agencies, and commissions in Ethiopia use political manipulation. Thus, the political criteria take precedence over the professional criteria established by the bureaucratic elites in the course of civil service reform.

Therefore, such passivity on the part of professional officials might suggest that there are no laws protecting them from reprisals by politicians if they refuse to carry out their orders, that the political system is opaque and not transparent or democratic, that there are no laws protecting whistleblowers if they expose malfeasance or political pressure on officials, and that there is no independent, active, responsible, and professional media and civil society sector to expose such malfeasance.

On the issue of truthfulness, this study shows that misinformation, exaggeration, and underestimation of facts related to public service in general and data on CSR, in particular, are among the serious public sector problems in Ethiopia that require national dialogue and discussions to find the strict policy and legal solutions. The survey data suggest that both the politicians and the officials at the top fail to live up to the principle of truthfulness in public sector reform. In other words, the failure to provide accurate, complete, and correct information promptly may indicate a deficit in democratic

governance. It could also be concluded that civil service reform should be preceded by reform of the human elements of public sector organizations and citizens in general.

In short, in countries like Ethiopia, where the role of the two actors (political and administrative) is blurred and arbitrary interventions take place, this is a major challenge for professionals. Therefore, public service elites should use all legal and procedural means at their disposal to minimize the violation of their duty to be truthful.

Another important parameter of this research was the dilemma situation regarding the political neutrality of civil service elites in the wake of CSR. The survey data of bureaucratic elites yielded mixed results. However, responses from academics and politicians suggested that the politicization of civil service reform is a reality in Ethiopia, despite the feigned reactions of civil service elites.

Civil service neutrality is indeed a pillar that guarantees continuity of administration in a country. It is a value that could force both politicians and civil service elites to see the big picture rather than short-term desires for political and material gains. Moreover, adherence to the principle of bureaucratic neutrality helps preserve the institutional values of the civil service, which are the very reason for the existence of the civil service and the distinction between public and private organizations.

Moreover, this study found that the presence of conflicts of interest among civil service elites in the course of civil service reform might have helped elected and/or appointed political masters exert more influence over civil service elites and influence issues of discretion and domain of administration. In other words, the political elites may exploit the competition among the bureaucratic elites for power and material interests while trying to enforce their political orders during the reform.

Hence, the conflict of interests among careerists at the top, therefore, may lead to the loss of cohesion among bureaucratic elites and consequently leaves loopholes for political leaders to politicize Ethiopia's public administration in general and the civil service reform process in particular. Thus greater the cohesion, mutual understanding, and familiarity among the civil service elites, the more difficult it becomes for political

leaders to manipulate and politicize the administration and these are the missing attributes.

The study found that top civil service elites in the Ethiopian federal public sector are not very sensitive to the politicization of the CSRP, regardless of their respective positions, educational backgrounds, and work experience. It can be concluded that Ethiopia, with its young democratic institutions and principles on the one hand and its parliamentary form of government in which the executive and legislative branches are intertwined on the other, may have exacerbated the degree of politicization of the civil service in general and the CSR processes in particular.

In general, the manipulative political climate, Ethiopia's poor public sector wage system, low efficiency of public services due to poor education and training systems, problems with national construction projects, passive traditions of administration, undemocratic governance, The lack of legal and institutional guarantees to protect civil servants, and the lack of independent media and oversight, may have contributed to the strengthening and perpetuation of the practice of politicizing civil servants. It is due to the such contextual reality that in Ethiopia, the Civil Servants; field of study and the position they held matter when the magnitude of civil service reform politicization and bureaucratic responses came into play. Nevertheless, to some extent, top public service elites employed by the ministries are in a better position to talk about excessive politicization of the CSR processes.

Recommendations

It seems that any attempt to establish and determine an acceptable and sensitive balance between politics and administration continues to be a thoroughly controversial research topic in public administration. In this regard, even contemporary scholars in the field disagree strongly on the degree of political intervention in administrative discretion on one hand and the political engagement of civil servants in policy decisions made by their respective superiors on the other.

A politicized civil service is described as rank-based, closed career, seniority-based, and centrally managed by political masters (Namkoong, 2017).

Therefore, any civil service reform should seek to make a comprehensive paradigm shift: from rank-based to job-based, from closed career to open career (a flexible career that provides an opportunity for creativity, innovation, and multitasking), from age-based recruitment and promotion to merit-based employment system, and centrally administered civil service to a decentralized bureaucratic system and its management.

The changes that the CSRP could bring would affect the political elites and the current government. For this reason, the veteran political parties oppose the changes that the CSRP would bring, especially when it comes to distancing politics from the prerogatives of the public service. Instead, the elected politicians and the incumbent government would resort to the system of Spoils or patronage. Therefore, political commitment is the crucial step that the government should take if the civil service reform programs are to bring about changes that will strike a delicate balance between politics and administration, thereby improving the quality of public services (Dia, 1993:4).

In the case of developing countries, the success of civil service reform programs is dependent on six success factors, as prescribed by Corkery et al. (1998): Explicit political support and commitment, a clearly defined goal and strategy for achieving it, a lead agency responsible for strategy implementation with the intellectual and tactical capacity required for task execution, participation of ministries and agencies in identifying issues to be addressed and developing and implementing programs to address these, and effective feedback, monitoring, and evaluation system

In addition, it has been argued that when changes in public service are demanded by political elites or political masters, the initiative for the demanded changes spreads rapidly and reaches directly to the lower levels of the government structure. However, if the initiative for change (in this case, civil service reform) and the underlying procedures are not quietly legitimized, the initiatives reach the lower levels gradually and the patterns of adoption of change initiatives vary over time (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).

This shows the importance of political engagement in the process of civil service reform and the creation of a competent, independent, dynamic, professional, and socially responsible civil service where societies receive the basic amenities of the public sector, irrespective of their political background and attitudes. In other words, institutionalizing change requires the commitment and willingness of political actors to lend legitimacy to the desired changes in the public service if the reform initiatives were promising.

The government of the day should refrain from excessive interference in the affairs of the civil service. Rather, the relationship between politics and administration should be guided by clearly defined goals. In other words, the government should be purposeful enough as it could influence other entities in the country, including the public bureaucracy. In other words, given the political culture of the country, where politics and administration are the same, achieving a balance between politics and administration requires a political commitment from the government and an initiative to depoliticize the civil service.

The neutrality of civil servants, mainly at the top levels of policymaking and program formulation, is vital, especially in democracies where leaders change regularly. Bureaucratic continuity is a necessity, even if it can become a mechanism for creating a privileged, self-referential group within the state. It is worth noting that the principle of bureaucratic neutrality has never been completely rejected as an instrument for preserving democracy.

In addition, structural issues should be addressed if the relationship between politics and administration is to be regulated to an acceptable degree. It is argued that the civil service or bureaucracy is growing in many countries around the world. However, there is no consensus on whether this physical growth of the civil service is accompanied by greater autonomy and institutional powers that allow it to freely regulate matters within its discretion with little or no political intervention. On the contrary, the number of political institutions, such as ministries, is increasing and their respective powers are steadily growing, which in turn may limit the administration's discretionary power.

Many countries in the world in general and countries with a very stable and effective bureaucracy have started the civil service reform process by ensuring the representativeness of their respective civil service. Therefore, the researcher believes that ensuring the representativeness of the Ethiopian civil service would pave the way for meritocracy and stable administration.

Moreover, it is never easy to move from one reform program to another. In this regard, the move from a representative bureaucracy to a meritocratic civil service should be accompanied by thoroughly conducted research and supported by clearly articulated legal frameworks.

As in other sub-Saharan countries, many of the public service reform measures have been transplanted from developed countries to Ethiopia. However, this does not mean that outside experience is irrelevant. Rather, it simply means that it is necessary to ensure that the various preconditions, the necessary capacities, and resources are in place before the civil service reform measures or initiatives are taken.

Previous studies suggested that not only the civil servants at operational levels and the bureaucratic elites at the apex, but also the political leaders in charge of heading the execution of the Civil Service Reform Programs (CSRPs) lacked a clear understanding of the vision, mission, and goals of the reforms packages.

Consequently, the political masters with blurred ideas concerning the targets that the CSRP strives to achieve cannot be in a position to provide clear and adequate guidance to civil service elites who in turn lead the implementation of a particular reform program.

Therefore, prospective CSRP should have clarity for all the concerned bodies ahead of execution as that would aid in minimizing wastage of resources and ensuring the success of the reform programs.

Furthermore, enshrining the establishment, mandates, duties, and general functions of the civil service in the country's constitution and other key legal frameworks would protect civil servants from unnecessary political interference and also create formal accountability mechanisms for poor performance in the public sector.

In general, the following suggestions could be made in order to minimize politicization of civil service and its reform processes so as to enhance the maintainance of normative limits. These are:

- ✓ Defining the scope of official duties and clear boundaries between politics and administration position;
- ✓ Limited and strict regulation of political leaders' involvement in personnel affairs.
- ✓ Hiring through transparent and fair competition.
- ✓ Transparent employee promotion and incentive system. Detailed regulations and restrictions discretion of the decision maker;
- ✓ Precise and detailed regulation on the issue of disciplinary liability and limitation of political liability leadership involvement;
- ✓ Detailed Rules for Reasons and Procedures for Dismissal and Restriction of Employees discretion of the decision maker;
- ✓ Restrictions/strict regulation of political and partisan activities of civil servants;
- ✓ Permanent/indefinite employment of civil servants; performance-based professional development and
- ✓ Compensation schemes and other guarantees conducive to self-reliance.

Finally, this study may pave the way for future researchers to address aspects and dimensions of the topic that were not covered in this study. Indeed, its theoretical and empirical review, as well as the findings, could serve as a model for future researchers interested in the topic.

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Appendix I: Questionnaire to be filled by Civil Service Elites

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University

Institute of Postgraduate Studies

Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Dear respondents;

This vignette questionnaire is designed to gather pertinent information on the dilemmas of public service reform. The questionnaire is to write a dissertation entitled "Civil Service Reform Dilemmas: Politicization and Normative Limits in Ethiopia".

Dear respondents, we request you provide genuine, balanced, accurate, and relevant information. Your responses are very valuable as the quality of this research is highly dependent on the quality of information you provide. Therefore, the researcher is very grateful for the time you sacrifice and promises that the information collected will be kept strictly confidential and used only for academic and research purposes.

Thank you in advance!

Part I: Personal Information:

1. Age:
2. Sex: 1. Female 2. Male
3. Educational Background:
 1. Law
 2. Business and Economics
 3. Social Sciences
 4. Other: -----
4. Level of Education:
 1. Below BA/BSc
 2. BA/BSc
 3. MA/MSc
 4. Ph.D. or above
5. Work Experience: -----
6. Position held:
 1. Advisor
 2. Director-General
 3. Director
 4. Other: -----
7. The Employer:

1. Ministry
 2. Agency
 3. Commission
8. Generic spheres of duties and responsibilities:
1. Policy & Institutional Development
& Change
 2. Administrative Execution
 3. Organization and Management
 4. Any other, please specify: -----



Part II: Listed below are statements about civil service reform dilemmas-politicization and Normative Limits. For each item, please indicate whether you Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, or Strongly Disagree and put a “√” mark with the corresponding values of 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively!

No.	Statement	Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
1.	In CSR, the roles played by politicians outweigh that of Civil Service Elites’					
2.	Both political and Civil Service Elites play relatively balanced roles in the course of CSR					
3.	Political criteria are used to determine CSR Processes more than the administrative criteria					
4.	Both political and administrative criteria are used in dealing with the processes of CSR					
5.	In the course of Civil Service Reform, Civil Service Elites are autonomous while discharging their responsibilities					
6.	Civil Service Elites feel much participated in vital decision-making processes related to CSR, given their relationship with the Political Executives.					
7.	Civil Service Elites trust political executives and are willing to take a risk in discharging their duties relating to CSR.					
8.	Civil Service Elites experience adequate upward communication to gain clarity on CSR					
9.	I am certain about the civil service norms					
10.	In most cases, Political Executives provide the framework for dealing with CSR activities on which I am personally responsible					
11.	During CSR, I immediately consult my direct supervisor when the need arise					
12.	Civil Service Elites cooperate among themselves in dealing with CSR					
13.	Civil Service Elites strive to advance Public Interest over political responsiveness					
14.	Civil Service Elites strive to put their professional dignity ahead of their material desires					

Part III. Listed below are the statements about CSR dilemmas-politicization and Normative Limits. For each item, please read the statements carefully and indicate your responses using the following keys and put a “√” mark.

1	2	3	4
Accept, with no reservation	Accept, but I will present my reservations to the Political Executives	Accept, only after a direct order, and I will warn the political Executive in unequivocal terms	I will decline the order

No	Statement	Responses			
		1	2	3	4
1.	In a trice when Political Executives request me to commence CSR with an executive order, not by a law enacted by parliament, I will...?				
2.	When the political executive/elite assigns your department to undertake a particular CSR program without legal authorization, I will...?				
3.	In an instance when Political Elites instruct me to hire Civil Servants who facilitate the CSR implementation without due consideration of legal procedures and merit principles, I will.....?				
4.	CSR involves the analysis & selection of alternatives as per relevant professional standards. If the Political Elites request me to pick a particular choice that he/she believes is appropriate or politically viable, I will....?				
5.	In circumstances where the Political Elites order me to adopt an approach to present matters relating to the ongoing CSR that is not in line with professional standards, I will.....?				
6.	CSR priorities must be set based on empirical evidence. If the political executive requests me to set reform priorities based on a unique value that he/she believes to be urgent and demanding, I will....?				
7.	Civil servants must live up to the duty of truthfulness. In a situation where the Political Elites request me to withhold information regarding CSR causing adversary effects in the public service, I will...?				
8.	When the political Elite in my organization instructs me to prepare a report concerning CSR by adjusting some statistics to maintain the positive image of the institution, I will...?				
9.	Civil Service Elites can assess the government's & opposition parties' proposals on CSR in a politically neutral manner. If a political executive requests me to evaluate the political programs of opposition parties, I will....?				
10.	Civil servants must implement CSR in a politically neutral manner. In a situation where the Political Executives request my assistance in expediting the reform with national or local elections, I will....?				

Appendix II: Interview Guide to be addressed by Political Executives

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University

Institute of Postgraduate Studies

Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Dear respondents;

This interview guide is designed to collect information on Civil Service Reform Dilemmas in Ethiopia. It is part of a Ph.D. dissertation. The dissertation at hand is being conducted as part of the requirement for the fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Dear respondents, you are expected to provide genuine, accurate, and balanced information concerning the aforementioned topic. Your genuine information is highly treasured as it determines the success of this study. Therefore, the researcher is very much grateful for the time sacrifice you pay to this end and promises that the information gathered will be kept highly confidential and used for academic purposes only.

1. How do you describe the nature of the relationship between the Political and Civil Service Elites in the course of Civil Service Reform? Describe their relations from the following angles:

A. Their roles,

B. Their respective criteria (Political/administrative

C. Separation of Power/Authority/discretion

2. The CSR implementation must be endorsed by laws enacted by the parliament. How would it be possible to get support from the Civil Service Elites under such a situation where CSR is commenced with a simple executive decree?

A. The Commencement of CSR with the simple decree or

B. The commencement of CSR with laws endorsed by the Parliament

3. Civil Servants are required to comply with established rules or norms and preserve professional standards when discharging their duties in the implementation of CSR. Under what circumstances do you think the Civil Service Elites may face a dilemma situation in maintaining their corresponding Professional Standards?

4. Civil servants must perform their work in a politically neutral manner. How can the political elites get maximum assistance from the civil service elites without compromising the principle of political neutrality?

5. Civil Servants must live up to the duty of truthfulness in the course of CSR. How can the Political Elites obtain the required information or data relating to CSR from the Civil Service without undermining their duty of truthfulness?

6. Could you please explain how the conflict of interest might affect the politicization of civil service reform in practice?

Appendix III: Interview Guide addressed by Academicians

Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University

Institute of Postgraduate Studies

Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Dear respondents;

This interview guide is designed to collect information on Civil Service Reform Dilemmas in Ethiopia. It is part of a Ph.D. dissertation. The dissertation at hand is being conducted as part of the requirement for the fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration.

Dear respondents, you are expected to provide genuine, accurate, and balanced information concerning the aforementioned topic. Your genuine information is highly treasured as it determines the success of this study. Therefore, the researcher is very much grateful for the time sacrifice you pay to this end and promises that the information gathered will be kept highly confidential and used for academic purposes only.

1. How do you describe the nature of the relationship between the Political and Civil Service Elites in the course of Civil Service Reform? Describe their relations in terms of A, B, and C:
 - A. Their roles,

B. Their respective criteria (Political/administrative

C. Administrative autonomy

2. Political and Civil Service Elites must act within the boundaries defined by law. How can Civil Service Elites, in the course of Reforms, maintain legal procedures in situations where there is interference from the political executive?

A. The Commencement of CSR with the simple decree or

B. The commencement of CSR with laws endorsed by the Parliament

2. Civil Servants are required to comply with certain rules and professional standards while discharging their duties in the implementation of CSR. Under what circumstances do you think they may be compelled to compromise their professional standards?

3. Civil Service Elites must perform their work in a politically neutral manner to ensure that they can function as credible civil servants for successive governments. How do you think the Civil Service Elites should react to a situation where the Political Executives request them to expedite or associate the ongoing CSR with elections to come?

4. Civil Servants must live up to the duty of truthfulness. They are expected to provide accurate and correct information. How can the Civil Service Elites live up to the duty of truthfulness when encountered with a dilemma situation that the political executives may create?

5. Could you please explain how the conflict of interest might affect the politicization of civil service reform in practice?



6. If you have information on the dilemmas of public service reform, politicization, and Normative Limits of legality, truthfulness, professional standards, and political neutrality, please do not hesitate to mention them.

Appendix IV: Core reform elements required for revitalizing Africa’s civil services in the 21st century

Key reform elements	Essential elements/ indicators
Governance architecture	1. The emergence of central state power: a coalition of social & political forces 2. Consensus on long/medium-term vision: above party and sectional interests 3. Independent institutions for ensuring accountable use of power – legislature and executive; field agencies distinct from efficient & accountable local governments 4. Involvement of professional groups and cultural organizations in governance and policy review (governance & policy score cards)
Creation of a professional bureaucracy	1. Merit-based civil service – competition in recruitment, selection, and promotion 2. Permanent and politically neutral civil service 3. Effective performance evaluation/performance contracts 4. Competitive remuneration 5. Vertical decompression
Modernization of higher education & heavy investment in research organizations	1. Reinvestment in relevant higher education and promotion of autonomy with inputs from private (for-profit and not-for-profit); 2. Higher-quality outputs from the primary & secondary levels 3. Heavy investment in research by state and non-state actors, the closer linkage between policy & research
Prioritization of hard and soft infrastructure	1. Regional & national long/medium-term infrastructure plans including maintenance and sustainability 2. Effective participation of the private sector and NGOs including faith-based organizations 3. Use of multiple financing options including bonds and property taxes in cities
Taxation and financial reforms to reduce growing inequality & finance infrastructure	As in (4) above. Taxation and enforcement to be focused as a part of aid conditionality; the special case for natural-resource-rich countries via Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and investment of resources in infrastructure bonds and banks
Rigorous search for regional opportunities	As in (4) above, via regional and sub-regional organizations.

Source: Van der Meer, F. M., Raadschelders, J., & Toonen, T. (Eds.). (2015). *Comparative civil service systems in the 21st century*. Springer.

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Eylül 2022

Kişisel Bilgileri

Soyadı, adı : BOKE ADEM

Eğitim:

Derece	Eğitim Birimi	Mezuniyet tarihi
Yüksek lisans	Kamu Yönetimi (MPA)	2010
Lisans	Kamu İdaresi ve Kalkınma Yönetimi	2007
Lise	Sosyal Bilimler	2003

İş Deneyimi:

Yıl	Yer	Görev
Eylül 2007	Wollega Üniversitesi, Etiyopya	Araştırma
Görevlisi		
Mart 2012	Addis Ababa Üniversitesi, Etiyopya	Öğretim Üyesi

Yabancı Dil

İngilizce Türkçe

Yayımlar

Hobiler

Futbol oynamak, Okumak, Yüzmek, Seyahat etmek ve Yeni Gelişmeleri Keşf etmek, Akrabalara Ziyaret etmek ve İnsanlar Yardım etmek.

Resume
September 2022

Personal Information

Surname, Name : BOKE ADEM

Education:

Level	Field of Study	Graduation Year
Masters	Public Administration (MPA)	2010
Batchelor	Public Administration and Development Management	2007
High School	Social Science	2003

Work Experience

Year	Employer	Position
September 2007	Wollega University, Ethiopia	Graduate Assistant
March 2012	Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia	Lecturer

Foreign Languages

English, Turkish

Publication

Hobbies:

Playing Football, Reading, Swimming, Travelling and Learning New Developments,
Helping People, Visiting Relatives.





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