



**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
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**A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS:
INDONESIA’S ROLE AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE
UNITED NATION SECURITY COUNCIL IN 2019-2020**

Master’s Thesis

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Ankara, May 31st 2022

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information provided in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that I have quoted and referenced all material used in this thesis which is not part of the originality of this thesis. I also declare that this thesis has followed the writing rules of the Social Sciences University of Ankara.

Saif Robbani

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ÖZET

Dış Politika Analizine Bilişsel Bir Yaklaşım: Endonezya'nın 2019-2020'de Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin Daimi Olmayan Üyesi Olarak Rolü

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Dördüncü kez Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin (BMGK) daimi olmayan üyeliğine seçilen Endonezya, bir Orta Güç olarak 2019-2020'de kendi rolünü "Dünya Barışının Gerçek Ortağı" olarak belirledi. Endonezyalı karar vericiler bu rolü Endonezya'nın temel ulusal çıkarlarına ulaşmak için önemli olarak algıladılar. Breuning'in ulusal rol anlayışı olarak adlandırdığı bilişsel bir Dış Politika Analizi (FPA) yaklaşımını kullanarak bakıldığında, Endonezya'nın rolünün, iç içe geçmiş düşünsel ve maddi faktörlerden etkilendiği görülecektir. Bir taraftan, düşünsel faktörler olarak Endonezya'nın gelişmekte olan bir ülke, en büyük Müslüman nüfus ve en büyük üçüncü demokrasi olarak kimlikleri; dış politika pratiği kültürü olarak korunan bağımsızlık ve aktiflik ilkeleri; iç farkındalık yaratma ve destek alma istekleri gibi faktörlerin ülke içinden gelen düşünsel faktörler olarak sıralanabilir. Diğer taraftan; çok taraflı gücü veya Endonezya'nın çeşitli çok taraflı forumlardaki diplomatik katılımı ile konumu ve ayrıca orta güçler için uluslararası düzeyde katılım fırsatları; uluslararası sistemden kaynaklanan maddi faktörler olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu tez ayrıca, rol algılama ve uygulamada Endonezyalı karar vericilerin bilişsel olarak tutarlı ve pragmatik kaldığını, yani Endonezya'nın 2019-2020 dönemi için Konsey'deki rolünün, Endonezya'nın küresel barışı sağlamadaki temel ulusal çıkarlarına uygun olarak tatmin edici olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Endonezya, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi, 2019-2020, ulusal rol anlayışı, bilişsel Dış Politika Analizi.

ABSTRACT

A Cognitive Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis: Indonesia's Role as a Non-Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council in 2019-2020

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Elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the fourth time, Indonesia as a middle power presented a national role as a "True Partner for World Peace" in 2019-2020. Indonesian decision-makers cognitively perceived this role as important to achieve Indonesia's core national interests. By using a cognitive Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach called Breuning's national role conception, Indonesia's role is influenced by the intertwined ideational and material factors. On the one hand; Indonesia's identities as a developing country, the largest Moslem population, and the third largest democracy; independent and active principles that have been preserved as the culture of foreign policy practice; as well as domestic awareness and support; perceived as part of the ideational factors emanating from the domestic sphere. On the other hand; multilateral power or Indonesia's diplomatic participation and position in various multilateral forums, as well as opportunities to engage internationally for the intermediate powers; perceived as the material factors originating in the international system. This thesis also finds that in the role perception and implementation, Indonesian decision-makers remained cognitively consistent and pragmatic, meaning that Indonesia's role in the Council for the 2019-2020 period was satisficing in accordance with Indonesia's core national interests in pursuing global peace and was based on Indonesia's position as a non-permanent member.

Keywords: Indonesia, United Nations Security Council, 2019-2020, national role conception, cognitive Foreign Policy Analysis.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This introduction chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will be discussing the empirical background of this thesis which are based both on the empirical phenomena and theoretical imperative. The second will be providing the research question of this thesis. The third will be weighing up the purpose or significance of this research both practically and academically. The fourth will be to provide structure of the thesis.

1.1. Empirical Background

Indonesia is a middle power country located in Southeast Asia that has been actively involved both in regional and international political relations. Although Indonesia has not taken part among global great powers, its contribution to international peace and security has been widely avowed by the international community. Hitherto, Indonesia has been trusted as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) four times since 1973. In its foreign policy practices, Indonesia has some firm foundations, including those related to the pursuit of its role as a non-permanent member of the UNSC.

The presence in the sector of international peace and security could be traced back to the Cold War era, when Indonesia with India, Egypt, Ghana, and Yugoslavia initiated the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1960s as a reaction to the dispute between the eastern bloc under the Soviet Union and western bloc presided by the United States of America (the USA). Before the first NAM formal meeting was held in Egypt in 1961, the fundamental conception of NAM itself had been discussed in 1955 through the Asia-Africa Bandung Conference hosted by Indonesia (NTI, n.d.). Formerly, NAM was created as a manifestation of freedom and impartiality. Therefore, according to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India (2012), its primary objectives were focused on “the support of self-determination, national independence and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; opposition to apartheid; non-adherence

to multilateral military pacts and the independence of non-aligned countries from great power or block influences and rivalries; the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations; the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, foreign occupation and domination; disarmament; non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all nations; rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations; the strengthening of the United Nations; the democratization of international relations; socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system; as well as international cooperation on an equal footing.”

Thus far, NAM has been evolving and developing as a forum in which its members coming from different backgrounds could harness their involvement to pursue their manifold national interests. However, despite the fruitfulness of NAM in representing the third world countries in global politics and defending the interests of underdeveloped countries, there are still prolonged challenges to overcome as NAM aspires to maintain a reputable role in contemporary global politics (Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, 2012).

Moreover, aside from being one of the founding fathers of NAM, Indonesia has been playing significant roles in certain areas both within the scope of its leadership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its membership in other international cooperation including the United Nations (UN). Regionally, even though no country has yet become a hegemon in ASEAN, and probably no country will ever do, Indonesia, according to Emmers (2014), is often referred to as “the natural leader” of that regional association considering its vast geographical area, large population, strategic location, and abundant natural resources.

Unlike the European Union (EU), the vision of ASEAN as a regional integration upholds the importance of the non-interference principle in each member’s domestic concerns. Although this so-called “regional norm” might be criticized by some, this core value of ASEAN is indeed suitable to be applied in that region in light of that almost all ASEAN member countries are former colonies. In other words, being a leader of ASEAN does not mean that the country is dominant or militarily powerful. Having an image as “a natural leader of ASEAN” is arguably not important since all member countries also have

the opportunity to take the initiative to determine the direction of policy since the leadership changes annually and is determined alphabetically. However, the performance or role of each member in leading this regional integration is something that needs to be investigated.

Indonesia was one of the creators of ASEAN in 1967, and until now, ASEAN remains part of the cornerstones of Indonesian foreign policy. ASEAN was established primarily to achieve regional stability which is significant for Indonesia's national interest. 1971 was an important year for ASEAN, in which its members agreed upon neutralization of the region, so they could concentrate on building a security regime, political consolidation, and economic development (Supriyanto, 2017).

One of the greatest achievements of Indonesia in leading ASEAN is encouraging the formation of the ASEAN Community that was founded in 2015. During its chairmanship in 2003, the 9th high level conference of ASEAN was implemented in Indonesia and the Plan of Action, which has become the keystone of ASEAN Community, was approved (Andrea, 2016). Hereinafter in 2011 chairmanship period, Indonesia succeeded in achieving significant progress in the establishment of the three pillars of ASEAN community, namely the Political- Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia [MoFA of Indonesia], 2012).

In addition to ASEAN, other regional cooperation in which Indonesia has been actively involved are the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Pacific Island Forum (PIF), Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CTI-CFF), Southwest Pacific Dialogue (SwPD), Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) between Indonesia and European Union (EU), Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

More globally, Indonesia's activities in world politics has been shown by its role in hosting the annual Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), support for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, support for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), support for environmental initiative called the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), active contribution to the UN peacekeeping force, and its non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Considering the facts above, ranging from regional to global cooperation, it can be assumed that Indonesia is arguably a representative of middle powers playing various roles in the international political stage and strongly relies on multilateralism. It is not surprising as Evant and Grant (1991:19) emphasizes that "middle powers are characterized by their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of good international citizenship to guide their diplomacy".

However, it is enticing to understand how Indonesia, which does not stand among great powers, has decidedly apprehended its contribution to global community. Identifying Indonesia's role as "A True Partner for World Peace", Indonesia has reflected its tendency to act as a good international citizenship, and has remained active both in the election and contribution to the UNSC in the period of 2019-2020. Although Indonesia's priorities were enhanced for this period, its core national interests and values had not changed as these seem to be the guidelines for every Indonesia's foreign policies since its independence day in August 1945.

1.2. Research Question

Based on the above background, this thesis has one specific research question, which is "*how did Indonesian decision-makers perceive Indonesia's national role as 'A True Partner for World Peace' in the UNSC for the 2019-2020 period?*" By using Breuning's national role conception from the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to answer the question, this thesis uses analytical variables which consider ideational and material factors that have potential to shape Indonesian decision-makers' perception of Indonesia's role in the UNSC, which later influenced its foreign policy behavior while serving as a non-permanent member of UNSC in the period of 2019-2020.

1.3. The Purpose or Significance of the Thesis

This thesis aims to make a significant contribution both academically and practically. Academically, it aims to prove that utilizing the approach of FPA could potentially grasp a profound understanding of a country's foreign policy towards specific issues. As theorists of FPA, Hudson & Day (2020) emphasized that IR shares the same ground with other social sciences, which lies in human acting singly or in groups. Thus, instead of treating the actor of international relations as the "black-box" states, understanding how decision-makers perceive and react to their surrounding is paramount in the study of IR.

As IR sub-discipline that has focus on human decision-makers, theoretical studies using the approaches of FPA must be reproduced and developed more. As for the case of the role that Indonesia has performed as a non-permanent member of UNSC, this thesis will be giving theoretical elucidation of how Indonesian decision-makers perceived the role of Indonesia on consideration of both ideational and material factors.

Practically, a more detailed and in-depth analysis provided by national role conception, which stands on the analysis on human decision-makers and has potential to act as a bridge, is considered important for analysts in giving alternative scientific judgment for those working in government agencies. This thesis will also help to clarify to the public about the implementation of particular foreign policy and what kind of factors lie behind the foreign policy in the first place. Regarding the topic itself, namely the involvement of Indonesia as a middle power in the UNSC, this thesis is expected to provide verification not only for decision-makers in Indonesia, but also for the public, as well as for those from other countries, about the growing importance of the role of middle power countries in the UNSC.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first is the introductory chapter consists of the context and background, research question, the purpose or significance, and the structure of the thesis. The second chapter provides analytical background, literature review, theoretical framework, and methodology. The third chapter scrutinizes the ideational factors of Indonesia's role conception in the UNSC in 2019-2020, while

the fourth chapter reveals the material factors. The fifth chapter analyzes Indonesia's role conception and foreign policy behavior in the UNSC in 2019-2020 through the lens of cognitive approach. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of this thesis and recommendation for further research.



CHAPTER TWO

ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the analytical background of the topic of this thesis, revealing the importance of utilizing a particular FPA approach to analyze Indonesia's role in the UNSC. The second section reviews the available relevant academic literature and points out a significant gap in relation to theoretical developments in the study of IR. The third section elucidates a theoretical framework coming from the approach of FPA that is used in this thesis, which is Breuning's national role conception. The last section illustrates the methodology used in this thesis.

2.1. Analytical Background

As discussed earlier, Indonesia has shown an arguably active role and contribution to world peace and security in various international frameworks of cooperation. Interestingly, Acharya (2014) argues that as an "emerging power", Indonesia does not perform itself in global politics like other nations in traditional manner, in which they tend to pursue military or economic capabilities. Instead, Indonesia has been showing the ability of a middle power to actively engage in world stage based upon three main factors, which are democracy, development, and stability.

Status of a middle power has been defined differently by scholars. However, one possible way to identify middle powers is by looking at their foreign policy behavior, that is, "their proclivity for seeking multilateral solutions to international problems, for advocating compromise and for, in general, being part of the solution to problems at international level" (Jordaan, 2003, p. 166). It is in consonance with what Evant and Grant (1991) mention above regarding the tendencies of middle powers.

If we look from a point of view on Indonesia's behavior as a middle power, Indonesia shows the importance of multilateral forums which also indicates that the contribution or role shown in these international platforms is part of the important goals. Indonesia's perceived role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council is interesting to be analyzed for several reasons. First, Indonesian decision makers should have understood that taking a sizable role as “A True Partner for World Peace” for a non-permanent member of UNSC might not be really feasible because of the presence of Veto countries in it. Second, because of that, this conspicuous role certainly held several significant drivers, especially considering that Indonesia relies heavily on multilateral forums to achieve its interests. Not to mention that in several important multilateral forums related to aspects of international security that exist in the world, such as ASEAN, NAM, and UNSC as discussed empirically above, Indonesia has shown an arguably active roles and involvement.

Understanding countries' foreign policy is undoubtedly one significant area in the discipline of IR, hence, its distinct approaches or concepts are important to be developed. Although it emerged as an important part of IR as a sub-discipline, FPA does not try to follow generalization nor establish universal theories that aim to explain every states' foreign policy with a single conceptual or theoretical framework. It is because the situation happened and the characteristics held by countries, as well as traits owned by its respective decision-makers, are different from each other.

According to Hudson & Day (2020), the *explanandum*, or “something to be explained or comprehended in FPA, is the decision taken by human with reference to or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state”. In order to provide an explanation or understanding of a particular decision, FPA analysts could refer to the factors having influence on foreign policy decision-makers and decision makings. Hudson and Day call these factors as *explanans*.

It is important to note that as a sub-field of IR, FPA has its six hallmarks (Hudson & Day, 2020). *First*, multifactorial view requires an inspection of the most possible factor behind a foreign policy decision. *Second*, multilevel analysis means an examination of variables from different levels of analysis. *Third*, multidisciplinary trait of FPA enables

analyst to ruminate on the potential insights from various intellectual disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, organizational behavior, economy, and so forth.

Fourth, if the prior three combined, FPA can be regarded as the most radical integrative theoretical enterprise among all sub-disciplines of IR, integrating a wide range of information across all levels of analysis and spanning a wide range of human science disciplines. *Fifth*, FPA emphasizes an agent-oriented theory, arguing that human beings are the true agents while the states are only abstractions. *Sixth*, the theories of FPA are profoundly actor-specific in their orientation. In other words, the source of all international politics and all of its dynamics is particular human beings who use their agencies and act individually or in groups.

This is not to say that IR mainstream theories are not reliable or obsolete, as some FPA theories have their roots in or borrow some of the assumption of some IR mainstream theories. Instead, as argued by Hudson & Day (2020), the future of FPA as a sub-discipline depends upon the degree of awareness of the vision that emphasizes on human decision-makers, multiple levels of analysis, and integration. Indonesia in the UNSC is an evidence of a middle power perceiving and implementing a relatively significant role in the biggest international security platform. In understanding this behavior and explaining what sort of factors behind the role, an approach that focuses on role is useful to locate the significance of the domestic sources of foreign policy and how they are correlated with external weight. For this reason, this thesis tries to focus on utilizing national role conception as a part of FPA approach.

2.2. Literature Review

Published academic literatures that have analyzed about the states' behavior in the UN, especially the UNSC could be categorized into four groups. The first group of studies discusses the role of particular five permanent members (P5) in the UNSC. The second group converses about the relatively enthusiastic involvement of some distinguished non-permanent members in the UNSC such as Brazil, India, and Japan. The third group examines specifically the contribution of Indonesia in its non-permanent membership of the UNSC. The last group provides literatures that have used the approach of FPA. The categorization is chosen logically to reveal the gap of knowledge and to ascertain that the

utilization of national role conception could provide a robust account in understanding particular states' behavior in international politics.

The first two categories will present a variety of “non-FPA” approach in understanding the different types of states' behavior regarding their involvement in the UNSC. The third category presents the existing studies that have discussed about Indonesia and the UNSC, which have not utilized any FPA approach. The final category aims to shed a light on how the few FPA approaches are used and how they perform differently in analyzing states foreign policy behavior in relation with the UNSC.

To begin with, since the creation and operation of UN bodies cannot be separated by the United States (the US), it is deemed appropriate to know how the hegemon behaves or performs its role in the UNSC. However, there have been no findings regarding the published journals that specifically discusses the role of the US in the UNSC. For the role of the US in the UN as a unit in general, Dafano (2014) believes in her thesis that analysis on the relationship between the US and the UN lies in the macro-systemic level, which is eventually drawn from the major theories of IR. Even though she took Obama's administration as a focus in comparison with Bush's, she elaborates two possible, yet opposing, conceptual models of the role of the US within the UN. Interestingly, instead of proposing the third possible model, she concludes that role played by Obama's US in the UN is best described by a mixed model that combines the two.

According to Dafano (2014), the first is called the “unilateralist” model that is close to realist perspective. It describes the behavior and foreign policy of the US towards the UN as motivated by both national interests and hegemonic aim. By using this model, it is argued that the UN is merely a means for the US to be exploited to achieve national interests, which are the US' security and economy, and to preserve position of power and hegemony in a post-American world.

Conversely, Dafano (2014) adds the second model named “multilateralist”, which is closer to liberalist perspective, portrays its desire to promote a global order of common interest and mutually advantageous cooperation among all actors in international politics. According to this model, the UN is valued by the US as a solution to solve global problems on behalf of its members, not only means for a mere cooperation. Consequently,

the position of the US within the UN motivates and enables the US to improve its behavior.

In addition to the US, it is arguably appropriate to understand how the other influential P5 countries, especially China and Russia, behave and perform their role within the UNSC. Regarding China, Lei (2014) was interested to analyze about the more constructive role of China in UNSC. According to him, the existing and growing threats to the world peace and security has caused China to expect to play a more prominent role as a P5. This is not surprising because when participating in every multilateral framework of cooperation, China is mainly in pursuit of defending its national interest, engaging major world powers, and addressing global security threats. In other words, materially pragmatic is the color of China's role in the UNSC as it is believed by China that the UNSC has become a critical organ for promoting China's developing global strategy.

For the case of Russia as another potent P5 members, Nikitin (2012) shares a common contention with Lei, which he argues that although Russia's performance as one of the P5 in the UNSC is wavering over time, it is always pragmatic in nature, which is driven by its core national interests. Pragmatism has been a leading approach of Russian foreign policy, referring to not only a freedom to make necessary actions, but also a freedom from old Soviet-motive that orientates to ideological goals, international friendship, and rivalries.

From the second group of studies, Thorhallsson (2012) implies that the involvement of relatively emerging states in UNSC are determined by two factors: which are competency and image as "norm entrepreneurs". This condition was demonstrated by some Nordic states that have contributed to the UNSC as they tried to act as norm entrepreneur by performing active participation and contribution towards humanitarianism, world peace and burden sharing. This is interesting because although in an international security platform like UNSC, their strategies remain grounded in soft power diplomacy.

Furthermore, Thorhallsson's assumption also applies to the case of Brazil, as Ferreira (2012) argues that Brazil's actions on the UNSC in the period of 2010-2011 portray its traditional principles of diplomacy, which are the defense of multilateralism and peace, respect for sovereignty, and promotion of the development of people and of

human rights. Ferreira also adds that Brazil's strengthened international position could make Brazil competent to be regarded as a new permanent member of the UNSC. This pursuit of being the main part of the UNSC is also considered as a reasonable goal for the relatively emerging powers. It is reflected by some other motivated countries, for instance, India, Japan, and even Indonesia, which have shown their own competencies to set their agendas and to serve as the prominent members of the UNSC.

According to Yadav (2016), India's involvement in UNSC, especially in peace keeping operations, has some considerable motivations. But the most influential impetus is the assessment of national interests and its adherence to peacekeeping principles. Regarding its remarkable contribution in peacekeeping operation, India sees that world peace could possibly be promoted not only through suggestion but also substantial action. Murthy (2011) also believes that India has always preferred to be seen as an important part of democracy that can be relied upon in the adoption of widely acceptable solutions, as well as in the UNSC.

Japan has also been in a long quest for a permanent membership of the UNSC due to its recognized competency. Katsuno (2012) argues that Japan is often regarded as a prime candidate for the next permanent member of the UNSC. As a matter of fact, this has been its goal since 1990s. In his speech in UN General Assembly in 2004, Prime Minister Jun'ichirô Koizumi stressed Japan's enthusiasm to be a component of a permanent members of the UNSC and Japan's contribution to international peace and security is considered as a strong reason for acquiring this position.

Regarding its driving forces to be one of the permanent member of UNSC, it still needs to be formulated comprehensively due to Japan's relations with the United States (Katsuno, 2012). Still, according to National Security Strategy (2013), Japan perceives its role as a "proactive contributor to peace". In this regard, Japan is committed to "strengthening diplomacy at the United Nations, promoting international peace cooperation, sharing universal values, responding to global development issues, realizing human security, and cooperating with human resource development efforts in developing countries." (Tatsumi, 2016: 13).

Especially for the case of Indonesia as the third category, the reviewed literatures are quite diverse and tend to be based on a realist-constructivist continuum. For instance,

Hutabarat (2014) applies a realist perspective in analyzing Indonesia's involvement in the UNSC under the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). He implies that Indonesia's active participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN-PKOs) is a mere means used by Indonesia to maintain its emergence in international politics that had previously started. As "emerging power" status has been attributed to Indonesia, inconsistency in contribution to the UN might compromise Indonesia's national interest.

Different from the above realist point of view, scholars like Sitamala (2020) concludes that the position of a non-permanent member of UNSC offers an essential opportunity for Indonesia to influence international focus on particular issues, and to strengthen synergies between international level and regional level organizations. Norlyanti (2018) also assumes that Indonesia's role in UNSC, especially in the realization of peace for Rohingya and Palestine, is based on the significance of the values of democracy and Islam. More recently, Khoirunnisa and Budiman (2021) concluded that Indonesia is relied on as a non-permanent membership of UNSC for the 2019-2020 due to its adherence to "independent" and "active" foreign policy principles and its good track record in conflict resolution. Even though their ideas are differently provided, these three literatures share a common ground that a position in the UNSC is indispensable and will help states to perform particular norm or agenda setting.

From the last group of literatures that have utilized the approach of FPA, only few academic literatures found that have explicitly made use of FPA approach in analyzing state's behavior in the UNSC. Falchi (2006) tries to utilize a multi-level analysis approach of FPA in explaining different behavior of Italy and Germany in proposing UNSC reform. While Germany tries to claim a permanent seat in the UNSC, Italy stands for a regional representation system. He implies that the combined scrutiny of the possible factors at the international, domestic, and individual level are needed specifically to explain both states' behavior.

More recently, Schuffert (2021) attempts to analyze Germany's agenda of Women, peace, and Security (WPS) during the non-permanent membership in the UNSC for the 2019-2020 period through the lens of what she calls as a "feminist FPA". In general, she tries to analyze the different positioning held by different lower-level actors

(the bureaucratic politics approach) regarding the implementation of WPS agenda and concludes that the political elite has the largest impact on pursuing or excluding the feminist foreign policy agenda. Also, the successful implementation of WPS agenda, for Germany, depends on the adjustment of structures of the institution within the UNSC itself.

Earlier, another study has also analyzed the practice and effectivity of feminist foreign policy of Sweden, which also influences the country when acting as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Rosamond (2020) employs a two-step analysis on the significance of Sweden's state feminism and the norm of gender cosmopolitanism. Regarding the involvement at the UNSC, Swedish feminist foreign policy pursues "gender equality at the center of nearly all of Sweden's foreign policy initiatives, from pushing for more female negotiators in peace talks to supporting international development programs for women and girls" (p. 228).

Based on the above review, existing literatures found have not utilized national role conception of FPA that could be an alternative useful tool to grab a profound, specific, and focused analysis on states' behavior while being part of the UNSC. Moreover, as this topic is about the role or involvement of a middle power like Indonesia in the UNSC, an approach that has focus on the term or concept of "role" is considered significant. It will be discussed later that national role conception, as a cognitive approach of FPA, can provide useful elucidation by bringing together the domestic and international variables to understand or explain how the individual decision-makers of particular state could conceptualize state's role and resort in a certain state's foreign policy behavior.

This model also performs as a "bridge" between divergent driving forces behind states' perceived role in international politics. A more detailed explanation about this approach is discussed within the next section. Tewes (1998) also indicates that national role conception or role theory's usefulness for FPA lies in the "conceptual tools it provides to trace the link between a state's identity, the development of its foreign-policy culture, and the particular policies it pursues on a persistent basis" (p. 118). For the sake of fulfilling the gap in the discipline of IR and of the advancement of FPA as a unique sub-discipline, this thesis tries to utilize cognitive model of national role conception

developed by Marijke Breuning into the case of Indonesia's role in the UNSC within the period of 2019-2020.

2.3. Theoretical Framework: National Role Conception

National Role Conception as a Cognitive Approach of FPA

In political psychology, there is the cognitive approach that is useful to analyze the political behavior of a group or an individual. According to Rapport (2017), this approach embraces what he called as the 'mental activities', which are the observation of different stimuli in an environment; the memorization and recall of information; pattern recognition and problem representation; and complex activities like social judgments, analytic reasoning, and learning. In the context of international relations, cognitive theories of foreign policy focus on how humans and/or small groups take part in decision making processes.

This is in line with one assumed by Hudson & Day (2020), which asserts that state, in this regard, comes to existence only as a shorthand for IR, not as realistic conceptualization, because it consists of different human decision-makers. As it is produced by human decision-makers, foreign policy of a state must be seen as decision emanated from ideas developed or consideration occurred in domestic level. This approach controverts the premise of states as utility maximizers or wholly rational actors in their foreign policy.

Before explaining Breuning's national role conception as a part of cognitive approach of FPA, there are themes that need to be carefully considered. Firstly, regarding rationality, this approach usually presumes that "individuals are procedurally rational, meaning that limited cognitive capacities prevent them from processing information, weighing probabilities, fully specifying available policy options, and learning from events in an optimal manner" (Rapport, 2017:2). Given these constraints, thus, decision-makers perform the best they could to make policies and rarely maximize utilities.

Secondly, according to Festinger (1957), cognitive approach emphasizes that people seek to maintain consistency and avoid arising dissonance when different beliefs conflict with one another. Jervis (1976) also asserts that people tend to follow information

that they expect or they want to see, effectively affirming their pre-existing beliefs and ignoring disparate information.

Based on this theme, it is compatible to say that any decision made by individuals in different countries could not be generalized roughly. Instead, it strongly depends more on their own context and environment, distinct interaction, characteristics, and upheld belief, which apply as their cognitive limitation. These two themes mentioned clarify the assumption of Rapport (2017) that in cognitive approach of FPA, individuals or decision-makers are modeled as “boundedly” rational beings who satisfice and seek to maintain cognitive consistency in the presence of a complex international environment.

In the study of policy analysis, including FPA, “satisfice” is a concept proposed by an economist named Herbert Simon (1916-2001) when he introduced the theory of bounded rationality. It came from “satisfy” and “suffice”, which emphasizes that:

“Individuals do not seek to maximize their benefit from a particular course of action (since they cannot assimilate and digest all the information that would be needed to do such a thing). Not only can they not get access to all the information required, but even if they could, their minds would be unable to process it properly. The human mind necessarily restricts itself. It is, as Simon put it, bounded by ‘cognitive limits’. Hence, people seek something that is “good enough”, something that is satisfactory.” (The Economist, 2009).

In the context of the study of policy analysis while analyzing decision-makers, it basically focuses on decision-makers’ pragmatic effort when faced with several tasks. This is because aiming for the optimal solution may require an unnecessary expenditure of time, energy and resources.

As a part of social science, IR, as well as FPA as its sub-discipline, shares common understanding about how actors behave towards their surroundings in particular settings. In contemporary IR, it is widely argued that the most significant actors in international relations are nation-states, even though non-state actors have taken their places in certain aspects of international social phenomena. However, as both states and non-states actors consist of human(s) taking action, it is reasonable to begin the assumption that state is not a “black-box” in which domestic contention and politics are irrelevant, but rather social entity that is composed of human decision-makers.

National role conception as an FPA theory that is used in this thesis might seem having similarity with constructivist assumption, especially with regard to the use of the concept of identity. But in general, the basic difference between the fundamental standing of FPA and Constructivism is relatively noticeable. One study argues that “constructivist analysis focuses on broader social structural contexts and macro-levels, while FPA is mostly concerned with micro-levels, investigating individual and policy-making learning and psychological bias” (Behraves, 2011, p. 1). In between the two, national role conception has ability to provide cross levels of analysis to link agent with the structure as this, according to Thies (2009), is regarded as one of the significant advantages national role conception.

Before discussing Breuning’s national role conception as it is used as an analytical tool in this thesis, national role conception was first adopted to the foreign policy literature after the writing of Kalevi J. Holsti in 1970. To begin with, Thies assumes that the definition of role itself referred to “a social position(s), as well as a socially recognized category of actors, that is constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group” (in Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 2011, p. 8). In the context of foreign policy, Holsti (1970, p. 245) defined national role conception as:

“the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment”

In accordance with this definition, “ego” (or sometimes “self”) refers to the role conception decision-makers have of their state, whereas “alter” defines the role expectation or prescription that others have regarding the appropriate role enactment (or foreign policy behavior) of the state.

Holsti (1970) also highlights that in foreign policy, states tend to neglect the role expectation or prescription from others because in a situation where state is faced with a dilemma between its national interests and international norms, the national interests normally take precedence over international norms. International norms are considered important only when they are in line with states’ fundamental interests.

At the time that the theory was coined by Holsti, which was during the Cold War era, Holsti found at least 17 conceptions of national roles that can be categorized into role typologies based on the active-passive continuum. Holsti's 17 national role conceptions are as follows:

- a. *Bastion of revolution-liberator*: a role responsible to provide material and moral support for revolutionary or independence movements in other countries.
- b. *Regional leader*: a role that refers to a specific task in relation to other countries that are part of a particular region or subsystem.
- c. *Regional protector*: a role of having a special responsibility to provide protection for a particular area or issue area.
- d. *Active-independent*: a role emphasizing independence, self-determination, mediation function, and active behavior to expand diplomatic relations.
- e. *Liberation supporter*: a role that refers to efforts to support the independence of another country.
- f. *Anti-imperialist agent*: a role that identifies oneself as an "agent" that stands against imperialism.
- g. *Defender of the faith*: a role that views the goals and commitments to defend a certain value system.
- h. *Mediator-integrator*: a role of being capable or responsible for fulfilling and carrying out a special duty to reconcile conflicts between states or other groups of states.
- i. *Regional-subsystem collaborator*: a role that is committed in long term to build a wider community between countries or to form a cross-sector subsystem.
- j. *Developer*: a role that denotes a specific duty or obligation to help developing other countries.
- k. *Bridge*: a role that is similar to "mediator-integrator", but often appears in a vague form. The policies derived from it also appear invisible and unclear.
- l. *Faithful ally*: a role that has a special commitment to support the policies performed by allies.

- m. *Independent*: a role focusing on making policy decisions according to its own interests rather than supporting the goals of other countries.
- n. *Example*: a role that emphasizes the importance of promoting its honor or pride coming from a particular policy and gaining influence in the international system.
- o. *Internal development*: a role that focuses on internal development and has little reference to a specific task or function in the international system.
- p. *Isolate*: a role that minimizes any contact with other countries in any aspect of international cooperation.
- q. *Protectee*: a role that does not indicate a particular orientation to the external environment, but rather describes as one protected by other particular state or party.

These role conceptions were found by Holsti through his empirical study, which was based on more than 900 statements and speeches of top decision-makers in more than 70 countries in the period of 1964-1968. However, Holsti also admitted that the conception of national role should not be limited to his typology. This is understandable considering the changing situation of international relations, especially the contemporary international system that is dissimilar from during the Cold War era, in which ideologies and values have a strong influence in shaping role of states. As the phenomenon of contemporary international relations has evolved in certain way, the national role conception has gone through critics and developments, which the conception depends on or is rooted in more specific and relevant variables. Simply put, states' national role conception evolves depending on time or scope, and states could possibly have more than one conception.

Breuning's National Role Conception

Marijke Breuning was one among the first scholars that acquainted the cognitive model of national role conception and also offers the more specific directions or guidelines in utilizing the theory. Breuning's national role conception also has a close connection to cognitive approach of FPA as she argues that decision-makers of state are parts of the social cognitive structure in domestic sphere that can bring their own biases and particular ideas to the making of foreign policy. Through her writing entitled "Role

theory research in international relations: State of the art and blind spots" in 2011, Breuning emphasizes that the potential for developing the concept of the national role lies in domestic variables. This does not necessarily mean to exclude international variables, but the relative significance of both domestic and international variables is something that deserves further investigation.

Based on this consideration, according to Breuning, national role conception "seeks to understand how actors fashion their role in the international system, navigating between domestic ideational sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advantage of the material resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as possible the obstacles imposed by their position in the international structure" (in Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 2011, p. 26). To simplify, decision-makers in Breuning's theorizing, conceptualize the role of their state based on their perception of the country's identity and/or cultural heritage, as well as their awareness of the position and/or possibilities that exist in the international system.

Regarding the concept of identity as one of Breuning's variables of national role conception, it is deemed appropriate to first clarify its limitation as it is a widely used concept. To begin with, it has been expressed by several IR experts which reflects that the presence of identity is inherent in states affairs. Hopf (1998) suggests that "a world without identities would be a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy" (p. 174). More fervently, it is believed that "there is no world politics without identity, no people, no states, no international system" (Burke, 2006, p. 394), and "identity is an inescapable dimension of being. Nobody could be without it" (Campbell, 1992, p. 9).

In accordance with Breuning's theorizing, the position of identity is the same as other ideational factors and material factors. There are several experts who give an indication of how salient identity is as a reference for a state in its international affairs. As an example, Cronin (1999) claims that "identities provide a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other states" (p. 18).

From this claim, it is argued that identity only provides reference, while determining action is another matter, one of which is emphasized here is the perception of decision-makers about the national role conception that will eventually result in some sorts of foreign political

behavior. This is in line with what Hopf (2002) implies when he says that role is a template consisting of externally predetermined dimensions, whereas identity is more amorphous and more deeply psychological than a national role conception (in Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 2011, p. 21). Hopf (2002) also posits that “identity is focused on ‘who we are’, instead of ‘what role we play’” (p. 263). Based on this, identity does not intersect directly with action as it is only assumed as an abstract reference.

In this relatively newborn definition of national role conception, it is asserted that both the ideational and material factors are intertwined with each other. Ideational factors refer to decision-maker’s vision of the state that concludes identity, cultural heritage, and domestic audience, whereas material factors hint at the state’s capability and opportunity. In the process of conceptualizing national role, both factors have strong influence and are weighed depending on a certain context. The operationalization of Breuning’s national role conception could be seen from figure 2.1 below.




Figure 2.3. 1. Breuning's National Role Conception as a Cognitive Approach (Harnisch et al, 2011, p. 26)

On the one hand, ideational factors consisting of identity, cultural heritage, and/or domestic audience are parts of the existing social structure in a country. They are resonated domestically and credible internationally in states’ relationship with one another. On the other hand, material factors which consist of states’ capability and/ or

opportunity to act are also significant in determining the conception of a country's national role.

The second is in line with what Kowert and Legro (1996) have emphasized that “collective understandings do not exist in a material vacuum, but are instead contingent upon the physical capabilities or material characteristics of the state” (p. 491). In defining specific role of a state that is relevant to specific issue area or geographic domain, both the ideational and material factors are taken into decision-makers’ consideration. All these will later result in the role enactment, which is particular foreign policy behavior.

In addition, considering the argument of Rapport discussed regarding cognitive approach of FPA, decision-maker satisfices and seeks to maintain cognitive consistency. Hence, as national role conception is considered as a part of that approach, role taken and foreign policy behavior shown ought to be cognitively consistent, meaning that they are in bounded by some certain cognitive limitations that the decision-makers have and satisficing or pragmatic in nature. This view also relates with Breuning’s statement that national role conception describes the scope of foreign policy behavior that can be imagined and felt by state decision-makers as the appropriate policy to carry out.

2.4. Methodology

By applying Breuning’s cognitive model of national role conception into the case of Indonesia’s role as a non-permanent member of UNSC, this thesis pursues deductive reasoning. This reasoning testifies if the established theory is pertinent to a particular social phenomenon (Hyde, 2000). In order to answer the research question, which is “*how did Indonesian decision-makers perceive Indonesia’s national role as ‘A True Partner for World Peace’ in the UNSC for the 2019-2020 period?*”, the design used in this research is qualitative with the approach of single case study as its strategy.

According to Yin (1994), case study is preferred when “how” or “why” question is being appointed, when there is less opportunity to control the phenomenon that is being investigated, and when the research focus is rather a current phenomenon. Regarding the topic chosen in this thesis, which investigates Indonesia’s role in UNSC within the period 2019-2020, it encompasses all these necessities.

This thesis conducts in-depth investigation that is focused only on the context of the research question. Based on the topic of this thesis, the unit of analysis is the Indonesian decision-makers that were relevant to Indonesia's foreign policy in the UNSC, which is none other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (MoFA of Indonesia).

Moreover, as indicated by Yin (2018), there are, at least, six data sources commonly used to acquire the answer to the research question in a case study, which are documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. Regarding its data collection, this thesis uses various data sources, consisting documents, archival records, and interview. Direct observation and participant-observation are not used due to the limited time and access in making observations. Physical artifact collection is not used because it is not suitable for the case that is being studied.

Breuning also asserts that in the context of using national role conception as theoretical framework or in determining the national role perceived by states' decision-makers, data set consisting of official policy statements, leaders' speeches, historical documents, and so on, are acceptable (in Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 2011). Interviews are conducted to ascertain or to validate the findings. The interview itself is arranged with a related staff working at the MoFA RI. The interviewee is Ms. Rina Setyawati, who is the Head of the Sub-Directorate for International Peace and Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and also was assigned as the Coordinator of the UN Security Council Task Force at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia for the year 2019-2020. With regards to the theoretical framework used, which is national role conception, this thesis' dataset could be seen as below.

Table 2.4. 1. Datasets Based on Variables

No	Variables of Breuning's National Role Conception	Indicator	Datasets
1	Ideational Factors as the first independent variable	- Narratives/ speeches/ statements/ about the identity and/or cultural heritage that are resonated domestically. - The doctrines underlying the role of the state in relation to the relevant	- Decision-makers' speeches. - State's national laws. - Online articles/ media. - Opinions of the experts.

		foreign policy that has resonated domestically.	- White books or official published reports related to states' identity and foreign policy principles. - Interview
2	Material Factors as the second independent variable	- The country's own capability to support an active role and good track record in international politics. - Opportunity to act, which is related to the nation's track record and position available in the international structure.	- Asia Power Index 2019, an official published report on state's commitment in performing its active role. - Online articles/ media. - Interview
3	National Role Conception as a dependent variable	- Decision-maker's perception of the national role conception - The implementation of the national role conception	- Decision-makers' speeches. - White books or official published reports related to perceived national role conception - Online articles/ media - Interview

This dataset is processed using Yin's four data collection principles in the case study method. The first principle is using multiple data sources. The second is tabulating the data sources. The third is ensuring the data sources collected are related to the research question. The fourth is ensuring the validity.

Regarding the strategy of analysis, the study case of this thesis is based on a specific theoretical proposition, which makes reference to the assumption of Breuning's national role conception. Therefore, all the variables or dataset written above will be analyzed thoroughly to provide compatibility between the investigated phenomenon and the proposition of Breuning's national role conception has sought to account. Yin (2018) refers to this strategy as "explanation building". In explanation building, explanation about the investigated case is built with Beuning's theoretical proposition. The explanation is then being re-examined and all the data found will be compared repeatedly in order to strengthen the explanation while pursuing consistent findings.

CHAPTER THREE

IDEATIONAL FACTOR OF INDONESIA'S ROLE CONCEPTION AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF UNSC IN 2019-2020

This chapter examines what appear to be the most suitable ideational factors that help shaping national role conception of Indonesia. Revisiting the aspects fashioning Breunig's national role conception, ideational and material factors that are interlinked with each other are perceived by decision-maker(s), as well as the role conception, before a particular foreign policy behavior is enacted. This chapter is divided into three sections.

The first section explains some prominent identities perceived by the Indonesian decision-maker(s) under the current presidential term. The second one talks about the cultural heritage of Indonesia's foreign policy that has been nurtured since the independence day. The last section includes a discussion about Indonesia's democracy and constitution that appear to make every decision made by government resonates domestically, as well as the influence of social media.

3.1. "Emerging Economy, Biggest Moslem Population, and Democracy": The Pertinent Identities

During the 2019-2020 leadership period, in which Indonesia was elected as a non-permanent member at the UNSC, Indonesia was led by President Joko Widodo (also known as President Jokowi). Like his predecessors, President Jokowi's administration in foreign politics perceives some prominent identities. He also still adheres to some notable ideas or guidelines that have been upheld by his predecessors since the period that Indonesia gained its independence in 1945. Therefore, it can be argued that the difference in the practice of foreign policy of Indonesian leaders lies only in how each leader perceives the meaning of these ideas.

As for the purpose of this thesis, there are various identities related with Indonesian foreign policies in general, such as Indonesia as the biggest Moslem population, Indonesia as

an archipelagic country, Indonesia as a maritime country, and Indonesia as a democratic country, Indonesia as the ASEAN leader, and so on. Ashizawa (2008) defines the concept of identity as something that is conceptualized by individuals involved in foreign policy making about what their country represents. He also adds that “identity of states could be observed and identified through close examination of interviews and writings of individuals involved in policymaking, both directly and indirectly, as well as relevant official documents” (p. 576).

Regarding Indonesia’s perceived identities for the purpose of this thesis, it appears that there were some pertinent identities which were also echoed by Indonesia under the President Jokowi’s administration. They were not something that just appeared in the era of Jokowi’s presidency, but have been embedded until now and have their traceable origins. At the Asian-African Summit 2015 in Jakarta, President Jokowi portrayed at least three identities that Indonesia held to be elected as a non-permanent member of UNSC for the 2019-2020 period. He declared that:

“Indonesia as a new emerging economic force, as a country with the largest Moslem population on earth, and as the third largest democracy, stands ready to play a global role as a positive force for peace and prosperity. Indonesia is ready to cooperate with all parties to fulfill that noble goal.” (MoFA of Indonesia, 2017a).

Highlighting Ashizawa’s concept of identity and quotation from Hopf as mentioned before, these identities should be ones that are consciously perceived and utilized by Indonesian decision-makers, which will later become a reference or consideration for the national role conception and its relations with other states. Therefore, the three identities mentioned must be examined carefully to ensure their relevance to Indonesia’s national role conception in the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020.

Indonesia as an Emerging Economy


To begin with, the first uncovered identity is Indonesia as an emerging economic force, which is related with its status among other countries in terms of economy. Although a particular status is not valued equally by different countries, it is reasonable to say that the identity of a country as an emerging economic power on the international scene has to do with the degree to which that country has ambition to pursue that identity or to maintain it. More importantly, a recognized identity such as emerging economic power can provide several privileges to the state to play a certain role and a better maneuver in its foreign policy.

In the late 2009, the term CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa) was coined by an economist named Robert Ward, as the 5 emerging economies and global potential markets. According to Yi, Qi, & Wu (2012), these countries were favored due to their dynamic and diverse economy, young growing population, and so on. They were expected to be the new generation of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), a group of major and fastest growing economies of the world.

Indonesia is also known economically as “the largest economy” in Southeast Asia, a member of the Group of Twenty (G-20), and the world’s 10th largest economy in the aspect of purchasing power parity. Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, moreover, Indonesia has successfully reduced its poverty rate by more than half and was able to reach upper middle income status (World Bank, 2022).

But despite the fact that Indonesia has been imaged as an emerging economy, there have been several considerable challenges that remain for Indonesia’s domestic economic development, especially while surviving the COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2021, it was reported that Indonesia’s economy experienced a full-year economic recession for the first time after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, which its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell 2.07 percent (Aljazeera, 2021). As retrieved from Financial Times (2020), the sagging Indonesia’s GDP growth since 1998 until the forecasted increase in 2021 and 2022 could be seen from the bar chart below.

Chart 3.1. 1. Indonesia's First Economic Downturn in Two Decades Measured by GDP According to the World Bank (Financial Times, 2020)



But this should not be overemphasized considering that the COVID-19 pandemic has inflicted a global negative impact, causing survival challenges in various aspects of development to most of developing countries. Compared to other countries within the region, Indonesia is expected to achieve a GDP growth rate of 4.5 percent which places it in the top four Southeast Asian countries that are able to withstand the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 (Asian Development Bank, n.d.). Another major challenge is rather political, in which until the end of 2020 and more recently, Indonesia has been facing an unresolved and rooted corruption problem. Indonesia was ranked 102 out of the 180 most corrupt countries in the world in 2020 (Transparency, 2021).

Regardless of the challenges faced, economic development has been regarded prominent especially under the administration of President Jokowi. After winning the presidential election in 2019, President Jokowi confidently declared the plan for setting the target for Indonesia to become one of the top five economies in the world by 2045 (Negara, 2020). It could be contended that the Indonesian decision-makers of this era strongly comprehend the importance of economic diplomacy, thus, they are cognizant of Indonesia's identity as an emerging global economy. President Jokowi himself has also instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to include economic diplomacy as a priority until the end of his term in 2024 (Karim, 2020). This includes an effort to strengthen Indonesia's economic cooperation at all levels.

The key and the most visible policy implemented appears to be the trade liberalization, which also relates to the reason of why Indonesia pushes economic diplomacy as an important agenda. According to Karim (2020), President Jokowi's domestic policy agenda regarding the economic diplomacy from the beginning of his administration in 2014 has focused on

reforming the bureaucracy. Although it can be argued that President Jokowi's economy-centric foreign policy project has caused Indonesia to be less-active in international engagements in various global issues if compared to his predecessor, this reformation has been successful in establishing new markets in Indonesia and alluring foreign investments. Another reason for pushing economic diplomacy has been the global economic uncertainty heightened by the on-going trade war between the United States and China.

Indonesia as the Largest Moslem Population in the World

The second identity that the decision-makers of Indonesia under President Jokowi's administration have perceived is Indonesia as the largest Moslem population in the world. Even if identity as a country holding the largest Moslems is an undeniable fact, however, whether this identity is considered important or not in determining political action and how then this identity is perceived by the Indonesian decision-makers is something worth exploring further.

Self-claiming itself as a largest "moderate Moslem country", Indonesia defines its brand of Islam in foreign policy as "a force for peace, tolerance and harmony". This brand is articulated as "a moderating voice between the Moslem world and others, and within the Moslem world itself" (Sukma, 2011). It is important to note that incorporating this brand of Islam into foreign policy is neither an exaggeration nor a claim that Indonesia should have foreign politics on the basis of one particular religion.

Although Indonesia is without a doubt a country owning the largest Moslem population in the world, it could be said that moderate Islam of Indonesia was first entered as substance of Indonesia's foreign policy since the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyoho (period of 2004-2014) stated that "Indonesia is a country where democracy, Islam, and modernity go hand in hand" (Nugraha, 2012, p. 13). In other world, the brand of moderate Islam perceived by Indonesian decision-makers is a dynamic Islam, in the sense that it is able to adapt to democracy and even to modernity.

The recognition of this brand of moderate Islam has never gone smoothly without domestic challenge. Sukma (2011) notes that a delicate balancing act is required for the integration of Islamic values into Indonesia's foreign policy, as the expectations of some segments of the Moslem community demand that Indonesia identify itself as part of the Arab-

Moslem world. However, Indonesia seems to have its own unique perspective of moderate Islam as mentioned above, thus, the influence of the growing Moslem community on foreign policy should not be exaggerated. Simply put, it seems that Indonesia will not be able to become an Islamic country like those in the Middle East region, at least in the next few years due to the high multicultural hue. More importantly, Indonesia still consciously respects the importance of values that apply internationally such as human rights, international law, and the principle of non-intervention.

If one looks more deeply into how Indonesia's moderate Islam was born as an identity of Indonesia, it could be found that the public discourse of moderate Islam became popular subsequent to the growth of radical Islam and the rise of terrorist groups (Nugraha, 2012). Even though there might be a debate on what or who is qualified to be defined as "moderate", it has been commonly acknowledged that moderate Islam has been characterized by tolerant, modern, progressive, pro-democratic, close to secular, and anti-violence tenets in both regional practice and political life (Cohen, 2005). In the case of Indonesia's moderate Islam as an identity, it has been strongly related to the relationship between religion and politics.

There have been two most important Islamic institutions in Indonesia that have significant role which public has been relied upon since before Indonesia gained independence in 1945. The first is Muhammadiyah, established in 1912 as a reformist-modernist Islamic institution and the second is Nahdlatul Ulama that was founded in 1926 as the conservative one. Since Indonesia is a plural, multicultural, and multi-religion country, the challenge for dominant Islamic communities in Indonesia has been how to place Islam into a proper position within state's structure (Nugraha, 2012). Yet, *Pancasila* (five foundations of Indonesia) which includes "the belief in one God" was chosen after independence to become the fundamentals of Indonesia as a settlement between the nationalist and Islamists. Until now, *Pancasila* itself remains legitimate national ideology, still has been recognized and supported by the most elements of communities in Indonesia including Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.

Indonesia as the Third Largest Democracy

The third identity is the third largest democracy. Although democracy was recognized as the national system since the day of independence in 1945, the newly enhanced democratic system in Indonesia was arguably commenced in 1998 after a massive demonstration brought down the authoritarian government of ex-president Soeharto. This, according to USINDO

(n.d.), has continued to be strengthened by several determinant factors, such as democratic elections, rising influence of regional self-governance, and the peaceful transition of power in 2004. Even for the election in 2019, which was assumed as the fiercest election the nation has ever witnessed, it has been sealed by a symbolic reconciliation between the winner and the loser not long after the election ended (Bayuni, 2019).

However, besides Indonesia's apparent success in democracy, there have been harsh criticisms if Indonesia's democracy is evaluated from the academic point of view. Indonesia's less democratic process to the sign that Indonesia is on the verge of returning to authoritarianism is a part of the points raised in the academic debate about the developing democracy in Indonesia. Like other countries that claim and decide to have a democratic system, development and improvement will always be there for Indonesia. Bayuni (2019) points out that it is wrong to say that Indonesia's democracy is stagnating or retreating because Indonesia's democracy has always been "a case of two steps forward and one step backward".

Despite the criticism, relating to the public enthusiasm and confidence towards democracy in Indonesia, it could be argued that democracy is still widely reckoned by the majority of Indonesian citizens a preferred system to be implemented. This can be indicated by the high level of public participation in the 2019 presidential election, marking a temporary stop to the trend of truancy over the past elections. According to Jakarta Globe (2019), it was reported that in 2019 election, there were over 154 million voters registered and the participation rate for the domestic elections reached 80 percent on the report of a survey agency named Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting (SMRC).

Regarding the intercourse between foreign policy and the democratic system which is more domestic in nature, Sukma (2011) emphasizes that democracy inevitably plays a central role in Indonesia's foreign policy. Domestic support for values that are upheld under the umbrella of a democratic system is very capable of influencing Indonesia's foreign policy in front of other countries. Examples for this are domestic encouragement through its parliamentarians that have set Indonesia's posture towards the ASEAN Charter, the preservation of human rights in the region, and investigation on crimes against humanity in Myanmar.

Like the two identities discussed above, the identity as a democratic country is also perceived by Indonesian decision-makers as an ideational factor that potentially influences

Indonesia's foreign policy. However, this thesis does not assume that identity could directly determine action, instead, it is only one of the ideational factors that will be taken into account as forming Indonesia's national role conception and foreign policy along with material factors that will be discussed later. Other relevant ideational factors will be discussed in the next two sections.

3.2. Independent and Active Principles: Pragmatic Cultural Heritage

It is widely known among IR scholars that one of the most prominent disapprovals against the most famous theory of IR, which is Realism, has been it being negligent to the importance of domestic values, ideas, or principles behind a country's foreign policy. Notwithstanding the foundation of Neoclassical Realism as a branch of realist multilevel way of thinking that has been focused on analyzing foreign policy, Neoclassical Realism still holds the structural realist tradition that assumes that the major driving force of any states' behavior is only the international system. In fact, a shift in a particular country's foreign policy implementation does occur, and this might depend on a change in the era of the presidency or merely a changing perception of the same decision-maker(s). Therefore, in this section, the principles of "independent" and "active" are scrutinized to understand how they together could have impact on the practice of Indonesian foreign policy.

The Context of Independent and Active Principles of Indonesian Foreign Policy

According to Sukma (1995), Indonesian foreign policy should be regarded as "a product of continuous historical consciousness", which marches along a historical continuum toward its ideal form. In the context of Indonesia, "independent" and "active" are the principium or foundation of Indonesian foreign policy, and they have gone through the perceptions of Indonesian decision-makers until now. The concept of it was first coined by the first Vice President of Indonesia, namely Mohammad Hatta through his speech in 1948.

Considering the bipolar world system at that time and a self-reliant Indonesia in striving for independence, the first Indonesian Vice President Hatta laid out the outline of definition of the "independent" and "active" foreign policy of Indonesia:

The [foreign] policy of the Republic of Indonesia is not one of neutrality, because it is not constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own path through the various

international problems. It terms this policy 'independent', and further characterizes it by describing independent and 'active'. By active is meant the effort to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by two blocs, through endeavors supported if possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations (Hatta, 1954, p. 444).

It has been further discovered that Hatta through his speeches explained that "independent" and "active" foreign policy consisted of four main premises. The first premise says that the foreign policy implementation must be based on an ideological basis. This is related to the national ideology called *Pancasila* (the five moral principles of Indonesia). These are: the belief in the one supreme God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives; and social justice for all Indonesians (Sukma, 1995).

The second premise states that foreign policy must be aimed at safeguarding the national interest as stated in the Constitution. This is especially in accordance with the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution which states the establishment of an Indonesian government that "protects the entire Indonesian nation and the entire homeland of Indonesia; promotes public welfare and educates the nation's life; and participates in carrying out world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice".

The third premise proposes that pursuing national interests would be better served through independent policies. Indonesia's national interests are written above in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. They are, in short, "to protect the citizens as well as the entire homeland of Indonesia, to promote public welfare, and to participate in carrying world order". The fourth premise utters that Indonesia's foreign policy must be carried out pragmatically, meaning that it must be resolved based on its own interests and must be carried out in accordance with the situation and facts at hand. What is meant by "situations and facts at hand" is the identification of Indonesia's place and position within the international system (Sukma, 1995).

As noted that contemporary Indonesia's foreign policy is "a product" of continuous historical consciousness, so is the definition of the principles behind it. Regarding the independent and active principles, Laws of the Republic of Indonesia Number 37 of 1999 concerning on Foreign Relations stipulates that "independent foreign policy is a foreign policy which is not essentially a neutral policy, but a foreign policy that is free to determine

attitudes and policies towards international problems and does not bind itself a priori to one world power”. While active foreign policy is “a foreign policy that contributes, both in the form of thoughts and active participation in resolving conflicts, disputes and other world problems for the realization of world order based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice” (People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017).

However, although the concept of “independent” and “active” foreign policy has been defined in such a way, it is important to remember that the interpretations as well as the practices of Indonesian leaders toward these principles have been at variance, which strongly depends on the situation at hand, that is, Indonesia’s place and position in the international system. The fourth premise mentioned above have actually shed some light on this. It would be too naive to say that the practices of a country's foreign policy will be fixated only on written norms or principles.

In other words, the perception of policy makers towards the principles, values, or norms, is an important variable in the study of foreign policy analysis. This is not to say that these principles are not strong enough to become a consistent corridor for Indonesia's foreign policy, but to emphasize that the context of space and time influences the perception towards a certain principle. The slightly differences in the application of these principles among Indonesian presidents will be briefly explained hereafter.

The Independent and Active Principles under the First President Soekarno and an Ambition of a New Sovereign Country

The period of early 1950s until the late 1990s was the era in which Indonesia’s foreign policy was characterized as pragmatist in safeguarding national interest and globalist in terms of playing its role. As a relatively recently independent country, until 1959, Indonesia mainly focused on safeguarding national independence, sovereignty, and security; maintaining internal consolidation; and safeguarding economic interests. These goals then had an impact on the color of Indonesia's passive-pragmatic foreign policy, which wants to show the world that Indonesia's position remains independent, especially in the context of its posture towards the Cold War. This system was called Liberal Democracy (Sukma, 1995). Although it was considered as passive, this era of Liberal Democracy had its contribution in the initiation of Bandung Conference (also known as the Asia-Africa Conference) in 1955, a milestone of the

establishment of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which still exists until today as an international forum of world's developing countries.

In the late 1959, a change occurred in the tone of Indonesian pragmatism which became "more active" than it had been in the previous years as the first President of Indonesia, Soekarno, decided to abandon his obsolete system of Liberal Democracy and began to implement a new system called Guided Democracy. According to Sukma (1995), President Soekarno recognized that international imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism were enemies to be eradicated. Although it looks ambitious, this change happened because Indonesia at that time was considered "not yet independent" and needed a revolution. In consequence, Indonesia became more globalist in its foreign policy.

This revolution was to form a unitary state since a part of Indonesia, namely West Irian, at that time was still controlled by the Dutch; and to create a just and more prosperous society. Soekarno believed that one important way to achieve this revolution was through the radicalization of Indonesia's foreign policy (Sukma, 1995). With the radical change in Indonesia's foreign policy, Indonesia has achieved some significant goals in light of anti-colonialism, especially the establishment of a new bloc of emerging countries called the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) that was envisioned to reshape the international order amid the Cold War. The issue of whether the emergence of NEFOS as a new bloc reflected the principle of independent foreign policy or not has been a subject to academic debate. However, the difference in arguments against this need not be exaggerated because this only reflects the dynamics in the perception of decision-maker towards the same set of principles or values.

The Independent and Active Principles under the Second President Soeharto and a Pursuit of Economy

Under the era of the next President (or the second President) of Indonesia, named Soeharto (from 1967 until 1998), the characteristics of the application of the independent and active principles changed quite significantly as it was on the contrary to what Soekarno had done under the system of Guided Democracy. This new system called New Order came across two phases in order to pursue the ideal form of "independent" and "active" foreign policy of Indonesia (Sukma, 1995). These stages were reconceptualization of foreign policy on the basis of building internal strength and forward movement to show the "true" form of

the principles. Under this New Order system, it was also the first time in Indonesia's history that the country was led under a military man and an authoritarian leadership. This New Order system believed that internal strength was a necessity to perform an "independent" and "active" foreign policy.

The foreign policy changes which was quite significant were reflected in the abandonment of NEFOS and the closer connection with the West. But this was not based on globalist goal nor idealist excitement, but the pursuance of goals-centered foreign policy on the needs for national security, stability, and economic development (Anwar, 2014). In short, this was done mainly to secure foreign aid and to serve Indonesia's economic interest. This color of foreign policy was conceptualized by the decision-makers as "concentric circles", in which the priorities of Indonesia's foreign policy were based on geographic proximity.

According to Anwar (2014), the inner circle encompassed the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy, the second circle covered major countries in East Asia, and the third circle was the Asia Pacific region. Relations between Indonesia and the West or any region beyond these circles were selective, depending on what sort of economic benefits the other countries could offer. Economy, which could preserve security and stability, caused decision-makers in the era of President Soeharto to place more importance on close relations with the West and to leave NEFOS which was no longer relevant to the convenient economic needs.

Interestingly, the foreign policy under this New Order system was still considered to follow the principles of "independent" and "active", despite the criticism of Indonesia being closer to the Western bloc (Sukma. 1995). The government believed that Hatta's fourth premise, namely pragmatism, was the most important premise to be upheld at that time. As mentioned above, being pragmatic means that Indonesia's foreign policy must be resolved based on its own national interests and must be carried out in accordance with the situation and facts at hand. Under New Order system, economic development was the most prominent of Indonesia's national interest.

Later in 1980s, which was still under the New Order System, Indonesia surprisingly became confident and more assertive in playing a bolder role in its external affairs. According to Sukma (1995), the first main point of reference was the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Conference which was held in 1955 as a form of Indonesia's enthusiasm to be able to

contribute actively to the international politics. Not until the next 5 years, Indonesia tried to nominate itself as the chairman of NAM in 1989 even though it was defeated by Nicaragua. As one of the founding fathers of NAM, this defeat did not prevent Indonesia from bidding for the chairmanship as Indonesia would later be elected as the chairman of NAM for 1992-1995 term.

The second was the restoration of diplomatic relations with China in 1990 that had previously been stalled since 1967. According to Sukma (1995), the termination of relations with China in the past was due to the avoidance of Chinese interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Therefore, reconnecting with China showed Indonesia's confidence in handling a situation that was once avoided and indicated Indonesia's readiness to deal with a major power.

The third was Indonesia's assertiveness in the scope of regional affairs when Indonesia began to pay more attention to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. In November 1994, Indonesia hosted the 2nd APEC Leaders' Meeting and insisted to forward proposals for the creation of the APEC Free Trade Area which was targeted to be inaugurated in 2020. This proves that Indonesia had growing desire to perform a greater role in every level of international affairs.

As in the previous presidential period, Indonesia under Soeharto's presidency again showed a clear pattern of change to become more energetic in its foreign policy behavior. However, as domestic condition became increasingly unstable and public distrust of the government at that time was high due to the severe domestic and regional economic crisis, massive demonstration broke out to demand President Soeharto to step down from the seat of government.

After President Soeharto resigned from his leadership due to the turmoil happened in May 1998, Indonesia entered a new phase of its foreign policy colored by democratization. Since then until 2021, Indonesia has undergone its various foreign policies under a relatively progressive democratic system with five different leaders. Similar to their predecessors, the principles of "independent" and "active" have still been coloring the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policies despite the difference of the individuals.

The Independent and Active Principles under the Third President Habibie and the Transition of Democracy

The end of authoritarian leadership after the era of President Soeharto provided his successor both opportunities and restrictions in foreign policies. Huntington (1991) asserts that there are at least three stages in any democratization process: the termination of authoritarian regime, the insertion of a democratic regime, and the consolidation of democratic regime. On the one hand, since the fall of President Soeharto, Indonesia under the third President of Indonesia named Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, has at least passed through two stages of what Huntington mentioned above, even though his presidential term did not reach two years. On the other hand, in the era of President Habibie, Indonesia experienced a transformation type of democratic transition since President Habibie himself was an aircraft engineer and the vice president during Soeharto's regime. With the lack of political legitimacy, this era took power while it had to make promises of democratization at the same time (He, 2007).

Mulyana (2018) notes that President Habibie's presidency faced a series of difficult international and domestic matters since the beginning. Although there were several issues where domestic and international affairs were intertwined such as the issue of human rights, improving domestic reformation seemed to be the most attention for the decision-makers at that time. The economic crisis left over from the previous era, the management of the transition of the political system, and the restoration of public security were the domestic issues that caused foreign policy to rank second to the government's focus.

Even if not proactive, this does not imply that the principles of "independent" and "active" were removed from Indonesia's foreign policy. It was rather a low-profile and inward-looking type of foreign policies that were implemented. The color of foreign policies at that time was almost the same as in the early days of President Soeharto's leadership, which every policy was directed based on the reformation and economic development, and was carried out in accordance with the domestic situation. The focus on economy was reflected in the establishment of a close relation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and maintaining closer connection with the West to secure foreign aid (Yani, 2009).

Furthermore, it should be underlined that as Indonesia began to build a robust democratic system, domestic reformation process that took place in Indonesia did not escape

international scrutiny. One of the challenges was how internationally recognized democratic values could be applied to the domestic sphere. In addition to economic problems, for the case of Indonesia, the preservation of human rights in domestic realm was also the focus of decision-makers under President Habibie's administration. This does not seem surprising because in order to gain trust from the West and spark international aid from the IMF, human rights values and their implementation are among the requirements that must be met by democracies including Indonesia.

As the result of inseparable domestic and foreign policies, laying a solid foundation for strong human rights diplomacy was an important contribution of the presidency in that era. Mulyana (2018) notes that through this diplomacy, Indonesia would not only gain a great capacity in promoting and protecting human rights at home, but also open the door to become a key player in global human rights diplomacy. During his brief tenure, domestically, President Habibie managed to dismantle the authoritarian regime, release political prisoners, remove press restriction, and make the state Bank called “Bank Indonesia” an independent body (USINDO Brief, 2008).

However, the lack of political figure of President Habibie who was also not strong compared to his predecessors and the rapid pace of transition from the dictatorship were some of the reasons why some policies implemented did not receive full support from domestic population. For instance, one of the controversial policy implemented was his approval of referendum for the people East Timor in 1999, which ended in a vote for independence and released a tide of violence (Reuters, 2019). In addition, due to the legacy of the dire economic conditions of its predecessors, inflation and unemployment surged at home. Thus, as the presidential election drew near in 1999, support for Habibie fell below 10 percent and he withdrew from the candidacy (Manby, 2019).

The Independent and Active Principles under the Fourth President Wahid and a More Globalist Indonesia

The next presidential era in Indonesia was under the leadership of a well-known religious figure named President Abdurrahman Wahid, held between 1999 and 2001 (because of his resignation). Although it was not because of direct general election, Wahid's presidency itself was the product of a free and competitive election implemented by the Parliament (He, 2007). There were not many differences regarding domestic economic and

political outgrowth at this time. It was rather a more challenging era considering the continuing process of transition to civic democracy. According to Yani (2009), Indonesia under President Wahid was faced with a number of domestic considerable challenges; such as the potential territorial disintegration, a widespread mass violence and the fragile law and order, the perpetual economic crisis as well as national disability to consolidate democracy and to attain a good governance.

Regarding its foreign policy practice from one point of view, Anwar (2014) states that Indonesia at that time followed “ecumenical” foreign policy with a dominant trend towards globalism. This was indicated by various bilateral and multilateral initiatives. More interestingly, President Wahid even took the time to visit contradicting countries consecutively, such as Cuba shortly after visiting the United States. From another point of view, visiting countries extensively without a blueprint outlining the primary objectives of Indonesian foreign policy towards particular countries or international organizations reflected a lack of coherence and clear focus of foreign policy. Yani (2009) asserts that Indonesia’s orientation was high profile but erratic under the era of President Wahid.

It was also argued by He (2007) that President Wahid’s focus in foreign policy was characterized by his “looking towards Asia” rather than a globalist foreign policy. Unlike the first Indonesian president, Soekarno, that expressed a loud ambition and assertiveness, President Wahid’s foreign policy was rather an external balancing policy. Within the first 4 months of presidency, President Wahid chose to visit China followed by other 26 countries in the Asia-Pacific. This focus on Asia was initiated because of three main reasons.

Firstly, enhancing relationships among Indonesia, India, China, Japan, and Singapore might oppose Western influence and lessen dependency upon the West. This could also gain domestic support as his predecessors favored the West. Secondly, the separation of East Timor in his precursor’s era was feared that it might lead to further national disintegration and international intervention. Indonesia hoped that close relations with developing countries within Asia-Pacific that were facing the similar situation could provide international support for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thirdly, due to the ongoing economic crisis at that time, various international visits were expected to encourage financial aid and investment in Indonesia.

If the point of views mentioned above are combined and a common thread is drawn, it could be seen that the “independent” and “active” principles of Indonesian foreign policy were painted under the era of President Wahid even though in a relatively brief period of presidency. External balancing maneuvers did reflect independency in carrying out foreign policy, while actively visiting countries were excoriated as an ineffective and misdirected foreign policy. This concept of “ecumenical” foreign policy was abandoned and was irrelevant later after President Wahid stepped down from the government (Anwar, 2014).

Given the precarious condition at home, it is not surprising that domestic economic and political development were the strongest stimulus for Indonesia’s foreign policy. Thus, there were not many foreign policy maneuvers that could be carried out at this time, as well as in the previous period under the leadership of President Habibie. The characteristics of the application of independent and active principles in the President Wahid era did not change much as it was pragmatic in the sense that they were limited to seeking support for the development of the domestic political and economic ecosystem, even though President Wahid’s administration seemed more energetic than Habibie’s.

The Independent and Active Principles under the Fifth President Soekarnoputri and the More Comprehensive Approach of Indonesian Foreign Policy

After President Wahid resigned in 2001 due to declining domestic supports triggered by several significant political failures, Indonesia's leadership for the next three years was completed by its vice president named President Megawati Soekarnoputri, a female politician and the daughter of Indonesia's first President, Sukarno. Many observers argue that the main causes of Wahid’s downfall were mismanagement and abandonment of the fragile political coalition; despite the allegations of corruption and cronyism, failure to carry out economic reforms, and inappropriate handling of deteriorating domestic security (He, 2007). Unlike ex-President Habibie and Wahid, President Megawati enjoyed some leverages because of her dominating party in the Parliament, her father’s legacy who was the first president of Indonesia, and her arguably sufficient leadership skills.

He (2007) asserts that in terms of foreign policy practices, President Soekarnoputri was more determined compared to his predecessor’s balancing policy. Yani (2009) also emphasizes that when President Soekarnoputri shouldered presidency in 2001, signal of respect and credibility began to appear gradually. On the one hand, domestic concerns such

as economic recovery, maintenance of unity, and escorting the transition to an “appropriate” democratic and reformed system were the priorities for President Soekarnoputri’s administration. On the other hand, Indonesia was also trying to gain its international stature. Hence, foreign policy initiatives were characterized as “intermestic”, or intermingled between the international and domestic politics.

Especially in the aspect of foreign policy maneuvers, Indonesia under President Soekarnoputri was committed to regain international confidence, aiming for achieving a stronger foreign policy and diplomacy, developing economic cooperation, and engaging in multilevel cooperation. In order to achieve this goal, the maneuvers carried out were aimed at restoring Indonesia’s international stance; improvement of the economy and community welfare; strengthen the unity, stability and integrity of the nation, as well as maintain the sovereignty of the nation; development of bilateral relations, especially with countries that could support economic recovery; and the promotion of cooperation that could help Indonesia build and maintain world peace (Yani, 2009).

But there was also an approach that did not change in President Soekarnoputri’s administration in terms of whom Indonesian foreign policy should be prioritized first. Following the “concentric circle” conceptualized during the ex-President Soeharto’s era, ASEAN remained the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy and bilateral relations with Japan, European countries, and United States bloomed in the light of Indonesia’s national economic and security interest.

Moreover, relationship between Indonesia and United States also became warmer due to the international condemnation of September 11 (9/11) attacks in 2001 (Anwar, 2002). Despite criticism that President Soekarnoputri was too American-centric, the focus on ASEAN appeared to gain a relative importance. The official document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly stated that ASEAN countries were the first priority of the “concentric circle”, while beyond that it depended on what benefits could be obtained.

He (2007) asserts that this “neighbor-first policy” was an internal balancing strategy directed to the strengthening of internal consolidation within a regional framework and to encourage the rise of ASEAN to counter external pressures. It was also assumed that this “neighbor-first policy” was the underlying reason of why Indonesia became energetic in building an economic, social and cultural, and security community at the 2003 ASEAN

Summit. The year of 2003 was the period that Indonesia served as chairman of ASEAN for the third time and was considered an important milestone for ASEAN to become a regional integration. In a wider scope, Indonesia under President Soekarnoputri also revived the spirit of the Bandung Conference 1955 that once established NAM in 1960 with the launching of an Asian-African sub-regional cooperation initiative (Mulyana, 2018).

Based on the foregoing, it could be seen that Indonesia's foreign policy in the era of President Soekarnoputri was keener than in the previous two eras, each of which was relatively brief and unfortunately passed down the unresolved domestic problems. Yani (2009) notes that Indonesia's foreign policy was reformed in this era. Indonesia in this case significantly reviewed, reoriented, and restructured its foreign policy to fulfill the needs at hand. Looking back to the "independent" and "active" as defining principles of Indonesia's foreign policy, I argue that the maneuvers of foreign policy remained pragmatic to achieve the core national interests, especially in the economic and security aspects, but they were more enthusiastic.

The Independent and Active Principles under the Sixth President Yudhoyono and a More Strategic Stance in International Politics

Replacing the era of former President Soekarnoputri, a qualified ex-military officer, a bureaucrat, and a politician named President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) entered the presidency because of his victory in the general election in 2004 and managed to re-conceptualize the strategy of Indonesia's foreign policy in accordance with Indonesia's most prominent national interest at that time. Anwar (2014) states that Indonesia's foreign policy under President Yudhoyono was based on "thousands (later became millions) friends and zero enemies" and the Minister of Foreign Affairs popularized the so-called doctrine of "dynamic equilibrium" that quested for the involvement all the major relevant powers within cooperative frameworks as a basis for the establishment of a more inclusive regionalism, namely ASEAN.

According to Anwar (2014), Indonesia under President Yudhoyono's administration inherited strong sense of nationalism and missionary outlook from the era of the first President Soekarno, which sought to manage, if not transform, its strategic environment. As a result of Indonesia's relations with other countries had gotten closer; and ASEAN as a regional cooperation had been formed and continued to evolve later to a regionalism in 2015,

confrontational character of the first President Soekarno was replaced. It became a desire to carve a bigger role in developing regional order as the cornerstone of foreign policy.

This focus on ASEAN was similar to the “concentric circle” foreign policy during the days of the second President Soeharto. Anwar (2014) put a strong emphasis on this by saying that there was much national time and energy devoted to the realization of the ASEAN Community by 2015. Beyond ASEAN, priority was given to relations within the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea), the East Asia Summit and APEC. In this regard, attention concerning security interests was generally directed to countries that are geographically close to Indonesia, followed by countries outside the region that could indeed provide economic benefits.

This strong emphasis on good neighbor policy of Indonesia did not set aside its core national interest that had taken precedence since the era of second President Soeharto, which was economic interest. Also, persisting sign of third President Wahid’s ‘ecumenical’ foreign policy was reflected as Indonesia under President Yudhoyono set out to befriend with every country. For instance, Indonesia also gave importance to sustaining cooperation with “like-minded countries” like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In more global scope, Indonesia sought to strengthen multilateralism through the World Trade Organization (WTO), G-20, and the UN (Yani, 2009).

A more dynamic and outward-looking foreign policy under President Yudhoyono was predictable because of a variety of aspects that needed to be deal with as the world had become more globalized. According to Yani (2009), in his first speech of foreign policy in 2005, President Yudhoyono highlights that Indonesia at that time had already passed the two reefs (the enmity between the Western and Eastern blocs) and in describing the new challenges that Indonesia faced, he used “navigating the turbulence ocean” as a metaphor. In this respect, the implementation of the principles of independent and active experienced significant changes compared to the priors and was outlined into five grand foreign policy design.

First, Indonesia’s independence and activism needed to be combined with constructive mindset, representing “the ability to turn adversary into friend, and to turn friend into partner”. This mindset was believed to help Indonesia to be a peace-maker, confidence builder, problem solver, and bridge builder. Second, having independent and active foreign

policy confirms that Indonesia would not get involved into any military alliances nor allow any foreign military bases on Indonesia's territory. Third, having independent and active foreign policy means pursuing connectivity into the globalized world, meaning that it compels Indonesia to have an active and healthy engagement with the whole range of actors. Fourth, independent and active foreign policy should represent Indonesia's international identity as the fourth most populous country, the largest democracy, and the largest Moslem population. Fifth, independent and active foreign policy should portray Indonesia's brand of nationalism that is "open, confident, moderate, tolerant, and outward looking" (Yani, 2009).

Despite some major changes in priorities, strategies, and even doctrine, adherence to the principles of "independent" and "active" and key elements of previous foreign policy practices still prevailed. The most obvious thing we could see is the greater flexibility of the implementation of the "independent" and "active" principles was evident under Yudhoyono's presidency. Mulyana (2018) argues that this was because the exercise of Indonesian multilevel diplomacy was bundled with substantive and intellectual leadership combined with the insertion of relevant doctrinal and pragmatic elements during the reign of President Yudhoyono,

The Independent and Active Principles under the Seventh President Jokowi and a Balance between Domestic and International Presence

After Yudhoyono fulfilled his decade of presidency in 2014, President Jokowi carries on presidential chair of Indonesia for two periods from 2014 until 2024. Like ex-President Yudhoyono, President Jokowi has successfully won the general election twice which occurs once in five years. Prior to entering the presidency, President Jokowi, who holds a businessman background, was elected mayor of his hometown from 2005 to 2012 and became governor of Indonesia's capital city in 2012. In the presidential election that took place in 2014, President Jokowi stepped up and triumphed with the support of a coalition led by the largest political party named the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan/ PDI-P).

During his early days of presidency in the first term (2014-2019), President Jokowi once promoted "down to earth diplomacy" or also known as "pro-people diplomacy", by which he declared a more domestic-focused policy, which locates domestic need as center of Indonesia's foreign policy (Andika, 2016). Without a strong political and diplomatic

background, it was presumed that he did not have a tendency to make Indonesia an active player in the international arena, or to continue what had been pursued in foreign policy in the previous era. For instance, Connelly (2014) claims that President Jokowi did not appear to have a strong view of Indonesia's position within international politics and had shown no particular interest in it. Jokowi saw himself not as an international statesman but a merely domestic reformer.

In fact, within the first term of President Jokowi's administration, Indonesia had implemented a fairly active foreign policy through strategic plan created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia in accordance with the President Jokowi's vision and mission. In the Ministry's press release in 2015, Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi highlighted what appeared to be the priorities of 2014-2019 foreign policy in general. They were the maintenance of Indonesia's sovereignty, enhancement of the protection of Indonesian citizens and Indonesian legal institution, and intensifying economic diplomacy (MoFA of Indonesia, 2015). This was not surprising since it was in line with President Jokowi's pro people diplomacy, aiming for securing the needs of "the Indonesian people first and foremost". Some even argues that this was a welcome correction to excessively elitist and internationalist worldview of President Jokowi's predecessor (Parameswaran, 2015).

Marsudi further stated that Indonesia would not reduce its involvement with the international community, but would increase Indonesia's contribution as a middle power for a more democratic, prosperous, secure and stable world. It was also emphasized that Indonesia will continue to uphold the principles of independent and active and the constitutional mandate to continue to play an active role in maintaining world peace and security. ASEAN would also still remain the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. One major thing that was novel than before was the establishment of maritime diplomacy with a doctrine of "Indonesia as a global maritime fulcrum" as part of sovereignty, security, and economic diplomacy, considering that Indonesia's maritime aspects have great potential for national economic development.

The second period of President Jokowi's presidency, which will be taking office from 2019-2024, features five priorities (also known as "4+1 formula") of Indonesia's new foreign policy. They are improving economic diplomacy, citizen protection diplomacy, sovereignty and nationality diplomacy, as well as Indonesia's role in the region and globally. The "plus"

was the improvement of diplomatic infrastructure, which means its human resources, bureaucratic form, and diplomacy digitalization (Djumala, 2020). As in the previous period, Marsudi was again appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia for this second term.

In order to understand the whole picture of Indonesia's current foreign policy, the “4+1 formula”, especially the “4” introduced by Marsudi needs to be further elaborated. According to MoFA of Indonesia (2019), firstly, economic diplomacy focuses on the enhancement of domestic and traditional markets, with further breakthrough in non-traditional market. This is also implemented through trade and investment negotiations, promotion of trade, and integrated investment along with outbound investment encouragement. Secondly, protection diplomacy is addressed to encourage the presence of state in protecting its citizens abroad. This has three main objectives, such as the launch of "one single data" for Indonesian citizens abroad to facilitate protection; the reconstruction of migration governance for safe, orderly and regular migration; and the focus on preventive actions for crises through education and community empowerment.

Thirdly, diplomacy of sovereignty and nationality are considered as a non-negotiable since it is related to the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. As a consequence, the settlement of national borders is imperative and conducted by intensifying negotiations. Fourthly, Indonesia's role regionally and globally needs to be increased in the form of Indonesia's contribution and leadership in various forums, including in the non-permanent membership of the UNSC.

Something that is relatively new in this second term of Jokowi's presidency compared to his first period, is the special attention that has entered as one of foreign policy priorities, which is the importance of Indonesia's role in the international arena. However, this should not need to be exaggerated, such as saying that Indonesia's foreign policy has turned globalist or assertive. This change is only a manifestation of the pragmatic character of Indonesia's foreign policy, especially under President Jokowi's administration.

In addition, this second term has no longer envisioned Indonesia as “global maritime fulcrum”, but instead diverted Indonesia's attention to enhancing capacity for technology and manufacturing. This diversion portrays a more pragmatic vision of what should be prioritized more within the second chance of President Jokowi's administration. Muhibat and Kharisma

(2019) notes that although there was an Indonesian Moslem identity narrated during his presidential campaign in 2019, this was not a strategic maneuver to answer any global challenges. This was more a sign of a pragmatic effort to deepen relations with Islamic countries for economy or to align domestic preferences with President Jokowi's efforts to develop Indonesia's economy.

All in all, it has been witnessed that during the President Jokowi's first period, independent and active principles were manifested by a pragmatic and more inward-looking foreign policy that sought interest in developing domestic economy as a result of "pro-people diplomacy". Nevertheless, its activities and initiatives on the international stage were still carefully maintained. In the second period, although Indonesia's role in international stage has become one of priorities, assertiveness is unlikely to be implemented. This, instead, is a pragmatic and a slightly outward-looking foreign policy, which also correlates with the implementation of the independent and active principles.

President Jokowi's first and second presidential term have shown no key difference if the discussion is about whether the principles of independent and active are maintained or not. As it has been pragmatic in practice as it has ever been, carrying out these principles strongly depend on what is being considered as priority at hand by the decision-makers in place. Despite being passive and low-profile in the president's appearance when compared to his predecessor, President Jokowi's administration has never disregarded Indonesia's presence in international affairs.

3.3. Democracy, Constitution, and the Age of Social Media: The Resonance for the Domestic Audiences

In Breuning's role theory, it is assumed that one of the ideational sources of national role(s) is the domestic audience. This concerns whether a certain government perception or action resonates domestically, that is, supported or recognized primarily by the domestic community. This ideational factor is closest related to the character of a democratic state, because in some ways there is, indeed, a strong correspondence between the actions of the elected government and the process that involves the public in the formulation of those actions. Therefore, a robust national law that regulates particular government action could be an indicator that a certain action is legitimate and appropriate in the eyes of the public community.

Indonesia's democratic system has gone through a long history of transition, with various adjustments and developments. Although it is known as the largest democracy in the globe by population, it should not be neglected that Indonesia's democracy until 2020 is still classified as flawed democracy, measured by electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation, democratic political culture, and civil liberties (Democracy Index, 2020). Regarding the classification of the countries within this Democracy Index, it is divided into four. From top to bottom, they are full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.

According to EIU (2021), full democracies refer to "countries where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles". They also have a proper system of check and balance, independent law enforcement, government that functions sufficiently, as well as diversified and independent media. Full democracies are led by Norway that is scored highest in 2020. Secondly, flawed democracies are "countries with free and fair elections. Even though there are certain significant problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation, however, basic civil liberties are still respected".

Thirdly, hybrid regimes are "those where elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being free and fair. Serious problems are more pronounced than in flawed democracies. Corruption tends to be rampant with weak rule of law, weak civil society, and oppressed journalists". Lastly, authoritarian regimes are "countries that do not have, or severely limit political pluralism. They tend to be dictatorial. Judiciary, journalists, and civil society are controlled by groups linked to the regime. Elections, if happens, are not free and fair, and there is a waiver of violations toward civil liberties".

Indonesia was ranked 64th in the world among all countries with an overall score of 6.3 covering all of the measurements (EIU, 2021). In this case, the lowest score for Indonesia was in the category of democratic political culture with a score of 4.38 followed by civil liberties with a score of 5.59 (EIU, 2020). In a surprising comparison, as a promoter of democracy, the US has also been one of the flawed democracies for five years since 2017 according to the annual Democracy Index.

The US itself was deficient in democratic political culture with a score of 6.25 and in the functioning of government with a score of 6.79. The strength of democracy in 2020 was mainly tested by the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. The index result represented a significant deterioration due to the government-imposed restrictions on individual freedoms and civil liberties in response to the pandemic. The average global score in 2020 fell from 5.44 in 2019 to 5.37.

Having said that Indonesia was ranked 64th in the 2020 Democracy Index with a score that was relatively high above the average, it needs to be discovered further if one needs to understand how a certain government's approach of policy is supported or disseminated domestically. Indonesia's score in Democracy Index was an indicator that there is a fairly thorough interrelationship between the government and the public regarding certain political actions, including foreign policy. Previously, it has been discussed that Indonesia's foreign policy has its roots in the national law and consistently implemented principles of independent and active. Moreover, identities perceived by Indonesian decision-makers appear to have full support of the domestic community.

Like other democracies in general, there is a separation of powers provided by the Constitution (fundamental law of Indonesia of 1945, also known as "Undang-Undang Dasar 1945") within Indonesia's government system. According to Thomson Reuters (2021), Indonesia's branch of powers, which includes the executive body, the legislative body and the judicial body, is strictly upheld that each of them has an equal power and position in the government hierarchy to ensure checks and balances. Thomson Reuters (2021) further explains the regulation of the mechanism as follows:

- a. The executive body, which is the president and vice president, can be dismissed by the legislative body for violation of the law or for treason, corruption, bribery and so on.
- b. The executive body has no authority to disband the legislative body.
- c. The president must ask the legislative and judicial body for their advice or approval on certain matters, that includes declaring war and entering into a peace treaty or other international agreement.
- d. The legislative body must discuss with and require approval from the president when issuing or enacting a law.

- e. The legislative body holds the budgeting authority and represents the people in supervising the executive power by exercising the right to conduct interpellation (questioning the executive on an aspect of government policy).
- f. The Supreme Court, as part of judicial body, is authorized to conduct a judicial review of regulations or decisions made by the executive if they are against the law.
- g. The Constitutional Court, as part of judicial body, has authority to constitutionally review a law that may be contrary to the Constitution, settle disputes among government institutions, dissolve political parties, and settle election disputes.

Based on the above regulations, it is arguable that every foreign action or policy carried out by the Indonesian President (with the Ministers) is subject to supervision from both the legislative and judicial body. On the one hand, domestic audiences, which are citizens in general, could possibly convey their aspirations to the president through the legislative body as the legislative body works to represent the people. On the other hand, any policy enacted from law or any law created should be in line with the Constitution.

This is also related with the process of consensus decision-making in Indonesia, there is a nurtured traditional practice called *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, or also known as “deliberation” and “consensus”. These two connected concepts were manifested from cooperative spirit that affirms the village sense of community in Indonesian traditional societies (Kawamura, 2011). “*Musyawarah* is the process of developing general agreement and consensus, while *mufakat* is the acquiescent decision that emerges from the agreement and consensus” (Koentjaraningrat, 1967, p. 397).

This concept of *musyawarah* is, in fact, embedded in the fourth moral principles of *Pancasila* as Indonesia’s national ideology, which states democracy that is led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives. In the modern democratic Indonesian decision-making process, although this *musyawarah* as a process of obtaining *mufakat* might cause delays in legislation, Kawamura (2011) argues that the two concepts “can function to consolidate Indonesia’s democracy in the way that it functions to integrate plural societies” (p. 7). Besides, the prevalence of these concepts in *Pancasila* as the Indonesian national ideology, that is also directly connected with the premise of principles of “independent” and “active”, reflects their importance.

Furthermore, the preservation of principles of independent and active in Indonesia's foreign policy practice is also guarded under the Laws of the Republic of Indonesia Number 37 of 1999. This law also directly points to Indonesia's national interests that are written in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Like other national law, the Laws of the Republic of Indonesia Number 37 of 1999 that particularly governs Indonesia's foreign policy has also been approved by the legislative body and do not deviate from the 1945 Constitution. This is because the 1945 Constitution is arguably the country's first source of law that becomes a reference for other laws. Nonetheless, if there are impropriety or suggestion within the Constitution, it could be amended through a democratic process executed within the legislative body. In fact, throughout history, the Constitution itself has been amended four times, which was in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002.

In other words, the system of government in a particular country determines how far the public community is willing to accept and recognize the legitimacy of actions taken by the government. Because Indonesia adheres to a democratic system, it possibly has its own mechanism to ensure that the government policies are legitimately set. Checks and balances mechanism of democracy could be deemed as a point of reference to draw an assumption that every action of Indonesian decision-makers that are visible, or ideation that are obvious, are widely investigated by the public, in other words, are resonated domestically.

Additionally, the age of social media arguably stimulates a more active interaction between decision-makers and the domestic audiences, especially in countries with democratic system. Although it necessitates a deeper and multidisciplinary research in order to grasp a theoretical explanation about the relationship between democratic government, domestic audiences, and social media; it has become a fact that social media has brought the extension of the public space, thus, it has become possible for the audiences to directly deliver aspirations regarding every policy taken by the government. This does not imply that the democratic government has no longer in control over its power and position, but social media provides a platform for the domestic audiences to escalate their movement to monitor, support, and also criticize government policies, including foreign policy, through digital sphere.

This is a worldwide phenomenon, which Castells (2012) calls as "social movements in the Internet age" that serves as a check and balance on the ruling

government. Iosifidis & Wheeler (2016) argue that as this phenomenon allows the domestic audiences to have power to “oversee” the activities of their elected decision-makers, it also enables more direct forms of democracy to emerge. However, this assumption should not be overstated given the different situation and democratization process happening to each country. There is also a risk that the more untrusted information or opinions spread through social media, the less accountable the shared information will be, and there is a potential that the particular government in a certain country will respond it with authoritarian measures.

One study found that the increasing use of social media in Indonesia does not automatically increase the public participation, instead, it resulted in the less accountable information, and a heavy polarization between groups supporting and opposing government (Syahputra & Ritonga, 2019). What is implied here from the discussion about the social media aspect is the increasing public awareness and increasing opportunities for the public to be heard by the government, especially if the government concerned is active in digital diplomacy.

Nevertheless, Baum & Potter (2008) highlights that albeit to varying degrees and often indirectly, public opinion can influence every foreign policy decision making if democratic leaders keep considering the public reaction to their policies. In other words, government action is a spectacle for social media users, which are the domestic audiences themselves. With the increasingly widespread use of social media, both by the general public or government institutions, public opinion exerts a lasting influence because decision-makers anticipate possible public reactions to their policies. In Indonesia, the explosion of social media and the sophisticated uses of it by special interests suggest that growing attention to issues that touch people’s sensitiveness will have greater political impact (Weatherbee, 2013).

Taken together, based on the schematic of Breuning’s national role conception, all three ideational factors have been scrutinized. However, material factors namely the state’s capability and opportunity to act must follow as they are considered intertwined with ideational factors and also are perceived by Indonesian decision-makers. Like how the ideational factors are presented above, the next chapter discusses the most suitable material

factors that act as a system-based driving force of Indonesia's role as "A True Partner for World Peace".



CHAPTER FOUR

MATERIAL FACTORS OF INDONESIA'S ROLE CONCEPTION AS A NON-PERMANENT MEMBER OF UNSC IN 2019-2020

Role theory or national role conception is one of the few that serve as a cognitive tool standing at “the intersection of the ideational and material aspects” of International Relations. Material aspects themselves are state’s capabilities and opportunity derived from interaction between one another in the international system. In knowing what sort of role(s) a country plays on the international stage, the ideational driving force could not hold up without the calculation of material factors. Galal (2020) notes that “the relative status of states in the international system and their material capabilities provide useful approach to understanding states’ external behaviors” (p.41). Therefore, it cannot be ignored that there is a need for comparison of capabilities and consideration of opportunities that may arise from a certain status possessed by a country.

A certain role can be firmly held and perceived by decision-makers because of a strong perception of the combination of both the ideational and material impetus, so that a country’s attention and resources can be directed to the performance of that role, which will later be implemented as foreign policy. For the objective of this research, this chapter discusses material factors in accordance with the role theory in more details, which is divided into two sections. The first examines Indonesia’s “multilateral power” that represents its own capability, while the second inspects the existing liberal international order in a multipolar world and globalization that have provided middle powers an opportunity to act.

4.1. “Multilateral Power”: The Perceived Capability of a Middle Power

Measuring the capabilities of a country is, oftentimes, closely related to finding out how much military and economic power that the country has, which is then compared to other countries. But along with the development of views or approaches to international relations that are no longer focused on hard power issues, the discussion about countries’ relative

power has become more enticing to study. With the demise of the Cold War, the distribution of so-called “power” became less centralized and the debate about it expanded. Brito (2010) argues that “the discussion around the concept of power is associated with strategies inherent to hard power, soft power, and the emerging smart power” (p. 112). Rather than debating which concept of power prevails over one another, they are actually intertwined with each other.

According to Wilson (2008), hard power strategies “focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests” (p. 114). Brito (2010) adds that these strategies often recur to military force in an erratic but useful manner. On the contrary, soft power is “a country’s capacity to persuade others to do what the country want” (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). This develops attraction and encompasses almost everything apart from economic and military power (Cooper, 2004). This is not surprising because the world has witnessed how developing countries, especially those that are part of the middle powers, can play a role in shaping regional and international politics. Joseph Nye’s soft power “anticipates action through mediation and persuasion, implying the adoption of strategic principles that combine symbolic or cultural reference elements with political or ideological values that could reinforce state’s leadership” (Brito, 2010, p. 112).

Following these two kinds of power, smart power entered the discussion especially after Bush’s administration failed to use US power appropriately. According to Wilson (2008), there was a widespread belief that Bush administration’s foreign policies was not smart. As a result, it compromised the security and diplomatic interests of the US, generated unprecedented hatred, and greatly reduced America’s standing in world politics. Wilson (2008) further notes that smart power from a different manner recognizes the “combination of hard power and soft power”, and is built upon few core considerations below.

1. The target over which one seeks to exercise power - its internal nature and its broader context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of these attributes of the target populations and regions.
2. Self-knowledge. Smart Power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its requires will and capacity to achieve its goals.

3. The broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted.
4. The tools to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination.

Based on the above considerations deduced by Wilson, it could be argued that smart power involves decision-makers' awareness towards target, self-knowledge of national interest that is pursued, the context in which the action will be implemented, and sorts of tools to be employed. In short, smart power is about decision-makers' perception, choice, or strategy regarding a particular instrument(s) to be used under a particular circumstance in order to gain a particular interest. Decision-makers also have to know the strength and limitations of each instruments, which can take the form of military and economic power, as well as mediation and diplomacy.

In inspecting Indonesia's capability as a whole, it is deemed appropriate to observe it from the available research or data, that shows comparative powers. It has been discussed before how Indonesian leaders appear to perceive ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy and how Indonesia with its capabilities seems to have played significant roles in the establishment of ASEAN. Indonesia's capability to influence events in sub-regional organization namely ASEAN is undebatable as it is often regarded as its "natural leader" given the geographical conditions, population, strategic location, and natural resources. However, in order to know Indonesia's capabilities and its role globally, a wider scope of discussion is needed.

In a wider context, in contemporary international politics, Asia has become a key region in which tenseness between powers will determine war and peace. From the perspective of US as the most powerful country in the globe, Asia in 21st century has profound implications for its future (Nehru, 2013). With China's increasing involvement within Asia, it is important for the US to assure a peaceful rise of the region in many ways. The Asia Power Index (2019), which is published annually by the Lowy Institute, is a useful resource for analyzing the comparative capabilities of 25 countries that actually have influence in the regional events. This index is based on key eight thematic measures of power, 30 thematic sub-measures, and 126 indicators. The eight measures of power are economic resources,

military capability, resilience, future resources, diplomatic influence, economic relationship, defense networks, and cultural influence.

According to the Lowy Institute (2019, pp. 2-3), the list of the eight measurements of power is as follows:

1. Economic resources: core economic strength and attributes of an economy with the most geopolitical relevance, measured in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity, international leverage, technological sophistication and global connectivity.
2. Military capability is about the amount of conventional military strength which is measured in terms of defense spending, weapons and platforms, armed forces and organization, signature capabilities and regional military posture.
3. Resilience is the capability to deter real or potential external threats which is measured in terms of internal institutional stability, geo-economic security, resource security, geopolitical security, and nuclear deterrence.
4. Future resources are the projected distribution of future resources and capabilities, which is measured in terms of estimated economic, defense and broad resources in 2030, as well as forecasts regarding working-age population for 2045.
5. Diplomatic influence is about the extent and standing of a state's foreign relations, measured in terms of diplomatic networks, involvement in multilateral institutions and clubs, and overall foreign policy and strategic ambition.
6. Economic relationship is the capability to exercise influence and leverage through economic interdependencies, measured in terms of trade relations, investment ties, and economic diplomacy.
7. Defense networks are partnerships in defense sectors that act as force multipliers of autonomous military capability; measured through assessments of alliances, non-allied partnerships and arms transfers.
8. Cultural influence is the ability to shape international opinion through cultural appeal and interaction, measured in terms of cultural projection, information flows and people exchanges.

Furthermore, the first four measurements that listed above are categorized in “resource measure” that is a prerequisite factor in the exercise of power, while the last four

measurements are grouped as “influence measure” that assesses countries’ activeness of influence, especially in Asia.

One may question about the weighting of each measurement, which indicates how significant each of the eight measurements above is for a country when compared to one another. In this case, Lowy Institute (2019) through the Asia Power Index assigns a set of weightings that has been analyzed on the basis of relevant academic literature and consultations with decision-makers from the Asia region. It could be seen from the table below.

Table 4.1. 1. The Weightings of Measurements of Asia Power Index 2019 (Lowy Institute, 2019, p. 174)

Measure	Weighting
Economic Resources	17.5%
Military Capability	17.5%
Resilience	10%
Future Resources	10%
Diplomatic Influence	10%
Economic Relationships	15%
Defense Networks	10%
Cultural Influence	10%

From the table above, it is shown that economic resources and military capability get the highest percentage, both of which are the most beneficial to the countries given the current situation of regional circumstance. However, if we look it from another point of view, the comparison between the total "resource measures" and the total "influence measures" is arguably not too significant where the first only gains 55% while the second gets 45%. This means that the measurements of power apart from military and economy has become undoubtedly significant.

Regarding Indonesia’s capability according to Lowy Institute (2019), Indonesia was ranked 11th of 25 in overall power and was categorized as a middle power. Super powers that have influence in region were the US and China, whereas the major powers were Japan and India. The more completed rankings could be seen as below.

Table 4.1. 2. Overall Power by Ranking of Asia Power Index 2019 (Lowy Institute, 2019, p. 5)

Rank	Country/ Territory	Score	Category
1	United States	84.5	<i>Super Powers</i>
2	China	75.9	
3	Japan	42.5	<i>Major Powers</i>
4	India	41.0	
5	Russia	35.4	<i>Middle Powers</i>
6	South Korea	32.7	
7	Australia	31.3	
8	Singapore	27.9	
9	Malaysia	22.8	
10	Thailand	20.7	
11	Indonesia	20.6	
12	New Zealand	19.9	
13	Vietnam	18.0	
14	Taiwan	15.9	
15	Pakistan	15.3	
16	North Korea	14.0	
17	Philippines	13.7	
18	Bangladesh	9.7	<i>Minor Powers</i>
19	Brunei Darussalam	9.1	
20	Myanmar	8.9	
21	Sri Lanka	8.5	
22	Cambodia	7.7	
23	Laos	6.4	
24	Mongolia	6.2	
25	Nepal	4.7	

Interestingly, despite the fact that Indonesia was ranked 11th with a score of 20.6, Indonesia was also ranked 4th in the context of multilateral power, which is measured under the assessment of diplomatic influence. As a thematic sub-measure, multilateral power is defined as “a country’s participation and diplomatic clout in multilateral forums, which examines membership in selected summits, diplomatic clubs and intergovernmental organizations, as well as financial contributions to the UN and development banks, and voting alignment with other countries in UN resolutions” (Lowy Institute, 2019, p. 170). In this regard, Indonesia was ranked 2nd after China in the membership of summits, diplomatic clubs, and regional intergovernmental organizations.

The measurements of power and their weightings determined by the Asia Power Index is, somehow, related with smart power that encompasses both the hard power and smart power. Although it is needed to explore more about how each country on the rankings utilize its own power(s) or how they prefer one power over another, Indonesia's rank in terms of multilateral power is conceivably one of good examples of how a middle power demonstrates its distinct power and posits itself in the presence of both the major and super powers.

If one thinks carefully, the first president of Indonesia together with other developing countries such as Yugoslavia, Egypt, India, and Ghana managed to lead the establishment of NAM against the two major blocs during the Cold War in 1961. Hence, it seems hard to believe that military or economic power alone has been enough to exert a major influence globally. Especially after the demise of bipolar world system, Indonesian decision-makers have been aware about their country's potential as an independent middle power that could harness its manifold national interests.

4.2. Existing Liberal Order and Globalization Phenomena: The Convenient Opportunity for the Middle Powers

Right after the end of the Cold War, the bipolar world system turned unipolar in which the US achieved the status of the sole global hegemon. This unipolar world political system under US hegemony has provided a liberal order that is quite challenging, but profitable, especially for democratic countries. Not surprisingly, because as a tradition of political thought and action, Liberal Institutionalism initially sought to organize and reform an international order in which liberal democracies could work together for mutual benefit, manage shared vulnerabilities, and protect their way of life (Ikenberry, 2020).

The world has seen that regional and global institutions have been established in a manner to facilitate cooperation, to perpetuate common norms, and to unite the world community. Especially for the middle powers, the liberal order has created a strong sense of multilateralism among them and an international platform that is quite effective for them in the achievement of their own collective interests or national goals, even to offset their influence in front of the great powers. Not only in the scope of sub-regions or regions that are related to geographical proximity or cultural similarities, but also in a wider scope globally, such as the active involvement of middle powers in various UN agencies.

However, the unipolar system has slowly created a permissive condition for the emergence of new major powers to counterbalance the US and pursue its strategic interests in international politics. It has been argued that the presence of one hegemon could eventually give birth to a multipolar world. Not only that, whether good or bad for the US, the liberal order that the US has supported has actually accelerated this emersion.

To borrow a quote from the neo-realist way of thinking, Waltz (1991, p. 669) argues that "in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it". Layne (1993) then complements this assumption by generating the following premises: (1) the unipolar system contains the seeds of its own destruction, as unbalanced forces create an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers, and (2) the entry of new powers into the world erodes the hegemon's relative strength and preeminence.

While this realist assumption has proven valid with the rise of China, Russia, and India, it cannot be said arbitrarily that the balancing act of non-hegemons will automatically lead to an unfavorable international environment. It is a fact that despite the transition of the world system, the US has always been the presumably strongest country in the world, both militarily and economically.

Regarding the definition of the multipolar world itself, it has been defined differently by some researchers even though the concept of polarity was first introduced in realist studies. For the purpose of this thesis, according to Behuria (2020), a multipolar world is a world in which power is shared among several countries rather than being owned by one or two countries, thus opening up foreign and security policy options for all countries. Another definition states that multipolar world is a world condition in which the legitimate interests of a country are respected, and developing countries can influence international development (Siddiqui, 2021).

Despite the assumption that US influence will shrink as the activities of China and other developing countries increase, the liberal order is likely to persist rather than to tumble down. Ikenberry (2018, p. 18) notes that "the characteristics of the liberal international order, such as openness, rules, multilateral cooperation, are deeply entrenched and likely to persist even though the US hegemonic position may decline". He also emphasized that even the Trump administration's actions to question the US commitment to liberalism did not lead to the downfall of liberal institutions.

In contrast, non-Western developing countries remain bound to the architecture and principles of a liberally oriented global order. Even China is trying in various ways to build competing regional institutions. The point here, is, whether the legacy of liberalism from the US will be replaced or not, countries have depended on a similar global order that gives them the opportunity to engage in global politics.

According to Chatham House (2019, p. 2), the challenge to maintain the liberal order is “to reform institutions that are failing, devise new rules for emerging policy areas, and adapt the multilateral system so that it better reflects the shifting realities of global power”. Without the supports from US, there has been expectation that the middle powers could somehow be able to reduce the disintegration of liberal order. Entanglement in the liberal order reflects both the necessity and opportunity especially for middle powers.

On the one hand, middle powers benefit from the order because the existing international institutions and rules could provide protection for middle powers from great powers and help to buffer the international system from escalating conflicts between them. On the other hand, the middle powers have contributed to the stability of the order, thus, they have their own legitimacies. For instance, they have been involved in a variety of UN bodies, building bridges between the developed and developing countries, and joined coalitions of like-minded countries to promote common interests (Aydin, 2021). In other words, the active role of the middle powers is arguably the key to achieving that expectation. Their roles determine not only their own destiny in the shadow of the great powers, but also the liberal order that is in decline.

Furthermore, considering the consequences of a liberal world order, the candidacy for non-permanent members of UNSC is done through election in accordance with the decision made within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This two-years term involvement in the UNSC reflects even more promising opportunities for countries to act, despite their status as the middle powers or not, to jointly take part within the world’s major international security organization.

The UNSC itself is composed of 15 members in total, which includes five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France, Russian Federation, the United States, and the United Kingdom; and 10 non-permanent members. While the P5 will remain unchanged, the 1991 UNGA resolution states that the 10 non-permanent members shall be elected based on

equitable geographical distribution according to the following scheme: five from African and Asian States, one from Eastern European States, two from Latin American States, and two from Western European and other States (Elect the Council, n.d.).

Verbeke (2018) highlights about what it actually means to be a non-permanent member at the UNSC through the following points.

1. Power versus authority. Being a non-permanent member of UNSC is not a power to grab but rather an authority that is conveyed, which a country is expected to exercise responsibly. This allows and expects a country to contribute effectively to the primary purpose of UNSC to maintain international peace and security.
2. Privilege versus responsibility. A non-permanent membership at the UNSC is not a privilege to be enjoyed, but rather a responsibility a country should demonstrate in framing and shaping solution to problems.
3. One's country versus the others. A non-permanent membership is not about one's country but first and foremost about the whole UN memberships at large that one is supposed to represent.

Taken together, the three points above reflect the role in which a country that is a non-permanent member of the UNSC is responsible for taking some actions for the common good. Indeed, the common interest here is the interest of the countries that are parts of the liberal order as mentioned by the third point. Verbeke also adds that UNSC aims to solve problems and there is not much room for a country's ideology in it.

To conclude, although some say that the liberal order has entered its collapse due to the decline of the US, it still exists today. Coupled with the transition to multipolar world, the international system provides a place for democratic middle powers to play a better role in maintaining the existence of the liberal order or bringing about change within its particular institutions. CFR (2021) states that although many experts say that UNSC's overall track record is relatively strong especially in the peacekeeping operation, there have been prospects for reforming UNSC to be more representative, effective, efficient, accountable and transparent, considering the many challenges faced in the 21st century. In other words, the opportunity to perform is explicit under the current international politics, and it is likewise in the UNSC.

In addition, there have been growing non-traditional international security threats that have caused countries to concern themselves on how to interdependently cope with the issues in order to achieve both their own and common security. In carrying out its responsibilities, the UNSC is one of the main institutions responsible for responding to various forms of threats to peace or acts of aggression that threaten international security. UNSC also has the authority to deal with traditional and non-traditional security issues, as long as the issue is considered a threat to international peace and security (MoFA of Indonesia, 2017b). Discussion of any agenda regarding international security, aspirations and interests of all members, whether permanent or not, will be necessary.

These issues have been often connected with the phenomena of globalization, which is one of the many impacts of the liberal international structure. Although there has not been a general definition of globalization, Hughes (2001, p. 408) states that “globalization has been variously defined as universalization (expansion of culture around the world), internationalization (increased interaction and interdependence between people in different states), Westernization or Americanization (homogenization of the world by Western or US standards), and liberalization (spreading of the power of deregulation of technology, production, cross-border trade and finance)”.

Regarding the nexus between globalization with security issues, a number of attempts have already been made in terms of its creation of new security actors, problems, and responses (Cha, 2000). As an example, in 2003 when the issue of globalization began to get a lot of attention, an Assistant to Foreign Minister of China, Shen Guofang, included the relationship between globalization and new emerging security within his keynote speech at the International Conference of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which discussed about "the Role of the UN Security Council in Future World Order". The speech also highlighted the central role of the UNSC as a means of interdependence in coping with the emerging international security threats. According to the MoFA of the People's Republic of China (2003), Guofang mentioned that:

“Globalization has not made everyone a winner, and in the fields of finance, information, health and others, there exist hidden security threats ... The international situation is really undergoing a complicated and profound transformation. First, security threats have taken on multiple dimensions. Traditional security concerns such as ethnic or religious conflicts and border or territorial disputes still exist, while non-traditional security threats are

quickly growing. Non-traditional security problems such as terrorism, cross-border crimes, environmental pollution, population explosion, drug trafficking and infectious diseases have become the major problems impeding the human development. The interweaving and mutual conversion between the two kinds of security issues has brought new challenges to the international peace and security.

Second, security threats have a complex nature. Non-traditional security threats have complicated causes and diverse manifestations. Terrorists go after their goals through violence, their activities are becoming more secretive, and means more brutal. The use of biological, chemical, cyberspace and other high-tech means makes terrorists more and more dangerous. As such, the security issue has spilt over to a wide range of areas of politics, economy, military, finance, science and technology.

Third, security threats have obtained global proportions. Today, with the deepening of globalization, countries are more interdependent. Security is no longer a local issue bearing on individual countries or regions, but a global one that threatens to impede peace and development of the world. No country can keep itself out. As a Chinese old saying goes, no individual can simply "clean the snow on his own doorsteps while turning a blind eye to others".

According to the Charter of the United Nations, the UN Security Council is the core of such a mechanism and the most authoritative and legitimate institution of the multilateral security regime. Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council has played an irreplaceable role in maintaining world peace and security.

The unique features of the Security Council have enabled it to continue to play a pivotal part in the future world configuration. First, the Security Council is the principal venue for multilateral cooperation. Second, the Security Council is a key platform for democracy in international relations. Third, the Security Council is a core institution for peaceful settlement of disputes. Fourth, the Security Council is also an important vehicle to promote a law-based pattern of international relations.

All in all, the existing liberal order and globalization have provided an obvious opportunity for all countries, especially the middle powers to extend their role as a bridge between the superpowers and beyond; as well as architects of solution towards the international security as a whole. Middle powers appear to be the key to international institutional reform and the creation of a new international agenda because of their status, influence, and their desire to play an active role in international relations. Even though it has not been proven to be effective in terms of their involvement in UNSC, their status as a middle power clearly reflects credibility in foreign policy and reflects the ability to take advantage of the existing opportunities, including in the non-permanent membership of the UNSC.

CHAPTER FIVE

A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS ON INDONESIA'S ROLE CONCEPTION IN THE UNSC AS "A TRUE PARTNER FOR WORLD PEACE"

In the previous two chapters, the arguably potential ideational and material factors in shaping the conception of Indonesia's national role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council were investigated following the schematic of Breuning's national role conception. According to MoFA of Indonesia (2019c), the role as "A True Partner for World Peace" is an extraordinary role meant to serve in the maintenance of international peace and security. It was taken not only because a country has ambition, but also because of reputation and contribution that represent its stance as well as its national interests.

This fifth chapter focuses on the cognitive analysis on the conception of Indonesia's role as "A True Partner for World Peace", how this was related with the relevant ideational and material factors depicted, and how this was applied to Indonesia enacting its role in the UNSC for the year 2019-2020. This chapter is generally divided to three sections, each of which analyze about relevant ideational factor, material factor, and the national role conception as well as its enactment through the lens of cognitive approach to FPA.

5.1. Ideational Factors as The Perceived Endogenous Incentives of Indonesia's Role Conception

To begin with, before running for a non-permanent member of the UNSC from 2019 to 2020, Indonesian decision-makers were conscious of the identities of Indonesia in the eyes of the international community. As mentioned, President Jokowi portrayed Indonesia's identities at the Asian-African Summit 2015 in Jakarta as a new emerging economic force, a country with the largest Moslem population on earth, and the third largest democracy. These three identities were not mere bywords, but rather stimulants of the perceived national role.

As a new emerging economy, Indonesian decision-makers apprehended Indonesia's economy as one of the important modalities for carrying out responsibilities as a non-

permanent member of UNSC. However, Indonesian decision-makers do not seem to see this identity as a mere status to be hailed or flaunted in front of other countries. It is rather one of perceived criteria to perform a more effective role and to contribute more significantly to the international community. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, stresses that “the issue of membership in the UNSC is not an issue of how big or small a country is, because all nations have the same right. Rather, a country’s track record and commitment to contribute to world peace needs to be assured” (The Jakarta Post, 2018).

Because foreign policy cannot be separated from the domestic constellation, political stability and conducive economic condition indicate that a country is ready to support the creation of world peace. More importantly, being a part of the UNSC places a country in a strategic and advantageous position, therefore, an emerging economy like Indonesia could possibly sit together with countries that have political influence on global security and the largest economy in the world (MoFA of Indonesia, 2017b).

The second perceived identity is Indonesia as a country with the world’s largest Moslem population on earth. This identity is not only a reflection of the belonging of one country to the largest Moslem population, but also manifests in some of the basic practices of Indonesia's foreign policy, especially those related to the pursuance of peace. It is clearly stated on the document of Aide Memoire of Indonesia’s candidature for a non-permanent membership of the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020 that:

“As the world’s largest Moslem population and as a founding member of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Indonesia is committed to facilitating peaceful talks for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Indonesia is also a strong proponent for moderation and tolerance in defending Islam as a religion of peace, and it seeks to strengthen the bonds of solidarity and enhance economic-social and technological cooperation among OIC member states.” (Norlyanti, 2018, p. 102).

In the UNSC, the resolution towards Palestinian – Israeli issue has been discussed regularly as the Council has addressed the situation in the Middle East and the Palestinian question since 1948. But, Indonesia has seen this issue as something that needs to become separated concern in the Council.

On top of that, Indonesia’s support for Palestine has been considered as one of the priorities of Indonesian foreign policy in both bilateral and multilateral contexts since 1945.

It is a fact that Palestine was one of the countries supporting Indonesia's independence and supporting Palestine remains a mandate of the Asia-Africa Summit which was championed by Indonesia's founding fathers.

According to the interview that I have conducted with Ms. Rina Setyawati, if Palestine is not fought for, Indonesia is the same as betraying. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, especially in 2019-2020, despite the pressure coming from the superpowers, especially the US, and the uncertainty of whether the suggestion is accepted or not, Indonesia has always been at the forefront of any dynamics in the Palestinian issue. Indonesia believes that the UNSC should issue productive decisions to resolve the Palestinian problem as a reflection of the responsibilities of the main organ of the UN that deals with the maintenance of international peace and security (MoFA of Indonesia, 2019).

The last mentioned identity is Indonesia as the third largest democracy in the world. Democracy itself has seemed to be viewed by Indonesian decision-makers as a tool to achieve Indonesia's goal, which are international peace and prosperity. For that, it is believed that democratic values have to be diffused globally through democratic ways. Indonesian decision-makers also highlight that building partnership is the key to avoid "the mighty takes all", thus, it should be developed and strengthened to respect international law and multilateralism (The Jakarta Post, 2018).

More interestingly, Indonesian decision-makers appear to consider this identity as the largest democracy to coexist with the prior. During a campaign for Indonesia to be a part of UNSC that was launched by Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi in September 2016, it was expressed that Indonesia was eligible to be a non-permanent member of the Council as it has demonstrated that Islam, democracy and modernization can possibly synchronize with each other. Moreover, Indonesia has also shown a sign to become a model of tolerance and pluralism by hosting the annual international forum on democracy named Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), participating in the UN Peace Corps, and having 132 representatives abroad. With this background, according to the Minister, Indonesia wishes to play a great and constructive role, while undertaking maximum efforts to participate in the council's assignments (Prasetyo, 2016).

If alluding to the discussion about Indonesia's brand of moderate Islam in chapter three, it could be seen that Islam, democracy, foreign policy, and peace are terms that cannot be separated. As deliberated by Cohen (2005), this brand of Islam is characterized by tolerant, modern, progressive, pro-democratic, close to secular, and anti-violence tenets in both regional practice and political life. Sukma (2011) also describes this brand of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy as "a force for peace, tolerance and harmony, which is articulated as a moderating voice between the Moslem world and others, and within the Moslem world itself".

Referring to what has been discussed earlier in the chapter two, identity, according to Hopf, is focused on "who we are" rather than on "what role we play". It also does not intersect directly with action as it is only assumed as an abstract reference. Simply put, identity here acts as a discerned attribute or asset that describes how appropriate and confident Indonesia is to perform in the UNSC. This corresponds with the interview I have conducted with Ms. Rina Setyawati as she highlights that:

"Identities relate to how strong Indonesia's position is when under pressure from the superpowers in the UN Security Council. Strong countries (the five Permanent members of the UNSC, also regarded as the P5) will use all lines to suppress, in this case, the opinions and aspirations of the countries under them.

In other words, this is related to how Indonesia can optimally carry out its role. In addition, in the nomination of non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, these identities also become one of important capitals for Indonesia in addition to its track record or work in peace diplomacy and so on, in order to win elections."

Besides identity as a part of ideational factors, Indonesia also has two inherited foreign policy principles that still color every Indonesian foreign policy practice until now, which are the principles of independent and active in conducting foreign policy. Although principles seem concise, when it is associated with Indonesia and its role in the UNSC, these two principles are contained in several guidelines for Indonesia in carrying out its duties when elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020.

MoFA of Indonesia (2019) highlights the basic fundamentals of implementing Indonesia's role in its non-permanent membership of the UNSC, especially for the period of 2019-2020 in which Indonesian decision makers presented Indonesia as "A True Partner for World Peace". They are *Pancasila* as the national ideology, the 1945 Constitution, and the

Ten Principles of Bandung, which are indeed, interrelated with each other and embrace the spirit of independent and active principles.

If taken together, the mentioned three fundamentals of Indonesia's role in the UNSC for 2019-2020 period address the principles of independent and active. First, the premises of these principles that have been discussed before, it is stated that foreign policy is based on ideology (which is the *Pancasila*) and national interest. Second, in the Preamble of 1945 Constitution, it is clearly stated that one of Indonesia's core national interests is "participating in carrying out world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice", which is also directed to Indonesia's role in the UNSC.

Third, regarding the Ten Principles of Bandung, this is a political statement containing the basic principles in the efforts to promote international peace and cooperation as a result of 1955 Bandung Conference hosted by Indonesia, a milestone of the establishment of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an international forum of world's developing countries. Referring to Republika (2015), the ten principles are as follows:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries.
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.
10. Respect for justice and international obligation.

The 1955 Bandung Conference, which also known as the Asia-Africa Conference, was not only regarded as a communique among the developing Asian-African countries and a milestone of the establishment of NAM, but also a critical point for the implementation of Indonesian foreign policy that was based on the spirit of independent and active principles for the first time (Margo Post, 2019). The eighth principle of Bandung Conference discussed above also explicitly mentions an effort to settle international disputes through peaceful means in accordance with the Charter provided by the UN. In short, it appears that the conceptualization of “A True Partner for World Peace” cannot be separated from these fundamentals.

Furthermore, ideational factors also encompass the resonance of a country’s national role to the domestic audiences, in the sense that the national role and action taken by the decision-makers gain support and recognition from the domestic constituents. In this regard, the Indonesian government has long adhered to a democratic system and this is certainly protected by national constitution.

As mentioned within the chapter three, Indonesia’s democracy has long gone through transition periods although it is still regarded as flawed democracy. Indonesia also has check and balance mechanisms through the separation of powers in order to assure that every actions taken by the decision-makers are transparent and controlled. In the context of foreign policy, references regarding its practice has been kept in line with the Laws of the Republic of Indonesia Number 37 of 1999 that particularly governs Indonesia’s foreign policy and the Preamble of 1945 Constitution as the first source of national law.

MoFA of Indonesia (2017b) asserts that Indonesia's nomination as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council has a very strong *intermestic* (international-domestic) dimension. Indonesian decision-makers believe that membership in the UNSC does not only have an international impact on Indonesia's diplomacy in international forums but also has a domestic impact.

On the one hand, Indonesia's position on various issues of concern to the UNSC will be influenced by the perspectives of domestic stakeholders. On the other hand, Indonesian

diplomats at the UNSC will have great confidence if Indonesia's position is fully supported by the Indonesian people and all other stakeholders related to the issues discussed at the Council. Besides, referring to the concept of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* discussed in the chapter three, every decision made by Indonesian government must be gone through deliberation and consensus before it could be decided as a unanimous decision.

Domestic support for Indonesia's candidacy as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2019-2020 has been shown by the legislative body (the House of Representatives or also referred as Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/ DPR), and the mass media. As a state legislature with legislative, budgetary and supervisory functions, the DPR has an important role in the decision-making process regarding Indonesia's domestic and foreign affairs. According to MoFA of Indonesia (2017b), Indonesia playing its role in the UNSC gained full support from DPR and it even helped in efforts to garner support from other countries. Mass media, on the other side, has shown its attention and reported positive news about Indonesia's candidacy as a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020.

Conforming to the interview with Ms. Rina Setyawati, Indonesia as a “True Partner for World Peace” in the UNSC was supported by domestic audiences because it had gone through a process of discussion, seminars, both internally and with partners, including other government bodies and the academics. Anything that becomes Indonesia's foreign policy in the UN Security Council will be a spectacle for domestic observers even at the closed door meeting level. As the executor of foreign policy, she implies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been always open and not anti-criticism. Not only that, Ms. Rina Setyawati also confirmed that Indonesia in the UNSC received strong support, especially from religious or community leaders and academics.

This does not seem to stop at the mechanism of Indonesia's democratic system, because it cannot be denied that the development of information technology and the era of social media has led to increased public scrutiny of every state policy. The MoFA of Indonesia has begun to conduct its strategic diplomacy through social media or digital platform. In 2002, MoFA of Indonesia has established the Directorate General of Information and Public Diplomacy, which indicates fundamental and strategic policy on the way the MoFA would conduct public diplomacy (Madu, 2018). Initially, digital diplomacy was only intended as a tool to ensure good relations between the MoFA and both the media and public, however,

through the Decree No. 84/B/RO/I/2017/01 year 2017, digital diplomacy has been decided as not only means of disseminating information but also tools of a more strategic function (Kurniawati et al., 2020).

Regarding the topic of this thesis, the role or action(s) taken by the Indonesian government in the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020 was spotlighted, if not supported, especially by the domestic community. The other way around, it has also made it easier for Indonesian decision-makers to socialize or to gain domestic supports regarding the role of Indonesia and what actions Indonesia could or have taken while serving as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. With respect to this, Ms. Rina Setyawati stressed that:

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far engaged in various ways, from visits to campuses, campaigns, writing and publishing articles involving think tanks, discussions with mass organizations, religious leaders, netizens, influencers, to discussions with parliament. This is important considering the disclosure of information in the era of globalization... Every policy carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the UN Security Council always takes into account how the public reacts, both domestically and internationally.”

5.2. Material Factors as The Perceived Exogenous Incentives of Indonesia's Role Conception

Aside from the discussed ideational factors, Breuning's role theory does recognize the importance of material factors. Likewise, the material factors also occur as driving forces of Indonesia's national role conception in the UNSC in 2019-2020. As previously discussed in the chapter four regarding the material factors of Indonesia's role in the UNSC, finding out about a country's smart power is one of several ways to measure its capability in the contemporary International Relations. This is important if it is related to the national role, because the role(s) taken by countries might vary and are not solely about hard power or soft power alone. It might be about both, and might also be about something else such as smart power. Therefore, it is considered necessary to examine what kind of power(s) is indeed related to the national role of a certain country.

Middle powers like Indonesia are countries that, in fact, can possibly exert a significant influence in international politics. Outside the UNSC, it appears that Indonesia has been part of vanguards of various international initiatives. A fairly representative example of this is the formation of NAM as discussed earlier which was driven by Indonesia and other developing countries during the Cold War period, in the midst of the competition of two giant

powers to expand their influence. Not to mention that Indonesia is often regarded as “natural leader” of ASEAN due to some reasonable reasons and, in fact, was one of its founding fathers.

In the chapter four, according to the scrutinized 8 (eight) measurements of power of Asia Power Index, Indonesia was ranked 11th of the overall power in 2019, ranked 4th in the context of sub-measure called multilateral power, and 2nd in the membership of summits, diplomatic clubs, and regional intergovernmental organizations.

What has been presented by the Asia Power Index is an indicator that a country's capability is no longer confined by military and economic power alone, although the share of both is larger among other measures of power in the Asia Power Index. However, middle powers can take advantage of one or more of the remaining six power measures to be able to possess an impact or influence on contemporary international politics, especially their involvement within liberal international organizations, including the UNSC.

Referring to the definition of multilateral power discussed earlier, and considering that the UNSC is the most prominent bodies of the UN that produces resolutions in order to attain global peace and security, it could be said that the active involvement within UNSC is a large window for middle powers to utilize their multilateral power to secure every possible interest and outcome, in the presence of P5. Based on the interview conducted with Ms. Rina Setyawati, it is clearly stated that multilateral power is believed significant for Indonesian decision-makers to maximize Indonesia's role in the UNSC. When asked about the most prominent driving force for Indonesia to hold a global role in the UNSC, Ms. Rina Setiawati reveals that:

“Multilateral power is the main driving force (in the context of UNSC), but that does not mean Indonesia is dependent only on it. This is not surprising, because this is the fruit of Indonesia's consistency which always upholds multilateralism wherever and whenever... In addition, as a representative of ASEAN countries, Indonesia in the UNSC also facilitates synergies and consultations between regional organizations and the UNSC, which has also become a priority”

Among several major international organizations to which Indonesia actively contributes aside from the UNSC are ASEAN, APEC, G-20, NAM, and OIC. Ms. Rina Setyawati also adds that Indonesia has a foreign policy posture that so far can be considered superior in its role and leadership in peace and security diplomacy. Not to mention that

Indonesia itself has been chosen four times to be a non-permanent member of UNSC, it means that the country has experiences in playing its role in the UNSC. Some of Indonesia's distinguished contribution to the maintenance of international peace before nominating itself for a non-permanent member of UNSC 2019-2020 could be seen from table 5.2.1. below.

Table 5.2. 1. Indonesia's Contribution to the Maintenance of International Peace Before Its Candidature of UNSC 2019-2020 (MoFA of Indonesia, 2017b)

Form of Contribution	Year	Assignment
Indonesian Peacekeeping Force (Garuda Contingent)	1957-2017	Sending 2,713 Garuda Contingent personnel including UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan), MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo), MINUSMA (Mali), UNMISS (South Sudan), MINUSTAH (Haiti), MINURSO (Sahara West), UNISFA (Abyei) and UNMIL (Liberia)
	2006-2008, 2010-2012, 2013-2014	Indonesia is a member of the Peacebuilding Committee (PBC) of the UN and has been trusted to be a facilitator in the event several times
	2012	Indonesia is an Annex II country that signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Indonesia's Membership in the UNSC	1974-1975, 1995-1996, 2007-2008	Indonesia has been elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC three times
Indonesia in ASEAN	1976	Initiator of the establishment of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation regarding the principles of how countries act in ASEAN
	1995	Establishment of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty
	2009	Establishment of the pillars of the ASEAN Political-Security Community
	2010	Participation in the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) on the protection of women and children in which Indonesia organized several events of the ACWC
	2011	Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) the agency that regulates cooperation on disaster management
	2012	- Consolidation of representatives of ASEAN countries to make joint statements through the shuttle diplomacy strategy - Initiating ASEAN's Six Point Principles
	2016	Encouraging ASEAN member countries to agree on a communique in the ASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting in Vientiane, Laos.
	2017	Active involvement in the process of increasing cooperation in the region through the

		Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea.
Indonesia towards Terrorism Issue	2004	Establishment of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) and has trained police officers from 70 different countries
	2011 - now	Indonesia is a founding country and a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)
	2015-2018	A member of the Advisory Board of the UN Counter Terrorism Center (AB UNCCT)
Indonesia towards Climate Change	2016	Ratification of the COP21 agreement in Paris on climate change and has committed to meet the targets of the agreement
Indonesia towards Conflict Resolution	1993-1996	Mediator in negotiations between MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) – the Philippines
	2002	Establishment and implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DoC)
	2008	Mediator in the Preah-Vihear conflict between Cambodia and Thailand
	2008 – 2013, 2014, 2014 - 2017	Continuously raising international support in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) with the NAASP Capacity Building for Palestine program, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

Introducing the role as a “True Partner for World Peace” is a part of an effort to promote what a country is capable of doing in the recent times. Regarding Indonesia's physical material contribution to the UNSC before its candidacy in 2019, Indonesia had become ranked 7th out of 124 countries contributing personnel to the UN peace mission with 3,544 Indonesian personnel, with a commitment to achieve a personnel deployment of 4000 in 2020 (MoFA of Indonesia, 2019).

For Indonesia, it appears that being a non-permanent member of the UNSC is something that must be fought for even though Indonesia has quite capable multilateral power, has made its own contribution, and has earned the trust of the international community. Ms. Rina Setyawati highlights during the interview that “UNSC is a *prima donna* and countries in general will do everything they can to be a part of it... Whoever opposes Indonesia in the election of non-permanent members of the UNSC, Indonesia's treatment, strategy, and "all-out" attitude will still be put forward.”

Using multilateral power as one unique capability is in line with what has been stated by Wilson (2008) about smart power. Indonesian decision-makers seemed to involve

awareness towards its targets, self-knowledge of its national interest in pursuing international peace in accordance with the Preamble of 1945 Constitution, the context of UNSC, and sorts of modal qualities to be employed. In short, Indonesian decision-makers were arguably smart in perceiving its multilateral power in playing its role at the UNSC. As a matter of fact, Indonesian decision-makers has shown confidence in using its multilateral power.

When asked about how confident Indonesia was in nominating itself against the competing country (which in the 2019-2020 UNSC period was the Maldives), Ms. Rina Setyawati stated that “When it comes to confidence, Indonesia was generally confident with a better posture than the Maldives.” These confidence and seriousness in becoming a non-permanent member of the UNSC were reflection of the perception of its decision-makers that Indonesia was considered capable and worthy to get on duty in the UNSC. Certainly, this confidence was not something that just came up without any efforts. Regarding this, Ms. Rina Setyawati adds that:

“This has gone through a long history, therefore, if a country really wants to nominate itself as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, the first and most basic thing is whether the country is included in the category of peace-loving states or not. Indonesia has a good track record in this, a long history of peacekeeping missions and involvement in peacebuilding processes in several countries. Indonesia is considered very competent, credible, and as a partner of countries around the world to create peace.”

Moreover, the significance of Indonesia’s multilateral power could not be separated from the opportunities that are available in the international structure, as well as at the UNSC. The international political constellation has now been colored by various forms of initiation of international cooperation, which have provided opportunities for all countries, especially for the middle powers including Indonesia, to spark their impact and achieve their interests. As Ms. Rina Setyawati stated during the interview that:

“Political dynamics in the UNSC during 2019-2020 period provides greater opportunities for non-permanent members to voice and aspire. This is different from the UNSC 10 years ago where the majority of countries would choose to side with P2 or P3 of the P5. In short, the role of the non-permanent members has gotten bigger.”

As discussed in the chapter four that liberal order in the structure has created a strong sense of multilateralism among middle powers. On the one hand, this could mean a mark of opportunities to achieve a certain goal and collective interests. On the other hand, this could

also give considerable challenge(s) to the middle powers' capacities to sustain, to support, and even to reform, if necessitated, the existing order of international structure in order to remain in its ideal condition.

Given the stature of the UNSC as the most prominent UN body dealing with peace and security issues, it can be assumed that there is a big opportunity for Indonesia to contribute to the attainment of international peace and security. More importantly, the occurring non-traditional international peace and security issues have required the UNSC to be reformed in order to be more representative, effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent (CFR, 2021). Indonesian decision-makers have seemed to grasp both the opportunity and challenge emanated from being a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Regarding this, Ms. Rina Setyawati stresses during the interview that:

“Although some countries may be skeptical of the UN, Indonesia still believes in the principles of multilateralism. Indonesia remains with the UN but also has a critical attitude towards the relevance of the UN in the recent international politics.

To Indonesia, the UN cannot continue to do ‘business as usual’ because international security issues have become increasingly dynamic and cross-cutting within the last decade. In the UN Security Council, many contemporary issues have developed, such as climate and security issues, although the majority of countries' views on these issues are still divided.

A decade ago, Indonesia did not consider non-traditional issues as important discussions at the UNSC because they were not included in the UN Security Council mandate. But recently, Indonesia has to calibrate its position in the UN Security Council because of the impetus and potential of non-traditional security threats. Indonesia must be agile and not fixated on only security issues which are included in the mandate of the UN Security Council.”

5.3. The Role Conception of “A True Partner for World Peace” and the Role Enactment

“A True Partner for World Peace” as the Cognitively Perceived National Role

All relevant factors, which are ideational and material, have been put forward to determine Indonesia's national role conception while serving at the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020. In Breuning's role theory, national role conception is defined by a country's decision-makers and might be relevant to issue area and/or geographic domain. Considering Rapport's cognitive approach of FPA, these decision-makers are “boundedly” rational,

meaning that they satisfice and seek to maintain cognitive consistency in foreign policy due to the complex environment of international politics.

As a middle power and a non-permanent member of the UNSC, it would be an overstatement to say that Indonesia can influence international politics deeply and/or reform bodies such as the UNSC to an ideal form. Unlike the P5 members who have special privileges and strong influence, Indonesia's seriousness in carrying out its role as "A True Partner for World Peace" in UNSC seems to be motivated by factors that are related to Indonesia's strong perception towards its interest. During the interview, Ms. Rina Setyawati reveals that:

“Indonesia, both in the UNSC and in other international organizational formats, is generally known as a country that has no ‘interests’, in the sense that Indonesia remains independent and is not easily influenced by major powers (P5) in positioning itself and making policies. ‘A True Partner for World Peace’ is encouraged by something that has long existed in the veins of Indonesia as a country committed to contribute to the pursuance of global peace.”

MoFA of Indonesia (2017b) also confirms that Indonesia’s foremost national interest, aside from other interests, in becoming a non-permanent member of the UNSC is the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate, which clearly states that “one of the ideals of the Indonesian people is to participate in implementing world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice”.

This also related with the opportunity about what the UNSC could potentially does with its capacity. Indonesian decision-makers realized the fact that the UNSC has a very large role, especially in overcoming global security issues. Therefore, Indonesia's nomination shows and reinforces Indonesia's commitment to implementing world order as a fulfillment of the constitutional mandate that must be carried out.

To Indonesian decision-makers, the goal was clear, namely the creation of world peace and security. Equally important, Indonesia's commitment and character which were assumed not easily influenced by the P5 seem to be related with the principle of “independence” in foreign policy which has still been maintained by Indonesian decision-makers in any practice of foreign policy, including by President Jokowi’s administration.

If examined further, "A True Partner for World Peace" as the role that Indonesian decision-makers perceived in the UNSC for the 2019-2020 period also appears to be a manifestation of a more obscure but more general role(s), departing from certain relevant issues, and is related to how Indonesia positions itself in the issue, as well as what Indonesia could and has done regarding the issue. When asked about the origin of this national role conception during the interview, Ms. Rina Setyawati explains that:

“The emergence of the concept of a role as A True Partner for World Peace is a necessity, which relates to sales strategies in campaigns, jargon or taglines that are related to the latest trends. If viewed from the membership of UNSC 10 years ago, the nomination of the country had not brought a similar concept or tagline to attract international support. But recently, the trend like this does not only appear in the Council, but in other international bodies.

This concept of role (as A True Partner for World Peace) identifies what is relevant and we have done, continued, and strengthened when we are in the UNSC. There are many cases in the UN Security Council where Indonesia is still playing other particular roles. For instance, as a bridge-builder, Indonesia in the UNSC does not only represent the country but also the region.

Not only that, Indonesia is also a representation of a country with a Moslem population or which is part of the OIC and a representation of the NAM. Therefore, whatever Indonesia does in the UNSC is not only about Indonesia, but also the struggle for the interests of other countries that are worth fighting for.”

Referring to Hoslti as a founding father of national role conception in FPA studies, role as a bridge builder is somehow connected to one of his 17 national role conception, namely “bridge”. In 1970, Holsti found this role as something that often appeared in a vague form, and policies deriving from it did not seem apparent.

Likewise, Indonesia’s role as a bridge builder in several international relations issues often appears as a less specific role, but has been a point of reference in designing a more specific national role. What has been said by Ms. Rina suited the statement of Hudson & Day (2020) that the approach of FPA is unique in the sense that it exposes human agency, human accountability, and human creativity. In pursuit of UNSC’s 2019-2020 non-permanent membership period, it could be seen that Indonesian decision-makers adapted to what has become a necessity, which the conceptualization of role as “A True Partner for World Peace” and responsibility, which the maintenance of role(s) that have been played.

The role conception as “A True Partner for World Peace” then acted as a manifestation of other pre-existing role, which appeared to be the role as bridge builder. In a speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia at the General Debate Session of the 75th of UNGA, it was revealed that:

“It is our determination that Indonesia will continue to contribute to world peace according to the mandate of the constitution. Indonesia will always continue to play the role of a bridge builder, as part of the solution. This commitment continues to be carried out by Indonesia, including when Indonesia sat as a member of the UNSC. The spirit of cooperation will always be put forward by Indonesia, a spirit that benefits all parties without leaving a single country.

The UN must be more responsive and effective in solving global challenges. And we all have a responsibility to continue to strengthen the UN so that the UN remains relevant and increasingly contributing, in line with the challenges of the times.

The UN is not just a building in New York City but a shared goal and commitment of all nations to achieve world peace and prosperity for future generations. Indonesia has unwavering faith in the UN and multilateralism. Multilateralism is the only way that can provide equality” (The Ministry of State Secretariat of Indonesia, 2020).

In addition, before Indonesia was elected as a non-permanent member of UNSC for the period of 2019-2020, MoFA of Indonesia (2017b) highlights some of “rationalities” written in the *aide memoire* behind Indonesia’s candidature. It appears to be the evidences of what Indonesia has and is capable of doing. It describes a consistency, not something that departs from merely maximizing material benefits.

1. Indonesia is a member of the UN that is active in various fields (social, economic, humanitarian, etc.) and supports and strengthens international peace and security.
2. Indonesia was a bridge and consensus builder in the previous membership of the UN Security Council in 2007-2008.
3. Indonesia is active in regional and global engagement through peaceful dispute resolution, conflict prevention and resolution, including through mediation.
4. Indonesia has an important position among UN member countries because of Indonesia's status as a democratic country with the largest Moslem population in the world.
5. Indonesia is a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping force.

6. Indonesia was an initiator to strengthen the involvement of civilian roles in peace missions proposed and approved in UNGA resolutions.
7. Indonesia hosted the Asia-Pacific Regional Meeting on Peacekeeping in 2015 as evidence of support for continuing to strengthen the role of the United Nations in maintaining peace.
8. Indonesia contributes actively as a member of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in peacebuilding, especially in the post-conflict stage.
9. Indonesia has played a role in dispute resolution, prevention, and conflict resolution in accordance with the UN Charter and international law through dialogue, consultation, mediation, and negotiation.
10. Indonesia has played a key role in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Example: Coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Working Group on Disarmament and strong supporter of the establishment of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ).
11. As the world's largest Moslem population and a founding member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Indonesia is committed to facilitating peace talks to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and a strong advocate for moderation and tolerance in defense of Islam as a peaceful religion.
12. Indonesia has upheld the aspirations of developing countries. Example: proactive role in NAM.
13. Indonesia has demonstrated a strong commitment to fight terrorism by upholding respect for human rights. Example: A decade before 2018, there have been 900 cases that have been successfully handled and have ratified a number of international conventions related to terrorism.
14. Indonesia has taken many initiatives to promote interfaith dialogue.
15. Indonesia has played a role by bridging differences in the discussion of human rights considerations at the Human Rights Council, as well as the UNGA.
16. Indonesia has been maintaining regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia, such as being the initiator of the ASEAN Political Security Community.
17. Indonesia has promoted the interests of developing countries through membership in the G-20.

18. Indonesia has been supporting environmental protection in the context of sustainable development. Example: Indonesia was the Chair of COP13 (United Nations Climate Change Conference).
19. Indonesia supports reform of the UNSC that is more democratic, representative and effective.

MoFA of Indonesia (2017b) also states that the most prominent reason behind the rationalities is how Indonesia as a country has always been one that actively participates in maintaining world security and peace, as well as how it has fulfilled the principles and objectives of the UN Charter. By becoming a non-permanent member of UNSC for the 2019-2020 period, Indonesia can also take back its roles, such as a consensus builder and mediator on various issues discussed at the UN Security Council as it has done when it was a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the period of 2007-2008. Indonesian decision-makers apprehended that non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council only lasts for 2 years, therefore, non-permanent members must be experienced and actively convince P5 to support various concrete efforts for the realization of global peace and security.

A commitment to carry out an ambitious vision in the UNSC cannot be separated from the capabilities of a non-permanent member and the existing opportunities. Even though Indonesia does not possess military and economic postures as the great powers do, it can be expected that it still prevails in the context of multilateral power, as well as its contribution and efforts. Even before Indonesia was elected as a non-permanent member of UNSC for the period 2019-2020, MoFA of Indonesia (2017) already committed and declared that:

“If elected, Indonesia can play a role as a country that fights for its national interests based on its objectives and modalities, considers the agenda and mission of the institution based on its mandate and track record, considers politics between permanent member countries that have veto rights, and aspirations of other countries that can be represented by Indonesia.”

Nevertheless, as mentioned by Assistant Foreign Minister of China, Shen Guofang, about the unique features of the UNSC in the chapter four, middle powers have every opportunity to play significant role when serving in the UNSC. The decision to conceptualize “A True Partner for World Peace” as Indonesia's national role in the UNSC in 2019-2020 was deemed feasible given the ideational and material driving forces that Indonesia has possessed. By being involved as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2019-2020,

Indonesian decision-makers also recognized the need for UNSC reform in line with a more inclusive global order.

To Indonesian decision-makers, the opportunity for membership in the Council has opened up a very strategic opportunity to encourage the UNSC reform process from within (MoFA of Indonesia, 2019). However, Indonesian decision-makers also realized that Indonesia's contribution in the UNSC, as well as the issues raised, must be rationally considered. It means that the role conception and enactment should reflect Indonesia's national interests and ought to be in accordance with Indonesia's capabilities and readiness (MoFA of Indonesia, 2017b).

The Role Enactment of “A True Partner for World Peace”

Regarding Indonesia's role enactment (foreign policy behavior) in the UNSC in 2019-2020, Indonesia remained consistent and satisficing given the limitations of UNSC non-permanent membership. Following the role taken, which was “A True Partner for World Peace” as a manifestation of preceding role in Indonesia's previous membership in the UNSC, Indonesia set a bundle of prime concerns called the 4 Priority Issues and 1 Special Attention Issue (4+1 priorities). According to MoFA of Indonesia (2019b), the 4 Priorities are as below:

1. Continuing the contribution of the Indonesia in its efforts to realize world peace, among others through strengthening the ecosystem or geopolitics of global peace and stability by promoting peaceful dialogue and resolution of conflicts.
2. Building synergies between regional organizations to maintain peace and stability in the region. The emphasis is on the need to strengthen regional organizations.
3. Increasing cooperation between countries and the UNSC to combat terrorism, extremism and radicalism.
4. Trying to synergize efforts to create peace with sustainable development efforts.

In addition to the above Priority Issues, the Special Attention Issue was paying attention to the Palestinian issue, which has remained as one of the main focuses of Indonesian foreign policy for years. Indeed, there were other actions done and innovations made by Indonesia when being a part of UNSC aside from the mentioned 4+1 priorities. But what Indonesia has done was a mere manifestation of the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate and the result of the consistency maintained by Indonesia in the UNSC.

Speaking of some important achievements in implementing these priorities, to begin with, in solving conflict, Indonesia has always voiced the importance of promoting peaceful dialogue (Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation of MoFA of Indonesia, 2019). For instance, this has been put forward and done in Indonesia's role in the peace process regarding the issues of Afghanistan, Myanmar, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Eritrea, Burundi, Western Sahara, Mali, Venezuela, Haiti, Cyprus, Kosovo, and Ukraine. Even when solving Palestine issue that has been one of the interests of Indonesian foreign policy, Indonesia always believes that Palestine's independence can only be achieved through dialogue that puts forward a two-state-solution.

According to MoFA of Indonesia (2019b), some of the main achievements of Indonesia's Presidency at the UNSC that took a theme of "Investing in Peace" were the adoption of 4 Resolutions, which were UNISFA (United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei), UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq), AMISOM (African Union Mission for Somalia), and the extension of resolution on South Sudan Sanctions.

Indonesia also encouraged the Council to hold an open meeting which resulted in a Presidential Statement (PRST) regarding efforts to continue to strengthen the training and capacity of peacekeepers towards improving the performance of UN Peacekeeping Mission. This was also the first UN document discussing aspects of training and capacity building for UN Peacekeeping Mission, and emphasizes the mission as the most effective tool in maintaining international peace and security.

Indonesia Window (2020) also adds that under Indonesian Presidency in 2020 that were themed "Advancing Sustainable Peace", UNSC has adopted 4 (four) resolutions, which are "an extension of the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL); extension of the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia (UNSOM); extension of the sanction regime in Mali; and resolution 2538 on female peacekeeping personnel which was initiated by Indonesia".

The resolution on female peacekeeping personnel was also the first resolution in the history of Indonesian diplomacy to be adopted by the Council. Additionally, there was a draft resolution that was vetoed by the US on prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration (PRR) of terrorists, which was also initiated by Indonesia and supported by 14 members of the UNSC.

Regarding the peacekeeping operation, peacekeeping always gets special attention from Indonesian decision-makers, as its efforts that Indonesia has done regarding this is also considered as one of modalities for Indonesia's candidacy. The resolution on female peacekeeping initiated by Indonesia was also motivated by belief that women can contribute to "greater credibility of the missions among the population, more effective community engagement, and enhanced protection responses" (Monash University, 2021).

This is not surprising because this has always been a concrete manifestation of the implementation of the Constitutional mandate in the Preamble 1945 Constitution, which also cannot be separated from the independent and active principles of Indonesian foreign policy. Although the UN Peacekeeping Mission has gone through developments in accordance with the dynamics of the issues faced, Indonesian troops' contribution and possible efforts have, in fact, remained consistent since 1957. Indonesia has so far received awards for its credibility, professionalism and active role (Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation of MoFA of Indonesia, 2019).

Moreover, there is also an agenda of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in the Council which could not be separated from Indonesia's priorities to build synergy between ASEAN and the UNSC. Promoting gender equality and reducing social inequalities between men and women in ASEAN through this agenda was already pledged by ASEAN countries in Joint Statement On Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN in 2017.

Indonesia itself has adopted the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in 2014 through presidential decree. However, the main obstacle for Indonesia in pursuing the regional WPS agenda appears to be the ASEAN "non-intervention" principle as there have been only 3 ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, that have adopted the WPS national plan. Nevertheless, during its first presidency of the UNSC in 2019, Indonesia organized regional training on "women, peace and security" for 60 diplomats from ASEAN countries, aimed at building their capacity to analyze and sustain post-conflict peace (Monash University, 2021).

Regarding other regions, the synergy between regional organizations and the UNSC has so far demonstrated by a number of peacebuilding efforts, such as the synergy between the UNSC and the European Union in resolving conflicts in the European region, including in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Crimea, as well as the synergy between the UNSC and the African Union in peacebuilding efforts. In 2019, Indonesia supported the ratification of

Resolution 2457 regarding Silencing the Guns in Africa, which contains the UNSC's support for the African Union's efforts to combat the illicit trade in firearms within Africa.

Indonesia has also carried out a consultation visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2019. This visit is a form of Indonesia's efforts to voice the concerns of African countries and explore the potential for concrete cooperation, especially with the African Union. From this visit, several areas of cooperation were identified in the aspect of counter-terrorism, maritime security, peacekeeping operation, climate issues, police cooperation, small arm and light weapon (SALW) issues, cooperation between ASEAN and African Union, and the implementation of the ten principles of Bandung that has been upheld by Indonesia as one of fundamentals in playing its role in the UNSC (Directorate General for Multilateral Cooperation of MoFA of Indonesia, 2019).

Furthermore, as the country hosting biggest Moslem population on earth and a country promoting “moderate” Islam, Indonesian decision-makers certainly view the issue of terrorism, which is often considered related to particular religion, to be crucial to be solved. Indonesia, as well as in the UNSC, has continued to prioritize a comprehensive strategy that combines both the hard approach through law enforcement efforts and the soft approach through prevention, de-radicalization, counter-radicalization, and interfaith dialogue. An example for this was Indonesia’s initiative to draft the PRR resolution that was vetoed by the US.

In the context of international cooperation under the framework of the UN against the issue of terrorism, Indonesia has ratified 8 (eight) international instruments, including the ratification of amendments to 1 (one) international convention related to counter-terrorism. Indonesia has also continued to prioritize cooperation with the UNSC in advancing the discussion of counter-terrorism issues, among others were under the framework of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) through collaboration with the United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism (UNOCT), Terrorism Prevention Branch-United Nation Office for Drugs and Crime (TPB-UNODC), and United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED).

In addition, Indonesian decision-makers seem to believe that peace could be built through the pursuance of sustainable development program. Especially in Africa, the root causes of many conflicts are often poverty, economic and welfare inequality, struggles for

access to natural resources, and the effects of climate change. Indonesian decision-makers believed that peace is broader than the absence of war. Aspects of economic development, community empowerment, protection of human rights, promotion of an inclusive political process and democracy must also be the main concerns to achieve peace.

Among Indonesia's real contributions in achieving this were holding of technical capacities in the field of entrepreneurial empowerment in Jordan in April 2019, in Suriname in September 2019, and in Nigeria in October 2019. Indonesia also held Indonesia-Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (IAID) in August 2019 to make progress leaps and to improve infrastructure and economic connectivity. A number of resolutions adopted regarding conflicts in the African region, including resolutions on peace missions in Mali, Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, also stressed on strengthening international partnerships in supporting sustainable development.

Aside from the 4+1 priorities, Indonesia has also paid special attention to several non-traditional security issues. During its second presidency of the Council, which was in August 2020, Indonesia initiated 3 signature events (Indonesia Defense, 2020). The first was the Meeting on the Linkage of Counter Terrorism and Organized Crimes. In this meeting, Indonesia emphasized three main points: (1) adjustment of policies in dealing with the relationship between terrorism and organized crime; (2) strengthening legal infrastructure and institutions in overcoming the link between terrorism and organized crime which must be adopted into the national law of the country; and (3) strengthening cooperation mechanisms in the region in responding to the issue of terrorism and organized crime.

The second was the Meeting on The Pandemic and The Challenges of Sustaining Peace, which took a format of open debate. Indonesia conveyed three things that became its main priorities, which was: (1) adoption of peace-building aspects in a comprehensive effort to overcome the pandemic; (2) synergy of the UN working bodies in the peace building efforts; and (3) optimizing the use of limited resources for peacebuilding efforts.

The third was the meeting of *Arria Formula* on Cyber and Protection of Civilians. According to Security Council Report (2020), *Arria Formula* meeting is an informal meeting held at the initiative of a member or members of the Security Council to hear the views of individuals, organizations or institutions on matters under the authority of the Security

Council. This meeting can also be a mechanism or a forum for discussing new security issues that have not been on the UNSC agenda.

Through this meeting in August 2020, Indonesia put forward a number of issues, namely the various impacts of cyber-attacks on vital objects, including for humanity, as well as the importance of strengthening national legislation and international norms as an effort to protect civilian infrastructure. Indonesia encouraged bilateral, regional and global efforts to strengthen capacity and common understanding to face cyber security challenges (Indonesia Defense, 2020).

Revisiting Breuning's National Role Conception

All considered, it can be drawn that Indonesia's role conception and its enactment was cognitively consistent and satisficing. Cognitive consistency is reflected in the formulation of role, priorities, activities, as well as Indonesia's continuing contribution to the UNSC for the period of 2019-2020, which did not contradict with Indonesia's identities, inherited foreign policy principles and core interests. It was also recognized and gained full support from domestic constituents. While satisficing means that Indonesia's role conception and enactment were pragmatic, given the limitations of being a non-permanent member of UNSC for two years' period.

Interestingly, consistency and satisficing (pragmatic) foreign policy behavior are intertwined with each other in the context of Indonesia, as pragmatic foreign policy to Indonesia (discussed in the chapter three) means foreign policies that are resolved based on its own interests and must be carried out in accordance with the situation and facts at hand. Indonesia's core interest is written clearly in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution which states "the establishment of an Indonesian government that protects the entire Indonesian nation and the entire homeland of Indonesia; promotes public welfare and educates the nation's life; and participates in carrying out world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice".

Pragmatically, Indonesian decision-makers should pursue any forms of foreign policy that are in line with its interests and in accordance with situation at hand. If it is maintained by Indonesia and the interests are upheld, it will represent cognitive consistency in conducting foreign policy. A question may then arise about how Indonesia could possibly fight for its

interests in the UNSC format which does have its own unique situation, especially with the existence of the P5. In the recently UNSC, any role taken or any proposal originating by a non-veto state must be subject to P5 approval.

Regarding this, a non-permanent member like Indonesia could possibly navigate and utilize its multilateral power in order to aspire and bargain its position. In fact, there is always potential for the middle powers to perform their role and even to push a reform of the UNSC as has been discussed earlier. Ms. Rina Setyawati told an interesting fact about the increasing role of the non-permanent member of UNSC during the interview that:

“When COVID-19 first went global, the UN Security Council, including international agencies, was late in responding and providing resolutions. This is due to the political competition between China and the US, both of which are the P5. In this situation, Indonesia was a country acting as a mediator and a country that provided input that could be accepted by both parties.

Another example is in the case of Afghanistan, where Indonesia was trusted to act as one of the penholders, being one of the determinants of resolutions regarding any situation that occurs in Afghanistan. Indonesia has received international trust to play its role in the UN Security Council”

Based on this, it is possible for Indonesia as a middle power to aspire and to spread its influence. In other words, opportunities for middle powers at UNSC are always there and has become increasingly visible, the problem is whether these middle powers, which are capable, are willing to try and take advantage of the available opportunities or not. Nonetheless, being cognitively consistent and satisficing is the fruit of a long journey of Indonesian diplomacy and consistency in the priorities that Indonesia has maintained. As Ms. Rina Setyawati highlighted during the interview that:

“If one country is no longer consistent, other countries will notice and automatically lose their trust ... Indonesia's first priority in its role in the UNSC is saving lives. Whatever the debate, any interests will be put aside so that saving lives is maintained. The second priority is the effort to pursue the unity of the UNSC in formulating policy ... Indonesia is known to have no “interests”, Indonesia while in the UNSC has been like a “celebrity”, becoming the target of lobbying for many countries to represent their aspirations.”

Taken together, the summary of Indonesia's national role conception during a non-permanent membership of the UNSC in 2019-2020 and its driving forces, as well as its reference for the role enactment could be seen from the chart below, which is created for the purpose of this thesis, adapting to the schematic of Breuning's national role conception in chapter two.




Figure 5.3. 1. Indonesia's National Role Conception and Role Enactment in the UNSC (2019-2020)

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis is basically inspired by an assumption that the approach of an FPA sub-discipline of IR, in this case the national role conception or also known as role theory, has its own merit to provide an in-depth understanding about the particular phenomenon of international relations. For IR researchers in analyzing a country's foreign policy, they should first bring a mindset that state is a social entity consisting of human decision-makers, meaning that every policy taken or every behavior shown by a state cannot be separated from the presence of the social creature having cognition and recognition. Subsequently, each topic taken for analysis by must also have a limited scope and focus so that it could provide more detailed findings.

What is interesting about the discussion of the conception of the national role is the fact that all states, regardless their status, can influence international politics by playing different roles in international platforms that may suit their country. Of course, the roles taken must be in accordance with the perceptions of their decision-makers and be driven by several determining factors emanated both from domestic and international context. Not only that, it is also appealing that the national role conception of country can also be varied and unique, making this discussion more interesting and fruitful for expanding the scientific aspects of international relations.

By following the above ideas and utilizing Breuning's national role conception of FPA, this thesis finds that the role taken and carried out by Indonesia as "A True Partner for World Peace" in its non-permanent membership at UNSC in 2019-2020 has a vigorous domestic and international basis. In a mutually reinforcing manner, the perceived ideational driving forces such as Indonesia's identities, inherited foreign policy practices, and domestic recognition; and the perceived material factors such as Indonesia's multilateral power and the opportunity in the UNSC, have formed a role conception as "A True Partner for World Peace" that was not only relevant but also related to several national roles and performances that have existed before Indonesia's candidacy to be part of the UNSC in the 2019-2020 period. The

behavior of the foreign policy derived was also cognitively consistent and pragmatic according to Indonesia's fundamental interests in maintaining world peace.

Related to its external validity, Breuning's national role conception has the potential to be applied to other case studies that are aimed at analyzing the role of a country, which influences its foreign policy behavior. It is also important to direct the analysis to the perceptions of the country's decision makers and to focus on one-specific issue relevant to the role, not solely based on the analyst's perception of an apparent role, because Breuning's theory is part of cognitive approach of FPA. Analysis can be conducted on the decision-makers' views, statements, official publications, and as well as interview with related person, as these have been done in finding the result of this thesis.

For the application of the theory, because it is about role of a country, the first thing researchers must do is to locate a particular role of a certain country that is strongly and clearly perceived by its decision-makers in relation to an international relations issue. As in this thesis, what makes the topic interesting is that Indonesia as a middle expressed its role to become "A True Partner for World Peace" explicitly in the largest international security cooperation scheme in the world, which is in the UNSC. Furthermore, cognitive analysis of decision makers can be started by allocating several factors that may be relevant in the formation of the national role. As for Breuning's theory, research on factors can be carried out by following closely what Breuning means regarding ideational and material factors in the conception of the national role. As this is a cognitive approach, data can be drawn from the relevant individuals' perceptions of the issue in which the role arises, for instance, the head of the state or someone working in the MoFA.

Being based on the assumption that theories derived from the FPA sub-discipline can be quite useful alternatives for studying foreign policy in IR, this thesis believes that Breuning's national role conception which emphasizes the cognitive aspects of decision makers is capable of being one of them. This is because Breuning's theory does not only bridge between domestic-based and international-based analysis (multilevel analysis), but also considers the importance of ideas and materials in determining the national role and behavior of foreign policy. Regarding the weightings between ideational and material factors of a particular role or behavior, it is the perception of the individual(s) concerned that determines.

This thesis helps IR researchers to broaden their understanding of the potential theoretical wealth and scientific scope of IR. By introducing a role conception derived from the field of social psychology, this thesis also asserts that contemporary IR should not be limited to mainstream theories, but must also be able to be synchronized with other social sciences to capture more advanced knowledge. It should also be realized that many IR theories or concepts have adopted concepts that previously existed in other disciplines, such as the concept of rationality derived from economics. Vice versa, some FPA approaches borrow the concepts or assumptions of some IR grand theories as shown within this thesis. Instead of imposing limitations in terms of theory or approach, contemporary IR has become unique because of its cross-disciplinary nature.

This thesis also has its own shortcoming considering the limited time and ability to complete it. Although Breuning's assumption about role theory is one of the most contemporary, finding out about the conception of Indonesia's national role as a democracy in the UN Security Council, or certain other democracies in certain IR topics, would be better if a direct investigation was carried out on how strong the public perception and understanding is regarding the national role taken by the government. This investigation may be carried out through interviews with several key informants who represent the community in general or perhaps a direct survey involving the community. This is not to say that Breuning's national role conception is deficient, but rather to assume that it would be an interesting discussion and useful to be carried out to ensure a national role of state is effectively disseminated throughout society as one solid role.

The author of this thesis also recognizes that as one of the most contemporary role theorists, it might be only reasonable that Breuning has yet to provide a single and detailed guide on this subject, as she herself hopes for further development of the conception of the national role. Apart from the recommendation, Breuning does provide solution to this, even though it might require a further advancement, by arguing that the use of official policy statements, speeches of leaders, historical documents, and so on is a fairly acceptable strategy to explain the perceived national role conception and foreign policy behavior of a country (in Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 2011).

As for the completion process, this thesis has at least followed the strategy provided although the author is aware that there is still potential to strengthen the findings. Attending

to Breuning's theorizing, each determining factors of national role conception, as well the perceived and enacted role, is plotted sequentially chapter by chapter. Ideational factors and material factors are discussed respectively within chapter three and four, while the cognitive role conception and its enactment are examined in the chapter five. This method was chosen to make it easier for readers to follow and to understand how Breuning's national role conception can be understood.

Finally, despite the shortcoming of this thesis topic and the approach chosen above, I generally believe that this thesis has provided a fairly fruitful explanation of Indonesian decision-makers conceptualizing Indonesia's role as "A True Partner for World Peace", which in turn has an impact on foreign policy behavior of Indonesia in the UNSC for the 2019-2020 period. Since the conception of the national role is expected to still have room for progress, the author of this thesis hope that this thesis can help, at least, develop and increase the use of the national role conception in the study of IR in particular, and help encourage the use of other FPA-typical approaches in analyzing foreign policy decisions in general.

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