

THE POLITICS OF POLICY REFORM IN MULTIPLE STREAMS: THE CASE OF ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN TURKEY

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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ABSTRACT

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How did a policy entrepreneur managed to appear, successfully set the (decision) agenda, and drive a path-departing policy reform in asylum and immigration in Turkey in the 2000s? In seeking answers to this question, this study examines the politics of policy reform in asylum and immigration in Turkey from 2008 and 2013 through the analytical lenses of the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). MSF, as initially conceptualized, puts a particular emphasis on actions compared to institutions in agenda-setting. Given the geographical setting –the United States (the US)– where this framework was born and developed, such an action-focused approach to the policymaking process is not surprising. The conventional wisdom, too, corroborates this argument by pointing to the US, where entrepreneurial efforts are rewarded. However, not all settings share the same politico-administrative conditions with the US. Therefore, a meaningful application of the MSF requires considering institutions. Perceiving policy styles as a master variable embedding formal political institutions and informal rules, including overlooked administrative traditions, this study offers to incorporate policy styles into multiple streams. Arguing that only after considering policy styles can the MSF shed light on the politics of agenda-setting, policy design, policy adoption, and eventually policy reform, this research revisits multiple streams through the prism of policy styles. In this way, it provides answers to the emergence, operations, and successful agenda-setting of a policy entrepreneur in Turkey's statist policy style, where policy entrepreneurs are not encouraged as much as their counterparts in the US. This study bases on empirical evidence collected through programming and legislative documents and semi-structured interviews with key bureaucrats, experts, and representatives of international and national organizations in asylum and immigration.

Key Words: Public policy, agenda-setting, policy change, MSF, policy style

ÖZET

ÇOKLU AKIŞTA REFORM POLİTİĞİ: TÜRKİYE’DE İLTİCA VE GÖÇ REFORMU POLİTİKASI ÖRNEĞİ

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Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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2000’li yıllarda Türkiye’de politika girişimcisi iltica ve göç alanında nasıl ortaya çıktı, çalıştı, karar gündemini başarıyla belirledi ve politika reformunu tetikledi? Bu soruya yanıt arayan bu çalışma, 2000’li yıllarda Türkiye’de gerçekleşen iltica ve göç reformunu Çoklu Akış Modeli’nin analitik merceği altında incelemektedir. Çoklu Akış Modeli, başlangıçta kavramsallaştırıldığı gibi, gündem belirlemede kurumlara kıyasla eylemlere özel bir vurgu yapar. Bu çerçevenin doğup geliştirildiği coğrafya -Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD)- göz önünde tutulduğunda, politika oluşturma sürecine böylesine eylem odaklı yaklaşılması şaşırtıcı değildir. Geleneksel tartışmalar da bu argümanı girişimci çabaların ödüllendirildiği ABD’ye işaret ederek destekler. Ancak, tüm coğrafyalar ABD ile aynı siyasi-idari koşulları paylaşmaz. Bu nedenle, Çoklu Akış Modeli’nin anlamlı bir şekilde uygulanması kurumların dikkate alınmasını gerektirir. Bu çalışma Politika Stillerini resmi siyasi kurumları ve resmi olmayan kuralları içeren (şu ana kadar göz ardı edilmiş idari gelenekler de dahil olmak üzere) ana değişken olarak algılamakta ve bu sebeple Politika Stillerini Çoklu Akış’a dahil etmeyi önermektedir. Bu çalışma ancak Politika Stilleri Çoklu Akış Modeli’ne dahil edildikten sonra, Çoklu Akış Modeli’nin farklı coğrafyalarda gündem belirleme, politika tasarımı, karar verme ve dolayısıyla politika reformu politikalarına ışık tutabileceğini savunmakta ve Çoklu Akış’ı Politika Stilleri üzerinden gözden geçirmektedir. Böylece, bu çalışma politika girişimcilerinin ABD’deki girişimciler kadar teşvik edilmediği Türkiye’de, devletçi politika stilini göz önüne alarak iltica ve göç alanında ortaya çıkan politika girişimcisinin çalışmalarına ve başarılı gündem belirlemesine cevap sunar. Bu çalışma, iltica ve göç politikası alanlarındaki kilit bürokratlar, uzmanlar ve uluslararası ve ulusal kuruluşların temsilcileriyle yapılan yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler ve programlama ve yasal belgeler aracılığıyla toplanan ampirik bulgulara dayanır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamu politikası, gündem belirleme, politika değişikliği, çoklu akış modeli, politika tarzı

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE POLITICS OF ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION REFORM IN TURKEY

1.1. Research Questions, Gaps in the Literature, and the Argument

In January 2012, a policy entrepreneur successfully got his policy alternative on the decision agenda. In April 2013, the policy entrepreneur's pet proposal materialized as the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (henceforth, the LFIP) by bringing significant changes in asylum and immigration in Turkey. As a path-departing policy reform¹, the LFIP (i) removed the Republic's years-long aim to boost the population qualitatively and quantitatively by replacing it with migration management, (ii) lifted the link constructed earlier between nation, culture, and security by acknowledging human rights of refugees and protection seekers at domestic level, and (iv) transferred the authority of managing migration from the Foreigners Department of the National Police (henceforth, the Police) to the Directorate General of Migration Management (henceforth, the DGMM) by establishing civilian supremacy over police organizations.

These changes in asylum and immigration in Turkey stimulated discussions about the LFIP among scholars. A wealth of scholarly work explained changes the LFIP brought in asylum and immigration through the lenses of Europeanization literature (Baklacioglu, 2017;

¹ Policy reform, policy change, and policy transformation are used interchangeably in this study unless otherwise stated.

Bolukbasi et al., 2018; İçduygu & Aksel B., 2012, 2013; Kirişci, 2012). Despite providing scholars with invaluable insights into “outside-in” explanations, existing research fell short of explaining how the LFIP was moved to the decision agenda in the first place. To fill this gap in the literature, this study focused on the domestic level. It sought answers to: *How did the path-departing policy reform in asylum and immigration take place in Turkey in the 2000s?* In so doing, it dissected the policymaking processes of the LFIP and accordingly examined the politics of policy change.

This is a case of policy change, which may be best examined through the analytical tools of the public policy literature. Public policy literature suggests many theories to scrutinize the politics of path-departing policy reforms. Nonetheless, not all theories present effective instruments to trace policy changes back to agenda-setting. The most employed public policy theories focusing on agenda-setting are the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and the Multiple Streams Framework in the literature. Despite having some similar features, these theories disagree on one critical point: the way political actors design and build their strategies in setting agendas. For instance, the Advocacy Coalition Framework discusses that political actors challenge the monopoly of beliefs governmental actors exercise by building coalitions and thereby trigger change. The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory argues that political actors seek attention from a broader audience, appeal directly to the public, and thereby change policies. The Multiple Streams Framework (henceforth, the MSF) draws attention to a *policy entrepreneur* who operates in and around government to get her/his pet proposal, sets the decision agenda, and hence triggers policy change. The policy entrepreneur does not necessarily approach the public, nor does s/he set up coalitions to challenge the government's authority over beliefs in setting the decision agenda. On the

contrary, policy entrepreneurs may build their strategies in line with the rules of the game and without getting the support of the public.

Because there was a policy entrepreneur, who set the agenda and drove the path-departing policy reform in asylum and immigration without challenging the government's monopoly and turning to the public, the MSF stood as the prime candidate to apply in this case.

The MSF provides analytical means to understand the politics of policy change starting from the agenda-setting. Kingdon (2011) argues that agendas are set and, hence can be changed by a *policy entrepreneur* if s/he couples a *perceived problem* together with a *policy solution* and an apt *political context* when a *policy window (window of opportunity)* is open.

Kingdon developed the MSF building on the US' peculiar politico-administrative system, where individuals are rewarded for their entrepreneurial actions (Kingdon, 2011; Marmor, 1986, p. 225). Think of the way Kingdon describes the policy entrepreneur, for instance. Policy entrepreneurs are 'advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money- to promote a position in turn for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solidary benefits.' (Kingdon, 2011, p.179). This action-focused description denotes that anyone willing to invest her/his resources may perform as a policy entrepreneur, set the agenda, and thereby prompt policy change anywhere. However, such a policy entrepreneur would most probably be detected as a threat to the policymaking process in Turkey. Having said that, a policy entrepreneur appeared, set the (decision) agenda, and generated policy change in asylum and immigration without being identified as a threat; how? In this study, I also addressed *how a policy entrepreneur appeared, functioned, and*

successfully set the (decision) agenda in Turkey by triggering policy reform to fully understand the politics of the policy change in asylum and immigration.

The MSF literature argues that policy entrepreneurs may appear beyond agenda-setting and the US. In building their arguments, MSF scholars allude to the powerful insights from institutionalism. Scholars usually bring formal political institutions (also read as formal rules) in the MSF when explaining diverse outcomes across geographies (Béland & Howlett, 2016; Koebele, 2021; Sætren, 2016b; Zahariadis, 1992, 2003, 2016; Zohlnhöfer, 2016; Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016). They do so not only to explain variances concerning policy entrepreneurs but also to enlighten differences as to the other structural elements beyond the US. Sætren (2016b) discusses how formal rules structure the relationship between the executive and the legislature in Norway and argue that *insiders* (read, ministers) have greater chances to set agendas than *outsiders* (read, non-political actors). A few MSF scholars point to *informal institutions* as explanatory variables. For instance, Spohr (2016b) explains how interest intermediation models, as informal rules, constrain and enable new ideas to thrive in different European welfare states. Fewer scholars mention formal and informal institutions together.

Despite providing invaluable perspective to multiple streams worldwide, existing research offers fragmented and isolated findings. This is because MSF scholars habitually focus on one or a few structural elements of the MSF in their analyses. Likewise, scholars mostly zoom in on a single stage of the policy process. Besides disabling systematic comparisons and coherent debates to develop in the literature, these also disable adequately explaining the case.

The state-of-the-art discussions almost unanimously point to a single way to effectively apply the MSF beyond its original scope: incorporating institutions into the framework. Following

the footsteps of MSF scholars, I, too, include institutions in the MSF in this study. Unlike them, however, I propose drawing on policy styles as a master variable (structuring variable) that embeds formal and informal rules, including long-neglected administrative traditions. Accordingly, I argue that we may explain meaningfully multiple streams beyond its original scope only when we include policy styles in the framework. Scholars define policy styles as “styles and structures which are strongly embedded in the macro-institutional context of the state tradition, the legal system and the political-administrative system (including characteristics of the civil service as well as the state structure and organization” (Knill, 2001, p. 61). With their structuring effects, policy styles determine the “public policy processes and outcomes” (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 6). In this way, policy styles help us understand “who can play and how they play” in the politics of policy processes (Steinmo, 2015, p. 181). Hence, this study brings two bodies of literature together: MSF and policy styles to shed light on the politics of agenda-setting, policy design, policy adoption, and thereby the politics of policy reform in asylum and immigration (*dependent variable*).

1.2. Theoretical Contributions or Introducing Policy Styles to Multiple Streams

Direct application of the MSF to the case at hand raises concerns due to differences between the US’ politico-administrative system and that of Turkey. In its original formulation, Kingdon attaches particular importance to actions (also read as actors) compared to institutions. Therefore, anyone reading Kingdon’s approach to agenda-setting would think that any person having entrepreneurial enthusiasm might set the agenda and thereby generate policy change by dedicating some time to a pet project and pursuing particular strategies. However, this would be hardly the case in Turkey’s policy style, where institutions do not always encourage

individuals to assume entrepreneurial roles and even identify such an actor as a threat to the integrity of the policymaking system. Existing MSF discussions considering different institutional contexts, on the other hand, are inadequate to explain the Turkish case meaningfully. The case at hand requires a specific focus on formal political institutions and informal rules comprising administrative traditions in Turkey. Existing studies typically approach institutions in a piecemeal fashion by often leaving informal rules aside, such as administrative traditions. In examples where both formal and informal rules are considered, scholars discuss the enabling and constraining effects of institutions on one or a few structural elements of the MSF or within a single stage of the policy process. These leave the literature with fragmented and isolated findings generating the following questions: *Does the same institution, be it formal or informal, structure the politics of agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption in tandem, and if yes, how? Does the same institution, be it formal or informal, structure the multiple streams, and if yes, how? Do formal and informal rules together structure the politics of agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption, and if yes, how?*

In this study, I propose contributing to the literature on MSF in five ways. First, I suggest benefitting from insights from policy styles to bring a more balanced approach to the relation between action (also read as actors) and institutions in multiple streams. In so doing, I believe I will help institutions become more visible in the MSF. Second, I will emphasize administrative traditions as informal rules, which had long been overlooked in MSF applications. Treating these rules as an integral part of policy styles, I will expand the existing approach to institutions in the MSF. Third, focusing on the politics of policy reform, and hence relatively a lengthy period comprising agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption, I will open a new line of discussion whether the same institution (read policy styles) structure these policy stages in tandem. Fourth, I will revisit the MSF's structural elements for each

policy stage. In this way, I believe, I will provide a basis for systematic comparisons and coherent debates in multiple streams. Fifth, I will expand the MSF's geographical focus to an understudied setting: Turkey.

1.3. Empirical Contributions

Turkey is one of the under-studied geographies in the MSF literature. There are essentially two studies focusing on Turkey through the lenses of the MSF (Bakir, 2009; Bakir & Jarvis, 2017). These studies explore the politics of macroeconomic change by nicely illustrating the applicability of the MSF to the Turkish context. However, both studies understand institutions as mere contextual conditions without providing clues about the Turkish politico-administrative system and how the policy entrepreneur these studies examined, who once was an outsider, was on-boarded in the policymaking processes. Furthermore, these studies exclusively focus on the policy entrepreneur by excluding thorough research on whether and, if so, how institutions shape other structural elements of the MSF. Therefore, I believe this study will contribute to the existing MSF applications to Turkey in three ways. First, this study will bring a broader approach to institutions by conceiving these as constraining and enabling variables in policymaking and policy change. Second, it will discuss their structuring effects on each structural element of the MSF. Third, it will do so by exploring different stages of the policymaking process.

1.4. Methodological Issues

1.4.1. The Least Likely Crucial Case (A Policy Entrepreneur in Turkey?)

Increasingly seen as complementary than competitive, there are strong reasons to prefer qualitative research over quantitative work. The conventional wisdom points to qualitative work as a data collection strategy; when small samples are on the table, cases are approached in an opportunistic or purposive way, and “particular individuals, events, and contexts” are in question (Gerring, 2017, p. 18). As it stands, qualitative research is ideally suited to idiographic analyses (Gerring, 2017, p. 18). Therefore, what distinguishes a qualitative study from a quantitative work are “non-comparable observations drawn from chosen cases” (Gerring, 2017, p. 19). Noncomparability of observations excludes the possibility of coming up with algorithms and hence eliminates quantitative research from being carried out. This study, with its non-comparable observations, stands as qualitative research.

There are several strategies to conduct qualitative research, one of which is the case study. Gerring (2004, p. 341) describes the case study² as “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena.” Earlier research supports this definition as well. For instance, Orum et al. (1991: 2) describe a case study as an “in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single phenomenon.” As its descriptions suggest, case studies promise to unpack a set of complex political issues over time, identify particular characteristics of a political phenomenon, build theories, and generalize findings.

Single case studies reach their methodological potential mainly when researchers concentrate on a *crucial case*. Eckstein (2000, p. 118) defines the crucial case as one “that *must closely fit* a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity, or, conversely, *must not fit* equally

² Case studies also refer to works that a) adopt small-N qualitative research; b) are “ethnographic, clinical, participant-observation, or otherwise “in the field” (Yin, 2014 cited in Gerring, 2004, p. 342); c) have characteristics of process-tracing; d) examine the features of a single case or e) scrutinize a single phenomenon (Gerring, 2004).

well any rule contrary to that proposed.” Therefore, there are simply two types of crucial cases in Eckstein’s terms: a *most likely* or a *least likely* -crucial- case. A most likely case is crucial if it disconfirms a theory when it is most expected to confirm it. On the other hand, a least likely case stands as a crucial case if it confirms a theory when least expected to do so (see George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). Gerring (2007: 231-232) adds up on these discussions by highlighting that “a case is crucial in the strongest sense when it can be explained precisely by a theory; no other theory can explain the facts of that case, and the theory is invariant (deterministic).” Therefore, a single case study reaches its cruciality not only when its findings confirm or disconfirm whichever theory but a deterministic one when it is not expected to do so. Hence, George and Bennett (2005: 81) argue that single case studies comprising a variable which “is at an extreme value can be very useful for heuristic purposes of identifying new theoretical variables or postulating new causal mechanisms. Single case studies can also serve to reject variables as being necessary or sufficient conditions”.

As its design suggests, this research stands as a -single- case study. It investigates a single *unit of analysis*: the politics of policy reform in asylum and immigration in Turkey. The period under review is from October 2008 to April 2013. Keeping the core focus on this period, this study explores how a policy entrepreneur appeared, functioned, successfully set the decision agenda, and triggered a policy change in asylum and immigration. The appearance of a policy entrepreneur and his successful agenda-setting point to a single theory in public policy literature: the Multiple Streams Framework. Since no other existing public policy theory would better explain the case at hand for the above-stated reasons, this research reached its cruciality in the most robust sense in Gerring’s terms.

Echoing Eckstein, this case can be better identified as the *least likely crucial case*. This is because the policy entrepreneur, who prompted the policy change, was not expected to appear and function in Turkey's peculiar politico-administrative system. After all, the MSF, which was developed in line with the US' unique politico-administrative system, alludes to how actions create changes in politics -almost- without being constrained by institutional contexts. However, this study challenges the asymmetrical emphasis on actions compared to institutions. Therefore, it argues that despite being *necessary*, actions are not *sufficient* to explain the politics of agenda-setting and policy change alike. Hence, this study highlights policy styles as a master variable embedding formal and informal rules. This study argues that policy styles, as institutions, enable and constrain policy entrepreneurs' actions and provide clues about "who can play, and how they play" in politics. Hence, they are necessary to clarify policy entrepreneurs' emergence, functioning, and agenda-setting beyond the US. In testing the multiple streams theory and helping its generalization through the help of policy styles, this study seeks to contribute to similar units of analysis.

1.4.2. Data Collection Strategies: Semi-structured Interviews and Desk Research

This study relies on empirical evidence collected in two ways: through (i) semi-structured interviews with key bureaucrats, experts, scholars, policymakers, and representatives of international and national organizations in asylum and immigration, and (ii) desk research including programming and legislative documents and other published material.

Throughout this research, I conducted a total of 16³ open-ended, semi-structured interviews with people who either directly participated in the policymaking process of the LFIP or had the chance to monitor the process closely. Most of the interviews (13) were conducted face-to-face between 2018 and 2021, whereas a small number of these were conducted online (2) and over the phone (1). One-third of them were performed with high and mid-level bureaucrats working at different ministries. Two interviewees were MPs from the opposition parties (the Republican People's Party and earlier the Equality and Democracy Party and later the People's Democratic Party). One was a policy advisor and program manager at EU Delegation to Turkey. The rest were from IOs (IOM, the UNHCR), associations (Association for Solidarity with Refugees), NGOs (Refugee Rights Turkey), and research centers (the Research Center on Asylum and Migration) operating in the field (please see Table 4. Interview Methods Table for more details). I had many opportunities to talk to academics, who had the chance to observe and participate in the policymaking process of the LFIP. However, most of these engagements were informal except for a semi-structured interview.

There are two reasons why I conducted -only- 16 semi-structured interviews. First, only a handful of people directly participated in or closely monitored the process. While small in numbers, these people were in critical positions. This, on the one hand, directed me to pursue a snowball approach within a small sample frame and provided me with the opportunity to reach most of the interviewees. On the other hand, it reduced the number of people I talked to when rejected. I was planning to conduct seven more interviews with stakeholders. Among these, 2 directed me to their colleagues as the experts of the issue. Their names were already on my list. Four did not respond to my interview invitations. I was not able to reach out to one

³ Those with the policy entrepreneur might be assessed as conversations or limited opportunities than proper hours-long interviews.

interviewee. Among the six categories I displayed in Table 4, I reached saturation for five categories, whereas I reached only partial saturation for one category. To reach saturation, I drew on other documents such as minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (henceforth, the GNAT) Committee Reports.

During interviews, I asked several questions to interviewees. Among these were: How did asylum and international protection policies develop in Turkey in the 2000s? How was the LFIP prepared, and why? Which stakeholders supported the policymaking process of the LFIP? Which stakeholders had the opportunity to monitor closely and even participate in the preparation process of the LFIP, and how? How do you think that the EU impacted the policymaking process of the LFIP in Turkey? How do you think that the proposal was introduced to the GNAT? I also asked about the geographical limitation maintained to the 1951 Refugee Law, whether interviewees think that the LFIP is bred of domestic needs, international pressures, or then-existing Syrian influx. I aimed to find out whether one potential reason outweighed the other in setting the decision agenda.

During this study, I also analyzed archival documents, parliamentary discussions, legislative documents, and published reports. I was also invited to a couple of conferences by stakeholders, which provided me with invaluable observations and information about asylum and immigration. These materials helped me triangulate the insights I gained during interviews and ensure the internal validity of the findings. These also served as independent materials to corroborate the themes and facts.

1.4.3. Data Analysis

After having collected data, I analyzed it in two ways. As to interviews, I sought to categorize dominant themes and facts to prompt testable conclusions. I went over the second round of interviews with two bureaucrats to clarify some of these concepts. Over time and as the dominant themes and facts loomed, I asked the themes and facts I came up with through new questions during interviews. These themes and facts helped me dissect the politics of policy reform through the MSF's structural elements and compare the case with other MSF applications. More often than not, I compared themes and facts with those in Kingdon's work, which I can explicitly call my *informal (shadow) unit*.

1.5. Outline of the Dissertation

This study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the MSF and how it was applied in different geographies and stages of the policy process. Since this study emphasizes institutions' enabling and constraining characteristics, Chapter 2's sub-sections are designed to discuss the impacts of institutions on the MSF's structural elements. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on policy style. This chapter discusses the potential effects of policy styles, which are considered as a master variable enfolding formal and informal rules, on the structural elements of the MSF. Additionally, this chapter provides a theoretical background for further discussions on incorporating policy styles as a structuring variable into the MSF. Chapter 4 presents Turkey's statist policy style, briefly mentions the historical development of asylum and immigration policies, explains the agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption processes of the LFIP, and finally touches upon changes to the structure of asylum and immigration policies. This chapter is where I zoom in on the dissected structural elements of the MSF in Turkey's politico-administrative design and provide the findings on the

polycymaking process of the LFIP accordingly. Chapter 5 concludes by presenting the main results.



CHAPTER 2 MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK: EXTENDING THE POLICY PROCESS, EXPANDING THE GEOGRAPHY

The previous chapter briefly mentioned the two bodies of literature that this study draws on and reviews. This chapter embarks on a more detailed discussion of the first body of literature: the Multiple Streams Framework (henceforth, the MSF). To this end, it first introduces the MSF's structural elements – problem stream, policy stream, political stream, policy windows, and policy entrepreneur. Second, it reviews modifications offered to the framework when scholars extended multiple streams to the following policymaking stages and expanded its geographical focus beyond the US. Categorizing institutions-focused modifications under two groups as formal (political) and informal rules, this chapter, third, explores how institutions shape the structural elements of the MSF. Finally, it concludes.


2.1. Multiple Streams Framework

As opposed to theories suggesting complete rationality, Kingdon (1995) echoes Cohen, March, and Olsen's (1972) Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice⁴ in *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Alluding to ambiguity in policymaking, Kingdon highlights problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation⁵ in agenda-setting and discusses how

⁴ Kingdon does not name his model the Multiple Streams Framework. However, scholars following his footsteps and the literature on the public policy process widely term it the Multiple Streams Framework. I will use the Multiple Streams Framework in this study when referring to Kingdon's Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.

⁵ Problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation point to ambiguous conditions under which governments make policies. In this understanding, problematic preferences allude to political actors' opaque and unprecise choices in decision-making. These actors habitually adjust their priorities as the policy process matures. Therefore, political actors' ultimate goals cannot be ascertained from the very beginning of the policy process. Ambiguity is present in technology, as well. Members of a given organization, for instance, usually have

policies are made under ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2003, p.3; Cairney & Heikkila, 2018). In dissecting agenda-setting politics, Kingdon proposes to rely on five structural elements – problem stream, policy stream, political stream, policy windows, and policy entrepreneur. As figure 1 illustrates, a policy entrepreneur⁶ sets the agenda by coupling problem, policy, and political streams during an open policy window (read as a window of opportunity).



fragmented “understandings of why they are doing what they are doing” despite having a good knowledge of their individual responsibilities (Kingdon, 2011, p.84). Fluid participation refers to the disproportionate time and effort members of a given organization put into decision-making. Moreover, not always the same members participate in decision-making processes. Consider the executive in a democratic setting, for instance. Its composition would change with each election. Hence, each executive’s conclusion would differ, even if they address the same problem. Therefore, the participation of different members in decision-making would result in disparate choices.

⁶ Although the policy entrepreneur has a central position in Kingdon’s framework, this does not mean that a single person is responsible for the whole process alone (Zahariadis, 2014).

Figure 1. Multiple Streams Framework with its highlighted sub-components in the study (Adapted from Jones et al., 2016; Herweg et al., 2015)

2.1.1. Problem Stream

The problem stream refers to the challenges that seize key persons' attention 'in and around government' (Kingdon, 2011, p. 90). Once key persons, or as re-conceptualized by Knaggård (2015) policy brokers, decide to take up existing challenges, they frame and re-introduce these as problems. Due to their perceptual, interpretative, and contextual nature, problem definitions vary across geographies (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016; Kingdon, 2011). Therefore, a condition defined as a problem in one setting may be disregarded in another.

When defining problems, policy brokers draw on indicators, focusing events, and feedback⁷ about existing programs. These help problem brokers capture policymakers' sincere attention to the magnitude of a given problem (Herweg et al., 2018; Howlett et al., 2017; Kingdon, 2011).

Indicators, be these systematic or not, are helpful to calculate the scale of a problem and monitor changes to it. Both central authorities and non-governmental actors [may] assess existing programs and thereby produce indicators. More often than not, indicators prompt curiosity among small groups and therefore need to be supported by other sources.

Unlike indicators, focusing events such as crises and disasters attract a broader audience. Due to their nature, focusing events are often visible not only to people in and around the

⁷ The literature treats these as the sub-elements of the problem stream.

government but also to the public. Therefore, these events make the public question why “the problem had not been considered before and what ought to be done about it” (Birkland, 1997, p. 3). In this way, the public becomes part of the problem stream. Because its inclusion usually gets an issue onto the agenda, scholars tend to focus on public problems and assume that there is a sort of causality between public problems and governmental action (Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 222).

Feedback about the existing programs, too, helps problem brokers frame conditions as problems (Herweg et al., 2018). Once people in and around the government perceive that the existing programs fall short of reaching targeted goals, become costly or generate undesirable consequences, they tend to construct conditions as problems (Herweg et al., 2018; Kingdon, 2011).

The problem stream is ready for coupling when policy brokers define conditions as problems and support these via indicators, focusing events, and feedback⁸. However, their success in conveying their problem definition to policymakers depends on other conditions as well, such as acting quickly before policymakers’ attention shifts elsewhere and persuading them that there are solutions to existing problems (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 90).

2.1.2. Policy Stream

The policy stream refers to policy communities generating policy alternatives to perceived problems (2011: 116). Following Kingdon, the literature defines a policy community as a “loose connection of civil servants, interest groups, academics, researchers and consultants ...,

⁸ Despite being used to draw attention to problems, *indicators*, *focusing events*, and *feedback* are not always enough to transfer an issue to the decision agenda.

who engage in working out alternatives to the policy problems of a specific policy field” (Herweg, 2016).

People regularly exchange ideas about their proposals in the policy community (Kingdon, 2011, p. 117). In parallel, they promote their views on several platforms and explain how their solutions respond to arousing issues. These lobbying efforts are necessary because policy advocates (read policy entrepreneurs) know that only very few alternatives reach decision agendas in the end.

In the policy community, ideas go through natural selection. Some ideas survive, whereas others disappear. Still, some others change or merge with others to see the light of day (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 116–117; Zahariadis, 2014, p. 33). There are some criteria for the survival of policy alternatives. Among these are *value* and *public acceptability*⁹ (Kingdon, 2011, p. 131). The more embraceable the proposals are in values within a *policy community*, the more likely they persevere. Likewise, the more *publicly acceptable* the proposals are, the more likely they survive in the policy stream. More often than not, “decisions that are likely to be successful” get on the agenda rather than the best policy options out there (Peters, 2015, p. 51).

There is also a practical way to keep alternatives in force: softening up. In this process, policy advocates discuss, alter or unite their ideas with others to make their ideas survive and crack any potential resistance to these in the policy stream. Therefore, they educate people, make them talk about the proposal, and illustrate how to deal with perceived challenges. In this way, policy advocates try to save their pet projects from falling on deaf ears (Kingdon, 2011, p.

⁹ There are other criteria, such as *technical feasibility* and *financial acceptability*, for policy alternatives to survive in the policy stream. However, these will not be treated in detail here. For further discussion, please see Kingdon, 2011.

128). In case advocates succeed in softening up their proposals, they get one step closer to getting their pet projects on the decision agenda.

The policy stream is ready for coupling when a workable proposal exists. Its workability largely relies on its *value* and *public acceptability* (Herweg et al., 2018; Kingdon, 2011).

2.1.3. Political Stream

The political stream alludes to dynamics resulting from changes to public opinion, the multiplicity of interests among groups, and legislative turnover, which form the sub-elements of the political stream: the *national mood*, *organized political forces*, and *election results*.

The first sub-element is the *national mood*. The national mood refers to public opinion and its potential to change the decision agenda. The national mood does not necessarily denote the mass public. Instead, it is understood as a “fairly large number of individuals” sharing similar views (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 34). Political actors are expected to sense the national mood to adjust their agendas accordingly. There are several ways to perceive the shared preferences structuring the national mood. Political actors may benefit from print media, receive information through surveys and face-to-face conversations.

The second sub-element of the political stream is *organized political forces* embedding interest groups, political parties, and their activities. These actors do not have to share common interests. However, their consensus on a given topic coupled with supporting activities may shape how political actors approach and react to existing problems. Hence, their stance and actions give the political actors clues about the direction they may follow.

The third sub-element of the political stream is *election results*. These allude to the changes to the composition of governments and legislatures, hence changes of administration and redistribution of seats (Kingdon, 2011, p. 145). Following elections, governments may follow two ways to change their agendas. First, if a new political party sets up the government, it may replace items previously moved onto the decision agenda with the new ones. Second, if the same political party sets up the government, it may want to review its agenda and adjust the items according to its new priorities.

The possibility of an item to enter the decision agenda is closely linked to the support of the majority in the political stream. Shifts in national mood, (re)distribution in legislative seats, and organized political forces' supportive campaigns provide a fertile ground for agenda changes in receiving such support. Therefore, the political stream is ready for coupling when the majority's support is guaranteed in the political stream.

2.1.4. Policy Window

The *policy window*¹⁰ is “an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 165). Because the policy window is a short-lived occasion, policy advocates should get their pet projects ready and wait for such an opportunity to present itself.

Policy windows open in either the problem stream due to a compelling problem such as a natural disaster or the political stream due to an eye-catching event such as redistribution of

¹⁰ Also used as a window of opportunity.

the seats in the parliament (Herweg et al., 2015, p. 443; Kingdon, 2011, p. 168). As opposed to those opening up in the problem stream (henceforth, the problem window), the policy windows in the political stream (henceforth, the political window) open up regularly and predictably. Therefore, the political windows provide policy advocates with the advantage of getting prepared ahead of time compared to unpredictable problem windows.

Relying on ‘the relationship between the origin of the window -political or problem- and their degree of institutionalization or routinization,’ Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p. 137) suggest four window types. The first of these is the ‘routinized political window.’ Institutionalized procedural events such as regularly held elections produce ‘routinized political windows’ predictably. The second is called the “discretionary political window.” The discretionary political windows are hard to predict since their existence is inextricably linked to the behavior of individual political actors. The third one, the “spillover problem window,” opens when an agenda item emerges parallel to an already opened policy window elsewhere. The fourth one, the “random problem window,” opens when a random or an unforeseen problem such as a crisis emerges. In this context, scholars evaluate the readiness of a policy entrepreneur for seizing the opportunities and making use of them.

The literature also examines how the location of policy windows shapes the relationship between problems and solutions. The original conception allows us to think that solutions might be prepared well before a policy window opens. Zahariadis (2008, 2014, p. 37) illustrates that “solutions are developed in response to specific problems” when windows open in the problem stream. In this case, problems chase solutions. If windows open in the political stream, the link between these two becomes conceptual. In Zahariadis’ words (2014: 37), “attention is focused on solutions first before problems can be clearly defined. This time and unlike what

one might have expected, solutions chase problems. Therefore, the issue becomes getting the solution adopted rather than answering a problem. Timing turns out to determine how the consequential relationship between problems and solutions develops (Copeland & James, 2014, pp. 3–4).

Objective facts and events such as changes to executive help policy advocates identify policy windows. However, the idea of whether a policy window is open or not is inextricably linked to the perception of policy advocates. Hence, it is critical for policy advocates to evaluate “whether a window is open or will be open” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 171). The policy window lies at the heart of the MSF, without which the readiness of the streams or the policy entrepreneur would not bring any agenda change (Herweg et al., 2018).

2.1.5. Policy Entrepreneur

Kingdon attributes a pivotal position to the policy entrepreneur¹¹ as the actor responsible for coupling the streams, setting the decision agenda, and driving the policy change. Policy entrepreneurs are ‘advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money- to promote a position in turn for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive for solidary benefits’ (Kingdon, 2011, p. 179). What describes a policy entrepreneur is her/his actions than her/his position (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011). Therefore, policy entrepreneurs “are not necessarily found in any one location in the policy community. They could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed positions, in interest groups or research organizations” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 122). In this understanding, “the location of policy

¹¹ The MSF literature increasingly perceives the “policy entrepreneurship as an institutional or collective act.” As a result, the policy entrepreneur is considered a less “alone hero” (Goyal et al., 2020, p.2).

entrepreneurs ... is nearly irrelevant” (Sætren, 2016a, p. 73) and hence “any policy-relevant actor – policymaker, bureaucrat, academic, journalist, representative of an interest group, or a member of parliament- may become a policy entrepreneur” (Herweg et al., 2018, p. 28).

Since her/his actions stand out rather than her/his location, scholars propose to follow some criteria in identifying the policy entrepreneur. First, the policy entrepreneur is the actor who has considerable expertise on a given issue and is able to “speak for others” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 180). S/he draws on her/his expertise when proposing solutions. The more expertise a policy entrepreneur has, the more influence s/he would have in a policy community. When challenged, the policy entrepreneur may choose to soften up her/his proposal by altering or uniting her/his ideas with others. In this way, s/he turns her/his proposal into a workable alternative and minimizes the risk of fragmentation which would decrease the support coming from the policy community (Herweg et al., 2018). Therefore, not always the best policy alternative gets on the agenda; instead, the policy entrepreneur advocates for “decisions that are likely to be successful” (Peters, 2015, p. 51). Second, the policy entrepreneur is also the actor who has and uses her/his ‘political connections’ and ‘negotiating skills’ (Kingdon, 2011, p. 181). The influence of the policy entrepreneur increases when s/he benefits from her/his political connections. Third, the policy entrepreneur is persistent in her/his endeavors. S/he dedicates a considerable amount of time communicating with others, e.g., “giving talks, writing position papers, sending letters to important people” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 181). Those who qualify for being entrepreneurs use all these skills to move their pet projects in the decision agenda successfully.

As the central component of the MSF, a policy entrepreneur couples her/his pet project with a perceived problem and political momentum when a policy window is open in either problem or political stream (Kingdon, 2011, p. 182).

2.2. Modifications to the MSF beyond Agenda-Setting and the US

In the original conceptualization of the MSF, Kingdon attributes a more prominent role to actors than institutions (Tosun & Workman, 2018, p. 332). Therefore, he does not discuss whether and, if so, how institutions shape agenda-setting and policy change in the US. Nor does he provide scholars with clues about how institutions would structure policymaking processes and policy outcomes elsewhere. As a result, scholars extending the MSF beyond the agenda-setting stage and expanding the geographical focus of the framework incorporate institutions into it. In this way, scholars pave the way for a line of discussion about how public policymaking relates both actors and institutions in multiple streams.

2.2.1. Extending the MSF Beyond Agenda-Setting

Kingdon is interested in how issues end up in the decision agenda and thereby sheds light on the agenda-setting stage. Scholars nicely illustrate that the framework is also applicable to the following stages of the policy process, including policy implementation and policy evaluation¹². In so doing, they usually pursue one of three options.

The first option is to merge agenda-setting with decision-making. Zahariadis (2003), as the pioneer of this option, argues that the same policy entrepreneur couples all three streams for

¹² As stated in the introduction, this study does not discuss the implementation and evaluation stages of the LFIP. Hence, modifications offered to the MSF for these policy stages are not treated in detail here. For further discussions, please see Howlett, 2018; Ridde, 2009; Sager and Thomann, 2017; Boswell and Rodrigues, 2016; Sætren, 2016; Goyal, Howlett, and Chindarkar, 2019.

two different venues: agenda-setting and decision-making. In this understanding, policy change happens if the policy entrepreneur succeeds in both. This is the option that institutions do not explicitly come into sight of.

The second option is to dissect the policymaking stages. Zohlnhöfer et al. (2016) argue that only through dissecting policymaking stages can one identify whether “a policy change failed because the proposal did not even succeed in entering the agenda or because it made it onto the agenda but was vetoed during decision-making” (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, p. 246). This is because each policymaking stage has different institutional features, producing disparate results. Therefore, scholars suggest incorporating formal political institutions into the MSF without challenging its structural elements.

The third option is to dissect the policymaking stages and include new structural elements beyond agenda-setting. Howlett et al. (2014) propose to add process and program streams for policy formation and decision-making. In this *five-stream confluence model*, the inclusion of new actors and thereby new strategies hint at varying power dynamics in each policy process. This is because institutions structure different policy stages in different ways. In this option, scholars emphasize formal political institutions and ways of doing things as informal institutions (read, informal rules).

In conclusion, scholars follow one of the three options when following up on the agenda items beyond agenda-setting. Stressing institutions’ structuring effects in politics, they often offer modifications to the MSF.

2.2.2. Expanding the MSF Beyond the US

The MSF builds on the US' peculiar institutional characteristics. Unsurprisingly, institutional characteristics change from one setting to another by structuring politics to varying extents (Steinmo et al., 1992). Therefore, scholars investigating the applicability of the MSF in other places refer to these places' political features and relatedly stress the need to bring institutions back into the MSF. As Pollitt (2008, p. 127) puts it: "the further one travels from . . . the distinctive characteristics and procedures of the American legislature – the more Kingdon's analysis may require adaptation."

Today, more than three hundred MSF applications focus on geographies other than the US (Cairney & Jones, 2016). These primarily focus on European countries, such as France, Germany, Greece, and Turkey. Applications also entail Asian countries, such as China, India, and Russia. The MSF also travels to African states such as Burkina Faso and Latin American countries such as Mexico and Brazil.

2.3. Bringing Formal and Informal Rules Back Into the MSF

Scholars have chosen two ways to bring institutions back into the MSF (Bolukbasi & Yıldırım, forthcoming). One group of scholars followed insights of the classic approach to institutions (Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Lijphart, 1994, 1999; Olsen & Peters, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Sætren, 2009; Treib, 2008; Weaver & Rockman, 1993; Herweg et al., 2015; Zahariadis, 2003, 2008; Zohlnhöfer, 2016; Ness & Mistretta, 2009; Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016). In this understanding, institutions are defined as formal political institutions such as "legislatures, courts and executives" (Cairney, 2020a, p. 1) and "legal rules and procedures" (Rhodes, 2011, p. 5). These institutions are considered to structure "the power relationship between the state and individuals and associated constituents" (Rhodes, 2011, p. 6). Comparing different formal political institutions as key study variables (federal vs. unitary, parliamentary vs. presidential

systems) and legal rules, MSF scholars discussed how policy processes and outcomes vary across geographies (Sætren, 2016b).

Another group of scholars traced why similar formal political arrangements produce different solutions to the same problem (Bell, 2002; Sætren, 2016a; Weaver & Rockman, 1993). Drawing on the insights of the New Institutionalism, scholars this time approached institutional rules from a broader perspective. They understood these as both formal political institutions and informal rules, such as “compliance procedures and standard operating practices” (Hall, 1986, p. 19). In this way, scholars discussed institutions “shape the behavior, power, and preferences of actors in politics” (Bell, 2002, p. 5) by going beyond the formal political arrangements and traced them through norms, practices, and routines that “shape constellations of actors and their goals” (Spohr, 2016b, p. 251; Zahariadis, 2016).

2.3.1 How Do Formal Rules Shape the MSF’s Structural Elements?

Formal rules structure the components of the MSF to varying degrees in different settings and policy stages. Employing conceptual tools of classic institutionalism, scholars developed and modified the MSF’s four structural elements: the policy stream, the political stream, the policy entrepreneur, and policy windows. The problem stream is considered to be shaped fundamentally by the political contexts and hence seen as independent of formal rules.

2.3.1.1. How Do Formal Rules Structure the Problem Stream?

Problems are different from conditions. Unlike conditions, problems are “not entirely self-evident” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 90). For a condition to become (read, be perceived as) a problem, actors should think that they “should do something about them” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 109). Such thoughts emerge when there is “a mismatch between the observed conditions and one’s

conception of an ideal state” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 110). This conception of an ideal state may belong as much to the public as it may belong to the political actors. The political actors’ perceptions and ideal states may matter more than the public’s depending on the issue. Scholarly debates illustrate that policymakers tend to define a condition as a problem when that condition jeopardizes the government’s re-election in a party-driven parliamentary system (Herweg et al., 2015; Zohlnhöfer, 2016; Zohlnhöfer & Huß, 2016, p.171).

Despite being supported by indicators, focusing events and feedback almost in an objective manner, problems are not exempt from “perceptual and interpretative element[s]” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 110). As Herweg et al. (2015: 436) put it, “problems are not objective facts that the political system – be it presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential- addresses in a quasi-automatic manner.” Therefore, scholars avoid modifying the problem stream for different institutional settings. Instead, they emphasize the contextual nature of problems in examining how formal political institutions shape the problem stream.

2.3.1.2. How Do Formal Rules Structure the Policy Stream?

In the original formulation of the MSF, the future of policy proposals exceedingly depends on how successfully they come out of the natural selection process (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 116–117; Zahariadis, 2014, p. 33). In this understanding, the policy proposals’ fate is free from formal political institutions of any sort. However, with scholars examining new settings, a new survival criterion emerges for the policy proposals: the formal political institutions.

As Table 1 illustrates below, formal political institutions shape the policy stream in two ways. First, formal political institutions structure types of solutions that come into being. This is mainly because formal rules determine who are invited in and frozen out of policy

communities. Selective invitation to policy communities naturally limits which “problems [...] are addressed” (Sætren, 2016b, p. 27), and policy alternatives emerge in the policy stream.

Second, formal rules shape the degree of autonomy of the “para-political sphere” from central authorities in different geographies in different ways (Beland, 2005, p. 8; Koebele, 2021). The level of independence of a given para-political sphere, in turn, yields clues about who policy community members would be and how they produce expertise and policy alternatives. Think of the para-political sphere in France, for instance. Compared to that in the US, the para-political sphere in France is seen as less independent of the political administration (Beland, 2005). This is because the French government offers “institutionalized access to policy communities through government-sponsored agencies” (Bolukbasi & Yıldırım, forthcoming). In contrast, actors’ actions in the US are “institutionalized through the establishment of “think tanks” and academic “research institutes,” which are generally autonomous from political parties and the state” (Béland, 2005, p.8).

2.3.1.3. How Do Formal Rules Structure the Political Stream?

In its original formulation, the MSF solely stresses “the fluid, changeable aspects of politics, such as shifts in public mood, changes in the preferences of policymakers, governing-party turnover and the emergence of new interest groups” (Spohr, 2016b, p. 253). Other than these contextual features of politics, Kingdon does not provide any clues about how institutions systematically shape politics. However, institutions structure “variables that determine the dynamic in the politics stream” (Spohr, 2016b, p. 253), and they do so in at least four ways, as Table 1 shows below.

First, institutions structure the *national mood* that Kingdon begins constructing his arguments about the political stream (Spohr, 2016b, p. 253). The *structured* national mood, in turn, “determines the dynamic in the political stream and empowers and shapes constellation of actors” (Spohr, 2016b, p. 264). Shaping the responsibilities of the political actors indirectly, institutions also provide insights into the degree of their responsiveness to the national mood (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016).

Second, institutions enable or constrain “the establishment of *interest groups* and their attempts to influence decision-makers” (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, p. 246). Through their enabling and constraining features, institutions provide some organized political forces with different opportunities while restricting others as to their political influence (Beland, 2005). Therefore, some groups are more influential in shaping the political stream in some settings than others.

Third, institutions determine “formal and informal *veto-points*” that configure the political context for agenda and policy change. Think of a coalition government in a consensual democracy, for instance. In such a political context, political actors will seek an agreement to change agendas and policies (Bolukbasi & Yıldırım, forthcoming). In contrast, political settings with few or no veto points, e.g., single-party governments in majoritarian democracies, will not seek to make a consensus. Hence, the presence of veto points will compel political actors to pursue different strategies and result in different policy outcomes, among which are policy lock-ins and incremental adjustments (Spohr, 2016b, p. 253).

Fourth, institutions shape the electoral systems, which in turn determine “the composition of [government and] parliament” (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, p. 246). When there is executive dominance and weak or no bureaucratic turf battles, an item would easily slip into the decision

agenda (Herweg et al., 2018). In contrast, when there is weak executive dominance and great bureaucratic turf battles, an item would not reach the decision agenda. The composition of the executive also gives clues about whether consensus is needed to be built among different political actors to change decision agendas. Hence, the composition of the executive keeps its importance for the decision-making process as much as it maintains its significance for the agenda-setting stage.

2.3.1.4. How Do Formal Rules Structure the Policy Windows?

Policy windows may open in either problem or political stream in the agenda-setting stage. The problem window opens because there is a compelling problem or an eye-catching event. The political window opens when “a change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats in Congress, or a shift in national mood” occurs (Kingdon, 2011, p. 168). Scholars applying the MSF in different settings claim that the problem windows are independent of formal rules to a great extent (Herweg et al., 2015, p. 447). Stressing their contextual and perceptual features, scholars, therefore, do not provide any clues about how formal political institutions structure the problem windows (Herweg et al., 2015, p. 447). In contrast, scholars discuss the potential impacts of formal rules, such as electoral systems, on the political windows. Electoral systems in democracies often create regularities and predictabilities. The cyclical nature of these windows provides actors with opportunities to review and revise their agenda items and pet projects in advance (Smith, 2018, p. 66).

MSF scholars discuss that political systems, e.g., parliamentary vs. presidential, create divergent opportunities to actors as to policy windows. Independent of its location, Blankenau (2001) argues that policy entrepreneurs may benefit from short-lived policy windows to change agendas in parliamentary systems with few veto points. For instance, the closely-knit

relationship between the executive and the legislature in parliamentary systems will help policy entrepreneurs not lose much time when coupling streams. However, a policy entrepreneur in a presidential system will need comparatively long-lasting policy windows for similar changes due to multiple veto points in such institutional settings (Blankenau, 2001, p. 40).

As the literature extends its focus on the following stages of the policy process, scholars also draw attention to different windows of opportunity. Herweg et al. (2015) suggest differentiating the agenda windows from the decision windows. The agenda windows, as scholars describe, are no different from the ones Kingdon originally developed in his model. When a policy window opens, the policy entrepreneurs should be ready to move their projects to the decision agenda. However, even when they successfully put their proposals on it, policy entrepreneurs cannot guarantee the adoption of their alternatives. In this case, policy entrepreneurs need to reach political entrepreneurs functioning in the decision-making and persuade them to pursue decision windows to get their pet projects adopted (Herweg et al., 2015).

2.3.1.5. How Do Formal Rules Structure the Policy Entrepreneur?

As Table 1 displays below, formal political institutions structure policy entrepreneurs' actions, locations, strategies, and success in at least four ways. First, institutions afford policy entrepreneurs legitimacy in their actions. The perception of legitimacy changes from one setting to another. As a result, strategies built and actions taken by policy entrepreneurs change depending on which context they function in. Therefore, actors holding legitimate locations in the policy process have greater chances of promoting alternative policies or political rules than others (Child et al., 2007; Flynn et al., 2014; Garud et al., 2007; Ohemeng & Kamga, 2020).

Relatedly, formal rules structure the very being of the policy entrepreneurs as individuals vs. organized forces. Although the MSF literature predominantly focuses on individuals as policy entrepreneurs, recent studies increasingly emphasize organized forces, e.g., governments and the UN, as institutional policy entrepreneurs (Child et al., 2007; Maguire et al., 2004; Flynn et al., 2014; Nay, 2012). This is because the actions of these organized forces are considered more legitimate than that of any individual in the examined settings.

Second, institutions control who would be “invited in” and who would be “frozen out” of the policy process (Schmidt, 1996, p. 57). For instance, Sætren (2016b, p. 27) argues that formal political institutions determine “what type of actors/participants” are included in or excluded from the stages of the policy process depending on the sensitivity of an issue¹³ (also see Marmor, 1986; Rabe, 2004; Schneider & Teske, 1992; Thompson, 1994). In this understanding, the more sensitive the issue is, the more influential the institutions become in determining who would -better- set the agenda and drive policy change. Going a step forward, Mintrom and Norman (2009: 656) distinguish insiders from outsiders by favoring the former over the latter when it comes to significant policy changes. “[M]ajor change,” they argue, “must be informed by insider sensibilities.” They go further by suggesting that “the efforts of ‘outsiders’ to make change often come to nothing” (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 656). This view, however, creates a sort of tension in the literature since there is still a considerable number of researchers claiming the policy entrepreneurs to be outsiders by definition (Roberts & King, 1991; Zahariadis, 2003).

¹³ This is particularly important for the following policy stages that require entrepreneurs to play entrepreneurial roles.

Third, formal political institutions determine policy entrepreneurs' success in connection with their locations¹⁴. This is particularly true for settings where insiders set the agenda¹⁵ (Beland, 2005; Borrás & Radaelli, 2011¹⁶; Mintrom & Norman, 2009).

Fourth, formal political institutions enable different types of entrepreneurs to appear and function in different stages of the policy process (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016). In line with this argument, scholars highlight different entrepreneurs operating in different policymaking stages, if not a single actor assumes all the entrepreneurial roles (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016). In applying the MSF to the decision-making process under a coalition government in Germany, Zohlnhöfer et al. (2016) suggest the "political entrepreneur" as the subsequent actor to the policy entrepreneur. Political entrepreneurs "hold elected leadership positions" and operate in the decision-making stage (Herweg et al., 2015, p. 446). As insiders, political entrepreneurs have greater chances than policy entrepreneurs in coupling the streams and getting policy alternatives adopted during the decision-making (Herweg et al., 2015; Zohlnhöfer, 2016; Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016)¹⁷. Despite sharing some common skills with policy entrepreneurs, such as having strong communication and negotiation skills, political entrepreneurs develop distinct strategies due to different institutional conditions they are

¹⁴ In this scheme, as the independent variables, institutions simply constrain or enable the political actors to hold locations where they may function as policy entrepreneurs. In turn, the venue, determined by institutions, appears as the intervening variable and affects the success of the policy entrepreneurs.

¹⁵ However, other scholars think that the location of entrepreneurs does not matter at all (Roberts & King 1991; Zahariadis 2003).

¹⁶ Borrás and Radaelli (2011) espouse a similar approach in their research. Yet, this time, scholars discuss the link between the entrepreneur's location and her success in an institutional change.

¹⁷ The application of the MSF beyond the agenda-setting stage also enabled scholars to introduce other concepts to the literature: *Process brokers*, *program champions* (Goyal et al., 2019, p. 4), and *institutional entrepreneurs* (Bakir, 2009; Bakir & Jarvis, 2017). *Process brokers* are usually those who have an in-depth knowledge of the institutional system. They are traditionally bureaucrats operating within or outside the government. *Program champions* function in implementation, which does not necessarily depend on "the political executive" (Goyal et al., 2019, p. 4). Since "implementation support [does] not depend merely on bureaucratic loyalty and expertise" (Goyal et al., 2019, p. 4), scholars coin the program champion as policy program implementers. Bakir (2009, p. 572) and Bakir and Jarvis (2017, p. 471) define the *institutional entrepreneur* as an actor who "mobilizes ideas, resolves conflicts, and steers their implementation for policy and institutional changes."

working in. Some of their strategies are “conceding concessions, proposing package deals or manipulating the severity or salience of problems” (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016, p. 243). Hence, institutions shape entrepreneurs’ strategies.

2.3.2. How Do Informal Rules Shape the MSF’s Structural Elements?

The inclusion of informal rules in the MSF resulted in modifications to the policy stream, the political stream, the policy windows, and the policy entrepreneurs. The problem stream that scholars modified the least while including the formal rules in the MSF is, this time, considered to be shaped by institutionalized past policies as informal rules.

2.3.2.1 How Do Informal Rules Structure the Problem Stream?

Starting from the early 1990s, [new] institutionalist scholars criticized the MSF for undermining the link between “problems, solutions and politics” (Mucciaroni, 1992, p. 462). Scholars found Kingdon’s garbage can model partial because institutions were perceived almost exclusively in situational terms (Mucciaroni, 1992, p. 466). Scholars called for examining “the impact of historical and institutional constraints on agenda-setting” to fill this gap. They discussed how “policies from an earlier period” shape “the way [present and future] problems are conceptualized and defined” (Mucciaroni, 1992, p. 462; Weir, 1992, p. 191).

As one of the forerunners, Weir (1992: 191) argued that “the conception of what problems are and how they should be defined very often depends on previous policies,” and thereby, past policies help actors consider future policy choices. Birkland and Warnement (2016) and Spohr (2016a) corresponded to this conclusion by discussing that patterned problem definitions usually emerge victorious from the competition. Likewise, Sager and Thomann (2016: 289)

illustrated that “inherited policy paths impact and interact with the actors’ problem perception.” However, as opposed to other scholars, Sager and Thomann did emphasize that new problem definitions would create “competitive pressures” and challenge institutionalized policies, mainly when there is no strong opposition in the political stream or “traditional [political] elites” weaken (Sager & Thomann, 2017, p. 297; Spohr, 2016a, p. 264). In this way, scholars argue that path deviations are possible, novel problem definitions may “‘rule out’ and replace the prevailing problem perceptions,” and re-interpret, re-define and re-structure the value systems (Sager & Thomann, 2017, p. 297; Spohr, 2016a).

2.3.2.2. How Do Informal Rules Structure the Policy Stream?

Informal rules come up in many forms, such as past policies, interest intermediation models, and policy paradigms. First, scholars argue that past policies affect the value acceptability of policy proposals. As one of the survival criteria, value acceptability is crucial for policy proposals to be embraced in the policy community (Spohr, 2016a, p. 258, 2016b, p. 252). Therefore, proposals compatible with value acceptability, which is often patterned by past policies, have greater chances to enter the decision agenda. Otherwise, even proposals, whose time has come, risk being sidelined and hence have a lower chance of being adopted among others (Spohr, 2016a, p. 258; Ziblatt, 2002, pp. 629–630). Past policies play a similar role for the criteria of fairness and efficiency. As long as actors find a policy proposal morally just or appropriate, or efficient, they tend to support it in the policy primeval soup (Spohr, 2016a, p. 264). In turn, these frequently reproduce existing policies and create path dependency.

Second, interest intermediation models shape the policy stream in two ways. First, they filter actors’ access to policy communities by inviting some actors in and freezing others out. For instance, closely-knit interest intermediation models prevent new actors from entering the

circle (Spohr, 2016b, p. 262). The “selective and restrictive” characteristics of these models, in turn, disable new ideas to thrive. In resisting new ideas and reducing contingency, interest intermediation models hamper “the fluidity” in the policy stream (Spohr, 2016b, p. 262). The lack of fluidity in the policy stream, in turn, functions in favor of habitual policy and practices by creating self-reinforcing mechanisms in policy communities (Spohr, 2016b).

Third, policy paradigms shape the policy stream by functioning as road maps for actors (Beland, 2005, p. 8). Constituting the “intellectual background of policy decisions,” these road maps direct actors in policy communities towards predictable and habitual solutions (Beland, 2005, p. 8; Berman, 1998). Because they shape the mindset of policy actors and guide them towards established policy choices, policy paradigms are seen as “inherently normative and programmatic” (Beland, 2005, p. 8).

2.3.2.3. How Do Informal Rules Structure the Political Stream?

As Table 1 shows below, informal rules structure the political stream in two ways. First, institutionalized policies, as informal rules, shape how political actors evaluate future policies. Echoing Weir (1992: 191), “earlier policies also provide politicians and policymakers with analogies that they use to judge future policy options.” Once institutionalized, these policies get “a powerful influence on the politics at a later moment” (Weir, 1992, p. 192). This is one of the reasons why elected officials frequently rely on “culturally accepted repertoires” in their decisions (Beland, 2005, p. 11). In this way, these actors reduce any political risk they may encounter in the political stream (Beland, 2005). This, however, does not eliminate path-departures in a given setting. After all, institutionalized policies alone do not “determine what is possible at a later time” in a definite fashion (Weir, 1992, p. 192).

Second, past policies shape the political stream by distributing power among distinct political groups. Scholars argue that these informal institutions “establish some groups as authoritative voices in a particular field and make other perspectives less credible” (Weir, 1992, p. 191). Whereas some, as the beneficiaries of the institutionalized policies, play significant roles in the policy process, others face unique constraints (Béland, 2016). Additionally, Béland (2005, p. 3) discusses that established policies “structure the political behavior” by conditioning political actors’ strategies and actions.

2.3.2.4. How Do Informal Rules Structure the Policy Windows?

Informal rules structure the policy windows concerning their width and duration. Scholars explore how a set of informal rules such as “the style of framing” (top-down vs. bottom-up), “the degree of institutional ambiguity” (high vs. low ambiguity), and the sources of “policy spillovers” (endogenous vs. exogenous) structure the policy windows (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Becker, 2019). Whereas some of these institutions structure the “width” of the policy windows (comprising more policy sectors vs. a single policy sector), others shape their “duration” (for a short period vs. long periods). Ackrill and Kay (2011), for instance, illustrate that “the overlapping institutions lacking a clear hierarchy” creates institutional ambiguity (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p. 75). In such ambiguous policymaking settings, “policy issues can overlap multiple thematic areas” (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p. 75). Therefore, a change in one policy area may affect a related policy area by prompting “an imperative for change” (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p. 74). Scholars identify this stimulus stemming from institutional connectedness as an endogenous spillover. Since the second change does not have to take place right away, scholars argue that “the characteristics of endogenous spillovers can hold windows open for a longer time” (Ackrill & Kay, 2011, p. 74). As such, endogenous spillovers affect the duration of the policy windows.

2.3.2.5. How Do Informal Rules Structure the Policy Entrepreneur?

Rules of the game, as informal rules, structure policy entrepreneurs' success. In this understanding, their triumph does not necessarily rely on their institutional position, e.g., insider or outsider (Galanti, 2018; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). Instead, it depends on their ability to play the rules of the game appropriately (Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). Think of a bureaucrat, for instance. In case s/he seeks to set the agenda, s/he will need to “navigate the bureaucratic and legislative processes” and, hence, have in-depth knowledge about these processes (Gunn, 2017, p. 270). As Galanti (2018, p. 50) summarizes it, “the crucial problem of entrepreneurship is not its embeddedness in institutions, but rather the capacity to propagate change at the right time, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ability to overcome resistance from actors who benefit from the status quo. In the same vein, Gunn (2017, p. 270) illustrates that the policy entrepreneurs may become successful in their endeavors if they control “the flow of information” and limit “access to closed circuits of decision making and manipulate and dominate “the policy process.”

2.4. Concluding Remarks

The MSF, as a developing research program, provides a fertile ground for adopting a holistic approach to agenda and policy change through its structural elements. Despite having overlooked the impact of different institutions in its original formulation, the MSF proved its openness to theoretical development and worldwide application. Relying on its theoretical openness, scholars proposed to include formal political institutions, such as federal vs. unitary, presidential vs. parliamentarian, as well as informal rules, such as established policies in the MSF. However, existing institutions-focused multiple streams research still has deficiencies. First, scholars discuss how institutions structure multiple streams by focusing on a few structural elements of the framework. This, in turn, creates fragmented and isolated discussions

in the literature by impeding a more blended and comprised approach to multiple streams. Second, scholars more often than not deal with a single stage of the policy process in their research. This, in turn, disables understanding whether the same institutions may structure different stages of policy processes in a given geographical setting. Third, scholars do not always adopt a comprehensive approach to institutions and principally focus on formal political institutions. However, public policymaking does not relate only to “the formal structures of government” but also to the “actual rules-in-use that structure the day-to-day behavior of actors engaged in policy processes” (Weible, 2018, p.14). Therefore, the MSF research needs a fine-grained and comprehensive approach to institutions. In order to fill the stated gaps in the literature, the next chapter proposes to bring *policy styles* in as a master variable embedding both formal and informal rules. In so doing, it discusses how policy styles shape the MSF together with its five structural elements. In this way, it illustrates how insights from policy styles may provide a comprehensive outlook to public policy studies.

Table 1. Examples of How Institutions Shape Multiple Streams

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS	FORMAL RULES		INFORMAL RULES	
	RULES	POTENTIAL EFFECTS	RULES	POTENTIAL EFFECTS
PROBLEM STREAM	N/A	N/A	Institutionalized problem definitions and policy legacies	Shape whether, to what extent, and how actors perceive and define conditions
POLICY STREAM	Formal political institutions	Determine who would be invited in and frozen out of the policy community, and thereby policy alternatives	Past policies	Shape the fate of policy proposals
			Interest intermediation models	Filter access to policy communities and policy alternatives
	Formal rules	Determine the degree of autonomy of policy communities from central authorities	Policy paradigms	Shape policy alternatives
POLITICAL STREAM	Formal political institutions	Shape national mood and power distribution among actors	Institutionalized past policies	Shape political actors' policy preferences
	Formal political institutions	Shape the establishment of interest groups		
	Veto points shaped by party systems	Shape political actors' strategies	Institutionalized past policies	Distribute power among political actors
	Electoral systems	Shape timing and how the executive and the legislature		

		respond to the national mood		
POLICY WINDOWS	Electoral systems	Shape cyclical policy windows	Degree of ambiguity	Shape the width and duration of policy windows
	Veto points shaped by party systems	Determine how long windows need to remain open for bringing agenda change		
	Formal rules	Shape new policy windows (decision window)	Sources of policy spillovers	Shape the duration of policy windows
POLITICAL ENTREPRENEUR	Formal rules	Shape legitimacy	Rules of the game	Shape policy entrepreneurs' success
	Formal political institutions	Determine who is invited in and frozen out of the policymaking process		
	Formal political institutions	Determines policy entrepreneurs' success		
	Formal political institutions	Determine the type of entrepreneurs		

CHAPTER 3 POLICY STYLE: THE MASTER VARIABLE

EMBEDDING FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES

This chapter, first, introduces policy style as a master variable embedding both formal and informal rules. Second, it reveals state-of-the-art discussions in the policy style literature. Third, after briefly deliberating how insights from the literature may enrich the MSF, it illustrates how policy styles may shape the MSF's structural elements and concludes.

3.1. From Formal and Informal Rules to Policy Style

The previous chapter illustrates that scholars are inclined to integrate institutions into the MSF when exploring the stages of the policy process beyond agenda-setting. Likewise, they are apt to include institutions when they take the MSF for a walk beyond the US. In each case, scholars seek to shed light on how institutions affect stages of the policy process as well as policy outcomes. In these studies, scholars often rely on formal political institutions. In a few of these, informal rules appear as intervening variables. Even in fewer scholarly works, scholars mention both. However, none of the existing research discusses whether and if so how both formal and informal rules, including long-neglected administrative traditions, structure multiple streams, and the framework's structural elements. As this chapter will argue, *national policy styles* (henceforth, policy styles), as administrative traditions encompassing formal and informal rules, promise a comprehensive approach to institutions. In this way, policy styles inserted MSF studies reach their potential to enhance dull MSF applications in settings with different institutional characteristics.

3.2. Policy Style as Master Variable

3.2.1. Policy Style in Comparative Public Policy

Policy styles are “styles and structures which are strongly embedded in the macro-institutional context of the state tradition, the legal system and the political-administrative system (including characteristics of the civil service as well as the state structure and organization” (Knill, 2001, p. 61). In this understanding, policy styles entail not only formal rules but also “the standard operating procedures of governments in the making and implementing public policies” (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 28; Richardson et al., 1982, p. 2). As “patterns and sources of policy dynamics,” policy styles help identify “typical policy processes, deliberations that may or may not lead to policy change” and “the relatively enduring nature of many policy arrangements” (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, pp. 3–4; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2016, p. 26). Policy styles also help spot where these policy deliberations habitually occur and identify typical actors participating in the policy process and policy outcomes (Howlett & Tosun, 2019; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2016).

Comparative policy analysts argue that “a distinctive style¹⁸ [...] affects [...] policy decisions” in settings (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 3; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2016, p. 26; Simmons et al., 1974). As per these analysts, actors make policies in a structured “tradition and history which constrains and refines their actions and concerns” (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 3; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2016, p. 26; Simmons et al., 1974). Therefore, scholars link why actors offer different

¹⁸ Some scholars increasingly illustrate that there is more convergence than divergence as to policy styles in Western European countries. Arguing that policy routines of these countries resemble each other due to their “anticipatory problem solving” and “consensus-oriented policy making” tendencies, scholars question whether it is [not] possible to talk about a [common] European policy style (Knill & Tosun, 2020; Richardson et al., 1982; Richardson & Jordan, 1979). Others illustrate that not all policymaking and implementation attitudes across Western European countries are the same. Still some others discuss that a single state may take different policymaking and implementation approaches, e.g., more consensual or imposing- depending on policy sector or time (Cairney, 2009; Jordan & Cairney, 2013).

solutions to similar policy problems to distinct policy styles¹⁹ that constrain and refine actors' actions in different ways across settings. Following up on this reasoning, Gustafsson and Richardson (1979), Jordan and Richardson (1983), and Richardson et al. (1982) identify and systematically explain policy styles. In so doing, they refer to two factors. One factor is "a government's approach to problem solving" (Knill & Tosun, 2020; Richardson et al., 1982). Governments approach problem-solving in an *incrementalist* or a *rationalist* way. In settings where the *incrementalist* approach prevails, there is "conflict over values [...], consultation and agreement, [...] and low coercion" (Richardson et al., 1982, p. 12). In contrast, in geographies where the *rationalist* approach predominates, there is "central authority, high coercion ability, limited conflict over values, wide search options, clear objectives, a possibility of radical change" (Richardson et al., 1982, p. 12). Since defining what rational is or is not might cause perplexing conclusions, scholars propose alternative and measurable qualifiers in describing governments' attitudes towards problem-solving. They suggest zooming in on whether a given setting tends to embrace an "*anticipatory/active* attitude towards societal problems" or take a "*reactive* approach to problem solving" (Richardson, 1979, p. 13). Another factor is "the relationship between [its] government and other actors in the policy process" (Richardson et al., 1982, p. 13). Scholars explore whether governments seek to "reach consensus with organized groups" or impose "decisions notwithstanding opposition from such groups" in making policies (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 3; Richardson et al., 1982, p. 13).

19 Currently, some scholars illustrate that there is more convergence than divergence concerning policy styles in Western European countries. Arguing that policy routines of these countries resemble each other due to their "anticipatory problem solving" and "consensus-oriented policy making" tendencies, scholars question whether it is [not] possible to talk about a [common] European policy style (Knill & Tosun, 2020; Richardson et al., 1982; Richardson & Jordan, 1979). Others illustrate that not all policymaking and implementation attitudes across Western European countries are the same. Still some others discuss that a single state may take different policymaking and implementation approaches, e.g., more consensual or imposing- depending on policy sector or time (Cairney, 2009; Jordan & Cairney, 2013).

Relying on these factors, scholars offered “four ideal-typical policy styles” particularly for (Western) European countries: (1) the German rationalist consensus style, (2) the British negotiation style, (3) the French concerting style, and (4) the Dutch negotiation and conflict style” (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 28). However, scholars recently revisited and refined these ideal-typical policy styles for a broader geographical focus (Howlett & Tosun, 2019). These typologies help pinpoint the dominant policy style for a given state.

3.2.2. Modifications to Policy Styles

In an attempt to advance the discussions about the relationship between policy and politics, scholars argued that existing research needs some clarifications. This was because a limited number of governments are consistent in their *impositional* or *consensual* styles in policymaking and implementation²⁰, and different policy styles [may] surface in different stages of the policy process in a single setting (Howlett et al., 2009; Howlett & Tosun, 2019). In identifying whether different policy styles operate in a single geography, these scholars offered two perspectives to rely on: “unit of analysis” and “level of analysis.” By following these, scholars argue, the typology of policy styles will become more operationalizable and help come up with meaningful results.

20 There has been a rise in the studies displaying that policy style of a state may change over time due to various national or international factors. Some scholars see “large-scale geo-historical developments such as wars, conquests, and colonization” as the causes of policy style alterations in a chosen state (Castles, 2001; Farazmand, 1999; Welch & Wong, 2001 cited in Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 7). Others propose to explore changes to “the secular or religious nature of the society in question”; “educational systems or political power”; “levels of public sector unionism or professionalism” and other potential factors that may create change, e.g., “foreign war, revolution, civil war or other means” (Bekke, 1999; Readschilders & Rutgers, 1996 cited in Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p.8). Still others discuss that increasing regional governance models and transnational interactions among national states result in policy style alterations (Héritier, 2001; Héritier et al., 1996; Knill, 1998 cited in Howlett & Tosun, 2019).

3.2.2.1. *Unit of Analysis Perspective in Policy Style*

As to the *unit of analysis*, the policy style indicates two distinct components: behavioral and structural. The behavioral component refers to political actors' behaviors, whereas the structural component indicates the politico-administrative structure where these actors operate. The latter is thought to shape the former constantly. The structure of governmental organizations, standard operating procedures, "rules, norms and symbols," as part of policy style, "affect what the state does," shape "political behavior," and enable or constrain future preferences (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 9). As opposed to the original conceptualization of the MSF, the unit of analysis perspective as to policy style does not bring actors to the fore at the expense of institutions. Hence, it provides a more balanced approach to actors and institutions.

The interaction between actors and institutions is best understood by looking at *electoral systems*. Electoral systems structure political systems and the relationship between the legislative and executive to a significant extent. For instance, relying on electoral systems, Lijphart (1999) categorizes democratic regimes and proposes two fundamental systems: majoritarian (Westminster) and consensus. In majoritarian systems, power is concentrated in the hands of the executive (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 10-12). In such settings, political actors are inclined towards an "exclusive, competitive and adversarial" way of thinking (Lijphart, 1999, pp. 2-3). Accordingly, political parties compete, and governments tend to impose policies from a top-down perspective.

In contrast, there is clear separation and balance between legislative and executive in consensus systems. In these settings, proportional representation does not prompt an overall majority in parliaments. This, in turn, paves the way for setting up coalitions through "inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise" and cooperation among governments and other organized

political forces (Lijphart, 1999, p. 2). Each category creates its own institutional regularities and dynamics that shape actors' actions, policy processes, and policy outcomes (Howlett & Tosun, 2019).

3.2.2.2. Level of Analysis Perspective in Policy Style

From the level of analysis perspective, scholars approach policy styles as a group of “political and administrative routines and behaviors” which are shaped by the established arrangements of “the civil service and political system” (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 10). Scholars, this time, analyze the rules and regulations forming policy styles relying on three different levels of analysis: *macro* (or *national*), *meso* (or *sectoral*), and *micro* (or *agency*).

In analyzing policy styles from a macro (national) level analysis, scholars focus on national politico-administrative contexts within which political actors function (Vogel, 1986 cited in Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 11). Other scholars zoom in on political cultures by claiming that these evidently shape policy outcomes (Castles, 1998 cited in Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 11). Additionally, these scholars discuss that policymakers pursue embedded politico-administrative paradigms when acting. Still, others stress that politico-administrative and legal institutions as well as political cultures are to be equally considered in policy style analyses (van Waarden, 1995 cited in Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 11).

Relying on meso (sectoral) level of analysis, scholars argue that one may trace policy styles by looking at policy sectors, such as health, education. Because each policy sector creates its own norms, routines, and standard operating procedures, policy sectors prompt their distinct policymaking styles, which shape actors' strategies and actions. Consequently, the sectoral

level of analysis gives clues about how policies are made and provides predictability as to solutions to a certain extent.

In analyzing policy styles stemming from micro level of analysis, scholars focus on an administration's characteristics and its relation to politics (whether it is being politically controlled or not), and its responsibilities (whether it is responsible for its performance or not). They do so in two ways. Concerning the political control of an administration, scholars, first, allude to "the traditional legislative-executive means and that of single-party partisan or judicial control" (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 11). Second, scholars examine routinized processes of "recruiting civil servants and the nature of their interactions with each other and with members of the public" (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 10). This helps scrutinize the nature of recruitment (open or closed), "the basis of selection [career or program orientation], the nature of job evaluations," promotion and "the presence or absence of opportunities for training and development both among civil servants and politicians" (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 11; van der Meer et al., 2015).

3.2.2.3. A Conceptual Modification to Policy Styles

To render policy styles more measurable and operationalizable, scholars propose to modify their fundamental dimensions: *anticipatory vs. reactive* and *imposition vs. consensus*.

First, scholars offer to supersede the *anticipatory vs. reactive* dimension with *key actors* taking part in policymaking. This is because key actors in the policy process hint at whether a policy style is anticipatory or reactive. For instance, the involvement of bureaucrats or experts in the policy process points to an anticipatory policymaking style. In contrast, political or public actors taking the lead create "a tendency for reactive policymaking" (Howlett & Tosun, 2019,

p. 13). Second, scholars propose to replace the *imposition vs. consensus* dimension with *state-society relationships*. Scholars argue that state-society relationships help identify “the patterns of interest intermediation (corporatism vs. pluralism)” in a given setting. The proposed modification also promise to unpack the causal mechanisms between “a more impositional policy style with pluralist democracies and a consensus-seeking policy style with corporatist democracies” (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 13). Moreover, focusing on state-society relationships allow scholars to expand policy styles beyond Western European countries where distinct policy styles surface.

Relying on these modifications, scholars draw attention to four types of policy styles. Type 1 policy style entails representative democracies, e.g., Germany, Korea, Mexico, the UK, where bureaucrats and experts are the key actors in making policies and where inclusiveness of societal actors in the policy process is high. Type 2 policy style involves participatory or consultative democracies such as Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, where politicians and the public play a principal role in policymaking and where inclusiveness of societal actors is high. Type 3 policy style refers to closed-centralist systems, e.g., China, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and the United Arab Emirates, where bureaucrats and experts play more roles than politicians and/or the public in policymaking and where participation of societal actors in the policy process is low. Type 4 policy style implies competitive electoral authorities such as Russia, Singapore, Togo, and Turkey, where politicians and the public lead the policymaking process and where participation of societal actors is low in the process (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 13).

All these four typologies reveal that policy styles vary across geographies due to their particular way of doing things. Despite being distinct from each other, however, all policy typologies

have common points. These entail the ways in which policy discussions occur (read, embedded patterns of policy and decision making), predominant actors in policymaking, and also [established] ideas (read, routinized preferences of political actors). By bringing these three together, scholars help analyze “the range and types of alternatives, and final policy outputs” (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 5).

3.3. Why policy styles?

Policy styles are worth being considered in MSF applications for at least three reasons. First, as a master variable, policy styles entail formal and informal rules, including long-neglected administrative traditions. Administrative traditions may individually limit policy alternatives and create, increase or decrease action capacity in a given setting. Therefore, policy styles have the potential to help MSF scholars adopt a comprehensive approach to institutions and not leave influential ones aside in their analyses.

Second, more often than not, MSF scholars do not discuss whether institutions structure all components of the MSF. This, in turn, creates hardships in making the existing research talk to each other in a systematic way. Against this backdrop, policy style, as a research program, pledges to gather unsystematic conclusions under a meaningful roof and render the inclusion of institutions in the MSF more integrative and systematic.

Third, insights from policy styles flawlessly match with that from the MSF. The literature on policy styles, too, focuses “not only [on] the manner in which policy deliberations take place, but also [on] the kinds of actors and ideas present” (Mukherjee & Howlett, 2016, p. 26). However, different than the MSF literature, policy style literature explicitly stresses institutions.

3.4. How does policy style shape the structural elements of the MSF?

Although the literature on policy style does not directly deal with the structural elements of the MSF²¹, it is still possible to construct coherent linkages between these two. This is partly because both are interested in the relationship between politics and policy by focusing on comparable factors and partly because the MSF is open to theoretical and empirical development. Moreover, with its formal and informal rules embedding characteristics, policy styles promise a broader perspective to institutions.

3.4.1. How does policy style shape the problem stream?

Existing research indicates that policy styles shape the problem stream in two ways. As illustrated in Table 2, scholars, first, argue that policy styles have an impact on the betterment of problem definitions. For instance, Jordan and Richardson (1983) argue that the British policy style is more likely to generate better problem definitions because it allows a “wider participation” in problem definition due to its *consensus-seeking* practices and consultative tradition (Jordan & Richardson, 1983, p. 606). Arentsen et al. (2000) discuss that broader participation in problem definition increases the exchange among different groups, “improve[s] the information-gathering and information processing.” This results in “the most productive use” of data gathered (Arentsen et al., 2000, p. 600).

Second, policy style scholars discuss how institutionalized past policies shape the way problem brokers approach public issues. In approaching MSF scholars, policy style researchers claim

21 There is no -direct- reference to the problem, policy and political streams, policy windows and/or policy entrepreneurs in the cited work. Even some of the referred articles in this section were published before the -first- edition of Kingdon’s *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy* book. Since Kingdon’s work builds on an earlier research (Cohen et al., 1972) and the literature on policy style engages with politics and policy, I took the liberty to create linkages between these two bodies of literature. I think making connection between these two contributes to the originality of this study. To not cause any conceptual stretching, however, I remain loyal to the MSF’s terminology throughout the chapter.

that established past policies create a shared perception around “the nature of policy problems” (Cairney & Denny, 2020, p. 79; Jordan & Cairney, 2013, p. 8). In such a context, problem brokers cannot turn a blind eye to “the value of building on past policies” in defining problems (Cairney & Denny, 2020, p. 79; Jordan & Cairney, 2013, p. 8). Policy style scholars discuss that if problem brokers choose to dismiss established policies, their preference may be “politically expensive” (Richardson et al., 1982, p. 10).

3.4.2. How does policy style shape the policy stream?

As shown in Table 2, policy styles shape the policy stream in two ways. First, policy styles impact the range of policy alternatives by “stimulating, restricting or enabling context for individual or corporate action” (Knill, 1998, p. 3). Individual and/or corporate action encouraging environments tend to generate wide-ranging policy alternatives. In contrast, policy styles restricting individual and /or corporate action limit the range of policy alternatives. Policy styles, hence, enable or disable different “venues, arenas or sites” for policy communities to generate and/or initiate “policy ideas and frames” (Richardson, 2000, p. 1021; Wright, 1988).

Second, policy styles shape the relationship between state and policy communities. This relationship may be “formal versus informal, legalistic versus pragmatic, open versus closed” (Knill, 1998, p. 5). Depending on the characteristics of this relationship, political actors determine “whether or whom to consult” during the policy process (Lehmbruch, 1991, p. 2). This defining process, hence, functions as a filter in sorting out policy proposals. Moreover, it closely determines which policy proposal reaches decision agendas. In *impositional* policy styles, central authorities tend to perceive policy proposals coming from policy communities as pressures. Therefore, it is not surprising to see these authorities resist suggested policy

alternatives. When encountered, these authorities tend to subdue these communities during the policymaking process (Lehmbruch, 1991). In contrast, state bodies and policy communities may work hand in hand in settings with more consensual policy style characteristics. As long as a policy community is acknowledged as a “relevant” group in these policy styles, its proposals will be valued. This is because consensual policy styles seek to “achieve a consensus relationship between government and groups” (Jordan & Richardson, 1983, p. 604).

3.4.3. How does policy style shape the political stream?

Policy styles shape the political stream in three ways. First, policy styles shape the relationship between state and organized political forces regarding their access to and function in the policymaking processes. Depending on the distribution of power between state and organized political forces, four types of relationships emerge. These are *clientelism*, “*autonomy of the state/public administration vis-à-vis organized interests*,” *state corporatism*, and *symbiosis* (Berger, 1981; Waarden, 1992, p. 36). For instance, states may claim active intervention in and control society if they have “developed autonomous authority structures over society” (Knill, 1998, p. 6). In contrast, “the society-led state” structures enable “a network of elites and institutions” to access the policy process. This is because such settings do not interpret the inclusion of political elites in the policy process as “the forcible conquest of the state” (Knill, 1998, p. 6). Moreover, policy styles shape how organized political forces function in the policy process. Politico-administrative structures may assign a multitude of roles to these political elites or limit their actions in politics. Depending on the intensity of this relationship and the needs of state bodies, the following tasks may be delegated to organized political forces: “channeling access to decision-making process; consultation or exchange of information; [...] cooperation in policy formation; implementation and legitimation” (Waarden, 1992, p. 33).

Second, policy styles structure the distribution of power and resources among different actors in the political stream (Waarden, 1992). Comparing majoritarian regimes to consensus-seeking ones, Scharpf (1989: 157) illustrates that “hegemonic powers are free to disregard any interest and to choose any distributive rule.” In contrast, “the possibility of involuntary redistribution” decreases in consensus-seeking regimes (Scharpf, 1989, p. 157). This is because policy styles determine the “bargaining positions” of actors in politics. These bargaining positions, in turn, provide “varying possibilities for actors to influence policymaking” (Leiren et al., 2021, p. 33). Among them, some are provided with “privileged or even exclusive access and ‘biased influence.’” Hence, they gain “a competitive advantage over other interests” (Waarden, 1992, p. 37).

Third, policy styles determine veto points, which in turn shape the possibility and/or the tempo of policy changes. Scholars illustrate how policy styles structure veto points in a variety of comparative studies. Knill (1998: 14), for instance, argues that Britain has a “high capacity for initiating and implementing administrative reforms” due to “the low number of institutional veto points.” This is also because of “the strong position of the central government” in Britain even when its administrative structure does not rely on “a comprehensive hierarchical system but on a loosely coupled system of special authorities” (Knill, 1998, p. 14). In a more recent study, Leiren et al. (2021, p. 2) corroborate this argument. Scholars claim that “the UK government is known for being effective in enacting policy change, due to strong majority governments and a relative lack of veto points.” Moreover, scholars illustrate that the parliamentary system in the UK enables policymakers to ignore “the demands of a wide range of pressure groups” (Leiren et al., 2021, p. 2). In Brazil, in contrast, “parliamentary party fragmentation and centrifugal federalism” generate a multitude of institutional veto points. Instituting them through “a strong judicial power, a symmetrical bicameralism with strong

over-representation by the smaller states, a proportional open list representation, government boards of corporate bias and multi-partyism,” the 1988 constitution paves the way for blocking policies rather than producing and implementing them (Grin & Abrucio, 2019, pp. 115–116).

3.4.4. How does policy style shape the policy windows?

In the original formulation of the MSF, policy windows open in two locations: the political stream or the problem stream. Windows in the political stream usually open due to electoral elections, which show up regularly. Elections, therefore, provide political actors with regular opportunities to propose agenda or policy change. In their research, policy style scholars accept the opportunity that elections provide political actors to change decision agendas and policies (Cairney, 2011; Leiren et al., 2021; Richardson, 2018). In Richardson’s words (2018: 10), “voters want jam today, not jam tomorrow, and there are plenty of new populist political parties around who will promise just that.” Policy style scholars suggest focusing on the nature of electoral elections. They discuss whether elections take place under fair conditions in a chosen setting (Burkhanov, 2019; Osei & Akinocho, 2019). In this way, they shed light on under which conditions policy windows open (Zohlnhöfer & Tosun, 2019).

As to problem windows, policy style scholars emphasize that most states tend to develop a reactive policy style more than an anticipatory one (Richardson, 2018). This is because future problems are challenging to identify “before they have actually begun to have adverse effects, and “voters seem interested only in the cure” rather than prevention (Richardson, 2018, pp. 8–10). Hence, for policy style scholars, any possible policy change typically comes after a problem or a crisis shows up. This, in turn, enables us to discuss whether problem windows should be prioritized over political windows in analyses.

3.4.5. How does policy style shape the policy entrepreneur?

As Table 2 displays, policy style shapes policy entrepreneurship in at least three ways. First, policy style shapes policy entrepreneurs' actions by enabling or constraining their room for maneuver (Richardson, 2006, p. 251; Skogstad, 2001, p. 486). In this understanding, the more open a policy style is, the more extended the scope of policy entrepreneurship becomes. In contrast, the more limited a policy style is, the more restrained the entrepreneurial field turns out to be. The institutionalized "forum style polit[y]," for instance, enables a multitude of actors to push their pet proposals (Richardson, 2006, p. 251). In contrast, the statist policy style tends to protect the policymaking environment from external pressures. In cases where alternatives are advocated by external pressure groups, authorities in a statist policy style are likely to subdue them to maintain control over the policy process. Consequently, they limit entrepreneurial activities (Lehmbruch, 1991).

Second, policy style determines whose entrepreneurial activity is legitimate. Legitimacy comes with "widely accepted decision rules that specify who is entitled to participate in which decisions, and how collective choices are to be reached in the face of disagreement among legitimate participants" (Scharpf, 1989, p. 153). Hence, the legitimacy issue brings the selection of actors by controlling who is (going to be) invited in and frozen out of the policy process (Waarden, 1992). Consequently, some actors, e.g., state actors, get more chances to become policy entrepreneurs in some settings than in others.

Third, policy style structures policy entrepreneurs' strategies through "existing rules and standard operating procedures" (Knill, 1998, p. 3). Policy entrepreneurs develop strategies in line with existing institutional rules because they feel closer to achieving their goals only when they follow these rules (Battilana & D'Aunno, 2009).

3.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter, first, started with introducing policy styles as a master variable. Policy styles' formal and informal rules entailing characteristics promised to adopt a comprehensive approach to institutional variables, including long-neglected politico-administrative traditions in future MSF applications. Second, this chapter presented up-to-date discussions on the fundamental factors that scholars draw on when identifying policy styles. Following a short section on how insights from policy style literature may contribute to the MSF's theoretical development, this chapter, third, explored how policy styles shape the MSF's structural elements. Such an analysis was possible since both literature focuses on policymaking, typical actors participating in it, and the venues where political deliberations occur. The next chapter will bring insights from these two bodies of literature and discuss how statist policy style shapes multiple streams in asylum and immigration in Turkey in the 2000s.

Table 2. Examples of How Policy Styles Shape Multiple Streams in Agenda-Setting

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS	POLICY STYLES IN AGENDA-SETTING
	Potential Effects
PROBLEM STREAM	shape quality of policy definitions
	shape how problem brokers perceive, construct and define conditions
POLICY STREAM	shape multiplicity of policy alternatives floating around
	shape whether or whom to consult
POLITICAL STREAM	shape power distribution between political actors and organized political forces
	shape distribution of power and resources among political actors
	shape veto points and thereby tempo of policy changes
POLICY WINDOWS	shape nature of elections and thereby conditions under which policy windows open
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS	shape scope conditions within which policy entrepreneurs appear operate
	shape who would be invited in and frozen out of the policy process
	shape policy entrepreneurs' strategies

CHAPTER 4 EXPLAINING AGENDA-SETTING AND POLICY CHANGE: THE CASE OF THE LAW ON FOREIGNERS AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN TURKEY

*All revolutions can happen in Turkey, but only through laws.*²²

4.1. Introduction

This chapter explores the politics of policymaking of the LFIP to understand the path-departing policy reform in asylum and immigration in Turkey in the 2000s. In so doing, this chapter illustrates how Turkey's statist policy style shape multiple streams in agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption of the LFIP. Relatedly, this chapter gives answers to how a policy entrepreneur emerged, functioned, set the decision agenda in Turkey's statist policy style. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. I, first, present Turkey's policy style within which agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption took place. Second, I provide an overview of the pre-LFIP period in asylum and immigration to illustrate against which background the policy entrepreneur proposed his pet project. Illustrating how Turkey's statist policy style shapes multiple streams of the policymaking, I, third, share my empirical findings

²² The original expression is "Türkiye'de her inkılap olur, fakat ancak kanun yoluyla ..." (Aydemir, 1993, p. 316). Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was one of the pioneers and vigorous advocates of the Turkish Revolution in the young Republic of Turkey. I think, reading revolution here as policy reform or policy change would not be erroneous. I believe this sentence provides us with clues about Turkey's policy style and *how* policy reforms/changes take place in it.

on who can play and how they play in agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption. Originating from Graziano's "policy structure approach," I, fourth, illustrate changes to *principles, objectives, procedures, and instruments* of asylum and immigration policies in Turkey. Finally, I conclude.

4.2. Turkey's Policy Style

As highlighted in the previous chapter, policy styles refer to formal and informal rules in policymaking (and policy implementation²³). With their analytical insights into the relationship between policy and politics, policy styles help us understand and "describe typical policy processes, ... deliberations that may or may not lead to policy change, ... the relatively enduring nature of many policy arrangements" (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, p. 4)."

When examining policy styles, scholars draw on two factors: (i) key actors in policymaking and (ii) state-society relations in politics. The former helps identify whether the given state makes policies in an anticipatory or a reactive fashion. The latter sheds light on whether the given state imposes its decisions or makes policies consensually.

When portraying Turkey's statist policy style in the following section, I capitalize on two complementary sources: (i) Lijphart's (1999, 2012) insights into majoritarian vs. consensus democracy categorization and (ii) Painter and Peters' (2010) administration classification. Both help scrutinize who can play and how they play in politics in Turkey and provide a comprehensive perspective as to key actors and state-society relations.

²³ Policy styles in policy implementation are not examined in this study.

4.2.1. Majoritarian Characteristics of Turkey's Political System

Lijphart argues that there are several ways democratic political systems are organized and run. In categorizing these, Lijphart alludes to a set of variables, which provide us with powerful clues about key political actors and state-society relations in a given politics. The “majoritarianism-consensus contrast”²⁴, which outlines Lijphart’s typology (1999: 1), builds on two dimensions: (i) the executive-parties and (ii) the federal-unitary (Lijphart, 2008, p. 7).

Turkey stands as a majoritarian political system for the period under consideration concerning the executive-parties dimension. First, the executive holds the highest power in politics. Uninterrupted Justice and Development Party (henceforth, the JDP) governments between 2002 and 2017²⁵ nicely epitomize how the power is concentrated in the hands of the executive in Turkey (Lord, 2012).

Second, the political system in Turkey *de jure* allows the prime minister to maintain the highest role in the executive. Her power is reinforced by different means in politics. First, the prime minister is given the utmost authority to organize bureaucracy through nominations. Second, the rigid party discipline makes her the most potent component of the executive. Relatedly, the

²⁴ In majoritarian democratic models, political power is concentrated “in the hands of the majority” (Lijphart, 2008, p. 112). The executive backed by “single-party majority cabinets” is typically more powerful than the legislature (Lijphart, 2008, p. 7). Consensual democratic models, in contrast, builds upon the principles of “executive power sharing in broad multiparty coalitions, executive-legislative balance of power, multiparty systems, proportional representation and coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems” (Lijphart, 2008, p. 7). Hence, the majoritarian model of democracy denotes a model that governments account for a bare majority without feeling equally responsive to a minority whereas the consensus model of democracy implies being accountable to as many people as possible. However, Lijphart expresses that pure majoritarian model of democracies are rare in practice and most of them display consensual characteristics. Additionally, majoritarian democratic models more often than not appear as plurality rather than majority in practice (Lijphart, 2008).

²⁵ In 2017, the majority voted to change the political system in Turkey -from Parliamentary to a Turkish type of presidentialism-. With this new political system, the executive lost its power vis-à-vis the President. Since the policy change this dissertation focuses on happened before 2017, I do not discuss whether, and if so, how Turkey’s new political regime changed Turkey’s statist policy style. For a recent study on this topic please see: Ertugal, 2021.

prime minister shows up as the “ultimate decision-maker over the entire policy cycle” from agenda-setting to implementation as long as supported by the “highest number of seats in the parliament” (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 354). Against this backdrop, opposition parties are left with little room for maneuver and seldom have the opportunity to promulgate. This, as a consequence, allows single-party governments to govern without strict checks and balances.

Third, uninterrupted single-party governments formed by the JDP create “a predominant party regime” (Sayarı, 2016), which in turn embodies an “extreme form of majoritarianism” in Turkey (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 355).

Fourth, the 10% electoral threshold introduced to the 1982 Constitution favors large parties to enter the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (henceforth, the GNAT) at the expense of small parties. Despite having adopted proportional representation to permit diversity in the GNAT, the exclusion of small parties from policymaking processes in practice reinforces majoritarianism once again.

Fifth, the degree of participation of interest groups (also read as organized political forces) in policymaking in Turkey prompts a hybrid interest intermediation system. In this hybrid interest intermediation system, no particular group overtakes in policymaking. Hence, both private associations and trade unions have the opportunity to access it, albeit to a certain extent and typically upon invitation (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 355; Lord, 2012).

Concerning the federal-unitary dimension, Turkey stands as a centralized unitary state (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019; Lord, 2012). First, Article 3 of the 1982 Constitution materializes this feature at the highest legal level: “The state of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an

indivisible entity” (1982 *Anayasası*). The indivisible and centralized nature of the state significantly constrains any action to thrive at the local level, e.g., sub-national governances. Despite the recent decentralization efforts, local authorities do not gain fiscal and political autonomy (Savaşkan, 2020). Consequently, the center maintains its authority and control over local authorities by leaving almost no room to make policies at the local level (Tansel, 2019).

Second, the legislative power is concentrated within a unicameral legislature aligned with “Turkey’s highly centralized unitary political system” (Lord, 2012, pp. 244–245). The unicameral structure disables any alternative house to share or challenge the legislative power. This, in turn, enables the executive to enact any legislation²⁶ it chooses after having a simple majority in the GNAT²⁷ (1982 *Anayasası*).

Third, Turkey’s 1982 Constitution stands as a typical rigid constitution. Rigid constitutions are often associated with consensus democracies in the literature (Lijphart, 2008). However, increasingly offered referendums in Turkey challenge the 1982 Constitution’s rigidity by approximating it to majoritarianism once again (Lord, 2012).

Fourth, the political system in Turkey embraces a “centralized system of *judicial review*.” The Constitutional Court of Turkey, as the highest legal body, has the right to limit majorities in the GNAT. In the 1990s, the Court used this authority as a veto player (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 356). However, the 2010 Referendum increased the government’s control over the Constitutional Court through appointments (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019). Consequently, the

²⁶ There are exceptions to this rule. The 1982 Constitution has immutable clauses which cannot be amended nor can be proposed to do so.

²⁷ Public policy literature supports this argument by indicating that members of the executive have the authority to raise issues on the agenda whereas the executive as a whole structures the design of a policy proposal in parliamentary systems (Knill & Tosun, 2012, p. 145).

majoritarian elements in Turkey's political system intensified at the expense of consensual features.

Fifth, one way to trace the characteristics of a political system is to examine whether the Central Bank of a given setting is politically independent or not. In 2001, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (henceforth, the CBRT) was *de jure* announced independent of the political system with a law. This independence (read the attempt to distribute power among experts and the executive) has been violated many times in practice. Consequently, each violation against the independence of the CBRT has intensified the "concentration of power in the hands of the executive" (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 356).

Although the political system in Turkey provides mixed results, violations against a more consensual political system render it more majoritarian in practice.

4.2.2. Characteristics of the Administrative Tradition in Turkey

Despite being given limited credit for its role in policymaking, administrative practices hint at the parameters within which a policy change does (or does not) occur (Peters, 2008, p. 120). Scholars have categorized administrative traditions under at least nine groups in the literature: Anglo-American, Napoleonic, Germanic, Scandinavian, Latin American, Postcolonial South Asian and African, East Asian, Soviet, and Islamic (Painter & Peters, 2010, p. 19). Among these, Turkey's administrative tradition resembles the Napoleonic tradition the most.

Peters (2008) offers six dimensions to identify the characteristics of the Napoleonic administrative tradition. The first dimension concerns the "relationship of the state to the

society” (Peters, 2008, p. 121). In the Napoleonic administrative tradition, state and society are perceived to be united so that one has little meaning without the other (Peters, 2008, p. 121). In this organic typology, society has little autonomy vis-à-vis the state. As the source of power, the state is given the role to protect society (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019; Peters, 2008). In Turkey too, where a version of the Napoleonic administrative tradition prevails, the state assumes the role to protect and integrate society by “subsuming difference in the general entity” (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 357).

The second dimension, which helps detect the features of the Napoleonic administrative tradition, is fundamental tasks attributed to the public administrator. Scholarly debates specify two different roles for her. One is public administration (also read as law), and the other is management. In the former, the more the public administrator rises in the hierarchy of the state, the more she engages with policymaking and policy advice. In the latter, the public administrator simply implements the law by prioritizing management. In the Napoleonic tradition, producing laws outperforms the management. As a result, in settings where the Napoleonic administrative tradition prevails, the tendency is to pass laws in addressing problems (Peters, 2008, p. 122). Having Napoleonic administrative features, Turkey, too, responds to perceived problems by passing new legislation. This, in turn, causes excessive production of laws (Sotiropoulos, 2004).

The third dimension focuses on the relationship between politicians and civil servants. Peters (2008) classifies this relationship by delving into the degree of autonomy civil servants have before politicians. Peters (2008) argues that there is hardly any barrier between politicians and civil servants in the Napoleonic administrative tradition. Turkey nicely epitomizes this administrative typology. For instance, politicians in Turkey frequently assign high-level

bureaucrats to political positions by creating quick and frequent changes to bureaucracy (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019).

The fourth dimension investigates how distinct the civil service career is from the private sector and political careers. Scholars expect civil service careers to be distinct from stated sectors in the ideal Napoleonic administrative tradition. In some cases, scholars identify firm distinctions even within the bureaucracy, such as “elite public servants” vs. the rest (Peters, 2008, p. 124). However, patronage keeps ruling in bureaucratic employment in Turkey rather than meritocracy. This, in turn, jeopardizes the distinction between civil service careers and political careers. However, some bureaucratic agencies keep their recruitment systems autonomous from partisan appointment practices (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019).

The fifth dimension is about how the administration treats citizens. Democracies promise to treat citizens equally regarding “their needs and their eligibility for services” (Peters, 2008, p. 125). To secure it and create an “integrated political system,” states tend to develop uniform policies and services (Peters, 2008, p. 126). From the very beginning, Turkey sought to construct a “centralized unitary political system” (Lord, 2012, pp. 244–245). This aspiration is also reflected in how Turkey structured its territorial administration despite population-, culture-, economy- and topography-related differences (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 359).

The last dimension relates to how societal actors play a role in the policy process. The inclusion of societal actors in policymaking depends on how states approach them. If perceived as threats, interest groups would barely access the policy process (Peters, 2008). This is because interest groups are not the *sine qua non* components of the policymaking processes in Turkey. Consequently, they are not necessarily invited in policymaking processes, nor are they totally

excluded from it. When included in the policy process, their participation usually remains limited. Their limited participation does not oppose Turkey's Napoleonic administrative tradition (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019; Peters, 2008).

4.2.3. Turkey's Statist Policy Style

The Turkish political system stands as a "statist policy style" by blending the majoritarian characteristics with Napoleonic administrative tradition (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 359). In statist policy style, the state has an apparent authority above society. This authority is "legitimated by democratic vote and pursuing a common 'national' interest" (Eising, 2009, p. 33). State actors, particularly those in the executive, hold the highest authority over policymaking, whereas interest groups (organized political forces in Kingdon's terms) have little say (Eising, 2009). The executive holding the highest power in policymaking controls and resists "the pressures of interests, whether organized or not" (Schmidt, 1996 cited in Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019 p. 360). In this way, the executive shapes interest representation.

Relying on its supremacy vis-à-vis interest groups, the executive decides to invite interest groups in the policy process or freeze them out of it (Schmidt, 1996, p. 57). Despite having adopted the *Mevzuat Hazırlama Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik*²⁸ (2006), invitation of interest groups to the policy making process is still optional. Therefore, the executive habitually acts unilaterally. In such instances, interest groups have almost no room for maneuver. Even when invited in the policymaking processes, interest groups' impact on policy proposals remains limited due to already outlined policy proposals of the executive. This is because the

²⁸ Regulation on the Procedures and Principles concerning the Preparation of Legislation in English

level of trust towards “intermediary bodies in policy formulation” is low (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 365).

The 1982 Constitution, too, illustrates how organized political forces and interest groups are associated with a low level of trust in policymaking. The 1982 Constitution enabled only political parties and elected officials to join political activities until the 1995 amendments (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019). During this period, interest groups, e.g., professional organizations, foundations, organized labor, were excluded from political activities. In this way, the supreme authority of the state was shielded from any external intervention. Even after the 1995 constitutional amendments, societal actors were not included in policymaking processes as expected. Over time and with the pre-accession process to the EU accelerating, governments adopted a more participatory discourse (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019). However, this does not often reflect in practice. Even when ministers need external expertise on a particular policy area, they tend to consult with whom they have a bond of trust (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019).

In Turkey, “authority, power, and resources” are concentrated at the center (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 370). Single-party governments foster this even more. Coupled with other features, Turkey displays majoritarian features and Napoleonic administrative tradition and thereby qualifies for a statist policy style.

4.3. Explaining the politics of policy reform: The Case of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey

4.3.1. Historical Perspective on Asylum and Immigration Legislation in Turkey

As its Napoleonic features suggest, the administration in Turkey is inclined to excessively produce legal documents. Asylum and immigration, as a policy sector, is no exception. Some of the legislative instruments exemplifying the excess in asylum and immigration in the pre-LFIP period are: “the Passport Law (Law no. 5682, 1950), the Law on Residence and the Travel of Foreign Nationals (Law no 5683, 1950), [...] the Law on Foreign Students Studying in Turkey (Law no. 2922, 1983), the Turkish Citizenship Law (Law no. 403, 1964), [...] the Regulations concerning International Road, Transport of People and Goods (1994), [...] the Regulation on the Procedures and the Principles Related to Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey Either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum Either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in Order to Seek Asylum From Another Country (1994)” (İçduygu & Aksel B., 2012, p. 41).

Despite overabundance in the area (also read as the absence of a comprehensive regulation), two instruments shaped migration management exceptionally in the pre-LFIP period. One is the *İskan Kanunu*²⁹ (1934) (henceforth, the Settlement Law). The other is the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (also commonly known as the 1951 Refugee Convention).

The Settlement Law was designed in line with the needs of the early years of the Republic. Since there was a need to support the population in the Republic’s early years, the Settlement Law aimed to boost it in terms of quality and quantity. Therefore, the Settlement Law targeted those attached to Turkic and Muslim identity to migrate to Turkey from the Ottoman Empire’s former lands, such as Bulgaria and Bosnia (Baklacioglu, 2017; Kirişçi, 1996b). Because the

²⁹ Settlement Law (1934) in English.

Settlement Law did not define who qualified for Turkic and Muslim identity in detail, the executive inconsistently applied the law by ranking protection seekers according to its preference and security concerns (Daniş & Parla, 2009; Kirişci, 1996b). Hence, the fuzzy interpretation of the Turkic and Muslim identity resulted in different policies in asylum and immigration (Daniş & Parla, 2009).

Turkey signed the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1961. The 1951 Convention reserved the refugee rights for European residents only until its 1967 Protocol. The 1967 Protocol lifted the geographical limitation by expanding the rights for everyone regardless of national or geographical identity. However, keeping or lifting the geographical limitation was left to the discretion of the signatory states. Relying on this authority, Turkey chose to keep the geographical limitation intact to the 1951 Refugee Convention when signing the Protocol in 1968. This, in turn, gave Turkey the right to reject refugee status for those coming from outside Europe by also shaping its asylum and immigration policies to a great extent.

Turkey experienced several mass arrivals from neighboring countries, such as Iran and Iraq, between the late 1970s and the early 2000s. However, none of these arrivals was perceived as an opportunity to change then-existing asylum and immigration policies. Likewise, not a single policy entrepreneur appeared to push a path-departing policy reform by approaching these as policy windows. Despite not creating significant changes to asylum and immigration policies, the executive provided some secondary legislation. For instance, the 1994 Regulation on Asylum (henceforth, the 1994 Regulation³⁰) was introduced as a response to increasing and changing needs in the sector.

³⁰ “Regulation on the Procedures and the Principles Related to Mass Influx and Foreigners Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum from a Third Country”.

The 1994 Regulation introduced new rules as to asylum applications³¹ in Turkey (Kirişci, 1996a). These rules fell short of responding to the needs of protection seekers contrary to expectations. Stakeholders in the field raised their criticisms on many grounds. First, they emphasized that the 1994 Regulation consolidated the “authoritarian role of the state in immigration and asylum issues” (İçduygu & Aksel B., 2012, p. 40). Second, they highlighted that the 1994 Regulation disproportionately embraced a security-centric approach to refugees’ human rights instead of striking a balance between these two (Kirişci, 1996b, 2012, p. 67). Third, interested parties drew attention to the ephemerality of timeframes: five days³² for asylum applications and ten days for appealing (*European Commission Report, 1998, 1998*). Fourth, stakeholders stressed the lack of long-term solutions for non-European protection seekers in Turkey because the 1994 Regulation did not lift the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Fifth, they called attention to the fact that the 1994 Regulation did not respond to “violations of the principle of *non-refoulement*,” nor did it provide a fertile ground for information delivery about the rules and procedures of the asylum application process (İçduygu & Aksel B., 2012, p. 40; Kirişci, 1996a; *The Amnesty International, 1997*).

Stakeholders kept criticizing the 1994 Regulation and drew attention to the potential problems in asylum and immigration for an extended period of time. Starting from the late 1990s, the European Commission Reports, too, pointed to the ineffectiveness of migration management policies due to the geographical limitation and short timeframes fixed for asylum applications³³ (*European Commission Report, 1998*). However, their criticisms did not result in fundamental

³¹ Refugees were categorized under three groups: Convention refugees, non-Convention refugees and national refugees (Kirişci, 1996a).

³² The Article 4 of the 1994 Regulation limited the asylum application to five days. Those, who were not able to issue their asylum application within five days following their entry to Turkey, were facing deportation (Kirişci, 1996a).

³³ Details of these problems will be presented below in Section 4.4.1.1. *The Problem Stream*.

changes. Only, some articles of the 1994 Regulation were modified in January 1999, albeit marginally³⁴.

Following the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Turkey and the European Union (henceforth, the EU) relations had intensified. Turkey speeded up the reform process for its EU membership. Following the Framework Regulation in 2001, the “National Programme for the Adoption of the EU acquis” was introduced. The National Programme was revised in 2003, 2005, and 2008 successively. In 2005, Turkey launched its National Action Plan for compliance with the EU acquis in asylum and immigration (henceforth, the 2005 National Action Plan).

The 2005 National Action Plan, first, highlighted deficiencies in asylum and immigration. It then announced measures to be taken such as lifting temporal limits to asylum applications, making an up-to-date asylum and immigration policy, and setting up a civilian unit within the Ministry of Interior to implement it (*Ulusal Eylem Planı*, 2005). Due to the ebb and flow of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, stated proposals could not be put into action at the planned time (Interview with a high-level bureaucrat, 06/27/2018). Three years later, the Unit of Asylum and Immigration was set up to implement the 2005 National Action Plan provisions (IGAMDER, 2020).

“Do we really need this law? We spent two years to answer this question³⁵.”

³⁴ With these changes, the duration of the asylum application was extended to ten days, and the appealing period was extended to fifteen days.

³⁵ Interview with a senior national program officer, 09/20/2018

4.4. Politics of Policy Reform in Asylum and Immigration: Presenting the empirical findings

In this section, I will explore the politics of policy reform³⁶ in asylum and immigration. In so doing, I will unfold agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption processes of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. It is challenging to incorporate the MSF's structural elements into synthetically divided policymaking stages. Therefore, in the concluding remarks, I will touch upon the takeaways, which could not be covered in the following subsections.

4.4.1. Explaining the Politics of Agenda-Setting

The purpose of this sub-section is to dissect the agenda-setting process of the LFIP to understand how a path-departing policy proposal entered the agenda. I start the agenda-setting stage with the appointment of a senior bureaucrat (who later became the policy entrepreneur) to the Bureau of Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum (henceforth, the Bureau) at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior in 2008.

The Bureau was established to (1) assess the best legal and institutional structure in migration management, (2) determine whether strategy documents were in line with that of the EU requirements, (3) take measures to meet the EU requirements in asylum and immigration during the EU harmonization process, (4) monitor and coordinate the European Union projects on asylum and migration, and (5) inform the executive office set up in the Ministry of Interior about asylum and immigration issues (Ekşi, 2018, p. 11). Hence, the Bureau was not allocated the task to draft a policy proposal. As an active member of the policy community put it: “Do we really need this law? We spent two years to answer this question” (Interview with the senior

³⁶ This study does not explore the institutional change the LFIP brought about. However, interviewees unanimously concur that the policy change the LFIP brought with it may also be read as an institutional change.

national program officer, 09/20/2018). Empirical evidence illustrates that the Head of the Bureau (read, the policy entrepreneur) and *his team* (read, the policy community) came up with the idea of drafting a law as a solution³⁷ after having examined the gaps within the sector (Interview with the senior national program officer, 09/20/2018).

4.4.1.1. The Problem Stream in Agenda Setting

Indicators displaying that there were problems in asylum and immigration abounded since the 1990s. International Organizations (henceforth, IOs), non-governmental organizations (henceforth, NGOs), and the EU Commission published many reports on then-existing problems in asylum and immigration. Presenting these as indicators, stakeholders aimed to draw the executive and the administration's³⁸ attention to problems. However, there was an apparent mismatch between stakeholders' problem perception and that of the central authorities. For instance, public authorities interpreted entrance and long-term residence of those coming from the Eastern border route as a threat (Avcı & Kirişçi, 2006; Baklacioglu, 2009) whereas the Amnesty International (1997), the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2000), the Human Rights Watch (2000) and the European Commission (2000) perceived central authorities' security-centric stance and the 1994 Regulation³⁹ as worrying and dysfunctional. Likewise, the executive conceived the geographical limitation as a legal right while stakeholders understood it as an obstacle to refugees' rights. Academics supported stakeholders' concerns by presenting

³⁷ In line with Kingdon's emphasis on how conclusive agency may be in the policy process, the interviewee explained that the result would be totally different if another team was set up and worked in the Bureau. For the interviewee, drafting a law was a distinct way to approach then existing problems.

³⁸ Until the LFIP, protection seekers were expected to approach the Prefectures and file their applications accordingly. For residence and work permits, however, Foreigners Department at Police Stations were responsible.

³⁹ Asylum seekers, and foreigners who request residence permit from Turkey to seek asylum in third countries were to file their applications within five business days. In case they do not complete their applications in time, they were facing deportations. The authorities were pointing out the 1994 Regulation in justifying their deportation decisions since the Article 4 was providing a legal background.

empirical evidence on the changing nature of human mobility from and to Turkey and emphasizing the need to adopt an up-to-date asylum and immigration policy (İçduygu & Aksel, 2015; Kirişci, 1996b; Ozcurumez & Şenses, 2011). Because Turkey's statist policy style empowered central authorities vis-à-vis non-governmental actors, there were times when the latter was asked not to publish indicators emphasizing deficiencies in asylum and immigration (Interview with an expert, 08/06/2021). Consequently, these indicators waited for being used until authorities assented to.

There was *feedback* about asylum and immigration practices as well. One of the primary sources of such feedback was the European Court of Human Rights' (henceforth, the ECtHR) decisions. Among others, the example of *Jabari vs. Turkey* made an overwhelming case. The ECtHR adjudicated that the automatic and mechanical application of the five-day registration requirement was contrary to the protection of the fundamental values enshrined in Article 3 ECHR⁴⁰ (ECHR, 2000; Ekşi, 2018). Following the case of *Jabari vs. Turkey*, the ECtHR ruled that Turkey violated articles of the ECHR for similar cases. Although the *Jabari vs. Turkey* case created situational awareness among authorities, its' impact did not stimulate a policy change in asylum and immigration alone.

There were also *focusing events* that caught governments' attention to the deficiencies in asylum and immigration. For instance, the Iraqi crises in the early 1990s gave birth to the 1994 Regulation, which, however, repeated authorities' security concerns instead of presenting long-term protection solutions to non-European asylum and protection seekers in Turkey. The executive sought to control "illegal entries into Turkey" via the 1994 Regulation, which introduced a strict time limit for applying for asylum and appealing. This, in turn, rendered the

⁴⁰ ECHR is an acronym for European Convention on Human Rights.

right to asylum application almost unachievable in practice (Baklacioglu, 2009; Kirişci, 2007, p. 11). The 1994 Regulation did not meet stakeholders' expectations as to asylum and immigration management. Consequently, it raised more concerns than appreciation.

Given Turkey's statist policy style, the disagreement between central authorities (read the state) and society (read as organized political forces) is not extraordinary. After all, political actors do not have a tendency to include societal actors to make policies consensually. Even when they are included, societal actors in Turkey have limited room to maneuver. Against this backdrop, non-governmental actors' problem definitions long remained as bare indicators and feedback in the eyes of the center until the policy entrepreneur became willing to pick these up. Therefore, the problem stream waited for being coupled by the policy entrepreneur.

Among others, the most stated problems composing the problem stream were as follows: the lack of a law on foreigners and international protection, absence of a central institution to engage with migration management, the ineffectiveness of then-existing -secondary-legislation, and maintenance of the geographical limitation (Ekşi, 2018).

4.4.1.2. The Policy Stream in Agenda Setting

Policy proposals may be developed and transferred in different ways in different settings. The statist policy style in Turkey compels actors to produce policy proposals exceptionally at the national level and under the strict control of state bodies. In this setting, more often than not, civil servants generate policy proposals. Since non-governmental actors are not the *sine qua non* components of the policymaking process (also read as the policy community), their

inclusion in it depends on the invitation they would receive from the administration⁴¹. Unless they receive an invitation to the policymaking process, their proposals do not see the light of day. In the present case, stakeholders were included in the *policy community* unexpectedly. As a result, they found the opportunity to convey their concerns, priorities, and policy solutions throughout the Law on Foreigners and International Protection policymaking process. This was possible since the policy entrepreneur extended invitations to non-governmental actors that were used to being sidelined (Interview with an expert, 08/06/2021).

The literature on the MSF does not provide precise clues about how policy communities gather elsewhere. However, empirical findings indicate that the policy community in the present case regularly gathered upon invitation. Among these gatherings, the roundtable meeting held on December 10, 2009, in Ankara, for instance, unlocked opportunities for experts at UNHCR and IOM to cite and present the best examples from around the world (Ekşi, 2012, pp. 11–12). The large-scale meeting on October 19-20, 2010, too, provided IOs, INGOs, and NGOs with opportunities to express their views on different versions of policy alternatives (Ekşi, 2012, p. 13). Apart from these, some experts from IOs even had the opportunity to join the Bureau and closely work with the policy entrepreneur as well as his team (Interview with the senior national program officer, 09/20/2018).

⁴¹ Due to sporadic invitation practices, scholars link the inclusion of non-governmental actors in policy communities to the preferences of governments (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019). After all, not a single legislation obliges the executive to invite non-governmental actors to generate policy alternatives. There is not an informal rule obliging to do so in Turkey either. Only when preparing a policy proposal in line with the EU acquis, the Regulation on the Procedures and Principles of Drafting Legislation (Mevzuat Hazırlama Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik, 2005) requires getting the views of the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union on the proposal. Be it linked to the EU acquis or not, consulting local administrations, universities, trade-unions and non-governmental organizations is optional. Even when invited in, they have limited power over policy proposals. This is because policy alternatives are already shaped to a significant extent (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019).

In a setting where frequent consultation with non-governmental actors is rare, inviting experts from IOs to work at the Bureau was exceptional. This example was repeatedly linked to the policy entrepreneur and his team's unconventional approach to policymaking (close to consensual) during interviews. Besides the policy entrepreneur's individual characteristics, which helped non-governmental actors join the policy community, at least two other reasons (one is practical, and the other is macro-political) may be highlighted here to explain how such an unconventional way was followed in organizing the policy community at the time. First, the policy entrepreneur had no prior knowledge about asylum and immigration before his assignment to the Bureau (Interview with the senior bureaucrat 1, 09/13/2019). His consultation with key stakeholders was probably inevitable to pick up technical know-how under those conditions. Hence, the policy entrepreneur and his colleagues in the Bureau desired to learn from stakeholders' expertise. Second, gatherings took place before the 2016 coup d'état attempt when the lines of communication were still open to stakeholders in the administration (Interview with the senior national program officer, 09/20/2018). All in all, the inclusion of non-governmental actors in the policy community depended on a complex interaction of different variables at the time: individual characteristics of the policy entrepreneur, technicality of the issue requiring expertise in asylum and immigration, and Turkey's macro-political conditions.

Additionally, non-governmental actors' presence in the community gave the policy entrepreneur at least three clear advantages in generating his policy alternative. First, non-governmental actors brought expertise in and transferred know-how to the Bureau (Interview with the senior national program officer, 09/20/2018). Second, non-governmental actors repeatedly showed their support for the policy entrepreneur's endeavors. This, in turn, helped him receive the most comprehensive support for his proposal in the policy community.

Empirical findings suggest that Turkey's statist policy style challenges how Kingdon conceptualized the softening-up process and the likelihood of several policy entrepreneurs competing each other in the policy community. In the present case, non-governmental actors did not challenge the policy entrepreneur's proposal, nor did they attempt to take over entrepreneurial roles. As a result, their presence did not challenge or jeopardize the policy entrepreneur's proposal. On the contrary, their presence raised the acceptability of the policy entrepreneur's proposal. Third, Turkey's statist policy style forced non-governmental actors to soften-up their suggestions to secure their presence in the policy community and closely monitor the policymaking process (Interview with MP3, 07/04/2021). Think of the geographical limitation maintained to the 1951 Refugee Convention, for instance. Although non-governmental actors insistently asked the policy entrepreneur and his team to lift it, the policy entrepreneur chose to keep it due to national sensitivities. Hence, the policy entrepreneur traced non-governmental actors' expectations and filtered their demands when he saw fit by including them in the policy community. Consequently, the interactions between the Bureau and non-governmental actors produced the most acceptable and feasible alternative in line with the sensitivities of the administration as well as the statist policy style.

Empirical evidence also indicates that Turkey's peculiar policy style casts who is more likely to be the policy entrepreneur by providing positional advantages to him/her among others. It does so from the very beginning of the policymaking process. Therefore, one emerges and functions as a policy entrepreneur not always because s/he holds the most robust policy proposal that better survives than others' proposals.

Concerning the policy alternative, the policy entrepreneur's pet proposal sought to strike a balance between human rights of refugees and public security. Highlighting the human-rights

perspective in asylum and immigration, the policy entrepreneur's policy alternative also foresaw a transfer of power from the National Police to a civilian institution.

The policy stream was ready to be coupled with other streams when the policy entrepreneur completed his policy proposal in 2011.

4.4.1.3. The Political Stream in Agenda Setting

Political actors sense the national mood drawing on several sources, one of which is mass media (Kingdon, 2011). In the case at hand, mass media did not provide straightforward clues about what the public conceived of the policy entrepreneur's pet proposal. The public's silence between 2008 and April 2011 had a couple of reasons. First, asylum and immigration, as a policy sector, did not directly relate to nationals. Second, the proposal was not shared publicly to establish a ground for discussions. Given the statist policy style where the "state is an authority over society," one might not find this surprising (Eising, 2009, p. 33). Third, only a limited number of people engaged with the proposal due to the technicality of the issue.

However, the national mood reflected on the media starting from April 2011 when Syrians first began to flee to Turkey. This, in turn, opened up an opportunity for opposition parties to bring up the public's concerns about the potential impacts of the Syrian crisis on Turkey's economics. Starting from December 2011, discussions about the Syrian crisis increased in the GNAT with questions raised by members of the Parliament (henceforth, the MPs) (24. *Dönem 2. Yasama Yılı Genel Kurul Tutanakları /Minutes of the GNAT, 24th Term 2nd Legislative Year, 2011*).

*Organized political forces*⁴², on their end, actively monitored the progress of the policy proposal on asylum and immigration. However, they did not directly interfere in the political stream. After all, the hybrid interest intermediation system did not privilege a particular organized political force to actively take part in politics.

Only one general *election* took place in June 2011, between 2008 and 2013. Following the June 2011 general elections, the Justice and Development Party (henceforth, the JDP) formed yet another single-party government, albeit with different party members. The Minister of Interior, who appointed the senior bureaucrat as the Head of the Bureau, became vice prime minister. From June 2011 to April 2013, three different JDP deputies served as the Minister of Interior. Although Turkey's political history is replete with frequent changes to the bureaucracy, frequent changes to the Ministry of Interior delayed the agenda-setting⁴³ (Interview with the senior national program officer, 09/20/2018). Thus, the statist policy style effectively shaped the duration within which the political stream got ready for coupling. Meanwhile, MPs' persistent questions about how the government planned to respond to the Syrian crisis and its potential impacts in Turkey kept the political stream ready to be coupled with other streams.

4.4.1.4. The Policy Window in Agenda Setting

Legislative elections were held as planned in 2011 by providing the policy entrepreneur with prediction as to the political window. However, elections did not particularly help the policy

⁴² Kingdon's work enable researchers to assess the way organized political forces involve in the policymaking process by focusing on two distinct streams: the policy and the political streams. The data collected for this study indicates that organized political forces initially took part in the policy stream. Therefore, I analyzed their actions in the policy stream.

⁴³ The Minister of Interior, during whose ministry the policy proposal was enacted in the GNAT, was present in all Internal Affairs Committees. At that time, he was not serving as the Minister of Interior. However, he, as the chairperson, led the Internal Affairs Committee meetings. His participation as well as his support for the proposal, might have helped the policy entrepreneur in keeping his pet project in the agenda.

entrepreneur in coupling the streams. Moreover, frequent changes to the Ministry of Interior lengthened the coupling process, as interview data indicate⁴⁴.

The case at hand suggests that a policy window opened in the problem stream following the Syrian crisis in March 2011⁴⁵. Opposition parties (the Republican People's Party, the Nationalist Movement Party, and the Peace and Democracy Party) insistingly brought up questions about how the executive planned to respond the Syrian crisis and Syrians' needs in Turkey by keeping the Syrian crisis on the agenda (see the minutes of 23. *Dönem 5. Yasama Yılı Genel Kurum Tutanakları / Minutes of the GNAT, 23rd Term 5th Legislative Year, 2011* on April 6, 2011; December 10, 2011; December 20, 2011; and January 12, 2012). The window, which opened because of a pressing problem, consequently increased policymakers' acceptability of the policy alternative.

The endurance of the problem shaped the longevity of the policy window by surpassing any precise institutional impact on it for the present case.

4.4.1.5. The Policy Entrepreneur in Agenda Setting

Kingdon describes *policy entrepreneurs* as to their individual characteristics. For Kingdon, policy entrepreneurs are “advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money- to promote a position in turn for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 179). Such a definition implies that anyone willing to invest her resources may become and function as a policy entrepreneur.

⁴⁴ In its original formulation, Kingdon predominantly links political windows to regular elections. However, in a statist policy style, as the case indicates frequent changes to bureaucracy may also be seen as blessing or curse eventually depending on conditions.

⁴⁵ Given the unpredictable nature of the Syrian crisis, this window may also be called random problem window in Howlett and Ramesh's terms (2008).

However, political actors do not appear and operate in an institutional vacuum. Nor do they share the same institutional conditions with their counterparts elsewhere. Therefore, direct application of the MSF beyond the US, in this case in Turkey, becomes puzzling.

Scholarly debates imply that separation of powers and federalism in the US enable individuals to emerge and function as policy entrepreneurs almost irrespective of their location and background (Marmor, 1986). However, Turkey with its statist policy style characteristics tend to choose who can become a policy entrepreneur, control his/her actions, and assign a particular location for his/her in the administration. Therefore, I argue that the application of the MSF becomes meaningful in Turkey only when policy styles are included in the framework.

Considering Turkey's statist policy style, I suggest dividing Kingdon's policy entrepreneur definition into three and present the characteristics of the policy entrepreneur at hand depending on i) her/his individual performance; ii) emergence, and iii) request for future gain. First, the policy entrepreneur in the case at hand flawlessly conforms to Kingdon's policy entrepreneur definition with regard to his individual performance. Interview data suggests that the policy entrepreneur was keen to invest time and energy to promote his policy alternative. Consequently, he recurrently lobbied⁴⁶ to receive the maximum support possible (Interviews with the senior bureaucrats 1 & 2, 09/23/2019).

Second, as to the policy entrepreneur's emergence, findings illustrate that he did not appear and operate based on his individual concerns about security-centric practices in the area.

⁴⁶ In the policy design process, the policy entrepreneur's lobbying efforts were frequently appreciated, albeit without explicitly describing these efforts as lobbying.

Instead, he was appointed⁴⁷ by the Minister of Interior⁴⁸ to operate in asylum and immigration (Interview with the senior bureaucrat 2, 11/19/2019). Given the few barriers between politicians and high-level bureaucrats in the Napoleonic administrative tradition, this appointment was not surprising in Turkey. However, I propose to go beyond this classic reasoning and suggest reading his appointment as an official invitation/ approval/ consent/ permission extended by the highest level of authority, the executive, to the senior bureaucrat which brought him at least three benefits.

First benefit is that this appointment provided the bureaucrat with the opportunity to deal with problems in asylum and immigration, create solutions to these, and operate as a policy entrepreneur⁴⁹. Despite being part of the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Interior, this senior bureaucrat would not have assumed policy entrepreneurship in the policy sector without such an invitation due to statist policy style. After all, any individual action without an invitation risk being frozen out of the policymaking process.

⁴⁷ Findings eloquently indicate that the appointment of the policy entrepreneur was not haphazard. Plausible analyses may be gathered under two initial points. First, the policy entrepreneur was a senior bureaucrat having years of experience in Turkey's politico-administrative system. The senior bureaucrat had knowledge of employing public resources, legal reputation and policymaking. Second, he had a pro-European stance, which helped him emerge as a liberal-minded bureaucrat and eased his communication with international actors, e.g., the EU bodies and other stakeholders such as the UNHCR, the IOM. Having familiarity with the policy style and a pro-European perspective coupled with being open to communication with non-governmental actors helped the policy entrepreneur strike a balance between national concerns and protection priorities in generating his pet proposal. Think of the insistence on the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention, for instance. Despite being a pro-European, he chose to maintain the geographical limitation intact, which was expected to be lifted by EU bodies and other non-governmental actors.

⁴⁸ When asked about the potential reasons why he would have been chosen for this position, the policy entrepreneur expressed that he had a good idea of these. However, he abstained from sharing any of these reasons. In a scholarly source, the policy entrepreneur was described as a pro-European and liberal minded (Fine, 2018, p. 25). Although these might not be the only reasons why he was assigned to the Bureau, these seem to have an impact on the decision of appointment.

⁴⁹ Despite being necessary, the appointment alone was not sufficient for the bureaucrat to become a policy entrepreneur. No single appointment alone automatically entitles policy entrepreneurship to an appointee, nor does it guarantee his/her success. Such an invitation simply but effectively opens a window of opportunity to the appointee to become a policy entrepreneur.

Second, any entrepreneurial attempt without official approval would create a conflict of interests between the bureaucrat and the Police. After all, the Police was in charge of managing asylum and immigration related issues before the LFIP. Hence, the invitation coming from the Ministry of Interior shielded the bureaucrat from being labeled as a threat to the policy process. It also helped him appear as a legitimate and indigenous member in asylum and immigration in the eyes of the Police.

Third, the appointment allowed the bureaucrat to use public resources that he might not otherwise use. In this way, he benefitted from material resources, positional reputation, and advantages in communicating with other actors in the field and receiving information from them. Interview data suggest that even members of the GNAT did not have such administrative, political, and technical information channels (Interview with MP1, 07/29/2019). Hence, this appointment granted both financial sources and legal reputation to the bureaucrat. Moreover, neither financial resources nor the legal reputation was individual possession, but both came with the bureaucrat's administrative position.

Third, going back to Kingdon's policy entrepreneur definition, collected data did not provide a clear answer to whether the policy entrepreneur sought any benefits in exchange for his endeavors. Whether he sought such a benefit or not the policy entrepreneur was given the authority to manage the Directorate General of Migration Management (henceforth, the DGMM) following the enactment of the LFIP from March 9, 2014, to June 20, 2017.

The policy entrepreneur's pet project aimed to introduce a comprehensive legal document to manage asylum and immigration, strike a balance between refugee rights and public security,

set up a civilian institution, the DGMM. The latter eventually envisaged a transfer of power from the Foreigners Department of the National Police to a civilian institution. Turkey's statist policy style profoundly shaped the policy entrepreneur's strategies in dealing with this issue which might have created conflicts by impeding successful agenda-setting. Since Turkey's statist policy style does not foster competition, the policy entrepreneur first prepared a favorable ground for knowledge exchange with the Foreigners Department of the National Police by inviting officers in the Bureau and the policy community. This inclusive approach enabled officers to transfer their expertise, convey their concerns about asylum and immigration-related issues, and inform other community members about their past experiences. In this way, these interactions transformed potential competition into cooperation. This, in turn, decreased any tension that may have surfaced otherwise between the Foreigners Department of the National Police and the Bureau. Second, the interview data suggest that the policy entrepreneur explained the transfer of power as 'the changing of the guard' within the same institution: The Ministry of Interior⁵⁰. By emphasizing the shared values and concerns of the same institution, the policy entrepreneur likened the Ministry of Interior an umbrella body embedding both the Police and the Bureau.

There were plausibly other factors that eased this transfer. First, the Foreigners Department of the Police was not alien to human rights-based practices in asylum and immigration. Even years before the appointment of the policy entrepreneur as the Head of the Bureau, the UNHCR was known to provide legal assistance to the Foreigners Department of the National Police and training programs to the border police. The reports of the UNHCR indicate that these pieces of

⁵⁰ Possessive nouns used by representatives of the National Force in Committee meetings, later on, corroborate this argument and illustrate the way they approach the Ministry of Interior: "We, too, thank to our Ministry (read, the Ministry of Interior) which prepared this proposal and those who contributed to it". This overbearing approach also shows that they do not make a distinction between individuals (read, the policy entrepreneur and his team) and institutions (the Ministry of Interior) (Second meeting of the Internal Affairs Committee)

training were successful in raising awareness of “refugee rights among immigration officers” (UNHCR *Global Report*, 1999). Consequently, the policy entrepreneur had leverage in increasing interest in human rights-based asylum and immigration policies. Second, existing security concerns as to terrorism in Turkey formed an opinion that it would be a waste of human resources to make police officers sit at the office and do office work. Hence, the firm will within the National Police to perform duties for crime-related issues, too, eased the transfer (Interview with the senior bureaucrat 1, 09/23/2019).

Against this backdrop, the policy entrepreneur pushed his pet project and successfully got it on the decision agenda in January 2012, when the policy window was still open in the problem stream. The already available policy alternative, which might otherwise wait for the executive to become more receptive, was placed on the agenda with Syrians increasingly seeking protection in Turkey.

4.4.1.6. Quick Take: How Does Turkey’s Statist Policy Style Structure the Politics of Agenda-Setting?

As to the problem stream in agenda-setting, findings suggest that Turkey’s statist policy style provides some actors with positional advantages in defining problems. Therefore, although indicators, feedback, and focusing events point to problems, these may not be addressed unless positionally advantaged actors perceive these as such.

As to the *policy stream* in agenda-setting, findings reveal that the statist policy style in Turkey compels policy communities to be organized under strict control of the bureaucracy and upon invitation. In such communities, positionally advantaged actors (read, policy entrepreneurs)

can not be challenged by others. However, the latter gets the opportunity to convey its concerns, proposals, and recommendations.

As to the *political stream* in agenda-setting, findings reveal that the majoritarian characteristics of the policy style in Turkey do not always require consensus-building. This is particularly true when the executive has enough support in the legislature. Hence, it is usually up to the policy entrepreneur to adjust his/her lobbying strategies in line with existing conditions in politics. The case at hand shows that the policy entrepreneur preferred to lobby at every opportunity to receive the highest support for his pet project without leaving it to a change. This may also be because the policy entrepreneur has a tendency towards consensual policymaking practices.

As to *policy windows* in agenda-setting, findings do not particularly point to the structuring effect of Turkey's statist policy style. However, besides regular elections, frequent changes to bureaucracy may be seen as opportunities opening windows.

As to *policy entrepreneurs* in agenda-setting, findings indicate that the statist policy style of Turkey compels invitation for those who would like to pursue entrepreneurial actions. Without such an official invitation, any individual attempt would be considered as a threat to the policymaking process in Turkey's statist politico-administrative system. Hence, Turkey's statist policy style determines who would be invited in or frozen out of the policy process and whose entrepreneurial activities would be legitimate. Moreover, the official invitation allows the policy entrepreneur to use public resources which would otherwise be inaccessible and provides her/him with a legal reputation.

The main takeaways as to how statist policy style shapes multiple streams in Turkey in agenda setting are illustrated in Table 3 below.

4.4.2. Explaining the Politics of Decision-Making

The purpose of this sub-section is to unfold the decision-making process (policy design and policy adoption) of the LFIP, drawing on the MSF's structural elements. In so doing, this sub-section discusses the ways in which policy style structures multiple streams in policy design and policy adoption.

As laid out in Chapter 2 (please see 2.2.1. Extending the Policy Process), there are a host of ways to extend the framework beyond the agenda-setting stage. Scholars more often than not proposed to modify the MSF in analyzing decision-making across geographies. Existing modifications significantly contributed to the development of the MSF and introduced new structural elements to it, e.g., the decision window and the political entrepreneur. In applying the MSF to the Turkish case, I do not offer yet another component-based modification. Drawing on empirical findings of this study, I illustrate that considering policy styles would help understand multiple streams in decision-making. However, the offered structural elements are considered in the following sections, as contended by MSF scholars.

Since the challenge to incorporate the MSF's structural elements into synthetically divided policy design and policy adoption processes continues, I will touch upon the takeaways that could not be covered in the following subsections in the end.

I start the policy design process with the policy entrepreneur's successful agenda-setting in January 2012. In exploring the politics of policy adoption, I focus on the period between the

introduction of Committee Reports on the LFIP's draft to the GNAT in June 2012 and its voting in April 2013.

4.4.2.1. Designing the LFIP

The policy entrepreneur successfully got his pet project on the decision agenda in January 2012. The Cabinet decided to send the policy proposal to the GNAT in its meeting on January 16, 2012. Almost six months later, on May 3, 2012, the Prime Minister sent it to the committees to be reviewed: The Internal Affairs Committee (the central Committee), the Committee on Justice, the European Union Harmonization Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Human Rights Inquiry Committee, the National Education, Culture, Youth and Sports Committee, the Plan and Budget Committee and the Health, Family, Labor and Social Affairs Committee. Only two committees other than the central Committee presented their views on the proposal: the Committee on Justice, the European Union Harmonization Committee, and the Human Rights Inquiry Committee. Therefore, the following sections will draw only on these three Committees' reports.

4.4.2.1.1. The Problem Stream in Policy Design

The inclusion of new actors in policy design (read, policymakers) did not challenge the previous problem definitions. Actors in this policy stage relied on the same *indicators*, *feedback*, and *attention-grabbing events* in presenting conditions as problems. However, not all actors' problem definitions saw the light of the day, e.g., recurrent request for lifting the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Hence, these actors could not re-design the policy proposal in line with their problem definitions.

Throughout this process, familiar problems were raised. These were (i) the absence of a comprehensive law on asylum and immigration, (ii) lack of a central institution to engage with migration management, (iii) ineffectiveness of managing migration through secondary legislation, (iv) increasing convictions of the ECtHR, which were thought to be degrading Turkey's reputation at the international level. The geographical limitation remained as a problem for IOs and NGOs such as Amnesty International, Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, and Mülteci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees) (24. Yasama Dönemi 2. Yasama Yılı AB Uyum Komisyonu Tutanak Dergisi / Minutes of EU Harmonization Committee, 24th Term 2nd Legislative Year, 2012). In policy design, MPs did not notably support lifting the geographical limitation. Only one MP representing the Equality and Democracy Party repeated non-governmental actors' concerns about asylum and immigration-related issues, albeit without particularly stating the geographical limitation (24. Yasama Dönemi 2. Yasama Yılı İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, Minutes of the Human Rights Inquiry Committee, 24th Term 2nd Legislative Year, 2012). Among others, application fees requested from protection seekers were raised as a problem to be addressed by policymakers.

Statist policy style provided some policymakers (read, the executive and JDP MPs) with a positional advantage in problem definition vis-à-vis other actors in policy design. For instance, a JDP deputy explicitly stated that the geographical limitation is not a problem since the proposal would bestow protection rights to non-Europeans as well, in practice. The policy entrepreneur who had the opportunity to monitor the policy design process did not agree to define the maintenance of the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention as a problem either. Instead, he interpreted the geographical limitation as a right granted to Turkey by the 1951 Refugee Convention (24. Yasama Dönemi 2. Yasama Yılı AB Uyum Komisyonu

Tutanak Dergisi / Minutes of EU Harmonization Committee, 24th Term 2nd Legislative Year, 2012).

All in all, the involvement of new political actors during the agenda-setting stage did not challenge the already existing problem definitions, nor did it challenge the already positionally advantaged actors. Therefore, problems are defined as positionally advantaged actors saw fit and hence the same problem definitions continued to float around.

4.4.2.1.2. The Policy Stream in Policy Design

On May 3, 2012, the Prime Minister decided to send the proposal to (1) the Internal Affairs Committee, (2) the Committee on Justice, (3) the European Union Harmonization Committee, (4) the Foreign Affairs Committee, (5) the Human Rights Inquiry Committee, (6) the National Education, Culture, Youth and Sports Committee, (7) the Plan and Budget Committee, and (8) the Health, Family, Labor and Social Affairs Committee. These committees had charge of reviewing and designing the policy proposal in line with their area of expertise. Since only three Committees scrutinized the proposal among others, their gatherings are considered as *policy communities* here. The Internal Affairs Committee functioned as the Central Committee. Therefore, it had more say and time in re-structuring the policy proposal compared to others.

All committee meetings were open to academics and representatives of IOs (the UNHCR, the IOM) and associations (the Human Rights Association, Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants, Association for Solidarity with Refugees, Helsinki Citizens' Assembly). The inclusion of interested parties in Committee meetings provided a set of opportunities for both parties and increased the rate of acceptability of the proposal. First,

committee members (read, policymakers/ policy designers/voters) received firsthand feedback from those operating in the field. This, in turn, gave voters an idea about how the proposed document would respond to the existing problems. Second, academics and representatives of IOs and associations had the opportunity to monitor and participate in the policy design process. This inclusive approach helped particularly opposition party MPs support the policy proposal.

However, the inclusive approach to policy design did not result in the mechanic adoption of non-governmental actors' proposals. Turkey's executive favoring statist policy style was again reflected in the policy design process. This was also true for the changes suggested by opposition party MPs. For instance, the policy entrepreneur, who appeared as the representative of the executive in policy design, rejected the RPP MPs' recommendations in the European Union Harmonization Committee. Therefore, no matter how inclusive the policy design process was, the executive had the final word on the proposal and played a decisive role in designing it.

Turkey's peculiar politico-administrative structure also reflected on the invitation-only participation of non-governmental actors in Committee meetings. Although these actors had the opportunity to monitor Committee meetings upon invitation, they could not attend all the sessions of policy design. For instance, the Chair of the Central Committee asked non-governmental actors to leave the room from time to time. In some other sessions, these actors were not given the floor to express their views. These reverberated the statist policy style in Turkey and manifested the state's authority over society⁵¹.

⁵¹ As a member of the latter, I received my share as well. Not all minutes of the sessions were documented and publicly shared e.g., the second meeting of the Internal Affairs Committee (for detailed information about the majoritarian characteristics of the political system in Turkey and its Napoleonic administrative tradition, please see: 4.2.1.; 4.2.2.; and 4.2.3).

The following paragraphs provide detailed analyses of the Committee meetings in chronological order.

4.4.2.1.3. Committee Meetings

The first meeting on the policy proposal was held on May 24, 2012, by the Human Rights Inquiry Committee. MPs from the political parties -the JDP (7), the NMP (2), the RPP (1), and the PDP (1)- and two bureaucrats from the Ministry of Interior, one of whom was the policy entrepreneur, were present in the meeting. Non-governmental actors were present, too, to monitor the meeting, but they were not given the floor to join discussions. The meeting started with the standing committee chairperson's (a JDP MP) opening remarks. In his speech, the chairperson introduced the proposal's rationale and gave the floor to the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Interior to detail it. In his remarks, the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Interior pointed to the problems emphasized in the problem stream, such as lack of a comprehensive law in asylum and immigration, the ECtHR's decisions, absence of a central institution responsible for migration management. Starting from this meeting, the Ministry of Interior clarified that it took over the entrepreneurial role in policy design.

A JDP MP supported the proposal and referred to the needs resulting from the Syrian crisis⁵². The MP argued that if the proposal gets adopted, those coming from Syria will benefit from the protection services as well. Another MP (JDP) brought up the fees required for the residence permit applications in Turkey and proposed to lobby the Ministry of Finance to lift

⁵² In almost all interviews, interviewees highlighted that this proposal was prepared before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011. They, therefore, explicitly expressed that the proposal was not prepared as a solution to then raising problem but to already present chronic problems in the area. Moreover, two interviewees (one from the IOM and other from the ICMPD) shared their concerns about how the Syrian crisis would have delayed the adoption of the proposal in the GNAT.

it. The PDP MP asked for the inclusion of representatives of associations, namely Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Human Rights Association, Association for Solidarity with Refugees, Human Rights Agenda Association, and Amnesty International, to get their views on the proposal and receive precise feedback. The chairperson reminded that representatives of stated associations paid a visit to the Committee earlier. In this way, he stressed that stated stakeholders were not excluded from the process and monitored the proposal's design. In general, the proposal was welcomed among MPs.

At the end of the meeting, the policy entrepreneur took the floor to respond to MPs' concerns, proposals, and recommendations. As the Ministry of Interior bureaucrat, the policy entrepreneur emphasized that the proposal was a product of mutual interaction of central authorities and IOs such as the UNHCR and the IOM. He also informed the audience that the Ministry of Finance was persuaded not to ask for fees for residence permits from foreigners. Apart from these, the policy entrepreneur exercised his authority to approve or disapprove proposals and expressed which recommendations were to be embedded. Following his talk, the Committee unanimously approved the proposal.

The Internal Affairs Committee, as the central Committee, gathered on May 31, 2012⁵³. The Minister of Interior, together with the JDP (4), the NMP (1), the RPP (3), and the PDP (1) MPs, were present in the first session. Academics, representatives from the IOs and NGOs, and press members actively participated in the meeting. The Minister of Interior's keynote speech opened the session. During his speech, the Minister of Interior referred to previously stated problems and explained how the proposal at hand promised to respond to these. His speech confirmed

⁵³ In seven different meetings of the Internal Affairs Committee, the policy entrepreneur's proposal was discussed. However, only three of these meetings' minutes were shared publicly.

that the policy entrepreneur's proposal had the full support of the Ministry of Interior. The JDP and the RPP MPs repeatedly appreciated the policy entrepreneur and his team's endeavors throughout the meeting. The representative of the UNHCR, too, expressed that the UNHCR enjoyed the transparent process of proposal development. Two law professors explained why such a legal document is needed by referring to the EU *acquis*, ECtHR decisions, and the absence of a comprehensive law in the sectors.

The Internal Affairs Committee gathered on June 5, 2012, to further discuss the proposal⁵⁴. Representatives of IOs (the UNHCR, the IOM) and associations (Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants, Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and Association for Solidarity with Refugees), a representative of Republic of National Defense General Staff, Head of Migration Management at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Head of Foreigners and Border Management at the General Directorate of Security, a government representative, and the ruling party and the opposition parties' MPs were present at meeting sessions.

Representatives of associations appreciated once again the transparent nature of the policy design process. Although they shared their concerns about the proposal, these actors did not (read could not) change the proposal as they desired. The geographical limitation⁵⁵, which had

⁵⁴ The minutes of the third session of this Committee were not documented fully. The National Defense General Staff, for instance, shared their comments in a written form, which were not published either. The analysis of this Committee meeting notes, therefore, entail only the publicly shared minutes.

⁵⁵ The meeting minutes as well as interviews indicate that maintenance of the geographical limitation helped the policy entrepreneur persuade many policymakers besides the Turkish National Police which long had the authority to administer asylum and refugee-related issues. It decreased the security concerns of many actors. Stakeholders, on the other hand, seem to be persuaded that Turkey will lift geographical limitation upon its EU membership. They were also persuaded that the proposal promises to respect the basic human rights of asylum and protection seekers. Hence, getting it adopted would be better than executing then existing secondary regulation.

long been required to be lifted by stakeholders, was kept intact to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Besides the geographical limitation, actors emphasized the following as problems: (i) the 15-day rule to object to authorities' deportation decision⁵⁶, (ii) inequality across different nationals in accessing the labor market, (iii) lack of an article guaranteeing that public authorities would provide all information in a language that the applicant might understand, and (iv) a clear definition of who is a child. The executive representative -probably the policy entrepreneur⁵⁷- answered recommendations and concerns at the end. However, not a significant article change had happened. Similar to policy stream in agenda-setting, the *softening-up* process worked in contrast to how Kingdon conceptualized it. Instead of challenging the policy entrepreneur's policy alternative, non-governmental actors' inclusion in the policy community raised the acceptability rate of the proposal in policy design.

The European Union Harmonization Committee met on June 6, 2012. Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, Representative of the Ministry for European Union Affairs, JDP (4), NMP (2) and RPP (4) MPs, as well as representatives of IOs (UNHCR and IOM) and associations (Human Rights Association also on behalf of Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Human Rights Agenda Association, Association for Solidarity with Refugees and Amnesty International), were present in the committee meeting. The proposal was discussed article by article in this Committee meeting. At the beginning of the Committee meeting, the Deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior referred to earlier stated problems and presented the proposal as a remedy to these. The Ministry of Interior expressed its full support to the proposal and shouldered entrepreneurship. The Ministry for European Union Affairs representative

⁵⁶ Imposing a limited time for deportations was overtly supported by the Deputy Head of Foreigners and Border Management at the General Directorate of Security for security reasons. Hence, some of their concerns were replied by the proposal.

⁵⁷ The name of the representative of the executive was not disclosed.

emphasized the proposal's substantial compliance with the EU acquis and supported it. Representatives of the UNHCR and the IOM, too, expressed their support for the proposal.

The representative of the stated associations invited the Committee to make some changes to the proposal. These were about (i) lifting the geographical limitation applied to the 1951 Refugee Convention, (ii) adding an article about non-discrimination against “gender, race, color, ethnic, social or national origin, hereditary characteristics, language, religion, belief, sexual orientation and gender identity, philosophical and political opinion, marital status, citizenship, wealth, birth, pregnancy, health status, disability⁵⁸,” (ii) declaring that those, who are threatened by the death penalty, cannot be returned, (iv) reducing residence permit fees to reasonable levels, and (v) lifting the condition of functioning as an association for the public interest to have a protocol with governmental bodies in executing services at removal centers, reception and accommodation centers, and shelters for the victims of human trafficking.

Upon these requests, the Chair reminded the audience that the Committee should initially assess the proposal's compatibility with the EU acquis since the Central Committee was the Internal Affairs Committee. However, the Chair assured the participants that the Committee would share these views with the Internal Affairs Committee. An RPP MP suggested adding the right to legal aid to the proposal to render it in line with the EU acquis. She also proposed explicitly declaring that asylum interviews would be in the language of the applicant's country of citizenship or in a language that s/he understands. Another RPP MP expressed that the main

⁵⁸ In Turkish “cinsiyet, ırk, renk, etnik, sosyal ya da ulusal köken, kalıtsal özellikler, dil, din, inanç, cinsel yönelim ve cinsiyet kimliği, felsefi ve siyasi görüş, medeni hâl, hemşehrilik, servet, doğum, hamilelik, sağlık durumu, engellilik, yaş”. We understand that an article entailing all these was present in an earlier version of the proposal. However, the latest version which was sent to the Committees did not include it. Consequently, representatives of the associations asked for its inclusion in the proposal.

opposition party found the proposal an essential step toward improving the sectors of asylum and immigration. However, the proposal should be further developed. Another criticism that the MP raised was about receiving the proposal quite late - just a day before the committee meeting- which, in turn, disabled him to prepare for it thoroughly.

At the end of the Committee meeting, the policy entrepreneur responded to recommendations and concerns on behalf of the Ministry of Interior.

Throughout this session, MPs proposed seven changes. Among these, only one was reflected in the proposal. On behalf of the executive, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior voted in favor of this change because it complies with the EU acquis. The rest was rejected by either the Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior or the policy entrepreneur on behalf of the executive.

The Internal Affairs Committee gathered for the last time on July 20, 2012, to discuss the proposal. During this last Internal Affairs Committee meeting, the JDP (9), the NMP (1) and the RPP (2) MPs, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, representatives of IOs (UNHCR and IOM) as well as the policy entrepreneur were present. The Chair, who became the Minister of Interior afterward, delivered his opening remarks by stressing the relevance of reviewing such a proposal on World Refugee Day. The proposal, which was composed of 131 articles, in the beginning, was reduced to 126 articles. Committee members appreciated the efforts of the policy entrepreneur and his team for providing detailed information about the proposal before meetings. The representatives of IOs expressed their support for the proposal as well. Furthermore, they indicated that this legal document would help Turkey deal with illegal migration and comply with international protection standards. The proposal was also

appreciated for being transferred to the Central Committee in its almost final version and respecting policymaking techniques.

Additionally, the policy entrepreneur was appreciated for having prepared the proposal with an inclusive approach. However, in appreciating the proposal, an NMP MP felt the need to emphasize that this policy proposal, like other proposals, was designed based on the priorities and interests of the Turkish people. This intervention might be read as a reminder that the inclusion of international organizations in the policy process, as its atypical components, did not challenge, nor did it change the state's powerful stance.

An RPP MP expressed that the executive kindly took the opposition parties' views into account in designing the policy. Again, this should be read as the reflection of Turkey's unique politico-administrative system in the relationship between the executive and opposition parties. The executive does not necessarily need to persuade opposition parties' MPs in designing or adopting a policy, essentially when it guarantees the majority in the Parliament. However, on the case at hand, the executive (read the policy entrepreneur) put an explicit effort in pursuing an inclusive approach in designing the policy.

Against this backdrop, all articles and the whole proposal were voted unanimously. Interview data suggests that the unanimity reached in the Central Committee was a story of success. The meeting was closed by appreciating the policy entrepreneur and his team's endeavors in receiving the support of such a broad group.

4.4.2.1.4. *The Political Stream in Policy Design*

Few had changed in the political stream between January and June 2012.

As the central source to sense the *national mood*, *mass media* pointed to the public's concerns about how the Syrian crisis would affect accommodation and employment related issues in Turkey. As opposed to the agenda-setting stage, the public was more interested in the Syrian crisis in policy design process. And so did the opposition party MPs in the GNAT. The latter kept raising questions about Turkey's stance vis-à-vis Syrians fleeing to Turkey, the budget reserved for them, and the potential impacts of the Syrian crisis on Turkey's economic landscape. The JDP MPs referred to the draft LFIP to remedy Syrians' existing accommodation and protection problems in Turkey to respond to these concerns. These discussions, together with the Syrian crisis enduring, kept the political stream receptive to the LFIP.

The policy design process was on the radar of *organized political forces* throughout this process⁵⁹. The same Minister of Interior served throughout this policy stage.

Besides increasing discussions about the Syrian crisis, not another factor affected the political stream in policy design.

⁵⁹ Due to their function, I zoomed in on the engagement of organized political forces in the policy stream in policy design.

4.4.2.1.5. The Policy Window in Policy Design

The MSF literature does not distinguish policy design from policy adoption. Therefore, there are no clues about whether another policy window is needed to design and re-formulate the proposals on the agenda. Findings indicate that after the executive decides to share a proposal with Committees and the GNAT, the policy design process mechanically starts and does not require any additional window to open.

Since the Syrian crisis endured at the time and hence kept the problem window open, it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion about whether the proposal would move off the decision agenda by the executive's counter decision. Even if that was the case, it would again draw attention to the statist policy style and its structuring effects in politics. Since the statist policy style empowers the executive the most in politics, its counter decision would suggest that the executive may synthetically open and close policy windows. This, in turn, would suggest searching other policy windows by going beyond regular political and unexpected problem windows.

The present case indicates that even if the executive did not open an artificial policy window, the Syrian crisis dominated the politics by keeping the problem window open and helping the policy proposal get re-designed.

4.4.2.1.6. The Political Entrepreneur in Policy Design

Zohlnhöfer et al. (2016) suggest calling actors taking over entrepreneurial roles in decision-making *political entrepreneurs*. However, they do not make a distinction between the policy

design and the policy adoption stages. As a result, they do not provide us with clues whether another political entrepreneur appears and takes over entrepreneurial roles in policy design. Following Zohlnhöfer et al. (2006)'s lead and drawing on Turkey's statist policy style, I suggest searching for a political entrepreneur in policy design as well.

4.4.2.1.6.1. The Political Entrepreneur in the Committee Meetings

As discussed in Chapter 2, not all policy and political entrepreneurs are individuals. In some cases, an organized force or an organization might assume entrepreneurial roles and function as an entrepreneur. Empirical findings show that the Ministry of Interior took over entrepreneurial activities as the political entrepreneur. As the Ministry of Interior's representatives, the Minister of Interior and the deputy secretary engaged in discussions in designing the policy throughout Committee meetings.

The policy entrepreneur did not wipe off the policy design setting as opposed to what the conventional wisdom⁶⁰ indicates. In this stage of the policy process, he participated in Committee discussions as an integral part of the Ministry of Interior (read the political entrepreneur⁶¹). Although he did not have the right to vote the policy draft in Committees, he still shaped the policy design greatly. This was made possible by the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Interior's referral to the policy entrepreneur in answering questions throughout meetings. All the more, the policy entrepreneur was asked to represent and present the executive's views vis-à-vis recommendations popping up during sessions. In answering these,

⁶⁰ Though possible, scholars do not discuss how the policy entrepreneur may act as the political entrepreneur unless s/he holds a seat in the Parliament nor do they go beyond the characteristics of the entrepreneurs in their explanations (Bakir & Jarvis, 2017; Saetren, 2016b).

⁶¹ Besides all, official documents indicate that he kept spending remarkable amount of time and energy on pushing his pet proposal and explaining the rationale behind the proposal throughout Committee meetings.

the policy entrepreneur filtered, outlined, and thereby designed the policy proposal. Albeit few, some changes⁶² were made in the proposal during committee meetings.

All in all, the policy proposal was voted unanimously on June 20, 2012, in the Internal Committee, which was considered exceptional by stakeholders, including the policy entrepreneur himself. The report of the main Committee entered the GNAT's agenda on October 1, 2012.

4.4.2.1.7. Quick Take: How Does Turkey's Statist Policy Style Structure the Politics of Policy-Design?

Concerning the *problem stream* in policy design, findings suggest that Turkey's statist policy style keeps providing some actors with positional advantages vis-à-vis others in defining problems. As a result, the executive's problem definition prevails over non-governmental and opposition parties' problem definitions.

Concerning the *policy stream* in policy design, findings indicate that Turkey's statist policy style obliges policy communities to organize under the strict control of political actors. This, in turn, sets up the stage in favor of positionally advantaged political entrepreneurs. Given the Committee meetings' representational organization, the executive holds the highest rank, particularly when the majority in the GNAT is guaranteed. Another example of how this politico-administrative structure reflects in policy design is the invitation-only inclusion of non-governmental actors in the policy stream. However, invitations do not guarantee non-governmental actors to take the floor, engage in discussions and monitor all policy community meetings.

⁶² Compared to others' suggestions, predominantly those offered by JDP MPs were incorporated into the proposal.

Concerning the *political stream* in policy design, findings illustrate that policy style does not shape the policy design in any different way than it usually structures politics in general. The executive, backed by the legislature, holds its power as opposed to parties in the opposition.

Concerning the *policy windows* in policy design, findings do not indicate that Turkey's statist policy style structures in a particular way.

Concerning the *political entrepreneur* in policy design, findings suggest original conclusions about the statist policy style's structuring effects. First, despite not being a political entrepreneur, Turkey's statist policy style allows the policy entrepreneur to participate in policy design actively. Second, depending on the proximity between the policy entrepreneur and the political entrepreneur, the policy entrepreneur holds power to design the policy proposal in the policy design process as well. Hence, any opportunity the policy entrepreneur may have prevents him/her from monitoring the policy design from a distance in Turkey's statist policy style.

The main takeaways as to how statist policy style shapes multiple streams in Turkey in policy design are illustrated in Table 3 below.

4.4.2.2. Adopting the LFIP in the GNAT

The political entrepreneur successfully got his policy alternative voted in the last session of the Central Committee meeting in June 2012. Together with the Committees' favorable reports, the proposal entered the GNAT's agenda on October 1, 2012.

4.4.2.2.1. The Problem Stream in Policy Adoption

The entrance of the draft LFIP into the GNAT and the inclusion of new policymakers in policy adoption did not change the way problems were defined earlier. Problem brokers kept their stance intact during this policy process. Opposition party MPs, individually, raised their problem definitions concerning asylum and immigration throughout discussions in the GNAT. Given their comparatively low impact on the policy adoption, these actors' approaches to problems in asylum and immigration did not practically shape the draft LFIP. Between October 2012 and April 2013, the Syrian crisis preserved its place on the agenda as the most attention-grabbing event.

4.4.2.2.2. The Policy Stream in Policy Adoption

Another policy community did not meet throughout the policy adoption in the GNAT. The reasons were twofold. First, Turkey's formal political institutions (also read as the statist policy style) empowered the executive. With its support in the legislature, the executive appeared as the most potent component of the policy adoption. As a result, the single-party government did not need to make coalitions with other political parties in the legislature. Second, the proposed policy did not create significant controversies among different political parties in the GNAT. Even if it did, the executive would still pass the proposal based on its support in the GNAT.

4.4.2.2.3. The Political Stream in Policy Adoption

From October 2012 to April 2013, the national mood was reflected in the politics via discussions on the Syrian crisis. Since there were no elections, the distribution of seats did not

change in the legislature, nor did it jeopardize the issue on the agenda. However, the Prime Minister replaced the Minister of Interior, who served as the political entrepreneur during the policy design, with another JDP MP. This change did not result in ruptures in the adoption of the LFIP in the GNAT. Probably two factors played roles in this continuance. First, the statist policy style envisaged almost a mechanic policy adoption process once a proposal was presented to the GNAT. Second, the new Minister of Interior was present in Committee meetings and hence had an idea about what the proposed document would bring. Thus, if the proposal were challenged, the new minister would appear and continue his political entrepreneurship in the policy adoption based on his familiarity with the proposal.

4.4.2.2.4. The Policy Window in Policy Adoption

The MSF scholars argue that a separate policy window, which they name decision-window (Zohlnhöfer et al., 2016)- should open to getting proposals adopted in policy adoption. However, the case at hand nicely illustrates that there was no need for such a window. This was because the formal political institutions compel policymakers in the GNAT to review the proposals and their reports coming from Committee meetings almost mechanically. Yet still, the Syrian crisis kept open the problem window by keeping the interest alive in asylum and immigration-related issues in the GNAT, and thereby, the policy proposal.

4.4.2.2.5. The Political Entrepreneur in Policy Adoption

MSF scholars envisaged a political entrepreneur to take over from policy entrepreneurs in decision-making. Since they did not distinguish the policy design stage from the policy adoption, it is hard to detect the exact place of the political entrepreneur in decision-making.

However, their arguments draw on cases where coalition governments oblige political entrepreneurs to function in parliaments. This, in turn, corresponds to the policy adoption process in a setting such as Turkey's.

The statist policy style does not necessitate a different political entrepreneur to appear and function in the policy adoption process. This is usually the case when the executive has enough support in the GNAT. The issue at hand suggests that a Central Committee representative was present during the voting sessions in the GNAT. However, he did not assume any entrepreneurial roles but repeated the Committees' favorable reviews on the proposal.

Against this backdrop, the designed proposal was voted in the GNAT on April 4, 2013, with a few changes. Changes offered by opposition parties could not gain the approval of the executive, nor did they achieve the support of the GNAT in general. Consequently, these changes did not reflect on the LFIP (see the minutes of 24. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı Genel Kurul Tutanakları, Minutes of the GNAT, 24th Term 3rd Legislative Year on March 20, 21, 26 and April 4, 2013). However, JDP MPs' suggestions were accepted by MPs in the legislature following favoring views of the executive (see the minutes of 24. Dönem 3. Yasama Yılı Genel Kurul Tutanakları, Minutes of the GNAT, 24th Term 3rd Legislative Year on April 4, 2013). At this stage of the policy process, the views of the executive played essential roles in shaping the final decision on the LFIP.

4.4.2.2.6. Quick Take: How Does Turkey's Statist Policy Style Structure the Politics of Policy Adoption

As to the *problem stream* in policy adoption, empirical results illustrate that Turkey's statist policy style continues to empower the single-party governments (read, the executive) against opposition parties in the GNAT. Therefore, even when opposition party MPs raise their

problem definitions, there is no guarantee that the positionally advantaged actors (the executive) would buy these.

As to the *policy stream* in policy adoption, empirical results point that Turkey's statist policy style does not require setting up yet another policy community in the policy adoption stage. This is particularly true when the executive ensures a majority in the GNAT, and when the policy issue does not create significant disagreements among policymakers in the GNAT.

As to the *political stream* in policy adoption, empirical results indicate that the statist policy style in Turkey shapes the policy adoption process by rendering it almost mechanical. Once entered the GNAT, all proposals are to be reviewed. Another point is that changes to the executive -even in the absence of a general election- may endure the duration of a policy proposal to get adopted in the GNAT. However, the existing findings are insufficient to come to a definite conclusion.

As to *policy windows*, empirical results suggest that Turkey's statist policy style does not require a decision window to open in policy adoption.

As to the *political entrepreneur*, empirical results indicate that Turkey's statist policy style does not necessitate a political entrepreneur to appear and assume entrepreneurial action in policy adoption when the executive guarantees the majority in the legislature.

The main takeaways as to how statist policy style shapes multiple streams in Turkey in policy adoption are illustrated in Table 3 below.

4.4.3. Changes to Asylum and Immigration Policies

A critical point is whether the policy entrepreneur's efforts in setting the agenda impacted the asylum and immigration policies substantially as promoted. Since the focus of this study is on the politics of the agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption in asylum and immigration in Turkey's statist policy style, not a voluminous section is devoted to discussions about how policies are changed in practice. As an analytical tool, Graziano's policy structure approach helps measure the degree of a policy change. In Graziano's terms (2011, p.585) "change varies according to the dimension involved- that is more dimensions involved, greater change." Consequently, policy transformation (read as policy reform) takes place when all dimensions change.

Therefore, I will briefly review asylum and immigration policies changes based on Graziano's "policy structure" approach. Graziano (2011) developed a policy structure approach to explain the politics of domestic policy change and contributed to the literature on Europeanization. Drawing on the analytical tools the policy structure approach provides –*principles, objectives, procedures, and instruments*- I will illustrate changes to asylum and immigration without revisiting the Europeanization discussions in asylum and immigration. (for the Europeanization of asylum and immigration policies in Turkey, please see Bolukbasi et al., 2018).

4.4.3.1. Policy Structure Approach

Echoing Hall (1993), Graziano argues that researchers need to compare a given policy based on its temporal dimensions and analyze how different it is at time-1 than at time-0. To gauge

the intensity of change and operationalize it, Graziano suggests using the policy structure through its four dimensions: *principles, objectives, procedures, and instruments*.

Following Hall's (1993) and Graziano's (2011) lead, I conceive pre-and-post-LFIP periods as t_0 and t_1 , respectively. As stated in Section 4.3.1. *Introduction: A Historical Perspective on Asylum and Immigration Legislation in Turkey*, Turkey's then-existing legislation was unevenly implemented. The 1934 Settlement Law, for instance, considered only those who were perceived to be Turk and/or Muslim agreeable to immigrate to Turkey. However, in its application, not all who claimed to be Turkish descendent and/or Muslim received residence permits, let alone citizenship. Second, the way previous legislation was interpreted empowered the lawful embodiment of security concerns. Following the influxes of Iraqis, for instance, authorities rejected offering long-term solutions to those coming from Iraq and justified their stance by recalling the geographical limitation Turkey applies to the 1951 Refugee Convention (Avcı & Kirişci, 2006; Kirişci, 1996a). Even the legal solutions introduced in the 1990s, e.g., the 1994 Regulation⁶³, repeated short-term solutions by providing non-European asylum seekers temporary protection until their resettlement in third countries took place (Kirişci, 1996a; İçduygu & Aksel B., 2013). Furthermore, the Police were assigned to asylum and immigration-related issues by reinforcing Turkey's security-centric focus on asylum and immigration.

4.4.3.2. Changes to the Structure of Asylum and Immigration Policies

⁶³ Regulation No. 6169/1994 on the Procedures and Principles related to Possible Population Movements and Aliens Arriving in Turkey either as Individuals or in Groups Wishing to Seek Asylum either from Turkey or Requesting Residence Permission in order to Seek Asylum from Another Country (İçduygu and Aksel's translation, İçduygu & Aksel B., 2013).

Authorities in Turkey had long presupposed if not equated security to a unified nationality and culture. The LFIP lifted any connotation linked to culture and nationality and introduced a more compound understanding of security in asylum and immigration. With the LFIP, security is linked to public order, public security, and the public health of the inhabitants. In this way, the LFIP removed any emphasis on national and cultural identity. This move, first, ruled out categorizing protection seekers as acceptable and unacceptable due to nationality and culture. Second, it removed the possibility of making loose interpretations of Turkish culture and offering impertinent protection solutions to influxes of people. Third, the new rule shifted the *objective* from boosting the population by receiving only those of Turkish origin and culture to governing diverse human mobility towards Turkey.

The LFIP also affirmed the *non-refoulment principle* together with other fundamental human rights *norms* of migrants. With its emphasis on these, LFIP got in line with the international human rights regime (Bolukbasi et al., 2018) and reflected a clear shift from a security-centric approach to a human-rights-based approach.

The establishment of a civilian institution (the DGMM) waiting to be enhanced administratively and technically as to migration management and the unprecedented influx of Syrians increased the number of internationally funded financial *instruments*. Whereas some of these were solely used to harmonize legal requirements with that of the EU's asylum and migration rules and practices as in the case of the EU-Turkey Deal Action Plan, others were provided individually to enhance the DGMM's migration management capacity, e.g., Norway AVRR between February 2021- February 2022 (T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2021).

Authorities invited academics, civil society organizations, and international organizations to the policymaking process of the LFIP and kept communication channels open with these stakeholders throughout this process. In this way, they followed an unconventional path which stakeholders widely appreciated. Despite being inclusive, the *procedures* still predominantly remained hierarchal, however.

In sum, changes entailed objectives (from qualitatively and quantitatively increasing the population to migration management), principles (from security-centric approach to human-rights based approach), instruments (from predominantly national instruments to internationally funded financial instruments), and procedures (from solely hierarchal to hierarchal yet inclusive procedures).

4.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter first introduced Turkey's statist policy style displaying majoritarian political characteristics and features of Napoleonic administrative tradition. Second, it briefly revealed the historical development of asylum and immigration policies in Turkey prior to the LFIP. Third, dissecting the politics of agenda-setting as Kingdon proposed, it explained how the policy entrepreneur set the agenda. In so doing, it unfolded how Turkey's statist policy style structured multiple streams in policymaking in Turkey including the emergence and functioning of the policy entrepreneur in asylum and immigration. Fourth, it extended the MSF beyond agenda-setting and focused on the politics of policy design and policy adoption, respectively. Drawing on empirical data, it discussed the structuring effects of Turkey's statist policy style on decision-making in asylum and immigration. Finally, it briefly unveiled changes to the structure of asylum and immigration.

Table 3. Examples of How Statist Policy Style Shapes Multiple Streams in Turkey

STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS	STATIST POLICY STYLE IN TURKEY		
	AGENDA-SETTING	POLICY DESIGN	POLICY ADOPTION
	Potential Effects	Potential Effects	Potential Effects
PROBLEM STREAM	provides positional advantages, empowers/disempowers policy brokers	provides positional advantages, empowers/disempowers policy brokers and thereby shapes how actors perceive problems	provides positional advantages, empowers/disempowers policy brokers
POLICY STREAM	determines who would be invited in and frozen out of the policy community, and hence policy alternatives	determines who would be invited in and frozen out of the policy community, and hence policy alternatives	N/A
	determines the degree of autonomy of policy communities from central authorities	determines the degree of autonomy of policy communities from central authorities	
		filters viable policy alternatives	
		shapes policy alternatives	
	shapes policy alternatives		
POLITICAL STREAM	shapes power distribution among actors	shapes power distribution among actors	shapes power distribution among actors
POLICY WINDOWS	possibly shapes political windows	N/A	N/A
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS	determines who qualifies for policy entrepreneurship by inviting actors in and frozen them out of the policymaking process	distributes power among actors and selects who gets to be an entrepreneur	shapes whether a political entrepreneur is needed or not
	determines who would draw on public resources	shapes political entrepreneurs' strategies	
	provides legal reputation		

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION: MULTIPLE STREAMS, POLICY STYLES, AND ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION REFORM IN TURKEY

A policy entrepreneur successfully got his pet project on the decision agenda in Turkey in January 2012. Shortly, Turkey's asylum and immigration policies underwent significant transformations. The policy entrepreneur's policy alternative, which later materialized as the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in April 2013, (i) sought migration management and rejected to reproduce the young Republic's ideal of increasing the population qualitatively and quantitatively; (ii) lifted years-long nation and culture-based understanding of public security; (iii) recognized human-rights of refugees in domestic legislation, and (iv) transferred administrative and managerial responsibilities from the Foreigners Department of the National Police to the Directorate General of Migration Management.

A dominant strain of scholarly work focusing on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection explained how it brought path-departure in asylum and immigration drawing on the Europeanization literature (Baklacioglu, 2017; Bolukbasi et al., 2018; İçduygu & Aksel B., 2012, 2013; Kirişçi, 2012). These "outside-in" assessments more often than not overlook under which conditions and how the Law on Foreigners and International Protection was developed and moved on to the agenda at the domestic level. To fill this research gap, this study addressed *how the path-departing policy reform in asylum and immigration took place in Turkey in the 2000s*. In so doing, this study zoomed in on the policymaking processes of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection by unfolding enabling and constraining features of the politics at the domestic level in Turkey.

Public policy literature provides scholars with several theories in examining the politics of path- departing policy reforms. However, few offer enough analytical tools to trace the politics of policy reforms back to the very first stage of the policy process, agenda-setting. Among these are the Multiple Streams Framework, the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, and the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Despite having some common points, these theories disagree on the way political actors shape and develop their strategies in setting agendas. For instance, the Advocacy Coalition Framework argues that political actors driving policy change tend to challenge the monopoly of the governmental actors by objecting to the existing beliefs. The Punctuated Equilibrium Theory discusses that political actors directly appeal to the public to get support in changing policies. Because none of these strategies was detected in the policymaking process of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, this study did not bring insights from the Advocacy Coalition Framework or the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. On the other hand, the Multiple Streams Framework points to a *policy entrepreneur* who lobbies in and around government to get a path-departing policy alternative. The policy entrepreneur does not necessarily turn to the public in developing his/ her strategies or build coalitions against the monopoly of the governmental actors. The empirical data point to a policy entrepreneur in asylum and immigration who lobbied in and around the government without drawing on the strategies emphasized by Advocacy Coalition Framework and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory scholars. Consequently, the Multiple Streams Framework appeared as the prime candidate to examine the politics of policymaking of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.

With its structural elements, the Multiple Streams Framework (henceforth, the MSF) helps dissect the politics of agenda-setting: *problem stream*, *policy stream*, *political stream*, *policy*

windows, and *policy entrepreneur*. In this understanding, a decision agenda may be set and changed when a *policy entrepreneur* couples her/his *policy solution* with a *perceived problem* and an apt *political environment* during an open *policy window*.

The MSF builds on the US' peculiar politico-administrative system, where individuals are encouraged to pursue political entrepreneurial roles. Their counterparts in Turkey do not receive such support. On the contrary, any entrepreneurial effort in politics at the individual level risks being sidelined, if not labeled as a threat to the integrity of the policymaking process. However, a policy entrepreneur managed to appear, operate, and successfully set the decision agenda by driving a path-departing policy reform in Turkey; how? With this study, I sought answers to this *how* question.

The state-of-the-art discussions in the MSF literature nicely illustrate that policy entrepreneurs do not only appear and function in the US and agenda-setting by applying it beyond its original scope. Scholars often call for bringing institutions back into the framework in their applications because the MSF is designed as to the characteristics of agenda-setting in the US. In the literature, most scholars base on *formal political institutions* (also read as formal rules) and rationalize varying outcomes concerning the MSF's structural elements across geographies. Whereas some illustrate that the relation between the executive and the legislature effectively shape policy entrepreneurs' strategies in Norway, for instance (Sætren, 2016b), others display how federalism as a formal rule creates spillover effects in the US and thereby opens policy windows in different states (Mintrom, 1997). A small group of MSF scholars, on the other hand, point out informal rules as the sources of varying outcomes. For instance, some emphasize that interest intermediation models, as informal rules, impede new ideas from materializing in Germany by rendering policy entrepreneurs' actions difficult in particular

policy sectors (Spohr, 2016b, p.262). On the other hand, others illustrate that the more proficient a policy entrepreneur is in playing rules of the game in a given setting, the more s/he succeeds in setting the agenda (Meijerink & Huitema, 2010; Gunn, 2017, p. 270). In fewer studies, scholars highlight both formal and informal rules as explanatory variables.

None of these fragmented and isolated findings helps explain the case at hand fully. Nevertheless, all these helps how one should employ the MSF beyond the US and agenda-setting: by including institutions in the framework. Following their footsteps, I, too, incorporate institutions into the MSF in this research. Different than them, however, I suggest benefitting from insights from policy styles as a master variable. In this study, I argue that only by including policy styles in the MSF can we explain multiple streams beyond its original scope. The literature defines policy styles as “styles and structures which are strongly embedded in the macro-institutional context of the state tradition, the legal system and the political-administrative system (including characteristics of the civil service as well as the state structure and organization” (Knill, 2001, p. 61). Policy styles entail formal rules as well as informal rules such as “the standard operating procedures of governments in the making and implementing public policies” (Knill & Tosun, 2020, p. 28; Richardson et al., 1982, p. 2). As patterns of policymaking, policy styles help elucidate the relationship between the institutional context and political actors (also read as policy entrepreneurs). In this way, policy styles contribute to explaining “typical policy processes, deliberations that may or may not lead to policy change” in a chosen setting (Howlett & Tosun, 2019, pp. 3–4; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2016, p. 26). Furthermore, as employed in this study, policy styles ultimately help understand “who can play and how they play” in the policy process.

Following a short introduction, I reviewed the literature on the MSF in Chapter 2. In so doing, I brought together the state-of-the-art discussions on how formal and informal rules as institutions shape the MSF's structural elements. Conceiving policy styles as a master variable entailing formal and informal rules, including administrative traditions, I introduced a brief review of the literature on policy styles in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I also discussed how policy styles shape the MSF's structural elements. After presenting a concise introduction to Turkey's statist policy style, I briefly introduced the historical development of asylum and immigration policies in Turkey in Chapter 4. Then, I illustrated the empirical findings on the politics of policy reform in asylum and immigration in Turkey. Dissecting the agenda-setting and decision-making processes along the lines of the MSF's structural elements, I revealed who can play and how they play in multiple streams. Once again, in chapter 4, I explored how the policy entrepreneur developed and pushed his pet project and thereby set the decision agenda. This chapter aimed to illustrate the policy entrepreneur's operations and successful coupling in Turkey's statist policy style. Drawing on the statist policy style of Turkey once again, I discussed how the policy entrepreneur managed to attend Committee meetings and became part of the policy design process. Likewise, I argued that the policy adoption stage did not require a political entrepreneur to guarantee policy adoption in the GNAT and policy change. I concluded Chapter 4 by illustrating the changes to asylum and immigration policies through the policy structure approach. I presented my conclusions in Chapter 5.

5.1. Empirical Findings

In this study, I explored the politics of policy reform in asylum and immigration in Turkey in the 2000s. Anatomizing the agenda-setting and decision-making processes in line with the MSF's structural elements, I sought answers: *How did the policy reform in asylum and*

immigration happen in Turkey in the 2000s? How did a policy entrepreneur appear, function, and successfully set the decision agenda in Turkey's statist policy style? To employ the MSF meaningfully in the case at hand, I drew on the insights from policy styles. These shed light on who played and how they played in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection policymaking process.

5.1.1. From October 2008 to January 2012: Setting the Agenda

As to the *problem stream* in agenda-setting, the empirical findings point to positional advantages of the executive vis-à-vis others. Unless the executive and/or its representatives acknowledge or re-define conditions as problems, these are doomed to remain unanswered. The most highlighted issues in asylum and immigration were: (i) the absence of a comprehensive law and an umbrella institution responsible for migration management and asylum and protection-related issues, (ii) the security-centric approach creating uneven protection practices, (iii) the geographical limitation maintained to the 1951 Refugee Convention disqualifying many from being protected, and (iv) ECtHR judgments concluding that Turkey violated protection seekers' human rights. Despite being voiced several times by international organizations, non-governmental organizations, supranational organizations, and scholars based on indicators and feedback about then-existing policy and practices, these problems were not addressed until the executive was willing to do so. Therefore, the assignment of the senior bureaucrat to the Bureau of Foreigners, Borders and, Asylum should be read as the executive's consent (also read as the permission of the highest authority for examining problem definitions floating around). Hence, the executive specified its representative with whom problem brokers may contact and vice versa. As the representative of the executive, the policy entrepreneur was also given the authority to filter problem

definitions as he saw fit. In these ways, Turkey's policy style shaped the problem stream in asylum and immigration.

As to the *policy stream* in agenda-setting, the empirical findings show that the policy entrepreneur had a positional advantage vis-à-vis other policy community members. This advantageous position was not earned because the policy entrepreneur developed the most enduring policy solution but because the policy style determined who would be invited in the policymaking process. As the representative of the executive, the policy entrepreneur also held power to filter viable policy solutions and shape policy alternatives. Turkey's statist policy style determined the degree of autonomy of the policy community from central authorities. There were circumstances under which the policy entrepreneur had room for maneuver in extending the invitation to non-governmental actors in the field. For instance, the policy entrepreneur invited almost all stakeholders in asylum and immigration to the policy community. Although he was not expected to do so in Turkey's statist policy style, he often consulted these stakeholders in generating policy alternatives. In this way, he showed an unprecedented example in asylum and immigration. However, the consensual nature of the policy community meetings did not restrain the policy entrepreneur from filtering and changing non-governmental actors' policy solutions.

As to the *political stream*, empirical findings suggest that the distribution of the seats in the GNAT did not play a particular role in setting the agenda. The Justice and Development Party set up yet another single-party government following the 2011 *elections*. However, the Minister of Interior was changed quite often. Throughout this period, the public (read, the national mood) indirectly engaged in the policymaking. This was not surprising considering the power distribution between the public and the state in Turkey, where the latter has apparent

authority over the former. However, with the Syrian crisis deepening, the public raised its concerns about its impacts, particularly on the economy in Turkey. This, in turn, paved the way for opposition parties to raise questions about migration management in the GNAT. In this way, the Syrian crisis kept its place on the agenda by preparing the policy stream to be coupled.

As to *policy windows* in agenda-setting, findings suggest that the Syrian crisis opened a *problem window* by creating a favorable context for coupling. The 2011 general elections did not help open a policy window in the political stream. Frequent changes to the bureaucracy, which the statist policy style triggers, lengthened the coupling process for the policy entrepreneur. These frequent changes might be seen as opportunities that open frequent political windows under different conditions. There were no clues about whether Turkey's statist policy style helped the problem window remain open. Instead, the *problem window* remained open longer than expected due to the endurance of the humanitarian crisis. Despite remaining open, the same policy window did not give rise to other items concerning policy areas close to migration management on the agenda, such as border management.

As to the *policy entrepreneur* in agenda-setting, findings illustrate that policy styles shape the policy entrepreneur's emergence, functioning, and agenda-setting strategies. Think of the assignment of the senior bureaucrat once again. Unless he was appointed as the Head of the Bureau of Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum, the senior bureaucrat would not have the chance to appear as a policy entrepreneur and would probably continue to do what he was earlier charged with. However, this appointment opened a door into policy entrepreneurship for the senior bureaucrat without being sidelined or detected as a threat to policymaking. Turkey's statist policy style urges actors to generate policy alternatives exceptionally at the national level and under strict control of state bodies. However, there is no guarantee that an assignment

would bring a policy change mechanically since the former does not necessarily bring the latter. At this very point, individual actions step in. The findings reveal that the policy entrepreneur managed to play the rules of the game to get his pet project on the agenda. Charged with identifying deficiencies in asylum and immigration, he used his legal reputation to present then-existing problems to the executive. He followed an unconventional path by inviting stakeholders to generate policy solutions. In this way, he allowed the transfer of knowledge, increased the support for his pet proposal, monitored stakeholders' expectations, and filtered their demands. He also invited police officers, who once were responsible for migration management and about to lose their administrative and managerial power in asylum and immigration. Empirical evidence suggests that their invitation eased the transfer of power from the Foreigners Department of the National Police to the Directorate General of Migration Management. Against this backdrop, the policy entrepreneur took advantage of the *problem window* and successfully set the decision agenda in January 2012.

5.1.2. From January 2012 to April 2013: Policy Design and Adoption of the LFIP

As to the *problem stream* in the policy design process, empirical findings reveal that the above-stated problems maintained their significance. As a focusing event, the Syrian crisis remained the most striking issue during this period. MPs in the GNAT kept raising their concerns about the Syrian crisis' impacts on Turkey's economy. In the policy design process, different actors continued to define problems in different ways. For instance, stakeholders such as IOs and NGOs insisted on identifying the geographical limitation as a problem. In contrast, the policy entrepreneur and the executive voted for its maintenance to the 1951 Refugee Convention without perceiving it as a problem. Since the statist policy style bestowed positional advantage

to the executive and its representatives in policy design, the way, the political entrepreneur defined the problems prevailed.

As to the *policy stream* in the policy design process, empirical findings expose that three different committees (the Internal Affairs Committee, the European Union Harmonization Committee, and the Human Rights Inquiry Committee) were set up and functioned as policy communities, albeit with differing powers in policy design. The Internal Affairs Committee served as the central committee. Accordingly, it held the last word on the policy proposal. During Internal Affairs Committee meetings, the Ministry of Interior served as the political entrepreneur. The policy entrepreneur took part in re-designing the proposal and had the opportunity to filter changes to his pet proposal. This was initially because Turkey's statist policy style perceived the policy entrepreneur as an integral part of the Ministry (read the political entrepreneur). Representatives of associations, international organizations, and academics attended committee meetings throughout the policy design process, albeit as non-voters. When given the floor, they introduced their views about the formation of the policy proposal. Throughout the sessions, the policy proposal was not exposed to significant changes. More often than not, the political entrepreneur and the policy entrepreneur rejected proposals coming from the opposition parties while essentially adopting the JDP MPs' proposals. This is not surprising given the statist policy style in Turkey since it empowers the single-party government compared with opposition parties. The Internal Affairs Committee unanimously voted for the proposal in its final meeting and delivered its views on the proposal to the GNAT accordingly. Turkey's statist policy style in policy design once again determined, who would be invited in the policy community, the degree of the policy community's autonomy from central authorities, and thereby filtered and shaped viable policy alternatives. The statist policy style in Turkey was not reflected in the policy stream in policy adoption. However, the absence

of a policy community in policy adoption might still be read as one of the structuring effects of the policy style.

As to the *political stream* in the policy design process, empirical findings do not suggest significant changes. The public did not mainly engage with the LFIP throughout this process. This was because (i) Turkey's statist policy style only allows political actors to design policies, (ii) asylum and immigration, as a policy sector, requires technical knowledge, and (iii) does not directly relate to the public. However, opposition parties kept conveying the public's concerns about the Syrian crisis in general. In this way, asylum and immigration-related issues remained on the agenda and dominated discussions in the GNAT. In both policy design and policy adoption, the statist policy style was present by shaping the power distribution among actors.

As to *policy windows* in the policy design process, Turkey's statist policy style did not require yet another policy window to open in policy design or policy adoption. After voting policy proposals in their final sessions, the central committees -almost- mechanically send their views on given proposals to the GNAT. Any view coming from committees gets on the GNAT's agenda. Therefore, this process did not require another policy window. However, empirical findings indicate that the *problem window* remained open until the LFIP addressed problems in the case at hand.

As to the *political entrepreneur* in policy design, empirical findings unveil that the policy entrepreneur joined the political entrepreneur, which appeared as an institution in policy design: the Ministry of Interior. Perceived as an integral part of the Ministry of Interior, the policy entrepreneur had the opportunity to attend Committee meetings, explain what his pet

proposal addressed and filter proposals to change it. However, there was no need to pursue yet another political entrepreneur in the policy adoption process in the GNAT. This was because Turkey's statist policy style created tightly knit relations between the executive and the legislature. As a consequence, almost any proposal coming from the executive gets adopted in the GNAT as long as the executive guarantees its support in it. Turkey's statist policy style materialized in distributing power among actors and shaping the political entrepreneur's strategies in policy design. In policy adoption, the statist policy style shaped whether a political entrepreneur was needed or not in the GNAT.

All in all, the reviewed and marginally re-designed policy alternative of the policy entrepreneur was voted in the GNAT in April 2013 when the problem stream was still open.

5.1.3. But What Has Really Changed in Asylum and Immigration with the LFIP?

At the end of this study, one may ask: But what has really changed in asylum and immigration in Turkey with the LFIP's adoption? I will briefly respond to this question drawing on Graziano's policy structure approach, which examines policy change based on its *principles*, *objectives*, *procedures*, and *instruments*. As an analytical tool, Graziano's policy structure approach provides scholars with the opportunity to measure the degree of a policy change. Graziano (2011, p.585) argues that "change varies according to the dimension involved- that is more dimensions involved, greater change." Hence, policy transformation (read as policy reform) happens when all dimensions are subject to change.

Empirical findings reveal that there had been significant changes to *principles*, *objectives*, *procedures*, and *instruments* in asylum and immigration with the LFIP. First, as to *principles*,

the LFIP brought a more compound understanding of security in asylum and immigration. Rather than attaching it to a particular national and/or cultural identity, unlike earlier legislation, the LFIP approached security concerning public health and order. In so doing, it lifted any link between nation and culture and public security. As discussed in Chapter 4, the latter was subject to frequent changes with each government's priorities or 'security sensitivities.' Consequently, the LFIP stroke a balance between human rights and security. In this way, it introduced the *principle* of human rights of asylum and protection -seekers.

Second, as to *objective*, the LFIP replaced the Republic's early years' ideal of boosting the population by managing migration flows. In this way, the LFIP aimed at governing human mobility.

Third, as to *procedures*, the LFIP introduced an unconventional path starting from the agenda-setting stage. In generating the policy proposal, the policy entrepreneur invited almost all stakeholders in asylum and immigration to the policymaking process. Although *procedures* predominantly remained hierarchal, these effectively included non-governmental actors and kept communication channels open for a limited period.

Forth, as to instruments, the LFIP's human-rights-based approach to asylum and immigration enabled authorities to draw on internationally funded financial *instruments* in the post-LFIP period than in the pre-LFIP period. Findings revealed that this was partly because there was a need to enhance administrative and technical capacity in migration management and the increasing demands of protection seekers coming mainly from Syria.

5.2. It is the Policy Style, Stupid! Or Contributions to Multiple Streams

This study aimed to contribute to the Multiple Streams Framework by providing empirical data on the policymaking process of the LFIP in Turkey in the 2000s. Kingdon developed the MSF based on the agenda-setting processes of health and transformation policies in the US in the late 1980s. Since then, the MSF extended to the following stages of the policy process and expanded beyond the US. In MSF applications transcending its origins, scholars felt the need to introduce institutions as a response to varying outcomes across geographies and policymaking stages. In this way, they provided invaluable contributions to the literature. However, scholars often selectively included institutions in the MSF. They predominantly brought in formal political institutions -what I highlighted as formal rules in this study-. In a few studies, scholars pointed to other institutions -what I emphasized as informal rules drawing on New Institutionalism. Even in fewer studies, scholars discussed how both formal and informal institutions shape multiple streams in policymaking. More often than not, scholars zoomed in on one or a few structural elements of the MSF, drawing on its analytical leverage. This created fragmented and isolated conclusions and aroused curiosity about systematic comparisons and coherent discussions in the literature. Counting myself as one of the curious researchers in the literature, the following questions backdropped this study: *Does the same institution, be it formal or informal, structure the politics of agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption in tandem, and if yes, how? Or, in MSF's terms, does the same institution, again be it formal or informal, structure the multiple streams, and if yes, how? Do formal and informal rules together structure multiple streams in the politics of agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption? If yes, how?*

In this study, I followed the footsteps of MSF scholars. Their selective attitude to institutions helped me be vigilant about different institutions. Considering their diversity, I suggested policy styles as a master variable. Policy styles embed formal and informal rules, including long-ignored administrative traditions in the MSF literature. Hence, their inclusion promises to approach multiple streams from a broader analytical lens and contribute to existing discussions.

Concerning the case at hand, Turkey's statist policy style helped explain the politics of policy reform in asylum and immigration. Since the focus of this study covered agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption processes, it rendered discussions about whether policy styles have enabling and constraining effects in each stage. As detailed in Chapter 4, policy styles reflect in MSF's each structural element in each policy stage. Moreover, policy styles shed light on how a policy entrepreneur appeared, functioned, and successfully coupled streams in the agenda-setting. It also helped understand how the policy entrepreneur managed to join the political entrepreneur in policy design. Likewise, it answered why a political entrepreneur is not always needed in policy adoption. These inferences also show how well the MSF can travel to Turkey and hopefully unmapped geographies through the lenses of policy styles as well.

Moreover, this study aimed to respond to calls for systematic comparisons and coherent discussions in the MSF literature. It did so by exploring the MSF's structural elements through the lenses of policy styles (read, same institutions). The policy-style-embedding-MSF, as suggested here, did not seek to falsify the MSF as a whole, nor did it seek to reject existing debates on it. On the contrary, it sought to accommodate the facts put forward so far in the literature and the case of Turkey, which might otherwise have remained aberrant vis-à-vis its original conceptualization.

5.3. Limitations and Future Research

This study sought to explore the politics of policy change in asylum and immigration in Turkey in the 2000s. In so doing, it unfolded the causal mechanisms of interaction between policy styles and multiple streams. It did so by relying on a single case study. Single case studies usually raise generalizability concerns in social sciences, which scholars adequately address. Stemming from their guiding responses, I aimed to overcome generalizability concerns this study may bring with it by developing a falsifiable hypothesis which may be formulated as policy styles, as structuring variables, shape multiple streams and thereby who can play and how they play in agenda-setting, policy design, and policy adoption. Only after considering policy styles, therefore, one may shed light on policy changes generated by policy entrepreneurs in settings where they are least expected to appear, function, and successfully set decision agendas. I hope this study will contribute to a larger group of similar facts for developing the MSF literature.

Here, I would like to state yet another limitation this study brings. Since this study focused on just a particular policy sector, it did not present any comparative finding of whether sector-based institutions also play a role in the politics of policy reform and, if so, how. Acknowledging this, I believe this study would lead to future research on comparative findings on enabling and constraining effects of sector-based institutions. I also think that one more implication can be drawn from this study for future research. Since this study focused on the policymaking process, one may wonder if policy styles help explore the politics of policy implementation and evaluation with the MSF.

I hope this study would be a starting point in the MSF literature for those seeking to deepen discussions about enabling and constraining effects of institutions, including sectoral ones, on the politics of the policymaking, the policy implementation, and the policy evaluation. I also hope future research verifies or falsifies the arguments about the impact of policy styles on multiple streams.



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APPENDIX

A. Interview Methods Table

Table 4. Interview methods table*

	Interviewee	Status	Source	Saturation	Format	Length	Recording	Transcript
Civil Servants	Category 1			Yes				
	Senior Bureaucrat 1 (Ministry of Interior)	Conducted in person 09/13/2019 & 11/19/2019	Sample frame		Semi-structured	1 hr.10 min & 40 mins	Concurrent notes & supplementary notes	Confidentiality requested
	Senior Bureaucrat 2 (Ministry of Interior)	Conducted in person 09/13/2019 & 11/19/2019	Sample frame		Semi-structured	15 mins & 10 mins	Concurrent notes & supplementary notes	Confidentiality requested
	Mid-level Bureaucrat 1 (Ministry for EU Affairs)	Conducted in person 04/09/2018	Referred by a senior bureaucrat		Semi-structured	55 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
	Mid-level Bureaucrat 2 (Ministry for EU Affairs)	Conducted in person 07/03/2018	Referred by a senior bureaucrat		Semi-structured	1 hr. 14 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
	Senior Bureaucrat 3 (Ministry for EU Affairs)	Conducted in person 06/27/2018	Sample frame		Semi-structured	1 hr. 18 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested

	Police Officer	N/A	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
EU Delegation to Turkey	Category 2	Yes					
	Policy Advisor and Program Manager EU Delegation to Turkey	Conducted in person 06/26/2018	Referred by a senior bureaucrat	Semi-structured	1 hr. 5 mins	Concurrent notes & supplementary notes	Confidentiality requested
	Program Manager EU Delegation to Turkey	Directed to her colleague 06/19/2018	Referred by a senior bureaucrat	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
MPs	Category 3	Partial					
	MP 1 RPP	Conducted in person 10/02/2018	Sample frame	Semi-structured	20 mins	Concurrent notes & supplementary notes	Confidentiality requested
	MP 2 NMP	Contacted on 07/2/2021; No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	MP 3 PDP	Conducted over phone 07/4/2021	Sample frame	Semi-structured	21 mins	Concurrent notes & supplementary notes	Confidentiality requested
	MP 4 JDP	Contacted on 07/2/2021; No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
IOs	Category 4	Yes					

	Senior Migration Management Policy Advisor and Researcher IOM	Conducted over Skype 06/21/2018	Referred by a senior bureaucrat	Semi-structured	37 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
	Senior National Program Officer IOM	Conducted in person 05/08/2018	Sample frame	Semi-structured	58 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
	Project Coordinator IOM	Conducted in person 09/20/2018	Sample frame	Semi-structured	46 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
	Consultant IOM	Directed to his colleague 07/02/2018	Referred by an expert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Senior Protection Officer UNHCR	No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Protection Associate UNHCR	No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Legal Associate UNHCR	Conducted in person 09/19/2018	Sample frame	Semi-structured	50 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
Associations/ NGOs	Category 5	Yes					
	Association for Solidarity with Refugees	No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

	Association for Solidarity with Refugees	Conducted in person 10/09/2018	Sample frame	Semi-structured	35 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
	Refugee Rights Turkey	Conducted over Zoom 08/06/2021	Sample frame	Semi-structured	80 mins	Concurrent notes	Confidentiality requested
	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants	No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	The Research Centre on Asylum and Migration	Conducted in person 07/02/2018	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hr. 25 mins	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
Scholars	Category 6	Yes					
	Professor in Law	No response	Sample frame	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Professor in Political Science and Public Administration	In person	Sample frame	Unstructured	multiple times	Concurrent notes	Confidentiality requested
	Professor in International Relations	In person	Sample frame	Semi-structured	1 hr.	Audio recording	Confidentiality requested
*Modified based on Bleich and Pekkanen's (2013) Interview Methods Table							

