



SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
INSTITUTE FOR GRADUATE STUDIES IN
SOCIAL SCIENCES

GAMZE GÜNEŞ

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACEFUL CONTIGUOUS
DYADS**

MASTER THESIS

MASTER OF ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

JUNE 2021



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THESIS SUPERVISOR

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR GÜROL BABA

MASTER THESIS

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this study has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work. I further declare that this thesis is written according to the writing rules of the Social Sciences University of Ankara, Institute of Social Sciences.

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Signature:

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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACEFUL CONTIGUOUS DYADS

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MA, Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies

Supervisor: Associate Professor Gürol BABA

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In this study, it has been focused on dyads of contiguous states that are characterized by stable pacific relationships. These have been given less scholarly attention compared to war-prone dyads, which creates a gap in our understanding of dyadic conflict dynamics. To address this gap, this research focuses here on the dynamics of variables that foster conflict within pacific dyads in order to locate what differentiates them from war-prone dyads. This study also seeks to locate variables that can help explain why these dyads are pacific. In line with this objective, it was examined a random sample of eight contiguous dyads among the thirty-three peaceful dyads that have avoided fighting an interstate war with one another within the duration of their interaction. These case studies have been analysed by applying a ‘model of structured, focused’ comparative analysis that provides an opportunity for an extensive evaluation to clarify the common and different aspects of contiguous dyads. The findings of this study demonstrated that an asymmetric dyadic distribution of military capabilities in a dyad plays an important role in decreasing the possibility of war occurrence, even in the presence of a territorial dispute. Furthermore, joint membership in international organizations also reduces the war-proneness in a dyad, which increases the positive interaction between them. Lastly, a common colonial history is associated with dyads of ex-colonies avoiding military conflict with each other. The findings indicate the importance of increased scrutiny in the characteristics of pacific dyads in addition to that of dangerous dyads.

Keywords: Dyadic Level of Analysis, Dangerous Dyads, Pacifism, Interstate Peace, Peaceful Contiguous Dyads.

ÖZET

BARIŞSEVER KOMŞU DEVLETLERİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

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Haziran 2021

Bu çalışma, istikrarlı barışçıl ilişkileri ile karakterize edilen komşu aktör çiftlerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu aktör çiftlerine, savaşa eğilimli aktör çiftlerine kıyasla daha az bilimsel bir ilgi gösterilmiştir ve bu da ikili çatışma dinamiklerini anlamamızda bir boşluk yaratmaktadır. Bu boşluğu irdelemek için, barışsever komşu devletleri, savaşa eğilimli olan aktör çiftlerinden ayıran şeyin ne olduğunu tespit etmek amacıyla barışsever aktör çiftlerinin içinde çatışmayı teşvik eden değişkenlerin dinamiklerine değinilmektedir. Aynı zamanda, bu barışsever çiftlerin neden barışsever olduğunu açıklamaya yardımcı olabilecek değişkenler de aranmaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, etkileşimleri süresince birbirleriyle bir savaştan kaçınan otuz-üç barışsever aktör çifti arasından sekiz aktör çifti incelenmiştir. Bu barışsever komşu devletler, komşu devletlerin ortak ve farklı yönlerini açıklığa kavuşturmak için kapsamlı bir değerlendirme fırsatı sağlayan ‘yapısal-odaklı model’ uygulanarak analiz edilmiştir. Bu çalışmanın bulguları, bir aktör çiftindeki askeri kapasitenin çiftler arasında asimetrik dağılımının, savaşın oluşma ihtimalini bölgesel bir anlaşmazlığın varlığında bile azaltmada önemli bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Ayrıca, uluslararası kuruluşlara ortak üyelik, aktör çiftlerindeki savaş yatkınlığını azaltmaktadır, ki bu da aktör çiftleri arasındaki pozitif etkileşimi arttırmaktadır. Son olarak, ortak bir sömürge tarihi birbirleriyle askeri çatışmadan kaçınan eski sömürgeci çiftleriyle ilişkilendirilmektedir. Bulgular, çatışan aktör çiftlerinin yanı sıra barışsever aktör çiftlerinin özelliklerinde de artan incelemenin önemini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Aktör Çiftleri Analiz Düzeyi, Çatışan Devletler, Barışseverlik, Devletlerarası Barış, Barışsever Komşu Devletler.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABEDA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFESD	Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
ALO	Arab Labour Organization
AMF	Arab Monetary Fund
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AU	African Union
BALTBAT	Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
BIPM	International Bureau of Weights and Measures
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone
CBR	Chemical-Biological- Radiological
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CELAC	Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States
CICA	Conference of Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CINC Score	Composite Index of National Capability
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COW	Correlates of War Project
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
EU	European Union
EURO-MED	The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPI	Global Peace Index
GUAM	Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
HIACT	High Action
HOSTLEV	Hostility Level
IADefB	Inter-American Defense Board
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICES	International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
IOOC	International Olive Oil Council
IOPC	International Oil Pollution Compensation
ICOW	Issue Correlates of War
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFRCS	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGOs	International Governmental Organizations
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
LAES	Latin American and Caribbean Economic System
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MIDs	Military Interstate Disputes
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NAM	Nonaligned Movement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NB8	Nordic-Baltic Eight
NIB	Nordic Investment Bank
NMC	National Material Capabilities
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OAS	Organization of American States
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUA	Organization for African Unity
PFP	Partnership for Peace
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Missions in the Republic of South Sudan
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER I

1.1. INTRODUCTION

1.1.1. Statement of the Problem

One of the main progressive shifts in the study of conflict within the discipline of International Relations, was the focus of scholars on the characteristics of dyads, that is pairs of interacting states, and how those are associated with presence or absence of war (Bremer, 1992). The repeated occurrence of war among certain dyads has led to a focus on such dyads in the quest to understand war. Initially the dyadic level was not considered as a distinct level of analysis. The classical classification of levels of analysis was established in 'Man, the State, and War' by Kenneth Waltz, based on three distinctive focal points as the major causes of war: human nature, the nature of the structure of the state, and the nature of the state system (Waltz, 2001, p. 30). Later researchers included two more levels, and today we can talk of five levels of analysis used in theories developed to explain war: individual, substate/small group level, the state, the dyadic level, and the international system.

It is within these levels of analysis that we find the many variables that explain the behaviour and choices of actors in international relations. Of the five levels of analysis, the dyadic level identifies the 'nature of pairs of states' as a key explanatory variable, rather than their individual positioning (Cashman, 2014b, p. 237). This level focuses on the common and different characteristics arising from the interplay between pairs of states. States affect and are affected by these interactions that through their emergent properties end up having a constitutive effect distinct from the motivations of actors, and thus an independent causative effect. In broad terms, scholars have located two general sets of dyadic interactions that play this role, peaceful or pacific dyads and aggressive, fightaholic or conflictual dyads.

Zeev Maoz notes that pacifist dyads are composed of the pairs of states that avoid military disputes or interstate wars during their entire histories (Maoz, 2004, p. 111). On

the other hand, Lewis Fry Richardson named these dyads as ‘infrequent participants’ by focusing on some traits of them (Richardson, 1960, pp. 171–173). These states have shared relative prosperity, neutrality, absence of territorial claims, lack of colonies and overseas colonization, faint ideological commitment, markedly restrained sympathy with foreign subject classes or peoples, reasonably good defensive geographic situations, strong defensive war preparations, strong international trade ties, constitutional government, and less than major power status (Wilkinson, 1980, p. 60). In another name he ascribes their pacifism to relative isolationism. In other respects, Stuart Bremer evaluates some of these dyads as dangerous dyads by analysing their geographical proximity, equality in power, their major or minor power status, being undemocratic and militarized, and economic status (Bremer, 1992, p. 309).

What do we know about the tendency of dyads for being pacific or aggressive? Pacifism or aggressiveness are general nested concepts among conflict and peace studies, which include the discussion of the causes of war and conditions for peace. In this context, scholars have sought answers by making analyses on the determinants of being pacific and aggressive for dyads.

According to Lewis Richardson, 117 of the 200 wars that occurred between 1480 and 1941 were dyadic, thereby making dyadic wars the typical type of wars (Richardson, 1960, p. 250). The key variable that has been emphasized while explaining the factors promoting these types of wars is the presence of the geographic contiguity of states (Diehl, 1985, p. 1210). Charles S. Gochman finds more importantly that the percentage of contiguous state participants increases from 63.8% to 78% as the hostility level increases from the level of threat of force to the level of open warfare (Gochman, 1990, p. 50). On the other hand, Bremer’s (1992) analysis showed that contiguity is the most important factor among the seven factors that increase the probability of war. Taking into account the Correlates of War Project (COW) data, of the sixty-seven interstate wars from 1816 to 1980, 88% occurred between contiguous dyads (Small & Singer, 1982, pp. 82–85).

Geographic contiguity provides more chance for interaction between contiguous dyads. However, contiguity is a constant variable and for this reason, it is not a cause of war on its own. In such a contiguity-based interaction, the opportunity and willingness

framework of Starr (1978) explains the attitude that dyads will adopt towards each other. Geographic proximity provides an environment for conflictual interactions even if contiguous states may show a tendency not to fight. In the contrary case, that is dyads who choose to fight, this tendency marks the willingness for the higher-level conflictual interaction of contiguous dyads that are less constrained due to opportunities they have. Willingness refers to the degree of desires that an actor has to pursue a specific action and the most prominent factor that takes its source from geography is territorial motivations for war (Senese, 2005, pp. 770–771).

The territorial explanation of war argues that pairs of states, whether they are contiguous or not, will have a higher probability of going to war if they are fighting over territorial disputes (Vasquez, 2012, p. 304). The findings of Vasquez and Valeriano (2010, p. 300), show that 43 of 79 interstate wars from 1816 through 1997 are territorial. Of these 43 territorial wars, 26 have a dyadic qualification. Therefore, this means that the majority of wars that occurred between contiguous dyads are over territory.

Paul Hensel and Paul Senese showed that territorial disputes are much more prone to war and to conflict as opposed to nonterritorial disputes, and they later found that states having a territorial claim without using force are more apt to have a fatal militarized interstate dispute (Hensel, 1996, p. 49; Senese & Vasquez, 2003, p. 276). In that sense, disputes over territory are mostly associated with more violent confrontation and conflicts. Furthermore, territorial disputes occurring between contiguous dyads tend to be recurring (Hensel, 1996, p. 62).

A corpus of important studies focuses on the types of territorial disputes that are war prone and by extension, the reason for this war-proneness. They locate it in the salience attached to that territory by each member of a dyad. The argument Gibler offers as a way of explaining why contiguous dyads fight over territory marks the ‘symbolic value’ of territory and ‘strategic aspects the land contains in itself’ (Gibler, 2012a, pp. 12–14). For this reason, such an issue, like territory, can be significant for both tangible and intangible reasons for the claimants in a dyad. In addition to this, Hensel and Mitchell (2005, p. 275) find that territorial issues with intangible salience are more likely to be militarized than territorial issues with tangible salience. Huth found similar dynamics in an earlier study, noting that that territorial disputes with ethnic questions are the most

likely to escalate to a high level conflict (Huth, 1996, p. 108). In this regard, the more salience of territory is high, the more likely the probability of military interstate disputes and wars will result.

Territorial claims are also connected to the history of state formation. Hensel and Kim in their study discussed the tendencies of states having a colonial legacy to assert a territorial claim (Hensel et al., 2008). Their findings indicate that colonial legacies affect territorial conflict after independence processes, and that states that shared the same colonial ruler are more likely to experience a territorial conflict (Hensel et al., 2008, p. 2). Paul Huth also found that the possibility of territorial disputes is highly likely to occur between states that have ethnic or cultural similarities. In addition to this, Huth states that these states were often part of the same colony or country, since they have similar qualifications in cultural terms (Huth, 1996, p. 78). Hensel and Kim also state that there is a factor that may increase the possibility of conflict between former colony and colonizer, that is the way the former colony gained independence. If former colony gains independence via violent means against the colonizer, then the relationship between them will likely lead to future conflict (Hensel et al., 2008, p. 10).

These accumulated findings indicate that territorial disputes are much more war-prone than other types of interstate disputes (Hensel, 1996, p. 49; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005, p. 275). While geographical proximity provides the opportunity for a dyadic war, the factor that provides the willingness to go to war is the presence of territorial disputes between contiguous dyads (Vasquez, 1995, p. 282). Accordingly, this willingness of dyads to engage in a war and the probability of war reoccurrence depend on the resolution of the territorial dispute at stake between contiguous pairs of states. Kocs noted that if one of the members in a dyad have no territorial claim against one another, territorial dispute and by extension war does not exist (Kocs, 1995, p. 161).

Gibler makes a significant contribution to this literature by putting forward the argument that the settlement of a territorial dispute and the existence of stable borders are closely associated with peace between contiguous dyads, which leads us to the concept of 'territorial peace' beyond the democratic peace (Gibler, 2007, p. 512). Territorial peace is defined as the existence of stable borders and absence of any external threats to territory (Gibler & Miller, 2021, p. 158). According to the territorial peace argument, if territorial

disputes are resolved between contiguous dyads, these pairs of states will experience greater chances of having pacifist relationships with each other. If they have stable borders they are highly unlikely to fight a war (Gibler, 2012b, p. 114).

In that sense, the resolution of territorial disputes is the most important bedrock for explaining dyadic peace. However, territorial peace argument missed a group of interesting dyads of states. These are contiguous dyads, where territorial disputes are present, but which never engaged in a war over them. This combination of conditions is interesting, because the existing literature does not address it. The assumption based on copious findings is that territorial disputes will lead to at least some wars among dyads. The existence of contiguous disputants with territorial dispute which do not fight, is an anomaly for the territorial explanation of war and peace program. This study aims to rectify this.

1.1.2. Aims and Significance of Study

Regarding the context described above, this study will attempt to fill the gap in the literature on the variables that make some contiguous dyads peaceful in their relationships with each other. Based upon the method of structured, focused comparison which is best applied for the analysis of a small number of cases, it was intended to analyse eight cases of contiguous dyads that have territorial disputes but have avoided engaging in war over them. Considering that the dependent variable, non-occurrence of war, has the same value in all cases, my goal is to unearth the similarities in independent variable values between the cases that are associated with the similarity of outcome. This study sought to explain why some dyads are peaceful. It was especially focused on dyads that were able to remain in peace, despite the presence of two of the most powerful factors that make a dangerous dyad. These are territorial contiguity, being contiguous, and having a territorial claim. The study of peace and war has failed to provide adequate attention to these dyads, that we would expect to fight but did not fight. To help address this gap it was conducted a deep comparative case study analysis of eight dyads made up of contiguous states, that had a territorial claim in their common history, and never engaged in militarized interstate dispute or war with each other. In that sense, it is focused on the pairs of states. Therefore, this study does not make any states peaceful, but makes dyads peaceful.

1.1.3. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis has five main parts. In the first chapter, it is presented the conceptual framework that will guide my analysis. This is based on the dyadic level concepts of positive and negative peace, and the monadic level concepts of pacifism and fightaholism, which are important to understand the war-proneness of pairs of states. However, it has been handled the interstate peace scales which are positioned states according to their peace levels relying on the three core zones as rivalry, negative peace, and positive peace. In this chapter, this research also conducts a literature review of the concept of peaceful dyads and its use in the literature on the occurrence of war and maintenance of peace.

In the second chapter, this study evaluates the existing literature on the study of dangerous and peaceful studies, beginning with the foundational work of Bremer (Bremer, 1992). It is then extended the analysis to a discussion of the existing literature on peaceful dyads. The question this study raises is focused on the possibility that peaceful and dangerous dyads can share similar characteristics which make it hard to understand the reasons for the difference in war occurrence with the existing family of variables.

This the study tries to address in the third chapter, hypotheses concerning peaceful dyads. Here this study lays out a number of arguments concerning peaceful dyads. It is focused on explaining the absence of war between two states that are contiguous and have territorial disputes. This research also lays forth the justification for my Small-N study, the case selection criteria, and justify the model of analysis used. In this chapter, it is argued about the possible determinants of peaceful relations in such dyads.

The fourth chapter concentrates on the analysis of the eight case studies out of a population of thirty-three dyads. This chapter focuses on comparing the cases on the basis of a set of quantitative variables in order to find the commonalities that explain the absence of conflict.

The fifth and last chapter provides the overall evaluation of the main findings and case study-related factors.

The analysis indicates that there are three factors that can explain the absence of war in contiguous dyads that are engaged in a territorial dispute. First, increasing asymmetry in the dyadic distribution of military capabilities in the dyad. This finding fits within both power transition and behaviourist peace science arguments that a preponderance of capabilities in a dyad in favour of one state tends to deter conflict. Second, joint membership in intergovernmental international organizations. This fits with the liberal internationalist and behaviourist peace science arguments about the pacific effect of the engagement of dyads in institutions that provide alternative tools for conflict management than those of power politics (Vasquez, 1998). The final finding is the most interesting. It shows that dyads made up of states with common colonial pasts, in another name rising from the same colonial empire, tend to avoid war over their territorial disputes. The difference of these dyads from other contagious pairs of states is that the level of high action and hostility between states is zero. The three findings expand our understanding of the factors that promote pacifism in dyads of states, and raise interesting questions for future research.

1.1.4. Research Challenges

With regards to the scope of this study, it can be talked about two types of limitations for this study; one of them is due to the disuse or not defining of the general terms. There are a limited number of studies which deal with the subject to explain its nature and scope. The general focus of the existing studies is on the wars between or among the units. For this reason, it is not possible to carry out an in-depth analysis or to find holistically any studies on the peaceful contiguous dyads. Also, it is less likely to find datasets that handle the variables affecting the bilateral relationships between contiguous states. In that sense, it can be talked about the lack of previous studies concerning variables that have an effect on pairs of states. The other one is that this study is a peace and conflict study with an experimental methodology. In that sense, this paper bases on the peacefulness just between two pairs of states which are directly contiguous with each other, not monadic peacefulness of states. Therefore, these points should not be forgotten while considering this study.

1.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Before analysing the concept of peaceful contiguous dyads, it is essential to elucidate a number of related concepts that form the explanatory framework of this study. The relevant literature in international relations examines war eras more than peace periods even if the latter cover a larger span of history (Kacowicz, 1998, p. 15). The reason for this bias is the severity of developments during wars and their impact on political history. There is literature that explored the meaning of peace, its related concept, and their distinguishing features, but it does not match the volume of the conflict focused studies (Diehl, 2016; Galtung, 1969; Goertz et al., 2016; Wallensteen, 2015). This is problematic considering that we have examples of relative periods of long interstate peace (of varying character) both at the regional level, for example the Italian Long Peace of 1748-1789, and the dyadic level, for example the United States and Soviet Union during the “Cold War”.

However, this has begun to change with the decline of war, and two prominent works (Goldstein, 2011a; Pinker, 2011) demonstrate that the reduction in violence made the world more peaceful. Pinker highlighted the importance of the question of ‘what causes peace’ rather than asking about the causes of war (Regan, 2014, p. 345). Although it is impossible to talk of a ‘golden age’ of peace research that focuses directly on peace, the recent studies have made progress on peace and related ideas (Boulding, 1978; Galtung, 1985; Gleditsch et al., 2014; Isard, 2000; Rapoport, 1992; Regan, 2014).

Three concepts, herein, underpin my explanatory framework of why some dyads are pacifist while others are dangerous. The first is the dual opposition concept of peacefulness-fightaholism (Maoz, 2004). Developed by Maoz this oppositional concept seeks to explain why some states are repeat users of interstate violence, accounting for most of the war initiation in the international system in the post-1815 period. This study then discusses the dyadic level of analysis (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2015; Diehl & Wright, 2016). Finally, it will be discussed the concept of peaceful dyads. Although these concepts are handled separately, they are interrelated.

1.2.1. Pacifism and Fightaholism

The majority of studies conducted with the tradition of empirical peace and war studies aim to understand the sources and dynamics of conflicts and wars. As a result of this focus on the causes of conflict, had the unintended consequences of leading to a neglect of the study of the factors that produce and foster peace, and led to a dominance of a minimalist definition of peace (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 1; Wallensteen, 2015, p. 3). In that sense, the study of peace begins from the study of not-war. At minimal most definitions of peace used in the field consider peace the absence of war, namely peace as not-war. If we take the definition of war by Clausewitz as ‘nothing but a duel on a large scale’, we can argue that peace at minimal means to the ‘absence of this duel’ under the circumstances of international politics (Clausewitz, 2008, p. 75).

However, war and peace are the opposite poles of a continuum resulting from the ongoing and dynamic nature of social interactions within the international system. This means peace and war are interconnected. In that sense, it is meaningful that most scholars focus on the causes of war as a way to inhibit it, as inhibiting war by default moves relationships along the continuum to peace. But this is not enough, as it misses those factors that in turn pull the continuum from the war pole towards peace.

As John Vasquez puts it “the key to understanding war lies in understanding peace.” (Klein et al., 2008, p. 78). In the same way, understanding the conditions that promote peace makes a significant contribution to understanding the causes of war. This push-pull dynamic made up of factors that foster war, foster peace, dampen war, and weaken peace, which are not tautological, justifies a dual engagement with both poles in order to resolve the puzzle of peace and war. From this point of view, the core question of ‘Who fights whom?’ of Stuart Bremer can be transformed into a question of ‘Who do not fight with each other’ as an indicator of dyadic interstate peace (Bremer, 1992, p. 309). From this minimalist basis of not-war we can begin exploring the permutations of the concept of peace.

As noted before, the minimal meaning of peace used in the field is not-war, by war meaning interstate war as conceptualised mainly by the scholars working in the Correlates of War Project and Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Pettersson & Wallensteen,

2015; Singer & Small, 1972). Based upon the decline of war thesis, in conceptualizing the concept of peace scholars relied on operationalisations based largely on the number of fatalities in conflict (Diehl & Goertz, 2000, p. 291). For instance, the term ‘increasing peace’ coined by Goldstein is entirely based on the declines of deaths in both battle and indirect war since 1945 (Goldstein, 2011b).

However, this minimalist definition is not analytically rich enough. Further elaboration is required to understand whether peace can be identified simply as the absence of war or as a concept that includes both the absence of war and the existence of social and economic justice. In this direction, studies are done primarily on the basis of the work of Galtung, who is the father of sociological peace studies, as presented in ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’ (Gregor, 1996, pp. 274–275). Galtung promoted two different concepts of peace, ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’. This is a general distinction, which helps to explain the meaning of peace, and the two can be seen as opposite poles in a continuum that is encapsulated in the pole of peace, in the peace-war continuum.

The concept of negative peace refers to the absence of war and overt violence, thus been tautological to the minimal meaning of peace as not-war. This resembles the definition of Raymond Aron who defined peace as a condition of suspension of rivalry between political units for a long time (Barash & Webel, 2013, p. 6). On the other hand, Diehl and Goertz discussed peace and war in terms of rivalry approach and defined peace as the end of the rivalry relationship (Diehl & Goertz, 2000, p. 73). Negative peace, herein, refers to the non-war periods of dyadic interstate rivalry. In that sense, negative peace still means the continuance of the pattern of behaviour John Vasquez calls the power-politics tradition, which foster the onset of war (Vasquez, 2009). In another name, negative peace is the seeds of its own termination and the onset of war. This cannot be considered as an adequate definition of peace.

As Martin Luther pointed out;

‘Peace is not merely the absence of some negative force -war, tension, confusion, but it is the presence of some positive force—justice, goodwill, the power of the kingdom of God.’ (Herath, 2016, p. 106).

On the other hand, positive peace is a negation of the structural violence which is integrated into the political, economic, and cultural structures within the system. For this reason, this indicates a long-term struggle that targets to achieve the absence of structural or indirect violence (Vengoechea, 2004, p. 10). In this sense, it is crucial to minimize or eliminate exploitation, overt violence, and structural violence. Furthermore, structural violence is connected with social inequality and injustice. In this respect, positive peace marks the existence of 'justice' as a key point. For this reason, there is a deep change within the structure of society to remove the causes that give rise to the occurrence of war. If it is wanted to achieve positive peace, it is crucial to nullify conditions of injustice situation (Müller, 2010, p. 2). In empirical peace science terms, positive peace means the existence of credible alternatives to power politics for resolving issues and escape of interstate relations from the trap of the culture of power-politics (Vasquez, 2009). There is also no significant border or territorial disputes between pairs of states in positive peace (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 42).

Starting from the fact that peace is not simply a period of time with the absence of war, the only thing that matters is to maintain the necessary conditions that do not produce a war or prevent the repeating the same failures (Wallensteen, 2015, p. 6). This is because, these conditions determine the quality of that peace. Wallensteen explains peace having a particular quality beyond being without war with the concept of 'quality peace'. The quality peace of Wallensteen is based on successful peace processes that regeminate the social, political, and economic changes that make peace durable in that society (Joshi & Wallensteen, 2018, p. 10).

Fightaholism or conflict-related addiction, represents the dynamics of conflict involvement of a state in time. Specifically, fightaholism is defined as an excessive and repetitive inclination to the initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars for a long period, with occasionally harmful consequences (Maoz, 2004, p. 113). Fightaholic states are in a way addicted to power-politics solutions to interstate issues. Their societies and political culture are not just permissive to war as a tool politics, but actively foster it. In another name, we can say that per Vasquez these states have fully internalized the power-politics culture dominating the interstate system in their internal political culture (Vasquez, 2009, p. 93). Sooner or later that political culture leads to that

addiction to violence to also consume the domestic political interactions of a state (Wright, 2014, p. 376).

One of the important factors that affect the conflict-prone nature of dyads, and by extension having a negative impact on domestic politics of a state, is the presence of a territorial dispute. When territorial issues have an intangible and symbolic qualification for a state, they are more likely to be used for political purposes by decision makers (Cashman, 2014b, p. 242). In that sense, leaders are more willing to take high risks to achieve their objectives by applying discourses such as territorial integrity and national security that territorial issues inherently involve. Accordingly, the addiction to violence triggers the build up of military capacity in pursuit of goals, and by extension the availability of enhanced coercion mechanisms leads to increases in domestic repression. This is the manifestation of long-standing hostility over related issues between states, which means that at least one of the parties in a rivalry considers the use of military force (Bennett, 1996, p. 160). Therefore, rivalries and territorial issues often begin at the same time, as Rasler and Thompson found (Rasler & Thompson, 2006, p. 145). For this reason, territorial issues and rivalries between states are interconnected.

In this respect, positive peace forms a complementary ingredient while measuring the level of pacifism for each state. Also, this type of peace involves additional features beyond concepts of peace as merely “not war”. In the meantime, we need to locate the pacifist and conflictual relationship along the peace scale. To capture their emergent properties at the dyadic level of analysis we need measurement instruments that capture the presence or absence of conditions in dyadic relations that fall within the three themes of pacifism; ‘Societal Safety and Security’, ‘Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict’, and the degree of ‘Militarization’ in each state. This leads me to a review of existing interstate peace scales, mostly developed by scholars working in the empirical peace science tradition.

1.2.2. Interstate Peace Scales

The measurement of indicators of militarised conflict in international relations has received the lion’s share of attention by scholars, permitting us to observe the shifts in the relationships of states from not-war to militarised disputes, and the escalations of these

to war. For instance, we can capture the variation of the conflictual relationship between contiguous Russia and Ukraine, and note that their relationship is one of negative peace. Over the last years we have also seen the development of measurement instruments that permit us to measure the quality of peace among states. These tools permit us to measure peace and thus gauge the fragility of conflict-affected countries and understand the robustness or resilience of peace in a given state or territory (Caplan, 2020, p. 1).

There are various approaches to developing measurement instruments for measuring peace, which mark different paths. The binary distinction between negative peace and positive peace forms the most common approach to measuring peace. When it comes to operationalizing the difference between positive and negative peace, a number of efforts have been made. Placing a state or dyad in one of the two categories is usually based on batteries of indicators and indexes of variables. For instance, the Global Peace Index (GPI) measures the quality of peace using twenty-three indicators concerning the three themes as mentioned above (Barash & Webel, 2013, pp. 10–11).

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), which produces the GPI, put particular effort in formulating a conceptual framework to measure positive peace by identifying ‘Pillars of Peace’ consisting of the attitudes, structures, and institutions. GPI, herein, describes positive peace as the presence of these attitudes, structures, and institutions (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 71). In that sense, the themes of peace captured by the GPI measurement instrument, not only mean not-war, but also mean no motivation for war.

Attitudes, as the first component of positive peace, refer to the norms, beliefs, perceptions, misperceptions, and relationships of parties with each other and within themselves. Attitudes affect people and groups in society and are influenced by emotions such as hatred, fear, and anger (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 10). Structures as the second component of positive peace, refer to the rules of conducts both formally and informally such as the approval or refusal of other’s behaviours or social perspectives on morality. Institutions as the last one, show the existence of the official bodies formed by governments or groups like companies, labour unions and are influenced by the prevalent attitudes adopted within the society (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 70). Thus, it is clear that these three ingredients of positive peace are strictly interrelated.

When it comes to the framework formed by the IEP to measure positive peace, eight factors are selected as a baseline. These are; well-functioning government, free flow of information, sound business environment, high levels of human capital, low levels of corruption, acceptance of the rights of others, equitable distribution of resources, and lastly good relations with neighbours which will form the main theme of this study (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 55). These pillars help defining both peaceful states and dyads and also peaceful processes based upon the conditions that foster lasting peace. Therefore, those perusing this type of peace are interested in the peace-building capacity of countries rather than in just removing the presence of violence in the short term. The goal is to tear out the root causes of war, permitting societies to progress to a new form of interaction and conflict resolution that eschews violence.

The 2020 Report of the Global Peace Index ranks 163 independent states and territories and shows that Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Yemen take pride of place in the list as the least peaceful countries based on the last three years, in other words, the most fightaholic. On the other hand, Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal, Austria, and Denmark remain at the top of the list as the most peaceful countries around the world. Not only that, but the pacific character of these five is becoming stronger due to improvements in conditions affecting the level of pacifism. In comparison to the other countries of this list, these five countries have been able to avoid any major deterioration in the conditions under the three themes of safety and security, militarization, and ongoing conflict. Considering how behaviour creates images of expected behaviour, we can argue that some states have built a reputation of pacifism, which affects how other states interact with them, while others have developed a behaviour of fightaholism, which tends to foster the creation of dangerous dyads with their neighbours.

Another measurement of monadic quality of peace is The Fragile State Index, based on a battery of twelve indicators concerning social, economic, and political issue areas in a state. The Index is built by measuring the level of fragility and resilience of each state with each of the those three issue areas (*Fragile State Index Annual Report*, 2020, p. 41). That said, we need to remember that both the concept of pacifism and of fightaholism reside at the monadic level of analysis.

On the other side, a team of scholars based around the work of Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl developed a five-level scale measuring instrument for capturing the quality of relations in a dyad (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 27). These levels focus on the characteristics of interaction in a dyad on the basis of three core sets of behaviours, rivalry, negative peace, and positive peace.

In this type of peace scale, the quality of relationships between dyads begins with the severe rivalry on the left side of the peace scale through a range of different indicators. The dyadic relationship at this point marks the highest level of hostility. In that sense, the existence of military confrontation over the same territorial issue or interrelated issues is unlikely to happen once. By extension, this confrontation between dyads tends to escalate into a war. At this level of the peace scale, severe rivals learn from these confrontations, which have an impact on the strategies adopted in the rivalry (Maoz & Mor, 2002, p. 94). A dyadic condition of rivalry, one of the sub-categories of rivalry, is characterized by frequent or periodic military clashes, military planning such as troop and force deployments, no extensive interaction between two contiguous states, and serious and unresolved issues (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 32). As these war fostering conditions become absent in the relationship, the dyad will begin moving from rivalry towards more pacific relations.

The next zone of interstate relations is the lesser rivalry, which is other sub-categories of rivalry. What defines relations within this level is the less salient of disagreements between dyads, but hostility is still significant due to the existing dissatisfaction of at least one of the states. Even though there is no severe or sustained militarized conflict due to the existence of deterrence, one or both states apply the use of active threats and warmongering (Kacowicz & Bar-Siman-Tov, 2000, p. 20). In that sense, this level marks a *détente* that fosters the later transition of the dyad towards positive peace. For this reason, a softening in the indicators which describe the negative peace zone can be observed. On the other side, there are some diplomatic interactions, but these are not due to the encouragement of conflict management or resolution. Miller describes this situation as the ‘diplomacy of violence’, which means the use of military means for pursuing a diplomatic outcome (Miller, 2001, p. 202).

The level on the peace scale that lies between positive peace and militarized rivalry is negative peace, which is referred variously as ‘precarious peace’ (George, 2000), ‘adversarial peace’ (Bengtsson, 2000, p. 93), ‘pre-peace’ (Bayer, 2010), or ‘cold peace’ (Miller, 2001, p. 203). During this level, war and persistent military conflict between dyads are not present, but lower-level disputes can occur. Because of the low salience of disagreement, states lack the willingness to fight (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 36). However, while there is no profound hostility between states, the option to use force to resolve conflict is still accepted. This is because, one or both states are not satisfied with the status quo. However, states are neither friends nor enemies although they form an interaction with each other (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 37).

When it comes to the positive peace zone, this includes two sub-categories in the peace scale; warm peace and security community. For peace at this point, terms such as ‘warm’, ‘positive’, or ‘stable’ have also been used. The most important feature of this level in the peace scale is that the use of military force or war as a conflict resolution strategy is unthinkable or has a zero probability (Goertz et al., 2016, p. 41). In the warm peace sub-category of positive peace, existing borders or territorial disputes are resolved and they are not a latent source of conflict anymore. However, there are low levels of integration and the level of institutionalization of the ties between dyads is also limited and not permanent.

The right side of the peace scale with the highest levels of peace is the security communities, which is the strongest form of pacifist relationship. This level of peace represents the process of an integration of particular national interests to such a degree where we are speaking of common identity of interests and coordinated pursuit of mutual benefits, without the need of a single state apparatus (Deutsch, 2015, pp. 5–6). Indicators that a dyad is in a state of positive peace is the existence of diplomatic relations between dyads, and mutual benefits obtained from bilateral relations. There are also institutionalized mechanisms of cooperation and diplomatic coordination between dyads.

Having conducted an overview of the monadic level concepts of peacefulness and fightaholism, and then looked at monadic and dyadic level measurements instrument, it will be now explained how all of these elements come together at the dyadic level of analysis.

1.2.3. Dyadic Level of Analysis

In this section, this research will focus on the meaning of the dyadic level of analysis and the elements that make up the concept. The first dimension concerns the question of at what level of analysis interstate war occurs. While on the monadic level we can locate states that exhibit fightaholic behaviour, war is not unilateral activity of one state, but a strategic interaction of at least two states. Traditionally the dominant operationalisation of the concept of interstate war in the field of empirical peace science has been offered by Singer and Small. They identify wars as a conflict involving at least one member of the interstate system and by the number of deaths caused by the war for both sides, which should exceed one thousand (Singer & Small, 1972, p. 35). On the basis of this operationalisation, wars have been further categorized based on whether war is waged by state against states, non-state groups, or extra-state polities, or waged within states, or between non-state groups (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010, p. 47).

For dyads of states, the most relevant categories are interstate wars between the dyad members, and internationalized intrastate wars, that is civil wars in one dyad member, in which the other dyad member intervenes. The categories permit us to clarify the 'who' in the question of who fight whom (Bremer, 2000, p. 24). The simple reality that the minimal number of actors needed to fight a war is two, had led to a focus on the dyadic level of analysis, as the one that holds the promise of generating useful knowledge. While initially scholars working in the sociological peace studies tradition focused on systemic and monadic level factors, the dyadic level that focuses on empirical war studies, has now led to a dyadic level focus on empirical peace studies.

The use of multiple levels of analysis is dictated by the reality of causal complexity. No single causal factor can explain the onset of war. Moreover, the multiple factors that play a role in the onset of wars are in interaction with each other and emerge at different levels of analysis (Cashman & Robinson, 2007, p. 3). The use of levels of analysis helps us identify a typology of the causes of war which helps to aggregate similar causes together and classify different factors in a coherent manner. As noted, the logic of levels of analysis back to the arguments in 'Man, the State, and War' by Kenneth Waltz who attempted to identify the causes of wars (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p. 14). That said Waltz's main goal was to argue for the superiority of the systemic level over the monadic

or individual levels of analysis. It was later work that broke this attempt at monocausality, and developed the current inventory of levels of analysis: the individual, sub-state/small group, nation-state, dyadic or interactional, and the international system level.

These are accepted as levels of aggregation since each level is composed of larger units in contrast with the previous level (Cashman, 2014a, pp. 11–12). Individuals generate small groups by getting together, the aggregations of many small groups mark the existence of states, dyads are composed of two states and lastly, the international system is a reflection of the interactions between many states. At each level there are interactions whose emergent properties can foster war, and because such emergent properties are independent of the level interaction, all levels contain some element of the story of how we get war.

On the other side, there are a number of objections to the dyadic approach raised by Cranmer and Desmarais (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2015). The foremost criticism discussed by Cranmer and Desmarais, which is also important for my study, is the limitations of dyadic design for explanatory approach. They add that one of the remarkable features of dyadic design is that dyadic outcome variables are not employed to explain each other (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2015, p. 3). Diehl and Wright comment that this opinion focuses mostly on independent variables rather than outcomes (Diehl & Wright, 2016, p. 2). Bennett and Stam, herein, highlight that not all variables need to be dyadic attributes in the dyadic design and this feature makes the dyadic analysis unique (Bennett & Stam, 2009, p. 45). For this reason, the level that is most appropriate when concerned primarily with relationships based on two actors is the dyadic (Vasquez, 2004, p. 379).

The main interest for me here is to explain how the monadic level concepts of pacifism and fightaholism create emergent properties that become relevant to the causes of war and peace only at the dyadic level. In another name, this research wants to show how the concepts at the two levels interact. The advent of the dyadic level of analysis focused on the characteristics of pairs of states that are the most likely to fight wars with each other, Bremer's dangerous dyads. The thing that makes dyads important is the convenience of permitting the integration of state level factors with dyadic interaction to determine the root causes forming a basis for war or peace.

According to Most and Starr, war is the output of interaction of at least two sides, therefore the attention must be paid to the qualifications of all parties instead of focusing on just one among those who are involved in a war, in order to comprehend when battles occur and when they do not (Quackenbush, 2014, p. 13). Likewise, it is possible to apply the same idea to peace in order to understand why some pairs of states are better able to remain at peace compared to other pairs. In this respect, the dyadic level of analysis is the most appropriate level of analysis for my study.

Political scientists make a distinction between dyads as peaceful and war-prone (Cashman, 2014b, p. 238). It is important to understand whether such a classification is convenient in identifying some dyads as dangerous/conflict-prone or others as pacifist. The important question is to see how the monadic level labels of peaceful or fightaholic state become expressed in the dyadic level concepts of peaceful or war-prone dyads. Since it has already explored the concepts of fightaholism and pacifism at the monadic level, it will be now explored the concept of dangerous dyads.

The idea of dangerous dyads means that some pairs of states have the highest probability of going to war within a certain time of period in contrast with other dyads or other time periods (Quackenbush, 2014, p. 14). As noted above, the concept was introduced by Bremer (1992, p. 1). Bremer in his study contributed to the understanding of the reasons why militarised conflicts happened in 85 of 202,778 dyads from 1816 to 1965 by including all possible dyads without discriminating against dyads that were never involved in a conflict (Bremer, 1992, p. 321). Based on his analysis he located the following factors whose presence in a dyad was associated with the onset of militarised disputes among dyad members; the presence of geographically proximate, having an approximately equal distribution of power, the existence of major powers within the dyad, the absence of a dyadic alliance, being undemocratic, and being economically advanced and militarized. He also identified the factors that were considered as the key determinants for the outbreak of war and arranged them by examining the magnitude of the effect of each determinant on the causes of war (Bremer, 1992, pp. 4–11). The characteristics affecting dyadic relationships between “dangerous dyads” will be examined in the following chapters.

The other dimension of the use of dyads is the exploration of the conditions that foster dyadic interstate peace. If a condition causes war, does its absence lead to peace? Geoffrey Blainey, who is the exemplar of this thought asserts that if it is wanted to unearth the causes of peace, it is necessary to turn the reasons of war upside-down (Blainey, 1988, p. x). However, as we note above, interstate peace refers a more comprehensive concept than simply the absence of overt hostility (Martín, 2005, p. 53). In that sense, interstate peace has intrinsic features independent of the dynamics of war. For this reason, the next topic will be in the position of describing ‘peaceful dyads’ as an output of positive interaction between two contiguous states beyond a simple condition of not-war.

1.2.4. Peaceful Dyads

What are the possible explanations for the pacific character of some dyads of states? Does the existence of a wide range of connections such as alliances, or a joint historical background between states give a chance for quarrelling or reconciliation? These questions are among those which the study of peaceful dyads endeavours to answer. States do not just learn how to go to war, but they find out how to build peace as well. This is the output of the positive interactions between states which are named as ‘peaceful dyads’ within the frame of the dyadic level of analysis. This is doubly important as peace is not a rare event.

The literature on peaceful dyads is rather sparse. Zeev Maoz defined peaceful dyads as pairs that have never had a war with each other in the whole period of their dyadic interaction (Maoz, 2004, p. 111). The recent literature of international relations has generally emphasized the role of the Kantian triangle on interstate peace, it does not only rely on democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations. The dominant explanation for interstate peace in the literature is the Kantian triangle of dyadic democracy, economic interdependence, and membership in international organisation (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2013). The remaining significant portion of the literature is concerned with the negative and positive meanings of peace. Importantly this literature has not been as sensitive to level of analysis issues, as has the one of the causes of war. There is less clarity about what conditions operate at which level.

Per Geller and Singer, 150 of 208 states have never experienced international war within the 1816-1992 period, while war as an onset is absent in 81 of the 176 years of the same period (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 1). Existing research at the dyadic level has indicated some correlates of pacifism. Among these are alliances between dyad members (Gibler & Vasquez, 1998), geographical distance between pairs of states (Gibler, 2007), the lack of militarization in a dyad (Bremer, 1992), the dyadic existence of democratic regimes (Oneal et al., 1996), and an asymmetrical distribution of power between states (Geller, 1993). In that sense, some insight into peace can be gained by considering the insights about what causes dyads to become dangerous.

The question is whether we can connect this dyadic level correlates of peace, with the monadic level characteristics of pacifism. Can these monadic and systemic level distributions of not-war also emerge among dyads? The answer is yes, since there are both conditions specifically to the dyadic level, as well as emergent properties of monadic level conditions that have affect at the dyadic level, that can contribute to peace. We can use the democratic peace approach as an example of the different effect of the same concept at different levels of analysis. There are important studies that have evaluated democratic peace from a monadic perspective (Chan, 2010), and systemic perspective (Mitchell, 2002). However, Diehl and Wright discuss that the dyadic level has the strongest potential one among the levels of analysis to explain the democratic peace effect (Diehl & Wright, 2016, p. 5).

The general argument accepted within the democratic peace literature is that democracies are peaceful only when it comes to their relationships with other democracies, not in general (Chan, 1997; De Mesquita et al., 1999; Dixon, 1994; Maoz & Russett, 1993). This thought finds strong support for the dyadic democratic peace, but little support for peace in the national level (Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009, p. 269). On the other hand, Rummel discussed in his studies that democratic states are more peaceful than other states in general (Rummel, 1983, p. 67). Thus, several researches (Bremer, 1992; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2006; Huth & Allee, 2004; Souva & Prins, 2006) have paid particular attention to the idea that democracies are peaceful in general, not purely in their relationships with other democracies (Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009, p. 270). Benoit also contributed to the argument that democracies are less conflict prone than other types of

regimes throughout the 1960-1980 period (Benoit, 1996, p. 638). For this reason, they argue that democratic peace is not just a dyadic phenomenon, but also a monadic concept.

When considered from this aspect, there are two main thoughts within the democratic peace literature. The first of them is the dyadic version of the democratic peace. In this version, scholars argue that the formation of militarized disputes and war is mitigated only in relations among democratic states (Huth & Allee, 2004, p. 2). For this reason, the pacific polities are internalized within the concept of democratic states interacting with each other (Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 514). However, the second thought refers to the monadic version of the democratic peace. The advocates of this thought argue that democratic states are less aggressive than non-democratic states (Huth & Allee, 2004, p. 2). Accordingly, democratic peace is rooted in the individual behaviour of democratic states and a pacifist attitude is embarked on the relationships with all countries (Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 512).

Can pacifism as monadic characteristic lead to a peaceful dyad? We can readily accept that a dyad of two peaceful states will be peaceful (Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009, p. 280), and indeed that no independent dyadic variable plays any role here. We can also readily accept that a dyad of two fightaholic states will likely not be peaceful. What happens though in mixed dyad made up of a fightaholic and peaceful state? If monadic pacifism can create a barrier to the expression of fightaholism within a dyad, then monadic pacifism plays an important role in explaining peaceful dyads. It essentially acts as a limiter to the expression of fightaholism. If on the other hand this is not the case, and peaceful dyads require both states to be peaceful, then the monadic level variables are less important than the dyadic condition.

My argument is that it is very unlikely that such dyads will remain totally peaceful. Instead, it is focused on dyads of contiguous states that are fully pacifist, that is having avoided any interstate war or dispute with each other during the duration of their shared dyadic existence. In the second chapter, it will be reviewed the empirical findings of previous studies that focused on the analysis of dangerous dyads. This study is guided by the logic that understanding the causes of war is essential to explain how peace can be achieved and maintained (Waltz, 2001, p. 2). The goal is to extract a set of characteristics that will permit us to locate peaceful dyads.

CHAPTER II

2. EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS FROM THEORY

One of the enduring findings of the empirical study of peace and war, is that most interstate conflicts do not become militarised, and most militarised conflicts do not escalate to wars. As a result, a rich literature has developed explaining why conflicts become militarised and why militarised conflicts escalate to war (Quackenbush, 2014, p. 3). In all of these studies, peace is treated as not-war. This is a very limited view point, that misses how characteristics of peace might be more important in explaining the rarity of war among dyads, compared to characteristics of conflict.

My goal in this chapter is to formulate a theory of peaceful dyads. The definition of theory that this paper uses is the following:

‘A set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, to explain and predict phenomena.’ (Gray, 2004, p. 5).

There are two types of theories for the explanation of social phenomena; normative theories which deal with the questions concerning what is right and wrong, or how things ought to be, and empirical theories that select the ‘explanation of certain behaviours’ as a baseline (Cashman, 2014a, p. 2), in another name aim to explain how things are. However, theory can serve two different purposes and each of these purposes generates the different type of theory (Cox & Sinclair, 1996, p. 88). One of them is problem-solving theory, which takes the world as it is. This theory aims to deal with the particular troubles of existing international relations, and by extension to make the institutions and social and power relationships work (Cox & Sinclair, 1996, p. 88). The other one is critical theory. This theory asks how that order of the world occurred. Critical theory is concerned with both past and continuing process of historical change. In that

sense, this theory has the aim of clarifying alternative choices to reach a social and political order different from the current order (Cox & Sinclair, 1996, p. 90).

In the formulation of theories, variables and hypotheses are crucial components. Understanding peace and war requires a holistic understanding of the role of variables in causing war and peace and the relationship of variables with each other. Of major importance in the analysis of dyadic peace and war, is to understand if variables have an independent effect or that effect is mediated or caused by the dyadic interaction of variables. For instance, the initial monadic level democratic peace argument, was quickly abandoned as democracies as individual states were found to be neither more nor less war-prone than other regimes. Instead it was the dyadic presence of democracy that underpin the finding of the democratic peace (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 85). Theoretically though, the difference between the relationship of democracy to war at the monadic and dyadic levels, has led to theoretical stalemate, as a dyadic level explanation that is independent of monadic level aspects of democracy has yet to be agreed on.

It is important to also understand that some factors associated with war under certain circumstances can also be associated with peace under other circumstances. For instance, the variable of proximity is considered as permissive to the onset of war. However, proximity also fosters pacific relations by creating incentives for cooperation (Geller & Singer, 1998, pp. 60–61). This means that proximity rather than being a cause of war or peace, is really a cause of interaction, with other variables explaining why sometimes interaction leads to war and other time it does not. In the same manner, while dyadic territorial issues are deemed to be among the most war-prone, my analysis here will show that this is not always the case. Obviously, some factors are more influential than others for engendering warfare or sustaining peace (Maoz, 2009, p. 412). In that sense, each independent variable that is responsible for increasing the possibility of war or decreasing the likelihood of peace will be evaluated based on the dyadic relationship between pairs of states.

2.1. Empirical Insight from Dangerous Dyads

The question of how and why interstate wars erupt has seen scholarship approach it from different perspectives, using different concepts and looking at different levels of

analysis. For instance, in the Cold War period, there was dominance of structural realist concepts of war, which saw war as the result of variables relying at the system level of analysis (Quackenbush, 2014, p. 13), for example the structuralism explanatory story developed by Kenneth Waltz (Vasquez, 1998, p. 191). This tradition has now largely been supplemented by studies focusing at the dyadic level of analysis (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 20; Singer, 1961, p. 80).

The most important question to be answered here is what makes war a war. The causes and motivations between the complex World War II and the dyadic Falklands War between Argentina and Britain in 1982 are not the same. Factors increasing the risk of militarised interstate disputes (MIDs), i.e., the existence of a territorial problem, regime types will be helpful to grasp how the probability of the onset of a war between a pair of states changes with changes in the values of each variable. While causal variables of war can reside at any level of analysis, my aim is to review those that the existing literature had located at the dyadic level of analysis.

Although there is no general theory that explains the causes of war, some determinants triggering a war between dyads can be inferred from empirical studies. The work of R. J. Rummel focused on the relationship between regime type and international conflict based on the pairs of states between 1945 and 1965, and concluded that none of the democratic pairs of states at that time neither threatened to use force against each other or engaged in war (Rummel, 1983, p. 68). Erich Weede questions the connection between contiguity and the frequency of military interstate disputes between contiguous states between the period of 1950 and 1969, while David Garnham going along with Nils Gleditsch and J. David Singer found indicators that warring dyads were geographically more proximate than non-warring dyads (Garnham, 1976, p. 233; Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 77; Weede, 1976, p. 396). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, on the other side, reports that 15 wars within 76 war initiations between 1816 and 1974 occurred among nations that had a formal military agreement, in other words between allies. According to him, this result demonstrates the connection between war occurrence and dyadic alliance membership (De Mesquita, 1981, p. 160). Leeds argues that alliances affect the probability that a potential challenger will initiate a militarised interstate dispute since there is a factor

signalling information about the possibility of whether others will intervene in a potential conflict, the alliance itself (Leeds, 2003, p. 427).

More holistic treatments consider a battery of variables associated with war onset, with the initial example being Stuart Bremer's work on 'dangerous dyads' (Bremer, 1992, p. 309). Bremer concentrated upon seven significant factors increasing the risks for the onset of MIDs and wars, seeking to locate what made some dyads war-prone or as he called them "dangerous dyads" (Bremer, 1992, pp. 312–319). These factors are geographical proximity or contiguity, alliance, power parity, power status, democracy, development, and militarization (Bremer, 1992, p. 331).

Yet, there are some contiguous dyads which do not fit the framework of factors that Bremer addressed. They lack the war fostering factors that are present in dangerous dyads. Essentially these are dyads in which some of the motivation factors for war are present, namely territorial disputes, but still have managed to avoid the use of force for the duration of their dyadic history. To make clear the unique character of these dyads, it will be first summarized what we know about the correlates of dangerous dyads.

2.1.1. Geographical Proximity/ Contiguity and War

The role of geographic proximity, and thus interaction opportunities has received significant attention in studies of war onset. It is generally agreed that geographical proximity plays a crucial role on states' economic, diplomatic, cultural, military, or environmental interactions. Similarly, contiguity, a sub-category of geographic proximity, is seen as one of the permissive factors for the onset of interactions that can lead to war among contiguous dyads. Wars most frequently occur between contiguous states. For this reason, the first group of studies on this issue addressed primarily the measurement of the distance between countries. In this context, the distance between national capitals and also between centres of power has been used as a base to measure the geographical proximity (De Mesquita, 1981, p. 41; Lemke, 2002, p. 78; Stinnett et al., 2002, p. 61). Garnham, in the same manner, evaluated dyadic international wars between 1816 and 1965 by focusing on the distance between state capitals and his findings were the same as previous studies; war is more probable between geographically proximate dyads than relatively distant dyads (Garnham, 1976, p. 240).

An important step in the study of the role of contiguity was the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Data (The Correlates of War Project, 2017), which is the most widely used data to measure geographical proximity between states, which was also firstly discussed by Charles S. Gochman. This data set is composed of the 144 states that are members of the international system and these states are coded as being non-contiguous, contiguous by land, or within 6, 24, or 150 miles by water from all other states in the system, as Gochman elaborated (Gochman, 1991, p. 97). Peter Wallensteen, in his study involving nine the major states, England, France, Russia/USSR, Australia-Hungary, Prussia-Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and China, from 1815 to 1976, remarked that contiguity is a significant source of conflict leading to the militarized confrontation and war between the pairs of states. While 93% of contiguous dyads had at least one time militarized confrontation, 64% of these pairs experienced at least one war (Wallensteen, 1981, p. 84). Following these data-oriented findings, well-recognized studies claimed that most wars have been among the contiguous states who share land or water borders (Vasquez, 1995, p. 279).

The field relies on the ‘opportunity’ and ‘willingness’ concept developed by Harvey Starr in order to better grasp the role of proximity and geographic contiguity on the onset of war (Most & Starr, 2015, p. 30). According to Starr, opportunity is the possibility of interaction between entities or behavioural units of some kind, while willingness refers to the processes and activities that lead them to choose to go to war (Starr, 1978, p. 364). The empirical studies of geography and war are roughly classified into two categories. The first category involves the studies which regard geography as a ‘facilitating’ condition for conflict and concentrates on how geography works as an agent of opportunity for interstate disputes and war. The second category handles geography as a source of conflict (Diehl, 1991, p. 16).

The primary issue in a geography-oriented dispute is the control over a given territorial area which affects the willingness of states to go to war. The most consistent advocate of the territorial explanation for war, John A. Vasquez, suggests three essential perspectives via identifying geographic factors to the question of why neighbours fight (Vasquez, 1995, p. 278). The territoriality perspective accepts the geography as a ‘source of conflict’, which creates ‘territorial issues.’ The other two perspectives see geography

as a ‘facilitator for conflict’. Geography provides convenience for states to reach each other’s physical territories quickly, referring to the ‘proximity perspective’. Geography also influences the frequency of interactions between neighbours, and this refers to the ‘interaction perspective.’ (Hensel, 2000, p. 1).

The argument relating to why geography is deemed as a ‘source of conflict or war’ refers to the existence of ‘territorial issues’ between two contiguous states. The idea is that some issues can be more crucial than others in a way that makes states more willing to use force over them. The territorial perspective in this sense plays an important role as popular explanatory framework for war. Newman accepts territory as a ‘demographic container’ that holds people together, and also as an ‘exclusive entity’ for national identity (Newman, 1999, pp. 11–15). Diehl notes two general views about why territory has this effect. First is its intrinsic importance, which refers to its tangible or concrete value, and also its strategic value provided to a state, and sovereignty over the population within those borders. Many territories are likely to contain valuable resources such as oil, freshwater, strategic minerals, or specific territories are important for providing access to the sea or strategic waterways (Hensel, 2000, pp. 58–59). The land in question can give defensive advantages to one side as it happened in the Golan Heights for Israel, or it can play a role as a corridor to deny the access of undesirable states to important land or sea routes like the Straits of Hormuz.

The other is the symbolic value of territory, an intangible value such as historical importance or prominence for national identity, or religious significance such as Jerusalem (Cashman, 2014b, p. 241). This intangible or symbolic importance for that state can trigger a willingness to fight over the territory (Diehl, 1999, pp. x–xi). This is because the territory in question continues to maintain its importance as a root cause of war unless the assertions over territory are solved in a friendly manner between two sides. Threats to such territory create what Bahar Rumelili calls ‘ontological insecurity’ which can trigger defensive reactions even when physical insecurity is not a factor (Rumelili, 2015, p. 25). For this reason, the existence of territorial issues between neighbours makes war possible until this problem is solved. The settlement of territorial disputes or conflicts is also an important premise to achieve a high level of positive peace (Klein et al., 2008, p. 69). According to John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henahan, the dyads which experience

territorial disputes show a much higher possibility to go to war in contrast with the dyads that have other types of disputes (Vasquez & Henehan, 2001, p. 135). Territorial issues are thus a strong predictor of conflict in a dyad.

The other two perspectives handle geography as a ‘facilitator for conflict’ by focusing on the proximity perspective and interaction perspective as a function of geography. The studies on this category focus on how geography creates opportunities for conflict and war. Randolph M. Siverson and Starr conceptualized proximity as a factor that creates the possibility for conflict due to enhanced possibilities for both positive and negative interaction. Therefore, the geographically closer states interact more which can give rise to more instances of cooperation and conflict (Starr, 2005, p. 396). Bruce Russett argues that countries do not fight each other due to their geographic proximity, but on the contrary this opportunity exists because they are close (Garnham, 1976, p. 232).

Opportunity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for war. James Paul Wesley posits that the frequency and size of wars are results of geographical opportunity and therefore the frequency of wars occurring between neighbour dyads is greater than with countries separated geographically (Wesley, 1962, p. 387). Accordingly, if the frequency of wars happened especially between neighbour states, then there is a connection between the number of neighbours the country has and the frequency of wars. In that sense, Wesley’s view reinforces that of Lewis F. Richardson. According to Richardson, the presence of more borders produces war and conflict between neighbours (Richardson, 1960, p. 176). This is because borders enhance the interactions between these actors and thus the opportunity for conflict. Furthermore, Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr who disagreed with this view of Richardson, paid attention that a border constitutes a concrete structure of risks and opportunities in which several interactions purport more or less likely to occur (Starr & Most, 1976, p. 588).

As a consequence, there is a close relationship between the onset of war and geographic factors especially in the form of dyadic territorial issues. This factor refers to the negative contribution of geography on the contiguous states by preparing the ground for war. Therefore, the geographical proximity between dyads is one of the core explanatory variables in explaining the puzzle of war.

2.1.2. Alliances and War

The second most significant factor related to ‘dangerous dyads’ defined by Bremer is the existence of an alliance between the neighbouring dyad members. A few studies about alliance and war have focused on a debate between two approaches; those who support that alliances contribute to peace and those who believe that alliances are directly connected to war. The latter is more widely accepted. One of Vasquez’s findings is remarkable:

‘Alliances do not prevent war or promote peace; instead, they are associated with war, although they are probably not a cause of war.’ (Vasquez, 1987, p. 119).

This argument is also supported by the findings of Jack S. Levy, who found that the majority of alliances, except for the 19th century, have been followed by war including at least one of the allies. Additionally, all alliances consisting of great powers in the 16th, 17th, and 20th centuries have been followed by war (Vasquez, 1987, p. 120). For this reason, the majority view is that alliances generate mistrust and tensions causing the arms races and the further polarization of the alliance structure and eventually lead to war (Levy, 1981, p. 582). However, Leeds argues that formal military alliance agreements give information to state leaders about the possibility of intervention by other states in a potential conflict that could occur (Leeds, 2003, p. 427). In that sense, state leaders have a chance to envisage which conflicts will become bilateral or multilateral, in turn, this prediction will affect the willingness of that state leader to be in a conflict. Besides, Leeds adds some findings that different alliances contain different provisions and effects for participants. Therefore, some alliances prevent the hostilities, while others provide the necessary assurance to make attacks easier (Leeds, 2003, p. 428).

At the dyadic level, the analysis is a bit different. Research on the alliance and war is divided into two parts: the alliances within dyads and the alliance external to dyads (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 82). Bueno de Mesquita presents evidence for the war-proneness of allied states in contrast with unallied states. He reports that 23 of 76 war initiations between 1816 and 1974 are between two nations, each of which had at least one ally. Of these 23 war initiations, 15 were between states with a military agreement between them (De Mesquita, 1981, p. 160). Some studies concerning alliances and war

emphasized the two distinctive dimensions of alliances; the configuration of alliances and the magnitude of alliance commitments (Ostrom & Hoole, 1978, p. 3).

The configuration of alliances refers to the existence of great powers within a dyad in parallel with alliances external to the dyad, which means one member of a dyad is allied with a bloc, while the other member is not (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 82). According to Singer and Small, the presence of major states in an alliance creates a strong link between alliances and war occurrence. Alliances consisting of great powers throughout the 16th, 17th, and 20th centuries were very war-prone. While 78% of these wars include an ally, 61% involved two or more allies (Levy, 1981, p. 597). For this reason, the existence of just one major power in the alliances has been accepted as a strong factor that fosters war onset. The rate of onset was 28% in the nineteenth century and 87% in the twentieth century (Oren, 1990, p. 211). Alliances also increase the magnitude and severity of wars (Vasquez, 1987, p. 119). Alliances foster the entry of new combatants to an ongoing war, leading to increases spread (Smith, 1995, p. 406; Vasquez, 2018, p. 14).

The other distinction made by Singer and Small is concerned with the classification of alliances. They classify alliances into three types as defence pacts, neutrality or non-aggression pacts, and ententes (Singer & Small, 1966, p. 5). Bremer classified all dyads from 1816 to 1965 into four categories like defence pact, neutrality or non-aggression pact, ententes, and no alliance (Bremer, 1992, p. 323). Following these studies, ententes and neutrality pacts are seemingly less prone to generate wars than defence pacts. This is because, defence pacts are positively connected with the wars between great powers (Gibler & Vasquez, 1998, pp. 792–795).

Another factor playing an important role in explaining the war-proneness of alliances is whether alliance member are recent war victors, or war losers. States that were defeated in the war tend to avoid war compared to the states that achieved success at the end of a previous war. Whilst Weede analyses the negative relationship between alliance and war on the military conflicts among the dyads from 1950 to 1969, Bremer finds this condition present when the members of a dyad become highly militarized. Then concludes that states which adopt a universalist attitude to interests are less likely to fight against each other (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 83; Weede, 1983, p. 239).

Therefore, two inferences can be made on the relations between alliances and war occurrence. Firstly, war is more likely to happen between allied states in contrast to non-allied states. Secondly, the existence of major powers within a dyad strengthens the war fostering role of alliances on the onset of war.

2.1.3. Power Parity and War

The third important factor associated with dyadic war that Bremer located is a distribution of material military capabilities among dyad members, that is one of parity or near parity. Although a big body of research tried to discover whether there is a correlation between distributions of power and war, only a few of them discussed specifically this question at the dyadic level. However, the majority of the studies that deal with the dyadic level power relations have found indicators of a strong relationship between power parity and war, and between power preponderance and peace (Houweling & Siccama, 1988, p. 93; Maoz, 1993, p. 37).

These studies concentrate on two claims. The first is the balance of power theory related to power parity and the second the power transition theory relying on power preponderance. The concept of 'power parity' refers to a situation in which the most powerful states within the system are relatively equal in power (Siverson & Tennefoss, 1984, p. 1057). This equality decreases the possibility of war occurrence among dyads since the states with approximately equal power cannot be sure about their chances of victory (Lemke & Kugler, 1996, p. 5). War in this case is not a rational choice (Bremer, 1992, p. 313). Siverson and Tennefoss analyse the initiation and escalation of dyadic conflicts between 1815 and 1965 and find indicators that 61.7% of the conflicts between major powers found in a condition of power parity, do not escalate to war (Siverson & Tennefoss, 1984, p. 1061).

The concept of 'power preponderance' holds that a clear asymmetry in the distribution of material military capabilities is conducive to dyadic nonviolent interaction (Geller, 1993, p. 176). Advocates of this view argue that power parity is the necessary condition for major wars (Lemke & Kugler, 1996, p. 4). The argument is that the weaker side will not try to initiate war, and will indeed actively seek to avoid the escalation of conflicts. As Mihalka points out, when the capability differences between states are high,

the probability of conflict causing war is considerably lower (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 72).

The most important work on the role of power parity and preponderance on the onset of war has been done within the power transition research program. The main argument of the scholars working in this research project is that war is more possible in conditions where an asymmetrical dyadic distribution of power is becoming more symmetrical, approaching parity. Three elements underpin the explanatory framework of the power transition program: the structure of the international system, the existence of alliances, and the stability of national power capabilities (Kugler & Lemke, 1996, p. 8).

Regarding the structure of the international system, Organski argued that the international system is hierarchical when it comes to the distribution of power, composed of one dominant power and below it a decreasing hierarchy of major powers, middle and smaller nations, and lastly dependencies (Organski, 1968, p. 365). The power holding capability primacy leverages its material dominance to influence the norms, institutions, and rules of the international system in its interests. Those major, middle, and small powers that find this tolerable and are thus satisfied with the system, are allies and supporters of the status-quo. But not all powers can be satisfied, and indeed satisfied powers might become dissatisfied as differential rates of economic growth lead them to catch up to the dominant power. The combination of dissatisfaction and a decreasing asymmetry in the distribution of power between dissatisfied and satisfied states raises the spectre of power transition, and systemic change, which feeds preventive war motives and foster war onset (Lemke & Werner, 1996, p. 236; Heo et al., 2003a, p. 453). Preponderance thus fosters peace, while approaching parity fosters war.

In the power transition explanatory framework, alliances among major powers are stable, because their members are either satisfied or dissatisfied with the current international order. Thus, satisfied countries will join the dominant power to maintain the status quo, while the unsatisfied will ally with those against the status quo (Heo et al., 2003b, p. 451). On the other hand alliances between middle and small powers and major powers can be volatile as states jockey for partners against their dyadic opponents (Morrow, 1991, p. 905). Siverson and Tennefoss find that alliances are used to gain the necessary strength to initiate war (Siverson & Tennefoss, 1984, p. 1062).

Regarding dyadic power relations, a war is more likely to occur between dyads when they have, or are nearing, power parity. On the other hand, the existence of power preponderance reduces the possibility of war. In other words, the absence of 'power preponderance' between a pair of states plays an important role in rendering a dyad dangerous.

2.1.4. Power Status and War

The fourth factor contributing to dangerous dyads, according to Bremer, is the presence of a major power in the dyad. The existence of major powers is accepted as one of the important factors which increase the possibility of war. In the correlation between power status and war, major powers are more likely to engage in war compared with minor states (Bremer, 1992, p. 314).

Small and Singer state that the majority of wars in the international system involved only a small number of system members, most of which are major powers (Small & Singer, 1982, p. 180). Wilkinson stated that the states that most often participate in war are major powers (Wilkinson, 1980, p. 62). Gochman claims that great powers generate a large proportion of the conflict behaviour in the international system since they have a wide array of economic, strategic, and political interests beyond their borders (Gochman, 1980, p. 89). Köhler concludes that dominant nations become more peaceful following the loss of leadership status (Köhler, 1975, p. 57). Analysing the connection between power status and conflict, Bremer reports that nations scoring high on the composite index of national capability (CINC) have engaged in a larger number of wars than states scoring low (Bremer, 1992, p. 324). Most complex wars in the international system become so due to the presence of at least two major powers on opposing sides, for example the First World War, were barring Serbia and Belgium, all other initial belligerents were major powers (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 163).

As states attain increases in their economic power, they seek to leverage it into military power, in order to protect expanded interests (Fordham, 2011, p. 598). As a result, major powers engaged in much more active foreign policies than minor powers, and engage more often in the use of military power. As a result, the presence of a major power in a dyad can lead to war, especially in conditions of power transition and

dissatisfaction. Therefore, the higher the status of a pair of states, the greater the possibility of war involvement by that dyad.

2.1.5. Regime Types and War

The fifth factor concerning dangerous dyads described by Bremer is the absence of dyadic democracy. A large body of research has sought to uncover the causes of the empirical phenomenon of the democratic peace. At the centre of this endeavour is the search to understand what combinations of regime types in a dyad foster war onset.

Three main arguments are put forward regarding the relationship between war-proneness and regime type, with the main focus on the democratic peace. The first argument is made by those who focused on the monadic level of analysis, and did not find any indicators of an association between regime type and conflictual behaviour (Maoz & Abdolali, 1989, p. 3; Chan, 1984; Small & Singer, 1976; Vincent, 1987; Weede, 1984). They note that the findings show that democratic states are neither more nor less war-prone than the other regimes (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 85). The second argument is based on indicators found at the dyadic level of analysis, that show that democratic states never fight with other democracies (Quackenbush & Rudy, 2009, p. 268). Finally, a third argument is based on some indicators that at the monadic level democracies tend to be more war-prone than nondemocratic regimes. (Maoz & Abdolali, 1989, p. 4).

Maoz and Russett noted that the monadic democratic peace argument is based on the idea that democracies are generally unlikely to make war, due to the difficulties inherent in the democratic process and the need for broad support for risky policies, but the empirical findings show that democracies fight with authoritarian regimes (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 626). Chan asserts that there is a mutual barrier to violence between democratic states, which simply does not apply in the relations of democratic states with non-democratic states (Chan, 1984, p. 642). Democratic states are less likely to initiate war in a crisis situation, if the opponent is a democracy, compared to when the opponent is a non-democracy (Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 527). They also find that monadic effects of democracy on initiation and escalation of crisis are less influential than dyadic effects.

Small and Singer, questioning the monadic democratic peace argument, noted that there is no noticeable finding that democratic regimes are more pacific or war-prone

compared to non-democratic regimes during the 1816-1965 period. Instead, any pacific effect of regime type is only emergent at the dyadic level. Based on Correlates of War data from between 1816 and 1965, Small and Singer found that wars in which democracies participated were longer than average, had fewer deaths stemming from the war, and that democracies were as likely as non-democracies to start a war. (Small & Singer, 1976, pp. 67–68). But when it comes to dyadic interaction, democratic states, which as units are just as war-prone as non-democratic states, do not fight wars with other democracies (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 624). The question which consumes the literature is the why.

One prominent argument about the why of the democratic peace is focused on how democratic institutions constraint leader behaviour. Democratic leaders facing institutions of accountability are more likely to make an effort to win wars compared autocratic leaders. For this reason, when they are trying to decide on war, leaders in democratic political systems make a more elaborate calculation of the possible outcomes. Thus, if they expect that war will not lead to victory, they will choose not to fight. Considering this decision-making structure, leaders of democracies will avoid going to war with other democracies, as they know that their leaders like them, are constrained to fight as hard as possible by their democratic regime. Thus, the leaders of two democracies will prefer negotiation over war. This is not the case with non-democratic leaders that are expected to have more ability to avoid the consequences of defeat (De Mesquita et al., 1999, p. 794).

Further indicators of the dyadic democratic peace were found by Rummel. After examining fifty interstate wars consisting of participants which he coded as libertarian, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes from 1816 to 1965, he found indicators that no wars took place between libertarian states, 14 of the 50 wars were between libertarian and authoritarian states, and remaining 36 wars were between non-libertarian states (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 86). While 94 out of 176 members of the interstate system have not been involved in any international war between 1816 and 1980, 73 of the 91 states that were members of the interstate system from 1944 through 1980 had experienced at least one interstate war. Most of these 73 states were ruled by authoritarian or totalitarian leaders

(Chan, 1984, p. 626). The most war-prone dyads were those made up of a democratic and non-democratic regime. The most pacific were the those made up of two democracies.

In his study of 1983, Rummel argues that the explanation for the dyadic democratic peace lies in the idea of 'liberation systems', which is nullified by the existence of a non-democratic state in a dyad, and thus leads to the onset of war (Rummel, 1983, p. 29). Rummel examines the situation of democratic states in terms of violence and advocates that the strongest incompatibility is among autocratic and totalitarian regimes, not between democracies and non-democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 493). The minor visibility of military rivalry between democratic states confirms this idea. As militarized rivalry is the result of frequent military interstate disputes, it is unlikely to arise between democratic states (Hensel et al., 2000, p. 1175).

When it comes to fightaholism, the most fightaholic states are those that arose due to revolutionary process and are un-democratic, compared to those that arose through evolutionary political processes, and have democratic regimes (Maoz, 2004, p. 124). As a conclusion, it is obvious that the combination of dyads composed of jointly democratic regime types is unlikely to show a tendency to militarized interstate disputes, while dyads that contain one democracy are more likely to fight.

2.1.6. Development and War

The sixth important factor located by Bremer as contributing to the rise of dangerous dyads is development and war. Of all the factors this is the least researched, especially at the dyadic level. That said, there is a focus on two manifestations of the general concept of development; trade, first is the level of trade between states, and second is economic development in general (Geller & Singer, 1998, p. 93).

Sullivan based on their findings, argues that the level of trade between two states is an important factor affecting the likelihood of dyadic conflict (Sullivan, 1974, p. 549). Discussing the interaction patterns based on the trade levels between the United States and Warsaw Pact states, Polachek and Gasiorowski pointed out an inverse relationship between trade level and conflict behaviour at the dyadic level (Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982, p. 728). Oneal, Maoz, and Russett emphasized that high levels of trade are positively connected with peace. They analysed the interacting effect of bilateral trade

and regime type on conflict incidence between states, especially contiguous, for the 1950-1984 period. Their findings indicated a powerful pacific effect by high levels of dyadic trade in dyads of contiguous states (Oneal et al., 1996, p. 23).

Focusing on economic development, Bremer accepts that dyads consisting of one advanced and one underdeveloped economy, or two underdeveloped economies are more likely to be war-prone in contrast with highly developed dyads (Bremer, 1992, p. 317). The cost of war has been increasing over the last century, leading major states to seek to avoid war due to the escalating costs. For this reason, it is possible to argue that the level of joint economic development between dyads has an impact on the willingness of states to initiate war (Quackenbush, 2014, p. 15). According to Bremer, economic development is important when both pairs of states are economically advanced. If one of them is less advanced than the other, the possibility of war increases. Because, there are two possibilities for the formation of war due to asymmetrical economic development. Either the more advanced embarks on an enterprise to penetrate a less advanced economy or the less advanced economy seeks to escape from the pressures imposed by the more advanced economy (Bremer, 1992, p. 317). As a consequence, empirical findings show the effect of bilateral trade and having more advanced economy on pacifist relations between contiguous dyads.

2.1.7. Militarization and War

The final factor noted as contributing to dangerous dyads, is the level of militarization in the dyad. This means the level of military preparedness in a dyad, and is not exhausted by arms races and mutual military build-ups (Bremer, 1992, p. 319). The studies about the effect of militarization on the outbreak of war centre upon the question of whether militarization functions as a deterrent, helping avoid war, or as a contributing factor to war.

Although some studies use militarization and arms race interchangeably, Bremer makes a distinction between these two terms. According to him, the arms race is connected with continued increases in preparedness, and militarization refers to a high level of preparedness. Thus, arms races between dyads are dynamic, while militarization

is a constant (Bremer, 1992, p. 319). Rider defines arms race as a competition focusing on the quality of quantity of military capabilities between states (Rider, 2017, p. 1).

In analysing the relationship between arms races and war, significant attention has been devoted to whether arms races lead to war or not. Wallace found that dyadic disputes were highly likely to escalate to war in the presence of an ongoing arms race (Wallace, 1979, p. 13) and this findings were challenged. The debate between Wallace and those who criticize him demonstrates the two arguments on the effect of arms race; the deterrence framework and the hostile spiral framework (Sample, 2012, p. 113). One way to think about militarisation, is within the context of the belief that war comes about because of deterrence failure. Militarization, including arms races can help to uphold deterrence, especially for minor powers in a dyadic relationship with a major power, thus helping avoid war (Bremer, 1992, p. 318). On the other hand, working within the belief that war is the result of conflict spirals caused by misperception of motives, rapid militarization can trigger preventing and pre-emptive war motivations in a dyad (Bremer, 1992, p. 318). Which of the two conceptual frameworks corresponds more to empirical reality is the focus of a large corpus of research.

Traditional international relations research regards an arms build-up as a natural reaction and that arms race cause negative consequences, such as economic costs, the risk of escalating tensions and the potential for military conflict (Rider, 2009, p. 693). The studies arguing for a positive relationship between arms races and war do so along two different arguments (Intriligator & Brito, 1984, p. 64). The first argument was initially developed by Richardson who focuses on the instability of an arms race as a contributing factor to war. The underlying reason is that escalating arms races generate pre-emptive war motives, that cannot but lead to the eruption of war at some (Lambelet, 1975, p. 123; Richardson, 1951, p. 568).

Wallace evaluates this issue amongst great powers by comparing the preparedness of states and arms race dynamics as conditions leading to war. He concluded that international conflicts following arms races are more war-prone than those that do not arise from an arms race (Wallace, 1982, p. 44). Using an arms race index, Wallace splits dyads into two groups, one of those that engaged in arms races, and one of those that did not. His data indicated that while 23 of 28 arms race cases resulted in wars, only 3 of the

71 cases without arms races lead to wars. This supports the idea that arms races contribute to the onset of war (Wallace, 1979, p. 14).

On the other hand, Altfeld argued that an arms race is only underway between great power dyads that experienced disputes (Altfeld, 1983, p. 230). Accordingly, the rarity of the phenomenon precludes it from explaining war. Vasquez asserts that arms races are a reaction to a threat perception and this reaction is a reflection of the power politics strategy that is implemented especially in the face of a territorial threat (Vasquez, 1993). Rider approves this argument by highlighting the inherent salience of territory. Threat towards territory is more likely to produce arms races than other types of threats (Rider, 2009, p. 701). Diehl and Crescenzi, in other respects, discuss the arms races as a product of the enduring rivalry between states (Diehl & Crescenzi, 1998, p. 113). Morrow argued that arms races taking place in close proximity to the onset of war, may be masking deeper causes of war, stemming from structural conditions that feed a conflict spiral (Morrow, 1989, p. 526). Siverson and Diehl stated that 'If there is any consensus among arms race studies, it is that some arms races lead to war and some do not.' (Siverson & Diehl, 1989, p. 214). As a conclusion, it seems that arms races and war are positively connected with each other and arms races occurring between rivals and major powers have a triggering effect for the transition of disputes to war.

The above review of the empirical correlates of dangerous dyads permits us to begin thinking about what might be the correlates of peaceful dyads. The absence of correlates of war is just part of the story. We must also seek those variables that independently by their presence foster peace. In the next part, it will be reviewed the empirical studies that focus on this issue.

2.2. Empirical Insights from the Interstate Peace

Wars are waged for a political goal including some gains such as economic. A body of scholarship had noted how the termination of war provides the window of opportunity for the foundation of conditions that foster a durable peace and facilitates new cooperation schemes between former adversaries (Randle & Rapp, 1987). In this study instead it is focused on those dyads that never had a war and were able to maintain a long peace during their dyadic interaction. The factors that help maintain peace among

such dyads should differ from the factors that permit dyads that had a war, maintain peace after the war. Based on the factors Bremer's noted as contributing to the condition of dangerous dyads- geographical proximity or contiguity, alliance, power parity, power status, democracy, development, and militarization-, a new set of variables can be drawn that can help explain stable dyadic interstate peace.

As noted, geographic proximity is primarily a factor that foster interaction. Other variables explain why that interaction can take a conflictual or cooperative form. Exactly because of this janus-faced role of geographic proximity, this study will focus on the correlates of peace between contiguous dyads characterised by the presence of factors that foster war, but have never initiated a war against each other.

One of the most important issues triggering the occurrence of war or conflict among contiguous dyads is the existence of territorial issues. An important effect of territorial disputes is that they not only negatively affect interstate relations, but also undermine democracy within a state. Gibler conducted the seminal study on this. He divides his argument into three parts. First, when territorial issues emerge, leaders resort to arguments of security or survival of the state based on the perceived territorial threat. Second, the disputed territories are contested by large armies, which can also be used as tools of domestic repression. Third, leaders are less willing to engage in positive bargaining, instead preferring hard-line negotiation tactics in order not to undermine the domestic repressive apparatus built on the perceived territorial threat (Gibler, 2012c, pp. 211–212).

In that sense, the salience of territorial issues that affect the willingness of states to fight or to resolve disputes shows the degree of importance attached by the actors to that territorial issue. Territorial disputes thus not only undermine the establishment of positive peace, but undermine the domestic factors that can help promote positive peace. In that sense, the existence of a territorial issue is regarded as the most important factor to be solved among other issues that trigger the possibility of war. This study, herein, argues about the reason why territorial claims that are expected to produce a war between dyads do not so, with dyadic relations being pacific despite their existence. Accordingly, it will be focused on the aspect of territorial claims that does not lead to any dispute or disagreement between contiguous dyads.

It has been already discussed the second correlate of peace, which is dyadic democracy. This is the democratic peace thesis. The thesis relies on two competing explanations, one institutional. These are the checks and balances on executive power within democracies, including the presence of opposition parties and a robust civil society. Therefore, democratically elected leaders are not able to act quickly and this situation reduces the likelihood of conflicts erupting or escalating to war (Lalman & De Mesquita, 1990, p. 752). In conjunction with Bueno De Mesquita's, aforementioned, expected utility theory, which also rests on the institutional characteristics of democracy, democratic decision makers must overcome many institutional hurdles in order to sell war against another democracy. The second explanation about why states adopting democracy are regarded as less war-prone is connected with the characteristics of democracies that share cultural/democratic norms among themselves. Therefore, it is expected that democratic culture could promote the pacific resolution of disputes (Balci, 2011, p. 734).

Economic interdependence along with the democratic peace and the systemic presence of international law and international organizations are the three elements suggested by Immanuel Kant in his *'Perpetual Peace'*, that foster international peace. These three elements can be taken as correlates of peace that help states refrain from using force (Oneal et al., 2003, p. 371). Some call this the 'Kantian Triad' or 'Liberal Peace'. Strong trade relations between two contiguous countries mitigates the risk of war by raising the costs of it (Robst et al., 2007, p. 29; Barbieri, 1996, p. 31). In that sense, it will be considered the monadic economic development on the basis of trade and GDP levels and also monadic pacifism of states. It can be thus argued that strong trade relations are one correlate of peace in a dyad.

When it comes to the distribution of military capabilities in the dyad, it was focused on military expenditures as proportion of the GDP. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler analysed global patterns of military expenditure seeking to understand why some countries spend a higher proportion of their GDP compared to others. They concluded that there are five factors that can drive differences in military expenditures as proportions of the GDP between countries. These are active international warfare, peacetime military budget inertia, neighbourhood effects such as arms races, civil war, and lastly, satisfying

beneficiaries and vested interests (Collier, 2006, p. 11). While military expenditures can come from a variety of reasons, this study can consider that high military expenditures to reflect some war-preparation activity.

Dyadic trade levels help also shed light on the question of pacifism and war-proneness. As per Katherine Barbieri, 'peace through trade' is most likely to occur among dyads which consist of mutually dependent trading partners, and notes that symmetrical trading relations between dyads can strengthen peace (Barbieri, 1996, pp. 29–30). In that sense, if there is an asymmetrical trading relation between dyads, this type of connection may lead to conflict, as there is the temptation by the stronger side to use it as a tool of coercion. In other words, the symmetrical relations that are defined of both extensive and balanced dependence are more peaceful than asymmetrical ties between dyads. Accordingly, what is important for this study is the combination of dyads that have a trading relationship based on symmetrical interdependence. For this reason, the dyadic trade level will be taken into consideration to observe the effect of this variable on the pacifist relations between dyads.

Population is important in two ways. Both as an absolute number, and also by the age pyramid that characterizes it. The studies which focus on the role of population size on peace and conflict, generally focus on the percentage of the total population that is made up of young people, who are seen as contributing to the economic and military power of a state. Scholars have found indicators that a "youth bulge", i.e. a condition where 40% of the total population is made up of young adults between the ages 15 and 29 years, is associated with increased conflict incidence, both domestic, and interstate. (Cincotta et al., 2003, pp. 42–43, 48; Brooks et al., 2019, p. 62). Further empirical research has suggested four demographic situations that reduce the possibility of interstate conflict (Brooks et al., 2019, p. 94). These are a condition where the median age of the population of a state is above 30 years, where the youth rate of the population is under 20%, where fertility levels are below two births per woman, and finally where life expectancy is above 75 years. If both states in a dyad are characterised by combinations of these four conditions, this research expects the dyad to be peaceful.

Another control/contextual factor that is associated with the concept of population, is the ethnic make-up of the population of the dyad. Findings on the

relationship between ethnicity and interstate conflict confirm that ethnically diverse states with a large dominant or major ethnic group affects the likelihood of dyadic interstate ethnic conflict (Huibregtse, 2011, p. 56). The most important factor here is whether one of the two states hosts a minority population that has kinship with the majority population of the other state. Also important are the geographic location of the minority population and its size. Findings indicate that the presence of minorities that are less than 10% of a population are not associated with dyadic conflict (Huibregtse, 2011, pp. 45–46). In that sense, the ethnic make-up of population has an importance to handle.

The findings of Paul Hensel on the relationship between colonial legacies and territorial conflict demonstrates that a dyadic conflict over a specific territory is much more likely to happen between contiguous countries who were under the same colonial rulers and also between countries whose decolonization processes took place through violent means (Hensel et al., 2008, p. 2). Hensel also noted that the existence of just one dyad member who gained independence via violent means is sufficient for the occurrence of a territorial conflict between two former colonies (Hensel et al., 2008, p. 11). Accordingly, it will be evaluated the effect of former colonies of the same colonizer or different colonizer in a dyad combination on declaring a territorial claim.

The factor that requires more explanation is the pacific effect of the presence of international organizations and sophisticate name of interstate law (Kacowicz, 1995, p. 266). At the centre of this argument is a simple logic. States will be able to avoid using war to resolve disputes if they have alternative tools for resolving disputes. International Law and Intergovernmental Organisations provide such alternatives. A large body of literature has produced findings that support a strong connection between membership in international organizations and peace. According to Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum, shared membership in international organizations has a considerable impact on the reduction of dispute onset and escalation in a dyad. While an increasing rate in the joint membership in international organizations reduces the possibility of conflict at the rate of 2 percent, this effect among contiguous dyads increased to 13 percent (Oneal et al., 2003, pp. 2–3). Accordingly, the last leg of Kant's triangle concentrates on republican governments that have joined a 'pacific union' based on international organizations. This union ensures both collective security and cooperation among the members in order to facilitate the

peaceful resolution of conflicts. This combination has led to the Zone of Peace research program, with the exception that the increase in both democratic states and intergovernmental organization membership will expand such zones (Cashman, 2014b, p. 269).

As noted in my review of the literature on the correlates of war, there is some evidence that some types of alliances foster war in a dyad. However, some scholars like Levy (Levy, 1981) argue that not all alliances are followed by war and some of them decrease the possibility of war onset. In this context, military alliances are accepted as beneficial by enhancing coalition politics and restraining aggression among allied members (Schmidt, 2012, p. 19). It is possible to argue that some alliances have a deterring effect. If alliances serve to deter a war, then the larger the alliance, the stronger the deterrent capabilities that can reach each member (Oren, 1990, p. 209). Thus, certain types of alliances can act as a correlate of peace within a dyad.

The presence of a power preponderance, distribution of material capabilities in a dyad is associated with peace, per the findings discussed above (Bremer, 1992, p. 314). This is the final correlate of peaceful dyads. The next step is to extract testable hypotheses on the basis of these arguments and then evaluate them using the case studies.

CHAPTER III

3. ARGUMENTS AND METHODOLOGY

Following empirical findings concerning the conflictual relationships between states, this study analyses the pacifist connection between contiguous dyads. Some factors such as territorial disputes, the interaction arising from the geographical proximity between contiguous dyads, the existence of relatively equal capabilities between each state, non-democratic type of regime, having high rate of militarization are regarded as strengthening the possibility of war occurrence. This is what is expected to happen in the presence of these variables. But, in this study, it is mentioned about the contiguous dyads that are opposite of these patterns, which show the obverse of the 'expected', and by extension the dyads that reflect these anomalies, but do not fit the theory. This is what Jack S. Levy calls "deviant cases".

Based on the conceptual analysis in the previous section, the following arguments about peacefulness in a contiguous dyad can be extracted:

H₁: Given contiguity and the presence of war fostering factors, the presence of dyadic democracy in a dyad should be associated with peaceful dyadic relations.

H₂: Territorial claims that are economically salient, that is having a tangible value, tend to be more prevalent than other types of territorial claims.

H₃: Given regime type between contiguous dyads, territorial claims that are asserted by a state with an autocratic regime against another state with autocratic regime can take a relatively long time to solve compared to the states with democratic regimes.

H₄: There is a pacifist relationship between target and challenger state based on the ethnic minority within the target state during the active territorial claim.

H5: The members of a dyad that gained independence through violence as a result of the decolonization process are more likely to assert a territorial claim than the members having peaceful means despite decolonization process.

H6: Having joint memberships in international organizations throughout the active territorial claim, contiguous dyads are in tendency to be pacifist with each other.

H7: The territorial claims asserted by a member of dyad having a strong regime durability throughout the active territorial claim tend to be long standing to resolve.

H8: Dyads of highly militarized states are more likely to engage in conflict, except if one of the two has a clear preponderance.

H9: Contiguous dyads with lower median age are more likely to make a territorial claim following the independence, and by extension to have a possible dyadic war formation.

H10: Dyads with a power preponderance tend to be member of alliance-based organizations regardless of common colonial past between contiguous pairs.

These arguments will be evaluated on the basis of a Small-N case study design, focusing on eight contiguous dyads that are characterised by peacefulness on the basis of quantitative data. In the next sections, the sources of the data used will be discussed.

3.1. Data Sources

In this study, it was collected quantitative data for my case studies from several sources. First of all, those datasets were used to focus on collecting information on variables associated with the war-proneness of states. Accordingly, it was begun with the information collected in the ‘COW Dataset’ about which state initiated a war. It was focused on interstate war initiation and extra-state war initiation, as coded in the COW Interstate and COW Extrastate War Datasets (The Correlates of War Project, 2011). Extra-state wars are important, as their targets might not be states, but they are still polities engaged in international relations for which the war and peace dynamics of interstate relations still hold. In the datasets, this paper seeks those states that have never engaged in a war with each other. My focus is to locate dyads of states characterised by

the presence of factors that foster war, such as territorial problems, power parity, or mixed regime, and territorial claims, but have never initiated a war against each other. In that sense, the focus of this study is not to include the contiguous dyads whose relationships have evolved into positive peace. These pairs of states considered as sample in this study were chosen, due to their relationship that did not turn into a militarized conflict or war despite the existence of a territorial claim between them. According to the datasets, 263 dyads share a border directly with each other.

The first dataset this study approached was the ‘Dyadic Interstate War Dataset’, based on the Correlates of War data. This dataset breaks down war information to the dyadic level, collecting information on all dyads of states that participated in a war as opponents (Maoz et al., 2019). Two variables are of importance here. The variable labelled “hiact” or highest act, which refers to the highest level of militarised action which is explicitly directed by members of dyads to each other during a MID (Ghosn & Scott, 2003). The variable permits us to capture the intensity of the conflict in the dyad, and which party began the escalation to war. The variable is divided into twenty-one categories which capture the militarized patterns of behaviour among the two or more states (Maoz et al., 2018a, p. 11).

The twenty-one categories of “hiact” are then grouped into five levels of the “hostlev” or hostility level variable. This variable captures the intensity of the hostility exhibited by each dyad member. This ranges from the lowest hostility of absence of any military action, to threat of the use of force, to display of force, to use of force, and finally the highest level of interstate war. The first hostility level category indicated the absence of any militarized activity in the dyad. The second level consists of the exhibition of threat of use of force, including threats to blockade, occupy territory, declare war, use Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) weapons, or join a war as an upper level of hostility. The third level of hostility refers to the exhibition of force, in another name the use of military forces but not in order to engage in combat. This includes declarations of alert, nuclear alert, mobilization, and fortifying the border. The fourth level of hostility includes the use of force in an offensive manner and includes border violation, blockade, occupation of territory, seizure, attack, clash, declaration of war, and use of CBR weapons. These

essentially are militarised interstate disputes. The last level includes the onset of interstate war or the joining of an existing interstate war.

It is excluded from this analysis all dyads who had any exhibition of behaviour that fits with hostility levels four or five. It is only focused on dyads that had experience with activity at the first three hostility levels. This is because, this study is interested in dyads that may have had disputes but never militarised them.

When it comes to locating the presence of territorial claims, when militarised become disputes, it was used the 'Territorial Claims Data' of Issue Correlates of War Project (ICOW) (Hensel, 2001) (Hensel et al., 2017). This includes the territorial claims of dyads towards each other within the interstate system from 1816 to 2001. The dataset contains key qualitative information, for example the name of the claimed territory used by both challenger and target state. The quantitative information includes variables on the salience of the territory for participants, and information on past peaceful and militarized settlement attempts to resolve the claim between dyads.

For the importance of the disputed territory for the claimants, there is an index that ranges from 0-12. Of six indicators that go into coding the index, resources, strategic location, and permanent population in the claimed territory refer to the tangible importance of that territory. For estimating the tangible value of river claims, the data base collects information on the use of the river for navigation, irrigation, or the generation of hydroelectric power. For estimating the tangible values of maritime claims, the data base collects information on the presence of a strategic location, fishing resources, and oil resources. The other three indicators that help code that index capture the intangible value of a territory, by looking at the acceptance of territory as homeland rather than dependent territory, the stacking of an identity basis for the claim, and the existence of historical sovereignty implemented over the claimed territory. For river and maritime claims, the homeland/ dependent territory distinction is just as valid. Accordingly, if the total values obtained from these indicators over a territory by claimants is between 0-4, this territory has 'low salience' for the claimants. If it is between the range of 4.5-7.5, it has 'moderate salience'. Lastly, the range of 8-12 means that that territory has 'high salience' for the parties.

A territorial claim becomes a dispute when it is militarised. The data base collects information on whether a claim was militarized, in another name saw the use of threat of use of force, demonstration of force, or use of force, including war. It also collects information on the number of such militarization within a five year and ten-year period.

The type of resolution variable is composed of 12 value index that tries to capture the at any year state of the resolution of the claim. These values, in turn, are as follows from 0 to 11; ongoing, dropped by challenger, renounced by challenger, third party mediation, bilateral negotiation, independence, actor leaves system, military occupation, dropped by target, renounced by target, plebiscite, claim no longer relevant.

The Territorial Claims Data, provisional version (Frederick et al., 2014) will be used to ascertain whether a dyad had a past claim or ongoing claim. In this study, it was interested in dyads that also had past claims that were resolved for, two reasons. First, because if the resolution was without the use of war, it counts as one of my interesting cases. Second, a past territorial claim may give rise to new claims or a resurgence of the past claim. Even if the claim was resolved, it is likely that the past experience still leaves some space for domestic constituencies that might be opposed to the resolution and under the right conditions may promote the claim again. Thus, this research seeks dyads that both have ongoing territorial claims, or had a territorial claim during their history.

To capture the effect of the presence or absence of dyadic democracy on the peacefulness of a dyad, the variable 'Polity Score' was used in order to operationalize state regime. The variable is coded in the 'The Polity V Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions' dataset of the Centre for Systemic Peace (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). 'Polity score' in this dataset reflects a regime authority spectrum based on a 21-point scale. This point scale ranges from (-10) to (+10), in other words from authoritarian hereditary monarchy to consolidated democracy. Generally speaking, the literature breaks down that 21-point scale into three major groupings of regimes; autocracies in the range of (-10) to (-6); anocracies between (-5) and (+5), and democracies from 6 to 10. Three special values capture state death, interregnum periods, or lack of information. It is important to note that no dyads in this study have a special value. The combination of individual state polity scores in a dyad, created a dyadic score. For this study, a dyad will be evaluated as experiencing dyadic democracy when the joint

polity score ranged between 1 and 10, and as an autocratic dyad when it ranges from 0 to (-10).

It can be used polity scores to graphically represent annual changes in the regime characters of states. These graphs have been created for most states in the ‘The Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends’ data project. The importance of this variable is to question the proposition of ‘*Democratic states do not fight each other*’. With the help of this dataset, it will be analysed whether democratic states are truly pacifist or autocratic dyads and are more inclined to fight. Accordingly, it will become clear how regime types have an impact on the choices of states for being pacifist.

As a robustness check, this study also tracks regime type, using the Democracy Index introduced by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU). This measures the state of democracy for 167 countries based on the sixty indicators. These sixty indicators are classified into five categories; electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 51). In the same manner, the index classifies countries into one of the four regime types; full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes (Rahman, 2014, p. 374).

According to the findings of 2020 report, in the countries with hybrid regimes, a mix of democratic and authoritarian tendencies, the peacefulness level faced significant deterioration. However, flawed democracies had an average increase in peacefulness level, while this level in the countries with full democracies experienced a small deterioration (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 27). Based on this report, this difference in the peacefulness of government types is due to the ongoing conflict domain (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 28). Considering the index, authoritarian regimes score between 0 and 4; hybrid regimes score between 4 and 6; flawed democracies score between 6 and 8, and full democracies score greater than 8 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 53).

“Durability” is another important aspect of regime type. It refers to the duration of the existence of a regime type, counted from the last regime change or end of Polity transition period. Gurr points that the consistently democratic and autocratic polities were

more durable than states with mixed authority traits (Gurr, 1974, p. 1496). More recently, Gates et al. reported that full democracies and full autocracies are more stable polity types since institutions in these regimes give support to each other, thereby serve for keeping the regimes alive (Gates et al., 2006, p. 893). Goldstone presents convincing evidence that partial democracies and partial autocracies have a higher relative possibility of future instability compared to full democracies or full autocracies (Goldstone et al., 2010, p. 197).

Regime stability measured in regime duration is important, since as Mansfield and Snyder argued, emerging democracies can be quite war-prone compared to stable authoritarian regimes (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, p. 6). For this reason, it is important to consider regime durability when thinking about the effect of dyadic regime types and pacifism and war proneness. Data on durability was extracted from ‘The Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions’ of the Centre for Systemic Peace (Marshall et al., 2018, p. 17).

The above factors are part of my arguments. A number of control or contextual variables are also worth tracking down. The first is the colonial history of any of dyad members. For this purpose, the ‘Colonial History Data Set’ of ICOW was used (Hensel, 2018). This dataset indicates that of 222 states in the modern interstate system, 183 have been ruled as a dependency or a part of at least one foreign state at some point in the last 200 years. Accordingly, if a dyad member has a colonial past and a tendency to fight at the same time, then this factor helps us understand to what extent colonial past has an impact on the war-proneness of that state. Further a common colonial history may have explanatory power when it comes to the pacifism or war-proneness of a dyad.

The findings of Paul Hensel on the relationship between colonial legacies and territorial conflict demonstrates that a dyadic conflict over a specific territory is much more likely to happen between contiguous countries who were under the same colonial rulers and also between countries whose decolonization processes took place through violent means (Hensel et al., 2008, p. 2). Hensel also noted that the existence of just one dyad member who gained independence via violent means is sufficient for the occurrence of a territorial conflict between two former colonies (Hensel et al., 2008, p. 11). To control for this effect, it was coded a variable that takes the value of “one” if the dataset indicates

that at least one member of a dyad had a colonial history. “Zero” otherwise. If both dyad members had a colonial history, then the dyad is coded as such. Finally, it was also coded a variable that takes a value of “one” if the independence of a state with a colonial history was gained by violent means.

Another important control/contextual variable is the membership of dyad members in international organizations. As noted above, a robust body of empirical studies has provided indicators that joint dyadic membership in international organizations promote dyadic peace. To locate the shared memberships of dyad members in international organizations, this study used the International Governmental Organizations Data Set of COW that covers the years between 1815 and 2014 (Pevehouse et al., 2019).

As noted before, dyadic trade is another correlate of peace. Due to the fact that strong trade relations between two contiguous countries mitigates the risk, it was reviewed mutual trading relations between dyads based on the import and export value. Accordingly, what is important for this study is the combination of dyads that have a trading relationship based on symmetrical interdependence. To operationalise this concept, it was used the international trade data of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (Simoes & Hidalgo, 2011). This data captures the position of countries in world trade, their bilateral commercial connections, and the size of their imports and exports. This data is coded in monthly and annual observation units.

My next control/contextual variable seeks to operationalise the concept of balance of power and preponderance. In the literature that usual method for operationalising power is either using the Correlates of War ‘Composite Index of National Capability’ or CINC Score variable, or GDP (Lemke & Werner, 1996, p. 246). The CINC score focuses on latent and actualised military, while GDP is a measure of overall economic performance (Doran & Parsons, 1980, p. 953). Since part of the factors that are counted in the CINC score are also factors associated with a state’s GDP, the two variables are highly correlated (Rauch, 2017, pp. 646–647). The dimensions making up the CINC score are collected in the ‘National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data’ of COW (Singer et al., 1972). The CINC score is composed of six components based on national capabilities and for my study, only two dimensions of CINC score are isolated, as the most relevant for

the operationalisation of parity and preponderance this research is interested in here. These are the variable for total population of a state and the variable for military expenditures of a state. This choice will be next justified.

Concerning the concept of population, ethnic make-up of the population of the dyad constitutes another control/contextual factor that can explain dyadic peace and war. The most important factor here is the existence of large ethnic minority and majority in the population. To measure the ethnic make-up of population, it will be benefitted from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset and its original data source Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) Project initiated by the Cline Center for the situation that this issue is existing (Cline Center for Advanced Social Research, 2014; Drazanova, 2019). Through the dataset, the distribution of ethnic and religious group of a state will be considered.

Military expenditure captures the amount of funds a state is willing on its military apparatus. It is thus a measure of the militarization of a state. While it is not always easy to discern increases that are driven from armaments or from those driven from the use of the military as a social and political institution, either way high military expenditures are indicative of a central and increasing role of the military in the politics of a state. Dyads of highly militarized states are more likely to engage in conflict, except if one of the two has a clear preponderance. This study aims to capture this using the military expenditures data in National Material Capabilities of the Correlates of War Project and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database that handles the military expenditure of countries since 1949.

The last control is based on the alliance memberships of the members of the dyad. In this study, the alliance portfolios of dyad members are located by using the 'Formal Alliances' dataset of the COW (The Correlates of War Project, 2013). This dataset provides an opportunity to describe the types of each formal alliance of dyad members, including defence pacts, neutrality pacts, non-aggression treaties, or entente agreements (Gibler, 2009; Singer & Small, 1966).

3.2. Qualitative Case Study Analysis

Having laid forth the arguments and the operationalisation of the independent and control/contextual variables, this study will now discuss the case study methodology. According to George and Bennet, a case study sets an example of a class of events and marks a detailed explanation about a specific aspect of an issue to test an assertion from various perspectives on the purpose of generalizing to other events (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5). For others a case study refers to the extensive study of a single case study which can be used to enlighten a larger class of cases (Levy, 2008, pp. 2–3). The goal thus is to focus on describing and analysing an event, process, or community in order to exemplify a more general insight, or extract such a general insight.

A case study can be accepted as an investigation of a ‘limited system’, a case or multiple cases, through deep data collection including various sources of knowledge-rich in context (Knight, 2015, p. 1). That said an important choice must be made between a case study design focusing on only one case, or one focusing on two or more cases. A single case cannot form a basis for both a valid generalization and refuting an established generalization, but case studies make a great contribution to the establishment of general assertions (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). It can take three different shapes as single-country studies, many-country comparisons (large-N), and few-country comparisons (small-N). Of this classification, the many-country comparison is substantially variable-oriented. Variable-based studies focus on the limited variables which are obtained from the context of the countries (Lor, 2019, p. 260). My study falls within the small-N comparison design category and qualitative analysis with quantitative data.

The specific model of analysis this study will use is the ‘the method of structured, focused comparison’ in order to describe the specific features of each case in detail. This model is called a resulting synthetic approach due to its ‘structured and focused’ feature in the analysis of case studies. This method is accepted as ‘structured’ since the questions are written to reflect the research objective and therefore the same questions are explored in each selected case study, with the goal being a comparative analysis. Finally, the model is ‘focused’ in that it handles just specific aspects of the historical cases that will be analysed (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 67). It is not a process tracing or ideographic method, instead focusing on the behaviour of a select number of variables in each case.

In selecting cases it was paid special attention in making sure all continents were represented. These case studies which will be analysed are composed of the pairs of states that have not had a war experience even though they have, or had, active territorial claims in their dyads. It was first extracted thirty-three such cases from the total number of 263 dyads that share a border directly with each other found in the sources. Of thirty-three such cases, it was chosen eight on the basis of similar values in the independent variable to focus on, that is their pacific character, and the case selection variable, that is the presence of a territorial claim. These are Brazil-Venezuela, Sweden-Finland, Ghana-Burkina Faso, Estonia-Latvia, United Arab Emirates-Oman, Tunisia-Algeria, Kazakhstan- Russia, and Ukraine- Moldova. The objective is to see whether the variables this study argues can explain peace among them and take the same value in the eight cases.

Within the scope of this analysis, the variables that will be evaluated on the pairs of states are once more: the highest action and hostility levels exhibited in dyad history, the presence of territorial conflict within the dyad, whether there is any previous crisis experienced within the dyad, the regime types, authority trends, and regime durability score of the dyad, the total combined population level of each dyad, and the total combined GDP level of pairs, the presence or absence of joint alliance memberships in the dyad, the existence of power parity or power preponderance in the dyad, the dyadic trade level among dyad members, and the democracy scores of the dyad.

CHAPTER IV

4. SAMPLE OF DYADS

The case selection criterion is whether a dyad was pacifist or dangerous. It was begun by using the Direct Contiguity dataset of the COW, which covers the period of 1816-2016 (The Correlates of War Project, 2017), to determine the states that are directly contiguous. By this, it is meant a dyad who border each other directly with their homeland territories, at most separated by river (Stinnett et al., 2002, p. 62). This produced an initial set of 263 dyads that share this type of border. It was then used the high action level variable to determine which dyads had no experience of militarised interstate disputes or war. Of the 263 contiguous dyads, 122 dyads met this criterion. That is 46% of contiguous dyads. The distribution of 263 dyads by 'Highest Action Levels' is shown in the table 4-1.

Table 4- 1: The Distribution of High Action Levels per Dyad

NUMBER OF DYADS	HIGH ACTION LEVELS	HIGH ACTION LEVELS DEFINITION
4	22	Begin Interstate War
2	20	Declaration of War
65	19	Raid
29	18	Clash
7	17	Seizure
7	16	Occupation of Territory
3	15	Blockade
8	14	Border Violation
5	13	Fortify Border
2	10	Alert
5	7	Show of Troops
4	2	Threat to Use Force
122	0	No Crisis Activity

The data in the table shows us that there is near equal distribution of contiguous dyads that engaged in militarised disputes and contiguous dyads that did not fight. The next step in the case selection process is to locate those dyads that had territorial claims between members and fought, from those that had territorial problems and did not fight. The data is presented in Table 4-2 below.

Table 4- 2: The Number of Dyads by Territorial Claims and Highest Action Levels

Dyads with	HIGHEST ACTION LEVEL (15⁺)	HIGHEST ACTION LEVEL (15⁻)	NO CRISIS ACTIVITY	TOTAL
Territorial Claim	70	11	33	114
No Territorial Claim	44	16	89	149
TOTAL	114	27	122	263

According to the data presented in the table, 43% of all contiguous dyads have experienced territorial claims between members, while 56,6% have not. In other words, 114 dyads of 263 dyads are composed of the pairs of states that have territorial claims whether they have a war experience or not throughout history. The rest of them, namely 149 dyads, do not have territorial claims with each other, whether they have a war experience or not. Accordingly, contiguous dyads can be sorted into 4 types.

Type A. Dyad that experienced war and territorial claims.

Type B. Dyad that experienced war but not territorial claims.

Type C. Dyad did not experience any war, but did experience territorial claims.

Type D. Dyad experienced neither war nor territorial claims.

In table 4-3, it is utilized a 4x4 framework to exemplify the interaction of the two variables.

Table 4- 3: Distribution of Highest Action Levels and Territorial Claims among All Contiguous Dyads

	<i>WAR EXPERIENCE</i>	
	(A) Yes, yes	(B) No, yes
	81 cases (31 %)	60 cases (23 %)
	(C) Yes, No	(D) No, no
<i>TERRITORIAL CLAIM</i>	33 cases (13 %)	89 cases (33 %)

When it is considered the 263 contiguous dyads, the distribution of cases in Table 4-3 presents some interesting points. First the rarest distribution is that of dyads that did not experience war but did experience territorial claims (Type C). If we consider dyads that experienced war also experienced a territorial claim (Type A), we can note the difficulty of dyads that experience territorial claims to remain in peace. Of course, territorial claims are not a necessary and sufficient reason for war, as the Type B cases exemplify. But unquestionably war is more likely when territorial claims are present than when they are not.

When it is considered only the 122 peaceful dyads, we can see that the majority of them were Type D dyads (73%). Once more an indicator of the war fostering effect of territorial claims. Type C dyads make up 27% of peaceful dyads. We can thus note the unique character of these dyads that have present one of the most powerful correlates of war, territorial claims, but were able to avoid war. We are thus justified in studying them. In table 4-4, the data identification of these dyads, and the values for independent and control/contextual variables are presented.

Of the 33 dyads, 22 had at least one member that had a colonial history. Of those 22 dyads were made up of states that both had colonial history. Eight of 33 dyads were that one member in a dyad, but not both, had a colonial history. Finally, three dyads had members that both never had experienced a colonial history. It can be thus divided the 33 Type C dyads into three subtypes as follows:

Type 1: A and B colonized, 22 observations of 33 cases.

Type 2: A colonized but B not, 8 observations of 33 cases.

Type 3: A and B not colonized, 3 observations of 33 cases.

Of the 22 types 11 dyads, 11 or half, saw the two dyad members sharing the same major state colonizer. Thus, dyads that experienced a territorial claim can equally be connected by a common colonial past, or different colonial pasts. Six of the 11 dyads that have a shared colonial past, achieved independence through peaceful means such as a planned transition process. Of 11 dyads which had different colonial pasts, only 4 have an independence process through nonviolent means. These numbers hint at a story about the management of territorial claims. It can be hypothesised that dyads of states that share the same colonial history, became independent as part of a general policy of imperial retraction by the metropole. This process was largely peaceful and the result of political compromises. This may have committed the decision makers of the newly independent states to a pacific resolution of issues. In another name, peaceful conflict management was learned by the members of these dyads from the start, perhaps in the same imperial institutional environment. This happy coincidence is less likely among dyads that had different colonial masters.

Table 4- 4: The Dyads that Have Territorial Problems but No War Experience (Type C in the table)

Dyad	State1no	State1ab	State2no	State2ab	Colonial History State 1	Colonizer1	Colonial History State 2	Colonizer2	Colonial Past of Dyads	Polity Score State A	Polity Score State B	Durability State A	Durability State B	CINC Score State A	CINC Score State B	Alliance
710760	760	BHU	710	CHN	1	200	0	0	0	7	-7	10	69	0,049	206,988	0
101140	140	BRA	101	VEN	1	235	1	230	0	8	-3	33	1	25,391	4,417	1
820835	835	BRU	820	MAL	1	200	1	200	1	-	7	-	10	0,152	4,432	0
705710	710	CHN	705	KZK	0	0	1	365	0	-7	-6	69	27	206,988	3,199	1
703710	710	CHN	703	KYR	0	0	1	365	0	-7	8	69	7	206,988	0,317	1
702710	710	CHN	702	TAJ	0	0	1	365	0	-7	-3	69	20	206,988	0,346	1
95100	100	COL	95	PAN	1	230	1	230	1	7	9	61	29	7,181	0,265	1
522530	530	ETH	522	DJI	0	0	1	220	0	-3	3	5	19	3,771	0,144	0
211220	220	FRN	211	BEL	0	0	1	210	0	9	8	49	74	15,99	3,239	1
439452	452	GHA	439	BFO	1	200	1	220	0	8	6	17	3	1,224	0,725	1
437452	452	GHA	437	CDI	1	200	1	220	0	8	4	17	7	1,224	1,193	1
200205	205	IRE	200	UKG	1	200	0	0	0	10	8	97	138	0,57	15,634	0
225325	325	ITA	225	SWZ	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	70	170	13,788	1,397	0
670690	690	KUW	670	SAU	1	200	1	640	0	-7	-10	54	92	1,754	12,666	1
702703	703	KYR	702	TAJ	1	365	1	365	1	8	-3	7	20	0,317	0,346	1
704705	705	KZK	704	UZB	1	365	1	365	1	-6	-9	27	27	3,199	2,351	1
703705	705	KZK	703	KYR	1	365	1	365	1	-6	8	27	7	3,199	0,317	1
365705	705	KZK	365	RUS	1	365	0	0	0	-6	4	27	18	3,199	39,488	1
366367	367	LAT	366	EST	1	365	1	365	1	8	9	27	18	0,304	0,167	1
367368	368	LIT	367	LAT	1	365	1	365	1	10	8	27	27	0,409	0,304	1
510553	553	MAW	510	TAZ	1	200	1	200	1	6	3	24	3	0,653	2,042	0
560565	565	NAM	560	SAF	1	200	1	200	1	6	9	28	24	0,202	7,094	0
696698	698	OMA	696	UAE	1	235	1	200	0	-8	-8	61	47	1,245	3,897	1
679698	698	OMA	679	YEM	1	235	1	200	0	-8	0	61	0	1,245	1,741	1
670698	698	OMA	670	SAU	1	235	1	640	0	-8	-10	61	92	1,245	12,666	1
316317	317	SLO	316	CZR	1	300	1	300	1	10	9	25	25	1,173	1,94	1
344349	349	SLV	344	CRO	1	300	1	300	1	10	9	27	18	0,306	0,561	0
375380	380	SWD	375	FIN	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	101	74	2,18	1,693	0
220225	225	SWZ	220	FRN	0	0	0	0	0	10	9	170	49	1,397	15,99	0
615616	616	TUN	615	ALG	1	640	1	220	0	7	2	4	14	0,935	3,946	1
670696	696	UAE	670	SAU	1	200	1	640	0	-8	-10	47	92	3,897	12,666	1
359369	369	UKR	359	MLD	1	365	1	640	0	4	9	27	27	8,814	0,239	1
140165	165	URU	140	BRA	1	230	1	235	0	10	8	33	33	0,52	25,391	1

On the other hand, 22 of the 47 countries which constitute these 33 peaceful dyads gained their independence from a colonial power with organized violence, which Hensel considers as a fostering factor for the onset of territorial disputes (Hensel, 2018). Of the 11 dyads made up of former colonies of the same colonizer, 8 had members in which both had gained their independence via violence. Of the dyads made up of states that gained their independence from different colonial masters, 5 were made up of members that both gained their independence through violence. What is important is that while having a common colonial history, and common path to independence without violence can foster the pacific management of colonial claims, even in the presence of dyads of states that experienced violent independence campaigns, as a strong correlate of war, they still avoided fighting over their subsequent territorial claims (Vasquez, 2003, p. 276).

The idea that states that gained independence from the same colonial power share elements of common political culture in international relations, that provides some alternatives to power politics is reinforced by another characteristic. These dyads are characterized by a parity or near parity dyadic distribution of power, which is a factor that fosters war onset. But they have avoided it, and done so while engaged in a territorial claim. This is a very powerful finding as it indicates that two very powerful factors that foster war, are dampened within these dyads. What about those dyads in which the member's states gained independence from different colonial powers? In this case the pacific factor may be joint alliance membership. All 11 dyads of this type have experienced an alliance between the two dyad members.

Concerning the role of regime types, 17 of the 33 peaceful contiguous dyads, or 52%, are characterised by dyadic democracy. Eight of the 33 dyads, or 24%, are characterised by joint autocracy. Finally, the remaining eight cases, or again 24%, are mixed regime dyads. The higher proportion of dyadic democracy among the 33, is what we would expect on the basis of the democratic peace explanation. It is also considered the durability of regimes present in the dyads. Considering the 33 contiguous dyads, the least durable authoritarian regime is Yemen, which scores a zero in regime durability among the 8 autocratic regimes. Tajikistan with 20 years is the second less durable autocracy after Yemen. In another name, almost all the autocratic regimes have lasted for a generation or more. When it comes to democracies, the smallest durability value is 18

years. It can be thus concluded that the 33 dyads are mostly dyads made up of states with mostly settled and durable regimes.

Regarding the dyadic distribution of military capabilities, 15 of the 33 peaceful contiguous dyads, or 45%, have a power preponderance distribution. The other 18, or 55%, have parity or near parity distributions. Thus, we cannot ascribe much explanatory of power to distributions of military capability among the dyads. A more interesting finding is unearthed when combined distribution of capability with alliance membership. Twenty-three of the 33 dyads, or 69%, have alliances among themselves. Twelve of the 18 dyads that are characterized by a power parity distribution also have joint dyadic alliance membership. It is perhaps due to this factor that the fostering effect of power parity on war onset is dampened (Maoz, 1993, p. 41; Levy, 1981, p. 610). The same dynamics hold for the dyads characterised by power preponderance, were 11 of the 15 dyads characterized by power preponderance are also characterized by joint alliance membership.

My interest in this study is to explore the reasons why contiguous dyads that are characterised by one of the most war-fostering factors in international relations, territorial disputes, have avoided engaging in war (Vasquez 2001, p. 149). What my analysis unearthed is a remarkable set of 33 contiguous dyads, which experienced the presence of many war-fostering conditions, and still kept peace. These cases defy the expectations of the body of work on peace and conflict studies, and can be considered candidates of “deviant case analysis” (Levy, 2008, p.13). The potential explanation for this counter-intuitive empirical fact is the effect of a common colonial history, the presence of durable regimes, the presence of dyadic democracy, and joint alliance memberships. These factors work together to provide an alternative conflict management framework to power-politics that helps keep peace in the presence of territorial claims. It will be now explored more in depth these factors by focusing on eight of the 33 dyads. Of all 33 dyads, one pair from each culturally different region, that is, having different cultural trait in common in terms of language, religious, customs etc., was selected. The first case study that will be analysed is the Brazil-Venezuela dyad located in South America.

4.1. Brazil-Venezuela

Forming the southern part of Latin America as a vast and culturally diverse region, South America is composed of eleven countries; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. These countries have a very rich history of early civilizations like the Incan Empire, yet the legacies of colonial rule shaped their social relations, economic life, culture, and also political struggles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Stern, 1985, p. 3). The historical process has witnessed different events in the region such as economic instability following political instability, that occurred between 1973 and 1990 in Chile (Bethell, 2008, p. 312), or the corruption, oppressive military regimes and military coups of Argentina since 1943 (Bethell, 2008, p. 5). Despite these domestic shocks, the region has a number of pacifist states and dyads.

Examples of pacifist states are Chile and Uruguay, both of which were placed on the top of the Global Peace Index of 2020. Brazil and Venezuela, however, are among the states which have achieved to stay as pacifist states for a long time. Examples of pacifist dyads are Brazil and Venezuela. Interestingly neither of the two scores are high in the Global Peace Index. Brazil ranks as the 126th in 2020 report of the Global Peace Index, while Venezuela is the 149th (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 9). Despite this, the two South American States share a long period of peace having never fought a war against each other in the 150 years of their independence. The history of the dyad will now be reviewed in order to understand why they have avoided war.

Brazil, officially known as the Federative Republic of Brazil, is the largest country in South America. The region of the modern state was settled by indigenous ethnic tribes before the arrival of European invaders in the 15th century, with the Portuguese establishing the largest colonial presence (Prado, 1967, p. 8; Peloso, 2014, p. 13). At the beginning of the 17th century, gold was discovered and it was a new struggle between newcomers and older settlers. Brazil gained its independence from Portugal in 1822 and became the only country that was ruled by a durable monarchy in South America. The victorious but costly War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay led to the collapse of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic. During the 1870s and 1880s Brazil was also affected by the wave of reform that passed over South American countries (Bethell,

1989, p. 161). We can add based upon the data created by Paul Hensel (Hensel, 2018) that Brazil's independence process did not involve any organized violence such as armed conflict with former ruler.

Venezuela, officially known as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on the other hand was colonized by Spain in the early 16th century despite the resistance of its indigenous people (Salas, 2015, p. 19). This colonization was the first permanent South American settlement by a European power. Since then, Venezuela has come to be used as an epicentre for mining and agricultural activities. While it declared independence from Spain in 1811, Venezuela gained its full sovereignty in 1830 from Gran Colombia, known as Colombia today. The period of independence was not a process including violence, a similarity with Brazil.

According to my argument, Brazil and Venezuela, which are separated from each other by a land border, constitute a good example for understanding whether the existence of territorial claims between dyads is an obstacle to the existence of peaceful contiguous dyads. According to the data, there was a territorial claim made by Venezuela against Brazil between 1841 and 1928 over the "Amazonas" region (Hensel, 2001). This claim did not become militarized, and no war is recorded between the two states in that period. The issue was resolved bilaterally. The salience of Amazonas for Brazil and Venezuela was 4, thus of low salience. On the other hand, both states considered it as part of their homeland, and not as a dependent territory. However, there was no strategic importance associated with the "Amazonas" region; but there was valuable resource which provide some tangible importance to assert a claim by Venezuela. Although there was a permanent population on this region, it cannot be talked about an identity-based connection of this population with Brazil or Venezuela. The region was never fully incorporated in either state for a long period of time.

This pacific condition held despite the variation in regime types experienced by the two states. The GPI report indicates that pacifism deteriorated most in the countries with authoritarian regimes in 2020. As an example of 'flawed democracy', Brazil ranks 52nd with 6.86 points. Concerning Venezuela, it is ranked an authoritarian state, ranking 140th with 2.88 points in 2019 report of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (The

Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 33). During the period of the active territorial claim this mixed-regime character of the dyad was also present.




Figure 4- 1: Authority Trends,1946-2013: Brazil

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

The Polity Trend Graphs present the information about variation in regime character, based on their polity score, for the period 1946 to 2014. For most of the period of the territorial claim from Venezuela between 1841 and 1928, Brazil was a durable autocratic regime with in the form of the Empire of Brazil. This regime was followed by the declaration of a Republic. Per its polity score, the early republican period of 1889-1930 was in general authoritarian and polity score was (-3). Between 1930 and 1946 the republic became even more authoritarian. The period of effective and widespread democracy in Brazil started after the bloodless coup of 1945, but this period was broken by a military coup in 1964 (Rosenn, 2010, p. 435). This is shown with 'C' on the graph.

Between 1964 and 1985 Brazil was ruled by a number of military-backed authoritarian regimes. This period came to an end in 1986 and since then Brazil has been a democratic regime, as coded using Polity variables. At that time, polity score of Brazil became 7. It can be said that during the period of the active territorial claim, Brazil was an autocratic regime type and was ruled by durable regimes. This is also the case with the post-1985 democratic regime. Only in the period 1930-1985 was regime durability weak, as no regime lasted more than 11 years.




Figure 4- 2: Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Venezuela

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

Between 1830 and 1881 Venezuela was ruled by a durable authoritarian regime. The period between 1881 and 1935 saw four regime changes, all authoritarian, with a minimum durability of 11 years and maximum of 17 years. We can thus state same that during the active territorial claim period, Venezuela also was generally ruled by durable regimes (International Business Publications, 2015, p. 10). Indeed, we can argue that the territorial claims period of the Brazil-Venezuela dyad was one of dyadic durable authoritarian regimes.

The period from 1935 to 1941 was one of formidable instability, followed by 17 years of a durable authoritarian regime. This period came to an end in 1958, where Venezuela moved towards a democratic regime (Buxton, 1999, p. 246). Despite variation within the strength of the democracy, a period of 48 years of democratic rule lasted until 2006. A protracted economic crisis in the 1980s-1990s undermined the democratic regime (Seawright, 2012, pp. 66–67), leading to a decline in democracy that terminated in 2006 when the countries polity score entered authoritarian ranges again (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). The important thing to note is that for a robust period of dyadic history the dyad was characterised by a mixed regime condition, with Venezuela significantly more democratic than Brazil. This situation was not associated with the onset of war.

Venezuela and Brazil have multiple joint memberships in international organizations (Pevehouse et al., 2019). During the period of the active territorial claim, there are two types of organizational clustering that Brazil and Venezuela became a member; regional-based organizations created under the Pan-America idea and international organizations. Brazil and Venezuela both participated in the series of Pan-

American congresses held between 1890 and 1928, and these conferences focused initially on the commercial relationship and aimed to harmonize all the states of America on the basis of an American conscience (Inman, 1923, p. 265). These conferences underpinned the Pan-American Union as a structure promoting cooperation between the states of region, which is known today as the Organization of American States (OAS) having a purpose of strengthening peace and security in the hemisphere.

On the other hand, Brazil and Venezuela were members of social-based international organizations such as Central Bureau, Inter-American Commission of Women, Inter-American Children's Institute; economic-based organizations such as International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Customs Tariffs Bureau, Universal Postal Union. Both pairs of states also were affiliated with the League of Nations of 1919, which was the first political organization whose objective was to maintain world peace and this followed by International Labour Organization (ILO) as a social organization with the goal to advance the economic and social justice following World War I. It can be said that during the period of the active territorial claim, there was no membership in any organization targeted towards the defence, neutrality, nonaggression or entente. These types of alliance can be observed between these dyads from 1936 (Gibler, 2009).

However, it can be said that the number of the joint memberships by Brazil and Venezuela in both regional and international organizations has increased. We can talk about some of these organizations. In the wake of the resolution of the territorial claim, the first organization participated by Brazil and Venezuela in 1942 was the Inter-American Defence Board (IADefB) that aimed to recommend the legitimate collective defence of the American continent against aggression until 2006. In 1945, both states became the member of the United Nations (UN) as a collective security system and its specialized agencies in various sectors in the coming years such as Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) etc.

In other respects, the experience of World War II has pushed the American nations to adopt a regional collective security system, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance, known as Rio Treaty in 1947. All regional organizations such as Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Latin American Economic system (LAES), Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), that were founded following this year aimed to create regional integration on economic development. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have the purpose to strengthen the deep integration of Latin America towards economic, political, social, environmental goals etc. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) was an organization promoting a non-aggression pact and nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, the dense network of joint memberships during and after the territorial claim helps maintain a close relationship between dyad members, and provide multiple avenues for resolving issues.

When it comes to dyadic trade patterns, Brazil is Venezuela's fourth import partner at a 5.45% share of imports. Venezuela imports 22.4% of its raw sugar from Brazil and exports 37.9% of its acyclic alcohols to Brazil (Simoes and Hidalgo, 2011; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2020). The two states thus have significant and symmetrical trade relations.

The other issue is about whether there is any relationship between member state economic trends and the level of dyadic pacifism. The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) shows a strong direct link between the positive peace levels of states and their economic positions. According to the report presented by the IEP, the most peaceful countries have experienced per capita GDP growth at an annual rate of 2.8 percent (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018, p. 28). In this sense, it can be said that the level of long-term growth in per capita income affects the level of peace in the number of states that choose to be pacifist. Therefore, countries with a high level of positive peace tend to be economically more developed than the countries with a low level of positive peace. Brazil ranked 74th with 3.05 points out of 163 countries on the positive peace index can be considered mid-range. On the other hand, Venezuela ranks 132th with 3.78 on the same index, or the bottom 20% (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, pp. 26–27). This is thus a mixed dyad when it comes to economic development.




Figure 4- 3: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Brazil and Venezuela

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020a)

In the period of the active territorial claim, the Brazilian economy experienced a period of change. Coffee production and the coffee export boom thanks to the subsequent developments in transport and local industry affected the rapid economic growth of Brazil in the early nineteenth century. In that sense, coffee production and trade became important linkages in the Brazilian economy (Hudson, 1997, p. 163). Between 1921 and 1929, the GDP level of Brazil grew 5,3% annually (Gómez-León, 2015, p. 1). However, the mainstay of the Venezuelan economy since the 1920s has been petroleum and composed between one-quarter and one-third of GDP (United States Library of Congress, 2005, p. 9). In that sense, this period when territorial claim was asserted by Venezuela coincides with a period of trade boom (Williamson, 2011, p. 37). Therefore, share of trade in GDP increased eight times between 1820 and 1913 (Williamson, 2011, p. 21). In that sense, we can say that economic growth in both Brazil and Venezuela may have prevented the escalation of the territorial claim to militarized conflict and war.

In general the Brazilian economy showed strong growth in the 1990s thanks to open trade in goods and services (Baumann, 2002, p. 6). After 2014, the economy entered a period of recession and stagnation (European Central Bank, 2016, p. 16). As of 2015, the economic crisis reached its peak and the GDP of Brazil fell by 3,5% that year and by 3,4% in 2016 (Worldometer, 2017b). Following these years, the economy began to recovery slowly. On the other side, Venezuela experienced a serious collapse in economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2007, p. 2). Even economic growth has recovered between 1990-1992, the existence of political instability along with the unsuccessful military coups undermined recovery (Kulesza, 2017, p. 14). After 2004, a global boom on oil prices increased the GDP growth by 2008 (Venezuelan & Ausman,

2019, p. 3). The Venezuelan economy saw a recession in 2009 and 2010 and in the wake of 2013, the economic growth of the country rapidly deteriorated (Lampa, 2016, p. 2). We can thus say that Venezuela and Brazil benefit from symmetrical trade relations. The asymmetry in economic growth patterns, in favour of Brazil is partly countered by the similar recent trades of low growth.

When it comes to the distribution of military capabilities in the dyad, this study focuses on military expenditures as proportion of the GDP.

Table 4- 5: Military Expenditure of Brazil and Venezuela during Territorial Claim

<i>Countries</i>	1841-1843	1866-1868	1913*-1915	1927-1929	1930-1931
<i>Brazil</i>	1903	2609	8382	39991	
	2358	6598	29499	48151	54335
	3190	2562	32193	52919	36100
<i>Venezuela</i>	n/a	n/a	434	3335	
	n/a	367	2106	5126	7045
	n/a	347	1851	6118	5125

*For 1816-1913: thousands of current year British Pounds.

*For 1914+: thousands of current year US Dollars

Source: The COW Project- National Material Capabilities (Singer, 1988).




Figure 4- 4: Military Expenditure of Brazil and Venezuela as a share of GDP, 1863-2016

Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

Based on the information presented in Figure 4- 4, we can argue that although the expenditure of Venezuela while making this claim is unknown, Brazil increased its spending in 1841 when this claim was made. The reason for the increase in military expenditure of Brazil from 1864 to 1870, especially in 1867 with 18,35%, can be said to

be due to the Paraguayan War between Paraguay and Triple Alliance, that is the Empire of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. While this rise decreased until the first decade of the 1900s, the outbreak of World War I in 1914 pushed both Brazil and Venezuela to allocate more economic shares to the military. In other respects, following the bilateral resolution of the territorial claim between Brazil and Venezuela, the levels of military expenditure of dyads decreased. During this time period, we can say that Brazil's expenditure was higher than Venezuela's.

According to the data of the SIPRI and COW Project on military expenditure of dyads, the highest proportion noted in Brazil was in 1953 with 5.53%, while Venezuela allocated its highest level in 1991 with 3.64%. Between 2003 and 2004 military expenditures were driven by an ambitious program to reorganize the Armed Forces and the defence industrial base (Bolzan de Rezende & Blackwell, 2019, p. 2). The underlying reason of this new defence policy is to strengthen Brazil as a regional power on the region. The spending in 2016 was 1.32% for Brazil and 0.45% for Venezuela. However, the spending of Brazil in 2019, according to the SIPRI data, constituted 1.5% of GDP, which are rather low by global standards. In that sense, we can argue that Brazil has spent much more on the military than Venezuela did so far.

When it comes to total population, Brazil is the largest country in South America, and the 6th most populous country in the world, while Venezuela ranks 50th (World Population Review, 2020i). Both societies are multiracial and multicultural, but do not share any cross-border minority groups. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, Latin American countries, in general, experienced a remarkable growth in population with the effect of rapid and export-led economic growth (Sánchez-Albornoz, 1986, p. 122).




Figure 4- 5: Brazil & Venezuela Population, 1800 to 2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division)
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

Based on the period after the independence of Brazil, we can point that the factor driving the increase in the population level in Brazil was the coffee boom. As coffee production came to dominate in Brazil, Brazil became dominant in the coffee production in the world and this development in economy had an impact on the structure of population (Papadia, 2019, pp. 4–5). From the 1850s until the 1870s when slavery was abolished, slaves were brought from abroad to the coffee-growing regions. In that sense, the population of Brazil increased during that time. The National Capability Index of the COW project notes this increase in population. While population increased at a certain rate until 1867, the reason for the increase in 1868 was the arrival of slaves (Singer, 1988). The population of Venezuela, on the other hand, was more stagnant and increased slightly compared to Brazil (Sánchez-Albornoz, 1986, p. 124; Singer, 1988). In that sense, we can say, by depending upon the COW Project, the population of Brazil increased during the active period of the territorial claim.

Both Latin American states experienced population increase between 1950 and 2010. Population growth rates have been declining, and both states are expected to enter a period of stagnation and population decrease in the next fifty years. Due to the political situation, Venezuela is also facing population decline due to emigration. However, we can say that the median age in Brazil and Venezuela is on the rise since 1950s; the former was 19.2 and the latter was 17.2 during that period. This rate currently is 33,5 and at Venezuela it is 29.6 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019). Thus, both states are becoming middle age countries.

In summary we can locate the presence of the following factors that explain the lack of a war between Brazil and Venezuela during the period of their territorial claim conflict. Factors that foster war were that both states became independent roughly during the period but from different colonial masters. Both were authoritarian regimes. Factors that dampened war during that period were that first, Brazil was and is, in a preponderant position vis-à-vis Venezuela. The authoritarian regimes during the period of the active territorial claim were largely durable. From early on both took active parts in the drive

for intergovernmental cooperation in South America, and continue sharing multiple IGO memberships. These factors continued to be present during the post 1950 period. New war dampening factors were the close and symmetrical trade relations, and the fact that the populations of both states has begun to age. We can thus be confident that despite the problems created by the disagreements over regime ideology, we are unlikely to see the rise of a renewed territorial claim, and the dyad will remain peaceful. This is thus a great example of a durable peaceful dyad.

4.2. Sweden- Finland

The second case study is the dyad of Sweden and Finland, located in Northern Europe. As is the case with Brazil-Venezuela, the dyad is located in a region of the world with a strong regional cultural and political identity, based on the ideas of Norden and Scandinavism (Thomas, 2005, p. 15). This region is usually made up of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway, plus their dependencies (Törnqvist, 1998, p. 3). This case study thus permits me to explore dyadic dynamics within a region that like Latin America has a strong heritage of regional cooperation.

Sweden and Finland share a land border. Sweden is the third-largest country in the European Union with an area of 482,586 square kilometres , and is the largest country in Scandinavia (Porterfield, 2004, p. 11). Finland having a land area of 338,145 square kilometres is the fifth-largest country in Western Europe (Phillips, 2008, p. 50). Finland was part of the Kingdom of Sweden from the collapse of the Kalmar Union in 1523 until 1808, when it was incorporated into the Russian Empire. The two states thus share a long history (Miles, 2005, p. 5; Hjärdar & Vike, 2016, p. 15; Ingebritsen, 2006, p. 7). Sweden gained its independence from the Kalmar Union, dominated by Denmark, by violence (Hensel, 2018). Finland gained its independence with the collapse of the Czarist Empire, but was consumed with the violence of the Finnish Civil War. Thus, both states came to be independent under violent circumstances.

The salient territorial claim between the two states was the Aaland Islands claim between 1918-1921 made by Sweden against newly independent, and consumed by civil war, Finland (Hensel et al., 2017). The Aaland Islands is an island group lying at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea, between Sweden and Finland. The

question was about whether this island group, whose population speaks Swedish, should form a part of Sweden or the newly independent Finland (Enflo, 2014, p. 9). This region, which is of great importance for Sweden and Finland, is seen as the homeland. It also has strategic and economic value. However, the population on island has an identity basis for both Sweden and Finland. Despite this, there was no militarised dispute or war between Sweden and Finland, either in the period of the territorial claim or after (Maoz et al., 2018b). The fact that the two states share minority populations, has also not led to a conflict (Boyd & Huss, 2001, p. 6; Camauër, 2003, p. 72)).

The 2020 Global Peace Index has Finland at rank 14th, and Sweden at rank 15th (The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020, p. 8,15). The dyad is characterised by multiple factors that foster peace. Politically both stands are among the most stable democracies of Europe. Both are among the top five countries in the 2019 report of the Democracy Index with 9.25 and 9.39 points (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 47).




Figure 4- 6: Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Sweden and Finland

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014b, 2014a)

Since 1946 both states have been reliably democratic according to their polity scores, as seen in figure 4-6. Regime durability is very strong, with Sweden has been a democracy for 101 years, and Finland for 74 years. During the phase of their active territorial claim both had become recently democratic. Despite their status as recent democratised regimes the states were able to avoid war. We can thus say that they are an excellent example of how even recent democratisation can help avert war over a territorial

claim. After the resolution of the claim, they are now a classical example of the dyadic democratic peace.

When it comes to their membership in international organizations, we can clarify that there was a limited number of organizations participated by Sweden and Finland between 1918 and 1921 when the territorial claim was present. Two of them can be handled as an important regional and international organization. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the oldest intergovernmental organization in the world, is an organization that includes Sweden and Finland as the founding nations. The aim was to gather information about marine cooperation and to increase the cooperation among contiguous countries. The other one was the League of Nations that aimed to maintain world peace.

In other respects, both Sweden and Finland followed until the end of the Cold War policies of neutrality. In the case of Sweden that was voluntary choice, while in the case of Finland it was mandated by its security relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Ulfgard, 2013, p. 141; Miles, 2000, p. 181). Post-Cold War both states made amendments to their neutrality policies, to permit their more active participation in international peacekeeping and peace enforcing mission, and align their security systems with the dominant ones in the West, through association but not membership in NATO (Ulfgard, 2013, p. 141; Miles, 2000, p. 184; Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2000, p. 14).

The two states also share multiple joint memberships in international organizations. This includes the European Union and the regional Nordic Council (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2000, p. 14; Chung, 2012, pp. 39–40). However, there are many organizations in various fields that Sweden and Finland are jointly members of. The United Nations as an intergovernmental organization and its specialized agencies such as Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO) etc.; again the UN Peacekeeping Mission like the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), or NATO programs such as Partnership for Peace (PFP); the EU as intergovernmental and supranational organizations; the Arctic Council as high-level forum promoting cooperation, and so on are some of these organizations (Pevehouse et al., 2019). In that sense, we can argue than Sweden and Finland maintained their

neutrality policy regardless of being member of any security or alliance-based organization and this strengthened their pacifist relations.

The dyad also is characterized by strong trade relations. Sweden has a 5.8% share of Finland's imports, while Finland has a 9.27% share of Swedish imports according to the 2018 data of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2011).

As far as economic growth patterns, Finland and Sweden rank among the top five states on the global list at positive peace levels per the positive peace index (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 26).




Figure 4- 7: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Sweden and Finland
Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020e)

Focusing on the period when the territorial claim was present, we can say that the national economies in Sweden and Finland were damaged due to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. While Sweden's economy had been one of the fastest growing economies until the war, the negative effect of war was seen in the aftermath of the war. That is, the economic growth reduced from 5.66% in 1916-1917 to 1.77% in 1918-1920 (Häggqvist, 2019, pp. 2–3). Despite the standstill in foreign trade between 1917 and 1918, there was also positive impact of this process, that is, benefits obtained from skyrocketed industry prices which led to increasing investments in various fields until 1920 (Schön, 2010, p. 236). The Finnish economy, on the other hand, was affected by the World War I and the Finnish Civil War of 1918 and experienced a sharp fall in GDP (Heikkinen & Nummela, 2015, pp. 2–3). Accordingly, we can talk about a relatively fall in economic development for both Sweden and Finland because of the impact of war.

When we look at GDP growth rates, as depicted in Figure 4-7, we can see that Sweden began the 1990s with a deep economic crisis. Between 1993 and 2010, the GDP of Sweden increased by 2.5% per year (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012, p. 22; Nordic Council of Ministers, 2018, p. 107). On the other side, Finland has experienced with a roller-coaster ride in economic growth after the stagnation of 2011, and this was followed by decline in both 2013 and 2014. Following 2015, a slow improvement started to show itself (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2018, pp. 102–103; Worldometer, 2017d). Both countries are affluent and developed, which contributes to pacific relations.

When it comes to the relationship between military expenditures and total population levels in the dyad Sweden (1.1%) and Finland (1.5%) have similar proportions of their GDP given to military expenditures (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, p. 6).




Figure 4- 8: Military Expenditure of Sweden and Finland as a share of GDP, 1842-2016
Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

Swedish neutrality dating back to 1812 was valid for the wartime. The primary aim was to protect Sweden from being involved war operations (Gotkowska, 2013, p. 10). However, both Sweden and Finland were not completely demilitarized, because they must be able to defend themselves in the case of a violation towards their status (Chillaud, 2006, p. 8). Whilst in 1917, Sweden spent (2.23%) from GDP, this rate was (3.05%) in 1918 when the territorial claim was asserted. We have no information about the spending of Finland between 1917 and 1918, the period civil war was active. However, following these years, Finland increased its spending from (1.18%) to (3.62%) during the period of the territorial claim. On the other side, Sweden relatively reduced its spending compared

to 1918 and in the wake of 1922, this rate was decreased increasingly, while Finland's rate increased.

In the 1990s, while Sweden gave up its neutrality policy, its policy was changed to a status of non-aligned state that maintains itself outside of any military alliances, but allows itself to decide its policies in the case of war. Based on this new position, Sweden reconstructed its armed force to participate actively in international crisis management (Gotkowska, 2013, p. 8). In the same way, Finland replaced its policy from neutrality to military non-alignment and a strategy for cooperation (Locher, 2010, p. 1). In that sense, as a result of the policy adopted towards crisis management by Sweden and Finland, we can indicate that the expenditure in 1993 in both member of the dyad became the highest level allocated to the military at that period. Following that year, the military expenditures of Sweden and Finland has been reduced by 1% as stated above.

The same similarity more or less holds when we go to population levels. Sweden is the 91st, while Finland is the 116th country in the world based on population (World Population Review, 2020i). Sweden does have twice the population of Finland as seen in figure 4-9.




Figure 4- 9: Sweden & Finland Population, 1800 to 2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division)
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

Focusing on the period that the territorial claim was present, we can say that the population in both Sweden and Finland had relatively close with each other. We can observe a slightly increase of population in both Sweden and Finland. In that sense, during the territorial claim, the rapid population growth was not available.

Although Sweden's population growth rate started to decline in the 1970s, population levels continued rising thanks to immigration, which changed the demographic profile of Sweden from a homogeneous country to a more multicultural one (World Population Review, 2020h). Finland has experienced rapid and stable population growth throughout history, reaching over a million for the first time in 1820. This steady growth pattern reached its highest level over the last five years. However, the population growth rate is currently at 0.20% and the expectation is that Finland will lose population in the next fifty years (World Population Review, 2020c). As of 2019, Sweden has about twice the population of Finland. The median age for both states has been on the rise since 1950s. During that time, median age in Sweden was 34.2, whilst Finland was at 27.80. As of 2020, these pairs of states have an approximate value; Sweden being at 41,1 and Finland at 43,1 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019). This high level in median age marks the population ageing, and by extension the existence of old societies in these countries. Thus, both states have comparable material capabilities and a demographic distribution that dampens any ardour for war.

We can argue that Sweden and Finland were very unlikely to fight over their territorial claim. Both were democratic states in the period, they shared a common history and regional identity. Once the claim was resolved, the factors that make it less likely that it would rise again became stronger. Democracy in both states became more durable and deeper. Their economic relations remained strong. And the density of joint memberships in international organizations deepened and each step has been shaped according to their neutrality policies as an important factor to strengthen peace within the dyad. Despite the presence of cross-border minorities, relatively old populations, and relative power parity, all the facts that foster peace permitted the two states to manage their relations in a way that makes their dyad among the most peaceful.

4.3. Ghana- Burkina Faso

Many countries in the African continent have been dealing with several conditions that undermine human security, including economic exploitation, widespread poverty, civil wars and insurgencies, and climatic conditions like drought. West Africa, which accounts for approximately 32% of the total population of Africa (Francis, 2010, p. 89), was the centre of the slave trade and experienced rapacious forms of colonization that

many see as the root causes of the current low levels of development and endemic poverty (Shillington, 2019, p. 181). This region is among the most unstable regions in the world and also the most coup-prone sub-region in Africa by being host to forty-one successful military coups of about seventy-five in all of Africa (Adebajo, 2004, pp. 1–2). The sixteen geographically proximate and contiguous countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, constitute the West African region.

The colonial history of the region has led to a diversity of experiences for the now independent states. Some are Anglophone (Sierra Leone, Ghana, The Gambia, Liberia, and Nigeria), some Francophone (Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Benin, and Togo), and some Lusophone (Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde). The fact that these countries are generally qualified as least developed or underdeveloped states based on their level of economic development and social progress is one of the similar features for the majority of West African countries (Francis, 2010, p. 90). Another important dimension that affects the countries in the region is the regionalization of domestic civil wars. Civil wars diffuse, crossing borders and becoming internationalised (People's Perspectives on Instability in West Africa, 2012, p. 7). For this reason, David J. Francis called the West African sub-region as 'bad neighbourhood' (Francis, 2010, p. 91). That said, we should keep in mind that despite these issues, the Pan-African opposition to violent border changes holds in West Africa.

Of the countries in the region, Ghana has been portrayed as a peaceful and stable country (Mahama & Longi, 2015, p. 113). The reason for this is its general experience of good governance since independence. The region has also experienced a trend towards increased pacifism. The 2020 Global Peace Index reports that Mauritius, Botswana, Ghana, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania, Namibia, Liberia, Malawi, Equatorial Guinea, and the Gambia are among the first sixty most peaceful countries in the world, while the number of pacifist countries was only eight in the report of 2015 (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 19).

The GPI in 2020 report ranked Ghana as the third most pacifist country within the forty-four countries in the sub-Saharan Africa (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 21). Ghana thus makes an excellent case for investigation. When looking for

which of its neighbours to focus on for the dyad, it was considered the states that shared a similar French colonial history like it, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Niger, and Mali (Englebert, 1998, p. 2). Of those, Burkina Faso was chosen since the two states had a territorial claim in their dyad. Ghana had a territorial claim over a region known as Komtenga or Sangabouli, targeting Burkina Faso between 1963 and 1966 (Frederick et al., 2014; Saffu, 1970, p. 204). This region had a population and Burkina Faso exercised its sovereignty over this territory despite the absence of any strategic feature or economically valuable resources. Ghana and Burkina Faso were selected as an indicator of a 'good neighbourhood', which have managed to stay in peace with each other, despite being situated in what some call a problematic neighbourhood.

The history of Ghana dates back to the 11th century. With the arrival of the Portuguese to the Gold Coast for trade in the late 15th century, a connection was established between the region and Europe (Briggs, 2014, p. 8). The region of Ghana, rich in gold and spice, became an epicentre of European trade in the region (Rodney, 1973, p. 167). The region also became one of the main trading points for the Atlantic slave trade. By the 19th century, Britain dominated and declared this region as the British Gold Coast (Page & Sonnenburg, 2003, p. 238). As for 1957, Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence from European colonial rule and Nkrumah became Ghana's first prime minister (Keller, 1995, p. 156). Its independence was granted by the United Kingdom, and was not the result of violent struggle, but instead an evolutionary process.

Burkina Faso is a multi-ethnic society which became a French colony relatively late in 1896, as a result of military expansion (Rupley et al., 2013, p. 2; Williamson, 2013, p. 12). The idea of independence began to take shape in Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta, in the 1950s, and it gained independence in 1960. Like Ghana its independence was the result of evolutionary de-colonization and not of a violent revolutionary struggle.

The territorial conflict between Ghana and Burkina Faso was initiated by Ghana, and just in the case of the Venezuela-Brazil dyad can be seen as a result of de-colonisation from different colonial masters. For both claimants the territory in question was of 'moderate salience', scoring a 5 on the relevant index. Both saw the territory as homeland territory rather than a dependent region. Regarding the state of the population reflecting

the tangible value of that area, there were towns or villages accepted as significant in terms of population, although there were no resources or places that were considered strategically important. However, there is no common identity connection between the territory and either state. Ghana never exercised sovereignty in it, with Burkina Faso both as a colony and as an independent state dominating it. During the period of the active claim, and after it there are no recorded militarised disputes or interstate wars between the two states (Frederick et al., 2014). The Hiact and Hostlev levels reached by these contiguous dyads were zero.

Another variable is the polity trends of Ghana and Burkina Faso. Ghana's place in the Democracy Peace Index is 55th, with 6.63 points as an example of flawed democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 11). As an example of a hybrid regime, on the other hand, Burkina Faso is in 112th place with 4.04 points (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 12). When examined the authority trends of each dyad, the graph of both indicates political instability and variation in regime types.




Figure 4- 10: Authority Trends, 1960-2013: Ghana

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

In figure 4-10, we can see that Ghana has generally experienced authoritarian rule since independence. The durability of the various authoritarian regimes was very low, with the longest period of regime stability being seven years. This period witnessed many coup attempts (noted as C in the figure), first of these attempts taking place in 1966 (Owusu-Ansah, 2014, p. 105). Three military coups in the 1970s ended in deadlocks and generated further problems. As a result, the “transition” period between 1966 and 1981 was characterised by regime fragility and autocratic degeneration. The constitution, which was suspended in 1981, was re-declared in 1992 with a transition to a multi-party

system. From the 1990s a process of democratization can be noticed which culminated in a democratic regime with polity score of 8 coming to power in 2004 and staying in power to the duration of the coverage by the dataset.




Figure 4- 11: Authority Trends, 1960-2013: Burkina Faso

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Center for Systemic Peace, 2014c)

Just like Ghana, Burkina Faso experienced many coups, as seen by the C notation in figure 4-11. The first of these took place in 1966 (Williamson, 2013, p. 23). An attempt at democratisation, noted by the green line, was quashed by two military coups in 1980 and 1982. The most important one was in 1983, which was called as a revolution in Burkina Faso's history. This year became the beginning of an array of revolutionary reform programs that included for social rights, women's rights, and the encouragement of domestic production in order to reduce foreign dependency (Boudon, 2018, pp. 130–131). This included changing the name of the country from the colonial era Upper Volta to Burkina Faso in order to erase the traces of the colonial era. Despite an opening up of the political system after 1990, Burkina Faso remains an authoritarian regime by Polity standards. Although there has been an increasing trend since the 1990s, this trend has shown a horizontal line. In addition to this, the polity score of Burkina Faso is 6 that signifies the tendency towards democracy in the country and the regime durability score is 3 (Marshall & Gurr, 2020, p. 5).

This means that during the period of the active territorial claim, both members of the dyad were fragile autocratic states. This is considered a dangerous combination, but war was avoided. One factor that might explain this is the joint membership in international organisations.

Ghana and Burkina Faso share membership in several crucial organisations. However, there were just two organizations with political nature that Ghana and Burkina Faso were a member when territorial claim was asserted. One of them was UN and other one was Organization for African Unity (OAU) established in 1963. The aim of this intergovernmental organization enduring until 2002, was to encourage and intensify the political and economic integration of member states and also to eradicate colonialism from the continent. In that sense, the politically based organizations in the African continent at that time had a goal towards the process of de-colonization. On the other side, we can talk about the social organizations that this dyad was a member, such as International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Labour Organization (ILO) or World Health Organization (WHO) as specialized agencies of UN; and economic based organizations such as African Development Bank (ADB) founded in 1964, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) etc.

On the other hand, one of the most important organizations is the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is an organization with a security mandate (Lewis, 2017, p. XIII). The formation of the organization included a Non-aggression Treaty in 1978 pledging member states to refrain from the threat and use of force against each other and this was followed by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence to reinforce member state sovereignty against external aggression and threats. Thus, this organization serves as an institutional structure on behalf of regional integration to foster economic development among the West African countries and also to deal with any crisis within and between countries.

Some of the other organizations in which Ghana and Burkina Faso have jointly participated after the resolution of claim can be sorted as follows. African Union (AU) aiming a continental union of Africa; International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) as international financial organizations and so on; the specialized agencies of UN such as World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), etc. In conclusion, there is a dense network of joint memberships that permit Ghana and Burkina Faso to resolve any issues that arise between them without recourse to military action.

Another variable that strengthens pacifist relationships are the commercial ties of between Ghana and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso has a 1.21% share in Ghana's total exports, while the product imported from Burkina Faso to Ghana makes up only 0.73% of total imports of Ghana. On the other hand, Ghana makes up 6.14% of Burkina Faso's imports. (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018a). These proportions may be evaluated as a result of regional integration thanks to ECOWAS. The two states share asymmetrical economic relationship, but common membership in ECOWAS can be said to dampen any conflict inducing effects.

The next factor to consider is the level of long-term growth in per capita income, and the rank of the dyad members in the positive peace index. Ghana is ranked the 74th with 3.05 points, while Burkina Faso is ranked the 109th with 3.48 points among 163 countries in the index (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, pp. 26–27). In this regard, Ghana has a 'high level' positive peace rank and Burkina Faso has a 'moderate' positive peace rank.




Figure 4- 12: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Ghana and Burkina Faso
Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020c)

Between 1963 and 1966 when the territorial claim was active, the economic growth of Ghana experienced a slowdown from 1964. This fall is coincidental with the change in government in the country (Fosu, 2001, p. 2). On the other side, the economy of Burkina Faso has tended to be 'stop-and-go' since independence, that is expansive periods were followed by restrictive periods (Bourdet & Persson, 2001, p. 170). While GDP per capita value in Burkina Faso increased from (1,03) in 1963 to (1,08) in 1966, this value in Ghana decreased from (2,27) to (2,15) in the same time period. Accordingly,

this period did not mark any economic progress for both states throughout the active period of the territorial claim.

On Figure 4-12 we can see the GDP growth rate of both states. Since 1984 Ghana has a steadily increasing growth rate around 3%, except for 2014 and 2015 (Worldometer, 2017e). While Ghana had a fluctuating structure in the years between 1960 and 1980, the GDP has been increasing following 1983. This was the result of a liberal economic reform program implemented by the World Bank and IMF (Alagidede et al., 2013, p. 7). In 2011, Ghana's GDP rate hit its peak resulting in growth of 14% due to the beginning of the commercial production of oil, making Ghana the fastest-growing economy in the world during that year (Aryeetey & Baah-Boateng, 2015, p. 1). Burkina Faso has also experienced steady GDP growth rates. The economic development in Burkina Faso has had qualification of sustained growth between 1990 and 2013 (Redifer et al., 2014, p. 3). This stability of economic growth in Burkina Faso has continued until 2017 (Worldometer, 2017c). Both states have experienced GDP growth since the 1990s which partly explains the stability of peace between them.

Regarding the proportion of budget allocated by Ghana and Burkina Faso to the military in terms of expenditure as a share of GDP, we can see that both countries reduced their spending during this time. In 1963 as the starting date of the territorial claim, Ghana allocated 1.66% from GDP, while Burkina Faso had a 1.33% rate. In 1966, these rates, in turn, were 1.41% for Ghana and 0.90% for Burkina Faso. Accordingly, none of members in dyad allocated more shares of economic activity to the military, contrary to the expectations during an active territorial claim.




Figure 4- 13: Military Expenditure of Ghana and Burkina Faso as a share of GDP, 1957-2016
Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

Ghana has assigned 0.4% of its GDP to military spending in 2019. The highest rate of Ghana in the historical period belongs to 1981 with 6,39. On the other hand, Burkina Faso allocates 2.4% of its GDP to military spending according to 2019 data. The highest percentage in military spending accounted for 6,16% of GDP in 1992 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, p. 1, 2019, p. 8). This trend may stem from internal affairs and instabilities in the political process of Burkina Faso in that year. What is important is the low levels of military spending during the period of the active territorial claim and this may have affected the claim not escalating into a dyadic war between Ghana and Burkina Faso. Furthermore, despite the current asymmetrical distribution of material capabilities among the two states, there was no resurgence of the territorial claim, or in militarised conflict.

When it comes to total population, Ghana is ranked as the 47th, while Burkina Faso is ranked as the 59th most populous states in the world (World Population Review, 2020i). From 1963, that marks the starting date of territorial claim to 1966, the population of Ghana increased from 7.30 with a 3.1% growth rate to 7,94 million, then with a 2,48% decrease in growth rate. However, the median age in 1960 of Ghana was 17,7 and 17,6 in 1965. In other respects, Burkina Faso had a 5,03 million population in 1963 with a 1,38% growth rate and this level increased in 1966 to the 5,26 million with a 1,6% rate. The median age of Burkina Faso, herein, was 19,1 in 1960 and 18,8 in 1965 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).




Figure 4- 14: Ghana & Burkina Faso Population, 1800 to 2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division)
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

The common feature of these two contiguous countries is the presence of a great number of ethnic groups. While the Mossi as the dominant group accounts for about half of the whole population in Burkina Faso, Akan with 49.1% constitutes the largest ethnic group in Ghana, according to the 2000 census (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p. 8; Girardin et al., 2015, p. 2). When it comes to the population graph of the countries, as seen in figure 4-14, Ghana has experienced rapid population growth throughout history and will continue to grow due to its high fertility rate of 3.89 (World Population Review, 2020d). Burkina Faso exhibits similar steady population growth and a high fertility rate of 5.23 (World Population Review, 2020b). Both states have a low the median age, in Ghana 21.1 and in Burkina Faso 17.6. Total population levels are comparable. Thus, the dyad exhibits many of the population characteristics that are considered dangerous. Young populations, high fertility rates, and parity or near parity (Brooks et al., 2019, p. 75). However, the two states have been able to maintain peace.

Despite the presence of some conflict inducing factors, the two dyads have remained at peace, both during the period of an active territorial claim, and after. Despite gaining independence from different colonial powers, a factor fostering war, having young and growing populations, asymmetrical trade relations, middle levels of development, periods of fragile autocratic rule, and being a mixed regime dyad in the last decade, the two states have avoided war. This is especially remarkable considering that during the period of the active territorial claim in 1963-1966 all those factors were exacerbated. We can ascribe this pacifism to a number of factors. First the fact that both states gained their independence in a peaceful manner from their colonial masters. Second, the joint membership in organizations like ECOWAS, which promoted the Pan-African norm of avoidance of the violent change of territorial borders. Third, their general upper trajectory in economic development. We can thus see the Ghana-Burkina Faso dyad as a good exemplar of the remarkable, compared to the history of Europe, territorial peace of Africa.

4.4. Estonia- Latvia

Over the course of 50 years under the domination of the totalitarian rule, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as three Baltic states became an integral part of the Soviet system. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the first thing the Baltic Republics did

was to declare independence (Steen, 2019, p. 1). The Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are commonly regarded as one unity, especially by the West. The reason for this is their geographic unity in the broader Baltic Sea, their joint history of Russian and later Soviet rule, with the exception of 1918-1940, their return to independence in 1991, and their simultaneous joining of the EU in 2004 (Mckenzie, 2010, p. 183).

The states also have important differences. Before incorporation in the Russian Empire, Estonia and Latvia were dominated by Sweden, while Lithuania was one of the two founding states of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Estonia and Latvia are majority protestant united by the Lutheran Church, while Lithuania is majority Catholic. When analysed the level of Sovietization or Russification to which the three states were put through, this was described by Edward C. Thaden as unplanned, administrative, and cultural depending on the case, with Estonia and Latvia being subjected to more compared to Lithuania (Weeks, 2006, p. 37). As a result Estonia and Latvia experienced a large influx of Russians which make up 24.8% of the population in Estonia and 33.8% of the population in Latvia, compared to just 5.8% in Lithuania (Thompson, 2018, p. 131,149,162). This much more common experience of foreign rule makes Estonia and Latvia a good candidate for a dyadic analysis.

Situated on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, the Republic of Estonia is the northernmost and the least populated member of the Baltic states (Spilling, 2010, p. 7). Although Estonia was exposed to the strong influence of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Swedes, Poles, and Russians throughout its history, a distinct Estonian national identity began to appear in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Unwin, 1999, p. 156). This national renaissance, lasting from 1860 to 1917, was triggered by the political and cultural hegemony of a ruling German minority, descendants of the crusaders that annihilated the older Estonia culture (Lane et al., 2002, p. 2). This conflict culminated with the declaration of independence from the crumbling Russian Republic of 1918. Estonia independence was violent, seeing the new state embroiled in war with the German minority, and the Bolshevik and White Russian forces fighting the Russian Civil War. Independence ushered a period of political instability culminated with the establishment of an authoritarian regime termed the Era of Silence between 1934 to 1939. In 1940 Estonia like the other Baltic State was forced into incorporation into the Soviet Union.

This process ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Estonia achieved its independence again with a violence process in 1991.

Latvia has a similar historical process. The biggest difference was the stronger support for the Bolsheviks compared to Estonia, which resulted in Latvia suffering from a civil war, in addition to the fighting with the same set of enemies that the Estonians fought. Like Estonia, it had an authoritarian regime rule from 1934 until the incorporation into the Soviet Union. Compared to Estonia, there seems to have been more support for the process (Lumans, 2006, p. 45). Like Estonia it became independent in 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated and this process involved violence (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 31).

Unlike the previous cases, the Estonian and Latvian territorial claim is more contemporary, though once more the result of the disintegration of an imperial master. Latvia made a territorial claim over the Gulf of Riga against Estonia in the period between 1991 and 1996. Based on the dataset (Hensel et al., 2017), it can be said that the type of claim is a maritime issue, which tends to be less war-prone than territorial issues.

For the maritime claims, variables are measured in terms of whether the territory is regarded as a homeland, and strategic location, fishing, migratory fish stocks, resources, and oil field attributes the claimed territory has. The total value of the Gulf of Riga in terms of both tangible and intangible importance is 6 and therefore has a moderate salience for the claimants. The Gulf of Riga is presented as homeland territory for both Estonia and Latvia. Even though this region does not contain economically valuable resources or have a strategic location, this territory is used for fishing locally and contains migratory fishing stocks. The number of peaceful settlement attempts is 4 in both 1995 and 1996. The issue was never militarised and finally resolved bilaterally by the two states. Therefore, this pair of states is a dyadic example of a 'zero' conflictual tendency towards each other.

Based on the 2020 Global Peace Index report Latvia is the 34th on the list, while Estonia is the 30th (The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020, p. 6). That means both Estonia and Latvia are portrayed in the report as having a 'high' level in the global ranking of peace.

The trends of the polity scores of both countries, found in figure 4-15 and 4-16, show the existence of dyadic democracy since independence in 1991.




Figure 4- 15: Authority Trends, 1991-2013: Estonia

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)




Figure 4- 16: Authority Trends, 1991-2013: Latvia

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

The interesting finding is that while Latvia entered independence as a democratic state, as per polity score, Estonia went through a transitory period from a borderline democracy, per polity, to a stronger democracy around 2000 (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). Importantly this period was during the active maritime claim between the two states. Despite the presence of a potential war fostering factor, the two democracies were able to resolve their issues in a pacific manner. The strength of the dyadic democracy conditions is now stronger, as both regimes have become durable.

Both states share a dense network of joint memberships in international organizations. During the active territorial claim as of 1991, one of the regional organizations that both Estonia and Latvia participated in was the Council of the Baltic

Sea States (CBSS) based on three priority areas towards improving cooperation; Regional Identity, Safe & Secure Region, and Sustainable & Prosperous Region. Both Estonia and Latvia became members of the United Nations in 1991 and joined the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) in 1992. This regional organization ties the five Nordic countries and the three Baltic states through different forms of integration especially in the economic field (Hilmarsson, 2019, p. 150).

Maintaining its existence between 1994-2003, the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was a military project on defence cooperation for the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Also, there was joint membership in many economic and social organizations during that time such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Maritime Organization (IMO); International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC), Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization and so on.

As for 2004, Estonia and Latvia were accepted into the European Union. Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 2005 as a forum based on the political and security-related issues among NATO and non-NATO countries; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an international military alliance; UN and its specialized agencies such as International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Health Organization (WHO) etc.; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as which has been formed only for the special purposes; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as economic-based organizations; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) as worldwide humanitarian aid organization; Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) as international financial institutions; International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) constitutes some of the organizations in various areas participated by Estonia and Latvia.

When it comes to dyadic trade relations, 9.2% of Latvian exports are to Estonia, and Estonian imports make up 7.1% of all Latvian imports. For Estonia, 7.65% of Estonian exports are to Latvia. Latvia accounts for 6.93% of all Estonian imports. (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018c). Therefore, it can be said that there are high symmetrical commercial ties between Estonia and Latvia, which fosters peacefulness.

In the framework of the Positive Peace Index, Estonia ranks 21st with a score of 1.69, while the rank of Latvia is 31st with 2.03 (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 26). They thus are very similar in rank.




Figure 4- 17: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Estonia and Latvia

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020b)

Besides the similarities in independence process or membership in international organizations, we can see a similar pattern in economic policies. Following independence, both adopted a market economy and the common objective was to have access to the European Union (Poissonnier, 2017, p. 2). As can be seen in figure 4-17, Estonia and Latvia saw a sharp rise in their GDP level after their accession to the European Union (Kajaks, 2013, p. 2; Purju, 2013, p. 2). For this reason, this period including the years from 2004 to 2007 can be characterized by very rapid economic growth. 2008 and 2009 mark the biggest drop in GDP levels recorded in both Estonia and Latvia due to a deep economic recession. However, Estonia saw moderate economic growth as from 2010 and this growth gained momentum in 2011. Latvia maintained steady growth from 2011 to 2013 and following 2014, the growth rate in Latvia decelerated. What is important is that the two states have similar levels of growth, creating a parity or near parity situations, that did not foster war though.

The next step is to look at the proportion of military expenditure as proportion of GDP.




Figure 4- 18: Military Expenditure of Estonia and Latvia as a share of GDP, 1995-2016

Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

Following independence in 1991, Estonia and Latvia pursued a policy based on NATO membership and the principle of collective defence of NATO. What is important was to build up a defence model that will deter against potential threats from Russia (Andžāns & Veebel, 2017, p. 29). On the other side, while during the active territorial claim, the military spending of both Estonia and Latvia increased, this increase fell after 1997 for both states.

For Estonia this was 2.1% of its GDP according to 2019 data, and the highest level devoted to military spending was in 2009 with 2.2%. Although Latvia allocated 2.0% of its GDP to military spending close to Estonia in 2019, it is clear that Latvia's military spending has been less than the spending of Estonia since Latvia's independence period in 1991. The highest level of Latvia is observed in the years 2006 and 2017 with a proportion of 1.7% (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, p. 5, 2019, p. 12). The relatively high levels of military spending, compared to the previous dyads, is due to the feeling of threat that both states see from Russia. For example the discourse of Russian President Vladimir Putin who regarded the collapse of the Soviet Union as 'the greatest geographical catastrophe of the century' (NBC News, 2005). Or the Russian-Georgian war and since 2014 the Ukrainian crisis. In another name, the presence of a common threat, dampens any war fostering effects of the parity or near parity in military spending within the dyad.

When it comes to total population, Estonia is located at the 155th rank, and Latvia on the 151st rank on the list of the World Population Review (World Population Review,

2020i). The two states have similar population levels and demographic trends as seen in figure 4-19.




Figure 4- 19: Estonia & Latvia Population, 1800-2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division) (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

The population of Estonia had increased from the 1950s until 1989. Between the range of 1991 and 1996 as the period of active territorial claim between dyads, independence led to low fertility levels and rising mortality levels in harmony with the immigrants. For these reasons, throughout the 1990s, Estonia and Latvia experienced population decrease, and by extension large ethnic minorities remained as crucial political issues (Population Reference Bureau, 2000). In 1991, while the population of Estonia was 1.55 million, in 1996 it was 1,42. In the same manner, Latvia had a population consisting of 2.65 million in 1991, this rate decreased to 2.48 million in 1996 as can be seen in the figure above. Currently, the population of both Estonia and Latvia shows similarly a falling tendency. When it comes to the median age, Estonia's was 34,4 in 1990 and Latvia's rate was 34,7. In 1995, this rate increased by 36.4 for Estonia and 36.2 for Latvia. As of 2020, the median age of Estonia is 42.7 and Latvia is 43.9.

Latvia and Estonia are examples of the presence of multiple peace fostering factors. A common history of foreign dominance, similar independence trajectories, dyadic democracy, symmetrical economic relations, and dense joint membership networks in intergovernmental organizations all foster peace. These counter any war-fostering effects of the early transitory democratisation of Estonia, or of the parity or near parity distribution of military capabilities. Ultimately the above in combination with the common perception of a Russian threat, as well as the maritime character of their claims,

explain why there was no militarisation of the maritime claim. They also explain the continued pacifism of the dyad.

4.5. United Arab Emirates- Oman

Throughout contemporary history, the Middle East has been one of the most turbulent regions in the world due to ongoing conflicts and a succession of wars. The term Middle East does not identify a geographical entity with static borders, rather it refers to a cultural transcontinental entity surrounding three different sub-regions; the Fertile Crescent or the Levant; the Gulf Region and Arabian Peninsula, and lastly North Africa and the Horn of Africa (Amour, 2020, pp. 4–5). The Gulf Region and Arabian Peninsula include the countries that border on the Arabian/Persian Gulf, namely Bahrain, Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Iran. If we focus on the Gulf region, the four Gulf states have a lot in common. These are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. The most important common feature of these contiguous countries is that they gained their independence from the same colonizer power; the United Kingdom. All are monarchies and are rich in oil. Their population is largely Arab in origin (Herb, 2020, p. 1163). For these reasons, it was chosen the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman as the fifth contiguous dyad this study will look at.

According to the Global Peace Index report of 2020, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the least pacifist region due to the ongoing armed conflicts and political instability in the region, the increase in weapon imports and exports, which lead to a deterioration in 19 of the 23 GPI indicators (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 6). As a result of these outcomes, there are only five countries that are located in the MENA that are also in the world ranking and these are Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman, and Jordan. Based on the indicators, the index ranks the UAE as 41st and Oman as 68th on the list (The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020, p. 16).

As two contiguous countries that share a large land border, the UAE and Oman constitute two pairs of states with close cultural ties. The Emirates located at the northeast of the Arabian Peninsula on the Persian Gulf, represents an example of constitutional monarchy as a federation of seven emirates; Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al

Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm Al Quwain (Abed et al., 2006, p. 24). Historically, the Emirates, which are located on important trade routes, have been exposed to conflicts with European powers, and became a protectorate of the British Empire with the Perpetual Treaty of Maritime Peace in 1819 (Ulrichsen, 2016, p. 23). The name of these six emirates became the 'Trucial States' due to the series of treaties implemented until 1892. The trucial states achieved their independence, without violence, in 1971 and became the United Arab Emirates (Abed & Hellyer, 2001, p. 132).

The Sultanate of Oman is located in the mouth of the Persian Gulf in a strategically important position. Oman became a powerful empire between the 17th and 19th centuries, competing both with the Portuguese and the British Empires for control of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (Oxford Business Group, 2007, p. 6). The Sultanate eventually came under the domination of the British Empire and relations based on mutual interests between these two empires were established from 1891 until independence. As an example of absolute monarchy, Oman achieved its independence in 1970, this time including violence. Thus, both the UAE and Oman gained independence as part of the process of gradual de-colonization and imperial retraction by the United Kingdom.

Shortly after independence the two states experienced a territorial claim, as Oman asserted between 1977 and 1999 a claim over the Ras al-Khaimah territory against the UAE (Frederick et al., 2014). The territory had high salience and was regarded as a homeland territory by both the UAE and Oman. It is also known that this territory has economically valuable resources. Ras al-Khaimah, which is one of the seven sheikhdoms of the UAE today, has the highest rainfall and the most fertile soil among the seven sheikhdoms and is the primary source for the agricultural produce in the UAE (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 65). For this reason, the territory has strategic value for the UAE and Oman. Neither Oman nor the UAE can claim any ethnic kinship with the local population, though the UAE has exercised uninterrupted sovereignty over the region. Despite the territorial claim, both states avoided militarizing it, or engaging in war.

Constitutionally the UAE is a federal constitutional monarchy, while Oman is an absolute monarchy. According to the Democracy Index Oman ranks 137th with a score of

3.06 and the UAE is 145th with a score of 2.76, being authoritarian regimes (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 37).




Figure 4- 20: Authority Trends, 1971-2013: United Arab Emirates

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

As a federal constitutional monarchy, the UAE consists of seven emirates, which are the hereditary tribal political system known as Sheikhdoms (McNaugher, 1985, p. 102). The Emirates are administrated by a Federal Supreme Council as the highest authority that is composed of the ruling Sheikhs of each of the seven emirates (Noack, 2007, p. 16). This Federal Supreme Council chose both the president and the prime minister. This system in polity terms is authoritarian as seen in figure 4-20, and very durable having remained largely unchanged for 47 years (Marshall & Gurr, 2020).




Figure 4- 21: Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Oman

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

Oman on the other hand is a unitary absolute monarchy ruled by a hereditary Sultan. The reign of Sultan Said bin Taimur between 1932 and 1970 was the period of British government support. It was a largely authoritarian period as seen in figure 4-21.

Between 1954 and 1959, there was an ongoing armed rebellion against the sultan and led to a hardening of the authoritarian regime. The Dhofar Rebellion from 1965 to 1975 brought to an end the tenure of Sultan via a coup in 1970 (Gemilere, 2019, p. 35). This is denoted with 'C' on the graph. The year 1970 marks the turning point for the history of the Sultanate with the rise of Sultan Qaboos, which lasted until 2020. His reign was marked policies of modernization policy and minor political reforms (Allen & Rigsbee II, 2014, p. 1). Following the 1990s, political reforms in Oman were introduced and in 1996, the first written constitution was presented. These reforms on the graph reflect an increase in polity score, though the regime remains authoritarian. Regime durability is 61 years (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). The UAE and Oman thus are a good example of a durable authoritarian dyad. The durability of the regimes, in many ways continuing from the pre-independence period, may contribute to peace.

Following independence in 1971, the UAE and Oman jointly participated in many organizations in various issue areas. Some of which maintained its effect throughout the active territorial claim between 1977 and 1999. For instance, membership in UN and the League of Arab States began in 1971, and was effective during the territorial claim. Membership aimed at increasing cooperation among member states and to protect their sovereignty. In parallel with this objection, both states became jointly members of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), the UAE in 1970 and Oman in 1973. However, there were several social and economic-based international organization, but we can say that economic-based organizations were overwhelming. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) purposed to save Islamic values both socially and economically, to protect international peace and security, and increase the cooperation in all areas; economic, cultural, scientific, and political. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Arab Labour Organization (ALO), Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were some of these economic-based organizations.

Oman and the UAE, herein, are among the founding members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), founded in 1981 as a regional organization in response to the potential threat of regional powers such as Iraq and Iran. It was created primarily as a means for enhancing cooperation amongst the six Gulf Arab states in all fields, especially in the economic and social domains (Makhawi, 1990, p. 140). A Customs Union

Agreement was signed in 2003 to remove restrictions on regional trade and establish common external tariffs. In 2008, it was declared a Common Market to create a single environment from which citizens of member countries benefit with commercial equal rights and privileges (World Bank, 2010a, p. 6). Accordingly, we can see that the UAE and Oman share membership in a number of other organisations.

When it comes to dyadic trade levels, Oman shares 4.32% of UAE imports. The UAE share 6.92% of Omani exports and 34.9% of imports (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018g). The two states have thus close, but partially asymmetrical dyadic trade relations. Considering GDP per capita levels the UAE ranks 32nd among all countries on the list of the Positive Peace Index with 2.06, while Oman ranks 47th with 2.6 (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 26). Thus, similar economic characteristics.




Figure 4- 22: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of the United Arab Emirates and Oman

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020h)

When we analyse the situation of GDP on a country basis, it can be said that UAE is the second largest Arab economy after Saudi Arabia. We can see the GDP levels and growth rate in Figure 4-22. The GDP graph of the Emirates followed a fluctuating flow between the 1980 and 1988 and the graph notes an increasing trend from 1989 until the 2008 economic crisis. As of 2012, the economy of the UAE has seen a growth over 4% (Worldometer, 2017h). The largest share in the GDP growth of UAE is represented by the oil and gas sectors (Schilirò, 2013, p. 1). The oil and gas sector has been the main driver of the economic growth and development in Oman as well. The rapid expansion between 1970 and 1986 in Oman was due to growing oil wealth which promoted the improvements of industrialization. The years between 1986 and 1989 were marked by

economic rationalization because of collapse of the oil price. Since 1990, there has been stable growth in the GDP level of Oman (Gonzalez et al., 2008, p. 153). Both states have had growing economies, through the UAE economy is much larger than the Omani. We thus have an economic makeup that fosters peace, as Oman has no chance to overtake the economic power of the UAE.




Figure 4- 23: Military Expenditure of UAE and Oman as a share of GDP, 1971-2016

Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

Considering the share of military expenditure as part of the GDP, Oman allocated more shares than the UAE from independence until 1975 and this rate was above 30%. The increment in the spending of the UAE began as of 1976 just before the beginning of the territorial claim and the peak was in 1991 with 9.47%. In the period from 1988 and 2002, there was a downward tendency in military expenditure as a result of rapid economic growth, but the per capita military spending began to rise (Ali, 2011, p. 2). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 triggered an increase in military spending among the Gulf states. The defeat of Saddam Hussein after 1991, and the increased regional presence of US troops significantly enhanced the security of the Gulf monarchies (Jarzabek, 2016, p. 1). This led to a reduction to military expenditures for Oman, but especially for the UAE, which was not reversed by the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Increased military spending followed the Arab Spring of 2011. By year 2016, Oman has a rate of 13,73%. While this research was not able to find information on the UAE, the state is heavily armed, called by some the “Little Sparta. Both Oman and UAE are thus militarised compared to previous cases. But that militarisation is not driven by any sense of enmity between them, instead being the result of regional political events,

including the rise of Iran, the Yemeni civil war, and the opposition of the UAE to the Muslim Brotherhood hosted in Qatar.

When we consider total population the UAE is the 93rd ranked country in the global population list, while Oman is the 120th (World Population Review, 2020i). The joint feature of the UAE and Oman is the visible existence of migrant workers, that moved to the countries to work in the oil industries (Essomba, 2017, p. 4). When we look to the population dynamics of both states, as presented in figure 4-24, we can easily note the abrupt increase in population due to immigration after the 1970s.




Figure 4- 24: United Arab Emirates & Oman Population, 1800-2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division) (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

The UAE especially has been experiencing decreases in fertility rates, while its population has been increasing. This is due to immigration, and immigrants feed an annual population growth of 13.6%. The median age at the beginning of the active territorial claim of the UAE was 25,4, while Oman had a ratio of 17,1 at that time. This shows the higher population growth rates due to the lower-level median age. On the other hand, Oman experienced a constant high level of fertility between 1955 and 1985. The period 1985 onward is characterised by declining fertility. Until 1970, the population growth was mainly due to natural increase, but after this year, the annual population growth rate increased due to immigration. In other respects, in 2000 when the territorial claim was already resolved the median age of UAE became 28,1, while Oman was 20.9. While fertility rate declined up to 2015, immigration has reached its highest level with accounting for 7.01% population increase in 2015. As of 2020, the median age is 30.7 for Oman and 34 for the UAE. The total population of the UAE is about twice that of Oman,

but considering the demographic make-up of both states we can consider them to be in condition of parity or near parity.

The Oman-UAE dyad is characterised by dyadic autocratic regimes, parity or near parity in the sinews of material military power, and an asymmetric trade relationship. All factors that foster war. However, the durability of the two regimes, their immigrant heavy societies, strong economic relationships, and dense network of joint regional and global organization memberships, the two states were able to avoid militarising their long-standing territorial claim, or fighting a war or militarised dispute. They are a classical example of the autocratic peace phenomenon.

4.6. Tunisia- Algeria

The Maghreb is located on the north of the Sahara Desert, which separates North Africa from the rest of the African continent. This region is also close to Europe and connected to the Asian landmass through the Middle East. In that sense, this geographical location makes the Maghreb a bridge for the exchange of influence among the African, European, and Middle Eastern regions (Willis, 2014, p. 9). The Maghreb region covers a huge area and features the states of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania. It can be said that the states of the region vary in geographic and ethnographic features, but still share some common cultural, linguistic, and ethnic characteristics specific to this region.

The modern state system of the Maghreb came out of decolonization (Duignan & Gann, 1983, p. 49). Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are geographically contiguous, they have Arab-Islamic majority societies, they experienced a period of French colonization, and they gained their independence in the same historical periods in the mid-1950s and early 1960s (Charrad, 2001, pp. 1–2). In the 1940s and 1950s, nationalism began to gain ground against the common colonial enemy. Cooperation between the nationalist movements among these three countries of the region accelerated their independence process (Willis, 2014, pp. 265–266). One special similarity of Tunisia and Algeria, not shared with Morocco, is that they are republics. Considering these similarities, Tunisia and Algeria were chosen as the new case study. Per the 2020 Global Peace Index, Tunisia ranks 92nd, while Algeria ranks 117th among 163 countries listed (The Institute for

Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 9). They are thus both states with below average levels of pacifism.

Officially known as the Republic of Tunisia, Tunisia is in the Maghreb region of North Africa. The first comers to this region were the Berber tribes. Along with the arrival of the Roman Empire, Christianity was introduced to the country. The expansions of Islam changed both the religious and demographic character of the country. By 1574 the Ottoman Empire controlled the region, though increasingly from the 17th century to the region was self-ruled. In 1881 France, which had already conquered Algeria, incorporated Tunisia as well as a protectorate (McKenna, 2011, p. 156). French domination of Tunisia lasted until independence in 1957 and the independence process was involving violence (Lewis, 2013, p. 4).

Algeria, officially the People's Republic of Algeria, was first settled by the Phoenicians and the area covered by Algeria came under the successive hegemony of Carthage, the Roman Empire, and the Byzantine Empire. From the mid-seventh century to the early eighth century, Muslim Arabs undertook the conquest of North Africa which sequentially was part of the Umayyad Caliphate and then the Abbasid Caliphate, for a short time (Naylor, 2006, p. 11). The region was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire with the conquest of Egypt in 1516. As with the case of Tunisia, by the 17th century it had become de-facto autonomous (McDougall, 2017, p. 9). Algeria became the first target of European colonial expansion into Africa, with France invading it in 1831. Unlike Tunisia, Algeria was made a settler colony by the French, who considered it as metropolitan territory. By the 1950s a violent independence movement erupted with culminated with independence in 1962.

As with many of the other cases, de-colonization was followed by a territorial claim between the two states, in this case the region Garet el Hamel & Edjele on the south of Ghadames between 1962 and 1970 (Frederick et al., 2014; Goemans & Schultz, 2016, p. 3). The remarkable thing about this region is that after 1963 the value of the territory increased in terms of the tangible salience, due to resources obtained from that territory. Furthermore, both Tunisia and Algeria regraded this territory as homeland territory, despite the lack of any strategic locations or kin identity groups. Algeria as the target state exercised uninterrupted sovereignty over the Garet el Hamel & Edjele region. Finally,

there was no militarisation of the claim, whether in the form of militarised disputes or war.

When it comes to regime type, the Democracy Index of 2019 ranks Tunisia 53rd with a score of 6.72 as a flawed democracy. Algeria ranks 113th with a rate of 4.01 as an example of a hybrid regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, pp. 11–12). Thus, both states are not fully democratic. Constitutionally Tunisia is an example of a unitary semi-presidential republic, while Algeria is a unitary semi-presidential constitutional republic. When we look at regime trends through the lens of polity, we can get some more nuance. See figures 4-25 and 4-26.




Figure 4- 25: Authority Trends, 1959-2013: Tunisia

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)




Figure 4- 26: Authority Trends, 1962-2013: Algeria

Source: Retrieved from Centre for Systemic Peace 2014 (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

Tunisia, whose polity history can be seen in figure 4-25, was governed by an authoritarian one-party regime, called the Bourguiba period, following independence in 1956 (Gana, 2013, p. 3). This regime lasted between 1957 and 1987 and is denoted

horizontally with a solid blue line to reflect the lack of any change in regime polity. In 1987 Ben Ali came to power through a bloodless coup (Erdle, 2010, p. 14). This is denoted with 'C' on the graph. While there was some liberalisation of the regime, it remained authoritarian in polity trends. This period came to an end by a popular revolt during the 2011 Arab Spring. This new period is indicated by the green dashed line referring to the transition process. This transition process indicates a period of transition for that state such as planning of new institutions, constitutional change, and the establishment of a new polity regime (Marshall & Gurr, 2020, p. 19). The result as of 2014 was democratisation (polity score of 7) though the democratic regime is still very young.

Algeria, whose polity trends are presented in figure 4-26, selected Ahmed Ben Bella from the National Liberation Front as the first president following independence. Ben Bella inaugurated an authoritarian regime, which was overthrown in 1965 by a coup, denoted with "C" on the figure (Naylor, 2006, p. 24). The new government doubled down on authoritarian trends creating a military regime which promoted an industrialization process between the 1960s and 1970s. Developments concerning democratization, such as a controlled multi-party system, were introduced in the late 1980s (Maamri, 2015, p. 89). This period is shown firstly horizontally, but then by an increasing line on the graph.

Between 1965 and 1988, the policy score of Algeria is (-9), thus very authoritarian. Although the first multi-party elections held in 1990 increased democratisation levels, these never escaped an authoritarian regime type. With the political instability that occurred in 1992, Algeria slid into chaos and the polity score became (-7) until 1994. While this period was shown as an auto-coup (A) on the authority trend of Algeria, this process negatively affected all progress made towards democratisation. Following 2004, it is possible to talk about an upward trend. However, it can be said that the polity trend of Algeria is 2 from 2004 until 2018 and regime durability is 14. Thus, Algeria remains an autocratic state, though the regime has been able to attain some stability. The Algerian-Tunisian dyad during most of the period of the active territorial claim 1962-1970 were ruled by fairly young authoritarian regimes, both of which suffered from political instability. Despite this factor that fosters war, the dyad remained in peace.

Located in a challenging neighbourhood, Tunisia and Algeria share joint membership in a number of international organizations that seek to help state manage issues that arise. We can talk about regional organizations in the political area and international organizations based on social and economic issues. The League of Arab States, aiming to promote political, economic, cultural and social programmes among Arab states and also to solve interstate disputes, was one of the first organizations that Tunisia in 1958 and Algeria in 1962 joined following the independence period. In that sense, this overlaps with the occurrence of the territorial claim asserted by Tunisia after independence. In 1963 while the claim was continuing, both states became members of the Organization for African Unity, whose primary purpose was to defend the territorial integrity and independence of African states. The African Development Bank, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), International Olive Oil Council (IOOC) are some of the economic-based organizations joined by Tunisia and Algeria during active territorial claim.

In the period after the settlement of the territorial claim, there have been many organizations that have a qualification of strengthening the relationship between Tunisia and Algeria. Among these organizations, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) of 1989 is important. This economic-based Union includes the five countries in the region, but the Western Sahara dispute between Algeria and Morocco hampers regional cooperation among member state. The Euro-Mediterranean (Euro-Med) Partnership is another regional organisation where both are members, that seeks to establish a framework based on economic, political, and social relations between the European Union and Mediterranean partners (Brunel, 2008, p. 13). Tunisia and Algeria also have individual association agreements with the European Union. However, it can be said that all these attempts at regional integration have made limited progress.

Other organisations of joint membership are as follows; the African Union as a continental union to encourage peace, security and stability by increasing the cooperation between the African countries, the United Nations and its specialized agencies such as UNESCO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), ICAO etc; Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a partner of a security-oriented organization; Arab Bank for Economic

Development in Africa (ABEDA) as a regional financial institution; Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) as a regional Arab organization; the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) as the UN Peacekeeping Force; Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) as an example of multi-governmental organization and so on. Accordingly, we can say that the number of economic and social-based organizations has been much more than the political ones. Thus, the two states share a dense network of joint memberships in international organisations, which foster peace.

When it comes to trade relations, no information could be obtained about the positions of Tunisia and Algeria with each other in terms of both export and import values in 2018. That said it, Algeria exports petroleum gas to Tunisia at the rate of 91.7% according to 2017 data (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2017). So, some level of trade dependence exists, but my information is not rich enough to permit a conclusion on this factor.

When it comes to economic development Tunisia ranks 62nd with 2,82 points and Algeria ranks 103rd in the list. (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, pp. 26–27). The dyad thus is characterised by asymmetrical economic development. This is more clearly visible when we consider GDP trends, as presented in figure 4-27.




Figure 4- 27: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Tunisia and Algeria

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020f)

Following the independence in 1956, the main goal of the new government became to rebuild institutions. The economy of Tunisia based on the public sector was characterized by a state-led import substitution (Ayadi & Mattoussi, 2014, p. 1). The

Tunisian economy during the active territorial claim is identified by Ghali and Mohnen as its first economic growth phases between 1961 and 1970 (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004, p. 1). This period was characterized by high growth rates driven by three areas; human resource development, agricultural expansion and public investments in basic infrastructure (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009, p. 5). However, some problems like growing debt, successive years of drought, and reports of corruption brought this investments initiative to a standstill (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004, p. 1). As a result of these steps, the GDP growth of Tunisia was the average over 7% a year during 1970s. In the process after the territorial claim was resolved, Tunisia was one of the fastest growing economies in the MENA region from the 1990s until the revolution of 2011 (Chemingui & Sánchez, 2011, p. 4). We can see in the graph that with the exception of the years 1986 and 2011, Tunisian GDP has been increasing. Economic recovery in the wake of the revolution showed itself in 2012. However, the Libyan crisis lasting over the period 2011 to 2015 affected the Tunisian economy by causing a fall in growth (OECD, 2018, p. 19).

Algeria's economy was largely based on agriculture before independence. Following this process, Algeria aimed to build new economic and political institutions following the independence like Tunisia. In the 1960s and 1970s, the development strategies of Algeria fueled by oil revenues and the government deflected its direction into the oil industry (Henry, 2013, p. 61). Algeria, which has had fluctuating GDP growth until 1994, began a stable though weak growth since 1994. In 1995, the government put into effect an adjustment program to stabilize the economy and restore the level of growth and this initiative gave the country a better economy entering the 21st century (African Development Bank & OECD Development Centre, 2004, p. 55). From 2010 to 2016, the GDP growth of Algeria became over 2.5% and this rate fell to the level of 1% in 2017 (Worldometer, 2017a). Compared to Algeria, Tunisia has exhibited stronger growth patterns, and also has a larger economy (200 billion USD vs. 50 billion USD), creating thus an asymmetrical economic dyad. That said the lack of information on dyad trade symmetry does not permit us to understand if this asymmetric economic condition fosters conflict.

When looked at the military expenditure of Tunisia and Algeria during territorial claim, Algeria with 3.24% had about three times more spending on the military than

Tunisia' spending with 1.76%. By 1970, when the territorial claim was resolved, there was a decline in the allocated rate to military spending as seen in figure 4-28. In that sense, Algeria had a rate of 2,04%, while Tunisia's spending on military was 1,58% in 1970.




Figure 4- 28: Military Expenditure of Tunisia and Algeria as a share of GDP, 1960-2016

Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

When it comes to my indicators of military power, Tunisia devotes 2.32% of its GDP to military expenditures (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, p. 8). In general Tunisia follows a defensive military policy (Cordesman, 2002, p. 28). On the other hand, Algeria has high military expenditure, raising to an all-time high of 6.55% in 2016 and remaining at 6% of GDP in 2019 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, p. 8). The high military expenditure of Algeria is driven by both an ongoing domestic Islamist insurgency, and Algeria's embroilment in the Moroccan conflict with the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.

Considering total population on a country by country basis, Tunisia ranks 79th, while Algeria is the 33rd most populous country in the world (World Population Review, 2020i). A common feature of Tunisia and Algeria is the existence of 'youth bulges' which are seen as contributing to the Arab Spring revolts of 2011. Figure 4-29 shows the population trends for both countries.




Figure 4- 29: Tunisia & Algeria Population, 1800-2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division)
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

In the 1960s, the first family planning program was implemented in Tunisia to reduce population growth and to improve socio-economic stability. The effects of this program are observed from 1965 until today with the decreasing population growth rate. Thus, Tunisia has a controlled increase in its total population level (World Population Review, 2020j). Tunisia, in general, has had a net migrant value since 1995. The median age in Tunisia is 31.6, while it was 18,5 in 1960.

On the other side, Algeria was one of the countries having the highest fertility rates in the 20th century and this rate in population growth increased rapidly until independence (World Bank, 2010b, p. 13). Algeria has a fixed rate of population growth. The growth rate of the population is decreasing gradually, and the main problem to be solved is the high fertility rate in the country. Following the 1990s, Algeria experienced a remarkable decline in fertility level, but not enough to permit the control of the rapidly growing population of Algeria (World Population Review, 2020a). The median age of Algeria is 29.1, while it was 17,9 in 1960. In that sense, these proportions in median age shows that Tunisia and Algeria had higher population growth rates during the active territorial claim. The population balance between the two states is thus asymmetrical in favour of Algeria. If we add the higher military expenditures, we can say that Algerian had a preponderance in military capabilities which is balanced by the Tunisian preponderance in economic capabilities.

Tunisia and Algeria share common cultural, linguistic, and ethnic characteristics specific to this region. They experienced a similar history of colonial rule under the

domination of the French as two former colonies, though Algerian independence followed a violent conflict. Tunisia as a challenger state suggested a territorial claim following the gaining independence. Despite the fragility of their initial authoritarian regimes, the active territorial claim between the two was not militarised. The dyad is interesting in that one state had preponderance in economic factors, Tunisia, while the other in military factors, Algeria. Both have relatively young populations. Despite the dyad now being a mixed regime dyad, with Tunisia a fragile new democracy and Algeria a democratising authoritarian regime, no new territorial claim erupted, nor did they use force against each other (Marshall & Gurr, 2020, p. 3). This can be ascribed primarily to their focus on domestic issues, and their joint membership in a dense network of regional and international organisations.

4.7. Kazakhstan- Russia

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marks a historical turning point for the formation of new states in Eurasia. Kazakhstan and Russia have the second-longest border in the world, and are two of the successor states that arose from the collapse of the USSR. These contiguous countries having zero high action level and hostility level are a good example to understand how colonial legacy contributes to the development of the pacifist relations in a dyad. The bilateral relationship between these two significant contiguous countries has been shaped by geographical proximity and a joint historical past. They are also the second case dyad of this study, after Sweden-Finland, to be characterised by the presence of a cross border minority kin, in this case Russians in Kazakhstan. Managing this issue is an important link between these two states. In 1995, Kazakhstan accepted Russian as an official language, and thus Kazakhstan has kept its seat as one of the most Russophobe states in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Cohen, 2008, p. 23). Unlike other post-Soviet republics, Kazakhstan has maintained close relations with Russia and a high degree of integration. This makes it a good case study of a pacifist dyad, that remained at peace despite the presence of many factors that foster war between contiguous pairs of states.

According to the 2020 Global Peace Index Report, Eurasia became one of only two regions that made progress in pacifism in 2020 (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 17). According to index, the biggest indicator driving this development in this

region is the improvements in good relations between contiguous countries (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, p. 17). That does not mean all states of the area are very pacifist. Kazakhstan ranks 70th, while Russia ranks 154th in the Global Peace Index, being one of the least pacifist states (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, pp. 8–9). Both states gained independence as successor states of the Soviet Union, with Kazakhstan being one of the last Soviet Republics to withdraw. The Kazakhstan process was not characterised by a violent independence struggle.

Kazakhstan, officially known as the Republic of Kazakhstan, is located in Central Asia and constitutes the largest landlocked country among the forty-two landlocked countries in the world (McColl, 2005, p. 529). Throughout history, the territory of Kazakhstan has become a home for many nomadic groups and the empires they built. Kazakhstan entered the western historical annals with the arrival of the Scythians known as ‘Saka’. In the 13th century, it became part of the Mongolian Empire, and later the epicentre of successor states, which led to the formation of a Kazakh identity (Pavlovic, 2003, p. 38). By the late 19th century, the Russian Empire succeeded in conquering the territory of modern Kazakhstan (Olcott, 1995, p. 28). The Kazakhs suffered many of the same deprivations and historical events that the other peoples of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union did. The area also saw an influx of Russian settlers, though the vastness of the territory averted many of ethnic conflicts, this process led to in other regions, like Estonia. From 1936 to 1991 a distinct Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic existed in the Soviet Union. With the decision of Russia to secede from the Soviet Union, the Kazakh’s had no choice but to also declare independence, being the last Soviet Republic to do so.

Russia, officially the Russian Federation, is the largest country in Northern Asia and Eastern Europe. The country has borders with sixteen sovereign states. Russian history began with the emergence of East Slavs between the 3rd and 8th centuries. In the 9th century, a medieval state of the Kievan Rus was founded under the domination of Swedish Viking warlord who intermarried with the Slavic population (Ziegler, 1999, pp. 11–12). After a period of Mongol rule, a new independent Russian state arose in the Grand Duchy of Moscow which then by a series of expansionist wars came to rule most of northern Eurasia, and became the Russian Empire. In 1917 the Empire was overthrown and replaced by a Republic, that quickly descended into general warfare, from which the

Soviet Union arose in 1922. (Batalden & Batalden, 1997, p. 16). Russia was the dominant state and nationality within the Soviet Union both politically and demographically. In 1991, the decision of the Russian political leadership to secede from the Soviet Union led to final disintegration of that state, with Russia being the legal successor. The independence occurred through a violent process.

As in the previous cases, the only territorial claim between Russia and Kazakhstan was a result of the disintegration of a common imperial overlord. Between 1991 and 2001, Russia asserted a territorial claim over the Ukatnyy island in the northern Caspian Sea against Kazakhstan (Hensel et al., 2017). This territory has eight points in terms of its tangible and intangible importance, which means it is of ‘high salience’ for the challenger and the target state. The Ukatnyy island is regarded as homeland territory by both Russia and Kazakhstan and this is the intangible value of this territory. The tangible value of the Ukatnyy island for the dyad is 4, which refers to two of three variables; the presence of a strategic location, fishing resources, or oil resources in the region. There were two attempts for peaceful settlement and this claim was solved bilaterally. Kazakhstan and Russia did no militarize the claim, and avoided war over it.

Let us now consider the independent variables and contextual factors. When it comes to regime type, per the Democracy Index, Kazakhstan ranks 139th with 2.94 points, while Russia ranks 134th with 3.11 points, thus noting both as authoritarian regimes (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 13). Constitutionally Kazakhstan is an example of a presidential republic, while Russia is a federal semi-presidential republic. We then move on to the authority trends of both states as captured by polity scores presented in figure 4-30 for Kazakhstan and 4-31 for Russia.




Figure 4- 30: Authority Trends, 1991-2013: Kazakhstan

Source: Retrieved from the Centre for Systemic Peace (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

Kazakhstan is ruled since independence by President Nazarbayev, who presides over an authoritarian state (Kassymova et al., 2012, p. 10). In 1995, a new constitution reinforced the authoritarian trends by giving broader authority to the head of state. During this period, the government was able to implement a range of economic reforms, reviving many sectors of economic activity, but in the political context of repression (Cohen, 2008, p. 38). Despite the existence of political parties, the authoritarian character of the regime remains unchallenged, and from 2002, the government started to push back the independent media and freedom of expression due to the growing influence of the opposition camp (Cohen, 2008, p. 41). After the 2019 election the government carried out political reforms, though the regime remains strongly authoritarian scoring a (-6), with high durability at 27 years.




Figure 4- 31: Authority Trends, 1946-2013: Russia

Source: Retrieved from the Centre for Systemic Peace (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

The much longer authority trends of Russia note repeated attempts at democratisation. After the durable authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union, there was an attempt at democratisation in 1991, as noted with a solid red line by of increase of polity score increasing the level of 5. Between 1993 and 1999, the polity score was 3, which makes the Russian regime an anocracy. There was a movement towards further democratisation from 2000 to 2006 with the beginning of the Putin era. However, this process had stagnated, with Russia having by 2018 a polity score of 4, well under the democratic threshold, with a durability of 18. The dyad is thus made of two authoritarian states, with Kazakhstan being more stable and more authoritarian than Russia. Despite

the fragility of the Russian regime in the 1990s, there was no militarization of the territorial claim.

The above war fostering factors may be dampened by the dense network of joint memberships in intergovernmental organizations, the two countries share. During the 1990s, economic cooperation between these two contiguous countries remained on the agenda. The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1992 comprise a basis for bilateral relations (Cohen, 2008, p. 86). Accordingly, Kazakhstan and Russia promoted their integration through a series of regional organizations involving the oil and gas, security, military, trade, and other sectors.

Throughout the active territorial claim between 1991 and 2001, one of the first organizations joined as members by both was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a regional organization founded in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This organization aimed to promote economic, political, military, trade, security cooperation among the post-Soviet republics. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created to improve relationships on political and security issues in 1991, and is one of the international organizations that Kazakhstan and Russia joined. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) trying to enhance security via cooperation between contiguous countries, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as political, economic and security alliance created in 1996 and the UN are among the political-based organizations. Likewise, there were many regional and international organizations in social and economic areas that Kazakhstan and Russia were jointly members of during the active territorial claim.

On the other side, some of the organizations in which Kazakhstan and Russia participated following the resolution of territorial claim are as below; Central Asian Cooperation Organization seeking economic integration; the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as a regional economic union; Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a military alliance founded among the post-Soviet states in 2002; Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) promoting peace, security, and stability; international financial institution such as European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); World Health Organization (WHO); United Nations Educational,

Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the Partnership for Peace aiming at creating trust between members of NATO and other states in Europe. Accordingly, we can say that Kazakhstan and Russia had a common membership both during the active territorial claim and during the resolution of this claim as well. This may have affected the formation and progress of pacifist relationship between dyads.

The other variable which promotes peaceful relations in a dyad symmetrical and strong trade relations. When the dyadic trade relation is analysed the position of Russia in the export and import sectors of Kazakhstan is 8.24% for exports 34.6% for imports. Kazakhstan's position in Russia's export market is 8.08%, and 5.86% in the Russian import rate (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018f). Russia exports refined petroleum to Kazakhstan with a rate of 6.81% and imports the hot-rolled iron from Kazakhstan with 8.63% (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018b). Despite the stronger position of Russia in the trade dyad, both states are important trade partners for each other.

When we consider economic development, according to the peace index, Kazakhstan ranks 68th with 3.01 points, and Russia ranks 79th with a score of 3.09 (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 26). Both states are thus average in pacifism. When it comes to GDP levels, the trends are presented in Figure 4-32.




Figure 4- 32: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Kazakhstan and Russian Federation

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020d)

Post-independence the GDP of Kazakhstan decreased slightly before then growing steadily. After 2011, its growth are a very small rate, almost having a stagnant line (Worldometer, 2017f). From 2000 to 2006, Kazakhstan experienced an economic

boom in the wake of the eight years of crisis (Wandel, 2009, p. 1). Between these periods, growth reached over 9% and when it comes to 2009, growth slowed sharply (OECD, 2015, p. 19). While the economy increased until 2014, Kazakhstan has seen a slowdown in economic growth that was triggered by decreasing oil prices. Between 2015 and 2016, GDP growth remained about 1% and in 2017, it started a slight recovery (World Bank Group, 2015, p. 1).

The Russian Federation, on the other side, experienced a sharp decline in GDP in the wake of the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, which lasted to 1998. During the Putin period, Russia entered into a process of rapid economic growth that would last until the 2008 economic crisis (Hermanis, 2020, p. 5). The crisis led to a decline by 7.8% in 2009, but was followed by stable but small growth. Since 2013, the growth in Russian economy has continued to experience a slowdown due to the economic sanctions imposed as a result of the annexation of Crimea (World Bank Group, 2016, p. 6). The Russian economy vastly outstrips the one of Kazakhstan, creating a condition of economic asymmetry. However, both states experience anaemic growth rates, thus there is no danger of power transition.

Is this economic preponderance matched by a preponderance in the distribution of military capabilities? When we look at military expenditure as part of the GDP, Kazakhstan has become more active in specific areas such as military, security and defence cooperation and increased its defence spending. The reflection of this attitude can be seen in defence spending in 2000 (Cohen, 2008, p. 103). The highest military spending by Kazakhstan was carried out in this year at a rate of 6.82 % of GDP. While it was approved, a defence modernization program with restructure of the military in 2003, as of 2007 a new Military Doctrine was introduced. According to this doctrine, Russia remained an essential military partner of Kazakhstan (Cohen, 2008, p. 104). On the other side, the Kazakhstan only assigned 0.82% to military expenditure in 2016. We can say that Kazakhstan decreased its spending as compared with its spending during the territorial claim period.




Figure 4- 33: Military Expenditure of Kazakhstan and Russia as a share of GDP, 1950-2016

Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

On the other side, Russia began to increase the spending on the military in 2008 when military reforms were introduced to build a modern professional technology based military (Oxenstierna, 2016, pp. 60–61). This large scale revamping of the Russian military followed the war with Georgia in 2008, that while victorious revealed serious deficiencies in the military capacity of Russia (Oxenstierna, 2019a, p. 91). The fears of the diffusion of ‘Coloured Revolutions’ into Russia, the anti-Putin demonstrations of 2011 held in Russia, and the potential rapprochement of Ukraine with the European Union and later with NATO made Russia intervene by military means in Crimea in 2014 (Oxenstierna, 2019b, p. 106). As a result, Russian military spending in 2016 reached 5.4% of GDP. In 2019 Russian military expenditure dropped to 3.9% which is still high. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, p. 13).

Another element of the distribution of military capabilities is the total population of each member of the dyad. According to the World Population Review, Kazakhstan ranks 64th while Russia ranks 9th on the global list of countries by population (World Population Review, 2020i). Kazakhstan also hosts a large Russian majority making up 20% of the population. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there were 130 nationalities and ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, leading to a tolerant multi-cultural identity (Ametbek, 2017, p. 68). Figure 4-34 presents the population dynamics of the two states.




Figure 4- 34: Kazakhstan & Russia Population, 1800-2019

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division)
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

Kazakhstan had a high fertility rate from 1955 to 2000, but any impact on population growth was dampened by a large migration movement until 1970. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the population of Kazakhstan declined to 15 million people, which undermined the labour base for the industrial sector (Cohen, 2008, p. 26). For this reason, the government launched a program to increase birth rate and by the year 2020 this rate is 2.76 (World Population Review, 2020e). During the beginning of territorial claim, the median age of Kazakhstan was 26, while in 2000 it was 27.8. By 2020, this rate is 30.6. On the other side, Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, experienced a demographic collapse due to increasing deaths compared to births in 1992. This led to a negative population growth and rapid aging of the Russian population. Even though demographic decline had decreased, it is expected that the Russian population will continue to decrease well into the next 30 years (World Population Review, 2020g). The median age in Russia during the active territorial claim was 33.4 whilst this rate became 36.5 when the claim was resolved in 2000. By 2020, it is 39.6. That said Russia has a much larger population than Kazakhstan, a trend that will not change in the next decades. We can thus say that there is a preponderant dyadic distribution of military capabilities in favour of Russia.

The Kazakhstan-Russian dyad is thus a classical asymmetrical dyad, where Russia holds preponderance on most measure of power. This preponderance is stable, and raises the question of why Russia did not pursue its territorial claim in the Caspian Sea by war. The answer is that Kazakhstan largely accepted integration in a Russian led regional system, underpinned by dense joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, as

well as cultural ties and the presence of a Russian ethnic minority in Kazakhstan, which is not seen as a threat. We can call this a classical example of a sphere of influence-based pacifist dyad.

4.8. Ukraine- Moldova

The last case study to be analysed within the framework of this study is the dyad of Ukraine and Moldova located in Eastern Europe. Ukraine and Moldova both gained independence in 1991 during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One of the common features between Ukraine and Moldova is that western regions of both countries have supported nationalist, pro-Western parties, while Eastern regions in the countries have backed pro-Russian parties (Katchanovski, 2014, pp. 19–21). This is due to both the presence of Russian minorities in those regions, but also the prevalence of Russian as a language, whose speakers are larger than just the Russian ethnic minorities (Katchanovski, 2014, p. 34). Also, these eastern regions of Ukraine and Moldova were a part of the Soviet Union for a much longer period than the western regions, which in the Interwar years were in the hand of Poland or Romania. Both of them shared the Soviet political system before gaining independence. Accordingly, these pairs of states have strong historical links with Russia.

When it comes to pacifism level, according to the 2020 Global Peace Index Report, Ukraine ranks 148th with 2.92 points and Moldova ranks 71st with 1.95, among 163 countries (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, pp. 8–9). They are thus a mixed dyad of an average pacifist state, and low pacifist state. They are thus a good case for exploring why they did not engage in war despite the presence of a territorial claim.

Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe, with a history dating back to the Middle Ages. During this period, this region was the epicentre for the East Slavic culture of the Kievan Rus. After the Mongol conquests, the region experienced the domination of several powers, including Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire (Takacs & Farah, 2015, p. 281). Between 1648 and 1764, a Cossack state was founded in central Ukraine, but it was split between Poland-Lithuania and the Russian Empire in 1686 (Cohen, 1998, p. 43). However, the movement for self-determination remerged after the Russian Revolution in 1917. Regions of Ukraine under Austro-Hungarian rule sought

union with those ruled by the Russian Empire. Ukraine was one of the epicentres of the Russian Civil War and linked interstate wars.

By 1922 the Soviets had come to control most of the region and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was established as a founding member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922. The western parts that had been under Polish rule became part of Soviet Ukraine in 1939. During the early cold war, the region was beset by a Ukrainian nationalist, and collaborationist with Nazi Germany, insurgency. By 1960 Ukraine had been pacified, and was a key region of Soviet power. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared independence without violence.

Moldova, officially the Republic of Moldova, is a landlocked country, and this country shares three borders with Ukraine: north, east, and south. Most of the territory of today's Moldova was a part of the Principality of Moldavia from the 14th century until 1812 (Nantoi, 2013, p. 15). Russia annexed the eastern part of Moldova with the Bucharest Peace Treaty in 1812 and the name of this region was changed to Bessarabia (Worden, 2014, p. 22). While southern Bessarabia was transformed into Moldavia in 1856, Russia was dominant over the whole of the region until 1878 (Mitrasca, 2002, pp. 20–21). The region had strong cultural and ethnic connections with Romania, and seen as *terra irredenta* by Romanian nationalists. Following the Russian Revolution and collapse of the Russian Republic, the autonomous Moldavian Democratic Republic voted for union with the Kingdom of Romania (Worden, 2014, p. 23). A Moldavian autonomous republic in the territory inhabited by Moldovans in the east of Bessarabia was established in 1924. In 1940 the part that had united with Romania was ceded back to the Soviet Union, forming Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic including a considerable part of Bessarabia. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic proclaimed its independence, again without violence, and changed its name to Moldova.

As in the case with the other case dyads, the territorial dispute is the result of the dissolution of a previously dominant metropole which included both states. After independence, Moldova staked a claim on the territories of Dzhurdzhulest Strip & Kopanka Road against Ukraine between 1996 and 1999 (Hensel et al., 2017). The

territory in question had ‘moderate salience’ for the claimants, in terms of tangible and intangible values. Both dyad members regard it as homeland territory. The location of the Dzhurdzhulest Strip & Kopanka Road is militarily or economically strategic for both claimants. The region does not seem to have a permanent population or host valuable resources. Nor are there any identity base links between the two states and the locale. Ukraine has held uninterrupted sovereignty over the region. What makes the case special is that Ukraine made its own counter-claim against Moldova over the Reni-Odessa Highway near Palanca between 1996 and 2001 (Frederick et al., 2014). While the Moldovan claim has been resolved, as of the end date of the dataset, the Ukrainian one is still unresolved. That said neither state tried to militarise the two claims, with via a militarised interstate dispute or war.

Let us now consider the independent variables and contextual factors. When it comes to regime types, according to the Democracy Index of 2019, Ukraine ranks 77th with 5.90 points and Moldova ranks 83rd place with 5.75 point among the 165 independent and two territories listed. Thus, both are an example of hybrid regime types per the index (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 12).




Figure 4- 35: Authority Trends, 1991-2013: Ukraine

Source: Retrieved from the Centre for Systemic Peace (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

Figure 4-35 presents the authority trends based on the polity score value for Ukraine. Ukraine entered independence with a borderline democratic regime, per polity score. A period of political instability followed, which saw some deterioration of democratic characteristics. This came to an end with a new constitution in 1996. A period of democratic stability followed with some gains and losses in democratic characteristics.

That said the country remained a borderline democracy with a polity score of 6 or 7. The most recent political event to create a regime crisis was the Euromaidan Protests of 2014, which were followed by Russian military intervention and annexation of Crimea. The instability and military conflict created by the attempts of the Russian speaking regions of Donbass to secede led to deterioration of the democratic characteristics of the Ukrainian polity and a score of 4, below borderline democracy as of 2018. Until then Ukraine had a borderline democratic regime with a durability of 27.




Figure 4- 36: Authority Trends, 1991-2013: Moldova

Source: Retrieved from the Centre for Systemic Peace (Centre for Systemic Peace, 2014)

We can see the authority trends of Moldova in Figure 4-36. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova entered independence with a regime that was less democratic than a borderline democracy. However, unlike Ukraine, Moldova has seen steady increased in the democratic characteristics of its regime, having become a borderline democracy with its polity score of 6 and continuing to deepen its democratic characteristics with its polity score of 7, 8 and 9. The cause of this are the deeper relations of Moldova with other European countries, followed by a neutrality policy and integration with the European Union (Shoemaker, 2012, p. 188). Regime durability is 27, and since 2005, Moldova is a full democracy despite the existence of a separatist violent struggle with the Russian speaking Transnistria region.

The dyad thus began as a mixed-regime dyad of two fragile democratizing states. At some point it became a joint democracy dyad, before reverting to a mixed regime dyad. It is important to note that the Dzhurdzhulest Strip & Kopanka Road was resolved during the joint democracy period, while the ongoing Reni-Odessa Highway is going on during the mixed-regime period.

When it comes to joint dyadic membership in international organizations, both Ukraine and Moldova became members of many organizations in various areas. This includes the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), United Nations were some of the leading organizations in which Ukraine and Moldova joined following the independence process and also before the active territorial claim period.

These two states are connected by a bilateral Treaty on Good-Neighbourhood, Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1992 and put into force in 1997. The significant influence of this treaty is that it was the basis for the solution of the border disagreement between Ukraine and Moldova (Korobov & Byanov, 2012, p. 223). In 1995, the two established a Joint Commission on Economic and Commercial Cooperation based on promoting on free trade in the dyad. The two were also founding members of a new international organization in 1997, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), involving Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe based on the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy, superiority of law, and immunity of state borders (Korobov & Byanov, 2012, p. 223). Bilateral relations between Ukraine and Moldova have reached their best level since 1991 (Brezianu & Spânu, 2007, p. 370).

They have shared a dense network of joint memberships in international organizations after resolution of territorial claim as well. Some of these organizations can be listed as follows; Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as security-oriented; the specialized agencies of the UN such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and so on; peacekeeping missions such as United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) or United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Finance Cooperation (IFC) as international financial institutions; Partnership for Peace (PFP) proposing the creation of trust between NATO and other

states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. In this respect, we can see the interconnected linkage between Ukraine and Moldova in various fields.

We can see thus that the resolution of the first territorial claim between the two states was contemporaneous with the presence of two of the three points of a Kantian triad, dyadic democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations. What about the third point, of close trade relations? When analysing the position of Ukraine in the export and import sectors of Moldova, we can see that the Ukraine exports 8.92% of its scrap iron to Moldova and imports 23% of the total exports of Moldova in hot-rolled iron bars with a rate of 23% from Moldova (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018d, 2018e). More information on their dyadic trade relationship was not found, but there are indicators of a close trade relationship.

Next is the analysis of the level of economic development in the dyad. When the Positive Peace Index is examined, Ukraine ranks 83rd with 3.15, and Moldova shares the 70th place with Morocco with 3.03 among 163 countries (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, p. 26). They are thus both mid-range countries when it comes to development.




Figure 4- 37: GDP (constant 2010 US\$) of Ukraine and Moldova

Source: World Development Indicators (The World Bank, 2020g)

In figure 4-37, we can see the trends of GDP level for both countries. Like Russia, Ukraine experienced a massive collapse of GDP after independence and decline continued throughout the decade (Sutela, 2012, p. 4). Beginning from the 2000s, GDP increased until the 2008 economic crisis (Smits, 2019, p. 8). A sharp recession in 2009 caused a 15% decrease in GDP level. Recovery was anaemic and undermined recessions

in 2014 and 2015 sparked by the Euromaidan events and a conflict in the East of Ukraine (Smits, 2019, p. 9). As from 2016, the economy of Ukraine started to grow rapidly again (Worldometer, 2017g).

Moldova experienced economic decline post-independence as well. It was due to the internal conflict starting in 1992 as a result of the secession of the Transnistria region. While exports and imports values recovered rapidly in 1995, a program was adopted to accelerate the reforms and strengthen them by 1996 (International Monetary Fund, 1999, p. 5). Accordingly, this decline started changing in 2000, and ever since then, with the exception of a slowdown between 2012 and 2015, the economy has been steadily growing (Dabrowski, 2003, p. 4; UNEP, 2014, p. 14). The Ukrainian economy far outstrips the Moldovan one, creating conditions of economic preponderance.

Is this accompanied by a preponderance in the distribution of military capabilities? During the active territorial claim, Ukraine allocated 2.88% from its GDP, while Moldova had 2.83% in 1996. By 1999, Ukraine increased its military expenditure to 4.55%, but Moldova cut the proportion of military spending to 2.31%. However, both states increased their spending in 2000, but they have had a relatively lower spending since 2005.



Figure 4- 38: Military Expenditure of Ukraine and Moldova as a share of GDP, 1991-2016

Source: Our World in Data (Based on COW& SIPRI 2018) (Roser & Nagdy, 2013).

According to 2016 data, Ukraine's military spending is 3.67% as a share of its GDP, while Moldova's is 0.44%. The ongoing Donbass crisis and annexation of Crimea by Russia, explain the high Ukrainian levels of military spending. The highest spending for Moldova's military belongs to 1991 over the 25% rate as is seen from the figure 4-38.

Once more this was associated with the Transnistria conflict. Following this year, military expenditures have decreased less than 1% step by step.

The other factor of military power is the total population of each state. According to the World Population Review, Ukraine ranks 35th, while Moldova 131st (World Population Review, 2020i). According to the census conducted in Ukraine in 2001, Russians constitute the largest minority ethnic group in Ukraine (Romaniuk & Gladun, 2015, p. 325). In Moldova, Ukrainians form the second largest ethnic group.




Figure 4- 39: Ukraine & Moldova Population

Source: Retrieved from Our World in Data (Based on UN Population Division) (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019).

The Ukrainian population, as seen in figure 4-39 has been decreasing starting from 1990. This is due to a combination of very low birth rates, high death rates, and emigration resulting from the conflict with Russia. At this point of time, Ukraine had a negative 0.59% population growth rate (World Population Review, 2020k). In 1990, the median age of Ukraine was 35.3, while it was 36.4 in 1995. By 2020, this rate became 41.4. Moldova has similar population trends. This is above all due to low birth rates and immigration. In that sense, throughout the active territorial claim, there was a decline in the population level of both Ukraine and Moldova. By 2000 Moldova was suffering from a negative 0.64% population growth rate, while currently it is minus 0.23% (World Population Review, 2020f). In 1990, the median age of Moldova was 29.9, whilst it was 30.8 in 1995. This rate is 37.6 as of 2020. These proportions in both Ukraine and Moldova shows us the existence of an elderly population and a lower population growth level. Thus, both states have a similar demographic profile, though Ukraine has a much larger

population than Moldova. There is a clear preponderance in the distribution of military capabilities in favour of Ukraine.

Sharing a similar recent historical past, and gaining independence from the same dissolving colonial master, Ukraine and Moldova have remained in peace. This can be partly attributed to the preponderance of material and economic capabilities that favours Ukraine over Moldova. Equally important was period of joint democracy during the lifetime of the first territorial claim. A dense network of joint memberships in intergovernmental organizations, similar problems with Russia, and similar demographic and economic problems, has helped keep this dyad pacifist with each other, despite the existence of a second ongoing territorial claim.

This brings to an end my analysis of eight dyads from the thirty-three contiguous dyads that had territorial claims in their history and never fought a war. Each case has its own unique characteristics. The effect of variables that we analysed on contiguous dyads is similar for some of them and for others has a different outcome. In the next chapter, it will be conducted a systematic analysis of the findings.

CHAPTER V

5. FINDINGS & CONCLUSION

In this study, it was sought to unearth the factors that explain why dyads of contiguous states with territorial claims were able to buck the trend underlying the territorial explanation of war. These dyads did not fight a war over their territorial claims, and have indeed remained in peace for all of their history. They are thus peaceful dyads in the truest sense of the word. They have defied the combination of two of the most war-fostering factors found in the study of international relations, opportunity creating contiguity and willingness generating territorial claims. And they did so even though many of the dyad members are quite bellicose in their relations with other states.

This study located thirty-three such dyads and chose eight exemplar cases to analyse in depth. The dyads on the basis of a number of variables the literature has associated with peace and war were compared. This included their history, and how they gained independence, the character of their territorial claim, the distribution of demographic and military power within the dyad, their level of economic development, their regime types, and the density of their networks of joint membership in international and regional IGOs.

When it comes to general levels of pacifism, the analysis showed high variation, with most dyad members scoring in the middle and low levels. Many of these dyads are characterised by members that have experience government repression, civil war, and ongoing insurgencies. Others on the other hand are among the most peaceful states in the Peace Index list. Thus, we cannot argue that monadic pacifism can explain dyadic pacifism. Indeed, the question can be rephrased not to why these dyads did not fight, but why did the states that make part of this dyad not fight each other, when they have fought other states in other dyads.

When we focus on the character of their territorial conflict, in all cases the territories in question were regarded as homeland territories. However, salience varied from case to case. What is interesting, is that in all cases but the Brazil-Venezuela, the territorial claims did not last long. Most were resolved within a decade of initiation. In all cases the territorial claims can be seen as the result of de-colonization or the dissolution of an empire, and the independence of both or one of the dyad members. Accordingly, one connection among all dyads, with the exception of the Brazil-Venezuela dyads, is that their territorial claims were short lived, and all happened within the confines of the modern legal system as formed in the 1918-1945 period.

The dyads of Estonia-Latvia, Algeria-Tunisia, Russia-Kazakhstan, Moldova-Ukraine, and Oman-UAE all shared a common past as colonies or protectorates of the same colonial empire, or parts of the same state. Sweden-Finland also shares a common political past. Ghana-Burkina Faso and Brazil-Venezuela were the two cases that independence was gained from different colonial states. Thus, the majority of dyads were connected with close cultural, historical and political ties, and had some common experience of imperial norms of governance. The two dyads that did not, are located in regions where a rich regionalist political culture connects the states.

The independence of Algeria, Tunisia, Russia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden and Oman was the result of a violent process. Among these countries, Estonia and Latvia were former colonies of the same colonial power with violent independence processes. Six of these members, herein, gained independence through the decolonization process. On the other hand, Venezuela, Brazil, UAE, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, Ghana and Burkina Faso became independent either due to the dissolution of their imperial master, or as a result of an evolutionary political process. Of these members of dyads, Ukraine and Moldova were the former colonies of the same colonizer obtaining independence through peaceful process. Accordingly, four of these members achieved their independence through decolonization and others with secession. In that sense, in three dyads both states gained independence via peaceful means, and other three dyads gained independence via violence.

Thus, there is a clear equality between the cases where independence was gained as a result from a peaceful process and violent process, and also from the same colonial

or imperial master, just one dyad for both cases. Estonia-Latvia and Ukraine-Moldova can be considered as having gained independence from the same colonial or imperial master with via violence for former and via peaceful for latter. It thus seems to be worthwhile for future study to explore whether the conflict fostering effect of violent independence is tied to wars over the distribution of the territories of the same colonial or imperial master.

When it comes to the other leg of regime type, the cases are interesting. They confirm two different findings. First the pacific effect of dyadic democracy. Sweden-Finland, Estonia-Latvia are stable democratic dyads, while the territorial claim of the Ukraine-Moldova dyad was resolved when both of them were democratic regimes. The other dyads are mixed-regime dyads or joint authoritarian dyads. However, the cases also confirm the argument that regime durability is conducive to peace. The Brazilian-Venezuela dyad saw the resolution of their territorial claim when they were both durable authoritarian regimes. Oman-UAE are also durable authoritarian regimes. That said regime might not be as important. Algeria-Tunisia and Ghana-Burkina Faso had their territorial claims when they were joint fragile authoritarian dyads; Finland, Ukraine, Russia were fragile regimes when they got involved in the territorial claim, but the other dyad member was not. But none of them faced war. It seems that as long as at least one member of a dyad has a durable and stable regime, democratic or authoritarian, chances of avoiding conflict over territorial claims can be avoided.

However, most of the dyads were characterized by the economic and military preponderance of one of the dyad members, a condition that foster peace. All were characterized by close economic relationships, sometimes extremely asymmetric and thus conflict fostering, but this was also counted by dense networks of joint membership in regional and international organizations. All dyads share dense networks of membership in regional and international intergovernmental organizations. Especially of note is the prevalence of joint membership in dedicated regional organizations. Thus, one of the three legs of the Kantian Triangle is very strong in these cases.

When it comes to economic development, there is diversity in the dyads on the monadic level. Some states are characterised by high levels of economic development, as captured by GDP levels or their ranking on trade indexes. All cases, but the Ghana-

Burkina Faso dyad, have indicators of high levels of dyadic trade, but these were symmetrical only for the Brazil-Venezuela, Estonia-Latvia and Sweden-Finland cases. In the other dyads some level of trade asymmetry existed, which is considered a war fostering factor. What is clear is that close trade relationships are preponderant among the cases, but when it comes to the symmetry, we cannot speak of any clear pattern. We must note that in all dyads bar Estonia-Latvia, some level of economic preponderance, as measured by GDP size, was enjoyed by one of the dyad members throughout its history.

The presence of preponderance can also be located in military capabilities as measured by military expenditures and total population size. Of the eight dyads, six are characterised by indicators of preponderance rather than parity in the distribution of military capabilities. The two exceptions are Latvia-Estonia and Sweden-Finland. It thus clear that most of these peaceful dyads are not dyads of parity. This agrees with the general finding that parity is associated with war while preponderance is associated with peace. Interestingly are some cases, the state holding economic preponderance, was not the state holding military preponderance (i.e., Algeria-Tunisia), which may help balance relations. All the dyads were also minor-minor dyads, with only the Russian-Kazakhstan dyad being a major-minor dyad. Major Powers are unlikely to be peaceful, and are indeed fightaholic. The pacifism of the Russia-Kazakhstan dyad is indeed remarkable considering Russian conflicts with other contiguous states.

Nor are most of these dyads young demographically. Only Algeria-Tunisia and Ghana-Burkina Faso can be considered as having young populations. On the other hand, only three of eight dyads, are characterised by decreasing population growth. Thus, the cases agree with the finding that older societies are less likely to fight, but not with the argument that shrinking societies are less likely to fight.

Ultimately, we can focus on two factors that seem to be the most common among the cases. First is the lack of parity in power, second is the dense joint memberships in international organizations. It seems that these two factors might have the strongest explanatory power for the phenomenon of peaceful dyads. Based on this analysis we can extract the following conclusions.

1. *Some contiguous dyads are more prone to peace in comparison to other dyads.*

Based on the literature review, this research noted the importance of ‘propinquity’ between states when it comes to explaining peace or war, in another name whether geographic proximity between two states increases the possibility of war. This is due to the role of geographic proximity in providing the opportunity for conflict. However, the literature noted how proximity can also lead to increased cooperation. My findings support the argument that proximity is not a necessary condition for militarization. Indeed, the strong trade relations, and dense network of joint memberships in intergovernmental organizations that characterised the majority of the cases, indicates how proximity can be an opportunity for cooperation rather than conflict, even in the presence of territorial claims.

2. *The existence of a historical past of territorial claims between dyad members is not an obstacle peaceful contiguous dyad.* The role of territorial claims as a willingness factor for the onset of militarised dyadic relationships and war, is one of the most powerful empirical findings in the literature. However, my cases all defied this connection. Indeed, what is important is that in many cases the territorial claim was active when the dyads were characterised by exacerbating war fostering factors, like regime fragility, ongoing domestic and international violent conflicts, and a lack of dense joint memberships in intergovernmental organizations. Despite this not only did these dyads not militarize their claims, but they also avoided the resurgence of these claims or others.

3. *Contiguous dyads that have the highest alliance-related connections tend to remain peaceful with each other.* All of the cases considered here were characterised by dense networks of joint membership in regional and international organizations. This included also membership in some form of security treaty.

4. *The joint membership to the international organizations constrains the possibility of war occurrence between peaceful dyads.* As noted, all dyads were characterised by dense networks of joint membership in intergovernmental organizations. Important is the prevalence of dedicated regional organizations. Examples are Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Euro-Med partnership framework of the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), and South American regionalism. Of the three legs of the Kantian triad, this is the most powerful among the cases.

5. *Dyads that are composed of at least one minor power show a tendency towards being peaceful.* With the exception of the Russia-Kazakhstan dyad, all other cases were made up of minor powers. While having a major power member does not preclude a dyad from peace, it is clear that most cases of peaceful dyads do not include dyads with one or more major power members. This makes sense as major powers are prime fightaholics.

6. *Economic interdependence between pairs of states strengthens the peaceful relationships of contiguous dyads.* With the exception of the Ghana-Burkina Faso dyad, all other cases are characterized by close economic relations, in many cases asymmetrical.

7. *The dyads consisting of the countries that gained independence from the same colonizer are less likely to assert a territorial claim than the dyads that were the former colonies of different colonial powers.* The findings here are mixed. Five of the dyads that had territorial claims shared the same colonial or imperial master (UAE-Oman, Tunisia-Algeria, Ukraine-Moldova, Russia-Ukraine, Estonia-Latvia). The other three (Ghana-Burkina Faso, Brazil-Venezuela, Sweden-Finland) did not. It is thus clear the having a common colonial or imperial master is more likely to lead to territorial claim. In all cases of course the territorial claims are the result of de-colonization and imperial dissolution.

8. *Preponderance in a dyad is associated with peace.* Most of the case studies were characterised by a distribution of military capabilities that favoured one of the two dyad members.

9. *Dyadic Democracy is much more connected with peace.* Only a minority of cases were durable dyadic democracies. Instead, what seems to be more important is regime durability, even in mixed dyads. In all cases but one, either one or both dyad members had a durable regime, whether democratic or authoritarian.

10. *Territorial claims are much more asserted by the members of a dyad who gained independence through a decolonization process with violence, regardless of whether they were former colonies of the same or different colonizers.* Six members of dyads, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Oman, Tunisia and Algeria, gained independence

through violent decolonization; while four members of dyads, Brazil, Ghana, Burkina Faso and UAE achieved independence through peaceful decolonization. In that sense, it is clear that independence type affects the asserting of territorial claims in dyads.

11. Although territorial claims with tangible value are more likely to be prevalent than other types of claims, it is less likely to lead to a militarized conflict between contiguous dyads. Six of contiguous dyads, except Finland-Sweden and Ghana-Burkina Faso, asserted a claim due to their tangible value, especially for the economic feature and all of them were asserted in the wake of independence period. Some of them, like Brazil and Venezuela, took a long time to be resolved, some of them lasted a short time to come to a conclusion. But, none of them escalated into a militarized conflict.

Ultimately from this analysis we can argue that a combination of dense networks of joint membership in regional and international organisations and security agreements, combined with a preponderant distribution of power, and durable political regimes stand the best chance of explaining peaceful contiguous dyads that had experienced a territorial claim. One factor that might need further examinations is the duration of territorial claims, in almost all cases rather short, and how a common colonial past might explain this duration. Future studies should aim to empirically evaluate the pacific triad of intergovernmentalism – preponderance – regime durability, on a larger number of cases, and especially focusing on those cases of contiguous dyads with long duration territorial claims.

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
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7. APPENDIX

7.1. APPENDIX A: Territorial Claims of Contiguous Dyads on the Map



8. CURRICULUM VITAE

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WORK EXPERIENCE

Management Analyst (Part-time)

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International Relations

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PUBLICATIONS

- ‘Bollywood Movies and Indian Diaspora: How Indian Values Are Reconstructed?’ Journal of Social Policy Studies, Vol. 19, Issue: 42, p. 101-125 (2019)

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