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**CONVENTIONAL VS NONCONVENTIONAL FORMS OF
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
MOTIVATIONS BEHIND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF
YOUTH IN TURKEY**

PhD THESIS

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
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Özge ÖZ DÖM



To my family; Memnune, İsmail, Nazlı and Alper

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ÖZET

Geleneksel ve Geleneksel Olmayan Siyasi Katılım Şekilleri: Türkiye'de Gençliğin Siyasi Katılımının Arkasındaki Motivasyonlar

Bu çalışma, Türkiye'deki gençlerin siyasi katılımlarının arkasındaki motivasyonları incelemektedir. Temel amaç, geleneksel ve geleneksel olmayan siyasi katılım biçimlerini incelemek ve analiz etmektir. Ayrıca bu iki siyasi katılım biçimini etkileyen motivasyonların benzerliklerini ve farklılıklarını genç üyeler özelinde görmek amaçlanmaktadır.

Çalışmanın araştırma sorusu, “Türkiye'de siyasi parti gençlik kollarının üyeleri ve sivil toplum örgütleri üyesi olan gençlerin temel motivasyonlarının farklılıkları nelerdir?” şeklinde oluşturulmuştur. Gençlerin Türkiye'de siyasi partilere ve sivil topluma katılmaları için vatandaşlık, sosyal sermaye, kişisel çıkarlar/ilgiler, aile, sosyal medya, parti kimliği / lideri ve sosyal çevre olmak üzere yedi temel motivasyonları olduğunu ve bu iki katılım biçiminde bu motivasyonların etkisinin önemli derecede farklılaştığı öngörülmüştür. Çalışmada, bu motivasyonlara dayanarak yedi hipotez oluşturulmuş ve alan araştırması ile bu hipotezlerin geçerliliği sınanmıştır. Çalışmanın evreni, AK Parti, CHP ve GoFor'un gençlik kollarının üyeleri olarak belirlenmiştir. Örneklem ise her kuruluşun yürütme üyelerinden seçilen 10 üyeyi kapsamaktadır. İçerik taraması ve analizi MaxQDA 2018 yazılımı ile yapılmıştır. Alan araştırması sonuçlarına göre parti kimliği AK Parti'nin genç üyeleri için ana motivasyon iken, CHP ve GoFor için kişisel çıkar/ilginin ana motivasyon olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Öte yandan, en az etkili motivasyonun siyasi partiler için sosyal sermaye, GoFor örneğinde ise sosyal çevre olduğu görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: gençlik politik katılımı, Türk gençliği, genç sivil toplum üyeleri, Gençlik Kolları

ABSTRACT

Conventional vs Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation: Motivations Behind Political Participation of Youth In Turkey

This study examines the young people's motivations behind political participation in Turkey. The basic aim is to study and analyze the different forms of political participation; conventional forms and nonconventional forms of political participation, and see if there is any similarities or differences among the young members of these two modes of political participation.

The research question is developed as "What are the differences of basic motivations of the young people who are the members of political parties' youth branches and members of civil society organizations in Turkey?" I assume that there are seven basic motivations for young people to participate in political parties and civil society in Turkey namely citizenship, social capital, personal interests, family, social media, party identity/leader and social environment, and their importance changes in these two cases. I stated seven hypothesis based on these motivations, and evaluate their validity with the field research. The universe of the study is set as the members of youth branches of AK Party and CHP, and GoFor. I decided my sample to cover 10 members from each organization, and these members are selected from the executive members. The content is scanned and analyzed via MaxQDA 2018 software.

Based field research on motivations of youth members of political parties, and GoFor, I find that party identity is the leading motivation for the young members of AK Party, while it is the personal interest in the case of CHP, and GoFor. For political parties, social capital seems to be the least chosen motivation, while it is the social environment in the case of GoFor.

Keywords: youth political participation, Turkish youth, young members of civil society, youth branches

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
ARI Movement	European Stability Initiative
AK Party	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (People's Republican Party)
GoFor	Gençlik Örgütleri Forumu
KONDA	Research and Consultancy Company
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NSM	New Social Movement
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
SES	Socio-economic status model
TESEV	Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)
TÜİK (TSI)	Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute)
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

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1. INTRODUCTION

“The thing called ‘apathy’ is democracy’s version of original sin.” (Minoque 1999: 8)

This study examines Turkish young peoples’ motivations for participating in politics; specifically, the main aim of the research is to discover the differences between the motivations of the young members of the political parties and young members of civil society organizations. The main question of the study is, “What are the differences of basic motivations of the young people who are the members of political parties’ youth branches and members of civil society organizations in Turkey?” Based on this question, two sub-questions have been formulated:

- Why do young people need nonconventional channels to participate in politics?
- Why do young people participate in conventional forms of political participation?
- Why do the political participation patterns of the youth change?

Then, based on these questions, literature review, and field research, seven basic motivations were formulated as citizenship, social capital, personal interests, family, social media, party identity, and social environment.

The main argument of the thesis is that the motivations of the young members of political parties and the young members of civil society differ based on citizenship, social capital, personal interests, family, social media, party identity, and social environment. So, I formulated seven sub-hypotheses (one for each of the above factors) and investigated the literature and the field to answer those questions.

Political participation is not a static phenomenon; it takes many forms. So, conceptualizing and operationalizing the term itself requires the inclusion of many theoretical and practical explanations and observations. By continually evolving and adapting itself through the needs of society, it appears that the older generation does not pass on their political participation habits to younger generations. However, appearances can be deceiving; the individuals who are affected by and affecting the decision-making process, while engaging in political processes, may open new ways to participation and democratic

involvement. Nowadays, it is a fact that newer forms of political participation have been evolving while enlarging the sphere of politics to include lifestyle politics. Therefore, the gap between social and political is disappearing (Norris, 2004), and young people have become the key actors in this new scene. Manning claims that, at this point, politics is no longer limited to the public domain; it lies somewhere in public-private dichotomy and is becoming transcendent of this dichotomy (as cited in Sveningsson, 2015). Therefore, if we accept that a democratic society requires politically-active citizens to survive, and citizens have found new ways to become active, then it should be studied further from the eyes of the younger generation, who will be the carriers and supporters of these new forms of political participation.

In the 1940s and 1950s, political participation was mainly defined as voting and participating in campaign activities (Campbell et al., 1960), which are the very basis of the conventional modes of participation. In the 1960s and 1970s, the borders of the political participation concept were enhanced, leading to community groups and direct interaction between citizens and officials (Verba and Nie, 1972). Also, through mass protests and the alteration of the citizens' expressions, the interests and opinions of the individuals became increasingly important matters (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Gradually, nonconventional modes of participation have increased, and political participation, as a concept, began to contain both political and non-political, both public and private activities, enhancing the civil activities more and more, while encouraging the volunteering and social engagement in the 1990s (Putnam, 2000; Norris 2001).

Furthermore, the amount of literature about political participation has increased a great deal in the last few decades (Van Deth, 2001). Political party membership was high in the 1950s, but other forms of membership to organizations reached a peak in the 1980s and 1990s. There has been a shift in the political agenda from economic interest groups and political parties to large issue-oriented voluntary organizations and NSMs (new social movements), but this has not necessarily caused the shift from conventional to nonconventional forms of participation (Koopmans, 1996). While focusing on the motivations of youth in political participation, this study analyzes whether these two shifts are correlated.

It is undeniable that civic mechanisms to influence the government have gained momentum in the 21st century. As opposed to their ancestors, the new forms of political

participation modes tend to function in less hierarchical mechanisms. In this century, sending signals to the government via more democratic and collective ways becomes important (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999; Putnam, 2000). As opposed to 20th-century Progressive reformers, who defend the hierarchical and rule-based organizations to fight and prevent political corruption (Skowronek, 1982), today's reformers are more likely to focus on less hierarchical governmental organizations to enhance the responsiveness of officials and increase the number of citizens participating in the policy-making processes (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Peters, 1997). This participatory model operates under the assumption that when there is a strong relationship between citizens and policymakers, policy-making improves, which leads the way to good governance. Participatory mechanisms such as "e-government" (Fountain, 2001), "digital democracy" (Norris, 2001), "discursive democracy" (Dryzek, 1990), "strong democracy" (Barber, 1984), and "deliberative democracy" (Elster, 1998; Dryzek, 2000) open up the new ways and new sources of ideas when decisions are to be taken by the officials. Also, proponents of these mechanisms further suggest that they will lead the public trust and enhance civic capacity (Tolbert and McNeal, 2003).

In the case of Turkey, after the establishment of the Turkish secular state, younger members of the society were given the duty of being "guardians of the state/regime", then labeled as "rebellions against the state" in the 1960s. After the 1980s, they were labeled as apolitical consumers (Neyzi, 2001). Since the 2010s, they have been called the "pious generation" as an official discourse of the current government.

This thesis keeps these points in mind as it covers the political participation literature and tries to create a broad definition of the term and its transformations. By doing that, the aim is to see the young peoples' participation patterns and their motivations to be part of a political scene. Over the course of my readings, I became curious about the different subjects and problems of the youth; I tried not to enlarge the boundaries of the study to the youth research or to make assumptions and studies related only to my main argument.

To examine the motivations of the young people in the political sphere and the reason behind this involvement, we can consider the AK Party's and CHP's youth branches as examples of the conventional type of participation and GoFor (Gençlik Örgütleri Forumu) as an example of the nonconventional form of participation. The main aim is to understand if there are any differences behind the participation motivations of young people when they

become members of the political party or civil society or when they become members of the power party and the main opposition party to understand the future of democracy.

Scholars primarily try to discover the intentions and motivations behind youth political participation. These are sometimes interrelated and certainly not mutually exclusive. Moreover, in my opinion, intentions and motivations leading young people to participate in politics are nurtured and enhanced by the identification of the issues/problems of the country they live in. I claim that this recognition comes from family, social environment, and social media, and develops through participation via the recognition of party identity, social capital, citizenship, and personal interests. Whether or not an intention or a motivation that leads to the recognition of a political problem comes before active political participation is a matter of subject.

At this point, the power of social media seems to be significant in accordance with my analysis. Nowadays, thanks to social media, one is less able to blind oneself to the political, social, economic, and cultural issues at hand, regardless of whether these issues affect one directly. Increasingly, knowledge is just a mouse click away; a wealth of information is both readily and easily accessible via social media; as such, it becomes difficult for anyone, especially younger people, to remain ignorant of socio-political and personal issues. The gap between the social and political spheres, furthermore, continues to narrow. There is a shift from economic interests to social issues, and the single-issue motivations of younger people tend to increase. One of the main inquiries of this study is to examine this aspect of political participation and to determine whether it is trending among the young people in Turkey.

I should mention that the focus of this study is not youth research, nor is it a philosophical discussion about the political participation of the younger generation. It aims to determine the basic motivations behind political participation from the perspective of young people in Turkey. Political participation is an urge to do, say, make, or prepare something regarding any issue that touches human life. It is a search for change, betterment, and making a difference, and sometimes, it is a struggle to maintain what is owned, whether it is employed in a conventional or nonconventional way. Therefore, the futures younger people dream of, as well as their needs and expectations of the society they inhabit, matter because they are the ones who will change, better themselves, and make a difference in the long run. My political orientation seems to have many civic-duty elements in it, so I wonder

if this is also the case among the youth in Turkey. How do they motivate themselves in this digitalized era?

In this study, I use the terms conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation, borrowed from Barnes and Kaase (1979) and Inglehart (1977, 1990). They originally use the unconventional, but in many studies, the term is used as nonconventional. In this study, I prefer using “nonconventional” simply because I want to emphasize that nonconventional forms of political participation are not the opposite of, but the complement to, the conventional forms. They are the different forms of being part of the political arena but not necessarily the exact opposite of conventional forms.

Since I use the term “nonconventional” forms of political participation not as the opposite of “conventional” forms; these two forms of political participation are considered to be complement to each other in this study. As stated in the literature, the civil society in Turkey differs from the civil society in West. In Turkey, civil society can be seen as a part of political system, under heavy bureaucracy. However, in this study, I focused on the essence of civil society, which searches for the different channels of political participation and different channels to reach political systems. Civil society envisions an idea of a society through different organizations or groupings in real life so, besides the institutional structure of civil society in Turkey, I underlined this envision and search of youth members of the society and called it nonconventional.

The issues that I chose to examine in this study have been the subject of much existing literature. Political participation, youth participation, civil society democracy, and each selected motivation have their own theories, criticisms and discussions. Covering all the arguments and theories behind the topics above requires more time and space than I have; therefore, while studying youth political participation, one of the biggest challenges for me was the issue of narrowing the topic down. I am not a concise person, so narrowing the focus of this thesis to only the primary concern of the study, political motivations, was the most challenging thing for me to manage. It was challenging to determine where to begin and end. So, I decided that when I read and wrote about some topics, for example, citizenship, I would focus on the relationship between citizenship and the motivations behind political participation, and nothing further. In so doing, I tried to restrict myself to the main argument and to focus exclusively on the answer to the research question.

To that end, this thesis consists of 6 (six) main sections. In the first chapter, a brief introduction to the main issue is presented. In the second chapter, the methodological and conceptual framework of the thesis is evaluated. In the methodological framework, the aim, contribution, design, and the contribution of this thesis are underlined. Then, within the conceptual framework, the literature on political participation and different forms of political participation is analyzed in the context of the research question. In the third chapter, democracy and political participation are examined under the subtitles of political participation in the democratic world, nondemocratic countries, and civil society. In the fourth chapter, I focus on youth political participation in the Turkish political system. In the fifth chapter, the interpretations and results of the field research are examined. Then, in the last chapter, I support my conclusions by presenting the relevant research and literature on political participation.

The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that most of the studies underlying the motivations behind the political participation of the young members of the society use descriptive information like age, gender, working status, marital status, belonging, income level, and educational level as topics of interest. Based on the literature review and the field research, I argue that, with the increase in age, income level, educational level, and employment, the social environment of young people positively impacts the political participation in Turkey. According to my sample results, political party executives are predominantly male; nearly all members of both political parties and civil society are single, and almost all of them identify themselves with either an ideology or ethnic and municipality-based identity. So, my findings support the “life-space changes” theory of Tsai, arguing that while individuals' social status is considered an essential factor in political participation, participatory acts need some resources. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) underline, the political environment and the changes in life circumstances may result in the different forms of political participation; an individual likely chooses to participate based on their age and experience in the society they live in (Jennings and Niemi, 1975).

Moreover, another contribution of this study is its comparative side; it underlines the differences between the motivations of the young members of political parties and the members of civil society, highlighting their differences and similarities, which enables us to understand the future of democracy and politics in Turkey.

I claim that the recognition of the political issues comes with the age, education, employment, and income and that it comes from family, social environment, and social media and develops through participation via the recognition of party identity, social capital, citizenship, and personal interests. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that the participation of the individuals may vary, over time, depending on the shifts in their life circumstances and the societal, political environment which they inhabit. In this approach, it is suggested that higher income and better education result in citizens becoming more active in politics (Verba et al., 1978: 63). It is also argued that the socialization process affects political participation; when people age and get more information and experience in the subject, they can be encouraged or discouraged to participate (Jennings and Niemi, 1975). At that point, it is argued that “life-space changes” influence the attitudes of the different age generations, pushing them to the same point. (Tsai, 2016). Therefore, while an individual's social status is considered to be an essential factor in political participation as participatory acts need some resources, the social environment cannot erase some individual characteristics that push people not to participate due to the lack of a feeling of belonging.

2. METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Methodological Framework

2.1.1. Importance of the Study

It is significant to analyze the patterns of youth political participation to understand the future of democracy because the transformation of participation channels will eventually transform the nature of politics and the patterns of civic participation as well. If new participation patterns are born, they are expected to create additional forms of participation patterns and new forms of channels that can lead the way to further consequences. These consequences are expected to change the way that scholars examine political participation, and it is reasonable to assume that there will be real-life aftermath as well.

Investigating youth civic engagement matters for many reasons. First, as citizen involvement is a fundamental issue for democracy, youth involvement produces a higher level of exercising of popular sovereignty. They are the dynamic and more responsive section of the society, so their thoughts on the current political system, its institutions, and the policies put in place by governments allow politicians to gain popular support and sovereignty. In the case of Turkey, they consist of almost half of the population, and understanding and motivating them to be part of politics has a huge potential for the politics of the country. Secondly, youth participation nurtures political action and mobilization, enhancing civil engagement against tyranny. The young members of society are the ones who can evaluate the situation in the country and give quick responses to it due to their concerns about their future. Thirdly, youth participation nurtures the democratic values of involvement and openness, creating opportunities for political engagement. Since they are the ones reacting, criticizing, and mobilizing in a short amount of time, especially via social media, their political participation is an essential feature of the functioning democracy.

Therefore, it is essential to understand the motivations of the young members of society today to shape the future policies of the country.

2.1.2. Research Objective

The basic aim of this study is to compare the motivations of the conventional-vertical way of participating in the political decision-making process, as in the case of youth party organizations, and nonconventional horizontal ways of participation in civil society. While analyzing the two groups of young people who are eager to participate in politics using different channels, the study aims to investigate their basic motivations, their political identifications, and the current tendencies of youth civic engagement. This study's primary objective is to discover whether conventional political participation is evolving to become civic participation as a form of direct participation among the young population and, if this is the case, what this tells us about the future of political participation patterns.

So, while being a member of the political party appears to be the structural participation, acting outside of this structure, acting as an individual, or as a part of horizontally-defined movement seems to require individual responsibility; this study seeks to determine whether this is true for Turkey.

2.1.3. Research Design

The main research question of the study is, "What are the differences in the basic motivations of the young people who are the members of political parties' youth branches and members of civil society organizations in Turkey?" Based on this question, two sub-questions are formulated as;

- Why do young people need nonconventional channels to participate in politics?
- Why do young people participate in conventional forms of political participation?
- Why do the political participation patterns of the youth change?

I argue that there are seven underlying motivations for young people to participate in political parties and civil society in Turkey, namely, citizenship, social capital, personal interests, family, social media, party identity/leader, and social environment, and their importance changes in these two cases.

Based on this argument, I formulated seven sub-hypotheses for analyzing the motivations.

1. The main argument regarding citizenship is that young people participating in youth branches of political parties show the characteristics of dutiful citizens and subject-oriented citizens; while young members of civil society show the characteristics of actualizing citizens and participant citizens.
2. The main argument regarding social capital is that young members of political parties tend to gain something from membership (mostly material); young members of civil society do not necessarily have this desire.
3. The main argument regarding personal interests is that the main motivation of young members of political parties is self-efficacy and empowerment, while; young members of civil society are more inclined to adhere to social norms because of an internalized sense of duty over the community.
4. The main argument regarding family is that family has a huge impact on young people of political parties; while the importance of familial influence is less significant for the participation of young people of civil society.
5. The main argument regarding social media is that social media motivates young people to participate in political parties by seeing and reading about their activities while motivating young people to participate in civil society by encouraging civic duties.
6. The main argument regarding party identity/leadership is that if young people trust the political system and its components, then they are more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation. If they do not trust the political system, they are more likely to engage in civil society.
7. The main argument regarding the social environment is that the social environment and engagement of the people to that environment affects the young members of conventional forms of participation more than the young members of civil society.

This study uses the literature of political participation, civil society, and political parties' youth branches; it aims to evaluate the differences of young people in terms of their motivations when they decide to be part of the political sphere. After examining the literature, I decided that their motivations can be grouped into seven specific themes that influence political participation: party identity/leader, social capital, citizenship (belonging to a community), personal interests, family, social media, and social environment. I

researched the main influences of young peoples' political participation and how these influences affect the way that they participate.

So, I formed semi-structured interviews with 14 questions and asked them to the executive members of the AK Party and CHP's youth branches and the executive members of GoFor as the representative of civil society in Turkey. In total, I met with 30 participants from Ankara and İstanbul, and every interview lasted about 45 minutes. In these interviews, I used an audio recorder, and all the interviews have been transcribed manually.

Example of coding style: here is the small part of the interview with C4;

- What is your main purpose to join a political party?

- In fact, while I was participating, I did not say I would go there on my own will. As I said, I already had a process of participation which originated from the family. So, as I said, these things actually developed for me automatically. It developed spontaneously. Let's say with the influence of my environment. Under the influence of my environment, my close circle, my family. My parents, my relatives, my cousins, my aunts are my grandmother are also members. So most of my close relatives are members of the party.

I coded the "originated from the family", "My parents, my relatives, my cousins, my aunts are my grandmother are also members. So most of my close relatives are members of the party" as the motivation originated from family. I coded "the influence of my environment" as the motivation under the title of social environment.

This is an example of overlapping codes for the motivations.

Here is another example from the interview of A4

- What is your main purpose to join a political party?

- In order to develop my own skills and raise myself with my own curiosity without being influenced by anyone; I entered a process myself to be a benefit to my country, homeland and nation.

I coded "to be a benefit to my country, homeland and nation" as the motivation under the title of citizenship.

The content was scanned and analyzed with MaxQDA 2018 software (Cleverbridge, Berlin). MAXQDA offers a functional coding scheme hierarchy that allows for the retrieval of all data associated with a hierarchy (Saillard, 2011). I used MaxQDA 2018 on Windows 10 (64 bit) with the configuration of 8 GB of memory, 1 TB of HDD, and Intel® Core™ i7-6500U CPU @ 2.50 GHz and 2.60 GHz. (In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung).

The universe of the study is the members of the youth branches of AK Party, CHP, and GoFor. I decided that each sample would cover ten members from each organization and that these members would be selected from the executive members. The age range is from 18 to 30 because for young people to participate in a political party, they must be between the ages of 18 to 30. The data was collected from May to September 2019.

My data is qualitative; it is based on transcribed and transformed to textual data and observations in the field. Interviewing and transcription took a massive amount of time and effort. Mihas states that “Generic or basic qualitative research refers to an approach in which researchers are simply interested in solving a problem, effecting a change, or identifying relevant themes rather than attempting to position their work in a particular epistemological or ontological paradigm” (2019). The objective of qualitative studies is an understanding of the event, circumstance, or phenomenon (McNabb, 2008). Qualitative designs provide interpretations, explanations, and/or predict future interrelations in similar circumstances (McNabb, 2008: 99).

The fundamental obstacle of the qualitative data is the selection of the data because human beings collect this data. “People tend to record as data what makes sense to and intrigues them. Selectivity cannot be eliminated, but it is important to be aware of how it affects data collection” (LeCompte, 2000: 146). By knowing that from the beginning, I avoided being selective and stayed neutral towards all the participants as much as I could.

I used the Interpretive Research method. “The goal of interpretive research is to build understanding between the participants and the researcher” (McNabb 2008: 100). Therefore, “interpretive research often focuses on standards, norms, rules, and values held in common” (McNabb 2008). So interpretive research looks at the meanings, beliefs and attitudes of the participants, clusters, codes and interprets them, and makes them meaningful within a particular phenomenon, in this case, the motivations of youth political participation.

I chose AK Party, CHP, and GoFor because when I started to study in this subject at the end of 2016, the power party in the parliament was AK Party, and the main opposition party was CHP. Because I wanted to see differences and commonalities in the motivations for political participation, it seemed convenient to focus on the power party and the main opposition party. As a civil society, I chose to study GoFor because it is the common platform for youth organizations to act together, and I believed that it would provide the diversity that I looked for in this study.

I focused on the differences and similarities, if any, between the motivations of young people who were part of political parties and civil society, and between political parties. So, the content of the answers matters in this study, rather than the numerous data. I did not measure how many times they touched on one of the main themes of the study; I just focused on the content of the terms.

2.1.4. Data Analysis

Political scientists have three methods of collecting data: interviewing, document analysis, and observation (Johnson et al., 2015). I conducted interviews and collected data from 30 young people between the ages of 18 and 30; these young people were selected among the executive positions of youth political party branches and GoFor. The main reason behind my research is to understand both the stand of the young people and the administrations of the political parties and civil society organizations. The first step is organized to compare the motivations of young people involved in political parties and underline any differences that existed. Then, the next step is to compare the motivations of young people engaged in political parties and civil society.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the help of a professional interviewer. Interview data has been transcribed, documented, and organized using qualitative data analysis software. The content was scanned and analyzed via MaxQDA 2018 software.

2.1.5. Ethical Considerations

First, the questions of the interview have been organized and presented to Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University Ethical Board. After their evaluation, they approved the interview design and the questions.

Secondly, I made sure that participants' names would be kept anonymous so that they could answer my questions as freely and accurately as possible. Participants were informed about the objective of the research. The confidentiality and anonymity of participants were promised to be secure. I assured the participants that the results of the study would be used for academic purposes only. But, despite all my efforts, the young members of the political parties seem especially reluctant to answer the questions, and after a while, finding a member to answer the questions became the major challenge itself.

Thirdly, I knew that qualitative research had its own challenges. The fundamental challenge of this study is to reach out to young people and convince them to be part of this study. So, sometimes I had to use personal connections and get help from my acquaintances. I tried to reach out to the executive members of the political parties and GoFor so that I could obtain more direct information from the ones who had access to the party administration and the members of the youth branches.

Lastly, it is a known fact that one of the weaknesses of a qualitative study is subjectivity (Johnson et al., 2015). Since I was part of the interview process, it was crucial for me to stay neutral and not to make any interpretations. So, I just analyzed what the interviewees answered and tried not to allow my personal views and interpretations to color my perceptions of their answers.

2.1.6. The Frame of the Study

The main concern of this study is to understand the similarities and the differences, if any, between the young members of political parties and civil society. So, to narrow the focus of the research was challenging. I narrowed the scope of the study to the literature review on political participation, conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation, civil society, and the state's approach to the youth in Turkey. Therefore, I avoided conducting a historical analysis or trying to cover every connected topic in this study. I tried to focus on the main research question as much as I could. It is not a youth

study or historical analysis of the youth and the youth movements in Turkey. It is a study that deals with the conditions, opportunities, and needs of this time and tries to make sense of them via a literature review.

I also chose to conduct interviews to collect data and chose to code and interpret them to see, understand, and evaluate the field; I believe that you have to look at the source and make sense of the situation while combining it with the data. The interview method seemed more appropriate than a questionnaire to see and communicate with the participant.

2.2. A Conceptual Framework

2.2.1. Political Participation

Political participation has been one of the significant issues studied by scholars, from ancient to modern times: from Aristotle to Verba and Nie. It has become a major issue for Communist China and for New Haven (Townsend, 1967; Dahl, 1961). Political participation has been discussed based on different concepts, from ideology to voluntary associations (Smith and Freedman, 1972; McCloskey, 1968; Sills, 1968), enhancing its limits to the protests, demonstrations, other modes of involvement. In this chapter, the historical journey of the term of political participation would be discovered to draw a clear picture of where the literature stands and where it has been leading to. For so doing, further analysis of the youth political participation would acquire a meaningful explanation for its effect on the current political system.

Verba and Nie draw a picture of what is the perhaps widespread use of the term: "Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (1972: 2). They list 4 (four) types of political participation as voting, campaign activity, cooperative activity, and citizen-initiated contacts (1972: 46-48). The former two of them can only be engaged in during the election period. Cooperative activity takes place outside the election period and is engaged in by the individuals who are motivated to provide a solution to social and political problems. And, the last one is an effort of an individual to contact the government officials related to the specific concerns without being a member of a group (Pettersen, 2016). However, this well-known definition excludes ceremonial support, where no direct influencing processes are involved; it excludes societal participation

that is not "aimed at affecting the government", and it excludes extraordinary modes of action, including most forms of protest. In general, and with some notable exceptions, this is what other political scientists have done for so long, too.

Moreover, Verba and Nie exclude many features of political participation; they support participation due to their inability to influence political decisions; they exclude attitudes as a part of political participation; they also did not consider the participation in schools, family, jobs, voluntary associations, etc. as a part of political participation; they exclude the many features of participation, such as protest due to accepting only the legal and legitimate modes (Van Deth, 2001). Also, Verba and Nie's description of political participation excludes the passive forms of political participation and limits political participation to the activities related to the government.

The exclusion of civil disobedience and political violence has been widely criticized. For example, Barnes, Kaase, and their colleagues conducted a series of surveys related to both the conventional and nonconventional modes of political participation throughout Austria, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, and West Germany in 1974. As nonconventional participation, they focused on the political protest and violence, while as conventional modes to the electoral processes. They used a "protest potential" term to describe the nonconventional forms of political participation, such as demonstrations, strikes, occupation of the buildings, etc. They describe political participation as "all" the activities aiming to influence the political decision-making processes, so any protest or violence should also be considered political participation due to its intention to comment on current politics. So, one can argue that the boundaries of what is accepted as political action and what is unacceptable have been changing as a result of the shift in political values (1974).

For a broader explanation, Parry et al. list 6 (six) types of political participation as "voting", "party campaigning", "collective action", "contacting", "direct action", and "political violence" (1992: 50). However, like Verba and Nie, Parry et al. also exclude many features of participation. They exclude behaviors such as going to the office to get welfare benefits (due to its inability to influence officials), participation in the workplace, being interested in politics, attitudes showing the support for democracy, and willingness to take action (Van Deth, 2001).

Nelson describes political participation as a citizen's action aiming to influence the local and national governments' decisions. It broadens the definition made by Verba and Nie on two grounds; it includes illegal and violent actions in the definition. Nelson underlined the specific characteristics of the participants as mostly "small in scale, modest in objectives,

and sporadic in duration.” (1974). These activities were conservative activities intending to change something in the decisions of government, not in the form of government. The changes, such as overthrowing the government, can be rarely seen as the primary aim of political action.

From a more socio-economic perspective, according to Booth and Seligson, the concept includes the attempt to influence the distribution of public goods in general, which are defined as the services provided by governments, such as education, health centers, etc. However, in some areas, these activities may be provided within the collective manners; small towns and villages, especially, sometimes provide their needs collectively by themselves. So, these activities beyond the political decision-making of governments and the reach of government are also considered political participation. Thus, the boundaries of the concept have been expanded to include the “unintended political outcomes, behavior outside the realm of government, behavior mobilized by the government efforts to change or maintain the structure of government, and political violence” (1978).

The scope of the term, then, widens to the six major issues; (1) Active and (2) Passive Forms (3) Aggressive and (4) Nonaggressive Behavior (5) Structural and (6) Nonstructural Objects (7) Governmental and (8) Nongovernmental Aims (9) Mobilized and (10) Voluntary Actions (11) Intended and (12) Unintended Outcomes. Three aspects of this definition should be emphasized. First, the action can be verbal or written. Second, it can be violent or nonviolent. Third, it can be of any intensity (Seligson, Booth, Conge, and Conge, 2013). As linked to the classification mentioned above, political participation could be characterized as active or passive, depending on the interaction between the political system and the individual. If the participants engage in the leader selection, party activity, contributing money, volunteering, and disobedience, then it is called active instrumental participation. At the same time, if s/he attends demonstrations, protests, and provides a political argument, it is called active, expressive participation. Passive participation occurs, on the other hand, when a participant shows obedience, compliance, conscription, and pays taxes (Milbrath, 1965). In line with this argument, Barber (2009) suggests that if a participant engages in formal political organizations, the passive roles are given to him/her. However, if participants engage in politics via activism, volunteering, or through social actions, then s/he can be considered as an active participant (Sveningsson, 2015). Therefore, political participation may be defined as an individual or collective action at the national or local level

that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding governmental or nongovernmental goals.

According to Brady, political participation contains the activities of citizens with the intention to influence the government actions and political outcomes; the participation's being official or not (1999) does not matter. Verba and colleagues (Schlozman, and Brady, 1995), while combining the rational choice theory (Downs, 1957), socioeconomic status modes (Verba and Nie, 1972), and the mobilization model, built a civic voluntarism model to understand political participation. This model suggests that when citizens are asked to join political causes and have the necessary resources to do it, they participate. Resources include time, money, and cognitive abilities. In addition to these resources, internal political efficacy is an essential incentive for participation. The different sources of financial, human, and social capital ultimately reduce the cost of participation.

From this perspective, the Internet provides a unique opportunity to attract citizens who typically lack these resources, such as women, youth, and minorities (Correa and Jeong, 2011; McCaughey and Ayers, 2013; Mossberger et al., 2008). However, the opponents of this view suggest that the Internet and digital technologies rarely reinforce existing gaps in political participation, and the use of interactive services is still at the hands of people from higher socioeconomic status, educational background, and social capital (Neuman et al., 2011).

Scholars had been equating the political participation with electoral activities for so long (Conway, 1985). Then, some recognized that participation goes beyond elections; it has something to do with other activities, such as working for community or attending a demonstration (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). The major turning point was the Internet leading the way to new types of participation (Chadwick and Howard, 2008). In that context, Gil de Zuniga measures participation at three levels; (1) civic engagement (e.g. volunteering for charities), (2) offline political participation (e.g. attending political rallies), and (3) online political participation (e.g. forwarding political messages by e-mail). While the first one aims to provide a solution to the problems (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter, Zukin, and Delli-Carpini, 2006), the latter two aim to influence government action and policy-making (see also Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995 cited in Gil de Zúñiga, 2012).

Another critical issue is modernization and its effect on participation. Özbudun underlines that with modernization, four dimensions of political participation have been affected; “nature, motive, bases, and the amount of political participation in society”, which are not mutually exclusive with each other (1976: 5). The nature of the state indicates the act’s being autonomous or mobilized, and he suggests that autonomous participation has been positively affected by the modernization. Motives of the political participation borrowed from Scott (1969) and Schneider (1971) are listed as deferential, solidarity, instrumental, and civic. Deferential participation requires a strong bond with the influencer; there is a strong inclination for the participant to be influenced (Frey, 1971). Solidarity participation requires solidarity over a social group. Instrumental participation requires inducements, which can be individual or material. Civic participation requires a civic duty nourished by an ideology or a vision of a good society.

Özbudun argues that a low level of modernization is more likely to lead the way to deferential participation, and a medium level of modernization leads to solidarity participation. In contrast, a higher level of modernization is more likely to reveal the civic and instrumental participation. He suggests that when the modernization increases, sectoral and communal inducements are likely to replace the individual and communal inducements as the primary motives (1976: 8-9). Bases, the third dimension, suggests that in modern societies, the importance of the kinship and communal group identifications are faded away and replaced with class-based participation. Regarding the amount of political participation, he suggests that with the economic modernization, the size of the middle class increased, and this encouraged class-based participation even more. All these things aside, he accepts that these assumptions cannot be implemented to all countries; as an example, rapid economic modernization has caused voting to decrease in Turkey (Özbudun, 1976) because certain forms of participatory acts or behaviors have a corresponding impact in some social and cultural contexts but not in others.

Webster describes the term participate as “to have a share in common with others”, so the term, by definition, requires an activity and a social context to exist. Therefore, formal political participation is easy to understand with this very basic point of view. However, when the involvement type changed or altered, the issue becomes complicated (2002).

Until now, a summary of the discussions regarding the term political participation has been analyzed. But the clearer and more systematic definition should be devoted to

understanding the essence of political participation. Van Deth (2014) proposes a conceptual framework drawn under four variants of political participation. He mentions that the content of political participation has been growing day by day, and modes of participation have been objects to constant change and evolving throughout time while changing the style of political action. The main challenge is to conceptualize the term accurately so that one can reach meaningful results about the subject. At that point, he underlines that “individualized” or “personalized” modes of participation can only be seen as the non-political activities, stating no political aims. However, they have the potential to become political activity if they lead to further arguments creating agenda in the public sphere. For him, if one is not motivated by the consequences of the policies in a broad sense, if one only thinks of himself when voting, this also cannot be seen as political participation. So, he warns us not to use an outdated conceptualization regarding political participation while also not to broaden the scope of the term to almost any activity. When considered all the definitions made until this day, he listed four relatively common areas: first, political participation is an activity; secondly, to talk about the political participation, the citizens should be in the scene (not as politicians or lobbyists); thirdly, political participation is a voluntary activity; and lastly, political participation includes the concern about the government, state, and politics in a broader and narrow sense. Therefore, the minimalist definition of political participation rises “as a voluntary activity by citizens in the area of government, politics or the state”.

Here, the problematic issue is to understand the relationship between civic and political participation. He underlines that “apparently, any organized action or social behavior or any activity aimed at change or at influencing collective life is covered by these broad approaches”. By this definition, almost any activity can be categorized as political participation. So, he accepts the difficulty of providing a comprehensive definition for the term and focuses on the question of “how would you recognize a mode of participation if you see one?”. As Hempel (1965) suggests, one should first decide 1. whether the term does or does not apply, and then 2. a decision rule should be developed to reach a conceptual framework. The map of political participation is drawn like:

1. Rule 1: Do we deal with behavior? We need activities or actions, not purely behaviors, to talk about political participation. It should not be speaking only; if you say that you will boycott some product, you should not buy it when it is

obtainable to you (saying is not doing). It should be distanced from orientation, opinion, and attitude.

Rule 2. Is the activity voluntary? This activity should be voluntary/optional and based on free will.

Rule 3. Is the activity done by citizens? Different from “politicians, civil servants, office-bearers, public officers, journalists, and professional delegates, advisors, appointees, lobbyists, and the like.” Professional activities (p.354). You should be an amateur.

Rule 4. Is the activity located in the sphere of government/state/politics?

These four decision rules lead us to the **minimalist definition of political participation**: ‘conventional modes of participation’ (Kaase and Marsh, 1979), ‘institutional modes of participation’ (Hooghe and Quintelier, 2013) or ‘elite-directed action’ (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002).

So, what about the new modes of political participation, which cannot be limited to the boundaries of the sphere of politics/government/state?

Rule 5. Is the activity targeted at the sphere of government/state/politics? Not in this sphere, but targeting it. ‘contentious politics’ (Tilly, 2008: 5) or ‘elite-challenging politics’ (Inglehart, 1990: 338–340; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002) underline this feature.

Rule 1+2+3-4+5: targeted political participation

Rule 6: Is the activity aimed at solving collective or community problems? Amateur, voluntary activities that are not located in, or targeted at, the sphere of government/state/politics can be considered modes of political participation if they are aimed at solving collective or community problems.

1+2+3-4-5+6=second variant of a targeted definition of political participation

1+2+3-4-5-6: non-political activity (what about not buying some brand to protest the child labor?)

Rule 7: Is the activity used to express the political aims and intentions of participants?

1+2+3-4-5-6+7: motivational definition of political participation

Rule 7¹: Is the political activity used to express the political aims and intentions of the participants?

The same phenomenon cannot always end up with the same category. Aims, goals, and the intentions behind the activity matter a great deal. So, from this perspective, which will be the basis of this research, political participation is regarded in its motivational form and should contain action, voluntary participation, and non-professional politicians to express the political aims and intentions of the participants. However, the first rule is expanded to include behaviors, speaking, and writing, especially in social media.

2.2.2. Who Participates?

The debate over political participation is also localized around the question of who participates because policies are determined mostly by who participates. It is significant to answer the question of who participates in this study because the answer gives me the opportunity to understand the participation patterns in a detailed way, revealing the reasons, resources, and opportunities behind them. In that manner, first, it is assumed that participation is an atomistic activity: it is sufficient for an individual to be motivated for the issue, and then participation occurs. However, many of the political activities are not individual-based by nature, such as attending political meetings, voting, etc. Secondly, it is assumed that opportunities for participation are distributed among the population in an even base. If it is the case, it is a confirmation of the socio-economic status (SES) model. However, if it is not, it means that low socio-economic status individuals have fewer opportunities to participate, and then it is inevitable for different socioeconomic status to cause different opportunities (Knoke 1990; Rothenberg, 1992; Verba and Nie, 1972). Hansen and Rosenstone (1993) argue that the participation of the individuals may vary over time, depending on the shifts in life circumstances and political environment. Thirdly,

¹ By using rule 7* for modes of participation covered by the minimalist definition, we arrive at the two variants of voting by the Downsian citizen: a politically-motivated form for those who base their vote for Party A on their political preferences and a non-political form for those who prefer Party A but vote for B to avoid further conflicts at home. In this way, the question of whether the phenomenon under consideration is a specimen of political participation does not depend on the intentions or aims of the people concerned, as the minimalist or targeted definitions are reached before the intentions and aims of participants are introduced.

differences among participants are considered unimportant. It is suggested that there is no meaningful and satisfactory explanation of the high-voting rates of high-social status people, while others participate more on nonelectoral activities (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1983; Huckfeldt, 1986; Leighley, 1991; Neuman, 1986; Zipp and Smith, 1979; Zipp, Landerman, and Luebke, 1982 as cited in Leighley, 1995).

Among these assumptions, the socioeconomic status model needs to be analyzed in detail to address the relationship between resources and participation, which is one of the very fundamental concerns of this study. The model states that individuals with high socioeconomic status are more likely to engage in formal and informal mobilization because they would have the opportunity based on their status-related resources. So, mobilization becomes the mechanism mediating the relationship between SES and political participation. Secondly, one can see both participation and mobilization as the reasons behind the civic orientations of the individuals. It is argued that when people are involved in politics, it is more likely that they will feel included, and it leads to positive attitudes towards political participation. Therefore, individuals' motivations can be determined by both externally and internally-driven reflections.

To see obvious evidence related to the external motivation of political participation, one can focus on voter turnout, which is higher in the places where the campaign spending and intensity are high (Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; Cox and Munger, 1989; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983 as cited in Leighley, 1995). Socio-economic explanations depend on the question of who participates; and tries to answer this question to define eligible adults depending upon gender, age, education and residential location (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969). In this approach, it is suggested that higher income and better education result in citizens who are more active in politics (Verba et al., 1978: 63). Also, it has been discovered that better-educated citizens tend to be part of political actions between elections, such as contacting representatives, rather than just voting in the elections (Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978).

Besides the SES model and the other two models, one underlying the importance of political participation becoming atomistic activity and one expressing no relationship between participation and status, two other explanations regarding citizen engagement are listed as the psychological explanation and political institution explanation. The first explanation focuses on the impact of values, attitudes, and motivations of the citizens. This

approach answers the question of who participates depending on the psychological conditions and the personal choices of the individuals; it concerns itself with interest in the politics of the individuals (Almond and Verba, 1963; Gamson, 1968; Barnes and Kaase, 1979). According to this approach, interest in politics plays a crucial role for political participation and encourages citizens to build more sophisticated political attitudes, such as, among other things, political efficacy (e.g. Dahl, 1992; Sigelman and Feldman, 1983), and political trust (e.g. Mishler and Rose, 1995; Seligson, 1980). The second explanation suggests that the role of political institutions is the major factor for political participation, which is not the main query of this study.

It is also argued that the socialization process affects political participation; when people age and get more information and experience in the subject, they can be encouraged or discouraged to participate (Jennings and Niemi, 1975). At that point, it is argued that “life-space changes” influence the attitudes of the age generations, pushing them to be on the same point. (Tsai, 2016). Therefore, while individuals' social status is an important factor in political participation, as participatory acts need some resources, the social environment cannot erase some individual characteristics that push people not to participate due to a feeling of a lack of belonging.

This study uses the SES model as a ground for the analysis and evaluates the social-community-based vs. personal/individualistic attributes of the participants when analyzing the data. Because there is evidence to prove both the community's effect and individual concerns for political participation, no certain lines are drawn. Whether one of them is highly seen in conventional political participation or nonconventional form of political participation will be discussed further.

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995: 38) define political participation as the direct and indirect attempts to influence government actions, public policies, and the choice of these policies. Barnes and Kaase (1978), on the other hand, classify political participation as conventional and unconventional participation. Barnes and Kaase (1978) suggest that political action can be categorized under two categories; conventional and unconventional. While the routine channels of political participation are considered conventional ones, such as voting, unconventional channels call for more direct actions, such as demonstrations and occupying buildings. Unconventional channels mostly call for challenging activities, mainly prior to voting. Moreover, the four-participation model that Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978)

have been added two (2) more participation by Dalton (2008); protests and contentious action, and internet activism. So, it leads us to investigate different types of thinking — the broad one regarding political participation.

2.2.3. Youth

In this study, I used the category of “youth” as the main interest of the study, and while doing that one should identify the term in a specific way. There are many ways to define youth however, I will briefly explain the term based on biological approach, generation approach, cultures approach, transitions approach, socioeconomic approach, lifecycle approach, and ideological approach, and construct a basis for this study.

Youth research offers at least three approaches to conceptualize youth: **youth as a generation**, as a life stage, and as a social group. The first concept is mainly used by political science, departing from Mannheim’s (1952) seminal essay. It is highly relevant in times of the rapid social changes Europe was enduring (Semenova, 2002). The second approach starts from the social-psychological specificity of this life stage – the search for self-identity – and explores the values that shape its consciousness (Cote, 2002). The third understanding conceptualizes youth as a group in a process of transition from dependence into autonomy while moving between the spheres of education and employment, from the parental home to an independent housing and family formation (Bynner, 2001; Wallace and Kovacheva 1998).

The term “youth” should be described to draw the line of the study and to focus on the targeted group in a specific way. In general, youth is seen as the stage in the life, it is defined and understood within the age limits; however, what is important for this study is to describe the term in terms of their sociological connotations and provide a deeper meaning. One side of literature defines the term in reference to its biological structure (Marcues 1969, cited in Kentel 2005), and sees youth as a secondary group of citizens, underlying that youth is a socially constructed category in human life. It is constructed because it divides the adult, the previous generation from itself; and has its own characteristics on the base of the aging on the basis of socioeconomic factors. On the other hand, Bourdieu (1980) holding a socioeconomic perspective, claims that the category of the youth can be seen within the class system as a reference to different social classes; and they can be seen as the tools for the fight against inequalities (cited in Kentel, 2005: 13). For Bourdieu, age is the key factor lying

on the social classes, where adults have the power to shape youth's life decisions; however, it does not satisfy and project the real expectations of the young people. The common characteristic of the term "youth" is that each and every generation has the desire to be different from the previous ones, they underline their differences and make their own distinct characteristics; and this is highly related to cultural and socioeconomic developments (cited in Kentel, 2005: 13). So, it can be suggested that youth, as a category cannot be seen the homogenous entity, but as heterogonous groups of young people.

Rather than biological and socioeconomic definition of the youth, there is also the social definition of the term in the West literature suggesting that there is no separate "youth" category in the technologically unsophisticated societies;

"The vast changes that gave rise to a modern life characterized by specialization, continuous innovation, an increasingly knowledge-based economy, high rates of geographic mobility, economic surplus, and leisure created a socially defined period in the life cycle between the dependency of childhood and the responsibility of adulthood. The social definition of youth and its consequent as a group betwixt and between (not fully integrated into society) coincided with the industrial era" (Weinstein, 1995: 61).

So, youth became the social category when the young people were given the role of provider, rather than the ones being cared after WW2 in the West (Weinstein, 1995). Especially in the West, youth was regarded as the subculture till 1950s. After 1950s, with the impact of their music and lifestyle, they became the irrefutable cultural configuration in the society. In these years, the rock and roll was used by the young people to express their thoughts and feelings against the system, class codes and their parents. In the 1960s, youth subculture became the counterculture; and young people displayed their lifestyle as opposed to adult culture. In the 1970s, the group of youth began to dissolve into two separate categories; "Youth" as a cultural category was eviscerated and sublimated into a commercialized spirit of 'youthfulness', haunting contemporary life at every turn. On the other hand 'youth' no longer belonged to young people as a cultural designation, as their own style of life, but belonged potentially to everyone in some way or other" (Weinstein, 1995: 63).

In the 1980s and 1990s, youth was judgmental, unhappy with their living standards, and hopeless about their futures. (Weinstein, 1995). When it comes to modern times, as any

age group, young people have been encountering many uncertainties (Beck, 1992 cited in Odegard and Berglund, 2008), and they are portrayed as the vulnerable group within society. In modern times, youth is understood as the period of time when they are risk-takers, so education is expected to suppress this risk-taking position. Since the 1990s, the globalization and by extent the neo-liberal policies had led young people to feel more uncertain about their future. One implication of this situation on youth was the rise of consumerism and conformism, leading to a conflict between local and global values (251). Young people started to engage in cause-based struggles rather than class-based ones, and political participation is redefined by them.

Moreover, in the 21st century, new vision over the American youth was created, and many scholars defined the youth as “resources to be developed” (e.g., Benson, 2003; Damon & Gregory, 2003; Lerner, Brentano, Dowling, & Anderson, 2002; Roth, Brooks-Gunn, Murray, & Foster, 1998) However, this view is problematic because it only underlines the practical categorization of the youth, but not the sociocultural and socioeconomic characteristics of this certain group (Lerner, et.al., 2002).

Not only in the West, but also in the Africa, youth is conceptualized as the generation, but adds the space to the scene. To understand the notion of youth, it is significant to focus both on the time and the space. So, it refers both “situational” exploration and “situational” exploration of youth. Christiansen et. al. (2006) argue that one should understand the youth with regard to space and place, and use the term “navigation” for it. In accordance with this view, youth can be defined as “somebody” based on the place s/he is in. The definition regarding youth can be varied depending on the place and situation. At the end, “Youth seem to create their own landscapes of action and interaction, their own sites for being young and for acting out their identities; and situations that seem to fit the idea of the emergence of distinct ‘youthscapes’ (Chatterton and Hollands 2003), forged as these are by the modern media, migration and new modes of communication” (Van Dijk et. al., 2011: 5-6).

According to de Bruijn 2007; Moyer 2003; Nieuwenhuys 2001, youth is an ideological project, and some issues are centered around the youth especially in the “post-colonial state-formation, the emergence of civic society organisations, educational systems, foreign NGO-activities and policies, and rapidly changing kinship patterns as a result of rapid population growth” (cited in Van Dijk et. al., 2011: 7). Therefore, youth became a

center issue for the decision makers who understand the youth as a separate category to be heard in the national state building process.

In terms of the relationship between ideology and the youth leads the conceptualization to the counter-hegemony characteristics of the youth. In this view, youth is defined as the counter agency towards the current system; they are seen as the challenge to the system and the force to make it better. Youth provides the check and balance to the current powers such as state, religious institutions, etc. Youth as an ideology shows the the potential of youth to suggest new structures when there are disruptions in the system. (Van Dijk et. al., 2011: 12).

Youth is also described as a social concept. It is a convenient concept to use for the certain point of time in the life, and it is also useful to use for the self-definition of the people. Soares (2000) underlines that there are three points in this context, first; theoretical and sociocultural youth conceptualization were made in time, second; the emergence of these definitions are connected to the emergence of bourgeois society, and third; youth emphasizes the specific section of the society. So, the definition of the youth may differ in various societies. For example, in the industrial societies, age 30 and under are tend to be considered as youth, while this age is generally 25 in the developing countries. The common characteristics of the youth in both societies are that there is a decreasing belief that youth constitutes the transition from childhood to adulthood. Youth as a category is becoming more than an age range, and it transcends a time in life, and increases its area of age dependent definition (210-211) to the sociocultural realm.

Also, it is underlined that when one say “youth is the future”, young people are trapped in the future, and it seems like they do not have any space in the present. However, seeing young people in a transition hinders their potential to become someone and do something. They have a saying in the future and in the present before the age of maturity (Soares, 2000). This does not mean that youth has no specific characteristics and expectations; they have different choices from the previous generation based on the changes in the society they live in itself. So, because of the lifecycle, when young members of the society get older, they would experience new situations and accumulated new knowledge that will change the way they acted (Quintelier, 2007: 166).

The crucial issue here is the difficulty to set a definite conceptualization of the term “youth” because the young people in different parts of the world have different characteristics, expectations and experience different circumstances. At this point, youth policies of the governments show an intention to standardize the transitions of young members of the society so that they cannot find any autonomous way to deal with the changes. Arnett (2000, 2004) underlines the new understanding to the youth as an “emerging adulthood” which emphasizes the importance of the culture and its attributes to the adults. The young people from different societies do not share the same attributes, and expect same things for themselves. So, it is underlined that young people feel like adults when they start to feel that they have the characteristics assigned to be an adult in the society in which they live, rather than a certain age range. Cultural constructions seem to be the most important issue at that point (Fierro Arias and Moreno Hernández, 2007). So, there cannot be one-absolute definition of the youth, because the transition period differs from one culture to another (Arnett, 2004: 21).

Within the scope of this research, the youth is studied as a generation, as a reference to Mannheim and Kentel, and I kept in mind that the youth is based on the cultural constructions as mentioned by Fierro Arias and Moreno Hernández. I am aware that there is cultural differences in Turkish society, and there cannot be a universal “generation” with specific characteristics but youth shows the similarities and differences in every society. So, I used the youth as a generation within the specific cultural norms in the current Turkey. For narrowing the sample down, and taking the admission age range of youth branches of political parties, however, the age range of 18-30 is applied in this study.

2.3. Different Forms of Political Participation

2.3.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation

Some definitions of conventional political participation are listed as:

“... those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics” (Milbrath and Goel, 1977: 2).

“... those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba and Nie, 1972: 2).

“... all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence, either directly or indirectly, political choices at various levels of the political system” (Kaase and Marsh, 1979: 42).

“... action by citizens which is aimed at influencing decisions which are, in most cases, ultimately taken by public representatives and officials” (Parry et al., 1992: 16).

“... affords citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond” (Verba et al., 1995: 37).

“... any dimensions of activity that are either designed directly to influence government agencies and the policy process, or indirectly to impact civil society, or which attempt to alter systematic patterns of social behavior” (Norris, 2001: 16).

These definitions all share the common denominators. They all underline the individual/ private citizens’ (amateurs) engagement, and they all aim to influence/make an impact on the decision-making process. They are all organized efforts within the political system. So, forms of conventional political participation involve voting, membership in a political party, running for a political party, working on political election campaigns for candidates or a party, donating money to political parties, and trying to persuade others to vote (adapted from Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014; in Barrett and Zani, 2015: 5-6).

These definitions also tell us four main things; first, people become citizens when they participate in politics; secondly, political participation is mainly understood as an activity, as people are really in action; thirdly, citizens act in a volunteer base when participating politics; and lastly, political participation is related to the government and politics in general, not specifically to drawing the line within the parliament or national officials (Van Deth, 2001).

From these definitions, two conclusions can be drawn. The first one is related to the very nature of political participation, emphasizing the relationship between citizens and institutions and the impact/influence/pressure of the citizens on them. However, it is unclear

how the citizens act or do to influence the officials. Direct and indirect ways of influence should be specified. The second one is related to the citizens' desire to change or alter the pattern of social behavior, not only to influence it but to actually change it. So, while the first one emphasizes the role of people as citizens, the second one emphasizes the individual's active role above and beyond being citizens.

Traditional definitions of political participation mainly focus on the activities related to the governmental institutions, activities such as voting, lobbying, running for office, and the separation of power. Another school of thought, however, argues that politics is all about the determinations of the division of limited resources and the development of societal values. According to that theory, politics is no longer limited to the domain of the government, but it is a relationship embedded in economic, cultural, and civic institutions (Camino, L., Zeldin, 2002). Therefore, formal political participation embraces activism; Özbudun (1976) argues that political participation is a phenomenon, which is to be engaged within the domains of government; however, he acknowledges that government participation should be seen as the subcategory of political participation. He underlines that political participation is more about activity but not attitudes, and whether the attempts to influence decisions are illegal or unsuccessful, they should be thought of as political participation.

For conventional political participation, the importance of the modern state should be underlined. As Huntington (1968) suggests, the modern state builds an environment for political participation to evolve beyond the village or town level. Similar to this suggestion, Lerner (1958) also argues that the modern state is a participant society where democracy is provided.

2.3.2. Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation

According to Ekman and Amnå (2012), political participation consists of two categories; civil/latent civil participation and manifest political participation. Civil participation contains the activities outside conventional models of participation (Sveningsson, 2015).

Weiner (1971) saw political participation as a voluntary action; as such, Nie and Verba (1972) underline that political participation is all about influencing government decisions. These characteristics of political participation are mainly discussed and covered in a

conventional way. However, at that point, the focus of the study lies in the nonconventional forms. Huntington and Nelson suggest that if the participation is voluntary and autonomous, then it is merely an arbitrary action whose rules are defined only by the participant, who has no obligation to succeed all the intended aims (1976).

Forms of nonconventional political participation are listed as protests, demonstrations, marches; signing petitions, writing letters/emails to politicians or public officials, writing letters, emails, or phone calls with political content to the media, writing articles and blogs with political content to the media, using social networking sites on the Internet to join or like groups which have a political focus, using social networking sites on the Internet to distribute or share links which have a political content to friends and contacts, wearing or displaying a symbol or sign representing support for a political cause, distributing leaflets which express support for political causes, participating in fundraising events for political causes, writing graffiti on walls which express support for political causes, participating in other illegal actions (e.g. burning a national flag, throwing stones, rioting) in support of a political cause, membership of political lobbying and campaigning organizations/attending meetings of these organizations/expressing one's point of view at these meetings/participating in the activities of these organizations/ holding an office for these organizations (adapted from Barrett and Brunton-Smith, 2014; as cited in Barrett and Zani, 2014: 5-6).

2.3.3.A Comparative Analysis of Conventional vs. Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation

One of the main differences between conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation is that while conventional forms depend on the political system, top to bottom activities, nonconventional forms depend on bottom-up and elite-challenging activities, and are operated not according to the political system's principles but through the principles set by the participants (Christensen 2013: 104 cited in Bengtsson and Christensen, 2014).

Although the conventional definition of political participation rests upon the idea of the access of citizens to the channels that would directly influence the decision of who will run the government and which policies they will apply (Verba, Nie, Kim, 1978: 46), the concept has multidimensional meanings that surpass voting; it also embraces participation

in the electoral campaigns, collective action on policymaking and the decisions, getting involved with the political representatives, and being part of protests and demonstrations (Bahry and Silver, 1990: 830; Verba et al., 1978: 51).

There has been a rise in the non-institutionalized political participation (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Norris, 2002; Pattie et al., 2004), as Internet activism has become the significant channel for political participation in contemporary democracies (Norris, 2001; Norris et al., 2005; Stolle et al., 2005 as cited in Kriesi, 2007).

The line and question regarding the conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation is also a discussion around the institutionalization. Participants in conventional forms of politics became part of the political system, while others keep some distance from the current political system.

Some scholars suggest that these new noninstitutionalized forms of political participation grant new opportunities for the younger generations, who have been characterized as ‘monitorial’, ‘post-materialist’, and ‘critical’ (Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 1999; Schudson, 1999). Monitorial participants are the ones who need to be part of the political process as they see fit without being part of the traditional political organizations (Hooghe and Dejaeghere, 2007; Schudson, 1999). Some scholars, such as Henrik P. Bang and Eva Sørensen, (2001) state that younger generations are more likely to engage in the decisions related to their everyday lifestyles, leading them to be “everyday makers” while avoiding institutionalized traditional organizations. In line with these arguments, post-materialists also claim that post-materialist citizens choose to engage in politics via individualized ways rather than institutions (Inglehart, 1997). Also, there is a different argument in the literature claiming that citizens increasingly support democracy, but they are not happy with the way democracy has been functioning. As a result of this, they still want to be part of the political decision-making process, but not in a traditional, institutionalized way (Norris, 1999: 2002).

There is some discussion in the literature with regard to whether nonconventional forms of political participation require more time, commitment, risk or energy. This is a question that cannot be answered with absolute certainty due to the impossibility of understanding all groups of participants, but some suggestions can be made. For some authors, nonconventional forms of political participation need less commitment because

participation takes place occasionally (Li and Marsh, 2008; Trechsel, 2007). For other authors, the activities that seem to be less time-consuming can also be as demanding as the traditional forms of political participation, such as demonstrating (Norris et al., 2005).

According to Warren (2002: 678), political participation is not just an obligation or a moral requirement for citizens, but it is also a strategic necessity. This assumption depends upon the idea that inactive members of the community are destined to be unheard of by the authorities, so they become invisible in the political process. What is the level of opportunity to participate in politics via conventional and nonconventional ways? The prominent view in the literature suggests that non-traditional ways of political participation open more doors to the mobilization of a more heterogeneous proportion of the population to participate.

There are three main assumptions regarding this issue. First, it is assumed that nonconventional ways of political participation forms are more likely to open their doors to more people, creating less inequality while making participation accessible. Also, the cost of nonconventional forms of participation seems to be less than the institutionalized ones, taking into consideration the short-term commitments (Li and Marsh, 2008; Micheletti, 2004; Trechsel, 2007) and the online opportunities, which are cheap and easy to access (Jennings and Andersen, 2003), resulting in more inclusive forms of participation. Secondly, it is suggested that new types of political participation do not change much in terms of the one who is willing to participate in politics. Since the 1970s, the same kind of people is willing to participate in whether they follow the conventional or nonconventional ways (Barnes and Kaase, 1979), leading the argument that inequality stays the same, with a stable pattern of inclusion and exclusion (Lusoli et al., 2006). So, political influence keeps coming from the same social base, and there is no real change. Thirdly, depending on the participation paradox, some scholars argue that nonconventional forms of political participation require more cognitive skills, making the more privileged groups' access to them easier. 'Nearly all can vote, and most do. But very few citizens can (or do) file a lawsuit, make requests under a Freedom of Information Act, attend an Environmental Impact Review hearing, or attend local planning meetings' (Dalton et al., 2003: 262). This will lead to unequal participation because it will demand more skills, time, energy and resources (Skocpol, 2003; Verba et al., 1995). For example, even if to attend a demonstration is open to all, only the more educated ones will tend to be part of it. Or, online participation would

create an inequality, depending on the spread of it within and between the societies. (Lusoli et al., 2006; Vissers and Hooghe, 2009, Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier, 2010).

Carpini (2004: 396) defines political participation concerning democratic engagement, which is not limited to conventional ways, such as voting; it is a matter of being part of politics. The discussions related to political participation support the notion that no one can ignore online ways of participation. The attitudes toward democracy and participation have been changing and evolving, and so have the forms of participation (Henn, Weinstenn, and Wring, 2002). Younger generations are assumed to be more skeptical about the traditional forms of political engagement (Phelps, 2004; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, 2006). However, within the atmosphere of change and evolvement, as Zukin et al. (2006) suggests, “simple claims that today’s youth (. . .) are apathetic and disengaged from civic life are simply wrong” (Bakker and Vreese, 2011: 188-189).

Now, with the rising level of use on the Internet, participation is no longer confined only to political activities available to the public sphere. The Internet has opened new opportunities for participation as it enhanced interactivity and drew a line between online and offline participation (Graber, Bimber, Bennett, Davis, and Norris, 2004; Krueger, 2002; van Dijk, 2000). This online participation has led the way to the visual, immediate, self-selected, and impersonal types of activities (Gennaro and Dutton, 2006: 566). Online participation has also led the way to the new communication channels, such as blogs, websites that resulted in the rise of grassroots and bottom-up participation forms. These online forms would encourage participants to feel more open and freer while bringing them closer to elected officials, journalists, and elites. It is mostly the expressive participation that took place in the form of verbal political engagement. Through e-mail and social media, citizens would have the chance to send direct messages and posts to their authorities. As stated, the Internet has created the following communication types: many-to-many, one-to-many, and many-to-one (Castells, 2007). This type of political participation is essential for individual attempts to make a difference now; in any given subject, collective influence in politics is still important, but individuals have the opportunity to pave the way to the collective demands. The mobilization of political activities, in an online way, complemented offline efforts (Postmes and Brunsting, 2002; Shah et al., 2007). Therefore, it does not mean that the importance of offline participation channels has been decreasing; online participation just facilitates the participation decision and lowers the cost of offline

participation (Verba et al., 1995), leading the way for more individuals to engage and drawing itself as the supplementary to the offline participation (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, and Shah, 2010).

Undeniably, the role of the Internet and social media is pivotal in youth political participation. This may cause them to be underseen or underrepresented in political institutions (Delli Carpini, 2000) while encouraging them to be active in politics as a whole (Dahlgren, 2007). Regarding this issue, there are two suggestions in the literature; one claims that either conventional or online activities, either in a manifest or latent mode and second, regardless of the underlying process, the role of online media with regards to political activities should be contextualized. Based on these suggestions, Bailey (1994) tries to create a typology regarding political participation. Political participation has been conceptualized around two components; it is “an extension of the conventional manifest mode of participation and an additional latent form of participation”. The first one is related to conventional ways of political participation, while the second one is based on the work of Ekman and Amnå (2009), developed from the work of Teorell et al. in 2007. Political participation has been classified into six types; voting, party activity, consumer participation, protest activity, contacting, and latent participation; while latent participation was later divided into three subtitles: information seeking, information dissemination, and content distribution (Fu, Wong, Law, and Yip, 2016).

In that manner, then, who possesses the characteristics of online participation? If the Internet can change the patterns of offline political participation channels, then it would be the tool to even the score between the individuals from the higher SES and lower SES status (Murdock and Golding, 1989), and the resources for engaging online and offline participation differ significantly (Bimber, 2000; Kling, 1999) In the simplest case, online participation reduces the time and inconvenience in the process of contacting authorities (Bimber, 1999; Delli Carpini, 2000). While offline forms of participation depend upon civic skills, the online participation forms may require new web skills to largen their impact area (as cited in Best, S. J.; Krueger, 2005).

2.4. Participation in the Information Age: New Opportunities for Youth

The literature mainly underlines that young people are apathetic; they are not interested in politics, and they are prone to give their attention to the matters that directly affect their lifestyles. However, these assumptions miscalculate the changing patterns of political participation and the complexity of the channels that young people can reach in this time. With the change in their motivations, the channels that they use are also subject to evolve.

The institutional roots of participation have declined, and are less and less preferred by the youth. They are concerned with the “causes”, not the collectives. One of the important reasons behind this is the weakened role of strong identities. As Melluci states, the relationship between biography and biology/lifecycle has been weakened, diversifying consequences and possible trajectories. Until modern times, a person’s lifetime consisted of clear and determined cycles; however, now, individual biographies are primarily reflexive, individualized constructions in which identities are no longer ‘strong’ (as cited in Rossi: 469).

The literature about youth political participation mainly accepts that young people have apathy towards formal politics, and are reluctant to participate in politics in general. They are portrayed as the ones who do not want to know and care about the politics anymore (Delli Carpini, 2000; Galston, 2001; Levine and Lopez, 2002; as cited in Kovacheva, 2005). However, in contrast to the classical view, there is a new understanding regarding youth political participation, one identified with values and active involvement (Mitev, 1982; as cited in Kovacheva, 2005). It is claimed that they are more motivated to deal with a single issue and to create an environment giving them a chance for self-representation. So, the so-called apathy can only make sense of voting in some countries, but there is an undeniable interest for young people to be part of political activism (Kirby and Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2009).

Chisholm and Kovacheva (2002: 24) claim that there are three forms of political participation regarding young people: involvement in institutional politics (elections, campaigns, and membership), protest activities (demonstrations and new social movements), and civic engagement (associative life, community participation, voluntary work), which cannot be understood as mutually exclusive.

Today, young people tend to become active in politics when they want to encounter specific ideas and projects through specific networks that allow them to share their identity. There have been primarily three reasons behind this in the literature; first, young people usually do not own a house or stable residence, so it is difficult for them to engage in political participation. Secondly, young people prefer new social movements and activities rather than conventional political practices; they tend to care more about single-issue politics. Thirdly, young people are usually claimed to have a negative attitude towards political processes and do not trust them. They usually do not desire to engage in politics with conventional forms; they are more attracted to new forms of political participation. These new forms, as well as and cause-oriented participation, may not always be seen as political forms of participation, but in this frame, “personal is political”. It can be stated that “although some of the newer forms are less ‘political’, they are still valuable indicators for measuring young people’s political participation.” (Quintelier, 2007: 165-167).

Therefore, young people choose less to become members of political parties and less to be involved in formal political debates but rather to participate in single-issue movements and networks (Della Porta and Mosca, 2005; Norris, 2002). They claim that young people are interested in politics but in a different way than previous generations. Norris (2002) talks of ‘a phoenix rising from the ashes’, referring to the fact that disengagement from traditional, conventional, and ‘old’ forms of participation appears to have created new resources that feed on innovative, unconventional, and ‘new’ forms of participation. They may not become members of political parties but are active in non-governmental groups; they may not go to the general elections but will express their opinion about specific issues.

Today, political participation is the ability to express political opinions and exert political influence in both offline and online worlds. Offline political participation includes activities such as attending a rally, donating to a candidate, and talking to people about the political parties. Online political participation consists of forwarding political e-mails, posting political comments on blogs, and following a candidate online (see Cohen, Kahne, Bowyer, Middaugh, and Rogowski, 2012). This is an especially relevant distinction to make when examining political participation among young adults.

Social movements and online demonstrations/actions should be considered as two cooperating concepts, which are not mutually exclusive. If the classical social movements contain actions such as strikes, rallies, and marches, the same kind of actions can take place

on an online basis. In many cases, classical social movements can take place over the Internet. In fact, online activities performed over the Internet may have the potential to gain continuity by organizing. An action that takes place primarily on the streets can likewise inspire online actions on the Internet. The opposite is also possible. Virtual action can also turn into street demonstrations (Bingöl and Tanrıver, 2011: 137). Online actions have the capacity to form tangible results in the real world. They also affect the quality of democracy of the information society. Social movements in the information society aim to balance the state and civil society. Social movements demand the democratization of the relations between the state's social arrangements, public policies, and civil society (Ibid: 140).

It is mostly accepted that young people are more likely to engage in politics when there is a specific cause allowing them to satisfy both personal and social aims (Rossi, 2009: 473-474). So, four possible motivations for political participation have been stated as such: (1) for personal realization through helping others (Beck, 1999: 14), the model generally adopted by volunteers; (2) because of a personal problem; (3) for professional reasons; and/or (4) to put ideas and principles into practice. Also, rejecting institutional patterns and becoming part of the social movement motivate young people (Rossi, 2009: 474). It is evident at that point that their biographical-professional interests and life histories are the most important determinants of motivation. In short, they want to actively participate when they feel like the issue touches their lives, and they desire to see some concrete results and fulfill their desire with regard to personal and social ideas.

The Internet has opened new ways of political participation by lowering the cost and providing the opportunity to access information from all over the world, enhancing the spectrum of political participation. The Internet is a new public environment, which offers a wide array of opportunities for social and political behavior (Bennett 2000; Kann et al., 2007; Shah et al., 2001; as cited in Anduiza, Cantijoch, and Gallego, 2009). It is easy to build a website and express opinions on a certain issue; e-mail campaigning is a fast and cheap way to spread information and gather support. (Anduiza et al., 2009: 860). So, whether or not the existing literature has been answering the current questions regarding political participation becomes a valid inquiry. The main question here is: What are the effect of the Internet and social media use to reduce the inequalities of participation?

One additional question/inquiry about the subject could be: Is there a change in the amount of political participation due to the Internet? In the literature, there are three views

regarding the subject. 1. There would be an atomized society and the reduction of social cohesion (Davis, 1999; Noveck, 2000); 2. According to the normalization hypothesis (Bimber, 1999; Schuefele and Nisbet, 2002), the use of the Internet would have no effect or a fade effect on political participation; 3. The use of the Internet would create a more participative society (cited in Anduiza et al., 2009: 861).

The techno-deterministic approach suggests that the use of the Internet affects political participation. It is presumed that using the Internet and becoming familiar with its patterns pushes people to use the Internet for political participation in a specific way. The Internet reduces the cost of participation and opens a way for people to communicate with each other in the following ways: one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many.

A voluntaristic perspective states that political participation steers the use of technology; online political participation is then expected to mirror offline political participation. The basic idea is that people will not change their political participation just because new opportunities have been created. This fits with the idea of reinforcement (Kraemer et al., 1989); the ones that visit political party websites will mostly be the same ones that attend political meetings and party congresses. Young people who read about politics in newspapers will read about it online; the ones that read about sports will not suddenly decide to visit websites providing political information.

The following relations between the Internet and political participation can then be proposed:

1. Technology changes political participation. From the techno-deterministic perspective, one expects that a high level of Internet use will enhance political participation online. The group of young people who are using the Internet most for political participation would then be the group of 'very high Internet users'. The use of the Internet can also be expected to lead to a shift from more traditional to newer forms of politics since the medium characteristics arguably fit better with new forms of participation.

2. Political participation guides technology use. The voluntaristic perspective states that the offline participation of young people will be reproduced online. The students who are not at all or a little engaged in politics offline will not use the Internet for politics at all, while those who are highly engaged offline will use the Internet frequently for political participation online. One can also expect that there will be no shift in the types of

participation: offline traditional political participation will lead to traditional online participation.

In terms of the advantages of the Internet, it can be argued that anybody can access information about specific interests and related questions. The Internet provides easy contact with other individuals and organizations without the limits of the physical world — leading the way to the single-issue mobilization. The Internet provides greater autonomy to the ones wanting to organize themselves by promoting the involvement of groups and individuals from outside the Institutional area (Castells, 1997). The Internet makes it easier for people to adapt more quickly to the events than political parties and institutions of democracy due to horizontal organization structure, the usage of symbolic resources, and decentralized modes of functioning (as cited in Anduiza et al., 2009: 864.)

According to the civic voluntarism model, developed by Verba et al., if the cost of participating is high, then people tend to be active less, or vice versa. This was the case in 1995; there was no Internet at that moment. The Internet has modified the cost calculation and emerged as a new resource for political participation. So, the Internet opens a door for the ones who can access valid information through valid channels and for the ones who have the cognitive capacity to evaluate that information. For those people, it is expected for them to engage in social and political matters; and political interest may increase as a result (Anduiza et al., 2009: 866).

One of the most important aspects of the new technology is that it creates a non-hierarchical environment for the recipient and emitter of the information and ideas, and contact through the Internet constitutes new lines of communication with interactivity. Interactivity online allows for multiple-participant-based communication. Therefore, Internet users can find new spaces to communicate beyond traditional boundaries (Gastil, 2000).

Over the past decade, the Internet has opened new ways to reach the information. However, it does not guarantee that the Internet will change how users approach politics. Although some scholars fear that the Internet may cause people to abandon their social environment (Nie and Erbring, 2000), other researchers suggest that electronic media have the potential to strengthen social relationships (Hampton and Wellman, 2003; Wellman and Hampton, 1999) and to enhance democracy and increase participation (Anderson, 2003).

A politically knowledgeable electorate is desirable for citizens to make informed decisions (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Political efficacy is a determinant of political behavior — without feelings of competency and beliefs that one's actions are consequential, one has little incentive to participate in politics (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982). Political participation is important because levels of engagement in a democratic system have consequences on the system's equity (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1993). Theoretically, an optimal democracy would contain citizens who possess high levels of political knowledge, efficacy, and participation. Political participation involves taking part in activities related to politics, such as donating to a campaign or attempting to convince others how to vote. Prior investigations of political participation have demonstrated its strong association with several demographic variables, including education, income, and age (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1993; as cited in Kenski and Stroud, 2006)

With the diffusion of social network sites (SNS) such as Facebook and MySpace, social media has become one of the most popular Internet services in the world. SNS are online services that allow users to create an individual profile, connect with other users — usually, people know offline — and navigate through these networks of contacts (Boyd and Ellison, 2008: 211). Social networking technologies had matured, and people became more comfortable using them. According to Inside Facebook, a blog that traces the Facebook platform for marketing purposes, as of December 2006, there were almost 22,000 corporate social networks registered on Facebook. Profiles allow users to learn detailed information about their contacts, including personal background, interests, music tastes, and whereabouts. Users can also communicate with each other through a variety of tools within the same site, including chatting, sending private messages, leaving public comments in users' profiles, linking to outside content, and sharing photos and videos. There are important differences across SNS. Some sites, such as Facebook, target the general population, while others target a niche.

The main question here concerns the boundaries of political participation; is it political participation when one writes a political comment on a website? Furthermore, do online participation mechanisms affect the intensity of political participation?

Political action becomes faster, easier to engage, and more universal thanks to new digital technology (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2002: 466). The political participation, here, covers both conventional and unconventional forms of participation. For example, Dale and

Strauss (2009) state that text messages to remind voters to vote on election day have a positive impact on the turn-out rate. Also, candidates, now, invest time and money to their own or their political parties' websites to reach the voters, because the Internet has been transforming the previous forms of political participation and social movement (see particularly Bennett 2003, Bennett et al., 2008; for a review of this literature, see Earl et al., 2010). So, "engaging politics online leads an increase in political participation offline" as defined by an index of seven self-reported political behaviors.

Through social networking sites (SNSs), we all become both the receiver and the sender of a specific message, which can be related to politics or any other area. So, social media enables people to participate in political discussions via (i.e. receiving news from one's network members), news following (i.e. following the accounts of news sources in SNSs), and news dissemination through SNSs. Social media enables people to obtain news easily (Glynn, Huge, and Hoffman, 2012). This situation provides receivers knowledge about the news and gives them an opportunity to disseminate them. In this created network, people who follow and share the news have started to influence each other's judgment of news value (Singer, 2014).

The main issue here is the question of whether this social media usage leads to political outcomes or not. Based on the psychological approach, if political knowledge increases, so does political participation. Social media makes it easier for individuals to discover information about the things going on around them and around the world; therefore, they are expected to become more involved in politics. Despite this assumption, the results are complicated. Some studies have underlined positive relationships between social media use and political participation (Bode et al., 2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012), while others have found no relationship whatsoever between them (Baumgartner and Morris, 2010).

The bottom line is that if social media leads users to news as a byproduct of searching the Internet, it is unlikely for these people to participate politically in an active way; but if people using SNSs are gathering knowledge, following the news, or engaging in political conversations, then they are more likely to engage in politics and promote political participation. When people talk more and more about politics, they become more and more engaged in it (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz, 1999; Kwak, Williams, Wang, and Lee, 2005; as cited in Hyun, K. D., and Kim, J. 2015).

The accepted notion of the parents' being the key socializers for their children with regards to politics has been changing, and social media and its effects on young people have been replacing their influence.

Communication mediation models should be briefly analyzed to understand digital information technologies. The communication mediation models analyze the relationship between communication activities and democratic outcomes while considering the social factors' inclusion in this process. These models focus on youth communication with regards to every aspect of social life, from family to social media. They conclude that the usage of social media and communication among young people are the main process affecting the forms of participation which are influenced by the family, school and peers (Lee et al., 2013; cited in Bakker, T. P., and De Vreese, C. H., 2011: 671). This model has evolved to the "Citizen Communication Mediation Model" (Shah et al., 2007) underlying that media shapes participatory behavior in an indirect way, through its effects on conventional and unconventional ways of news. This model asserts that online participation channels add a new step to the communication chain, making the people the main mediator getting information through mass media and that they complete the offline participation channels. Expressing political views online gives citizens a chance to reach people outside of their social circle (Southwell and Yzer, 2007). Also, it allows us to spread our views by sharing, and the ones who share our views have the potential to spread these views even further, so the cost and time to disperse the ideas are reduced (Lupia and Sin, 2003).

Borrowing from the "Citizen Communication Mediation Model" (Shah et al., 2007), a theoretical model of youth socialization has been brought out. Three key agents of socialization are listed as family, peers, and school, which affect civic engagement while encouraging different communication behavior. In that manner, there is a difference between online and offline information sources; while conventional online news sources give us the typical reports, nonconventional online news sources focus more on the opinionated and less neutral information. Through promoting opinions and exchanging ideas, online participation promotes political mobilization (Lee et al., 2013). Many studies nowadays show that young people do not choose to participate in traditional channels of politics and regard voting and party affiliation as the main symbols for political participation (Inglehart, 1977, 1997). The younger generation, now, are interested in involving themselves in political processes in local, national and international matters (Tarrow, 1998). So, the emerging forms of political

participation are now inseparable from the social life; it is linked to the civic and volunteerism, and this provides young people with motivations for participation and increases their personal and political efficacy (Verba et al., 1997). Therefore, youth political participation becomes not only political but also a social, thereby socio-political issue (Catellani, 1997 in Mannarini, Legittimo, and Talò, 2008).

The other model regarding digital information technologies is the communication perspective. This perspective regards young people as active participants in their social circle (McDevitt and Chaffee, 2002). So, it is assumed, in this perspective, that learning can be a reciprocal process; it can be from parent to child or child to parent. Also, the socializing agents (parents, schoolteachers, media, social media, friends, etc.) are not seen as mutually exclusive; they are regarded as interdependent (Lee et al., 2013).

According to Habermas (1991), information, citizenship, government, and the public sphere are interconnected through mass media. If we look at Web 2.0 and social media from Habermas' public sphere perspective, we can regard them as facilitators of a deliberation space, where people can exchange ideas freely. In this context, the term cyberdemocracy is introduced as a technocultural goal that intends to create a "healthy public sphere" by providing people access to political advice, analysis, criticism, and representation through communication media (Carrol and Hackett, 2006). Though Web 2.0, social media, and the Internet have the potential to promote a Habermasian public sphere (Habermas et al., 1991), and authors such as Fernback go so far as regarding the Web as a "new arena for participation in public life" (1997: 37), there are issues that should be considered by any "networked nation" regarding the limitations of Web 2.0 and social media as facilitators of social communication.

Therefore, the participation has been shaped via different modes, covering both political and social concerns that seem to be interrelated with each other. Many studies underline that if young people have the opportunity to share political news and views, and gather information via these channels, they are likely to participate in political and social activities (Easton and Dennis, 1967; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Liebes and Ribak, 1992; Sherrod et al., 2004).

Politics is more than just voting, volunteering in a campaign, or attending meetings, and so on. It is much more than that; it seems necessary for a well-functioning democracy.

Politics is also is not only about making decisions regarding the macro/big/important issues and not only about deciding about how to use resources, or provide a public service; it is about making decisions which touch every aspect of life (such as our mode of dress, family structure, or even the number of the kids we should have). So, political participation is not only about delivering power to a representative; it becomes the issue evolving throughout our lives. Nowadays, it is possible to reach out to any authority through social media; so, when it is easy to reach out, citizens become more willing to participate because they know they will be heard.

Political participation requires an act; it is not a mere argument or thought. This act may be performed within the specific period, depending on the pre-determined procedures (as in elections), or within personalized/non-specific periods of time and space, while the procedures may be developed through the process. Whether in one way or another, it requires a will to attend, time, resources, personal or community-related concern, concern about the accountability of the authorities, different tools and means, expected/hoped results, and observing some consequences in your lifestyle.

It is suggested that the more educated people are, the more they want to engage in politics. Voting is assumed to be infrequent, leading to inadequate responses from the politicians regarding key issues, which leave many people feeling dissatisfied. This has pushed people to search for further tools to influence the decision-makers, such as direct contact and contentious politics (Norris, 2002; Stolle et al., 2005; Wuthnow, 2002: 75; Zukin et al., 2006) allowing participants to take an active part in the politics. So, it is assumed that America has been experiencing a new “renaissance of democratic participation”, but a decline in the electoral participation, leading to more direct forms of participation — and they will be in charge of when and how they will be part of the political process (not just waiting for the elections) (Dalton, 2008).

Needless to say, the definition of Verba and Nie is no longer covering the framework of political participation, especially with regard to youth participation. Now, we need to think about passive forms of political participation, participation in the social environment, and the activities not aiming to influence or change the decision-making process. Nelson adds the behaviors outside the sphere of government to the definition. Others (Selingson, Booth, Conge, Sveningsson) underline the importance of activism and social actions.

Özbudun discusses modernization and underlines the different effects of modernization on political participation patterns. The civic voluntarism model developed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brody relates political participation to one's having political causes and necessary resources. For Van Deth, the motivational definition of political participation contains activity, voluntarism, engagement by citizens, and aim to express political intentions. There are referring the personal interests, citizenship, social environment, and social media in the study.

Political values are changing, and so is the definition and the content of the political activity. Therefore, so is political participation.

To that point, the study will focus on the participation patterns of young people because it is significant to analyze the patterns of youth political participation to understand the future of democracy since the transformation of the participation channels will eventually transform the nature of the politics and the patterns of civic engagements as well. According to Joerg Forbrig, "arenas for youth involvement in political and, more broadly, public life, appear to be more numerous than ever before" (2005: 7), yet does it also mean that the young population engage in effective and widespread participation? The evidence shows no proof that supports that conclusion when looking at the voting rates of the youth. However, it cannot be denied that there are changing forms of youth political participation besides involvement in the conventional democratic institution, so new modes of participation have been emerging.

3. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES

3.1. Democracy and Political Participation

Parry et al. (1992: 3) suggest that the notion of political participation cannot be considered apart from democracy; the two are inextricably intertwined. As Verba and Nie point out, if there are a few numbers of people engage in the decision-making process, then there is a democracy, or vice versa (1972: 1). Needless to say, citizens' involvement is necessary for democracy. Pericles states that;

“An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household, and even those of us who are engaged in business have a fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless but as a useless character, and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of policy” (cited in Mackendrick, Lorraine M., 1988: 262).

In line with this, Barber (1984) also argues that private participatory democracy should be supported because private actors are not necessarily to follow the public goods that have a destructive effect on private rights and values. He believes that individual participation in the decision-making process is necessary for a stable democracy, making the citizens an integral part of social life. The political participation of the citizens guarantees the promise of democracy as being the “government by the people” (Van Deth, 2001). Many scholars who are supportive of direct democracy are more likely to encourage citizens to become more engaged in the political process to strengthen democracy (Cree, 1892; Key and Crouch, 1939).

There are four arguments over the relationship between political participation and democracy based on legitimacy, autonomy, state authority, and responsibility. First, many scholars suggest that political participation is at the very center of democracy; without the involvement of the citizens, democracy loses its legitimacy and its guiding force. It is the core element of democratic citizenship (Dahl, 1998; Pateman, 1970; Verba et al., 1995). If citizens do not take part in the discussion and decision-making process of the public policy, then the all-democratic process loses its meaning. Second, political participation is related

to autonomy (Petersson et al., 1998). Autonomy stands for the idea that good citizens should be informed about the acts of government. A good citizen is expected to be sufficiently informed about the public policies and to understand the views of others in that manner. Third, the commitment to social order and the acceptance of state authority is essential. The rule of law and legitimacy of the state are crucial for the citizens because, without the rule of law, the political discussion cannot exist. The fourth element of citizenship involves the relationship with others in the polity; the citizens' intention to take care of each other and their feeling of responsibility for the others in the nation is underlined. In this view, the main argument is that if we want democracy to function well, then there is a need for distributive justice and basic needs, and resources should be available to all (Shklar, 1991).

Supported by Schumpeter (1942) and Sartori (1987), the elitist version of democracy claims that the only role of the individuals is to vote the leaders out of the office; this is a very limited definition of political participation, leading the way to the *liberal* model of democracy, which Riker (1982) defines as consisting of three components. Citizens only hold meaningful preferences over the personnel of government; these preferences are solely expressed indirectly through a system of representation and are considered to be fixed and exogenous to the democratic process itself. However, it is not possible to define political participation with such a narrow point of view. In this context, Verba and Nie (1972) underline the civic part of the term, emphasizing the relationship between citizens and government and putting the citizens in a position to influence and monitor the government's choices and actions. Riker (1982) calls it *populist democracy*, while Teorell (2006) uses the term *responsive model of democracy*, stating that political participation is much more than the voting and campaigning.

However, participation was still considered the indirect action of the citizens, who cannot directly designate the consequences of political actions; this brings us to the third conceptualization of political participation by Gould (1988: 259) called participation as *direct decision-making*. This conceptualization underlines the role of citizens as active actors with immediate responses in the decision-making process. With this, citizens can no longer be seen as the passive receivers of the policies but have the authority to exercise power in the hands of them. So, it is not only about being represented anymore; it is about the self-government (Barber, 1984: 151). But this direct decision-making cannot be understood as bypassing all the representative institutions; it mainly opens a way for the opportunities to

nourish the direct participation outside the conventional manner, mostly on a small scale, such as workplaces (Gould, 1988: 269). A deliberative mode of democracy, on the other hand, focuses on what citizens would say to influence the decision-making process, think arguments over, and make decisions (Fearon, 1998: 61). It consists of mainly political discussion, which does not require a collective decision (Fearon, 1998: 63).

According to Morlino et al. (2011), the quality of democracy can be evaluated through the patterns of political participation. Thus, some scholars have been worrying about the declining interest in electoral and conventional politics because this situation may potentially put democracy itself at stake (Macedo, 2005; Putnam, 2000). Even though current discussions about democracy and participation concern the conventional forms of participation, they now analyze and add the nonconventional forms of political participation literature. Bang (2005) suggests that citizens cannot be said to be apathetic; instead, they feel excluded from the system when they feel like they do not have a voice. So, contemporary liberal democracies cannot be categorized with the increasing apathy but with the different forms of political participation.

Bang is well aware of the individualization of politics and the decline of citizen-oriented participation, leading him to make two main assumptions based on the literature. On one side, there is a claim that if civil engagement decreases, the government will be less effective and responsive (Putnam), a concept referred to as mysterious disengagement. Alternatively, it is suggested that new forms of political participation have been increasing since the collective participation has fallen and led the way to the rise in individualized or micro-political participation (Norris and Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley) — namely, cause-oriented participation.

To Bang, these two theories have two shared assumptions. First, the participation of the citizens aims to influence public policymakers and their decisions. Second, the core of citizen identity revolves around ‘the creation of strong, affective, moral ties, committing citizens to act normatively, responsibly, and in the name of the common good’. For Bang, the main problem with liberal democracies is the free-riding problem — but not the key one. He thinks that individualization will not result in atomization. Democracy will no longer have a core/key political problem. However, there will be ever-changing problems and challenges based on diversity. These problems and challenges will be the keys to understanding democracy.

For Bang, participation means interaction between political authorities and people; therefore, for democratic political relationships to occur, everyone should have the possibility of being heard and of impacting the policymaking process. He defines two types of solidarity based on this assumption: political and social solidarity. The former is weaker and lacks the common good, while the latter calls for the mutual recognition and acceptance of differences through an awareness of the general values. He also underlines two emerging identities as Expert Citizens and Everyday Makers. Neither has a point of view regarding the legitimacy of political authorities or engages in the activities related to the state. Still, each chooses to develop networks with the government or political communities: either full-time (Expert Citizens) or part-time (Everyday Makers). Expert Citizens see the government officials, politicians, administrators, interest groups, and media as partners to influence; they enhance the negotiation with them and try to be effective partners. They are mostly concerned with the problems that they experience every day, such as issues like poverty, gender, and ethnicity. Everyday Makers, on the other hand, make a clear distinction between elite networks and the politics of ordinary people. They desire to feel included but are not interested in gaining influence; they are interested in small local narratives (Li and Marsh, 2008). In my research, I saw that young people in Turkey most certainly want to be included in the process. Those participating in civil society share concerns over their future. However, they show little interest in gaining power through the political system, making them more like Expert Citizens. Young people participating in youth branches show an interest in being part of political processes, making them more like Everyday Makers (2005).

The instrumental view on democracy considers the participants vital and grants the role of decision-making to the individuals who are materially affected by those decisions (e.g. Dahl, 1989; Gant and Lyons, 1993; Hill and Leighley, 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). The assumption is that because individuals have an equal appreciation for democracy, their decisions would be beneficial to all communities (Dahl, 1989: 86). If the individuals displayed a responsibility to present their decision and choices, then they would become active citizens whose needs are to be heard by the authorities. So, if there is no equality in terms of participation, then an equal share of benefits cannot be talked about.

From the different perspective, Marxists, and anarchists underline that democracy is a corrupt type of ruling; and they understand the current systems as the political institutions to

serve for special groups only. They believe that “democracy is a corrupt sui generis” (Springborg, 1984).²

So, how can one achieve equal consideration by the authorities? One answer to this question revolves around the classification regarding the individuals’ shared categories, such as income, gender, etc. This classical viewpoint suggests that an individual from a higher socioeconomic (SES) background is more likely to participate than an individual of a lower SES background (Lijphart, 1997). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady underline the alternative approach to this view and try to understand the underlying reasons through the SES-based participation questions (1995: 271). The question has changed from “who participates” to “who possesses the characteristics enabling participation?”. The answer is that the greater the civic skills and resources (time, for one), the more that the higher-SES individuals engage in politics (Verba et al., 1995). So, if individuals with a higher-SES status are the ones who are more likely to have a chance to transmit their needs to the authorities, they become the authorities’ primary concern. However, with the Internet becoming widespread and the diminishing importance of the social classes, I suggest that young people in Turkey have greater opportunities to participate in politics, regardless of their social status.

Participatory democrats approach political activity as a way of self-development. At the same time, “mobilization of support” theorists, such as Ginsberg (1982) and Weissberg (1975), participation serves to enhance the popular compliance with the governmental authority, and to enhance the feeling of legitimization towards all political systems. These theorists mainly focus on the system’s stability while emphasizing the system’s responsiveness to citizens’ needs and wishes (Ginsberg, 1982: 182). Thus, in that approach, internal political efficacy remains an unimportant motive, and the responsiveness of the regime to the attempted influence is the leading indicator of political participation (Craig, 1979). Trust in political authorities is closely related to this approach. Furthermore, it is suggested that if the external political efficacy is not satisfied and if the trust in the political system declines, political participation declines, too, because citizens do not feel that the government is responsive anymore (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982). Moreover, “mobilization of support” theorists suggest that when individuals vote or feel that the government is responsive, their future political participation stays within the system. This relationship can

² For further info, see: Carpentier, N. (2011). The concept of participation. If they have access and interact, do they really participate?. *CM Komunikacija i mediji*, 6(21), 13-36.

be reversed, too; individuals who do not participate can feel that the government is unresponsive in reinforcing the non-participation. These two relationships suggest the reciprocal causation between external efficacy and electoral participation (Finkel, 1985). In my analysis, I saw that young people in youth branches trust the government and want to be part of the system because they believe that they can make a difference.

3.2. Political Participation in Non-Democratic Regimes

Up to this point, the general definition of political participation and the discussions over political participation have been evaluated. This analysis is mostly based on the democratic ideal of participation. Scholars studying democratization in general, and political participation, in particular, focus primarily on the Western democratic countries, not on the authoritarian states. Thus, it would be crucial to understand the other embedded meanings (if any) to evaluate the term and the process correctly. What does political participation mean in non-democratic countries?

A contemporary project of developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process is typically found in liberal representative democracy alone (x). In this view, democracy is not only a set of rules, procedures and institutional designs, and participation cannot be reduced to engagement in electoral processes. Instead, it is a process through which citizens exercise ever-deepening control over decisions that affect their lives through several forms and in a variety of areas. Full democratic citizenship is attained not only through the exercise of political and civil rights but also through social rights, and it is also about the “right to create rights” through struggles and demands from below. The book reminds us that we cannot assume that the institutional design of “new democratic spaces” will mean that these will automatically become spaces for change (Burnell et al., 2017: x-xv).

At this point, it is claimed that political participation covers not only the political sphere but also the social and economic spheres. Especially in MENA (Middle Eastern and North African) countries (authoritarian states), the content of political participation cannot be degraded to the state or influence on the state. Elections, in that manner, are seen as vital opportunities for political participation, emphasizing the different incentives behind the candidates and voters of the democratic states. How should we conceptualize “political participation” (Burnell et al., 2017)?

As in the case of Iran's 2004 parliamentary and 2005 presidential elections, the elections can be used to maintain pluralistic authoritarianism. In this case, elections are the mechanisms regulating political participation based on the regime's intentions. It is formal, it is legal, and it justifies the current system as intended by the people in power. The purpose behind political participation may differ; for some researchers, such as Albrecht, political participation is about making an impact on public policy. For others, such as Alhamad, it has many other intentions that cannot be limited to influencing public policy. Another discussion concerns "who participates". Some (Laila Alhamad, and Samer Shehata) evaluate the importance of the participation of the broad public — ordinary citizens, while others (Holger Albrecht, Güneş Murat Tezcür and Katja Niethammer) focus on the participation of the elites and its impact (Lust-Okar, 2008).

However, regardless of the actors involving in politics, in non-democratic states, the elections can be the tools for justification of the current regime. For instance, in Egypt and Jordan, citizens are encouraged to vote via service offerings and access to state patronage (Shehata, 1992). Also, as in the case of Iran, citizens can be forced to vote if they want to get access to state services. In Palestine, on the other hand, voters dream of having an impact on elections and see voting as a tool to change ruling elites and improve the quality of their own lives. There are significant differences regarding political participation in MENA countries; these differences result in different voter motivations. High turnout means varying things in those countries. For instance, in Iran, high turnout in the election can be seen as a sign of the legitimization and justification of the current regime because voting is perceived as the national duty (Tezcür, 2010). Also, it may be the mechanism of sustaining internal conflicts, as in the case of Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran under the Shah.

Moreover, as in the case of Tunisia, political parties' power to influence current politics depends not only on their political success but also on their success in connecting with other institutions, such as civil society organizations; both formal and informal institutions are used to make a statement. In this context, Laila Al-Hamad argues, "probably the most ubiquitous forms of participation in the MENA region are those of the informal realm, many of which are perpetuated by the rigidity of the formal political sphere. When the state, through its formal institutions, represses, excludes, or fails to listen or respond to people's needs, people resort to the informal realm." (as cited in Lust-Okar and Zerhouni: 8); this can lead to unsustainable political and economic development in the long run.

Also, there cannot be one way to classify formal and informal participation channels, as they are mutually exclusive. For example, in the case of Bahrain, both parliamentarians and opposition — whether they are formal or informal institutions — shape their agenda based on the relationship between them and the state; in one case, it might be more efficient to reach out informal institutions than formal ones or vice versa. The political relationship is merely based on the topic of the battle. In those countries, there is a fluid boundary between formal and informal institutions. Thus, not only political actors but also clerical actors play an essential role in participation in the Middle East, where social networks shape participation patterns. These patterns mostly depend on power relations and obtaining resources. Therefore, not only formal and informal channels of participation but also intimate venues and social identities play a significant role in political participation.

One other aspect of the politics in those countries is that international forces play a part in influencing their political participation patterns in some way; this is more or less direct in various countries. In some countries, this effect may be seen as about getting a balance to the competing elites, while in others, such as Egypt, it can be about putting pressure on the government regarding the debated issues, such as media freedom. Some authors are critical on that subject, while others see these efforts of the international community as the right kind of pushing towards democratization in those authoritarian states.

However, in most cases, this situation only makes the West feel good about themselves and leads those states to care about the reforms to reduce public frustrations. So, as in the case of Jordan, electoral turnout is used primarily as a tool for the sustainability of the system, and low levels of the population had real confidence in the government. Alhamad's recommendation on this point is that: "To remedy this situation, the debate on democratization in the region needs to move away from its focus on funding and quick fixes to consider options for political change based on the reality on the ground" (as cited in Lust-Okar and Zerhouni, 2008).

Also, in delegative democracies, which were inspired by the systems applied in Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and in Asian countries, such as Korea, although they often hold elections by democratic methods, they lack democratic institutions that can reflect their preferences. In a delegative democracy, which can be defined as one where the leader (the candidate who won the presidential elections) runs the country as he wishes until the next election, that leader can face serious political problems after the

elections; this cannot be described as a consolidated democracy. So, in such countries, whoever wins the elections will have the power to redesign the rules of the game to their advantage or to affect the future of democracy in the country, which, in turn, will have a profound impact on the future political developments in the country (Bingöl, 2009:114-117).

3.3. Democracy and Civil Society

The term civil society comes from the term *societatis civilis*, referred to as “an ordered and peaceful society, one governed by law” (Hodgkinson and Foley, 2003: ix). Although the intention behind civil society can be summarized with these nine words, the term has gained many different — and sometimes interrelated — meanings throughout time.

Karaman and Aras suggest that Western philosophers have been arguing about the definition of the term civil society for an extended period of time. Based on this long-time discussion, civil society discussions have been concentrated in two spheres, representing the developmental stages of Western Europe and referring to the theoretical concept as a part of historical philosophy. Historical analysis suggests that with the bourgeoisie’s acquisition of power in the Middle Ages, civil society (as a term) began to include civil rights and the new autonomous way of life that arose from the state intervention. The historical philosophy side, on the other hand, underlines the definitions of intellectuals from different points of view (2000: 42).

The term is referred by Aristotle when he defines Greek polis as the association of associations that are linked by friendship and religious loyalty to the homeland and have evolved around virtue. In contrast to Aristotle, liberal tradition promotes free and fair politics and sees human nature in a pessimistic way, dictating that there needs to be an agreement to live in harmony. Hume, as an example, argues that a societal agreement based on the rule of law, not the King, leads to a well-governed society. On the other hand, Kant and Madison underline that there is no need to try to establish a social harmony to achieve fair policy; what is necessary is the plurality of interests and an environment that enables them to evolve. The plurality of interests is favorable, just like Smith suggests in the economic competition, which would be promoting greater wealth than when it is regulated (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: ix - xiii).

One step forward, modern civil society tradition emphasizes the arbitrary inequalities, class divisions, and diverse human needs, along with the human effort to shape their lives according to ethical norms (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003, p.xiv). Marx suggests that a man in civil society is a profane being, as a private acting individual, and treats others as means (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: 103). According to Marxist theory, the term has been linked with bourgeoisie society and, currently, civil society, representing the free association and voluntary organizations; civil life becomes the main understanding (Karaman, 1990: 4-8).

Gramsci had led to the renewal of civil society language by emphasizing the civil society's role as the voice of the dominant class — as another way for the dominant class to hold power and to achieve their interests. The ideological and cultural hegemony are reproduced by the dominant class in the civil society arena, where they can counter with counter-hegemonic ideas (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: xix). Ferguson adds to the literature of civil society and the civil acts by underlying the importance of vigorous and public-spirited men to build a strong nation and urges us to avoid degenerate and cowardly men forming a weak nation (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: 57).

Cohen and Arato, on the other hand, focus on the discourse of civil and emphasize the non-class base of civil society, which gains its power from collective action and respecting the rule of law (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: 271).

Dewey and Arendt underline the civil society as the public sphere and as an arena of contestation. Habermas, further, added the communication side to the term and defined the term as the democratically communicative public sphere (in Edwards, 2009: 9). Therefore, as Edwards argues, civil society is about the things that we, as individuals, make for social change (Edwards, 2009: 124). The vital characteristic of civil society stems from the idea that individuals do what they want to do when they want to do it, not because they are told to do so by the state, government, or market. So, it is a “force for good, fuel for change in the practices of states and business, and it motivates people to raise their voices in the public sphere” (Edwards, 2009: 125).

Therefore, the term has evolved to its modern definition, which covers many features. It evolved through the concerns of human beings rather than the state, the non-class base instead of the class base. It focused on diverse human needs to change or to fulfill them rather than focusing on social change while resting upon the modern ideals, such as the

democratization and liberalization of society. At that point, Norton, representing the liberal view, defines the role of civil society as a promoter of liberalization and democratization by encouraging free speech and conflict with the arbitrary power and by supporting the popular demands by-elections (Şimşek, 2004: 52).

In the modern form, civil society is seen as based on free will, as a voluntary arbitrator between main interests, and as an intermediary between the household and the state. At the same time, it is independent of state intervention and glorifying public opinion against the control of the dominant power. So, there is an interaction between civil society and the state, which leads the way to the various approaches.

In terms of the relationship between civil society and the state, there are three prevailing assumptions. First, the liberal approach sees the term civil society as the individual or group autonomy from the state. As argued by Gellner, “civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.” (1994).

Secondly, as Beckman suggests, civil society and the state should not be seen as separate domains; instead, they are the products of common political culture and conflicts. So, the conflict or struggle begins among themselves rather than with each other (Şimşek, 2006: 50–51). Therefore, it can be suggested that while a liberal approach refers to civil society, as opposed to the state and pro democracy, a critical approach defines it as a neutral and multi-directional situation, representing the Anglo-American and Continental-European traditions regarding the concept of civil society (Şimşek, 2006: 51).

The third assumption proposes a middle way among the first two, as Edelman (2003) states that civil society is an intermediary sphere between the household and the state. So, the role of civil society as an autonomous influencer on the state remains crucial to promote civil rights (Bhatti, 2000: 1033).

As it is claimed by modern theory, the reason why it is essential to become independent from state control lies in the very heart of democracy; this autonomy ensures the democratic civil society. In that manner, civil society emerges as a reaction to the authority and authoritarian and dictatorial power. The civil society, representing public opinion, becomes

the core of autonomous individuals or groups. So, it can be stated that “civil society serves as the foundation for democratic theory as well. Civil society can be seen as the social basis of a free and pluralist democracy” (Karaman, 1990).

In this study, the focus has become primarily on the civil society organizations’ influence over society and their reaction about the recent conditions within different channels — which is independent from the state intervention — to promote the importance of public opinion, free will, pluralist democracy, and a vision regarding the future of a society which we live in. Civil society envisions an idea of such a society through different organizations or groupings in real life. They may be given different names and serve for different interests, but, in the end, participants want to provide a voice to some issues that would be highlighted for many different reasons. At that point, I also find it important to examine civil initiative, civil disobedience, social movement, new social movement, and contentious politics to grasp the features of nonconventional forms of political participation and their differences and similarities.

3.4. From Civil Society to Contentious Politics

3.4.1. Civil Initiative

The civil initiative is one way for public opinion to flourish. The difference between a civil society initiative and civil society organization is that an initiative may be formal or informal, and one individual is enough to start with, while civil society organization is a formal and organized grouping of individuals. So, collective interests are the primary influences that make civil society more union and solidarity-based (Bhatti, 2000: 1038).

The civil initiative is a sum of knowledge, compassion, incentive, and fear. Knowledge stands for the specific knowledge leading to a collective benefit, compassion stands for the initiator’s will to contribute to the collective good, incentive stands for the personal or collective gains, and fear stands for the fear of losing something (Bhatti, 2000: 1040). Three types of these initiatives are listed as proactive, including the motivation behind the action, reactive, representing the response to the events outside, and induced, representing the collective activities sponsored or encouraged by the state agencies (Bhatti, 2000: 1040).

In terms of the responsible person or the initiators of the civil initiatives, there would also be three types, namely, indigenous, hybrid, and polymorphic. The first one argues that the initiator is an organic part of the initiative, the second one states that initiative is based on the internal and external entities (public and private matter), and the last one suggests the initiative to be supported, mostly by a public sector agency (Bhatti, 2000: 1040).

The civil initiative can be categorized under three titles in terms of their management structure; pure, buffer, and proxies. Pure organizations' managers are independent of external entities, such as government and donors. In contrast, buffer organizations include the representatives from the government entities and require consultation from other agencies as well. Proxies' organizations behave like the branches of international organizations, such as most NGOs (Bhatti, 2000: 1041).

It is suggested that “voluntary engagement” and the “community of nonprofit organizations” (NPOs) are used interchangeably with civil-initiative organizations (Sungurov, 2000: 48). The community of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) emphasizes the problems or concerns of its members; mutual-aid NPOs underline the common misfortune or handicap of the people forming this organization, such as parents of the sick children. They differ from the club-like NPOs, which emphasize the common interests of the various groups. Socially-oriented NPOs deal with humanitarian and social issues. Furthermore, ecological NPOs deal with the protection of not only the environment but also the culture. Also, there are legal defense organizations watching and monitoring legal procedures. Infrastructural NPOs support the other NPOs with research, education, or other activities (Sungurov, 2000: 48).

Civil-initiative organizations fail to challenge the authority in a societal base. Although they envision an ideal for society, their focus is limited when compared to civil society. They can be seen as a branch of a civil society that emphasizes the concerns or needs of specific groups or individuals.

3.4.2. Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience refers to the political action aiming to amend laws and government policies which are publicly engaged, nonviolent, and moral but not legal. It emerges when citizens feel that their objections are not heard anymore by the political actors and when they

feel certain doubts in terms of the legitimacy of the government because neglected rights are turned into an identity struggle by the people who want to have them. Identity makes rights and freedoms natural and binds the people who fully belong to the same identity (Tatar and Çelik, 2013: 54).

Civil obedience is an act performed in the public sphere, which calls everyone, is moral and distant from violence, and enjoyed with underlying peaceful motivations. If it becomes restrictive to others' rights and freedoms and threatening to others, it loses its main characteristics. It is nothing like a militant protest and an organized struggle based on violence; it does not attack the dominant justice understanding. Civil disobedience is not a revolution; instead, it acts in the frame of the general frame of the authority, accepts the legitimacy of the legal system, and aims to make a difference in the current system (Ibid).

It is very acceptable and encouraged to perform social movements in democracies; however, as mentioned, these movements — flourishing thanks to democracy — have been challenging the current or dominant way of democracy and demanding more radical or progressive ones, so they are using the opportunities inherent in their current democracies to challenge and update the existing democracies.

3.4.3. Social Movements

Social movements come on the scene when the autonomy of civil society must be supported and when further democratic and civil rights claims must flourish. A social movement requires a democratic political culture to be alive. Social movements bring new issues, topics, and concerns into the public domain, try to resolve the contradictions, and produce a consensus (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2003: 286). A social movement is defined by Diani (1992: 1) as:

“a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations engaged in political or cultural conflict based on a shared collective identity.”

“Collective identity is a crucial aspect of social movement activity. The formation of a collective “we” and its extension to include those who are indifferent or opposed to “our” vision is the principal political action of the movement. Social movements work by persuasion: making injustices or problems visible, creating knowledge and persuasive arguments, and effectively constructing social reality in such a way that ignoring those

injustices or problems becomes impossible. In this respect, and rather oddly perhaps, a social movement aims to dissolve itself; it is successful when it becomes “a way of seeing” generally, rather than a bonded if a loosely-networked group of activists who share a common perspective” (Nash, 2005).

This definition emphasizes the unstructured characteristics of these movements (Della Porta, D., and Diani, 1999: 16) but underlines political goals differing them from social clubs and voluntary organizations (Woods, 2003).

As Zirakzadeh notes, social movements represent a type of interest groups or political parties feeling irritated by social routines and trying to use legal codes to justify their means (2006: 2-5) as similar to civil disobedience, but they differ from it by bonding with the government institutions if necessary. The parliamentary system in industrial society is shifting from participatory democracy to social movements that are the driving force of society (Erkan, 1994: 80-98).

Della Porta and Diani argue that there is a diversity of the protests that originated from the end goals and their complexity. But one of the most important goals of the movements is to build support, so they have to be significant enough to find a voice in the media and the public so that they can be justifiable in terms of their causes (Della Porta, D. and Diani, 1999: 183).

Social movements evolve based on informal relationships between diverse and conflictual issues and the ones representing themselves with these issues (Diani, 1992). So, social movements take the shape of networks, connecting the ideas, organizations, individuals, and movement actors based on solidarity (Melucci, 1996). This network and relationship go beyond direct communication, covering both private and public spheres, extending the boundaries of communication, and creating new communication channels and new identities.

For Touraine, the important actors in the social movements and social transformation evolve around individuals, not states. Struggles of social movements emerge in the social realm, not the state, which promotes the status quo and prevents radical changes. Information and knowledge are the key issues, promoting the social and cultural sides of the conflicts rather than economic concerns (Nash, 2005: 108).

Melucci sees social movements as an outcome of everyday practices influencing collective identity. For Melucci, social movements are “invisible, submerged networks” carrying experiments and allowing new experiences in life while forging collective identities. Social movements emerge from mostly invisible phenomena and then evolve and gain strength over time (Nash, 2005: 113–114).

3.4.4. New Social Movements

From the beginning of the 1970s, old class-based movements began to diminish in importance as a core running principle of the actions, while as Crouch and Pizzorno argue that class struggles have sustained their places in the movements; they have taken different forms of protests, calling attention to problems other than those of class, such as the struggles of students, women, and other social groups that have had a say in the current system. It was a total change in terms of struggle-base. Touraine saw this change as proof of the new type of society: post-industrial society — while Bell saw it as an extension of industrial society, underlying the fact that these so-called new movements presented the actors similar ways of struggling, ones that were not exclusively based on material concerns (as cited in Wieviorka, 2005: 5).

In the 1970s, the question that political-process theorists asked was how the groups and people engaged with collective protests, rather than conventional political involvement channels, assemble collectively. For Gamson, Tilly, and McAdam, the interest of the collective actors was crucial at that point, and these interests eventually play a role in accessing the political resources for basic purposes (Gamson 1975, Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982 as cited in Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 286).

However, new social-movement theorists (Touraine 1981, 1985, Melucci 1985, 1989, Offe 1985, Castells 1997, Laclau and Mouffe 1985, as well as Lerafta et al.'s 1994 overview) argue that participation in these social movements cannot be regarded as the proof of the way of accessing a political bargaining position; there was no expectation for these activists to gain any political and economic gains from the formal or political institutions to fulfill their interests in conventional terms. The primary purpose behind all their actions is to show and support the new types of identities and lifestyles that are strange to the mainstream and long-rooted types of life; novel forms of collective action, namely, "postindustrial",

"programmed" (Touraine, 1981), "information" (Melucci, 1996), or "network" society (Castells 1997, as cited in Polletta and Jasper, 2001: 286).

According to Laclau and Mouffe, these movements arose as a response to new hegemonic formation taking place after WWII. This process follows three main stages: the first one is the expansion of the logic of capitalist production relations towards the ensemble of relationships in the society (1992: 197); the second one is the interventionist character of the welfare state itself because as social relationships are increasingly materializing, the state expands and intervenes across a wider space, which empowers the bureaucracy and makes it more and more interventionist. Eventually, new types of struggle against this intervention occur (1992: 198–199). The last phase is the development of mass communication devices, which lead the mass culture to create new belonging types. Therefore, new social movements are born as a response to the materialization, bureaucratization, and homogenization of social life (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992: 201).

Offe (1987) states that the fundamental issues, such as the distribution of material wealth or economic growth, which formal institutions have attempted to solve and corporate bargaining has evolved to the new paradigm — depending on the issues, such as environmental problems, human rights, and peace — in which action is informal (in Woods, 2003: 315). For Offe (1985), this was the new and radical politics aiming for the critique of established rules and procedures. As Della Porta and Diani (1999: 12) summarized in Offe's view, new social movements are characterized by “an open, fluid, organization, inclusive, and non-ideological participation, and greater attention to social than to economic transformation”.

The basic difference between the social movements and new social movements was their point of origin; while the first one arises as a result of material inequalities — based on industrial capitalism and the classes it created — new social movements were motivated by non-material considerations (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995: 183 as cited in Woods, 2003: 315).

New social movements also differ from social movements based on content because the interests of the new social-movement activists come from the political places that are determined by the social activists themselves, and not from their class positions. So, there is a transition to post-industrial movements that are going beyond the instrumental problems

of class struggles (Buechler, 1995; Inglehart, 1990; Parkin, 1968 as cited in Coşkun, 2006: 69).

These new movements differ from old movements on that basis: they are non-instrumental, closer to civil society, informal, and nonhierarchical organizations using the mass media effectively underlying the cultural differentiation; while past movements were class movements engaged with parties, trade unions, and formal institutions serving the economic interests in a conflict base. Therefore, as Touraine, Melucci, and Offe argue, new social movements are more about socio-cultural situations rather than socio-economic and socio-political issues.

As Melucci argues, the concerns of new social movements are more symbolic when compared to social movements motivated by material concerns. For the activists, the underlying motivation behind these new movements is to assert who they truly are; each movement is an identity battle to affirm what others deny (Melucci, 1989: 46). According to him, in complex societies, the personal aspects of our lives, such as health and sexuality, are under increasing control. Thus, no one can assume that power is only about the administration of subjects anymore; it also includes the usage of resources that intervene in every aspect of our lives (Melucci, 1989: 208–209). Therefore, individuals have more than before to express themselves, and new social movements make sense to them because they address their personal needs (Nash, 2005:115).

It can be suggested that “the 'new' social movements are “non-instrumental and oriented towards civil society rather than the state and involve a focus on the symbolic politics of culture, lifestyle and participation rather than the centralized and bureaucratic politics of the nation-state” (Taylor, 2010).

This change in the nature of social movements, leading the way to the new ones, is explained by many scholars with different points of view. According to Offe, new social movements flourish in a social-democratic environment, with the expansion of the service sector and education system; they reject the materialist outlook of labor movements and depend on the universalism of new social movements. The “new social movements’ mobilization constituted a politics of class but not politics on behalf of a class” (Offe, 1987: 77).

For Habermas, new social movements represent the break from bureaucratization and stand for the expression of the everyday values of communities and individuals and lead the way to democratic deliberation in the public sphere (Habermas, 1983).

New social movements are the products of the search for a new type of politics based on personal respect and intellectual satisfaction (Inglehart, 1990). This process further expanded through globalization and individualization, as Melucci (1996) argues, and was shaped by the experiments expressing the different ways of living and conflicting with the dominant cultural codes of society. Therefore, these new social movements represent a change and an awareness of societal logic as accessing the information all around the world becomes more manageable. As Melucci states, new social movements create new social spheres/public spaces between the state and civil society (Taylor, 2010).

Melucci underlines the thought-provoking characteristic of the new social movements because they lead individuals to think about the things they live with every day and question the reasons and consciousness behind them. New social movements engage in activities that would conflict with the dominant system; as Melucci puts it, they can be seen as the agents of counter-hegemony, creating the new or alternative forms of politics and organizations (as cited in Hardy, 2009: 17). Therefore, activists would want to effect a change in the dominant societal views, not the economic conditions; this shift in public perceptions would be their leading cause. As Melucci states, “The principal power is embedded in their capacity to organize the minds of the people” (Melucci, 1996: 179).

According to Melucci, also, the search for the new forms of movements is the sign of the failure of dominant classes to keep society united in solidarity; he underlines the importance of shifting the debate to the cultural structure of the societies, which have been long dominated by the economic and political structure (1980: 217). In this respect, Melucci asserts that the tendency of “new social movements” to concern themselves with aspects of cultural life is a key to liberation from dominance by the prevailing social order of the capitalist economic system” (Hardy, 2009: 18).

New social movements celebrate new ideas and values and stand against state regulation and the position of civil society as a place for deprivation. Thus, as the agents of the domination of society, political institutions are directly opposed (Kriesi 2007; Berbrier 2002; Offe 1985). They do not want to be part of conventional political forms; instead, the

activities take place in the social sphere instead of political spheres (Feher and Heller 1983 in Tridico, 2011: 158).

According to Melucci, their fundamental concern was not to challenge the state; instead, they create alternative and symbolic ways to achieve their purposes (Melucci 1981: 190-191 as cited in Tridico, 2011: 59). The attempt of new social movements to isolate themselves from the politics is based on the idea of creating as autonomous an area as possible for the members; social changes are best effected through challenging the values and identities of the actors, not through political action (Melucci 1981: 189 as cited in Tridico, 2011: 59). These movements are the agents of change in mainstream and conventional values and norms, with the creation of alternative lifestyles and the reconstruction of individual and collective wills (Scott 1990: 17-18 as cited in Tridico, 2011: 60).

Cultural and political versions of the new social movements clarify two sides of these movements. The cultural version claims that social integration is based upon cultural conditions; there is a split from the past movements to the current ones. This version focuses on the daily life practices, civil society, and the creation of an independent area between the state and civil society while underlining the decentralized position of power and resistance. The core of new social movements is linked through the values and ideologies that define the movement, not through the classes. Therefore, new social movements have been replacing class conflict and going beyond class politics. From that point of view, this version can be called as disengagement/split theory because there is not a continuity but a split from the old movements; and this view is supported by Habermas (1994), Laclau ve Mouffe (1992), Inglehart (1990), Touraine (1988), Melucci (1995), Castells (1997), and Cohen ve Arato (1992) (as cited in Coşkun, 2006: 70).

Social actors no longer fight for the history but for themselves and more willing to gain their freedoms rather than to take control of things; they want to be themselves and to avoid exploitation by the tools of power, coercion, and propaganda. Thus, their main protest is against the discursive and instrumental obstructs in front of their goals, their projects, their aims, and the conflict they want to engage with. The actor wants to be viewed as an individual in this movement, not as a part of collective freedom. Therefore, new conflict/struggle grounds have arisen, and this has led the way to new social movements focusing on the targets of the production of cultural goods, replacing the social class with

social movement (Coşkun, 2006: 71). This cultural shift underlines the new social movements' basis as the new form of identity politics dealing with the recognition and cultural autonomy (Taylor, 2010).

Unlike the cultural version, the political version depends on the neo-Marxist approach, treats capitalism as social integration, and underlines the strong bonds between advanced capitalism and the emergence of new social movements. From that point of view, if the movements based on class struggles do not detract attention from the movements based on class-based conflicts, both can form an alliance and coalitions, and new social movements can lead to progressive change (Coşkun, 2006: 73).

The social base of these movements is middle class, farmers, craft and related trades workers, and the ones who do not participate in the labor market directly, such as students, unemployed people, and housewives (Coşkun, 2006: 74).

There are two ways of building an identity in new social movements. One is related to the autonomy that individuals have been experiencing in the movement; this individual autonomy leads actors to feel as if they are part of a movement and develop a consciousness that they are contributing some change in the social and political structure. This creates solidarity among the members of the group and strengthens the commitment to the movement. The second posture is the movement's separation from the political structure, which would not directly influence, intervene, or exert control over the members of the movement (Buechler 1995; Melucci 1985 in Tridico, 2011: 60).

The advantages of new social movements are their ignorance of economic and class reductionism and their purpose of building the areas in which new identities can flourish. Their disadvantages are that they fail to answer the question of how social movements originate and how social action has been organized and that they ignore possible connections between civil society and state, between movements and political reform (Buechler 2000; Canel 1992 as cited in Tridico, 2011: 63).

The values and ideas that are expressed by the new social movements, such as individual freedom, equality, peace, and collective social organizations, cannot be said to be "new". They are inherited from the progressive movements of the proletariat and bourgeoisie throughout history. So, these movements cannot be referred to as either anti-modernist or post-materialist movements. In that manner, the rise of the new movements can be seen as a

result of the inner conflicts and inconsistencies of the modern cultural values, not as the result of the conflict between “dominant” and “new” values (Offe, 1985: 835-836 as cited in Coşkun, 2006: 74).

According to Offe, old and new social movements cannot be thought opposite of or rival each other; they share some continuity. However, old movements have organized around formal and hierarchic structures, while the new movements consist of the organizations, which are informal and spontaneous. While social movements form around the socioeconomic groups that have conflicting interests, the new social movements form around the socioeconomic groups, which do not come together based on collective interests (in Coşkun, 2006:76).

In terms of the motivations behind new social movements, first, it can be suggested that new social movements go beyond classes (Rose, 1997: 466); they are rebelling against the over-rationalization of the society (Offe, Melluci), and they promote participatory democracy and different lifestyles and have a critical say about technology and its relationship with progress (Rose, 1997: 467).

In terms of actors, issues, values, and modes of action, old and new social movements can be differentiated. The former revolves around specific interests as labor movements, while the latter underlines the interests of any group while cutting across the class lines. While the former emphasizes individualism and personal material gains, the latter concentrates its focus on personal autonomy and self-determination. In terms of organizational structure, the former embraces more formal and conventional political channels, while the latter flourishes under more informal and equality-based structures (Rose, 1997: 468).

The second motivation lies in the new social movements’ identity-focused agendas, which have led the way to critiques of large-scale processes, such as industrialization and urbanization, and how these indicators have affected the tendencies towards discrimination or exclusion (Polletta and Jasper, 2001).

Thirdly, as Offe predicts, the new paradigm is that ‘new’ social movements have emerged in which the individual material gain to the participant is not apparent — but where the costs of participation are balanced by the aim of achieving some greater good.” (Woods, 2003: 315).

Fourthly, as Jean Cohen (1985), Jürgen Habermas (1987), Melucci (1989), and Alain Touraine (1981) have underlined, the main targets of the movements at the end of the twentieth century had changed from more state-based concerns to societal and daily life concerns. New social movements were not defined as political because they did not demand anything from the state directly or from state power (Offe 1985 as cited in Tuğal, 2009: 424).

3.4.5. Contentious Politics

Tarrow and Tilly define contentious politics, pointing out that it consists of people struggling for each other, making demands and critiques of authorities, collectively using public performances, and using mostly informal norms to advance their claims (2007: 2–4).

Contentious politics are defined with three interrelated features of social life; contention, collective action, and politics. Contention means one party's claims on another, bringing subjects, objects, and claims together. Collective action occurs when the members in the movement take steps to actualize the shared interests, with the contention and government involvement. Politics refers to interactions with government agencies. The responsibility of governments is crucial as the receiver of the contentious claims; they must be a party in the action. When they all come together, power, shared interests, and government come together also. The claims that are made collectively lead the people to form coordination among themselves, and this coordination makes them political; they gain political identities (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 5–9).

For them, social movement is about organizing campaigns to emphasize claims and interests with repeated performances, such as marches, rallies, demonstrations, the creation of specialized associations, public meetings, public statements, petitions, letter writing and lobbying, repeated public displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment by such means as wearing colors, marching in disciplined ranks, etc. From that point of view, most forms of contentious politics cannot be regarded as social movements (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 8).

Contentious performances are defined as collective claims of political actors on other sets of political actors through mass demonstrations as visible, compelling performances. Contentious repertoires are stated as “arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors” (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 11).

The Internet represents the means of mobilization as a tool to assemble or coordinate people in demonstrations, coordinating modular performances (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 13).

Contentious politics depends on collective claims, which are made with interactive ways involving governments as claimants, objects of claims, or third parties. So, from that point of view, social movements, civil wars, and struggles can be regarded as a form of contentious politics. They are transformative events leading social appropriation with an identity base while producing political opportunity structures (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007: 23, 34, 183, 197).



4. YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE

Before analyzing the political participation patterns of Turkish youth, some statistical data must be examined to understand the importance of the youth population in the country. 16.1% of the Turkish population consists of young people (15-24 ages- May 2018: 2017 Gençlik İstatistikleri- TÜİK). The unemployment rate is 20.8% among young people. 24.2% of the young people were neither employed nor in education. Among the employed young population, 18% were employed in the agricultural area, 30.4% in the industrial area, and 51.6% in the service sector. Nine out of ten young people have access to the Internet. 61.3% of the young people indicated that they are happy, and most of them showed being healthy as their primary source of happiness. According to TUIK, the age range of youth is 15-24, as in the case of UNICEF and the UN.

Quantitative research studies on this subject of youth political participation in Turkey are the studies of the ARI movement called “Turkish youth and participation” in 1999, 2003, and 2008, which conclude that there is no significant difference between the ratio of the young people participating the youth branches (Yılmaz ve Oy, 2014: 28-29). Another study conducted by KONDA states that by 2013, 12% of the youth joined the political party’s youth branches, or took part in the political party actively (34). The book, titled “*Gençler Tartışıyor*” and edited by Cemil Boyraz, evaluates the young people between the ages of 18-24 in a focus group study and directly emphasizes the youth branches subject. Emre Erdoğan’s article (2009) in this book covers the motivations for and obstacles to participation in this process. In the same book, Cemil Boyraz studies the difficulties of engaging in politics via the youth branches in political parties.




Figure 4.1. Population Projections — 2015-2017

Source: TurkStat

Turkey, with half of its population under the age of 31 in 2016, has the largest youth population when compared with countries in the EU.




Figure 4.2. Population-Age Group Pyramid — 2016

Source: TurkStat

In the past decade, Turkey's age-dependency ratio has continued its downward trend, allowing extra room for government expenditure on healthcare, social security, and education.




Figure 4.3. Age Dependency Ratio by Region (% of working-age population)




Figure 4.4. Age Dependency Ratio by Country (% of working-age population)

Source: World Bank

Turkey's labor force is around 30.5 million people, which makes Turkey the 3rd largest labor force market in Europe. Turkey's young population is an essential contributor to labor force growth and has boosted the country's rank over its competitors. Turkey has posted the largest labor force growth when compared to other EU countries.






Figure 4.5. Labor Force — 2016

Source: OECD, World Bank, ISPAT




Figure 4.6. Number of Universities and University Graduates

Source: CoHE

The main issue in Turkey regarding the young population is that, even though youth is the largest percentage of the entire population, the policies and strategies for them are low in number. One of the most important attempts to change this is the establishment of the Ministry of Youth and Sports in 2011, allowing policymakers to make comprehensive policies with a relatively large budget. However, this situation illustrates how the official policy for young people tends to be organized around the leisure and sport base, rather than around making them a meaningful part of social and political life (Sener, 2014: 72) Despite the establishment of youth centers under Ministry, these centers' activities are more likely to educate and provide jobs for young people and, especially in rural areas, this is more difficult to achieve.

The decrease in the age of candidacy in national elections is a major attempt for young people to participate in politics. Article 58 of the Constitution states that “the future of the Republic is entrusted to this group, as opposed to other sections of society defined within the Constitution, such as women, people with disabilities, or citizens”, and the state is responsible for the training and the development of the youth. It is stated that the constitution draws the frame of state's intervention on youth affairs to limit them in civic and political participation, and lacks the support for young people (Sener, 2014: 73). So, the constitution seems to disregard the rights and needs of youth.

According to the Turkish Civil Law (2001), 18 is the age when adulthood starts. According to the Regulations on Youth Centers (2003), those aged between 12 and 24 are eligible for membership to youth centers. Also, at the age of 15, one can be a member of a children's association or establish one.

According to Kurtaran et al. (2008), young people have been associated with certain goals and responsibilities; for one, they are the future of our society. During the last decade, the Prime Minister gave the duty of raising a faithful generation to the state. A representative of an NGO states the need for young people to be “secular, inquisitive, curious, and critical individuals”. However, there is no specific program that encourages these young people to participate in politics. As a member of the Grand National Assembly Commission for National Education, Culture, and Sport from the main oppositional party indicates, there is no intention to encourage youth civic and political participation (9). So, there is little provided by either conventional or unconventional channels of participation to encourage the young population to be part of the process.

Şener and Ataman et al. (2012) indicate that young people tend to see that there is a relationship between socio-economic status and being citizens. Poverty and unemployment are seen by them to be equal to discrimination and prejudice; these factors prevent them from becoming full citizens. Also, Şener underlines that even university graduates seem to have very little information about civic participation (2012: 76). Despite the membership of the Council of Europe and the European Commission, the Revised European Charter for Youth Participation in Local and Regional Life does not appear to be well-implemented. Therefore, one can say that even though civic participation of the youth is an important issue for youth policy development, it is not considered the key issue for policymakers.

When talking about the history of youth, the needs and expectations of the time and society matter. For example, in the nation-state period, the education of the youth was given importance. And, then, all other modern ideologies emphasized youth as a major issue. In the nation-building period, it is underlined by education and their bodily strength (Thiesse, 1999: 239). Modern ideologies used the category of youth for their needs (Malvano, 1996: 278). Age was not the main indicator at this point; the crucial issue was making the youth a part of the system and making them the part of the constructed reality of certain ideologies (Lüküslü, 2005: 30)

According to Lüküslü (2005), young is one of the categories to be used in the modern world to build a nation-state. At the beginning of the 20th century, European-influenced education is used as a tool for young people in the nation state-building process in Turkey; this was expected to transform the political system accordingly. To this end, the founders of the Republic recruited Western-educated young people to represent the young Turkish republic.

During the 1970s right-left conflicts, young people were attached to political roles. However, the 1980 coup d'état caused a decrease in youth interest in politics; the oppressive institutions and nature of the coup d'état led the youth to become an apolitical generation. Whatever the historical changes are, youth continue to represent the spirit of the time in Turkey (2005: 28).

In Turkey, youth was regarded as a social category from the 19th century and became part of the modernization process. Young Turks have altered the Ottoman language with an emphasis on generational differences (Georgeon, 2004). The term generational differences was used during the Turkish Republic as well. As with other modern ideologies, Kemalist ideology used the youth to represent their ideologies. The youth were portrayed as the ones who constructed the nation-state while being constructed by it. As Neyzi describes, Turkish youth were defined as the “guardians of the regime” at that time (2001: 31).

However, at that time, the youth population represented but a small portion of the entire population; these well-educated youth lived in the urban areas. Therefore, this ideology regarding Turkish youth was limited to only a small portion of the society, leaving most of the youth out of the picture (Lüküslü, 2005: 32). The main youth organization at the time was Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union) which was established in 1916, and closed down in 1980. It is the longest running student movement of the Republic of Turkey. When the Union was first established, the students were close to nationalist ideas; but especially after 1965, and after the coup d'état, nationalist-religious youth replaced the left-wing students in the Union. In the 1970s, the Union acted as the youth branch of the MSP (National Salvation Party), however, this organic bond was loosened during time. In 1976, Akıncılar Derneği (Raider's Association) was established as a reaction to the loss of confidence of MSP to the Union (Yorgancılar, 2006).

Until the late 1940s, political participation was limited. After 1923, the CHP's main priority was to use education as a tool to spread Atatürk's modernization program. The mobilization of the periphery was guaranteed with the competitive political-party system (Sayarı, 1975). In the 1960s, youth (as a category) transformed its dynamics, and especially with the 1968 generation, similarly to in other parts of the world, new culture regarding the youth emerged. In Turkey, the '68 generation mostly affected leftist young people. They made it their duty to defend the country against the outsiders and enemies; this led to political polarization and violence. According to Mardin (2008: 260), this situation was the result of a generational clash. From the beginning of the 1950s, the youth started to build their life

according to the influence of rock and roll, fashion, and new types of lifestyle. In the 1960s, they became the rebels against the system itself; they had the desire to change the world and to be heard. (Lüküslü, 2005: 32). The Turkish young people in the 1970s were no longer the guardians of the state; they started to rebel against it. However, the young people still saw themselves as the guardians of the state, which was no longer governed by legitimate administrators. The main place for youth to be organized was universities; then, high schools became part of the picture. In the 1970s, young people have been marginalized under two ideologies and labeled as rightists and leftists. While the conflict between these young people increased, they were portrayed as a threat to the national interest (Neyzi, 2001: 419). The leftist young people mostly defined themselves as Kemalists and emphasized that they wanted to save the country with socialism, while the rightists saw the solution as nationalism. According to Neyzi (420), these young people were mostly coming from rural areas; they were primarily university students, and their families were mainly working-class. The youth generation of the 1960s and 1970s was not the same as their elderlies. They were more curious about the functioning of the system and wanted more for themselves.

In 1980, the coup d'état took place to end the confrontations between rightist and leftist groups. The Turkish army thought that there was no way to provide harmony and peace in society with parliament or societal contact. The other underlying reason why the military took over was to rehabilitate and depoliticize the Turkish youth. The National Security Council (NSC) was established under the leadership of Kenan Evren. NSC shut down all political parties, the parliament was no longer in function, and martial law was declared. The new constitution was prepared in 1982, and it was accepted with the referendum. In 1983, the ANAP (Motherland Party, MP) became a power party with an apolitical agenda to embrace different people from different ideologies. Following this era, to promote young people as “apolitical consumers of a global market”, neo-liberal policies have been encouraged (Lüküslü, 2005: 33). So, youth have been pushed to become apolitical members of society; individualization was the main trend among the young people in all over the world and in Turkey. Göle (1994: 211) argues that, at that point, “the post-1983 Turkish political culture was shaped largely by a form of social engineering with Muslim overtones, which has constituted the core ideology of the MP”.

In the 1990s, Turkey's major challenges were the Kurdish issue and the rise of Islamism. As Neyzi (2001: 412) underlines, the post-1980s opened new ways for youth in the form of the rise of the new media. She underlines that young people became more and more apolitical

consumers, but they learned how to use the media to express themselves. She also points out that the major characteristic of the young people was portrayed as “apolitical” were established in the post-1980 period.

Since 2012, Erdoğan’s government underlined that they aimed to create a pious generation. He stated in a party meeting in 2012 that, “There is the raising of a pious youth. We will be raising a conservative democratic generation, loyal to the historical values and principles of the nation and the fatherland. That is what we are working on.” (Bianet, 2012) It was an attempt to create an ideal youth: not atheists, not glue-sniffers (*tinerci*), and not *çapulcu*. The ideal youth for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was ‘an ideal young person carrying a computer in one hand and a Quran in the other’ (İHA 2012) (as cited in Lüküslü, 2016).

Youth, once more, became the main actors to build the new culture in the globalized world. As a result, in the 21st century, young people in Turkey are not interested in participating in politics, and they have little trust in institutions; however, they are concerned about the future of the country, according to a study conducted in Istanbul. They want free expression without any intervention. So, it is not accurate to assume that young people in Turkey are apolitical. It is crucial to see the change in the nature of the participation of young people. The things that they care about might be changing, and they are making apolitical matters the subject of politics (Lüküslü, 2005: 35). However, this does not mean that the young members of that period was apolitical, it only underlines the policies and discourses of the state.

In the literature, there is a common view that young people are no longer interested in politics, and they choose not to participate in politics. However, if it is the case, the possible argument against it would be that agencies of old traditional political channels can no longer be available for them (Hooghe et al., 2005: 43).

It is argued that young people are no longer interested in rigid bureaucratic organizations and want to build more fluid relationships with authority (Pleyers, 2005: 135). However, can this be seen as the rejection of the current system?

It is suggested that the motivations of young people are now centering around short-term projects and do not have to be attached to any ideology. The line between social and political has faded away. The success of any participation is measured with the change in daily life, not with taking power. “Politics is everywhere. It is the sum of our analysis of the situation and

your practices” (Pleyers, 2005: 136). So, for those young people, it is logical to think that they are no longer interested in traditional political divisions. However, is this the case in Turkey?

With the 21st century, different sources of authority began to be accepted. Non-governmental organizations’ influence increased. In the decision-making process, multiple actors were engaged, and the role of the state as a guide is consolidated, rather than its manager role (Pearce, 2010). It is argued that “the state moves from (paternalistic) provider to (participative) enabler, with consequent reductions — it is hoped — in demands on the state for welfare” (Newman, 2005: 123).

With the Atatürk and the revolution, industrialized, secularized, and westernized version of a rural, traditional, and Islamic country was tried to be established from the above. Nearly 48% of society was living in the rural parts of Turkey, and literacy was very low among the population during those years (Hyman et al., 1958: 276). The young people were the sample for the study of 1958 because they were the ones who were the future of governance (Ibid: 277). Historically, militarism was one of the main components of the Turkish state; despite this emphasis, nationalism was missing in the discourse until the emergence of Turkish nationalism under Atatürk’s reforms. Nationalism became the main point for the new republic; it filled the gap opened by the break from traditional dependence that can be an obstacle for modern reforms. In this study, Gillespie and Allport conducted questions measuring the hierarchy of values. The findings showed that young people are more intensely nationalistic. When asked: "What three things or activities in your life do you expect to give you the most satisfaction?" fifty-three percent rank "participation in activities directed toward national or international betterment" as their first, second, or third choice (Ibid: 282-83). Also, especially among Ankara students, family loyalties mirroring the traditional Turkish society seemed to be the primary concerns of the people. When they considered the conflict between religious and revolutionary values, a high percentage of the young population prioritized the latter one. At the same time, they agreed that religion was necessary to have a fully-mature life. And 47% of the students underlined the characteristics of democracy as “for the people” (Ibid: 284-86).

In Turkey, the youth has been categorized as a group, not as individuals with concerns but as the sum of individuals. As Çelik states (2008), the idea is “my state is my father” when it comes to young people. The question of identity occurred later due to the top-down model of democratization. Although the state would like to engineer society, there has been a struggle to recreate the government and the state. In 1995, IMV-SAM’s research was conducted, and it

underlined that, while youth in Turkey felt repressed, they had no intention to fight back against their oppressors and follow their ambitions. The reasons behind this were stated as their family and conservative institutions; these factors led to assimilation.

The studies in the 1980s showed that young people were apathetic and had little interest in participating in politics. In 1999, Konrad Adenauer Vakfı published a report stating that 3.7% of the youth were members of political parties; only 10% of them talked about politics among friends, and the majority believed that policymakers did not care about their problems anymore. In 2003, the study conducted in universities showed a similar result (Kepenekci, 2003): only 14% of them were engaging in politics through conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Erdoğan (2013) also underlined that voting was the most common form of political participation, although most voters did not trust political institutions (Cankurtaran Ontas, O., Buz, S., and Hatiboglu, B. 2013). He discussed three forms of political participation as conventional, unconventional, and post-modern methods. Conventional politics is described as active participation in a party or the youth branches of the party; he stated that 15% of the young people in Turkey were considered part of conventional politics. Unconventional politics covers the campaigning, boycotts, and protests, representing 31.5% of the young population. 14.3% of young people participate in politics through the internet or NGOs, labeled as postmodern participants (Lüküslü, 2016).

Since the 1980s, Turkish youth have developed distrust towards the political arena and see politicians as interest-driven people trying to meet their personal needs. In addition to that, because Turkey is still not a welfare state, young people attached excessive importance to money. 1980 was the turning point for Turkish history; the oppressive politics of the time has led the way to a generation of apolitical people, and the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies has led the way to the consumerist culture among young people (Cankurtaran et al., 2013: 253). Political parties' youth branches have reemerged just 17 years after the September 12th military coup. According to Cayman, these branches were not investigated in a detailed way since. Starting in the 1990s, with the lack of political integrity and the rise of religious discourse, young people experienced a clash between secularism and religion, statism, and liberalism, freedom and authoritarianism, nationalism and universalism, and politicism and apoliticism, resulting in the different identities. So, the postmodern, heterogenic new youth emerged (Kentel, 2005: 16-17). Among these young people, religiosity has been a rising phenomenon; in 2005, TESEV conducted research stating that 94% of young people have faith in Allah.

Furthermore, 97% of these students believed in science, concluding the research, as these students had secularized religious beliefs (Lüküslü, 2016). According to a research study conducted by Kustepe Youth (İstanbul Bilgi University, 2002), economic problems of the time resulted in young people attaching more importance to materialistic values. Also, this study showed that young people were concerned about their health, family, and unemployment.

Thus, it can be said that young people have developed a fear of government officials while they demand their needs to be heard. Furthermore, the government no longer represents a father-figure role among young people (Çelik, 2008); it has evolved into the role of the spectator. In Turkey, the 1980s produced a culture of fear, which produced cautious parents who passed on this fear to their children. Despite this fear, youth want to be heard and to be involved in political processes.

Table 4.1 Literature Review

Literature	Motivations
Birol Caymaz (2015)	Gender Family Social Networks Individual Interests Social Capital Social Media Party Leader Activities of Father
Ayşegül Bozan (2013)	Family Political Leader Social Milieu and Political Context Individualistic Expectations
Fulya Atacan and Derya Kömürcü (2014)	Family Friendship Personal Benefits Serving People Ideology } } AK Party CHP
Murat Toraman and Ercan Şahbudak (2015)	Family Social Environment Gender Educational Level Income Status Age Working Status
Emre Erdoğan (2001, 2003) Emre Erdoğan and Pınar Uyan-Semerçi (2017)	Educational Level Gender Working Status (Occupation) Family Age Place of Residence

4.1. Conventional Political Participation of Turkish Youth

According to Erdoğan (2003), Turkish youth suffers from not getting a chance at political participation. It is indicated that, rather than voting, the participation of the youth in conventional and unconventional forms of politics is low. The reasons why youth fail to participate in politics in the literature are regarded mainly as sociological, economical, and demographical, and the author also adds education, working status, and gender as the main factors. His data shows us that women, low-skilled, and unemployed people do not participate in politics. University students, workers, men, and highly-educated young people are more interested in participating in politics via unconventional forms of politics; the ones outside of this group have an intention to participate in conventional forms of politics.

According to Oktar, obstacles encountered by the youth in Turkey can be explained by the “iron triangle” analogy. The first edge of the triangle is a family in which young people have no habit to express themselves. The second is an educational system with a mechanical structure that does not give them any chance to express themselves. The third is a state bureaucracy that prevents participation rather than encouraging it.

In his research, Erdoğan focuses on young people between the ages of 16-28. Voting seems to be the most common practice in terms of non-political participation among these people; this is followed by gaining information about politics through media. The more that young people believe and trust in the current system, the more that forms of conventional participation increase among the youth. At the same time, the more the youth is against the system, the more they choose to participate in unconventional forms of politics.

In Turkey, the relationship of elders with the youth is a matter of cultural structure, kinship and nationalist discourse, and youth were formulated as educated elites in the Republican period. According to Mardin, the relationship of the youth with the elderly is linked to the family, educational system, apprenticeship, religious brotherhood, and the military establishment. (Neyzi, 2001: 412-415).

Neyzi divides the public discourse of youth into three periods in the Republican era. He distinguishes the 1923-1950 period as when young people were portrayed as educated elites in the newly-emerged nation, the 1950-80 period as correlated with student movements among leftists and rightists and as threats to nations, and the post-1980 period as a time when the main discourse about the youth was shaken, and they were portrayed as apolitical consumers. With

the rise of social media and the internet, youth found new ways to express their thoughts (Neyzi, 2001: 412-414) Primarily, the young people have felt excluded from institutional domains in terms of politics. They have found new alternatives and different forms of political mobilization thanks to new communication technologies.

One of the important issues here is the visibility of the youth in the political arena. This visibility is significant in parliament when it comes to youth believing in the conventional forms of political participation. As is the case in every form of political participation, presence ensures representation. In that manner, the political participation of the youth in Turkey, April 16th, 2017 stands is an important turning point when the constitutional amendment lowered the age of eligibility for running in parliament to 18. The first election applied to this change was the June 24th, 2018 election. In this election, six parliamentary members under the age of 30 entered parliament. Two of them were just 22 years old; this seems to be an important attempt to inspire young people to participate in politics and enhance the democratic culture of the country; however, some concerns related to the immaturity of the young people at the age of 18 are emphasized. The study conducted by Oral (2019), with 74 young participants, underlines that those less than 18 years of age do not have the necessary qualifications to become a deputies due to their emerging adulthood and developmental characteristics.

When it comes to the continuity of democratic regimes, the people who will represent the nation and make decisions on behalf of the nation are expected to be those who have adopted democratic values, democratic culture, and acquired democratic skills. Democratic culture and skills have experienced gains in the family, school, workplace and other social organizations (Uygun, 1996: 48). As stated, for individuals who have just recently come out of childhood legally and have not been taken into business, and whose democratic preparation processes have not yet been completed, gaining power in administration is questionable in terms of the development of democratic culture.

Youth Branches of AK Party

The 83rd-87th articles of AK Party's Party Charter organize the woman and youth branches of the party. Youth branches are defined as a subsidiary branch. According to the charter, each member who is entitled to be a member of the Party and who is not more than 30 years of age shall be registered as a member of the youth branch (article 83:2). According to the 84th article of the charter, the youth branch's administrative organs are listed as:

84.1: Youth Branch Town Organs

- a) Youth Branch Town Congress
- b) Youth Branch Head of Town
- c) Youth Branch Town Board
- d) Women/Youth Branch Town Executive Committee

84.2: District Organs of Youth Branch

- a) Youth Branch District Congress
- b) Youth Branch District President
- c) Youth Branch District Board
- d) Youth Branch District Executive Board

84.3: Provincial Organs of the Youth Branch

- a) Youth Branch Provincial Congress b) Provincial Head of Youth Branch
- c) Provincial Board of Women Youth Branch
- d) Provincial Executive Committee of Youth Branch

84.4: Youth Branch Headquarters

The number of membership and delegates in youth branches is the same as the equivalent organizational level and congress in the Party. However, the relevant Deputy Chairman of the Party, the Central Division, and the Board of Directors of the relevant branch are authorized to increase or decrease the number of members of the level organ and the number of congress delegates (Article 85).

The usual congress calendar of youth branches is to be organized no less than two years and no more than three years in advance, which will not prevent the congress of the Party and its completion before the party's grand congress, according to the consent of the Party's deputy chairman in charge of the organization. (85:2) The congress headquarters of the youth branches

are held on the date of the approval of the Party Central Executive Board and under its supervision and control (85:4)

Units under the Youth Branches are listed as the Presidency of Political and Legal Affairs, Directorate of Organization Affairs, Directorate of Electoral Affairs, Presidency of Promotion Media, Foreign Relations Department, Presidency of Social Policies, Universities Presidency, NGO and Public Relations Department, Directorate of Local Governments, Directorate of R and D and Education, Directorate of Financial and Administrative Affairs, Directorate of Environment, City and Culture, Directorate of Human Rights, and General Secretary. The Head of Youth Branches was Ahmet Büyükgümüş as of November 2019.

The Twitter account of the party's youth branch had 393,623 members as of November 2019. As of July 2018, there were 39 active official Twitter accounts of AK Party Youth Branches and 38 of AK Party Youth Branches in İstanbul (Sener and Yücel, 2018).

The distribution of subjects of the 228 tweets in the official account of the AK Party Youth Branch İstanbul Presidency was as follows: 27.63% were shared mostly about the party leader's activity, 19.74% concerned youth activities, and 15% were about party activities. Other subjects, broken down by percentage, include the special day (53%), the party leader's message/slogan (6.14%), celebrations (5.26%), online tweets on action (4.39%), the international agenda (4.39%), and other topics (Sener and Yücel, 2018: 58) (covering the tweets between July 1st and September 30th).

The purpose of sending the tweets included in the @akgencistanbul account is as follows (broken down by percentage): disseminating the statements of the party leader (24.89%), making the activities of the party leader visible (17.03%), making the party's activities visible (15.8%), making the activities of the youth branches visible (15.8%). (14.41%), advocacy (9.61%), recruiting new members of youth branches (6.55%), commenting on the agenda (4.8%), keeping political memory alive (4.8%), disseminating political opinion and strengthening party identity (0.87%) (Sener and Yücel, 2018: 65). The @akgencistanbul account uses Twitter mostly as a means of political propaganda, reflecting the central communication in the party. The account primarily aims to make party events visible through the activities and statements of the party leader. The activities of youth branches come in fourth place (70).

Youth Branches of CHP

Units under the Youth Branches are listed as Social Policies, Foreign Relations and Foreign Organizations, Black Sea Regional Manager, Aegean Regional Manager, Directorate for the Organization, Information/Communication Technologies and R&D, Human Rights, Marmara Regional Manager, East-Anatolian Regional Manager, South Eastern Anatolia, Media and Public Relations, Democratic Mass Organizations, Activity Organizations, Mediterranean Regional Manager, Central Anatolia Regional Manager, Administration and Financial Affairs, Education Secretary, Local Governments, and Law and Election Affairs.

The Head of Youth Branches is Emre Yılmaz as of November 2019.

The Twitter account of the party's youth branch had 66,679 members by November 2019. As of July 2018, there were 36 active official Twitter accounts of three of CHP Youth Branches and 38 of CHP Youth Branches in İstanbul (Sener and Yücel, 2018).

The distribution of 77 tweets in the official Twitter account of the CHP İstanbul Youth Branch were as follows (broken down by percentage): commemoration (22.08%), event announcements (16.88%), online action (11.69%), offline action (9.09%), government criticism (9.09%), call to action (7.79%), youth branches activity (6.49%), special days (5.19%), and other (11.69%) (Sener and Yücel, 2008: 61) (covering the tweets between July 1st and September 30th). The distribution of the purpose of sending tweets in @chpgencistanbul account is as follows: advocating rights (29.87%), keeping political memory alive (20.78%), making the activities of youth branches visible (16.88%), commenting on the agenda (14.29%), making party activities visible (11.69%), opposing (2.6%), recruiting new members to youth branches (2.6%), creating an agenda on a specific issue (1.3%) (p.63). The Twitter account @chpgencistanbul discusses many subjects; rights advocacy, online and offline actions, and calls for action stand out among the shared topics. The activities of the youth branches are also shared with the event announcements (71).

According to the 27th article of Party Charter, youth branches are established in headquarters, cities, and towns. These branches hold congresses every two years. The upper limit of being a member of the youth branches is thirty years old. The 56th article of the charter indicates that thirty-three percent (33%) gender and twenty percent (20%) youth quotas shall be applied for the nomination of deputies, provincial general assemblies and municipal

councils, election of party councils, election of provincial and district administrative boards, election of provincial congress delegates, and congress delegates (CHP regulations).

Administrative organs of the youth branches are the head of the youth branch, youth branch general secretary, central board members, provincial heads of youth branches, and district heads of the branches.

4.2. Nonconventional Participation of Turkish Youth

It is argued that the civil society with a Western definition does not seem to be a reality in Turkey, but what we have is the appearance of that civil society. People in the country are mainly attached to official ideology and state bureaucracy. Even though the country seems to have a civil society, it is mainly bound by the state and its ideology, which holds civil society's improvement back.

It is underlined that even though the expectation over the state is to favor all demands of diverse groups, it tends to involve the issues and problems of the groups, which are considered close to its discourse and help to provide a source of income. According to Heper (1992: 189), this type of state prevents the development of effective civil society in the country. So, there is civil society at the institutional level, but the freely-functioning civil society in Turkey seems to be absent. However, it should be seen that there are very fragmented civil societal organizations in the country, dealing with the single issues parting from the ideological matters of the 1970s. Chronologically, there were first labor unions, then private organizations related to mass media, issue-oriented NGOs (İHD, TEMA, Mor Çatı etc.), other non-governmental organizations, and then the special concerns related to culture, ethnicity, and/or ideology (ÇYDD, Cem evleri vs) in Turkey (Karaman and Aras: 45-47). The authors underline that because there is no fully-functioning democracy in Turkey, civil society cannot flourish without the influence of the state. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire to not think of civil society as a different unique entity from the state was also followed by the Turkish republic (Ibid: 47-48).

There was an attempt to follow Western counterparts and push civil society towards that direction during the presidency of Atatürk. Still, this attempt was limited to its form: the regulations, not the function. Therefore, the development of civil society was in the hands of the state throughout history. However, by definition, civil society is embedded in democratization, so it cannot be limited only to the impact of the state. There is a need to create

a barrier between civil society and the state to expect civil society to function properly. With the multi-party system in Turkey, the first steps towards this sovereignty of the civil society have begun. However, the functioning of the labor unions as the first attempt of sovereign civil society did not reflect the fully-independent organization, but their work domains were determined. (Karaman, 1990: 10-11). Thus, the state stands as the main obstacle for the development of civil society in the country. From the 1940s to the coup of 1960, there was rapid improvement in civil society. After the coup, the new constitution helped to promote the development of civil society with the legal framework. However, the very idea of the coup was itself undemocratic. Then, after the 1980 military coup, the new constitution was written, and its main issue was the survival of the regime and the state, underlying the predominance of the state over civil society (Karaman and Aras, 2000: 49-51).

In the 1990s, the main issue became the state's reluctance to hear the different segments of society and its pursuit of the goal of maintaining the power of the state dominating the civil society (Karaman and Aras, 2000: 59).

For the scene of public deliberation and for democratic state-society relations to flourish, there should be a strong civil society against the nation-state (Keyman, 2000). Especially with globalization, the needs and expectations of societies have evolved and changed. This change showed itself with the society-state relations and pushed the demands for participatory democracy; the new language of politics has emerged (Giddens, 1987). We can see this change in civil society in Turkey; during the 1990s, it led the way for a more democratic and participatory manner. Civil society organizations in the country concerned very diverse issues: from human rights to nationalism and from the environment to ideological interests. Also, civil society began to be autonomous of the state; this can be seen as a positive development for the democratization. However, one must understand the aims of the actors and organizations of civil society because it can also be used as a tool to spread anti-democratic ideals (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 220-221).

The history of civil society in Turkey is explained under four periods. The first period, since the 1980s, is called "the changing meaning of modernity", where the new actors' identity claims entered the modernization period. In the second period, "the legitimacy crisis of the strong state relations" was emphasized. In the third period, with the EU membership process (especially since 1999) to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the scope of civil society was enlarged, underlying the fact that not only national channels but also international channels were now in

a position to have a say in the development of civil society in the country. In the fourth period, the process of globalization has led the way to diminish the boundaries of rightist-leftist ideologies in the political and economic areas in Turkey (Keyman and İcduygu, 2003: 222-225).

Starting with the 1980s, the general demand for a more participatory democracy has increased. While the state is deemed incompetent to understand the needs of the society, the main reason for this was the creation of global civil society, underlying more participatory democracy. So, globalization has affected the language of politics and led the way for civil society to create itself a place apart from the political scene, in the societal arenas. In Turkey, in the 1990s, with the effect of globalization, along with the problem of a strong state phenomenon, there was a significant rise in the civil society organization. Civil society organizations started “influencing us to rethink the state-society/individual relations beyond the strong-state tradition and by employing the globalization of the language of civil rights” (Keyman and İcduygu, 2003: 226-227).

In Turkey, there is a difference between the intellectual discourse of civil society and the operations of civil society organizations. Whereas the former puts the relationship between state and society to the center and seeks legitimacy, the latter depends mostly on the official discourse and the ideology of the state (Keyman and İcduygu, 2003: 229).

As was the case all over the world, in the 1980s and 1990s, there were many civil society organizations in Turkey. Out of 38,354 NGOs, more than 20 thousand were closed down after the military coup of 1980. Today (2004), the number is about 60 thousand, but their impact is relatively low in the socio-political areas (Şimşek, 2004: 48).

In many non-Western examples of civil society, informal ties are more important than the formal ties between citizens. Also, in Turkey, there are many diverse civil society organizations. One reason for that is the absence of tolerance for others. The state and the civil society nurture this tradition of imposing the one truth they consider the best, and this left no room for other ideas to flourish (Şimşek, 2004: 63).

As mentioned above, with the impact of globalization, the traditionalist and collectivist culture of society has transformed into a more individualistic one. Although this individualism showed itself in consumption, it also pushed people to be part of civil societal life. People started to criticize the things they saw as unfair. So, civil society does exist in Turkey; however,

it lacks many democratic interests, due to a lack of autonomy and power relations (Şimşek, 2004: 65-68). Keyman and Kancı (2013) also underline, at that point, that the effect of the civil society on the state's policy-making process is limited, and the state-centric modernity of Turkey has been the main obstacle for the civil society's development in the country.

Some scholars argue that the influence of the state in every sphere of life is so high that it limits the border of civil society in the country. This situation also has an impact on the efficiency of the civil society (Alpay, 1991). Others underline the areas of civil society on challenging the policies of the government and the advice regarding these policies (Heper and Yıldırım, 2011: 2). As Çaylak underlines, civil society is thought to have a position against the state in Turkey. However, it can serve as the defender of the current situation. He points out that active participation cannot be ensured with the existence of civil society in the country because, despite the existence of many civil society organizations with many different agendas, these organizations cannot create an environment of political participation. Thus, civil society remains a slogan, not a reality. Knowing that, he also points out that there are some attempts by some civil-society organizations to expand the civil and political rights and respond to societal inequalities. After examining four CSOs, he states that "CSOs in Turkey exercise a policy of response and defense as they attempt to eliminate complaints and injustices. The common feature in the foundation of these four CSOs is the meeting of needs" (118-145)

Chronologically speaking, since the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic lacked intermediary organizations, and there were interactions between the citizens and the state in a direct way (Mardin, 1973; Heper 1980). There was a reciprocal relationship in the Ottoman Empire, where the sultans were accountable for the welfare of the people, and if they needed something, they would ask the sultans. This relationship was kept going in the Republican period (Heper, 1985). Given this background, Turkey, despite its merits, was not the best candidate to foster a civil society. It was convenient for the state to build vertical relations with peripheral groups rather than creating horizontal structures. The EU accession period and the effect of globalization led civil society to become more visible in the country. With the push from the outside countries and organizations, the civil society and related laws started to become more liberal (Tocci, 2005: 81), and the significance of the civil society was accepted in economic and political arenas (Keyman and Öniş, 2007 as cited in Heper and Yıldırım, 2011: 6-7).

When it comes to the continuity of democratic regimes, the people who will represent the nation and make decisions on behalf of the nation should be those who have adopted democratic values and culture and acquired democratic skills. Democratic culture and skills have been gained in the family, school, workplace and other social organizations (Uygun, 1996: 48). As stated, for individuals who have just recently come out of childhood legally, have not been taken into business, and whose democratic preparation process has not yet been completed, gaining power in administration is questionable in terms of the development of democratic culture (Işıkçı, 2016: 547).

Civil Society Case in Turkey: GoFor

GoFor (Gençlik Örgütleri Forumu: Youth Organizations Forum), working with a right-based approach in addressing the youth policy in Turkey, is a common platform of youth organizations acting together. The most important role of the Youth Organizations Forum is to raise awareness for the formation of the infrastructure of youth policies that are at universal standards. It seeks to defend the rights of young people on relevant platforms, to improve the capacity of youth organizations, student communities, and members, and to increase their influence as a network.

On January 29, 2015, the Youth Organizations Forum acquired legal status and became an association. The Youth Organizations Forum Association held its first General Assembly between March 17-19, 2015. In this General Assembly, besides the determination of the Board of Directors, many resolutions were held regarding the operation and structure. Also, the use of the abbreviation of the Youth Organizations Forum as Go-For was decided.

The Youth Organizations Forum has a General Assembly of 18-30 years of age, elected by members of associations, foundations, student communities, and youth centers. Each representative has one voting right at the General Assembly. Representatives meet once a year at the General Members Meeting and once at the General Assembly Meeting.

Member Associations to the Forum (GoFor website):

3H Hareketi	İstanbul
Adana Kent Konseyi Gençlik Meclisi	Adana
AEGEE-Ankara	Ankara

AFS Gönüllüleri Derneği	İstanbul
Aizanoi Eğitim, Kültür ve Sanat Topluluğu	İstanbul
Akdeniz Üniversitesi Uluslararası Gençlik Topluluğu	Antalya
AktiF-İz Gençlik Topluluğu	Ankara
Avrupa Gençlik Derneği	Denizli
Avrupa ve Gençlik Çalışmaları Topluluğu	Pamukkale
Büyük Gençlik Hareketi	Ankara
Çanakkale 1915 İzcilik Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Derneği	Çanakkale
Çanakkale Koza Gençlik Derneği	Çanakkale
Ceza İnfaz Sisteminde Sivil Toplum Derneği	Ankara
Çift Kanatlı Gençlik Derneği	Kayseri
Çukurova Kent Konseyi Gençlik Meclisi	Adana
Diyarbakır Çevre ve Kalkınma Derneği	Diyarbakır
Doğal Yaşam Derneği	Ankara
E-Gençlik Derneği	Bursa
Engelli Hakları ve Engelsiz Gelecek Derneği	Mersin
Eski Avrupa Gönüllü Hizmeti Gönüllüleri Gençlik Derneği	İzmir
Eskişehir Gelişim Derneği	Eskişehir
Genç Avrupalılar Derneği	İstanbul
Genç Engelliler Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü	Adana
Genç Erzurum Bilgi Derneği	Erzurum
GençEv	Ankara
Gençlik İçin Hareket Grubu (Genç Saha)	İstanbul
Gençlik Öncülüğünde Kalkınma Derneği	Mardin
Gençlik Turizmi Derneği-GENÇTUR	İstanbul
GSM-Gençlik Servisleri Merkezi Derneği	Ankara
İletişimciler Derneği	Konya
İnsanca Yaşam Ve Demokratik Toplum Derneği	Ankara
İstanbul Genç Adımlar Derneği	İstanbul
İstanbul Gençlik Aktivasyonu Derneği	İstanbul

İstanbul Poyraz Lions Kampüs Kulüp	İstanbul
İzmir Kent Konseyi Gençlik Meclisi	İzmir
Kadın ve Genç Girişim Merkezi Derneği	Ankara
Kaos GL Derneği	Ankara
KariyerİST Kariyer ve Girişimcilik Merkezi	İstanbul
Katadrom Kültür Sanat ve Sosyal Politikalar Derneği	İstanbul
Katılımcı Gençlik Derneği	İstanbul
Lykia İzcilikVe Doğa Sporları Kulübü Derneği	Antalya
Mardin Gençlik ve Kültür Derneği	Mardin
Martı Derneği	İstanbul
Nilüfer Kent Konseyi Gençlik Meclisi	Bursa
Ortak Gelecek İçin Diyalog Derneği	İstanbul
Pi Gençlik Derneği	İzmir
Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği	Ankara
RET	Gaziantep
Roman Gençlik Derneği	Ankara
Rönesans Enstitüsü Derneği	Ankara
Sağlıkta Genç Yaklaşımlar Derneği	Ankara
SEKDER	Ankara
Selçuk Üniversitesi Düşleri İnşaa ve Medya Topluluğu	Konya
Selçuk Üniversitesi Münazara Topluluğu	Konya
Siirt Üniversitesi Hayat Boyu Öğrenme ve Girişimcilik Topluluğu	Siirt
Sivil Düşünce ve Yönetişim Platformu	İzmir
Sof Dağı Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Derneği	Gaziantep
Sosyal Farkındalık Derneği	İzmir
Sosyal İnisiyatif ve Müşterek Sistem Derneği	Gaziantep
Sürekli Gelişim Merkezi Gençlik Derneği	İzmir
TAŞEV Eğitim Kültür ve Gençlik Derneği	Gaziantep
Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı	İstanbul
Tulpar Derneği	Bursa

Türkiye Gençlik Birliği Derneği	Ankara
Tuşba Genç Gelişim Derneği	Van
Uçan Süpürge Kadın İletişim ve Araştırma Derneği	Ankara
Uçarlı Gençlik Derneği	Diyarbakır
Yaygın Eğitim Merkezi Derneği	Ankara
Yinfo	Gaziantep
Youth Agenda Derneği	İstanbul
YOUTHART Gençlik Sanat Araştırma ve Eğitim Derneği	İstanbul



5. DISCUSSION: MOTIVATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE IN TURKEY

Political participation as an intellectual usage has three categories: political participation as a legitimizing act, and instrumental and solvent participation. First, political participation can be regarded as a legitimizing act because when citizens vote for an individual or a policy, they demonstrate their intent to consent to either the individual's decisions or the policy's constraints. Thus, political participation, mostly in the form of voting, legitimizes the governments' policies and the people who oversee the decision-making process; this is the very central issue for the democracy discussion (from Locke to Schumpeter), and it is closely related to the concept of system stability (Pateman, 1970; Sartori, 1962). The high level of consent has been a strong indicator of regime stability. The second one is called instrumental participation; this concept was formulated by Geraint Parry and suggested that there is inequality in the distribution of benefits, and only the government can guide the equitable redistribution of these benefits. Thus, in this case, the distribution of the resources became the major issue for political processes. Thirdly, political participation is associated with the solvent of social conflicts (Rousseau, Mill).

Rousseau, on that point, suggests that if citizens actively participate in politics, the common conception of the general good can be achieved, and they can all agree about the allocation of the resources. Mill, also underlining the importance of consensus, argues that participation is a learning process and that those who are outside of this system can be in conflict with the ones inside of the system; participation prevents this conflict from happening. However, both Rousseau and Mill based their assumptions on participation in small communities, and they thought of everyone as having equal status. Furthermore, the primary belief was that consensus would result from increased participation.

On the subject of participatory democracy, promoted by Pateman (1970), Thompson (1970) and Mason (1982), the individual-level effects of political participation have been discussed, and it is claimed that the moral and political development of the individual should benefit from political action. Like Rousseau and Mill, they suggest that individual self-actualization is important for participation, along with advocating higher levels of mass participation. Parry suggests that the main value of political participation lies in its educative

feature because political participation and the system encouraging it was designed to create responsible citizens who take part in social and political action. This participatory process stands as a justification system for decision-making processes (Pateman, 1970: 24-25).

The motivations of young people have been one of the major topics of literature which is summarized in the table 4.1. Caymaz lists gender, family, social networks, individual interests, social capital, social media, party leader, and activities of the father as main motivations; Atacan and Kömürcü underline family, friendship, personal benefits, ideology, and serving people as the major motivations; Toraman and Şahbudak mention social environment, gender, education, income status, age and working class as significantly impactful; Erdoğan focuses on the education, gender, working for status and family, and Erdoğan and Uyan-Semerci focus on educational level, gender, working status (occupation), family, age, and place of residence. Bozan lists family, political leader, social milieu and political context, and individualistic expectations.

In this study, based on the field research, I focused on citizenship (belonging to a community), party identity/party leader, social capital, personal interests, family, social media, and social environment as the key themes as motivations. Gender, age, income status, and belonging are decided as the demographic factors from which I obtained information, and they are used to understand if there is any correlation between demographic knowledge and motivations listed. I use gender, age, working status, marital status, belonging, income level, and educational level as the descriptive information, and based on the field research and the literature reviews, I decided to label them as the factors influencing the awareness of the young people, rather than solely as motivation; after establishing this, I studied the seven underlying motivations above.

Regarding the employment of the interviewees, it is evident that the AK Party has the most employed young members, followed by GoFor and CHP (Figure 5.1). Almost all the members of the AK Party, CHP, and GoFor are single (Figure 5.2).




Figure 5.1. Employment Status Distribution




Figure 5.2. Marital Status Distribution

The age distribution of the participants (Figure 5.3) was selected to be evenly distributed between the ages of 18-30 to understand the motivations of different age groups.




Figure 5.3. Age Distribution

In terms of gender (Figure 5.4), there is a greater number of male participants, mostly because the interviews are done with the executive members of the political parties; what we see in terms of GoFor is the equal distribution of power based on gender; thus, I interviewed five female and five male members.




Figure 5.4. Gender Distribution

In terms of education (Figure 5.5), almost half of the participants have a Bachelor's and Graduate degree; and almost half of the participants have a high school or two-year university degree, while only three participants from AK Party have middle-school degrees. Converse states that the level of education is the most powerful factor influencing whether someone

participates in politics (1972). The sample indicates that educated people were more willing to participate.




Figure 5.5. Education Distribution

I also asked the participants about the first thing that comes to their mind about their belonging. Some of the participants did not feel comfortable sharing their answers. Four of them (three from CHP and one from GoFor) said that, first and foremost, they are humans. Two participants from GoFor associated themselves with a religious identity. And six participants (four from GoFor and two from AK Party) felt an ethnic-based (Kurdish) affinity and town-based (hometown) belongings. But, almost half of the members of political parties identified themselves first with an ideology (leftist, conservatist, Islamist, social democrat, nationalist, and Kemalist).




Figure 5.6. Belonging Distribution

5.1. Citizenship (Belonging to a Community)

It is mostly stated that political knowledge is key to political participation, as Delli Carpini and Keeter suggest, “it is to democratic politics what money is to economics; it is the currency of citizenship” (1996: 8). Under this title, I will not use the classical literature on citizenship. I aim to underline the relationship between political participation patterns and the feeling of civic duty, belonging to a community and feel responsible for that community. Thus, I primarily use the citizenship orientations borrowed from Almond, Verba, and Bennett. To this end, in this study, citizenship is defined as the responsibility for civic duties and responsibilities and rooted in communal or personal interests.

In 1963, Almond and Verba (1963) asked their respondents in five nations about their obligations towards their countries. Based on their answers, the scholars come up with three citizenship orientations: parochial, subject, and participant. Parochial citizens do not have a specific expectation or definition of the political roles, system, or leaders. The subject-oriented citizens believe in the political system, have expectations of the government, and respect towards the political elites. These citizens concern themselves with the inputs and outputs of the system demand results from their government. The last one, the unconventional type of participation, underlines the effective, direct, positive way of influencing the government and getting touch with them. These people show the highest motivation among all (Theiss-Morse, 1993).

According to Theiss-Morse (1993) and Dalton (2008), citizenship norms, the norms that establish what we consider to be a good citizen, predict the types who choose to participate politically. Theiss-Morse notes that “Greater predictive power is gained by measuring people’s perspectives of good citizenship, thereby providing better-specified models to explain behavior” (1993: 370). Two citizenship characteristics have become prominent in literature; “dutiful” (Dalton, 2008; Bennett, 2007) and “engaged” (Dalton, 2008) or “actualizing” (Bennett et al., 2011; Bennett, 2007). While dutiful citizens desire to participate in politics due to their sense of civic obligation, especially to the traditional institutions, actualizing citizenship (Bennett, 2007) requires participants to be more active and assertive. They are both concerned for others. Engaged citizens (Dalton, 2008) are similar to actualizing citizens; they both engage in activities that are not encouraged by government officials, such as rallying or boycotting. Bennett et al. (2011) state that “Dutiful communication logic is ‘primarily the one-way consumption of civic information’, whereas actualized communication is characterized as having blurred lines between consumption and production” (as cited in Feezell, Conroy, and Guerrero, 2016: 840).

Table 5.1 Dutiful and Actualizing Styles of Civic Action and Communication (Bennett et al., 2011:840).

Civic Style	Communication Logic
Dutiful	• Oriented around citizen input to the government or formal public organizations, institutions, and campaigns • Primarily one-way consumption of managed civic information (news and political ads)
	• When individual content production occurs, it is aimed at specific institutional targets (contacting elected officials, letters to newspapers)
	• Channeled through membership in defined social groups

	Civic Style	Communication Logic
Actualizing	• Open to many forms of creative civic input, ranging from government to consumer politics to global activism	• Lines between content consumption and production are blurred
	• Rooted in self-actualization through social expression	• Individual content production and sharing over peer networks that tie personal identity to engagement (which can occur in traditional political contexts, such as viral video sharing in political campaigns)
	• Personal interests channeled through loosely-tied networks.	

Many studies underline that group membership (Pollock, 1982; Brown, Hedges, and Powell, 1980; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972), community integration (Hofstetter, 1973; Alford and Scoble, 1968), and recruitment (Zipp and Smith, 1979) attempts enhance political participation (Leighley, 1990). It has been widely accepted that people feeling attached to the community are those who are most likely to get involved in politics. A sense of community is the underlying motivator behind political involvement (Chavis, Hogge, McMillan, and Wandersman, 1986). The sense of belonging to the community is known to enhance the sense of obligation to participate in democratic processes. The belief that others share your needs and concerns has a positive effect on one's concern regarding the political allocation of resources; in addition to that, emotional connection, or belonging to the group, may enhance the motivation to take political action for other people. Thus, a sense of belonging to the community encourages people to participate (Davidson and Cotter, 1989).

Group identity also seems to be one of the main reasons behind political participation. According to Özbudun, group identity encourages political participation. The claim is that when

an individual identifies with a specific group, he/she is more likely to actively engage in organizations and politics (Özbudun, 1976).

My primary assumption about that point is that young people participating in youth branches of political parties demonstrate the characteristics of dutiful citizens and subject-oriented citizens, while young members of civil society demonstrate the characteristics of actualizing citizens and participant citizens.

5.1.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding citizenship is that young people participating in youth branches of political parties show the characteristics of dutiful citizens and subject-oriented citizens, while young members of civil society show the characteristics of actualizing citizens and participant citizens.

I used the terms “useful to the public, serve the community, improve society, worry about the current situation, serve and benefit the country, and have concern over country’s interests” as an indication of the dutiful citizenship. I looked for the terms such as “confrontation with society, to criticize, and to change and push” as an indication of the actualizing citizenship.

AK Party

For the motivation behind the political participation and the membership in AK Party’s youth branches, A1 underlines the importance of belonging to a community and says that:

“With Davutoğlu, I was motivated by the fact that I thought that a truly revolutionary anti-imperialist and Muslim group in the country would direct the political atmosphere and ideology of the country. Even if there are crumbs at the moment, I continue for that reason. As I said, I became a member because I believed that a sincere Muslim intellectual would guide the country's politics. I am thrilled to be able to stand by the Palestinian solution, the Kurdish issue, and making connections with the Balkans again. I don't think of being a parliamentary member in the current system, but the mayor's office is still an influential area, so I can think of it.”

A4 states, on the one hand, that her/his main motivation is to be beneficial for the country.

“I entered the process in the name of improving my own skills and raising myself completely, without being influenced by anyone, and in the name of benefit to my country, homeland, and nation.”

In the same line, A5 underlines that:

“Also, as I said, we want to improve ourselves and actually benefit the country and nation. Our only aim as a youth branch, the heads of the AK Party organization, our President is to serve and benefit our country. It's the kind of thing that helps motivate us to do good.”

Another AK Party member (A2) also mentions that s/he wants to be part of something related to the country's agenda, and underlines the importance of cooperation with other parties and groups to serve as a good citizen:

“My aim in becoming a member was my desire to add something to the country. I wasn't much interested in the country's agenda in high school; however, after entering the party, I was more interested in this. When I first entered, I was doing book readings with my friends; then, I liked it and continued it. I wanted to be part of something. There is some cooperation between citizens working on the elections. They say that it is patriotism; I think it is purely in the country's interest. In the last elections, there were speeches and draws, and there was participation in social activities aimed at winning the elections with a common mind.”

These answers clearly indicate that the young people in AK Party youth branches have concerns over the future of the country, and they want to be part of the change. These motions are also motivated by the party leaders that they look up to. It is clearly seen that they want to be influential members of the community. And they saw themselves as good citizens and good people while participating in something. They clearly have concern for others. I argue that they show the characteristics of the dutiful citizen, as mentioned by Dalton (2008).

Also, A1 underlines that they are afraid, not only for themselves but also for any other citizens of the society who are establishing the future concerns for the whole society and country as part of being citizens.

“Essentially, I have huge concerns; from the economic downturn to the unfair practices, we need strong names to oppose it from our base. The current policy does not serve anyone; let me keep the MHP out of the crowd. I hope that everyone can learn from the past. I fear that the opposition will create a new hatred; we will see about that.”

A5, in the same line, states that “As I said, I love my nation; however, I have some concerns. In other words, there is always a concern about the extinction of Islam and the question of whether people will succeed in bringing it about. This is what actually encourages us to work. We also have hope: hope that we can defeat these people, break these ideas and continue our nation as a whole because there has long been a polarization between the left and right political wings. We are trying to break this situation because this polarization alters the way that people view each other; to illustrate this, In other words, I give examples about the right-wing people and the left-wing people; of course, there are exceptions. Of course, the left-wing people can call the right-wing people, so to speak, different things. We are trying to break this kind of thing because we are all living together; because we are all in this country, and we have common living spaces.”

Another AK Party member (A2) underlines that the first time s/he decided to be part of political party youth branches, her/his main concern was to learn about the national agenda and then her/his main concern, has become the personal interests in time. So, it shows us that the main motivations to be part of the youth branches of political parties tend to change and evolve and alter throughout time.

Even though these young people have concerns and possible solutions to these concerns, they are not optimistic about party politics and their future in the party. A2 states in that manner that:

“I'm not thinking about getting into politics right now. There are some shortcomings in the country; I think that they need to be corrected, especially injustice. When I say injustice, people react to me. I even got a reaction from my own friends for saying, for criticizing the nation and saying that there is injustice. When I first entered the party, I didn't realize it, but as I grew older, I became aware of such things. I am aware that my candidacy may have an effect on this situation, but I am not thinking about that for now. I think that there is no merit inside the party, and I'm going to be blocked.”

Moreover, not only domestic politics but also international politics seem to be essential for youth people to participate in politics as citizens. A4 states that:

“I rather joined the party I saw useful, both in their activities in the country and the movements outside; these things are most important to me. What is done outside the country is more important to me. The development of a country is automatically caused by its commitment

to the outside world. Therefore, I have seen their success in the field of diplomacy, as well as global and trade, and in order to make a contribution to these things, I have started this way.”

A7 underlines his/her motivation to be part of a political party as the well-being of the country in the long run:

“Now there is something like this: being in a political community tells me both to realize the structure of the society, to be aware of the situations because we are part of this society. and it legally feeds me as knowledge; It is my main motivation to be active in meeting people, and being with people, in my own opinion, is even more valuable. In the future, if I come across something contrary to my beliefs, if I don't think that they believe what I believe in, I will , of course, stop being a part of it. I'm not blindly attached to them. That's why I call it wrong when it is wrong. But my concern for the future, as every young Turkish man, is that the end of our country will be better.”

Members of AK Party's youth branches seem to be displaying the characteristics of the subject-oriented citizens described by Verba and Nie. They believe in the political systems, have expectations of the government for their future, and have trust towards the political elites.

CHP

C6 points out that their main motivation centers around the public good:

“Our main motivation is to appeal to more people in terms of civil society and to be more useful to the public.”

One of the main motivations of young people when participating in youth branches is to be part of the organized structure and serve the community; as C10 states:

“I thought that the greatest aim was to fight from the organized point in many things, in terms of making a sound and especially in terms of raising a certain point in politics. In other words, there is not much that the individual struggle will ultimately reach, so I chose to take part in the organized struggle, and, at this point, I became a member of the Republican People's Party. I want to serve the community in this way; so, this is my main motivation.”

C2 states that s/he wants to use her/his academic knowledge within the party to contribute to the country's politics as a good citizen:

“When I first entered, the main motivation was that, at the time, I was studying International Relations. I wanted to do something about it: I would work in the state; I wanted to get into the ministry, the foreign ministry — but I did not. Then I wanted to do something that's already the case in politics in Turkey. I was more motivated to do something in the party — to use my training in foreign affairs to do something within this framework.”

C3 underlines the very basic motivation behind political participation in a nutshell: “Basic motivation improve the world in general. Improving something in society”, and s/he adds their first motivation to improve his/her hometown.

In the same line, adding their concerns, C4 underlines that:

“Because I want to contribute to where I live and to myself. This is my motivation, I want to contribute to this country. I want to add something to both myself and my environment and people. I want to do the right thing that I'm criticizing now as this should not be done. In general, I am worried that the situation in the country is not very positive. This, of course, affects the educational process of the people, the financial situation of the country, all kinds of social activities that trigger the already bad situation in this country. Of course, I'm also affected by them. How will my economic situation be in the future? Will I be able to live like a human being economically, or will I face a repressive regime? I have these worries.”

C7 also underlines that s/he has concerns over the future of the country and wants to contribute:

“I was playing football; I was a goalkeeper in Kasımpaşa. In 2013 I had a disability. During this process, there were also events of Gezi. We thought something was wrong in this country. We thought that the most sensible place for something to change is the Republican People's Party. We are still working to change things. My main motivation is to change things going wrong in this country and; I knew very well that two people could have two effects where one person could influence one, and I have mastered this situation stemming from the politics we have done for years. I'm worried about the future of the country. The biggest hope for me is that for 6 years, the problems that I decided to start in politics and which are important for me will be solved and we have the opportunity to solve them.”

C8 and C9 underline that the current situation is not satisfactory for them, so they emphasize the importance of the struggle and its impact on society:

“I think we will overcome these dark days at the end of our struggle.”

“The current deteriorating situation of the country is a great motivation for me, we are young people who will do something. As I said for this, I acted with the motivation that I have to tell it somewhere.” (C9).

As is the case in AK Party, CHP youth branches’ members also tend to be dutiful citizens (Dalton, 2008) and show the characteristics of both subject and participant citizens (Verba and Nie (1963) because in addition to their belief in the political system and expectations from the government, they also believe in influencing the government by being in close contact with them.

The members of youth political branches have clear intentions to serve the community they live in and the people they are in contact with and to do something better for the country. They feel responsible for the other citizens of the community.

5.1.2. Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation: GoFor

G1 states the main motivation behind being a member is to improve society:

“Of course, the aim of the projects is to learn about different cultures, different people from different countries, because you know that every human being is a world, a little tendency to go abroad, a little to explore the world, to know different people, to know different cultures and we are trying to do something useful to society.” “I met the civil society world in high school, it changed my whole life. The change provided by my older brothers and sisters, who worked with us, was quite large, and unrequited studies enabled us to advance their lives in a better way. I wanted to provide the support that my volunteer brother and older sisters provided to me especially in my break during my adolescence. However, everything you experience in the world of civil society, whether good or bad, brings you to benefit, confrontation with society, being aware, being able to convert the existing energy into social benefit makes you work more. Even in my desperate moments when I was very tired, crying, I find myself working again after an hour. Social benefit is my greatest source of motivation.”

G2, who sees voting as an opportunity to make a statement and as a civic duty, states that:

“I think voting is the duty of citizenship. At the same time, I think we need to make our opinion clear — apart from our duty to citizenship, which is a good option for us. The purpose of being in non-governmental organizations is to impose things to people in some way and to show them something and to get into better ways.”

G2 also underlines the importance of voting as; “Of course I vote. If I do not vote, I cannot see the right to criticize myself or make demands. I vote with hope in the period when democracy was hit hard. I insist to my environment to participate in the voting process rather than the political views. No matter which party.”

G1 also appreciates the voting and conventional forms of politics as; “Yes, I am preparing for the next national elections. As I mentioned above, I believe in change. I trust in my good communication and analytical approach with my studies in civil society for 11 years. And I don't think those who represent us represent us. I will continue my work to change to criticize.”

As in line with others, G9 underlines that:

“As I said, I don't work actively in a political party but I have a vote. I think it is a very powerful tool. I vote to reveal the problems or problems, or the will to make visible the actions supported by the party I support.”

G10 states, regarding the same subject:

“I vote; I vote. I use it because I can only change things that way. I don't make a different contribution. What can I do? Vote ... It is very difficult to change people's thoughts, but of course, I'm trying to change.”

The main motivation for G6: “Because there are a lot of contradictions in society, and these are disturbing people. You feel that I have to put my hand under the stone to take a step to change, so I think I will.”

My basic assumption on that point was that young people participating in youth branches of political parties show the characteristics of dutiful citizens and subject-oriented citizens, while young members of civil society show the characteristics of actualizing citizens and participant citizens.

When analyzing the members of GoFor, it can be suggested that they all believe the conventional form of political participation is voting. They perceive voting as their chance to have a voice in politics and public matters. In that sense, they appear to be dutiful citizens (Dalton, 2008), not actualizing citizens, as I expected.

By evaluating the young members of political parties, I find that they are showing the patterns of dutiful citizens, and subject and participant citizens; so, my assumption has gone beyond and covered the participant citizens as well.

In the case of AK Party and CHP, we see the traces of solidarity participation (Frey, 1971), while in the case of GoFor, there is a trace of deferential participation (Frey, 1971).

5.2. Social Capital

Verba et al. (1995) add to the picture the civic skills including the linguistic facility, communication, and organizational proficiency (Chapter 11) — also, the notion of social capital (Putnam 1993,2000; Coleman 1990).

Social capital (Lin, 2017: 8-12) is considered resource-engendering participation. The main idea behind this is that when the social network increases, the person can engage in more political participation (Knoke, 1990: 1042; Verba et al., 1995: Chapter 5: Teorell 2003). Thus, through social media, information that a person has been gathering tends to increase because s/he becomes more open to the actions. Social capital, as a term, covers the interrelated structural and cultural aspects; it is a key to democracy to work (Putnam, 1995: 185).

The broad definition of social capital underlines the social networks of individuals, and may cover trust and shared norms that arise from these networks (Putnam, 2000). The main idea here is that if there is a lack of social capital in society, then it is unlikely for people to trust one another and feel isolated from the government and the society, which will lead to a decrease in political participation. (Newton, 1999; Foley and Edwards, 1996). In contrast, when people trust each other and build social networks, they are likely to develop political engagement. (Hall, 1999: 467-468).

Which factors are essential to understand the dynamics of political participation? Micro, macro, and meso-level interactions. Micro-level interactions are related to the individual level interactions, such as wealth, status, and education and have been the primary factors to evaluate

political participation in many studies (Almond and Verba, 1965; Lipset, 1990; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1978). Macro-national variables, such as the design of state institutions, have been identified by another group of analysts (Duverger, 1954; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Meso-level variables, on the other hand, are related to the activities in the communities and social groups (Laitin, 1995; Putnam, 1995, 1996; Seligson, 1999). Within this discussion, the social capital's influence on political participation is revisited.

It is assumed that when people are part of the social group, their involvement in politics is a way to influence public services intensely, and “they are prepared to act collectively to achieve their shared goals. Their counterparts in less civic regions more commonly assume the role of alienated and cynical supplicants” (Putnam et al., 1993: 182). According to this view, the participants' level of engagement — or their alienation — is assumed to be related to the level of social capital, which is defined by Putnam (1995: 67) as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”. However, we cannot ignore the impact of the capacity of political parties, their mediation, and their nature in that manner. According to Berman (1997: 427), social capital is a “politically neutral multiplier, which is not inherently good or not inherently bad”. In this view, democracy depends upon the capacity of the agency and institutions. Therefore, it is clear that: “The inference is clear: Social capital matters significantly for political participation, and the capacity of new leaders adds to (and multiplies) the effects of social capital. Social capital provides both glue and gear. However, the gear is significantly improved when a capable agency is also available” (Krishna, 2002).

5.2.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding social capital is that young members of political parties desire to gain something (mostly material) from membership, while young members of civil society do not necessarily have this desire.

AK Party

A2 states that by participating in the political party, s/he has the opportunity to meet the officials from the government and has the experience to be inside governmental buildings. S/he

underlines that: “We do weekly book analyses, interviews, and corporate trips. There are mostly trips to state institutions, such as ministries, etc.”

A3 underlines the importance of gaining power in the government offices and states that:

“Youth Branch is a small phase, you start from the foundation. You're on the streets, hanging banners, handing out flyers, walking door to door. You don't expect much. We would like the ones sharing a common cause to come to certain places of the state authorities. We would like to have those who are knowledgeable in Islamic terms, people who will take care of Islamic values, in those positions. We had our fellow friends, so were we. we were in a rush that How can Islamization of Turkey can be achieved. We wanted to keep it in the end.”

A3 also underlines that, despite the positive effect of political participation on gathering social capital, individuals can encounter negative views when they become part of other social environments:

“People always have high expectations. You are on the top one day and on the bottom the next day. If you make a mistake, they'll finish you. I wouldn't be in the Youth Branch if I had the right mind; I would support from the outside. You have to hide; you talk to your circle of friends, but if you go to work in a government institution, they will immediately take pictures of you, swear at you, and you will be on the agenda. Politics is a dirty thing; it is all lies. It's not for us. We saw everything in five years.”

A4 thinks that s/he can be a parliamentary member one day because of the experiences and networks s/he acquired in youth branches, and he/she states:

“The structure is based on two systems in Turkey. Central and local administrations. When we look at it, the local administration is not my area. I can't be active in the local event. But if I trust my diction, my long-term plans, I can think of something like the state. Of course, I think that the first step for this is deputy, so I know. If that happens, I can trust myself on that. I will if the conditions of life allow.”

A7 believes that they touch peoples' lives; they have the opportunity to meet and listen to people and socialize with them. S/he states in that manner that:

“In our department, for example, we organize seminars for universities, we organize summits, we have ministerial programs, we prepare the course of the programs. As I said, I

have a chance to touch too much because we're directly on top. We don't say let's meet in the youth branches, let's meet tea parties or attend a conference. For example, we have a chance to meet with professors who have a considerable chance to direct them to make a speech to the students. That's why I'm sure that I'm benefiting people's thoughts, that I can touch something in their lives.”

Also, A7 underlines that they are open to anyone who needs help and, in this way, they create social capital in the long run. S/he states that:

“We have no criteria. Our door is open to anyone who wants to be with us and who thinks the same or doesn't need to think the same, who wants to listen to us, and who wants to talk to us so that why I should think the same way as you. We always communicate with them. We are also trying to help the students who do not have the opportunity in the university. For example, this last week, in the repeated election process, what we did were: for university students living in Istanbul who went out of town for BTCs, we contacted them to provide access to Istanbul. If they need help and cannot afford it, we have sent our help, support and request forms to our organizations. We called the students who returned to us and arranged tickets for them, so that we can help if you want to come. We helped people like this last week. Previously, we visited the students' homes and dormitories; if they have any shortcomings, we try to help them as much as we can and then try to arrange a scholarship. As I said before, on the subjects they want to talk about, they want to discuss, we set up programs with professors. When the ministers come, for example, the course of the ministerial programs, which issues will be focused on, the program will be like this, a place will be arranged like this; we adjust them. Women structuring holds extra meetings, where we meet among ourselves, we also have fun meetings. In fact, it is a very colorful structure because we do not look at politics only. These people are ultimately our lives, they share the same opinion with us because we are the people we need to support each other, and we act with love most of the time. I love to be inside them, a very enjoyable experience for me.”

CHP

C5 clearly underlines that being a member of youth branches has its own merits, and creates its own expectations, such as providing a job one day:

“Let me tell you that yes, we called, invited young people, but they more likely come themselves. As I said, there are intense local elections. What is the biggest problem for young

people in Turkey? Unemployment. They think that local election processes can be a job opportunity especially for university graduates, they come through an acquaintance. ... I have concerns related to finding a job. But I am also hopeful because I'm interested in politics and I think that the candidates that have elected are the ones that represent me lately. And that's why my hope outweighs because I believe that things will change eventually.”

C8 indicates the primary motivations of young people to be a member of youth branches and clearly states the expectations regarding jobs and earnings:

“Of course, there are people who come with different motivations. Some of them really come here to fight for the values the CHP advocates, while some of them come to get profit from municipalities, to get jobs or different earnings, there are those who are members. In this way, people have different motivations.”

C10 underlines that when you are in the youth branch, you have the opportunity to be part of real politics, meet the officials, and be part of the administrative processes. As s/he explains:

“In addition, especially around the university, the problems of university students are talked about by one-to-one communication. We bring political discourses to help them with their housing, transport, and similar problems. At the point of local administrations, we are an intermediary to the local administrators of the Republican People's Party and as a youth branch. If we have any needs, if any of our students have any requests at school or employment point, we will take steps to solve the problem with our young friends through the municipalities of the Republican People's Party. ... At this point, the biggest reason is close to 10 years I am a member of the Republican People's Party and since childhood, I think I have gained the basics of politics, both intellectually and practically because of what I have done. I would like to take this knowledge and practical experience to a higher level in my own way and to serve society in this way”.

5.2.2. Nonconventional Form of Political Participation: GoFor

G6 underlines the negative effect of being a member of the civil society organization due to the fear of losing her/his job and losing wealth and social capital. S/he states that::

“Unfortunately, due to the situation of the country, including the political, social, cultural and familial prejudices experienced, there is a fear in me regarding the future, there is

apolitization whether we want or not. Me being a public worker is effective, too. ... Because unfortunately, I think that in political organizations, everyone works for themselves, for a certain audience. ... I think that it exists for certain groups because the actions are taken, verbs always observed in that direction, that's why. My civil service will end if I speak”.

G7 reflects on his/her future with concern and underlines the importance of torpedo to find a job, which she/he thinks that she/he can get for being a member in the civil society organization:

“Concern. Because now we see that we go back in the progress. After finishing school, for example, people in Europe do not have anxiety about their future. They don't think I get a job after that I took KPSS exam ... We are skipping from one exam to another in Turkey, but I do not think people in Europe feel so anxious. I graduated from two universities, but I'm not doing my job right now. I'm a Justice graduate, I'm a public administration graduate, but I'm not doing my job. You have KPSS, you enter the interview, the only ones entering have torpedo for example. You can't go in, so it's very difficult. So people are constantly worried about the future.”

G8 appreciates the networking part of being a member and underlines the importance of knowing different people and experiencing different cultures; and sees becoming a member of political parties in a negative way and goes on to explain:

“The motivation of being a member of a non-governmental organization is; You open your eyes to life in a way. One, you see different people, when people see different cultures from Erasmus, recognize something from different cultures, people open their eyes. You learn life. In this context, I think it is very useful to me. ... In the present conditions in Turkey, I see a lot of cons to be members of political parties. I assume there will be no plus in my career. That is why political parties have no purpose, no purpose for me, so I do not prefer.”

Opportunities come in different forms; they may be in the form of capital, job opportunities, networking, or any other means. In the case of AK Party youth branches, it is mainly in the form of expecting something for the political future and expecting a place in the political arena. In the case of CHP, young people tend to appreciate meeting people in power or people who are influential in their line of work, and they do not mainly focus on their own political future. GoFor members do not really think about gaining something from the

membership, but they appreciate the values and experiences gained by being part of civil society.

In the case of GoFor, the members seem to be gaining civic skills as a part of social capital (Verba et al., 1995). In the case of political party membership, the broad definition of the social capital (developed by Putnam) can be seen; it underlines the social networks of individuals and may cover trust and shared norms that arise from these networks. The difference between AK Party's youth branches and CHP's youth branches is that, while young people of AK Party tend to gain some political place based on these networks, CHP's young individuals look for sharing experience, norms, and knowledge.

5.3. Personal Interests

As Olson claimed in 1965, it is not an act of a rational actor to take a step towards a common good via *general incentives*. The reason behind collective activities lies in the *selective incentives* contributing to oneself (51). At first, this idea is linked to material benefits, but, in time, it is engaged in the literature of political participation. Then the term process incentives came on the scene, alluding to the fact that people may participate out of excitement regardless of the outcomes. Also, the term expressive incentives was used to define participation out of the recognition of an identity (Calvert, 2002). Another incentive behind political participation that was offered was out of an internalized sense of duty over the community (Knack, 1992). So, there are two main propositions regarding the reason behind the participation: first, because people have resources, they can afford to participate, and second, because they have the incentives. However, it is not always possible to say that incentives and resources are mutually exclusive (Elster, 1989: 16-20).

The basic motivations behind political participation can be categorized into two categories; the first is related to the personal needs and values that individuals care about, and the second one is about expressing the interests and opinions in the decision-making process. The former indicates the internal motivations for participation, while the latter indicates the instrumental motivations for participation. Thus, it would not be wrong to assume that the main motivations behind the conventional forms of political participation are self-efficacy, empowerment and the feeling that they can influence the decision-making process (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 2017). Therefore, it would not be wrong to assume that conventional political participation is assumed to be driven by intrinsic motivations; it is related to feeling that they

are contributing effectively to the decision-making process (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 2017).

Regarding the motivations behind political participation, some researchers claim that the political identity of the individuals and their psychological orientations matter when it comes to their willingness to participate in politics; this can be related to identifying with the party identification or a particular subject, such as protecting the environment (Holbert, 2005). In that manner, being a member of the political party can be seen as both the source of participation and a consequence of participating (Putnam, 2000). Political self-efficacy and self-competence with regards to political and public affairs are two of the most important motivations behind political activities (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). The assumption is that efficacy and the cost of engaging political activities are positively correlated; when the former is low, the cost of the latter decreases also. Political knowledge is another motivation for participation (Junn, 1991) because people require information to decide how they will engage in politics (Gil de Zúñiga, 2012).

Rational choice theorists³ find it difficult to understand the logic behind voting because the individual vote would not make an influential mark on the results of the voting, so it is not worth wasting any time (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, 1995; Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1967). Most studies related to political participation are based on the socioeconomic model developed by Almond and Verba (1963), Barnes and Kaase (1979), and Milbrath (1965). In this model, political participation is mostly associated with the individuals' resources (time, money, skills, education), and their social environment is assumed to be playing a crucial role in political action; high socio-economic status calls for a higher participation level and vice versa. Evidence: (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Conway 1991; Dalton 1988; Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990; Nie, Verba, Brady, Schlozman and Junn 1988; Salisbury 1980; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie 1993 as cited in Leighley, 1995).

The rational choice theory draws into the political participation problem from the pure self-interest point of view (Aldrich 1993; Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985). There are some challenges to this view; one person's participation will not have any concrete effect on the

³ Rational Choice Model: (e.g. Tsebelis, 1990; Aldrich, 1993; Jackman, 1993), and opponents of such models (e.g. Hindess, 1988; Lowi, 1992; Eckstein, 1992).

outcome. This view may cause people to gain from the costs of participation and enjoy a free ride on the efforts of others, resulting in the best-known paradox of participation.

In general, it is accepted that political participation is rational. This means that when someone involves themselves in politics, s/he is expected to have goals, and s/he has calculated the costs and benefits of participation (for descriptions of rational choice models, see Aldrich 1993; Downs 1957; Jackman 1992; Opp 1989; Whiteley 1995). However, it is an accepted assumption that no interest can serve only one person; participation, by nature, contributes to the collective benefits, so it creates a problem of collective action (Verba and Nie 1972, Olson 1965). There we come to the rational choice model, which suggests that one's effect on the voting result is so small that the cost of voting would outweigh the benefits, resulting in one hesitating to vote.

However, in contrast to rational choice theory, a paradox of participation underlines that voting and other types of participation are common. Some assumptions have been developed to solve the paradox of participation. Olsson (1965) proposed that only the ones choosing to participate can be provided with some benefits. Alternatively, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) propose that individuals' decisions to vote are guided by their preference to minimize the probability that their least-preferred option (candidate) occurs (wins). Morton (1991) and Uhlaner (1989) use the term group approaches to solve the problem. Uhlaner states that the vote of the individual is an investment decision because when someone votes, it is the achievement of the group's leader that will allow this group to benefit from the elected politicians. Morton (1991) underlines that this can be accepted if only the voters are not forced to participate.

Aldrich, on the other hand, states that voting is low-cost participation; it has low potential benefits; therefore, it is the least appropriate type of participation to use to study collective action problems. Thus, working with the voter turnout rate to illustrate the rational choice model has its limitations. The only empirical evidence showing the high-cost, high-benefits participation stands for the protest as a form of collective action. Opp and his colleagues investigated the protest activity in Germany and the States and stated that if there are no selective material incentives to participate, public good acts are provisioned as the psychologically-selective incentive stimulating the participation (Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989; Finkel and Opp, 1991; Opp, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990).

These studies of political protest underline some problems related to empirical studies regarding the rational choice model. First, some of the incentives for participation or some concepts used in the rational choice model are questionable. For example, Finkel and Opp (1991) used the public good incentives, measures of policy dissatisfaction, collective rationality, etc. The operationalization of these concepts is problematic. Second, these studies apply the same usage of motivations, which can be used to justify the individuals' behavior (Pierce and Converse, 1990). And, third, the samples often include the protestors and participants, which can cause the selection bias to model estimates (Achen, 1986).

According to Olson, the rational choice theory works better for those who have economic incentives for joining a group, while it is less important for those who seek non-economic incentives (1965: 161). The rational motivation behind the participation has been confronted by many scholars, who suggest that some acts of participation may be expressive rather than instrumental (e.g. Carter and Guerette, 1992; Fiorina, 1976; Hinich, 1981; Niemi, 1976). So, as explained by Whiteley (1995), the rational choice theory cannot be applied when understanding this form of participation (as Knoke, 1990).

However, if we think of values as benefits, then when a participant seeks to enhance values (so the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs), then participation becomes rational. There are four approaches regarding the paradox of democracy (rational choice model of participation), which asks the following question: although participants have little or no influence on outcomes, why do rational people choose to participate? The first one suggests that it is not rational to calculate the costs and benefits of participation when they are so small that they become trivial (Barry, 1970; Aldrich 1993). The first difficulty with this approach is that it provides a solution to the paradox by abandoning the framework; if the costs and benefits are too unimportant to calculate, then participants do not spend time to calculate them, and the theoretical explanation for voting is no longer an explanation based on rational choice. The second difficulty is that it fails to explain high-cost types of participation, such as party activism, which has no trivial costs making this explanation incomplete.

The second approach to the problem uses the folk theorem to explain collective action (Rasmusen, 1989: 92-94). Hardin (1971) suggests that the collective action problem is related to the prisoner's dilemma game, and the folk theorem points out the problem of this game. It has been highly suggested that cooperation is possible in the prisoner's dilemma game, and if some conditions are met, collective good can be reached (Taylor, 1976, Palfrey and Rosenthal,

1983). The first condition is that the participants should be thinking of the future too much to create anxiety over it, so that cooperative action can be nourished. The second condition is the repetition of the game over time. A third condition is that there should be suspense about the end-time of the game. The fourth condition is that cooperation would not be broken down unless the cooperators are able to punish defectors. The folk theorem is especially used in situations where there is a lack of central authority. The major problem regarding the application of the paradox of participation lies in the fact that, in most situations, active participants have no power, authority, or ability to punish defection (non-participation), and this is true for both institutionalized and non-institutionalized organizations. As Truman (1951) states, it is difficult for active members to motivate the latent members of the group.

The third approach regarding the collective action problem is to add altruistic concerns to it. Mueller (1989: 362), states that voters care about the capability of others while deciding to participate in an election and while voting. He defines this as the “Jekyll and Hyde” view of human nature, underlying that people who vote possess two motivations: self-interested and altruistic. If one considers the welfare of the others, this can provide additional encouragement for them to vote.

The fourth and final approach suggests that selective incentives matter for collective action. Riker and Ordeshook (1973: 63) list a series of selective incentives that individuals have for voting, such as: "The satisfaction of complying with the ethic of voting"; "The satisfaction of affirming allegiance to the political system"; and "The satisfaction of affirming a partisan preference.' So, if one does not vote, s/he cannot enjoy these benefits. This approach relates to participation due to self-interest. However, in high-cost types of participation, it can be wrongly assumed, depending on this approach, that policy concerns can be seen as trivial to the activists (this is not true; see Rapoport, Abramovitz and McGlennon, 1983; Seyd and Whiteley, 1992). Thus, this approach is not consistent with the rational actor model (Whiteley, 1995).

By the 1990s, the studies on the individual-level motivations of participation had started to become challenged, and scholars, such as Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), revisited their earlier SES model and discovered that they did not successfully link social status to participation. In a revised civic-volunteerism model, Verba et al. underlined the importance of “networks of recruitment”, such as churches, workplaces, volunteer groups, etc. for political involvement. As such, Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) emphasized the importance of education for political participation because education provides social networks and

communities that encourage civic engagement. Putnam (1995), on the other hand, focuses on the role of social capital and suggests that it has lost its importance since the 1960s. He defines the term as the “elements of social life, such as networks, norms, and trust that enables community members to cooperate in the pursuit of shared objectives.” When one is a part of the community, frequent cooperation leads to stronger social bonds, which have a positive effect on trust in one another: a “virtuous circle” of participation and trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Scheufele and Shah, 2000).

5.3.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding personal interests is that the main motivation of young members of political parties is self-efficacy and empowerment, while young members of civil society are more inclined to adhere to social norms because of an internalized sense of duty to the community.

AK Party

A1 underlines the importance of the July 15 coup attempt to continue working in youth branches:

“certain activities are carried out, like reading clubs, the spread of hashtags on social media agenda. Home visits, election period persuasion, etc. but I was there to produce more action. ... July 15 was that time we went down to the street as a very powerful way of youth. I continued to remain for this reason, but now I'm waiting for a little change.”

A2 states that s/he wants to participate in politics through youth branches because it enables her/him to develop her/his personality, and s/he appreciates the environment in the branch.

“I joined out of curiosity five to six years ago. When I first entered, tolerance, compassion, and closeness towards the people who greeted me pushed me into this. I entered it in a friend circle 5 years ago. Afterward, I became interested in the agenda of the country and continued to take part in the Board of Directors. (Pendik District Youth Branches) Then I continue in terms of personal development rather than the agenda of the country makes a lot of contribution to me in every sense. ... There are swimming, handball and football activities every week. Non-party people can also participate in these events. When it comes to these activities,

non-members of the party necessarily come to the party membership later. I took my own friend and he was neutral, he had no view. He came, looked at the work, his family was inclined and entered the Youth Branches of the party. Our activities have positive effects.”

Also, A2 points out the effect of being part of youth branches in her/his intellectual and spiritual development by stating:

“My aim in becoming a member was my desire to add something to the country. I wasn't much interested in the country's agenda in high school, but after entering the party, I was more interested in the work. When we first entered, we were doing book reading tests with our friends, then I liked it and I continued my involvement. . . . My goal is to purify myself spiritually.”

A3 states that her/his motivation is based on the hope s/he feels towards the country and its politics:

“There are no issues that we are concerned about for the future of the country, but I have hope in general. Nobody's a prophet. We said the party we support, but it has errors. I can't say that to a member of a different party. But these situations can be improved, there is nothing that cannot be improved. Our elders have seen the old times, our age is younger. In this country, those covered with headscarves were taken to school with scarfs, there were thirst, garbage hills, and people defending Islam were always despised. I don't see anything like that right now, to be honest, the current power doesn't restrict anyone's freedom. Everyone is living their freedom, so I'm hopeful.”

A4 underlines the importance of self-criticism and states that being involved in party politics encourages her/him to develop herself/himself and discover his/her true identity;

“When we look at the two opposing views, the right-left views (and this happens in the AKP and CHP), you can't argue with a right-wing person because your route or course, is the same. But because it is in a different direction with the other, a compromise must be reached. The connection with the opposing view is more attractive. If you say A to what someone says B, you must find a common path here. He presents you with your own data, you provide him with your own data. Political communication occurs automatically here. Here too, the consensus is made to find the right path. Although the result cannot be achieved, at least the details are attracted to one's own mind. The party organization can't do anything to it. Even

though you are the same as the views of the party you are in, there is no rule that your result will be the same. Here you can have your own opinions if you are open to self-criticism. Anyone who is not open to self-criticism will automatically act according to the environment in which he or she is. But if you say that my self, self-criticism is ahead, your personal opinion becomes more prominent. You do something of your own free will.”

A7 underlines that s/he wants to achieve so much in her/his life, but it does not have to be inside the party; s/he seeks what is best for her/his best interest in the long run:

“There are some things I want to do at the academy, etc. I am not a person who can work on politics, my family is like that, but I want to continue as a lawyer in my own field rather than proceeding in their way. Nevertheless, the AK Party has lawyers, just like every other institution. In case the institution is needed, of course, I do it for the AK Party.

A9 states that the elections that s/he participated in pushed her/him to become a member; he/she has an urge to make things right:

“Most recently, before the elections of these two municipalities, I was in charge of the ballot box and somehow I saw that there was a lack. I was aware of that before, but I noticed a lot at the polls that day. In some respects, I thought that there was negligence of party officials, that there were things done wrong, that I wasn't saying that because I was so good, I was just saying things that went wrong in a certain way, and because I wanted to be in it, to make a good contribution, I started.”

Also, A9 states that s/he cannot stay silent about the thing s/he sees as wrong and touches on these aspects of life:

“I want to do correct things that are going wrong; I want to contribute to help make things right. For example, I want to be involved in reasons such as the moral deterioration that I see in my opinion about youth, there is a wrong direction about female-male relations, or I see in our electorate on my behalf to eliminate uneducated aspects. I hope I will be a literature teacher next year, both related to education and the situation of women in our country, and most importantly, the protector of Islam in our country, that is, of course, the protector of the religion of Allah. I want to be in this, not only for Islam but also for freedom.”

CHP

C10 underlines that s/he needs hope to pursue the struggle and that the activities, which are done in the youth branch, satisfy her/him in that way:

“Of course, the biggest concern for my future is the insecure environment created by the economic crisis, I am currently employed, so I have a job now, but of course there is no clear path ahead of me in the long run. Because of the neo-liberalization policies implemented in the last 15 years, we are not working in a safe and employable way that we can foresee for the time being, as precariousness and subcontracting are paved. There are concerns about this. I hope that at this point, mainly the activities carried out, especially the efforts to help people in the lower-income group of the society by young people at this point feeds my hope for the future.”

C2 states that his/her first intention to enter the youth branches occurred when s/he was in charge of the ballot box in 2014. S/he also underlines that there is a hope for the future of herself/himself and the country and that s/he wants to be part of it;

“I have concerns about the future of the world. Populism and fascism are on the rise. Racism is also on the rise. I also have concerns about the future of Turkey and hope too. My concern is that the economy will hurt us very bad in the future. I have hope, that: I hope that democracy will recover. I have great hopes for my own future. I'm happy, I'm hopeful. I think I can shape my future the way I want, my own future.”

C4 points out the incapacity of the political party to mobilize the young members and accepts that they have to do everything on their own to protect their interests, and he/she states that:

“In fact, the party is lowering motivation. This is due to the current administration of the CHP. If you say how we are motivated, the conditions develop spontaneously. An air gets caught, a synergy emerges. We saw this in Muharrem İnce's presidential election. In fact, these conditions arise from the general situation in the country or with our local environment, everything comes together and a synergy emerges. In other words, we are affected by social media and television if necessary. Nobody motivates us, we motivate ourselves by environmental factors.”

The main motivation of C6 is to govern the country in the right way, and she/he describes this philosophy by explaining, “Because, in the end, I am a person who believes that all citizens

living in this country have the right to speak up about the management of this country.” In line with this, C7 also underlines the importance of beautifying one’s city, and her/his main interest is to do so. S/he knows that the party can solve the problems s/he mentions. C8 points out that her/his basic motivation to participate in politics is the struggle against something that s/he believes is problematic or unjust:

“The decline in secularism, and the fact that life becomes more difficult for young people and women, I decided to take part in the youth branches of the CHP to fight against it, as I said. ... For example, as a protest, I participated in the protests in the process of the cancellation of the mayor of Imamoğlu. Of course, I thought there was an unfair situation, I participated in protests to show my reaction”.

Lilleker and Koc-Michalska (2016) mentioned before that the main motivation behind the conventional forms of political participation is self-efficacy and empowerment, and the feeling of the participants over the influence on the decision-making process. However, in the case of both AK Party and CHP, the young members of the parties show little interest and state that they are given little chance to influence the decision-making process; rather, they tend to act on the things that they see as problematic or unjust. Their main concern is to express themselves, regardless of whether it changes something or not. They are here to say something, achieve better things, and search for the best for the city or country to live in. So, there seem to be no calculated benefits from participation as rational choice theory suggests. It also seems like, as Junn suggests, political knowledge is essential for these young members to participate.

5.3.2. Nonconventional Form of Political Participation: GoFor

G2 states that her/his basic motivation for participating in civil society was because of the forests: “The reason I joined was that I couldn't digest that our forests were to be massacred.”

Also, s/he adds that s/he has hope and concerns about the future of the country and herself/himself;

“My concerns are, as a person with a lot of experience abroad, I say this, the quality of our living standards, the quality of our education standards, respect for human rights, love for people ... I think we are back on many issues, so I'm worried. But I'm also hopeful. But of course, over time, something that will happen again with education, showing people something.

The purpose of being in non-governmental organizations is to impose things to people in some way and to show them something and to get into better ways.”

G1 states that the very first reason for her/him to enter civil society was human rights; “I was fully involved in human rights. For opposing the removal of our existing rights and for believing that we will have a greater impact with the mass.” Then, s/he underlines the importance of the issue of change as a major motivator for her participation:

“Yes, I am prepared for the next national elections. As I mentioned above, I believe in change. I trust in my good communication and analytical approach with my studies in civil society for 11 years. And I don't think those who represent us represent us. I will continue my work to change to criticize. But knowing that there are still good people and they make great efforts makes me hopeful. Chaos won't last forever, we will do our best to get out of chaos. Sometimes my worries outweigh, but I can't live if I lose hope.”

G3 states that her/his primary motivation is to go abroad and develop her/his foreign language; the civil society organization that s/he is a member of provides opportunities in that area.

G4 underlines the importance of understanding other cultures and societies and sees civil society as an opportunity:

“In other words, it was the thing that impressed me the most about recognizing the different cultures that the association has already aimed. The reason I applied to become a member is that I was able to recognize different cultures and explore different places.”

“Also, s/he emphasizes that “I did not take such an initiative because I thought that membership in political parties might cause problems for me in the future.”

G6 underlines that “I met with the NGO during my university years. After my university years, I felt a vacancy after being assigned as a teacher, because I had a lot of time. It had a project, I applied, I got accepted. Then I got involved in his work. I attended more this year.” However, s/he tries to avoid being political; “unfortunately, in our culture and society, politics is seen as one of the biggest discriminating factors. It shouldn't be like this, but our society is formed in this direction, so I try not to make politics.

G7 states that socialization and learning something that makes her/him be a better member of civil society; “I wasn't exactly familiar. I was following through Instagram and Facebook. I'm looking for volunteers in English, it had shared, I participated to know more people. I can communicate with many people in one language. I can improve myself better. I'm thinking about studying law in the future, it would be better if I have a foreign language.”

G8 underlines that civil society allows her/him to develop herself/himself; “The motivation of being a member of a non-governmental organization is; You open your eyes to life in a way. One, you see different people, when people see different cultures from Erasmus, recognize something from different cultures, people open their eyes. He learns life. In this context, I think it is very useful to me.”

G9 states that her/his purest motivation for joining civil society was to participate in something that created change. As s/he explains:

“The NGO was first established in 2006 or 2007 as human rights schools. And in the face of injustice, my friends were going to give a press release and I was interested in them at the time. I wasn't interested in much like that, but I was still going to support it. Then, while studying at university, we had a lesson called community service. There was also the requirement to work voluntarily in a non-governmental organization. I worked there for a period and then my civil society life started. ... I think I need to be in action, in accordance with my own principles and principles. That is why NGOs have the power to transform what I see as problematic to transform them. You feel like you put your hand under the stone. So I can work that way in any NGO, so I'm there to transform it. ... Saturday mothers had a protest, I joined them. There was an injustice to them, and I thought that I should show my presence.”

G10 points out that there is a social side of participation. As s/he explains:

“The activity was very good for me, it was very good. I knew different people, people from different professions, different styles.”

In the case of GoFor, one of the main motivations of young people seem to be changing something that they saw as problematic. This reinforces Knack's assumption that the incentive behind political participation can be traced to social norms due to an internalized sense of duty to the community. Also, these young members tend to use participation as a tool for

socialization and networking, not for the purpose of economic interests but for personal development.

In both cases, conventional and nonconventional political participation, young people seem to have selective incentives to participate (Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989; Finkel and Opp, 1991; Muller and Opp, 1986, 1987; Opp, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990). They don't act based on economic incentives. They try to maximize their satisfaction with economic interests; they choose, rather, to be beneficial and useful to the society that they live in.

Also, as Van Deth proposes, personalized modes of participation are more likely to be seen in the case of GoFor.

5.4. Family

On one side of the literature, there are studies focusing on the transfer of political behavior between generations, and on the other, there are some investigating the relationship between family ties and political participation.

Putnam (1993) underlines that if there is a strong family tie, there is an increased chance for distrust of the government and authority in general. The author argues that this type of behavior is transferrable to the young generations, leading the way to the creation of trust only in the family. It is argued that if the family ties are strong, political participation and trust are low (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011: 2-3).

Low or strong family ties have an impact on social life and all the decisions made inside of the social sphere. The authors use the data from the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey, as well as the data from three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). The second segment of data is focused on the immigrants, and the majority of the information is gathered from the Germans, Italians, and Turks (5) They measured political attitudes, political action, and trust. The results of the study with the data from the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey underline that strong family ties have led the way to a low interest in politics. This low interest contains both conventional and nonconventional types of participation. The second data set shows that, among the immigrants, the findings are not so different, except they are more reluctant to participate in political activism if there are strong family ties. (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011: 7-12)

In the issue of youth civic engagement, one important determinant is the parents (Bekkers, 2007; Flanagan and Sherrod, 1998; Lerner, 2004). In the literature, there are four main discussions over the relationship between parents and youth civic engagement. The first one focuses on the impact of the participation of the parents and underlines its importance (Zaff et al., 2003a). The second discussion examines the civic values and how they are inherited from the parents (Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csapo, and Sheblanova, 1998; Flanagan and Tucker, 1999). The third one emphasizes that if the parents are involved in politics, and they talk about it when the children are present, then the chance that these children will be involved in politics is high (Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter, Zukin, 2003; McIntosh, Hart, and Youniss, 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995), and four assets, such as income (Zaff et al., 2003b). The last one addresses the relationship between the level of youth civic engagement and the level of education, income, etc. of the parents (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, and Schulz, 2001, Flanagan and Tucker, 1999; Verba et al., 1995, as cited in Bebiroglu, N. et al., 2013: 153-168).

Both family and the network of young people play the role of transmitting an interest in politics. (Rossi, 2009: 490)

In terms of the effect of the parents on the children, it is stated that their behavior and patterns of living have an impact on the children's participation in the social arena. Because parents are essentially the role models for their children, their reactions to the social phenomenon are significant determinants of their children's behaviors (Chan and Elder, 2001: 22-23).

The family and its attitudes towards political participation, or engaging political activities, affect the children throughout their lives. The beliefs and thoughts of the young people are basically shaped by their families. The family mostly provides resources and opportunities for the children; the family system constitutes the first connection that serves to promote an early interest in political participation. If the family helps the children to experience different activities, the political participation of the youth is expected to become high (Watts and Flanagan, 2007).

5.4.1. Conventional Form of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding family is that the family has a huge impact on young people of political parties, while the importance of familial influence is less significant for the participation of young people of civil society.

AK Party

A1 states that s/he acted against her/his family on ideological ground and chose to go her/his own way

“Since my childhood in my family, there was a tendency to support the leftist parties, I can say that I grew up in a secular environment. Actually, I was quite critical and distant to the AK Party. I was going to BISAV, I can say that I got closer to the party through Davutoğlu.”

A3 underlines that since s/he is subjected to so much information and talk about the politics in the family, it was inevitable for her/him not to participate in politics. As s/he explains:

“Since the political issues are discussed in the families, the child is inevitably dominating, and it is tempting to see it on social media. ... Since my childhood, my family has been talking about politics at home. When the TV's on, Dad talks. The mother and father support the party that I support and vote for. My father has more influence in shaping my political views.”

A5 also accepts the influence of family and their talks about her/his decision to become a member of the political party and to become active in politics:

“In general, the family has a lot of influence on this kind of thing. In our households, the parents were already pro-AK Party. In this way, we joined the AK Party because we think the AK Party is good for choosing the right wrong for us. It helped our friends in the same way. This way we joined the AK Party. My family has been a member of AK Party for 10-15 years. My parents, of course, are not as active as ours. The membership of my family affected me 30 - 40%. The other part is my own opinion, so it went from my own ideas.”

A7 explains how her/his family is interested in politics, but claims s/he was not influenced by them:

“Family-based mine. My father is an active member of the MHP. The mother side is mostly pro-AK Party. I come from a conservative family as a political view, as a live view. They did not oppress me politically until I turned 18. My uncle's active presence, my father's father's side... But no one has come to me they only answered when I asked questions. And when I was 18, they didn't ask me who to vote for when I first voted. We came home after voting, I told him myself. At that time, I voted for the MHP at first but after the political stance of the MHP began to become unstable, I started to think that it was not the right option for me. Then when I talk about it with my father, and he said I'm not going to interfere with you, etc. said. Then I started to like the AK Party or Recep Tayyip Erdogan's own stance. Then the AK Party began to interest me”.

In the same line, A8 emphasizes the impact and guidance of the family as an important motivation for participation, and s/he states:

“My mother had all the work of the party since the times of the welfare party till Erbakan's death, I also originated in the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) in fact I worked in high school AGD later I joined the AK Party. ... it is very likely that you will get closer to the parties coming from this tradition, from family. When the university started, I came to the AK Party. ... I became a member with the support of my cousin by establishing a relationship with a brother in Istanbul. ... my whole family is a member of the AK Party since 2013”

A9, moreover, points out that s/he was directed toward political participation by his/ family, although s/he undermines the influence. As s/he explains:

“Actually, my father had a duty in the neighborhood organization before, he has not been working in the neighborhood organization for two years or so, but before that, he was in the district organization, he also worked in the district for a while, then left, because of his job. Although I haven't had a formal duty in a long time, I have been coming and going in the neighborhood more or less with my father. I had a request, I wanted to go. Most recently, before the elections of these two municipalities, I was in charge of the ballot box and somehow I saw that there was a shortcoming. I was aware of that before, but I noticed a lot at the polls that day. In some respects, I thought that there was negligence of party officials, that there were things done wrong, that I didn't say that in certain terms, that is because I'm very good, I only thought that there were things that went wrong in a certain way, and I wanted to be in, somehow make a good contribution, and so I started. ... I think my father impressed me a little bit. But I think

I was more influenced by social media, I am very close to my family, my uncles, who are working directly in the foundation, not in the party, but my uncles are active in associations, but I think I was more interested in social media and my own environment. ... Although my mother is not actively involved in the political issue ... How do I tell? I am in a family that has political interests. Although my mother has no duty, there are people around me who enjoy sitting and talking about it. Yes, of course, it might have had an impact on my family.”

CHP

C10 underlines the importance of the combined effect of family and social environment on her/his political participation:

“There was an interest in the Republican People's Party as a family. Most of my friends were members of the Republican People's Party. With their influence and contribution, I started to make politics at the Republican People's Party. ... My mother and brother are members of the Republican People's Party. Of course, as I said before, my family and the environment were organized in the Republican People's Party, which provided me with a motivation to become a member of the Republican People's Party.”

C3 clearly gives an example of how a child is affected by the political environment of the house s/he lives in:

“I started when I was eight because of my mother. I've been to many different political parties. I was in TKP during high school, for example. The transition to the CHP was the full Gezi process. During the Gezi, our brother in the neighborhood kept talking about it and I entered. My mother, my father is a member of the CHP. They don't have memberships in non-governmental organizations, but my mother likes this kind of work.... Of course, my mother's situation affected my political situation. I would say that I started at the age of 8, thanks to the books I bought from her. My mother bought all my political books until the end of high school.”

C4 explains how s/he grew up in a politically-active family, and how s/he sees her/his membership to the political party as the inevitable consequence of living in that family:

“My family is a family that is interested in politics. And I've naturally found myself at the party since I was little. So I felt like I was brought up at the party, so I can say that my involvement in politics was automatic. ... Actually, while I was attending, I didn't mean to go on my own and be a member. As I said, I already had a participation process from a family that

came from a small age. So as I said, it actually developed automatically for me. It developed spontaneously. my parents are my family, my relatives, my cousins, my aunts my grandmother, So, most of my close relatives are members of the party.”

A7 and C7 also claim that despite the political activities of his/her families, it was their own decision to participate in youth branches:

“I can call the whole family a member of the political party. No, it did not affect me. As I mentioned before, I had a very different opinion in high school. I mean by very different views. I wasn't a youngster looking to be part of CHP. Then it changed.”

C7: “My mother is a member of the Republican People's Party, and my father is a member of the Justice and Development Party. When I became a member, I was absolutely under no influence. It was my own personal thought, starting politics. My family also did not put pressure on this situation. Nor did I try to influence them in any process.”

Also, as in the previous case, C7 also underlines that it was her/his decision to join a youth branch of the political party despite the membership of her/his family;

“I started exactly in college. Meanwhile, the Gezi Process occurred. When I joined Gezi from Tekirdag, I said I had to do something for this country. What should I do? The most obvious thing for me was the CHP. My mother, my grandfather, and other generations of my family had done this before me; I became a member to continue their work. Everyone in my family is a member of CHP, but they did not tell me to go and become a member.”

The answers of the young people related to motivation of the family to join a political party resemble the findings of Jenkins, Andolina, Keeter, Zukin, 2003; Lake Snell Perry and Associates, 2002; McIntosh, Hart, and Youniss, 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, which claim that if the parents are involved in politics, and they have talked about it when the children are present, then the chance of these children to be involved in politics is high. Some young people claim that they are not influenced by their families; however, they may confuse pressure with the influence.

5.4.2. Nonconventional Form of Political Participation: GoFor

G1 underlines and appreciates the impact of her/his father's influence on her/his desire to be part of a civil society organization;

"I live in a very cosmopolitan family and migrate from a small city to a big city. My father and mother are both very opposed and are interested in politics. My father is the founder of the association in our country and they carry out very good works within the scope of social assistance and solidarity. My father has a lot to do with my volunteering. I can't say I'm impressed with my family as a politics."

G2 clearly points out the influence of her/his siblings in her/his own participation:

"Previously, my brother's friends abroad had been involved in these affairs and had worked in various non-governmental organizations. My brother became interested, then he told us, and that's how we became interested. That's how it happened. ... especially, my brothers and sisters, they held various positions in non-governmental organizations, they offered me to come, you want to take part in this kind of activity. It attracted my interest"

G5 points out that although s/he has had conversations with her/his father about politics, her/his family does not always support her/him, and underlines that;

"I applied to ERASMUS here; I did not get in. Then I searched for AEGEE or something, and the family doesn't look supportive. I discuss politics with my father, I enjoy discussing it with my family. I listen to my father's opinions; we talk about these issues when we sit down. But I've never seen them become a member."

G7, on the other hand, explains how s/he feels neglected because her/his father spent so much time in politics, and still be part of the political scene:

"I felt I was missing something because my father was giving all his time to politics. He was always going to the thing, he was doing something, he was coming to the deputies or something. For example, he was doing something to give support. How could I say He was helping them work. I couldn't see my father more. That's how he affected the family."

G9 speaks of the impact of her/his father's past and tortures that he witnessed in his youth and decides to be part of the political arena without his support or consent, stating:

“My father demanded that his children be extremely apolitical after the torture of the prisoners, and he made suggestions. Our property conflict is in this direction. I feel the lack of it, so I can't see my father's support in the work that I'm doing.”

G10, similar to the previous case, does not feel supported by the family; there was no one in her/his family to be influenced by; yet, s/he wants to be part of politics:

“Of course. They are less politically related to this religion, so I think politics like religion. I was impressed that they did not have such a strict political attitude.”

As explained by Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csapo, and Sheblanova, 1998 Flanagan and Tucker, 1999, civic values, and how they are inherited from the parents, play a crucial role in young people becoming the member of civil society. If the parents are involved in such activities, it is clearly the driving force for their children. Also, based on the interviews, it seems that if the parents have bad experiences related to the political scene, their children tend to become members of the civil society organizations rather than political parties.

So, in both cases, conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation, it is evident that the family, and its views regarding the political arena, influence the choices of the young people, making them more motivated to become active members of a political party or a civil society.

5.5. Social Media

Brady defines political participation as “action by ordinary citizens directed towards influencing some political outcomes” (1999: 737). However, the important thing is the type of influence, whether it is voting, party membership, or becoming a part of demonstration matters (Bäck and Christensen, 2016) (see also van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007; Norris, 2002). So, political participation means much more today than high-effort, offline acts. It transcends this definition, and broadens its walls to include activities such as demonstrations and nonconventional forms of participation encouraged by and evolved through digital technologies and social media, where expressing themselves matters more than influencing decision-making (de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela, 2012). As stated, “via social media, the participant can go beyond the state boundaries to contribute and enhance the discussions and national and global causes” (Pettersen, 2016).

Unlike static functionalism, which portrays young people as the receivers of the news and information from their social circles, the new studies about youth political participation have been focusing on the motivations behind their participation (Bennett, 2008; McLeod and Shah, 2009). Further to this point, one of the main focuses of the literature is the role of new media tools. As the media becomes more and more digitalized, communication patterns change and open new ways for young people to engage in politics. So, participating the politics and saying something about the things you think are important has become much more resource-dependent.

Suddenly, time, money, and personal connections have become less significant when you want to reach an audience, to share your ideas, and to be heard by the authorities. Nowadays, it is easier to connect with other people, and political knowledge circulates more and more. This situation provides new opportunities for young people to become politically active and mobilized (Bennett, 2008; Delli Carpini, 2000; Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal, 2007). The important point here is the fact that, even though young people do not intend to participate in politics, when they use digital media tools, they are learning participation skills and acquiring knowledge about politics (Quintelier and Vissers, 2008; Smith, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, 2009). So, it is possible for young people to become politically active in the process, even though they do not consciously make that choice at the beginning.

It is stated that the importance of informal discussion has been growing over the years despite the idea of “conversation is the soul of democracy” (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz, 1999, p. 362, emphasis theirs) has resonated for centuries. Especially with the Internet, new opportunities for political participation have been opened up; these are particularly used by the young people. More than ever, with the help of blogs, social network sites, user-generated news, and specific websites, individuals become more engaged in politics to influence the government (Valenzuela et al., 2011; Kaufhold, Valenzuela, and Gil de Zuniga, 2010; Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal, 2007; Valenzuela, Park, Kee, 2009).

The new type of political participation has been emerging with the help of digital media and the Internet. With the Internet, new forms of political participation are possible, such as sending emails to politicians, visiting campaign websites, etc. (Lusoli, Ward, Gibson, 2005). The cost of political participation has been lowered by the Internet (Quintelier and Vissers, 2008); unlike offline participation, online political participation requires less time and civic skills (Best and Krueger, 2005).

5.5.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding social media is that social media motivates young people to participate in political parties by seeing and reading about their activities while motivating young people to participate in civil society by encouraging civic duties.

AK Party

A1 underlines the effect of the things we see in social media and how it motivates those reading or seeing them:

“I know many curious, hard-working young people who come to read rights from social media, I don't know the situation now but you are touching a section through social media that you can't influence from the TVs”

“There is something like that television and the media do not report everything. Twitter reports them all, good or bad. And you can see the reaction of the people very easily, the things they said, what they did and what they did not ... Let's say that something happened, p the public's reaction to this is necessary. We learn this kind of information from Twitter, and obviously, it motivates us because it allows us to tidy up more.” (A5)

A2 emphasizes that it is now easy to access any news through social media, and the main purpose of Twitter and Facebook, especially, evolved from sharing something to following the political agenda, while Instagram is primarily used for personal posts:

“I saw their work on social media, I was already following the AK Party. I use social media actively. I have a Twitter and Instagram account. (I don't share anything from Facebook.) I'm using Twitter purely to follow the country's agenda. I use it to follow political and cultural activities. I use the Instagram account for personal purposes, share photos and follow friends. ... Twitter agenda items, TTs, are helpful to follow the country's agenda. If I see an injustice, I would criticize it even if it was my own party, so I had even left the party. Usually, when I see something I feel the need to express ideas.” (A2)

“I've already communicated with the party through social media. I use Twitter and Instagram. I use Instagram to take photos, enjoyment, I do not share political opinions. On Instagram, political sharing is not appropriate. I did political sharing on my Twitter account, I am following the agenda, but now I suspended my account. I have no followers, I have

followers, I use them for information purposes only. ... There was Gezi Park event, I was using Twitter then. I was following and I was depressed.” (A3).

“The first thing people do in order to obtain information is to go into hashtags and learn the details of the event and analyze it. One has his own view, he sees a hashtag outside his own view and looks at everyone's opinion. I use Twitter for purely political aims. I use Instagram and Facebook personally, in the sense of a close environment. I don't make political sharing on Instagram, and I find it absurd because Instagram is not a political environment. It was opened for the purpose of sharing one's own events with his close circle. There is no political sharing here. Twitter is more suitable for this purpose. When you look at it, you see that all politicians always make their thoughts and opinions on this platform even at the top of the stage. Twitter is very useful for these purposes. Everyone has a personal account, interaction is very important, called the freedom site.” (A4)

“I've been using Twitter about since it was founded, probably. I have an anonymous account other than my own account. In fact, I usually use Twitter for small talks and I use it to follow the agenda. So, I'm actually using Twitter rather than a news app. Both because I see every opinion, every idea together, I can read different comments, and I think I use a hand habit, I use Twitter the most, I love it the most, in this way, in fact, to follow the agenda and to click the others I use Twitter because I find it more intimate. I also use it for political purposes myself, I write and read a lot of political things, I follow political accounts too much. In general, I think it is used too much for political purposes, and I think that the left segment is even more successful. I observe that they are very active and successful especially on Twitter. As I said, I use it politically myself.” (A10).

Also, the young people I interviewed state that they mostly do not watch TV for following the country's political agenda because they do not believe in the impartiality of TV programs anymore; as A2 states in that manner that

“I'm not watching TV. Because I see television away from me, most programs are empty. There are channels focusing around a continuous view since there are no dissenting channels, it does not seem objective. I'm just watching TV for the football match. Especially I am trying to follow the agenda on Twitter. I follow the agenda abroad, through newspapers on Twitter (Anadolu Agency) I follow the Syrian agenda. Because it's our neighbor, it affects us directly.”

“I use social media very well, I follow Twitter, I do this often, but I can not say that I follow the whole agenda from there. I'm trying to watch all the channels on TV. No such thing as neutrality in Turkey, this also applies to the channel. Everyone has a case, but there must be neutral media, for justice. Social media sets justice in Turkey. Social media is the beginning of news, the entrance of the event. After the smartphones, the TV era was over.” (A3).

“Where do I follow the news? I follow NTV and HaberTürk’s websites, but I follow them in general, but Twitter is an ideal place for instant information. When an event occurs, it explodes on Twitter directly.” (A7)

Some young members appreciate the importance of social media in encouraging people to take a stand; however, some believe that it matters more for visibility:

“I was inspired by the news, social media and the environments I was in and found myself here. We have made major supports on the spread of the hashtags on social media and opening the eyes of the citizens. Home visits, brochures were distributed, major brochures were distributed to raise public awareness in the squares. Such things are not effective enough to change people's views. Because what matters here is the person's own thoughts, the practice of putting their theory into practice. If someone else is to come and change your opinion, it needs a very powerful mechanism and a powerful weapon. But still communication and propaganda are powerful weapons, you say I'm here. You make your presence felt, it helps people enter your subconscious.” (A4).

A7 states that although the party uses social media in an active way, s/he thinks that the opposition party is better in using it:

“We have a social media unit in our commission. When the activities take place, we are actively involved in the activities that affect the youth branches that are connected to the party and enable us to reach out to people, but I am sure that this is something that I realize and accept the general view. On social media, the opposition parties can make more noise. Because they have more to contend with. Ours is nothing more than sharing our activities. Because we don't see it as a battlefield. Some see it that way. Especially during this election period, we witnessed them very much. You know we're not doing anything. It caused an argument to ourselves. Let's just say we're using it to announce what we do and make our voices heard. But social media is actively used.”

Among ten interviewees in AK Party, only one (A8) thinks that social media does not have any effect on political participation. As s/he states:

“I do not believe that social media contributes (motivates). Maybe other parties benefit more from social media.” (A8).

CHP

As in the case of the AK Party, social media, Twitter, especially, seems to be the most favored source for following political agendas.

“I'm sharing especially via Twitter. I'm making political shares. Right now I'm already working on an election. After the Gezi Events of 2013, social media is more encouraging for politics, especially for those who use Twitter. I follow the Turkish and foreign agenda via Twitter.” (C5).

“I share my world view as much as I can fit 240 characters on Twitter. I used social media accounts to encourage people to the party. I already have access to any information I want from social media. Since I follow news sites from social media accounts, the easiest thing is to get healthy information from Twitter.” (C7).

“I use social media mostly to share on the political agenda. When I'm going to share on a political point, Twitter comes first, followed by Instagram. We discussed and acknowledged the importance of social media in an environment where social media became widespread and especially affected the elections.” (C10).

As in the case of AK Party, the young members of CHP also underline the importance of social media for motivation on political participation:

“Let me talk about membership first: Membership, in general, is through care. Our friends who like to see our activities and who want to participate in our activities are demanding from us. They are especially affected by social media. In other words, we are affected by social media and television if necessary. Nobody motivates us, we motivate ourselves by environmental factors. “I use Instagram to communicate with my friends, so I use it to see what my friends are doing or to show it to my friends. Twitter, but mostly to follow the news and agenda. Social media motivates us for sure.” (C4).

“We use social media to reach out to the masses and to introduce ourselves to the public better. Social media motivates participation.” (C6).

“I don't know if it encourages political participation, but it doesn't for me. But it's a guarantee that social media motivates people outside. We are making a mistake in this: People who follow us on social media or those who follow us are our people as political views. We think every share is working. It doesn't work if we try to use social media with a political consciousness. Personally, yes. In fact, social media is the place to satisfy ourselves. Unfortunately, we are trying to ban a ton of people on the street, the place where we explode is social media.” (C9).

They, however, unlike the youth of AK Party, give importance to follow the news through TV or newspapers:

“I usually look on TV. In Twitter, I follow Duvar and, Sendika.org or something like a socialist workers' magazine. I gave up talking about politics in social media.” (C2)

“In general, let's say to follow social media. Other than that, there are major internet news portals, mainly to look at those places. On the weekends, let me say that I mostly look at the tabloid paper. Similarly, I follow the international agenda through social media channels.” (C10).

Only one of the interviewees thinks that social media does not motivate her/him to be more politically active; s/he posts political content because s/he is political and explains:

“I use Twitter, especially in the political sense, no one reads the news anymore. You can learn more easily with short tweets. Twitter is a little more than a news retrieval tool for me. In fact, if we say Facebook, it is also almost political; I take only one Instagram as my own. I try not to make much political sharing there. I use Twitter and Facebook politically. I mean, yes, but does it add extra motivation? No. On the contrary, my shares are political because I am political.” (C3).

In the same line, C9 also states that s/he does not necessarily follow social media to get information about the current political and daily news but sees these platforms as an opportunity to express herself/himself;

“I use social media; I usually make political posts. I share about the CHP, our youth work, or the general work of the party. I express my political views and thoughts through social media. I use social media for political purposes to make propaganda. In addition, I'm sharing personal things.”

5.5.2. Nonconventional Form of Political Participation: GoFor

G1 points out that s/he experienced undesired outcomes by posting political views on social media:

“Previously, I used social media for my work and for political reasons. Of course, this led me to an inevitable process. I came across the great reality of society. Even if your discourse and the work you do is meaningful, they make you a target for your political work. I've been labeled as a terrorist 3 times where I live. For ridiculous reasons. With all the good things I've done, I have declared as a traitor due to my political criticism. I have tried to understand this issue for a long time but I have never been able to agree with the other party. In this process, I do all my own work, news from the world and political criticism other than the political party.”

Maybe because of the impact of such examples mentioned above, G8 points out that sharing political content is not appropriate on social media:

“I actually use social media to spend time just like this. I don't expect anything in terms of political content to chat with my friends. We are already students, we can do nothing by making political content.”

Like the young members of political parties, GoFor members also show that they follow the political agenda via social media and the sources they find online:

“I have a look at the Internet newspapers of all opinions, and I also follow the world agenda from Internet newspapers.” (G1).

“We use social media in the most active way possible. We carry out the activities of our association through Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, and advertising our association on various platforms. Today is technology age so I follow various news sites, various applications through social media, instead of newspaper magazines.” (G2)

“My goal of using social media is to learn the news in the country where I live, to get the most accurate information, not from television, but from sources that offer as accurate news as possible.” (G4)

“I'm comparing the news now because every media source says something different. I love reading newspapers online. There are websites of different newspapers on the Internet, I follow them. I'm looking at the news from Facebook. Every minute of my day, I almost try to get some news. Every day I read absolutely news. I do that every time I sit on a computer and every time I pick up a phone.” (G5)

G3, on the one hand, underlines that social media does not motivate young people to participate; s/he sees the current political situation in Turkey as depressing, and knowing about political developments makes him/her feel less encouraged and motivated to participate in politics. S/he states that:

“I usually follow the agenda abroad on BBC News or on the Internet. I do not want to follow the current agenda of Turkey because it is not too good. I do not watch, I do not follow much to keep my morale and motivation.”

G6, on the other hand, underlines the importance of social media to motivate young people by saying: “I use social media more as a news medium. Social media positively affects political participation.”

“The youth organizations forum is also very active in using social media accounts. We constantly stream information to our members via mail, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. I use all my social media accounts and try to use them as actively as I can.” (G9).

“Every page, that is, if you follow pages that are close to your own thinking, you feel closer to them because they share things close to your own thoughts. For example, I do not get up and support an x party, y party, I do not follow the page anyway, but social media's perception management is very good.” (G10).

Due to the widespread usage of smartphones and development in digital media, it seems like young people have been gaining participation skills and becoming increasingly knowledgeable in the political arena, as mentioned by Ito et al., 2009; Quintelier and Vissers, 2008; Smith, Schlozman, Verba, and Brady, 2009. By reducing the costs of participation, social media opened the information open to all; thus, it can be suggested that young people now

understand the risks and gains coming from social media and act accordingly. As in the case of GoFor, although they use social media to motivate people by sharing their work to impress them, they show some reluctance to become more political in social media. Unlike them, young people in political parties are more open to sharing their political views and using social media as a tool to recruit new members.

However, what we see here is that people already engaged in political issues are the ones visiting the political sites; as a voluntaristic perspective states, political participation guides the use of technology. Online political participation mirrors offline political participation, so people will not change their political participation just because new opportunities have been created. This idea fits the idea of reinforcement (Kraemer et al., 1989): the ones that visit political party websites will mostly be the same ones that attend political meetings and party congresses. Young people who read about politics in newspapers will read about it online; the ones that read about sports will not suddenly decide to visit websites providing political information. There are exceptions to this, of course, but seeing and reading about political issues or things that have a direct impact on their life does not guarantee the political involvement of young people.

5.6. Party Identity/Leadership

After reading the literature on the party identity/leadership, I decided to narrow my research down to the relationship between trust and political participation because, in the end, the decision to participate can be evaluated according to the young peoples' views on the current political system; they are more likely to establish their relationship with the current politics via their trust (or lack of trust) in the political system.

Many scholars argue that trust and political participation are positively correlated (Benson and Rochon, 2004; Kaase, 1999; Norris, 2002; Putnam, 2000). The basic explanation behind this argument is that individuals are likely to believe that others will be politically active, open to cooperating and working on the collective goals while embracing the benefits of participation, so this belief encourages them to become more active in politics. On the other hand, some scholars could not find the strong or positive relationship between trust and political participation, and even suggest that there is a negative one (Bäck and Christensen, 2011; Pattie, Sayd, and Whiteley, 2003; Uslander and Brown, 2005 cited in Bäck and Christensen, 2016). The main assumption related to trust and its effect on voting is that when the former is strong, then

the latter would be high. However, the failure of this assumption is that this correlation does not work when one considers the opposite assumption; a low level of trust does not necessarily guarantee a low level of voting or apathy.

The relationship between politics and trust is one of the most studied issues in politics. Distrust in politics and politicians is one of the most common problems faced by contemporary democratic regimes. A lack of confidence in politicians and political institutions is the case, not only in Turkey but in the world's most developed countries. The sense of trust is primarily related to consistency. The more consistent a person or situation is, the more reliable it is (Bingöl, 2009: 1-2).

Individual characteristics, and the ties within the family, are significant determinants of trust in others and in institutions. Those with strong family ties seem to be less interested in politics. These strong family ties are associated with a low level of social capital, resulting in a poor quality of politicians and high levels of corruption.

The argument stating that there is a positive correlation between the level of trust in the system, the party and its leaders, and political participation is called the Rainmaker Effect. Putnam (2002), on this point, suggests that trust means something; trust towards a system shows trust in conventional participatory actions. However, Uslaner and Brown (2005) argue that trust is more likely to be related to non-traditional participation. The reason behind this assumption underlines the time-consuming characteristics of the conventional type of participation (Marien and Christensen, 2013); as Uslaner (2002) states, generalized trust that encourages the nonconventional ways of participation provides a high motivation for individuals who have a desire to engage in politics because it does not require much effort to participate (Bäck and Christensen, 2016).

Trust in institutions, and the system in general, results in high engagement in conventional forms of political participation (e.g. Uslaner and Brown, 2005), while mistrust enhances nonconventional forms of participation (Citrin and Luks, 2001; Dalton, 2005; Norris, 1999; Gamson, 1968; Pierce and Converse, 1989; Tarrow, 1994, as cited in Mannarini, Legittimo, and Talò, 2008: 108-109).

5.6.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding party identity/leadership is that if the young people trust the political system and its components, then they are more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation; if they do not trust the political system, they are more likely to engage in civil society.

AK Party

Trust and the belief in the party leaders have a positive effect on the young members of the political parties; they most likely need to feel attached to the political party they are a member of and establish this attachment on the basis of trust. On this subject, A1 underlines that not only the current leaders of the party but also the former ones have a huge impact on her/his decision to stay in politics;

“I was there to produce more action. When the Necmettin Hodja was handed off from the Prime Ministry, I became quite distant from the process. Then it was July 15 that we went down to the street as a very strong youth. I continued to stay for this reason again. Since the July 15 and June 24 elections, the situation has already become dependent on the MHP, I am uncomfortable with this alliance, so I am not as active as before. ... Also, with Davutoğlu, I was motivated by the fact that I thought that a truly revolutionary anti-imperialist and Muslim group in the country would direct the ideology of the country. Even if there are crumbs of this thought now, I continue.”

“I went into a process for myself to benefit my country, country, and nation. I have continuity in that way I have some resentment in the last period, especially after the Hodja's departure, but I continue to work” (A4).

“As Erbakan said, Islam is not only fasting to pray. jihad is too. jihad may mean war, but the intent here is to make Muslim politics. To move the Muslim stand to the public sphere motivates people. My intention was to come to a position that could help people and to do things here and to continue Erbakan's line. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the new address and leader. Even though I know that we are having problems, I see that we are on the way to becoming a strong country and as a result of this, my worries are replaced with more hope.” (A8).

Also, the belief in the leader and the trust the young members feel for the leader is significant to for political participation; A2 states in that manner that:

“What is important to me is the power that the leader stands behind. If the leader is strong and the people behind him depend on the leader, it is okay. Candidates are motivated through leaders. We are constantly talking about the leader's work for young people and comparing them to the past and the present, motivating them.”

“That's why the leadership characteristics of the person I envision and the party leader's compliance with my thoughts matter. I'd like him to act under my thoughts.” (A4).

Moreover, not only the leader of the party but the members and representatives of the party play an important role for young people to participate in politics; A3 underlines this issue:

“At that time, we were men with a cause, the people there, our friends were men with a cause. They acted with Islamic feelings. He attracted me, and I joined. Now it is not the case, unfortunately, there are no men with a cause. The party is a very different place in terms of politics, there is politics, but you are not given the education to teach politics, they teach you organizationism.”⁴

Also, the discourse of the political party, in and of itself, motivates young people to trust and participate in politics:

“Actually, we can examine my motivation under several headings. First of all, I think the AK Party is doing really good things, so I thought that I could do more things for myself, so I could improve myself more and I thought that the party could develop and I joined the AK Party in this way. My motivation will also provide what I say again, maybe the things he developed, his actions could be done. They can say things and stand behind them. In fact, I was more motivated by myself. Our only aim as the youth branch, the heads of the AK Party organization, our President that everyone wants to add something to the nation if you want to add something more precisely these things are usually the most motivating things.”(A5).

“There are issues that I think the AK Party is missing too much, there are issues that I think are pointed, but I believe that you can defend me with a political opinion stably in an AK Party organization” (A7).

⁴ TEŞKİLATÇILIK

The young members also underline the importance of being on the same page with the party's discourse and the leader's opinions; they emphasize that they have to believe the system and have to believe the leader; they have to trust her/him to act:

"The electorate is changing and you want to manage this country in total and make them happy, it's not just that I love that seat, but if you run this country, you have to do something good for them. You have to make people happy. Because now the voting mass has started to age. The mass that voted for us began to age. As a teenager, I am pleased with my position because I know what I want. But there are a lot of people at my age who aren't satisfied enough. We need to be more unifying. I am concerned: I am one of those who think that the AK Party does not exist as the AK Party alone but with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. But Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a human being and everyone is going to die. May God give him a long life, and a good life for him, but when he dies, who will follow him and fill his place? Or he doesn't need to fill it. For example, Imamoglu is a very good example. So, for example; A person from a different perspective also changed the direction in which people voted because they believed that they could do something well. When someone different comes out like this, if my views satisfy me, of course, I vote for him. I do not support the AK Party just because it is the identity of the AK Party, I support Recep Tayyip Erdoğan not because he is, but because he is in line with my views and because he is someone who can pursue what I believe. If I come up with something like this in the future, of course, if I don't think that they believe what I believe in, I will, of course, stop being a part of it. I'm not blindly attached to them. That's why I call it wrong. But my concern about the future, as every young Turkish man, hopes that the end of our country will be better." (A7).

CHP

In the CHP case, mostly because of the thrill of local elections, the young members were mostly talking about İmamoğlu and how they believe in him. Here are some statements;

"I joined to the party to support our mayor candidates" (C10).

"I think the candidate or candidates I support in the election will be my hope for my future, and I think I will give them the strength to be with them at rallies or programs." (C5).

"Or now, for example, we are in the process of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the torch burned by Ekrem İmamoğlu was great hope. Yeah, we lost the election we won in the election box. People want to become a member when they see it. ... Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is our light, but

Muharrem İnce was very hopeful in the past; Ekrem İmamoğlu is now also. So, I'm hopeful for her that a restart occurs, which is always called over.” (C9).

Also, young members of the party feel that the party defends their own ideological views and shares the same concerns with them, creating a trusting environment; C9 underlines that youth branches of CHP are no exception; all the youth branches and the members are tied to the ideology. Others think in the following manner:

“My political stance is a left stance, we are CHP focused as the family already. Nevertheless, we are people who understand and interpret all other political parties” (C1).

“I joined in the form of a small dialogue with my friends before I was 18, but after that, it was all about feeling close to me, not from friends, but from vision. The reason I joined is, of course, better governance of the country. Since I saw what my own party would do, I was trying to explain this to people why it was more appropriate for my own party to run.” (C6).

“Of course, there are people who come with different motivations. Some of them really come here to fight for the values the CHP defends. Same reason I'm here; In other words, I would like to make a political struggle to protect the Kemalist values that I advocate, the secularism and independence of the country. ... Of course, I have concerns about the future. Because of the current state of the country, I think that if it continues this way, the values of Atatürk and the basic values of the country will be disinform, so I am worried. But I also struggle against it so that we will succeed.” (C8).

However, unlike AK Party branches, they feel like they are not given much authority, and this causes some trust issues:

“In fact, what the head office does, as the youth branches. We cannot say that the youth branches do much differently from the head office or from the general administration of the party. In fact, what a political party has to do is what the youth branches do.” (C4).

“I have friends from the power party, because they have everything possible, they can do everything in a much better way. For example, we want a very small project, we can not; it can be very simple for them. But in terms of education, I like the left parties more.”C7 “The events of the Gezi took place. We thought something was wrong in this country. We thought that the most sensible place for something to change is the Republican People's Party. We are still working to change things.” (C5).

5.6.2. Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation: GoFor

As predicted, many of the participants express their distrust of the current political system, leaders and institutions. The young members of civil society are more likely to trust the issues they deal with and focus on the betterment of these issues; they trust themselves to make a change. In that context, some of the statements are as follows:

“I say that political parties cannot be trusted.” (G5).

“I say that there is no trust in political parties. The only thing that doesn't change is the change itself. Because every day everything changes. In politics, humanity is never stable. The wrongs change in accordance to correct, and vice versa. I think that politics changes because people's needs and opinions change all the time. Which is already changing. If it had stayed the same, all things would have been the same” (G7).

“People, I told you in the first place, people ... There is always a lie in politics, I think so. I see it, because I watch the news, I read it. He denies what he says a month ago, then he denies it, he changes his mouth, because these people can do anything for vote.” (G10).

They seem to be focusing only on the issues that they work on, and do not want to be involved in current politics:

“The association I am a member of is a local association. To support the socio-economic sense of women living in our city and to support the education of girls. At the same time to develop national and international women's policies and advocate.” (G1).

“As I said, I am a bit of an apolitical person. I did not try to be a member of any party because I am not very involved in politics. I do what I want to do.” (G2).

As Putnam (2002) underlines, trust towards the system encourages people to participate in conventional forms of political participation. It can be seen in the cases of both the party in power and the main opposition party. The main difference between these parties, however, lies in the people whom they trust. Most of the AK Party's young members show their belief and trust in the current or the past party leaders, while young members of CHP are more likely to show their belief and trust in the local candidates. The ideology of the political party is one of the most important factors that encourage young people to participate in politics in both cases of political parties. Young people feel included and understood in such an environment.

However, unlike in the case of the AK Party, young members of CHP are more unsatisfied and feel less included within the party, causing some resentment.

In the case of GoFor, as opposed to Marien and Christensen (2013), Uslaner (2002), states that generalized trust that encourages the nonconventional ways of participation provides a high motivation for individuals who have a desire to engage in politics because it simply does not ask for much an effort to participate (Bäck and Christensen, 2016); members do not show any trust towards the current political system, political leaders, and the political parties in general.

5.7. Social Environment

Political activity calls for a social context; it is rarely an individual act. Not only the factors that are attached to individuals' personalities but also the other factors external to them, such as political events, may be incentives for political participation. In the 1970s, the assumption among scholars was that people with higher incomes and better social status would be likely to engage in politics more than the disadvantaged ones (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972). The latter two scholars justify this assumption with three related links; participation is motivated by the social environment you are in. People with higher incomes and better social status would be likely to have more time, money, and knowledge, and political efficacy and awareness are high among these individuals (1972: 133). They suggest that when people are more linked to politics via the social environment, it is more likely that they will participate in politics (1972:148). However, it is challenged that if the individuals' characteristics are not in line with those in the group or social environment, then, this individual may lack political interest and participation (Berelson et al., 1968). Also, being a minority in the social environment may discourage political participation, even if the environmental norms encourage an individual to do so (Huckfeldt, 1979).

The social environment is one of the motivators for political participation. It has the potential to turn its norms into social obligations. People tend to behave within these pre-given norms to adopt and establish a place in the group. For example, as indicated, high social status leads the way to high political participation, so if you are in a high social status environment, then it is expected for you to feel inclined to participate in politics (Huckfeldt, 1979: 580-581).

Socially constructed and individual-based participation is affected by the social environment, even if people chose to discuss the political matters with the one sharing the same ideals or political stand or not, they made an effect on their participation (Kenny, 1992).

The world we live in gives us opportunities to participate in politics, both in online and offline ways. Unnecessary to mention, individual interests provide incentives for people to act and participate, but other people and social networks have a substantial impact on participation. People need to communicate, interact, and connect with each other because we are basically social animals. Even the individually-driven interest for political participation has some social context behind it. Education level, religious attendance, mobilization, political knowledge, political convictions, and civic norms are listed as the sources of a social network; the assumption is that they affect and are affected by each other and contribute to the political participation of the individuals.

When the education level becomes high, then the social status of the individuals tends to become high, and this provides a push for these people to stand up and choose whom they serve for themselves. People showing up in churches are shown to deal with civic issues and tend to engage in civic involvement because someone who already participates in one community is expected to attend others as well. Mobilization and political conviction encourage commitment to the cause, nourishing political participation. When people are around others, there is an opportunity for them to gain political knowledge. Also, civic norms incentivize people because they define who is a good citizen. The author underlines that, even though these factors can be listed as the individual factors for political participation, there is a social component to all of them. So, the social networks and the social environment make people think about and act more on political engagement.

Social environment matters when it comes to political participation because people tend to imitate the people around them. The desire of humans to portray themselves in the online and offline social environment leads them to create a political identity as well. This portrayal, especially in online arenas, can pressure them to act in an effective way and to be part of political participation (Bond et al., 2017).

5.7.1. Conventional Forms of Political Participation: AK Party and CHP

The main argument regarding the social environment is that the social environment and engagement of the people to that environment affect the young members of conventional forms of participation more than the young members of civil society.

AK Party

Social environment, especially the impact of friends, is a very significant motivator for individuals to become engaged in politics because the more you encounter the experiences of those who are near you, the more you are attracted to do something. While young people see that the people their age are dealing with some stuff, it is a push effect for them to be part of something, too. Below are some examples from the field:

“During the university period, I met Islamic thoughts and groups. I was quite critical and distant to the AK Party and today I was still very critical. I've seen people around me who are distant with the power but also seeing the power as a front that needs to be protected.” (A1).

“I entered it as a consequence of friend circle 5 years ago. Afterward, I became interested in the agenda of the country and continued to take part in the Board of Directors.” (A2).

“I joined the Youth branch through a friend. He invited me, I wanted to go in. Five years ago I was following the party via Facebook, then my friend invited me. I worked in Neighborhood, commission, neighborhood presidency, district administration, district reserve management, district management after 6-7 months ago I was elected to the headquarters delegates of youth branches.” (A3).

“I was inspired by my environment and found myself here.” (A4).

“We have been aware of the Youth Branches through our friends and their works. As I said my motivation is based on my friends. They were members of the youth branches, I had the intention, but I did not work much before, obviously 3-5 years ago. Together with their contribution, I said I'm a participant I wanted to look at how it is going, how I wanted to enter the party; I keep going that way.”

Rather than a friend circle, the people you work with can inspire young people to participate. A7 states, to this point, that:

“My boss is an active member of the AK Party. He asked me if you want to be in it, my political opinion was in that direction. Then I went to the interviews of the Istanbul University Commission of the AK Party youth branches, they wanted to meet with me. There are units within our organization. Whichever one you can take a more active role in? The education and project unit were very suitable for me as I was one of the people who improved themselves in terms of education. I talked to such times when I'm available, etc. I entered into the organization”

CHP

Like in case of the AK Party, the young members of CHP also tend to be affected by their peers, especially in universities:

“In 2008, when I was a student at Süleyman Demirel University, I joined the political party of the Republican People's Party Youth Branch. I participated in that process; I participated in university youth. Most of my friends were members of the Republican People's Party. With their influence and contribution, I started to make politics at the Republican People's Party.” (C10).

“I joined through my friends, I had friends coming and going, with the CHP youth branches as a reaction to the difficult situation in the country or as a means of solidarity. Of course, as I said, my friends circle informed me about this, they talked to me about these issues, when I went there, whether the head of youth branches or other friends there, what kind of work there, what I can accomplish with them, told me how I will achieve advantages.” (C8).

Also, as in the AK Party case, not only the young peers but also the social environment can have a say in youth participation:

“There was a meeting in our neighborhood, and in the neighborhood meeting, I had my elders who were members of the party and they told me: there is such a meeting; young people will come, there is a youth choice within the party; they will provide information... I wasn't a member at that time, but I wanted to go anyway, I wondered what kind of formation is being discussed, what are the targets. I went that way and after that day I came and started to go to the party. Finally, I became a member in 2012.”

“My main goal here; beautify the city I live in, make it more livable. I became aware of these organizations with the effect of my environment.” (C7).

Sometimes, the young members of a party openly ask their friends to be part of the process, even though it is a controversial issue inside the branch; one participant explains situations like that:

“Our friends who like to see our activities and who want to participate in our activities are demanding from us: Let me also come to your meetings, let us know when you have an event. They are especially affected by social media. It's that way. So that's how it's happening around me. Some of you are demanding your friends, let's make you a member, come work with us. Because they probably see a light in those people. A political light that I call the light. So they think you want to deal with politics. They are a demanding party. But I'm not on that side.” (C4)

“We lost the election we won in the ballot box. People also want to become a member of themselves when they see it more or as I say spread around friends.” (C9).

5.7.2. Nonconventional Form of Political Participation: GoFor

The experiences of the young people really matter in civil society participation; besides the impact of their peers, their own observations of the social environment also matter:

“The civil society world I met in high school was a factor that changed my whole life. The change provided by my older brothers and sisters, who worked with us, was quite large, and unrequited studies enabled us to move on with their lives in a better way. I wanted to provide the support that my volunteer brother and older sisters provided to me especially in my break during my adolescence.” (G1).

Regarding the social environment, the most influential people are friends in the case of GoFor:

“We had a friend called Barış in the language class. He went to the Czech Republic with this association, the year before we met. He told us about his memories there, so we dreamed, and then we said, why don't we do it. We searched, we did, we searched and entered civil society.” (G3).

“I got help from Fatma Hoca, Dicle University. There is Fatma Hoca, our teacher, I love her very much. I got help from her, she named the association. I took the name, Then I came, saw their activities, sensed that there was no political content. So I said, why not?” (G8).

“I have a friend here, - , I was talking to him. I wasn't exactly familiar with the process. I was following through Instagram and Facebook. I made a direct application since that day I have continued without disruptions.” (G5).

“I met with the NGOs through human rights schools, 2006 Or 2007. And in the face of injustice, my friends were going to give a press release and I was not interested. I wasn't interested in much like that, but I was still going to support it. Then, while studying at university, we had a lesson called community service. There was also the requirement to work voluntarily in a non-governmental organization. I worked there for a period and then my civil society life started.” (G9).

The basic thing that the social environment does is to provide young people with motivation and inspiration to be part of the process and have a saying about the current issues. It can be said that, in three cases, Verba and Nie (1972) made this a point by stating that when people are more linked to politics via their social environment, it is more likely that they would participate in politics. It seems like, especially in the case of political parties, social networks and the social environment make young people think and act more on political engagement. In the case of GoFor, it is mostly the personal experiences rather than the push from friends that seems to be a more important factor motivating them to become part of civil society.

5.8. Comparison of Youth Branches of Political Parties and GoFor

Based on the answers and tendencies of young people, this study aims to see the basic similarities and the differences among and between the youth branches of the AK Party, CHP, and GoFor. The frequency analysis of the results of my study is designed, with the help of MaxQDA, to see these similarities and differences in a clear way. As we can see in Table 5.2, based on the answers of 30 young members of conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation, personal interests and social media are the most influential motivations. They are followed by party identity, citizenship, family, and social environment. The young members show little interest in social capital; it does not motivate their political participation.

Table 5.2 Frequency Analysis: AK Party, CHP, and GoFor

	Frequency	%
Personal Interest	82	20.87
Social Media	75	19.08
Party Identity/Leadership	62	15.78
Citizenship (belonging to a community)	61	15.52
Family	43	10.94
Social Environment	42	10.69
Social Capital	28	7.12
TOTAL	393	100.00

Table 5.3 shows the basic motivations of the young members of the AK Party. Party identity stands as the most influential motivation, while social capital is the least influential one. Although social media is listed as the second motivation that young people have, I originally expected social media's influence would be much greater than the results supported. Personal interests, citizenship, and social environment stand as the following motivations, and social capital is the least-mentioned motivation among young people.

Table 5.3 Frequency Analysis: AK Party

	Frequency	%
Party Identity/Leadership	31	22.14
Social Media	27	19.29
Personal Interest	22	15.71
Citizenship (belonging to a community)	20	14.29
Family	16	11.43
Social Environment	14	10.00
Social Capital	10	7.14
TOTAL	140	100.00

In the case of CHP, what we see is that the young members seem to give the same importance to personal interests and social media, followed by citizenship, party identity, social

environment, family, and social capital. The interesting point here is that, although I was expecting the influences of social media would be much higher, personal interests are as influential in terms of motivation as social media. By personal interests, however, one should understand the opportunities and both material and civic gains they get via being a member of the political party.

Table 5.4 Frequency Analysis: CHP

	Frequency	%
Personal Interest	27	19.85
Social Media	25	18.38
Citizenship (belonging to a community)	24	17.65
Party Identity/Leadership	22	16.18
Social Environment	17	12.50
Family	15	11.03
Social Capital	6	4.41
TOTAL	136	100.00

In the case of GoFor, I can say that they are mostly motivated through personal interests, covering the interest areas and gains expected from meeting with many leaders and influencers of the civil society and political institutions. Then, the motivations are listed from the most influential to the least as: social media, citizenship, social environment, social capital, family, and party identity. In terms of civil society, my case, GoFor, showed that as Edwards (2009) underlines, young members present themselves as a “force for good and fuel for change in the practices of states and business, one that motivates people to raise their voices in the public sphere.” (125)

Table 5.5 Frequency Analysis: GoFor

	Frequency	%
Personal Interest	33	28.21
Social Media	23	19.66
Citizenship (belonging to a community)	18	15.38
Social Environment	12	10.26
Social Capital	12	10.26
Family	11	9.40
Party Identity/Leadership	8	6.84
TOTAL	117	100.00

When looking at the frequency analysis of the political parties (Table 5.6), it reveals that the young members of political parties are affected mostly by party identity/leadership and social media at a high rate, while social capital seems to be the least influential motivation among the members.

Table 5.6 Frequency Analysis: Political Parties

	Frequency	%
Party Identity/Leadership	53	19.20
Social Media	52	18.84
Personal Interest	49	17.75
Citizenship (belonging to a community)	44	15.94
Family	31	11.23
Social Environment	31	11.23
Social Capital	16	5.80
TOTAL	276	100.00

Table 5.7 shows the comparison of the motivations of youth members of political parties, and GoFor, and reveals that party identity is the leading motivation for the young members of AK Party, while it is personal interest in the case of CHP and GoFor. For political

parties, social capital seems to be the least chosen motivation, while it is the social environment in the case of GoFor.

Table 5.7 Frequency Analysis: Comparison of AK Party, CHP, and GoFor

	GoFor	CHP	AK Party	Total
Party Identity/Leadership	8	22	31	61
Social Capital	12	6	10	28
Citizenship (belonging to a community)	18	24	20	62
Personal Interest	33	27	22	82
Family	12	15	16	43
Social Media	23	25	27	75
Social Environment	11	17	14	42
TOTAL	117	136	140	393
N = Documents	10	10	10	30

The figure 5.7 shows the coding map of the study. It shows the proximity of the motivations with each other and their relations. The very clear result of that is there is a close and strong relationship between citizenship and personal interests. This shows us that young members of the population seem to believe that while they express themselves and do something for their own interest, they expect it to contribute to the community.




Figure 5.7. Coding Map of Motivations

6. CONCLUSION

Political participation is an essential phenomenon for social scientists due to its effect on the whole political culture, elections results, elections strategies, the policies, and determining the tools/institutions of politics. In this study, I focused on youth political participation and the motivations of the youth to participate in political parties and civil society in Turkey. It is not a study that tries to understand the youth policies; it does not investigate the perspectives of the state and government. It merely analyzes how young people understand the nature of politics and how they are motivated or motivate themselves to participate in politics in Turkey.

Young people and their choices matter in the political arena because they are the decision-makers of future politics and those who carry them out. In Toffler's words, the information society is the beginning of the Third Wave Civilization after agricultural and industrial civilizations. According to Toffler, each civilization period has/creates its own socio-cultural and socio-economic structure. He says that every wave of civilization is a form/model of explanation for people, nature, and society (Toffler, 1981: 10-12). This thesis tries to analyze the motivations of youth people in the information age and by the time the period witness a change in socio-cultural and socio-economic structure.

It is evident that political participation is beyond voting nowadays; especially with the impact of the social media and free circulation of the news and knowledge, new arenas for participation are established. Also, the aim of political participation goes beyond impacting government and political decisions and opens new doors for itself, such as affecting social, cultural, economic and environmental problems, and expands to cover all things touching individuals' lives.

Minimalist definitions of political participation (Van Deth) define political participation as activities performed by volunteer citizens to make an impact on the government. The second definition of political participation, according to Hempel (1965), states that it is a behavior performed by voluntary citizens to express the political aims and intentions of the participants (motivational definition). The third definition of political participation is a legitimizing act towards the decisions of the government; it symbolizes the consent of citizens (Pateman, 1970; Sartori, 1962). This definition of political participation can be enlarged to cover the acts of

voluntary individuals to have a voice and make changes regarding the subjects/issues related to their lives and the problems related to the country that they live in. This involvement may be in the form of supporting the government, influencing the government, and pressuring and challenging the government to alter political patterns. It may be in a variety of ways, from participating in protests to writing a post on the political officials' walls on Instagram.

Based on the main research question of the study, "What are the differences of basic motivations of the young people who are the members of political parties' youth branches and members of civil society organizations in Turkey?", the literature of political participation, conventional and nonconventional forms of participation, civil society, and youth were analyzed. This analysis led to the development of three other questions: "Why do young people participate in conventional forms of political participation?", "Why do young people need nonconventional channels to participate in politics?" and "Why do the political participation patterns of the youth change?" These are the main sub-questions in mind. At the end of the literature review, I argue that there are seven underlying motivations for young people to participate in political parties and civil society in Turkey, namely, citizenship, social capital, personal interests, family, social media, party identity/leader, and social environment, and their importance differs in the following two cases: youth branches of political parties represent a conventional form of political participation and civil society represents a nonconventional form of political participation.

Based on this argument, I formulated seven sub-hypotheses to analyze the motivations.

1. The main argument regarding citizenship is that young people participating in youth branches of political parties show the characteristics of dutiful citizens and subject-oriented citizens, while young members of civil society show the characteristics of actualizing citizens and participant citizens.
2. The main argument regarding social capital is that young members of political parties tend to gain something from membership, while young members of civil society do not necessarily have this desire.
3. The main argument regarding personal interests is that the main motivation of young members of political parties is self-efficacy and empowerment, while young members of civil society are more inclined to social norms because of an internalized sense of duty over the community.

4. The main argument regarding family is that the family has a significant impact on young members of political parties, while the importance of familial influence is less significant for the participation of young people of civil society.
5. The main argument regarding social media is that social media motivates young people to participate in political parties by seeing and reading about their activities while motivating young people to participate in civil society by encouraging civic duties.
6. The main argument regarding party identity/leadership is that if young people trust the political system and its components, then they are more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation; if they do not trust the political system, they are more likely to engage in civil society.
7. The main argument regarding the social environment is that the social environment, and the engagement of the people to that environment, affects the young members of conventional forms of participation more than the young members of civil society.

Based on the literature review and the field research, the findings of the research are formulated as:

1. Young members of both AK Party and CHP show the characteristics of dutiful citizens and subject and participant citizens as expected. However, as contradict to my hypothesis, young members of civil society also carry the characteristics of dutiful citizens, not actualizing citizens and show the participant citizen's features.
2. Young members of AK Party and CHP both expect to gain something from the participation, while AK Party members are mostly motivated to find themselves a place in the political arena; members of CHP are mostly motivated to meet people in power and share experiences and gain knowledge. As expected, members of GoFor do not seek to gain something, but they appreciate the experience and values gained.
3. Young members of political parties underline that their main concern is to express themselves, whether it changes something or not. Their main motivation is not the self-efficacy and empowerment. Young members of GoFor tend to use participation as a tool for socialization and networking, not for the purpose of economic interests, but for personal development. Both the members of conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation show an internalized sense of duty over the community.

4. Unlike my hypothesis on GoFor, for both cases, conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation, it is seen that the family and its views regarding the political arena influence the choices of the young people, making them more motivated to become active members of political parties or civil society.
5. Both in the case of AK Party and CHP, and GoFor, it is seen that seeing and reading about the political issues or the things that have a direct impact on young members' lives does not guarantee the involvement of young people. However, what we see here is that people already engaged in political issues are the ones visiting the political sites; as a voluntaristic perspective states, political participation guides the use of technology. Online political participation mirrors offline political participation.
6. As expected, in the case of AK Party and CHP, young members show trust to the leaders, candidates, and ideology. In the case of GoFor, members do not display any trust towards the current political system, political leaders and the political parties in general.
7. It seems like, especially in the case of political parties, social networks and the social environment make young people think and act more on political engagement. In the case of GoFor, it is mostly the personal experiences, rather than the push from friends, which seems to be a more important factor that motivates them to become part of the civil society.

I draw these conclusions by harmonizing the literature and the field research; in terms of citizenship, young members of AK Party and CHP display the attributes of dutiful citizens because they have faith in the political system and its institutions; they have expectations from the government. Also, regarding the young members of political parties, I argue that they show the patterns of dutiful citizens, and subject and participant citizens; so, my first hypothesis has gone beyond and covered the participant citizens as well. The young members of GoFor have faith in the community and society. They both show the attributes of the dutiful citizens because they want to improve the country that they live in. However, their motivations are different; young members of political parties are motivated to participate in politics to serve the country, society, and political system, while young members of GoFor are motivated to improve society. To do so, they see voting as an essential tool, but they do not show any other trust in the current political system. So, I saw that they are dutiful citizens as well. My first expectation regarding the members of GoFor was that as members of civil society, they have an intention to find alternatives ways to participate in politics and affecting the decision-making process; however,

although they do not trust current political institutions, they still believe in voting and representative democracy.

In terms of social capital, I saw that young members of political parties tend to gain something material from their participation. However, their expectations differ. While the young members of the AK Party are mainly motivated by their future places in the political arena, young members of the CHP are motivated by networking opportunities, sharing experiences, and gaining knowledge. The members of AK Party believe that political institutions are the key to serving the country and society, and are highly interested in becoming part of the current political system today to become influential decision-makers in the future. Young members of CHP show relatively little interest in gaining any political position in the future, but they hope to gain political knowledge and a network that will help them in the future. In the case of GoFor, the members value the experience and do not expect anything material. Civic skills are an essential gain for these young members. With these civil skills, they hope to improve their futures inside their communities.

In terms of personal interests, like my initial hypothesis, young members of political parties desire self-efficacy and empowerment; this is consistent with those who engage in conventional forms of political participation. However, young members of both political parties underline that they are not given much of a responsibility and voice in their affiliated political parties, and they exert little influence over the decision made by the political parties. Members point out that they feel like acting on their own to resolve things that they see as problematic. They want to be heard, to change something, but they state that they don't get much of a chance to do so. They express that they are part of the political parties because they want to do something better for their country; this contradicts the rational choice theory, which underlines the importance of calculated benefits for participation. The young members of GoFor also show a high interest in changing something in the society that they see as problematic. They also see participation in the political scene as a way to socialize, gain a network, and as a source of personal development. The members of both conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation show an internalized sense of duty over the community. Also, in both cases, young people underline selective incentives for participation. They don't act based on economic incentives and try to maximize their satisfaction with economic interests; instead, they choose to be beneficial and useful to the society they live in.

In terms of family, my first assumption is that the family has a massive impact on young people of political parties, while the importance of familial influence is less significant for the participation of young people of civil society. However, I see that, in both the cases of conventional and nonconventional forms of political participation, it is undeniable that the point of view of the families and their involvement in the political scene affect the choices of young people. Young members seem to be more motivated to participate if their family members are also active members of political parties or civil society. Even though some young members in the political parties underline that, for them, there is no familial impact on their decisions to be part of political parties, I deduce that denial as a reaction and, ultimately, a motivating effect.

In terms of social media, I underline that social media's influence differs regarding the young members of political parties and civil society. I initially thought that members of the political parties were mostly motivated through seeing the activities and writings of political parties on social media, while members of civil society were mainly motivated by their sense of civic duty when seeing things on social media. However, what I see is that for both the members of conventional political participation and nonconventional political participation, the visibility of the news, problems, and issues does not guarantee the involvement of young people in the political scene. It seems that young people who tend to care about political issues and the ones who read, research, and become engaged in politics are also the ones reading, researching, and engaging in political issues in the online arena. This finding reflects the voluntaristic perspective, which states that political participation guides the use of technology. Online political participation mirrors offline political participation. Consistent with this finding, the young members of GoFor also show little interest in being active in the political scene in both offline and online platforms.

The main difference between the members of political parties and civil societies arises in the case of recruitment; the former uses their online platforms to motivate and recruit new members, while the latter does not necessarily have that intention but possesses the intention to spread their activities. Therefore, we can say that the idea of reinforcement (Kraemer et al., 1989) applies here; people will not change their political participation just because new opportunities have been created. Barnes and Kaase (1979) underline, on this subject, that new forms of political participation do not have a significant impact on who is participating (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). There are exceptions to this; of course, young peoples' involvement in politics cannot be guaranteed with the widespread usage of social media. I have observed that it has a pushing effect; however, this push cannot guarantee real participation. Retweeting or

sharing some political issues or problems related to their way of life or issues that society cares greatly about makes the young people involved in the political process but does not ensure their engagement.

In terms of party identity/leadership, I used the trust as a critical factor determining someone's belief in the system and their motivation. Initially, I assumed that young members of political parties trust the current political system, and members of the civil society tend to distrust the system. As expected, the results of my research indicate that the members of conventional political participation channels do show their trust to the leaders, candidates and the ideology of the political party and choose to be part of the current political system. However, in the case of GoFor, members indicate that they do not trust the current political system, leaders, and political parties, and do not want to be part of it.

In terms of the social environment, I first assumed that the influence of the social environment would be higher on the young members of political parties than the members of civil society. The social environment is an important motivator because it can directly and easily affect young people daily. I discovered that the social environment is a major motivation channel for both the young members of AK Party and CHP, and GoFor. However, social networks are more important motivator for young people to participate in political parties than in civil society, while the influence of their friends is more important among the members of civil society.

Table 6.1 shows the first hypotheses of the study. Table 6.2 reveals, based on the comparison between the motivations of youth members of political parties and GoFor, that party identity is the leading motivator for the young members of AK Party, while the leading motivator is personal interest in the case of the members of the CHP and GoFor. For political parties, social capital seems to be the least popular motivator, while the social environment is the least popular motivator in the case of GoFor.

Table 6.1 Hypothesis of the Study

Motivations Behind Political Participation	Conventional Forms of Political Participaiton	Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation
Citizenship	Dutiful Citizens	Actualizing Citizens
Social Capital	Material Gain Oriented	Civic Gain Oriented
Personal Interests	Self-efficacy and empowerment	Sense of Duty
Family	More Influential	Less Influential
Social Media	More Encouraging	Less Encouraging
Party Identity/Leadership	Strong Trust in the Political System	No Trust in the Political System
Social Environment	More Influential	Less Influential

Table 6.2 Results of the Study

Motivations behind Political Participation	Conventional Forms of Political Participaiton	Nonconventional Forms of Political Participation
Citizenship	Dutiful Citizens	Dutiful Citizens
Social Capital	AK Party: gaining political knowledge and place CHP: sharing experience and knowledge	Civic Gain Oriented
Personal Interests	Sense of Duty	Sense of Duty
Family	Influential	Influential
Social Media	Encouraging young members who are already interested in political issues	Encouraging young members who are already interested in social issues
Party identity/Leadership	Strong Trust in the Political System	No Trust in the Political System
Social Environment	Influential	Influential

Moreover, depending on the field research, I argue that in the AK Party case, young members are more motivated through the actual events organized by the branch, such as sports

events and cultural events. Most of the young members of the party underlined their importance and how these events motivated them to spend more time with the other party members. They saw these events as bonding activities, and they felt like they were doing something together as a part of a specific community. Through these events, the young peoples' sense of belonging to the party grew and became stronger.

In the case of CHP, based on the time period that I interviewed, the young people seem to be very motivated via the impact of İmamoğlu and the cancellation of the elections. They think that they are fighting against injustice, and this makes them highly motivated to be active, especially on online platforms.

I found it interesting that most of the young members of CHP are more inclined to talk as “we”, even if they talk about their own experiences and thoughts. That shows me they are highly integrating their thoughts with the party's identity and ideology. This shows their complete trust in the ideology, rather than the leader.

One of the characteristics of the conventional forms of political participation is their systems' being top to bottom (Bengtsson and Christensen, 2014). I also saw that in the field research that the young members are all aware of the political parties' hierarchical structure, but they do not tend to challenge it; they accept it and know their position in the hierarchy. This can be seen, especially in the case of CHP. Like in the literature, the structure of the GoFor is looser than the political parties, and the members always feel included in the process.

I expect social media would be a major motivation for the political participation of the youth, and internet activism would be an important channel for participation, especially among the young members of civil society (Norris, 2001; Norris et al., 2005; Stolle et al., 2005, as cited in Kriesi, 2008). However, the use of social media is limited, and the members of political parties, especially, are reluctant to post and share their political opinions. Conventional forms of political participation seem to use social media to share the activities of the party, especially the activities of the leaders; they do not aim to motivate or recruit new members. Nonconventional forms of political participation seem to share knowledge and use social media as a reminder to the citizens. The Internet, then, stands as a tool to coordinate people in demonstrations, coordinating modular performances (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007).

One of the important implications of this study is that I argue that the young members of civil society are appearing more like the monitoring participants mentioned by Inglehart 1997,

Norris 1999, Schudson 1999 and Hooghe and Dejaeghere, 2007. They involve themselves in political issues when they see necessary and are more likely to engage in uninstitutionalized structures. So, like in my case, GoFor, it can be suggested that participation occurs occasionally and requires more time, energy, and risk, as Li and Marsh, 2008 and Trechsel, 2007 propose. However, unlike these authors, I saw that selecting the issues they want to engage in does not make these young people less committed to the issues dealt with. The members of GoFor seem to be motivated and committed to their causes.

In terms of who participates, the SES model underlines that participation is not evenly distributed among the citizens, but high socioeconomic-status individuals have greater opportunities to participate (Knoke, 1990b; Rothenberg, 1992; Verba and Nie, 1972). This model states that the higher the education level and material resources, the higher the conventional and nonconventional forms of participation are. However, regarding education, in the case of AK Party, CHP, and GoFor, there is no evidence supporting this claim. The least educated people in my sample were the members of the GoFor. Twelve of the participants were middle school or high school graduates; given that 12 years of education is mandatory in Turkey, almost half of the interviewees are relatively less educated but highly engaged in politics. Also, in terms of economic status, almost half of the participants (13 members) are unemployed, but they are involved in politics and the decision-making process. Therefore, I agree with Dalton, 1988; Hansen and Rosenstone, 1983; Huckfeldt, 1986; Leighley, 1991; Neuman, 1986; Zipp and Smith, 1979; Zipp, Landerman, and Luebke, 1982, as cited in Leighley, 1995, who claim that socioeconomic differences among the participants do not play an important role in participation. Also, as in line with Almond and Verba, 1963; Gamson, 1968; Barnes and Kaase, 1979, I also claim that an interest in politics and the personal beliefs of the participants play significant roles in motivating their political participation.

It is also argued that the socialization process affects political participation when people age and get more information and experience in the subject; they can be encouraged or discouraged to participate (Jennings and Niemi, 1975). At that point, it is argued that “life-space changes” influence the attitudes of the age generations, pushing them to the same point. (Tsai, 2016). Therefore, while individuals' social status is an important factor in political participation, as participatory acts need some resources, the social environment cannot erase some individual characteristics that push people not to participate due to the absence of a feeling of belonging.

In Turkey, young members of the population were labeled as “guardians of the state” from the establishment of the Turkish state according to the Kemalist youth myth. Then, after the 1960s, they were labeled as rebellions of the state. In the post-1980 period, they were thought of as apolitical consumers. In the 2000s, their involvement in the political arena became visible due to digitalized media. Since 2012, the party in power calls the youth the “pious generation”. With the current law change decreasing the candidacy age to 18, the decision-makers show their interest and underline the significance of the young people in Turkish politics. The party politics and state policies have influenced the young members of Turkish society from their establishment until now. According to my research, as opposed to what was underlined by Newman (2005), I can say that the state does not seem to move from (paternalistic) provider to (participative) enabler in the eyes of the young people in Turkey, and it continues its impact on the young citizens. So, the patterns of the political participation change because the needs of the time and the policies of the state change.

As Van Deth (2001) argues, the political participation of the individuals ensures the promise of democracy as “government by the people”. So, it is crucial for me to understand the dynamics of democracy and political participation because if there is no participation, then one cannot talk about democracy. This is what makes democracy legitimate. In contemporary liberal democracies, however, we see the emergence of new forms of political participation, especially among the people feeling excluded from the system. This situation cannot be referred to as apathy, as Bang underlines, but we should understand that the frame of participation has been changing. Since class-based collective movements have been decreasing, new, individualized political participation patterns have been growing (Norris and Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley), leading to cause-oriented participation. This was what I expected from GoFor; however, I saw that although some of the young members are engaged to focus on single-issue problems, most of the young members have intentions and motivations to work within the current political system; in many cases, they were not feeling excluded.

Young members of the conventional forms of political participation and nonconventional forms of political participation show the characteristics of direct decision-making, as Gould (1988) underlines. These young people know that they are citizens; they are active actors, and they have a say in the decision-making process; thus, they are not the passive receiver of the policies anymore. However, knowing and executing something are two different subjects. Especially in the case of youth political parties, young members are aware that they are expected to behave in line with their parties’ main policies and ideologies.

In terms of the relationship between GoFor and the state, I saw that, as Beckman underlines, civil society and the state are not to be considered as separate domains, and they are both the product of shared political culture and conflicts. This assumption resembles the consequences of my field research because the young members of GoFor share the concerns of the members of political parties and struggle within the current political system rather than trying to create alternative forms of participation and alternative ways of affecting the decision-making process.

Regarding GoFor, I can say that the members show the characteristics of those who participate in civil initiatives based on their will to contribute to the collective good (Bhatti, 2000) and civil disobedience based on mimicking the general frame of the authority and the legitimacy of the legal system (Tatar and Çelik, 2013). The civil initiative does not show any features of the social movement but shows a similarity because new social movements rise as a result of non-material considerations (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995, as cited in Woods, 2003). Rather than class differences, the intentions and motivations of the young members of GoFor come from the policies and issues they are affected by, not from their class position (Buechler, 1995; Inglehart, 1990; Parkin), and they are nonhierarchical organizations. However, a civil initiative differs from the new social movement because, while the main concern of new social movements is their socio-cultural issues, the primary concern of the members of GoFor is socio-political issues. As mentioned before, civil society is evolving through contentious politics, defined as the contentious acts of individuals with shared interests, including interactions with government agencies, which are the receiver of the claims. This coordination with the agencies gives the participants political identities (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). Overall, based on the interviews with young members of GoFor, I can say that GoFor resembles the contentious politics, covering some features of civil initiative, civil disobedience, and new social movements, but not social movements. So, they need nonconventional channels to participate in politics to express themselves.

I argue that young members of political parties and civil society believe in the political system in Turkey. They have expectations for their future, and have trust towards the political elites for their future. Despite some critics, they believe in democracy and its mechanisms to function well for the improvement of the society. So, there is a need for the inclusive youth policies engage them into the political arena. To do so, firstly the political parties should give more space and opportunity to young members to express their visions on society.

For further studies, based on the literature and experience in the field, I am eager to study the political participation patterns of Muslim youth and uncover the relationship between Muslim identity and participation patterns. Then, I aim to focus more on the identity issue and how the identities of the members affect the political parties' policies and activities. The last inquiry, which depends on this study, is formulated in reference to the differences between the young members of AK Party and CHP; while members of the former strongly attach themselves to the party leaders, members of the latter identify with the party's ideology. I want to study this issue further and see whether or not there is a politically significant result.



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<http://genclikkollari.akparti.org.tr/parti/parti-tuzugu>

<https://www.go-for.org/>

<https://www.go-for.org/uye-orgutler/>

<https://www.go-for.org/yapi-ve-isleyis/>

8. APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Interview Questions

Dear participant,

Information gathered from the interview will be used in his Ph.D. thesis held in Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, and the advisor of the thesis is Prof. Dr. Yılmaz Bingöl. Since your interview questions will be examined in general, your name is not required, only code names will be used. Participation in this survey is voluntary. You have the right not to participate in the study. Do not be under pressure or indoctrination when answering the questions you are asked. The information to be obtained from these forms will be used purely for scientific research purposes.

The interview consists of 14 questions and is expected to be completed in approximately 1 hour. The purpose of the survey is to make a comparison on the motivation of the political participation of young people. Therefore, it is important that you answer the questions sincerely.

Thank you for your contribution.

Res. Assist. Özge Öz Döm

If the participant is a member of the youth branch;

1. Demographic information; Age, educational status, gender, marital status, income level, working status, belonging to which you will first express yourself?
2. Can you tell us about the process of joining a political party? How did you become aware of the political party and youth branches you are a member of?
3. What is your main motivation/purpose behind becoming a member of a political party?
4. How are new members recruited into the youth branches of the Party? How are the candidates motivated in this process?
5. What are the activities of the party youth branches? Where do you take part in these activities?

6. Do you have any relationship with other youth organizations in Turkey? If so, what is the content?

7. For what purposes do you use social media? (Political purposes, writing, etc.). Does social media encourage you to participate in politics?

8. Are you a member of a voluntary organization? If so, what is your main purpose? How did you know? Or why do you prefer not to be a member of a voluntary organization?

9. Are any members of your family members of political parties or voluntary organizations? Who is there and if this situation affected you?

10. Have you participated in an activity such as protest and signature campaigns in the last 6 months? If so, what is the reason for your participation?

11. Do you consider being a candidate in national and local elections? What are the reasons?

12. What resources do you use to follow Turkey's agenda? Can you follow the agenda abroad?

13. Do you have links with the youth organizations of the international youth organization, group or political party? If so, can you explain?

14. Are you concerned/hopeful about your future? Please explain.

If the participant is a member of GoFor;

1. Demographic information; Age, educational status, gender, marital status, income level, working status, belonging to which you will first express yourself?

2. Can you tell us about the process of joining this organization? How did you become aware of the organization you are a member of?

3. What is your main motivation/purpose behind membership in an NGO?

4. What are the activities of your voluntary organization? Where do you take part in these activities?

5. For what purposes do you use social media? (Political purposes, writing, etc.). Does social media encourage you to participate in politics?

6. Do you have membership in one of the political parties? If so, what is your main purpose? Or why do you prefer not to be a member of a political party?

7. Are any members of your family members of political parties or voluntary organizations? Who is there and if this situation affected you?

8. Do you vote? Would you encourage someone to vote for a particular party or person? If you are/are not, what is the reason?

9. Have you participated in an activity such as protest and signature campaigns in the last 6 months? If so, what is the reason for your participation?

10. Do you consider becoming a candidate in national and local elections? What are the reasons?

11. What resources do you use to follow Turkey's agenda? Can you follow the agenda abroad?

12. Do you think the political institutions are reliable? Why is that?

13. Do you have links with the youth organizations of the international youth organization, group or political party? If so, can you explain?

14. Are you concerned/hopeful about your future? Please explain.

APPENDIX 2. Ethics Committee Approval Form



ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ (AYBÜ) ETİK KURULU PROJE ONAY BELGESİ




Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi *Siyaset Bilimleri*
Fakültesi/Enstitüsü... *Siyaset Bilimleri ve Kamu Yürütme* bölümü akademisyenlerinden /
öğrencilerinden... *Doç. Öğr. Öğr. Öz Dem* 'in, *Two Levels of State Policy*
Participation in Turkey: Conventional vs. Non-Conventional Channels of Participation adlı
araştırması değerlendirilmiştir. (Bu kısım başvuru sahibi tarafından doldurulmalıdır)

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmuştur.

Proje etik açısından geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir.

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmamıştır.



AYBÜ ETİK KURULU KARARI (Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır)	
Araştırma kodu (Yıl – Araştırma sıra no)	<i>2019 – 60</i>
Başvuru formunun Etik Kurula ulaştığı tarih	<i>14.02.2019</i>
Etik Kurul Karar toplantı tarihi ve karar no	<i>15.02.2019</i>
Yer	Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Esenboğa Külliyesi
Katılımcılar	Formda imzası bulunan üyelerimiz toplantıya katılmıştır.

KURUL BAŞKANI, BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI VE ÜYELER:

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Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak ÇUKUR	Başkan	
Prof. Dr. Tekin AKDEMİR	Bşk. Yrd.	
Prof. Dr. Muharrem KILIÇ	Üye	
Doç. Dr. Özge GÖKBULUT ÖZDEMİR	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ertuğrul DEMİRDEL	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Behlül TOKUR	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şule KAYA	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Birgül ÖZKAN	Üye	
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ERASMUS Scholarship: 2009-2010 (Philipps Universitat Marburg,Germany)

PUBLICATIONS:

Şentürk S. & Öz Döm, Ö. (2018, April). POSITION OF WOMEN IN NATION BUILDING PROCESS: POST-SOVIET TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN. M.Ali Sağlam & Emek Yıldırım (eds.), in CURRENT DEBATES IN HISTORY & POLITICS vol.23. (pp.71-87). London: IJOPEC Publication.

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Akar, B., Öz Döm, Ö. & Güngör, M. (2015). The Event of Bulgaria Migration and the Discourses of Nationalism and Gender in Ahmet Er's Theaters. Turkish Migration Conference 2015 Selected Proceedings, Ed. Seker, G., Tilbe, A., Ökmen M., Yazgan, P., Eroglu, D., Sirkeci, I., Transnational Press London, 374-381.

Copy editors (Özge Öz Döm, Başak Akar, 2014) of the Proceedings of the Conference “9 May Europe Day- Our Europe Our Future”, Ed. Santagostino, A., YBU and Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Press.

AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS: -



