

CHANGING ALLIANCE AND COOPERATION DYNAMICS:
GLOBALIZATION, NATION-STATE AND THE THREAT

Volume I

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

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Department of International Relations

Bilkent University

Ankara

March 2010

To perseverance,

CHANGING ALLIANCE AND COOPERATION DYNAMICS:
GLOBALIZATION, NATION-STATE AND THE THREAT

Volume I

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

March 2010

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ABSTRACT

CHANGING ALLIANCE AND COOPERATION DYNAMICS: GLOBALIZATION, NATION-STATE AND THE THREAT

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March 2010

This dissertation is a study about the form and dynamics of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism epitomized by Al-Qaeda. Since international security is traditionally regarded as the parcel of nation-states, transnational terrorism is a conceptual new-comer to the playground of politics. Its scale of operations occurs in a security environment structurally different from that of the Cold War. The recurrent reason given for debating the role and relevance of alliances in regard to counterterrorism is discussed in the literature to be a systemic change in world affairs marked by the end of the Cold War and globalization. The latter must be disaggregated to determine the essential elements and features of the systemic differences and related threats. Does contemporary inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism correspond to the previous alignment behaviors of states that were conducted against other states? Analyzing the evolving forms of cooperation in general and the form of cooperation in alliances is the aim of the study. Through a three-pronged analytical discussion based on the factors of globalization, unit-level preferences and the features of the threat itself, the study concludes that cooperation form in general and in alliances in particular - including the form of cooperation in NATO- is experiencing a shift from a 'defensive nature' to a 'security nature'. Coalitions of the Willing type of cooperation appears to be the re-emergent form of inter-state security cooperation, especially against ambiguous threats such as transnational terrorism that erodes the distinction between internal and external threats.

Key Words: cooperation, alliance, alignment, globalization, the new threat, NATO, security culture, transnational terrorism

ÖZET

DEĞİŞEN İTTİFAK VE İŞBİRLİĞİ DİNAMİKLERİ: KÜRESELLEŞME, ULUS-DEVLET VE TEHDİT

Çağlar, Barış

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Mart 2010

Bu doktora tezi, devletlerin ulus-ötesi terörizme karşı gösterdikleri işbirliği ve gruplaşma biçimleri ve dinamikleri hakkındadır. Uluslararası güvenlik çalışmaları geleneksel olarak devletlerin ilişkilerini incelediğinden, ulus-ötesi terörizm bu alanda görece yeni bir kavramsallaştırmadır ve faaliyetleri Soğuk Savaş ortamından farklı bir güvenlik ortamında gerçekleşmektedir. Literatürde ittifakların rollerinin ve terörle mücadeleyle ilintilerinin tartışılmasının başlıca nedeni, Soğuk Savaşın bitmesi ve küreselleşmeyle gelen sistemik değişiklikler olarak gösterilmektedir. Son dönem müttefiklik ve işbirliği dinamiklerinin anlaşılabilmesi için sistemik değişimlerin ve beraberinde getirdiği tehditlerin çözülmesi gerekmektedir. Devletlerin ulus-ötesi terörizme karşı günümüzde gösterdikleri işbirliği ve gruplaşma davranışları daha önce kendi aralarında diğer devletlere karşı gösterdikleri işbirliği davranışlarıyla örtüşmekte midir? Tezin amacı ittifak içinde ve dışında gelişmekte olan işbirliği biçimlerinin getirdikleri yeni boyutlarıyla beraber çözümlenmesidir. Küreselleşme, devletlerin tercihleri ve tehdidin farklı boyutları saçıyağında yürütülen inceleme, gerek genelde gerekse ittifaklar içindeki işbirliği yapısının -NATO içindeki işbirliği biçimi dahil- ‘savunma ağırlıklı’ olmaktan ‘güvenlik ağırlıklı’ olmaya doğru evrildiği sonucuna ulaşmıştır. Kurumsal olmayan koalisyonlar çerçevesindeki işbirliği, devletlerarası güvenlik işbirliğinin başat biçimi olarak tekrar kendini göstermektedir. Bu işbirliği türü, iç ve dış tehditler arasında yapılagelen ayrımı zorlaştıran ulus-ötesi terörizm benzeri muğlak tehditlere karşı özellikle kullanılacak işbirliği biçimi olarak gözükmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: işbirliği, ittifak, küreselleşme, yeni tehdit, NATO, güvenlik kültürü, ulusötesi terörizm

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

-“We ‘ad hoc’ our way through coalitions of the willing. That’s the future.”¹

-“There are new forces at work: Information technology has politicized world’s people. People and societies are involved. Almost everybody has a TV set. They are informed instantaneously. We cannot do with traditional tools of power/economic or military. The way power is exercised is changing because national borders are eroding, because of the growth of non-state actors. It’s a different kind of a world. We are tied down by a tiny little country -- Iraq. It’s amazing, given the disparity in military economic strength. It’s a -- it’s a world where most of the big problems spill over national boundaries, and there are new kinds of actors and we’re feeling our way as to how to deal with them. I think it is less policy oriented than Zbigniew indicated. I think it’s more systemic.”²

-“Current relations among the Europeans, the US, Russia and China are not strategic or confrontational.”³

-“Charlie Rose: Let me turn to China. You have said in conversations with me before, China is the most important foreign policy challenge for America, the peaceful rise of China.

Henry Kissinger: Right. For this reason: Historically when there is a rising power like China, it has usually led to confrontations between the rising power and the existing dominant powers. And when you have a shift of the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific, then you have an additional element.

¹Dinmore, Guy. 2006. “U.S. Sees Coalitions of the Willing as Best Ally” *Financial Times*, January 4.

²Scowcroft, Brent. 2007. “Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft” *Charlie Rose*, July 12, <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551>

³Kissinger, Henry and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2007. “Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft” *Charlie Rose*, July 12, <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551>

On the other hand, that was in a period when national states were still the dominant feature. Now we have a whole series of problems -- energy, environment, proliferation ...

Charlie Rose: Right.

Henry Kissinger: ... which go beyond the nation. And we also know that a conflict between major powers would be a catastrophe for which there is no compensation in anything you can gain. So the challenge is whether China as a rising country, the United States as the superpower, can develop a cooperative relationship in this period before nationalism becomes so dominant in China as a substitute for communism, and a kind of self-righteous isolationism in this country that substitutes China for the Soviet Union... The most important thing for all governments, in the face of today's threats, such as energy, environment, proliferation and terrorism, threats that go beyond nation-states, is strategic dialogue. Establishing common understanding and cooperative relations among governments transcends even the crises in the Middle East.”⁴

-“We know that we cannot swim as others sink.”⁵

-“...The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past. The twentieth century started out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity -- an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse... even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended: Three explanations for its demise stand out.

The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally.

Secondly, US policy. US oil policy during 1970s, the Vietnam War, the 2003 Iraqi intervention and the way it deals with Iran engulfed power from influence.

(Thirdly,... today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization.

Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers.

Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to

⁴Kissinger, Henry. 2007. “Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft” *Charlie Rose*, July 12, <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551>

⁵Benjamin, Daniel. 2008. “Strategic Counterterrorism”, Brookings Policy Paper, No. 7, October.

transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments).

It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power... In addition to the six major world powers (China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States), there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.”⁶

This dissertation is a study about the form and dynamics of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism best exemplified by Al-Qaeda. Since international security is traditionally regarded as the parcel of nation-states, transnational terrorism is a conceptual new-comer to the playground of politics. Its scale of operations occurs in a security environment structurally different from that of the Cold War. The security landscape has changed as pointed out by the quotations above.

Within such an environment, does contemporary inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism correspond to the previous alignment behaviors of states that were conducted against other states? Analyzing the role, relevance and evolving form of cooperation and alliances regarding the

⁶Haass, Richard. 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance” *Foreign Affairs* May/June, highlights added.

transnational terrorist threat is the aim of the study.

Cooperation has been traditionally categorized as taking place either in high-politics of defensive-military issues or in low-politics of non-military issues. Importantly, alliances have constituted the height of military cooperation among nation-states especially during the twentieth century. Around the turn of the century, the role and relevance of alliances in regard to terrorism have become a matter of controversy and debate. However, the debate is not pervasive or comprehensive, nor does it bear analytical clarification. Most of the discussions appear to be fractional without presenting the big picture. As the recent literature itself indicates, the embryonic debate on alliances and terrorism seems to be just browsing over the dynamics without a sense of analytical direction.⁷ The vagueness or lack of analytical direction of such studies is explained by the uncertainties and conceptual difficulties of a transformational era, or by the understudied dynamics of the international structure under globalization. Nevertheless, the recurrent reason given for debating the role and relevance of alliances in regard to terrorism is discussed in the literature to be a systemic change in world affairs marked by the

⁷Byman, Daniel. 2006. "Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 29, No. 5, 767 – 811, October; Report of the Secretary-General. 2005. "Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in preventing and combating terrorism", *General Assembly-Sixtieth Session*, Items 107 and 109 of the provisional agenda-Crime prevention and criminal justice Measures to eliminate international terrorism 25 July; de Nevers, Renée. 2007. "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 34–66; Kreps, Sarah. 2008. "When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan" *Security Studies*, 17: 3, 531-567; Popescu, Ionut C. 2009. "Strategic Theory and Practice: A Critical Analysis of the Planning Process for the Long War on Terror", *Contemporary Security Policy* 30:1,100-124; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Chapter One: Beyond the War on Terror" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389, 17-34; Davies, Philip H.J. 2004. "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No 3, 495 520; Byman, Daniel. 2007. "US Counter-terrorism Options: A Taxonomy", *Survival*, 49:3, 121-150; Jackson, Richard. 2007."An analysis of EU counterterrorism discourse post-September 11" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20:2,233-247; Noetzel, Timo and Schreer, Benjamin. 2009. "NATO's Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30: 3, 529-547; Douglas M. Gibling, Jamil A. Sewell. 2006. "External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, no. 4, 2006, 413-431.

end of the Cold War and globalization. This claim of the emerging literature must be disaggregated in detail to determine the essential elements and features of the systemic differences and related threats. Accordingly, this study attempts to explore the compatibility of the established alliance literature with non-state violence. It is specifically about the form of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism.

1.1. The Organization of the Dissertation

The contents of the study add up to nine chapters. After the present introductory chapter, next chapter -Chapter 2- presents an extended summary or synopsis of the entire dissertation. Chapter 2 summarizes the independent variables that affect inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. It also discusses the reasons for why these variables are selected among others. It explains the cause-and-effect relationships alongside the examination of differences between ‘alignment’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘alliance’.

A quick list of items that Chapter 2 elaborates is: the research question, the argument, the methodology, the relation of terrorism with International Relations discipline, why cooperation and alliance are studied, working definitions of key concepts, the significance and goals of the study, why and how specific independent variables are selected and developed, and their relations/causalities. The reasons for singling out the threat variable, as the most explanatory independent variable, are also discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, the methodology is further elaborated in the second chapter.

Chapter 3 reviews the literatures on cooperation hypotheses, alliance theories and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. It also extends on the

distinctions between ‘alliance’, ‘alignment’ and ‘cooperation’, which are also briefly explained in the second chapter.

Chapters from 4 to 7 examine the independent variables conditioning inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. Two chapters are invested to examine which structural variable fits the research question at hand: While Chapter 4 examines and elaborates the structural independent variable of globalization; Chapter 5 discusses the argument of polarity and whether it is tenable under the research question.

Chapter 6 defines contending national counterterrorism cultures. While counterterrorism culture explains security culture-induced state preferences underwritten by security understandings or security culture of a state. The way the preferences are implemented is manifested in alignment policies such as penetration or balking, which are explained in Chapter 3. Alignment strategies as policy-choices after September 11, 2001 are reviewed as they are elaborated in the literature and their relevance is further substantiated in Chapter 8.

Chapter 6 also outlines the contemporary concerns of the intelligence institutions alongside a brief review of American and European responses to terrorism. The latter is again further detailed in the empirical Chapter 8. Suffice it to note here that alignment strategies as response policies are the policy manifestations of different national preferences over how to deal with the threat vis-à-vis the security concerns of other nation-states: while national perceptions and preferences (or the ways the threat is defined and responses are devised respectively) are explained by the national counterterrorism culture, the application of these preferences into policy in relation to other states gives the alignment strategy. While counterterrorism culture explains a nation’s perception and

preferences (definition of the threat and its method of countering it), alignment strategy describes how it tries to activate its preferences amidst other states' policy implementation.

Chapter 7 details 'the distinctive features of the threat', as a variable conditioning inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. It starts off by dissecting the distinct features of the threat without involving any debate on its newness or novelty. It just concentrates on the different dimensions or manifestation of the transnational terrorism threat. Although the working definition of the transnational terrorism threat is explained in Chapter 2, it is worth mentioning here succinctly: The dissertation is not involved in the debate whether the new dimensions or form of terrorism amounts to a 'new terrorism'. Rather, the study focuses on the new features or manifestation of the transnational terrorism threat without tackling the debate on implications of these new manifestations for the nature or essence of terrorism. Transnational terrorism may be assessed by different scholarly and governmental circles as constituting a new terrorism entirely different from the ones previously experienced. It may alternatively be regarded as constituting just a new version of the age-old terrorism as usual. Although assessments differ, manifestation of a threat is distinguishable from nature of threat itself. Again, although 'form' and 'essence' are correlated, different forms are not necessarily equivalent to different essences. The relationship between the manifestation and the nature of terrorism is a separate research subject that might be studied elsewhere.

Distinctive features of the terrorist threat and the nature of the threat are two separate subject-matters; and thus, distinctive features of the terrorist threat are separable from the discussions over whether these features also give way to a

distinct threat in essence or ontology. This is especially possible due to the way research question is framed. ‘The new terrorism debate’ is not central to the research question that the study answers. It is thereby outside the main scope of the study, which is interested in nation-state reactions and counter-policies in the way they define the situation. The focal point of the study is neither the evolution of terrorism nor its types. The focal point is on the form of inter-state cooperation: the form of nation-states’ cooperative responses against what they regard as a national security threat.

The dissertation is limited to the impact of globalization and impact of transnational terrorism threat upon international security and alliance politics. As such, this is an international security study rather than being a study on terrorism per se. This is the definitional framework for what is studied under the transnational terrorist threat, against which inter-state efforts are carried out.

The clarification of the threat factor is important for it is gauged as the most explanatory contributing-cause that conditions inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorist groups. Within the above-mentioned framework, ‘*transnational terrorist threat*’ implied in the research question refers to *the distinctive dimensions or manifestations of the transnational terrorism* threat against many nation-states around the world. This is the working definition of the transnational threat, which is short-handed as the new threat. ‘*The new threat*’ is used throughout the dissertation to denote ‘the distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’. Yet again, it is vital to reiterate that the label ‘the new threat’ is not meant to argue that transnational terrorism is a new kind of terrorism. It is not referring to essence of terrorism either. The word ‘new’, in the phrase “the new threat”, just refers to terrorism’s

novel manifestations short of its implications for the evolution of terrorism. The dissertation does not focus on the new terrorism debate, which is process-traced only to the extent that demonstrates the transatlantic rift on contemporary terrorism. Thus, Chapter 7 presents the ambiguity of the threat and its implications for cooperation among states within the contemporary conflict environment. To that end, the topics covered in the Chapter 7 are: The Distinct Features of the Threat; Ambiguity of the Threat and Its Implications; Terrorism and the State-System during and after the Cold War; Deterritorialized Economy of the Threat; Old Threat, New Threat? Different State Policies and Non-Cooperation; Transnationality, Al Qaeda and the PKK: A Discussion on the Scales of Threats; and Cooperation Setback: The Nature of the Threat Debate and Different Threat Assessments.

Chapter 8 is the empirical chapter about the NATO transformation and the convergences-divergences of the Atlantic Allies regarding transnational terrorism. The empirical chapter tries to enliven the analytic explanations through the method of process-tracing. What is more, the empirical research is enhanced by numerous interviews that were conducted face-to-face with NATO authorities within the timeline of 1999-2009. And, finally, Chapter 9 sums up the findings and prospects for further research.

In order to correspond to the international counterterrorism effort, the study works through two levels: theoretical and empirical. The systemic changes along with the distinct features of the contemporary form of terrorist threat are examined in the middle chapters. Next, contending counterterrorism cultures of European countries and that of the US are explained before the developments on the ground are presented in the last chapter with an eye on the regulatory and legal

undertakings such as legal initiatives, new agencies and intelligence difficulties within and among states.

1.2. The Research Question

To what extent nation-states, which involve in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states, can show *these alignment behaviors* against transnational terrorist groups?

1.3. Departure Point of the Study: The Argument

The argument that led to the making of the research question above is that nation-states do not show their ‘previous alignment and cooperative behaviours’ against transnational terrorism. The argument is *not* that there is no cooperation against transnational terrorism. The research question does not seek to find out whether there is cooperation or not either; rather, the argument and the related research question is about the *form* of inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. Before the research is fully conducted, the starting point was based on a claim: A claim based on an initial unsystematic empirical observation was made such that previously demonstrated Cold War alignment and cooperation pattern among nation-states is not existent this time against transnational terrorism as of the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is the argumentational departure point for the research question and the study at large.

Since this is an observational claim to be tested, the dissertation presents both an empirical and analytical test to see whether this is the current situation. Defense and military oriented alignments and cooperation among states were the order of the Cold War days. Does this kind of cooperation among states continue or

not? Equally, the research question is: to what extent nation-states (which involve in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states) can show *these alignment behaviors* against transnational terrorist groups?

1.4. Methodology

1.4.1. Theory-oriented Case Study Method

The dissertation is conducted by means of theory-oriented case study method. The case study approach is the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop historical explanations that might be generalizable to other events.⁸ Before detailing what kind of a case study research is conducted, it is essential to clarify why the case study approach is chosen as the method. Why not the statistical approach, formal modeling or another theory or method is not used is worth mentioning.

Researchers should use a method for a research task for which it is best suited.⁹ For instance, statistical methods have been widely used in recent decades to develop logically consistent models. Statistical method tries to take observable implications from the model that is abstracted, and it instructs to test these implications against empirical observations. In turn, it uses these tests to decide how best to modify the deductive theory.

However, neither statistical method nor formal modeling is used in this dissertation. This is simply because they do not fit the present research question and task at hand. The answer to the research question is best answered via ‘process-

⁸ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 5.

⁹ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 6.

tracing'. The latter method is used in case study approach to academic research where no extant research program or theory exists for the research task.

There is not any established theory to be used for studying the research question. Neither a theory with regard to the impact of private entities upon nation-states, nor a consensual research program for the study of inter-state cooperation against terrorism exists. That is why the research program and the analytical framework of contributing-causes and causalities are worked out by the candidate from the scratch: the research is at the intersection of the accumulation of the prevailing alliance literature and the relatively embryonic literature on cooperation and globalization that forays into answering contemporary developments that go beyond national borders. The subject-matter of this dissertation is a new one that has been hardly studied in the literature as of 2010.

Under such circumstances of uncharted analytic waters, process-tracing is of help. The method of process-tracing helps to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, personal interviews, official documents and declarations to see whether the causal process a study implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the contributing-causes or factors in that case.¹⁰

Process-tracing is used for theory formation where the research task does not correspond or lend itself to any prevailing theory. It can perform a heuristic function, generating new variables or hypothesis on the basis of sequences of events observed inductively in case studies.¹¹ Process-tracing is used either to

¹⁰ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7

¹¹ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7.

uncover evidence of causal mechanisms at work or to explain outcomes. The causal mechanism behind inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism can thus be studied via process-tracing, which is especially useful in case studies. Since it allows incorporating both material and ideational variables, process-tracing is ideal for establishing the possibility of a causal chain linking independent and dependent variables or contributing-causes of an observed outcome.

1.4.2. What is a ‘Case’? What is a Case Study?

‘A case’ is defined, via Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, as an instance of a class of events:

The term ‘class of events’ refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governments, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or generic knowledge) regarding the causes of similarities and differences among instances (cases) of that class of events. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, is a historical instance of many different classes of events: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, and so on. A researcher’s decision about which class of events to study and which theories to use determines what data from the Cuban Missile Crisis are relevant to her or his case study of it.¹²

As Alexander George indicates, there is potential confusion among the terms ‘comparative methods’, ‘case study methods’, and ‘qualitative methods’. In one view, the comparative method (the use of comparisons among a small number of cases) is distinct from the case study method, which in this view involves the internal examination of single cases. However, this dissertation follows George’s definition of case study method: to include both within-case analysis of single case studies and comparisons of a small number of cases. This is because there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case

¹² George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18.

studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program. Yet again, he maintains that single-case studies can also play a role in theory formation or development.¹³

Theory formation or development requires exploring casual mechanisms, which operate only under certain conditions. Case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in single cases in detail. Within single cases, one can look at a large number of intervening variables and inductively help identify what conditions present in a case activate the causal mechanism. Contrastingly, statistical studies omit all contextual factors except those inherent in the variables selected for measurement and leave out many contextual and intervening variables.

Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise. Correspondingly, the present dissertation tries to find the dynamics and conditions under which inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism occurs. It is concluded that the causal mechanisms that are dissected into parts in other chapters are evident in the sequence of relevant events and processes that are traced in chapter eight.

Process-tracing is a research method; rational choice models or formal modeling are theories. Thus, process-tracing is fit to studying an understudied subject-matter that cannot be explained by any extant theory of the literature. Process-tracing can also be used by statistical research programs, by rational choice models or game theory to test their insights derived from the latter theories' deductive frameworks.

¹³ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18.

As for using process-tracing method in case studies, it is maintained that it helps build the explanation of causal mechanisms of outcomes. Tracing the processes that may have led to an outcome helps narrow the list of potential causes. Therefore, process-tracing is an invaluable tool for the first stages of theory formation on a new question. Alexander George underlines two reasons for how it helps theory-building: first, tracing processes generates many observations within a case, and secondly, it helps to link these observations to one another to form an explanation.

There are four kinds of process-tracing: a- detailed narrative, b- use of hypothesis and generalizations, c- analytic explanation, and d- general explanation. The kind of process-tracing that is used in this dissertation is a conflation of type-b and type-d. That is, both generalizations specific to the case and general explanations of form of inter-state cooperation are made.

In general explanation kind of process-tracing, the researcher constructs a general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process. The researcher may do this either because the data or theory necessary for explanation is lacking, or because an explanation is intended at a higher level of generality or abstraction due to the research objective. This is also true for the present dissertation; that is, not the data but a theory to be benefited from is lacking. Secondly, since this study attempts to explain violent non-state entities' impact upon inter-state relations, it tries to climb the ladder of abstraction in order to define the place of non-state entities in world politics and thereby answer the research question. Thus, the kind of process-tracing used in this study is suitable for abstraction and general explanation. Yet again, it is also analytic to the extent parts of the narrative are accompanied with explicit causal factors or variables highly

specific to the case. Yet, no testing of a hypothesis occurs: this study neither employs theoretical variables of any theory, nor does it assert any generalization of its explanation into a generalization. Therefore, the study, via process-tracing, heads for analytical general explanation of the specific subject.

1.5. The Place of the Study

As for the place of the study in the literature, the main interest is to see whether inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism follows the previously established inter-state form of cooperation and alignment against other nation-states. If not, why? Is there a new form of cooperation among states against transnational terrorism? What is it and why does it come to surface? By discussing the differences between past and present cooperation patterns, the research question links itself to the alliance literature that seldom queried the impact of non-state entities upon inter-state cooperation in general and alliances in particular. The need to establish such a linkage arose because cooperation and alliance literature largely ignores the new security landscape that is evolving, and it seems to underestimate the impact of networked/transnational threats upon nation-state alignments.

The alliance literature still overwhelmingly focuses on state-centric threats in the face of the burgeoning studies that assert the unlikelihood of large-scale invasion or of major inter-state war.¹⁴ The lack of hard-balancing and its

¹⁴Miller, Steven E. "International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 Summer 2001, pp. 5–39; Jervis, Robert. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace" Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001 *American Political Science Review* Vol. 96, No. 1 March 2002; SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Brawley, Mark R. "The Rise of the Trading State Revisited" in Aydinli and Rosenau eds. *Globalization, Security and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition* Albany: State University of New York Press, pp.67-81; Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*. New York: Basic Books; Kaysen, Carl. 1990, "Is War Obsolete? - A Review Essay" *International Security* 14:42–64; Mueller, John.

implications for alliances,¹⁵ lack of poles¹⁶, the questioning of the proper applicability of balance of power theory and the need for initiating new concepts such as soft-balancing¹⁷ or under-balancing¹⁸ mainly originate from the waning of major war or the low anticipation of force-on-force confrontation of armies on the

1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, John. 1995. *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics*. New York: Harper Collins; Mueller, John. 2004. *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, P.3; Ray, James Lee. 1989. "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War" *International Organization* 43:405–439; Rosenau, James. 1990 *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/1991 "Primed For Peace: Europe after The Cold War" *International Security* 15:7–57; Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War" *International Security* 22:5–43; Mandelbaum, Michael. "1998/1999 Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival* 40:20–38; Mandelbaum, Michael. (2002) *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, And Free Markets In The Twenty-First Century*. New York: Public Affairs.

¹⁵ Michael Don Ward, "Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics," *Monograph Series in World Affairs* 19 1982; Stephen M. Walt, "Multilateral Collective Security Arrangements," in Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, eds., *Security Studies for the 1990s* Washington, D.C.: Brassey's 1993; Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39 Spring 1997; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24 Summer 1999; Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World", *World Politics* 61, no. 1 January 2009, 86–120; John Ikenberry, ed., *American Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001; Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003; and T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.

¹⁶ Smith, Steve. 2002. "The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order" *International Relations* Vol. 16-2: 171–183 and Calleo, David P. 2009. *Follies of Power-America's Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; as for the state-agency papers and reports, 2007. *Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States*, National Intelligence Council Report DR-2007-16D- 23 August; 2004. "Mapping the Global Future" *Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project Based on consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world* December, <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>; as for the think-tank sources, Sunstein, Cass R. 2006. On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-13 May downloadable, www.aei-brookings.org or from the Social Science Research Network at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=901217> O I N T C E N T E R; Institutes, Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Paul Huth. 2008. *Peace and Conflict*. The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, www.cidcm.umd.edu; as for a viewpoint from a practitioner and theorist, Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance", *Foreign Affairs*.

¹⁷Pape, Robert. 2005. A. "Soft Balancing against the United States" *International Security*, Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp7-45; Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 126-132; Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing" *International Security* 30, no. 1 Summer: 72-108; Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wolforth. 2002. "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research" *International Security* 26, no. 4 Spring, 93-111.

¹⁸Smith, Steve. 200. "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., *Critical Reflections on Security and Change* London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing" *International Security* 29-2, 159-201.


battlefield. When the conventional military threat assessments are low, alliance literature experiences difficulties in using the conventional concepts such as counter-balancing, power, polarity and balance of power theory for the main underlying rationale of all these concepts focuses on external military threats anticipated from nation-states.

The unlikelihood of major war is acknowledged by most nations and the NATO authorities.¹⁹ However, current world-wide academic debate on the conceptualization and usage of the above-mentioned terms is multifaceted and bereft of consensus.²⁰ That is fundamentally because the alliance literature does not work on entities other than nation-states yet. As a corollary, examination of the rise of non-state entities and the threats they pose is the first step to resolve the hardship of alliance literature in answering non-state threats. Facing the reluctance in the alliance literature, the dissertation attempts to address the gap between the established conceptual lenses and the contemporary developments on the ground. Duly, next page presents the figure that depicts the causal mechanism that is developed to answer the research question.

¹⁹All NATO strategic concepts adopted since 1999 underlines the point - especially the Riga Summit Declaration, www.nato.int; Interview with William R. Puttmann, NATO WMD Center-NATO Maritime Security Seminar, Crete-Greece, September 20, 2009.

²⁰Byman, Daniel. 2006. "Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:5, 767 – 811; Tertrais, Bruno. 2004. "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances" *The Washington Quarterly* 27:2, 135-150; Thies, Wallace J. "Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO's Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?" *European Security*, 16:1, 29-50.

THE CAUSAL MECHANISM:



The answer to the research question is given via three independent variables that condition inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. Variable is used in the sense of contributing-causes or factors that play into the outcome. They are not tested in any statistical sense for the study follows only process-tracing method in case studies, which leaves out statistical approach.

The independent variables are: first, *the structural variable* of globalization; secondly, *the unit-level variable* of nation-state behaviours driven from their counterterrorism cultures, that is convergent or divergent security cultures that help answer to what extent contemporary transnational terrorism is defined in similar terms and to what extent methods to deal with terrorism is similar; and thirdly, *the new threat variable* or ‘the threat of transnational terrorism itself with its distinctive features’.

These independent variables condition the dependent variable of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. The study incorporates discussions that bring forth a ranking of independent variables, and it concludes that the new threat variable or ‘the distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’ have the highest explanatory power.

One of the obstacles for inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism is lack of corresponding bureaucratic and legal procedures among states. The bureaucratic rearrangements undertaken in the US and Europe are different from each other due to their different political cultures and bureaucratic organization. European states are attached to supranational institutions to which they intentionally and partially compromise their sovereignty. Europe argues to be primed for being a ‘power for peace’ through methods avoiding use of force. The EU as an institution is leveraged by the European states to answer the

threat in ‘a European way’, which is different from that of the US.

However, neither European nor American counterterrorism efforts are consolidated in the face of a threat that excels in adaptation to state-responses. States still try to manage their response in its conceptual, regulatory and operational phases. Significantly, European and American counterterrorism cooperation is limited mostly to bilateral undertakings devoid of comprehensive institutional collaboration. The European states, despite their differences among each other, still remain mostly introvert or turned into European-self: They try to manage a unified foreign policy within the EU. While Europe tries to form a unified policy with a common Europe-wide strategy, the US acts along its peculiar understanding of the threat.

Markedly different from most European approaches, the US perceives transnational terrorism as a totally unprecedented new threat. This crucial difference of the American outlook paves the way for bureaucratic and regulatory measures that are much more sharp-pointed: Terrorism has been regarded as a minor criminal issue in the US until September 11, 2001. Prior terrorist attacks to American interests around the world did not stimulate a change in American perceptions of terrorism. This is no longer the case in the American eyes.

Yet, not all states see transnational terrorism as a new threat. Thus, contending counterterrorism cultures on the two sides of the Atlantic is a factor that exacerbates reaching a common ground for a unified allied policy in curtailing transnational terrorism. European ‘anti-terrorism measures’ (which are measures short of use of force and focused more on legal regulatory action, law enforcement, diplomacy, preventive-intelligence, economic aid, reconstruction and nation-building) are not in harmony with ‘counterterrorism measures’ of the US such as

use of force, use of specific interrogation and rendition methods and counter-intelligence that focuses more on punishment than prosecution.

Still another factor limiting inter-state cooperation and realignment against transnational terrorism is the opportunities presented by globalization. Information technology and advances in transportation, communication and banking systems strengthen terrorist and criminal hands. While globalization presents an opportune environment for criminals and terrorists, it hardens the counter-operational terrain for nation-states.

Although globalization presents opportunities or permissive causes for private violence, it is mostly an indirect cause. Rather, the transnational terrorist threat (which is posed by non-state terrorist groups that takes advantage of the opportunities presented by globalization) is the heart of the answer to the research question: the form of threat determines the form of cooperative responses of states; the form of inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism is different from the previous forms of inter-state cooperation. The threat of transnational terrorism shapes inter-state cooperation with its distinctive features. Moreover, the threat itself is a limit against cooperation and alignment among states. Therefore, the threat itself is argued to be the most explanatory variable in explaining the form and shortfalls of inter-state cooperation. The features and impact of the threat on cooperation and alignment is elaborated and discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

As depicted in the figure on page thirteen, globalization not only conditions the formation of the threat, but it affects the working conditions of states as well. Globalization's chief effect is interconnectedness of social processes. Its due impact for policy-making and implementation is conflation or combination of previously different job-definitions both at the decision-making level and

operational/bureaucratic level. Overlapping fields of policy-making increases trade-offs, which makes it difficult to prioritize one national security policy over another. The way nations pursue their different national security interests has become ever interconnected as a result of the structural role of globalization in binding counter-strategies with internal and international law.

Owing to globalization, strategy is no longer restrained to conventional defense affairs of national armies, but it is now connected to or conflates with domestic and international law regarding the contemporary politics of violence that does not include major wars between Western states. The fight against transnational terrorism or against unconventional form of warfare requires a marriage between law and strategy. Equally and problematically, it requires the marriage of internal and external affairs of a nation-state. The ongoing difficulty of differentiating between the internal and external realms of the nation-state policies is the fundamental imposition and characteristic of the threat of transnational terrorism.

The contemporary form of political violence testifies to the eroding conceptual borders between 'the internal' and 'the external': Various terrorist attacks around the world during late 1990s and the first decade of the new century are the primary examples to the ambiguity of the threat. Apart from those, unconventional forms of warfare such as civil war in Balkans during the 1990s, warlordism and conflict over diamonds in Africa, global trade of cocaine and heroin among all continents, the problem of child soldiers and small arms, the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraqi intervention and the unconventional protracted conflict (insurgency) in their aftermath, the illegal migration of people, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through land and sea borders (via NATO jargon, border security

and maritime security) and separatist movements in Asia also demonstrate the transnationality of security concerns. In particular, terrorism in its contemporary manifestation or dimensions demonstrates the change in the way power is exercised.

The study concludes that states try to implement a new form of cooperation against transnational terrorism. This is a mode of cooperation that is different from their previously demonstrated alignment and cooperative behaviours, which were restricted to almost pure military defense contingencies. 'Coalition of the Willing-type inter-state cooperation' has emerged as the form of inter-state cooperation applied against the transnational terrorist threat. Coalition of the willing type inter-state cooperation is an un-institutionalized and short-term cooperation among several states whose formation is based on the goals of particular missions. It is mostly conducted by national groupings or alignments as witnessed not only in 2001 and 2003 interventions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in bilateral law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

Utmost importantly, the formation process and undertakings of the coalition of the willing-type cooperation are mostly outside the institutional frameworks of the NATO and the UN. These latter intergovernmental institutions are not at the forefront in inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. They are given a back-filling or supporting role. The acme of alliances, the NATO, is going under a transformation from a 'defensive nature' to 'a security nature' with its new missions and command structure. Yet, its role in the fight against terrorism does not seem to be central as discussed in the following chapters. Coalitions of the Willing appear to be the emerging form of cooperation among states, especially against ambiguous threats such as transnational terrorism for it overrules the

distinction between internal and external threats.

CHAPTER 2:

THE METHODOLOGY AND THE SYNOPSIS

This chapter presents a synopsis of the dissertation for ease of reading the entire dissertation. It outlines the flow of the study by explaining the following: the research question, the argument, the methodology, the relation of terrorism with International Relations discipline, why cooperation and alliance are studied, working definitions of key concepts, the significance and goals of the study, why and how specific independent variables are selected and developed, and their relations/causalities. The reasons for singling out the threat variable, as the most explanatory independent variable, are also discussed. Figure 1, on page 43, summarily demonstrates the framework of analysis conducted. The content of the chapters are also given during the explanation of the above-mentioned elements of the dissertation.

2.1. The Research Question

This study focuses on the form of inter-state cooperation and alignment behavior against transnational terrorism. Corresponding to the original argument of the dissertation, the research question that is to be answered is:

To what extent nation-states, which involve in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states, can show *these alignment behaviors* against transnational terrorist groups?

2.2. Departure Point of the Study: the Argument

The argument that led to the making of the research question above is that nation-states do not show their ‘previous alignment and cooperative behaviors’ against transnational terrorism. The argument is *not* that there is no cooperation against transnational terrorism. The research question does not seek to find out whether there is cooperation or not either; rather, the argument and the related research question is about the form of inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. Before the research is fully conducted, the starting point was based on a claim: A claim based on an initial unsystematic empirical observation was made such that previously demonstrated Cold War alignment and cooperation pattern among nation-states is not existent this time against transnational terrorism as of the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is the argumentational departure point for the research question and the study at large.

Since this is an observational claim to be tested, the dissertation presents both an empirical and analytical test to see whether this is the current situation. Defense and military oriented alignments and cooperation among states were the order of the Cold War days. Does this kind of cooperation among states continue or not? Equally, the research question is: to what extent nation-states (which involve in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states) can show *these alignment behaviors* against transnational terrorist groups?

2.3. What's in the Research Question? The Backgrounder

This dissertation is specifically about inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. As such, it is part of two literatures that overlap with one another: it is both a part of the broader cooperation literature that involves several different actors and issue-areas, and also a part of the alliances and alignment literature that concentrates mostly on relations among nation-states over fields of 'high-politics'. On the one hand, cooperation literature is involved in this dissertation due to inter-agency cooperation over non-military fields related to counterterrorism. On the other hand, there is alignment and alliance politics. Alignment behaviors (or grouping of states that converge on a military-political cause) have been traditionally studied in the alliance literature rather than in the generic cooperation literature. That is, 'alignment' has been traditionally understood as military-centric and state-centric cooperation. 'Alignment' is the customary term that is equivalent to 'inter-state cooperation in high politics'. There are other types of cooperation among nation-states such as those over economy and environment. The latter issues are not military-centric, and they are examples to non-military issue-areas that constitute the shift from 'defense' to 'security'.

As for terrorism, it can be noted that it is a contested policy-issue among nation-states without a clear consensus whether it is mainly a defensive or security issue. States differ on whether it is an issue that must be struggled with criminal and domestic means or with military tools. As such, it is an in-between subject that has interfaces with both realms of military-oriented 'defense' and non-military aspects of 'security'. Therefore, the reason for why states differ regarding the fight against terrorism, as the chapters elaborate, is that it is a gray threat with distinct characteristics that is at the intersection of both high politics and low politics. The

features of the threat conditions nation-state policy responses.

Since alliance literature focuses on nation-state as unit of analysis and since it mainly concentrates on high politics of external military threats and arms build-up, the literature does not study all areas of cooperation that are involved in the fight against terrorism. Law enforcement, reconstruction, prosecution and jurisprudence, border security and illicit trafficking, financial tracking, surveillance of individuals, intelligence gathering, democracy and rule of law are the areas that may be qualified as the gray zone at the intersection of low politics and high politics. It is those areas where counterterrorism cooperation is conducted alongside counter-insurgency and special military operations of national armed forces. Besides, the alliance literature via realist theory is traditionally reluctant to study international organizations for the literature's order of priority is on nation-states and much less on international organizations or on intra-state agencies. Thus, the alliance literature does not analyze national institutions or agencies within a nation-state. However, inter-agency cooperation among departments of different nation-states lies at the heart of inter-state counterterrorism cooperation.

Within that framework of analysis, alliance literature can be seen as a sub-category of the broader cooperation literature in that the wide-scope literature about cooperation includes, *inter alia*, the study of alliances. The study of alliances is a specified field of cooperation studies that focuses on 'international security'. Its issue-area is traditionally narrowed down to military and defense affairs with nation-states as the sole actors.

However, this customary trajectory of alliance politics is under change: Alliances of collective defense nature are increasingly giving way to security alliances that approximate collective security institutions. This change or attempted

transformation from a defensive nature to a security nature of alliances is one of the findings of the dissertation at hand. This change is not only limited to NATO's transformation, but it also applies to other alliances such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Correspondingly, the study aims to understand: to what degree previous inter-state alignment and cooperative behaviors against nation-state-rivals remain or disappear when the threat against which they cooperate changes from being state-centric to non-state-centric/transnational terrorism? The research question does *not* aim to understand whether nation-states cooperate against transnational terrorism or not, fundamentally because it inherently presumes that there is some cooperation on the ground. The study concentrates on the *form* of inter-state cooperation and alignment behavior that seems to be under change. The main empirical onus or burden of proof is on NATO's recent transformational trajectory.

Previous cooperative behaviors seen in alliances, especially during the Cold War, were driven by preparation for and anticipation of war among nation-states. They were chiefly against large-scale military aggression emanating from other states. Defense departments, military establishments and intelligence agencies of nation-states were at the forefront of defensive cooperation conducted within the framework of alliances, and the confrontational relationship between the US and the USSR was the driving motor of Cold War alliance system. Since the argument that gives birth to the research question is that nation-states do not demonstrate much of these previous defensive cooperative behaviors against terrorist groups, the dissertation examines the similarities and differences in cooperation patterns among states during and after the Cold War. The reason for the selection of the

Cold War as a period of comparison is its recent past, which has accustomed mental repercussions for nation-state policies and international security culture at large.

In due course, the study seeks to figure out the differences between the Cold War pattern of cooperation among nation-states against other states and the present cooperation against transnational terrorism mainly exemplified by Al Qaeda. Therefore, to what extent states confronted by transnational terrorism demonstrate alignment and cooperative behaviors *in the way they previously demonstrated them against other states* is the determining yardstick of the research question.

Since it is necessary to explain why the research question is worth studying, a brief elaboration is what follows: By researching to see whether established alignment behaviors are still applied this time against transnational terrorism, the dissertation tries to fill in the vacuum of the alliance literature about states' exposure to terrorism and their form of cooperative response. Thereby, the dissertation is an attempt to figure out and situate non-states' impact on alliance literature. Despite the accumulation of the literatures on alliance and cooperation, the question of the impact of non-state groups upon nation-states remains mostly unexplored. Previously, nation-states were aligning among themselves against other nation-states. As a feature of the new conflict environment, transnational terrorism is defined by states as a new national security threat. The latter is a novelty to be studied where the dissertation attempts to make a modest contribution to alliance literature by answering the research question.

By asking the research question again, several dynamics are studied such as what makes states urge inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism? The answer is that the scale and distinct features of the threat drive inter-state

cooperation. However, one of the research findings is that the threat itself is also the strongest limitation against inter-state cooperation.

Previously, no single terrorist threat caused a collective-response effort as international as the contemporary effort against Al Qaeda. Different from the latter, separatist terrorist groups and the threats they have posed have primarily concentrated on a particular country: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or Kurdistan Workers' Party-Parti Karkerani Kurdistan best known as PKK (which is also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, and KGK) mostly hit a particular country. However, Al Qaeda and its offshoots or groups affiliated with Al Qaeda hit many states, not just a particular state. The global scale and transnationality of Al Qaeda threat motivate states to align with each other and urge them to give a collective response. Nevertheless, there are still limits to inter-state cooperation as summarized in the following pages and detailed in the chapters.

The literature on alliances includes a vast amount of work about the alignments and alliances of states against other states. However, the novel issue to be explored is the alignments of states against non-state violence, that is to say, states facing terrorist groups. Thus, the research question required finding answers to such questions as: Is the prevailing literature on cooperation and alliance well enough in guiding us to understand this understudied dimension of alignment dynamics against non-state entities? If there is a need to improve the prevailing literature, in what ways can it be done? What are the problems and analytical pitfalls? What may be the modest analytical steps to undertake in explaining this understudied dimension?

Throughout history, nation-states or political formations other than nation-states such as city-states and empires enter into treaty-based alliances or showed cooperative behaviors. The modern literature on alliances includes considerable amount of work about the alignments and alliances of nation-states against other nation-states.²¹ It goes without saying that there were two adversarial alliance systems during the Cold War: first, the NATO-based Western bloc that comprised the peripheral states revolving around the US as a superpower; secondly, the Eastern bloc that comprised the former Soviet superpower and the countries that aligned with it mostly under the Warsaw Pact. The NATO and the Warsaw Pact were two formal alliances in that they were treaty-based. Utmost importantly, threats were emanating from other states, not from non-state formations. This was the situation until after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the end of the USSR sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

The demise of the USSR quickly followed, which ended the Cold War era that can be seen as rivaling alliance systems. A decade later, September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States of America took place in the absence of any polar structure. September 11 attacks and the subsequent terrorist attacks that took place around the world seemed to replace state-centric threats due to lessening threat of large-scale invasion of nation-states by other states. Although state-to-state rivalry continues, non-state entities rose to prominence in addition to classical power politics. Thus, the series of terrorist attacks at the start of the twenty-first century underscored the rise of non-state influence in international affairs. They motivated nation-states to fight transnational terrorism. In accordance, there are two different pictures of alignment and cooperation dynamics that can be compared and

²¹ Chapter 3 provides a detailed literature review of the alignment and alliance literature.

contrasted: the dynamics of Cold War alignments and cooperation and those of the post-Cold War era. Can states show previously demonstrated alignment and cooperation behaviors against transnational terrorist groups? This is the research question that is under-studied in the alliance literature.

2.4. The Differences between Cooperation and Alliance

2.4.1. Alliance

Nation-states traditionally have used alliances to extend power beyond their borders and to prevent or prepare for military conflict. “An alliance (or alignment) is a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or influence. Although the precise arrangements embodied in different alliances vary enormously, the essential element in a meaningful alliance is a commitment for mutual support against some *external* actor(s).”²²

Although informal commitments are included in Walt’s above definition of alliances, formal commitments (not informal ones) are the clearest manifestation of an alliance because they are coded in international treaties. Alliances (as treaty-based alignments) become part of international law with clear rights and obligations of state members. As such, alliances enhance the credibility of commitments made under the terms of the alliance agreement. Thus, the addition of informal commitments (which are not attached to treaties) into the definition of alliances causes ambiguities in the alliance literature. Put differently, whether informal commitments and relations among nation-states constitute an alliance is contested in the alliance literature. ‘Cordial relations’ or ‘partnerships’ are the

²² Walt, Stephen M. 2009. “Alliances in a Unipolar World” *World Politics* 61, No. 1, January, 86-120.

terms that are used to refer informal commitments without any treaty.

In alliance literature, alliances are commonly understood to be treaty-based military cooperation among states against ‘external’ threats. Thus, alliances most of the time refer to treaty-based or institutionalized military cooperation among states. Moreover, the terms ‘alignment’ and ‘alliance’ mostly denote military security cooperation, rather than cooperation on non-military issues. ‘Alignment’ and ‘alliance’ have been used as the equivalent of cooperation in the military-security field or defence realm. That is basically why armies and military officers are closely involved in alliances throughout history.

2.4.2. Cooperation

‘Cooperation’ is a broader term, which refers also to non-military issue-areas alongside military and defensive cooperation fields. Cooperation is a generic term that refers to both military and non-military issue-areas over which either nation-states or non-governmental organizations, or both nations and non-state entities collaborate among each other. Thus, when compared to ‘cooperation’, alliance is a specific form of cooperation. Alliance is the institutional name for defence cooperation or military cooperation among nation-states excluding non-state entities. Accordingly, ‘alignment’ is the behaviour of nation-states through which they group together or draw closer on a specific issue-area related to military security. ‘Alignment’ is traditionally understood as military security cooperation among nation-states, whereas ‘cooperation’ is not restricted either to military field or to nation-states.

Cooperation is a broader term that includes, among other forms of cooperation, alignments among states. Other than military-centric cooperation such

as alliances and alignments, ‘cooperation’ also includes collaboration or joint work such as those associated with the anti-personnel landmines campaign and the initiative on the International Criminal Court in the mid to late 1990s. ‘Cooperation’ can be distinguished as the upper-most general term for collaboration among both nation-states and non-state entities. However, it is traditionally regarded as being more appropriate to talk about alliances when cooperation is carried out only by nation-states on defence and military affairs or on war preparation and war contingencies. This is the traditional usage and meaning of the concept of alliance.

‘Cooperation’, as a general term, includes other examples such as the campaign against the use of child soldiers and small arms, and the formation of the Kimberley process on conflict over diamonds. This latter form of ‘cooperation’ operated as fluid networks without a clear leadership of the cooperation process, and they did not include nation-states alone. They were voluntary, group-interaction-based cooperation samples with mixed actors that included nongovernmental entities.²³

2.5. Terrorism and International Relations

The sequence of terrorist attacks around the world in the timeline of 2000-2010 demonstrated the increasing global impact of terrorism on nation-states. That is why international relations scholars around the world rushed to study contemporary terrorism to an unprecedented extent. Otherwise, the subject would continue to reside mainly in the realm of terrorism experts. When the number of states hit increased, the threat resonated globally, becoming an inter-state security

²³Cooper, Andrew F. 2005. *Stretching the Model of “Coalitions of the Willing”* The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Working Paper No.1 October, pp. 1-3.

problem. The fact that terrorism has truly become an international security threat against many states is new;²⁴ and this is basically why terrorism has been included in the parcel of International Relations and Security Studies more than ever before.

Previously, terrorism was mostly a sideline issue. It was occasionally factored in mainstream research questions of International Relations because it was not a national security concern. That is basically why International Relations did not examine terrorism or due state-responses in-depth. Terrorism was a subject mostly left to the terrorism experts and political scientists that deal with its history and relation to domestic problems respectively. It was not regarded as a proper ‘national security threat’ to be studied within the domain of International Relations. However in the last decade, most nation-states have regarded terrorism as a threat to national security; and the academia followed suit. Both for practitioners and scholars, terrorism has become a high-politics issue. For these reasons, transnational terrorism is one of the subject-matters against which inter-state cooperation and alignment is studied.

2.6. Why Study Forms of Cooperation and Alliance?

Alliances, alignment and cooperation lie at the heart of international relations. However, there seems to be ongoing challenges to the above-mentioned traditional conceptual distinction between ‘alliance’ and ‘cooperation’. The challenge mainly originates from the novel dimensions of the transnational threat, which imposes overlaps between the activities that ‘alliance’ and ‘cooperation’ refer. The challenge is about rearranging conceptual tools and working-

²⁴Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2006, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups”, *International Security* 31-1 Summer pp. 7-48; Zimmerman, Doron. 2003. *The Transformation of Terrorism*, Zurich: Andreas Wenger; Burnett, Jonny and Dave Whyte. 2005. “Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism” *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1-4, 1-18.

mechanisms of alliances to adapt to the post-Cold War strategic environment. The existence of such a challenge is the reason why alliances and cooperation forms are chosen as the subject matter to be revisited.

The challenge is visible in the most resilient alliance of our time, namely NATO. The challenge that NATO faces is the changing form of cooperation within or the challenge of a shift from ‘defense’ to ‘security’.²⁵ The main reason for such a shift is the change from state-centric threats to non-state, transnational, ambiguous threats in the sense that it combines or conflates internal threats and external threats. This is extensively detailed in Chapter Six where the features of the transnational terrorism threat and their implications for cooperation and alignment are elaborated. The consequence of the transnational threat exposure can be succinctly summarized: that ‘cooperative military relations in an alliance’ traditionally refer to relations centred on *defense*, whereas ‘cooperation on different realms alongside military collaboration’ is used in the emerging relevant literature as corresponding to *security* rather than to defense. That is, NATO is at pains to shift from a ‘defensive alliance’ that focuses on military affairs to a ‘security alliance’ that also includes non-military security issues such as transnational terrorism and illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction materials and devices, border security and maritime security in high seas. That is the heart of the NATO transformation process.²⁶

NATO is not a single-headed body. Since NATO has an intergovernmental organization depending upon the sovereign decisions of its member-states, the modifications in the national threat assessments are determining the way the Alliance transformation is carried out in the post-Cold War strategic environment.

²⁵ “Security Cooperation”, *NATO Issue Brief*, March, 2008.

²⁶ Chivvis, Christopher S. 2009. *Recasting NATO’s Strategic Concept Possible Directions for the United States* Occasional Paper, RAND.

Clearly identified territorial threats within the bipolar world -which served as the guidelines of defence planning- have been mostly replaced by ambiguous or hybrid threats posed by transnational groups. Importantly, NATO's transformation is a result of the contemporary transnational threat that confronts states. Irrespective of the ambiguity of the threat, it has been the most influential factor that channels the course of NATO transformation.²⁷ The threat, due its distinct features, is not clearly identified and assessed in a standard fashion in that nation-states, as Rickli maintains, give more importance to perceived future consequences.²⁸ Accordingly, as Rasmussen argues, 'it is not present actions that are to produce future results, but perceived future results that produce present actions'.²⁹ The latter indicates that 'if states know that they might be able to prevent an unwanted occurrence from happening, this gives them the duty to protect the future from the present. It therefore leads to pre-emptive and preventive national strategies.'³⁰ However, this does not prove valid for all the member-states at all times. All members are sovereign and retain the right to disagree. Nevertheless, some states prefer pre-emptive and preventive strategies as elaborated in the empirical Chapter 8. Utmost importantly, the reason for such a preference mainly originates in the threat itself. The distinct features of the transnational terrorism threat shapes threat assessments of states in a way different from the previous national threat assessments made against state-centric threats.³¹

²⁷NATO military-concept-developers of the Allied Transformation Command-ACT underlined the point repetitively in the Crete-Greece meeting of NATO-MIO seminar in October 19-24, 2009.

²⁸Rickli, Jean-Marc. 2007. "The Impact of Globalization on the Changing Nature of War", February 7, GCSP Policy Brief No 24, *Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, Geneva.

²⁹The point also explains the logic of 'the mission determines the coalition' statement, which is much discussed in the run-up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2001 and 2003 respectively. Ramussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2001. "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society", *Millenium-Journal of International Studies*, 30: 285-309.

³⁰Ramussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2001. "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society", *Millenium-Journal of International Studies*, 30: 285-309.

³¹The candidate's interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for

In turn, the transnational threat not only shapes a single state's response, but it affects the collective response or the cooperative responses of states because international policies are determined and conducted in relation to one another.³² It causes the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism to be different from the previous nation-state alignment and cooperative behaviors. This point is elaborated throughout the dissertation, especially in Chapters 5, 6 and 8.

Consequently, the above-mentioned points give the summary-answer to the research question: States do not show their previously demonstrated cooperative and alignment behaviours against transnational terrorism as the main argument of the study has it. There is inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism, but its form is different from states' previously demonstrated cooperative and alignment behaviours.

That has both practical implications and academic implications. Practical implications for alliances are seen in the case of NATO. Its strategy, purpose, tasks and mode of cooperation are in a continuous process of modification: The alliance is under an ongoing transformation which is leaning towards a security-oriented form of cooperation. An evolving shift from 'defense' to 'security' is underway in NATO. The details of why and how this is the case is analytically studied from along chapter two to chapter seven, and it is empirically studied in chapter eight.

Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

³²States can imitate other states' behaviours for gaining influence over its neighbours, penetrating into its alignment partner's decision making process, externalizing its domestic problems or sharing gains at the end of a campaign. These alignment policies have been implemented especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. They are detailed in Chapter 3 as documented in the literature. Importantly, preference of a state (whose formation is explained in the dissertation by the counterterrorism culture of a state) is different from the way that preference is implemented. The way a preference is implemented equals to the alignment policy of a state. Thus, while counterterrorism culture explains state preferences, the way the preferences are activated is manifested in (alignment) policies such as penetration or balking.

The implication for academia is worth noting: contemporary national threat assessments, national security strategies and due bureaucratic overhauling and rearrangements testify that the significance of transnational threats, globalization, and non-state entities' increasing political clout should not be underestimated. Nation-states are not the only entities that pose national security threats, especially where NATO as an organization and nation-states as its state-members do not regard conventional large-scale military invasion as likely.

As a corollary of the decreasing expectation of major war, late twentieth century was a period during which international security came to be understood to include non-military security issues. In accordance, the dissertation tries to understand the struggle against transnational terrorism with an emphasis on the form of cooperation among states. Previously, the form of cooperation in alliances was military and defense oriented. Threats such as illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and transnational terrorism were regarded as the additional or supplementary items of the main agenda, not the heart of intra-Alliance cooperation schedule. However, they are regarded by most nation-states today as national security threats or as part of 'high politics.' Within the present transformational era where definitions are overhauled due to globalization and threats such as transnational terrorism, the dissertation attempts to explain the changing parameters of alliance and cooperation.

2.7. The Methodology

2.7.1. Theory-oriented Case Study Method

The dissertation is conducted by means of theory-oriented case study method. The case study approach is the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop historical explanations that might be generalizable to other events.³³ Before detailing what kind of a case study research is conducted, it is essential to clarify why the case study approach is chosen as the method. Why not the statistical approach, formal modeling or another theory or method is not used is worth mentioning.

Researchers should use a method for a research task for which it is best suited.³⁴ For instance, statistical methods have been widely used in recent decades to develop logically consistent models. Statistical method tries to take observable implications from the model that is abstracted, and it instructs to test these implications against empirical observations. In turn, it uses these tests to decide how best to modify the deductive theory.

However, neither statistical method nor formal modeling is used in this dissertation. This is simply because they do not fit the present research question and task at hand. The answer to the research question is best answered via ‘process-tracing’. The latter method is used in case study approach to academic research where no extant research program or theory exists for the research task.

There is not any established theory to be used for studying the research question at hand. Neither a theory with regard to the impact of private entities upon nation-states, nor a consensual research program for the study of inter-state

³³ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 5.

³⁴ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 6.

cooperation against terrorism exists. That is why the research program and the analytical framework of contributing-causes and causalities are worked out by the candidate from the scratch: the research is at the intersection of the accumulation of the prevailing alliance literature and the relatively embryonic literature on cooperation and globalization that forays into answering contemporary developments that go beyond national borders. The subject-matter of this dissertation is a new one that has been hardly studied in the literature as of 2010.

Under such circumstances of uncharted analytic waters, process-tracing is of help. The method of process-tracing helps to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, personal interviews, official documents and declarations to see whether the causal process a study implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the contributing-causes or factors in that case.³⁵

Process-tracing is used for theory formation where the research task does not correspond or lend itself to any prevailing theory. It can perform a heuristic function, generating new variables or hypothesis on the basis of sequences of events observed inductively in case studies.³⁶ Process-tracing is used either to uncover evidence of causal mechanisms at work or to explain outcomes. The causal mechanism behind inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism can thus be studied via process-tracing, which is especially useful in case studies. Since it allows incorporating both material and ideational variables, process-tracing is ideal for establishing the possibility of a causal chain linking independent and dependent

³⁵ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7.

³⁶ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 7.

variables or contributing-causes of an observed outcome.

2. 7. 2. What is a ‘Case’? What is a Case Study?

‘A case’ is defined, via Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, as an instance of a class of events:

The term ‘class of events’ refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governments, kinds of economic systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or generic knowledge) regarding the causes of similarities and differences among instances (cases) of that class of events. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, is a historical instance of many different classes of events: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis management, and so on. A researcher’s decision about which class of events to study and which theories to use determines what data from the Cuban Missile Crisis are relevant to her or his case study of it.³⁷

As Alexander George indicates, there is potential confusion among the terms ‘comparative methods’, ‘case study methods’, and ‘qualitative methods’. In one view, the comparative method (the use of comparisons among a small number of cases) is distinct from the case study method, which in this view involves the internal examination of single cases. However, this dissertation follows George’s definition of case study method: to include both within-case analysis of single case studies and comparisons of a small number of cases. This is because there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program. Yet again, he maintains that single-case studies can also play a role in theory formation or development.³⁸

³⁷ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18.

³⁸ George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 18.

Theory formation or development requires exploring casual mechanisms, which operate only under certain conditions. Case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in single cases in detail. Within single cases, one can look at a large number of intervening variables and inductively help identify what conditions present in a case activate the causal mechanism. Contrastingly, statistical studies omit all contextual factors except those inherent in the variables selected for measurement and leave out many contextual and intervening variables.

Case study researchers are more interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their outcomes arise. Correspondingly, the present dissertation tries to find the dynamics and conditions under which inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism occurs. It is concluded that the causal mechanisms that are dissected into parts in other chapters are evident in the sequence of relevant events and processes that are traced in chapter eight.

Process-tracing is a research method; rational choice models or formal modeling are theories. Thus, process-tracing is fit to studying an understudied subject-matter that cannot be explained by any extant theory of the literature. Process-tracing can also be used by statistical research programs, by rational choice models or game theory to test their insights derived from the latter theories' deductive frameworks.

As for using process-tracing method in case studies, it is maintained that it helps build the explanation of causal mechanisms of outcomes. Tracing the processes that may have led to an outcome helps narrow the list of potential causes. Therefore, process-tracing is an invaluable tool for the first stages of theory formation on a new question. Alexander George underlines two reasons for how it

helps theory-building: first, tracing processes generates many observations within a case, and secondly, it helps to link these observations to one another to form an explanation.

There are four kinds of process-tracing: a- detailed narrative, b- use of hypothesis and generalizations, c- analytic explanation, and d- general explanation. The kind of process-tracing that is used in this dissertation is a conflation of type-b and type-d. That is, both generalizations specific to the case and general explanations of form of inter-state cooperation are made.

In general explanation kind of process-tracing, the researcher constructs a general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process. The researcher may do this either because the data or theory necessary for explanation is lacking, or because an explanation is intended at a higher level of generality or abstraction due to the research objective. This is also true for the present dissertation; that is, not the data but a theory to be benefited from is lacking. Secondly, since this study attempts to explain violent non-state entities' impact upon inter-state relations, it tries to climb the ladder of abstraction in order to define the place of non-state entities in world politics and thereby answer the research question. Thus, the kind of process-tracing used in this study is suitable for abstraction and general explanation. Yet again, it is also analytic to the extent parts of the narrative are accompanied with explicit causal factors or variables highly specific to the case. Yet, no testing of a hypothesis occurs: this study neither employs theoretical variables of any theory, nor does it assert any generalization of its explanation into a generalization. Therefore, the study, via process-tracing, heads for analytical general explanation of the specific subject.

An analytical disaggregation of the relevant variables is sought after: The chapters that examine the independent variables (of globalization, counterterrorism cultures, and the new threat) explain why and how analytical constructs or security concepts are changing as a response to developments on the ground: A separate chapter is invested for each contributing-cause or independent variable. These chapters theoretically examine the independent variables. They are not historical briefs, but rather analytical discussions about how variables help answer the research question. The sum of all three independent variables might also be seen to present a picture about the changing parameters of international security. These analytical discussions about variables are married to an empirical chapter reserved for the examination of the research question via process-tracing method.

Analytical inquiries attempt to figure out the reasons why and how current developments regarding inter-state cooperation and alignment evolve. This is done not only by mere descriptive narrative, but through a systematic framework of analysis that includes causalities: Three independent variables (of globalization, counterterrorism culture of a nation-state, the new threat) and the dependent variable of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism are put to an empirical examination.

The approach is qualitative and largely positivist, though the independent variable or the contributing-cause of ‘counterterrorism culture of a nation-state’ borrows from the constructivist and neoclassical realism literatures in a way that complements the use of traditional approaches in theorizing about the inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. That is, analytical and theoretical inquiries are part of the methodology followed. Qualitative and coherent

discussions of theorizing constitute part of the method itself.³⁹

The answer to the research question is given via the above-mentioned three independent variables that condition inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. To repeat, the independent variables are: first, *the structural variable* of globalization; secondly, *the unit-level variable* of nation-state behaviors driven from their counterterrorism cultures, that is convergent or divergent security cultures that help answer to what extent contemporary transnational terrorism is defined in similar terms and to what extent methods to deal with terrorism is similar; and thirdly, *the new threat variable* or ‘the threat of transnational terrorism itself with its distinctive features’. These independent variables condition the dependent variable of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism. The study incorporates discussions that bring forth a ranking of independent variables, and it concludes that the new threat variable or ‘the distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’ have the highest explanatory power.

There is not any established theory to apply for the research question. Neither a theory with regard to the impact of private entities (non-state entities in general or transnational terrorism in particular) upon nation-states, nor a consensual research scheme for the study of inter-state cooperation against terrorism exists. That is why the research program and the analytical framework of causalities are worked out by the candidate from the scratch: the research is at the intersection of the accumulation of the prevailing literature of alliance and the relatively

³⁹Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. "Hard Times for Soft Balancing" *International Security* 30, no. 1 Summer: 72-108; Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2002. "From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research" *International Security* 26, no. 4 Spring, 93-111; Smith, Steve. 200. "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., *Critical Reflections on Security and Change* London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing" *International Security* 29-2, 159-201.

embryonic literature on cooperation and globalization that forays into answering contemporary developments that go beyond national borders.

In accordance, the main research question leads to two interrelated follow-up questions: The questions of where non-state entities in general and terrorist entities in particular may academically be placed in the field of International Security and where nation-states place them in their security conceptions and policies.⁴⁰ As for their place in academic and policy quarters, it can be noted that they are gradually acquiring a semi-actor or pseudo-actor status owing to their capacity to cause counter-policies from nation-states. Non-state entities are taken seriously when they pose significant threats; and although they are not regarded as proper actors in the customary sense, their autonomy or freedom of action defies traditional conceptions. These latter points are reached by conducting a theoretical inquiry checked by empiricist verification. Thereby, the research attempts to situate transnationally-active violent non-state entities within the context of overall world politics. That is, the study concentrates both on explanation of causalities and empirical reality-check at separate chapters. The theoretical explanation is taken down to earth by explaining the variables themselves and the relation among variables. Causalities are shown mainly through the case study on NATO transformation. A second case study is also conducted regarding the contending national counterterrorism cultures of Europe and the US and regarding the difficulties of the threat. These case studies are completed by means of process-tracing, which builds upon official declarations, recorded interviews and conversations with diplomats, law enforcement authorities, military officers, and

⁴⁰Non-states entities might be seen as of three kinds: market, illicit and moral. Transnational corporations (*market authority*), transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (*illicit authority*) and various types of non-governmental organizations (*moral authority*). The issue is elaborated in Chapter 4.

above all, scholars both in Turkey and abroad to substantiate the argument. It goes without saying that pondering over the written material of the literature fed the qualitative approach pursued. Academic articles and books, numerous conferences attended especially in Bilkent, TOBB, Koc and Ankara Universities as well as governments' reports on the issue were invaluable. National security strategy documents, special commission reports, press meetings, media news services such as UNWire, IPRIS, UN News Center, UN Foundation, UN Dispatch, local and foreign newspapers articles, international organizations' news briefs, policy briefs, monographs, working-papers of think-tanks and research institutes proved valuable. Sources on the Cold War era such as the 'Parallel History Project' were also invaluable.

Personal contacts helped conduct the qualitative approach toward the subject-matter: Interviews and conversations were conducted with diplomats, civil and military officials of the NATO Headquarters, Belgium in 1999 and 2005, and in Greece in 2009. Contacts with NATO officials in person in 1999, 2005 and 2009 created the opportunity to make a comparison between the NATO's standing with regard to its mode of operation, transformation within, and the strategy and clarity of purpose of the Alliance. Personal conversations with Turkish military and police authorities also help shape the dissertation. Military and police authorities are consulted mainly through a number of opportunities created by the Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), which also provided the chance to consult Georgian, Polish, Turkish, American and French military authorities. Political advisers of different NATO member countries were interviewed in the United States in 2005, in the workshop of February-March 2007 in Georgia and NATO seminar in Crete, Greece in 2009. Presentations and

seminar participations made in Georgia, Belgium, Greece and the Yale and Harvard Universities in the US provided ample opportunity to discuss the research question with both academics and practitioners.

As for more on methodology and the place of the study in the literature, the main interest is to see whether inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism follows the previously established inter-state form of cooperation and alignment against other nation-states. If not, why? Is there a new form of cooperation among states against transnational terrorism? What is it and why does it come to surface?

By discussing the differences between past and present cooperation patterns, the research question links itself to the alliance literature that seldom queried the impact of non-state entities upon inter-state cooperation in general and alliances in particular. The need to establish such a linkage arose because cooperation and alliance literature largely ignores the new security landscape that is evolving, and it seems to underestimate the impact of networked/transnational threats upon nation-state alignments. The alliance literature still overwhelmingly focuses on state-centric threats in the face of the burgeoning studies that assert the unlikelihood of large-scale invasion or of major inter-state war.⁴¹ The lack of hard-

⁴¹Miller, Steven E. "International Security at Twenty-Five: From One World to Another" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1 Summer 2001, pp. 5–39; Jervis, Robert. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace" Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001 *American Political Science Review* Vol. 96, No. 1 March 2002; SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Brawley, Mark R. "The Rise of the Trading State Revisited" in Aydinli and Rosenau eds. *Globalization, Security and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition* Albany: State University of New York Press, pp.67-81; Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*. New York: Basic Books; Kaysen, Carl. 1990, "Is War Obsolete? - A Review Essay" *International Security* 14:42–64; Mueller, John. 1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, John. 1995. *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics*. New York: Harper Collins; Mueller, John. 2004. *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, P.3; Ray, James Lee. 1989. "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War" *International Organization*

balancing and its implications for alliances,⁴² lack of poles⁴³, the questioning of the proper applicability of balance of power theory and the need for initiating new concepts such as soft-balancing⁴⁴ or under-balancing⁴⁵ mainly originates from the waning of major war or the low anticipation of force-on-force confrontation of armies on the battlefield. When the conventional military threat assessments are low, alliance literature experiences difficulties in using the conventional concepts

43:405–439; Rosenau, James. 1990 *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/1991 “Primed For Peace: Europe after The Cold War” *International Security* 15:7–57; Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War” *International Security* 22:5–43; Mandelbaum, Michael. “1998/1999 Is Major War Obsolete?” *Survival* 40:20–38; Mandelbaum, Michael. (2002) *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, And Free Markets In The Twenty-First Century*. New York: Public Affairs.

⁴² Michael Don Ward, “Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics,” *Monograph Series in World Affairs* 19 1982; Stephen M. Walt, “Multilateral Collective Security Arrangements,” in Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, eds., *Security Studies for the 1990s* Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s 1993; Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” *Survival* 39 Spring 1997; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security* 24 Summer 1999; Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 January 2009, 86–120; John Ikenberry, ed., *American Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001; Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003; and T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.

⁴³ Smith, Steve. 2002. “The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order” *International Relations* Vol. 16-2: 171–183 and Calleo, David P. 2009. *Follies of Power-America’s Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; as for the state-agency papers and reports, 2007. *Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States*, National Intelligence Council Report DR-2007-16D- 23 August; 2004. “Mapping the Global Future” *Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project Based on consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world* December, <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>; as for the think-tank sources, Sunstein, Cass R. 2006. On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-13 May downloadable, www.aei-brookings.org or from the Social Science Research Network at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=901217> O I N T C E N T E R; Institutes, Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Paul Huth. 2008. *Peace and Conflict*. The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, www.cidcm.umd.edu; as for a viewpoint from a practitioner and theorist, Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, *Foreign Affairs*.

⁴⁴ Pape, Robert. 2005. A. “Soft Balancing against the United States” *International Security*, Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp7-45; Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 126-132; Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing” *International Security* 30, no. 1 Summer: 72-108; Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wolforth. 2002. “From Old Thinking to New Thinking in Qualitative Research” *International Security* 26, no. 4 Spring, 93-111.

⁴⁵ Smith, Steve. 200. “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years,” in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., *Critical Reflections on Security and Change* London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing” *International Security* 29-2, 159-201.

such as counter-balancing, power, polarity and balance of power theory for the main underlying rationale of all these concepts focuses on external military threats anticipated from nation-states.

The unlikelihood of major war is acknowledged by most nations and the NATO authorities.⁴⁶ Given that, current world-wide academic debate on the conceptualization and usage of the above-mentioned terms is multifaceted and bereft of consensus.⁴⁷ That is fundamentally because the alliance literature does not work on entities other than nation-states yet. As a corollary, examination of the rise of non-state entities and the threats they pose is the first step to resolve the hardship of alliance literature in answering non-state threats. Facing the reluctance in the alliance literature to address the gap between the established conceptual lenses and the contemporary developments on the ground, the dissertation attempts to address this gap.

Such an attempt seems timely when non-state networks such as Al Qaeda with its distinctive features of transnational threat confront nation-states. Such an attempt is to try to take an initial modest step in explaining the new security landscape from the alliances/cooperation point of view, without which the dissertation cannot compare between the past and present forms of nation-state cooperation and alignment. Alongside other variables, the examination of and discussion about the contemporary structural circumstances are needed for a systematic research because structural analysis is needed to disaggregate evolving systemic factors that condition state behaviours. The following section summarizes

⁴⁶ The candidate's interviews with civil and military NATO authorities during the Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19-24 October 2009.

⁴⁷ Byman, Daniel. 2006. "Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:5, 767 – 811; Tertrais, Bruno. 2004. "The Changing Nature of Military Alliances" *The Washington Quarterly* 27:2, 135-150; Thies, Wallace J. "Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO's Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?" *European Security*, 16:1, 29-50.

how the study goes about the structural or systemic factors.

2.8. The Independent Variable of Globalization

Structural variables, by definition, condition other variables that are nevertheless separate from the structural variable. Structure, whether it is selected as globalization or international system, presents permissive or restraining causes for the entities involved in politics. As such, it conditions actors and the relations among them. By presenting opportunities or worsening the play-ground circumstances, the structural variable is indirectly involved in any process. Through such an analytical role of structural variables in understanding causalities or cause-and-effect relationships, structure is traditionally seen as the international system that shapes and shoves nation-state behaviours via neo-realism.

However, contemporary security landscape demonstrates features that cannot be fully explained from the level of international system. The internal and external, domestic and foreign distinctions are challenged by formations other than states. The way they force observers to devise new conceptual tools are presented in detail in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Thus, which structural variable answers the research question of this study is an important point to ponder over. To this end, the thesis discusses both polarity and globalization in order to dissect the differences between the previous and present structural environment and how the present one conditions the contemporary state behaviours in question. After a discussion of polarity, the study opts for 'hegemony qualified by globalization or the non-polarity argument' which claims that 'polarity' as an analytical-construct does not correspond to the research question well enough. This point is elaborated in chapter five.

The present security environment goes back to mid-twentieth century technological and economic advancements, the nuclear age and transnational illicit markets which defy state-centric conceptualizations such as polarity. Besides, the source of transnational terrorism is not a nation-state. Thus, polarity as an analytical-construct or concept is not seen as an independent variable that corresponds to inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. However, polarity as a concept can still be used in other studies analyzing state-centric threats and state-to-state relations. All in all, the most salient structural independent variable for this study is demonstrated in the following chapters to be ‘globalization’.

The structural discussions in the study involve both ‘arguments of globalization’ that can be studied at a meta-theoretical level with a macro-approach, and ‘arguments of polarity’ that are discussed at the neo-realist structural level. Polarity debate is conducted at a relatively traditional theoretical framework, whereas the realm of globalization and its impact on security are interdisciplinary with respect to both issue-areas and theoretical orientation.

The working-definition of globalization used in the dissertation is the flow of inanimate and animate objects inside and across borders with tremendous velocity and in tremendous volume. These objects can be tangible or intangible: ideas, information, people, capital, labor, drugs, conventional arms, tanks, artillery, small arms, AK47s, fissile material, know-how, greenhouse gases or endemic diseases flow in and across the borders. Keywords for globalization are ‘mobility’ and ‘interconnectedness’. As for the course of the theoretical discussion and standing-point of the study about globalization’s effect on nation-states, the study is one of the transformationalist views that are congruent to a mid-way or *via media*

between the approach of hyper-globalism and that of globalization-scepticism.⁴⁸

In the light of above-mentioned specifications, globalization as an independent variable conditions two other independent variables. The question of how an independent variable conditions other independent variables is worth explaining succinctly: Whatever conception of structure is used (whether it is the traditional trilogy of system, state and individual levels of analysis, or micro-macro level of analysis in globalization studies), the levels are analytical constructs which are nested into each other in real-world practicality; yet, they are separated for analytical purposes. Therefore, globalization as a structural variable conditions other variables, namely counterterrorism culture of a nation-state and the new threat.

The figure on the next page demonstrates how globalization affects other variables. Globalization, depicted as the circular platform, affects nation-states and the formation process of the threat of transnational terrorism. However, since other variables include agency or political groups that take action by their own choice, they are still separate variables with independent effect on the dependent variable.


Globalization creates suitable environment for the conduct of non-state violence. This becomes possible by the technology-driven time-space compression. That is, geographical distance becomes a lesser obstacle in the conduct of violence. Action-reaction time-period is shortened. This is roughly called deterritorialization whose implication for strategy is elaborated in Chapter 4. Interconnectedness increased for both private and public (or state and non-state) entities and transactions of any kind changed with respect to form and speed. Societal and logistical dimensions of the new threat come into life due to these features of the

⁴⁸ Bell, Duncan S. A. 2003. "History and Globalization: Reflections on Temporality" *International Affairs*, 79, 4, pp. 801-814; Hopkins, A. G. 2002. ed. *Globalization in World History* London: Pimlico.

independent variable of globalization.

Yet, globalization is not a direct cause for the creation of the new threat; rather, it presents window of opportunities that are exploited by violent extremism. Thus, apart from its civil uses, globalization leaves open a dark side of it to be advantaged by violent groups. While globalization gives permissive causes for the formation of private violence, it simultaneously hardens the difficulties that nation-states face by presenting problems of categorization, prioritization/strategizing and coordination within and among bureaucracies.

CASUAL MECHANISM:



2.9. How Does Globalization Condition ‘The New Threat’?

What is structurally distinct about the contemporary security environment is that there is an ongoing diffusion of power owing to globalization. What is meant by ‘diffusion of power’? Power resources such as economy, weapons, knowledge, technology, skill and mobility of citizens increased both in depth and breadth or qualitatively and quantitatively. They became available not only for nation-states/public entities, but for private/non-sovereign entities as well. Resources of power (which are used both by nation-states to counter threats and by non-state entities to challenge the status quo) expanded world over. Such power-diffusion is a distinct feature of the present era, and it is chiefly a structural feature related to globalization.

Power is more diffused and took different forms. Conventional lenses give contradictory accounts about the repercussions of power diffusion on new polar configuration or lack of polarity itself. Yet, what is more fundamental than the debate on polarity or politics of power-balancing is the phenomenon entitled as ‘globalization and terrorism’. The relation between globalization and terrorism displays how power is scattered. Illicitly funded asymmetrical warfare is one of the manifestations of power diffusion. It is also the chief example to the changing way power is used. Transnational terrorism is an asymmetrical form of power that has global operational reach hand in hand with ideological propaganda. Globalization enhances terrorists’ operational reach or their unconventional power-projection ability. Weapons acquisition and financing of violence is facilitated through interconnectedness of goods and services. Furthermore, terrorist attacks instantly affect international public opinion thanks to real-time news of information and

communication technologies. This is how facilitating availabilities of the globalization process set the stage for non-state violence.

Utmost importantly, globalization causes mobility both within and across nation-states. In other words, alongside the mobility across borders, the mobility is also within nation-states. This becomes possible by the technological leverage that globalization process provides for private entities. Thereby, states' monopoly on the use of force is challenged by terrorist groups and nation-states' capacity to control violence and manipulate information is relatively reduced. It is a relative reduction assessed in parallel to the rise of the autonomy of terrorist groups in financing and committing violence.

States cannot control economic, financial flows as effectively as done before, and they do not have direction and control over transnational terrorist groups. Transnational terrorism, flourishing in the circumstances of globalization, is not a state-proxy. That allows its mobility across borders alongside the mobility within nation-states. Therefore, globalization paves the way for the formation of internal threats, too. Thus, globalization merges the internal and external realm of nation-states through interconnectedness that cannot be effectively controlled by states. This is the permissive structural circumstance that is open to be exploited by transnational terrorists. The structural circumstances or the independent variable of globalization is inherent to or embedded in the distinct dimensions of the transnational terrorism threat that is animated and put into effect by terrorist groups.

The 'flow' or 'mobility' of objects is the main feature of globalization that interconnects the world, though not necessarily interconnecting the minds of people. That is, different ideologies contend with each other. However, ideologues'

recruiting tools are enhanced by advanced technology. Innovations especially in communication and transportation are the tools that terrorists take advantage in attracting new followers, acquiring weapons and communicating with each other.

Globalization-induced availability of those means and instruments is at the service of terrorist groups: Globalization, by presenting a permissive cause, plays into the formation of the threat. Yet, globalization is not the direct cause of non-state violence since it is, by definition, a structural variable. The conscious use of these power-resources is realized by transnational terrorist groups.

Transnational terrorists act *as if* they were agents or actors. Suicide-bombing, truck-bombs, kalashnikov, laptop, global positioning device, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and devices, unregulated economic and financial transactions, and use of the Internet for mobilizing the masses are some of the catch-phrases telling of the way how globalization plays into the formation of the threat.

Globalization diffuses power resources. In so doing, it affects the way power is used. Asymmetrical warfare is the non-state use of violence different from the way nation-states previously used it in the form of army battalions. Asymmetrical or unconventional warfare is not war in the proper sense, but certainly a form of it. Non-state use of power is the result of power diffusion around the world, which is a feature of globalization. This is how globalization-caused power diffusion conditions the formation of the transnational terrorism threat.

2.10. How Does Globalization Condition Cooperation Problems Within and Among Nation-States?-The Circumstances within which States Behave

Alongside terrorism as asymmetrical form of warfare, diffusion of power resources can be noticed even in social sciences. Power diffusion is an overarching development that has implications for most branches of social sciences, whose research programs and analyses reflect the way power spreads around the world: In addition to international relations and security, other branches such as international and domestic law, sociology, history, economy, political philosophy, and political science are also affected. The effect demonstrates itself as increasing overlaps and interdisciplinarity. The hardship is that there is now ever increasing overlaps among these branches. That is telling of the consequences of power-diffusion under globalization: interconnectedness and ever overlapping processes of any kind that requires academia to follow suit.

Increasing interdisciplinarity and departmental overlaps is also valid for national bureaucracies. There are overlaps among bureaucratic categorizations and job-definitions. Moreover, the overlapping processes take place both within and among nation-states. The main point that explains how globalization affects states is that there is an increasing overlap among different job definitions of nation-state agencies. Globalization presents uneasy working conditions for states by giving way to problems of categorization, prioritization and coordination in national bureaucracies. That is basically how globalization affects nation-states' working mechanisms and in turn conditions their behaviors.

Globalization's impact on nation-state strategizing and policy-making is remarkable. For one thing, criminality and warfare conflates into one another as does internal and external security threats. Police-work and military work exchange

roles.⁴⁹ Multinational troops that are deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq pursue tasks within cities, not on the battlefield. They try to neutralize insurgencies by cooperating with the tribal leaders. They try to bolster corruption-ridden governments. Nations sent police trainers and military trainers for the Afghan and Iraqi authorities. They provide money for civilian projects such as reconstruction, infrastructure and health facilities. Furthermore, coordination in the military side of the cooperation against transnational terrorism is not without problems. New NATO members are not fully qualified to work with older members. Intra-alliance training of new NATO members' troops to be deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq continues. However, the training given cannot be categorized as pure military because it involves civil tasks as well as counter-insurgency tasks.

Yet, counter-insurgency operations of 2000-2010 in Afghanistan and Iraq represent part of the responses to the transnational terrorism threat. Counterinsurgency is not the heart of counterterrorism cooperation. Since transnational terrorism is more about attacks against civilians in different countries around the world, most counterterrorism effort is carried out at the inter-agency level among different states. Coordination of different, and yet overlapping, tasks are assigned to police, judiciary, internal and external intelligence agencies and the media of each nation that are in cooperation with those of another nation. However, categorizations and thereby prioritization/strategizing become harder for nation-states owing to interconnectedness of national security issue-areas: Diffusion of power resources under globalization gives way to overlapping categories and to interconnectedness of previously separate fields of work. Besides, as it is

⁴⁹Bensahel, Nora. "A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29/1 January–February 2006, 35-49; Bensahel, Nora. 2003. *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* Santa Monica, CA: RAND; and Fair, C. Christine. 2004. "The Counterterror Coalition: Cooperation with India and Pakistan" Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

elaborated in the following chapters, national decision-makers' challenge of prioritization and balancing different national security interests with one another became severe due to hard policy trade-offs because implementation of different policies depend upon each other more than ever. Those are the ways how globalization structurally limits and exacerbates inter-state counterterrorism cooperation.

Issue-areas of security and thereby threats to national security increased in kind and number. Moreover, they became multi-faceted and ever overlapping. Different, and yet, overlapping threats such as migration, environmental problems, pandemics, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit trafficking (of money, nuclear materials, small weapons, narcotics, precious stones, human beings), poverty, criminal organizations' activities such as money laundering, and terrorism depend upon one another to continue to exist. They manifested themselves as being 'transnational' threats. Transnational threats are both an external and internal threat at the same time. Transnational threats challenge states' indigenous capability of detecting, arresting or crashing illicit activities. Importantly, the challenge takes place both inside and outside of national jurisprudence.

The overlapping nature of these transnational threats rose to prominence due to globalization: the best example for the scope of this study is again the conflation of criminality and terrorism.⁵⁰ Corresponding to the overlapping features

⁵⁰ Bjornehed, Emma. "Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror" *Global Crime* Vol. 6, No. 3&4, August–November 2004, pp. 305-324; Levitt, Matthew. "Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover Between Terrorist Groups" *SAIS Review* Vol. 24, No. 1 Winter-Spring; Thachuk, Kimberley. "Countering Terrorist Support Structures" *Defense Against Terrorism Review* Vol. 1 No.1 Spring 2008, pp.13-28; Croissant, Aurel. 2007. "Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in Southeast Asia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30:131-156; Levitt, Matthew A. 2002. "The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 6, 4: 49-65; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2007. *Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking*

of the threat, counter-terrorism fields overlap with each other: Financial tracking, surveillance of communication routes, law-enforcement, intelligence gathering, coordination, assessment and sharing, military operations, black market surveillance and investigation, border security, critical infrastructure protection, civil responders and the media have all become interrelated and overlapping. Law-enforcement and military are affected the most because they exchanged their missions to certain extent. Police-work comprises activities related to national security, and the military is assigned seek-and-destroy missions against semi-criminal entities.⁵¹ Hence, bureaucratic job-definitions are blurred.

Although nation-states' problem of strategizing in the face of several overlapping fields or issue-areas is not new, the conflation and ambiguity among job-definitions of state agencies seem to be higher than the previous eras. Different national security interests regarding energy, demography, economy and military strategy have been interrelated for a long time now. However, not only counterterrorism is included in these national security issue-areas, but also counterterrorism undercuts or impedes the work that is required for other issue-areas. Furthermore, the work specifically undertaken for counterterrorism alone is such that military tasks of counterterrorism cancels anti-terrorist intelligence gathering. In other cases, police-work duplicates military work. This is how the

in Arms, Drugs and Human Life Westport, Conn: Praeger; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2002. "Terrorism's Financial Lifeline: Can It Be Severed?" *Strategic Forum*, Institute for the National Strategic Studies Defense University, Washington DC. 191-May; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2005. "Corruption: The International Security Dimension," *SAIS Review* 25, 1: 143-152; Porter, Richard D. and Ruth Judson. 1996. *The Location of US Currency: How Much Is Abroad?* Federal Reserve of St. Louis; Baker, Raymond. 1999. "Money Laundering and Flight Capital: The Impact on Private Banking", *Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations*, 10 November; Pearl, Daniel and Steve Stecklow. 2002. "Taliban Banned TV but Collected Profits on Smuggled Sonys," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 January; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2005. "Money and Terrorism" *Friede*, <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/93/dinero-y-terrorismo>; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2003. *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks*. London: Pluto Press; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2008. *Rogue Economics: Capitalism's New Reality*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

⁵¹ Bensahel, Nora. 2006. "A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29:35-49.

operational environment of states is shaped by globalization.

2.11. The Unit-Level Independent Variable: Contending Counter-Terrorism Cultures of Nation-States

Inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism has confronted the above-mentioned operational environment induced by globalization. The circumstances within which states carry out their policies have worsened. The work-load tremendously increased and became complicating for authorities because counterterrorism issue-areas proliferated with remarkable overlaps. Combating such threats entailed a network-like steady coordination among state departments that have different competences and mandates. As indicated in the above section on how globalization shapes the contemporary environment, the internal security authorities and external security forces conflated into each other. Police, intelligence agencies and military partly exchanged their roles. Indeed, they became dependent on each other to remedy the threat. This is the globalization-caused operational environment in which states find themselves.

Apart from this environment within which states act, nation-state decisions depend on their counterterrorism cultures. While globalization conditions the context for state actions, it does not fully determine states' immediate decisions and actions. The working conditions of cooperative state bureaucracies worsened due to globalization, yet that is a structural determinant of nation-state policies. The latter is different from national decision-making, which is also largely affected by the counterterrorism culture of a state.

Counterterrorism culture of a nation-state is about how states perceive and assess threats and devise response-policies. Since states are sovereign in that they

retain the right to craft their own policies, they may differ on the strategy to be followed. Each may decide on a particular method or strategy to face the transnational terrorism threat. Counterterrorism culture, as sub-category of a nation's strategic culture, is marked by the history of a state's experience with terrorism. The concept of 'strategic culture', and 'counterterrorism culture' as an extension of it, are based on the understanding that nation-states are inclined or predisposed by their historical experiences, political systems and cultures to respond threats. It tends to accept that states may draw lessons from their historical experiences. Sustaining economic performance and military capabilities of a state may influence strategic choices, yet the concept of strategic culture presumes that state preferences will be mostly determined by its past.

The study focuses on the decisions of the EU as a supranational institution, the behaviours of the EU states and the behaviours of the US, especially before and after they are victimized by terrorist attacks. It is important to explain the reasons for such a selection. The reasons for studying the words and deeds of European states and those of the US are four-fold:

First, these countries are directly targeted by transnational terrorist groups, whose pronouncements directly confront Europe and the US. The values of the West such as democracy, rule of law and individual liberties are addressed by transnational terrorists groups as targets to be demolished. Transnational terrorism's challenge against the dominant Western economic and political order of international relations is anti-hegemonic and it concerns the West most.

Secondly, these states are commonly regarded in the world-wide academic literature as the most powerful ones in the system. As such, they are also commonly referred to as 'major powers'. They rank highest regarding most criteria

that are used to measure national power. Accordingly, European states and especially the US have been setting the world agenda more than other states. Their political, diplomatic, economic and military clout is higher than the rest of the states. This is reflected in the power to obstruct or pressure for the adoption of most decisions and resolutions of international organizations such as the UN, Concert of Europe, International Monetary Fund and the NATO. Indeed, most international organizations that are of international significance were established by these states in the very first place.

Thirdly, those states are the ones that experience the highest turbulence in relations with their citizenry due to the ideological propaganda of transnational terrorist groups that shuns the values of the West. These countries are so much at the target of transnational terrorism that a country that establishes cooperative relations with them takes a risk in its association with them. The content analysis of Al Qaeda declarations and the examination of their attacks indicate that the new threat is particularly against the strong or major states above all. That is why transnational terrorism has a strategic dimension and acquired a national security threat status for Europe and the US. Even before the terrorist attacks in Europe took place, European states were quick to support the US in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. That is because they assessed the new threat to be directed at them, too. That proved right and several terrorist attacks in Europe followed September 11. Although it is not much publicized in foreign daily newspapers so as not to cause societal unrest and panic, transnational terrorism continues to pose a dire threat to Europe and the US. There have been a dozen foiled attacks in Europe, and twenty-nine foiled attacks in the US since September 11. Thus, the burden of defense against transnational terrorism is mostly on the

shoulders of European and American governments.

Fourth reason is that these nations have the most advanced capabilities to wage conventional and unconventional warfare when compared to those of most other nations. They still train other nations' anti-terrorism and intelligence personnel, give technological and economic support and mostly channel the course and agenda of the struggle against transnational terrorism. For all of these reasons, European states' policies and the US policy on counterterrorism are examined in this study. The contending counterterrorism cultures of the transatlantic partners accounts for their different responses to terrorist attacks, which are detailed in chapter six and chapter eight.

2.12. The Working Definition of 'Transnational Terrorism Threat'

It is important to specify what is meant by the threat of transnational terrorism or 'transnational terrorist threat' that is posed by transnational terrorist groups. To that end, it goes without saying that terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been a problem for centuries. Although the contemporary manifestation of terrorism has been internationally debated for a decade now as to whether it constitutes a new kind of terrorism or not, this study is *not* involved in this debate per se. Whether transnationality of terrorism constitutes a new kind of terrorism is outside of the main scope of the study, which is not after figuring out whether terrorism is transformed.

The dissertation is not involved in the debate whether the new dimensions or form of terrorism amounts to a 'new terrorism'. Rather, the study focuses on the new features or manifestation of the transnational terrorism threat without tackling the debate on implications of these new manifestations for the nature or essence of

terrorism. Transnational terrorism may be assessed by different scholarly and governmental circles as constituting a new terrorism entirely different from the ones previously experienced. It may alternatively be regarded as constituting just a new version of the age-old terrorism as usual. Although assessments differ, manifestation of a threat is distinguishable from nature of threat itself. Although form and essence are correlated, different forms are not necessarily equivalent to different essences. The relationship between the manifestation and the nature of terrorism is a separate research subject that might be studied elsewhere. Therefore, distinctive features of the terrorist threat and the nature of the threat are two separate subject-matters. Distinctive features of the terrorist threat are separable from the discussions over whether these features also give way to a distinct threat in essence or ontology.

This dissertation is not studying the linkage between manifestations of terrorism and essence of terrorism. It is just concentrating on the distinctive manifestation of the transnational terrorist threat alone: Novel characteristics are brought forth without seeking whether these novel features mean transformation of terrorism. This is possible because whatever categorization is applied to transnational terrorism, it has distinct characteristics as demonstrated in Chapter 7. However, whether these distinctive characteristics add up to transformation of terrorism requires a separate research to be conducted elsewhere.

One of the independent variables explained in the dissertation is based upon ‘the distinctiveness of the transnational terrorism threat itself’. It is argued that it has the highest explanatory power in explaining inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. Yet, this variable is studied in a way irrespective of whatever rubric, label or category the contemporary manifestation of terrorism is

placed under. This is simply because ‘the new terrorism debate’ is not central to the research question at hand. It is thereby outside the main scope of the study, which is interested in nation-state reactions and counter-policies in the way they define the situation. The focal point of the study is neither the evolution of terrorism nor its types. The focal point is on the form of inter-state cooperation: the form of nation-states’ cooperative responses against what they regard as a national security threat. In doing so, NATO is specified as the main exemplary institutional framework to test whether form of cooperation in alliances change or not. The dissertation is limited to the impact of globalization and transnational terrorism threat upon international security and alliance politics. As such, this is an international security study rather than being a study on terrorism per se.

Furthermore, leaving ‘the new terrorism debate’ out is an analytical and methodological requirement so as not to be biased or entrapped by analytical conceptions of other research programs on different topics. Consequently, ‘transnational terrorist threat’ implied in the research question refers to *the distinctive dimensions or manifestations* of the transnational terrorism threat against many nation-states around the world. This is the working definition of the transnational threat. It is the definitional framework for what is studied under ‘the transnational terrorist threat’ against which inter-state efforts are carried out.

Hereafter, ‘*the new threat*’ is used throughout the dissertation to denote ‘the distinctive dimensions or manifestation of the threat of transnational terrorism’. Yet again, it is important to reiterate that the label ‘the new threat’ is not meant to argue that transnational terrorism is a new kind of terrorism. It is not referring to essence of terrorism either. The word ‘new’, in the phrase “the new threat”, just refers to terrorism’s novel manifestation short of its implications for the evolution of

terrorism.

2.13. Why Is ‘The New Threat’ Itself an Independent Variable? :

‘Transnationality’

The scale of extremist attacks and the governmental responses are taken as a guide for the working definition of ‘transnationality’ and for what is meant by transnational terrorism and due groups: While terrorism has not emerged in the twenty-first century, its scale of operations and political weight has increased in the late 20th century. States have seldom seen it as a national security threat in the previous eras; rather, they mostly treated it as a criminal issue, which was *privately* countered by their domestic law-enforcement means.⁵²

Contrastingly, the start of the twenty-first century records the initiation of a *collective effort* by states that started to see terrorism as an international security threat to be countered internationally and by all means deemed necessary - not just by criminal prosecution. In that sense, the study’s selection (of ‘terrorism with a global reach’ as the target that is countered by states in cooperation) is a technical choice. Previously known terrorist groups did not stimulate a wide-ranging international effort by many states, and they remained relatively local when compared to the manifestation of terrorism in the first decade of the twenty-first century. That is due to scale of contemporary terrorist attacks. Former groups hit mostly a single country, while contemporary terrorism hits many countries. September 11, 2001 New York City, Virginia and Pennsylvania; 12 October, 2002 Bali; November 15, 2003 and November 20, 2003 Istanbul; May 16, 2003

⁵²About previous state-responses in the 20th century, Evans, Graham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics*. NY: Simon & Schuster, p. 388; Rapoport, David. 1992. “Terrorism,” in *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics* M. Hawkesworth and M. Kogan, eds. London: Routledge.

Casablanca; 11 March, 2004 Spain; September 1, 2004 Beslan; 7 July, 2005 London; 26-29 November, 2008 Mumbai are some of the examples to the overarching geographical extension of the new threat. So far, transnational terrorism threat seems to be identical with the threat of international terrorism.

However, it is also crucially important to define *what it is not*: *Transnational terrorism is not international terrorism*. Transnational terrorist threats are more than attacks in many states. In other words, transnational threats are not equal to international threats. “*Transnationality*” is the distinct feature of contemporary terrorism around the world:

- *A massive and dispersed body of followers* all around the world whose whereabouts are unclear
- *No nation-state-control*, manipulation or sponsorship over transnational terrorist groups (Thus, no internationality is included. They are active in the societal dimension, which might be also called ‘the uncivil society’ dimension).
- *Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing* that is supported by black markets and corrupt officials⁵³(Previously, almost a clear distinction between criminality and terrorism was possible. Such a distinction does not apply to transnational terrorism.
- *Lack of a territory* (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which cancels deterrence.
- *Incorrigibility*; closed to bargaining, negotiation or compromise

⁵³Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. *Countering Terrorist Support Structures*. Defense Against Terrorism Review DATR Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29.

- *Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing* as determined choice; pursuing any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD
- Possessing *suicide-bombers* as the smartest weapon⁵⁴
- *Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology* in carrying out attacks (the use of hawala, hundis, banking system, explosives, airliners, GPS and the Internet)
- A learning curve higher than other terrorist groups, which enables them to be ever *adaptive to state-responses*.

These distinct features of the contemporary manifestation of terrorism limit inter-state cooperation against it. Put differently, due to these above-mentioned features, the threat itself is a limit against inter-state cooperation. Its ambiguous features animate both internal and external threats. Above-mentioned features play into the disagreements among states as to what methods and strategies to be followed in the fight against it. That is why the new threat is a separate variable on its own. As explained in the next section, the new threat variable is more determining than both the variable of contending national counterterrorism cultures and that of globalization.

The ambiguity of the threat reduces the cohesion among cooperation partners: Its distinct features are immune to traditional and established war-fighting schemes and bureaucratic organization of nation-states. Its ambiguity and societal dimension means the erosion of the distinction between internal and external threats. It also imposes upon nation-states to work in ways that compromise their

⁵⁴Pape, Robert.2005. *Dying to Win*. New York: Random House.

sovereignty through new national, international and supra-national legislature needed for the collective anti-terrorist cause. Not only strategy, but both domestic and international law have become included in the fight against the new threat; a feature totally different from the previous cooperative struggles against state-centric threats. Thus, the new threat is itself a limit against inter-state cooperation forcing states to re-design bureaucratic working-mechanisms alongside forcing nation-states to overhaul their foreign relations with other states. Above-enlisted features of the new threat point to the non-state and transnational characteristics of the new threat. Utmost importantly, these characteristics are different from threats coming from other nation-states with regard to organization, scale, ideology, political autonomy, and economic and weapons capacity. Thus, inter-state cooperation against the new threat is shaped by the distinct characteristics of the threat itself.

The exercise of power by non-state entities became much more decentralized and autonomous in organization. Besides, they are operationally active both within and beyond borders of many nations, not within a single nation. Thus, setting them apart from previous terrorist groups, contemporary terrorists obtained global reach that is underwritten by the increase in their autonomy from nation-states and by the increase in their scale of operations.

‘Transnational security threat’ is an oxymoron itself. As every oxymoron underlines an ironic point, transnational threat underlines a point, too: its own distinctive features. Viewed from the international security perspective, it is both an internal and external threat simultaneously. It can hit countries both from inside and outside. Therefore, the features of the threat force itself upon state authorities by challenging the established conceptual lenses with which threats are previously

understood and assessed. This has complicating ramifications for counterterrorism coordination both within and among nations.⁵⁵ The issue becomes more complicating for states when transnational terrorism is entangled with criminality and funded by a global black market.⁵⁶

One of the different features or dimensions of the transnational threat is worth reiterating: different from the earlier forms of terrorism, the late 20th and early 21st century terrorism got out of nation-state control and manipulation - they are less of a proxy status.⁵⁷ They do not belong to the inter-national template: It goes without saying that the states-system is composed of nation-states separated by sovereign borders, which are political lines that divide the external and internal

⁵⁵Casale, Davide. 2008. "EU Constitutional and Legal Counterterrorism Framework" Vol. 1 No.1 Spring *Defence Against Terrorism Review-DATR COE-DAT*; Dalyan, Sener. 2008. "Combating the Finances of Terrorism: Rethinking Strategies for Success" Vol. 1 No.1 Spring *Defence Against Terrorism Review-DATR COE-DAT*; Mc Dowall, John. 2006. "Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks by the Authorities" in the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on 'Global Terrorism and International Cooperation 23-24 March 2006 Ankara-Turkey, The Turkish General Staff Printing House Publication No. 39; W. O'Connell. 2006. "Efficient Crisis Management in Counterterrorism" in the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on 'Global Terrorism and International Cooperation 23-24 March 2006 Ankara-Turkey, The Turkish General Staff Printing House Publication No. 39; Brig. General Bekto Suprpto. "Problems in Managing Counterterrorist Activities" in the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on 'Global Terrorism and International Cooperation 23-24 March 2006 Ankara-Turkey, The Turkish General Staff Printing House Publication No. 39; Lt. General Karl Eikenberry, 2006. "Pros and Cons as a Coalition of the Armed Forces on the Fight Against Terrorism" in the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on 'Global Terrorism and International Cooperation 23-24 March 2006 Ankara-Turkey, The Turkish General Staff Printing House Publication No. 39; Jervis, Robert. 2006. "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 29, No. 1, 3 – 52, February.

⁵⁶Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. "Islam in the US Global Order" Project Muse-Duke University Press, *Social Text* 73, Vol. 20, No. 4; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2007. *Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life* Westport, Conn: Praeger; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2002. "Terrorism's Financial Lifeline: Can It Be Severed?" *Strategic Forum*, Institute for the National Strategic Studies Defense University, Washington DC. 191-May; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2005. "Corruption: The International Security Dimension," *SAIS Review* 25-1: 143-152; Porter, Richard D. and Ruth Judson. 1996. *The Location of US Currency: How Much Is Abroad?* Federal Reserve of ST Louis; Baker, Raymond. 1999. "Money Laundering and Flight Capital: The Impact on Private Banking", *Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations*, 10 November.

⁵⁷Kishore Mahbubani, 2005-2006. "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System" *Survival* Vol. 47 No. 4 Winter 2 pp. 7-18; Lafree, Gary and Laura Dugan. 2007. "Introducing the Global Terrorism Database" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19:181-204; Blomberg, S. Brock and Gregory D. Hess "From (No) Butter to Guns? Understanding the Economic Role in Transnational Terrorism" Paper presented for the World Bank Workshop on Security and Development, Washington D.C., May 26-27, 2005; Howard, Michael. 2008. "Are We 'At War?'" The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture for 2008 - The International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS Wednesday 2 April.

'relations among nation-states'. These two separate realms of the internal and the external correspond to internal sovereignty of states, and to its corollary, namely external sovereignty or international anarchy. That is the root political template within which the threat assessments are made by nation-states. This analytical scheme has not foreseen non-state formations acting as if they are independent agents of political consequence that hardly see halt at national border security. Any regular person without arrest warrant or criminal record is hardly a suspect and can travel without interruption if there is no prior intelligence about him/her. Besides, illegal or unregulated access to national territories is not rare.⁵⁸ Besides, insider or sleeper cells reside within the countries that are attacked and these attacks may be carried out by the resident citizen of the attacked country. Therefore, transnational threats operate mostly beyond the intellectual and practical templates of the nation-states system and national bureaucratic organization.⁵⁹

Outstandingly, unlike the previous manifestations of terrorism, transnational terrorist groups are not trying to correct alleged wrongdoings while still approving the system and working within it. They are challenging and trying to transform the system itself through destruction, however far-fetched their objective is.⁶⁰ They do

⁵⁸Andreas, Peter. "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century" *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 2 Fall 2003, pp. 78–111; Adamson, Fiona B. 2006. "Crossing Borders-International Migration and National Security" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 165–19.

⁵⁹Hills, Alice. 2002. *Border Control Services and Security Sector Reform* - the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Working Paper Series, Geneva, July.

⁶⁰Sedgwick, Mark, 'Karen J. Greenberg, ed. *Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists*', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19:2, 276; Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* New York: Columbia University Press, May 15, 2002; Hoffman, Bruce. "What Can We Learn from the Terrorists?" *Security-Geopolitics and Terrorism-Global Agenda 2004*; Tibi, Bassam. 2007. "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8:1, 35 -54; Byman, Daniel L. 2003. "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?" *World Politics*, 56-1 October; Post, Jerrold M. 2007. *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan; Raymond Ibrahim. Compiled, translated and ed. 2007. *The Al Qaeda Reader*. New York: Broadway Books, which is reviewed in Zimmerman John C. 2008. "Islam and War: A Review Essay" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20:434–459; In April 2002 al Qaeda issued a lengthy statement giving seven justifications for targeting civilians in terrorist attacks-the

not fall squarely into the category of state-proxies as it was mostly the case during the Cold War. They break free to evolve into self-subsistent networked structure.

It is not that nation-states do not play partial roles in the formation of the networked structure of terrorism by turning a blind eye in order not to invite threats or due to lack of capacity to oversee them as in the case of failing-states. However, that is not a central role in their subsistence. Investigations reportedly indicate that most terrorist attacks of the twenty-first century are devoid of both passive and active government support. Some terrorist groups approximate autarchic entities due to illicit black markets of finance and weapons. This is terrorism under ever complicated and complicating licit and illicit global economy and finance. Yet, globalization permits or conditions the agents of political violence; it does not cause terrorism directly. The non-state entity is a purposeful unit that gives life to destruction. That is why globalization as a structural variable is separate from the new threat variable.

Under these circumstances, there is no geographically clear threat. Hotspots are everywhere and may arise even without short-notice. Transnational threats have no addresses and they spread like the nodes of the Internet. Bearing in mind the complications of the thorny analogy, the threat works as if there seems to be an approximate analogy to the forward-defence doctrine: Interests are everywhere and thus borders are everywhere; power-projection has key importance. With partially corresponding logic, hotspots of terrorism are everywhere. Transnational terrorism is arguably akin to something nebulous as 'unconventional forward defence'. Yet, the units and their means are different from

statement's translation is at http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_alqaeda.asp; Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11" *Middle East Policy*, Vol. X, No. 2 Summer 2003, p. 90; Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* New York: Verso, 2005.

those of nations-states, and the geographical location is largely out of the equation. The point is that transnational terrorism is similar to asymmetrical power-projection of private entities against nation-states.

Due to these distinctive features of transnational terrorism, no counterterrorism effort focusing on a single field of cooperation matches the threat. International cooperation requires coordination of intergovernmental and interagency responses. Cooperation among several agencies of different nations has to focus on the interfaces among police, military, financial, intelligence and judiciary activities, not to mention the dissuasion and persuasion aspect of the problem through public diplomacy and counter-propaganda or what is commonly referred to as winning hearts and minds of people. Yet, ‘best-practices’ (to use the international organizations jargon) seem to be slow-developing.

2.14. Why Does ‘The New Threat’ Have the Most Explanatory Power When Compared to Other Independent Variables?

In order to answer the research question, it became essential to clarify more than the structural features of the contemporary security landscape. Instead of ignoring non-state formations, almost all causalities that are involved in the contemporary security environment are determined. Figure 1 is intended to help clarify both the argument itself and the study methodologically. Yet, so as not to be superfluous, the casual center of gravity is put on ‘the new threat variable’.

Why does the new threat have the most explanatory power? It is so because transnationality of the threat, which gives its distinctiveness, does not correspond to working mechanism of state bureaucracies. It is alien to the entire political template of the Westphalian states-system. Thus, it affects cooperation much more than

other variables such as national counterterrorism cultures, which can be seen more of an insider variable to the state-system.

Transnational threats are the most limiting factor regarding inter-state cooperation because its features create bureaucratic and analytical conundrums: The feature of ‘transnationality’ obstructs application of established concepts to transnational terrorism. This hardship of applying former concepts to the new threat creates half-responses because most concepts related to law enforcement, domestic law or military strategy fall short of addressing it.

Since states are organized along these established concepts, doctrines, definitions and working-mechanisms, state responses are hard to design let alone implementing them. The hardship for nation-states starts with identifying the threat and then it goes on as to how states work out a strategy. The new threat defies the Clausewitzan trilogy of strategy, and as such military strategy doctrines are just offering recommendations which actually apply to state-centric warfare. By crossing established boundaries, the new threat is the biggest factor that hinders inter-state cooperation among states because transnational terrorism blurs the boundaries between external security and internal security.

Moreover, state responses are likely to be mixed, ranging from the use of force to increasing internal security measures such as law enforcement and judicial action. Creating a common cooperative ground is not easy even when all states in cooperation managed to minimize their divergences on how to fight it. Even if contending counterterrorism cultures are absent and all cooperative states pursue a common counterterrorism strategy, the above-mentioned features of the new threat continue to present problems of cooperation both within and among national bureaucracies and institutions. Since transnational threats are not international

threats, it conflates almost all analytical schemes and categorization in the body-politic of nation-states. If it was an international or state-centric threat, it would be more likely to effectively benefit from previous national and international organizational schemes and institutions without the need for re-arrangements owing to the fact that there are already established means and protocols to respond accustomed threats, which are threats coming from other nation-states.

As such, the new threat carries potential and likelihood to cause change in the states' working-mechanisms. New national institutions and intra-state tasks have already been initiated. Thereby, the new threat is likely to cause modifications in the counterterrorism cultures of states in the future. That is, the new threat also affects the counterterrorism cultures of states. As of 2010, Obama administration's counterterrorism policy demonstrates a shift from those of two G. W. Bush administrations.⁶¹

Another example is the way the new threat channels the EU policies in addition to its effect on individual policies of European states. The integration of the first pillar and third pillar of the EU is underway, fundamentally as a response to transnational terrorism. The EU aims to conduct a distinctive foreign and security policy that sees its starting point as the peculiar response it gives to transnational terrorism. To sum up, transnational features of the threat stimulates a remarkable overhauling or rearrangement process in states.

This is so much so that it modifies not only strategy, but it also modifies domestic law. An eminent academic Philip Bobbitt, in his book *Terror and Consent*, persuasively argues that transnational terrorism slowly changes the Western constitutional order. Thus, transnational terrorism does not stop at killing

⁶¹de Vasconcelos, Álvaro and Marcin Zaborowski eds. 2009. *The EU and the world in 2009-European perspectives on the new American foreign policy agenda*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, No. 4 January.

people. It gradually leads to institutional and constitutional change inside the states that are hit. Although the point is elaborated in the following chapters, it might suffice it here to underline that he argues that transnational terrorism imposes new strategies that include domestic and international legislative rearrangements.

Strategy concerns the role of the State in defending itself from violence from other states, while law has to do with the role of the State in monopolizing legitimate violence within its own borders. In the twentieth century, it made sense to separate law and strategy... democratic nations in the past successfully protected themselves from aggression and largely avoided domestic repression. Nevertheless, this particular habit of insulating law from strategy (and vice versa) can contribute to our defeat in the century we have entered because the threats posed by the twenty-first century terrorists do not arise from the politics of a hostile nation state - such threats were the domain of strategy, not law – nor do they arise from causes within a nation state.⁶²

As such, the new threat itself affects nation-states in not only how they cooperate among each other, but also in how they organize themselves internally. The empirical chapter details such national institutional overhauling. In order to cooperate, states must have corresponding institutions that can communicate with each other based on the rule of law. Thus, labeling the new threat as ‘international’, rather than defining it as ‘transnational’, runs the risk of an illusion such that the threat concerned was just one of the state-centric threats that can be responded with classical international security measures of defense and military. Military defensive measures are just one of the aspects of the counterterrorism effort by states. The previous cooperation dynamics demonstrated by states in the past seem to fall short as examined in chapter eight.

The new threat does not come directly from a nation-state. It is not sponsored indirectly by any nation-state either. In cases where it takes refuge in some of the states such as Afghanistan, it is not the state that controls transnational terrorist groups: More often than not, it is the transnational groups that control or

⁶²Bobbitt, Philip. 2008. *Terror and Consent- The Wars for the Twenty-First Century*, Borzoi Book-A. A. Knopf-Random House, p. 14.

manipulate the governments.⁶³ Terrorists' use of failed states as safe-havens does not give terrorism an international dimension. Indeed, the reverse is valid. Since the state providing safe-havens is a failed one, it cannot get rid of the terrorist elements let alone control them. That gives the new threat a transnational dimension that defies states from both inside and outside of their borders. The defiant or challenger is transnational terrorism threat that operates at the societal and non-state dimension.

As Stephen M. Walt maintains, transnational terrorism is not a Realist phenomenon: "It seems to me, a Realist would have to concede that the phenomenon of al Qaeda is not really a Realist phenomenon. It's not a state. You could invent ways of squeezing it [into the theory] in different ways."⁶⁴ To perceive terrorist groups through the state within which they reside for a certain period of time is an analytical squeezing that categorically equates terrorists with nation-states. That might have unintended consequences simply because such analytical squeezing does not address the threat directly. In order to address it directly, strategists seem to be forced to combine strategy with law:

We tend to associate terrorism with institutions that command power within, but not among states, that is, in the domain of law, not strategy. Yet, twenty-first century terrorism is unlike that of the preceding century in that it possesses a significant strategic dimension. To combat twenty-first century terrorism, we shall have to think in terms of strategies that reinforce the legal institutions that command power among states as well as anticipatory legal institutions that operate strategically within our borders – that is we have to think in terms of the confluence of strategy and law.⁶⁵

⁶³ Grimmett, Richard F., 2006. CRS Report for the Congress, *9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status*, December 4, Coordinator Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.

⁶⁴ "Balancing American Power in the Post-9/11 World" - Conversation with Stephen M. Walt in *Conversations with History* Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, November 15, 2005 <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Walt/walt-con0.html> , page 3 of 8.

⁶⁵ Bobbitt, Philip. 2008. *Terror and Consent- The Wars for the Twenty-First Century*, Borzoi Book-A. A. Knopf-Random House, p. 15.

The terms 'transnational' and 'international' are not synonyms. They denote different conceptions. The distinct feature of the new threat, namely transnationality does not refer to state-centric processes. It refers to private or non-state processes in economy, finance, logistics, ideology and conduct of illicit violence that break the state monopoly on the use of force. The threat has transnational features, not inter-national features.

Transnationality, on its own, is an important determinant for inter-state cooperative response. The way the cooperative response is crafted by states depends on transnational features of the new threat more than on other independent variables. Why is the new threat more determining than other variables? Because, on one hand, the new manifestation or dimensions of the transnational terrorist threat is the activation or animation of the circumstances that globalization leaves open to be exploited. In so doing, it enlivens or puts life into the structural variable of globalization. It is, thereby, one step beyond globalization. Without non-state groups' actions, the available circumstances presented by globalization would not lead to violence. Globalization, as a structural variable, is an indirect independent variable that conditions or contextualizes inter-state cooperation. Yet, the threat variable also reflects agency, the conscious decision and implementation of terrorist attacks. Without transnational terrorist groups, there would be nothing to fight against. Globalization would continue to present windows of opportunities for violence without the occurrence of private violence.

On the other hand, the new threat determines the dependent variable more than the counterterrorism cultures of states do. National differences about counter-strategies have frequently accompanied international relations. If the contemporary threat was posed by a state, national differences would exist again. However,

diverging from the disagreements over how to respond a nation-state threat such as threat of use of force, invasion, sporadic military raids, attrition or blitzkrieg, the disagreements among governments over how to respond non-state threats are heavier in that the qualities of the new threat worsens the ever present hardships of reaching a common strategy. Devising common strategies and roadmaps were very hard even during the Cold War where the threat was relatively much clearer. Nevertheless, Europe and the US still diverged on the methods to respond the Soviet threat. Therefore, contending national counterterrorism cultures exist long before the new threat exposure. The ways states perceive threats and the ways they assess the strategies to counter threats have almost always diverged from each other.

Underlining the higher weight of the new threat variable, this age-old obstacle of contending counterterrorism cultures and assessments are aggravated by the distinct dimensions of the new threat, which would impede inter-state cooperation even in the absence of contending counterterrorism cultures. Even if states converged on all points of a common counterterrorist strategy, the new threat would continue to present dire difficulties such as categorization, prioritization and coordination among states. The new threat itself exacerbated the implementation of cooperative inter-state responses to an unprecedented extent. That is fundamentally because the new threat cancels the established bureaucratic working routine of state institutions and the ways they interact. Thus, the threat is the most significant variable in explaining cooperative problems. Yet, that does not annul other variables. The variable of the new threat is just the higher determining variable affecting inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism.

Another reason for singling out the variable of threat originates from the accumulation of alliances and cooperation literature: The literature focuses on threats. The threat that is countered by states is the main determinant of the form of cooperation among them. Whether it is conducted in an institutionalized form such as NATO, or on an *ad hoc* basis such as ‘the coalition of the willing’, cooperation is almost always *against a perceived threat*, only secondly *for* something else. Threats channel the way cooperation and alliance is conducted. In other words, security cooperation among states usually aims at protection from threats – that are destructive factors and agents. The literature on cooperation and alliance does not address the need to make peace; rather it addresses the ways to protect nation-states from threats. Building up or sharing peace-dividends is a lesser priority due to the security dilemma and international anarchy.⁶⁶ Thus, the literature on inter-state security cooperation has been revolving around a threat in a specific context. Thus, it is appropriate via the alliance and cooperation literature to single out ‘the new threat variable’. The examination of nation-states’ words and deeds, or the discursive examination of nation-state declarations and their actual actions carried out on the ground might be traced throughout the study to reach conclusions about the main causality between the threat factor and inter-state cooperation and alignment against terrorism.

An emphasis is put on ‘the new threat’ as a separate variable from both the structural variable of globalization and unit-level variable of states’ counterterrorism culture. Since ‘the new threat’ (or the distinctive features and

⁶⁶The threat assessments which gather together nations under coalition of the willing type cooperation may have different threats to be addressed in each mission, while institutionalized cooperation within the NATO framework has a relatively fixed threat assessment. Coalition of the willing type of cooperation follows a flexible threat assessment and agenda, because it is *ad hoc* and un-institutionalized. Despite their different forms, both NATO and coalition of the willing types of cooperation are *against* threats, and only derivatively *for* other purpose. For details, Glenn W. Snyder. 1997. *Alliance Politics* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

manifestation of transnational terrorism) is discussed to be the most determining independent variable, it is specifically studied in the chapters ahead. The variable of threat is argued to be the one with the higher explanatory power regarding whether past cooperative practices are still applied *in the way they were applied during the Cold War*. In understanding the past and present cooperation forms, a good guideline is claimed to be the new features or distinctiveness of the transnational threat. It appears to help understand the differences between the Cold War cooperation pattern and the cooperation pattern of the post-Cold War world.

It is important to elucidate the different manifestation of the threat itself to explain why the threat is the most important variable that limits inter-state counterterrorist cooperation: If a group of lines or connections are cut, there are other routes for terrorists that work as backdoors to hit states, similar to the nodal system of the Internet. Internet, by way of analogy, is akin to globalization and the transnational threat is akin to particular groups of computers, nodes or servers at the disposal of terrorists.

Backdoors exist because nodes or terrorist groups are splintered cells that operate independently from one another at the societal level and in a fashion freed from state-control. They are also freed from any terrorist headquarters, too. They are, thus, autonomous in two senses: Small terrorist cells, which may also consist of just one individual at times, are autonomous from one another. That is, so-called foot-soldiers are independent from one another. Secondly, they are not hierarchical or not ruled under one single higher-command or master-mind.⁶⁷ They have

⁶⁷Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad - Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia: Uni. of Pennsylvania Press; Byman, Daniel L. 2003. "Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?" *World Politics*, 56-1 October; Post, Jerrold M. 2007. *The mind of the terrorist: The psychology of terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan; Raymond Ibrahim. Compiled, translated and ed. 2007. *The Al Qaeda Reader*. New York: Broadway Books.

operational independence to large extent. Thus, they operationally grew more individualistic and atomistic; there is diffusion in the form and direction of attacks. Operational distinctiveness of the threat itself is a limit against international cooperation on the ground, leaving aside the political divergences of governments and contending counterterrorism cultures on how to fight it.

Diffusion of command-and-control of the non-hierarchical structure of terrorism approximates globalization of terrorism. There is no centrality or concentration of any kind typical of the previous forms of terrorism. Information revolution has paved the way for networked/nodal character of terrorism unlike the centralized terrorist groups mostly striking a particular territory with other nation-states' support at their disposal.⁶⁸ Halvard Buhaugb (while criticizing the traditional military-strategy accounts of contemporary threats and form of warfare) explains the determinant role of the new threat:

...Moreover, many readers will find the discussion (Londsedale's work in 2004) *anachronistic and largely irrelevant, as it relies on the implicit assumption that future wars echo past ones in that they involve clearly identifiable state actors and the ultimate strategic goal is surrender of the opponent*. There is no discussion of how the information age is affecting the nature of today's predominant forms of organized violence – civil war and terrorism – despite occasional references to the 9/11 events. Because of this, *The Nature of War in the Information Age* is not likely to attract much interest outside the small community of military strategy scholars.⁶⁹

Thus, the new threat embodies the characteristics of the contemporary strategic environment and it performs as the political violence that states are not institutionally prepared to respond. In due course, this dissertation attempts to fill in the above-mentioned vacuum both in the international relations theory and alliance literature by studying the impact of globalization upon security concerns of states,

⁶⁸Betz, David J., 2006. "The More You Know, the Less You Understand: The Problem with Information Warfare" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 29, No. 3, 505-533; Buhaugb, Halvard, "Book Note: The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future" *Journal of Peace Research* 2006; 43; 497.

⁶⁹Buhaugb, Halvard. 2006. "Book Note: The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future" *Journal of Peace Research* 2006; 43; 497 - emphasis added.

the manifestation of the new threat and forms of inter-state cooperation. Without the pillars of the new strategic environment marked by globalization, it is hard to go down to the specifications of cooperative problems and the features of the new threat that is animated by terrorists. The new pillars are about differentiating the factors related to the research question and analyzing them. Accordingly, the structural variable of globalization, and variables of the new threat and contending counterterrorism cultures of states are analyzed.

The dissertation is not typical because it attempts to study the new factors of international security. That is why theoretical examinations, that compose most of the chapters, are somewhat different from the accustomed literature in that it aims at filling in analytical blanks to the extent possible.

The previous security environment of the Cold War period was different. The power politics among nation-states focused on the bipolar structure composed of huge power concentrations of the US and the former USSR, each forming a pole that balanced the other. The power differentials set these state-poles separate from the rest of the states. This is judged by the distribution of capabilities among states.

Utmost importantly, the threat assessments of intelligence agencies were then only state-centric, and the threats were clear and present: that is, ‘the who’s and ‘the where’s of the perpetrators were known to intelligence agents, analysts and in turn to decision-makers. There was a geographical delimitation of the political and military rivalry, with the main theatre of the Cold War confrontation being the continental Europe. The belligerents knew who was in charge of the threat, and where it originated from. Threats had geographical confines and coordinates. The intelligence work had always dealt with unknowns by definition, but it was relatively easier before to capture enemies.

Now, there is no definitional clarity of the threat on the side of the states: fugitives, criminals, soldiers of other nations, insurgents and terrorists resist clear identification and differentiation from one another. Uncertainty of the identities and whereabouts of the perpetrators caused the contemporary intelligence ever harder. National or indigenous agencies were more or less doing a good job of at least saving the day when previous threats were emanating from a particular state.

Most importantly, the ever more complex nature of the strategic environment and the diversity of contemporary security arrangements have tested the very notion of “alliance”.⁷⁰ The official NATO declarations emphasized that NATO have acquired a new dimension and become a political organization as well as a military one. NATO authorities have repetitively declared that NATO is under an ongoing shift from ‘defence’ to ‘security’ in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.

The chapters that follow examine the independent variables that are already summarized. A separate chapter is invested for each variable, to be followed by an empirical chapter that tries to take them down to earth through the case of NATO transformation. It is concluded that previously demonstrated inter-state alignment and cooperation behaviours are rarely demonstrated against transnational terrorism threat. Rather, coalition of the willing type of cooperation is likely to be states’ first choice of response.

⁷⁰Byman, Daniel. 2006. “Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29:5, 767 – 811; Tertrais, Bruno. 2004. “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances” *The Washington Quarterly* 27:2, 135-150; Thies, Wallace J. “Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO’S Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?” *European Security*, 16:1, 29-50; Kay, Sean. 2005. “What Went Wrong with NATO?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 18:1; Schori, Pierre. 2005. “Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and Global Governance” *Global Governance* 11, 273-280; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. “Chapter One: Beyond the War on Terror” *Adelphi Papers*, 47:389, 17-34.

CHAPTER 3:

LITERATURE REVIEW ON COOPERATION HYPOTHESES, ALLIANCE THEORIES AND THEIR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

‘Alliance’ and ‘cooperation’ are interrelated terms that have concept kinship. Both of them refer to cooperation or joint work of states, yet they are also separable. In accordance, the terms represent two separate literatures, namely alliance politics literature and cooperation literature. It is, first, essential to note at the outset that the correlation between these literatures lies in one commonality, which is the states’ adjustment of their policies to one another in order to reduce the negative consequences for the partner state. Suitably, ‘cooperation’ and ‘alliance’ are mostly described with comparisons and contrasts with one another due to their interlocking features. Despite the separate sub-headings throughout this chapter, it is important to underscore that the two literatures overlap.

Secondly, the theoretical literatures review herein tries to describe the recent conceptual developments in a way that correspond to traditional concepts and theories. In such a way, why new concepts are initiated in the way they did is as easy to see as to show the connection between cooperation and alliance, and the past and present of the literatures.

3.1. The Study of Cooperation - The Prevailing Literature

The study of cooperation (whether in the form of alliances or not) has a jargon that includes terms such as alignment, commitment, goals and preferences. It is appropriate to clarify the jargon concisely.

Any rational action presumes a goal to achieve and each nation-state is assumed to have some policy goal/s. Yet, ‘commonality of goal/s’ among states is another factor altogether that determines the effectiveness of any alignment among nation-states towards a certain line of political standing or understanding.

Alignment does not refer to effective cooperation directly, nor does it refer to magnitude of commitment. Briefly, ‘alignment’ is a particular grouping of states and it is an ‘attempt’ at the relative lessening of distance between state preferences through coordination. When this attempt succeeds, cooperation occurs. Alignment is indicated by the will and due declaration of states to try to approximate a congenial viewpoint that presents advantages to aligned states. The condition of alignment, however, does not necessarily bring about immediate effective cooperation on its own, the will and declaration notwithstanding. The realization of practical payoffs for cooperating states requires burden-sharing, too. That is the degree of commitments undertaken and compliance with the alignment agreement.

Even when states are aligned to one another, commitment of states might be perceived as low by participating nation-states and *burden-sharing* might be seen unbalanced or the degree of coordination might be perceived as insufficient to help achieve congruent results regarding the specified terms of alignment. As a consequence of such instances, *free-riding*⁷¹ usually occurs. More often than not,

⁷¹International *burden-sharing* is the question of how costs of common initiatives or the provision of public or collective goods should be shared between states. *Free-riding* is lack of burden-sharing: obtaining something with no or very less effort or cost; it is benefiting without contribution by taking advantage of the efforts of the rest. In other words, it is taking a share from the final-product with low

the allegations of free-riding hamper the cooperation, and it in turn causes erosion of cooperation or failure of it.

Reliability and ensuing trust are key building blocks of cooperation. Free-riding is detrimental to effective cooperation basically because it diminishes the reliability of free-riding partner due to its perceived or actual lack of commitment to the collective effort or cooperation. Few states prefer to work with states that are eager to take without giving. Then, *seeking mutual benefits* through *adjustment of policies* (coordination) entails *trust* and *reciprocity*.

Reputation is another term that is used in conjunction with reliability. Reputation is the image or perception of a state created in the long term regarding its reliability during joint-work or co-operation of states. However, if it is asked to give one keyword or leitmotif for successful cooperation, it is *reciprocity* for it paves the way for the formation of adjustment of policies via coordination, reliability and reputation.

Coordinated actions that emerge by means of adjustment of policies generally make cooperation easier to realize because this reduces the potential harm to states with different preferences. Contrastingly, different preferences erase the meaning of alignment if coordination is absent. In other words, 'co-ordination' is a key condition to 'co-operation'. Adjustment of policies and the coordination created thereby aim to lessen the clash of policies that serve different preferences.

or no participation in its production - taking without giving. If all attempt to free-ride or freeloader, however, there is no accomplishment of the task and no 'ride' at all- the job is not done producing no benefits for anybody. Free-riding is a common problem of collective action whose logic is that of the [n-prisoner's dilemma](#), which is essentially a game-theoretic model of exchange. As a problem that inhibits collective action, free-riding concerns a group that includes more than two members, that is when $n > 2$. With only two parties in exchange, there can be no free-riding unless one is altruistic. Hardin, Russell. 1971, 'Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma' *Behavioral Science*, 16 September: 472-481; Hardin, Russell. 1982. *Collective Action* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press; Hardin, Russell. 1982. 'Exchange Theory on Strategic Bases', *Social Science Information* 21-2: 251-272; Hardin, Russell. 1997. 'Economic Theories of the State', Dennis C. Mueller ed. *Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook* New York: Cambridge University Press: 21-34.

Therefore, even states which have different preferences can cooperate with each other by trying to do their best in not inhibiting others' policies. Then, adjustment and coordination serve to 'minimize' the damage to cooperative partner state's preferences and interests.

In cooperation literature, a common single goal among states is *not* necessarily sought to speak of cooperation whereas alliance literature presupposes a common security goal in its conceptualization of alliance-induced cooperation. Distinguishingly, cooperation literature is not restricted to the realm of high-politics security; it involves adjustment of policies on other fields such as environment and economy.

In comparison to alliance literature, cooperation is a holistic term whose study includes game theory models, rational design models and coalition models. Alliance, on the other hand, is mostly defined as being more formal. Formality refers to 'structured security cooperation' in the sense that they are mostly established on an international treaty-basis with more distinguishable characteristics to notice, and they are chiefly examined under the theoretical auspices of realism. Although realist premises are used both in cooperation and alliance literatures, realism dominates the study of alliance politics and theory more than it does cooperation theory. Alliance politics are under the guidance of theories such as balance of power, balance of threat, hegemonic stability theory⁷² and the theory of underbalancing. Recently, there is a promising yet unconsolidated literature that tries to merge the study of cooperation and alliances under the

⁷²As it is discussed in section 1.3.3, Hegemonic Stability Theory is controversial in that it is argued not to be a theory, but more a research program that cannot be tested or refuted. Sheetz, Mark S. and Michael Mastanduno. 1997/98. "Correspondence-Debating the Unipolar Moment" *International Security* Vol.22 No.3 168-174. Distinguishingly, hegemonic stability theory is akin to political economy and structural cyclical theory, which is also associated to systems-theory.

concepts of ‘stretched cooperation’ and ‘transnational advocacy networks’.⁷³

Milner underlines that cooperation literature has started to emerge from 1970s onwards; however, as she maintains, cooperation has been elusive both to notice and analyze.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the literature has made two general contributions. First, a rough definition has emerged in the cooperation literature that can help distinguish what behavior counts as cooperation. Knowing what is meant by cooperation is an important point. Second contribution is the development of propositions about the conditions under which cooperation is likely to emerge. These propositions are developed by using game theoretical models. The definition of cooperation and the conditions under which cooperation works are what follows.

3.1.1. The Definition of ‘Cooperation’

Following Robert Keohane, many scholars defined cooperation as occurring ‘when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of coordination’.⁷⁵ A process of policy coordination implies that

⁷³Asal, Victor, Nussbaum, Brian and Harrington, D. William. 2007. “Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30:1, 15-39; Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. “Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation and Networks of Violence” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 18 Number 1, April; Bank, André and Van Heur, Bas. 2007. “Transnational conflicts and the politics of scalar networks: evidence from Northern Africa” *Third World Quarterly* 28:3, 593-612.

⁷⁴Milner, Helen. 1992. “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses” *World Politics* Vol. 44 No. 3 April, pp. 466-468.

⁷⁵Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Krasner, Stephen. ed. 1983. *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation* New York: Basic Books; Putnam, Robert & Nicholas Bayne. 1987. *Hanging Together* Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Feldstein, Martin. 1988. *International Economic Cooperation* Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Lipson, Charles. 1984. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs” *World Politics* 37-October; Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” *World Politics* 30-January; Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “Cooperation versus Prisoner’s Dilemma” *American Political Science Review* 79-December; Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory” *International Organization* 39-4; Mosher, James S. 2003. “Relative Gains Concerns when the number of States in the International System” *Increases Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.4 7 No. 5, 642-668; Farer, Tom. 2004. “Toward an Effective International Legal Order- from Coexistence to Concert?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 17, Number 2, July; Jervis, Robert. 1985. “From

policies of each state have been adjusted in order to reduce the negative consequences for the other participant states. This conceptualization of cooperation involves two elements. First, it assumes that each actor's behavior is directed towards some goal(s). It need not be the same goal for all involved actors for cooperation to occur. However, it does assume rational behavior of nation-states. Secondly, the definition assumes that cooperation provides nation-states with gains

Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation" *World Politics* Vol. 38, No. 1, October, pp. 58-79; Barrett, Scott. 1999. "A Theory of Full International Cooperation" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11-519; Carbone, Maurizio. 2007. "Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? The Policy Dimension of a Contested Concept" *Global Governance* 13 179-198; Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 43 No. 4 October, pp. 979-1002; Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" *International Organization* Vol. 42 No. 3 summer pp. 485-507; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Conclusion: Ambitions and Limits of a Transatlantic Partnership" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389, pp. 87-92; Forman, Shepard & Derk Segaar. 2006. "New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism" *Global Governance* 12, 205-225; Schori, Pierre. 2005. "Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and Global Governance" *Global Governance* 11, 273-280; Dyson, Tom. 2008. "Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy" *Security Studies* 17:4,725-774; Atsushi, Tago. 2009. "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the 'Coalition of the Willing' " *Journal of Peace Research* 46 219; Adler, Emanuel. 1992. "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control" *International Organization* 46, 1, winter; Goldstein, Joshua S., Jon C. Pevehouse, Deborah J. Gerner, Shibley Telhami. 2001. "Reciprocity, Triangularity, and Cooperation in the Middle East, 1979-97" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 5, October pp. 594-620; Weaver, Michael E. 2008. "International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939-41" *Intelligence and National Security*, 23:2, 153-175; Srinivasan, Krishnan. 2009. "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century" *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 98:400, 37-47; Svolik, Milan. 2006. "Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 50 No. 4 October, pp. 909-925; Davies, Graeme A. M. 2008. "Strategic Cooperation, the Invasion of Iraq and the Behaviour of the 'Axis of Evil', 1990-2004" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 3 pp. 385-399; Young, Joseph K. 2006. "Simulating Two-Level Negotiations" *International Studies Perspectives* 7, 77-82; Kreps, Sarah. 2008. "When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan" *Security Studies* 17:3, 531-567; Wang, Lake. 2007. "The Good Neighbor- Why China Cooperates" *Harvard International Review*, Fall; Kydd, Andrew. 2005-2006. "US Hegemony and Global Cooperation: In America We (Used to) Trust" *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 120 Number 4; Lander, Stephen. 2004. "International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 17, Number 3, October; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. "Is Anybody Still A Realist?" *International Security* Vol. 24-Fall 2, pp. 5-55; Schweller, Randall and David Priess. May 1997. "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate" *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 1-32; Choucri, Nazli. 2000. "Introduction: Cyber Politics in International Relations," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 243-264; Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 1996. "Origins and Evolutions of War and Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, pp. 1-22; Krasner, Stephen D. Spring 1994. "International Political Economy: Abiding Discord" *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 13-19; Strange, Susan. 1994. "Wake up, Krasner! The World has Changed" *Review of International Political Economy* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 209-219; Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty" *International Security* Vol. 29, No. 2 Fall, pp. 85-120.

or rewards. The gains need not be same in magnitude and kind for each state, but they are mutual. Each actor helps the other to realize its goals by the anticipation of its *own* reward. Each state is not out there to help the other; it is the anticipation of bettering its own situation that leads to adjustment in one's policies. To sum up, once mutual policy coordination to realize joint gains occurs, and then it is cooperation that follows.

3.1.2. What Cooperation Is Not?

To clarify the concept further, it is helpful to define what cooperation is not. "Cooperation" is often contrasted with 'conflict' or 'competition'. Conflict or competition are situations created by nation-state behaviors, which try to reduce the gains of others or impede their want-satisfaction as opposed to cooperative behavior that intends to reduce the negative impact of one's policy on other states.⁷⁶

In contrast to common-sensical assumption, it is important to underline that cooperation is *not* the behavioral situation where actors directly help each other to achieve their goals; since international relations, via realism, consist of self-help state behaviors, states that cooperate among each other just try to limit detrimental effects of their policies upon the other.

3.1.3. Overshadowed Premises: Realism and Cooperation

Viewed from the realist lenses, cooperation among nation-states produces indirect help for one another at best. Since 'helping another entity' is not conceptualized as an existential attribute of state-behavior in anarchy, cooperation

⁷⁶Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses" Review Article *World Politics* Vol. 44 No. 3 April, pp. 468-470.

is not assumed to be easily forth-coming. Yet, that does not translate to a non-nuanced assumption such that realism sees cooperation as impossible or undesirable. Indeed, realists assert that states cooperate with each other more than it is appreciated.⁷⁷

The presumption that realists have arguably concentrated more on conflictual nation-state behaviors does not refer to any realist opposition against cooperation, nor is that it is inconsistent with realism. As a defensive realist by his own self-definition, Jervis implies that offensive realists are ostensibly given more voice by policy-makers that led to the presumption as if realism invalidates and isolates cooperation as a non-practical and idealist naiveté.

Underlining the realist literature on cooperation in contrast with that presumption, Jervis stresses that cooperation is possible among states, and that it is not outside of the parameters of realism.⁷⁸ Especially, classical realist, defensive realist and neo-classical realist accounts of cooperation are vigorous,⁷⁹ different from the neo-realist research agenda that does not deal with state behaviors on purpose so as to keep systemic, non-reductionist and parsimonious. Neo-realism does not aim to be a foreign policy theory, nor is it interested in states other than major ones.⁸⁰

⁷⁷Most of the classical and neo-classical accounts of realism substantiate the point. Also, most of the articles and books cited in footnote 5 follow this premise to a large extent.

⁷⁸Jervis, Robert. 1999. "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation-Understanding the Debate" *International Security* Vol. 24, No. 1 Summer, pp. 42-63; Jervis, Robert. 1985. "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation" *World Politics* Vol. 38 No. 1 October, pp. 58-79.

⁷⁹Neo-classical realism can be associated with Schweller et al; defensive realism with Jervis et al and classical realism is associated with seminal writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, Carr, Hertz, Oppenheimer and Gray.

⁸⁰Kenneth Waltz's exchange with Colin Elman in *Security Studies*, Autumn 1996, pp.7-61; Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

3.1.4. What Makes Cooperation Work?

Once mutual policy coordination to realize joint gains starts to occur, and then it is cooperation that follows. That is seen as a good enough definition of cooperation within its own literature. A more specific definition presumes cooperation as occurring when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of coordination.

But how and when does cooperation emerge and work? What are the conditions under which it emerges? The definition of cooperation does not tell anything about how the mutual gains from cooperation will be distributed. However, the conditions under which cooperation occurs can possibly do so. These conditions define the circumstances in which cooperation emerges. The conditions may also give clues about the working-mechanism of cooperation as well. In other words, attempts to explain what causes cooperation may help understand what makes cooperation work. As yet, there is no theory of cooperation clearly delineating these points; only hypotheses exist. Milner portrays the status of the cooperation literature in the following vein:

One function of a definition is to enable us to classify different acts as being an instance of the concept at hand. Having a widely accepted definition of international cooperation should make it easier to agree on which acts count as cooperation and which do not. Keohane, Kenneth Oye's *Cooperation under Anarchy* volume, Joseph Grieco, and Peter Hass all employ the same definition. They should therefore be able to agree on what is cooperative behavior and what is not. Indeed, this seems to be the case. Their disagreements are not about what constitutes cooperation; they are about what causes it. This, however, may be fortuitous since the empirical classification of events as cooperative can be very difficult. Establishing the counterfactual may pose serious questions: without some process of policy coordination, would the states have behaved differently? The strategic misrepresentation of preferences may add to this problem. Determining the beginning and end of an attempt at cooperation can also be problematic. Finally, it may not be easy to demonstrate that each side adjusted its policies in the expectation of gains.⁸¹

⁸¹Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses" *World Politics* Vol. 44 No. 3 April, p.468.

The problems mentioned in the above quotation do not amount to an analytical deadlock though; cooperation has been studied by numerous scholars: Cooperation can be noticed by contrasting a state's declarations and its actions on the ground in relation to those of others. This is a parsimonious method that helps to understand whether the behavior is cooperative or uncooperative. Furthermore, in the present informational age where state authorities make regular and sometimes blunt declarations and statements, the job does not appear to be insurmountable. As Jervis points out, information sharing and disclosing policies is a very political issue that is gauged relatively in secrecy.⁸² This exacerbates the analysis; yet, the leakages to the press that are not denied or refuted by the authorities together with the on-the-ground actions taken by nation-states help studying the secretive nature of bargaining and entanglements among nations. At least, this is how cooperation is studied within world academic community.

In our times of information-technology where even intelligence authorities find open sources as informative as the secretive nation-state sources, noticing cooperation presumably might not be harder than it was the case in the past. One advantage that is created on purpose by the study herein is that it examines the recent past. Although the events pertaining international efforts to curb terrorism at large and the war on terrorism in particular are still 'hot' in comparison to 'cold-cases' that are based on much former developments, numerous developments and events have already taken place to constitute the empirical side of a study.

Within this framework, hypotheses as to how cooperation emerges and works are important for the present study. The above-mentioned definition of cooperation allowed several hypotheses to be developed in the cooperation literature. This is the

⁸²Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics* Vol. 30, No. 2 January, pp. 167-214.

second contribution of the literature in addition to the provision of the definition. The hypotheses, which try to describe the circumstances under which cooperation emerges, are six-fold: 1- Absolute gains, Relative gains and Reciprocity Hypothesis, 2- Number of Actors Hypothesis, 3- Iteration Hypothesis, 4- International Regimes Hypothesis, 5- Epistemic Community Hypothesis, and 6- Power Asymmetries Hypothesis. For scope and space limitations, these theories are not examined in detail while some are explained in the following sections.

3.1.4.1. Decision Makers' Concerns that Hinder Cooperation and Alignment among States

Decision-makers' concerns that hamper cooperation originates in the security dilemma, issues of reciprocity, relative gains/cost-benefit assessment, subjective security demands, and the unquantifiable problems associated with perceptions.

The primary problem these hypotheses try to answer is the anarchy-induced security dilemma. International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (that is policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Against this problem, first, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma has been used to demonstrate that *cooperation is more likely when* the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Secondly, the security dilemma is argued to be reduced when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. Moreover, these two variables that form four possible security worlds or contexts are shown by the literature to be influenced by geography and technology.

Yet, the framework or the context within which actors are assumed to be acting is not examined enough according some scholars such as Robert Jervis. Jervis calls attention to the relation between ‘choice’ and ‘context’; the relation between the strategic decisions and actions carried out by nation-states (choice) and the structural environment or the current state of international relations that is inherent in the situation and not manipulable by nation-states (context):

Perhaps the most important limitation of the works on anarchy is that it looks at individual actors, their preferences, and their choices, and thus blinds us to the broader setting in which behavior occurs. Problems arise in a context and out of history, and not all patterns are the product of careful and conscious choice.⁸³

In light of the above-mentioned problems, cooperation - via Oran Young - can be achieved in three ways: first *tacitly*, second *through negotiation*, and third, *by imposed agreement or bargaining processes* among nation-states.⁸⁴

Cooperation may be *tacit* without communication or explicit agreement. The metaphor of repeated prisoner’s dilemma captures this situation as best explained by Robert Axelrod in *the Evolution of Cooperation*.⁸⁵ Without the explicit agreement between governments, cooperation may occur as the expectations of actors converge.

Cooperation may emerge through *negotiation*, too. It can be negotiated in an explicit bargaining process. As the most common and often studied type of cooperation emergence, negotiated cooperation is explained primarily by Keohane’s *After Hegemony*, Kenneth Oye’s *Cooperation under Anarchy* and Grieco’s *Cooperation among Nations*. They either examine the codes and issue-areas of bargaining or the ideas and learning processes during the negotiations undertaken by nation-states. Since there is a cooperation agreement to focus on,

⁸³ Jervis, Robert. 1988. “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation” *World Politics* Vol. 40, No. 3 April p.320.

⁸⁴ Young, Oran. 1989. *International Cooperation*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

⁸⁵ Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation* NY: Basic Books.

negotiated cooperation is easier to notice and analyze when compared to the tacit cooperation that is spontaneous and self-reinforcing.

Finally, cooperation can be *imposed*. This approach, that aims to explain how cooperation emerges, is akin to the benign version of the hegemonic stability theory in that a stronger party enforces others to adjust their policies meanwhile it adjusts its own policies to those of the enforced states to achieve mutual gains. During the Cold War, the US maintained such a position in the Western bloc regarding economic, financial and military policies of the allied nation-states especially within the framework of the NATO. Gowa remains unsurpassed in this kind of explanation of cooperation. Gowa maintained that a hegemon can serve, to certain degree, as the functional equivalent of a common international authority to establish and sustain cooperation.⁸⁶

Independent from the fact that whether it is tacit, negotiated or imposed cooperation that is at issue, first hypothesis that attempts to explain cooperation focuses on *relative or absolute gains debate and reciprocity*. The heart of the hypothesis is that states cooperate in order to realize absolute gains. Following economic reasoning, states rationally seek to maximize their net benefits from interactions. This is often explained by the minute-details of the prisoner's dilemma. Due to cheating and inability to sanction it, the best way for cooperation introduced by Axelrod is 'the TIT for TAT strategy' that gives the basis of reciprocity.⁸⁷ This is also supported by Keohane and other authors in *Cooperation under Anarchy*: cooperation is more likely when states pursue a strategy of reciprocity.

⁸⁶Gowa, Joanne. 1986. "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations" *International Organization* 40, Winter.

⁸⁷Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation* NY: Basic Books, pp. 3-24.

Grieco objected to the assumption that states cooperate to achieve absolute gains because relative gains matter more than absolute gains especially when uncertainty is prevalent due to the security dilemma. It is asserted that ‘security cooperation’ is delicate and harder to realize in comparison to cooperation on other fields of foreign policy. Even for Grieco though, cooperation is not impossible. He identifies one condition that leads to cooperation: ‘a balanced distribution of gains’ among cooperative participants.⁸⁸

Cooperation under the security dilemma is especially well studied by Jervis who clarified the conditions that make security cooperation likely despite the relative gains concerns.⁸⁹ Some are relevant to this study as summarized in the following pages.

3.1.4.2. Low Costs of Being Exploited

The cost of being exploited by the process of cooperation is the cost of getting no reciprocal cooperative action in return for a state’s realized cooperative commitment. When one side contributes to its share of tacit or negotiated terms of cooperation whereas the other defects, there emerges a cost for the contributing state. If this cost is low, cooperation is still more likely to emerge.

When the cost is tolerable, the arms-procurement level is likely to decrease and a less aggressive and patient foreign policy is apt to emerge. That decreases the security dilemma, and in turn, it plays into the hands of states that tend to cooperate with one another.

⁸⁸Grieco, Joseph. 1990. *Cooperation among Nations*. Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press; Haas, Peter. 1990. *Saving the Mediterranean*. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁸⁹Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” *World Politics* Vol. 30, No. 2 January, pp. 167-214.

3.1.4.3. Subjective Security Demands

There are two dimensions that determine decision-makers' assessments of threats and due policy responses.

One dimension is about the question of how much security the state seeks and the price the state is willing to pay for increments of security. Even if decision-makers of different nations agree on the objective situation, they may differ on the price that they will pay for increasing their security. To be sure, the price is not only economic but it is life-comprehensive of a nation's total resources both tangible and intangible.

Second dimension is the predisposition that shapes the way threats are perceived. When a state is predisposed to regard other states in general as a threat, it will react more quickly and strongly to developments than a state that views others and the environment as generally benign. The predisposition to perceive threats is argued, by Jervis, to be related to the state's view of how many enemies it must be prepared to fight.

3.1.4.4. When Gains Overrun the Costs

When gains from cooperation and costs of a breakdown of cooperation are perceived high, cooperation is likely. The main cost of a policy of reacting quickly and severely to increases in the other's arms is not the price of arms-procurement. The cost is sacrifice of potential gains from cooperation and the increase in the dangers of needless arms races and wars. This is the classical argument of the security dilemma-induced analysis of cooperation whose dynamics are to be born in mind even if nation-states do not prepare for conventional or regular war against one another. It is also argued that regimes can be seen as a useful instrument facilitating the realization of the above-mentioned factors that make cooperation

likely. Regimes are defined as sets of norms, principles or decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge. They mitigate the effects of international anarchy by aiding in the enforcement of international agreements. Regimes do so by easing the problem of defection from cooperation. Regimes are seen improving participant states' information on the behavior of others. It provides information for states on the likelihood of cheating and likelihood of compliance. Regimes are also thought to be changing the patterns of transactions costs, which are namely any direct and indirect costs of working jointly and implementing policy. Regimes arguably do so by reducing the incentives of violating regime principles. Thereby, regimes reduce the uncertainty about other state's behavior and it reduces the fear about other states' defection from cooperation. That reduces the defection challenge or the fear of being exploited when cooperation is not reciprocated.

3.1.4.5. Transaction-Costs Approach and Different Threat Assessments

Non-polar environment presents an environment of competition. Competition of the nonpolar environment is unchecked and unregulated by the interworking of international organizations. In the absence of ineffective working of a set of international economic and political organizations unlike that of the 1945-1991 post-World World II institutional order, nation-states are left to act more autonomously despite they are bound by the circumstances and threats to cooperate.

In other words, although states are hard pressed to cooperate with other states in the face of threats that they cannot individually confront, they nevertheless tend to act unilaterally absent the institutionally binding security arrangements.

Threats may force states to cooperate and work jointly, but the lack of institutional wherewithal to realize such cooperation constitutes one of the limits of cooperation according to this approach. The question is, then, how and why international security cooperation cannot be institutionalized.

To that end, in addition to organizational transaction costs, the nature of threats to national security, fears of defection from cooperation, cheating and concerns of relative gains are studied in the alliance literature to explain the hardship to establish and sustain formal alignments. Military alliances are shown to be especially hard to establish if an external threat is not clearly perceived by all potential cooperative participants.

Yet, the threat may come not only as an external one, but the literature demonstrated that it may come in another form, namely as internal threats. Alliance and cooperative problems becomes complicated when the form of threat turns from external to internal and from external to transnational. Transnational threats by definition manifest themselves as being both internal and external at times, leaving the dichotomous separation between the internal and the external relatively unclear as an instructive conception.

That is why threat perceptions and assessments of nation-states evolve to become different from one another over time. Reaching consensus on the position of states as to where they stand in relation to transnational threats becomes a thorny issue. In sum, states differ in their perceptions of the threat even when they agree that they are all exposed and vulnerable to a common threat.

3.2. Alliance as ‘Institutionalized-Cooperation’

Definition and types of alliances, though controversial after the Cold War,⁹⁰ are best given by the collective security approach that is gauged hand in hand with traditional realist theories. Collective security approach can be seen as an approach that merges the principles of realism and public/collective goods perspectives. When alliances are concerned, it is more often possible to talk about collective security or collective defense organizations whereas cooperation may occur on a bilateral or multilateral basis without any organizational and institutional framework. Thus, ‘organization’ is more associated with alliances than cooperation. In parallel, alliances refer to *structured international security cooperation*. Their structure is established by and enshrined in treaty-based organizations, which give them an institutionalized hard-law form. In other words, institutionalized security cooperation comes with a treaty-based international organization, which can then be called an alliance. Alliance, thereby, denotes institutionalized cooperation.

3.2.1. The Definition of ‘Alliance’

A clear *definition of alliance* can read as follows: *alliance is an international, institutionalized, treaty-based security cooperation organization among nation-states*. Its legal status under international law is underlined by a treaty-ratification process by member-states, which gives alliances an organization-status and an institutionalized formal structure. The latter feature distinguishes ‘alliances’ from ‘cooperation’.

⁹⁰For a study about the conceptional and due definitional confusion on alliances after the Cold War, Salmon, Trevor. 2006. “The European Union: Just an Alliance or a Military Alliance?” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 29 No. 5, 813-842 October.

Alliances usually take one of two forms: “security” alliances or “defensive” alliances. Both are organization-based; thus, alliances can also be respectively named as a *collective security organization* or a *defensive security organization*. Still other labels are “collective security alliances” and “collective defense alliances”. As a short-hand, they are heretofore referred to simply as “security” alliances or “defensive” alliances.

On the one hand, *defensive alliances* require a clearly defined threat to fight and defend against because defensive organizations or alliances are almost always ‘against’ a common foe. Alliances are different from other alignments and cooperation types because they have an actual or anticipated enemy. In Liska’s terms, “alliances are against, only derivatively for, someone or something”.⁹¹ On the other hand, *security alliance* is established to secure the member-states from one another. It is not against a common foe. The former aims to manage the security dilemma originating from outside the alliance whereas the latter tackles with the security dilemma within the alliance.

The elements of an alliance are clearer in a ‘defensive alliance’ in comparison to both ‘security alliance’ and ‘mere cooperation’ because defensive alliance is institutionalized security cooperation, which have a structure provided by an international treaty. Although security alliances also have a structure, they are less specified and binding as is the case for mere cooperation. ‘Mere cooperation or cooperation at large’ refers to relatively less structured cooperative behaviors of states without international treaty guidelines at the background of the cooperative framework. ‘Mere cooperation’ has an underspecified or loose structure at best. It may be bilaterally or multilaterally conducted on not only about security, but on

⁹¹Liska, George. 1962. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.12.

other issue-areas such as economy and environment as well.

Importantly, ‘cooperation’ does not necessitate a consensual common goal among states. Each state may have different goals and agendas of their own. Thus, neither security alliances nor cooperation in general have the clear structural elements of a *defensive* alliance. That is mainly because, via the literature, defensive alliances are *against* a common clear enemy and accordingly a clear threat.⁹² They are established for the pursuit of a specific common goal that paves the way for a more binding and preordained specific *modus operandi* than those of other types of cooperation among nation-states.

The structural elements of a *defensive alliance* are:

a-clear common state-centric-threat, *b*-predetermined common goal *c*-predetermined common grand strategy *d*-international treaty-based organizational structure with modalities such as headquarters, secretariat, departments, protocols and procedures, *e*- executive and operational planning (also called ‘tactical level or minor strategies’) *f*- permanent personnel, and *g*- predetermined aggregation and arrangement of material capabilities to fulfill anticipated military tasks.

First three and the very last elements (*a*, *b*, *c* and *g*) particularly distinguish *defensive alliances* from the rest of cooperative relations that take the forms of, first, *coalitions*; secondly, *security alliances*, and finally, *bilateral or multilateral cooperation at large*.⁹³ To expand, cooperative relations other than defensive alliances manifest themselves, first, as *coalitions*;⁹⁴ secondly, as *bilateral or*

⁹²Booth, Ken and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2008. *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics* New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Friedman, Julian, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen. eds. 1970. *Alliance in International Politics*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

⁹³The categorization does not presume rigid exclusiveness among the types: There is intrinsic overlapping between ‘coalitions’ and ‘cooperation conducted bilaterally and multilaterally at large’. The types and their differences are further clarified in the following sections, first on alliances and then on coalitions.

⁹⁴Coalitions are cooperative endeavors short of alliance, and they come in two forms. ‘Coalition of the willing’ is one of the two coalition types. Coalition of the willing is an *ad hoc joint-work-group of*

multilateral cooperation on any issue-area such as trade talks, pollution-control, clearing landmines, climate change, poverty, terrorism or arms control⁹⁵; thirdly, as the inward-looking collective security organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).⁹⁶

Distinctive features of defensive alliances are clear and common state-centric-threat, common goal and preordained common grand strategy and relevant material capabilities stationed in anticipation of attack. These defensive features are hardly existent in ‘coalitions’, ‘bilateral/multilateral cooperation at large’ and ‘security alliances’. Where they partially exist in the former types, their modalities and institutional form are mostly different. Besides, any form of international regime⁹⁷ (under which states cooperate short of predetermined specific target-state/s, and predetermined possible and specific nation-state-oriented threat, and a pre-arranged institutional protocol and means to punish violators militarily if necessary) is not an alliance.⁹⁸

states based on the mission, rather than based on a common threat perception. The example is the coalition formed by the alignment of states with the US following the onset of the 2003 Iraqi intervention. The types are discussed in the last chapter with examples.


⁹⁵Arms control is a kind of cooperative relationship among states. It is different from disarmament, which aims at elimination of weapons. Arms control is a control mechanism among states that cooperate among each other to ‘control’ weapons so as to lessen the security dilemma among the participants. It may lead to international treaties or agreements that limit or increase the number of weapons and weapon-systems. However, it is mainly about bilateral cooperation short of a security alliance structure or a defensive alliance structure. As such, arms control is akin or similar to nonproliferation regime in the sense that it creates international agreements, commitments and expectations so as to respond to the preferences of participating states. Yet, regimes are not formal in that they are devoid of institutionalized international treaty organizations established for either protection from the in-group member-states as in the case of security alliances or from out-group nation-states as in the case of defensive alliances. Their target is, first and foremost, issue-area based rather than being state-centric.

⁹⁶The reasons why Shanghai Security Organization is not a defensive alliance (but mainly an inward-looking collective security organization/alliance that does not balance against out-group states such as the US and the EU member-states) are explained in sections below.

⁹⁷‘Regime’ is defined in the literature as ‘the principles, norms, rules, and procedures’ that are seen as governing state behavior in specific issue-areas of international politics. It is a rule-based cooperation in the international system. Further information is given above in section 4.1.4.

⁹⁸ From a collective security perspective, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) is a regime-establishing treaty around which nuclear states (‘nuclear-haves’ or nuclear weapon states -NWS-) try to protect themselves from nonnuclear states (nuclear have-nots or non-nuclear weapon states -NNWS-) by avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons horizontally and vertically. In return, nonnuclear states

These remarks are made so as to clarify the terms (cooperation, regime and alliance) as much as possible because they are interrelated: When pictured as concentric circles or fields, alliances are at the very center while the regimes approximate the middle layer that also comprises alliances. Cooperation is at the most outer layer comprising all of them. When moved from the outer layer of concentric fields towards the center (that is from cooperation to regime and then to alliances), ‘institutionalization’, ‘specificity’ and ‘binding force of cooperation and reliability of commitments’ are likely to increase. The relationship is depicted just below:



expect security provision through articles IV and VI. Although a common goal (nonproliferation of nuclear weapons) and a common threat (vertical and horizontal proliferation) can be said to exist, it fails in four elements to be named as a defensive alliance: a common strategy to enforce compliance, a collectively institutionalized headquarters of a defensive nature with operational military capabilities specific for the task, and lack of a target out-group state/s to defend against. Fourthly, it does not view states as direct referents of threats, but only indirectly so. The threat is not state-centric; it is subject-centric; proliferation without attaching to a state is a derivative threat which is not clear and susceptible for strategizing. Within such a framework, the NPT is the linchpin of the nonproliferation regime alongside other relevant international agreements on biological, chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Although it is functionally similar to a collective security organization in that it serves member-states to protect themselves from one another, it is not identical to an alliance for the above-mentioned reasons, let alone a defensive one. Thus, not all regimes and regime-establishing treaties are of alliances. However, regimes may lead to alliance formation in time or vice versa. Alliances may also benefit from regime norms and decisions; nevertheless, regimes are not institutionalized enough to take punitive actions originating from hard-law, that is an international treaty. Regimes are weak at institutionalizing preordained strategy, goals and material capabilities that are operationalized in advance of a conflict among nations. Therefore, regimes are mainly of cooperation at large more than of alliances.

3.2.2. How Do Alliances Decrease the Uncertainty mainly caused by the Anarchic International System?

Alliances are instruments to manage the security dilemma. Alliances increase ‘the perceived likelihood of expected behavior to come true’. Thereby, they help to decrease the uncertainty among states. Alliances enhance perceptions positively in the sense that it reduces the uncertainty as to what other state will do. Uncertainty, alternatively labeled as shadow of the future, is an age-old factor that causes the security dilemma. Similar to ‘fog of war’, uncertainty about burden-sharing and reliability of partners (fog of alignments) causes impasse and reluctance to commit resources. Formal alliances, such as the NATO, are aimed at addressing this uncertainty. Alliances decrease the likelihood of defection from cooperation by their treaty-based road-map. Road-map includes guidelines or modalities serving materialization of reciprocal benefits and assessment of state commitments to common cause. These factors clear away ‘the fog of alignments’ and alliances to certain extent.

The benefits provided by an alliance road-map and strategy are relatively higher in comparison to coalitions. Coalitions are ‘coalition of the willing’ kind of grouping of states. Coalitions are unstructured cooperation attempts. As structured cooperation, alliances are more predictable, binding and enforceable than rest of the cooperative relations. This is so due to alliances’ formal status and pre-arranged modalities. Thus, reliability of alliance member-states in their commitment and burden-sharing is perceived to be increasing because there are binding clauses of a treaty when compared to other types of cooperation.⁹⁹ The institutional procedures,

⁹⁹As to how international law is directly relevant to international politics in general, and how it came to be binding and enforceable, please see: Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” *International Organization* Vol. 54, No. 3 Legalization and World Politics-Summer pp. 421-456.

formal communication between governments, concerns of prestige and reputation,¹⁰⁰ and the binding force of international law are factors that help decrease uncertainty among states as to what the other state will do. These factors serve to increase the credibility of the credibility-assessments about the behaviors of other states. In other words, these factors make it reasonable for a state to perceive or assess other states' burden-sharing and commitments as more reliable or less uncertain in contrast to situations where they are absent.

Although even treaties may not always guarantee accordant state behavior, alliances (as treaty-based organizations by definition) decreases the uncertainty that causes the security dilemma. Future concerns may well constrain state behavior. Shadow of the future has always been a big question mark for states because they do not know for sure what other states will do in the future. That uncertainty is a result of mutually constituting sovereignty and anarchy.

The security dilemma (the dilemma that the more states seek security, the more insecure they become) leads to several kinds of groupings among states. Alliances and alignments short of alliances, then, are ways to ease the security dilemma. Throughout history, alliances have been regarded as the best way to respond the dilemma, simply because it is seen as the most binding and reassuring arrangement in the face of uncertainty caused by the anarchy of the international

¹⁰⁰‘Reputation’ is a very important concept used in the analysis of policy-making. Yet, the academic theoretical accumulation on reputation is shallow. For the importance of the understudied concept, please see Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* trans. Rex Warner. 1979. New York: Penguin- *The Melian Dialogue* is the epitome of ‘reputation’ in realist terms; Sartori, Anne E.2005. *Deterrence by Diplomacy* New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Cashman, Greg. 2000. *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict* Lanham: Lexington Books; Jervis, Robert. 1982. “Deterrence and Perception” *International Security* Winter 3 pp.9-11; Mercer, Jonathan. 1997. “Reputation and Rational Deterrence Theory” *Security Studies* 7-1, 100-113; Schelling distinguishes between resolve and capability and he relates reputation to ‘resolve’ of a nation-state. Schelling, Thomas. 1966. *Arms and Influence* New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.199-124; Kahn, Herman. 1960. *On Thermonuclear War* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.550-556; Alt, James, Randall Calvert, Brian Humes. 1988. “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoric Analysis” *American Political Science Review* June; Wagner, R. Harrison. 1992. “Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4-2, pp.115-141.

system.

Although states have historically allied with one another as a means to address the security dilemma¹⁰¹, not all alignments result in alliance formation. Coalitions are informal alignments devoid of treaties. Alignments or certain juxtaposition of states become alliance only when they are institutionalized under a treaty-organization. *Defensive alliances* are the most studied alliance form due to the US-former USSR rivalry of the recent-past Cold War. The NATO and the Warsaw Pact are alliances in point.

3.2.3. Differences between Defensive and Security Alliances

As stated, alliances may take defensive or collective security forms. One of the criteria to distinguish between a security and defensive alliance is their orientation: Collective security alliances are *inward-looking* while defensive security alliances are *outward-looking*. The UN can be seen as a collective security organization or alliance in the sense that member-states try to protect themselves from one another through the intermediary of the organization.

A collective security alliance is, then, an inward-looking alliance/organization because it is designed by the members of a group to protect themselves from each other. A security alliance is concentrated on the security dilemma within alliance itself as opposed to the defensive alliances, which are more concentrated on the security dilemma originating from outside. Defensive alliances are those alliances to protect member-states from a specific 'other', which is a specific non-member state or group of states. Defensive alliances are outward-looking in that they are established against threats emanating from the out-group.

¹⁰¹ Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, second part in particular.

Collective security alliances are usually based on a formal agreement among states to provide mutual assistance in the event of specified aggression or threat of aggression toward one or more of the alliance members. The threat is not sought outside the alliance for it is contemplated from within. Therefore, security alliances such as the UN or Shanghai Cooperation Organization represent self-establishing agreements among members who agree to lessen the pursuit of their narrow self-interest to the broader goal of system stability.

System stability may be regarded at regional or global level by the member-states. In accordance, a security alliance or a collective security alliance is fundamentally regarded as an idealist conception following Woodrow Wilson. The root of the concept originates in the idea that stability can be obtained through the consent of member states. Woodrow Wilson's maxim puts security alliances as, "there must not be a balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set off against another, but a single overwhelming group of nations who shall be the trustee of the peace".¹⁰² It goes without saying that this conception has confronted difficulties, first of which came from Wilson's nation whose Congress refused to ratify the League of Nations. Wilson wished for establishment of the League above all other concerns of the World War during the Paris Peace Talks, and thus compromised with other Allied leaderships on many issues.¹⁰³

The League was established in Europe by ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. However, Wilson's own American Congress refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and thus to establish the League. However, the idea that peace could be enforced by means of mutually pledged protection among its members did reflect well especially upon Europe. Throughout Europe's evolution into the EU,

¹⁰²Kissinger, Henry. 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp.45-47.

¹⁰³Wilson, Woodrow. 1916. "An Address Before the League to Enforce Peace", May 27 in Arthur S. Link ed. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press vol.37.

European statesmen who developed the political norms that avoid use of force as a tool for resolution of conflicts are inspired also by Wilson alongside other cornerstone political thinkers and politicians. Wilson's diplomatic policies had a profound influence on shaping the world as diplomatic historian Walter Russell Mead has explained:

“Wilson's principles survived the eclipse of the Versailles system and they still guide European politics today: self-determination, democratic government, collective security, international law, and a league of nations. Wilson may not have gotten everything he wanted at Versailles, and his treaty was never ratified by the Senate, but his vision and his diplomacy, for better or worse, set the tone for the twentieth century. France, Germany, Italy, and Britain may have sneered at Wilson, but every one of these powers today conducts its European policy along Wilsonian lines. What was once dismissed as visionary is now accepted as fundamental. This was no mean achievement, and no European statesman of the twentieth century has had as lasting, as benign, or as widespread an influence.”¹⁰⁴

Consequently, collective security approach to alignments among states also includes ‘security alliances’ that aim to lessen violence among its member-states, whereas defensive alliances (as the other form of collective organization) do not necessarily have a quest to eliminate or attenuate violence. Members of defensive alliances accept instances of violence as inevitable facts of life, and they do not try to eliminate violence or aggression per se.

They assess in advance that violence may well occur, and that it must be deterred or countered in kind when survival of states are severely threatened by a predetermined adversarial state. *Anticipation and contemplation of war among states is the basic reason for defensive alliance formation in the very first place.* To diminish concerns of war-anticipation-of-states is a basic driving-force underlying both defensive alliance formation and its effective functioning. The members choose to cope with the security dilemma originating from an out-group of states; and their response is to align against the threat for which they prepare in case of a

¹⁰⁴Mead, Walter Russell. 2001. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*. NY: A.A. Knopf, p.133.

direct military assault, brinkmanship or an out-of-control crisis escalation into open warfare. Thus, defensive alliances anticipate use of force from the outset of their alignment under an international treaty-based framework.

In other words, state-members of defensive alliances do not shy away from using force as a principle because in an environment where states contemplate war, military prudence is generally what followed throughout history. Concurrently, defensive alliances are most effective when war is perceived to be in the offing.

Accordingly, the conceptual elements of balancing, bandwagoning and the logic of alignments among states are all defined differently by different seminal works and scholars. The most distinguished approaches, which determine the dominant tone of the scholarly work on alliances, are under review here. These approaches can best be separated by their initiators: those approaches of Waltz, Walt, Liska, Synder, Riker, Altfeld, Bueno de Mesquita, Russett, Mastanduno, Schweller and Schroeder.

3.3. The Mainstream Theories of Alliances

3.3.1. The Theories of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt

The first approach that is used to explain alliances depends upon ‘the balance of power theory’.¹⁰⁵ Waltz, following Morgenthau, underlines that alliances are formed to balance power in the international system. However, he systematized the balance of power analysis above the nation-state level. The act of

¹⁰⁵For the latest theoretical and empirical developments and problems regarding balance of power theory, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2, 155-185; For a succinct, yet comprehensive explanation of ‘balance of power’ with crucial references, Evans, Graham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics-A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and Institutions*. New York: Simon & Schuster, p.30-32.

balancing ‘power’¹⁰⁶ constitutes the main axis of the balance of power theory explanation of alliances. Although Morgenthau laid the basis for the connection between balance of power theory and study of alliances, arguments by Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt dominate the international relations field to explain self-help great power politics and consequent alignment choices of states. Waltz’s balance of power is followed by his student Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat theory’.

These two (Waltzian and Waltian) theories of alliances share some common features: States are rational unitary actors with self-help behaviors in an anarchic system. The primary mode of behavior is assumed to be “self-help”, not as ‘other-help’.¹⁰⁷ Both Waltzian and Waltian explanations of alliances are systemic in that the self-help approach of the traditional alliance literature dominated by Waltz and Walt is primarily based upon neo-realism.¹⁰⁸ Since neo-realism or structural realism does not take small states into account, traditional alliance literature centers only on great power politics and alignments to increase *security* and *stability*. Needless to say non-state entities are outside of the confines of neorealism. Although Waltz himself maintains that neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy and does not purport to explain or predict what individual states will do,¹⁰⁹ he nevertheless asserts that states do not pursue power per se, but *security* is what they primarily

¹⁰⁶Kenneth N. Waltz’s balance of power conception defines ‘power’ as “capability defined as military force in particular”, and thereby evaluates the distribution of capabilities across nation-states. Capability is an aggregate metric or approximation taking economy and particularly the military resources of a nation-state as the basic components of its power. Military-balance schemas of countries are in point here: indeed, the academic journal entitled *Military Balance* (which provides a quantitative assessment of military strength and defense spending of most countries) illustrates how power is understood within the confines of balance of power theory.

¹⁰⁷‘The other-help behaviour of states’ is conceptualized in a recent study, Spero, Joshua B. 2009. “Great Power Security Dilemmas for Pivotal Middle Power Bridging” *Contemporary Security Policy* 30:1,147-171.

¹⁰⁸The reason for using two separate sentences for marking the systemic approach of neorealism is because neorealism is just one of the systemic approaches. The most notable other is world-system theory.

¹⁰⁹Kenneth Waltz’s exchange with Colin Elman. 1996. *Security Studies*, 6 Autumn.

seek.¹¹⁰ This is a systemic given or axiom of neo-realism different from the tenets of classical realism.¹¹¹

The significance attached in neorealism to security rather than to power is important to understand the underlying logic of mainstream alliance theory, which regards major states (not all states) as having dispositions to protect status quo in any given period of time. Herein alignment is meant to convey either balancing (opposing the most powerful state by coming together with other lesser states) or bandwagoning (accommodating or coming together with the most powerful state). The kind of actors involved in alignment behavior, namely weak states in relation to strong states¹¹² are just seen as compact and same unitary actors that are functionally similar. Two binary templates are used within the framework of the theory: balancing versus bandwagoning and weaker/smaller states versus stronger

¹¹⁰Waltz explains the reasons for why 'security' is assumed to have more theoretical significance in neorealism than 'power' in Waltz Kenneth N. 1988. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Vol. 18, Spring No. 4, p. 616. 'Power' has the pride of place in classical realist accounts especially following Morgenthau. About the resilience of neorealism, Waltz argues that neorealism is vindicated even after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Waltz, Kenneth. "The Continuity of International Politics-Chapter 31" in Booth, Ken and Timothy Dunne eds. 2002. *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 348-355; Waltz, Kenneth. 1993. "The New World Order" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22-2; for a sophisticated theoretical account and critique of neorealism, Suganami, Hidemi. 1996. *On the Causes of War*. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-80.

¹¹¹There are other versions of neorealism, which assumes that states are not satisfied with achieving security. Waltz is a defensive realist; offensive version of neorealism is associated with J. Mearsheimer who argues that 'security' is not enough, but hegemony is what states seek to achieve. For a taxonomy of realist theories, Snyder, Glenn H. 2002. "Mearsheimer's World - Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security" *International Security* Vol. 27, No. 1 Summer, pp. 149-173.

¹¹²'Aligning with' is to make state policies *congenial* to other (partner) state in cooperation. 'Aligning against' is coming together and implementing congenial policies with other states against a threatening or powerful third party. Aligning against a state or groups of states means trying to undercut the policies and preferences of the opposed state against which balancing occurs. In balancing, then, balancer states cooperate to resist another state/s. Thus, 'alignment' is the condition of being in partial or certain agreement with a state either to bandwagon (accommodate the threatening state) or balance (resisting the threatening state). Alignment is to cause to arrange and adjust according to a line of understanding or political standing. This is achieved through coordination and adjustment of policies by taking into account the preferences of other states that are involved in the condition of coming to congenial viewpoints in the sense that even if their goals are not identical, their behaviours are adjusted or arranged so as not to prevent other cooperating states from achieving their goals and interests. Aligning with other state is to make the policies of the two more *congenial* or *congruous* to each other in a way to serve both states. That is not direct help; however, it is not clashing, confrontation or open competition in full either. In that sense, alignment and cooperation is closely related in that alignment shows the direction of cooperation in the balance of power theory as to whether it is the bandwagoning or balancing strategy that states employ.

states/major powers. To elaborate, balancing is aligning with other weak or middle power states against the strongest one, while bandwagoning is aligning with the strongest one.

Waltz following a suggestion from Stephen Van Evera introduced the term ‘bandwagoning’ into the international relations literature from domestic politics.¹¹³ According to Waltz, balancing and bandwagoning and the distribution and re-distribution of power within the systemic balance of great powers leads to weaker state alignment with the strongest state. A state whose power is increasing will attract support rather than repulsion. However, Waltz stresses that states seek *less to maximize power* rather than *to maintain their positions*; thus, balancing against rather than bandwagoning with the stronger state is the behavior primarily induced by the system. Although Waltzian system design or construct is not directly determining the behaviors of states, it ‘*shapes and shoves*’ them by presenting structural permissive or constraining causes with which states have to cope in making policies.

Waltzian *Theory of International Politics*¹¹⁴ assumes that although bandwagoning is the natural tendency towards the state with increasing power, the system is *not* conducive to bandwagoning behavior or aligning with the superior side in the hope of picking up benefits defined as increasing power. Since neo-realism views system-induced behavior of states as being towards maintaining system stability and maintaining their prevailing status, ‘security’ is the main systemic driving-force of behaviors. Behaviors are not fixed on maximizing power as is mainly argued by the classical realists. As a corollary, the behavior that is

¹¹³Keohane, Robert O. 1998. “Review: Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 1. Summer, p.172.

¹¹⁴Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics* Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley; Kenneth N. Waltz. 2000. ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’ *International Security* Vol. 25 No. 1 summer, pp. 5-41. According to Waltz, neorealism is still largely vindicated after the Cold War.

‘shaped and shoved by the system’ is assumed mostly to be “balancing”. It is not bandwagoning. Secondary states ‘flock to the weaker side; for it is the *stronger side* that threatens them.’¹¹⁵ Balance of power theory claims that states often balance against power defined in terms of military capability because ‘balance’ has a connotation of preserving system stability and security. Thus, neorealism views states as status quo-oriented in the sense that ‘playing safe’ is assumed to be the behavior of states that is induced by the system. Playing it safe is not exactly compatible with increasing power whereas maintaining security and position is. Maintaining position rather than acquiring more power is taken as more prevalent in the system even if there are revisionist tendencies. Crucially, the nation-state is not alone in the system: The system, much like the economic market mechanism, reaches equilibrium or pareto-optimal to sustain itself only to be taken down in time by subsequent rising hegemon/leader state. When a group of rising states balance against the strongest state, balance of power replaces hegemony. The latter two concepts, namely ‘hegemony’ and ‘balance of power’, are binary opposites that describe distinct international power configurations. Since their conceptions work in diametrically opposed ways, arguing for one of them negates the other.¹¹⁶

Neo-realism is basically a translation and application of economic theory upon ‘politics among nations’, which is seen by classical realists as including more complicated elements that cannot be reduced to merits of economic metrics or calculation whether it is systemically put or not.¹¹⁷ A classical reading of balance of

¹¹⁵Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 125-127.

¹¹⁶William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2, 155-185.

¹¹⁷Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2000/01. “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 5–53; Walt, Stephen. 2005. “Conversations with History- Balancing American Power in the Post-9/11 World” Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, the part about Realism Nov 15, <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Walt/walt-con3.html>. The case for ideas that is underlined by Wohlforth and Brooks has already been included in realism

power is rather different; however, this overview concentrates on the mainstream approaches to alliances. Then, it is worth underscoring that balance of power theory via neorealism sees balancing more prevalent than bandwagoning.

Balance of threat theory theoretically follows in the foot-steps of the balance of power theory. It takes issue with both great powers and lesser states different from neorealism and balance of power theory. It does not assume away the roles of lesser states. To the contrary, Walt includes the analysis of the Middle Eastern states' alignment strategies in his seminal work *the Origins of Alliances*.¹¹⁸

Waltz defines bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing alignment with *periodic* balancing of would-be leaders among states. For Kenneth Waltz, states decision to whether balance against or bandwagon with another state is mainly based on the strongest state. In Waltz's argumentation, determining which state or group of states appears strongest is vital. However, for S. Walt, this consideration of the balance of power is not enough to understand alliances. Stephen Walt varies from K. Waltz on the merits of states' calculations. He argues that *balance of threat* is more important: States measure or calculate the merits of bandwagoning with or

represented by Morgenthau, which has been labelled Classical Realism after Neorealism came to be dominating the field. Interpretative tradition, putting oneself in the shoes of the decision-makers and looking over their shoulders is what Morgenthau maintains to be necessary for effective analyses. That line of thought presents space for ideational and perceptual factors still to be explored and developed within the classical realist horizon. It does not totally exclude 'the understanding approach' of the political philosophy as contrasted to that of 'explanation' variant, yet it keeps its realist tenets, too. Niebuhr, Herz and Carr deals extensively with non-quantifiable factors such as intentions, wisdom, the role and manipulation of the society, power over people (which is labeled as 'soft power' later on), peaceful change and the quality of leadership. Besides, Classical Realism is not totally focused on 'balancing' alone. The roles and limits of institutions and ideas are discussed not to refute them altogether and not to leave them aside for good, but realism just points out the limitations in their service to national interests and security. In other words, Classical Realism (as the oldest tradition) is rich and sophisticated with grays or fine-grained arguments, yet it has been underappreciated with reductions to mere cost-benefit analysis. Classical Realism is so much nuanced with foresight that classical figures even predicted that nation-states, as other political organization forms such as city-states and empires, may wax and wane over time. That is especially reminiscent of Edward H. Carr. Reputation and prestige, national honor and glory are factors that are discussed widely because they do shape policies. For instance, Thomas Schelling, building on the classical realist principles, famously claimed that it is perfectly sensible to die for keeping the reputation of adamant 'resolve', which is one of the most precious power-resources of a nation-state to exercise power over other states - that is to deter them via reputation for reliability of posed threats.

¹¹⁸ Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

balancing against other states by determining not only which state or group of states appear strongest, but also they consider which state or states appear most threatening. Therefore, if serious threats appear, Stephen Walt asserts that state leadership need to consider risks and to calculate towards the threatening state.

Origins of Alliances is a valuable refinement of traditional balance-of-power theory by persuasively arguing that states form alliances not simply to balance power, but in order to balance threats. His underappreciated contribution is to start a debate about the clarification of the ways states respond against threats. Walt argues that states respond to threats in one of two ways: they either balance/oppose or bandwagon/ accommodate.

As will be seen shortly, there are several other proposed ways of state responses that are detailed by other scholars. Stephen Walt's framework is very parsimonious in that there are only two options for states, either balancing or bandwagoning. Different from Kenneth Waltz's argument, Walt argues that states do not balance against 'power or strongest state', but rather their alignment strategies are based on the perception and calculation of the external 'threat'. 'Balancing' is defined as *allying with others against the prevailing threat of hegemony* while 'bandwagoning' refers to *aligning oneself with the source of threat*. According to Walt, balancing has been the dominant tendency in international politics, while bandwagoning has been the opportunistic exception. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union are given as a rare example of bandwagoning in *the Origins of Alliances*.

Both Waltz and Walt conclude that states balance more than they bandwagon. That is, they often balance against greater capability or against threatening state rather than bandwagon, namely the behavior of aligning against

the source of power (power being defined as capability) or against the source of threat. Stephen Walt separates himself from Kenneth Waltz and other realists such as Arnold Wolfers and Hans Joachim Morgenthau¹¹⁹ by insisting that states balance against threat, not power alone. He includes 'power' in his conception of 'threat', claiming that threats are determined both by *capabilities* and *aggressive intentions of other states*. Walt points out that since the United States has been stronger than the Soviet Union in global terms throughout the era after World War II, one would expect to observe many of the allies of the US align with the Soviet Union if states are solely balancing against power. Therefore, balance of threat theory has a broad concept of 'threat' in that threat includes aggregate power, proximity to a target, offensive capability, and perceptions.

Needless to say, what offensive and defensive capabilities are and how exactly state perceptions of threat are gauged and understood are open questions. Nevertheless, Walt improved neo-realism by aligning it with cognitive processes of perception. Balance of threat also paved the way for a discussion of the role of ideology in realism. That is a step towards both classical realism and constructivism in the sense that although Walt argues that ideology does not play important role in alliance formation, the formation and role of ideas is brought forward to the extent state decision-making and perceptions are concerned. Aggressive intentions and perception are the doors to further realist refinement of the concept of threat, and the next step is taken by other scholars. 'Two-level analysis' that studies the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy making does not have a short history¹²⁰ or they are not rare in alliance literature as

¹¹⁹Wolfers, Arnold, 1962. *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 117-131; Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1985. *Politics among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Knopf, pp. 224-228.

¹²⁰Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games"

is the case for studies that urge to combine material and ideational factors in international relations.¹²¹ Although these are the contributions that enlighten the way for further theoretical research, there are critiques.

As regards to Walt's seminal work - *the Origins of Alliances*, Robert Keohane marks the pitfalls as follows: Walt finds that (Middle Eastern) states indeed react to threats than simply to power: they take proximity, offensive capability and perceived intentions into account as well as aggregate power. This is not surprising, since (Kenneth) Waltz's overly parsimonious account to construct a theory on the variable of capability alone was never very convincing. Yet balance of power theory requires so much information – about state perceptions as well as objective facts – that it has relatively little theoretical power of its own. It restates what we already believe more than providing us with new insights.¹²²

Given alleged problems in his thinking about 'threat,' Lebovic argues that Walt overstates the usefulness of balancing and bandwagoning as behavioural contrasts and understates the impact of ideology on alignment.¹²³ Similarly, Barnett criticizes Walt in the following vein. In constructivist terms, Walt's efforts to incorporate ideology into his theory are regarded as being half-hearted. Walt's balance of threat theory, as Barnett and Lebovic argue, makes room for ideology only to the extent that it can be tied to 'aggressive intentions', which is arguably 'underspecified and under-theorized'.¹²⁴

International Organization 42-3, pp. 427–461; Young, Joseph K. 2006. "Simulating Two-Level Negotiations" *International Studies Perspectives* 2006 7, 77–82

¹²¹Sørensen, Georg. 2008. "The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of IR" *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 14-1, pp. 5–32.

¹²²Keohane, Robert O. 1998. "Review: Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism" *International Security* Vol. 13, No. 1. Summer, p.172.

¹²³Lebovic, James H. 2004. "Unity in Action: Explaining Alignment Behavior in the Middle East" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 41-2, p. 168.

¹²⁴Barnett, Michael N. 2003. "Alliances, Balances of Threats, and Neorealism: The Accidental Coup" in John A. Vasquez & Colin Elman eds. *Realism and The Balancing of Power: A New Debate*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 222–249.

3.3.2. Liska, Riker, Atfeld, Bueno De Mesquita, Russett and Snyder

The above-mentioned kind of critiques led to the development of different alignment conceptualizations with different definitions of bandwagoning and balancing. Despite the critiques, it is crucially important to emphatically evaluate the improvement that Walt introduces in both mainstream international relations theory and alliance theory in particular. It may seem half-hearted from a constructivist standing, however it is revolutionary from a realist stance. Walt is one of the rare realists who try to marry realism and constructivism in contrast to some constructivist accounts that do not even bother to involve in bridge-building between realism and constructivism. Thus, a balanced and objective view that is at equal standing both to realism and constructivism would underline that balance of threat theory is much to be appreciated. It is the first stepping stone towards more rigorous theories and research programs that aim both to explain (in the way neo-realism and neo-liberalism are concerned) and understand (in the way constructivism is concerned with) alliances. Indeed, other scholars press on from that point onwards.

Liska, as one of the most cited and eminent scholars on alliances, has asserted that the prerequisite for alliance cohesion is the presence of ‘an alliance ideology’: alliances are formed mostly “*against*, and only derivatively for someone or something.”¹²⁵ Riker, on the other hand, studied how alliances are formed. He argued that alliances are built economically in the sense that prospective members consider the “marginal utility” of joining an alliance. They base their decision on the expectation of benefits or rewards versus potential costs. What is more, the size of the alliance is assumed to be commensurate to balance power, not more than

¹²⁵Liska, G.F. 1968. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 10-15.

necessary to balance power, creating “a minimum winning coalition.”¹²⁶

Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita followed the line of Liska and Riker, and they argued that nation-states form alliances only when they see ‘utility’ in it. In other words, alliances are only formed when states perceive potential benefits of a decision to join an alliance outweigh the costs and risks. Glenn Snyder, who built on this line of argument by using game theory, argued that states form or join alliances if they gauge or assess ‘the payoffs’ from the decision to form an alliance be greater than the payoffs from not forming such an alliance.¹²⁷ That led to the game-theoretic pay-off matrixes. Bruce Russett underlined significant limitations though. Regarding the formation of minimum winning coalitions, he cautions that its limitations are severe: When more than just a few actors are involved, it is almost impossible to determine what a minimum winning coalition would or should be. The complexities of measurement, weighting, perceptions, and levels of commitment are multiplied by both the numbers of allies and adversaries being considered. Game theory models of alliances assume a zero-sum “terminal” situation with fairly clear information on relative costs and payoffs, but international politics is not generally regarded as zero-sum and is “a continuous game, not an episodic one”.

Moreover, communication and perceptions are usually imperfect, which makes knowledge of relative payoffs difficult, especially for individual members of an alliance.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, Stephen Walt sees alliances arising as a response to “threat”. He defines “threat” as a combination of capabilities (power) and intent (both motivations and perceptions). “Geographic proximity” and “offensive power”

¹²⁶Riker, W.H. 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven, Cr: Yale University Press, pp.176-183.

¹²⁷Snyder, G.H. 1984. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics” *World Politics* 36-4, pp. 83-103.

¹²⁸Russett, B.M. 1968. “Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12-3: 285-301.

are also included as components of threat. According to him, balancing against a threat is far more common than bandwagoning. He concludes that the greater the threat, the less ideology and common culture matter, asserting the central role of threats in alliance formation independent of ‘ideology’.¹²⁹

Theories that are brought forward by K. Waltz and S. Walt have, by and large, dominated the alliance (strategies of nation-state alignments) literature. Succinctly, both authors claim that nation-states would often balance rather than bandwagon with the stronger or more threatening power, either to preserve themselves or maximize security in a self-help system.

3.3.3. Hegemonic Stability Theory

Hegemonic Stability Theory is applied both by political economists and realists in analyzing international affairs. It rose to prominence in international relations literature (especially in the US) during the 1970s as part of an effort to explain the stability and instability in the world economy. After the Cold War, it is particularly used to assess the US foreign policy in the absence and power vacuum of the former Eastern bloc, and, to explain the policies of nation-states in general.¹³⁰ The 1991 Gulf War, the Balkan interventions in the late 1990s, expansion of the NATO and structural polarity after the Cold War have all often been examined through the hegemonic theory lenses.

Hegemonic stability theory is separable from, but correlated to ‘leadership theory’ and ‘hegemony theory’.¹³¹ Hegemonic stability theory argues that

¹²⁹Chiu, Daniel Y. 2003. “International Alliances in the Power Cycle Theory of State Behavior” *International Political Science Review* Vol. 24 No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics, January, p. 124.

¹³⁰Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the Unipolar Moment” *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 3, p. 172.

¹³¹Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the

international politics is characterized by a succession of hegemonies in which a single powerful state dominates the system as a result of its victory in the last hegemonic war.¹³² The hegemon establishes an international order that promotes its own particular interests and values and supplies public goods such as international security and international economic order.

There are two versions of hegemonic stability theory. The liberal version, in which a 'benevolent' or 'benign' hegemon neither excludes other states from the benefits of public goods nor forces them to share in the costs, is mostly associated with Kindleberger and Keohane. A realist version, in which a 'coercive' hegemon can both exclude other states and compel them to pay the costs of public goods through the use of selective incentives and punishments, is associated with Gilpin and Krasner.

The hegemon provides stability in international security affairs by acting as a balancer of last resort, and supports international monetary and trade regimes by acting as lender and market of last resort. Over time, the hegemon overpays for international public goods in order to maintain its dominance. Meanwhile, differential rates of economic growth and diffusion of military and technological means around the world lead to diffusion of power and the rise of challengers. As a response to its challengers, 'a declining hegemon' attempts to make other states pay for the costs of the international public goods such as stability of international security and international economy. It does so by exacting tribute, by reducing its share of the costs, by changing the rules of the international order it established after the last hegemonic war it won. Finally, it may resort to preventive war so as to

Unipolar Moment" *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 168-174.

¹³²Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. *The World in Depression*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade" *World Politics* Vol.28 No.3, pp.317-347.

maintain its dominant position.¹³³

Mastanduno argues that to explain the foreign and security policy of a single state through hegemonic stability theory, predictions should be established for state behaviors based on the position of the state in international structure, especially the extent to which a state is hegemonic.

This is important since the theory makes a differentiation between ‘hegemonic states’ and ‘declining hegemons’. However, the task of determining the relative position of a powerful state is complicated due to the conceptual ambiguity of the term ‘hegemon.’¹³⁴ Concurrently, scholars disagreed on the extent of the declining position of the US in the aftermath of the Cold War: Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, Richard Haas and Paul Kennedy argued for the relative decline of the US that makes it a declining hegemon whereas Susan Strange, Bruce Russett and Joseph Nye argued for the enduring hegemonic position of the US. The basic argument goes on to posit that when a hegemon turns into a declining one in time, the primary regimes and institutions that are created under its auspices wane, and international stability regarding security and economy deteriorates because of the declining hegemons’ anti-status quo policies that risks system stability and war.

As the last note of notice, Mastanduno argues that hegemonic stability theory is controversial in that it is less a theory, but more a research program that cannot be tested or refuted.¹³⁵

¹³³Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the Unipolar Moment” *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 168-174.

¹³⁴Snidal, Duncan. 1995. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory” *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 579-614.

¹³⁵Sheetz, Mark S. and Mastanduno, Michael - Correspondence, Michael. 1997-98. “Debating the Unipolar Moment” *International Security* Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 168-174.

3.3.4. Alignment Strategies as Policy Choices in Response to American Policy Behaviour after September 11, 2001

Labeling actions as ‘terrorism’ promotes condemnation of groups or actors; a definition may be regarded as reflecting ideological and political bias derived from peculiar interests. As the primary actors of the international system, nation-states have different interests to pursue and they define issues in ways that favor them. Their definitions differ because states have different perceptions, preferences and goals over time. Consequently, lack of a standard definition of terrorism is mainly due to disagreements among nation-states in pursuing their national interests, which may not be same at all times. Furthermore, each state has a list of national interests. The interest that is associated with (not necessarily countering) terrorism is just one of the interest that is pursued. Some states may see interest in the continuation of terrorism or it may not take action against it and simply turn a blind eye. France-Spain relations pertaining to ETA is a case in point. France did not take any action against ETA until after Spain undertook covert operations against the organization in French soil.

The bottom line of the issue is that definitional controversy about terrorism points to different interests of nation-states. It, then, goes without saying that terrorism is highly political. As a politics-laden issue that pinpoints enemies, the term ‘terrorism’ has numerous definitions each of which is designed for political use by its definer/an actor in international politics. More often than not, major powers of a particular historical period have the ascendancy of determining what terms or concepts stand for.

Given such considerations, Laquer in 1977 argued that,

...a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist and nor will it be found in the foreseeable future. To argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a definition is manifestly absurd¹³⁶.

Laquer in 1999 underlines that working-definitions remained restricted to the work at hand and have not found general acceptance among those studying the subject. That point seems largely valid. In passing, Laquer underlines, via Nietzsche, that

‘...only things that have no history can be defined; terrorism, needless to say, has had a very long history. Furthermore, there has not been a single form of terrorism, but many, often with few traits in common. Today there are more varieties than existed thirty years ago, and many are so different from those of the past and from each other that the term terrorism no longer fits some of them. In the future, new terms will probably be found for the new varieties of terrorism.’

In accordance with Waltz’s and Walt’s arguments, alignment scheme of the post-Cold War era would have seen great powers allying to balance more than to bandwagon to protect themselves in a self-help world from either the strongest or most threatening state. This line of argument came under severe critique because of the post-Cold War climate of academic debates: controversy on systemic and state preservation was common, and alleged alignments among non-state entities and nation-states risked analytical clarity. Relationship of Hamas and Hezbollah with the Middle Eastern states presented seemingly insurmountable analytical problems owing to the inclusion of violent non-state entities, their control, motivations and means. Al Qaeda is an altogether unique phenomenon in that it instigated huge debate as to anything related to terrorism at large with remarkable repercussions for foreign policies of nation-states.

¹³⁶Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2004. “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism” *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol.16, No.4 pp.777–794.

The most important historically recent development for international relations is the end of the Cold War. The second most important development for international relations at large and alliance politics and cooperation in particular is the September 11, 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks around the world. These terrorist attacks enforced the consideration of non-state actors and terrorism world-wide. Terrorism became a serious foreign policy problem instead of just a nuisance. Since terrorists interpret Islam peculiarly and explain their atrocities in the name of Islam, Islamism or political Islam (both in its licit/political and illicit/violent forms) came to be recognized as the enemy or the suspect. However, whether this is true or justified is not a concern of this study. Rather, what is important for international relations and security is that Islamism has become a counter-hegemonic movement or ideology in opposition to those states which have up to now defined the ideological, economic and military contours of the international system and order.¹³⁷

In parallel, epistemic arguments for the role of ideas in conducting state policies, private violence or illicit use of force that breaks state monopoly on the use of force, the influence of domestic politics on foreign-policy making, the impact of international organizations on states and the impact of non-state actors (corporations, NGOs, criminal and terrorist organizations, economic black markets and unregulated funds) all come to have influence over state alignments in ways different from the days of the NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. These are some of the important issues that have provoked numerous discussions.¹³⁸ These discussions

¹³⁷Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics" *International Studies Review* 7, 547–569; Ayoub, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North–South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629–643.

¹³⁸NIC Report. 2007. "Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States" *National Intelligence Council* 23 August; Nye, Joseph S. 2002. "The American National

also have important repercussions on alliance theory and cooperation, which have been detailed starting from the very beginning of the first chapter of this study. Significantly, cooperation, alignment and alliance behaviors of states are affected by the increasing political clout of non-state entities. Security cooperation has

Interest and Global Public Goods” *International Affairs* Vol. 78, No. 2 pp. 233-244; Gleason Gregory and Shaihtudinov Marat E. 2005. “Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia” *International Studies Perspectives* 6, 274–284; Hoffmann Stanley. 2002. “Clash of Globalizations” *Foreign Affairs* July-August; Walt, Stephen M. 1997. “Building up New Bogeymen- Review of the Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order” *Foreign Policy* Spring Issue 106; Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2008. “Where Is the World Headed?” *Yale Global* 10 July; Judge, Clark S. 2001-2002. “Hegemony of the Heart-American Cultural Power Threatens Old Orders Worldwide” *Policy Review* Dec.-Jan.; William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang¹, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2, 155-185; Sørensen, Georg. 2007. “Dilemma of Liberal Values After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Weak States” *Security Dialogue* 38, 357; Krebs, Ronald R. and Lobasz, Jennifer K. 2007. “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq” *Security Studies* 16:3 409-451; Scheuer, Michael. Aka. Anonymous with a New Epilogue. 2005. *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* Virginia: Potomac Books; Keohane, Robert and Katzenstein, Peter eds. 2007. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Bolton, John R. 2002. “The United States and the International Criminal Court”, Remarks to the Federalist Society by John R. Bolton, former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Washington DC. November 14; Nye, Joseph. 2004. ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry’ *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 83 no. 3; Judt, Tony and Denis Lacorne. 2005. *With Us or Against Us: Studies in Global Anti-Americanism*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan; Bernard Lewis. 2003. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Toronto; Kagan, Robert. 2008. “The End of the End of History” *The New Republic*, April 23; Kagan, Robert. 2008. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* New York: Alfred A Knopf; Kagan, Robert. 2007. *Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World, from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century*. New York: Vintage Books; Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2008* Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland Paradigm Publishers; Hacke, Christian and Jana Puglierin. 2007. “John H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality” *International Relations* Vol. 21, 3: 367-382; Howard, Michael. 2008. “Are We ‘At War’?” *The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture*; Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. eds. *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Ned Lebow, Richard and Thomas Risse-Kappen. 1995 eds. *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* New York: Columbia University Press; Katzenstein ed. *The Culture of National Security*; William C. Wohlforth. 1998. ‘Reality Check: Revising Theories of International Politics in Response to the End of the Cold War’ *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 4 July, pp. 650–80; Fearon, James D. 1998. ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations’ *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1, No. 1 Fall, pp. 289–314; Alexander Wendt. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; John Gerard Ruggie. 1998. “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 855-885; Kenneth N. Waltz, 2000. “Structural Realism after the Cold War” *International Security* Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 5-41; Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity” *Security Studies* 15 No. 2 April-June: 271-309; Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. 1997. “Individual Leadership and Structural Power” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 30, No. 2 Jun., pp. 257-283; Borer, Douglas A. and Berger, Mark T. 2007. “All Roads Lead to and from Iraq: the Long War and the Transformation of the Nation-State System” *Third World Quarterly* 28:2 457 – 463; Baldwin, David A. 1997. “The Concept of Security” *Review of International Studies* 23, 5–26; Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2006. “Dogmatic Dangers-When Policymaking Rigidifies Ideas” *Academy and Policy*, Vol. 28-2 Summer & *Harvard International Review*.

become vital in protection from and fight against terrorism. Alliances evolve into having more political substance rather than remaining as mere military structures, while coalitions are emergent ways of responding contemporary threats. Thus, balance of power and threat theories appear to have some shortfalls despite their crucial contributions. That is primarily because the source of contemporary threats is not always a nation-state. The threat is ambiguous and the security landscape is different from that of the Cold War as detailed in previous chapters.

3.3.4.1. Schroeder: 'Self-Help Behavior Is Relatively Rare'

In the face of the changing conflict and security environment, other theoretical developments such as that of Paul Schroeder's may help analyze these problems. Although Paul Schroeder's work is underutilized, it opened the door to Randall Schweller's sophisticated follow-up scheme of alignment strategies.

What Schroeder basically posits is that *self-help behavior is relatively rare*. He asserts that self-help behavior does not always explain how states survived from their Westphalian origins up until now.¹³⁹ According to Schroeder, 'self-help means, at least generally, the potential or actual use of a state's own power along with that of other units for the purposes of compellence, deterrence, and other modes of controlling the actions of one's opponents'.¹⁴⁰ However, his definition of 'self-help' is counter to that of Waltz and Walt in that he defines it as *a last resort alignment strategy or a fallback policy*. Self-help, unlike Waltzian and Waltian

¹³⁹For the debate concerning 'self-help', Schroeder, Paul. 1994. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 108–48; Schroeder, Paul. 1995. 'Correspondence – History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 193–5; Glaser, Charles L. 1996. "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as "Self-help"", in Benjamin Frankel ed. *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, London: Frank Cass, pp. 122–63; Mercer, Jonathan. 1995. 'Anarchy and Identity', *International Organization*, Vol. 49 No. 21, pp. 229–52; Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman. 1995. "Correspondence-History versus Neo-realism: A Second Look", *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 182–93.

¹⁴⁰Schroeder, Paul. 1994. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 112.

conceptions, is not defined as balancing against an actual or potential hegemon. In contrast with Waltzian analysis, self-help does not automatically lead to balancing either. He argues that balance of power theory is not that simple enough to equate self-help with balancing persistently. Instead, he persuasively claims that alignment strategies other than bandwagoning and balancing exist: five alignment strategies to which states turn are '*hiding*', '*transcending*', '*bandwagoning*', and '*specializing*', and sometimes in combination with others, *self-help* as the fifth alignment category.

3.3.4.2 Hiding

It is important to underscore that self-help and alignment strategies are conceptualized differently from the way balance of power theory is understood by Waltz and Walt. Schroeder argues that balancing may be prohibitively costly, and this may coerce states to look for alternative options. Facing the hardship of sustaining long-term self-help strategies, states turn to *develop armed forces (internal balancing)*, *forge temporary military alliances*, or *initiate deterrence by diplomacy*. Enhancing the concept of Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen's 'buck-passing'¹⁴¹, he posits '*hiding*'. *Hiding* is done by ignoring or declaring neutrality during crises. The objective of hiding as a defensive alignment strategy is to eschew war or conflicts short of all-out war that includes full mobilization of mass armies, while gaining or increasing 'security'. Again, the goal is not revisionist such that the state is not aiming to gain power, but hiding state is attempting more defensively to maintain position and security. If states escape from joining into an alliance and avoid using force, they hide from other states by

¹⁴¹Christensen, Thomas J. & Jack Snyder. 1990. 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity' *International Organization* Spring Vol. 44, No. 2.

seeking security trade-offs through diplomatic visits, cordial and friendly relations and non-military support. Formal military commitments or commitments induced by a military alliance membership are thereby avoided by the hiding state.

3.3.4.3. Transcending

Another alternative alignment is '*transcending*'. It is applied to solve problems rather than hedging against them. States, Schroeder argues, may achieve transcending by stopping threats or thwarting them. Yet, an institutional framework is seen as necessary, one that is based on international consensus or formal agreements. Norms, rules and procedures are included to be active in the implementation of the transcending alignment. This is where Schroeder establishes a link to regimes. This establishes another connection to Glen Snyder's 'third-party ties', through which Snyder explained the cooperative and appeasing strategies of states against domineering or threatening states without entering into alliances. Domineering state is what Waltz sees as more capable state to be balanced, and it is what Walt sees as most threatening state to be balanced. Schroeder sees conciliatory or cooperative strategy on the one hand and the compromising/appeasing alignment strategy on the other. He focuses on the study of cooperation as a strategy of survival in contrast to Waltz and Walt. He comes out of the arguably extreme parsimony of the hypothesis that balancing is the only prevalent alignment strategy leaving no room for any other alignment types and policies.

In lieu of hiding and transcending alignments, he opposes the Waltzian and Waltian arguments that balancing happens more than bandwagoning. For Waltz and Walt, military alliances dominate international relations; bandwagoning occurs

less than balancing and bandwagoning signals insecurity and loss of independence. For Schroeder, throughout the Westphalian era nation-states both small and great are aware of their vulnerabilities and they seek survival not only by balancing, but also by bandwagoning, hiding and transcending. Contrary to Waltz, Schroeder argues that bandwagoning occurs more than balancing. He goes on to argue that 'specializing' is yet another alignment strategy that may be applied instead of balancing.

3.3.4.4. Specializing

'*Specializing*' is fulfilling vital roles or functions that no other state could do or do so as well. Specialized states are performing roles that provide other states 'support of assistance'. Schroeder claims that such functions and roles often modified the behavior of states, including great powers, and significantly changed their purposes and methods in using power.'¹⁴²

Randall Schweller expands on some of the above-mentioned strategies of Schroeder. Different configurations of alignments are discussed. However, as a unique concept, Schweller coined *underbalancing* in 2006 (Unanswered Threats) that shed light on cooperation among states during the war on terrorism campaign. Another depiction is Walt's scheme of strategic reactions of states to American power after September 11 (*Taming American Power*), which is discussed further below.

¹⁴²Schroeder, Paul. 1994. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 126.

3.3.4.5. Schweller: Bandwagoning for Profit and Underbalancing

Schweller argues that bandwagoning is *not* the opposite of balancing. A state not only bandwagons with a stronger nation-state to increase power, but also to gain a reward or *profit* by responding to an opportunity, not just responding to a threat. Therefore, bandwagoning may be expedient. With resemblances to Schroeder's transcending alignment, *binding* behaviour restrains them in engaging in balancing against the stronger states. This is so simply because a state may have bilateral rivalries with commensurate states which can be viewed either as potential allies to balance against the strongest or threatening state or as rivals against which advantages could be obtained by bandwagoning, which is allying with the strongest state. As a result, binding may even lead to new alliance formation in order to tie down revisionist states within an institutional framework because it allows lesser powers to attempt to acquire greater 'voice' within the alliance, promote cooperation and consensus, or entangle and prevent systemic disruption. This may be repeated within an already existing alliance, too.

In the light of above-mentioned arguments, alliances in collective security terms can be seen as intra-restraining institutional tools that aim to integrate or manage the revisionist state. Lesser states may try to attract or even include the revisionist state into an alliance if it is not already within it. Congruently, post-Cold War NATO can be seen as an institutional tool for binding the US through intra-alliance dynamics. Binding as such is restraining the strongest state without openly challenging it in capability or power terms. This is done without resorting to traditional external military balancing. Then, binding is bandwagoning without remaining subservient to the greater power. That is what the EU states tried to do regarding the American power after the Cold War.

Balancing is, according to Schweller, allying with a weaker state or with a coalition of them against a stronger revisionist state. However, balancing is not contrasted to binding and bandwagoning. Indeed, Schweller argues that balancing, binding and bandwagoning are not mutually exclusive. They are overlapping. Why the three alignment strategies are regarded as overlapping becomes clear when aggression is introduced.

Balancing may lead to *aggression*, which is itself an altogether different alignment designed to wage war. Balancing may precede aggression and most of the time, claims Schweller, big crises or tensions such as World War I and II are the result of balancing turning into aggression. Aggression is different from bandwagoning and balancing: Bandwagoning may be for profit rather than to increase power. Binding happens to ease out or tame revisionist state institutionally. Neither bandwagoning nor binding maintains or increases tension for long; rather they gradually extinguish fire in relations. In contrast, since balancing is lucid challenge to the revisionist state unlike binding and bandwagoning, it maintains or increases tension. If the tension is kept relatively stable or cold, it may not lead to all-out war as in the case of the Cold War. Thus, balancing does not always precede or give way to aggression, which is the war-like or war-prone state behaviour. Within such delimitation, balancing though different from other strategies is associated with binding and bandwagoning as one of the alignment strategies to manage conflictive and tense relations. Thus, Schweller presents strategies other than bandwagoning and balancing that manage the revisionist or stronger states.

Importantly, balancing and bandwagoning are not categorized as binary opposites but as overlapping strategies of power management. States may not

always clearly or notably balance against the strongest state due to tremendous costs and risks attached. However, that does not mean acceding to strongest state preferences at all times. This approach includes a synthesis of bandwagoning and balancing that merges and fine-tunes the policy of giving in or compromising and the policy of obstructionism, which is resistance without external military balancing.

Another explanation of alignment and cooperation among states is made by Stephen Walt who has studied the reactions of nation-states towards the US foreign policy, especially after the initiation of the 2003 American intervention in Iraq. Walt argues -in *Taming American Power, the Global Response to US Primacy*- that at a time when America's dominance abroad is being challenged as never before, the strategies that rival-states have devised to counter the US is important for alliance studies. The book evaluates anti-American alignment strategies. That evaluation also is equivalent to why and how cooperation among states is limited even when they are eager to fight against terrorism. Therefore, the book's significance is that it focuses on intra-alliance and intra-coalitional setbacks in states' fight against terrorism.

His book makes the case that the ever-increasing tide of opposition against the US not only could threaten the America's ability to achieve its foreign policy goals in the present but also may undermine its dominant position in the future. He argues that while Americans tend to see US pre-eminence as benign or positive, it arouses fear, worry and resentment around the world. It also explains why American influence and soft power have declined during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

3.3.5. Opposing Alignment Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era

Walt divides the responses of countries into two main groups: Opposing strategies and accommodating strategies. *Opposing strategies* are balancing, balking, binding, delegitimation and blackmailing. *Accommodating strategies* are bandwagoning, bonding and penetration. These strategies are also strategies that are used by states for solving intra-alliance problems. Therefore, they explain how and why states become ‘uncooperative’¹⁴³, if not conflictive.

3.3.5.1. Balancing

‘*Balancing*’ is the strategy of opposing the threatening state and it comes in two traditional forms, ‘internal’ and ‘external balancing’. As a rather new-comer concept of alignment strategies coined by R. Pape, ‘soft-balancing’ is also used by Walt.

Internal balancing is the build-up and mobilization of internal sources of a country in its opposition to the threatening state. *External balancing* is allying with other states against the threatening state, which is the US throughout the book. External balancing includes formal alliance formation while internal balancing is done through symmetric and asymmetric strategies. *Symmetric strategy* is mainly conventional military procurement and arms-build up of other nations that oppose the US. *Asymmetric strategies* includes transnational terrorism without a state-sponsor, state-sponsored terrorism, terrorism with weapons of mass destruction and the states’ ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction making the issue of horizontal proliferation an opposition leverage against the hegemon or the primary power in the system.

¹⁴³‘Uncooperative’ is used in lieu with the definition and explanation of ‘cooperation’ that is in pages one to six of this chapter.

‘Soft-balancing’ is a rather new concept developed by R. Pape so as to explain the reactions of the rest of the world against the US policies after the September 11 attacks.¹⁴⁴ So as to start explaining, soft-balancing might be defined roughly as an opposing strategy short of traditional military balancing. Qualifications and further delimitation of the concept are necessary though, and they are mainly fourfold; they are explained below shortly. However, the definition of soft balancing must be developed in advance to the qualifications or goals to which it serves.

‘Soft-balancing’ can best be understood in comparison to ‘hard balancing’: Walt defines hard balancing as that strategy of alignment among states that ‘concentrates on the overall balance of power and seeks to assemble a countervailing coalition that will be strong enough to keep the dominant power in check.’¹⁴⁵ In other words, hard-balancing seeks to change the distribution of capabilities to balance the revisionist state and maintain equilibrium thereby. Soft-balancing, however, does not expect to alter the distribution of capabilities or does not aim at a re-distribution. Distinguishingly, soft-balancing accepts the current balance of power, but aims to obtain better results within it.

The US is still regarded as ‘the preponderant power’, but that does not inhibit opposition strategies by other states. That causes a problem of American power.¹⁴⁶ To understand the salience of soft-balancing, it is essential to briefly elaborate what a preponderant power refers to. ‘Preponderant power’ or position of

¹⁴⁴Pape, Robert. 2005. A. “Soft Balancing against the United States” *International Security*, Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp7-45.

¹⁴⁵Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 126-132.

¹⁴⁶ Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p.13.

primacy is not meant to denote unipolar power. As the term preponderant implies, the US is just greater than other states in terms of different types of power; however, its influence and the ability to achieve its objectives is structurally limited as discussed in chapter 3 on non-polarity. Yet, preponderance is no small advantage on its side. Apart from the polar logic of analysis, it is especially tenable to maintain that the US is far and away in its own league in terms of military capability with forward defense bases all around the world. Its power-projection capability is simply unrivalled. Yet, military capability alone (the capacity to compel or deter and punish when deterrence fails) does not equal to achieving goals and compliance or having remarkable influence over the rest of the world in a nonpolar era. This is exactly why soft-balancing succeeds. Consequently, soft-balancing is the response strategy of states against the US in a nonpolar era. Soft-balancing can only be possible in a non-polar era where power is diffused, where power has acquired additional uses by states and non-state entities.¹⁴⁷ Thus, soft-balancing is the strategy that is directly linked to and follows from the structural factors discussed in the first three chapters. Accordingly, waning of major war explains why hard-balancing did not occur regarding the post-September 11 US foreign policy. Instead of raising armies, states soft-balanced: conscious coordination of diplomatic action so as to obtain outcomes in contrary to US preferences. Those outcomes could not be achieved unless states that oppose the US gave each other mutual support. Then, cooperation to manage the US is soft-balancing. The cooperation centers on the conscious attempt to deny or limit the US ability to impose its preferences on other states.

¹⁴⁷Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp.24, 126-132, 143, 178, 277.

Soft-balancing must be qualified. It has *four goals*. First, states soft-balance in order to increase their ability to resist US pressure including, according to Walt, the use of force. It is, then, seen also as a preliminary phase leading to military hard balancing. Exchange of intelligence information is a way to resist US pressure exemplified by Serbia-Iraq, North Korea-Iraq, China-Iraq and Russia-China.¹⁴⁸

Secondly, joining forces with others is a way of improving bargaining position in negotiations whether conducted bilaterally or multilaterally. The bargaining issue at stake may be of both low and high politics, such as environmental precautions, genetically modified food, economic and trade talks or the use of military force and manoeuvres. During forums under the aegis of international organizations, soft-balancing or conscious coordination of policies against the threatening state may prove to be strengthening the bargaining power of states. Soft-balancing states can consciously choose to play into their hands with the expected benefit of resisting or limiting the imposition of strongest state preferences upon them. The example is the World Trade Organization arrangements among India, Brazil, China, and South Africa representing a group of twenty-one developing countries. They came together to force developed states to cut trade barriers. It paid off and developed countries made concessions in 2004.

Third, soft-balancing may be a warning to stop doing something. Sino-Russian Friendship Pact of 2001 is an example. Russia and China demonstrated that they had other options than to concede to US demands, and that it is a prospective hard-balancing in the making. It may be evaluated as an indication of a potential hard-balancing in the future. In 2004, Russia and China announced a joint military exercise involving all three force structures, land, air and naval forces.

¹⁴⁸ Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 126-132.

Moreover, in response to the alignment of US with its allies such as Israel, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, Russia showed behaviours of near-alignment with Iran. Iran and Russia, as a strategic response of soft-balancing, joined efforts to limit the influence of the US and its allies regarding the Central Asian and Middle Eastern power contestation: Russia and Iran is not in a conflict with each other with regard to energy security and Iranian nuclear ambitions.¹⁴⁹

Fourth goal and usage of soft-balancing is that it serves to obtain relative independence from the strongest power or reducing the interdependence between the soft-balancing states and the threatening state. European efforts to develop a unified defence force would make Europe less dependent upon the US protection. This would enable it to defend its own interests on its own and in a way it sees fit - that is multilaterally. That would also strengthen European bargaining hand in international organizations and institutions.

Best example to soft-balancing, according to Stephen Walt, came with “the Bush administration’s failure to acquire UN Security Council authorization for its 2003 preventive war.”¹⁵⁰ He views it as a perfect example of soft-balancing. The US was able to persuade only three states within the Security Council to support its call to arms against Iraq. This was due to both American heavy-handed diplomacy and to soft-balancing among France, Germany and Russia. The latter anti-war group of states did not balance traditionally or in the classic sense. They did not send armies to resist the US militarily. They did not send military support or aid to Iraq. Yet, their opposition made it safer and less costly for other states to follow suit and oppose the US policy softly. Turkey refused US requests to use its soil

¹⁴⁹ Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 126-132.

¹⁵⁰ Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p. 130.

during the war. Mexico and Cameroon were encouraged by the soft-balancing alignment among Russia, France and Germany and opposed diplomatically. By adopting a unified position, all these nations denied the US the legitimacy that came with the UN mandate.

3.3.5.2. Balking

Second opposition strategy is '*balking*'. It has three variants. Balking is ignoring the strongest state's requests or demands, or doing the bare minimum to avoid an overt clash. It is a close cousin of balancing. When states balance against the strongest power, they seek increasing or bettering their position relative to the hegemon or the leader state. Balking is not seeking to acquire a better position; rather it is just trying to avoid compliance with the demands of the hegemon because balking state perceives that compliance is not in its interest. Turkey's refusal to give access to US forces prior to 2003 Iraq intervention is an example to balking. It is assessed that America lacked either the will or the capacity to compel obedience. Another example is premiers Sarkozy's and Merkel's refusal to accept the demands of President Obama regarding Turkey's accession to the EU. Iran's refusal to allow further inspections of its nuclear activities is still another example.¹⁵¹

Although balking is mostly 'just saying no', it is a surprisingly effective strategy of opposition. Moreover, it can take two additional forms or variants, namely 'dragging one's feet' and 'free-riding'. Dragging one's feet is not saying no, but it is doing the minimum necessary and prolonging the so-called process of cooperation. The EU member states are arguing that they are fighting against

¹⁵¹"US "Special Coordinator" against PKK terror submits resignation", <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/7396686.asp?gid=74&sz=69985>

terrorism but they are delaying the necessary steps to be taken. EU initially did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization unlike the US. After a long time, PKK was added to the terrorist organizations list. However, at almost no time, extradition problems are solved and European Union denied transferring terrorists. In this case, the definitional problem of terrorism does not matter because the EU does not take the necessary steps to cooperate with Turkey even after its acceptance of the PKK as a terrorist organization, as the remarks of Joost Lagendijk indicates.¹⁵² American pledge to fight against the PKK in Northern Iraq and yet its commitment to its pledge at a bare minimum is another example.

3.3.5.3. Free-Riding

Free-riding is the third form of balking according to Walt. In free-riding, a state genuinely supports strongest state's policy, but it does not want to contribute its share of costs. It is akin to 'foot-dragging' variant of balking, yet free-riding states do not try to thwart the policies of the strongest state. Free-riding states just try to make the strongest state and other states pay for the agreed course of action. This is how Walt conceptualizes free-riding as a variant of balking.

The term 'free-riding' is basically of the collective goods theory jargon, and its equivalent in alliance literature is 'burden-sharing problem'. *Free-riding* is lack of burden-sharing: obtaining something with no or very less effort or cost. It is benefiting without contribution, by taking advantage of the efforts of the rest. In other words, it is taking a share from the final-product with low or no participation in its production - taking without giving. If all attempt to free-ride or freeloader, however, there is no provision and no 'ride'. The job, defined along the agreed

¹⁵²2007. "10 Yil Once Teror Konusunda Sacmaliyorduk", *Zaman Online*, 23 Kasim, Cuma <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=616810>

course of action among allies, is not done; producing no benefits for anybody. Free-riding is a common problem of collective action whose logic is that of the N-Prisoner's Dilemma. Free-riding is also a common burden-sharing problem *within* alliances.

According to Stephen Walt, 'free-riding as the third variant of balking' largely explains the setbacks in the current effort to control 'international terrorism'.¹⁵³ With just one reservation, this study follows the validity of 'free-riding' in explaining the limits of cooperation and intra-alliance problems among states in their struggle against terrorism. The reservation is that contemporary terrorism is not international, but it manifests mostly 'transnational' characteristics.¹⁵⁴ 'International' signifies the cooperative struggle of states, not the threat. 'International' denotes the current effort of nation-states against transnational terrorism. Thus, an *international effort of nation-states* against the *non-state centric transitional threat* is at issue.

The confrontation of the different scales and scope of efforts, namely international versus transnational, is crucial. It is crucial because the nuance between international and transnational explains the limits of cooperation among states. Balking and free-riding must be evaluated within this framework, a point which is not studied in any of the alliance literature studies as yet. The international effort of nation-states confronts transnational effort of terrorists. All of the above-mentioned alignment strategies must be evaluated within this scheme. Unless this is

¹⁵³Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p. 142.

¹⁵⁴First three chapters qualify the nuanced characteristics of the contemporary terrorism. It does so in its correlation and difference to international terrorism. Contemporary terrorism thereby is defined as 'transnational terrorism'. Transnational terrorism has overlapping features with international terrorism; however, it is still separable due to some of its distinct characteristics explained in chapter one and chapter two. The nuances between international and transnational terrorism are of degree, and not of absolutes. The conceptualization methodology of this dissertation basically follows that of Baldwin's: Baldwin, David A. 1997. "The Concept of Security" *Review of International Studies* 23, 5-26.

done, intra-alliance cooperation problems cannot be understood well enough. Accordingly, this raises the difficulty that faces the traditional alliance literature: how to integrate the non-state centric transnational threat formation into the literature so that implications of the threat for the literature will not weaken but improve the approaches that are reviewed in this chapter. The point is detailed in the next chapter about strategies of states in cooperation against terrorism.

In the light of that point, it is turned to 'balking' strategy of alignment again. Why do states balk? In other words, why do they become uncooperative by saying no or by prolonging the implementation of their share, or by free-riding? States balk particularly because there are conflicts of interests between the primary power and the rest of the states. However, rather than balancing, balking is preferred to minimize costs and damage to interests even where common goals exist between the strongest state and the rest. Balking is not open hostility or strong opposition; rather it is a strategy to manage the primary power or the leader state. It is an attempt to channel policies of the strongest state or primary power in a way that makes it consider the interests of others. Although the US pressured Russia to stop helping Iran to build a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, the Russian government politely refused and balked. The US simply could not get what it wanted: crippling the means with which Iran struggles to become a nuclear power. Balking forced the US to devise policies that calculate the interests of other states too.

3.3.5.4. Binding

Binding is the strategy used by states that do not want to balance, but still want to restrain the use of strongest state's use of power. It is a strategy to limit dominance. Binding is the use of norms and international institutions to restrain the

strongest state or the threatening state. This strategy is most effective in non-military issues. While balancers oppose the primary power by distancing themselves, binders embrace and pull it in an institutional and normative framework. The metaphor for binding is the Gulliver lying on the beach tied down by numerous Lilliputians, who are weak to oppose him openly. Thus, they bind the primary or strongest state. The logic of binding lies in the perception of some states that international institutions play a powerful role in sustaining international cooperation. The prevailing view of institutionalism is that states that would like to cooperate can do so more easily when they establish rules, norms and procedures among each other to regulate their relations. These rules help states determine whether their partners are living up to the specified terms of cooperation. The rules and procedures also make it easier to negotiate agreements and provide mechanisms that distribute the benefits of cooperation. Equally important, international institutions confer legitimacy on actions of the most powerful states. The institutionalist approach argues that if weaker states perceive that the strongest state will use its power when there is broad international backing, they will be less concerned about the asymmetries of power between themselves and the strongest state. Binding, then, is to place institutional and normative limits on the unilateral use of the strongest state's power.

3.3.5.5. Blackmailing

Under certain conditions, weaker states can blackmail stronger ones. Any benefit obtained by threat or pressure is the basis of blackmailing. The blackmailing state threatens to take some action that the victim or blackmailed state wants to prevent, but at the same time declares that it will quit taking action if the

victim complies with the blackmailer's demands.

North Korea's interaction with the US is an example. North Korea is a tragic economic failure and uses its nuclear aspirations as a blackmailing leverage against the US. It uses the threat to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a blackmailing instrument and obtains several of its demands. From 1994, the US, Japan and South Korea agreed to provide North Korea with two light-water nuclear reactors, fuel, food and economic assistance. The US, during the Clinton administration years, came very close to exchanging high-level visits.

How does the blackmailing strategy work? Initially, it is worth noting that it is tempting to blackmail a rich state or, via Rosecrance, 'a trading or a virtual state' then a poor one.¹⁵⁵ Since this is a strategy to make the blackmailed state to pay up, blackmailing a weak state is relatively rare. A latent blackmailer has to meet several conditions. First, it must have the ability to do something that the blackmailed state does not want to happen. Secondly, the unwanted action that is threatened by blackmailer cannot be easily prevented by the victim or blackmailed state. Third, the demands of the blackmailer must not be too large. Otherwise, the victim state may decide to fight rather than pay up the blackmailer. Finally, the victim state must be assured that paying up will prevent the threatened action/blackmailing to disappear. Additionally, what North Korean behavior from 1994 onwards showed is that blackmail strategy is not likely to work if the blackmailer refuses to be bought.

¹⁵⁵Griffiths, Martin. 1999. *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. London: Routledge, pp. 89-95. Richard Rosecrance, argues: "What will power look like in the century to come? Imperial Great Britain may have been the model for the nineteenth century? "...but Hong Kong will be the model for the twenty-first." We are entering the Age of the Virtual State -- when land and its products are no longer the primary source of power, when managing flows is more important than maintaining stockpiles, when service industries are the greatest source of wealth and expertise and creativity are the greatest natural resources."

During the Cold War, Soviet and American clients blackmailed their superpower patrons. Egyptian leader Nasser in early 1970s and South Vietnamese leaders during most of the Cold War threatened to re-align with the other superpower or resign from alignment and stay neutral if they do not receive greater benefits in return for acceptance of their patron's preferences.¹⁵⁶ Recently, several states have exploited the US preferences regarding the war on terrorism in order to receive concessions and benefits that serve their own interests. Russia, China, Pakistan and Uzbekistan are examples in point. They all asked for concessions on human-rights issues so as to cooperate with the US against terrorism. The US turned a blind eye to human-rights conditions, and has given political and economic support to these countries in exchange for cooperation against terrorism. The details are examined in the following chapter about the nation-states' declarations and actions taken on the ground.

3.3.5.6. Delegitimation

Delegitimation is a restraining strategy that seeks to erode the soft power of the primary nation-state in the system. Normative and ideological dominance of the system is by and large sustained by the hegemon or the strongest state in the international system. The aim of delegitimation is to erode the influence of the strongest state by portraying it as an irresponsible state or one that does not live up to its own norms. Since the norms of the hegemon are also the norms that shape the basic values of an international order, delegitimation is especially effective when used in combination with the strategy of binding. The delegitimation strategy pictures the strongest state as being extremely selfish that does not pay any

¹⁵⁶Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 161-177.

attention to others' interests. Moreover, it portrays it as violent or aggressive. As such, delegitimation strategy aims to erode the legitimacy of the targeted state.

The belief throughout history that the kings rule by 'divine right' strengthened their control over their societies because when the society saw the status of royalty and aristocracy as God-given, no reordering of society or challenge to status quo emerged such as riots along the democratic lines. Thus, reordering any system of rule requires picturing it as 'corrupt', or 'illegitimate'. It goes without saying that legitimacy is different from being legal.

Similar concerns arise when a state enjoys a dominant position in the international system. If other states see the existing international structure of power as 'legitimate', they are less likely to challenge the dominant nation-state and its values along which the international system is largely shaped usually after major wars.¹⁵⁷ However, if states see the prevailing power distribution and the use of it as illegitimate or 'unfair', they start to look for ways to change it. Thus, being 'a force for good' matters to persuade states that the use of power is acceptable. That is the use of force will not be used arbitrarily without recourse to standards of state behavior described in the codes of international organizations. International organizations form a web of standards with which states manage their relations especially decreasing the uncertainty and security dilemma. When international organizations are left aside, some states perceive to be left out in the cold because they assess that their interests are violated by unilateral behaviours with no credible assurances given in advance.

What characteristics or behaviours make a policy seen as legitimate? First, conformity with established procedures is a key condition of acquiring legitimacy.

¹⁵⁷Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

If actions result from a previously agreed-upon process, they are more likely to be assessed as legitimate in comparison to a situation where such a process is lacking. In democracy, the authority of leaders is formed by winning fair elections. New laws are regarded as legitimate if they follow from legislative procedures. Similarly, conformity with established procedures is a condition for acquiring international legitimacy. When a state acts in accordance with the established international norms, procedures and modalities, its actions are likely to be perceived as legitimate. This basis of legitimacy depends upon the logic of appropriateness.

Secondly, nation-state actions will be perceived as legitimate if the effects of them are largely beneficial for others. This source of legitimacy depends upon ‘the logic of consequences’. Thirdly, actions will be seen as legitimate when they are *perceived* as being ‘moral.’ That presumes that ends do not always justify the means. Walt explains it in the following vein:

Actions that produce net positive consequences may still be illegitimate if they violate widely accepted moral principles. The removal of a despot might be wholly desirable, for example, but not if one has to slaughter hundreds of innocent children in order to do it. In other words, the ends, the ends do not necessarily justify the means. Even when its actions yield positive results, therefore, US primacy will appear more legitimate if it also appears to conform to prevailing moral norms.¹⁵⁸

The efforts of an international coalition of lawyers and human rights groups to prosecute the US for violating the laws of war with the claim that it used illegal weapons and targeted civilians during the 1999 Kosovo war and the 2003 war against Iraq is an example. Another example is the European and Arab criticisms that the US support for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is in conflict with the basic principles that the US argues to be defending. They argue that the support for Israeli occupation is against the principle of self-determination

¹⁵⁸Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p.167.

and basic human rights. The United States is also delegitimized by the argument that it failed to act in the case of the Rwandan genocide. As the US proclaims itself as the leader of the free world and beacon of hope for security, stability and democracy, these criticisms are not argument-wise totally in vain, resulting in the erosion of legitimacy.

3.3.6. Accommodating Strategies

3.3.6.1. Bandwagoning

‘Bandwagoning’ occurs when a state aligns with the strongest or most threatening state it faces. Bandwagoning occurs if a state perceives another state as powerful and potentially aggressive and if it is also convinced that the only existing option to avoid punishment is to align with it. According to Walt, bandwagoning is a form of appeasement unlike Schroeder’s and Schweller’s above-mentioned conceptualizations of bandwagoning. Bandwagoning states hope minimize the damage to their interests by convincing the threatening state that they are loyal supporters. Walt argues that bandwagoning has been rare throughout history because aligning with the source of the threat emboldens the aggressive state. Therefore, he argues that states usually balance against threatening nation-states rather than being cowed and bandwagon.

3.3.6.2. Regional Balancing

Another alignment strategy is ‘regional balancing’. When a state wants to acquire advantages to be used against a regional threat or rival, it seeks to obtain the support of the strongest state in the system. Although this strategy comes close to be a bandwagoning strategy when viewed from dynamics of the regional power-

to-global power relations, it is a balancing strategy at the regional level when two regional states are rivaling each other and one of them is getting outside help from the global power.

Regional balancing is not a new strategy. During the Cold War, regional states sought superpower support in order to balance against adjacent or nearby threats. North and South Korea in the East; Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia in Africa; Cuba and Latin American states in the Americas; Egypt, Israel and Turkey in the Eurasian rimland all sought the US or the Soviet help to meet a proximate or nearby threat. The proximity to threatening state was determining. Nearby states were generally perceived to be threatening while those that are far away were less likely so. Turkey sought American support against the nearby threat of the Soviet Union as was the case for Europe. The US separated by two oceans from the rest of the world was perceived to be less likely to invade the countries in Asia or Europe. Rather countries turn to it for assistance against neighboring threats in their backyards. This made the US an off-shore balancer. The same was true in the case of the Soviet support for Cuba during the Cold War.

Same motivation seems to be evident today, too. The preferences of Poland and Hungary and Baltic states to join the NATO are an act of regional balancing against the long-term threat of a resurgent Russia. The presence of American troops in Europe can be seen as an off-shore balancing by the US and simultaneously a regional balancing of each European state to one another to prevent any re-nationalization of foreign policies reminiscent of the days before the Cold War. Yet, the latter point of view is controversial in that those who see Europe as a distinct entity different from all other states claim that Europe will not and cannot return to the days of the real-politik even without the American troops stationed on

European soil. The neorealist view is at odds with it arguing that any power that is unbalanced will be balanced sooner or later. This is a corollary of two paralleling assumptions, which namely are that international system does not welcome power vacuums, and that all states are functionally same and neither of them is distinct.

In Asia and the Middle East, support of the US as the dominant power is sought to balance against the regional rivals and nearby threats. China is the country against which American assistance is sought by Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Singapore and Japan. Even without the current rise in Chinese economic and military power, these states need the US as an off-shore balancer in their interactions with one another. In the Middle East, the US support for Israel translates to an obvious regional balancing on the side of Israel against its neighbors. However, it is also central for the relations of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia with the US.¹⁵⁹ Although security cooperation with the US creates serious domestic political problems, they nonetheless perceive benefit in cooperating with the US against internal and external threats and challenges.¹⁶⁰ The same holds true for Turkish-American relations with a twist. Turkish state perceives that it needs to cooperate with the US in order to manage the nearby threats despite the dramatic rise in its society's anti-Americanism.¹⁶¹ However, in this case the Turkish state needs regional balancing not against a state but against terrorist non-state formations such as the PKK. Regarding the political re-

¹⁵⁹Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p. 187-189.

¹⁶⁰Milner, Helen. 1991. "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Theory: A Critique," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17 January, pp. 67-85; David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 50 (1997), pp. 1-33; Buzan, Barry and Richard Little, "Reconceptualizing Anarchy," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1996), pp. 403-39; Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds. 1999. *Explorations and Contestation in the Study of World Politics* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 119-46. Ikenberry, G. John. 1998. "Constitutional Politics in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No.2, pp. 147-77.

¹⁶¹Naím, Moisés. 2003. "Missing Links: The Perils of Lite Anti-Americanism" *Foreign Policy*, No. 136 May- Jun. pp. 95-96.

arrangement of Iraq after the 2003 American intervention, cooperation with the US became inevitable to have voice over the course of developments which affect both internal and external security of Turkey. However, Turkey does not seem to be in need of American support against Syria and Iran as much as Israel does. Therefore, non-state threats appear to be domineering over the Turkish alignment strategies and policy-making agenda especially throughout the 2000s. The fight against Al Qaeda is another cooperation field in which the US and Turkey jointly work. The latter point is detailed separately in the last chapter.

3.3.6.3. Bonding

Another alignment strategy that accommodates the strongest or most threatening state is bonding. It is trying to form close personal ties with the strongest state officials and lending support for its policies in the hope of gaining influence over what the strongest state does. The typical example is Britain's alignment with the US. Especially after September 11 2001 then Prime Minister Blair established close relations with the Bush administration leadership cadre and supported its policies with the hope of changeling the actions that are taken to fight against terrorism with global reach. Integrating themselves with key decision-makers and the leader of the primary power, prime ministers of other countries try to cultivate a close strategic relationship with the strongest state of the system. This may potentially give them 'a place at the table' and encourage the hegemon or the leader state to consult with its bonding partner. Although bonding state cannot reverse its hegemonic partner's policies to which it is firmly committed, it may aspire or prefer to influence how it sees the problems, how it define them and which methods it employs to reach its goals. By doing so, bonding strategy aims at

minimizing the possible damage incurred by the policies of the hegemon on its interests. In that vein, British-American relations reflect a conscious British choice to enter into an unequal partnership with the US, starting from the end of the nineteenth century up until the beginning of the twentieth century. It has done so to connect its declining power to the perceived rising power of the US. When the hegemony or the dominance changed hands from the British to the Americans, the former did not prefer to stay aloof to the US in interests. Although 'the special relationship' between Britain and the United States of America is based on common or similar traditions, language and political culture, the conscious choice of Britain to align with the US is worth highlighting. These latter commonalities ease out the bonding decision without which commonalities cannot be affected to have a connection with and influence over the US to a certain extent.

3.3.6.4. Domestic Political Penetration

An active accommodating alignment strategy is domestic political penetration. States that adopt a pro-strongest state position do so to assure that dominant state is using its soft and hard power in a way that further their interests. Instead of silent loyalty to it, they try to channel a way that primary state's power serves them.

One way to do so is through traditional diplomacy. Trying to influence what other states do is the aim of conducting diplomacy. Another way, as Walt argues, is through manipulation of domestic politics. Manipulation of domestic politics is realized by lobbying activities and public opinion management.

The accommodating alignment strategy of penetration to influence and manipulate US politics resulted in significant debates in the US domestic arena

especially after the publication of the book entitled *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* co-authored by Mearsheimer and Walt. The book, as claimed on the front cover, aims to explain “how a powerful American interest group has created havoc in the Middle East, damaged Israel itself and now threatens an even more perilous future”.¹⁶² Another example given by Walt in *Taming American Power* is the activities of the Armenian lobby to influence specific American legislation with policy consequences for other states.

As an alternative method of penetration, foreign governments may join forces with sympathetic domestic interest groups or lobbies, especially with ethnic diasporas, so as to reach ethnic-oriented policies.¹⁶³ Still another way is to conduct propaganda or public out-reach efforts such as media campaigns. The Saudi government launched a multimillion dollar public campaign that tried to fight the perception that Saudi Arabian royal family was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks.¹⁶⁴

3.4. Cooperation and Alliance Theories: Strengths and Weaknesses

3.4.1 Two Contexts of Interaction

There are currently two contexts of interaction in international relations: Nation-states aligning against other nation-states (the traditional alliance literature template) versus nation-states aligning against non-state formations (the contemporary problematic). The dynamics of nation-states’ cooperation against terrorist groups is different from the previous dynamics of cooperation and

¹⁶²Mearsheimer, John J. & Stephen M. Walt. 2007. *The Israel Lobby and the US Foreign Policy* London & New York: Penguin Books.

¹⁶³Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p.195.

¹⁶⁴Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p.196.

alignment of nation-states against other nation-states. The different dynamic between the two settings lies in the form and source of contemporary threats, which are not emanating from a nation-state.¹⁶⁵ The form of the contemporary threat of terrorism -its transnationality- is the heart of the differences between ‘nation-states versus nation-states context’ and ‘the nation-state to non-state entities context’. The former context is the one in which states view threats as originating from other states, while in the latter context the threat has no address for nation-states to retaliate accurately.

In accordance, the main difference is the transnational entities and the threats they pose. This is crucial to bear in mind for the latter context is an under-studied and under-conceptualized one in the alliance and cooperation literatures. Although that is due to the recent advance of terrorist entities and threats into foreign policy agenda of states, it nevertheless has become the main weakness to be met by alliance and cooperation analyses.

Previously, states have had counter-terrorism policies; yet former counter-terrorism policies did not have much publicized national security priority over other state policies. In the wake of a series of terrorist attacks against the US and Europe, terrorism became a matter of high security concern for the major states, too. As for the rest of the world, terrorism has been a constant concern for long. However, by the turn of the century, it seems that counterterrorism acquired higher priority in the list of state policies. In due course, the study of the above-mentioned difference (between the traditional focus of literatures on state-centric threats and the new problematic that comes with the non-state threats) corresponds with the research question of the present dissertation, namely, to what extent states can show

¹⁶⁵The distinctive features of the contemporary terrorism are discussed in Chapter 7.

previously demonstrated cooperation and alignment behaviors against terrorist groups (that pose non-state centric threats)? The focus tends to be on the behaviors of major actors. There are two principal reasons of it. First, the mainstream theories of cooperation and alliances focus on major states, and significantly less on smaller ones. Secondly, the internationalization of cooperation and alignment against global terrorism is mostly realized by the activation of major powers' capability to set the world agenda.¹⁶⁶ The threat against which inter-state cooperation is urged is the one that is truly transnational or global. Regional or local threats are involved as sideline-concerns of the lesser states to the extent lesser states impact upon cooperation against global terrorism through bargaining.

Unit of analysis of the alliance and cooperation literatures has traditionally been the nation-state. In other words, the literature has long been state-centric. The threat of transnational terrorism (either in its form/modus operandi or source) is not nation-state-centric. Thus, inter-state cooperation against terrorism is tried to be realized against deterritorialized, non-national, sovereignty-free, diffused groups of people, operating at the inter-societal level, within and across different state-borders. The incorporation of the non-state factor in alliance and cooperation theories has yet to come.

Keeping on with the literature shortfall, it goes without saying that terrorists do not operate at the nation-state level and they are largely unattached to the state supervision because they are relatively freed from the previous manipulation or control of nation-states that took place during the Cold War¹⁶⁷; and particularly

¹⁶⁶Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. London & New York: Routledge, pp.11-21.

¹⁶⁷On the nation-state strategies of war-by-proxy, Max, Boot. 2002. *The Savage Wars of Peace*. New York: Basic Books; Towle, Philip. 1981. "The strategy of war by proxy" *The RUSI Journal*, 126:1, pp. 21-26; Slater, Jerome. 1990-1991. "The Superpowers and an Arab-Israeli Political Settlement: The Cold War Years" *Political Science Quarterly*, 105:4, pp. 557-577; Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996. *The State*,

because they are empowered by the structural factor of ‘globalization’ (themes that are examined in the following chapters).

Second structural factor that is to be reconsidered in the literature is the arguments of ‘polarity’ denoting the status of the international system structure. Given that bipolar structure of the Cold War is over by late 1980s, inter-state cooperation against terrorism is carried out in a different structural configuration, which is argued to be ‘nonpolarity’ in the present study.

Explaining these developments is both a challenge and weakness to be met by the traditional cooperation and alliance literature. To conceptualize these phenomena including the transnational threat, it might be possible to think that the threat of transnational terrorism is shaped at an interface-level between the three traditional levels of analysis (a conflation of systemic, unit/state, and the individual levels of analysis). A better formulation is that of ‘the two frameworks’ put forward by Rosenau and Aydinli: While ‘the state-centric framework’ comprises the main premises of the dominant realist research program of International Relations, ‘the multi-centric framework’ seeks to meet globalization-driven analytical challenges.¹⁶⁸ The relation between the two frameworks points to the need to study them in tandem and deserves attention.

Transnational terrorism corresponds to the multi-centric framework of world affairs. It does not have a headquarters unlike those of the conventional armies. Terrorism is a diffused or scattered mode of operation with no central base.¹⁶⁹ Determining whereabouts of terrorists or finding them are a hard task for

War, and the State of War New York: Cambridge University Press, p.143.

¹⁶⁸‘The two frameworks’ are studied in Aydinli, Ersel and James Rosenau eds. 2006. *Globalization, Security, and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition*, Suny Series in Global Politics NY: State University of New York Press; Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁶⁹The play of irony in the semantics points to the form of the threat, if not to its nature which is

intelligence services of nation-states, simply because terrorists are not resident in one particular location for long. That is an analytical challenge not only for policy-making, but also for international relations theories including those of alliance and cooperation.

Most common forms of contemporary warfare deserve clarification within the above-mentioned course of developments. Iraq and Afghanistan are just two of the geographic pieces of the terrorism puzzle. Terrorism, as a form of unconventional warfare, is scattered all around the world. If perpetrators of violence hold portions of territory as in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, then it is appropriate to name such formations as guerillas or insurgents, as often named as such in the literature differentiating ‘insurgency’ from ‘terrorism at large’. Seen from the military strategy literature, the Afghan and Iraqi imbroglio of the start of the twenty-first century are conflicts that range mostly across a spectrum of unconventional tactics or modes of warfare from insurgency, terrorism to civil war. In other words, Iraq and Afghanistan are not only show-cases of terrorism, but they are geographies where several forms of unconventional warfare occasionally take its turn. The cases where ‘transnational terrorism’ exemplifies itself clearly are September 11, 2001 New York City and Virginia; 12 October, 2002 Bali; November 15, 2003 and November 20, 2003 Istanbul; May 16, 2003 Casablanca; 11 March 2004 Spain; September 1, 2004 Beslan; 7 July, 2005 London and 26-29 November, 2008 Mumbai. *These attacks are manifestations of a global scale of*

political. The name of ‘Al-Qaeda’ itself means ‘the base’. The term refers to its so-called universal ideological claim to authority and to its radically peculiar interpretation of Islam, rather than to a specific territory. The name denotes the centrality of its ideology. It neither refers to its centrality of command nor to unity in organizational structure with clear hierarchy. Its ideology is central in its mobilization and operational efforts. In that sense, ‘the base’ is more in the abstract and ideological rather than being territorial. This, inter alia, underlines the transnational form of the threat with its ideology resonating across boundaries. For details, Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

operations, rather than hitting a single country at a regional or local scale.

As such, non-state threats and entities significantly influence the contemporary cooperative relations of nation-states against terrorism. Non-state entities and the threats they pose have understudied repercussions for the state-system conception or the state-centric framework, which does not regard terrorist entities as actors. Therefore, the structural condition in which inter-state cooperation is attempted becomes a must to ponder over. ‘Structural factors’ are those that are inherent in the international situation, whereas the ‘strategic factors’ are those that are more manipulable by actors. Alliance and cooperation literature must press on with the repercussions of non-state entities both for the state-system and alignments of states. The literature is in need of such a systematic analysis.

Apart from decisions or policies of nation-states, the structural factors need to be considered to answer the research questions involving non-state entities. Both the literature on cooperation and the literature on alliances, more often than not, ignore either the systemic level or the unit/nation-state level of analysis: The works in the alliance literature mostly argue from the system-level outlook, while the studies about cooperation among states focus on policies and strategies of nation-states per se. A systematic study that involves both the systemic-level and unit-level analyses of terrorism became necessary because there is no established theory to benefit from in advance. The absence of such systematic studies is another weakness of the literature.

As stated above, the problem with applying the traditional outlook upon the question of nation-states’ cooperation against terrorism originates in the non-state threat. End of the Cold War and September 11, 2001 attacks moved international relations into a relatively new security terrain; while keeping some traditional state-

centric features intact, transnationality and globalization influenced the way power is exercised.

Impact of globalization has tipped the scales of violence and levels of analysis. Terrorism, global economy, religionization of politics and politicization of religion under the process of globalization affected international security and the nation-state system. Customary concepts and analyses of state-to-state relations offer guidelines as to the impact of these developments on security; however they are hard-pressed for development. But if the established theories of international relations and foreign policy have little to say about the causes or nature of terrorism, they are to tell more about how states respond. It is one of the aims of the present study to lay bare how states responded terrorism through alignments and cooperation with one another. States' policy-responses and strategies against terrorism and their cooperation and alignments with each other are not carried out systematically either. This study tries to take a modest step in that direction.

Another weakness of the extant literature is that they ignore the development of 'the security community among the most-industrialized nation-states'. At the same time, the alliance and cooperation literature underestimate a corollary development: the effect of the absence of war within the security community. One of the consensual points of the alliance literature is that defensive alliances such as the NATO are most effective when war is perceived to be in the offing. However, the contemporary trajectory of warfare within the shifting security environment presents war not as large-scale military confrontations of armies in battlefields, but mostly as economic and normative competition or rivalry. The enemies are not at the gates. Contestation of politics among the Western powers shifted from the military form to non-military form: Not battle-formations of armies, but

corporation, finance and investment formation of white-collar workers throughout the liberal economic market is the name of the game in the US and Europe. This is the essence of Thomas Friedman's works on globalization, under which the power of 'the digital herd' and 'attitudes' refer to the war of economics and the role of ideas respectively.¹⁷⁰ His works found much echo in the world academic community.

Unlike the centuries-long conflict environment that was resilient until after 1945, major powers such as the EU member-states, Canada, the US and Japan do not even contemplate war among each other today, let alone anticipate one.¹⁷¹ When conventional warfare does not even come to mind as an instrument to reach political goals, waning or declining of major war and conquest, via Jervis, came to be "a change of spectacular proportions in the history of international relations".¹⁷² Robert Jervis sees 'the security community' and accompanying 'absence of major war' as more important for international security than the September 11, 2001 attacks or terrorism at large. Lack of fear of war or no contemplation of war gives a hard time for balance of power theory. New accounts are initiated to fill the void.¹⁷³ Thus, the waning of major war argument has to be factored in the discussion of cooperation in general and alliance formation and maintenance in particular. The alliance theories did not come to terms with the absence of war neither in Europe nor among the US, EU member-states, Canada and Japan.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰Friedman, Thomas L. 1999. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Friedman, Thomas L. 2003. *Longitudes and Attitudes-World in the Age of Terrorism* NY: Anchor Books.

¹⁷¹The argument of decline of conquest and major war is examined in Chapter 3.

¹⁷²Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. London& New York: Routledge, p.13.

¹⁷³For 'soft-balancing', Pape, Robert. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States" *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp. 7-45; Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 24, 126-132, 143, 178.

¹⁷⁴Goldgeier, James M., Michael McFaul. 1992. "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era" *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 467-491.

The current international setting is composed of the interactions among nation-states, international organizations, non-state entities and economic and financial markets. In this setting, nation-states are resilient and they continue to define their stake and position by their power. Their use of power can be either cooperative or confrontational or an incoherent fluctuating policy between cooperation and conflict. Analysis of cooperative or confrontational state behaviors changes depending upon the conceptualization of ‘power’ and ‘threat’- the terms on which there is hardly extensive academic consensus especially after the Cold War. A theoretical opening that incorporates these developments-especially about the nature of power- is yet another weakness of the traditional literatures on cooperation and alliance. When wars are absent among the states that have the greatest means to inflict destruction and even annihilation, defining power mainly in terms of military capability appears to be a shortfall of the alliance and cooperation literature. This has implications for the NATO’s transformation, and it is discussed in the last chapter.

Still another weakness of the literature is summarized by Stephen Walt who is one of the prominent scholars of alliance politics: When there is hardly an external balancer to the dominant state in the system, the balancer turns out to be emerging from within the dominant state itself. Walt argues that

The stronger the US is relative to the rest of the world, the more latitude it has to define priorities for itself. Setting priorities is an intensely political activity, however, and domestic factors will exert relatively more impact when the external environment does not impinge very powerfully.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, p. 146.

The role of domestic politics and the increasing American latitude to set priorities are factors that must be accounted for by the alliance theories. Most states confront threats unlike the ones experienced during the Cold War: The age-old uncertainty among nation-states regarding intentions and behaviors of one another is the main cause of the security dilemma rooted in anarchy. Utmost significantly, that uncertainty has increased owing to unclear threats.

With the former Soviet Union's self-dismemberment, international security lost the security context that is conducive for centralized threats. This is crucially important. A clear threat gives direction to state policies and behaviors. During the Cold War, the overwhelming concern of the United States and the Soviet Union was to deter one another and contain each others' sphere of influence. The states that aim to take advantage from the superpower rivalry did so by positioning themselves, either intentionally or not, as strategic assets. That provided major powers of the Cold War a control mechanism that kept international relations state-centric: terrorism was relatively controlled through the bipolar structure of the Cold War and the peripheral alignments of states around the superpowers. This is no more possible to the extent it once was before 1989: A hierarchy of power is not clear due to the difficulties of exerting influence as of 2009. This is possibly the result of the contemporary absence of clear threats that is not state-centric.¹⁷⁶ Allin et al. argue that transnational terrorism posed by Al Qaeda is too diffuse a threat to provide strategic clarity or unity of purpose among states.¹⁷⁷ Within such an international environment, it is hard for decision-makers to determine what the main priorities and tasks of states should be.

¹⁷⁶Pressman, Jeremy. 2009. "Power without Influence - The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East" *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4 Spring pp. 149-179.

¹⁷⁷Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Chapter One: Beyond the War on Terror" *Adelphi Papers*, 47:389, 17-34.

Consequently, domestic factors increasingly weigh in the definition of interests and the allocation of resources. This is because the threats and alliance commitments are not only determined by the distribution of power or solely by the location of threats. They are determined relatively more by whichever political group is able to exert more influence upon the domestic body-politic of states. When compared to the bipolar Cold War environment where the external threat was existential and clear enough to silence internal political competition, the role domestic politics increased. That is how “domestic political penetration” is explained by Stephen Walt.

The structural limits of cooperation, which are detailed in consequent chapters, are diffusion of power-resources world over and the ambiguity of the contemporary threats including that of terrorism. Other limits of alignments and cooperation are the additional ways through which power is used. Power is horizontally used at the societal level by non-state actors, whereas nation-states exercise power differently due to separate political cultures. The transatlantic divide between the EU and the US is a sample of the latter. In his study entitled *Taming American Power - the Global Response to US Primacy*, Walt also gives persuasive reasons for why the US is not influential as it was during the Cold War. These reasons are the state strategies employed against the US power. They are the unit-level factors conditioning inter-state cooperation.

As Walt claims, “the opposing and accommodating strategies that are used mainly against the US enable other states to prevent American foreign policy from exercising absolute hegemony or dominance over the international system.”¹⁷⁸ This is why raw power or capacity does not equal to influencing other states or

¹⁷⁸Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, p. 217.

achieving results. The point is elaborated in Chapter 4 on the unit-level factors affecting international cooperation. The American power is seen as differentially greater from other states, but it is not seen commensurate to absolute dominance of the system. The latter point is discussed in Chapter 2 about the structural factors of ‘globalization’ and ‘non-polarity’.

3.4.2. What Is to Be Done for the Weaknesses of the Literature?

Searching For a Balance between Theory and Praxis amid the Academic Discord

The long-held debate on how best to capture world events and on the analytical tools to be used resulted in many perspectives and in an academic discord regarding research-design. Therefore, a section on issues of methodology, epistemology, and ontology is essential. As a corollary, it extends to issues of paradigm, theory and ideology whose discussions among scholars have become expansive especially after ‘the social turn’ in the study of *world politics*. Starting at the late 1970s in the West, studies of International Relations that took advantage of this social turn or reflectivist concerns found its way into respected academic circles and curriculum almost all around the world in time. According to those studies, contributions to literatures should not be non-practical ivory-tower extrapolations and should base themselves not only on solid theoretical ground, but also on solid practical ground as well. Being too much conceptual may be impractical. Being too-much practical makes scholars quasi-technicians, not developers of literatures with meaningful contributions. These two grounds can be made to enmesh with each other though. Otherwise, scholars are said to be ostensibly confronting the risk of either being too

empirical/practical/pragmatic/technical/conceptually weak or shallow or being too theoretical/abstract/conceptual and impractical that is unwise to implement or maintain in practice, lacking policy-relevance and leaving academia too much of an intellectual pedantry.

The departure point of the recent understanding in contemporary International Relations follows two maxims: Contributions should be intended for the people of the world at large. Science is ultimately for people whatever political formations they are clustered in. Ideally, this should be the driving motor of theoretical and empirical endeavors without indulging too much into either strict empiricism or into too much theorizing and conceptualization, nevertheless engaging the two in a fine-grained manner. This dissertation tries to make an original contribution to the International Relations literature by striking a balance in the intertwined nature of theory and praxis.

3.4.3. On Ideology, Paradigm and Theory

It is worth noting that no fundamental ideology whether *conservatism*, *liberalism* or *radicalism* is taken as a given throughout the study. Another equally important benchmark of this dissertation is that it does not take it for granted that any paradigm whether positivism or post-positivism is to be strictly followed without question.¹⁷⁹ As a corollary, none of the theories (that is to say, any

¹⁷⁹Postpositivism is an umbrella term for those theoretical perspectives that are skeptical of the positivist project in general. ‘Reflectivism’ and ‘post-positivism’ are used interchangeably. Postpositivism should not be conflated with postmodernism. Postmodernism is only one variant of this skepticism. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff use the term “post-empiricist” for post-positivism, while the terms “rationalism” and “reflectivism” are sometimes used for positivism and post-positivism respectively; however the latter are more common in the literature. ‘Reflectivist’ or ‘post-positivist’ concerns are mostly regarded as immutable with ‘positivist’ or ‘rational’ schools of International Relations in terms of their different approaches towards ontology, epistemology and methodology used in analyzing world affairs. Reflectivist-oriented studies mostly echo in theories of constructivism, feminism, postmodernism, the Frankfurt School, and to a certain extent in the English School tradition. Reflectivism, among its other benchmarks, reflects upon the importance of the political and social

theoretical extension derived from ideologies of conservatism, liberalism or radicalism) such as Realism, Liberalism or Marxism is the ‘only template’ in understanding and explaining world politics¹⁸⁰. Realism, Liberalism and Marxism and their neologisms and the reflectivist schools of thought are only different tools in the scholars’ toolbox of analysis. None of them, taken on its own, is thoroughly successful regarding explanatory power and omnipotent in understanding every phenomenon in full. However, this does not amount to lack of standard of analytical judgment. It does not lead to a form of epistemological anarchy. It just recalls that academic study must include certain knowledge and awareness of all different perspectives whatever the researcher’s theoretical leanings are. Keeping away from theoretical debates and argumentations may risk theoretical paralysis and repetition. It curtails theoretical development and understanding change. If change is not understood, academia cannot help delivering vain commentaries.

Reflectivist critiques inform that scholars should be conscious of their own leanings and tendencies. They emphasize the connection between power and university/knowledge. That is the reason why it becomes essential to indicate the self-consciousness of the doctoral candidate about the reflectivist concerns alongside the positivist approaches. More often than not, categorizations such as ‘Realist’, ‘Liberal’ or ‘Radical’ create academic rifts. They do not help develop the social science undertakings. It creates rifts among scholars that lead them to talk pass each other. Yet, that is not necessarily the case at all times. By way of

circumstances within which the researcher is shaped and conditioned. It argues for the vital need on the part of the researcher or scholar to be cognizant of it. Hence, reflectivist literature brings forward that writing process and speech acts (or discourses constructed) are political, and in turn, argues that writers of any kind are political actors.

¹⁸⁰ Keith L. Nelson & Spencer C. Olin, Jr. 1975. *Why War? Ideology, Theory and History* Berkeley, California: University of California Press. As an all-time seminal academic work, Nelson and Olin demonstrates that ideologies, theories and history are intertwined and that they are not *totally* disparate however different they are.

example, a scholar who writes with realist-slant or realist lenses can well take advantage of the constructivist literature, at least of ‘an empiricist’ or ‘coercive’ brand of constructivism.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, scholars mostly have reached out to a single paradigm and its due methodology more often than they refer to others. Ideally, this should not inhibit the scholar from using all theories. Scholars should not shy away from an attempt to find a conceptual and analytical roadmap to lessen academic disputes among adherents of opposed paradigmatic perspectives.¹⁸²

The paradigmatic perspective that approximates the theoretical outlook of this dissertation is found in the tenets of classical realism. These tenets are much less quantified, less ahistorical, actor-wise more open to be inclusive, and less deterministic unlike neorealism.

It is also vital to underscore that E. H. Carr has also constructivist leanings alongside his Realism. That is apparent in final chapters of his seminal treatise, namely *The Twenty Years Crisis*. It is, above all, important to point out that Carr was not merely a realist as often told. On due reflection, his sophistication not only includes Realism, but also it is way beyond mere Realism, and includes ‘realism’ with both ‘R’ and ‘r’¹⁸³.

3.4.4. The Non-State Entities and International Relations Theory

A history of different perspectives and their disciplinary development in relation to each other are not the subject-matter here. Its elaboration is beyond the

181 For ‘coercive constructivism’ please see, Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 13; 3, 2007

182A number of texts have overviews of disciplinary history and describe the ways in which theories developed in relation to one another. These texts offer views on lessening academic disputes. These include *Alker and Biersteker* 1984, *Kahler* 1997, *Olson and Groom* 1991, *Rothstein* 1991, *Schmidt* 1998, *Wæver* 1997, and *Wæver* 1996. For works that compare US IR as a discipline to the study of IR in other countries see *Crawford and Jarvis* 2000, *Jørgensen and Knudsen* 2006, *Smith* 2002, and *Wæver* 1998.

183Jones, Charles A. 1998. *E.H. Carr and International Relations : A Duty to Lie* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ‘Realism’ is taken to be referring to the theory of international relations while ‘realism’ denotes a branch of philosophy.

scope of this study. Yet, it is important to address what is meant by an International Relations (IR) theory within the confines of the above-mentioned academic discord, and of ideology, paradigm and theory relationships. This will shed light on why some academics view these three as enmeshed, and also on what is meant by IR theory in general.

Not surprisingly, scholars approach these issues differently. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff define theory as “systematic reflection on phenomena, designed to explain them and to show how they are related to each other in a meaningful, intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in an incoherent universe”.¹⁸⁴ Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi define theory “as a way of making the world or some part of it more intelligible or better understood,” by going “beyond mere description of phenomenon observed and engage in causal explanation or prediction based on certain prior occurrences or conditions”.¹⁸⁵ In both definitions, there is a common assumption that there is a pattern to international relations. International Relations theory is about revealing those patterns.

Rosenau emphasizes the importance of revealing patterns by putting forward an important question regarding a specific event, a question which has become an academic motto by now: ‘Of what is it an instance?’¹⁸⁶ This question is the starting-point of thinking theory thoroughly. There are, of course, contrary habits of research as Rosenau underlines: ‘We often have a hard time building up this habit’ [habit of revealing patterns] due to an inclination “to probe for the special meaning of an event, to explore it for what sets it apart from all other

¹⁸⁴ Dougherty, James E., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending theories of international relations* Philadelphia: Lippincott.

¹⁸⁵ Viotti, Paul and Mark Kauppi. 2007. *International Relations Theory* Prentice Hall.

¹⁸⁶ Rosenau, James N. *The Study of World Politics* Vol. 2: Globalization and Governance London: Routledge, p.92.

events, rather than to treat it as an instance of a larger pattern”.¹⁸⁷ Certainly not all, but most IR theorists interpret particular events as instances of some larger pattern, phenomenon, or theoretical proposition and expression.

John Lewis Gaddis, in articulating the difference between the methodology of historians’ and that of political scientists, stresses the concepts of ‘general particularization’ and ‘particular generalization’¹⁸⁸. These two labels stand for different methodologies, and indeed different epistemologies used by political scientists and historians, which correspond to the point made by Rosenau. Arguably, historians are more welcoming to some reflectivist concerns regarding methodology, and epistemology when compared to such attitudes of political scientists of the positivist paradigm.

A useful way to think about theory is the analogy of templates. Any historian or political scientist of whatever theoretical persuasion uses a set of templates / a theory. A theory is, then, a set of templates or prepackaged analytical tools. Scholars use these tools in multiple ways. Since they use it in multiple ways, different inner-categorizations occur even within a particular theory. Theory-trees emerge: For instance, the family of Realist theories includes different strands within itself such as defensive realism or offensive realism. The analytical tools/a set of templates which are used in multiple ways serve mainly three purposes: First, conceptualizing/making definitions, and relatedly realizing categorization. Secondly, understanding, and thirdly explaining international and/or transnational phenomena. These templates are used to demonstrate the pattern in the complicated

¹⁸⁷ Rosenau, James N. *The Study of World Politics* Vol. 2: Globalization and Governance London: Routledge, p.93.

¹⁸⁸ Gaddis, John Lewis 2000. ‘In Defense of Particular Generalization: Rewriting Cold War History, Rethinking International Relations Theory’ in Colin and Miriam Elman eds. Colin, and Elman, Miriam F. eds. *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* Cambridge: MIT Press.

bombardment of data.

Via Sterling-Folker, another common analogy that is used to explain what is meant by theory and what use they have is the analogy of a camera. Alternative lenses of a camera portray different pictures of the same phenomenon. Basic lenses provide a shot of landscape and its setting to its front, back, and sides. A panoramic lens makes the landscape seem smaller in relation to its surroundings, which are now more expansive and more important to the image. A series of close-up lenses draw attention ever nearer to the landscape, enlarging it until its surroundings no longer seem relevant and details that had escaped attention before are noticeable. Tinted lenses of different colors highlight different shadows and features that had not seem noteworthy¹⁸⁹. In much the same way, an IR topic can be seen from different theoretical perspectives. With different focus (unit of analysis), and different templates (different methodologies and epistemologies), disparate theories may either tackle only with an instance in a fashion similar to a sui generis approach, or they may be more suitable to see the pattern represented by the event/s.

Each IR perspective consists of various assumptive building blocks, some of which are shared across perspectives, but which are put together by each in specific ways in order to identify and highlight particular patterns in IR. Each perspective thereby illuminates slightly different elements of a given topic or event and hence patterns relevant to it, revealing aspects and details that were not obvious or particularly pertinent in other perspectives. The advantage of studying and understanding IR theory as an analytical domain distinct from any particular empirical event or topic is that it acquaints you with the multiple ways of seeing

¹⁸⁹Folker, Jennifer Sterling ed., *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp.2-10.

and understanding the various contexts for any particular event or topic, whether it is a historical, current, or future scenario. These contexts are the “bigger pictures”. The camera analogy is useful here. While an amateur photographer does not need to know photography in detail in order to take a picture, a professional photographer does need to know the specifics to manage zooming between different scales or levels. It is important not to push the camera analogy too far since one does not need to subscribe to a particular worldview, ideological perspective, or philosophical position in order to be a photographer/scholar or produce a zoom lens/new approach or use it in one’s own photography/scholarly analysis. While the type of camera lens you use might depend on why you are taking the elephant’s photo in the first place, whether you should use a zoom or panoramic lens to photograph it is usually not a matter of heated debate or the source of sharp divisions among colleagues. IR theory, however, is premised on alternative philosophical, ideological, and normative commitments, many of which are antithetical to one another and hence diverge sharply over how to understand IR. These commitments undergird the assumptive building blocks and analytical frameworks of IR theory. They typically involve disagreements over the nature of being (referred to as ontology), how we know the things we know and acquire knowledge about being (referred to as epistemology), and what methods we should adopt in order to study being (referred to as methodology).¹⁹⁰

¹⁹⁰Folker, Jennifer Sterling. 2007. ed., *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, Lynne Rienner, pp.2-10; Cohen, Louis. 2007. "Research Methods in Education", *British Journal of Educational Studies* 55: 9.

3.4.5. Two Grand-Paradigms Leading to Two Worlds of Theory-Design and Due-Policy-Making: Positivism and Post-Positivism

Two grand-paradigms are positivism and post-positivism. Each leads to a different theory-design. They are disparate comprehensive templates helping to understand and explain politics. How to differentiate them from one another? The most fundamental epistemological and ontological divide is that of whether one can know ‘fact/s’ objectively and whether there is an objective reality or not. Approaches to the argument of ‘a fact is a fact’ help determine the main paradigmatic dividing line. Those scholars who insist that there is an objective state of being, an objective “reality,” that is relatively obvious and can be accurately known and measured, are commonly referred to as positivists. Post-positivism, on the other hand, refers to IR scholars who are skeptical that “a fact is a fact” or that it can be objectively known and measured.

For most positivists, the primary activity of an IR theorist is to test IR theoretical perspectives against one another. This is done by collecting data and by devising methods that would be the equivalent of an experiment in the hard sciences. In undertaking such activity, the positivist hopes to produce more explanatory theories, which in an ideal world would make both prediction and better foreign policy making possible. As for the post-positivists, all events are subject to interpretation. Interpreter’s own situation, context, and language often determine how an event is characterized and explained. Since neither language nor the act of communication is hold to be ever unproblematic or value-free, post-positivists challenge the notion that scholars could objectively know or access reality by relying on methods drawn from the hard sciences.

For positivists, ‘If *A*, then *B*’ as hypothesis must be subject to empirical tests. Hypotheses are tested against real-world or factual data so as to make modest predictions about the nature and direction of change. Although many theoretical inner-differences exist among positivists, consensual focal point among them is the acceptance of the objective accessibility of reality and scholars’ ability to discover universal laws that are amenable to causal explanations and prediction. This paves the way to common analytical tools, namely levels of analysis.¹⁹¹

Post-positivists would define the nature and purpose of IR theory very differently in comparison to positivists. Testing competing hypotheses, developing causal explanations and making predictions are seen as the dominant and relatively destructive ways in which we have purportedly come to interpret the world or impose meaning and continually re-create particular patterns of knowledge and behavior in IR.

Steve Smith argues about IR that “what we think about these events and possibilities, and what we think we can do about them, depends in a fundamental sense on *how* we think about them. In short, our thinking about the ‘real world, and hence our practices, is directly related to our theories”. Although post-positivists eschew the notion that there are universal laws that are objectively discoverable with scientific methods, they do see patterns to the way positivists describe and theorize IR. Such patterns could derive from the values of eighteenth-century European Enlightenment (which promotes a faith in science), or the politics of identity within IR (which is dominated both in practice and in theory by men)¹⁹².

¹⁹¹It goes without saying that levels of analysis involve identifying where causal variables are located. They enable grouping variables according to a micro-macro spectrum for the purposes of explanatory organization. Although there is variety of ‘levels’ used in that direction, IR scholars have typically relied on three primary levels: the individual, the nation-state, and the system.

¹⁹²Folker, Jennifer Sterling ed., 2007. *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*. Lynne Rienner, p. 9.

If we turn to the camera lenses/photography analogy, both positivists and post-positivist are photographers. Both types of photographers would be engaged in revealing larger patterns and in answering Rosenau's question, "of what is it an instance?" Positivist answers would involve a conviction that they were documenting the patterns of reality itself, whereas post-positivist answers would involve revealing, as a pattern in itself, the positivist's conviction that reality was being documented. Both positivists and post-positivists hold one another responsible for using tainted color lenses. Thus, they find it hard to work cooperatively.

As stressed at the very beginning of the present chapter, the world is growing together, but those studying it are growing apart. This is due to different world-outlooks applied to theoretical design in the way explained just above. As it is argued almost everywhere from various academic journals, magazines to newspapers, globalization is leading to a shared culture to an important extent. However, academics whose specialization is the investigation of global politics are dividing into segregated schools of thought. This is why K. J. Holsti back in the mid-1980s described the international relations community of scholars as *the dividing discipline*¹⁹³.

Today this disunity is much more pronounced. The reason of this academic disunity owes to different ontologies (the study and understanding of the nature of being) and different epistemologies (the study and understanding about how we know the thing we think we know) underlying theories. Accordingly, the issue of how to capture new international and transnational developments creates rifts among scholars. This kind of philosophical and theoretical topics discussed among

¹⁹³Holsti, Kalevi J. 1987. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*, Unwin Hyman.

scholars has paradigmatic importance, because they have the potential to improve International Relations studies.

3.4.6. The Inside/Outside Distinction:

More Space for the Historical Context?

R.B.J. Walker underlines that the way the discipline of International Relations is structured has been defined by notions of territory. Inside the boundaries of states exists the ordered world of the political, and outside those boundaries is the anarchical world of international relations. Borders do not just divide states, but they also divide the discipline¹⁹⁴. Given this situation of the discipline, the dissertation at hand concentrates on the alignment behaviors of states against terrorist violence committed by non-state actors. However, policies and behaviors of states are not the only data to work on: Since the targets or addressee of states' response-policies are not nation-states but non-state terrorist groups, it is vital to take these non-state entities into account as well. The reasons for this inclusion are their capacity to influence both state policies/strategies, and societies around the world or the international public opinion. State and non-state entities with different capacities abound. Therefore, the divide between inside and outside may not always be applicable as an analytical separation in reflecting upon the terrorism of our era: a two-way dynamic relationship exists. It is this dynamic relationship between states and non-state entities that give clues in understanding why states acted the way they did. That is why it is important to study the impact of globalization on national security. Besides, owing to terrorists' simultaneous inside-out and outside-in operations, territorial borders appear to be rendered less

¹⁹⁴Walker, R. B. J. 1995. *Inside-Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

relevant by being transgressed.

The two-way dynamic is worth explicating. It is the dynamic between states and violent non-state actors. It is asymmetrical in nature because the sides of the conflict are disparate. The structure, strategy and territoriality status of the two sides of the conflict are dissimilar. Whereas states work mainly on a government-to-government basis, terrorist groups work through citizens of different countries around the world, and they cause citizens to question their states' policies in the aftermath of the terrorist atrocities committed¹⁹⁵. Indeed, terrorism is used to change the attitudes of popular audiences against their governments in order to make open the governments' alleged incompetency and so-called 'unfairness'. In turn, governments, especially democracies, try to mobilize public opinion against terrorism. Again, public opinion is to a certain extent another agency through which policies become un/successful. At times, public opinion becomes an intervening variable between states and non-state actors.

Terrorist tactics -unlike the working-mechanism of strategies such as compellence and deterrence- influence publics. Compellence and deterrence are meant to influence leaders and leadership cadre of states. Unlike states' demarcated and known territories, leadership and relatively predictable methods of fighting, global terrorism has no address and no specified territory, and no dialogical and communicative accessibility to its leadership. Lack of territory and address on the side of the terrorists increases (borrowing a term from the conventional warfare literature) 'the fog of war' for the states, but reduces it for the terrorists. Increased

¹⁹⁵Victims of the terrorists attacks are instrumentalized by terrorists so as to obtain their goal, which is changing the attitudes and ideas of the wider public, and turn the public against their governments. It is also about expanding terrorist constituency via acquiring more followers of the terrorist cause. Thus, terrorists force two addressees to change their course of action: governments and domestic/international audiences; their addressees are actually beyond the foreign/domestic frontier, and are whole community of peoples' minds.

fog of war (increased uncertainty of from where, when and how the terrorist attack could come, unobservability of their evolving capabilities or how they are adopting to the measures that states take against them) is an enormous advantage for the global terrorists. The conventional fog of war mechanism among belligerents works asymmetrically in this case.

With the benefit of this advantage, ‘twenty-first century form of terrorism’¹⁹⁶ changes the rule of the struggle for the states by driving them from the *battlefield* into a *virtual battlespace*. For they have no headquarters, outposts or address, terrorist acts occur at anywhere terrorists deem possible, without a clear and uncontroversial location to retaliate at. *Virtual* is used in reference to things that mimic their “real” equivalents: For instance, a virtual library is a library in electronic form. Likewise, ‘virtual territory or *battlespace*’ exist and result in essence or effect, though not in actual form. Thus, although terrorists do not have any clear and *demarcated territory or battlefield* in the common sense of the term, the terrorist virtual *battlespace* is almost anywhere not well guarded¹⁹⁷. Although, borders and territories are still staunch hurdles against conventional security

¹⁹⁶‘The twenty-first century form of terrorism’ is the current manifestation of terrorism, which is basically not a new phenomenon. It has been evolving since human beings existed. Therefore, there are ‘terrorisms’ of different time periods throughout history. The difference among ‘terrorisms’ is about the intersection of particular terrorist methods and the international structure. As for the nature of terrorism, it is intact: The nature of terrorism is political. Historical sensitivity to understand the change in methods used by perpetrators, that is understanding the changing features of terrorism, entails a perspective to look for the past, present and possible future of an event in a dynamic and interrelated manner. Historical sensitivity seeks to understand whether there is an evolutionary process or not. Otherwise, analysis becomes static within parameters of time and space, and understanding ‘change’ is curtailed. Seen in that vein, the fundamental nature of any of the ‘terrorisms’ taken place in different time periods throughout history did not change, but their manifestations and methods did. That is why adherents of the new terrorism debate labels contemporary terrorism as new. However, that is more about style and method, not nature and essence. Thus, when viewed intrinsically contemporary terrorism is not new in nature, but it may be defined as new in terms of form, method or manifestations (of the essence). They are all political and an unconventional violent means of change forced upon strong centers of power.

¹⁹⁷Even well-guarded locations like embassies or military vehicles, or aircraft-carriers or ministries (as the Pentagon was in the September 11, 2001) are hit by terrorists.

concerns, their effectiveness and utility in protecting from *transnational threats*¹⁹⁸ becomes diminished. This is one of the reasons why the disciplinary divide of inside/outside does not help much in analyzing threats that has transnational mode of operation and effect. Since the virtual *battlespace* is almost everywhere, our conceptual models should cover and meet almost everywhere. In other words, our models should not be territory-centric entirely, at least not all times.

Terrorist groups also cause states to devise new security strategies to deal with terrorism because terrorists adapt their behavior to changing conditions and responses, and may evolve to use new methods. That is why, not only states, but also sub-state and transnational entities and their movements become essential to examine in order to understand who did what, how and why. This is why mere state-centrism or *etatism* is not helpful. The borders may divide states, but it should not be dividing the discipline if we are to understand security in the 21st century. This being the case, the conventional analytical distinctions worth pondering. Before explaining how to replace inside-outside distinction with 'historical context', and what is meant by 'contextualizing or historical context', it is important to keep on explaining why such a replacement is required. The very first chapter put forward the current state of international relations; the current events, actors, topics and the dynamics among them. These events require not-totally-new theoretical lenses: It rather writes research-design *anew*, in a different manner and form. Some of the conventional assumptions are loosened. A slight shift to a more contextualizing and issue-specific approach is welcomed to capture the developments. For example, such a perspective aims to avoid ahistorical explanation, that is, it appreciates that every phenomenon has its past to it. The

198 "Transnational threats" denotes threats that transgress national borders, territories and interests. A discussion of 'transnationality' and related concepts can be found in the following chapters.

issue of whether current manifestation of terrorism is a new terrorism underlines the question of historicizing. Present situation or the present manifestation of a particular phenomenon is related to how its past is perceived. Perceptions of any event or a phenomenon like terrorism or alliance-making are dynamic and constantly built on a daily basis. To be sure, although such change is in the making on a daily basis, its repercussions do not become recognizable overnight. In other words, past, present and future are intellectually intertwined in the making of how we understand the current world affairs. Various understandings emerge through agencies of different actors, which perceive and interpret issues quite differently due to different interests, identities and loyalties.

How an actor perceives the present situation, and how it utilizes the current situation shapes the future to certain extent among other perceptions' role in shaping the future. Similarly, the views that claim to explain the present has a past, and in turn past is linked to the present and to the future: To illuminate, post-modernism cannot exist without *modernism*, and likewise modernism cannot exist without *pre-modernity*. This kind of relation among ideas is valid for any '-ism'. Then, ideas have their own cycle, but not necessarily unidirectional. Past and future merges at the present. This is so because ideas, conceptions and theories are as much a product of the human intellect as they are intangible activities, first emerging in the mind, and then carried out in behavior. We may perceive less than the truth out there, but it does not necessarily mean that there is not a truth out there which is to be explained with enhanced theory. Used in this framework, the term 'perception' inheres in philosophical realism tenets, not outside of it. It is just that the formation of 'the truth' or 'fact' is complex with many actors and processes. This translates to the assumption that the truth is knowable.

Although it cannot be logically argued that a phenomenon or a policy thereof does not exist if it lacks effectiveness, potential forces are overlooked to a certain extent until they have a net effect for the sake of parsimony. That is where effectiveness and capacity are interrelated. In other words, the interworking of different perceptions and due different policies is effective to the extent that actors' have influence or the capacity to carry them out. In this light, capability/power and influence can be separated. Herein, capacity is meant to comprise both tangible and intangible sources of power, which is taken to refer to the ability to manipulate others' behavior. Thereupon, ideas/perceptions/interpretations, interest, capacity and time as dynamic factors are inter-linked. The dynamic relation between past, present and future is sustained through the interpretations of actors, which link a current situation to an event or trend in the past. Some actors establish such a link and behave accordingly.

For instance, the US response-policy against terrorism is by-and-large a military one, mainly interpreting the current international fora as being similar to that of the Cold War era. It linked terrorism of the day with state-sponsors. It claims a right to preventively strike a state that is presumed to be sponsoring terrorism and/or going nuclear.¹⁹⁹ The Cold War mentality is state-centric. It sees no alternative but interpreting terrorism via state-centrism or via ahistorical lenses that is not interested on how change occurs. When the change is not peaceful, conflict occurs. Conflictual change brings forth the current form of terrorism with no headquarters or territory. The source of present-day terrorism originates at sub-state level, but operates trans-nationally largely without state-support.

How to supplement the weaknesses of the literature? Theories have been

¹⁹⁹2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002* Washington: White House, p.6; 2006. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America March 2006* Washington: White House, p.18.

customarily revised or rejected as theorists have sought to catch up with and capture changing global contexts. The rise and fall of paradigms can be accounted for by their relative capacity to interpret the global realities emerging at the time.²⁰⁰ Reconsideration, then, starts with the question: What are the main analytical tools/distinctions that are being used and at the same time challenged by different researchers of both a positivist and post-positivist persuasion? International Relations studies have worked through the conventional distinctions between:

- The public and the private
- Domestic and foreign affairs
- National and international issues
- Economics and politics

Multidimensionality of our shrinking globe becomes possible owing to great advancement of microelectronics, microbiology, medicine, real-time news and information processing, telecommunication and transportation. Travel of ideas and people enhances the impact of capital flight, movement of labor, goods and investment across borders. This is a snapshot of how globalization made the actors interdependent. As important political formations, nation-states are not alone. National polities are not the sole clusters of people who have national identities and loyalties to a particular state. They are penetrated by sub-national, supra-national and trans-national forces. Loyalty to the state is under challenge from various non-state entities. Thus, actors other than states are also actively trying to have a say in world politics. That directly means they seek power, too. With the empowerment of acquired allegiances and with the availability of improved telecommunication, they operate transnationally and force states to counter-attack. Hence, politics are not

²⁰⁰Kegley, Charles W. "Bridge-Building in the Study of International Relations-How "Kuhn" Do We Do Better?" in Donald J. Puchala ed. *Visions of International Relations-Assessing an Academic Field* South Carolina: University of South Carolina, p.64.

only among nations, but amidst different power-foci.

3.4.7. Degrees and Scaling

It is worth noting that not only International Relations alone, but for all the phenomena in life, the issues of conceptualization and usage of theories are about ‘degrees’, not about ‘absolutes’. This is an important point in conceptualizing phenomena. In addition to the use of the historical context, viewing phenomena in scales or degrees is necessary to have explanatory power. As a commanding articulation of “the conceptualization of *security*” debate in the aftermath of the Cold War, David A. Baldwin’s conceptual lenses in approaching to ‘security’ can be seen as an urge to build a bridge between positivist and post-positivist schools of world politics²⁰¹. These benchmarks of conceptualizing security also help considering the specific historical conditions and the need to conceptualize in degrees together.

Leaving aside the operational definitions, he attempts to elucidate ‘security’ as a concept by proposing questions such as: ‘Security for whom?’, ‘Security for which values?’, ‘How much security?’, ‘From what threats’, ‘By what means’, ‘At what cost?’, and ‘In what time period?’. One reason to specify the degree of security a country or any political entity has or seeks is that absolute security is unattainable. In a world of scarce resources of various kinds, allocation of resources among competing objectives, none of which completely attainable, entails asking the question of ‘how much is enough?’ This is an inescapable question. Thus, the issue of concepts and conceptualization and *likewise that of theories and their usage* must be seen as a matter of degree and not absolutes.

²⁰¹Baldwin, David A. 1997. “The Concept of Security” *Review of International Studies* 23, 5-26.

If security is conceived as a matter of degree, then complicated problems arouse disabling people to decide when to say 'enough'. However, this is precisely the question to be answered and the reason why social science exists. What is more, there is nothing unique about the concepts used in IR, because any phenomenon and objective to obtain in life and academia is subject to degrees, whether it be of anthropology, history, political science, economics, relations among people in an institution like Foreign Ministry or Army, or of even the institution of marriage. Not only security of state is about degrees, but also even security of marriage or happiness in life is a matter of degree. This is the ontological outlook of the thesis about the need to specify degrees of what we study, or what we hold as a 'fact' and/or 'phenomenon'.

3.4.8. Conditions, Interests and Definitions

As discussed in the above section on the historical context, changing conditions change interests, and in turn they change definitions. Not only definitions -such as definition of terrorism- change time and again, but what is seen as constituting 'the political' changes also. Thus, permanent academic definitions and conceptualizations, which are held to be valid throughout all history of human beings seems to be almost impossible. With our models, we can only try to approximate reality of a particular era within a particular period of time. This is so, because time neither stops nor progresses or develops in a linear fashion. Eventually, our definitions alter to be behind the times. They become insufficient to describe and explain the phenomena and actions on the ground.

The question of ‘what is political’ cannot adequately be explained without situating it in its particular setting or historical context. The contemporary context within which activities of various sorts take place is crucial in studying global terrorism of the beginnings of the 21st century and the behaviors of state responders.

CHAPTER 4

STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONDITIONING INTER-STATE COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM: GLOBALIZATION

4.1. Globalization and National Security

The end of the Cold War has been a watershed development in international relations with continuing implications for policy world and academia. The end of the bipolar structure of the system presented a new international security context which paved the way for contestation of fundamental concepts of International Relations and nation-state policies alike. Both the concept and practice of sovereignty, nation-state policy responses against new threats, and international organizations such as the United Nations have faced criticisms of ineffectiveness in the aftermath of the Cold War. Significantly, the international environment has changed in a way that led to a reconsideration of ‘polarity’ and ‘power’.²⁰²

What has been added to the new security environment is the new form of contemporary threats, which are mostly transnational: Manifestations of globalization have been diverse over different realms; however, from the

²⁰²Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics” *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75.

international security perspective, globalization appears to be particularly influential upon the formation of current threats. Twenty-first century threat formation seemed correlated to the process of globalization, and meanwhile also to the end of the bipolar structure of the international system. Thus, the post-Cold War structure of the system and international security is marked both by the demise of the bipolar political-military landscape and by globalization.

Utmost importantly, making threat-assessments and defining adversaries became harder for states due to the distinctive contours of the current security environment after bipolarity. Making threat assessments and gathering intelligence were relatively easier during the Cold War when threats were perceived to be mainly concentrated within the adversarial bloc. The former Soviet Union was the focal point of threats for the United States of America and vice-versa. With the source of aggregate threats dispelled, nation-states ceased to be the sole referent of threat assessments albeit still being considered. Terrorists move across borders, and sometimes they are within their home-country as sleeping cells. Because financial sources are splintered and whereabouts of perpetrators are not clear-cut, leitmotif for threat assessments is not necessarily nation-state-oriented any longer. National intelligence services work on two different realms that may only rarely overlap with each other: intelligence-gathering and assessment on conventional threats emanating from other nation-states and those assessments on threats emanating from non-state entities such as terrorist groups, criminal groups, and the methods-exchange and evolving merger between the latter groups.²⁰³

Non-state actors and specific issue-areas such as transnational terrorism, cross-border activities of organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass

²⁰³ Bjornehed, Emma. "Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror" *Global Crime* Vol. 6, No. 3&4, August–November 2004, pp. 305-324.

destruction and light-and-small weapons came to be pronounced as subject-specific-threats with their hard-to-identify possible and actual perpetrators scattered around the world. Perpetrators are hard to identify especially because they may reside in the target-country as citizens and immigrants. Perpetrators with no criminal record may travel from other countries to the selected target-country. That is why use of biometrics system and wire-tapping are frequent particularly in Europe and the US. As an operational method, terrorists may choose among remote-controlled bombing, truck-bombing, suicide-bombing, detonating nuclear-suitcases, critical sites bombing (such as dams, public transportation vehicles and routes, sports, entertainment or art shows that pool tens of thousands of people into a fixed area, bombing power-generators, nuclear silos, or factories and facilities that use industrial-grade nuclear materials to achieve radiological dispersal) or disrupting complex urban systems such as breaking into shopping-malls' air-conditioning systems with biological weapons agents, poisoning city water, jamming/hacking air-traffic control to cause to crash planes through simultaneous landing or intersecting flight destinations). Among these possibilities, suicide bombing is are the kind of decentralized threat formation is added to those traditional threats emanating from nation-states themselves. The addition of decentralized threats into national security threat and intelligence profiles is much likely to be mainly originating in globalization. This is why globalization has become a subject-matter of high priority in international and national security. Since the alliance and cooperation literatures have been traditionally studying threat formation and the threats against which states align, the globalization process that factors in current threats requires examination. Globalization - alongside its implications on arguments of polarity- is studied mainly due to its influence in

threat formation.

At initial examination, the post-Cold War period -while it is still in need of a better term- witnesses no power-blocs or alliances in the framework of the Warsaw Pact versus the NATO. After the self-dismemberment of the former USSR, the rivalry between nation-states is blurred owing to lack of clearly identified threats unlike the case of the Cold War:

The current system of international security, including the UN Security Council, has become "broken" - not least because it was never designed to handle the threats of this century. Second, traditional rules of warfare are not going to protect us against the kinds of rogues and terrorists who have been set loose by the end of the Cold War and advances in technology...We have never in history had a situation where small groups, *unaffiliated with any state*, and embracing radical, death-loving ideologies, could do vast-scale damage to us all.²⁰⁴

4.2. What is Globalization?

Formation of threats under globalization is being accepted as a decisive factor in explaining the limits and prospects of inter-state cooperation against terrorism; since contemporary threats are globalization-induced, it is a must to examine the process of globalization.

'Globalization' is a value-laden concept as most concepts in politics are. It is neither succinctly nor clearly defined. It is inconsistently and interchangeably used as a noun, an adjective or a verb. It refers alternatively to a process, a policy, a philosophy, a prescriptive theory, and a propagandistic ideology. Whatever its roots and different usages are, globalization marks a core part of both the academic terminology and the policy jargon.

Since political trends prospectively appear to be bringing forward the resilience of the ongoing merger of the world's people in an ever tightening web of interdependent relations of various actors and create transnational threats thereby,

²⁰⁴Nichols, Thomas M. 2009. "The Move toward Preventive Military Action is an International Phenomenon" Thomas M. Nichols on his book, *Eve of Destruction: the Coming Age of Preventive War*. Rorotoko.

study of globalization seems inevitable.

In an ever tightening web of interdependent relations of various actors, there are methodological approaches which see globalization as a singular economic process.²⁰⁵ However, it seems appropriate to conceptualize globalization as a multi-dimensional process, not as a singular one. Regarding globalization as merely an economic issue resembles defining the tools humans use, not what people think about themselves and others, or why and how they act with these tools. In other words, globalization does not only affect economic relations or defense-industries, army-modernization and weapons technology, but it also affects the status and political clout of ideologies and political regimes that are projected by rivaling nation-states and non-state entities.²⁰⁶ As a consequence of such single-dimension-

²⁰⁵ Hay, Colin. 2002. "Globalisation as a Problem of Political Analysis: Restoring Agents to a 'Process without a Subject' and Politics to a Logic of Economic Compulsion" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 15, Number 3.

²⁰⁶ As for nation-states, two incompatible ideological groupings of states are purportedly emerging (exemplified via China and Russia versus the continental Europe, Canada, and the US). These incompatible groupings proposed by Kagan are differentiated by the nature of the political regimes involved. Russia and China ostensibly espouse politically authoritarian state-capitalism that is not against economic liberalism; yet, they are claimed to be against the political liberalism urged by the West. This is asserted to be a clashing point for the long-haul. Ikenberry lends support to Kagan's argument regarding the evolution of political regimes in the world. As for the nation-states versus non-state entities and especially on global ideologies, Ayoob's and Adamson's arguments are globalization-driven, by which both are underlining the two transnational ideologies that are in current rivalry, namely Liberalism versus Islamism. Kagan, Robert. 2008. "The End of the End of History-Why the Twenty-First Century Will Look Like the Nineteenth" *The New Republic*, April 23; Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629-643; Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7, 547-569; Ikenberry, G John. 2001. "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy" *Review International Studies*, 27: 191-212; Judt, Tony and Denis Lacorne. 2005. *With Us or Against Us: Studies in Global Anti-Americanism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Lewis, Bernard. 2003. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Toronto; Kagan, Robert. 2008. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* New York: Alfred A Knopf; Kagan, Robert. 2007. *Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World, from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 20th Century*. New York: Vintage Books; Mihalka, Michael. 2004. "Globalization, the Liberal Imperative, Islamism, and the Future of Conflict in the 21st Century," *The Quarterly Journal* 3(3): 57-67; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "September 11: How Has It Changed the World?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117(1): 37-54; Kissinger, Henry. 2007. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com; Haas, Richard N. 2008. "The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005-06. "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System," *Survival* 47(4): 7-18; Goldgeier, James & Michael McFaul. 2003. *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press; Centre for the

dependence, the roles and domains of ideas, human nature, learning, socialization, philosophy, violence and culture are largely ignored. In spite of the fact that it is the enmeshment of these domains of life with economy that forms politics under globalization, this study does not aim to be exhaustive or comprehensive enough to cover all of these facets of politics - only pinpointing that globalization has never been only economic.²⁰⁷ Globalization is evident across economic, social-cultural, political, military and ecological realms.

This being the case, different dimensions of globalization is examined to the extent they pertain to contemporary threat formation and to inter-state cooperation and alignment against terrorism. While this section engrosses on descriptive technical dimensions of globalization, namely economic and technological processes as underwriters of it, following sections deal with ideational or seemingly abstract factors regarding loyalties and political space.

As for the repercussions of globalization for culture and on the interface between culture and politics,²⁰⁸ it has become increasingly popular to argue that

Study of Global Governance. 2000. *Round Table Debate on the Global Significance of 1989*, Public Lecture 12, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global>

²⁰⁷Kennedy, Paul. 2007. "Global Transformations but Local, 'Bubble' Lives: Taking a Reality Check on Some Globalization Concepts" *Globalizations* 4:2 267 – 282; Laidi, Zaki. 2002. "Does Globalisation Threaten the State? Thesis on the Fractal State" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 15, Number 3; Ruggie, John Gerard. 2003. "The UN and Globalization: Limits and Patterns of Institutional Adaptation" *Global Governance* 9, 301-321

²⁰⁸ 'Culture' is not used as a term that is related to religion as it is notoriously so used in the Huntingtonian Clash of Civilizations to refer to clusters of religious beliefs replacing nationalism as the basic parameter of conflict and cooperation in the post-Cold War period. Rather, it is used here to denote economic and political forces that give way to an ideological walk of life or world-outlook. In that sense, it reflects a political approach studying ideological hegemony, not an eclectic approach seemingly comprising theology and politics. Ayoob illustrates the issues of culture as ideological hegemony and so-called cultural argumentations as obfuscation of the real issue of ideological hegemony cloaked in the Huntingtonian Clash of Civilizations: "Ideological hegemony is an essential component of political and economic domination since it legitimizes the existing order, no matter how iniquitous it may be, and makes inequality palatable to those at or close to the bottom of the heap. The absence of ideological hegemony or its significant erosion provides the subalterns with the opportunity to mobilize and translate their opposition to structures of domination into effective political action. In the absence of alternatives in the current epoch, political Islam has become the leading anti-hegemonic ideology representing the South's resistance to the domination of the North. This provides the clue to why leading scholars and analysts in the United States, in a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the real issue, have referred to this confrontation between hegemonism and resistance as the 'clash of

twentieth century is one of a clash between ‘Jihad versus McWorld’ by which Benjamin Barber argued that the globalizing powers of capitalism (“McWorld”) are confronted with or resisted by the forces that Barber labels “Jihad” - the variety of tribal particularisms and “narrowly conceived faiths” opposed to the homogenizing force of capital. With the main separating benchmark being the ideologies that rival each other, namely the rivalry between anti-hegemonic political Islam and economic liberalism respectively, “Jihad vs. McWorld” is still one of the strongest depictions of the colliding world-outlooks. However, it seems sadly mistaken. It appears to be the case that twenty-first century is marked by ‘McJihad’, not by ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’. McJihad denotes mechanism of capitalism, which appears to operate in certain critical instances only by adopting the social force and moral authority of conservative Islamic movements. It is argued by Mitchell that the Islamic movements are not diametrically opposed to globalization of capital, and they are not always fighting against the West unlike what Benjamin Barber’s ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ argument has it.²⁰⁹ Islamic movements seem to have been awkward associates of the West especially since 1945.²¹⁰

As for the political level that works in parallel to ‘cultural realm’ construed as the realm of rivalry for ideological hegemony, on the one hand, there is arguably a wave of liberal democracy around the world that urges states to ‘go global’ through democratic regime and free-market-economy principles. This wave of liberal economic democratization is ostensibly interconnecting ‘states’ (as

civilizations’ resulting from ‘Muslim rage’ ” in Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. “Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide” *International Studies Review* 9, p. 632.

²⁰⁹ For the details of ‘McJihad’ and an historical examination of politics of oil, or the relations between Western governments and the Middle Eastern states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. “Islam in the US Global Order” *Social Text* 73, Vol. 20, No. 4 Project Muse-Duke University Press.

²¹⁰ Mitchell, Timothy. 2002. “Islam in the US Global Order” Project Muse-Duke University Press, *Social Text* 73, Vol. 20, No. 4.

aggregate of bureaucratic and governmental institutions) and ‘nations’ (citizens or laymen) economically and culturally.²¹¹ On the other hand, there is a contending global wave of tribalism and/or sectarianism. The two trends are not necessarily mutually-exclusive at all times. They seem to both clash and overlap, and give birth to different forms of political conflict and warfare.²¹²

On the social level, mass-migration is a manifestation of globalization, which evolved to be a national security issue for it may provide a potential pool of terrorist constituency and criminal activity.²¹³ On the environmental realm, climate change and environmental degradation are worth mentioning since it is related to various industrial products including the military-industrial complex. It is related to international security in that military-industrial sectors (especially those of nuclear reactors) are regarded as the interface between security and environment. Thus, globalization comes as a package. Although parsimony cannot be discarded totally, it is hard to choose to study only the tail or the head of ‘the globalization-elephant’. There are parsimonious approaches that favor ‘the tail approach’ risking issue-linkages and grasping the complexity of the political terrain, and those alternative approaches which tend to be more holistic that does not strictly fit into a particular theory in order to study implications of globalization on security. Concurrently, there are methodological disputes as to how the multi-dimensional process of

²¹¹The reason to mention ‘state’ and ‘nation’ separately is that transnational terrorism originates in the dissonance between *state* and *nation*: In the complex terrain of political violence, contemporary terrorism is the darker side of seemingly civil society that may not always remain ‘civil’ as it is comprehended in any western connotation of the term. The point is discussed in the second chapter, which deals with the ambiguous nature of the contemporary threat of transnational terrorism along with the shifting loyalties of citizens across different societies.

²¹²Kaldor, Mary. 2004. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 69-90.

²¹³Adamson, Fiona B. 2006. “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 165–199; *The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. NY: W. W. Norton, pp.47-86; Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad - The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

globalization is best analyzed. Lack of agreement in the academia on the methodology and epistemology of studying globalization cautions us against privileging one realm or aspect of globalization against other realms of it.

Given that caution, the working-definition of globalization here is primarily the flow of inanimate and animate objects across borders with tremendous velocity and in tremendous volume; whether these objects be ideas, information, people, capital, labor, drugs, conventional arms, tanks, artillery, small arms, AK47s, fissile material, know-how or greenhouse gases or endemic diseases such as AIDS, SARS, or bird-flu. Focal point of globalization is 'mobility'. The 'flow' or 'mobility' of objects is the main feature of globalization that interconnects the world, though not necessarily interconnecting the minds of people at all times. This mobility is correlated to economic interdependence and technological innovations; innovations especially in communication and transportation.

Another definition of globalization can be made by taking 'borders' as the yardstick of defining: Borders (political dividing-lines of nation-states) are not nature-given or natural parts of the planet earth; they are drawn by human beings. In that sense, borders are useful abstractions that delineate nation-states. Then, an alternative rough definition may read as follows: Globalization comprises most of the phenomena which cannot be considered through the abstraction of borders for its inner-logic recognizes almost no borders whatsoever.

The term 'global' refers to different foci-of-power within different issue-areas. The fundamental point is that 'global' not only qualifies specific political associations such as nation-states, but all political processes, formations, and entities beyond the limits of territoriality. Globalization may be seen as a process whose *modus operandi* are *beyond the limits of territoriality*. More often than not,

political units' actions and related processes operate on a basis that cannot be confined into one specifically demarcated geographical area or territory.

Globalization is about mobility among, through, in and outside of the borders. Therefore, its reflection on analysis and research is of a deterritorialized imperative: These actions and processes take place on a level, which cannot be analyzed using only 'territorial lenses'.²¹⁴ Because transmission of ideas, information, money, weapons, goods and even sometimes travel of people recognize no borders-as-filters, borderlines that separate territories are gradually rendered less relevant for the security of the homeland. Most of the time, it is not the armies (conventionally conceptualized regular armed-forces of nation-states) crossing borders; it is the non-military and civil elements, namely, information, money, goods, dual-use items and civilian people that transgress the borders and form the threat. Civilians may be insiders with foreign connections. These elements are not military-oriented in the customary sense. By the traditional international security jargon, they may be seen of non-military or low-politics.

Yet, they increasingly evolve to share the crux of security concerns alongside traditional security concerns of military nature. The distinction between 'civil' and 'military' is challenged today and gradually wearing thin: Peace operations and nation-building efforts or 'the war on terrorism', private military companies and various terrorist attacks are some of the telling examples presenting the erosion of the distinction between civil and military sectors.²¹⁵ Nevertheless, from most policy-makers viewpoint, security is still conceptualized mainly as safety of citizens,

²¹⁴ 2005. Hegemony and Its Discontents: A Symposium-Reflection, Evaluation, Integration. *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 525-629.

²¹⁵ NATO officials opened a Joint Staff College at Ar Rustamiya in Iraq on September 27, southeast of Baghdad. 2005. "Private Firm to Protect NATO in Iraq," *Agence France Presse* May 4; Sharp, Jeremy M. and Christopher M. Blanchard. 2007. *Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction* Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, September 25, p.3 www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32105.pdf

protection of welfare, order and values of a society and above all as *raison d'état*. Often and congruent with the geopolitical lexicon, national security simply refers to protection of territorial indivisibility and political independence of a sovereign nation-state. Thus, Machiavelli's central proposition of *raison d'état* is resilient; it is that every other value is subordinate to the survival of the state. In parallel though, political independence and sovereignty of nation-states recently became a controversial subject-matter among scholars that try to explain the impact of globalization on states.²¹⁶

Issues of political independence and sovereignty are being reconsidered given the gradual transcendence of the safety and control provided by territory (*territory as demarcations of authority-zones* or who rules where and *territory as protective-filters* or whether passage or actions are allowed by authorities of sovereign state). Territorial defense shield became ineffective to the extent that transcendence of the security provided by territory gives no permission to think about security along the classical concept of territory. In other words, state authorities often cannot capture or manipulate information, people and materials in contrast to the previous times when they were relatively more successful in doing so.

Power resources such as economic and financial wealth, and ever advancing instruments of power and manipulation such as technology and information met not only with nation-states but with non-state entities as well. The marriage of technology and increasingly skilled people continuously multiplies and the marriage becomes ever pervasive and comprehensive around the world. 'Virtual threats' apply to threats that are created and carried out by means of information-

²¹⁶ Although 'independence' became a contested term in the economically interdependent world of the twenty-first century, 'political independence' might be taken to denote 'noteworthy relative independence from other actors in decision-making'. "Noteworthy relative independence" can further be conceptualized as having a noteworthy bargaining-power/volition and capacity to refuse.

technology (IT). Information-technologic virtual threats target national security.²¹⁷ It goes without saying that virtual conversations are real conversations that take place over computer networks. In that respect, virtual communities or various epistemic communities are genuine social groups that assemble around the use of e-mail, blogs, and other networked-IT in different parts of the world. Use of cyberspace and the Internet as *virtual battleground* or as *battle-space* is one of the most effective methods that global terrorists use to recruit fighters, communicate with each other and devise plans.²¹⁸

The World Wide Web is a relatively new front to fight on. It conveys both public authorities and private entities, whereas nation-states have no monopoly in controlling all information-technologic exchange.²¹⁹ However, virtual threats are not only those that are related to the Internet or to generic computer technology. ‘Virtual threats’ might be expanded to comprise those deterritorialized threats and entities against which actual or threatened use of force has limited efficacy. Terrorism is like a computer virus or hacker attack in that both are surprise attacks with no addresses. The same is also valid for radical ideologies of terrorism. They cannot be successfully deterred physically.

Power resources such as the Internet, conventional armament, know-how, facilitation of logistics, communication and travel went increasingly private. These resources were more in the control of nation-states during the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War of today, private or non-state entities take advantage of these power resources and instruments in abundance. Black and gray markets of finance and

²¹⁷Bailey, Timothy D. and Michael R. Grimaila. 2006. “Running the Blockade: Information Technology, Terrorism, and the Transformation of Islamic Mass Culture” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18:523–543.

²¹⁸Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

²¹⁹Drissel, David. 2006. “Internet Governance in a Multipolar World: Challenging American Hegemony” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 19, March Number 1.

trade²²⁰ feed into private use of power resources. The issue chiefly pertains to the illicit and violent non-state entities, which are *the dark side of the civil society* empowered by *globalization*.²²¹ The dark side of the civil society not only uses arms and weapons, but civil resources of power as well. Transnational terrorism uses non-military or civil features in the build-up of its both physical and ideological (and also educational, propagandistic) attacks. Terrorism seems to thrive upon civil features and instruments especially empowered by the Western confusion of freedom to practice faith with disrupting the political and constitutional order of countries.²²² It goes without saying that strong counterterrorism measures are vitally needed to correspond to the globalization-induced form of the threat.

4.3. Impact of Globalization upon the Backbone of Territory and Strategy

4.3.1. Deterritorialization: Parting of Time from Space as a Challenge to the Customary Understanding of Warfare

Distance is the cornerstone of classical military strategy. Earlier works of strategy recorded that ‘distance’ has been a staunch criterion to be used both in the calculations of offense and defense.²²³ Traditional threats such as an invasion of a country are studied widely in military strategy literature.²²⁴ However, in the current

²²⁰‘Black market’ is mainly taken to be illegal transactions of private persons whereas ‘gray market’ is the illegal transactions between private individuals and public authorities that are corrupt.

²²¹The phrase, *the dark side of the civil society*, belongs to Anthony Giddens; Huntington, Samuel & Anthony Giddens. 2003. “Iki Bati” *NPQ*, Vol.5, No. 4, p. 40.

²²²Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. “Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics” *International Studies Review* 7, 547–56.

²²³Hence, the terms such as *heartland*, *hinterland*, *world-island*, *tier*, *flank*, *outpost*, *periphery*, *trench*, *battle-ground*, *no man’s land* or *forward defense*. However, it is important to note the development of new jargon such as the *cyber-space* or *battle-space* supplementing the traditional term of *battle-ground*. Moreover, breaking the fighting-will of opponent, a la Clausewitz, is complemented by ‘winning heart and minds of the non-combatants’ partly because the state and society separation does not seem to hold in the unconventional form of warfare such as the fight against terrorism. Winning hearts and minds is about the *soft power* or *intangible power*, which is discussed in the following sections.

²²⁴General Sir Mike Jackson UK. 2007. “Traditional Warfare Techniques on Their Way Out” 12 September.

state of international politics as of 2009, strategic exposure of nation-states includes those threats that cannot be responded by national means alone. Since September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, it has come to be commonly pronounced in national capitals that national means are not sufficient to curb global threats such as terrorism and that international cooperation is needed. This point became common-sense and seems obvious. However, common-sense is not enough and nuance appears to be necessary in the academe²²⁵: The reason why national means are not sufficient is crucial and requires emphasis.

The reason is plainly that threats such as terrorism neither recognize borderlines nor are totally congruent with the classical distinction between inside and outside politics of a nation-state. The latter reason for why national means are not enough to deal with the terrorism of our era has become a cliché in academia since the September 11 attacks.²²⁶ However, like most clichés it captures an essential part of reality. The conventional analytical distinction in International Relations between inside/domestic politics and outside/international politics (as the organizing principle of the state-system template) can still be used for studying terrorism but only with a shortcoming that must be borne in mind: When confronted by such threats that transgress borders, the distinctive characteristic of ‘territoriality’ becomes reduced (though not vanished) in practicality and importance.

<http://www.army-technology.com/news/news2439.html>

²²⁵Barnett, Michael. 2006. “In Need of Nuance-What the Academe Can Teach,” *Harvard International Review*, Summer, 48-52.

²²⁶For a lucid analysis of the problems terrorism presents for both International Relations and policy-makers, Talbott, Strobe and Nayan Chanda. 2001. *The Age of Terror-America and the World after September 11*. NY: Basic Books.

Why does the decline of practicality and importance in territoriality or territorial-thinking occur? It occurs because transnational terrorism is a deterritorialized threat: A deterritorialized threat in that, first, it presents the weakening of ties between time and space, and secondly, it presents the conflation of the scales of violence. Weakening of the ties between time and space denotes that conduct of terrorist attacks became less dependent on the parameters of territorial-defense due to interconnecting transportation and communication capabilities worldwide. Physical distance became less burdensome. Accordingly, the logistics, skill and organizational capacity of private actors increased due to globalization.

As for the conflation of the scales of violence, it becomes hard for states to decide whether it is homegrown/domestic, international, regional or global terrorism that they face. Constantly changing scale of violence complicates the exposure of threats. International terrorism evolved into transnational terrorism because nation-states' affiliation or sponsorship may lack in the conduct of some terrorist groups. These compounded aspects may roughly be defined as '*deterritorialization*',²²⁷ which enables some non-state entities to run away from the control and authority of nation-states.

Deterritorialization has important implications for cooperation and alignment of states against terrorism. As it is further discussed in the following sections, deterritorialized threats are hard to perceive, define and fight against. *The elusiveness or ambiguity of the threat is one of the fundamental reasons why states perceive the threat differently.* The deterritorialized and intrinsic features of transnational terrorism (its incongruence to territorial-defense parameters and its

²²⁷Patman, Robert G. 2006. "Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp 963-986.

conflated scale of violence) circumscribe international cooperative behaviors of states that aim to curb it. *The form of the threat itself is a limit to cooperation among states.* The nature of the threat itself as an obstacle against international cooperation is detailed in Chapter 4.

4.3.2. Zooming in on Deterritorialization

Territory, location and proximity of enemy forces are vitally important determinants of classical war assessments. Likewise, contingency-planning and territorial defense are mainly based on force-on-force confrontations of armies. Territory as such is at the heart of territorial-defense, and it is central in deterring conventional war among states. In spite of that, territory is not that central in deterring nuclear war because contingencies of nuclear war are also largely deterritorialized in nature. Thus, deterritorialization of defense is not a novel issue. It has been studied and explained by Cold War strategists.²²⁸ Likewise, transnational terrorism is a deterritorialized threat against which concepts of conventional warfare such as borders, geographical proximity, and mobilization of armies have limited efficacy.

How *distance* is defined within the conceptual scheme of *territorial-defense* helps demonstrate ‘deterritorialization’ and the difficulties that transnational threats present: The subject-matter of classical military strategy is the conventional challenges between armies. It is basically an actual or contemplated clash of wills between opposing military forces on the battlefield. The meaning of ‘distance’ is geographical, and territorial defense pertains to *external threats* that are originating *outside the territory*. Thus, traditional notions of war (or concepts regarding

²²⁸Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, J. Robert Oppenheimer and Thomas Schelling are among the notable military strategists of the Cold War. Brodie, Bernard. 1946. *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*. Harcourt; Brodie, Bernard. 1959. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Princeton University Press.

warfare in the form of armies-fighting-armies in vast confrontations) present the meaning and utility of 'distance' as basically geographical. Distance as a measure of territory has key importance for the customary understanding of territorial defense and war.

In the case of unconventional war demonstrated by transnational terrorism, practical and analytical utility of the concept of 'territory' is different. It is analytically and practically useful *only when terrorists are located or their whereabouts are identified*. The problem is that their headquarters or simply their whereabouts cannot be predetermined before a terrorist attack unlike the case where armies in conventional warfare are geographically detected. *When terrorists do not have any address, retaliation becomes controversial at best and impossible at worst.*

Territory is more of a static term than a dynamic one. However, continuously mobile terrorists (who do not always reside in and fight for a particular territory) are dynamic units. Since terrorism does not have any address to retaliate at, difficulty of locating terrorists or discovering place of terrorist hubs is disrupting the conventional mode of warfare. Thus, deterritorialized and intrinsically dynamic transnational threats challenge the territorial lenses of conventional defense-planning and warfare.

The way terrorists fight tries to break the fighting-will of states and force governments to make concessions. Since that is an attribute of warfare in general, terrorism is a form of warfare, albeit an unconventional one. As one of the forms of warfare, it certainly operates on some territory. Yet, transnational terrorism cannot be entirely seen through the territorial-defense lenses because it oftentimes cannot be *located* clearly. The threat is not settled, but mobile. It is not institutionalized

and organized like national armies or even like guerilla fighters who cling to a certain portion of territory. *Terrorism is a threat without address.*

Globalization of the present era adds up to a change in the dynamics of time and space, which in turn, creates an additional meaning and military-strategic utility of ‘distance’. The traditional utility and meaning of distance are still valid for conventional threats, but an alternative meaning and utility of distance seem to occur through deterritorialization. Technology via telephones, electronic-banking systems, satellite phones and satellite-broadcasting videos, jetliners, fax, the Internet communication and also multifaceted weapons and weapon systems ranging from small arms to nuclear know-how and materials may come under or already are at the service of both civil and violent aims. With the availability of power instruments for non-state formations and given that technology renders physical distance suspended or shrunk to some extent, it seems vital to develop a different understanding of defense and strategy for states.

To put ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘additional meaning of distance’ into the security perspective, several past cases can be considered: A nuclear submarine silently heading towards its target under the Arctic in proximity to a country, a computer espionage/hacker attack on any critically strategic national laboratory of *any* nation, satellite surveillance of military targets in Afghanistan, a cyber attack on power grids, the use of electronic cash in the Far East, broadcasting in languages other than English almost all around the world without much limits (non-Western channels joined the rivalry of agenda-setting and propaganda as opposed to the previous Western monopoly of international broadcasting and agenda-setting) and a cyberspace ‘meeting’ of exiled Burmese opposition leaders²²⁹. Furthermore,

²²⁹Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. *Remapping Global Politics-History's Revenge and*

September 11 terrorist attacks constitute another deterritorialized attack sample. It is also important to ponder over the possibilities and probabilities of terrorist attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.²³⁰

In addition to the above-mentioned show-cases of ‘deterritorialized threats’ (those threats that defy traditional national security understandings of inside-outside, civil-military, national and international), additional examples can be listed as follows: 1993 (Feb.): Bombing of World Trade Center (WTC)- 6 killed; 1993 (Oct.): Killing of U.S. soldiers in Somalia; 1996 (June): Truck bombing at Khobar Towers barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19; 1998 (Aug.): Bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 224 killed; 1999 (Dec.): Plot to bomb millennium celebrations in Seattle foiled when customs agents arrest an Algerian smuggling explosives into the U.S.; 2000 (Oct.): Bombing of the USS *Cole* in port in Yemen; 17 U.S. sailors killed; 2001 (Sept.): Destruction of WTC; attack on Pentagon. Total dead 2,992.; 2001 (Dec.): Man tried to detonate shoe bomb on flight from Paris to Miami; 2002 (April): Explosion at historic synagogue in Tunisia left 21 dead, including 11 German tourists; 2002 (May): Car exploded outside hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 14, including 11 French citizens.; 2002 (June): Bomb exploded outside American consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 12.; 2002 (Oct.): Boat crashed into oil tanker off Yemen coast, killing 1; 2002 (Oct.): Nightclub bombings in Bali, Indonesia, killed 202, mostly Australian citizens; 2002 (Nov.): Suicide attack on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killed 16.; 2003 (May): Suicide bombers killed 34, including 8 Americans, at housing compounds for Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; 2003 (May): 4 bombs killed 33 people targeting Jewish,

Future Shock Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.68

²³⁰Graham Allison. 2004. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* New York: Times Books.

Spanish, and Belgian sites in Casablanca, Morocco; 2003 (Aug.): Suicide car-bomb killed 12, injured 150 at Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia; 2003 (Nov.): Explosions rocked a Riyadh, Saudi Arabia housing compound, killing 17; 2003 (Nov.): Suicide car-bombers simultaneously attacked 2 synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey, killing 25 and injuring hundreds; 2003 (Nov.) Truck bombs detonated at London bank and British consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, killing 26; Terrorist attack to the US consulate in Istanbul on July 9, 2008, killing 6.

Do these attacks fit the orthodox national security concepts and schemes which are mostly against an *external armed attack*? It goes without telling that the answer is negative. It is not surprising that the list demonstrates a common tactic, namely terrorism. However, deterritorialized threats do not stop at terrorist attacks where location of the perpetrators is mostly unknown: such threats are imbued with the logic of military technology, too. Deterritorialization also penetrated the high-technology of nation-states' weapon systems.

A nuclear-armed or conventionally-armed submarine in vicinity to a nation-state creates a strategic vulnerability for national defense: In this way, national defenses (that are based on territory whether it is territorial waters or heartland) can possibly be transgressed. Such strategic exposure is possible due to the advancements in military technology and military-industrial complex. If a technologically-complicated submarine could not cruise under water, nuclear weapons would not be carried to a location that forms a strategic threat. The same holds true for ballistic missile technology. Accordingly, conventional submarine technology alone demonstrates the vulnerabilities of national defenses. Sonars that detect submarines can be overcome with higher offensive technology. Technological means rival with each other.

It is the competition of technological prowess among nations that tilts the balance between defense and offense. Defense and offense appear to be susceptible to ever advancing technology. High-technology may well surpass territorial boundaries of states; and that is an advantage that can be exploited by nation-states and by non-state entities alike. Therefore, security and technology are intertwined, the latter being one of the main drivers of globalization and deterritorialization. Thus, deterritorialization of security is not limited to terrorist attacks; it may be realized by holders of advanced means of technology that strain territorial defense.

4.3.3. The Nuclear Age, September 11 and Deterritorialization

In an op-ed in 1992 early-on, Strobe Talbott wrote about globalization and its implications for nation-states and sovereignty; pointing also to different manifestations of deterritorialization including those that are realized by states' advanced means:

... Stalin's conquest of Eastern Europe spurred the Western democracies to form NATO, history's most ambitious, enduring and successful exercise in collective security. The U.S. and the Soviet Union also scared each other into negotiating nuclear-arms-control treaties that set in place two vital principles: adversary states have a mutual interest in eliminating the danger of strategic surprise, and each legitimately has a say in the composition of the other's arsenal of last resort. The result was further dilution of national sovereignty and a useful precedent for the management of relations between nuclear-armed rivals in the future.²³¹

He was mainly referring to sovereignty-eroding effect of the second-strike capability of the superpowers which led to the nuclear arms-control treaties during the Cold War. The technology available for the major states was commensurate to rule out the basic prerogatives of sovereignty based on territoriality. Technology did not wait for the settlement of political quarrels.

²³¹Talbott, Strobe. 1992. "The Birth of a Global Nation," *Time*, July 20. Retrieved 16 August 2008; <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,976015-1,00.html>

That high-technology may surpass territorial boundaries and sovereignty is all the more apparent when other examples such as proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery-means are scrutinized. Among the delivery-means of NBC weapons, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have already *eroded the effectiveness of traditional national defense*. Nuclear sub-marines and inter-continental missiles are just two examples that put undue strain on national or territorial defense. It is instructive to study them, especially the evolution of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs): ICBMs rule out the defensive nature of geographical distance, and render landmasses or oceans defensively vain to missiles carrying atomic or thermonuclear warheads²³². After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, “speed of kill and mutual kill *irrespective of the landmass*”.²³³

Initially, possession of nuclear weapons was confined only to the United States. Yet, the genie was out of the bottle and the nuclear technology proved difficult to stop and other countries followed the US in acquiring the necessary materials and know-how: Hence, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The USSR followed the United States with its first test in September 1949. In time, many more weapons are produced and stored by both the United States and the USSR. The introduction of the hydrogen bombs in 1952-3 welcomed the vision of unlimited destructive power. The nuclear age was also the nuclear age of plenty and both superpowers produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.

²³²The perception of being left alone out in the cold regarding the nuclear balance constitutes the main underlying logic behind the Russian Federation concern against the missile defense project of the US, which was continuously debated during the George W. Bush administrations.

²³³Thomas C. Schelling. 1967. *Arms and Influence* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, chp. 1.

Regarding the issue of globalization's impact on national security and sovereignty, the delivery means of nuclear weapons are also crucial. Based on the ones developed by Germans during World War II, in 1960s the range of ballistic missiles had been increased to deliver a hydrogen bomb *from any point on earth to another*, pointing to *the globalization of the impact of weapon-systems in particular*. In the 1970s, the missiles became accurate enough not just to hit 'area targets' (entire cities), but also to hit 'pinpointed targets' such as military bases. Computerization gave way to the advent of multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) and multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) making it possible to put ten warheads on top of a single missile.

What is important for the subject at hand is not the increase in the number of warheads that can be carried by a missile: *For the subject-matter of deterritorialized threats what is important is the fact that national defense and territorial security was first breached by the states themselves via advanced technology. Later on, high technology in armaments, weapons systems and advanced means of communication and travel became available for private actors or entities other than nation-states.*

Technology empowers violence and broadens the probabilities of illicit use of force: By way of example, terrorist groups can base conventional missiles, radiological devices and especially rockets on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Technology, first produced by states themselves, surpassed territorial defense logic long before non-state entities took advantage of it: International high seas and the outer-space were potential war-zones during the Cold War. Territory-centric defense template was not the sole strategic concept even during the 1970s. With the advent of ballistic missiles flying at hypersonic speeds, and with the cruise missiles

flying so low that they could not be detected by ground-based radars, the problem of defense against attack became huge. *Second-strike capability*²³⁴ of the US and the former USSR was of a deterritorialized nature, too. The nuclear age of the 1960s and 1970s has already eroded the classical territorial-defense logic before the terrorism wave of the early twenty-first century surpassed it.

Territorial defense logic erodes in parallel to the use of advanced technology. Since technological advancement does not hold a distinction between civil and military realms, civil and military usages of high-technology tax national defenses with additional resources. This is manifest in the case of a computer espionage/hacker attack on any critically strategic national laboratory of *any* nation or in the case of a satellite surveillance of military targets in any country as done for Afghan targets before the beginning of war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. A cyberspace 'meeting' of exiled Burmese opposition leaders, the hacking of defense ministries' databases, electronic robberies of national and private banks are all examples of *deterritorialization of security* emerging via technology. In these above cases and in that of ballistic missiles, no traveling of people occurs, and territory-centric approach to defense is reduced in utility. *When the nuclear-suitcase contingencies, attacks by suicide-bombers and truck-bombs are concerned, it becomes clearer that such threats are not even external. Territory-centric national security approach defines threats as external, and it does not correspond to above-mentioned threats well.*

²³⁴By basing nuclear weapons with their delivery vehicles on the ground, in the air and at sea simultaneously (the strategic triad) the nuclear weapons themselves would be protected against a first attack to ensure that enough of them would survive after a possible first strike to deliver a second-strike as retaliation. As long as *second-strike capability* was assured, actual exchange of nuclear weapons would be meaningless because both superpowers would be annihilated. This arrangement caused 'the balance of terror' that inhibited the actual use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War.

Other cases such as September 11 2001 terrorist attacks mark the same point. September 11 shows how an airliner was turned into a missile-like weapon and how it was weaponized against civilians. Terrorists did not possess missiles, but turned aircrafts into vehicles functionally similar to missiles. The overcoming of the national security defense shield of a country was not breached by pure technology alone as in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but it was breached through *a compact use of deceit, secrecy, notorious innovative thinking and technology*. All in all, *commonality of all above-mentioned threats including that of September 11 is that they are deterritorialized threats that do not correspond to territory-centric national security thinking. Conventional armies and conventional war-planning are mostly sidelined.*

Deceit, secrecy and notorious innovative thinking by terrorists led to erosion of the distinctions between civil and military, and between domestic and international. Seemingly civilian people (none wore uniforms) hijacked airliners. When perpetrators of September 11 hijacked airliners, they also hijacked high-technology. Although they appeared to be civilian passengers, they were not civilians since they acted out of bellicosity. Yet, they were not soldiers in the regular sense of the term either. Thus, terrorism as a tactic hardly sees a distinction between civil and military realms or between inside and outside of a state. This is exactly the characteristic that makes terrorism what it is, namely a gray area phenomenon.²³⁵

Yet, not only *deceit, secrecy, innovative thinking and taking control of high-technology airliners* played into the hands of September 11 perpetrators, but *availability of free movement* helped them succeed in the same manner. Open-

²³⁵Chalk, Peter. 2000. *Non-Military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence, and Chaos on National and International Security* Oxford: Macmillan Press.

societies welcome free movement of goods, people, services and ideas. Unlike an environment of dictatorship that controls almost every interaction,²³⁶ *an environment of open interactions coupled with the availability of high technology increase the possibility of unconventional forms of warfare.*²³⁷

As for the high technology which went global, it is important to underline terrorist use of cell phones, fax, and the Internet as effective means of communication. Yet, it is also true that September 11 perpetrators weaponized box-cutters into tools of hijacking without using sophisticated high-technology weapons such as automatic-rifles or bazookas. This is arguably put forward as the superiority of the low-technology tactics or human-agency using crude methods against high-technology defenses. There is a reality to this argument. However, it seems incomplete. It is not only the box-cutters they used that give the impact of the attack. It is also the civilian aircrafts that are weaponized into killing machines. September 11 would not be a mass-casualty attack without the big airliners crushed and exploded. Complementing the picture was their successful deceit in boarding the plane, learning how to fly airliners in advance, and from an operational point of view, their innovative idea and success in execution to crush aircrafts into towers.

September 11 was the demonstration of the fact that technology drastically empowers educated laymen. It brings forward *the violent initiative power of the private or non-state entities.*²³⁸ September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a blunder

²³⁶Laquer, Walter. *The New Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.6.

²³⁷Crenshaw, Martha. *Terrorism in Context*. PA: Pennsylvania University Press; Stern, Jessica. 1999. *The Ultimate Terrorists*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; Stern, Jessica. 2003. *Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill* NY: HarperCollins.

²³⁸Nevertheless, there is a qualification to be made: not every individual is capable of exerting such an influence. Individuals or groups must be educated enough to use technology; for without learning how to fly an airliner it was not possible to conduct the attack in the case of September 11. Without such education and indeed the technology, human agency is nil. But, education rates of populations and schooling around the world increased and gave way to a skill revolution in human capital. There is a revolutionary increase in the number of skilled individuals all around the world. As Rosenau underlines, not only technology, but also education and skills went global.

of the high-technology and low-technology, a mix of inside and outside of the national borders, a mix of the national and the international and a conflation of civil and military realms along with the complementary factors of spread of education and technology. *In the jargon of geopolitics, hinterland and heartland conflated into each other.* Consequently, September 11 demonstrated the notorious dark side of globalization.

The *deterritorialization of security in the process of globalization* (which might be also put as *the constant shifting of scales of violence back and forth from the national scale to the transnational scale*) underwrites the dark side of globalization:

Since September 11th when the World Trade Center was felled by hijacked commercial aircraft and a wing of the Pentagon similarly destroyed, and especially since October 7th when US retaliation against Afghanistan commenced (notwithstanding that none of the hijackers was Afghani), we have been living through a further dramatic evolution in the meaning of terrorism. Here too *the question of conflated scales* has been crucial. In one sense, the attack on the World Trade Center was strictly local insofar as the affected site itself measures no more than 16 acres. Yet this was obviously and equally a global event: the hijackers from several countries led multinational lives; victims were of 83 nationalities; the unfolding catastrophe was instantaneously broadcast on television screens around the world; the economic, political and cultural fallout has been global. It was not, however, a clearly defined national event in the moments immediately following the attacks. For all that they were on US soil, the targets were symbols of global as much as national economic and military power, and such obvious symbols of US national and cultural power as the Statue of Liberty, Hollywood and Disneyworld were not targeted. If indeed Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network are responsible, the perpetrators have no coherent national identity either.²³⁹

Considered in the light of the question of conflated scales, national defenses appear to be clueless about the seemingly civil sources of transnational threats. *They are clueless because national defenses are mainly configured to work against military threats, not against seemingly civil-oriented ones.* National defense experts speak the language of ‘territory’ while non-territorial threats appear to be all Chinese to them. National security is conceptualized against an external threat to

²³⁹Smith, Neil. “Global Executioner: Scales of Terror”, *Social Science Research Council*, September 11 Writings Database <http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/nsmith.htm> italics added.

the state. However, as summarized by Smith, ‘external-internal’ or ‘inside-outside’ conflated into each other in most of the terrorist attacks. Hence the reiteration for the sake of emphasis: *a blunder of the high-technology and low-technology, a mix of inside and outside, and national and international, civil and military realms of the nation-state-centric approach to International Relations.*

Following Rosenau, it is then appropriate to ask: ‘Of what is this an instance?’ The answer for states appears to be the implication of globalization on national security. The implication is mainly the declining -not dying- significance of physical distance for states’ channeling and managing their national defense and influence. Declining significance of physical distance for territorial defense deserves singling out because it has important repercussions for national security strategy. Although it is by no means certain that this situation will prevail forever, it is likely to be tenable until the return of major conventional wars among states. This is so, Brzezinski argues, because unconventional threats come in unconventional forms so long as major conventional confrontations are absent and leave room for unconventional formations to operate.²⁴⁰

To elaborate the conflated scales of violence and security under globalization, and reflect on the declining (not dying) significance of physical distance in nation-states’ ability to manage their national defense and influence, it may be useful to further consider territorial defense. Territorial defense is, to be sure, not an unconventional form of defense. Yet, it is particularly *vulnerable* to the changing relationship of time and space in the conduct of unconventional and illegal forms of violence, namely terrorist operations. In the strictest sense of the word, national defense means the protection of a territory against an external

²⁴⁰Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1993. *Out of Control - Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*. Ontario: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, Inc, pp. 85-116.

enemy. 'Enemy' is conceptualized at nation-state level as being a belligerent state or adversarial soldiers of an opposing army. After the emergence of the nation-state as the main international actor, the military is usually organized at 'national level' and territorial defense is mainly synonymous with national defense. Confronting such an underlying logic of territorial defense, unconventional threats are neither territorially-oriented nor nationally-oriented at the unit-level. Such threats do not operate on a territorial basis as illustrated by the above-mentioned examples of terrorist attacks. Victim-states are intellectually and operationally nation-state-centric unlike the aggressors. Alternatively put, victim is thinking through nation-state analytical lenses whereas aggressor takes no strict nation-state template for its operational plans. Viewed this way, fighting-templates of the two sides are asymmetric.

4.3.4. Time and Space Relationship in Warfare

Seen from the basic mechanism of conducting military operations, the distance between the center (home-base) and the periphery (the theater of operation) creates a time-lag. This time-lag originates during the transmission of news of the developments on the ground. Sending data entails time. In other words, there is a time-lag between when developments taking place in the periphery and the generation of commands at the center to be sent back to the periphery. Commands move back and forth between center and periphery; however, change in the periphery surpasses communication with the center, resulting in the on-the-spot decision-making. This was mainly the case with the Western colonies in the previous centuries. Nineteenth-century colonial outposts of the British implemented

on-the-spot decision-making.²⁴¹

In our era, the time-lag is remarkably shortened. This causes the parting of time from space. Giddens formulates it as ‘dislocation of space from time’.²⁴² To demonstrate what is meant, it should be considered how the Roman Empire or the Ottoman Empire exercised its authority over a vast geography: Both empires built roads and waterborne channel-transport systems to overcome the limiting effects of physical distance. Without such artifacts of technology, physical distance placed huge limits on central authority to rule. The extent to which empires overcome limits of geographical distance through available technology determined their imperial life-time. In other words, *the capacity to project power* is an important indication of imperial life-time.

Limits of geographical distance are steadily overtaken by progress of science and technology throughout history. During the Cold War, firing-protocols of nuclear submarines (submarines ready to use submarine-launched ballistic missiles) of the United States were initially not totally dependent on the decision of the center/the president. The decision to launch a nuclear missile was to be advised by the commanding officer of the submarine, and a consultation between the center and periphery followed. Less-advanced technology of the time back then put immense pressure on the head-officer of the submarine to fire nuclear weapons even without the approval of the president in a rightly or wrongly perceived countdown crisis situation. Above-mentioned time-lag was a strategic deficit for the country that perceived itself to be under attack. Again, national defense was mostly about the technological means and deterritorialization. Today advance-technology

²⁴¹Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. *Remapping Global Politics-History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 227-238.

²⁴²Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. *Remapping Global Politics-History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.69.

shortened the time- lag between center and periphery with the consequence of empowering the center²⁴³. This example points to the parting of time from space. The once close link between physical distance and time is wearing thin because limits of geographical distance are overtaken by progress of science and technology. *Consequently, deterritorialized forms of threats are the state-of-the-art threats of the contemporary era.*

Command and control go through its electronics-age and terrorists take advantage of advanced technology, too. Encrypted websites, simple e-mailing and mobile phones are among the modern facilities alongside age-old tactics of face-to-face money and message exchange, informal payment methods of *hawala* or *hundis* that operate in the absence of legal and juridical surveillance²⁴⁴. Obvious and distinctive feature of terrorist groups is that they take their tactical decisions and conduct operations without the hindrance of legal systems and supervision of states. To the extent deterritorialization means states' eroding or diminished state control over economic transactions and over means of physical violence in their sovereign sphere (due to the uncontrolled flow of weapons and money), use of high-tech medium and non-technological methods free terrorists from national control. To name a few, high-technology such as mobile-phones, pay-phones, fax, electronic-banking used by firms and charity associations, satellite communication or the Internet; and non-technological or traditional methods of payment such as *hawala*²⁴⁵ are all together means of breaking-free from national control.

²⁴³ To be sure, the will to use such capacity of the center to direct the operations from far away locations depend on the decision-makers at the center. They retain two alternatives: to authorize the on-the-spot decision-making or control it from the headquarters at the heartland. Nevertheless, the latter alternative is enhanced ever more than the previous eras. American forces in Iraq from 2003 onwards, most of the time, are not given license to act independently. Different operations in separate districts are connected to the main headquarters in Iraq, which is in turn accountable to Pentagon.

²⁴⁴For the explication of the issue, Aydinli, Ersel. 2006. "From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists' Achilles Heel," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18: 301-313.

²⁴⁵Aydinli, Ersel. 2006. "From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists'

High-technology reduces difficulties emanating from physical distance, and reduces the effective control of law enforcement authorities. Master-plan, logistical preparations, communication and actual conduct of a terrorist attack are facilitated owing to the available technological sophistication and know-how on the side of the terrorists. Thus, it is not only the terrorist's seemingly civil outlook or lack of uniforms that helps them to operate in disguise, but *also it is the reduced need to meet in person*. With growing availability of technology, terrorists needn't come face-to-face. This is especially the case for Muslims in Europe contacting militants in states other than Europe.²⁴⁶ The radicalization of Ahmed Omar Sheikh, whose parents once expected the Queen of England to knight him, was known to have an idyllic life. He was known by his friends and family as 'the kindest, most gentle person that you could meet'. He was remarkably successful at school, the Forest School in England. He was the beloved young man for his friends, family and professors. However, as Sageman explains his circumstances in detail, he ended up being convicted of kidnapping *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl who was beheaded. The Ahmed Omar narrative highlights the issues facing those who wish to neutralize global terrorism.²⁴⁷

Successful use of that advantage in the fight against terrorism seems questionable²⁴⁸. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the fact that, if rightly applied, high-technology reduces difficulties of physical distance, time-lag, and on-the-spot decision-making. This may possibly be turned into an advantage for an army.

Achilles Heel," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, p. 302.

²⁴⁶Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

²⁴⁷Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 3-12.

²⁴⁸*Report on Wilton Park Conference*. 2006. WPS06/5 "Towards A Community-Based Approach To Counter-Terrorism" Monday 20-Wednesday 22 March in partnership with Demos and with the support of The Home Office (Faith Community Unit); United States Institute for Peace; Economic and Social Research Council; Arts and Humanities Research Council; Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).

However, this advantage confronts another difficulty. Since illegal travel or mobility of weapons, money and information is widespread, gathering intelligence about wherewithal of such materials and terrorists is a highly-dynamic process that fluctuates constantly. Although the time-lag of the counter-terrorism operations diminished, turning that into an advantage is still difficult. Put bluntly, ‘seek and destroy missions’ face difficulties in locating terrorists. Reliable human-intelligence is crucial to locate and separate them from the innocent civilians. However, fast change or fluctuation in *the definition of the situation*²⁴⁹ originating in the conflated scale of the terrorist modus operandi is a big problem. In other words, the way authorities perceive the situation they are in is constantly changing.

Terrorism operates in and through civil society. It basically operates at the societal level, not at the state-level. A likely conclusion to be made is that everyday activities of people who intentionally or unintentionally get involved entail surveillance. That is why there is a dilemma between security and freedom: the more one of them, the less the other. Without credit-cards, off-shore accounts, the Internet traffic and mobile phones, communication would be limited among all people including terrorists. Airlines, cruise-ships, fast trains and other transportation vehicles enabled the movement of people, including terrorists, to be more agile. If tight security is to be applied, nation-states should oversee all these interactions. Even if rigid surveillance was possible, it might become self-defeating because it limits basic freedoms and values that terrorists want to harm in the first place.

²⁴⁹Evans, Graham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics*. NY: Simon & Schuster, p. 82.

4.4. How Is The Threat Formed Under Globalization?

‘Psychological Distance’

In such a conundrum between security and freedom, how can states approach the fight against terrorism and political disagreements within society without indulging in any ideological blunder of sorts? How can cooperation against terrorism be sustained? The answer may be hidden in the use of the concept of psychological distance. *Psychological distance* is the degree of dissimilarity amidst cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to, and coping with the world regardless of geographical distance.²⁵⁰ If psychological distance is high among individuals or different segments of the same society, then the probability of experiencing misunderstandings and misperceptions becomes high. This causes both the possibility and probability of conflict and violence to rise. Then, the probability of sustaining an orderly community is low.

Perceptions of difference and availability of empathy (two main determinants of psychological distance) do not necessarily increase with physical distance. People living around the world are geographically dispersed. However, advanced communication and transportation helped a big portion of the peoples (especially the rich and the middle classes) create “*overlapping economic and cultural systems*”²⁵¹. Hence, technological change made it possible to obtain intimacy among people living far away from each other.

The enabler of intimacy and friendship or of at least acquaintances among people living far away from one another is the result of the parting of time from space. People need not come together at a particular location to get to know each

²⁵⁰ Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. *Remapping Global Politics-History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 69.

²⁵¹ For the details of why and how overlapping economic and cultural systems exist, please see Christopher Hill, 2007. ‘Bringing War Home: Foreign-Policy Making in Multicultural Societies’, *International Relations*, 21-3, pp. 259-279.

other, devise plans or join in a civil or violent activism. Distant geographical locations and territory do not axiomatically constitute obstacles that stand in the way of communication, psychological sameness or similarities. The high velocity and volume of exchange via telephone, fax, satellite phones and video connections, television and the Internet (e-mail, blogs, chat rooms, and high exchange of data in image, text, audio and video form) help citizens of different societies establish *psychological affinity or low psychological-distance that equals to thinking and acting similarly*. Moreover, such technologies enable electronically-based seemingly charitable, epistemic or terrorist and criminal communities to make common-cause. They also enable people to breed sympathy or animosity towards a certain 'other'. 'The othering-process'²⁵² acquired an enormous platform and facilitator in the Internet.

Communities that are formed through technology regardless of physically faraway places are geographically dispersed around the world. Although people's reach to technology are unevenly scattered around the world, those that can access to the Internet acquire the opportunity to establish ties with each other: When minds meet, politics start to take place simultaneously with no regard to vicinity or geographical proximity. Thus, psychological affinity is independent from vicinity or geographical proximity, and electronic highway or cyberspace is the on-line or virtual roads where people can meet. The communication of masses via technological medium is among the points of departure for the formation and organization of different non-state actors with which states tackle.

²⁵²Diez, Thomas. 2004. "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 17, Number 2.

Online communication is the relatively new platform where politics are carried out. Accordingly, disinformation, terrorist-propaganda and organization of criminal and terrorist operations through mostly encrypted-coding found a new platform to become effective against states' law enforcement and military capabilities. Previously, meeting of individuals in the same location was a must to coordinate an attack; now, it is relatively easy to organize and coordinate terrorist attacks without territorial safe havens. This is especially the case for homegrown or domestic terrorism.

Citizens of any state may make common cause with a transnational ideology and may contribute to the cause even without talking to the terrorists in person. When similar-minded people reach out to use high-technology for communication, the need to be within the sight of one another greatly diminishes. This is a corollary to the above-mentioned parting of time from space. It is possible via real-time communication and business transactions, TV, mobile-phones, fax, Global Positioning System/satellites usage, encrypted and non-encrypted Internet websites for communication, planning and propaganda. These are the main technological media through which various polities empower themselves to communicate, organize, cooperate among each other and co-opt or propagandistically clash, disrupt and attack states. The above-mentioned technological mediums are among the components of the transnational threat formation.

As of the beginning of the twenty-first century, people are able to devise plans among each other without limits of physical distance/territories and facilitate their mode of operation. *This advantage modifies the age-old obstacles and costs of organizing criminal and terrorist attacks.* It enables people in faraway locations to

make common cause with each other. Anarchists of the past centuries would certainly get mesmerized by the technologically advanced means of realizing terrorism or realizing ‘propaganda by the deed’. For anarchists, terrorist operations and objectives would only get facilitated with the progress in science. Unfortunately, time seems to prove them right as of the end of the twentieth-century.

Since it is relatively easy to organize and coordinate terrorist attacks without territorial safe havens, a different line of defense seems necessary. Simply put, the Internet is the online transnational space where any contact among people may either result in a clash or cooperation among them against an authority of their own choosing including the nation-states. Without any state control, direction or manipulation, citizens of different countries are empowered to choose which information to accept and use, get self-taught on a subject, set goals, organize, and conduct propaganda and counter-propaganda²⁵³. This is the crucial enabler of *the Al-Qaeda social movement* whereby citizens of any state decides to support Al-Qaeda’s goals without contacting *the Al-Qaeda Central*²⁵⁴. In that vein, an individual surfing the Internet is a micro actor trying to have a voice in international politics albeit seemingly a miniscule one. In hindsight, the seemingly miniscule role may prove to be a grave threat when preparations of the September 11 attacks are considered²⁵⁵. Globalization appears to be empowering violent individuals.

²⁵³Uimonen, Paula. 2003. Networks of Global Interaction *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 16, Number 2.

²⁵⁴2008. *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments* Press Release, February 25.

²⁵⁵Greenberg, Karen J. ed. 2005. *Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today’s Terrorists*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

At the other side of the fence, although people around the world may come close psychologically or they may come to have similar leanings, this is not unconditional: Socio-economic processes arguably determine the probability of establishing affinity among people. As Marc Sageman explicates in detail, establishment of affinity or accepting a common cause entails socio-economic commonalities. Socio-economic commonality is necessary for low degree of dissimilarity amidst cognitive frameworks of people.

Socio-economic commonality (that may arguably be seen as a necessary, but not a sufficient cause for establishing psychological affinity or making common-cause) demonstrates itself in common tastes, norms or walks of life. For instance, tastes and norms of urban populations who are integrated in the global economy have little in common with poorer underclass that is bereft of contact with the global economic market and due job opportunities. The better-off people in Caracas, Karachi, Istanbul, Berlin, Tokyo, Milan, Singapore or New York -though living in distant places from each other- can come to have relative intimacy and get on well with each other. Another example is China where political and social tensions arise between modernizing and entrepreneurial elite in coastal cities such as Shanghai and the rest of the society which is still overwhelmingly agrarian or not-fully modernized. In the United States, heartland states of the country are socio-economically different from the coastal ones. This is even demonstrated in most elections, coastal states of the US mostly voting for Democrats while the inner states preferring Republicans; the same goes for the March 29, 2009 Turkish local elections. Put differently, a certain community of a country may be experiencing the modern era and its due social institutions (norms and way of life among individuals) while simultaneously another community of the same country

may be following pre-modern or feudal-like mind-maps and institutions. Still another portion of that country may be going through a mixture of both contexts, constituting a transition from one to another. One may consider the contrasting snapshots of Hong Kong and the rest of China. Alternatively, the contrast between tribes' feudal way of life in eastern and southeastern Anatolia and the walk of life in Western Anatolia makes the point. Tribal life in eastern and southeastern Anatolia is shaped by kinship relations. Feudal-tribal social norms and institutions still overwhelmingly reign despite the repercussions of globalization such as in-flow of different ideas, life styles and economic trajectories upon this region. Blood feuds continue to take place. Today, most of the societies are torn between parochialism and globalism and between their respective values. Torn between these trends, societies go through a transition that portrays unique blends of the traditional and the modern. By way of example, psychological distance may arguably be high between New Yorkers and the inhabitants of a rural American county, while rural Americans may get on better with some of the rural or middle class Turks.

To sum up, people living face to face in cities may be psychologically remote from each other owing to age, education and income level. In contrast, people living in different parts of the world having similar characteristics may feel psychologically close. This is part of the main underlying logic of what Rosenau calls *distant proximities*.²⁵⁶ When people make a common-cause, and especially when they come together against a government, it does not seem untenable to assume that they have common motivations owing to the low psychological distance among them. Arab-Israeli conflict, the conflict in Afghanistan, Iraqi

²⁵⁶Rosenau, James N. 2003. *Distant Proximities-Dynamics beyond Globalization* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

inferno or the September 11 attacks all create different kind of affinities among people living away from each other.²⁵⁷ People have different interpretations of ethics, customs, law or religion. The point is that common values, lifestyles and philosophies in giving meaning to life may create affinity, liking and even attraction in several facets of life such as politics, religion, trade, art, science or sports. Therefore, formation of affinity becomes crucial in understanding the nature of lasting transnational ideologies such as jihadist militant Islam, or neoliberalism for that matter. Psychological distance is a term that helps avoid ideological argumentations in analysis and facilitate understanding of how transnational groups come into being. Formation of affinity among people or the concept of psychological distance has very important implications for understanding the structure of transnational terrorism in that it has direct relevance for national security today.

4.5. Political Space and Transnationality

Having defined psychological distance, *another definition of globalization* is proposed involving transnationality: *Globalization is the process of alteration in psychological distance occurring independently from physical distance, which paves the way for alternative polities to emerge and their respective political domains/spaces to rise all around the world.* This definition builds and improves on the deterritorialization of international politics. Whatever definition of globalization is put on the front burner, one common feature of all such definitions should emphasize non-territorial aspects of politics. The definition above invigoratingly points to the emergence of deterritorialized ‘political spaces’ that

²⁵⁷Sluglett, Peter 1982. “The Review- Rubin, Barry. The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict”, *International Affairs* Vol. 58, No. 4 Autumn, pp. 709-710.

both overlap and clash. *The concept of psychological distance* is intertwined with *the concept of political space* in that the former gives way to the latter.

It is essential to clarify *the concept of political space*. The confusion of territory with political space has arguably caused limitations in recognizing change in world politics. *Political space* is the extent of a polity's political (not physical) domain. *Political space refers to the ways identities and loyalties are distributed*. In that regard, territory is just one of the manifestations of political space. Territory is the physical marker or indication around which certain loyalties and identities gather. Therefore, a territorial political space is formed by people within the boundaries of a certain territory. Identities and loyalties are focused upon a landmass and upon the cultural body mainly situated within that landmass. However, not all political spaces focus upon a delimited territory or land. In other words, territory is not the only way of profiling political space. Spaces of authority or 'domains of the political' needn't be territorially defined. For example, transnational terrorism, especially the Al Qaeda-type of it, exemplifies a non-territorial form of a polity. Its political space is not territorial. Its ideology has a purportedly universal ideological claim that is argued to be applicable everywhere. Similarly, mechanisms and transactions of market economy and finance-capital are most of the time freed from territory. Transnational corporations are not operationally enclusted within a territorial political space. Their economic and political playground is mostly non-territorial. They are beyond borders and operate across the territorial political spaces of nation-states.

'Territory' is a concept that denotes a demarcated land attached to a political unit, namely the state as institutionalized bodies of political organization. Otherwise, without a political organization attached, it is merely land. As such,

every nation-state has a dominant ideology and set of values to which it anticipates loyalty from its citizens. Territory draws the borders of that anticipation. However, not all citizens may recognize the values of a particular nation-state. Certain portions of a society may come to develop their own loyalties and identities. Thus, even where political space is territorial, that is to say even in the political space of a nation-state, there may also be other clusters of identities and loyalties or political spaces different from that of the nation-state in question: Nation-states' political spaces are both co-inhabited and rivaled by other identity groups and loyalties. In other words, different political spaces may coexist within the same specific territory of a nation-state.

People may join polities other than those of nation-states. This may not be in a legal framework as in the case of citizenship. Yet, citizens may develop different loyalties while keeping their citizenship. Loyalty to the nation-state and acceptance of the identity or the formal socio-political ideology of the state do not seem to be automatically forthcoming. Citizens, while living in their homeland, may choose to refuse social, political, cultural or economic status quo that they experience. Although they may inhabit the same geographical location with their fellow citizens, some of them can choose to be loyal to different authorities and pay loyalty or allegiance to different ideological groups. Accordingly, different political spaces or identity/loyalty groups may exist side by side within the same society. *This is how terrorism is both inside and outside and across nation-states or most appropriately how terrorism becomes 'transnational'.*

How do different groups of people who have different identities and loyalties co-exist side by side and yet at the same time contact transnationally? This is possible due to globalization that provides people suitable conditions under

which they define and redefine their sense of belonging and identity independently from physical distance. The process of globalization (or the high velocity and volume of people, goods, capital, information, ideas, and weapons moving across borders) changes policies of states, the way people think about those policies, and the way they behave and react to developments in much shorter a time span than is the case in previous eras. Significantly, globalization affects and gradually changes the way people define and redefine their sense of belonging and identity independently from physical distance. Hence, groupings and regroupings of citizens or new polities are continuously shaped and reshaped under the multitude impacts of the process of globalization.

Under the empowering conditions of globalization, especially via information technology (IT) and media, they may develop loyalties to a variety of authorities. Citizens may contemplate, consider, devise, propagate and activate novel allegiances. Since the borders of the mind are not necessarily physically-bounded or geographically-oriented, these allegiances may transgress national borders. Examples to disparate groups that constitute political spaces other than that of nation-states abound. Feminists conceptualize political space along *gender* lines. Marxists think of it in terms of *class*. Nationalists organize their understanding of polity as nation and see their loyalties via *ethnicity* or *legal citizenship*. Indian tradition sees it through *caste-system*. The Communist International in the past was another polity operating beyond the national borders. Religious extremists in general organize various polities and show devotion to particular authorities with reference to a peculiar interpretation of a *religion, sect* or *cult*. By and large, these and other possible categories of identity are non-territorial and point to other possibilities of political space that are already in effect.

Gender, class, caste, ethnicity, religion or sects denote units of analysis. They are also identity-markers which define and point to separate loyalties or social glues. Different loyalties and social glues form different political spaces. Regardless of the fact that they have established themselves into nation-states or not, they exist and have authority and autonomy to certain extent. The challenge for each of these contending political spaces is to prevail over the others, including the ones that have established themselves into a nation-state formation. More often than not, states try to contain, suppress or co-opt them when they present threats to the citizenry and political survival of a regime. This process of containment or co-option is itself a gradual process of change for better or worse. Nation-state values are not necessarily constant or unchanging. They also change, but they do so slowly in the long haul seen from the historical continuum. States try to protect their establishing principles and values to the extent possible. Such protection is a matter of survival because it comes down to national unity both sociologically and territorially. Although rival political spaces do not always manifest themselves physically or violently, they are existential threats for states when they are perceived to be disturbing the prospects of political survival.

State values and its political space thereof are regarded as psychologically distant by other political spaces that comprise rival values and loyalties. However, it is not easy for states to single out and target an adversarial polity since people have several identities and loyalties, and work through different political spaces that overlap. In a democratic system that operates under the rule of law, it is not easy for states to isolate the persons that are believed to be endangering the well-being of the general population or political survival of the state. The dilemma confronting democratic states in fighting terrorism is that the more security

precautions take place, the more basic freedoms of individuals are likely to be hurt.²⁵⁸ In an atmosphere of overlapping political spaces -that is in a context of overlapping identities and loyalties- it is not easy to figure out whom active and passive terrorists are.

4.6. The Rise of the Global Middle Class

The rise of non-national entities accelerates with the end of the Cold War. New entities or polities gradually become more assertive after the end of the Cold War in parallel to the rise of societal elements in politics. This appears to have a strong correlation with *the rise of the global middle class*.²⁵⁹ According to Clark S. Judge, rising middle classes of the world are far more important than the global corporations, fall of communism in USSR and the rise of markets all around the world. From Europe to the Middle East to Asia and Latin America and also in Africa, new classes are rising. Where local societies are rigid and local elites are entrenched, these rising classes are disturbing to established ways. They are shopkeepers, the small craftsman, the local manufacturer or people with mostly similar jobs. Judge argues that these people, more than other people in their societies, are likely to be breaking away from the restrictive past. They are reaching out to a future open to ambition and innovation. That is why new parties, whose support-base comes from mainly this kind of people, obtain power and govern many countries.

Such societies come to have new kind of elites reflecting the values of the new rising middle class. However, not all trade and business transactions of these

²⁵⁸For a proposal of getting out of this dilemma, Müllerson. Rein. 2005. "Being Tough on Terrorism or Respecting Human Rights: A False Dilemma of Authoritarian and Liberal Responses", *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol.48, No.12 August pp. 1626-1656.

²⁵⁹Judge, Clark S. 2002. 'Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies', *Policy Review*, December-January, p. 9.

classes are within the law, resulting in corruption. Clark Judge sees them as political and social phenomena that suggest ‘a titanic tide of human ambition and intellectual and financial power pounding at the ancient walls of Third World social structures’.²⁶⁰ He goes on to argue that “the rise of the middle classes in almost all around the world suggests an entrepreneurial revolution that has transformed the US economy, society and politics in the past. Since 1970s, the American intellectual and financial entrepreneurship has a global counterpart scattered over the world”.²⁶¹ According to Seymour Martin Lipset, the rise of the global middle classes originate in the decline of the national working classes and the increase of middle-class numbers, the availability of advanced education, growing productivity and political consciousness that has diminished the lifestyle differences in the society, the decline of unionism, the rise of knowledge and service industries and the growing appeal to young people of self-employment and entrepreneurship.²⁶²

This is an important change that has policy-implications. In response to such change, states are forced to adapt gradual transformation of its past values. Then, globalization should not be seen as an external threat to states, which remain intact and never changing. Globalization affects all actors including the relationships of authority within states. On the one hand, authority of nation-state is illegally challenged by terrorist groups, and on the other hand, it is legally challenged by non-governmental organizations, interest groups of economic and ideological origin and by the above-mentioned middle classes that deny the status quo in the society. Moreover, political parties with their different ideological

²⁶⁰Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, *Policy Review*, December-January, pp. 10-12.

²⁶¹Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, *Policy Review*, December-January, p.13.

²⁶²Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981. *Political Man-The Social Bases of Politics*. Anchor: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, *Policy Review*, December-January, pp. 10-12.

agenda continuously try to shape society through democratic politics. Thus, taking globalization as an external factor that impacts upon the nation-state may inhibit studying its different dimensions. The debate on whether to expand the definition of 'security' to include the issues of identity becomes related to the political security of states at this juncture. As states inevitably deal with such issues so as to protect their authority and internal stability, the effects of globalization becomes internal.

The erosion of states' role in providing security means a decline in its economic and coercive capacity. The erosion has become obvious after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, politics and security were perceived as highly nation-state-centric and military-oriented owing to the existence of two blocs that vie for world-domination. The aftermath of the Cold War liberalized the issues which were sidelined previously because existential problems relatively lessened in imminence and external military threats to the political survival of states diminished. Internal problems came to surface in the absence of external threats that had unifying effects upon the different perspectives within societies.

It is important to bear in mind that while states clash or cooperate with these above-mentioned political spaces and polities, they themselves go under a process of change owing to this particular clash. States sometimes opt to cooperate or reconcile with these polities. Clash is not the standard reaction that every state gives to non-state and non-national polities and authorities: Some states choose not to clash with transnational companies or rising segments of the civil society. They establish some sort of rapprochement or compromise with them, and through compromises they try to achieve their goals of economic and political survival. Different institutions inside the state react differently to the developments caused

by globalization: This alone shows that not only external political environment of the nation-state, but its internal politics is also changing. Put differently, not only the context within which state operates change, but state itself is also transforming as it adapts to change.

How does a society get political? The adherents of different polities can occupy the same geographical location where distinct identities and allegiances overlap and clash. Those identity categories which develop sufficient informal capacity to mobilize their followers become polities with a certain authority over their proponents. This is the case with Islamism. Mostly as a source of blind or unquestioning devotion to a particular conception of *umma* and *sharia* where God is presumed to be the legislator, Islamism as an ideology and activism (not Islam as a religion) provides an alternative to *citizenship* and to *the rule of law of the secular democratic state* in its Western image. Those who claim to act and issue orders in the name of God strive to have authority over people.²⁶³ When they obtain allegiance and loyalty of a certain mass, they start to become political especially if they also acquire financial power. These are the general characteristics of the politicization of religion in any part of the world.²⁶⁴

When some declarations of Islamists are taken into consideration, it does not seem hard to understand why governments perceive a threat. As an alternative and challenging form of political regime and polity to the Western secular democracy as it is came to be perceived by the Western nation-states, Islamism in its violent or so-called civil manifestations are held to be imposing its preferences on the generic state structure and on other fellow countrymen who do not agree

²⁶³Stern, Jessica. 2003. *Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill* NY: HarperCollins, pp.147-172.

²⁶⁴Smelser, Neil J. 2007. *The Faces of Terrorism-Social and Psychological Dimensions*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 9-89. Stern, Jessica. 2003. *Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill* NY: HarperCollins, pp. 9-107.

with its idiosyncratic tenets. Intolerance of 'difference' and undemocratic attitudes create difficulties for states in sustaining democratic political order. Therefore, disagreements among different political spaces and polities may be seen as *increasing psychological distances among people*,²⁶⁵ and indeed at the extreme cases, such distances may become the harbinger of violence.

4.7. Transnationality as Overlapping Political Spaces

The political spaces of polities other than nation-states (such as nongovernmental institutions, transnational corporations or terrorist groups) need not be entirely territorial. Roughly, this makes them transnational and that is where *transnational relations* come in: The adherents of different polities and political spaces can occupy the same geographical location where distinct identities and allegiances both overlap and clash. This seems possible because political space is the mental map of a group that can coexist with other mentalities/political spaces. *Transnational relations are, then, the political and abstract highways on which political spaces both overlap and rival each other.* The concept of political space is explained in previous sections. Pressing on with that, the enmeshed mobility or the activities of the overlapping political spaces can be called *transnationality*. Thereby, 'transnationality' is defined in a deterritorialized way at the societal level through the term of political space.

Within this backdrop, nation-states aligning with each other to counter terrorism actually try to ameliorate clash of different overlapping political spaces within and across their borders. Not only the activities within the borders of State A is important for its security, but also the activities taking place within the borders of

²⁶⁵ Abel, Olivier, Mohammed Arkoun and Serif Mardin. 1995. *Avrupa'da Etik, Din ve Laiklik*. Istanbul: Fransiz Kultur Merkezi ve Metis Yayincilik.

other nation-state become important for State A due to overlapping political spaces. In due course, Europe, the US and Turkey are connected regarding radicalism. This is why transnationality defies the inside-outside distinction.

Importantly, political spaces cannot only be understood as religious or cultural groups and labeled as ‘civilizations’ because religions or cultures are not the sole determinants of a political space. Religion is not the sole attribute of culture or identity. Religions do not determine political spaces on their own, most often than not, ideologies and secular doctrines interfere. Interference of ideologies, secular or mundane doctrines are inevitable because the bottom line of all ideas and interpretations are man-made.²⁶⁶In the final analysis, any doctrine or code is inevitably interpreted by human beings. Thus, religion is one of the interpreted code of behaviors and rules of a culture while culture refers to all physical and ideational products of a given society. Furthermore, religions and cultures are not unchanging monolith sociological structures.²⁶⁷They are under continuous impact of other factors such as education, everyday social learning, politics, use of force, economics, migration, and various disparate worldviews propagated through mass media and the Internet. Globalization is the contact of all political spaces as different mental clusters of worldviews, identities and loyalties that overlap with one another everywhere in the world. This enmeshed mobility of physical and ideational products within the world-wide amalgam of overlapping political spaces can be called *transnationality*.

²⁶⁶Nelson, Keith L. and Spencer C. Olin, Jr. 1979. *Why War? Ideology, Theory and History*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 1-8, 184-193.

²⁶⁷Abel, Olivier, Mohammed Arkoun and Serif Mardin. 1995. *Avrupa’da Etik, Din ve Laiklik*. Istanbul: Fransiz Kultur Merkezi ve Metis Yayincilik, p. 7-78.

4.8. Diffusion of Authority and Power as the Impact of Globalization on Sovereignty and the International State-System

The men who intellectually invented the modern-state, more than any other cornerstone figure, were Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli.²⁶⁸ For centuries, one of the most important functions of the state was to wage war. This was very well elaborated by Charles Tilly who examined political, social, and technological change in Europe from the Middle Ages to the present. Charles Tilly, who attempted to explain the huge success of the nation-state as the dominant polity in international politics, explained state-formation as “War Makes States and Vice Versa”.²⁶⁹ According to his theory explicated in a prolific literature of his own, military innovation, gunpowder and mass armies in pre-modern Europe made war extremely expensive, and only states with a sufficient amount of capital and a large population could afford paying for their security and ultimately survive in the hostile environment of international anarchy or the non-existence of a supra-sovereign above nation-states.

In a nutshell, institutions of the modern state (such as taxes) were created to allow war-making. If the need to wage war did not exist, as the argument goes, the centralization of power in the hands of the great monarchs and later-day leaders would be hard to accomplish. If the need to wage war did not exist, as Tilly and van Creveld argue, the development of bureaucracy, taxation or services such as education and health would be much slower. In one way or another, the gist of their arguments converged at one point: all these state services were created to make

²⁶⁸The Leviathan and his other seminal writings can be shown to have created the state on philosophical and theoretical grounds.

²⁶⁹Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol eds. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; “Sweden, the First Modern State: Tilly's Assertion, ‘War Makes States, and Vice Versa’ ”.

citizens more able and willing to fight wars *for* their state. Therefore, it seems tenable to argue that throughout history, war and the possibility of war in several forms enabled political organizations such as city-states, empires, and then nation-states to control and regulate almost everything whether it is of economic, military or social matters. For instance, the Bank of England as the first institution of its kind emerged as the means to wage war against Louis XIV.²⁷⁰ This was especially the case for nation-states in the aftermath of *the Westphalia Treaties of 1648*.²⁷¹ The need to wage and prepare for war caused the centralization of power in the hands of monarchs, ministers or presidents.

The centralization of power has been greatly enhanced by the French Revolution and by the accompanying nationalist international ideological wave that has resonated across the world. The authority and power of 'nation-state' dramatically increased as *levée en masse*²⁷² was emulated by all states in time. In parallel to French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars' application of *levée en masse*, nationalism came to be fostered by both nation-state authorities and intellectuals such as Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, and Hegel who saw the state as a unifying factor. Nation-states acquired a great authority over the control of almost all aspects of life within their territories.

²⁷⁰Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, P.3.

²⁷¹The Peace of Westphalia includes two peace treaties of Osnabruck and Munster, signed on May 15 and October 24 of 1648 respectively, which ended both the thirty years' war in Germany and the eighty years' war between Spain and the Netherlands.

²⁷²In revolutionary France and later on in international relations at large, the new concept of the democratic citizen as opposed to a royal subject entailed all able-bodied men to defend the nation. Thus, the *levée en masse* was created and understood as a means to defend the nation for the nation by the nation as opposed to the previous eras in history where only a certain selected strata of the population fought.

Most important of all was *the nation-state capacity and legitimacy to wage war* for which other institutions worked. Early in the nineteenth century, first modern income taxes were again the product of war. So were the legal tender and the greenback. The abandonment of the Gold Standard in 1914 or the Bolshevik Revolution (as an attempt to assure total state control over economy and create a strong nation vis-à-vis its neighbors) would not be realized in the way they did, had it not been for the need of state to mobilize its resources to wage war against its neighbors.

Till 1945, the centralization of authority (legitimacy) and power (capability) at the hands of the civil and military bureaucratic apparatus and governments had already become common international practice. Nation-states, though with dissimilar capabilities, enjoyed considerable authority over economic, social, cultural, political and military affairs. However, states' authority over these realms evolved to scatter or diffuse particularly during the second half of the twentieth-century. The orthodox forms of economic and political organization started to be discredited gradually, and a transformation in these forms took place due to globalization of economy, technology and the spread of cosmopolitan ideas.²⁷³

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the search for new forms of political and economic organization is still on.²⁷⁴ Nation-states, as the resiliently first and foremost polities in international relations, are in the process of adaptation to the ongoing diffusion of authority and power among different kinds of entities. *Seen in historical continuum, states are still powerful actors. Yet, their authority*

²⁷³Hay, Colin. 2005. "Globalization's impact on states" in John Ravenhill ed. *Global Political Economy* NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 235-263.

²⁷⁴Hay, Colin. 2005. "Globalization's impact on states" in John Ravenhill ed. *Global Political Economy* NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 239.

and autonomy appears less by comparison to earlier eras. Their authority just seems less, yet it is not lessened: The authority of states is not reduced; it apparently fakes observers owing to the amplified or broadened total realm of political authority to include several power-foci other than nation-states. In other words, the political clout of non-state entities increased relative to that of nation-states; but, in the absolute sense, nation-state is still the formidable actor.

The factor that gave way to the amplification of the political realm to present relative gains for non-state entities is *the waning of major war among most developed nation-states*, which is also named in the literature as *the leading power peace argument* by prominent scholars.²⁷⁵

Waning of major war or a gradual decline in frequency of conventional war paves the way for the enlargement of political space to include non-state entities into the power-play of international relations. Where major conventional powers clash in major battles, non-state entities would not be as significant as is the case today, for in that case they would succumb or surrender to major powers that use extensive force in the event of a conventional war much like the times of the World Wars. Alternatively put, if major states continued to make war with each other as is

²⁷⁵ Kaysen, Carl. 1990, "Is War Obsolete? - A Review Essay" *International Security* 14:42–64; Kegley, Charles W. Jr. 1993 "The Neo-idealist Movement in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New Realities". *International Studies Quarterly* 37:131–146; Mueller, John. 1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, John. 1995. *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics*. New York: Harper Collins; Mueller, John. 2004. *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Ray, James Lee. 1989. "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War" *International Organization* 43:405–439; Rosecrance, Richard. 1986 *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*. New York: Basic Books; Rosenau, James. 1990 *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/1991 "Primed For Peace: Europe after The Cold War" *International Security* 15:7–57; Van Evera, Stephen. 1998 "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War" *International Security* 22:5–43; Mandelbaum, Michael. "1998/1999 Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival* 40:20–38; Mandelbaum, Michael. (2002) *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, And Free Markets In The Twenty-First Century*. New York: Public Affairs.

the case before the second half of the twentieth century, non-state formations could not find much room to flourish owing to the nation-state domination of the conflict environment in its entirety.

The reason why waning of major war occurs, and in turn creates a permissive cause for non-state entities to have political clout is principally the diffusion of authority and power world over. *The diffusion of authority and power can briefly be put as the process of spreading power-resources such as technology, economy and information world over.* In addition to the diffusion of authority and power around the world as one of the factors that lead to waning of major war, several other factors or possible causes of waning of major war exist as explained hereafter.

Since studying waning of major war is also studying the impact of globalization on *sovereignty, autonomy and authority*, it is necessary to clarify these former concepts in the first place. It is in the aftermath of this clarification that the argument becomes clear: The argument is that the diffusion of power and authority is the permissive cause that leads to waning of major war among the major powers. I

t also led to the emergence of new entities such as global terrorist groups. Accordingly, the following sections briefly review the concept and practice of sovereignty and how authority, autonomy and territoriality (as the constitutive elements of state sovereignty) are affected by diffusion of power or the globalization of power- resources.

Spread of technological prowess and interconnected financial and trade markets with global reach is at the core of globalization that diffused power and authority.²⁷⁶ Diffusion of authority and power is the result of globalizing economy and technology. Globalizing technology and economy means the diffusion of power-resources around the world. *Then, diffusion of authority and power is the diffusion of power-resources around the world, first of which is economic and technological advancement.*

When power is diffused and used in ways different from the ways states use it, transnational crime and terrorism have become credible threats. Moreover, diffusion of power resources such as money and technology enables non-state entities to have influence, which questions state sovereignty. In short, globalization of power-resources and their transnational usage changes the configuration or distribution of power and authority in the world. Power and authority are both contested and shared among several entities including non-state ones. Such contestation affects state-sovereignty. Then, the question is: How has sovereignty been affected? *Answering such a question helps explain why the threat of global terrorism is hard to deal with, how the threat works and why states find it difficult to cooperate against terrorism.* Last but not least, answering the question helps demonstrate that sovereignty itself may become an obstacle against cooperation among states against any transnational threat including that of terrorism.

²⁷⁶Kiras, James D. 2001. "Chapter 21: Terrorism and Globalization" in John Baylis & Steve Smith ed. *Globalization of World Politics* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4.8.1. Sovereignty: The Original Concept

One of the basic concepts in International Relations is sovereignty. Sovereignty is the enabling concept of international politics whereby states theoretically assert not only ultimate authority within a distinct territory, but also they assert membership of the international community thereby.

The literature on sovereignty focus on two kinds of it: Internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to a supreme decision-making and enforcement authority regarding a particular territory and population. External sovereignty refers to the antithesis of internal sovereignty: the absence of a supreme international authority, and thus the independence of sovereign states. Therefore, the doctrine of state sovereignty leads to the concept of international anarchy, non-existence of a supra-sovereign above the state. Lack of a supra-sovereign above the state originates in the idea of a supreme authority within the state. Sovereignty involved the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified and supreme rule within a delimited territory. It was exclusive in so far as no other ruler had the right to intervene in the sovereign affairs of other nations; unqualified in that within their territories rulers had complete authority over their subjects; and supreme in that there was no legal or political authority beyond the state.²⁷⁷

4.8.2. Sovereignty: The Practice

In practice, the denial of a supra-sovereign authority beyond the state has never meant that sovereign states are free to do as they please. For many, especially for weak states, sovereignty -as the legitimate claim to rule- has not always empirically translated into effective control within territories. As Krasner asserts,

²⁷⁷ Evans, Graham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics*. NY: Simon&Schuster, pp. 369-371.

'sovereignty' has for many states been little more than a form of 'organized hypocrisy'.²⁷⁸ Thus, the useful characteristic of sovereignty is taken to be the idea of formal or legal equality of states. The notion of unlimited absolute sovereignty, according to Krasner, was only a convenient fiction throughout the development of the modern state system.

Conventional sovereignty assumes a world of autonomous, internationally recognized, and well-governed states. Although frequently violated in practice, the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty—recognition of juridically independent territorial entities and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states—have rarely been challenged in principle. But these rules no longer work, and their inadequacies have had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak.²⁷⁹

The main inhibitor of a state's sovereignty comes from its peers, namely other nation-states: reciprocal nature of international law, diplomatic and economic policies of nation-states limit them on a quid pro quo basis. Alignment policies of states (balancing or accommodation policies) undercut the influence of one another and arrange the politics among them.

Still, another factor that circumscribes states' room of maneuver is the influence of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the UN or NATO). In addition to IGOs, other non-state actors such as Amnesty International or Green Peace, and also transnational corporations and illicit organizations interfere and limit state's room of maneuver to certain extent.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. *Leviathan*. Richard Tuck, ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997. *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*. Victor Gourevitch, ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press; Sim, Stuart and David Walker. 2003. *The Discourse of Sovereignty, Hobbes to Fielding: The State of Nature and the Nature of State*. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate.

²⁷⁹ Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty" *International Security* Vol. 29, No. 2- Fall p. 85.

²⁸⁰ National Intelligence Council Report. 2007. "Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States", 23 August.

4.8.3. Past and Present Status of Sovereignty Elaborated

Explication of the qualifications to state sovereignty and what has become of the Westphalian international order entail browsing the doctrine of sovereignty further into the corollary concepts, namely territoriality, authority and autonomy. Westphalian constitution of sovereignty and international state-system is marked by these three concepts, first of which is territoriality.

Territoriality refers to the organization of people principally into exclusive territorial (political) communities with fixed borders. In this case, political space is territorially drawn unlike transnational political spaces that operate at societal level devoid of territorial demarcations. Secondly, within the constitution of the Westphalian politics, sovereignty means that states and governments have an entitlement to supreme, unqualified and exclusive political and legal authority (the right and legitimacy to command and make decisions) within their borders. Finally, *autonomy* refers to *independence from external authority* whether this is spiritual (divine institution such as church or caliphate) or a temporal one (another nation-state or empire). Autonomy simply means capacity for self-governance.

The Treaties of Westphalia are held to be marking the beginning of *the autonomy* of the nation-state; hence the anarchic nature of international system came into being. However, numerous commentators and scholars argue that a few, if any, nation-states are autonomous in the true sense, and that all display dependence or penetration to certain extent.²⁸¹ *Autonomy* has taken on a much more relativistic implication, as a matter of degree rather than absolute. Thus, autonomy is no longer used as a substitute for sovereignty but as an alternative criterion.

²⁸¹Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty-New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States" *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 85–120; Lupidoth, Ruth. 1992. "Sovereignty in Transition" *The Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 45 No. 2.

While the concept of *sovereignty* excludes all but nation-states, the concept of *autonomy* might arguably include *any entity which is not completely controlled by another*.²⁸²

Different from *autonomy* but still within this scheme, *authority* is the person or institution which legitimizes acts or commands. It can also be differentiated from *power* which indicates capacity rather than right. Although used interchangeably with power, authority has a nuance: Authority is about common acceptance of the right to judge and to make decisions. It is about perceiving an institution or person as having the right to judge and legitimize. As such it is mostly about legitimacy.

What of now? What has happened to state sovereignty, state autonomy and territoriality, or, what has become of the Westphalian order? Our era might be viewed as a Westphalian state of affairs relativized by the diffusion of power, authority and autonomy.²⁸³ It witnesses a gradual transformation of state sovereignty.²⁸⁴ The sovereignty and authority of national governments, which is entitlement of states to rule within their own territorial space, is being both challenged outright and co-opted; thus being transformed without being disappearing. Today as of 2009, sovereignty varies or alternates along the spectrum between *statism/etatism* and *globalism* or between *self-government* and *the interplay of several actors* (nation-states and non-state entities) that does not

²⁸² Evans, Graham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics*. NY: Simon & Schuster, p. 369-371.

²⁸³ James, G. March and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders" *International Organization* 52-4 Autumn pp. 943–969: As an all-time must-reading for all students of international relations of any approach and perspective, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen lucidly summarizes the four-fold division of perspectives on the dynamics of international political order and change. They explain how power is diffused and how the way it is used changes over time. For how diffusion of power occurs throughout the world, and how change in structure and order is studied and explained within four basic IR perspectives (that are different but not necessarily mutually-exclusive), pp. 943-949 and pp. 959-969.

²⁸⁴ Krasner, Stephen D. 1994. "International Political Economy: Abiding Discord" *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 13-19; Strange, Susan. 1994. "Wake up, Krasner! The World has Changed" *Review of International Political Economy* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 209-219; Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty" *International Security* Vol. 29, No. 2 Fall, pp.85-120.

necessarily take place within a legal framework. Autonomy (capacity for self-governance) today is increasingly seen as a matter of metrics or degree. Autonomy can be regarded as the contestation and shared exercise of authority (right or legitimacy sought from followers) among national, regional and global entities. Both terrorist organizations and nation-states vie for loyalty of people.

State-sovereignty is not in decline however, it is being transformed because non-state actors dilute and gradually exploit nation-states' autonomy and authority. In due course, however, nation-states are not alone in politics but rather they are locked into a system of several entities or foci of power. Put differently, nation-states are not the sole players that have autonomy and authority in the world: Nation-states are an important part of the multitude of actors that internationally and transnationally engage each other in managing and determining international developments.

Institutional and non-violent power bargaining through diplomacy or violent power-bargaining through armed conflicts over the management of international affairs involves both nation-states and non-state entities. It is also important to note that nation-states have the advantage of asserting their sovereignty as a legal claim to supreme power. They have legal authority or the upper hand of deciding upon the legality of political acts, including those acts labeled as terrorism.

Yet, nation-states are challenged by IGOs, NGOs and by financial or terrorist groups in both decision-making and implementation of their foreign policies. Increasing number of people around the world contest the authority of nation-states regarding terrorism. Thus, state autonomy and authority are being challenged.

Terrorist claim to authority exists to the extent that they influence state decision-making and to the extent they manage to sustain their mass of followers. Since they have followers or constituencies, they have authority albeit an illegal one. In lieu with these points, actor-ness is debated as to whether it comprises, via Rosenau, both sovereign-actors (nation-states) and sovereignty-free actors (non-state entities).²⁸⁵ Transnational corporations, transnational criminal networks, transnational terrorist groups and non-governmental organizations can be lumped together as *sovereignty-free actors*. If the concept of *being autonomous* is taken to be referring any entity that is not wholly controlled by another, they seem to be fit to be regarded as actors that feed into politics. Consequently, actor-ness may arguably be conceptualized to include deterritorialized entities.

In the light of the real-world developments discussed in Chapter One, the traditional actorness criterion of *possessing territory* purportedly does not appear to be a *sine qua non* anymore for it seems hard to deny the existence of deterritorialized sovereignty-free entities that have some influence over nation-states to the extent they force nation-states to change policies. Such a denial exacerbates explaining the influence of non-state entities over nation-states. It is at least not easy to deny the non-state influence over states.

For instance, Spanish government's decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq in the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings indicates the non-state influence upon governments. World-wide economic and financial crises are out of the control of governments, too. Transnational corporations are focus of attraction for states to get wealthier. Transnational corporations are vital to obtain

²⁸⁵Rosenau, James N. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* Princeton: Princeton University Press; Aydinli, Ersel and James Rosenau eds. 2006. *Globalization, Security, and the Nation-State: Paradigms in Transition*, Suny Series in Global Politics NY: State University of New York Press.

investment, employment and market credibility opportunities. States pass laws to obtain such opportunities. More significantly from a security perspective, overall change in American foreign policy in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks is another indication of non-state political clout.²⁸⁶

Transnational Corporation (TNC) is arguably another candidate entity that vies for actor-ness: As pointed-out above, nation-states try to attract investments and bargain with TNCs. Indeed, states pass laws in order to prepare the conditions that transnational corporations demand.²⁸⁷ *Transnational mafia* is yet another power-focus, though it is illicit.²⁸⁸ It has autonomy on its own simply because states

²⁸⁶On the significance of the contemporary features and status of international relations and the role of non-state entities upon foreign policies, please see Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "September 11: How has it Changed the World?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117(1): 37-54; Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com; Richard N. Haas, "The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005-06. "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System," *Survival* 47(4): 7-18; Goldgeier, James & Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia After the Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003; Fiona B. Adamson. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7, 547-569; Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629-643; Michael Mihalka. 2004. "Globalization, the Liberal Imperative, Islamism, and the Future of Conflict in the 21st Century," *The Quarterly Journal* 3(3): 57-67; *Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of the Democratic Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Centre for the Study of Global Governance. 2000. *Round Table Debate on the Global Significance of 1989* Public Lecture 12, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global>; Khagram, Sanjeev. 2006. "Possible Future Architectures of Global Governance: A Transnational Perspective/Prospective," *Global Governance* 12: 97-117; Gortzak, Yoav. 2005. "How Great Powers Rule: Coercion and Positive Inducements in International Order Enforcement," *Security Studies*, 14(4): 663-697; Ferguson, Yale H., Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. *Remapping Global Politics-History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bin Hassan, Muhammad Haniff. 2006. "Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist Ideology," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29: 531-558; Barber, Benjamin R. 1996. *Jihad versus McWorld*. New York: Ballantine Books; Amy Chua, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall*, Doubleday Publishing, October 2007; Galtung, Johan. 2007. "What Comes after the US Empire? Quo Vadis après la chute del' Empire?" Rubrique: Notre Bibliothèque (www.dedefensa.org/article.php?art_id=4246); Wade L. Huntley, "Threats All The Way Down: US Strategic Initiatives in a Unipolar World", *Review of International Studies* (2006), 32, 49-67; David M. Walker, *Transforming Government to Meet the Demands of the 21st Century*, The Federal Midwest Human Resources Council and the Chicago Federal Executive Board Chicago, United States Government Accountability Office, Illinois August 7, 2007.

²⁸⁷Jensen. Nathan M. 2006. *Nation-States and Multinational Corporation-A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

²⁸⁸Björnehed, Emma. 2004. "'Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror,'" *Global Crime* 3 (4): 305-324; Cornell, Svante E. 2007. "Narcotics and Armed Conflict:

cannot annihilate or control them effectively. Black markets are transnational economic mechanisms from which crime syndicates, mafia and terrorists are fed. Since states cannot always control (that is stop or reduce) or manipulate their operations effectively, activities of crime and mafia organizations translate into illicit authority and autonomy to some extent.²⁸⁹

Leaving aside the debate whether non-state entities can be named as ‘actors’, *what is important for the distribution of power and authority in the world is that there are several formations that challenge nation-states.*²⁹⁰ To be sure, states are resiliently important actors owing to their sphere of influence over other entities. But they are frequently challenged or forced to share their autonomies (their capacity for self-governance) and authorities (their acceptance and legitimacy to rule over lands and people).²⁹¹ As a result of non-state challenges and threats, the

Interaction and Implications,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30:207–227; Levitt, Mathew. 2004. “Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover between Terrorist Groups,” *SAIS Review* Vol. 24(1):33-47; Croissant, Aurel. 2007. “Following the Money Trail: Terrorist Financing and Government Responses in Southeast Asia,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30:131–156; Levitt, Matthew A. 2002. “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 6 (4): 49-65; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2007. *Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life* Westport, Conn: Praeger; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2002. “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be Severed?” *Strategic Forum*, Institute for the National Strategic Studies Defense University, Washington DC. 191-May; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2005. “Corruption: The International Security Dimension,” *SAIS Review* 25(1): 143-152. Porter, Richard D. and Ruth Judson. 1996. *The Location of US Currency: How Much Is Abroad?* Federal Reserve of ST Louis; Baker, Raymond. 1999. “Money Laundering and Flight Capital: The Impact on Private Banking”, *Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations*, 10 November; Pearl, Daniel and Steve Stecklow. 2002. “Taliban Banned TV but Collected Profits on Smuggled Sonys,” *Wall Street Journal*, 9 January; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2005. *Money and Terrorism. Friede*, <http://www.fride.org/publicacion/93/dinero-y-terrorismo>; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2003. *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks*. London: Pluto Press; Napoleoni, Loretta. 2008. *Rogue Economics: Capitalism’s New Reality*. New York: Seven Stories Press; Thachuk, Kimberly L. 2008. “Countering Terrorist Support Structures,” *Defense Against Terrorism Review* 1(1): 13-28.

²⁸⁹Kaldor, Mary. 2005. “Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror” *Lecture in the Cold War Studies Centre*, London School of Economics, February 2.

²⁹⁰Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com; Richard N. Haas, “The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008.

²⁹¹Autonomy, authority and geopolitics are interlinked: who rules which lands and people is at the heart of geopolitics, whether the rule, reign or government is accepted or not. Authority is about whether rulers, national or otherwise, are accepted by citizens and those outside. Lack of domestic loyalty to and international recognition of state authority threatens autonomy or capacity for self-governance.

world-wide diffusion of authority and power scrolls down to non-state market, illicit and moral authorities that contest states' authority and autonomy to varying degrees.

The contestation of politics became increasingly visible in the post-Cold War period. The contestation of power accelerates due to the above-mentioned diffusion of authority across the world. *It is the diffusion of authority and the challenge of non-state entities that matter about international cooperation among nation-states. In the very first place,* the need of nation-states to cooperate and align against terrorism arises out of the existence of non-state challenges.

Secondly, non-state challenges are significant in that they shuffle cooperation and alignment dynamics of nation-states. As detailed in the following pages and chapters, actors and issue-linkages of foreign and security policy increased in number and the geopolitical arena became more complicated when compared to the Cold War era during which non-state entities could not act rather independently from states. The political playground was mainly of nation-states, and it was not fertile for taking action without the control of states.

Particularly after the end of the Cold War, non-state entities grew stronger and found a fertile ground to operate. This was possible because superpowers' control over conflicts in their peripheries faded away and unchecked world-wide spread of power-resources such as economy, technology and weapons enabled wanton destruction by terrorist groups without clear sponsorship of nation-states.

What does that diffusion lead to? It causes the concept of international anarchy to include non-state entities: For many states, and especially for weak states or for less than major ones, sovereignty -as the legitimate claim to rule- has

Authority is politics of domestic and international recognition and acceptance of a nation-state's control over its territory and citizens because if recognition is granted political penetration lessens, and in turn autonomy increases.

not always empirically translated into effective control within territories. All states have been open to penetration and influence from other states to certain extent. Today not only states penetrate and influence each other, but non-state entities penetrate and challenge states as well. Sovereignty has not been supreme in practice; it is less so in the twenty-first century. That is why presidents or prime ministers make declarations about the domestic politics of other nations. That is equally why terrorists announce their demands with regard to state policies. In the twenty-first century, domestic and foreign policies of any state are permeable and penetrable or yields to passage to certain degree.

Nation-states face a formidable *generic problem*: *Nation-states have to fight several non-state entities in different interlinked issue-areas all at once*. Inclusion of problems such as coordinated terrorist and mafia actions, border security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the traditional agenda of energy conflicts and regional rivalries complicated geopolitics. This complication has important implications upon the international state-system. In order to understand those implications such as the nature of contemporary threats and the states' policy-responses, the backdrop of the wider political landscape should be clear. Contemporary political landscape is especially contextual regarding the general status of power, authority and autonomy at world large with implications for states' cooperation and alignments.

Big-picture of the world political landscape presents that power diffused into non-state mechanisms. *Law-enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence and military operations are carried out inter-nationally at the nation-state level, whereas non-state operations mainly work trans-nationally at the societal level*. The big picture also includes intergovernmental organizations such as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (the UN) that pressure states to follow certain norms and legal procedures. Admittedly, international organizations are composed of states without which enforcement of resolutions is nil. Nation-states enable international anarchy by rejecting any overarching authority above them including the authority of intergovernmental organizations. Although intergovernmental organizations are not all-powerful to enforce states, there is a fine line: In spite of the fact that intergovernmental bodies are state-controlled to an important extent, states' control of institutions is not absolute. Such institutions are not always controlled by major states due to their institutional operating-codes and norm-making role. To the extent they are institutionalized, they become rule-based and thereby question the states' volition to act as they please.

Such influence of institutions is strongly felt, particularly regarding matters of legitimacy. The fact that international legitimacy is significant is demonstrated by the attack against Iraq in 2003.²⁹² Both before and after the Iraq war, the US had difficulty in acquiring legitimacy *and the* UN mandate. Its hardship with regard to curtailing negative international public opinion or acquiring cooperation of other states about Iraqi intervention, sustaining law and order and nation-building in post-war Iraq were testimonies to the importance of acquiring international legitimacy mainly given by states through the use of international institutions. Thus, institutions are not totally out of cooperative context even from a realist perspective. They still matter as instruments of bargaining and soft-tools of

²⁹²Simply any public opinion poll indicates the legitimacy problem, for details, Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Brent Scowcroft. 2008. *America and the World*. NY: Basic Books.

restraint. As such, they partially constitute the debate on ‘soft-balancing’ in alliance politics.²⁹³

In sum, authority and power in world politics is diffused: nation-states are circumscribed by international organizations, transnational corporations, criminal and mafia networks, nongovernmental organizations and terrorist groups. The reverse is also true, nation-states are in a constant contest against these entities; they are fighting back. Indeed, all these above-mentioned entities including nation-states form different combinations of alignments among each other. The war or fight against terrorism cannot completely ignore the alignments taking place within this scheme of entities for the sake of parsimony. If such alignments among different kinds of entities are ignored altogether, theoretical lenses would be crippled in matching real-world developments taking place especially after the Cold War.²⁹⁴

4.8.4. Globalization and Trade-offs in Policy-Making

The ways in which nation-states exercise their autonomy and power seem to go through a structurally forced-upon transformation or adaptation to the contemporary strategic environment. The need for adaptation originates from two fundamental developments: increase in the number of autonomous players and the inextricably linked issue-areas that present trade-off among policies.

As for the former, adaptation of states to the strategic environment is forced by the existence of inextricably linked foci-of-power, each of which contributes to a variety of threat and counter/policy permutations. Transnationally active

²⁹³Pape, Robert. 2005. A. “Soft Balancing against the United States” *International Security*, Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1 Summer, pp7-45.

²⁹⁴Put differently, theories that ignore non-state entities such as neo-realism or Waltzian/structural realism may be at a partial loss to explain terrorist actions. However, classical and neo-classical realism do not ignore non-state entities completely, and they are more open to study the terrorist phenomena.

corporations, sovereign funds of states, individual financial actors, criminal and terrorist organizations are fed by licit economic markets and illicit black markets of finance and weapons smuggling. Having information-technology facilitated communication and travel alongside spread of black markets of finance, small weapons and CBRN weapons, violent non-state entities are served a terrorist-friendly environment. The terrorist-friendly environment forces nation-states to adapt and transform accordingly.

Such an environment enables sovereignty-free non-state entities to exercise power in a way different from that of states. That is particularly why adaptation of states to this environment loaded with several power-foci and interlinked issue-areas is taking place so long as states contact and transact with other entities. Contacts among entities are on interlinked issue-areas such as law enforcement, border security, law, human intelligence, intelligence gathering and sharing, financial surveillance, economic transactions and use of force. In the global interconnectedness of our day, states inevitably contact with each other on these interwoven issues.

Since autarky or full self-sufficiency is next to impossible in a world of limited resources, twenty-first century existence of a web of interconnecting authorities is forcing actors to contact among each other. This seems inevitable as if caught in a fish-net. Such an environment is similar to interdependence in that all actors are affected by others' policies that aim to constrain or permit. However, it goes beyond interdependence because the political playground is also full of non-state entities that are not bounded by international rules and norms. Non-state entities do not have addresses to locate and retaliate at or to apply legal retribution. Since they are not accountable to their transnational constituency and lack

sovereignty, territoriality and a national constituency, they defy most of the characteristics of international state-system such as diplomacy, rule of law, sovereignty, reciprocity, democracy, international organizations, legal economic transactions and the conventional form of warfare. Thus, the cooperation and conflict environment is more than ‘the concept of interdependence’ explains.²⁹⁵ Interdependence literature does not study non-state entities’ role satisfactorily enough so as to place them in a theory of state-nonstate interaction. Still, non-state entities interact with nation-states, forming an uneasy gathering. Neither nation-states nor non-state entities are able to move without either directly or indirectly affecting the other. Via fish-net analogy, movements of one entity directly affect another when their policies and behaviors collide or they indirectly affect each other by tilting the fish-net, that is by tilting the strategic and political environment in which they all act.

The complications of the conflict environment do not end in the increased number of power-foci that play into politics: Issue-areas are so much interlinked that there are trade-offs between them. However, faced by scarce or limited resources, states must prioritize to achieve results. Strategizing requires prioritization as a fundamental precept of strategy. However, prioritizing on one issue-area such as law-enforcement undercuts intelligence and military operations. There is a trade-off among law-enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence and military operations.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁵Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. *Power and Interdependence*. 3rded. New York: Longman.

²⁹⁶Bensahel, Nora. 2006. “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, p. 38; Norris, John H. 2003. “When Alliance and Self-Interest Collide” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol.16 No.2 July.

Nation-states, among other entities, become ever more embedded in regional and global economic, financial, environmental, legal and military frameworks. In a world of global enmeshment of the interrelated issue-areas at varying scales, achieving domestic objectives and national security interests of nation-states are conditional upon engaging in extensive collaboration, co-option or clash with several entities at different times.²⁹⁷ The trade-off among issue-areas increased due to the increasing magnitude of issue-linkages. Therefore, law-enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence and military operations have become interfaces among domestic and foreign policy of states. That causes a hardship for strategic design and implementation.

There are different possible permutations of regional and global policy responses to respond to multifaceted threats and issue-linkages involved. Fields within which counterterrorism is carried out are law-enforcement, financial surveillance, intelligence and military operations. These fields are the fields of counterterrorism cooperation within and among states. With the issue-areas that are strongly tied to each other and became interfaces among domestic and foreign policy of states, the permutations among these fields increased both on the side of threat formation by terrorists and on the side of devising response policies by nation-states.

Consequently, strategizing or designing response policies and their implementation become a conundrum for states. The hardship of ‘designing strategic response policies’ in the sense of *strategic design and concept* such as

²⁹⁷ Pearlman, Wendy. Winter 2008-09. “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 79–109.

containment and ‘the implementation strategy’ of policy-responses in the sense of *executive planning* is aggravated.²⁹⁸

What is worse, nation-states face ‘an autonomy-dilemma’ in addition to the traditional security dilemma: Since acting out of the current strategic environment is impossible, the more states get embedded into the current strategic environment, the more their state autonomy -their capacity for self-governance- gets compromised. Nevertheless, this may not be regarded as a surprising development if E. H. Carr’s warning is followed. He points to the historical evolution of the authority and autonomy diffusion: By way of E. H. Carr’s depiction of nature of politics, the authority and autonomy diffusion is the consequence of continuous struggle between satisfied foci of authorities and unsatisfied foci of authorities.²⁹⁹ Compromised nation-state autonomy is only the present manifestation of such a diffusion, which cannot be taken for granted at all times.

This being the case of compromised nation-state autonomy, globalization has upsides and downsides contingent upon the specific political context: It may increase both cooperation and conflict. Cooperation and conflict may empower the forces of integration and fragmentation respectively.

The issue centers on the agent-structure debate and the micro-macro debate:³⁰⁰ Globalization has a structural effect conditioning actors, but it is itself a consequence of the actions of nation-states alongside the actions of non-state actors; presenting a two-ways street with one lane. When compared to the individual, state and system levels of analysis, micro-macro levels of analysis

²⁹⁸Watts, Barry D. 2008. *US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence Problems and Opportunities* the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments of the US- the Strategy for the Long Haul Series, pp.55-67.

²⁹⁹ Carr, Edward Hallett. 1964. *Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939*. NY: Harper & Row, p. 99.

³⁰⁰Rosenau, James. 1990 *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press;

seems to be more in tune with the current real-world developments because globalization's impact is not only at the system level, but it is effective at the state level as well.³⁰¹ States' territories are used by different transnational entities regarding different issue-areas leading the territory of a state become a globalized political space through which different loyalties and developments are experienced.

In that vein, globalization is a macro process sustained by micro level agents. These agents are in turn conditioned by it. Conditioning occurs as presenting opportunities and constraints for state actions but it does not determine behaviors on its own directly³⁰². However, intensity and impact of globalization on agents does not manifest itself in a standard and unidirectional way. Agents can manipulate the conditions and contexts, too.

Above all, political willpower/volition or simply intentions reside with agents or entities of several sorts that occupy territories as globalized room of maneuver. As a corollary, it is theoretically unwise to see globalization as irreversible. In other words, if it is not reversed, that basically means major actors/entities do not want it to be reversed. Bereft of the analyses of globalization with an ideological slant, it must be defended on an objective basis that it is not

³⁰¹ Individual, state and system levels of analysis are arguably left insufficient and too-much state-centric due to the increase in the number of entities that play into international politics and security. The interactions of different entities or units that operate at varying scales appear to be better analyzed with the criterion of being either micro or macro. Since level of analysis should not separate between states and non-state entities to study the response policies of states in return for terrorist actions, micro-macro levels of analysis might help observers out. Such a scaling may help approximate the magnitude of the influence of entities and casual variables. Fine-tuning levels of analysis from 'the individual, state and international' into 'micro-macro' seems to allow explaining interaction between different units. Leveling and evaluating different entities along the micro-macro spectrum is still a nascent and pending perspective that appears to be more eclectic and holistic than the traditional levels of analysis because it allows entities other than states and it does not necessarily differentiate among individual, state or system. Arguably, it is likely to be better suited to study the impact of globalization and terrorism upon both national security and international security.

³⁰² This point associates Waltzian analysis, but neo-realism does not bother to study non-state entities and it ignores the state-level analysis on purpose. Waltz himself declared that his theory is not one of a foreign policy prescription. Besides, globalization and transnational activities are excluded from his theory. Yet, Waltzian theory is precious within and of itself despite the drawbacks.

impossible to reverse globalization. The 2009 global financial and economic crisis is a testament to that; the crisis was ignited by Western states themselves.³⁰³

Although the process of globalization spreads crises around the world, it may prove to be fruitful as well. Liberals argue that since globalization is ever tightening interconnectedness and high flow of tangible resources (such as commercial goods) and intangible resources (such as new ideas, information, know-how and intelligence) transgressing borders with tremendous velocity and in tremendous volume, it may bring prosperity, cooperation and lessening of disputes. It may help getting to know more about 'the other' through dialogical contact. It may bring forward a sense of community with shared or similar values in the long haul.

The characteristics of globalization empower constituencies of any terrorist group.³⁰⁴ It enhances the hope and commitment of terrorists through facilitating the conduct of their propaganda operations and atrocities. If we use 'increased transactions and contact among people'³⁰⁵ or via Coker, simply 'interconnectedness' as a buzz-word for globalization at the risk of oversimplification, interconnectedness empowers individuals for both ends: cooperation and conflict. From a security perspective then, globalization is a force-multiplier for both peace-making and war-fighting.

³⁰³“World Financial Crisis What it Means for Security”,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/FinancialCrisis/EN/index.htm> last accessed on May, 2009.

³⁰⁴‘Terrorist constituency’ is of two kinds: *Passive combatants* are sympathizers of a terrorist cause who do not turn violent, and *active combatants* are terrorists on the ground. It is largely because of the former that the latter survives, because it constitutes the international public opinion favoring terrorists and it forms the harboring-ground for financing, logistics and man-power.

³⁰⁵Coker, Christopher. 2002. “NATO as a Post Modern Alliance”, in Ramet, Sabrina Petra and Ingebritsen, Christine, eds. *Coming in from the Cold War: US-European interactions since 1980*. Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 16-30.

Returning to alleged positives of globalization, emergence of a sense of community (a marker of integration) might be regional or global in scale. Ironically, globalization enables forces of fragmentation and integration to be active simultaneously. One of the manifestations of globalization in the form of integration is the evolution of the European Union. Putting aside neo-functionalist explanations such as 'spill-over effect' that details technical economic mechanisms that made such integration possible, the issue politically and theoretically appears to be coming under *the Anarchical Society* thesis of Hedley Bull. At least, it seems plausible to maintain that English School perspective is mostly congruent with the developmental aspects of the European Union. Due to scope and space limitations, and since the details of that subject are studied vigorously elsewhere, it is not dealt here.³⁰⁶ Suffice it to say that the EU as a project is the European adaptation to the diffusion of power and authority in the world.

The expansion of the European Union aims at preventing armed-clashes and sustaining prosperity among its new member-states alongside the older members. It aims at a particular endeavor and approach towards regulating diffusion of authority. The EU is trying to expand the European zone of peaceful co-existence devoid of wars. It still remains to be seen whether the EU will reach fully supranational status with formal sovereignties of its members ever more reduced such as in the form of con/federation of states with a common constitution. Nevertheless, the EU constitutes a sample of authority pooling or accumulation in progress.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁶March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders" *International Organization* 52, 4, Autumn, pp. 943–969; Fettweis, Christopher J. 2006. The Forum—"A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?" 8, 677–697.

³⁰⁷Nesser, Petter. 2006. Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:323–342.

As briefly pointed out by above-mentioned agent-structure connection, globalization helps states form a context in which it becomes increasingly possible both to diffuse authority and to accumulate it. Europe has experienced localization through local and federal formations within itself and in that sense it regulates the diffusion of authority. At the same time, this localization is tied up to the accumulation of authority in higher institutional bodies of the EU. The EU is trying to manage globalization's impact (power and authority diffusion) by pooling the different localizations together under the auspices of common supra-institutional bodies. Hence, its distinctive feature: The EU attempts to regulate the diffusion of power and authority within. In other words, the EU just *tries* to achieve a regulated or rule-based co-existence of diffused power foci within its political space. The expansion of the EU is about spread of such a political space and political culture avoiding conflict and war.

Yet, all states whether they are EU members or not, confront two main problems that challenge their sovereignty: First is the problem of keeping their economic autonomy, and secondly, preventing illegal violence from taking place inside their sovereign boundaries. When confronted by successful terrorist assaults, sovereignty of states is challenged because any terrorist attack breaks the state monopoly on the use of force.³⁰⁸ Consecutive terrorist attacks break it ever more.³⁰⁹

This break-down of state monopoly on the use of force challenges states' authority and leads them to pursue *raison d'être* policies that puts the primacy and centrality of states above all other concerns. Although it is being argued that states

³⁰⁸Leander, Anna. 2001. "Globalisation and the Eroding State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence" paper was presented at the conference The Global Constitution of Failed States University of Sussex, 18-20 April.

³⁰⁹Al Qaeda conducted a series of simultaneously-conducted operations one after another with only a small time between attacks, showing the hardship of preventing them by good intelligence-gathering the consecutive and simultaneous attacks, one attack after another in the very same day, and one more in the following day challenges sovereignty significantly.

are challenged by non-state entities and ostensibly became weaker, the challenge is not revolutionary: States became more concerned about their national security rather than human security, and the urge for centralization of power increases while nation-states fight against terrorism. As Tilly asserts, 'war made nation-states and nation-states made war':³¹⁰ proliferation of conflicts, no matter they are unconventional, could only strengthen state-power. Nevertheless, there is a qualification to be made: Although centralization of power at the hands of states and nationalism may increase in the face of terrorist attacks, the application of state influence is not easy because the use of force and authority is relativized³¹¹: the mode of the conflict shifted from conventional to unconventional. The enemy is not a state and it does not have a territory. Enemies of governments are among civil societies of different nations, and their *modus vivendi* is societal and transnational unlike states.

The emphasis of centralization of state power when faced by terrorist threats does not necessarily speak to the threats emanating from non-state entities. The political space within which actors contest each other broadened to include non-state entities. It seems that non-state actors gained relatively more power when compared to states. Thus, non-state entities came to have some influence over states that are forced to respond. However, that does not necessarily mean that states became weaker or that non-state actors enjoy great influence over states. In absolute terms, states are still stronger. As yet, non-state entities of our era have huge nuisance-value unlike the case of the Cold War. States are forced to respond

³¹⁰Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime". 1985. in *Bringing the State Back In* edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³¹¹Karaosmanoglu, ali, in Ali Karaosmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan eds. 2004. "Globalization and its impact on Turkey's security" the Europeanization of Turkey's security policy: prospects and pitfalls, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, Turkey, pp. 19-21.

to terrorist groups scattered around the world at the societal level.

State responses are not completely novel though. States are still states: *raison d'être* assumes that when well-being of state is deemed to be at stake, all other considerations are subordinate to its ultimate interest, namely survival. In such cases, survival of the state is dominant over every other value, such as societal security or human security. This is how the family of realist theories mainly conceptualizes security. There seems to be a tension between the traditional approaches and the relatively new approaches centering on human security. The societal aspect and the human security approach mainly argues for a different kind of state response against terrorism in that state supremacy over society must not be taken for granted because in the current state of politics not only the division of 'domestic' and 'international' erodes, but also the division between society and state must not be interpreted as state having absolute power over its own citizens.

Up until the last decades of the twentieth-century, 'human security' was not studied much in the academe or pronounced in popular jargon of politics, and the state was usually the sole unit in international security. Current landscape of politics at the dawn of the twenty-first century presents human security as an uneasy companion to the national security approach and consequent policies, especially in the continental Europe and UN diplomatic lexicon.³¹² *Raison d'être policies* may conflict with states' need to legitimize its actions in the eyes of domestic and international public opinion, and as such public opinion might be seen as an intervening-variable in the fight against terrorism.

³¹²*Charter of Paris for a new Europe, Paris 1990*. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, available on <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.pdf>.

From an historical perspective, public opinion was not much of an intervening-variable effecting policy in the previous centuries. States were much freer to authorize their domestic and foreign policy behaviors because a global consciousness (that demands correction of policies) was previously weak. Unlike previous centuries, as elaborated by Coker in ‘Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century’³¹³, there appears to be a rise of global consciousness: ‘Globalization has prompted more interest and moral engagement on the part of a global citizenry which is more aware of the wars fought, insisting on the articulation of global norms. Where these norms are challenged, it demands intervention.’ Two examples to this argument may be the American intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 or the international public opinion against the 2003 American intervention in Iraq.

Coker’s argument begs the question whether there is a ‘global community’ or even an ‘international community’ that defends particular norms unselectively. Other questions may follow: Does international community go beyond the transatlantic area of Europe and America? In whose community are the people of the world living? What do China, India and Russia, or the Middle Eastern states and their respective societies think about that? Another question that challenges Coker’s argument is whether U.S. policy in the Balkans is separable from the drive for global hegemony as late Alfred Sherman (the adviser to Margaret Thatcher) asserted. Therefore, Coker’s argument is not uncontroversial. Despite above-mentioned debatable points, it underlines the rising awareness and consciousness on the part of the people all around the world: Wide international coverage and public discussion about Balkan interventions in the 1990s, the 2003 American

³¹³Coker, Christopher. 2002. “Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk” *Adelphi Paper* October 345. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

intervention in Iraq and Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 are some of the indications about rising interest in the conflicts throughout the world. All in all, the bottom-line is that the awareness increased; yet success of global awareness and activism to change nation-state behaviors -or its influence- remains questionable and requires further rigorous study. It appears to be the case that it is at best a good candidate for being an intervening variable or determinant, rather than an independent variable. Independent variables seem to rest with states and non-state entities with economic and violence potential.

Leaving aside the question of whether global awareness change state policies or whether the drive for interventionism is rooted in power politics or in normative politics, Coker's observation that people have become more conscious and interested in international political developments seems tenable, and it is worth highlighting. Since laymen or civil society could not find much available room for criticizing state policies in the past, that is relatively new. The rising global awareness against conflicts in particular and international security in general, no matter it is selective or weak, must be factored in the security assessments of nation-states. States can manipulate this world-wide interest in conflicts; failing to do so, they may become *partly* inhibited in implementing their policies.

Another reason to include *the rising awareness factor* in security assessments of nation-states lies in states' need to gain domestic and international legitimacy for their behaviors. The need of states for international legitimacy to sustain their economic and military strength cannot be overstated especially for developing nations. International and domestic public opinion is a factor of legitimacy without which states cannot prolong their economic power or prolong their military interventions in our interconnected world. Acquiring legitimacy or

affirmative domestic and international public opinion is also critical in sustaining cooperation and alignments of nation-states.

The need of nation-states for affirmative domestic and international public opinion is itself an indication of authority diffusion alternating between the levels of below-the-state, nation-state and above-the-state. Before world-wide economic and financial interdependence locked nation-states into a networking structure of relations, states were previously more comfortable in streamlining their policies. Nation-state was the sole epicenter of power and authority both economically and militarily. Significantly, state apparatus or institutions were relatively much more capable of controlling the information-flow, which was a crucial advantage of mass-control. However, this seems to be gradually changing with the inclusion of other focal points of authority including the global media, the World Wide Web and most importantly the global finance-capital: Demands of transnational corporations and investors are crucial for governments. Economic leverage is an important power-resource to have voice; it forces governments to take transnational corporations into account and treat them seriously. This is especially the case for developing countries for which international economic contracts and foreign direct investments are matters of economic survival.

Another manifestation of diffusion of power occurs within the realm of political violence and terrorism: violent non-state entities are more independent even when devoid of state-sponsorship. Terrorist organizations question the nation-state monopoly on the use of force, which is legitimized by perceptions of citizens about their security, safety and prosperity supposed to be protected by governments. State monopoly on the use of force is eroding under terrorist conduct of violence and propaganda. In order to prevent the erosion, doctrine of raison

d'état (every other value is subordinate to the survival of the state) is followed by most states. This is argued to be creating a tension between basic individual liberties and security measures because, as the argument goes, the more a state ostensibly becomes a national security state, the less democratic it becomes.³¹⁴

This tension between states' need for legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and international public opinion and their need to assure survival gives way to separate views regarding the strategy to be pursued in the fight against terrorism. The tension is compounded by the influence of the international public opinion which can be manipulated by different actors. The 2003 intervention in Iraq and the dispute that it enflamed in Europe and the Middle East or the debate on Abu Gharib prisoners abuse and legal disputes over Guantanamo Bay detention camp are cases in point.

To reiterate for the sake of emphasis, international public opinion evolves to be a hurdle against states' domestic and foreign policy implementation. Before 1945, the media was relatively more silent on informing about the developments taking place in any part of the world. Advancements of information-technology (IT) that spread almost everywhere on earth enable citizens to learn about and react to international developments with real-time access. Citizens, alongside nation-state-apparatuses, are reacting ever more by comparison to previous centuries despite global political violence-rate is going down.

What difference does that make for cooperative policies of counterterrorism? The answer is: The more ordinary people react and question state policies, the higher the probability of recruiting terrorists. The pool of

³¹⁴In academic literature on the EU and democratic-peace, *national security state* arguably denotes undemocratic states that do not pay much attention to the human security concept in designing their policies. National security is regarded as referring to an authoritarian approach to politics. Alleged opposite is a *liberal state*. Although these terms and their usages seem problematical, the terms are nevertheless used in foreign policy discussions.

potential combatants grows bigger and states' cooperation against terrorism becomes complicated. Secondly, democratic states narrow down their room of maneuver when their voters react harshly. Spanish government's decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq in the aftermath of Madrid bombings is a case in point. Thirdly, states may not be willing to participate in collective efforts without international public support. The case of Kosovo in late 1990s lacked UN mandate, but still the NATO operation was, by and large, regarded as legitimate due to affirmative international public opinion. The intervention was not de jure legitimate owing to lack of legal mandate by the UN; nevertheless, it was de facto legitimate throughout the world - despite Russian opposition.³¹⁵ Therefore, rising global awareness regarding conflicts must be overseen by states for it may darken or limit prospective cooperation of states against terrorism, especially prospective cooperation among democracies where individual voters have a say in contrast to theocratic states of the Middle East.³¹⁶

Although there is an international dysphoria pointing to the increase in the number of conflicts and casualties after the end of the Cold War, the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that the number of wars and the number of casualties on the global scale both within and between countries are fewer in the post-Cold War period when compared to the Cold War era figures.³¹⁷ A more recent scientific research of the Maryland University in 2008 reports that, from the 1990 onwards, total conflict, internal conflict and interstate conflict are steadily

³¹⁵The primary coalition of the 'unwilling', which is the countries that clearly opposed the 2003 intervention in Iraq are Germany, France and Russia Federation.

³¹⁶Tago, Atsushi. 2009. "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the 'Coalition of the Willing'" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 219–234; Cooper, Andrew F. 2005 Stretching the Model of "Coalitions of the Willing" *The Centre for International Governance Innovation Working Paper* No.1October.

³¹⁷*SIPRI Yearbook 2009 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, pp. 2-10.

declining.³¹⁸ Confronted by the decline in organized violence, it is appropriate to ask, as does Coker, ‘why are we more sensitive to global violence than we were in the past?’ The answer he provides is the rise in the global consciousness, awareness and interest both in violence and politics all around the world. The wide-spread fear of mass casualties and economic disruption caused by terrorist attacks creates global awareness about political violence. More people understand that every instance of violence (whether far away from them or not) affect them existentially, politically and economically.

Although non-state actors seem disputably weaker than states in that they have no legal authority, the fact that they are not bounded by the rules of the international state-system is a great advantage for them to assert their influence, which is indeed taken into consideration by states most notably as demonstrated by ‘the war on terror’. Suffice it to mark here several manifestations of such an advantage especially for terrorist organizations: *unregulated financing* that is supported by black markets, *being devoid of international law* requirements and sanctions, the *lack of a territory* and *lack of responsibility* to protect a population, *lack of an address* to be retaliated at, *being unaccountable* to constituency, and the *upper-hand of surprise attack* against states. Therefore, although arguably still weaker than states that have legal authority, non-state actors have some illicit authority and capacity to influence state policies. Capacity to challenge state authority might be seen as a partial attribute of actorness.

The reason why it is arguable whether non-state entities are actors is because non-state entities are not acting according to the game-rules of the international state-system. This fact is demonstrated and recognized by states with

³¹⁸Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2008. *Peace and Conflict 2008*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland, pp. 1-14.

the designation of terrorist groups as illegal entities. Illegality marks an asymmetric and immutable relationship where comparisons are hard to establish between the capacities of states and those of non-state actors. Nevertheless, terrorist groups defy states. They force new military doctrines to be implemented. They force state authorities to redesign international law comprising the legal status of terrorists. Subject-matters such as reconsideration of legal and political definitions of war, legal questions on prisoners of war, the laws of war-initiation and the concept of just war demonstrate the influence of terrorist groups. They cause states to question the principle of sovereign non-interference or the norm of non-intervention into sovereign states. The procedures of financial surveillance, economic and political rights of firms and individual liberties are hotly debated issues alongside the above-mentioned traditional international laws and norms.

Previously, domains such as law, military, media and most economic transactions were mainly regulated by states. Control of states over these realms gradually became questioned and came under pressure. Non-state pressures upon nation-states impede the conventional working-mechanism of the international system. In other words, not only terrorist groups but all non-state actors impose their game-rules upon states and the international state-system. Alternatively put, they live in and function through the illicit domain where state regulation is absent or ineffective. By doing so, they challenge and impede not just states themselves, but also the state-system. States started to fight back in return and applied measures to tighten its control over almost all realms of social and political life. That is how fighting terrorism re-energizes nation-states via centralization.

Nation-states and non-state actors are not easily comparable to each other, because states and non-state actors (IGOs, NGOs, transnational corporations and illicit organizations such as mafia and terrorists) have different sets of game-rules or modus operandi. Non-state entities do not play according to sovereignty-based rules of the international system. At different issue-areas, they have different advantages making generalizations hard to maintain for long. This is why relativization of power exists. Where non-state actors are deemed weak may turn out to be their strength. The criteria that determine the degree of power, authority and influence of states and non-state entities become relativized to certain extent when two kinds of entities (sovereign states and sovereignty-free non-state entities) are compared.³¹⁹

In the light of these points, there are mainly four non-state entities against which turning a blind-eye would not be prudent for nation-states: First, *transnational corporations* (as the new actors born out of the dense and ever increasing economic interdependence made durable especially through voluminous finance, trade and commercial transactions beyond the control of any particular state), secondly, *criminal networks and transnational mafia* (that operate in the relative absence of legal and juridical regulations and controls of governments via black markets and parallel economies); thirdly *transnational terrorist organizations* that challenge states' monopoly on the use of force. Terrorist organizations reportedly also cooperate with the transnational mafia³²⁰. Last but not least, the *non-governmental organizations* and the media (such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace or the 'Al Jazeera-effect' and the 'CNN-effect') impede, force,

³¹⁹ States, alongside other adversarial states, confront non-state groups. Whereas states have legal authorities, non-state actors have illicit authorities. The mismatch of legal status between states and non-state actors is another demonstration of their different political spheres.

³²⁰ Napoleoni, Loretta. 2004. *Modern Cihat-Terror Orgutlerinin Kasalarindaki Dolarlar Nereden Geliyor* Istanbul: Bulut Yayinlari, pp. 41-85.

manipulate or embarrass states to change their policies through influencing national, regional and global public opinion.

These entities or power-foci *qualify* state sovereignty. They sometimes defy national economies and national security and at other times co-opt or exploit them. Consequently, states are no longer the only power-foci albeit still being powerful and resilient actors. The political realm of the world comprises non-state actors, too. Indeed, that is why Professor Ali Karaosmanoğlu asserts '*a relativization of the importance of the states in world politics*' regarding the connection between globalization and security:

There is a consensus among the scholars researching on globalization that its effects on international security involve 'more than looking for new threats'. Laurent Goetschel emphasizes three distinct phenomena that are central to understanding new transformations in world politics. *First*, globalization suggests that 'many chains of political, economic and social activities are becoming inter-regional or inter-continental in scope'. *Second*, interaction and interconnectedness have intensified between states and civil societies, emphasizing not only 'individual security', but also 'societal security' which involves the protection of the community cultures and values. This has, in turn, increased 'global awareness' among individuals and societies. *Third*, globalization has brought about 'a relativization of the importance of states' in world politics, compared to non-state entities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. *A fourth* development should be added to the list: the relativization of geopolitics.³²¹

Following Karaosmanoğlu, it seems possible to press on with actors' political spaces. Non-state entities have relativized the concept of authority and the importance of nation-states' territorial and political sphere of influence. Non-state entities have been slowly asserting themselves as having non-territorial political spaces and influence of their own. As a corollary, states and non-state entities together form concentric circles of authority and influence that overlap one another. As yet, that does not mean that states' influence on international politics is small or that states are weak. It is just meant to underscore the inclusion of other focal

³²¹ Karaosmanoglu, Ali L. 2004. "Globalization and Its Impact on Turkey's Security", in *The Europeanization of Turkey's Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, p.12, italics added.

points of influence and authority into the calculus of international politics through the relativization of power, authority and autonomy.

As long as these non-national polities have influence on nation-states forcing them to change their policies, they emerge to have *relative illicit authorities* of their own. As long as and to the extent they obtain active support or indirect support as sympathy from people, they evolve to exercise de facto authority that challenge states. So long as they mobilize people and create new focal points of loyalty and identity without completely depending on a state-sponsor as exemplified by Al Qaeda, they gradually assert to have authority in international politics.³²²

It is, then, important to discuss criteria for actor-ness. What determines an actor? If we do not consider the issues of deterritorialization, overlapping political spaces and the relativization of the importance of states that are addressed previously, we have the traditional theoretical approach and answer at hand: Nation-states are actors. This is the classical approach centered upon the conceptualization of state sovereignty, which is gauged in absolute terms. Within such absolute measurements that are largely devoid of the recent implications of globalization, non-state entities cannot be seen as actors and the unit of analysis is conventionally thought as nation-states. However, this theoretical stance does not always seem to be matching the facts. Although the concept of sovereignty is theoretically thought in absolute terms, absolute autonomy has never been possible in practice because every actor is dependent on other foci of power to certain extent. Even before the globalization came to dominate the agenda of international politics, absolute autonomy was impossible. Sovereignty, in practice, did not mean

³²² *The 9-11 Commission Report* - Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. NY: W. W. Norton, pp. 47-63.

that states are islands that are absolutely self-reliant, totally autonomous autarkic units. Even after the Westphalian praxis came to be the order of the day, states were never totally freed from political and economic intervention. Since this has been the case, globalization only intensified the interconnectedness of different polities or groups. Globalization enhanced the fact that states are not islands that are closed to economic, political-military influence and penetration coming from other entities. On the one hand, globalization interconnected states to one another ever more; on the other hand, it arguably gave way to emergence of new actors that share, exploit, co-opt and challenge states' authority and physical territory with the result of new actors being non-territorial entities that lives within and through states.

To sum up, states' grip on the control of their economy and security is not as tight as the case in earlier periods of history owing to the implications of globalization on sovereignty. Implications of globalization on sovereignty manifest themselves in deterritorialization of economy and security and in overlapping political spaces (or transnationality) that can only be roughly measured without clear delineations.

4.9. The Impact of Globalization on the Contemporary Conflict Environment: The Declining Form of Conflict and Warfare

4.9.1. Waning of Major War

(The Leading-Powers-Peace Argument)

A number of scholars, John Mueller and Robert Jervis foremost among them, argued that inter-state war among the armies of most developed industrial states such as the US, members of the EU, Canada and Japan did not take place since 1945 and it is not likely to take place for the foreseeable future.³²³ The gist of

³²³SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Major war as vast force-on-force confrontations of armies on the

the argument is that conventional war among these states is not contemplated by them against one another, and as a corollary war does not occur among them. The argument's departure point is the fact that there are no military threats among the above-mentioned countries.³²⁴ The argument exclusively refers to the advanced industrial countries (AICs),³²⁵ and it excludes the rest of states. Since these states are among the most powerful set of nation-states in the world, the likelihood of war among them has important repercussions on the prospects of global security. Most importantly, it complicates the application of balance of power theory; and as Robert Pape maintains, it opens the theory's validity into question particularly because balance of power theory works best where expectation of war looms large.³²⁶

4.9.2. What Waning of Major War Is Not?

'Waning or decline of major war' does not mean that international politics is necessarily going towards a more peaceful world. Indeed, viewed globally, world affairs are not rid of conflict.³²⁷ While there is a literature arguing that a more peaceful world is likely³²⁸, the argument of the waning of (major or regular or conventional inter-state) war among the most developed industrial nation-states is limited in scope. It does not convey the whole world. The argument is just viewed from the historical perspective, and it is simply that countries such as Canada, the

battlefield is absent since World War II.

³²⁴Mouritzen, Hans. 2006. "Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory" *European Security*, 15:2, p. 163-footnote 78.

³²⁵As the formal acronym for the Advanced Industrial Countries, 'AIC' is the United Nations abbreviation for the North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australasia. These regions and the states within are often referred to as 'the North' in the UN documents.

³²⁶Personal conversation with Professor R. Pape, Bilkent University Address, Ankara-Turkey, 2009.

³²⁷SIPRI Yearbook. 2009. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

³²⁸Goldsmith, Benjamin E. 2006. "A Universal Proposition? Region, Conflict, War and the Robustness of the Kantian Peace" *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12-4: 533-563.

US, the EU member-states and Japan did not go to war with each other since 1945. It is presumed that they are not likely to wage conventional wars against each other.

Secondly, it does not point to obsolescence of war. It does *not* mean that nation-states other than those mentioned-above are not likely to wage war.³²⁹ In other words, the observation of waning of major war just underlines that waning of major war is only valid for the US, Canada, the EU, and Japan. For states other than Canada, the US, the EU member-states and Japan, war is still considered to be a probability. The argument is that interstate war is down, but not out. It experiences an off-season, but it is specified for the above-mentioned countries. In other parts of the world, potential for war still resides: For instance, India and Pakistan has been contemplating and preparing for war, and constantly planning war-contingencies (including contingencies of nuclear war) and practicing maneuvers. Waning of major war simply does not comprise such nation-states. Then, war is not out, but it is currently down mostly in the western environs. According to Colin S. Gray, one of the most seminal military strategist and philosopher of our times, waning of major war exists.³³⁰ Yet, it is not eternal. Rather, he argues that waning of major war is contextual where there is no strategic necessity.

It is sensible to conclude both that there has been a notable debellization (lack of war) of the West, of Europe outside the Balkans in particular, but that that trend is vulnerable to contextual change. To regard war as uncivilized, unacceptable, and even all but unthinkable is a luxury permitted by the absence of dire strategic necessity. The taboo against war, if such it is becoming, will evaporate like the morning mist if, or more likely when, bad times of strategic insecurity return. In this case at least, culture is shaped by circumstances.³³¹

³²⁹Fleming, Colin M. 2009. "New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32:2 213-241.

³³⁰Gray, Colin S. 2005. "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters*, Spring, p.24.

³³¹Colin S. Gray. 2009. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Gray, Colin S. 2005. "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters*, Spring, pp.14-26

Although the emphasis on the strategic necessity is clear, Gray's above argument seems to be lacking a crucial factor that also play into determining the future of the taboo against war or waning of major war. When it is to the point that culture is shaped by circumstances especially in the immanency of war, it is also to the point that culture is also shaped by the strategic decisions or behaviors of states. The circumstances are partly created by the actors/agents and partly by the structure. Thus, the return of bad times of strategic insecurity depends also on the choices of states. If war (outcome) comes despite the efforts to avoid it (behavior), then the taboo will be broken.³³² Yet again, strategic necessity for war does not emerge by itself independent of the behaviors of actors. Gray also misses the crucial factor in the strategic culture literature that circumstances do not emerge from out of the blue, state/s take actions under the conditioning effects of the structure.

However, states take actions, too. The circumstances that create strategic necessity to go to war are subject to strategic or geopolitical culture which is shaped more by past experiences than by circumstances. That does not translate to an argument that decline of war is a permanent situation. Rather, it does show that the neorealist lenses have a predisposition to overestimate the weight of the structural explanations and underestimate the weight of the agent or the state's determining behaviors in the two-way street of the agent-structure dynamic. If the unit-level variable or actors' behaviors were not important, it would not be possible to explain the rise of any hegemon throughout history. Hegemons or the most

³³²As Mouritzen makes clear, Waltz differentiates between 'the behavior' and 'outcome'. Both the structural effects and the unit's behavior determine the outcome. The system is more than the sum of its parts, but it is also the parts and their behavior. This is the complicated point of Waltz's theory. Waltz escapes from this troubled waters of the intersection of the two levels of analyses by claiming that neo-realism refrains from explaining individual foreign policies of states. Nonetheless, many neo-realists including Waltz engage in foreign policy explanation. Mouritzen, Hans. 2006. "Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory" *European Security*, 15:2.

powerful state in the system comes to occupy a paramount position by pursuing particular policies of economic development and military procurement - even if the strategic insecurity or necessity induced by the system required the otherwise. In other words, a state could not rise to a hegemonic position if it chose to abide by the system at all times. Making war is also a choice of states. The decision to go to war does not come up immediately; rather it has a developmental course. If the predisposition of a state is benign rather than war-prone, the risk of war becomes smaller.

Third, waning of major war does not mean that violence or political conflict vanished altogether in every corner of the world. The full spectrum of 'warfare' includes regular warfare and the irregular warfare. While 'war', as the regular warfare waged by nation-state military battalion formations, is experiencing a downward tendency, 'warfare' continues in its irregular forms: intrastate conflicts and terrorism abound. The several complex wars of Yugoslavian succession, the wars of Soviet succession in the Caucasus region, and the near perpetual warfare across West and Central Africa including the Sudan and Somalia testify to it.

Finally, the fact that the Cold War has not turned into a 'hot' one, or, the fact that war among the two blocs as force-on-force vast conventional military clashes of armies did not actually occur does not weaken the waning of major war argument that addresses the post-Cold War conflict environment. Waning of major war is not a feature of the Cold War. It is a feature of its aftermath. Lack of major war during the Cold War is not related to a lack of war-anticipation during the Cold War whereas the waning of war of the post-cold War era is. It was exactly the anticipation of war itself during the Cold War, not its actual occurrence that led to defensive alliances formation. The political conflict had to be kept 'cold' due to the

balance of terror established by the superpowers' second-strike capabilities alongside strategies such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the flexible response and treaties such as Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Therefore, waning of major war is more about whether there is contemplation and anticipation of war among states than it is about actual occurrence of war. Major war among advanced industrial countries (AICs) occurred neither during the Cold War nor in its aftermath; however, with different reasons. Lack of war is an offshoot or by-product of declining anticipation of war in the aftermath of the Cold War while it is was the result of nuclear deterrence or 'the balance of terror' between the superpowers during the Cold War.

4.9.3. Determinants of the Waning of Major War

To put 'waning of major war' into perspective and briefly explain how it occurred, following correlated determinants can be enlisted: First of all, *the introduction of nuclear weapons* (which deterritorialized the conflict among nations as discussed in the first chapter) is determining: Military technology surpassed territorial barriers of defense by 'the strategic triad'. The world witnessed the age of nuclear plenty and the second-strike capability. The heart of the nuclear revolution is the *speed of kill and mutual kill, which transgressed borders of nation-states*.³³³ For the first time in history, mankind found itself in a situation that it could annihilate entire human life if it wanted to with missiles that could reach *almost any point on earth*. In other words, military-power-projection trajectory of the superpowers of the Cold War globalized, comprising the world almost to the full. Defense against *globalized military-power-projection* became possible not by defense on land. It became possible via second-strike capabilities of the

³³³Schelling, Thomas C. 1975. *The Strategy of Conflict* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

superpowers of the Cold War, the strategic triad, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and missiles and by the extrapolated defense projects at outer-space such as Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and missile defense. All these developments largely overruled the conventional war among states. Emergence and escalation of conventional conflicts risked initiation of nuclear weapons use, which meant mutual destruction of belligerents involved: This has been famously or notoriously known as the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Although the nuclear threat level and imminence decreased after the Cold War, the same contingency and the logic of deterrence are still overseen by states.³³⁴

Secondly, *horizontal and vertical proliferation* accelerated throughout the Cold War. The proliferation of CBRN, especially proliferation of nuclear weapons and deterrence decreased the likelihood of conventional war.³³⁵ The number of unconventional weapons or the number of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN) and their delivery means increased during the Cold War. They still remain as a significant concern for nation-states after the Cold War. CBRN and the related know-how spread to the world starting from the beginning of the post-WWII era to the present. In particular, the spread of nuclear technology proved hard to stop, paving the way for understandably alarmist threat assessments. Nation-states have perceived the CBRN stockpiles as clear and present threats against their national security because CBRN were affective deterrents. Consequently, threat assessments of the Cold War diminished the likelihood of a conventional war among major states, which fear that a conventional war would escalate into a nuclear war. Especially from the late 1950s onwards, states found it

³³⁴Pincus, Walter. 2005. "Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan; Strategy Includes Preemptive Use against Banned Weapons", *Washington Post*, Sunday, September 11.

³³⁵Payne, Keith. 2001. *The Follies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction*. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, pp. 2-17.

mutually destructive to fight one another directly. Therefore, the US and the former USSR turned a blind eye to the interventions in their peripheries to certain extent. In a sense, they were obliged to fight by proxy: Terrorist groups were manipulated by major nation-states themselves. Indirect assistance to conflicting parties and covert operations short of major conventional warfare were common practice. Unofficial sponsorship of terrorism replaced regular warfare.³³⁶

Third, *the size of regular armies has declined* to a mere fraction of the World War years.³³⁷ Rising costs of deploying and sustaining huge number of soldiers are coupled by ever advancing military technology that replaces manpower to some extent. Use of advanced weapons and weapon-systems facilitated power-projection, deployment and deterrence capabilities. Computerization improved logistical, operational and contingency planning. In particular, computational research and development boosted precision, pinpointing targets unlike the carpet bombings of the early twentieth century. It also enhanced firepower and assured destruction. Finally, professionalism also contributed to the decline in the size of armies.

Fourth, *the conventional military theory stagnated* due to nuclear weapons. Strategists of the Cold War period such as Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie tackled with nuclear strategy and nuclear deterrence unlike Clausewitz who dealt mainly with conventional war. *Vertical envelopment* was the sole novel concept in the literature of conventional warfare and military strategy.³³⁸ ‘Conventional

³³⁶Boot, Max. 2002. *The Savage Wars of Peace- Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* NY: Basic Books.

³³⁷Alach, Zhivan J. 2008 *Slowing Military Change*-Strategic Studies Institute the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program-<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>, October, p.19.

³³⁸Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, P.349. ‘VERTICAL

military stasis' is the departure point of analyses for defense analysts of armies in the twenty-first century.³³⁹

Fifth, *the post-World War II western institutional and normative order* played into limiting war by setting 'the game-rules' of politics among nations. Initiated by the introduction and development of nuclear weapons, the decline of major war among most developed states were also supported by the evolution of international law and various international organizations. Organizations such as the UN, the NATO, and OSCE are latent platforms of conflict resolution and dialogue. In a nutshell, legal and customary rules reflected a post-World War II western normative order under the auspices of the US. Concurrently, Western liberal regimes and public opinion evolved to become dominant in the post-Cold War period. By and large, they have culminated to be the normative rules of the international arena. Customary and written rules of international law, diplomacy and treaty-making mainly reflect a western mode of conduct slanted by democracy and liberalism.³⁴⁰

The post-World War II western institutional and normative order is built by the victors of World War II. That does not seem to be an accident: the distribution of capabilities after the war brought western powers forward. That is evident in setting up international institutions and international agenda. Major states have the upper-hand of setting the international agenda, which makes them up-starters in the

ENVELOPMENT' IS A tactical maneuver in which troops, either air-dropped or air-landed, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force.

³³⁹Alach, Zhivan J. 2008. *Slowing Military Change*, Strategic Institute of the US Army, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pp.19-66>.

³⁴⁰Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy" *Review of International Studies*, 27: 191-212.

politics among nations.³⁴¹ The capacity to set the international agenda is a significant indication of power. Setting up international institutions is another indication of power; and international institutions of significance are largely western. The Allied powers of the WWII (that have overpowered the Axis powers on the European continent) designed most of the economic, political and security institutions of the post-war international relations. The post-war international system adheres to the principles of international law that have been designed to sustain the post-war institutional order, main manifestation of which is the Security Council of the UN.³⁴² Authorization of legal use of force resides ultimately with the Security Council, which reflects the balance of power after WWII. Although the restraining clout of the Security Council diminished after 1989 as exemplified by the US intervention in Iraq and Kosovo in 1991 and 1999 respectively; it still retains some political clout to limit use of force for most states.³⁴³

Sixth and final factor is the *tight-knit economic interdependence among most developed industrial nation-states* and *gradual privatization of economy including military-industrial complexes* that tied national security considerations of nation-states to each other. Alongside global economic interdependence, privatization of economy and the eroding state monopoly on the use of force

³⁴¹Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1948. *Politics among Nations- the Struggle for Power and Peace* New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

³⁴²Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy" *Review of International Studies*, 27, p. 201.

³⁴³The post-World War II institutional system that emerged after 1945 was said to have frozen in place various enmities of the Cold War and of the consequences of political miscalculations made during World War II. Over the (current) past 20 years, they have thawed into life again. As William W. Finan Jr. emphasizes, 'although the conflicts in the Balkans, realignment of allegiances after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, interventions in the Gulf and the 2003 Iraqi intervention of the US requires a review of the current state of the post-World War II international security affairs, World War II continues, in nearly innumerable ways, to reverberate across East Asia, the United States, and Europe. The war and its reminders-from the monuments and gravestones marking the war's battles and commemorating its dead to the political, economic, and security institutions that rose in its aftermath-remain a presence that, visibly or invisibly, governs how we think about the world and how the international system functions.'

diminished state authority and power in a relative sense when compared to non-state entities. Although it can be argued that nation-states are more powerful than non-state entities in the absolute sense, transnational entities rose to challenge nation-states that previously monopolized and manipulated most of the economy, technology, information and use of force. *Power resources such as money, technology, know-how, weapons and communication became ever more available around the world. The diffusion or globalization of power- resources enabled non-state challenges and threats to arise, breaking the monopoly of states over economy and technology. Civil expansion of globalization regarding the diffusion and private application of the economy, technology, information and use of force empowered non-state entities.*

At the gist of all these factors that contribute to waning of major war lies the diffusion of authority and power at world-large. The rising unconventional forms of warfare such as terrorism and the rise (not emergence) of non-state entities are the impact of globalization on state sovereignty.³⁴⁴ Without studying the impact of globalization on sovereignty and authority of nation-states, it is hard to see why sovereignty appears as the obstacle to cooperate against transnational threats such as global terrorism. How sovereignty itself can limit cooperation against terrorism is explained throughout the entire dissertation.

Rather than disappearing, geopolitics became complicated by the diffusion of power resources into the non-state realm. That translates into non-state threat exposure. Ambiguity of contemporary threats originates in their transnational character and it is also related to the diffusion of power around the world. The

³⁴⁴Salehyan, Idean. 2006. "Book Note: The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 499-500.

current panorama of political and economic power is the permissive cause for the emergence of non-state entities and asymmetrical forms of warfare. *The reason why contemporary threats are ambiguous lies in the different way power is used by non-state entities. Ambiguity of transnational threats or the way non-state entities use power is different from the way states use power.* That has uncooperative repercussions and has become a basic limit of cooperation among states. It is these issues that are explained in this chapter.

4.9.4. Diffusion of Power-Resources and Waning of Major War

It seems probably less debatable to relate the waning of major war to the diffusion of authority because the contestation among states shifted from the battlefields to the economic, technologic, diplomatic and normative realm. Diffusion of authority is the increase in the number of power- foci that use power-resources to have a say in politics, either in a legal or illegal framework. Illegal and unconventional use of power-resources change the way power is used, too. Diffusion of authority manifests itself in the interconnected relations among nation-states and non-state entities such as transnational corporations, terrorist groups that are fed by illicit financial markets, and nongovernmental organizations such as Green Peace. Independent from the fact that some non-state entities are legal and some are not, they play into politics. They are connected to the international fora composed of nation-states. Such connectedness or linkage to international affairs is possible due to the availability of power resources for non-state entities. Power resources such as advanced technology and economic and financial power are available not only for nation-states, but they are also at the service of transnational companies that can dictate nation-states economic packages and investment conditions or have private armies of their own to protect business interests.

Nation-states lost the monopoly or privileged control over power-resources. Besides, power-resources are not just conventional military capabilities. Power-resources include availability and use of technology; a networked constituency composed of people from different societies that follow a particular cause; effective and expansive propaganda in disseminating ideologies rivaling to those of nation-states; increased skill, education and computer-literacy in conducting terrorist attacks and in execution of operations of sorts including information-technologic propaganda; legal or illicit financial power from black markets and actual or potential use of small weapons and unconventional weapons. It goes without saying that criminal and terrorist groups take advantage of high technology and other power-resources mentioned-above. These are realized alongside traditional illicit methods such as hawala or hundis.

In addition to the availability of power-resources for non-state entities, there is another significant development: As Scowcroft, Kissinger and Brzezinski maintain, the way power is exercised changed, too.³⁴⁵ This is different from democratic-peace theory in that it is not democracy that is hold to be the independent variable leading to absence of war among them, but the linchpin of the explanation is the economic, financial and technological interdependence. This is congruent with but not identical to the neo-functionalist liberal economic theory and it seems similar to the democratic-peace theory inasmuch as economy prepares a fertile environment for peace. When the domestic well-being of France is tied to Germany, or Japan's well-being to that of the United States or Britain's economic policies are correlated to America's economic calculations, common economic interests can be seen as one of the important factors that plays into avoiding war.

³⁴⁵ *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com, last accessed on January 2009.

Nevertheless, it is not necessarily related to democracy per se.

Secondly, since the diffusion of authority at world-large affects states' authority to wage war, waning of major war is the result of authority diffusion, too. Different foci-of-power including states and non-state actors as the contenders of autonomy and authority, demonstrate a constant rivalry of influence among each other. The formation of several authorities and the rivalry thence is the result of ever increasing and ubiquitous economic and technological prowess around the world. Inner-logic of capitalism imperatively directs markets and technology to expand throughout the world, and that in turn causes diffusion of authority around the world.³⁴⁶ That makes it unavoidable for states to forcibly share authority with other nation-states, but also with other actors such as transnational companies, international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, criminal and terrorist organizations and moral authorities such as Green Peace or Amnesty International. Because technology and wealth expanded throughout the world, nation-states could not help adapting to the new configuration of power-resources and authorities thus created. The more interconnected the world becomes; the more authority is contested, including the authority to wage war among developed nation-states.

Technological prowess and economic interconnectedness in global scale are both the indicators and means of authority diffusion. Widening and deepening technological prowess and economic interconnectedness in global scale paves the way for the emergence of non-state entities to have political clout because power becomes diffused. Thus, economic and technological glues that bind nation-states appear to be creating a correlation or linkage of interests among them, prohibiting

³⁴⁶Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy" *Review of International Studies*, 27: 191-212.

even the contemplation of war: Most developed states do not fear from one another paving the way for the waning of major conventional war among themselves.³⁴⁷

Interconnectedness is realized by the form and impact of advanced technology (especially on transportation and communication) and current forms of economic interdependence or enmeshed economies of scale that goes ever increasingly beyond the borders of a specific nation-state. Technological advancement and economic interdependence (or mutual vulnerability of national economies to one another and states' need for transnational corporations and cartels, and vice versa) also create a permissive environment for the creation of a multitude of actors other than nation-states. These factors also bear considerable marks on the creation of different political formations with loyalties of people shifting from nation-states to non-state power foci.³⁴⁸ They are also the basic engines of globalization.

Consideration of technology and economy became also sine qua non when the issue of declining and rising forms of warfare such as terrorism becomes the subject-matter of study. They are also central to discussions on eroding state-sovereignty, which is under the pressure of non-state entities taking advantage of

³⁴⁷Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace" *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "September 11: How Has It Changed the World?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117(1): 37-54; Amy Chua. 2007. *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall* Doubleday Publishing, October.

³⁴⁸For an elaborative examination of shifting loyalties and how different identities appear, please see Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach. 2004. *Remapping Global Politics, History's Revenge and Future Shock*. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press. pp. 143-160; Berger, Peter L. and Samuel P. Huntington. 2002. *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Oxford Uni. Press; Katzenstein, Peter J. 1996. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press; Lapid, Yosef. 1996. "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory" in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 5-10; Mayall, James. 1990. *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press. pp. 27-31; Linklater, Andrew. 1982. *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*. London: Macmillan; Walker, R.B. J. 1990. "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations" in Jongsuk Chay, ed., *Culture and International Relations*. New York: Praeger, pp. 10-13; Hall, Rodney Bruce. *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems*. 1999. New York: Columbia University Press.

illicit violence and economic power.

The factors of technology and economy are so much intertwined to each other that it is compulsory to view them as one compact motor of change. Although these two factors are not agencies (such as individuals or states), and are just processes overwhelmingly led by agents in the first place, it is those two factors which condition various agents or actors. They condition and contextualize all actors or entities of world politics, whether they are nation-states or non-state actors (non-state power foci). As such, economy and technology and the organizational skill to put them into use are among the most vital power resources in the world.

Viewed within such a framework, adaptation to globalization came in different guises and forms. Some states, such as the EU member states chose to pool some of their autonomy and authority together so as to get wealthier without the use of force among each other. Through their inseparably conjoint economic procedures and policies, they become more durable or less susceptible against non-state economic actors.

They increased their bargaining-power with regard to other states and transnational organizations over which they do not always have effective control on their own. Yet, like almost all other states in the world, the EU member-states are still vulnerable to terrorist organizations, which are again the result of authority-diffusion. When states lost their firm control over the means of violence and over economic production as an imperative of the advanced free market economy, numerous other entities emerged to challenge them.

4.9.5. The Origin of the European Security Community

In addition to economic enmeshment as a cause of absence of war among developed nation-states, states' decision to avoid war also helped form security communities in which disputes are resolved without resort to threat or use of force. The waning of major war among Canada, the US, Japan and the EU member-states or the security community that they form can also be seen as the result of a shared rebuttal of war among them after having experienced the two World-Wars. The continuation of absence of war between European states such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era is also of an indication of the importance of the intentions and decision of European states to avoid war. The decision and goal of eschewing war paved the way for economic integration, and was the driving motor of integration that helped to overcome difficulties of integrating the economies of European states, first starting off as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The ECSC was first proposed by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 as a way to prevent further war between France and Germany. It was formally established in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, signed not only by France and Germany, but also by Italy and the three Benelux states: Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

As the motive for the establishment of the ECSC, European states perceived a need to tie down Germany. The decision to avoid war was initially a French desire after having been twice battered by Germany. Originally a French effort to tie down Germany militarily, common steel and coal production was principally an idea of controlling the German military industry. Therefore, peace was not the result of democracy, but rather democracy was the result of peace which was established by enmeshment of French and German economies. It is not the

democratic values and relations among European states, but economic interconnectedness that was seen as a way to prevent war. Indeed, prior to 1945, democracy did not prove to be very successful at stopping major wars or the wars that were waged through force-on-force confrontations of the most developed Western armies. Therefore, although there has been a normative initiative and decision to avoid war in Europe that may be analyzed at the state level and individual/leaders level, this decision to eschew war is not directly related to democracy. The decision to prevent war on the side of the European states was the objective, and that objective was carried out with the strategy of economic enmeshment.³⁴⁹

When the survival of economically-interconnected states became inseparable from one another, war becomes costly and reduced in functionality. Put alternatively, each state's survival is linked to those of others. States (such as Japan, Canada, the EU member-states and the US among whom major war wanes) cannot survive without one another's survival. If war is to be waged to maximize economic gains, and if the political instrument of war itself demolishes such maximization, then war becomes too costly and meaningless to be even contemplated. Hence, economic interdependence or complex interdependence leads to waning of major war. This has been valid for the EU member-states, too.

³⁴⁹Mousseau, Michael. 2009. "The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace" *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 4 pp. 52-86.

4.9.6. Waning of Major War, Security Community and Complex Interdependence

The concept of security community is particularly debated for the politics of Western European states among which complex interdependence has contributed to lack of war considerably since 1945. The strategy of economic enmeshment to achieve absence of war turned into being an objective on its own after the establishment of the relative absence of war in time. Since there remained no fear of military aggression for European states, the objective became further economic integration leading to political unity under the conditions and pressures of global economic competitiveness.

Since, no single nation-state is capable to survive economically on its own under the current economic circumstances of globalization, it becomes compulsory for states to accumulate at least some of their sovereignty into an authority-pool. Surviving economically in a world of significant economic, technological and cultural rivalry, states need partners. That is why once a strategy to achieve absence of war, economic enmeshment turned into being an objective on its own after the establishment of the relative absence of war since 1945. Not only there was an intention to avoid war on the part of the founding fathers of the EU that passed on to latter generations, but also in time there appeared a different need, namely the need for pooling of sovereignties to remain economically powerful *vis-à-vis transnational companies and other states*.

The need for economic power became compulsory as a consequence of the way market economy evolved. Finance-capital, trade and investment do not recognize borders, and they are not successfully encapsulated into national

economies due to the expansionist inner-logic of the market system.³⁵⁰ Therefore, the idea of European unity that once started as a decision to avoid war was carried out and strengthened by the *pooling or accumulation of sovereignties* and *autonomies of states* which were also the imperative results of complex interdependence. Taken as an agent/state decision to establish absence of war, interdependence is voluntary.³⁵¹

4.9.7. Nuclear Deterrence and the Waning of Major War

Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence also contributed to the waning of major war during the Cold War, and it still plays a certain role in avoiding conflict. Decline of major war during the Cold War was very much related to the balance of terror, and the second-strike capability of superpowers.³⁵² After the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence continues to play an important role, but not a role as significant as it once had. The reason for the continuation of the absence of war in the post-Cold War, according to Schweller, is the fact that all major powers still regard the international order as advantageous for themselves. It is hard to deny that European states, Canada, the US and Japan still depend upon the globally

³⁵⁰Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. "American Power and the Empire of Capitalist Democracy" *Review of International Studies*, 27: 191-212.

³⁵¹Technically speaking, economic globalization forces states to respond in some way. However, states may respond by methods such as a political integration process (exemplified by the EU), fragmentation (the Balkanization), war-profiteering (2003 Iraq War) or just concluding economic treaties such as Mercado Común del Sur-South American Economic Organization (MERCUSOR), which does not integrate sovereignties of states unlike the fundamental logic of the EU. However, what sets the EU member states distinct is that they did not just seek economic welfare: They seek it in the absence of war. Although waning of major war and stability were the preliminary requirements for economic development, economic parameters are not the only determinants. If it were so, there would be no integration and nothing much would be different from the era before the World Wars. The foundational fathers of the EU (alongside the economic necessities/material factors that give way to the EU formation), chose to make a difference by taking a lesson from the two World Wars and they did not turn to the states-configuration of the pre-World Wars era where power-politics reigned. They could have returned to the pre-war geopolitics, but they did *choose* and *decide* not to. As such, the EU process also emphasizes the ideational factors as independent variables alongside the material ones.

³⁵²Vasquez, John A. ed. 2000. *What Do We Know About War?* Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

interconnected free-market economy and there is no reason to challenge one another militarily as long as doing so brings more costs than benefits. Even India and China, (that are not regarded as major powers in the literature owing to their different political and economic regimes from that of the western ones) as economically rising states, do not seem to be remarkably challenging the dominant rules of the political status quo for now.³⁵³ They may challenge it in the future, but that does not refute the argument of waning of major war among most developed states, because herein India and China are not regarded as major or most developed powers via the debate on the argument of waning of major war - due to their continuing relative economic and political weaknesses compared to the US, the EU, Canada and Japan.

The post-Second World War international order established by the United States with its economic and political institutions, while in need of reform, helped form a status quo that punishes an aggressor both economically and militarily. Economically, the IMF, World Bank, the interconnected financial system, and the high flow of goods and services make it imprudent to use force while states are economically in need of each other. As for the military realm, transnational corporations are involved in the arms procurement and military-industrial complex that serve many client-states. Arms-build up is not an entirely national business anymore.³⁵⁴ The preeminent military power of the United States of America is another deterrent for the major powers who would intend to use force. However, no major power, Japan, Canada or the EU member states show any serious sign or intention of challenging America militarily. In fact, they do not need to do so as

³⁵³ Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace" *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 1-14.

³⁵⁴ SIPRI Yearbook. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. 2009. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

long as their vital interests are not threatened severely.

In sum, waning of major war can be attributed to two main factors: first, economic and technical causes, and secondly, voluntary or agency-based causes regarding the intentions of the state bureaucracy, leadership. In other words, economic enmeshment was the strategy to achieve the objective of avoiding war. On the side of the governments' political adamancy and decision, especially on the side of the EU states, to set the goal as war avoidance is the normative and agency-based cause for waning of major war.

CHAPTER 5:

STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONDITIONING INTER-STATE COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM: POLARITY

5.1. Three Challenges and Three Answers

As follow-on to the previous chapter on structural factors conditioning inter-state cooperation, this chapter examines the concept of polarity from the viewpoint of balance of power theory. It focuses mainly on current non-polar state of international affairs, which condition the policy, cooperation and treaty behaviors of states.³⁵⁵ Before explaining what nonpolarity is and why the system is not unipolar or multipolar today, some of the policy-challenges non-polarity brings forward are discussed so as to ponder over the implications of nonpolarity. This

³⁵⁵ Barletta, Michael ed. 2002. *After 9-11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation* Occasional Paper No.8, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group-Center for Nonproliferation Studies <http://cns.miis.edu> Although this early-on evaluation of the post-September international security context is weak in that it fails to distinguish between terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as two distinct issues, it evaluates the implications of the September 11 attacks for major-powers relations well. It also partly discusses the shifting ground of security into non-state threats; Chayes, Antonia. 2008. "How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security" *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 1 Summer, pp. 45–81; David M. Andrews ed. 2005. *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US–European Relations after Iraq* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

will also help clarify what nonpolarity is. Then, second half of this chapter presents the argument of nonpolarity explicitly. Nonpolarity has crucial repercussions on cooperation and alignment among states, which are further detailed on state policies and behaviors in the following chapters based on the analysis herein. The chapter is trying to show how nonpolarity affects cooperation and alignments *within* and *among* states through a discussion of its problematic implications for policy-making and strategic design.

Non-polarity manifests itself as the unconcentrated and diffuse power scattered around the world among several kinds of players.³⁵⁶ The challenges nation-states face thereby is related to the current security context that involves private violence of non-state entities alongside traditional geopolitical concerns of nation-states. The complication of contemporary threats is manifested in the ambiguous form of contemporary threats.³⁵⁷

For instance, specific tactics and techniques such as ‘swarming’ or the temporary massing of people and resources for operational purposes is a new functional approach of terrorists. Their organizational style is likened to ‘netwars’, which is identified as a societal level counterpart to cyberwar. It is named as the networked relations of organizing. Literature on ‘the Network approach’ in examining transnational terrorism has made an upstart in 1996 before September 11, and it is still on³⁵⁸.

³⁵⁶ Arquilla, J. and D. F. Ronfeldt. 1996. *The Advent of Netwar*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation; Arquilla, J. and D. F. Ronfeldt. 2001. *Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation; Adamson, F. B. April 2005. “Globalization, transnational political mobilization and networks of violence” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18, 1, pp. 35-53; Chalk, P. 2000. “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) international organization and operations-A preliminary analysis” *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Winter Commentary* No. 77.

³⁵⁷ ‘The ambiguity’ of current threats is discussed in Chapter 6.

³⁵⁸ As one of the latest of that literature, *Leaderless Jihad* stands out as a must-reading, please see Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad-Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. The book demonstrates the diffusion of power into non-state leaderless radical Islamist movement- a social movement alongside but distinct from the Al

For the scope and purposes here, it is important to underline the landscape of the threat: it is argued to be networked. It is important because states build their strategies and policies, whether they are cooperative or not, according to their perception of the threat or the landscape of the threat.

Transnational terrorism poses ambiguous, deterritorialized, horizontal, societal threats with ‘a no-return address problem’. It can hardly be deterred by states’ traditional deterrence policies.³⁵⁹ Absence of a clear balance of power in the system means ‘non-polarity’, which is the non-existence of poles in the still anarchic system. It is in this security context that international relations are characterized by nonpolarity, which gives way to the formation of the ambiguity of transnational terrorist threats. In reverse reading, transnational terrorism would arguably not be influential enough to change state policies if the polarity argument of sorts (balance of power arguments) could account for the current international affairs. If the world was unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, there would be one, two or several concentrations of power among only nations-states. The politics among them would rule out or severely limit the fertile conflict environment conducive to the influence of non-state entities much as the situation of the Cold War. However, ranging from economics, transnational advocacy causes of secular, moral and religious issues to employing violence, non-state/non-sovereign formations have a voice and de facto political clout albeit being illicit in criminal and terroristic cases. The increasing activation of hybrid and ambiguous threats (that is threats whose structure, ideological basis, location, material and human sources are not as clear to nation-states as those of the Cold War threats) cannot be restrained by nation-states

Qaeda central.

³⁵⁹ For the epitome examination of the difficulties of applying deterrence against terrorism, Mustafa Kibaroglu, “11 Eylül’ün Ardından Strateji, Tehdit ve Caydırıcılık”, *Foreign Policy*, Kış 2002, İstanbul, ss. 30-38; Kibaroglu, Mustafa. 2006. “Kitle Imha Silahlariyla Teror: Kiyametın Yeni Esigi mi?” *Avrasya Dosyasi* Cilt 12 Sayı 3.

effectively. These threats are extant and wide-spread. In the face of these threats, resistance against devising new models, theories or improving already established approaches with modified research programs does not make contemporary threats disappear. In realization of this fact, the current security and threat environment caused different viewpoints to emerge pertaining to the implications of transnational political movements in general and especially of terrorism for the power-analysis at large and for major powers in particular.

The opening salvo of the twenty-first century is clearly the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Three main challenges can be evinced for nation-states' policy-making and academic analysis:

First and most significantly, on September 11, a non-state entity demonstrated that it could have a strategic impact on world affairs, even without the use of mass destruction weapons. The regional and global implications is almost endless: the reshaping of the Middle East and Central Asia, global financial system overview, immigration policies, border security, intelligence, human rights and democracy, law enforcement, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the transatlantic relations of the EU and the US, the US-Russia-China relationship, energy politics, the economic North-South divide, and without doubt, its implications on terrorism and counterterrorism on a global scale. For nation-states, violent non-state actors became a *sine qua non* of policy-making, a policy factor much more important than it has ever before.

What 9-11 demonstrated for nation-states is that in coming decades states might well face non-state groups that can inflict destruction on them on a scale that was unprecedented in peacetime among states. Peace or absence of war among nation-states was not enough to be secure against violence. The 9-11 terrorist

assaults and subsequent terrorist attacks such as those in Istanbul, London, Madrid, Bali or Beslan reflect a long-term trend, rather than an ephemeral one. Globalization or spread of economy, trade and knowledge enables the means of annihilation to fall into the hands of more and more people.

Secondly, regional conflicts and problems do not always remain minor ones. Sooner rather than later, they come to have global impact with implications for all states. However, major powers have a gradually decreasing voice in regional conflicts. Neither is the case that the US or any other state can effectively control or influence regional conflicts and intra-state skirmishes as was the case during the Cold War. Politics of peripheral spheres of influence of the Cold War superpowers has largely faded away. Europe, which once was the main theatre of rivalry, has been acting as a normative-and-economic soft power, albeit not united and concentrated as a bloc with its multi-headed organization without a constitution. Check and balance system established by the superpowers has eroded: Neither the problem of Kashmir, Lebanon, Palestine, North Korean and Iranian ambitions of nuclear weapons nor the conflict in Chechnya, Karabagh or Ossetia/Georgian-Russian tension are conducive for much major power influence. This is due to the rise of the middle powers and of the global middle class with the spread of power-resources such as economic, technological and educational advancement – the diffusion of power around the world. For instance, the insurgency in Iraq and failing state control in Pakistan for that matter is not in meaningful control or influence of even the allegedly hegemonic power of the US.³⁶⁰ Third, new players are emerging: new states are aspiring to join the major power club-elaborated below; and non-state entities vie for political power and influence.

³⁶⁰ Kaldor, Mary. 2003. "American Power: From 'Compellence' to 'Cosmopolitanism'?", *International Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 1 Jan., pp. 1-22;

Three viewpoints of the literature try to explain this new strategic landscape. First view is that post-Cold War era, especially after the September 11, 2001, is no more a world of major powers. It is rather about the transnational political and advocacy groups of both violent and non-violent methods. The main determining factor is the networked relations among states and non-state entities. It does not rule out the importance of states, yet they are not the sole unit of analysis. Secondly, a sharply different view is that the traditional power politics game continues; indeed it returned to its basics, freed from the restraining impact of the Cold War upon genuine balance of power politics.³⁶¹ Nationalism is on the rise in almost every corner of the world. Authoritarian regimes, with self-help calculations of national security, go unabated when they lack clearly identified strategic threats. The international economic crisis of 2007-2009 has heightened nationalism as each nation looks out for itself. All nations have been left to fend for themselves. Finally, third view is a synthesis of the two views mentioned-above with a difference of emphasis on the modest possibilities of international cooperation. The security landscape does not exclude the impact of networked movements or violent and non-violent political advocacy groups in both regional and global scales. For instances, human rights movement, land mines movement, environmental green movements under the auspices of the transnational moral authorities of the Amnesty International, Green Peace or the Red Cross and many groups alike represent the non-violent political movements across countries, trying to impose particular policies on governments. Sometimes they succeed to certain extent, too.

The fact that they pressurize governments is important because same horizontal organizational line (across countries among laymen at the societal level,

³⁶¹ Delpech, Therese. 2002. "Major Powers in the Twenty-First Century" in Barletta, Michael ed. 2002. *After 9-11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation* Occasional Paper No.8, Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group-Center for Nonproliferation Studies <http://cns.miiis.edu>

not at governmental agencies level) has a violent counterpart manifesting itself as terrorist groups and criminal mafioso organizations. Thus, both nationalist states and non-state transnational violent and non-violent activism is on the rise without a clear structure that streamlines them into a patterned relationship - that is 'nonpolarity' denoting absence of a traditionally understood international 'structure'. Structure, that is, patterned relationships among the parts (or patterned configuration of the parts of the systemic whole of world politics) is not easy to identify as complexity and chaos theorists such as Robert Axelrod maintains. Nevertheless, nation-states have the potential to cooperate among each other to the extent they can converge on their expectations and adjust their policies in a way that do not harm each others' pursuit of different goals.

5.2. Implications of Nonpolarity

'Power', 'great-power status', 'actorness' and 'polarity' has become essentially contested after the Cold War, and more notably so after September 11.³⁶² The end of the bipolar era led to an uncertain conflict environment where

³⁶² Smith, Steve. 2002. "The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order" *International Relations* 16-2, 171-183; Miller, Steven E. 2001. "International Security at Twenty-five, From One World to Another" *International Security* Vol. 26, No. 1-Summer pp. 5-39; Miller, Steven E. 2005. "Terrifying Thoughts: Power, Order, and Terror After 9/11" *Global Governance* 11 247-271; Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2002-3. "Limits of American Power" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 117 No. 4 Winter pp. 545-559; Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 1-14; Byman, Daniel. 2008. "An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or Bridge Too Far?" *Security Studies* 17: 599-643; Hoffmann, Stanley. 2002. "Clash of Globalizations" *Foreign Affairs* July-August; Richard N. Haas, "The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005-06. "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System" *Survival* 47-4, 7-18; Henry Kissinger. 2007. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster; December 2004-Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project Based on consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world; NIC Report. 2007. *Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States*, National Intelligence Council NIC Report DR-2007-16D 23 August; Walker, David M. *Transforming Government to Meet the Demands of the 21st Century*, The Federal Midwest Human Resources Council and the Chicago Federal Executive Board Chicago, United States Government Accountability Office, Illinois August 7, 2007; Møller, Bjørn. 2005. *Privatization of Conflict, Security and War* Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Working Paper no 2005/2; Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ted Robert Gurr.

real-world developments on the ground and the need to explain them in academia shook traditional concepts. Ostensibly, traditional concepts and analytical frameworks not only largely failed to predict the end of the Cold War, but they are seen as insufficient to answer the post-Cold War era.³⁶³ At the very least, the academic literature includes extensive debates on analytical frameworks and conceptualizations in order to answer contemporary challenges and threats. In due course, the world academic community experienced a shake; a shake that mixed or loosened debates that framed analysis.³⁶⁴ The situation seems to be an urging

2008. *Peace and Conflict 2008-Executive Summary* Center for International Development and Conflict Management University of Maryland; Sunstein, Cass R. May 2006. *On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change Working Paper 06-13*, Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies; Mueller, John. 2008. "Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration" *International Studies Perspectives* 6, 208–234; Martinage, Robert C. *The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment*-Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Allin, Dana H, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera, Gary Samore. 2007. *Repairing the Damage: Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus*. Adelphi Series 47-389.

³⁶³ Smith, Steve. 200. "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., *Critical Reflections on Security and Change* London: Frank Cass; Schweller, Randall L. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: a Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing" *International Security* 29-2, 159-201; Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics *International Organization* 51- 4 autumn pp. 513–53; Chauhan, Aleksandra. 2005. "International Conflict- A Cruel Necessity?" Prepared for delivery at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association South, Miami, Florida, November 3-5; Kastoryano, Riva. "The Reach of Transnationalism" Center for International Studies and Research and Social Sciences Research Council SSRC September 11 Essays-<http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kastoryano.htm>; Smith, Neil. "Global Executioner: Scales of Terror" The Social Sciences Research Council September 11 Essays <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/nsmith.htm>; Wohlforth, William. 2007. "A Tilted Balance, Who Will Rise? - Unipolar Stability, the Rules of Power Analysis" *Harvard International Review* Spring, 44-48; Desch, Michael C. 2007-08. "America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy" *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 pp. 7–43; Stokes, Doug. 2007. "Blood for oil? Global capital, counter-insurgency and the dual logic of American energy security" *Review of International Studies* 33, 245–264; Booth, Ken and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2008. *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics* New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" *International Organization* 52-4 autumn 1998, pp. 887–917; Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos. "Beyond Conflicting Powers' Politics" Social sciences Research Council <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/bresser2.htm>; Brown, Chris, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth. 2007. "Roundtable: 'The Future of the Discipline' " *International Relations* 21; 346; Baldwin, David A. 1997. "The Concept of Security" *Review of International Studies* 23, 5–26; Layne, Christopher. 2008. "Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited" *Security Studies*, 17:3; Keohane, Robert O. "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics and "The Liberalism of Fear" Social Sciences Research Council <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/keohane2.htm>; Brown, Chris. 2007. "Tragedy, 'Tragic Choices' and Contemporary International Political Theory" *International Relations* 21-5.

³⁶⁴ Hacke, Christian and Jana Puglierin. 2007. "John H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality" *International Relations* Vol. 21-3, 367–382; Howard, Michael. 2008. "Are We 'At War'?" *The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture*; Hoffman, Bruce. October 2002. *Lessons of 9/11* CT-201 Submitted for the

process for both policy-makers and academics to design better analytical frameworks, conceptual and practical responses as E. H. Carr and Morgenthau argued so decades ago.³⁶⁵

The current international environment is the departure point of many assessments. Based upon the context that is elaborated in previous chapters, current international environment is similar to a soup that people eat without knowing its recipe. Although the recipe of relations among ingredients (states and non-state entities) is not crystal-clear, there are some ingredients or factors involved such as ‘increased issue-linkages’: *Enhanced issue-linkages among different fields of state-policies* are determining contours of both cooperation and conflict. Issue-linkages that grow out of interconnectedness of globalization became a daunting policy-challenge for it complicates designing strategic concepts. Again, complication originates in interconnectedness or increasing linkage among issue-areas. The repercussion for the fight against terrorism is that the activities within the fields of economy, law-enforcement, finance, intelligence and military criss-cross each other.

In spite of the fact that issue-linkage is not a novel issue, it became more complicated: The interwoven issues intensified, became more connected, deeper

Committee Record to the United States Joint September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence on October 8, 2002; Krebs, Ronald R. and Lobasz, Jennifer K. 2007. “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq” *Security Studies* 16:3 409-451; Coughlan, Steve, Robert J. Currie, Hugh M. Kindred, Teresa Scassa 2006. *Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction In the Age of Globalization* Dalhousie Law School report-prepared for the Law Commission of Canada June 23; Carr, E. H. 1946. *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939*. London: Macmillan; William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2, 155–185; Sørensen, Georg. 2007. “Dilemma of Liberal Values After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Weak States” *Security Dialogue* 38, 357.

³⁶⁵ Carr, E.H. 1946. *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939*. London: Macmillan, last two chapters of the seminal work in particular. Carr discusses the possibility of obsolescence of the nation-state in the conclusion.

and expansive when compared to the Cold War era.³⁶⁶ They have been like concentric circles all along; but this time around, their overlapping is magnified. The state-responses, which are both to address and work through issue-linkages, are hardly corresponding. States still work through strict categorizations without which division of labor is understandably hard to establish. Yet, the threats manifest themselves in *a hybrid form* requiring different facets of counterterrorism (use of force and intelligence) and anti-terrorism (civil measures against terrorism short of force) applied together. Requirements of the civil side of the fight against terrorism such as nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq undercuts the requirements and modus operandi of military operations and vice versa. Simultaneous endeavors of development and security are challenging because they curtail each other.³⁶⁷

The form and mode of operations of the contemporary terrorism are different so much so that the label of the new terrorism is often used to refer to transnational terrorist acts. The changing features is such that the threat (global/transnational terrorism) became hybrid³⁶⁸; hybrid in style and methods

³⁶⁶ An excellent theoretical investigative analysis of the international structure of the Cold War is Wagner R. Harrison. 1993. "What was bipolarity?" *International Organization* 47-1. In arguing convincingly that bipolarity never existed, Wagner underlines that the fundamentals of nonpolarity were evolving during the Cold War; Aron, Raymond. 2005. "Fanaticism, Prudence and Faith" - first published in the journal *Preuves* in May 1956- 'Le fanatisme, la prudence et la foi' article publié initialement dans la revue *Commentaire*, no.109, printemps 2005. Aron deals with the lack of prudence in dealing with fanaticism and categorizations of the issue-linkages. Readers coming to it almost fifty years later find that Aron has lost none of its force and is still timely also with regard to the issue of conceptualization of 'poles'; On the difficulties of interwoven issues in the military realm, please see Leander, Anna. April 2001. *Globalisation and the Eroding State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence* paper presented at the conference "The Global Constitution of Failed States" University of Sussex 18-2 and Leander, Anna. 2006. *Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force*. Roma: Rubettino-Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, and also, Møller, Bjørn. 2005. *Privatisation of Conflict, Security and War* Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Working Paper no 2005/2. For the differences between conventionally and unconventionally defined military capabilities during and after the Cold War, Mack's study is resilient over time. Andrew, Mack. 1975. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" *World Politics* 27-2.

³⁶⁷ Bensahel, Nora. 2006. "A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29:35-49.

³⁶⁸ Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur, Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. 2004. "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism" *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol.16, No.4 pp.777-794; According to Martha Crenshaw, an eminent terrorism expert, Western observers probably exaggerate the force of religion as a motivation for terrorism: "That terrorism should be part of the Islamic regime's drive to

employed, with its multifaceted-composure requiring responses that work through different issue-areas in coordination. Stylistically, methodologically it is dynamic across borders and works through societies of many states. Nevertheless, that does not translate to apoliticalness of contemporary terrorism, which activates different policies presuming that the terrorists are irrational madmen.

Terrorism evolves with ever availability of violent means and international *nonpolar* political context that facilitates unconventional threat exposure and increases vulnerability of states. This being the case, there is tension between the intelligence, military, financial and law enforcement operations conducted in regions other than Afghanistan and Iraq where the fight against terrorism is carried out. The tension is such that anything that destroys terrorist networks whether that is blowing up their facilities, cutting off their sources of funding, or rounding up suspects necessarily limits the capacity to collect information about how the networks function. These kind of undercutting aspects of the fight against terrorism

consolidate the revolution and to spread it throughout the region should not have been surprising. Terrorism was not the result of irrational fanaticism but of political calculation. It was learned behavior, not the result of primordial forces. The Iranian government was capable of controlling terrorism when it proves to be counter-productive.” - Following scholars have convincingly contributed to refutation of the ‘new terrorism’ argument: Copeland, Thomas 2001. “Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism,” *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, 2 winter 7-27; Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. 2004. “How New is the New Terrorism? *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27-5 439-454; Zimmerman, Doron. 2003. *The Transformation of Terrorism*, Zurich: Andreas Wenger; Coolsaet, Rik. 2005. *Al-Qaeda: The Myth*, Gent: Academia Press; Burnett, Jonny and Dave Whyte. 2005. “Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism” *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1-4, 1-18; After the July 2005 bombings in London, Professor Richard Aldrich- editorial “The new terrorism,” *The Independent* July 10, 2005; Roy, Olivier. 2004. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* New York: Columbia University Press; Kagan, Frederick W. 2005. “The New Bolsheviks: Understanding Al Qaeda,” a National Security Outlook Report American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research- November; Drawing parallels to past cases of terrorism, Cronin implicitly argues that there is not really a new terrorism despite some new features that do not extend to transformation of it, Cronin, Audrey Kurth. 2006, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International Security* 31-1 Summer pp. 7-48; Following scholars have argued that the United States has over-reacted to the threat: Mueller, John. *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them*. 2006. New York: Free Press; Lustick, Ian S. 2006 *Trapped in the War on Terror* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press; Desch, Michael C. 2007-08. “America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy” *International Security* Vol. 32, No. 3 pp. 7-43; Crenshaw, Martha. 2007. *The Debate over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism*-Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 30-September 2.

constitute most of the problems in the war-on-terrorism-regions and especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁶⁹ Cooperation and implementation problems are detailed via examples in following chapters; however, a glimpse over them herein is meant to note that they are mainly because of nonpolarity that forms structural impediments against cooperation among states.

Succinctly, the connection between nonpolarity and cooperation/alignment is as follows: Since nonpolarity refers to lack of power concentration to the extent to form of a group of states to challenge other state groupings, it also translates to reduced alignment cohesion among states. Moreover, nonpolarity challenges the reliability of alliance commitments by exacerbating the implantation of policy tasks. Sovereign, operations due to complex issue-linkages, are subject to trade-offs among state policies. Globalization-induced nonpolarity and transnationality (by gradually connecting the sectors of economics and politics, civil and military, private and the public application of violence, inside and outside of sovereign states) tend to overpower the working-mechanisms of nation-state operations and policies. By challenging above-mentioned fundamental categories, transnational and nonpolar threats such as global terrorism defies conventional mode of state operations. Consequentially, state-strategies become harder to design and implement.

Traditional response-structure or response-composure of nation-states does not appear to be corresponding to ambiguous transnational threats well. With different aspects of policies undercutting each other, counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism are battering each other, not the perpetrators. The problems that arise from 'issue-linkages and trade-offs among policies' not only exacerbated

³⁶⁹ Pressman, Jeremy. 2009. "Power without Influence - The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East" *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 4 Spring pp. 149–179.

implementation of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism operations, but they made it hard for states to reach consensus on the way strategies are carved out and implemented as well. Achieving agreement on how to solve issue-linkage and trade-off problems is a daunting challenge both within nation-states and among them. While coordination within a particular state itself (that is, coordination among state institutions or agencies) became harder, cross-coordination among the institutions of different states became ever harder. Nonpolar threats themselves set states back from effective international cooperation and alignments.

Since the threat is multifaceted, it requires response at different fields such as law enforcement, financial oversee, intelligence-sharing and military operations.³⁷⁰ Significantly, the threat is not centered on a specific territory with a headquarters. As such, contemporary challenges and threats are dissimilar to those of the Cold War era. The USSR and the US knew the threat well: The nature, ideological and material sources, location and magnitude of the Cold War threats were clear and understandable to the belligerents of the Cold War. These features of the Cold War, alongside nuclear deterrence, kept the Cold War 'cold'. The situation persisted until the 1990s that witnessed the increasing activation of hybrid and ambiguous threats whose structure, ideological basis, location, material and human sources are not as clear as those of the Cold War. Lacking fixed location and vertical organization unlike states, the build-up of the threat (horizontal organization working through societies, not via state apparatuses) enables it to sidestep conventional defenses and precautions taken. Via Anthony Giddens, transnational terrorism has become analogous to the weaponization of the civil

³⁷⁰Martinage, Robert C. 2008. *The Global War On Terrorism: An Assessment* The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, csbaonline.org.

society.³⁷¹

On the one hand, nonpolar conflict environment advantaged perpetrators whose threats evolved to become ambiguous. The structural factor that explains ambiguity of the threat and the strengthened position of terrorists is non-polarity. Nonpolarity is a permissive structural cause for the increased and ambiguous profile of contemporary threats.

On the other hand, policy-design and implementation lacks wherewithal to formulate an effective solution to these contemporary threats and challenges that mix traditional operational fields or issue-areas. Since there is huge overlapping in practice among categories and issue-areas that are analytically assumed to be separate, categorizations that are meant to match the situation on the ground are more difficult to make. This leads to remarkable trade-offs among policies both in their design and implementation phases.

Secondly and as a corollary of the first, there are too many permutations and contingencies to be considered (even when the ones that cannot be anticipated or estimated are left aside). That underlines a rising need on the side of the states: There is a need to link domestic policies and foreign policies at the design-phase for they are linked on the ground by the current developments. In other words, developments require such a linkage. Current developments are linking the inside and outside of states because states are much more penetrated by other states and non-state entities in any aspect of domestic and foreign policy.

Unlike the academia though, politicians, diplomats and key decision-makers go by heuristics; they are often schooled by their experiences rather than a single

³⁷¹Huntington, Samuel & Anthony Giddens. 2003. "İki Bati" *NPQ* Cilt: 5, Sayı: 4.

theory prescription.³⁷² They are aware of the fact that life is more complex than a theory has it. Thus, they are notably inclined to fine-tune between theory and practice, and also between state-policy design and implementation. Although diplomacy and domestic politics are arguably carried out by authorities with the issue-linkages and trade-offs born in mind, the need to establish links increased due to globalization-induced interconnectedness.

Yet, policy-making is still largely based on the main distinction between the domestic and foreign realms. To be sure, this is understandable: nation-states are sovereign authorities. Sovereignty intrinsically divides between the inside and the outside of the state.³⁷³ However, the complex-composure of international relations is conducted in a way that challenges sovereignty itself.³⁷⁴ Although authorities are aware of the challenge, their answer is not good enough to craft strategies that effectively regulate issue-linkages and ease the trade-off among policies. Strategizing (both in the sense of concept-design such as containment and strategy as executive planning) itself became more entangled when compared to the Cold War era.³⁷⁵

The fact that inside-outside distinction is still largely resilient does not change the reality on the ground or developments which rule out clear distinctions. It just reflects the ingenuity demonstrated by the leadership cadre of states facing transnational threats.³⁷⁶ Leaderships around the world do not seem to give an

³⁷²George, Alexander. 1993. *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 10-14.

³⁷³The discussion of the impact of globalization upon sovereignty in practice and theory is mentioned in the first fifteen pages of Chapter 2.

³⁷⁴As chapters one and two underline, the interconnectedness and transnationality that comes with contemporary threats work against the way states are organized. Vertical versus horizontal organizational schemes do not correspond to each other.

³⁷⁵Talbott and Nayan Chanda. 2001. *The Age of Terror-America and the World after September 11*. NY: Basic Books.

³⁷⁶Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 2006. "Dogmatic Dangers When Policymaking Rigidifies Ideas" From *Academy and Policy*, *Harvard International Review* Summer Vol. 28-2.

impression that they understood the problems in depth.³⁷⁷ Despite their rhetoric on change after September 11,³⁷⁸ most nations appear to have a common pretension that everything is almost same as ever; as if there was not a rising need to address overlapping issue-linkages due to interconnectedness, and as if it thereby did not become essential to address the domestic and foreign policy linkage that is required to respond transnational terrorism. Transnational threats compel states to find a formula to address the transnational character (or transnationality) of threats by addressing the domestic-foreign policy linkage in their implementation of policies. Without doubt, that is a huge challenge for sovereign units. States cannot forgo their sovereignty that is based on the inside-outside distinction.

One of the best ways to address this challenge of the transnational character of contemporary threats is strengthening international cooperation, which must be carried out by several agencies of different states in a horizontal line of communication much like the threat that works in a horizontal way. Since the threat works horizontally, cooperation must work horizontally too.

The response must correspond or match the build-up of the threat. Then the questions are: What makes cooperation work that way? What are the related pitfalls and setbacks? These questions are detailed and discussed empirically in the chapter on state-strategies for the fight against terrorism. For the moment, the important point is that nonpolarity challenges the way power is exercised by states; it is to be horizontally used in a shared way, not vertically by a single state.

Within this framework, unilateralism is self-defeating luxury and it is not even a strategic option. Addressing the domestic and foreign policy-linkage in states' design and implementation of policies is a strategic predicament and an

³⁷⁷House, Robert J. 2006. *Culture, Leadership and Organizations-The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. California: Sage.

³⁷⁸The rhetorical assessment that gives way to this conclusion is presented in the chapter six.

implication of transnationality. That is the main burden of globalization upon security. The more this burden is ignored, the more it becomes interested in international relations. As explained in previous chapters, states must work more on the interfaces between traditional categorizations such as domestic-foreign affairs, economics-politics, national-international issues and the public and the private. These are the fundamental categories that are challenged by the contemporary state of affairs and threats. Failing to work on these challenged-categories translates to misunderstanding the current strategic environment. Governments and state-institutions in general traditionally try to strike a balance between domestic and international aspects of problems. However, post-Cold War threats seem to require more sophisticated response-policies with which analysts should continuously press on.

To sum up, following highlights are of the mark:

First, globalization caused spread of power-resources to different power-foci including non-state ones which use power in a different and non-state centric way at the societal level all around the world. This is the diffusion and spread of power and authority around the world that have gained huge impetus after the Cold War.³⁷⁹ Second and third points are the ramifications of this main point.

Secondly, spread of power and authority or roughly the spread of power-resources exacerbated ever-present nation-state problems of dealing with issue-linkages and trade-offs.

Finally, both the lenses of policy-makers and those of academia to analyze developments, devise concepts and due implementation-planning became insufficient to answer threats. To expand, parameters of power-analysis became the

³⁷⁹The ambiguity and composure of the threat is analyzed in chapter seven, while the diffusion of power and authority around the world is examined in chapter four.

subject-matter of debates and disputes in the academia that reflect itself in contending academic articles, monographs, books and academic-authored policy papers.³⁸⁰ The same contention regarding power-analysis is also valid for such basic concepts as ‘power’, ‘great-power status’, ‘actorness’ and most important of all, the concept of ‘polarity’.

The heart of the debate mainly revolves around whether concepts -as in the way they are used during the Cold War- need improvement or partial modification. This is manifestly observed in both government publications that aim to answer current threats and in academic publications that try to understand, explain and predict. Since bureaucracies or state apparatus in general is like a huge transatlantic carrier that maneuvers slowly, the call for change and reconsideration of policy-design does not come quickly from within the state itself.³⁸¹ However, even some of the government agencies call for a change in the way they strategize and design policies alongside due advice of think-tanks, institutes and universities that underline the inadequacy of the Cold War mentality and policies of ‘polar logic’.³⁸²

³⁸⁰Conversation with Robert Pape on the impact of non-polarity and waning of major war upon balance of power theory, Ankara, Bilkent University, 2009. Pape agrees that nonpolarity and waning of major war cancels out balance of power theory. Yet, he also cautions about the dynamics of nuclear deterrence that is the one and only area left to apply balance of power, because non-polarity equals to hegemony which is, by definition, the absence of balancing between powers and the dominance of a single power.

³⁸¹George, Alexander. George, Alexander. 1993. *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 3-19.

³⁸²From the academia, Smith, Steve. 2002. “The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order” *International Relations* Vol. 16-2: 171–183 and Calleo, David P. 2009. *Follies of Power-America’s Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; As for the state agencies, 2007. *Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States*, National Intelligence Council Report DR-2007-16D- 23 August, and 2004. “Mapping the Global Future” *Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project Based on consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world*, December, <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>; Think-thanks, Sunstein, Cass R. 2006. On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 06-13 May downloadable, www.aei-brookings.org or from the Social Science Research Network at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=901217> O I N T C E N T E R; Institutes, Hewitt, J. Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Paul Huth. 2008. *Peace and Conflict*. The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) University of Maryland, www.cidcm.umd.edu; as for a viewpoint from a practitioner and theorist, Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, *Foreign Affairs*.

These calls highlight the conundrum of the mismatch between analysis and practice or between the strategic-concept design and its implementation, first and foremost in the fight against terrorism. The epitome of this conundrum or mismatch is the concept of ‘polarity’ or polar-logic of analysis. It is also the linchpin of power-analysis underlying such important concepts as ‘power’, ‘great-power status’ and ‘actorness’.³⁸³

5.3. Nonpolarity

Arguments of polarity are derived from the balance of power theory. Balance of power and hegemony are two opposite concepts that correspond to different structural situations of world affairs. ‘Polarity’ intrinsically denotes rivalry. When there are no groups of states that balance each other, than polarity loses meaning. The situation turns to be hegemony, where a dominant power exists and the rest of the states are mostly complicit in its status.

According to the balance of power theory, when there is no balance of power or balancing acts of states in the system, the system becomes hegemonic.³⁸⁴ Wohlforth et al makes the point clear that in our day, it is hegemony and not the balance of power that is explanatory. While this is true, current hegemonic system (American hegemony) does not exclude non-state entities and their political clout. At times, they even undercut the hegemon’s power as seen in the imbroglio of Afghanistan and Iraq in human and economic toll and regarding international prestige and reputation in inter-state relations, and also international legitimacy-wise regarding international public opinion at the societal level.

³⁸³Wagner, R. H. “What was bipolarity?” Conversation with Robert Pape, during which he confirms that polar-logic is the epitome of power-analysis and that it is seriously challenged.

³⁸⁴ Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2: 155–185.

Another notable factor is the financial crises started off by the transnational corporations (2001 and 2008 world financial crises) and the scourge of terrorism and organized crime that are out of hegemonic control. These are huge power-determining factors that American hegemony cannot control.

That does not outright negate the hegemony of the US; yet, it limits it on another level: The hegemon's power is limited by the globalization of non-state influence. Put differently, the US is not balanced by the rest of states at the unit-level; however, it is checked at the transnational level by the trans-boundary working mechanism of the global economy that includes merger of state economies and corporations into one another and by the private or non-state perpetrators of global violence. Thus, non-polarity is the qualified hegemony where there is no balance of power in the system (where other states do not balance the US), yet meanwhile the hegemony is qualified or reserved in that it is vulnerable to the transnational mechanisms and entities. That is 'non-polarity', which does not leave out non-state entities as the traditional conception of hegemony does. Nonpolarity can be called 'circumscribed hegemony under globalization'.

Richard Haass provides fresh analysis that helps answer the current conflict and cooperation environment that leads to nonpolarity or circumscribed hegemony under globalization. He argues that current state of international relations is *non-polar*.³⁸⁵ The original abstract of his article is, 'The United States' unipolar moment is over. International relations in the twenty-first century will be defined by nonpolarity. Power will be diffused rather than concentrated, and the influence of

³⁸⁵Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance", *Foreign Affairs*; for another similar view on poly-centrism of regional powers akin to the nonpolarity argument, Srinivasan, Krishnan. 2009. "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century" *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* The Round Table 98:400, 37-47; Subacchi, Paola. 2008. "From Bretton Woods onwards: the birth and rebirth of the world's hegemon" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21:3,347-365.

nation-states will decline as that of non-state actors increases’.³⁸⁶

What did not change, however, is that there are still scarce resources at the disposal of states, and their *ability to turn power into influence and achieve results* are circumscribed. In other words, the way power is used or exercised has additional unconventional forms that defy traditional use of power. This circumscribing or limitation of states occurs through several developments, first of which is the relative rise in the clout of non-state entities. As discussed previously, that is a relative issue; one of degrees and metrics, not absolutes. States are still strong actors in the absolute sense. However, relative-gains of non-state entities seem to be more than those of states. That is the aggregated result of the factors that are elaborated and discussed in the previous chapter. Reminding them in a nutshell, those factors are power diffusion, waning of major war, spread of power-resources around the world, rise of the global middle class, advanced technology and transportation and unconventional usage of power by disparate non-state entities that co-opt/cooperate or challenge/clash with states. The effect of these factors is manifested as nonpolarity. Haass sums it up:

“The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.”

Multipolarity comprises several distinct poles or concentrations of power that by and large dominate international politics. Without doubt, powers are regarded as being nation-states in the conceptualization of multipolarity in contrast to the non-polar international system, which is characterized by numerous state and

³⁸⁶Haass, Richard. 2008. “The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June.

non-state centers with meaningful power.³⁸⁷ Haass asserts that the system is neither multipolar nor unipolar because contemporary state of international affairs presents diffusion of power, not concentration of it in a pole. Diffusion of power goes against the intrinsic condition of multipolarity, namely *the concentration of power clustered around several actors*, which mostly dominate international relations. Today, non-state power-foci accompany nation-states. Besides, no single state or groups of states dominate politics, and therefore power is not concentrated.³⁸⁸

5.3.1. A Closer Look at Prima Facie Multipolarity

Since power does not revolve around two positions as it was the case during the Cold War, the system is not bipolar after the demise of the former USSR. The system is not unipolar either, because no single power dominates it. The US is not dominating and controlling the world as was the case during the 1990s³⁸⁹; when compared to other actors, its relative power and influence have diminished as will be mentioned shortly. The system, then, *appears* to be a multipolar one;

Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from

³⁸⁷Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance" *Foreign Affairs* p.1.; Kupchan, Charles A., and Peter L. Trubowitz. 2008 "Correspondence: Of Polarity and Polarization" [reply to Parent and Bafumi], 33:1, pp. 170–173.

³⁸⁸ Maoz, Zeev. 2006. "Network Polarization, Network Interdependence, and International Conflict 1816–2002" *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 43 No. 4, pp. 391–411.

³⁸⁹Calleo, David P. 2009. *Follies of Power-America's Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places.³⁹⁰

Moreover, classic multipolarity assumes several or a limited group of states (not many states) that set the rules of international relations. Multipolarity does not convey all or most of the states in the world; it refers to several states which are separated from others in differential power and influence. It is the higher strata or group of states that are more powerful and influential than the rest. In contrast to multipolarity, today there are too many rising nation-states around the world that defy any concentration of power. No principal state or groups of state set the rules of the international game. Indeed, no groupings of states rival each other meaningfully.³⁹¹

Multipolar systems can be cooperative assuming the form of a Concert of Powers³⁹², in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive revolving around a balance of power and it may become conflictual when the balance breaks down.³⁹³ The current system is neither competitive nor conflictual in these traditional senses. It is not traditionally conflictual to give way to war among major states such as the US, the EU members, China, India, Russia and Japan.³⁹⁴ Besides, spheres of influence are not demarcated according to a polar

³⁹⁰Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance" *Foreign Affairs* p.3.

³⁹¹Schweller Randall L. 2001. "The Problem of International Order Revisited-A Review Essay of G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*." *International Security* Vol. 26, No. 1 Summer, pp. 161-186.

³⁹²Jervis, Robert. 1985. "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation" *World Politics* Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 58-79.

³⁹³Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger*, www.charlieroose.com;

³⁹⁴Waning of major war or leading power peace argument excludes Russia, India, and China from its

configuration as was the case previously. Spheres of influence of the two superpowers included more than their immediate neighborhoods during the Cold War and they were clearly known to all states. The ‘cold’ war was mainly over the control of Europe, control over which seesawed or kept changing the balance of power with problems for the application of the balance of power theory itself in the aftermath of the superpower rivalry.³⁹⁵ Under current circumstances, there is not a similar axis on which such a balance of power vacillates. Nor is the case similar to Concert of Powers system.³⁹⁶

In the post-Cold War environment, no power or group of power disciplined Russian 2008 intervention in Georgia³⁹⁷ or the Kosovo and Iraq interventions of the U.S. in 1999 and 2003 respectively. The examples are meant to highlight that no bunch of nation-states is capable of ruling the world, setting the game-rules and punishing the violators. In fact, there are not commonly agreed rules either, leaving aside the diplomatic tact and lip-service paid to alleged commonalities. Sovereign non-intervention principle has already been broken.³⁹⁸

Importantly, there is not even a rough consensus among major powers such as the US, Russia, China, India, Japan and the EU as to what the rules of the international game are. This is not multipolarity as the concept has it. Rough

scope of peace among major states for they are not regarded as major states by the proponents of the argument as presented in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, it is also true that no war has occurred between Russia, China, India, the US, the EU and Japan since the second half of the twentieth century.

³⁹⁵For an intriguing argument on the strengths and weakness of the balance of power theory and its usage, Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History” *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2: 155–185.

³⁹⁶Rich, Norman. 1992. *Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., pp. 28-44.

³⁹⁷Russia fought a brief war with Georgia in 2008 and is still vexed by what it describes as NATO support for the ex-Soviet state, a crucial transit route for Caspian Sea oil and gas to Europe long controlled by Moscow.

³⁹⁸Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention literature is simply too wide to be cited, yet the following conveys the gist of the point: Applegarth, Claire and Andrew Block. March 2009. “Acting Against Atrocities: A Strategy for Supporters of the Responsibility to Protect” Discussion Paper 09-03, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

consensus regarding international affairs is absent unlike the period of Concert of Powers or balance of power system before the World Wars. Rough consensus, explicit or implicit, is another component of multipolarity; yet, it is lacking as of the first decade of the twenty-first century.³⁹⁹ There is no contemporary Consensus among nations as similar to that demonstrated by the Concert of Powers or the Congress system in the nineteenth century or by the European diplomatic history of the times when United Kingdom was an off-shore balancer to the continental Europe. Non-intervention in sovereign states was one of the main elements of the consensus in multipolarity. Intervention in any state was a *casus belli* that almost all powers backed up unlike the case starting from the 1990s.

There is no traditional multipolarity to gauge the system by a core of group of states that are to be poles. Before the Cold War, the system was multipolar. After the two world wars, it ended up being bipolar. With the demise of the USSR, it was unipolar for about a decade under American leadership during the 1990s.

Prima facie, it has resemblances to multipolarity, yet on close inspection it is not multipolar. Current appearances of multipolarity are misleading: Although, ‘the major powers - China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States - contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending’, the picture also includes rising nation-states and non-state formations that are detailed in the previous

³⁹⁹Rough consensus on the basic contours of the international system is lacking: Sovereignty and nonintervention principle is challenged by Western nations, whereas Asian powers such as Russia and China strongly disagree with the West on the issue. Needless to remind, sovereign independence and noninterference are the heart of the nation-state system that is being eroded by the western interventions in the Balkans and the Middle East during the 1990s well into the twenty-first century. The argument is that liberal interventionism in the name of human rights and democracy clashes with the notion of sovereign non-intervention and independence. Secondly, although 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia was seen as a response to Balkan and Iraqi operations by the US, Russia is far cry away from balancing the US; it is rather reactive and on the defense.

chapters.⁴⁰⁰ They are also summarized by Haass in the quotation below:

In addition to the six major world powers (China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States),⁴⁰¹ there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.⁴⁰²

The crux of the above quotation corresponds to this dissertation, which posits the power-foci as states and non-states. States are sub-grouped as major and regional states. Non-states are sub-grouped as market, illicit and moral authorities: transnational corporations (*market authority*), transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (*illicit authority*) and various types of non-governmental organizations (*moral authority*).

As to keep explaining why the system is not multipolar, the balance of power between western powers and middle powers are changing in a way favoring lesser states or subalterns. This has not, however, turned India, Brazil, China and other strengthening middle states into challenger or revisionist states. They are just relatively better-off when the power-analysts are taken into consideration.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰The figures are of 2008 from National Intelligence Council and R. Haas.

⁴⁰¹Parentetical information is added in order to remind the major powers as defined by Haass. Underlinings and italics are added to highlight the main theme of the quotation.

⁴⁰²Haass, Richard. May/June 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance" *Foreign Affairs*; italics and underlining are added.

⁴⁰³Wohlforth, William. 2007. "Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis," *Harvard International Review*, pp. 42-46.

All in all, that does not constitute a group of states that control the world by and large though multipolarity: There are major powers with differing vantage points on world politics, but there are also rising middle powers as candidates of major power status. Rising middle powers assert their influence countering major powers short of external military balancing - that is forming military alliances against the West. Rather, economic and political alignments such as Shanghai Cooperation Council are seemingly of concern to power politics.

Yet again, that does not translate to a concentration of power among middle powers so as to speak of a pole-such alignments are not defensively structured international organizations against a commonly perceived threat-that is they are not defensive security alliances as was the case for the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It represents the urge of partner states to form collective security institutions that protect themselves from one another in the wake of the demise of the Soviet influence in Central Asia, rather than balancing other states. That is, the alignments do not create a tight concentration of power nor do they deter other states, playing effectively as a pole in the mechanisms of balance of power. They are inward oriented, rather than outward oriented.⁴⁰⁴

Currently, there are centers with meaningful power but that presents neither a classic multipolar aggrandizement or power-distribution, nor a classic balance of power matrix. Power is not concentrated. It is diffused. The way power is used to control the world does not work through poles, but through different power-foci; or via Haass, it works through many power centers including both nation-states and non-state entities. That is why power-analysis itself and terms such as 'polarity' do not do justice to current developments. Polarity assumes notable concentration of

⁴⁰⁴Gleason, Gregory and Marat E. Shaihtudinov. 2005. "Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia" *International Studies Perspectives* 6, pp. 281-282.

power. If concentration is not possible, no state or grouping can control most of the international conduct or the mainstream international relations as is currently the case. When there are many nation-states that have meaningful power as is the case today, the scope of the concept of multipolarity enlarges too much in a way that makes it meaningless. In other words, power is concentrated anywhere and everywhere. The world is neither western-centric nor eastern-centric. This is because of the diffusion of power world over that makes the world out of control by a single, two or several states.

The basic premise of multipolarity is the concentrated form of power by a small group of states that more or less agree on the implicit or customary way to conduct international relations via setting rules and punishing violators. When there are many states as listed in Haass' quotation, the concentrated-ness of power is disappearing. This is because there are way too many power-foci that diffuse the power-concentration to dominate world politics by a system of poles.

Regarding Iraqi imbroglio, William Wohlforth maintains that '...but the example of Iraq exhibits a balance of power dynamic between states and non-state insurgents, not one between several states'.⁴⁰⁵ This is exactly right on the mark in that non-state involvement in politics and warfare (ranging from Israel-Lebanon-Palestine conflicts to Iraq-Afghanistan-Sudan and Somalia inferno and extending to the series of terrorist attacks following September 11) forces observers to reconsider or make modifications to the traditional rules of power analysis. That is why Wohlforth and Haas assert different kinds of structural situations, unipolarity and nonpolarity respectively. The way they assess 'power' is different in that while Wohlforth is relatively rigid in taking states as the unit of analysis, Haas relaxes the

⁴⁰⁵ Wohlforth, William. 2007. "Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis," *Harvard International Review*, p. 45.

unit of analysis to include non-state entities next to nation-states despite keeping the structural outlook.

Non-state formations are not nation-states that work in a hierarchical and vertical manner and it is thereby not easy to include them in the balance of power analysis applied for nation-states. This is so also because of the nature of non-state entities and the ambiguous threats they pose, which are explained in chapters one and two.

Utmost importantly, what Wohlforth fails to recognize is that 'state-to-nonstate dynamic' is active not only in the Afghanistan and Iraqi cases, but they are active in most dimensions of international relations.⁴⁰⁶ Afghanistan and Iraq are places where state-to-nonstate conflict is magnified, especially for the military-oriented security eye. However, without the state-to-nonstate dynamic is globalized around the world, Afghan and Iraqi cases cannot materialize as the way they do. It is not tenable to think of native insurgents and the Al-Qaeda to sustain in Iraq without the diffusion of power (and thereby waning of major war among major states, spread of economy, military, skill, education, media-informatics and due transatlantic divergence, advanced technology, transportation and unconventional usage of power as both terrorist warfare and insurgency and ideological propaganda) affecting state policies. The role of international public opinion and international organizations alongside the roles played by non-state market, illicit and moral authorities feed the current conflict environment. Since the question of how these factors affect international relations has already been detailed, they are not repeated here.

⁴⁰⁶Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. "Power in International Politics" *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75.

What implication does nonpolarity have for theory (analytical schemes) and practice (policy-world)? The Cold War frame of the mind must not prevent observers from questioning and updating especially when some father-figures of traditional concepts are already updating their analysis to match current developments on the ground.⁴⁰⁷ Although Wohlforth's usage of the phrase ('a balance of power dynamic between states and non-state insurgents, not one between several states') is appropriate in that the relation is one of state-to-nonstate, the very term 'balance of power' is questionable in its usage to depict a relation among states and non-state entities.⁴⁰⁸ The way power is used is changing as Brent Scowcroft has put it,⁴⁰⁹ and that is why power-analysis that defines great-power status, actorness and polarity must be reconsidered. As long as several non-state entities influence international politics and security, the parameters of power-analysis should be updated. Since most of the contemporary conflicts are intra-state and transnational short of major conventional battles between nation-states, the politics among nations is not easily separable from transnational threats. Accordingly, the facts that power and authority are diffused; non-state actors entered the stage of politics and security; and that the way non-states use power in a way different from that of states (that is at the societal levels of countries around the world within a mix or blurring of the categorical distinctions between national-international, foreign-domestic, civil-military, economics-politics) constitute reasons for reconsidering power-analysis itself.

⁴⁰⁷ Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History" *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2: 155–185.

⁴⁰⁸ Conversation with Robert Pape. 2009. Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.

⁴⁰⁹ A conversation with Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser and Carlos Pascual, Brookings vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings-
<http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10249>

5.3.2. 'Unipolar' Moment Is Gone –

What about the American Standing in the World?

According to the balance of power theory and alliance theory, 'unipolarity' is a misnomer. So-called 'unipolarity' denotes hegemony⁴¹⁰ because when the system lacks at least two poles in opposition, there is not a balancing of power by states.⁴¹¹ Hegemony, by definition, denotes lack of balance of power. Given that no state militarily balances the US, it seems fit to be named as a hegemon. However, due to the involvement of non-state entities into politics, American hegemony is qualified under globalization.⁴¹² This structural situation of qualified hegemony under globalization is called non-polarity. This structural factor appears to have a negative effect on alignments and alliances. It reduces the solidarity and unity of purpose among state groupings or alignments after the Cold War in the absence of a common threatening pole/state that rises as a balancer.

For why the international system is not unipolar since the beginning of the twentieth-century, it is worth noting that the United States cannot channel, or via Pressman, control most of the international conduct as was the case during the 1990s.⁴¹³ When compared to other actors, its relative *power and influence* have diminished. Relative decline in American influence does not refer to weakness, but rather its tetchy and less effective policies when compared to its earlier influential

⁴¹⁰'Hegemony' is used as the term that denotes preponderance of power; it is not used in any other sense.

⁴¹¹Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner. 2007. "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History" *European Journal of International Relations* Vol. 13-2: 155–185.

⁴¹²Haass, Richard. 2008. "The Age of Nonpolarity-What Will Follow U.S. Dominance", *Foreign Affairs* May/June; Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. "Power in International Politics" *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75.

⁴¹³Jeremy, Pressman. 2009. "Power without Influence - The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East" *International Security* Vol. 33 No. 4 Spring, pp. 149–179; Srinivasan, Krishnan. 2009. "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century", *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* the Round Table 98:400, 37-47.

status that achieved most of its goals.⁴¹⁴

The US, without any need to align with other states, constituted the one-and-only pole during the 1990s. 1990s were remarkably different from the Cold War years in that the US was freed from the Soviet balancer and 'the European chains'. Although European powers were minor partners, from the American perspective they constituted obstacles in the implementation of US policies. That European nuisance was gone with the greatly diminished Russian influence in Eastern Europe after 1989. The last decade of the twentieth century was unipolar in that the US set most of the international agenda, enjoyed wide international support as exemplified in 1991 Gulf War and the Yugoslavian conflicts of the 1990s. It dominated the international arena economically, culturally and militarily. Both its power and its influence were overwhelming so as to control or channel the international affairs. However as of the beginning of the 21st century, only the military wing of the American preeminence survived the unipolar 1990s.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹⁴Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. *The Post-American World*. NY: Norton and Company. As the way Zakaria starts his book by stating "This is not a book about the decline of America, but rather about the rise of everyone else", it argues for the relative decline (not the absolute decline) of the US. Like Calleo, it substantiates other states relative rising in international arena; Calleo, David P. 2007 "Unipolar Illusions" *Survival* 49:3, 73- 78; Calleo, David P. 2009. *Follies of Power-America's Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Andrew, Mack. 1975. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict" *World Politics* 27-2. *The dissertation, however, includes not only the rising states argument but also 'the non-state relative rise' both of which pave the way for a nonpolar environment. Although Jervis, Kissinger, Chua, Pape and Scowcroft do not pronounce the word 'nonpolarity', they are not reticent or disinterested*; Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "September 11: How has it Changed the World?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117(1): 37-54; Amy Chua, *Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall* Doubleday Publishing, October 2007; Kissinger, Henry. 2007. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com; *Conversation with Robert A. Pape*. 2009. Bilkent University Address, May 5 Bilkent-Ankara, Turkey. Pape maintained that the nonpolarity argument with its possible implication for a reconsideration of the traditional power analysis at large is worth serious consideration, and that it is a smart point of academic debate.

⁴¹⁵For the erosion of ideological hegemony and soft power of the US, its 'liberal' policies, Desch, Michael C. 2007/08. "The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy America's Liberal Illiberalism" *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 Winter, pp. 7-43; by the military account though, no nation compares to the US-calculations based on data from International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2008* London: IISS, 2008. The combined defense budget

By 2010, the US preeminence is challenged culturally, economically, financially and through unconventional form of warfare - transnational terrorism. In all these latter fields, the US performs poorly.⁴¹⁶ As a result of significant changes that have taken place in the security environment over the past several years, as well as changes that are expected to occur in the future, the United States once again finds itself in need of allies, perhaps as much as (if not more than) it did during the Cold War. Although the United States still remains the world's preeminent global power, the scale of its advantage over potential rivals and competitors appears to be in the early stages of relative decline. Nations such as China, India, and perhaps Russia are now emerging (or re-emerging) as major powers that will increasingly compete with the United States and with one another for influence, and are likely to have a growing impact on international affairs in the years ahead. As a recent report by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) concluded, over the next two decades the increasing economic and military power of China and India in particular will give rise to an international system in which the United States "will remain the single most important actor but will be less dominant." Similarly, Fareed Zakaria has argued that, "On every dimension other than military power — industrial, financial, social, cultural — the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance." In short, while a multipolar world order characterized by several great powers of nearly equal strength is unlikely to take shape for quite some time, long-term trends do point toward an

of NATO members, Japan and Australia alone is slightly more than \$292 billion, while these nations have an active duty military strength of 2.5 million men and women.

⁴¹⁶Hoffman, Frank. "Assessing the Long War". *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, January, www.fpri.org; Warde, Ibrahim. 2007. "The War on Terror, Crime and the Shadow Economy in the MENA Countries", *Mediterranean Politics*, 12:2, 233-248; Abrahms, Max. 2006. "Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29:509-529; Martinage, Robert C. 2008. *Global War on Terror-An Assessment* Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)-CSBAonline.org.

erosion of the substantial relative power advantage the United States has enjoyed for nearly twenty years.⁴¹⁷

Culturally and ideologically, it is challenged most notably by transnational terrorism (as a counter-hegemonic transnational ideology, which manifests itself in political (governmental clout in some states), missionary (transnational non-violent activist movement with various educational courses and charities of allegedly benign or humanist nature) and militant forms of Islamism. Politically, it is challenged by authoritarian states such as Russia, China and Iran alongside the above-mentioned political forms of Islamist governments in the Middle East.⁴¹⁸ The EU is at loggerheads with the US about the way liberal democracy fights terrorism. There is a highlighting difference between the ways the transatlantic partners understand political norms of democracy.⁴¹⁹ Economically and financially, there are sovereign funds, rising states and transnational companies that forbid the US apex of power. The 2008-2009 global financial crises are a telling example.⁴²⁰ Last but not least, the US is markedly dependent on sovereign funds and Middle Eastern rulers (Saudi Arabian in particular) in managing the world oil market.⁴²¹ This suffices for the economic and financial dependence of the US, not even mentioning the economic interdependence between China and America.⁴²²

The US is not able to influence the world as much as it did previously, mainly because of the rising clout of middle powers and non-state entities.

⁴¹⁷Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2009. *Reshaping America's Alliances for the Long Haul* The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

⁴¹⁸Robert, Kagan. 2008. "The End of the End of History-Why the twenty-first century will look like the nineteenth The New Republic, April 23, www.tnr.com/environmentenergy/story.html?id=ee167382-bd16-4b13-beb7-08effe1a6844

⁴¹⁹Zakaria, Fareed, "The Future of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, p. 43.

⁴²⁰Khanna, Parag. 2008 "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony," *New York Times Magazine*, January 27 and Robert A. Pape, 2009. "Empire Falls," *The National Interest* January/February.

⁴²¹NIC. 2009 *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, National Intelligence Council (NIC) Report, November 2008, accessed at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html on January 3.

⁴²²Chen, Rosalie. 2003. "China Perceives America: Perspectives of International Relations Experts," *Journal of Contemporary China* May 12:35.

Following Haass, rising states that limit US power are Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. Turkey can be added to this list as the rising country in the epicenter of the Middle East, the Caucasus and Europe.⁴²³

What might replace or possibly accompany the pole-analysis then? One strong alternative is to see terrorist groups as ‘transnational advocacy entities’: Victor Asal et al details the approach alongside other scholars using the concept that is emergent.⁴²⁴ Krahmann gives one of the first notes on the implication of the approach upon transatlantic security analysis. The network analysis (through which the US is seen as an only strong-power-focus alongside other nation-states and non-state entities rather than constituting a league of its own) is a promising concept of contemporary terrorism analysis. Approximating to the current nonpolar world

⁴²³Turkey is a transit-country of geography, energy and cultures with skilled and dense population of military and economic potential.

⁴²⁴Asal, Victor, Nussbaum, Brian and Harrington, D. William. 2007. “Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30:1, 15-39, This article intends to integrate one theory of social movement networks, transnational activist networks (TANs) into the study of terrorist networks; for the implications of the terrorist network approach on transatlantic security, Krahmann, Elke. 2005. “Security Governance and Networks: New Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 18-Number 1 April; Arquillam, John, and David F. Ronfeldt. 2001. *Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation; Sageman, Marc. 2005. *Understanding terror networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Sageman, M. 2005. “Understanding Jihad Networks” *Strategic Insights* 4-4; Cragin, K., and S. A. Daly. 2004. *The dynamic terrorist threat: An assessment of group motivations and capabilities in a changing world*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation; Cronin, A. K. 2002-03. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and international terrorism.” *International Security* Winter 27-3, pp. 30–58; Keck, M. E., and K. Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Keck, M. E., and K. Sikkink. March 1999. “Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics” *International Social Science Journal* 51-159, pp. 89-101; Jones, David Martin, Michael L. R. Smith, and Mark Weeding. 2003. “Looking for the pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia - the genealogy of a terror network.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26-6, pp. 443–458; Galeotti, Mark 2002. “‘Brotherhoods’ and ‘associates’: Chechen networks of crime and resistance.” *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 11, 2/3, pp. 340–352; Raab, Jorg, and H. Brinton Milward. 2003. “Dark networks as problems.” *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 13-4, pp. 413–489; Tucker, David. 2001. “What is new about the new terrorism and how dangerous is it?” *Terrorism & Political Violence* 13-3, pp. 1–14; Zanini, M. and S. Edwards. 2001. “The networking of terror in the Information Age,” in *Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Zanini, Michele. 1999. “Middle Eastern terrorism and Netwar.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 22(3), pp. 247–256.

affairs, states and non-state entities might be likened to computers of different natures and capacity. Trying to translate this metaphor to social and political relations, network-analysis helps build cross-level analysis where domestic and foreign linkage of state policies can be further improved, by integrating Putnam's framework for two-level analysis.⁴²⁵

As for a rough and brief overview of the network approach to terrorism and international security, it can be noted that most of the above-mentioned rising nation-states might be regarded as notable nodes of a networked world of interconnectedness. They are like big server-computers in the current networked world. Although all states and non-state entities are connected to the system, there is neither a single main computer nor a compound of computers that can control and manipulate the system in its entirety. There are no mainstreams, but just the streams.

However, states are not the only ones that have their way. Different ideological movements and their operatives are active within them, too. Pictured within such a political landscape of networks, the US unipolar moment of the 1990s has gone passed the apogee: The US is just a strong node in and of the system that must always be kept in mind; yet, its exceptionalism is over.⁴²⁶ It is apparently dependent on other nation-states and nonstate entities more than it realizes.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁵Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games" *International Organization* 42-3, 427-461.

⁴²⁶Kaldor, Mary. 2003. "American Power: From 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism?" *International Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 1 January, pp. 1-22; Farer, Tom. 2004. "Toward an Effective International Legal Order: From Coexistence to Concert?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 2, July.

⁴²⁷Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. *The Post-American World*. NY: Norton and Company.

The most obvious need seem to be in the politics of energy and terrorism.⁴²⁸ As in the Cold War, strategic and economic considerations, as well as cultural affinities, may often cut against ideology for most of the nation-states.⁴²⁹ Nevertheless, religionization of politics and politicization of religion simultaneously occur as a transnational ideology that cuts across countries -if not state apparatuses- at especially the societal level.⁴³⁰ Throughout history, followers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam have almost always claimed three distinct realms of universal truth, whose peculiar interpretations cause extremism. It is not the religions that cause problems though; the problem is the interpretations of people that lead to the religious conflicts, which serve both mundane and alleged sacred ends. This is currently most apparent in Jihadism, the violent wing of Islamism worldwide. It is also constitutes the most fervent counter-hegemonic response to the West in general and to the US in particular.⁴³¹ Correspondingly, the war on terrorism is a fight against violent extremism. However, the American scorecard does not seem to be bright⁴³², which might be regarded as indicative of non-influential policies that lead to American relative decline.

⁴²⁸ Kaye, Dalia Dassa. "Bound to Cooperate? Transatlantic Policy in the Middle East" *The Washington Quarterly* 27:1 pp. 179–195.

⁴²⁹ Kagan, Robert. 2008. "The End of the End of History-Why the twenty-first century will look like the nineteenth" *The New Republic*, April 23.

⁴³⁰ Dalacoura, Katerina. 2002. "Violence, September 11 and the Interpretations of Islam" *International Relations* Vol. 16-2: 269–273.

⁴³¹ Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics" *International Studies Review* 7, 547–569; Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North–South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629–643.

⁴³² Hoffman, Frank. "Assessing the Long War". *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, January, www.fpri.org; Warde, Ibrahim. 2007. "The War on Terror, Crime and the Shadow Economy in the MENA Countries", *Mediterranean Politics*, 12:2, 233-248; Abrahms, Max. 2006. "Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29:509–529; Martinage, Robert C. 2008. *Global War on Terror-An Assessment* Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)-CSBAonline.org; Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. *The Post-American World*. NY: Norton and Company.

Transnational nature of jihadist ideology has become expansive partly due to the waning of major war. Waning of major war is an important feature of the current state of affairs among leading industrial states, without which non-state entities could not find fertile ground to operate. Currently, non-state entities find fertile ground to operate because nation-states do not clash in the world wars vein. Especially the Western countries do not even contemplate war among each other.⁴³³ Non-state entities, especially terrorist groups, would most probably have to integrate into one of the belligerents should a world war among nation-states occurred. Therefore, neither a single power nor a group of states can control contemporary non-state entities and consequent extremism. That is valid for all states including the US.⁴³⁴

To make it clearer what is meant by the declining relative power and influence of the US, the correlation and nuance between ‘power’ and ‘influence’ must be underlined: ‘Influence’ is taken to be the ability to achieve results. It is correlated to and arising from, but not necessarily equal to “power” defined as raw, latent or potential capacity. Accordingly, “influence” or actual, applied or kinetic capacity is the successful application of power, which affects the behavior of others to achieve results.⁴³⁵ Power must be translated into influence, and as such unit-level

⁴³³Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “September 11: How has it Changed the World?” *Political Science Quarterly* 117(1): 37-54; Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger, www.charlirose.com; Richard N. Haas, “The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005–06. “The Impending Demise of the Postwar System,” *Survival* 47(4): 7–18.

⁴³⁴One of the early-on analyses that saw nonpolarity in the offing is, Lyons, Gene M. 1982. “Review: Expanding the Study of International Relations: The French Connection” *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 1 October, pp. 135-149.

⁴³⁵When read in concert with one another, Barnett & Duvall’s article of 2005 and Baldwin’s articles of 1979 and 1997 are very helpful in examination of the concept. Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics” *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, pp. 39-75 and Baldwin, David A. 1997. “The Concept of Security” *Review Of International Studies* 23, 5–26; Baldwin, David A. 1979. “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies”

leadership and diplomacy are involved in exerting influence. Nation-states may remain powerful without much influence at times because the behaviors of nation-state are not only formed under the systemic effects that condition state behavior in a constraining or permissive manner, but they are also derived by leadership quality, negotiation skill, information gathering and analysis and calculations of benefits for domestic politicking and availability of venues for cooperation.

Power can be seen as of two kinds: Hard (tangible) power and soft (intangible) power. Hard power is of military and economic capacity, while soft power is the ability to attract others and move opinion. Therefore, 'power over opinions' is an element of power. E. H. Carr described international power in three categories: military, economic and power over opinion. Joseph S. Nye renames and

World Politics Vol. 31, No. 2 January pp. 161-194. Barnett and Duvall present an analytical discussion about the conceptualization and analysis of power. Cautioning against *theoretical tunnel vision* that causes scholars to overlook others forms and effects of power, they argue that scholars of international relations must work with multiple conceptions of power, suggest how they can accomplish this task, and demonstrate how a consideration of power's polymorphous character will enhance and deepen theoretic understanding of international politics. Moreover they argue that the failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates. There is a need to know about the ability of actors to use resources to control the behavior of others; Guzzini, Stefano. 1993. "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis" *International Organization* Vol. 47, No. 3 Summer, pp. 443-478; For a complementary analytical discussion of the relations among 'power', 'influence' and 'authority', please see "Power: Interpersonal, Organizational and Global Dimensions, Fall 2005" *Massachusetts Institute of Technology-MIT Open Course Ware Political Science Department Lectures Notes*, <http://ocw.mit.edu> last accessed on May 25 2009; De Mesquita, Bueno, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003 *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press; On "bases" of power: Dahl, R. A. 1957. "The Concept of Power" *Behavioral Science* 2 201-215; on state power, Holsti, K. J. 1964. "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations," *The Journal of the International Studies Association* 7 February, 179-192; Morgenthau, Hans. 1967. *Power among Nations* New York: Knopf; Carr, E.H. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. London: Macmillan, Part 3- Chapter 8 Power in International Politics; Knorr, Klaus. 1970. *Military Power and Potential* Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books; Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. "Power and Influence: The Means of Foreign Policy" *Discord and Collaboration* Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins, 103-115; on pervasive effects of power, P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions" *The American Political Science Review* 57, 3: 632-642; on correlation with success, Baldwin, David. 1971. "Inter-Nation Influence Revisited" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 471-486; Hoffmann, Stanley. 1968. *Gulliver's Troubles; or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill; on the relationship between generalized capabilities and bargaining strategies, Haskel, B. G. 1974. "Disparities, Strategies, and Opportunity Costs" *International Studies Quarterly* 18-1 3-30; Haskel, Barbara G. 1980. "Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of Power" *International Organization*, Vol. 34, No. 1 winter, pp. 89-120.

enhances Carr's 'power over opinion' concept as 'soft power'.⁴³⁶ Soft power is the ability to co-opt rather than coerce others. Soft power (the ability to attract others or power over opinion) rests on the ability to shape preferences of others without tangible threats (sticks). Without the threat of military force or economic sanctions, a country may get what it wants because other states want to follow it: It may admire its values, emulate its example and aspire after its level of prosperity. It is thus about capability of agenda-setting, attraction, and co-opting rather than commanding, coercion or threats.

American soft power in the world is said to be low since the 2003 Iraq War. This has a reality to it when viewed in recent historical conjuncture (the first decade of 2000s). However, it can be maintained that it has a big soft power when seen from the long historical continuum. In comparison to other states, it has been a bigger center of attraction. Although American foreign policy may be viewed unfavorably by some quarters, its vast array of products, sports, prosperity, political regime, multi-faceted entertainment industry, universities, scientific pioneering or research and development in civil and military sectors still attract people, and people want to emulate it. These elements add up to America's attraction or soft power, and they still enable America to set the world agenda to some extent. By Carr's standards, America's cumulative score of all three kinds of power (military, economic and power over opinion) is high. Nevertheless, this does not negate the *relative* decline in the American power and a decline in its influence in particular.

From the beginning of the twenty-first century onwards, the relative decline in

⁴³⁶Part 3, chapter 8, *Power in International Politics* - Carr, E.H. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939*. London: Macmillan; Nye, Joseph S. 2003. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* Oxford and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*; Nye, Joseph S. 2004. "Decline of America's Soft Power" *Foreign Affairs*, May-June; Nye, Joseph S. 2002-2003. "Limits of American Power" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 117, No. 4 Winter, pp. 545-559; Nye, Joseph S. 2002. "The American National Interest and Global Public Goods" *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), April Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 233-244.

American influence (the ability to achieve results) is manifest with regard to both other nation-states and non-state entities.⁴³⁷

Viewed in historical terms, the first decade is just a moment. It cannot be foretold that the decline will continue indefinitely. Yet again, the first decade of twenty-first century must be included in the explanation herein: As for the relations of the US with other states, American ability to persuade other states to accept its policies or dissuade unwelcome behaviors is decreasing. As Hoffmann and Watts underline, even a state as powerful as the US cannot achieve results when it suffers from 'strategic thinking deficiency (STD)'.⁴³⁸ Sky-rocketing anti-Americanism at world large following the Iraqi war of 2003 certainly did not help the US in hedging against its decreasing influence throughout the world.⁴³⁹ Indeed, it is the basic indication of relative decline in American influence after 2003.⁴⁴⁰

Nation-states are commonly argued to be behaviorally powerful/influential to the extent they can influence the behavior of other nations.⁴⁴¹ Turning soft or hard power into influence is based upon successful strategizing and application of power/both in its hard and soft forms. Successful strategizing requires activation of

⁴³⁷Lake, David A. 2006. "American Hegemony and the Future of East-West Relations - ISP Policy Forum: Hard and Soft Power in East-West Relations" *International Studies Perspectives* 7, 23-30; Levitt, Matthew and Michael Jacobson eds. 2008. *Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response a Changing Landscape* The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, Policy Focus #86, September; Kaldor, Mary. 2003. "American Power: From 'Compellence' to Cosmopolitanism?" *International Affairs* Vol. 79 No. 1 January, pp. 1-22.

⁴³⁸Hoffmann, Frank. 2007. "Assessing the Long War" Foreign Policy Research Institute www.fpri.org; Watts, Barry D. 2008. *US Combat Training, Operational Art, and Strategic Competence-Problems and Opportunities* one in a series of CSBA's *Strategy for the Long Haul*-The Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments CSBA.

⁴³⁹The most balanced academic account of anti-Americanism throughout the world is, Katzenstein, Peter J. and Robert O. Keohane. 2007. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* eds. Cornell University Press. Also, please see Stanley, Hoffmann. 2003. "America Goes Backward" *The New York Review of Books* Vol. 50, No. 10 June 12.

⁴⁴⁰Katzenstein, Peter J. and Robert O. Keohane. 2007. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* eds. Cornell University Press

⁴⁴¹Ward, Michael D. and Lewis L. House. 1988. "A Theory of the Behavioral Power of Nations" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, No. 1 March pp. 3-36. The article is still timely in the sense that it examines the behavioral interaction among (both conflictive and cooperative policy behaviors of) states.

collective wisdom of a nation, which consists roughly of authorities ranging from seemingly minor agencies such as those dealing with water-management up to government and possibly extending to intelligentsia consisting of retired policymakers, diplomats, analysts, think-tanks and academics.⁴⁴² Therefore, turning soft or hard power into influence is a matter of skill, vision, wisdom and leadership for any state. In a complex world, quality of leadership, making decisions and prioritization are ever vital because transnational interactions complicates the problems of issue-linkage and trade-offs among different policies of states.

In a nonpolar environment where horizontally operating non-state entities are active at the societal level and across all nations, vertically structured nation-states surprisingly find their sovereign structure as an unfit organizational scheme to respond strategically.⁴⁴³ Moreover, as a consequence of strategic thinking deficiency, the scale of violence is misunderstood. The conflated scale of violence⁴⁴⁴ is a conundrum for states whose responses against terrorism and their efficiency evolved to be controversial. As a corollary, legitimacy questions especially regarding use of force did not leave unattended to the advantage of the terrorists. From ‘the logic of consequences policy-making perspective,’⁴⁴⁵ when declared goals are not fast accomplished or partial or not achieved at all, legitimacy questions rise and new policies are sought in the face of failure, which strengthens violent non-state groups both at recruitment, motivational and propaganda levels.

⁴⁴²Unit-level analysis is mostly used by neo-classical realists and proponents of liberal and institutionalist approaches so as to explain activation of collective wisdom of a nation. Contrastingly, neorealism or Waltzian structural realism does not leave room for unit-level analysis, which is posited to be ‘reductionist’ within the neorealist framework of explanation.

⁴⁴³*The Politics of New Wars* in Kaldor, Mary. 2006. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Polity: Cambridge, p. 71.

⁴⁴⁴‘Conflated scale of violence and threat’ is discussed in chapter four, *Impact of Globalization upon the Backbone of Territory and Strategy*.

⁴⁴⁵March James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders” *International Organization* 52-4, Autumn, pp. 943–969.

Most of the international developments in the aftermath of the September 11 horrific attacks testify to the relative decline in American influence-its ability to achieve results. In the very first place, September 11 itself was a clear indication that the world is no longer unipolar for what kind of a hegemon could be hit in such a magnitude: Ashton B. Carter put it succinctly, “On 11 September, 2001, the post-Cold War security bubble finally burst.”⁴⁴⁶ Iraq and Afghanistan imbroglio turned unsuccessful to a large extent, arguably creating failed states rather than states of democracy and stability. The latter perspective on failed states became a fundamental reason for transatlantic disagreement after 2003. Those interventions ostensibly increased the hotbed of terrorism and insurgency rather than curtailing or crippling terrorism.

Financial control is out of American hands, too. Post-war international system (whether economically, normatively, financially, international organizations-wise or militarily) is eroding fast in a way that leaves no nation-state in charge. It is hard to see any hegemony of any nation-state leaving aside observers’ emotional wishful thinking originating in biased likings or favoritism.⁴⁴⁷ Simply almost all political developments at world large indicate a relative decline of American influence, most obviously reflected in worldwide anti-Americanisms. The United States lost its ‘hegemony of the heart’⁴⁴⁸ and antagonized the world. ‘Hegemony of the heart’ is not mere literal fine-wording. It denotes the eroding credibility and reputation of the US. Credibility and reliability is one of the most

⁴⁴⁶ Ashton B. Carter quoted in “The architecture of government in the face of terrorism” *International Security* 26: 3, Winter 2001/2 p. 5; Cox, Michael. 2002. “American Power before and after 11 September: Dizzy with Success?” *International Affairs* Vol. 78, No. 2 April, pp. 261-276.

⁴⁴⁷ One of such an account that is supported by John Lewis Gaddis is Ferguson, Niall. 2004. *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* NY: Penguin; Ferguson, Niall. 2006. ‘US Debt: Reasons to Worry’ *New York Times Magazine*, June 11; Kitfield, James. 2007. “Decline Begins” *National Journal* Sat. May 19.

⁴⁴⁸ Judge, Clark S. 2002. ‘Hegemony of the Heart: American cultural power and its enemies’, *Policy Review*, December-January.

precious power assets for states in international relations. That is also why America still stands tall as a major power, but not a hegemon owing to the above-mentioned reasons - save the military realm.

CHAPTER 6

UNIT-LEVEL FACTORS CONDITIONING INTER-STATE COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM

6.1. Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism

6.1.1. The Concept of ‘Strategic Culture’

The two sides of the Atlantic represent the major international actors that have a history of close cooperation. Since the EU-member states and the US have a significant weight in sustaining the international system economically, financially, ideologically and militarily, their cooperation in defending against transnational terrorism is one of the most determining factors in the wider international fight against terrorism. In accordance, the divergence and convergence between the US and the EU is examined through the concept of ‘strategic culture’.

Strategic culture denotes that states are predisposed by their historical experiences to deal with security threats. Hans Mouritzen defines ‘strategic culture’ as “past geopolitics in the minds of the foreign policy elite”.⁴⁴⁹ The historical experience of a nation-state carries the biggest burden in the concept of strategic

⁴⁴⁹Mouritzen, Hans. 2006. “Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory” *European Security*, 15:2, p.147.

culture.⁴⁵⁰ Although a state's strategic decisions may be affected by its level of technological sophistication, economic prowess or military readiness, the concept usage presumes that strategic choices of a state will mostly be determined by its past experiences. Institutional memories will shape how threats are assessed, and they will condition the responses.⁴⁵¹ Institutional memories are assumed to have greater weight in determining policies in the case of an unprecedented threat experience than in the case where threat profile is low and seen as usual. Meidinger maintains that officials internalize norms associated with a strategic culture, which determine the way policy courses are chosen. He asserts that a suggested policy can be ruled out on the grounds that it is incompatible with 'the way we do things'.⁴⁵² Caroline Ziemke's explanation of the concept sees it as state's self-conception, mediated though the historical experience of its past conflicts. Historical experience and strategic culture are often argued to be connected though a process of reasoning by analogy. 'Decision-makers tend to focus strongly on the commanding heights of their past strategic experience, navigating in terms of major episodes which are regarded as successes or failures'.⁴⁵³ These guiding experiences 'have burned themselves deeply into the national psyche and have significant unconscious meaning'.⁴⁵⁴ Munich and Suez, Vietnam and Somalia and more recently Afghanistan and Iraq are examples for the Reiter's term 'the shadow of the

⁴⁵⁰Lucian Pye. 1972. 'Culture and political science: problems in the evaluation of the concept of political culture' *Social Science Quarterly* 53, pp. 285–96.

⁴⁵¹A. Johnston. 1995. "Thinking about strategic culture" *International Security* 19: 4, Spring, pp. 32–64; Bean, Hamilton. 2009. "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs" *Intelligence and National Security*, 24:4, 479-498.

⁴⁵²Meidinger, Errol. 1987 'Regulatory culture: a theoretical outline' *Law and Policy* 9, pp. 355–86.

⁴⁵³Ziemke, Caroline F. 'The national myth and strategic personality of Iran: a counterproliferation perspective', in Victor A. Utgoff. ed. 2000. *The coming crisis: nuclear proliferation, US interests, and world order* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.87-90.

⁴⁵⁴Baum, Howell S. 1987. *The Invisible Bureaucracy: The Unconscious in Organisational Problem-Solving* New York: Oxford University Press.

past',⁴⁵⁵ which refers to past experiences of geopolitics or simply the strategic culture's evolution. 'Strategic culture' is a conceptual tool that mainly addresses military security. Strategic culture or strategic personality of a nation has been closely connected with defence affairs and war-fighting problems.⁴⁵⁶

The strategic cultures of the EU and the US regarding counterterrorism are comparatively examined herein. In accordance, it is appropriate to note the counterterrorism literature's classification of state-responses to terrorism. The literature mainly identifies three nation-state responses to terrorism: first, military-led approaches focused on a mixture of pre-emption, deterrence and retribution; secondly, regulatory or legal-judicial responses that seek to enhance the criminal penalties for terrorist activities and improve civil-police cooperation; and thirdly, appeasing options, ranging from accommodation to concession.⁴⁵⁷ The choice of these responses and the way they are implemented are shaped by the strategic culture of a nation. The predispositions or inclinations in responding threats originates from accustomed ways in which states decide to act as they have been filtered throughout a nation's past experiences in managing threats. These are not only entrenched in decision-makers' mental-maps, but they are enshrined in the values of the political regime of a state.

The US strategic culture, which has deep historical roots back to its early days of establishment, is congruent with the first kind of response as specified by the literature. Described as 'a dangerous nation'⁴⁵⁸ or 'trigger-happy nation',⁴⁵⁹ the

⁴⁵⁵ Reiter, Dan. 1994. 'Learning, Realism, and Alliances', *World Politics* 46: 4, July, pp. 490–526; Reiter, Dan. 1996. *Crucible of beliefs: learning, alliances and world wars* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

⁴⁵⁶ Spear, Joanna. 2003. 'The Emergence of a European "Strategic Personality" and the Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship' *Arms Control Today* 33: 9 November, pp. 13–18.

⁴⁵⁷ Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, pp. 905–923.

⁴⁵⁸ Kagan, Robert. 2007. *Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World, from its Earliest Days to the*

gist of its strategic culture can be summarized by the belief of ‘exceptionalism’. In the literature, ‘American exceptionalism’ is argued to be the self-anointed belief that its political and moral values are superior to the values of the rest of the world and justify its position of leadership. ‘Exceptionalism’ as a core element of the American strategic culture has given it a sense of world-wide mission and an unquestioning confidence that its policies are in the broadest interests of humanity.⁴⁶⁰

Second element of the American strategic culture is the predisposition to use force in carrying out its policies, which are carved out in the light of its sense of exceptionalism. As Wyn and Aldrich emphasizes,

This self-belief (in exceptionalism) has been allied to strategies that seek ways to leverage its vast material and technological power. It has predisposed American policy-makers towards a national security culture that privileges a military response. As a superpower, the US sees the use of force as an important signal of resolve within the international community. Its military gives the US a global reach and ensures that no targets are beyond its ability to strike. Since 9/11, increased American spending on defence (and especially defence research) relative to other major powers has accentuated this emphasis.⁴⁶¹

Wyn and Aldrich’s argument seems tenable given the huge military spending and proliferation of American foreign military bases and intelligence installations.⁴⁶² According to Johnston, who examined 2005 official Pentagon data, the US is claimed to own a total of 737 military bases in foreign lands.⁴⁶³ In sum, American strategic culture is marked by keywords such as ‘Status of Forces

Dawn of the 20th Century. New York: Vintage Books;

⁴⁵⁹ Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?” *International Affairs* 81, 5, p.909.

⁴⁶⁰ Dunn, David. 2003. ‘Myths, motivations and “misunderestimations”: the Bush administration and Iraq’, *International Affairs* 79: 2, March, pp. 279–97; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1997. *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company; Bacevich, Andrew. 2008. *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism* New York: Metropolitan Books.

⁴⁶¹ Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?” *International Affairs* 81, 5, pp. 912.

⁴⁶² Johnson, Chalmers. 2006. *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic* New York: Metropolitan, p. 32

⁴⁶³ Johnson Chalmers. 2006. *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic* New York: Metropolitan, p.120.

Agreements (SOFAs)',⁴⁶⁴ 'full-spectrum-dominance', 'forward-defense',⁴⁶⁵ 'Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)' and 'global power projection' with considerable military reach to all corners of the world. The latter terms are operationalized through a world-wide network of military bases.

Third element of the US strategic culture is creating connections among national security threats:

US strategic culture has also led to international terrorism being linked to a nexus of other threats. America's sense of its global responsibilities has meant that it has long been concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and states that reject the prevailing order (states of concern). Even prior to 9/11, the Clinton administration was warning of the potential linkages between international terrorist groups and 'states of concern'.⁴⁶⁶

As for the EU, its strategic culture is mostly shaped by the lessons it derived from the World Wars. Its strategic culture is not shaped by the World Wars per se, but distinctively it is shaped by the lessons Europe took from the battlefields. The strategic culture of Europe manifests itself in the decline of major war among European states. Many nations fought wars since time immemorial but it is only Europe that shuns the use of force as yet. Although the former Soviet threat -as a unifying effect for the European states during the Cold War- is no more, Europe has not turned 'back to the future'.⁴⁶⁷ Classical balance of power politics did not return to the European stage. That is, according to Jervis, the single most important development in the entire history of international security. Jervis evaluates it to be much more important than the implications of September 11, 2001 attacks for both

⁴⁶⁴'SOFAs' are the agreements concluded with the foreign governments that host the military bases and intelligence installations. The SOFAs arrange the status and role of American military and intelligence facilities abroad.

⁴⁶⁵'Forward defense' is an offensive mode of defense posture operationalized in a way that enables to sustain vested interests by deterrence; in the failure of deterrence, forward defense points to military intervention.

⁴⁶⁶Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, pp. 909-910.

⁴⁶⁷Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 Summer, pp. 5-56.

the US and other states.⁴⁶⁸

It is accustomed by now that major powers do not go to war among each other. It is a development that seems to be taken for granted. However, in historical terms, it is a significant development that major wars do not occur. It might be seen as a historical aberration, but it simply exists.

No war among the most powerful nation-states took place after the end of the Second World War. As important as the debates on the causes of the waning of major war (such as whether democratic peace theory has explanatory power or not), it is, in and of itself, important from the international security perspective that wars do not occur: Simply because war and the possibility of war among the great powers has been the essence of international affairs that influence the boundaries, shape of material advantages, political regimes and values, internal arrangements and the fate of smaller units. The absence of war signals a change in the way the latter aspects of international politics are affected and gauged.

The decline or waning of major war is overwhelmingly the result of the European strategic culture. The security community that is developed by Europe has manifested itself in a supranational body of institutions that can be summarized by the EU itself. As an intertwined but nevertheless separate institutional arrangement from the EU member-states, the EU is institutional embodiment of the strategic culture that avoids use of force. It favours non-military instruments such as multilateral diplomacy, public diplomacy, law-enforcement, intelligence and humanitarian aid with a strong emphasis on the rule of law in the implementation of all its policies.

⁴⁶⁸ Jervis, Robert. 2002. "September 11: How Has It Changed the World?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117(1): 37-54; Kissinger, Henry. 2007. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com

The gap between the two strategic cultures of the transatlantic partners is demonstrated by the different responses of the EU and the US to terrorism:

The US declared a 'global war on terrorism' and directed the full resources of a 'national security' approach towards the threat posed by a 'new terrorism'. Overseas policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus linking international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WDM) and 'states of concern'. At home the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened controls at points of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts, and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies. In contrast, Europe has conceived the problem differently. It has conceptualized radical Islam in less absolute terms, and accordingly its approach to counterterrorism has emphasized 'regional multilateralism' rather than 'global unilateralism'. European countries' military forces have attempted to encourage peacekeeping, reconstruction and security sector reform as well as partaking in gruelling counterinsurgency operations. Their foreign policies have continued to emphasize the containment of risk and consensus-building. Domestically, legal changes relating to surveillance and civil rights have been less sweeping, while the enhancements to internal security architecture have been more modest. Underpinning this different approach is not only a European desire to draw on some of the lessons from decades of counterterrorism, but also a growing conviction that the 'newness' of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda has been exaggerated. The implications of these divergent cultures for the future of the relationship between Europe and the United States are enormous.⁴⁶⁹

6.1.2. Historical Experience with Terrorism

The US did not confront a major domestic terrorist threat. The American experience of terrorism has been primarily restricted to its military and diplomatic presence overseas till the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. The small number of terrorist attacks makes a quick list possible: The attack on US Marines in Beirut in 1983 killed 240 Marines. A decade later, on June 21, 1998 rocket-propelled grenades explosions near the U.S. embassy in Beirut topped the headlines. On August 7, 1998 terrorist bombs destroyed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, 12 Americans are among the 291 killed, and over 5,000 are wounded, including 6 Americans. In Dar es Salaam, one U.S. citizen is wounded among the 10 killed and 77 injured.

⁴⁶⁹Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, pp. 905-906.

In response to the attacks on the US presence in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States attacked targets in Afghanistan and Sudan with over 75 cruise missiles fired from Navy ships in the Arabian and Red seas on August 20. About 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from warships in the Arabian Sea. Most struck six separate targets in a camp near Khost, Afghanistan. Simultaneously, about 20 cruise missiles were fired from U.S. ships in the Red Sea striking a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, which was suspected of producing components for making chemical weapons.

Yet, it was not until the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that the US experienced serious terrorism within its own homeland. This absence of a significant domestic threat caused domestic counterterrorism capacity to wane. There was a feeling that the country was invulnerable. This misperception became evident by the attacks on September 11, 2001. The intensity of the US reaction to September 11 attacks was possibly a reflection of the enormous loss of life that gave the US the political will to use force readily on the international stage.

The unprecedented shock that is inflicted upon the American body-politic is the key accelerating or igniting factor of the age-old American national security culture. The attacks are fundamental in understanding American foreign policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.⁴⁷⁰ Although it seems common sense at face value, it does not appear to be regarded as such by the decision-makers in other capitals when they evaluate post-9/11 American policies. A country that is hit and experienced terrorism acts differently in its decision-making compared to the countries that are spared from attack. At this point, national security culture or the

⁴⁷⁰Miller, Steven E. 2005. "Terrifying Thoughts: Power, Order, and Terror After 9/11" *Global Governance* 11, 247–271.

concept of strategic culture stresses the importance of ‘national psyche’, which drives the unit-level policy choices and the behaviors of states.

Viewed in that light, the specter of attacks or the psychology and fear the attacks create in America is a unit level variable connected to strategic culture. The fear and great power coupled to form the responses of the US.⁴⁷¹

On September 11, 2001 terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners taking off from various locations in the United States in a coordinated suicide attack. In separate attacks, two of the airliners crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, which caught fire and eventually collapse. A third airliner crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., causing extensive damage. The fourth airliner, which was believed to be heading towards Washington, D.C., crashed outside Shanksville, PA, and killed all 45 people on board. Casualty estimates from New York put the possible death toll close to 5,000 while as many as 200 people may have been lost at the Pentagon crash site. In the post-September 11, 2001 although the United States has long been perceived as ‘trigger happy’ (that is exercising poor judgment and prone to violence) around the world⁴⁷², American administrations were nevertheless being criticized from within as being reluctant to use force until 9/11.⁴⁷³ After 9/11, previous internal criticisms of reluctance to act changed into calls for restraint and selectiveness in the use of force.

European experience with terrorism is different from that of the US. Accordingly, its strategic culture is different. It is different in two ways. First, Europe experienced terrorism along a long historical period. Some European

⁴⁷¹Jervis, *Compulsive Empire*; Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*

⁴⁷²For why the US is perceived as ‘trigger-happy’, Kydd, Andrew. 2005-06. “In America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation” *Political Science Quarterly* 120: 4, p.620.

⁴⁷³Haas, Richard. 1994. *The Reluctant sheriff* Washington DC: Brookings.

nations had wounds from the remnants of their colonial past, while some tackled with separatist and ideological terrorism more recently. Thus, the first difference is the Europe's remarkably much longer terrorism experience in comparison to that of the US. Secondly, there is no European experience, but European experiences. History of the European experience and as a corollary its strategic culture pertaining to terrorism is multi-headed.⁴⁷⁴ That is mainly because each European state went through different terrorism contexts. Countries such as France, Spain and the UK have struggled against domestic terrorist movements, while others such as the Netherlands and Belgium did not face a major domestic threat. Each European state has its own particular history with terrorism.

6.2. Concerns of the Intelligence Institutions:

Identifying, Assessing and Reporting the Threat

There are two main concerns of the intelligence agencies in fulfilling their duty with regard to terrorism assessment and reporting to the governments. The first problem is related to 'the organizational culture' of a nation-state, while the second one is related to the nature of the threat.

The first problem comprises the way the relationship established between the intelligence agency and the government. It is related to organizational culture as a subset of strategic culture, which is itself a subset of political culture of a nation-state at large.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁴Halliday, Fred. 2004. "Terrorism in historical perspective" 22 April www.openDemocracy.net

⁴⁷⁵Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall. 1999. *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

As such, Hamilton cites organizational theorist Riad claiming that

...dominant, taken-for-granted understandings of ‘organizational culture’ shape the conduct of both management of practitioners and researchers and disciplines what can and cannot be said about organizational culture.⁴⁷⁶

Drawing on Riad’s argument, Hamilton examines how officials overwhelmingly internalize ‘organizational culture’, which is both a cause of intelligence failure and the reform efforts failure. In parallel, Garthoff explains a key Cold War pattern of reporting intelligence estimates about enemy intentions to be used to mobilize public support for what are deemed to be desirable countermeasures by the American administrations.⁴⁷⁷ Often this practice has been narrated around incidents that portray enemy’s vices with omission of positive or neutral enemy attributes regarding the narrated incidents. According to Robert Mandel, American intelligence analysts today face tough choices regarding politicizing enemy intentions when developing National Intelligence Estimates similar to the case during the Cold War.⁴⁷⁸

Politicizing enemy intentions estimates by using them to mobilize domestic public opinion is the direst problem in making a realistic assessment of the threat. For the present study, threat assessments are important in channelling the response policy of states in that similar threat assessments among countries lead to convergence of counterterrorism policies. However, when governments openly declare or leak the intelligence reports to the media so as to gain domestic support, there emerges a risk that intelligence analysts may oversimplify or distort their estimates to support the preferences of the politicians for praise and promotion.

⁴⁷⁶Bean, Hamilton. 2009. “Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs”, *Intelligence and National Security*, 24:4, 482.

⁴⁷⁷Garthoff, Raymond L. “On Estimating and Imputing Intentions” *International Security* 2, Winter, pp.22–32.

⁴⁷⁸Mandel, Robert. 2009. “On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions” *Intelligence and National Security* 24:2, p. 207.

That is one of the characteristics of the US strategic culture according to Mandel and Bean.⁴⁷⁹

Second concern of the intelligence agencies is hardship to assess the threat and make realistic assessments. Unconventional warfare such as insurgency, civil war, guerrilla war and terrorism become the frequent choice of struggle for power. During the simple bipolar 'us-versus-them' Cold War environment, national intelligence estimates were much easier to make than in the current environment where more complex transnational threats are confronting states in an unconventional mode of warfare. If terrorists fought in the open rather than secretly attacking soft targets, they would be eliminated by the strong national capabilities. Consequently, the threats that perpetrators pose become unconventional for they cannot otherwise take on the state-of-the-art conventional capabilities of states. Thereby, intelligence estimates became concentrated on terrorists alongside conventional assessments on other states' capabilities and intentions.

However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is argued that 'the dangers of the post- Cold War world were too opaque, too numerous, and too fluid for intelligence agencies to assess the terrorist threat more effectively than they did'.⁴⁸⁰ This is a crucial point that explains the leeway for different national threat assessments, which hinder the inter-state cooperation against terrorism.

⁴⁷⁹Bean, Hamilton. 2009. "Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs", *Intelligence and National Security*, 24:4, 479- 498; Mandel, Robert. 2009. "On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions", *Intelligence and National Security*, 24:2, 194-215.

⁴⁸⁰Jenkins, Brian Michael. 2006. *Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation; Zegart, Amy B. 2005. 'September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies', *International Security* 29 Spring.

The shortfall in the intelligence estimates of states inheres in the nature of the threat:

During the post-Cold War era, international coercion has gone well beyond formal threats of direct military attack from states and often has taken on the guise of far more subtle and varied unorthodox modes of disruption by non-state groups. Emerging threats have been typically covert, dispersed, decentralized, adaptable, and fluid, with threat sources relatively difficult to identify, monitor, target, contain, and destroy. For intelligence analysts, in contrast to the Cold War focus on the Soviet Union, the post- Cold War world appears ‘shapeless’, containing a virtually limitless range of threats and perpetrators requiring analytical understanding; now it is often a major hurdle even to isolate who is in control, let alone determine what they intend to do. These dangers frequently involve patient and politically astute insurgent, guerrilla, or terrorist groups utilizing elaborate political, economic, social, and military communications networks to demoralize and undermine superior military power.⁴⁸¹

6.3. American and European Responses to Terrorism

When the unit-level is concerned theoretically and strictly, the unit is the ‘state regimes’ instead of simply states that are characterized by a set of ideological values in addition to conventional state values.⁴⁸² In other words, when the unit-level is on the line, state is not a wide array of apparatus but the state regime and culture as explained above. Nonetheless, the specifics of responses of the EU member-states and the US response against terrorism must be examined.

Both in the EU and the US, counterterrorism effort is at the ground level where police work with local communities. However, since terrorists operate across frontiers, states that resist them needed to operate in similar fashion. Both among the EU member-states and between Europe and the US, horizontal inter-agency cooperation became a strategic necessity.

As for the cooperation within the EU, governments have created a complex framework for collaboration and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy in 2005.

⁴⁸¹Mandel, Robert. 2009. “On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions” *Intelligence and National Security* 24:2, p. 195.

⁴⁸²Mouritzen, Hans. 2006. “Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory” *European Security*, 15:2, p. 160.

Governments agreed terrorism-related laws, shared more security intelligence and appointed a counter-terrorism coordinator to manage inter-agency coordination and public diplomacy. In spite of these efforts, Europeans has experienced difficulties in carving out a strong or effective counterterrorism policy. This is because the EU as an institutional body, which is separate from the member-states, has limited role in internal security. The EU has mainly judicial and regulatory role in internal security affairs. This role was allocated as such due to the possible long EU processes that would take years to agree counterterrorism measures. Another reason for the limited role of the EU in countering terrorism is that the majority of the 27 member-states do not perceive a serious or vital threat from terrorism.⁴⁸³ Only a handful of European states feel threatened by terrorism. Besides, all EU members have different historical and cultural approaches to law and order. According to Brady, that is unlikely to change.

Brady underlines that how a country fights terrorism largely depends upon how much of its citizens and parliamentarians are willing to expand the powers of the state to detain, question, charge and imprison suspects. In that regard, European countries have different records.⁴⁸⁴ The most successful example of European counterterrorism to date is French regulatory arrangements. French efforts have placed particular emphasis upon magistrates and their close cooperation with the intelligence services, regulatory responses and the judiciary, which have originally started to evolve during efforts against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades.⁴⁸⁵ The French state has wide-ranging powers to tail suspects and intercept

⁴⁸³Brady, Hugo. 2009. Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy: The EU's role in counter-terrorism. Centre for European Reform, July, p. 1; Dittrich, Mirjam. 2005. "Facing the global terrorist threat: a European response" *European Policy Center Working Paper* No. 14 January.

⁴⁸⁴Burgess, J. Peter. 2009. "There is No European Security, Only European Securities" *Cooperation and Conflict* 44; 309.

⁴⁸⁵Shapiro, Jeremy and Benedicte Suzan, 'The French experience of counterterrorism', *Survival* 45: 1,

private communications that would be considered excessive elsewhere. Further, prosecutors are given wide authority to prosecute suspects under the mere intention to commit terrorism. French authorities indicate that the legal powers that they have accounts for their success.⁴⁸⁶ France managed to coordinate the intelligence services, the police and prosecutors by centralizing counterterrorism investigations under a single special terrorism magistrate. The magistrate can control the police, gendarmes, internal intelligence service and the external intelligence service. This is a clear hierarchy of managing counterterrorism efforts of a nation.

In contrast, the US or other European states do not have a similar hierarchical structure. The counterterrorism efforts in other European countries and the US are multi-headed, which exacerbates coordination among intelligence, police and the judiciary. There are several reasons for the latter. First of all, most European services do not have powers of arrest or detention. They are only responsible for obtaining intelligence on a particular threat by continued monitoring and surveillance. The police have the authority to arrest and hold detention over suspects, yet they generally prefer to receive actionable intelligence in advance.

However, intelligence services are reluctant to provide actionable intelligence for the police lest it will prevent intelligence leads from reaching significant results. The problem does not stop there and it becomes bigger because there are a number of police forces and intelligence services. With whom, when and where to share intelligence is a serious concern. This is especially the case in the UK and Spain where poor intelligence interagency coordination set the

Spring 2003, pp. 67–98.

⁴⁸⁶Greenway, H.D.S. 2009. “France versus Terrorism” International Herald Tribune, February 19th.

counterterrorism cooperation back.⁴⁸⁷

Some countries have tried to emulate the French example. The British government assigned the deputy commissioner of the Metropolitan Police as coordinator of national counter-terrorism investigations. Britain tried but failed to extend detention periods for terrorist suspects to 42 days. Germany established a hierarchy between the federal and state security structures. However, the country's constitution forbids full centralization of powers in security affairs.

Notwithstanding these complications, elements of a European style, focused on regulatory responses and the judiciary, may be said to have emerged during efforts against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a hallmark of French responses to Islamist extremism during the 1980s and 1990s. Even the UK, which engaged in a long military campaign against the Provisional IRA, gradually allocated more responsibility for counterterrorism to civilian agencies. The repeated assertions by Gijs de Vries, the EU's former counterterrorism coordinator, that Eurojust and Europol have a leading role in the EU's counterterrorist effort underline this European regulatory approach with its focus on civil agencies. The regulatory response has suited current European needs remarkably well because of its strong domestic dimension. The 9/11 attacks brought home to Europe its own vulnerability. Not only were many of the perpetrators of the attacks formerly resident in Europe, but concentrations of Muslim populations in western Europe far exceed those in the US. For example, the Netherlands is home to one million Muslims, the UK to one and a half million, Germany to just over four million and France some six million. While the vast majority of those citizens are law-abiding, the July 2005 bombings in London demonstrated that small pockets of second generation resident Muslims can be won over to the cause of extremism and the practice of suicide bombing.⁴⁸⁸

6.4. The Clash of National Security Cultures:

The New Terrorism Debate and the Transatlantic Rift

'The new terrorism debate' is a manifestation of the differences between the European national security culture and that of the US. As a part of national security culture, counterterrorism culture of a nation is shaped by historical experiences, and different past experiences end in separate present state-responses. American national security culture views the strategic landscape through 'leaps and bounds or

⁴⁸⁷Dittrich, Mirjam. 2005. "Facing the global terrorist threat: a European response" *European Policy Center Working Paper No. 14* January.

⁴⁸⁸Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, p. 910.

strategic revolutions'. During the 1990s, this element of the national security outlook presented the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the assertions of a 'strategic revolution' were quickly transferred from RMA to the field of terrorism. In accordance, terrorism as experienced by America in 9/11 is labelled 'the new terrorism' that has global reach. Since it has global reach, it is argued that fighting it is in the interests of all states. The most noticeable proponent of 'the new terrorism' is Bruce Hoffman.⁴⁸⁹ The description of the new terrorism can be summarized as being in contrast to the definition of terrorism given by Brian Jenkins. In contrast to what Jenkins argued, terrorists do not any longer want a lot of people watching, but a lot of people death.

Hoffman argued that terrorism was changing, with 'new adversaries, new motivations, and new methods' which challenged many of our most fundamental assumptions about terrorists and how they operate. Hoffman noted that while instances of attacks were going down, casualties were going up. He explained this in terms of a new religious terrorism which defied the old dictum that the terrorist wanted only a few people dead, but many people watching. Now, it appeared, killing was no longer an ugly form of political communication, or a form of bargaining with violence; instead, it was becoming a religious duty. In other words, the new terror was more apolitical and casualties were themselves the objective. This conjured up an alarming world without restraint, replacing the realist world of bargains, deterrence and rational behaviour, offering the prospect of terrorists who might seek to use WMD.⁴⁹⁰

While 'the new terrorism' became the accepted understanding of the American counterterrorism, Europeans disagreed with the idea of the newness of terrorism. They argued that terrorism remains rooted in some old political and economic problems. This is where strategic culture based on past experiences of terrorism plays its part. European attitudes were to interpret rising terrorism in terms of a reaction to specific policies and military deployments rather than hating the West in and of itself. Some of the prominent realist scholars in America agreed

⁴⁸⁹Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. *Inside terrorism* New York: Columbia University; Lesser, Ian O. Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Michael Jenkins. 1999. *Countering the new terrorism* Washington DC: RAND.

⁴⁹⁰Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, p. 920.

with the European approach arguing that ‘it is not who we are, it is what we do’.⁴⁹¹ However, they did not reflect the nation-wide sentiment including that of the two American administrations in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.⁴⁹² While this is the case in America, Europeans talk also of ‘a situation in which there is not so much a new terrorism, but a new and more globalized environment—in relation to communications, ideologies and capacity for violence- which presents our enemies with enhanced opportunities’.⁴⁹³ In response to terrorism, Gijs de Vries has pointed specifically to lack of progress on the Middle East peace process and to chaos in Iraq as key factors in terrorist recruitment.⁴⁹⁴

6.5. The Connection between Security Culture and Alignment Strategies

States can imitate other states’ behaviours for gaining influence over its neighbours, penetrating into its alignment partner’s decision making process, externalizing its domestic problems or sharing gains at the end of a campaign. These alignment policies have been implemented especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

Importantly, preference of a state (whose formation is explained in the dissertation by the counterterrorism culture of a state) is different from the way that preference is implemented. The way a preference is implemented equals to the

⁴⁹¹Stephen M. Walt on American Foreign Policy

<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publications/insight/international/stephen-walt>

⁴⁹²Campbell, James E. 2005. Why Bush Won the Presidential Election of 2004: Incumbency, Ideology, Terrorism, and Turnout *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 120 Number 2.

⁴⁹³Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?” *International Affairs* 81, 5, p. 920.

⁴⁹⁴Interview with Gijs de Vries on terrorism, Islam and democracy’, 6 Sept. 2005, at Euroactiv.com <http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmmuri=tcm:29-136245-16&type=Interview>; Speech by Gijs de Vries, European Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘European strategy in the fight against terrorism and co-operation with the United States’, given at CSIS, Washington DC, 13 May 2004 http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/CSIS_Washington.13_May_2004.pdf; ‘Interview with Gijs de Vries on terrorism, Islam and democracy’, 6 Sept. 2005, at Euroactiv.com <http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmmuri=tcm:29-136245-16&type=Interview>, accessed 12 Sept. 2005.

alignment policy of a state. *Thus, while counterterrorism culture explains state preferences, the way the preferences are implemented is manifested in (alignment) policies such as penetration or balking.* The latter two are alignment policies of states that show how they activate their different preferences and approaches in relation to another state. A review of alignment policies are presented in chapter three.

CHAPTER 7

THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE THREAT CONDITIONING INTER-STATE COOPERATION AND ALIGNMENT AGAINST TERRORISM

7.1. The Threat Variable

7.1.1 The Distinct Features of the Threat

Just a few quick observations on how catastrophic terrorism has changed the security environment...It seems to me that there's been a historical reversal that needs to be taken into account, and that is that *since the advent of al-Qaeda, it is clear that there are non-state actors that are at least as powerful as many states*. I have made the argument that in fact, most states in the world could not have carried out an operation like 9/11. If for no other reason, *that most states couldn't recruit that many suicide operatives*. And that is an invaluable resource to a terrorist organization. But due to technology, the availability of materials for weapons of mass destruction, and the many opportunities that globalization affords to terrorists, they have sort of *achieved a unique position in the international system*. And I think we need to recognize that we are now in a position where there is a state of warfare, *a state of war, between states and non-state actors*. And as a result, we need to update our practices and possibly also our laws to take into account that change. One of the interesting facts about this evolution is *that the prudential calculations that state-sponsors have traditionally made* (in carrying out their terrorism calculations that would affect the extent of the violence that they would inflict on their foe) *simply don't exist when you're dealing with a group like al-Qaeda or a group, say, like Aum Shinrikyo. They are simply operating on another level*. They're not thinking about attracting sympathizers as much, they're not thinking about becoming negotiating partners, most importantly, with the United States or some other power, and they are not seeking an incremental revision of status quo. They want the kind of revision that none of us could ever contemplate. I guess I was also asked to talk a little bit about issues of state-complicity. My feeling is that there's been less change in this regard than might meet the eye despite the arguments of the G. W. Bush administration. Most states will continue to exercise some caution in terms of how much they assist groups like al-Qaeda *because they can't control them. The history*

*of state sponsorship is you only get involved with someone you can control. So a group like Hezbollah is a case in point, it's always had to answer to its masters in Syria and Iran. Al-Qaeda has never acknowledged the real control of any other group, and that's part of the reason it eventually got run out of Sudan.*⁴⁹⁵

The dimensions of the threat, as summarized in the above quotation by Daniel Benjamin, poses a daunting challenge for nation-states, especially for policy-makers, law-enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency first-responders, judiciary and military. Simply any agency or institution of a nation-state confronts a form of terrorism that poses a threat that merges traditional categories of both 'the internal' and 'the external'. That is why it is transnational, not international.

Bereft of state-sponsorship or any state-control unlike the past cases of terrorism during the Cold War, heading for indiscriminate mass-killings while active at the inter-societal level among citizens of many nations, equipped with an effective, absolutist and incorrigible ideology or 'theology of hate'⁴⁹⁶ that does not negotiate or compromise, not interested in changing the status quo but seeking the destruction of the prevailing state-system itself with its established values and institutions⁴⁹⁷ and able to attract self-sacrificing followers without much recruitment effort, transnational terrorism is a serious irregular or unconventional threat against nation-states.

Since transnational terrorism's biggest gains come when it manages to set nation-state against nation-state, it is also a threat to inter-state relations and international stability.⁴⁹⁸ Transnational terrorism neither originates from nation-

⁴⁹⁵Benjamin, Daniel. 2002. *Project on International Law and International Relations and Workshop on International Law and International Relations* November 14-15, Center for Strategic and International Studies, italics added.

⁴⁹⁶Esposito, John. <http://vodpod.com/watch/32074-tackling-extremism-hamza-yusuf-desmond-tutu-john-esposito-and-diana-buttu>

⁴⁹⁷Raymond, Ibrahim. 2007. *The Al Qaeda Reader*. New York: Doubleday.

⁴⁹⁸Schmid, Alex P. 2000. 'Introduction' in *the Proceedings of the International Conference on*

states nor vulnerable to state control, manipulation or sponsorship. As such, terrorism is not a peripheral threat anymore unlike the past instances of terrorism. It is not mere sub-state terrorist activity that mostly strikes a single country.

It strikes targets in diverse countries such as the US, Russia, Britain, India, Turkey, Spain, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Foiled mass-casualty plots that are declared by the European Union involve France and Germany as targets of transnational terrorism.⁴⁹⁹ Therefore, it has come to be regarded by nation-states as a high-level national security concern and a crucial threat to be met by foreign policy-making.

Significantly, terrorism has never before played into a large group of states' foreign policy agenda to considerable extent and around the same time period. Previously, it was chiefly a nuisance that was dealt with privately.⁵⁰⁰ It has joined into the mainstream subjects of international security which is addressed in national security strategy documents and it has become one of the foreign policy issue-areas both nationally and collectively in international organizations. All these above-mentioned characteristics pave the way for the label 'the new terrorism'.

Transnational terrorism is distinct from other threats to national security at large and from other forms of terrorism in particular.⁵⁰¹ To present its differences

'*Countering Terrorism Through Enhanced International Cooperation*', Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy 22-24 September under the auspices of the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme and Terrorism Prevention Branch United Nations, Vienna.

⁴⁹⁹ Brady, Hugo. 2009. *Intelligence, Emergencies, and Foreign Policy*. Center for European Reform Essays.

⁵⁰⁰ Evans, Graham. 1990. *The Dictionary of World Politics-A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and Institutions*. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 388.

⁵⁰¹ As discussed in this chapter, transnational terrorism is 'new' in that it has some distinct features separating it from other forms of terrorism. Yet, it is 'old' in that it is 'political violence' despite the religious ideology and rhetoric that mobilizes followers. A fine-tuned examination of transnational terrorism clarifies the debate on whether it is new: It has new features significant in number and quality that justifies the label 'new terrorism'; however, it is not thoroughly or absolutely new in that it is political with its declarations and consequences of its attacks contrary to claims of apoliticalness owing to irrationality, nihilism, or unearthly beliefs. The operational epitome of transnational terrorism is the Al Qaeda Central and its franchises or outfits around the world. The ideological epitome of

from other threats, the literature on military strategy and defense doctrine might be instructive:

Four types of challenging threats exist: *Traditional challenges* exist by states that employ recognized military capabilities and forces in the more conventional forms of military competition and conflict. *Irregular challenges* are the more unconventional ways and means to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. *Catastrophic challenges* involve the acquisition, possession, and possible use of WMD or methods that produce WMD-like effects (WMD/E). *Disruptive challenges* may be the use of breakthrough technologies to limit or negate the operational advantage of an opponent.⁵⁰²

Operational mode of transnational terrorism combines irregular challenges, catastrophic challenges and disruptive challenges into a compact blend of Pandora's Box. The scale of its destruction, its *modus operandi*, its finance, operational tactics and mobilization are outside of state-control or sponsorship.

Distinctively, even when states cooperate or reach an agreement to curb or curtail it, let alone to eradicate it, they face grave difficulties.⁵⁰³ Thus, *one of the main reasons why states find it hard to cooperate against transnational terrorism is the nature of the threat itself*. The nature of the threat itself is one of the reasons for limits of cooperation because the threat is active on another level: In the aftermath of the Cold War and especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent terrorist atrocities in Europe and Asia, threats are defined more from within societies than the territorial boundaries between them. Not only threats are within societies, but most societies are knit together through communication, transportation and travel that increased social contacts and the feasibility and probability of terrorism. Most of the societies are interconnected by means of

transnational terrorism is Al-Qaedaism. The New Terrorism Debate is examined more in the following sections of this chapter for it leads to different state approaches and policies in cooperating against terrorism.

⁵⁰² *A Military Guide to Terrorism*. 2005. TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No.1, p.10.

⁵⁰³ That is dissimilar to the past cases such as ETA as a matter of dispute between Spain and France. For details,

transportation of goods, travel of people and communication of real-time news, encrypted websites and instant messaging.

“Transnational terrorism” is much more disassociated with state-sponsorship backup or with demarcated territorial bases or safe-havens when compared to ‘international terrorism’ on the same terms. As the 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes, threats have become ‘transnational’ rather than international:

“From terrorism to global disease and environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than international. *That is the defining quality of world politics in the twenty-first century.* National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred.”⁵⁰⁴

Transnational terrorism is separate from international terrorism. Terrorist threats against national security interests ‘over there’ must be regarded as threats against the nation ‘over here’. In this sense, for most of the nation-states there is no specified frontline, no enemy at the gates; the frontlines are everywhere. In this sense, any homeland of any nation is the planet. Transnational terrorism is globalized terrorism.

One of the distinct features of the threat of transnational terrorism revolves around the concept of ‘religious terrorism’, which provides the perpetrators with motivation to inflict indiscriminate killing and destruction. It is often claimed that religious terrorism (as being different from separatist or ideological terrorism) is incorrigible in that it cannot be rehabilitated through bargaining or negotiation. Religious terrorists do not seek incremental political compromises from governments. They seek to erase the fundamental political values, norms and

⁵⁰⁴ The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p.362.

procedures of all Middle Eastern states. Depending upon their declarations, their ultimate aim is often accepted to be establishing an absolutely new political system in the Middle East. Since their ultimate objective is not only toppling governments but terminating the core principles of political regimes in absolute terms, negotiation is seen as impossible. Alongside its political side, transnational terrorism's religious features have adamant tendencies. All of the political regimes in the world are allegedly corrupt and it is taken to be a religious obligation to pursue a universal paradigmatic transformation in the name of God.⁵⁰⁵ In religious terrorists' eyes, their aims are God's wishes; and God's wishes are not negotiable.⁵⁰⁶ In accordance, they are of the conviction that they have to destroy the world in order to save it, again in the name of God.⁵⁰⁷

Transnational terrorism shares the latter characteristic of utter and wanton destruction with millenarian cults. Yet, the commonality stops at sheer destruction and casualty. September 11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Britain, Spain, Russia, India and Istanbul are much more political in itself (target-selection) and of its consequences (an inter-state effort started off against terrorism) unlike the case for millenarian or apocalyptic groups. Besides, the propaganda campaign carried out mostly through the Internet resonates across the world, which indicates its political nature unlike the millenarian cults or sects that have relatively little constituency.

While this is the nature of the threat, Jervis underlines that academic grasp of terrorism is not secure. It is more so when compared to such accumulated

⁵⁰⁵Sedgwick, Mark , 'Karen J. Greenberg, ed. Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 19:2, 276-277.

⁵⁰⁶Brachman Jarret M., William F. Mccants 'Stealing Al Qaeda's Playbook' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:309-321, 2006

⁵⁰⁷Gus, Martin. 2003. *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues*, London: Sage Publications.

knowledge on other subjects as development, poverty, ethnic conflict, law or conventional warfare. As Jervis asserts, terrorism grounded in religion poses special problems for modern social science, which has paid little attention to religion. Yet, religion is one of the sources of authority in social relations from which actors and non-state violent groups derive *power over* people. In other words, if there is a debate on ‘winning hearts and minds of the people’⁵⁰⁸ to effectively struggle against terrorism and if religion can be turned into an instrument of mass-control and atrocity, then no meaningful analysis can ignore the political side of ‘religious terrorism’. It has an impact upon the relations of nation-states and the way governments rule.

Jervis presents an insight about the reason why religion is rarely studied in modern social science: ‘...perhaps because they (social scientists) are not religious, shy away from deeply held beliefs, and find this subject unfathomable if not embarrassing’.⁵⁰⁹ Although he touches upon a clue for finding out why religion is given scant attention, it is hardly to the point. Rather, the reason why religion is not studied much or not involved in modern social science or why social scientists shy away from it originates in a particular understanding of modernity. The Western separation of church from politics and the secular nature of science make anything associated with religion intellectually susceptible and fragile. Because of the Western separation of the state authority and apparatus from the authority of religion, religion is understandably held to be not much related to politics on the analytical level in academia albeit being related to political regimes by way of how

⁵⁰⁸ Drake, William J. ,Jamie Metzl Lecture Series: Winning Hearts and Minds
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=428&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>

⁵⁰⁹ Robert Jervis, 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*, New York and London: Routledge, p.37.

political cultures of nation-states interpret secularism or laicism⁵¹⁰. This is the underlying dynamic giving way to modern science, and this is why it is ‘modern’ social science in the first place.⁵¹¹ The separation between the political and the divine must not curtail academic examination of terrorism under globalization: There are other versions of modernity, through which political forms of social organizations other than Western ones⁵¹² came to play a role in world politics especially in the Middle East.

There is not any apolitical religion in and of itself even without its politicization; all religions thrive to rule over people en masse and they are political in that sense. It is especially their capability and authority to rule over the behavior of people that makes them political: History witnesses that loyalties are diverse. Likewise, religious loyalties, loyalties to different companies or to other centers of authority such as ethnicity can surpass the loyalty to the nation-state in the present era. The citizenship and loyalty to the state is apparently a matter of degree and it has been hard to see it ever-secure. Any religion is intertwined with politics because it rules over people and earthly physical undertakings in the name of a certain metaphysics which connects the earthly and heavenly, mind and matter, and fact and value.

Loyalties attached to religion enable control over people and their behaviors. Hence, religious authority. That is simply political; and since religion in that authoritative sense is related to politics, so it is to security, too. Viewed in this

⁵¹⁰ ‘Secularism’ and ‘laicism’ are two separate interpretations and forms of such separation. Please see Arkoun and Mardin.

⁵¹¹ John Gray. 2003. *Al-Qaeda and What It Means to be Modern*, Faber & Faber Limited.

⁵¹² Western political configuration accepts a separation between public and private domains, such as ‘civil’ and ‘military’. Today, it is observed that it is not always possible to make such a separation as exemplified by the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah. Accordingly, some non-Western political forms of social organizations do not foresee a separation between religion and state-rule as the way the relation between church and the state are arranged in the West. This is, to be sure, also the debate about ‘Christianity and democracy’ and ‘Islam and democracy’.

light, the 'strict distinction' made between 'political terrorism' and 'religious terrorism' is nil. More than semantics lie underneath, that is there is no apolitical terrorism: Terrorism is spread of fear through violence and killings for achieving coercion. Violence is a form of coercion. At the very least, violence-driven coercion is political with its effects or consequences, independent of whether its motivation is secular, divine or a mixture of both.

Transnational terrorism strikes nation-states, and it demands withdrawal of any nation-state from the Middle East along with their political regime and system of rule.⁵¹³ Put differently, neither the economic or military presence of Western states in the Middle East nor prevailing governments of the region is accepted by the terrorists. Thus, setting 'religious terrorism' as a unique type of violence unrelated to the means of power struggle paves the way for the fallacy of underestimating the political features of religiously-motivated terrorism. Religious terrorism, alongside its divine motivations, is in fact quite political both in its ideology (peculiar ideas), atrocities and states' response in return (consequences). David Rapoport reminds Machiavelli in explaining the political community/political space or the politics terrorists try to establish⁵¹⁴: "Machiavelli long ago emphasised that the process of remaking a community is similar regardless of whether the context is religious or secular." Although, contemporary transnational terrorism is a hybrid of religious and secular features, their endeavor to re-create a (peculiar understanding of) community is not much different from 'political terrorism'. It is neither pure religious extremism similar to apocalyptic/millenarian sects nor pure political or ideological extremism as it is

⁵¹³Ibrahim, Raymond. 2007. *The Al Qaeda Reader*. NY: Doubleday.

⁵¹⁴Rapoport, David C. 1991. 'Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, III/3 Autumn pp. 116-140 and Mark, Jurgensmeyer. 1992. ed. *Violence and the Sacred* London, Frank Cass; Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 March 2008; Perceptions and Misperceptions

conventionally understood. It is in-between the latter two. Through its propagated ideology and violence, transnational terrorism is the embodiment of both politicization of religion and religionization of politics at the same time.

Any terrorism is a compilation of differently-weighted underlying motivations of several sorts.⁵¹⁵ Labeling ‘religiously-motivated terrorism’ as mere ‘religious terrorism’ causes to underestimate the political element both inherent in the ideology of religiously-motivated terrorist groups and in their actions. That would be missing the nature of pure religious cults exemplified by mass-suicide of all cult-members.⁵¹⁶ Moreover, ‘motivations’ and ‘objectives’ are not the same, and using only one of them as a criterion of categorization is misleading because it causes scholars to see religious extremists as totally irrational, which does not seem to be the case. Irrationality would have led to operational failure. Religious terrorists, as Ali Karaosmanoglu maintains, have unique rationality of their own.⁵¹⁷

There is nothing as ‘pure religious’ or ‘pure political’ about the contemporary religious extremism. An amalgam of terrorist motivations is driven from differently-weighted separate issues of contention whether it is secular or not. Terrorists are motivated both by earthly and unearthly concerns. Some try to gain huge amounts of money and turn into being businessmen of blood-money and pursue it as an end in itself as a profession. Some die willingly for their cause to see that an incipient idea spreading far and wide.⁵¹⁸ The division of politics from the divine in understanding terrorist threats is missing the point of how terrorists see

⁵¹⁵Crenshaw, Martha. 2003. 3th ed. *Terrorism in Context*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

⁵¹⁶Laqueur, Walter. 1999. *The New Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79-106.

⁵¹⁷Conversation with Ali Karaosmanoglu, stimulated by the occasion of American commemorations of the victims of September 11, 2001 attacks, Ankara, Bilkent University, Turkey, September 12, 2006.

⁵¹⁸Stern, Jessica. 2003. *Terror in the Name of God-Why Religious Militants Kill* New York: HarperCollins, pp. 237-240.

the world and constitute the threat thereby.⁵¹⁹ But if for no other reason, this is where it is hard for decision-makers to understand the ambiguous threat before devising responses.

7.1.2. Ambiguity of the Threat and Its Implications

Although non-state actors seem disputably weaker than states in that they have no legal authority, the fact that they are not bounded by the rules of the international state-system is a great advantage for them to assert their influence, which is taken into consideration by states notably by the international effort to curb terrorism. Contemporary terrorism is not bound by the international system.⁵²⁰ It has features that are not clear for state parties to cooperate against to curtail it. Debatable features of contemporary terrorism cause disagreements and different strategies that hamper international cooperation.

The noticeable features that cause the ambiguity of the threat (and the points of disagreement among states in carving out a common strategy to fight it) are:

- Multiple nation-state targets: It *strikes a large group of nation-states, not a single nation as a fixed target*
- A hybrid ideology (or an ideology that is congruous to a political religion) with both religious and secular tenets and attributes. The ideology has spread all around the world and its counter-hegemonic claims resonate transnationally, not nationally or internationally. It has mobilized set of ideas, which encourages and achieves suicide-missions, and fuels the

⁵¹⁹Smelser, Neil J. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism. *The Faces of Terrorism-Social and Psychological Dimensions*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 11-90.

struggle against democracy, rule of law, human rights, laicite and secularism.⁵²¹

- *Operationally active around the world at the inter-societal level* across state borders
- *A massive and dispersed body of followers* all around the world whose whereabouts are unclear
- *No state-control*, manipulation or sponsorship
- *Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing* that is supported by black markets and corrupt officials⁵²²
- *Lack of a territory* (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which cancels deterrence
- *Incorrigibility*; closed to bargaining, negotiation or compromise

⁵²¹ Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629-643; Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7, 547-569; Jones, David Martin and Smith, M. L. R. 2010. 'Beyond Belief: Islamist Strategic Thinking and International Relations Theory', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 2, 242-266; Hedley Bull. 1984. "The Revolt against the West", in Hedley Bull and A. Watson eds. *The Expansion of International Society* Oxford: Clarendon; Tibi, Bassam. 2009. 'Islamism and Democracy: On the Compatibility of Institutional Islamism and the Political Culture of Democracy', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10: 2, 135-164; Hansen, Hendrik and Kainz, Peter. 2007. 'Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: a Comparison of Sayyid Qutb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8: 1, 55-76; Tibi, Bassam. 2009. 'Political Islam as a Forum of Religious Fundamentalism and the Religionisation of Politics: Islamism and the Quest for a Remaking of the World', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10: 2, 97-120; Vidino, Lorenzo. 2009. 'Islamism and the West: Europe as a Battlefield', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10: 2, 165-176; Bale, Jeffrey M. 2009. 'Islamism and Totalitarianism', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10: 2, 73-96; Cook, David. 2009. 'Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10: 2, 177-187; Hamadouche, Louisa Dris-Aït. 2009. 'Europe, Security and Islamism: Misunderstandings and Manipulations', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* Vol. 17, No. 3, 339-351; Soage, Ana Belén. 2009. 'Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 10: 2, 189- 203; Chalk, Peter and William Rosenau. 2004. "Confronting the "Enemy Within"- Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies" RAND, Santa Monica CA; Payne, Kenneth. 2009. 'Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32:2, 109-128.

⁵²² Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. 'Countering Terrorist Support Structures', *Defense Against Terrorism Review DATR* Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29.

- *Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing* as determined choice; pursuing any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD
- Possessing *suicide-bombers* as the smartest mobile bombs⁵²³
- *Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology* in carrying out attacks (the use of hawala, hundis, banking system, explosives, GPS and the Internet)
- A learning curve higher than other terrorist groups, which enables to be *adaptive to state-responses*.
- *Being devoid of international law* requirements and sanctions
- *Unaccountability* and *due lack of responsibility* to protect a population or followers
- Unpredictability; *upper-hand of surprise attack* against states

With the above characteristics, although arguably still weaker than states that have legal authority, non-state actors have some illicit authority and capacity to influence laymen. Inflicting huge psychological, financial and economic damage for the survivors of attacks, let alone the high death and casualty toll, it presents a grave challenge for devising counter-policy. The human, economic and psychological toll and the challenge of crafting an effective counter-policy significantly affect states and decision-makers.

Within that framework of the nature of the threat, the reason why national means alone are not sufficient to fight transnational terrorism requires emphasis. The reason is plainly that threats of transnational nature neither recognize

⁵²³Pape, Robert. 2005. *Dying to Win*. New York: Random House.

borderlines nor are totally congruent with the classical distinction between inside and outside politics of a nation-state. The latter reason has become a cliché in academia since the September 11 attacks.⁵²⁴ However, like most clichés it captures an essential part of reality. The conventional analytical distinction in International Relations between inside/domestic politics and outside/international politics (as the organizing principle of the state-system template) can still be used for studying terrorism but only with a shortcoming that must be borne in mind: When confronted by such threats that transgress borders, the distinctive characteristic of ‘territoriality’ or territory-centric thinking becomes reduced (though not vanished) in practicality and importance.

Why does the decline in practicality and importance of territory-centric-thinking occur? It occurs because transnational terrorism is *a deterritorialized threat*: A deterritorialized threat in that, *first*, it presents the weakening of ties between time and space, and *secondly*, it presents the conflation of the scales of violence. Weakening of the ties between time and space denotes that conduct of terrorist attacks became less dependent on the parameters of territorial-defense due to interconnecting transportation and communication capabilities worldwide. Physical distance became less burdensome. Accordingly, the logistics, skill and organizational capacity of private actors increased due to globalization.

As for the conflation of the scales of violence, it becomes hard for states to decide whether it is homegrown/domestic, international, regional or global terrorism that they face. Constantly changing scale of violence complicates the exposure of threats. International terrorism evolved into transnational terrorism because nation-states’ affiliation or sponsorship lack in the conduct of transnational

⁵²⁴For a lucid analysis of the problems terrorism presents for both International Relations and policy-makers, Talbott, Strobe and Nayan Chanda. 2001. *The Age of Terror-America and the World after September 11*. NY: Basic Books.

terrorist groups. These compounded aspects may roughly be defined as ‘*detrterritorialization*’,⁵²⁵ which enables non-state entities to run away from the control and authority of nation-states.

The detrterritorialized threat has important implications for cooperation and alignment of states against terrorism. *As it is further discussed in the following sections, detrterritorialized threats are hard to perceive, define and fight against. The elusiveness or ambiguity of the threat is one of the fundamental reasons why states perceive the threat differently.* The detrterritorialized nature of transnational terrorism circumscribes international cooperative behaviors of states that aim to curb it. In addition to its above-listed characteristics, its incongruence to territorial-defense parameters and its conflated scale of violence add up to the ambiguity of the threat. *The form of the threat itself is a limit to cooperation among states* because it is ambiguous. States have hardship to fight a threat which they cannot clearly define, detect or find.

7.2. Implications of the Distinct Features of the Threat for Inter-State Cooperation

In a political environment where civil and military means of attack mix into each other as another facet of the ambiguous threat, international efforts to curb terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks started as a campaign whose goal and strategy were initially not clear to all participating states. Since the threat was not clear, the goal was not easily settled. Especially, as part of the wider international effort to fight terrorism, ‘War on Terrorism’ started off with an ambiguous threat assessment. The goal of the campaign against terrorism was not

⁵²⁵Patman, Robert G. 2006. “Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp 963-986.

clear.⁵²⁶ Nation-states' hardship to set goals and their hardship to strategize is the main implication of the ambiguity of the threat of transnational terrorism.

The threat was not clear for states in its nature, location, ideology, organization, methods and constituency. The goal and strategy of Al-Qaeda the Central and the Al-Qaeda the Social Movement⁵²⁷ was neither intelligible nor comprehensible to nation-states in the first years of the international endeavor due to the enhanced secrecy of terrorist activities unattached to territory and state-sponsorship.⁵²⁸ Compared to the alignment of states during the Cold War, the emerging pattern of cooperation and alignment against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks was obviously different. The difference lies in lack of commonly perceived strategic goal, target and clarity: The first NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay, famously described that NATO's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down".⁵²⁹ This was NATO's goal succinctly described. However, contemporary alignment of states against terrorism still lacks such a succinct goal and a similar alliance structure functioning effectively against terrorism. NATO has been set up as an alliance for institutionalized cooperation against any threat to the political values and regimes of its members, and as such it was an instrument of the wider grand strategy to defend such values and interests. It was serving the grand strategy of containing

⁵²⁶ Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007'Chapter One: Beyond the War on Terror', *Adelphi Papers*, 47:389, 17 — 34

⁵²⁷ Al-Qaeda Central and Al-Qaeda social movement were two different organizational aspects of the threat. For details, Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad-The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

⁵²⁸ Al Qaeda use of Afghan territory under Taliban rule is just one facet of the transnational mode of operations which showed its real significant effect on the states' foreign policies in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe and Asia. Besides, Taliban did not sponsor Al Qaeda, but the reverse is the case. It was hijacking of a failing state that cannot sustain its rule. The Taliban government was sponsored by the terrorist organization in contrast to the cases of state-sponsorship during the Cold War.

⁵²⁹ Schorr, Daniel. "With No Clear Mission NATO Has Little Power" *NPR*, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102618942>

and deterring the Eastern bloc, which was then the main threat to Western political system. The problem with assigning NATO a clear and effective role against terrorism originates in the ambiguity of the threat itself. Clarification of the goal and the strategy was not easy for states due to the fact that the threat of transnational terrorism was vague as Wyn and Aldrich concludes: "...while some officials have begun to identify the shape of current problems more accurately, their elusive nature means that neither Europe nor America yet has convincing answers".⁵³⁰ The threat was open to interpretation - each nation-state perceived and assessed it in its own self-style. States developed different threat assessments over time. Concurrently, the debate among states on the proper response-strategy resulted in different strategies.⁵³¹ This is one of the important limits to cooperation of states, which has its roots in the deterritorialized, non-centric ambiguous threat. The need for cooperation among states in their fight against transnational terrorism arises from the ambiguity of the threat, which is above all the unknown location of the perpetrators. States cannot detect perpetrators on their own. However, ambiguity keeps hindering cooperation when collective efforts do not know where to focus, whom to focus and when to focus.

If terrorism had a headquarters, much cooperation would not be necessary; a single state could destroy it. If it had a territorial base, it would not be terrorism in the very first place. That would be insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Terrorism often manifests itself in urban cities of the world with suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or remote-controlled bombing. Even September 11, 2001 can be seen as a suicide-bombing case, the bombs that suicide-attackers carried were the airliners. Thus,

⁵³⁰Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, p. 906.

⁵³¹Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, 905-923.

Federally Administrated Areas around the Pakistani and Afghan borderlines is a snapshot of the alternation among different forms of unconventional warfare, namely terrorism, insurgency, guerilla war and civil war.

The threat must be clearly understood. Threat scale and nature of the 9-11, 2001 attacks in the US and subsequent attacks of 3-11, 2004 Madrid and 7-7, 2005 London are instructive: In the first place, these attacks were neither nationally-oriented nor so formed. Their mode of working was not nation-state centric. Thus, *modus operandi* of global terrorism seems to be the most original aspect of it. As for the case of September 11 in particular, borderlines were imposingly rendered meaningless because there was not even any belligerency declared by a state in advance. The element of surprise was not military in form *unlike the blitzkrieg raids* of conventional armies in the past. The oceans that separate the US from other continents as the natural buffer zones, which are customarily explained to be factors enhancing American defense, were rendered dysfunctional.

The response to the attacks was controversial in a strategic sense. From a strategy of conflict perspective,⁵³² state-responses must match the threat they target to communicate with the enemy; sending the message that attacks will not go unpunished. However, 'who to punish' became the critical question. The US argued that states may intentionally or unintentionally serve as safe havens for terrorists. Intentional support is state-sponsoring of terrorism. Unintentional support is the use of the territory of failed states by terrorists. The states that support or provide safe haven for terrorists are held to be accountable by means that includes the use of force. That is meant to change the conflict environment from which terrorists are fed. The deterritorialized threat was translated to

⁵³²Thomas C. Schelling. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp.121-130.

territorial terms with the attachment of the states that are held to be accountable. In order for states to take action, the threat needs to be in territorial terms. That is the also the understanding included in the US strategy to counter terrorism.⁵³³

Although the terrorists cannot be located punctually and their whereabouts are not clear before they conduct attacks, the locations or hotbeds of terrorism are sometimes approximated by nation-states. For instance, Pakistan and Afghanistan have vast regions that are out of government control. Although the form of conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan are more about guerilla warfare and insurgency than it is about terrorism, one hotbed of conflict (such as those in the Federally Administered Tribal area along the Afghan-Pakistani borders) is known to authorities in the very least. Therefore, horizontal interagency cooperation among different states that focus on societies within which terrorists are assumed to be residing is seen as helpful by states in the quest to curb transnational terrorism.

Another implication of the ambiguity of the threat is that lack of a clear target leads to other security concerns among cooperative states and among those that do not cooperate: The scale of states' cooperative behaviors must be transnational through interagency coordination among different states in order to match the transnational threat. These cooperative efforts must be built upon agreements on the modalities of cooperation. Modalities are about other inter-related issue-areas such as the non-intervention principle of sovereignty versus intervention in other states; energy security regarding petroleum and natural gas; how to fight terrorists, and how to save failed states. The point is detailed in the last chapter where state responses are examined particularly within the NATO platform.

The necessity to find common ground on issue-areas such as military-

⁵³³2003 Iraq and 2001 Afghanistan interventions seem to be the implementation of the 2002 and 2006 national security strategy documents and Libya also conceded to US demands to relinquish efforts to acquire WMD after the invasion of Iraq.

intervention on the grounds of curbing terrorism, energy security (especially of oil), and how to fight terrorism in general is the implication of the ambiguity of the threat because the ambiguous whereabouts of terrorists provide intelligence threat assessments of a state with a leeway to advise policies that undercut other states' interests. For instance, according to Jervis the way towards the 2003 invasion of Iraq is the result of an assessment which sees that particular states are responsible for terrorism and that use of force against them is a strategic must.

Ambiguity of the threat paves the way for a scalar-variation of the threat or the conflation of scales of violence (local, regional, global and internal, external) which might be taken as a reason for different state strategies. The gist of the point is that the scale of violence is not fixed, it varies: It may be seen either as internal or external at times. However, most of the time, it defies signifiers such as 'internal' and 'external'. That is partly why it is dubbed 'transnational threats'-going beyond national boundaries and interests. The depiction of the September 11 attacks by the world media demonstrates the hardship to understand the scale and deterritorialized nature of violence. Just hours after the incident, many media sources around the world flashed the subtitles 'America at War' that does not hold technically and logically.⁵³⁴ Nor does it make sense theoretically.⁵³⁵ All the political considerations and diplomatic tact aside, the analytical question remained regarding the 'war on terrorism': *Who is the enemy?* It may be known tacitly, but tacit targets are no substitutes for clear strategic ones. Besides, the concept of 'war' appears to be a victim of the ambiguous and unaccustomed deterritorialized nature of the threat as demonstrated most vividly by the response labeled as 'war' after the

⁵³⁴ Military history and strategy does not conceptualize 'war' as a clash between states and non-state actors. Besides, it does not record a 'war' against a tactic, but against an enemy.

⁵³⁵ In International Relations theories, terrorist groups are not regarded as actors or unit of analysis. They are simply not studied as such.

September 11, 2001.

The ambiguity of the threat and enemy is compounded by the asymmetry between the room of maneuver of nation-states and that of terrorists. When states' monopoly of violence inside their territories is challenged by terrorist attacks, different patterns of response appear: On the one hand, when nation-states apply legal use of force, they also take advantage of non-state entities such as private military companies alongside their armies. Since private military companies acquire legal mandate through authorization by states, they are bounded by law just as national armies are. On the other hand, illegal/terrorist violence does not regard law or any restrictions whatsoever. While states cannot act as they please, non-state actors can do so. When states act as they please without regard to other states and established norms of the international society of states⁵³⁶, they act only at the risk of economic sanctions and/or military interventions or at least they risk losing legitimacy that comes with the soft-balancing.⁵³⁷ While states are relatively locked down by these limitations, violent non-state actors are not restrained by similar concerns since they are not sovereign political formations.

⁵³⁶*International society* and *security community* are two intertwined concepts that may be used to describe the community formed by Canada, The United States, Japan and the member-states of the EU. This society of states is also a security community where disputes among them are held to be resolved without threat or use of force. They expect from each other to obey international law, refrain from using force as an instrument of politics. That is why France and Germany were in disagreement with Poland regarding the Iraqi intervention in 2003.

⁵³⁷'Soft-balancing' is explained in Chapter 1 on cooperation, alignments and alliances. Suffice it to note here that when confronted by soft-balancing, losing legitimacy and credibility may become problematic for states in the long run.

7.3. Contemporary Conflict Environment

7.3.1. Terrorism and the State-System during and after the Cold War

It is important to note that neither ‘terrorism’ nor ‘globalization’ is a new phenomenon. Current phase of globalization or that of terrorism has just different forms in our present day. The nature of terrorism is still political yet its methods, organization style, source and mode of operations are different. As detailed in the previous section, it has some distinct characteristics. Those features give way to the label of ‘new terrorism’.

Moreover, terrorists take advantage of the permissive causes that are presented to them by the globalization process. This is where the structural factor of globalization and the nature of the threat feed into one another in keeping the diffusion of power world over. The permissive causes presented by globalization are mainly two-fold: First, there is the impact of current state and mechanism of globalization. Globalization interconnected much of the world through availability of high technological means of various sorts and via telecommunication and transportation. Secondly, the power-vacuum in the aftermath of the bipolar international order cut criminal and terrorists organizations away from state manipulation.

As for the first facilitating factor originating from globalization, supply, logistics and intelligence equation of power struggle became ever more complicated for the nation-state authorities to decipher. In other words, the supply, logistics and intelligence equation acquired a terrorist-friendly usage. For instance, in addition to the orthodox face-to-face contacts such as the hawala method, encrypted-websites are added to the terrorist tool-kit. Technological innovation marked by cell phones, global positioning devices, satellite facilities, fax,

susceptible electronic banking and airliners smooth the way for terrorist operations; also bettering the probabilities of contact between terrorists and criminals. Yet, that does not refer to the dominance of information technology over terrorist operations in all its facets. Alongside being empowered by high-technology, orthodox face-to-face contacts among terrorists (such as hawala or hundis, contacts in transmission of information and money unregulated by states) continue to go to the heart of the issue.⁵³⁸

Second permissive cause is the power-vacuum that cuts criminal and terrorists organizations loose. Terrorism went out of state-control after the end of the Cold War, which is conducive to transnational terrorism. This is the second realm where the nature of the threat overlaps with the structural factors.

Since the end of the Second World War, major war has not taken place amid the leading industrial states. Gist of the waning of major war argument is that war is *not even contemplated or anticipated* among big industrial powers such as continental European states, Canada, the USA and Japan. These states find war as an undesirable means to reach their goals. Accordingly, absence of war among most developed industrial states denotes an estimate of nation-states that probability of regular war among them seems very low even in the long term.

The estimate covers observation of the period since the World War II; however, it is an argument that addresses the post-Cold War era. European states still do not go to war among each other in spite of the fact that the threat posed by the former Soviet Union disappeared. Absence of conventional wars among major powers was also a fact of the Cold War era, lasting into the twenty-first century. The political landscape of rival power-blocs institutionalized mainly as Warsaw

⁵³⁸ Aydinli, Ersel. 2006. "From Finances to Transnational Mobility: Searching for the Global Jihadists' Achilles Heel," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18: 301-313.

Pact versus NATO, and the Cold War was a 'cold' war or struggle during which most powerful states did not openly fight each other on battlefields. However, different from the situation today, there was a grim anticipation of war that was kept at bay via the 'balance of terror'.⁵³⁹ Anticipation of war declined among the mentioned powers starting from the 1950s onwards.

Critical for the formation of the transnational threat of terrorism, the political landscape of the Cold War created a check-and-balance system for all the power-foci in the world. This check-and-balance system was possible owing to tight grip or influence of the two superpowers (the USSR and the USA) over their respective peripheries in Eastern Europe under the Warsaw Pact and Western Europe under the NATO. The Cold War period can briefly be seen as a quest for hegemony in the world and an accompanying ideological clash. During this clash of interests over world domination, the superpowers' sphere of influence over other entities not only comprised peripheral states, but also included non-state entities such as proxy-terrorist groups. Terrorism was a lever with which states tried to reach their various targets.⁵⁴⁰

When states' sphere of influence over their peripheries acquired a different configuration and faded away to certain extent as of the 21st century, a freer political play-ground came into being in comparison to the Cold War. Thus, the end of the Cold War loosened the mechanisms that held non-state entities under state-control. When some of the terrorist groups lost their state-sponsors or patrons, others emerged self-reliant such as the Al-Qaeda. Thus, the end of the Cold War served a relatively freer play-ground for terrorism due to the relaxation of the

⁵³⁹ 'Balance of terror' denotes the credible deterrence situation where the former USSR and the US threatened each other with destruction.

⁵⁴⁰ Ganor, Boaz. 2002. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal*, 1477-271X, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp. 287-304.

superpowers' control of world politics at large.

However, there is more to the evolution of global terrorism, which is related to the decline of major war: As an understudied aspect of terrorism of the Cold War era, terrorism and waning of major conventional wars among most developed nation-states mutually reinforced each other since 1945. Terrorism has been one of the two facilitators of the waning of major conventional war, which was partly possible through the war-by-proxy tactic of the states that manipulate terrorist groups during the Cold War. The other facilitating factor was the balance of terror. The US support for the Taliban and mujahidin before and during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is an example. War-by-proxy is the former stage of the evolution of transnational terrorism, which replaced conventional wars between huge regular army battalions. Superpowers and their peripheries did not often militarily confront each other in the open-battlefield, but they rather conducted covert operations or unconventional wars through sponsorship of terrorism.

Unlike the case in the twenty-first century, terrorism during the Cold War era was mostly a tactic in the service of nation-states. Thereby, terrorism was mainly in the service of state-system during the Cold War whereas it is much more independent as of the turn of the century. Formerly, terrorism was not challenging the main contours of the international state-system itself because terrorist targets were predictable within fixed borders of a certain state, and they did not break free from the control and support of the major powers that dominate the international system.

While that was the political environment of the Cold War from 1945 to 1989, twenty-first century witnesses a rise in the power of non-state entities that are largely freed from state-sponsors. Today, global terrorists are acting at the inter-societal or transnational level; they are, for the most part, capable of operating without state-sponsorship.⁵⁴¹ Global terrorism does not strictly act according to the game-rules of the nation-state-system anymore. They are ‘out of control’.⁵⁴² Global terrorism, unlike the terrorism of the Cold war era, challenges nation-states and the international state-system rather than serving it in the role of a proxy.⁵⁴³

7.3.2. Deterritorialized Economy of the Threat

Not only finance and economy of violence, but economy at world-large are bereft of most nation-states’ full control. Within this control-proof economic environment, economy of violence operates without a fixed geography or territorial address. It manifests itself in global black markets of trade, smuggling and trafficking of drugs, diamonds, electronics, heroin, small weapons, sex-slaves and various covered illicit financial transfers. This is also named as the non-military forms of deterritorialization. The money acquired by these illicit transactions is used by criminal and terrorist organizations to challenge the sovereignty of nation-states.⁵⁴⁴ The interconnectedness among all economic and financial transactions including those of the global black market empowers both transnational corporations and transnational criminal and terrorist entities. The finance of

⁵⁴¹Desouza, Kevin C. and Hensgen, Tobin , “Connectivity among Terrorist Groups: A Two Models Business Maturity Approach”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30:7, 593 - 613

⁵⁴²Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1993. *Out of Control* New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, pp.45-74.

⁵⁴³Yet this does not negate that terrorism’s nature is resiliently same. The difference of the twenty-first century is that global terrorism survives largely without state-sponsorship and it has different methods; this is the ‘new’ feature despite the same nature of politicalness.

⁵⁴⁴Dillman, Bradford. 2007. “Introduction: Shining Light on the Shadows: The Political Economy of Illicit Transactions in the Mediterranean”, *Mediterranean Politics*, 12:2, 123 - 139

violence is possible due to the fact that economy went out of national borders and national control.

The typical example for the interconnected global economy that is free from nation-states' effective control is world economic and financial crises: financial disruption and economic meltdown in one country quickly spreading around the world without regard to territorial boundaries and national controls. 1997 South Asian economic melt-down started in Asia, then quickly felt in Hong Kong, and then jumped to Russia and, in turn, to the West. Likewise, 2001 and 2008 were the dates where a global economic and financial downturn spread across the world. Worldwide-knit-economy or via Thomas L. Friedman the electronic herd⁵⁴⁵ left few nations unaffected from financial crisis that spread all around the world. There is a mismatch between the scale of overall world economic activity and the scale of the national control of economy. In geopolitical lexicon, geo-economics is not constrained to state control alone. As a corollary, finance of terrorism is hard to control, too.

Our world becomes ever more interconnected through mobility of goods and ideas. Economy, culture, ideas and civil and military technology go to many corners of the world. However, borders and states as bureaucratic apparatuses are local and not mobile; they are fixed to geography. Projection of their power and outreach of influence onto their external spheres mainly spring from their territory. Previously, governments could relatively easily control their national economic policies because world economy was arguably not as interconnected as is the case today. At the very least, the speed of transportation of goods and financial transactions were certainly lower before the advance of the information technologic

⁵⁴⁵Friedman, Thomas L. 1999. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; Friedman, Thomas L. 2003. *Longitudes and Attitudes-World in the Age of Terrorism* NY: Anchor Books.

innovations. Seen from the historical continuum of centuries, the world was not cabled and computerized. There were no intergovernmental economic organizations as effective and influential as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank in previous eras. There were few transnational companies - world's local corporations- having branches in many states. Furthermore, the world-wide black market expanded ever more taking advantage from the establishment of new states following the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union, which ended a rival economic system with the result of liberal market principles becoming the single global economic mechanism.

Non-state actors are not always at bad terms with nation-states though; they may also cooperate with them. The nation-state benefits from private entities at times for it give the opportunity to maintain power without much accountability.⁵⁴⁶ In consequence of that, states sometimes may become complicit in the shift of authority to private actors. Hence a direct challenge to the system of sovereign states in the security realm emerges. The point is marked by the existence of 'private armies' or 'private firms' that provide surveillance, intelligence, logistics and manpower. There are private military companies (PMCs) such as Global Risk International, DynCorp, Vinnel, Blackwater Security Consulting, or Erinys. By way of example, private military companies (PMCs) operate extensively in Iraq, sometimes with highly sophisticated military means including helicopters and advanced computer systems allowing them to engage in direct combat as shown during the operations against the Army of Mahdi in May 2004 in the city of Nadjaf⁵⁴⁷.

⁵⁴⁶Bruce Hall, Rodney. "Private Authority: Non-State Actors and Global Governance" *Harvard International Review*, Summer2005, Vol. 27 Issue 2.

⁵⁴⁷Blakely, Gregg. 2002. *Marketized Soldiering: How Private Military Companies Challenge Global Governance, Erode Accountability and Exacerbate Conflict* Unpublished Dissertation-University of

Another example is bluntly provided by Rodney Bruce Hall:

If you have mining interests in Africa and need to get a government changed to permit you to operate without interference, you might ring up a firm specializing in the provision of "security" services with offices around the world that would be willing to fix your little problem for you for a fee. What Biersteker and I call "illicit" authority is exercised by mercenaries and mafias and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) worldwide. Private armed forces and TCOs penetrate weak states and provide under-provided public goods, like security from guerilla violence in Sierra Leone, to public services of kinds from Medellin, Columbia to former Soviet Central Asia. They provide control over the private means of violence where governments do not enjoy a public monopoly of the use of force. Significantly, they provide a means by which private actors, such as transnational corporations (TNC's) can acquire military capabilities. As such they pose a direct challenge to a system of sovereign states in the security realm.⁵⁴⁸

As it is the case with the flow of worldwide finance-capital or states' hardship to control their own economies, national means are not good enough to capture transnational terrorism and its financing. 'Borders of national-economy maintenance' does not match with the borders of economic activities in total. Since the Treaties of Westphalia, physical or territorial borders of a nation remain largely intact on paper. But the intangible borders of economy went ever beyond nation-states' economic sphere of influence. As Al-Qaeda (world's local terrorist organization) plainly shows, borders of national security do not start and end in national borders. That might be taken as an indication of how security and nation-state are gradually becoming globalized. State is becoming globalized because most non-state or societal violence and economic transactions are taking place in its sovereign space, yet nation-states cannot effectively control them. Establishing control is hard because money, technology and information are moving without much hindrance of physical distance. Even if insiders' attacks against their own countries are to be neglected, terrorists are mostly able to take advantage of the advanced civil means of electronic-communication, banking, and advanced

Toronto.

⁵⁴⁸Bruce Hall, Rodney. 2005. "Private Authority: Non-State Actors and Global Governance", *Harvard International Review*, Summer Vol. 27 Issue 2, p. 69.

transportation in infiltrating the borders of a nation. When working mechanism of economy goes beyond national scale coupled with the weaponization of modern transportation and communication into tools of infiltration, it becomes easier for any kind of terrorism to challenge states.

The challenge occurs when a terrorist attack itself occurs: The mere realization of the terrorist act constitutes the challenge because such an attack questions the legitimacy of governments and the legitimacy of state institutions and apparatus. States' *raison d'être* partly depends on the state's ability to keep its monopoly on the use of force. State monopoly on the use of force is legitimized by state's capacity, credibility and duty to protect its citizens. If the state cannot keep such monopoly or when a state fails to protect its citizens, its legitimacy and capacity to exist becomes challenged. Although states' ultimate goal is survival, which is not always about gaining legitimacy rooted in domestic and international public opinion, the concern of sustaining loyalty of citizens is a power-resource for states. Different from earlier historical periods, foreign and domestic politics of states is ever more open to inquiry of citizens and to the world over. Moreover, democratic societies arguably cannot always justify survival or *raison d'état* arguments readily and at all costs. In sum, when states face transnational challenges, they cannot always utilize their territories as a means of effective control and influence. Boulding's 'home strength' argument is therefore not always applicable to transnational and deterritorialized threats. The 'home strength argument' is of the military and national defense lenses. That kind of lenses hardly respond to a grey threat where civil and military realms are enmeshed. Moreover, the dynamics of conflict seem to evolve. It is these evolving dynamics that follow in examining the threat of transnational terrorism.

7.4. Old Threat, New Threat?

Different Perspectives and Non-Cooperation

Although many varieties of terrorism are said to be existing, the basic nature or the ontology of terrorism is one and the same. It is true that methods of terrorism change due to changing technological means of a particular era. However, a change in methods does not equal to a change in its nature. It may make sense to discuss the pre-Cold War era terrorism, the Cold War era terrorism and the twenty-first century terrorism *owing to different methods and capabilities available for terrorists in respective eras.*

Yet, transformation or newness of terrorism is controversial because the basic nature and the basic goal of terrorism seem to be the same over time. Basic nature of terrorism is to challenge and defy the political status quo established by major foci-of-power of a particular era. Terrorism is basically political because it challenges and aims to revise the political environment by unconventional means, and it is used or appropriated by disparate groups for realizing different ideologies. Neatly put, its nature has been to challenge politically and its aim has been to achieve political revision or total destruction of a particular political system in a specific time-period. Throughout history, the basic feature of terrorism has been constantly in place without regard to the different degrees of terrorist success, different technology, ideology and methods employed. When ‘methods’ is taken as the criterion to assess the newness of terrorism, contemporary terrorism comes close to be new; however, when its ‘basic nature’ is concerned it is not new.

‘The new terrorism debate’ is examined because it is directly related to the different approaches and perceptions of nation-states against terrorism. The disagreements on whether terrorism is ‘new’ influences the responses of states and

their divergent policies in fighting terrorism in that while one sees it as a criminal issue another sees it as mainly a military issue. Prosecution through law enforcement versus reactive punishment through military operations constitutes the main axis of diverging nation-state approaches, originating mainly from the perceptions about the new-ness of terrorism.⁵⁴⁹

7.5. Transnationality, Al Qaeda and the PKK:

A Discussion on the Scales of Threats

Since transnational terrorism is not international terrorism, it is determining to examine 'transnationality'. This may help studying non-state entities and the states' cooperative difficulties against them. 'Transnationality' is the co-existence of entities that overlap with one another. 'Entities' can be elaborated as political spaces, which are distinguished by people's loyalty and identity differences. Non-state entities are not territorially demarcated: Inasmuch as they are diffused or atomized, they are more distinguishable through the study of people's identity and loyalty. Therefore, transnational threats are defined more by the dividing-lines within societies than by territorial borders. Transnational terrorism mainly works at the societal level and that is why it occasionally manifests itself as if it were mere internal threat. The scale of the transnational terrorism is a conflation or synthesis of both the internal and the external. As such, it is difficult to pinpoint its adaptive mode of operations, organizational build-up, financial, logistical and human resources.

⁵⁴⁹ Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, pp. 905-923.

A rough illustration may be of the following: an Islamist militant following the teachings of Sayyid Qutb; or a Christian fundamentalist⁵⁵⁰ that follows (Christian) Identity movement which is an anti-Semitic Aryan American movement; or a person that dedicates himself/herself to Pastor Pete Peters; a Green activist that denies all ideologies, but the Green politics; or a feminist and/or Marxist wo/man; a far-rightist that is a member of the Christian Patriots Defense League (CPDL); a social democrat in the European self-style; or even a Maoist or Stalinist; or a person of any persuasion that is different from the above-mentioned leanings can all live side by side in the same city of the same nation-state. They also may contact with people of similar tendencies in other countries. They may occupy *the same territory of a country*, which is itself a particular manifestation of a certain political space. Yet, they communicate and move beyond one territory of a state into another. In that sense, globalization is not an external factor to the state. Globalization cannot be totally external to nation-states due to its transnational character.

Globalization manifests itself in the diffusion of authority and power that are rooted in loyalties and identities of people both *within* and *beyond* nation-states. It is not totally external to nation-states. Since it is not totally external to the state, it might be plausible to discuss ‘globalized security’.⁵⁵¹ As a corollary, the most important feature of ‘globalized security’ is arguably the eroding utility of the distinction between the inside and outside politics of states or the distinction

⁵⁵⁰As the eminent scholars of terrorism point out, ‘fundamentalism’ is historically and jargon-wise associated with Christian religious extremism and violence, not with Islamist violence. Hence the terms, ‘Islamist militant’ and ‘Christian fundamentalism’.

⁵⁵¹Most significantly, the literature on the connection between globalization and security is about the problematic that globalization imposes on the canonical distinction between inside and outside or between domestic and international. The issue, which is theoretically unorthodox, has not been theoretically settled enough to reach an overwhelming academic consensus yet. Bilgin, Pinar. 2005. ‘11 Eylül Öncesinde ve Sonrasında Küreselleşen Güvenliği Anlamak’ (Understanding Globalised Security Before and After September 11), in *Küreselleşme ve Alternatif Küreselleşme* (Globalisation and Alternative Globalisation), Cem Karadeli, ed. Ankara: Siyasal: 59-80.

between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ security due to the new form and methods of terrorism. Indeed, transnational terrorism does not seem to be permitting traditional approaches to stay intact, but rather relativized according to varying contexts and issues.

Implications of globalization on security in general and on nation-states in particular can be explained by keeping on with the above illustration where people with different persuasions live side by side in the same city. Accordingly, *psychological distance* as the cornerstone of the concept of ‘political space’ must be underlined: Although the fact that people with different persuasions live together might sound nothing new, the frequency and pace of contact between people, and the flow of ideas, goods and weapons that transgress borders is. They are not strictly encapsulated and effectively controlled by states as it once was. There have been many citizens of various persuasions in a state, but their volume of contact to other people in other continents has increased. Thus, the example of Green activists, far-rightists, Islamists and Christian fundamentalists, feminists and Marxists living in the same city may be enhanced with the possibility of their reach to similar minded-people in other continents and regions. Contact of people with each other is a crucial determining factor in politics for the reason that non-territorial political spaces are transnational when the psychological distance among people is low independent of geographical or territorial distance.

On occasion, manifestation of the threat that transnational political spaces or transnational groups pose is akin to domestic threats due to insider or citizen involvement. Yet, face-to-face contact is not indispensable for making common cause. The so-called “franchising style” of the Al-Qaeda enables citizens of different countries to join the terrorist cause. Information technology turns out of to

be the dark vehicle of globalization on these occasions that provides access to terrorist masterminds for guidance. Thus, from the policy-making perspective, the threat has internal features. However, the threat does not always remain internal or local, but it is connected to a certain transnational ideology and loyalty that goes beyond state.

Distinguishingly, transnational threats can materialize without the deliberate support of a state. The threat is not necessarily coming from a state though at times it may seem to be manifesting itself as such, too. If a state leader makes ambiguous references about terrorism, it may cause suspicion and indeed lead to reconsiderations of threat assessments. However the state-sponsorship of terrorism should not always be taken as synonymous with transnational deterritorialized terrorism. The citizens of any country may stand up to fight against their own country or against any other country by associating themselves with a certain global terrorist group. To the extent that people do so without any state's deliberate support, the threat is deterritorialized, and not strictly international. Therefore, global threats are not only restricted to the internal realm. Global threats are 'Grade A Transnational'. 'Grade A' signifies the degree of going beyond state-control or sponsorship and the degree of private violence in its organizational build-up, recruitment, logistics, finance and operational tactics of strike. If the threat were restricted to the internal, local or regional realm, the degree of transnationality and the scale of operations would be relatively smaller as seen in the cases of Irish Republican Army (IRA), The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is also called KADEK, Kongra-Gel, or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). However, the threats presented by Al-Qaeda are not local, but global.⁵⁵²It strikes diverse societies at

⁵⁵²Terrorism presented by Al Qaeda is basically political despite religious mobilizing features. It aims to

every continent.

The phenomenon of terrorism can be analyzed under two main categorizations: local terrorism, and global terrorism. *Local* terrorism is terrorism by non-state actors that targets only one single state while *global terrorism*⁵⁵³ is the repeated use of politically motivated violence that targets more than one state without state support. Local terrorist groups also have transnational connections albeit to much lesser degree than that of global terrorism, and distinguishing it again from global terrorism, local terrorist groups usually strike a single country.

To illustrate, we must bear in mind the differences between the activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)⁵⁵⁴, and those of Al-Qaeda. Did PKK bomb institutions, buildings, public places in different countries in the world? Where did Al-Qaeda atrocities take place? The answers to these questions show the differences between local and global agendas of different kinds of terrorist groups operating on separate levels. Al-Qaeda operates almost all around the world (such as Bali, Istanbul, Washington, Madrid and London), whereas PKK's attacks - though having some transnational connections - take place mainly in Turkey.

By way of analogy, violent non-state groups (terrorist groups, criminal groups and the merger of the latter two groups) are like the leeches or parasites that live in and through other organisms/states; yet, they act independently in the case of global terrorism. The analogy is meant to refer to the inextricable co-existence of states and those of non-state actors under globalization. Via Coker, globalization is

achieve political aims to change policies of governments and political regimes themselves. That is not something new about terrorism; however, the scale of its reach and mode of operations, the degree of independence from a state-sponsor is different, which constitutes its newness.

⁵⁵³Ambiguous definitions generically mark international terrorism as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. Definitions of international terrorism are not helpful because it cannot surmount or ease the difficulties presented by the conflated scale of the transnational threat-the constant alteration between inside borders and outside of state borders.

⁵⁵⁴PKK later tried to gain an allegedly more political basis as Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK).

interconnectedness.⁵⁵⁵ Interconnectedness manifests itself both in peaceful and conflictive co-inhabitation of different world-outlooks, loyalties and allegiances. That is, interconnectedness manifests itself in the cooperation and/or clash of different political spaces and dispersed groups that overlap each other. Different political groups may share or intersect at the same territory of a state. Yet, territorial borders are not practical benchmarks to understand whether the threat. Traditional national security lenses do not plan and prepare for global threats, and they are not fit to the conflated scales of threat, which is blurred and alternating between 'internal' and 'external' or between 'domestic' and 'international'. Most of the time, national security doctrines have conventionally been prepared and used against external threats, not against internal ones. That is also exactly why internal security or law enforcement and police operations have come to become significantly useful in fighting against terrorism.

The level at which terrorists are perceived to be operating determines the scale of the terrorist threat. The more the threat is perceived global, the more the number of states whose interests are at stake become. The question of why American administrations would act in total concert with Turkey to erase PKK's terrorist activities is to the point. Whether states perceive to have any vital interest in cooperating against terrorist groups whose attacks focus only on a single state is crucial. ETA, IRA and PKK are among those terrorist groups that strike a single state. They can be studied on a relatively local level. Al-Qaeda type globally active terrorist groups create global problems affecting many states. This global sort of terrorism appears to be highlighting the inevitability of international cooperation more successfully because victim states have a common wound. Thus, local

⁵⁵⁵Coker, Christopher. 2002. "Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk" *Adelphi Paper 245*, *The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, pp.23-24.

grievances resonate locally while global ones do globally.

7.6. Cooperation Setback: The Features of the Threat and Different Threat Assessments

In the light of deterritorialization of the strategic landscape, the difficulties of perceiving and assessing unconventional threats can be disaggregated to the changing weighted-roles of the components of threat assessment. Components of threat assessment are *intention* and *capability* of the adversary. States use them, in concert with one another, to assess threats. *However, nation-state authorities weigh them differently within different menacing contexts. This is particularly and crucially important as to why nation-states differ in their threat assessments.* ‘Intentions’ and ‘capability’ are weighed differently by different nation-states. The way states weigh them is analyzed also differently by three distinct schools of thought, namely Waltzian neo-Realist theory, Liberal Theory of IR via Andrew Moravcsik and the English School via Hedley Bull.

Viewed from the neo-realist system level, structure comes forth as the principal shaping and shoving force for state behaviors. In other words, structure is the permissive and constraining cause for state behaviors. Although structure is not directly determining, it affects the behavior by conditioning it. Within this neorealist approach, capability is taken as fungible with threat formation in the anarchic international system (composed of self-reliant states vying for security in the absence of any supra-state authority to rule over all nation-states). Realist theory, with its assumptions of a unitary state and fixed preferences, simply presumes that the greater the wealth and military power of a state, the less the

marginal cost of deploying it, thus reducing power to capabilities.⁵⁵⁶

Liberal theory suggests different predictions, especially regarding preventive wars initiated by democratic states. Liberal theory of international politics is not democratic peace theory; it rather refers to the Liberal Theory of International Politics as explained by Andrew Moravcsik.⁵⁵⁷ Liberal theory of IR focuses on the link between domestic policies and foreign policies of states. Importantly, it differentiates between liberal ideology and liberal theory. It keeps a distance from democratic peace argumentations so much so that it urges to explain how democratic states can indeed be war-prone and initiate preventive wars.

Through the lenses of a third school of thought, intentions, capabilities and threat formation are, yet again, seen from a separate vantage point. In an ‘international society’ or via Hedley Bull in an ‘anarchical society’, fungibility of capability for threat assessments cannot always be taken for granted.⁵⁵⁸ For instance, the European Union provides a distinct case where intentions are taken to be more important than capabilities in threat formation: despite the fact that Germany does not possess nuclear weapons, it is known to be able to build nuclear weapons in a very short time.

Following the scholars who define the EU as a distinctive actor, capability factor works in a different manner: Provided that political norms and economic situation of the EU remain resilient over time, Germany would probably not be contemplated as a threat against France, Britain or the United States arguably even after it builds nuclear weapons.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵⁶ Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. NY: McGraw-Hill.

⁵⁵⁷ Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics” *International Organization* 51-4, Autumn, pp. 513–553.

⁵⁵⁸ Bull, Hedley. 1977. *Anarchical Society-A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.

⁵⁵⁹ Boniface, Pascal. 1997. *Gücsüzlük İstegi*. Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayınları.

Given these three academic schools of thought trying to understand the threat assessments, policy-makers seem to differentiate between threats emanating from other states and those threats originating from non-state entities. Such differentiation seems likely to matter and move in direct proportion to the ambiguity of transnational terrorism.

In the formation of state-to-state threat assessments or in assessing threats coming from other states, intentions are regarded to be secondary in importance when compared to actual (operational or actionable) capabilities of enemies. The reason why this is so perceived originates in another perception, namely the perception of the nature of intentions. The nature of intentions is generally understood to be mercurial. Intentions are regarded as being intrinsically changeable and erratic. Put differently, intentions are held to be changing quickly in contrast to capabilities that does not change overnight. Besides, intentions are hard to measure due to their abstract nature. Capabilities do not change in a short time and they can at least be operationalized in numbers of weapon systems, machinery and manpower. Therefore, capabilities are more susceptible to measurement than intentions. Last but not least, materialization of violent intentions requires actual capacity. Hence 'capabilities' are seen as more conducive to realistic threat assessment.

The question of relative unreliability of intentions as a determinant of conventional threat assessment remains a point which is hard to dispute. This is due to possible quick changes in intentions of states. From that point forward, intentions become an unreliable factor to count on while making threat assessments. This makes sense especially in the military-strategic context where nation-states are juxtaposed to one another. Unlike the case in domestic politics

where the intention-capability relationship among state institutions may somewhat differ regarding the nature of a regime or the political moves made within the state, the pace of change in intentions matters especially in international security because ‘intention’ includes the willingness to inflict punishment and use of armed force in retaliation for or conditional upon a foreign policy move. That is why assessing the intentions of the possible or actual adversary is vital for national security. Still, role of ‘intentions’ is seconded to role of ‘capability’ in making state-to-state threat assessments for the reasons mentioned-above.

For states, that is the customary way of perceiving and assessing threats. Although this kind of threat assessment speaks to threats that are emanating from other nation-states, it does not always hold true for threats emanating from non-state entities. Since transnational terrorism includes several forms of attack including those conducted by networked-citizens against their own state, the working-mechanism of state-to-state-threat-assessment becomes problematic. The customary way of perceiving and assessing threats is unlikely to be tenable against unconventional threats that may be intra-state, sub-state or simply beyond states.

There are several reasons for why customary threat assessment is not valid enough when faced by non-state threat or use of violence. *First*, perpetrator of the threat is no more a nation-state in such a case, but a group of people (that may also include citizens of target-state) with connections beyond target-state. *Secondly*, since terrorists lack conventional capabilities, they are simply not as resourceful and hierarchically organized as nation-states are. They have to fight unconventionally for they cannot conventionally take on regular armed-forces of nation-states. However, a window of opportunity arises for terrorism: wider range of weapons and weaponization of any nation-state facility. Whether they are

civilian soft-targets (such as a shopping-mall, public transportation vehicles, beaches, discos or bazaars) or protected hard-targets such as military installations, all nation-state facilities can be weaponized onto itself through explosion. Besides, corrupt officials (as intermediaries of the gray markets) smuggle small weapons and nuclear materials from states' arsenal in addition to the leftover weapons from previous conflicts.⁵⁶⁰

Thirdly, transnational terrorism operates horizontally. It is neither accountable to a nation/public nor organized hierarchically. Its organizational scheme is chiefly horizontal: disparate citizens contact each other all around the world and they are capable of acting in many states including their own. In contrast, states have vertical and hierarchical structures that cause an organizational mismatch with transnational terrorism.

Since formation of threats that nation-states pose to its peers is irrelevant to terrorist methods and threats, the conflict environment within which nation-states rival each other and the one in which the non-state entities operate do not correspond to one another. They are asymmetric. However, 'asymmetry' goes further from asymmetry in capabilities into an asymmetry in strategizing. Indeed, the former seems to cause the latter. While victim is thinking through nation-state analytical lenses, aggressor takes no strict nation-state template for its operational plans.

In an asymmetric conflict, nation-states have clear superiority in conventional capabilities such as high precision, surveillance, and fire power; states may use tanks, helicopters and fighting jets against which terrorists cannot respond

⁵⁶⁰ Cukier, Wendy. 2002. "Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Public Health Approach" *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* Spring Volume IX, Issue 1; Kupatadze, Alexander. 2007. "Radiological Smuggling and Uncontrolled Territories: The Case of Georgia" *Global Crime* Volume 8, Issue 1: 40-57.

in kind. *But the problem of nation-states is that terrorists do not have to respond in kind.* Recognizing the conventional superiority of national armies, terrorists dislocate it. They choose to fight by terrorism, an unconventional form of warfare, which does not require them to attack or retaliate in kind. Thereby, they do not have to respond or deal with conventional weaponry. Potential enemies took note of the conventional superiorities and acted to dislocate it. Non-state actors like al-Qaeda developed asymmetric approaches to side-step regular military power of states. Side-stepping occurs by rendering it functionally irrelevant, which in turn is realized through operating in environments where states cannot bring their military capabilities to bear. This is how terrorism as one of the types of unconventional warfare becomes the tactic of the weak. When the fighting terrain is shifted, the weaknesses gradually transform to be strengths. This is the essence of any irregular form of warfare whether of small wars, insurgencies, guerilla war, low-intensity conflict or terrorism.⁵⁶¹

In congruence with the above-mentioned reasons (namely, the permissive international structure that does not allow previous state-control over private violence, availability of power resources for terrorism and existence of horizontal societal linkages across/trans nations), *fourth* reason for why customary threat assessments are not valid enough when nation-states are exposed to terrorist violence is that *the sociological build-up of contemporary terrorism is hard to capture, control or change: The way terrorists use power is different from the way*

⁵⁶¹Warfare is the basic concept denoting clashing applications of violence. It has regular and irregular forms or manifestations. Conventional manifestation is 'war' that place among nation-states. Irregular (unconventional or asymmetric) manifestations of warfare are not referred to as 'war'. They are often referred to as insurgency, low-intensity conflict, guerilla warfare, urban guerilla warfare or terrorism. Although these labels are used to denote different forms of irregular warfare that have some distinctive characteristics, they are not totally separate or mutually exclusive. They are different shades of the unconventional warfare spectrum. They are much more overlapping than completely separate. Nevertheless, on the merits of distinctiveness the most noticeable one seems to be terrorism, which is unattached to territory. Incendiaries or radicals who use terrorism as a political means may occasionally shift among these above-mentioned unconventional or irregular forms of warfare.

states use it. That is because the sociological build-up of non-state entities themselves and the threats they pose are different from those of the states. Formation of threats that nation-states pose to its peers is a subject matter largely irrelevant to terrorist methods and threats, and to debates on how to respond to terrorists per se.

Fifth, terrorists' resolve for destruction (which is reflected in their declarations and past terrorist attacks) indicates their willingness to have a say in politics incommensurate to their legitimacy and legal status. Their illegality gives them the freedom to do anything without international obligations and responsibilities. It enlarges the terrorist freedom of maneuver while increasing the fog of war/strategic uncertainty for nation-states whereas states are bounded by expectations of acting within the framework of law, democracy and individual rights and liberties to keep their campaign legitimate in the eyes of the domestic and international public opinion.

Finally and most importantly, the *sixth* factor that increases the fog of unconventional warfare is that terrorists do not have any address to retaliate at. Terrorists are seemingly civilians without uniforms who act in secrecy. Nation-states do not know where they are or where they live. They do not reside in or cling to a fixed portion of territory. When they start to live and fight on certain territory, the form of unconventional warfare shifts from terrorism to guerrilla warfare. Although guerilla war presents big problems of combat for armies, it is easier to fight against when compared to the military combat against terrorism. It is more susceptible to nation-states' territory-centric mode of combat. Although non-state forms of warfare may oscillate between terrorism and guerilla war, terrorism is not guerilla warfare. Guerilla war is not deterritorialized unlike terrorism, it

concentrates on certain territory. Nevertheless, there is a special kinship between the two forms of unconventional warfare in that it is not uncommon for violent extremists to switch between them.

Under these advantageous circumstances on the part of terrorists, high intention or resolve for destruction comes down to mean high cost for states. It does not compare much whether the probability is low or not; the fact that the probability exists is enough reason for worst-case scenarios to dominate the security agenda of nation-states. How is this possible? Compounded by unpredictable timing of terrorist operations and vague whereabouts of their locations, *intention* cannot be seconded to *actual capabilities* anymore: In a time of ubiquitous technological know-how, weapons and materials, *intention to hurt* matters more than ever. Leaving aside the vulnerability of any civilian facility as a possible target, wide avenues of obtaining weapons exist in contrast to narrow avenues of overseeing whether terrorists acquire them. When violent intentions and declarations have no address or when the place of people that call for destruction is not known to state authorities, a preventive-approach based on intention-analysis came forth as seen in the *preemptive-strike doctrine*.⁵⁶²

Previously, adversarial capabilities of nation-states could be overseen or constantly examined so as to understand whether capability is coupled with intention to destroy. This was the way it was gauged; because whatever the intention was, threat could only materialize with the acquisition of destructive capability commensurate with declared intentions. In other words, capability must correspond to intentions in its amount and magnitude so as to form a credible threat. There has been such proportionality between capability and intention. Faced

⁵⁶²The White House. 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002*. Washington, p.15.

with conventional threats, nation-states weigh or gauge the proportionality between capabilities and intentions with a ‘capability slant’. Capability factor is prioritized because, as discussed above, states’ intentions are hard to perceive and they may change.

The same underlying logic does not appear to be corresponding well to unconventional threat assessments. Since location of terrorists is not easily determined and overseeing whether they acquire additional means of capability is hard, ‘intentions’ or hostile declarations may come to be regarded as reasons for taking action before waiting for the evidence of actual acquisition of capability. For instance, when a terrorist organization declares its intention to acquire weapons of mass destruction as Al Qaeda did repetitively,⁵⁶³ it becomes strategically prudent to incapacitate it as soon as possible because states cannot accurately know how close terrorists are to obtaining or building a nuclear weapon. In the face of the existence of black markets all around the world, Al-Qaeda’s repetitive declarations indicating their pursuit of and willing to use weapons of mass destruction increases the weight of intentions in making threat assessments. When faced by unaccounted and missing nuclear materials from the former Soviet nuclear arsenal,⁵⁶⁴ ‘the factor of intentions’ in making threat assessments gains greater weight.

States’ previous criterion of threat assessment regarding another state which rested mainly on capability-acquisition happens to be coming forward to respond to terrorist threats: Faced with the unconventional threat of terrorism, ‘intention’ may itself become sufficient for states to perceive a vital threat. Indeed, nation-states may perceive existential threats that threaten their survival physically and politically. The case of Israel may be illustrative: When the damage of nuclear

⁵⁶³Ibrahim, Raymond. 2007. *The Al Qaeda Reader*. NY: Doubleday.

⁵⁶⁴Weiner, Sharon. “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction Progress, Problems and Issues for the Future” *The Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 211-235.

terrorism is contemplated for a small state that does not have enough strategic depth to survive after a first-strike or detonation, the point becomes vivid. An alternative contemplation as to what a series of consecutive nuclear terrorist attacks could do to major-power/s raises similar concerns of survival. Even without nuclear weapons, terrorist attacks would still cause great numbers of casualties, political and economic damage and instability. Yet, the point is that even the mere possibility -leaving out the probability- is enough for states to prepare accordingly.

Given that terrorists cannot be located clearly and that their dynamic weapons procurement process cannot be observed punctually, existence of violent intention is neither regarded as inferior to capability-assessments, nor prospective capabilities of terrorist groups are prior to their 'intentions' in considering unconventional threat formation. Indeed, 'intention side' of the traditional threat assessment came to have a bigger role owing to dramatically shortened duration of the formation of threat perception. To count as a threat, capability-acquisition or weapons procurement is not as determining as it once was. It became strategically prudent to act before it is too late to respond against terrorists.

Globalization's impact on distance and strategy is shrunk-distances or 'proximate distances' through advanced communication and transportation. Globalization shortened the time-span of delivery of goods, money, ideas, weapons and people. In parallel, delivery of threats shortened in time, too. Enemies acquired high and fast mobility: High mobility in that they move frequently from one location to another; fast mobility in that their movements or travel are faster than before. That brings about fast delivery of threats. Pace of perceptions followed suit: threat perceptions are formed in very short time span following violent declarations irrespective of capability. 'The factor of intention' in making threat assessments

seems to acquire upper-hand due to the inability to locate all terrorist hubs. In making threat assessments, such an inability reduces the weight of ‘the capability factor’: Without whereabouts, capability cannot be observed and assessed.

Correspondingly, acting before anticipated act of aggression becomes a strategic must. Acting before anticipated aggression is intrinsic to prevention, and prevention is basically about timing. Although above-examined unconventional threats have no address, initiation of response must still come before the initiation of the threat itself. Waiting for evidence of capability-acquisition is strategically unwise. Otherwise, no meaningful defense appears to be possible.

There is an obvious irony though: how to respond to threats whose place are not known to nation-state authorities? That is exactly where and why ‘intentions’ acquire greater weight in threat assessments: Suspicion about different groups of people originates from declarations of violent intentions communicated through media. In consequence of that, anticipation of attack increases because no accurate measure or scalar of threat is available to weigh the imminence of attack. States get suspicious and fearful about the activities of non-state entities, and even more so if they were hit before. Loaded with no measurement of any certainty as to the time and place of attack, suspicion amplifies the intentions factor of threat-assessment. Gradually, the factor of ‘intention of the enemy’ begins to rule in threat assessments. In due course, suspected units (units that threaten states) become potential targets of nation-states irrespective of their capability. However, how to name a ‘threat’ becomes controversial at this juncture. A point of dispute among nation-states arises for generally there is not enough intelligence on the whereabouts and capability of the adversary.⁵⁶⁵ *If nation-states knew the original*

⁵⁶⁵Grimmett, Richard F. Coordinator Specialist in Congressional Research Service National Defense-

location of a terrorist threat, 'intentions' probably would not come to have a broadened role in shaping threat assessments, because it is the lack of information on whereabouts of terrorists and the following lack of information on their capabilities that cause suspicion and fear. Suspicion formed thereby turns 'intentions' into a greater determinant of threat perception and assessment.

Congruent with this argument that 'the intentions factor' have acquired greater role than the factor of the 'capabilities of the enemy' in making threat assessments, Robert Jervis argues that *great fear coupled by great power or capacity to punish* causes significant counterterrorism responses.⁵⁶⁶ The United States of America shocked and humiliated by September 11 terrorist attacks fears similar and even bigger subsequent attacks. It apparently and understandably cannot overrule the probability of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Its foreign policy behavior, especially the 2003 intervention in Iraq, is the implementation of the principles of preemptive-strike doctrine enshrined in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America of both 2002 and 2006.⁵⁶⁷ Ideological value-judgments aside and notwithstanding the debate whether America's actions are justified or whether they are pre-emptive or preventive, why and how America acted the way it did after September 11 can probably and partly be explained by the rising weighted-role of 'intentions of enemy' in making threat assessments due to high fear and suspicion of nation-states originating in violent declarations with no address. This is a rather technical explanation for why states acted as they did after September 11. However, perceptions of the international

Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division, USA. 2006. *9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status*, December 4, RL33742.

⁵⁶⁶Jervis, Robert. 2003. "Compulsive Empire", *Foreign Policy* July-August, pp. 83-87; Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge, pp. 54-58.

⁵⁶⁷2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002* Washington: White House, p.6; 2006. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America March 2006* Washington: White House, p.18.

public opinion may differ: strikes that originate from the above-mentioned conditions would arguably be regarded as being more plausible in the international arena when directed against terrorist hubs rather than nation-states. At the very least, a political rhetoric presenting the situation as such would ease out the tensions among both states and publics for then they might not see pre-emptive strikes as threat to themselves and as a preliminary example-setting foreign policy move that damages sovereign-nonintervention principle. This would require a different set of actions that involve the participation and cooperation of states within which terrorists are presumed to be residing or sheltered, rather than addressing states themselves as targets.

CHAPTER 8:

**THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTER ON NATO TRANSFORMATION,
THE NEW THREAT AND
THE CONVERGENCES-DIVERGENCES OF THE ATLANTIC
ALLIES REGARDING THE NEW THREAT***

8.1. Interviews conducted with NATO Authorities

NATO's cooperation with former adversaries did not prove to be easy as political adviser James Bergerson puts it: "Russians did not show up to be the partners that we hoped they would be".⁵⁶⁸ Robert Wedan agrees by stressing the importance of solidarity: "The quality of the group is as strong as the weakest link in the group".⁵⁶⁹ The NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Guy Roberts, in an interview with the candidate, underlined the difficulties of working with new members and partners: "An Estonian official came

*'The new threat' (the working definition as defined in the introductory chapter one, and elaborated in chapter two) is used as only referring to the different dimensions and manifestation of transnational terrorism short of getting involved in the new terrorism debate.

⁵⁶⁸The candidate's interview with James Bergerson, Political Adviser to Admiral Bruce Clingan-Commander Striking Force NATO, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19 October 2009.

⁵⁶⁹The candidate's interview with Robert Wedan, Office of General Council, Department of Defense, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19 October 2009.

out to be a spy that worked for the Russians and took NATO classified information to Russia.”⁵⁷⁰ These instances of uncooperative behaviour coupled with spying dampen the embryonic culture of intelligence-sharing. Intelligence-sharing is important regarding almost all fields of NATO work-load, yet it is particularly significant for the alliance’s new goal of fighting terrorism.⁵⁷¹

However, cooperation difficulties are not limited to difficult transition of former enemies into partners. NATO authorities stress that intelligence gathering, exchange and assessment acquired an all-time high importance due to the terrorist threat that they confront. Guy Roberts underlines the features of the new threat as the reason for the increasing need to acquire reliable intelligence: “Non-state entities took advantage of technology and globalization well-before nations did.”⁵⁷² Roberts’ emphasis testifies that transnational terrorism is the advanced form of private violence under the effects of globalization. As private sector and transnational corporations are good at using technology, perpetrators of private violence follows suit in using high-technology.

Availability of technology, weapons and funding are the structural effects of globalization, which requires a different response: Roberts goes on to indicate that “the threat is daring but not invincible. It can be defeated, however, by a network of networks composed of nations and international organizations.” The phrase ‘network of networks’ has become a catch-word for the NATO’s comprehensive

⁵⁷⁰The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

⁵⁷¹Newsome, Bruce. 2006. “Expatriate Games: Interorganizational Coordination and International Counterterrorism” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:75-89; Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 3, October, and, Interview with Guy Roberts, NATO MIO Seminar, Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

⁵⁷²The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

counterterrorist strategy especially after the 2002 Prag, 2004 Istanbul and 2006 Riga Summits of the NATO.

Yet again, implementation of the Summit decisions faces obstacles other than the effects of globalization. Societal problems of governments constitute great impediments in establishing ‘a network of networks’. This has also repercussions for NATO policies. It is instructive to trace the institutional threat assessments of NATO during the late 1990s in order to understand the difficulties of fighting transnational terrorism today. What is rarely mentioned about the latest NATO Summits is their political and societal background, which gives clues as to what extent states are prepared to define and declare the threat clearly, and thereby reduce the ambiguity of the threat assessments used for the political and operational phases of inter-state responses.⁵⁷³

Even before the current Strategic Concept, namely the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, is adopted and before the consecutive terrorist attacks around the world took place in the timeline of 2001-2010, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, in 1995, stated that “Islamic militancy has emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to NATO Alliance and Western security.”⁵⁷⁴ According to NATO Secretary General Claes, the threat was more than that of the Cold War due to the fact that it encompassed elements of ‘terrorism, religious fanaticism and the exploitation of social and economic injustice’.⁵⁷⁵ This would appear to suggest that NATO has for long recognized the severity of the threat. However, it is not exactly

⁵⁷³Williams, Timothy N. 2004. *EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism*, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, www.isn.ethz.ch, p.195.

⁵⁷⁴Williams, Timothy N. 2004. *EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism*, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, www.isn.ethz.ch, p.194.

⁵⁷⁵Williams, Timothy N. 2004. *EU-NATO Cooperation in the Fight Against Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism*, Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, www.isn.ethz.ch, p.195.

the case: “Claes’ remarks caused widespread outrage across the Muslim world, and he quickly retracted them.”⁵⁷⁶ The fact of public outrage portrays the difficulties of European and American governments in tackling the religious extremism openly: NATO documents do not specify the threat. The threat definition is left unclear due to the reluctance to stir riots and protests in cosmopolitan capitals. It also translates to that countering terrorism is also an internal security problem especially for the European governments that could not manage to integrate their immigrants in full.⁵⁷⁷ This is particularly important in confronting religious-political extremist dimension of the transnational terrorism threat, which is also ‘a threat within’.⁵⁷⁸ Different from the former Soviet threat, transnational terrorism is not only ‘out there’, but also ‘here within’ the societies.

Comprehensive strategies presume a conception in that a combination of networked national policies with again a network of international organizations would fulfill the task of countering transnational terrorism, hence a network of networks. Such a strategy is being crafted in a way that corresponds to the new dimensions of the transnational terrorism threat whose features enforce authorities to respond to both internal and external threats.⁵⁷⁹ In answering such a combination, internal and external tools of state apparatus such as law enforcement, judiciary, military strategy and intelligence has become simultaneously important. Indeed, there have to be a synergy among the latter. However, NATO does not have an

⁵⁷⁶Pipes, Daniel. 2002. “Who is the Enemy?” *Commentary*, January.

⁵⁷⁷Lindstrom, Gustav. 2004. “Protecting Europe”, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/>

⁵⁷⁸Chalk, Peter. William Roseanau. 2004. *Confronting the “Enemy Within”: Security Intelligence, The Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies*, www.rand.org; Chalk, Peter. 2000. “The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” in Fernando Reinares ed., *European Democracies against Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation* Aldershot, pp. 175–210.

⁵⁷⁹Hamilton, Daniel, Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, James Townsend. 2009. *Alliance Reborn-An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century*, The Washington NATO Project of Atlantic Council of the United States, Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, February.

intelligence unit operating on its own: It depends upon the capabilities of its member-states. The same also goes for any other aspect of the collective effort undertaken because NATO is inter-governmental in organization and all member-states have sovereign prerogatives such as national decision-making, refusing or acceding to a new Memorandum of Understanding⁵⁸⁰ (MoU) that is intended to develop a new policy, or restraining intelligence as they see fit.

Thus, nation-states (as sovereign bodies) not only must come to an agreement on the terms of a policy prior to its implementation, but they must also devise new protocols to overcome 'classical problems of intelligence sharing'.⁵⁸¹ Yet, governmental decisions and preferences are preliminary for intelligence exchange to be conducted. Although intelligence-sharing is crucial for both policy-making and implementation, it must also be activated by the preferences and decisions of nations. However, different political cultures and national preferences seem to be limiting the inter-state cooperation within the framework of NATO:

The transatlantic disputes of the past two years have undermined any prospect of updating it (the 1999 Strategic Concept). One result of the transatlantic disputes within the NATO organization is the lack of agreement on the development of the purpose and mission of the organization, and how to modernize the pre-conflict decision-making process. If nothing else, according to Ronald D. Asmus, NATO

⁵⁸⁰Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is one of the building-blocks of a new policy by the member-states not only for NATO alone, but it is a common international legal and diplomatic instrument to determine and activate 'the best practices' to be followed.

⁵⁸¹The problematic of intelligence-sharing is illustrated by the Former Director General UK Security Service Stephen Lander in the following vein: "International intelligence cooperation is something of an oxymoron. Intelligence services and intelligence collection are at heart manifestations of individual state power and of national self-interest. The very language used about the work makes the point. British legislation talks about 'national security' and the UK's 'defence and foreign policies'. The role of the UK agencies is, thus, essentially to support and supplement other government activities where adversaries' secrets are involved. In terms of international relations, the role is, therefore, necessarily competitive if not aggressive. Intelligence is able, to pull out a few examples, to (a) maximise the effectiveness of your own armed forces by illuminating others' capabilities and dispositions; (b) to secure comparative political or strategic advantage internationally by disclosing others' intentions; or (c) to protect the safety and well-being first and foremost of your own citizens, if necessary at the potential expense of someone else's (e.g. action against people smuggling and the deportation of terrorists)", Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. "International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 3, October, p. 481.

needs to reinvent itself politically to create a functioning EU-NATO relationship as well as a strategic EU-US relationship.⁵⁸²

In addition to the need for prior agreement among the Allies with regard to rebuilding the relationships of EU-NATO and EU-US, the new basis of the relationships should address the new dimensions of the threat. Any form of response that excludes a networked-form of strategizing does not address the new threat. Indeed, this is acknowledged by the NATO member-states through Riga Summit Declaration on 29 November 2006 and Prag Summit Declaration on 21 November 2002.⁵⁸³

To implement such a networked-response, NATO 'tries'⁵⁸⁴ to follow a two-track policy:

First track is internal overhauling: NATO established a new Command, the Allied Commander Transformation (ACT). Thus, command structure and organization is being modified. The ACT underlines the importance that NATO attaches to the new threat. It indicates the importance given to the new threat more than the first-time invocation of the Article 5 of NATO Charter in 2001 does. Invocation of Article 5 was as a sign of solidarity with the US, and NATO's role and mission extended qualitatively beyond its Strategic Concept and beyond its traditional core concern in Europe. However, the ACT points to an attempt at

⁵⁸²Henning, Riecke. 2005. "The Need for Change" *NATO Review*, Special Issue-Spring, p. 14; Asmus, Ronald D. 2003. "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance", *Foreign Affairs*, September-October.

⁵⁸³Prag and Riga summit declarations, as they are in the NATO Online Library, can be retrieved from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> and <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>

⁵⁸⁴Kamp, Karl-Heinz. 2009. "Just What Is It For?" NATO Defence College, Rome-Chatham House, October, pp.24-25; Security and Defense Agenda (SDA) Discussion Paper – Belgium "Re-Launching NATO, or Just Re-Branding It?" <http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/>; Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. 2009. "Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process of Strategic Change" *International Affairs* 85: 2, 211–226; Hunter, Robert E. *NATO after the Summit-Rebuilding Consensus*, Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs on May 6, 2009; Herda, Graeme P. and Tuomas Forsberg. 2008. "Constructive Transatlantic Strategic Dissonance: Making a Virtue out of Vice?" *International Politics*, 45, 364–381.

modifying the Alliance mission. NATO has also embarked upon an Article 5 operation, namely Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). OAE is NATO's only Article 5 operation, and it was the first substantive military action the alliance took after the September 11 attacks to address the terrorist threat. According to General James L. Jones, OAE indicates NATO's shift from common defense to common security.⁵⁸⁵ Operation Active Endeavor has been significant for the Allies because:

This activity corresponds both to Washington's goal of preventing terrorist attacks and to NATO's antiterrorism strategy. After deploying in the eastern Mediterranean in October 2001 as a deterrent and surveillance measure in support of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, OAE evolved into a broader counterterrorism initiative. It expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean in 2003; and during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it escorted ships through the Strait of Gibraltar (at the United States' request) to alleviate concerns that terrorists might target such ships. OAE has focused on monitoring shipping and the safety of ports and narrow sea lanes.⁵⁸⁶

The second track of NATO transformation policy is its urge to establish partnerships with other organizations. Since September 11, 2001, NATO as an Alliance has continuously emphasized cooperation among international organizations. That is, it aims to work with other regional, international, supranational and global organizations such as the European Union on rebuilding EU-NATO and EU-US strategic relations, the United Nations on the legal regulations, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on illicit trafficking, democratization, border guards and interdiction training, and World Customs Organization (WCO) on controlling all customs regulations in the world.

In short, NATO's response against transnational terrorism is covered mostly in NATO transformation process, which includes two dimensions: an internal rearrangement dimension with its new command structure and operations, and

⁵⁸⁵General James L. Jones, "NATO: From Common Defense to Common Security," Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 7, 2006, <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2006/hrg060207a.html>.

⁵⁸⁶De Nevers, Renée. 2007. "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Spring, p. 41.

secondly, the inter-organizational cooperation dimension. This is the gist of NATO's transformation and its attempts to respond to the transnational terrorist threat. These two dimensions with new missions are further detailed in the following pages, but it might be useful now to turn to other relevant points regarding the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation and different approaches to 'the new threat'.

Previously, NATO did not work with an eye on institutional partners. During the Cold War up to the late 1990s, NATO members mainly concentrated on cooperation among each other rather than with other international organizations. The urge to create new institutional partnerships is a new dimension of the Alliance. This second track of NATO transformational policy is a novel feature, fundamentally because the new threat requires the Alliance to conduct joint work with other regional and international organizations. The first track of organizational rearrangement within the Alliance aims to re-organize the cooperative relations among the NATO member-states and new partner states, while the second-track aims at realizing inter-organizational cooperation with an emphasis on the OSCE, World Customs Organization, the EU, the UN, the Council of Europe and the Mediterranean countries.

These are the institutional methods with which NATO tries to answer the transnational terrorism threat. While these methods (intra-alliance rearrangements and inter-organizational cooperation) gives the ongoing institutional response, it is also important to underscore over what issues these methods are applied. NATO, in partnerships with other international organizations, concentrates on several new topics. These topics are new when compared to its previous Cold War activities centered on military build-up and war contingencies among national armies.

The new topics are terrorism with a global reach, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illicit trafficking, land borders security and maritime security or the surveillance of transportation that might possibly include weapon components of different sorts. All of these issue-areas are chosen as the necessary fields to answer the new threat. However, it is important to emphasize that NATO does not make a clear distinction between the threat of terrorism and that of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The relation between the latter two is ambiguous. This is mainly due to two factors: first, different counterterrorism cultures of its members lead to different response strategies. That is, allies perceive the threats differently. While the US perceives the new threat as a ‘new terrorism’, the EU does not agree on the novelty of contemporary manifestation of terrorism.⁵⁸⁷

Secondly, the connection between WMD and terrorism is ambiguous due to the ambiguity of the new threat that is open to different assessments. The occurrence of different threat assessments and consequent different methods or strategies of fighting terrorism originate from divergent security understandings or counterterrorism cultures. The ambiguous features of the threat facilitate national divergences. The noticeable features of the threat that cause ambiguity (and the points of disagreement among states in carving out a common strategy to fight it) are:

- Multiple nation-state targets: It *strikes a large group of nation-states, not a single nation as a fixed target*
- *Ideologically active all around the world*: Its counter-hegemonic ideology resonates transnationally, not nationally. *Advantaging a transnational*

⁵⁸⁷Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence?” *International Affairs* 81, 5, 905-923.

ideology that has mobilizing set of ideas (which encourages and achieves suicide-missions) spreading around the world as a counter-hegemonic claim against democracy, rule of law, human rights and secularism.⁵⁸⁸ A hybrid ideology with both religious and secular features.

- *Operationally active around the world at the inter-societal level* across state borders
- *A massive and dispersed body of followers* all around the world whose whereabouts are unclear
- *No state-control*, manipulation or sponsorship
- *Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing* that is supported by black markets and corrupt officials⁵⁸⁹
- *Lack of a territory* (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which cancels deterrence
- *Incorrigibility*; closed to bargaining, negotiation or compromise
- *Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing* as determined choice; pursuing any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD
- Possessing *suicide-bombers* as the smartest mobile bombs⁵⁹⁰
- *Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology* in carrying out attacks (the use of traditional methods of money transaction

⁵⁸⁸Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629–643; Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7, 547–569; Ozen, Cinar. 2007. "Al-Qaeda's Religious Terrorism and the New Cold War", *COE-DAT Newsletter* Vol. 1, Issue 4, November, pp.16-19.

⁵⁸⁹Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. "Countering Terrorist Support Structures". *Defense Against Terrorism Review DATR* Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29.

⁵⁹⁰Pape, Robert. 2005. *Dying to Win*. New York: Random House.

such as hawala, hundis, and also modern banking system, and modern weaponry and instruments such as explosives, GPS and the Internet)

- A learning curve higher than other terrorist groups, which enables to be *adaptive to state-responses*.
- *Being devoid of international law* requirements and sanctions (extended room of operational maneuver in comparison to that of states)
- *Unaccountability* and *due lack of responsibility* to protect a population or followers
- Invisibility; *upper-hand of surprise attack* against states

The US assesses the new threat as being more about both terrorism and WMD as a compact, whereas countries such as Germany and France are more inclined to make a separation between terrorism and proliferation of WMD.⁵⁹¹ However, these two issues are interlinked on WMD-terrorism, which is WMD use by terrorists. On the latter, the Atlantic Allies are mostly in agreement about protective measures, yet again they diverge on the pro-active measures such as pre-emptive and preventive strikes.⁵⁹²

More importantly, although the threat is acknowledged by most of the Allies, the difference comes with the strategy to be followed to counter the threat of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism. While the US sees the latter as inter-related top national security threats, Europe slows down the beat of urgency and warns that the threat must not be exaggerated or inflated in a way to deviate the Allies from concentrating on anti-terrorism methods that avoid use of

⁵⁹¹Binnendijk, Hans, David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler. 2005. "A New Military Framework for NATO," in Simon Serfaty ed. *Visions of the Atlantic Alliance: The United States, the European Union, and NATO* Washington DC: CSIS Press, pp. 85-89.

⁵⁹²Andrews, David M. ed. 2005. *The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

force.⁵⁹³ Europe is more inclined to separate the issue of terrorism from that of WMD.⁵⁹⁴

This point of divergence indicates a serious problem not only for counterterrorism cooperation, but a problem for the future solidarity and mission of NATO because the difference on the use of force (and the differences between *European anti-terrorism measures* short of using force and *the US counter-terrorism measures* for that matter) constitutes one of the main bones of contention among the generic European approach and that of the US:

Differences over the nature of NATO's future role and mission are deep. They include concerns over "reliance on the use of force, the legitimacy of pre-emptive war, and whether to foment sweeping political change throughout the Middle East." Rather than confront these differences, the Alliance has avoided them and it now resembles "an alliance of choice, not commitment." The enlargement of the Alliance to include twenty-six members and the continuation of consensual decision-making practices reinforces a disconnect between military and political decision-making. It also neglects the profound transformation of the Alliance from primarily a military defense pact into a political instrument to promote stability and support democratization.⁵⁹⁵

Illicit trafficking is another issue-area that NATO deals with in the aftermath of the Cold War. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, illicit trafficking, border security, maritime security, proliferation of WMD and terrorism came to be understood as interrelated subjects - a group of issues that requires 'a comprehensive approach', which have become a buzz-word for international organizations.⁵⁹⁶ Indeed, the NATO, World Customs Organization, the United Nations, the EU and the US have decided to follow comprehensive strategies that have common points. However, as

⁵⁹³Bendiek, Annegret. 2008. "Counter-terrorism and police cooperation: combining effectiveness with democracy" Wednesday, 04 June, <http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=699>

⁵⁹⁴Guertner, Gary L. "European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy", *Parameters*, Summer-2007, pp. 33-37.

⁵⁹⁵Seroka, Jim. 2007. "Security Considerations in the Western Balkans: NATO's Evolution and Expansion" *East European Quarterly*, XLI, March, No. 1, p.29. As of 2010, NATO has 28 independent nation-state members. NATO, in its official website, is defined as a 'military alliance of democratic states in Europe and North America.'

⁵⁹⁶Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor, in NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.

Roberts underlines, there seem to be differences on the implementation phase.⁵⁹⁷

Guy Roberts, in answering the main problem of the Allied cooperation, maintained that ‘Threat is same, but the execution of response is different.’ In addition, he summarizes ‘the comprehensive approach’ of NATO as creating “a network of networks” among international organizations and nations in order to counter terrorism-related threats including that of WMD terrorism. Yet, such effort is a multiheaded-one with divergent interpretations about the way the common response is undertaken.

Although each of these new issue-areas that NATO works on may be regarded as constituting a threat on its own, the hybrid threat or transnationality of ‘the new threat’ is assessed by NATO as requiring a correlation among all these areas.⁵⁹⁸ Nevertheless, in practice, the NATO’s priority seems to fall on WMD proliferation and WMD-terrorism, not on terrorism per se.⁵⁹⁹ As of late military interventions, the spread of WMD to other states (horizontal proliferation) and the probable access of terrorists to WMD materials and devices are associated with the 2003 Iraq intervention by the US. Terrorism, as a subject-matter separate from WMD proliferation, is more discussed within the framework of Afghanistan intervention of 2001 and within the counterinsurgency against the Taliban forces and Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan along the Afghanistan borders often referred to as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Yet, NATO is on the sidelines in the ongoing combat roles in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the unconventional

⁵⁹⁷The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

⁵⁹⁸The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

⁵⁹⁹The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

war-fighting is done by a group of countries that voluntarily participate. It is oftentimes called as 'coalition of the willing'. Before detailing the Coalition of the Willing and the relevance of Afghanistan and Iraqi conflicts for the inter-state cooperation against the new threat, it is important to keep on with the changing threat assessments.

NATO threat assessment focuses on WMD use by terrorists as the heart of hybrid threats. NATO top officials that are interviewed in 1999, 2005 and 2009 told the candidate that NATO does not see WMD terrorism as a farfetched threat assessment. Thus, it is a constant concern through the 2000s in assessing the strategic environment. Although some countries regard it as an issue that is too-much politicized, most major powers of the Alliance agree that the threat exists. That is one of the basic reasons behind the establishment of WMD Center in NATO.

WMD proliferation has been assessed as a threat during the Cold War, too. NATO threat assessment includes WMD long before the contemporary sequence of terrorist attacks. However, what is fundamentally different as of the first decade of the new century is that NATO countries, in cooperation with the UN, started to penetrate proceedings of new internal and international legislature to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. This is new for NATO. In that regard, Robert Wedan, Office of General Counsel to US Department of Defense underlined that NATO must elevate its legislative entrepreneurship by giving force to the recent resolutions such as UNSCR 1540 of 2004. He underlines that strategy and law became interrelated, and that there is no other way to devise an effective response to terrorism and proliferation without addressing legal problems that obstruct nation-states' cooperation against terrorism. He goes on to maintain that the

addition of law into strategic planning, or the need to consider legal requirements in designing counter-strategies is a feature of the new strategic environment.⁶⁰⁰ This points, again, to the structural effect of globalization, which connects separate fields of work to one another. Categorizing bureaucratic realms or separating different job-definitions became harder. NATO has worked with lawyers all along; however, NATO military doctrines and strategy did not have any noticeable legal element. Now, law and strategy are combined in order to devise an effective response because the internal threats and the external threats conflated into each other through transnational terrorism threat. NATO countries urge all nations to support interdiction of suspected vessels at sea, protect military hardware against terrorist attacks and participate in the UNSCR 1540. Although UNSCR 1540 is not an initiative taken within the NATO institutional framework, the Resolution is crafted by the diplomatic attempts of the NATO members in the Security Council.

The connection between legal initiatives and the NATO is not restricted to undertakings in the international realm. In the long interview conducted by the candidate, Wedan outlined the importance of domestic law of nations in devising an international cooperative response against terrorism: “International law has big respect for sovereignty. That means working through domestic systems. Sovereignty is the linchpin of the international system. It is also central to counter-proliferation. For instance, no legal enforcement with teeth in Chemical Weapons Convention exists because states are sovereign bodies. The same goes for counterterrorism, too. The domestic laws of nations are determining. Giving teeth to international law enforcement requires states to refer to domestic law. For example, UNSCR 1540 calls upon the states to take cooperative action to prevent

⁶⁰⁰Interview with Robert Wedan, Office of General Council, Department of Defense-US, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.

illicit trafficking in accordance with their national legal authorities and international law. The Resolution seeks to prevent WMD and their means of delivery from getting into the hands of non-state actors.”

Thus, NATO urges states to take necessary domestic measures to ratify new resolutions into law that aims to curtail terrorist logistics. In that regard, the UNSCR 1540 has a binding nature for all the UN member-states. However, Eric Rosand argues that the implementation process has not yet foreseen a group of experts to provide independent analysis to reduce problems of coming together:

It will be difficult to convince many countries of the urgency of the threat and the need to allocate the necessary domestic resources to address it without any independent analysis to explain why the threat is not simply the possibility that al-Qaida might employ WMD in an attack against the U.S. homeland or its interests abroad, but that, for example, biological or chemical agents produced in a sub-Saharan African country with lax monitoring of any biological or chemical facilities could be used by a local insurgency group or in the context of a civil war.⁶⁰¹

Thus, domestic and international law have become involved in preventing terrorist use of WMD. Law has an important part to play in addressing the threat of terrorism per se because contemporary dimensions of terrorism manifest itself both as an internal and external threat. Involvement of law in strategy is regarded by NATO as one of the important aspects of fighting terrorism.⁶⁰² However, each nation-state must adopt the UNSCR 1540 as their internal law so as to implement it effectively. That is one of the examples of how domestic law has started to find its way into the Allied strategy. Yet, the ratification of agreements or implementation of the UN Resolutions by many sovereign nations takes a long time that paralyze the collective-effort. Persuasion of all NATO members is desirable, but it does not appear to be feasible in a short period of time. Another example is the use of the 2005 Protocol to (the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful

⁶⁰¹Rosand, Eric. 2009. “Global Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540-An Enhanced UN Response is Needed”, *Center for Global Counterterrorism Cooperation*, October Policy Brief.

⁶⁰²“Examining NATO’s Transformation”. 2005. *NATO Review*, Special Issue Spring, pp. 36-39.

Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome 1988) the SUA Convention, in combination to the UNSCR 1540 of 2004.⁶⁰³

States must internalize these resolutions and protocols, which are aimed at responding to the new threat, before an international response is strengthened. This is why NATO is sometimes operationally-sidelined in maritime interdiction operations when there is an instant intelligence on a sea vessel carrying weapons or weapon materials and devices, and this is partly why Coalition of the Willing-type state groupings or alignments are recently seen as the better-suited response.⁶⁰⁴ This seems to be a case of simple arithmetic where increasing number of states decreases the chances of finding a common denominator for all.

Yet, cooperation problems are not restricted to nation-states per se; there are also institutional problems of cooperation at the international organizations level: As a partner institution to NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concentrates on terrorism and illicit trafficking of waste materials, drugs, human beings, WMD, WMD related devices, weapons-material and delivery means. OSCE also seeks to strengthen cooperation with other international organizations under its policy of ‘comprehensive security.’⁶⁰⁵ For instance, OSCE and NATO cooperate on training maritime security personnel and border guards training. Given its tasks, it might be suggested that OSCE could conduct joint-work with other institutions, such as the EU, that has similar tasks. Yet, the status of the cooperative relations between OSCE and the EU, Bolton stresses, hints at the counterterrorism cultures of states. “The cultures of these organizations reflect the

⁶⁰³Malirsch, Maximilian and Florian Prill. 2007. “The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention”, *ZaōRV*, 67, 229-240.

⁶⁰⁴Tago, Atsushi. 2009. “When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ ”, *Journal of Peace Research* 46, 219, p. 220.

⁶⁰⁵Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor, in NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.

strategic understandings of their state members, we do things in different ways”, says Henry Bolton the OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor.⁶⁰⁶

Moreover, he goes on to underline another point, which is about institutional competition: ‘OSCE and the EU are fighting like cats and dogs. The rivalry and envy between these two institutions hinder cooperation against terrorism.’⁶⁰⁷ While NATO can be set apart from OSCE and the EU due to its military origin, the latter two are more of a non-military security organization that does not focus on the contingencies of the use of force. OSCE and the EU reflect a rather common approach based on anti-crime methods. They both emphasize the binding role of law in implementing policies. Despite the seemingly common approach, they reportedly disagree with each other owing to simple envy.

The OSCE gives training to nations’ personnel on three fields: political-military security, economic and environmental security, and human security. It is also a platform to establish political dialogue among states. These have been the issue-areas of OSCE. However, Bolton notes that job-definitions are blurred and changes quickly during the last decade: “We were training customs officers, and then we started to train border guards,”⁶⁰⁸ and in his answer to the candidate’s question as to what are the limits to international cooperation, Bolton enumerated the following inter-state and inter-organizational problems *at world-large*:

- Insufficient forward planning
- Insufficient cohesion: Reactive policies
- Still not thinking out of the box

⁶⁰⁶Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor, in NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.

⁶⁰⁷Interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor in NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.

⁶⁰⁸The candidate’s interview with Henry Bolton, OSCE Senior Border Issues Advisor in NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 21 October 2009.

- Insufficient interagency information exchange and insufficient convening or meetings
- Weak intelligence analysis
- Insufficient up-streaming and route disruption

Mr. Bolton emphasizes that almost every international organization and nation has these cooperation shortfalls. Although Guy Roberts agrees with Henry Bolton, he adds: “Nevertheless, we (NATO) are transforming. We’ve gone well beyond the traditional military issues. We need to reach out other organizations more, to civil society and industry”.⁶⁰⁹ When asked about the reason for reaching out other organizations, Roberts answers in one sentence: ‘the complexities of the threat.’ During the interview, he wrote down ‘three qualities that complicate the definition of the contemporary threat of terrorism’.⁶¹⁰

- State actors vs. Non-state actors
- Financial motivations and prestige
- Transnational networks⁶¹¹

The network that A. Q. Khan established was given as the best example to these qualities of the new threat. Experts had suspected Dr. Khan for a long time, but couldn't confirm their suspicions until October 2003, when Italian authorities

⁶⁰⁹The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

⁶¹⁰In this respect, Ozen, Cinar. 2008. “International Strategic Cooperation in Asymmetric Warfare and the Problem of Defining ‘Terrorist Organization’ ”, *COEDAT Newsletter* Vol. 2, Issue 7, July, pp.18-22.

⁶¹¹The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

seized a German ship carrying 1,000 centrifuges headed for Libya. The parts were made in Malaysia and shipped through the Middle East, according to news reports.⁶¹² Libya was able to get nearly complete centrifuges through the network, as well as blueprints for a Pakistani-designed nuclear warhead. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed that he had shared nuclear designs and information with other countries, confirming experts' long-held suspicions.⁶¹³ Previously, proliferators bought bits and pieces of nuclear components from private middlemen, and then had to assemble them to set up functional nuclear systems. Khan turned this route into creating 'a Wal-Mart of proliferation' that offered technical advice, parts, and customer support.⁶¹⁴ Due to the network's efficiency, Mohamed El Baradei, former head of the IAEA, called it the "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation that increase the risk of WMD use by terrorists."⁶¹⁵

8.2. Whose New Missions?

Although the Khan network is underlined by the NATO authorities as a manifestation of the new threat,⁶¹⁶ it is important to note that the Khan network is not addressed or resolved by the NATO. After the 9/11 attacks, the American administration devoted efforts to combating the spread of weapons of mass

⁶¹²The Sunday Times, "Investigation: Nuclear scandal - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan" September 20, 2009, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6839044.ece>; Dahlkamp, Juergen Georg Mascolo and Holger Stark, "A.Q. Khan's Nuclear Mafia-Network of Death on Trial Part 2: Part II: Khan's Worldwide Network", <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,405847-2,00.html>, 03.13.2006

⁶¹³*SourceWatch*, http://sourcewatch.org/index.php/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan; and, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/khan.html>

⁶¹⁴Corera, Gordon. 2006. *Shopping for Weapons: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network* Oxford: Oxford Uni. Press, pp. 3-86.

⁶¹⁵Zenko, Micah. 2004. "Proliferation for Profit" Op-Ed, BALTIMORE SUN MARCH 12 AND http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1339/proliferation_for_profit.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F727%2Fmicah_zenko

⁶¹⁶The candidate's interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

destruction and particularly to keeping them out of the reach of terrorists. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by the Bush administration on May 31, 2003 is an agreement between 11 countries⁶¹⁷ to stop and search vessels in their territories suspected of carrying banned weapons or technology in order to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air or on land. The initiative is another example to the Coalition of the Willing type of cooperation among states.

PSI gives countries broad powers to board vessels and seize illicit cargo. It was under this initiative that the centrifuges headed for Libya in the fall of 2003 were seized.⁶¹⁸ The 9/11 Commission of the US recommended that the United States seek to expand PSI's membership as a means of counterterrorism and the European Union and the G-8 fully endorsed PSI.⁶¹⁹

Apart from the US, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom joined the initiative. An additional 70 countries including Russia have since publicly committed to it. Significantly however, the PSI participants have downplayed the concept of membership in the initiative, explaining in a press statement that PSI is "an activity not an organization."⁶²⁰ U.S. officials have courted China to join the PSI, but so far China has kept its distance, citing concerns about the legality of interdictions.

⁶¹⁷On Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Logan, Samuel E. 2004-2005. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges", *Transnational Law & Policy*, 253; Byers, Michael. "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative" *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 98, No.3, pp. 526-545; Garvey, Jack I. 2005. "The International Institutional Imperative for Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Proliferation Security Initiative", *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 10: 125-147; <http://fas.org/srg/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf> and <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm>.

⁶¹⁸Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7751/#p4>

⁶¹⁹Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program, <http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/synopses/psi.cfm>, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI>; *The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Authorized Edition, New York: W.W.Norton and Company, July 22 2004, p. 381.

⁶²⁰As a chief example of it, the British government issued the above-mentioned in-text statement as part of its Chairman's Conclusions following an October 9-10, 2003 meeting of PSI participants in London. For details, globalsecurity.org

PSI is followed by the UNSCR 1540 whereby NATO started to enter the stage, in partnership with the UN, by stressing the importance of maritime security and surveillance of sea transportation in the fight against WMD proliferation and terrorism.⁶²¹ Thus, new tasks exist for the NATO, but it has not yet excelled on them. The NATO's emphasis on maritime security is just one of the counterterrorism measures in the making.⁶²²

So far, the new fields or issue-areas over which NATO works, the methods followed by NATO and the cooperation problems are outlined. Initiatives such as PSI and the UNSCR 1540 are given as examples to the interstate counterterrorism efforts which are often named as the work of Coalition of the Willing.⁶²³ Utmost importantly, NATO has not been an insider to these counterterrorism initiatives, which are designed and implemented mainly outside of its institutional framework.⁶²⁴

At this juncture, it is also important to present a case study about why NATO transforms in the first place. The section below discusses the main reason of NATO transformation and its implications for the inter-state form of cooperation

⁶²¹Rosand, Eric. 2007. "Multilateral Responses to an Extraordinary Threat". Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series *International Peace Academy*, April.

⁶²²Allied Command Transformation ACT, NATO's *Maritime Security Operations Concept and New Alliance Maritime Strategy*-NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 19 October 2009; *NATO Briefing*. 2003. *Combating Terrorism at Sea*. December.

⁶²³Stevenson, Jonathan. 2010. "Jihad and Piracy in Somalia", *Survival*, 52: 1, 27-38; Stuart, Douglas T. 2004. "NATO and the wider world: from regional collective defence to global coalitions of the willing", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58:1, 33-46.

⁶²⁴The works that study coalition of the willing or ad hoc alignments of states for particular missions-as a development outside of NATO-include, Menkhaus, Kenneth John. 2006-7. "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 74-106; Andres, Richard. 2005-6. "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model" *International Security* Vol. 30, No. 3 Winter, pp. 124-160; Achvarina, Vera, Reich, Simon. 2006. "No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer, pp. 127-164; Walt, Stephen M. 2001-02. "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 56-78; Art, Robert J., Brooks, Stephen G., Wohlforth, William, Lieber, Keir A. 2005-06. "Correspondence: Striking the Balance" *International Security* Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 177-196; De Nevers, Renée. 2007. "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Spring.

against transnational terrorism. After the discussion about the reasons of NATO transformation, follow-up themes will be clearer. The discussion is followed by, again, the developments on the ground with an emphasis on nation-states' behaviors before and after terrorist attacks, the implications of globalization and of the new threat for the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation/Coalition of the Willing, and the whereabouts of NATO within the contemporary form of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorist threat.

8.3. Why Does NATO Transform?

8.3.1. A Case Study on NATO Transformation from the Alliance Politics Perspective

Alliances have been used to extend a state's power beyond its borders and to prevent or prepare for military conflict. A widely accepted point of departure for alliance scholarship is the work of the Correlates of War (COW) project⁶²⁵ which defines alliances as formal, written, mostly voluntary, agreements, treaties, or conventions among states pledging to coordinate their behavior and policies *in the contingency of military conflict*. In descending order of commitment, the COW project identifies defense pacts, non-aggression/neutrality treaties, and ententes.

However, this definition has recently become redundant for there is no anticipation of a major war. 'The decline of conquest or waning of major war among the most industrialized states' makes it more tenable to use a definition

⁶²⁵Singer, J. David & Melvin Small, 1966. "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description", *Journal of Peace Research* 3(1): 1-32; Singer, J. David & Melvin Small, 1968. "Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815-1945", in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics*. New York: Free Press (247-286). Small, Melvin & J. David Singer, 1969. "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the Basic Data", *Journal of Peace Research* 6, 3: 257-282. Smith, Alastair, 1995. "Alliance Formation and War", *International Studies Quarterly* 39, 4: 405-426. Snyder, Glenn H., 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gibler, Douglas M. & Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000", *Journal of Peace Research* 41, 2: 211-222; <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>.

based on collective security approach.⁶²⁶ After the Cold War, state policies draw more on peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian intervention and crisis management rather than on military conflict as the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept underlined early on with the end of the Cold War:

The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum allied warning time has increased accordingly. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁶Gray, Colin S. 2005. "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters*, Spring, pp.14-26; Simons, Anna. 2003. "The Death of Conquest" *The National Interest* Spring, pp.41-49; Van Creveld, Martin. 1991. *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press; Kaysen, Carl. 1990, "Is War Obsolete? - A Review Essay" *International Security* 14:42-64; Mueller, John. 1989. *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. New York: Basic Books; Mueller, John. 1995. *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics*. New York: Harper Collins; Mueller, John. 2004. *The Remnants of War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Ray, James Lee. 1989. "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War" *International Organization* 43:405-439; Rosecrance, Richard. 1986 *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. New York: Basic Books; Rosecrance, Richard. 1999. *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*. New York: Basic Books; Rosenau, James. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Van Evera, Stephen. 1990/1991 "Primed For Peace: Europe after The Cold War" *International Security* 15:7-57; Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War" *International Security* 22:5-43; Mandelbaum, Michael. 1998/1999. "Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival* 40:20-38; Mandelbaum, Michael. 2002. *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Public Affairs; Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96:1 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "September 11: How has it Changed the World?" *Political Science Quarterly* 117:1 37-54; Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger*, www.charlierose.com; Haas, Richard N., "The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008; Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005-06. "The Impending Demise of the Postwar System," *Survival* 47(4): 7-18; Goldgeier, James & Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003; Fiona B. Adamson. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7, 547-569; Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North-South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629-643; Michael Mihalka. 2004. "Globalization, the Liberal Imperative, Islamism, and the Future of Conflict in the 21st Century," *The Quarterly Journal* 3(3): 57-67; *Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of the Democratic Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Centre for the Study of Global Governance. 2000. *Round Table Debate on the Global Significance of 1989* Public Lecture 12, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/>; Khagram, Sanjeev. 2006. "Possible Future Architectures of Global Governance: A Transnational Perspective/Prospective," *Global Governance* 12: 97-117.

⁶²⁷For the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-366E09C2-7814F451/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, For the current NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm

War became less of a politics by other means. The common forms of political contestation among nation-states have relatively shifted from the military struggle to economic and normative struggle. The state of international politics started to include the fact of decline of major war. It marked a reduction in the expectation and assessment of conventional and nuclear warfare.

NATO never fought a day during the Cold War. Today, it is involved in five different operations - fighting and securing stability in Afghanistan; keeping the peace in Kosovo; assisting defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; patrolling the Mediterranean in an anti-terrorist mission under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and training Iraqi security forces. The Alliance launched an extensive humanitarian relief operation for Pakistan after the massive earthquake in 2005, helped victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and provided security support to the 2004 and 2006 Olympics and 2006 World Cup. New members have joined the Alliance, more are expected soon, and others are applying. Budding partnerships have been cultivated with the UN, the European Union and nations from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.⁶²⁸

Thus, the contemporary definition of alliances can be taken to be international security cooperation alongside defense cooperation among state partners. Alliance structure is established by and enshrined in treaty-based organizations, which give them an institutionalized hard-law form. In other words, institutionalized security cooperation comes with a treaty-based international organization, which can then be called an alliance.

Alliance, as of today, denotes institutionalized security cooperation alongside defense cooperation. In light of the previous sections above, and different from the classical definition of the COW project, it is not tenable to see alliances of our day as mere treaties concluded against external threats or military conflict contingencies. Therefore, there is a difference between the alliances of the Cold

⁶²⁸Hamilton, Daniel S. 2009. *A New Balance for NATO* Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee European Subcommittee May 6, p. 7 and Hamilton, Daniel, Charles Barry, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen Flanagan, Julianne Smith, James Townsend. 2009. *Alliance Reborn-An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century*, The Washington NATO Project of Atlantic Council of the United States, Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, February.

War era and those of the post-Cold War era. The difference mainly originates from the decline of a military conflict contingency. The major threat has shifted from being state-centric to non-state-centric. Significantly, the latter change in declining and rising threats is the driving-motor of NATO transformation.

NATO has long been a ‘defensive alliance’ or a collective defense organization. However, after the Cold War, the authorities formally declared it to be a political alliance alongside its traditional defensive and military nature.⁶²⁹ That is an important indication of an ongoing urge to transform the Alliance. Meanwhile, the label of ‘defensive alliance’ is still used for the NATO, the post-Cold War debates on the absence of a common NATO goal and strategy notwithstanding. The debate on the resilience, goal and strategy of the post-Cold War NATO signals a connection between ‘alliances as military-defense oriented cooperation among states’ and ‘cooperation in general that includes non-military tasks’. This can be viewed through NATO’s above-mentioned recent trajectory.

During the Cold War, NATO was a defensive alliance mainly focused on national armies and contingency plans of conventional attack and nuclear deterrence. The military nature of the Alliance was on the forefront different from the recent security dimensions of the Alliance under transformation.

Is there a commonality between the emergence of different forms of inter-state cooperation such as the Coalition of the Willing-type cooperation among nation-states and NATO’s present trajectory that includes security missions?

⁶²⁹Kibaroglu, Mustafa and Baris Caglar. 2007. “Cooperation Failure in the Fight against Global Terrorism” *COE-DAT Newsletter* Vol.1 No.2 June, pp.12-16; Oguzlu, Tarik. 2009. “Turkey and the Transformation of NATO” *SETA Policy Brief July* No: 33, pp.3-10; Shea, Jamie (NATO Director of Information and Press). 2002. “NATO-Upholding Ethics in International Security Policy” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 15, Number 1, pp.75-82.

To elaborate the question: *Is there a commonality between the emergence of different forms of inter-state cooperation such as the Coalition of the Willing-type cooperation among nation-states* (experienced in Afghanistan and Iraqi interventions of 2001 and 2003 respectively, and also witnessed in Presidential Security Initiative (PSI) that commits 70 states without an institutional framework, or the implementation of UNSCR 1540 that binds all nations regardless of whether they are members of any alliance or not) *and NATO's present trajectory that includes security missions* (such as Operation Active Endeavor and training non-member states' nascent armed forces, internal security personnel; providing humanitarian relief operation for Pakistan after the massive earthquake in 2005, helping victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States or providing security support to the 2004 and 2006 Olympics and 2006 World Cup and cooperating with the OSCE to halt illicit trafficking)?

This point seems essential to picture the contemporary cooperation and alliance landscape; and the answer is: Since the main threat of the contemporary security environment has shifted from being state-centric to non-state-centric, nation-states try to form a corresponding response to non-state threats by coming together in the form of ad hoc re-groupings or re-alignments for particular tasks. Meanwhile, NATO is trying to adapt to the new security landscape under the effects of globalization, decline of major war and the corollary rise of non-state transnational threats. Thus, it can be posited that there is a commonality between the above-mentioned two developments: Both are answers to security threats, or reflect a gradual cooperative response against common security threats different from the previously demonstrated inter-state cooperation centered on defense. While NATO transformation is the name of the ongoing institutional answer or

adaptation to the new threats, diplomatically improvised alignments or groupings of states for a particular mission is the ad hoc or un-institutionalized form of answer to the security threats.

How do we come here? The departure point of any analysis about NATO's transformation must be the waning of major war. That is, main threats are not emanating from other states. Regrettably, this crucial point is not analyzed enough within the alliance politics and theory literature. *Without addressing this point and its repercussions, no empirical analysis makes sense regarding alliances in general and the NATO in particular, mainly because when states do not contemplate regular war, alliances start to change.*

Defensive alliances are established against the anticipation of an external military attack from out-group states. It is, therefore, important to know which facts speak to alliances and how. It is thereby possible to provide an analytical direction to the examination of recent form of inter-state cooperation and NATO's attempt at transformation. Thus, decline of major war or low anticipation of conventional war among armies is a determinant of NATO transformation. The contemporary threats are emanating from non-state formations, not from other states. *Consequently, the form of the threat determines the form of inter-state cooperation.*

As the alliance literature indicates clearly, alliances are formed against common threats.⁶³⁰ When the threat against which allies cooperated is no more,

⁶³⁰Sprecher, Christopher and Volker Krause. 2006. "Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation" *Journal of Peace Research* 43, 363; Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses" *World Politics* Vol. 44 No. 3 April, pp. 466-468; Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Krasner, Stephen. ed. 1983. *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation* New York: Basic Books; Putnam, Robert & Nicholas Bayne. 1987. *Hanging Together* Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Feldstein, Martin. 1988. *International Economic Cooperation* Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Lipson, Charles. 1984. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs" *World Politics* 37-October; Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics* 30-January; Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Cooperation versus Prisoner's Dilemma" *American Political Science Review*

alliances start to go through modifications regarding the missions, goals and strategies followed. The main Cold War theatre of anticipated war was Europe, which presents important clues for elaborating the following point: *War was seen as possible and probable during the Cold War*. That is why superpowers found

79-December; Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" *International Organization* 39-4; Mosher, James S. 2003. "Relative Gains Concerns when the number of States in the International System" *Increases Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol.4 7 No. 5, 642-668; Farer, Tom. 2004. "Toward an Effective International Legal Order- from Coexistence to Concert?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 17, Number 2, July; Jervis, Robert. 1985. "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation" *World Politics* Vol. 38, No. 1, October, pp. 58-79; Barrett, Scott. 1999. "A Theory of Full International Cooperation" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 11-519; Carbone, Maurizio. 2007. "Supporting or Resisting Global Public Goods? The Policy Dimension of a Contested Concept" *Global Governance* 13 179-198; Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 43 No. 4 October, pp. 979-1002; Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" *International Organization* Vol. 42 No. 3 summer pp. 485-507; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Conclusion: Ambitions and Limits of a Transatlantic Partnership" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389, pp. 87-92; Forman, Shepard & Derk Segaar. 2006. "New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism" *Global Governance* 12, 205-225; Schori, Pierre. 2005. "Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and Global Governance" *Global Governance* 11, 273-280; Dyson, Tom. 2008. "Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy" *Security Studies* 17:4,725-774; Atsushi, Tago. 2009. "When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the 'Coalition of the Willing'" *Journal of Peace Research* 46 219; Adler, Emanuel. 1992. "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control" *International Organization* 46, 1, winter; Goldstein, Joshua S., Jon C. Pevehouse, Deborah J. Gerner, Shibley Telhami. 2001. "Reciprocity, Triangularity, and Cooperation in the Middle East, 1979-97" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 5, October pp. 594-620; Weaver, Michael E. 2008. "International Cooperation and Bureaucratic In-fighting: American and British Economic Intelligence Sharing and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1939-41" *Intelligence and National Security*, 23:2, 153-175; Srinivasan, Krishnan. 2009. "International Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century" *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 98:400, 37-47; Svolik, Milan. 2006. "Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation" *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 50 No. 4 October, pp. 909-925; Davies, Graeme A. M. 2008. "Strategic Cooperation, the Invasion of Iraq and the Behaviour of the 'Axis of Evil', 1990-2004" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 3 pp. 385-399; Young, Joseph K. 2006. "Simulating Two-Level Negotiations" *International Studies Perspectives* 7, 77-82; Kreps, Sarah. 2008. "When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan" *Security Studies* 17:3, 531-567; Wang, Lake. 2007. "The Good Neighbour- Why China Cooperates" *Harvard International Review*, Fall; Kydd, Andrew. 2005-2006. "US Hegemony and Global Cooperation: In America We (Used to) Trust" *Political Science Quarterly* Volume 120 Number 4; Lander, Stephen. 2004. "International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 17, Number 3, October; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. "Is Anybody Still A Realist?" *International Security* Vol. 24-Fall 2, pp. 5-55; Schweller, Randall and David Priess. May 1997. "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate" *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 1-32; Choucrist, Nazli. 2000. "Introduction: Cyber Politics in International Relations," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 243-264; Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 1996. "Origins and Evolutions of War and Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, pp. 1-22; Krasner, Stephen D. Spring 1994. "International Political Economy: Abiding Discord" *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 13-19; Strange, Susan. 1994. "Wake up, Krasner! The World has Changed" *Review of International Political Economy* Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 209-219; Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty" *International Security* Vol. 29, No. 2 Fall, pp. 85-120.

utility in deterring each other. However, nuclear deterrence was different from conventional deterrence in that balance of terror largely cancelled out actual war-making on the ground owing to the possibility of mutual nuclear annihilation.

As a corollary, the meaning and strategy of warfare changed starting from 1950s onwards. As examined in previous chapters, warfare has become deterritorialized shifting from conventional warfare to war by proxy, covert war and espionage to keep the balance of power in the superpowers' spheres of influence. The arms race between the superpowers accompanied their economic, propagandistic and ideological race.

The contemplation of mutual annihilation stopped clashes and skirmishes short of all-out large-scale war. Nuclear age prevented escalation of political conflicts from pouring into battlefields, which were replaced by diplomatic courtrooms and emergency hot-lines between the superpowers. The US and the USSR paid attention not to step on one another's foot.

However, there was a continuous grim expectation of war throughout the Cold war era, not even erased by the detente period. The contemplation of war, and high probability of war created thereby, gave way to development of nuclear deterrence policies, military contingencies or contingency plans of war-making in the event of a deterrence failure or inadvertent nuclear attack. Europe, in particular, was a theatre of anticipated war; that was exactly why Europe experienced an 'entrapment-abandonment dilemma' pertaining to its relation with the US.⁶³¹

⁶³¹ Aybet, Gulnur. 2000. *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy*. London: Macmillan, pp.2, 44, 67-71, 87.

Yet, there is a change that took place after the fall of the Berlin Wall: Europe is not a theatre of anticipated or probable war as of the first decade of the twenty-first century.⁶³² Otherwise, it would not be hard for scholars to strongly support Mearsheimer's extrapolation of 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War' which presents the strategic environment as basically unchanged.⁶³³ That extrapolation appears to be missing the basic contour of the post-Cold War political landscape. War is not in the offing⁶³⁴, and there seems to be hardly any tenable reason to credibly predict one in the foreseeable future: Importantly because, NATO not only was formed to defend against the Soviet threat, but it was equally functional to solve 'the German problem' as well. Due to the US-USSR enmity in the wake of the Second World War, a peace treaty to settle

⁶³²The fact that the Cold War has not turned into a 'hot' one, or, the fact that war among the two blocs as force-on-force vast conventional military clashes of armies did not actually occur does not weaken the waning of major war argument that addresses the post-Cold War conflict environment. Waning of major war is not a feature of the Cold War. It is a feature of its aftermath. Lack of major war during the Cold War is not related to a lack of war-anticipation during the Cold War whereas the waning of war of the post-cold War era is. It was exactly the anticipation of war itself during the Cold War, not its actual occurrence that led to defensive alliances formation. The political conflict had to be kept 'cold' due to the balance of terror established by the superpowers' second-strike capabilities alongside strategies such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the flexible response and treaties such as Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Therefore, waning of major war is more about whether there is contemplation and anticipation of war among states than it is about actual occurrence of war. Major war among advanced industrial countries (AICs) occurred neither during the Cold War nor in its aftermath; however, with different reasons. Lack of war is an offshoot or by-product of 'declining anticipation of war' in the aftermath of the Cold War while lack of war during the Cold War was the result of nuclear deterrence or 'the balance of terror' between the superpowers during the Cold War.

⁶³³Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 summer, pp. 5-56; Snyder, Glenn H. 2002. "Mearsheimer's World - Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security" *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 1 Summer, pp. 149-173; Tang, Shiping. 2010. "Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis", *European Journal of International Relations*, 16: 31-55.

⁶³⁴Jervis, Robert. 2003. "The Compulsive Empire" *Foreign Policy*, July-August, p.84; Gray, Colin S. 2007. *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* London and New York: Routledge; Gray, Colin S. 2005. "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" *Parameters* Spring, pp. 14-26; Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace" *American Political Science Review* Vol. 96, No. 1 March; Haas, Mark L. 2007. "The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics?" *International Organization* 61, winter, pp.145-179; Leffler, Melvyn P. 2003. "9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy" *International Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 5 October, pp. 1045-1063; Fettweis, Christopher J. 2006. "A Revolution in International Relations Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?" *International Studies Review* 8, 677-697.

the geopolitical problems of Europe was unwritten.⁶³⁵ By the end of the Cold War, both the German problem⁶³⁶ and the Soviet problem were no more. Europe, under the paralleling double impact of the Soviet threat and the US security assurances, largely managed to solve the European geopolitical problems. Germans are down, Russians are out and the US is still in Europe.⁶³⁷ The Cold War mission that glued the transatlantic partnership is completed. In the meantime, Europe evolved into the EU as a distinct economic and normative soft power that shuns the use of force, eroding the cornerstone of any defensive alliance.

Any defensive alliance principally presumes that member-states can use force if need exists. If members do not tend to use force, then the alliance backs away from being a defensive one.⁶³⁸ That is where and why the present transatlantic relationship started to return to the rocky times, which had already been experienced before the Cold War with ‘an old Europe’ originally proclaimed by Roosevelt.⁶³⁹ France and Germany are no longer in conflict in a strategic-military sense except for the political and economic ‘cooperative competition’ to shape a united Europe far into the future.⁶⁴⁰ Having the Soviet and German problems largely solved, the security dilemma of Europe shifted to non-military issues within itself as well as towards ‘insecurity dilemma’ of the candidate countries trying to join

⁶³⁵Calleo, David P. 2003. “Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU” *World Policy Journal*, Fall, pp.19-20.

⁶³⁶Calleo, David P. 1978. *The German Problem Reconsidered* U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

⁶³⁷Yost, David S. 1998. *NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, p. 52.

⁶³⁸Forster, Anthony and Wallace, William. 2001. “What is NATO for?” *Survival*, 43:4, p.113.

⁶³⁹For Roosevelt’s views on Europe, Harper, John L. 1996. *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁴⁰‘Cooperative competition’ or the way relations of the EU states is conducted is detailed throughout chapter four; cooperative competition is also explained by Douglas Porch, “Conflict within Cooperation: Western Security Relations, Past and Present” in Hay, William Anthony and Harvey Sicherman eds. 2007. *Is There Still a West? The Future of the Atlantic Alliance* Columbia & London: University of Missouri Press, pp.156-185.

it.⁶⁴¹

A combination of human security⁶⁴² and national security policy-making changed the former pure power politics approach that dominated the long European history of diplomacy and war.⁶⁴³ It shifted the classical geopolitical approach from military warfare to economic and cultural rivalry. Geo-economics and geo-culture became the terms that enhanced geopolitics.⁶⁴⁴ Geopolitics did not change all together though; it just widened to include other forms of rivalry manifesting itself as rule-based competition short of war. European states still clash with each other economically and politically, yet this time without thinking use of force even as a choice of last resort. Their conflict is rule-based under the aegis of supranational institutions and norms easing the clash of sovereign prerogatives coupled with interdependent national economies. That is an important exception and a significant development in the history of the world when evaluated along the historical continuum of past wars.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴¹“Insecurity dilemma” deals with domestic problems from a human security perspective, and it problematizes the state-individual relations and its repercussions upon international relations at large. For details, Sørensen, Georg. 2007. “After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and the Dilemma of Liberal Values” *Security Dialogue* 38, 357-378

⁶⁴²Paris, Roland. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security*, Volume 26, Number 2, Fall, pp. 87-102. On the problem of “conceptual stretching,” see Giovanni Sartori. 1970. “Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 1033-1053.

⁶⁴³Sami, Moisio. 2009. “Europe’s Enlargements: Security, Identity and the New Politico-Geographical Constellations” *Cooperation and Conflict* Vol. 44-1: 99–107; Price, Richard. 1998. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines” *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 613–644; Warkentin, Craig and Karen Mingst. 2000. “International Institutions, the State, and Global Civil Society in the Age of the World Wide Web” *Global Governance* Vol. 6, No. 2, 237–257.

⁶⁴⁴Defay, Alexander. 2005. *Jeopolitik* (La geopolitique). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayinlari, pp. 107-126; Lacoste, Yves. 2007. *Buyuk Oyunu Anlamak-Jeopolitik: Bugunun Uzun Tarihi*. Istanbul: NTV Yayinlari.

⁶⁴⁵Jervis, Robert. 2005. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*. New York: Routledge; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 96, 1: 1-14; Jervis, Robert. 2002. “September 11: How has it Changed the World?” *Political Science Quarterly* 117, 1: 37-54; Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; *An Hour with Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Brent Scowcroft & Henry Kissinger, www.charlierose.com; Richard N. Haas. 2008. “The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June.

The US, on the other hand, has found a strategic environment freed from the European entanglement and the Soviet threat. With tremendous differential power un-balanced by serious state-centric-threats, it seemed expedient to turn unilateral to keep the dominating margin over other states.⁶⁴⁶ Sustaining global dominance has always been the openly declared basic interest of the US as indicated in its several national security strategy documents.⁶⁴⁷

As a consequence of such strategic environment in the aftermath of the Cold War, defensive alliances gradually risk turning into coffee-shops of inward-looking collective security alliances without a clear common external threat and corresponding goals and strategy. This is not to belittle the development however; it is just meant to make clear the shifting security ground in the aftermath of the Cold War.

From a viewpoint of the essentials of a defensive alliance, 'coffee-shops' is not an unrealistic portrayal of the current working-mechanism of contemporary alliances.⁶⁴⁸ Whether that is desirable changes according to different interests of

⁶⁴⁶Mahbubani, Kishore. 2005–06. "The Impending Demise of the Post-War System," *Survival* 47, 4: 7–18; Goldgeier, James & Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003; Fiona B. Adamson. 2005. "Global Liberalism versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7, 547–569; Ayoob, Mohammed. 2007. "Challenging Hegemony: Political Islam and the North–South Divide" *International Studies Review* 9, 629–643; Michael Mihalka. 2004. "Globalization, the Liberal Imperative, Islamism, and the Future of Conflict in the 21st Century," *The Quarterly Journal* 3(3): 57–67; Geis, Anna, Lothar Brock, and Harald Müller. 2006. *Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of the Democratic Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Centre for the Study of Global Governance. 2000. *Round Table Debate on the Global Significance of 1989* Public Lecture 12, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global>.

⁶⁴⁷2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002* Washington: White House; 2006. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America March 2006* Washington: White House.

⁶⁴⁸Interviews of the candidate with several NATO officials that preferred to remain anonymous in Belgium NATO Headquarters, December-2005; and also the interviews conducted in, "International Cooperation Against Terrorism Conference" held by the Centre of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism, March 23, 2006 Bilkent Hotel, Ankara, Turkey. One officer put it as, 'We just keep busy without a clear strategy'; Aybet, Gulnur. "From Collective Defense to Collective Security" in 2000. *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy*. London: Macmillan, pp. 97–135; Kaplan, Lawrence S. 2004. *NATO Divided, NATO United-The Evolution of an Alliance*. Connecticut: Praeger, pp. 133–150. Kaplan concludes in the last chapter -entitled as 'Into the New Millennium'- that 'the danger in the future lies less in the abrupt dissolution than in the possibility of

states, and it is beyond the point for the moment. Nevertheless, referring to increasing diplomatic and political tone of defensive alliances,⁶⁴⁹ ‘coffee-shops’ marks the gradual resemblance of defensive alliances to security alliances following the decline in anticipation of military confrontations.

If war did not wane, that is, if war anticipation did not decline, would there be an official NATO transformation attempt? Would there be membership extensions of the NATO and the EU? Would there be inclusion of new member-states? The answer would most likely to be ‘no’.⁶⁵⁰ Although the answer is given in hindsight, it is still tenable to argue that these above-mentioned developments would not take place if war was still expected among major industrialized nation-states of Europe. If post-Cold War relations among continental European states returned to days reminiscent of the World War years or to war-prone environment of their long history, even the collapse of the former Soviet Union would not be enough to initiate NATO transformation and membership extensions.⁶⁵¹ In such a case, NATO would be the bulwark that prevents war among European powers, if not the bulwark against the former Soviet Union.

The withdrawal of American forces from Europe has been a point considered between the Atlantic Allies; however, no complete withdrawal has materialized. American forces in Europe and the NATO has turned more into a

NATO becoming as irrelevant as the League of Nations was in the 1930s if America and Europe fail to share the responsibilities of crisis management beyond the boundaries of the alliance.’; Hay, William Anthony and Harvey Sicherman eds. *Is There Still a West? The Future of the Atlantic Alliance* Columbia & London: University of Missouri Press-‘Conflict within Cooperation’, pp. 156-185.

⁶⁴⁹“NATO’s Past, Present and Future”, *NATO Review*, July 2006, pp. 46-58.

⁶⁵⁰Hunter, Robert E. 2009. *NATO After the Summit-Rebuilding Consensus* CT-331 Testimony presented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs on May 6.

⁶⁵¹Calleo, David P. 2009. *Follies of Power-America’s Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Smith, Steve. 2002. “The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order” *International Relations* Vol. 16-2: 171–183; 2007. *Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States*, National Intelligence Council Report DR-2007-16D- 23 August; 2004. “Mapping the Global Future” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project Based on Consultations with nongovernmental experts around the world, December, <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>; National Intelligence Council Report.

political instrument that ties the US to Europe. NATO's political dimension is demonstrated by the late 1990s Balkan interventions to an internal conflict of a non-allied country, namely former Yugoslavia.⁶⁵² NATO has thereby acquired a political dimension that institutionalizes the transatlantic link and serves as a preeminent forum in which the Allies can discuss issues of security and strategy even in the absence of the former Soviet threat.⁶⁵³ However, the Balkan conflict was a problem in the neighbourhood of the European geographical core. In that sense, it was an out-of-area mission for NATO. Different from the past, the US-led NATO interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia did not aim to prevent the European allies from going to war against each other.

The Balkan interventions were made due to the inability of Europe to control the fragmentation of its neighborhood, not because the EU member-states clashed among each other militarily. The former Yugoslavian crisis was an intra-state problem, not an inter-state clash. Thus, the intervention was not aimed at preventing the European Union member-states from going to war with each other. The German problem was resolved, and the former Soviet military threat had disappeared to a large extent.

What, then, initiated NATO's transformation and why? The answer is the waning of major war, which means the significant lowering of the threat assessment with respect to the former Soviet Union. It also refers to the lowered or reduced security dilemma and power-politics dynamics within Europe itself. If the relationship among European states returned to the pre-Cold War era power politics, the demise of the Soviet Union would probably not change the probability of war in the post-Cold War Europe. If wars were anticipated, it would be hard to

⁶⁵²Layne, Christopher. 2008. "It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations" *International Politics*, 45, pp.1-2.

⁶⁵³"Response to Terrorism-NATO and the Fight against Terrorism", *NATO Briefing*, March 2005.

start NATO's transformation.⁶⁵⁴ With clear and present threats in the offing, it would not be easy for the US and Europe to declare NATO's political missions to support democracy and human rights, out-of-area missions and the inclusion of new members. Expectation of war would rule out the latter and introduce military contingencies.⁶⁵⁵

NATO, as an alliance established under the strategic conditions of the Cold War, has lost its classical defensive form: No credible state-centric threat from out-group-states exists. No external threat so consensual as to diminish or minimize the current transatlantic divide appears to be present either.⁶⁵⁶ NATO members apparently do not find contemporary threats, including terrorism, threatening enough to leave aside their disagreements or to solve the transatlantic rift.⁶⁵⁷ The Allies argue over different approaches and strategies to counter threats; threats that are emanating not from states, but threats coming from non-state entities. Thus, although NATO's original purpose to protect Western political values is still intact, its defensive nature has gone through soul-searching. Its members did not give NATO a strategic clarity to keep the alliance as a defensive one.⁶⁵⁸

Dana H. Allin, Gilles Andréani, Philippe Errera and Gary Samore's detailed account of the NATO and of the contemporary transatlantic relations and 'the war on terrorism' highlights the point: The Western alliance of the Cold War had its

⁶⁵⁴ "NATO's Role in Civil Emergency Planning", *NATO Backgrounder*, September 2006, p.1.

⁶⁵⁵ *NATO Handbook*. 2001. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, Chapter 2: Transformation of the Alliance, pp. 35-38.

⁶⁵⁶ Thies, Wallace J. 2007. "Was the US Invasion of Iraq NATO's Worst Crisis Ever? How Would We Know? Why Should We Care?" *European Security* 16:1, 29-50; Ringsmose, Jens and Sten Rynning. 2009. *Come Home NATO, The Atlantic Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report, 04, pp. 8-10; Noetzel, Timo and Schreer, Benjamin. 2009. "NATO's Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 30: 3, 529-547.

⁶⁵⁷ Grimmer, Richard F., 2006. CRS Report for the Congress, *9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status*, December 4, Coordinator Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; Layne, Christopher. 2008. "It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations" *International Politics*, 45, 325-347.

⁶⁵⁸ Stuart, Douglas T. 2004. "NATO and the wider world: from regional collective defence to global coalitions of the willing", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58:1, 33-46.

own disagreements, but it also had clarity of purpose. It was intended to address one problem, the Soviet threat in Europe. The clear boundaries and purpose are gone. The present security agenda is a daunting one that includes the struggle against transnational terrorism, strategies against nuclear proliferation, and the stabilization of failed or failing states. All of these concerns affect Americans and Europeans alike, but this does not mean that they can provide the same degree of strategic focus as was supplied by the Soviet adversary.⁶⁵⁹

The transatlantic partners are said to be re-strategizing in order to answer the contemporary security threats mostly underlined by non-state actors.⁶⁶⁰ This was argued to be done in lieu with the new threat. However, it is controversial that NATO successfully shifted its threat assessment from the former Soviet Union to the threat of global terrorism.⁶⁶¹ The reports still indicate a vague threat assessment and lack of a clear strategy to be followed by all members effectively.⁶⁶² Previously-explained variables such as the distinct features or ambiguity of transnational terrorist threat seriously curtail a common threat assessment.⁶⁶³ Significantly, the new threat is not solely an external threat. Nor does it come in regular armed formations from states and it does not have an address to retaliate at. It requires not

⁶⁵⁹Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Beyond the War on Terror" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389 17-34.

⁶⁶⁰De Nevers, Renée. 2007. "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era" *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 Spring, pp. 34-66; Gleason, Gregory and Marat E. Shaihtudinov. 2005. "Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia" *International Studies Perspectives* 6, pp. 281-282; Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Beyond the War on Terror" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389 17-34.

⁶⁶¹Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Beyond the War on Terror" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389, 17-34; Byman, Daniel. "Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 29, No. 5, 767-811.

⁶⁶²Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. "Conclusion: Ambitions and Limits of a Transatlantic Partnership" *Adelphi Papers* 47:389, pp. 87-92.

⁶⁶³Douglas, Frank 'Scott'. 2007. 'Waging the inchoate war: Defining, fighting, and second-guessing the 'Long War'', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:3, 391-420; Mandel, Robert. 2009. "On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions", *Intelligence and National Security*, 24:2, 194-215; Meszerics, Tamas and Littvay, Levente. 2009. "Pseudo-Wisdom and Intelligence Failures", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 23: 1, 133-147; Jervis, Robert. 2006. "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq" *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 29, No. 1, 3 – 52, February.

only military strategists to devise counter-policies, but it also entails the contribution of law enforcement or police forces, internal and external intelligence agencies and the judiciary as well as land borders, sea-lanes, airport and cargo security among others. This is the impact of the new threat variable in exacerbating the transformation of NATO.

Even when global terrorism is set as one of the basic threats with which NATO copes, the ambiguity (that is transnationality) of the threat and the wider political and conflict environment under globalization do not permit NATO to continue functioning as a defensive alliance.⁶⁶⁴ This is the structural impact of globalization as Brent Scowcroft indicates:

There are new forces at work: Information technology has politicized world's people. People and societies are involved. Almost everybody has a TV set. They are informed instantaneously. We cannot do with traditional tools of power/economic or military. The way power is exercised is changing because national borders are eroding, because of the growth of non-state actors. It's a different kind of a world. We are tied down by a tiny little country -- Iraq. It's amazing, given the disparity in military economic strength. It's a -- it's a world where most of the big problems spill over national boundaries, and there are new kinds of actors and we're feeling our way as to how to deal with them. I think it is less policy oriented than Zbigniew indicated. I think it's more systemic.⁶⁶⁵

More often than not, alliance members turned inward and started to disagree with one another over guarding against the consequences of the use of differentially great American power. 'Managing the hegemon' has become the unofficial *de facto* task of NATO members alongside responding to threats such as transnational terrorism.⁶⁶⁶ Intra-alliance politicking and entanglements among NATO member-states have become the questions of inquiry for the scholars and analysts.⁶⁶⁷ Intra-

⁶⁶⁴Walt, Stephen M. 2009. "Alliances in a Unipolar World" *World Politics* 61, No. 1, January, 86-120; Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. 2009. "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences" *World Politics* 61, no. 1, January, pp. 1-27.

⁶⁶⁵Scowcroft, Brent. 2007. "Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft" *Charlie Rose*, July 12, <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551>

⁶⁶⁶Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. "Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity" *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 April-June, 271-309.

⁶⁶⁷Kay, Sean. 2005. "What Went Wrong with NATO?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Volume 18, Number 1, April.

alliance cooperation became a problem in the absence of an external threat and in the absence of a common strategy to struggle against terrorism.⁶⁶⁸

To sum up, NATO is not over; yet it does not appear to be a strict defensive alliance anymore. Contemporary alliances, though not dismembered, turned into *de facto* security alliances lacking clarity of purpose and strategy for they do not contemplate military contingencies.⁶⁶⁹ An uncertain period is experienced during which authority and legitimacy as a power-resource is being contested anew after the Cold War. Breakdown of power is not constrained to states alone. The institutional tools of authority allocation alongside states such as the UN, the NATO, the EU, World Bank and World Trade Organization are challenged by non-state entities such as transnational corporations (market authority), transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (illicit authority), and by various types of non-governmental organizations (moral authority). An additional factor that complicates this break down of power even further is the adjustment and coordination problems among states mainly caused by the distinct features of the new threat and diverging national counterterrorism cultures.

The interviews and the process-tracing included in this study indicate that different threat perceptions and different response-policies cause adjustment problems and friction among the Allies. In the face of friction, as Kissinger maintains, dialogue and cooperation has acquired a strategic importance⁶⁷⁰: institutions provide suitable arenas to lessen frictions through dialogue, which is

⁶⁶⁸Kydd, Andrew. 2005-06. "In America We (Used to) Trust: U.S. Hegemony and Global Cooperation" *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 120 No. 4; *Avenir De La Relation Franco-Américaine* Groupe Stratégique Franco-Américain Projet Johns Hopkins University-Fondation Robert Schuman Etude (Première Version) in both English and French, Janvier/January 2009, pp. 5-16.

⁶⁶⁹Terzuolo, Eric R. 2004. *Regional Alliance, Global Threat: NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction 1994-2004 Final Report*-Manfred Wörner Fellowship Center for North East and Adriatic Studies and Central Eastern European University Network, Venice.

⁶⁷⁰Kissinger, Henry. 2007. "Interview with Kissinger, Brzezinski and Scowcroft" *Charlie Rose*, July 12, <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8551>

the principal medium of establishing consensus at the inter-governmental level. Intergovernmental level is one of the interfaces or meeting realm of structural and unit-level factors conditioning inter-state cooperation. In institutionalized settings such as NATO, negotiations and bargaining among authorities of different nations can be held and a check-and-balance system or a mechanism of managing power becomes available to certain extent.⁶⁷¹

This is not just paying lip service to idealistic schemes because it is told by the authorities to be the only way out of the Alliance uncertainties regarding its strategy and cohesion.⁶⁷² During the candidate's interview with Jeroen Van der Veer in April 2005 NATO Headquarters-Brussels, Belgium, 'sustaining dialogue' was his main theme in mending relations. Van der Veer, who serves as of 2010 in the NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group, maintained that in the absence of war expectation, dialogue seems to be the only and least costly way out of cooperative problems in fighting terrorism. In lieu with that, the recent emphasis put on international cooperation in the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration is worth highlighting as the most recent effort of the Alliance in finding a common stance. The Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration was issued by the Heads of State and Governments participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg-Kehl on April 4, 2009. Thereby, NATO leaders adopted a Declaration on Alliance Security reaffirming the basic values, principles and purposes of the NATO Alliance. They also launched the process to develop a new Strategic

⁶⁷¹Grobe, Christian. 2010. "The power of words: Argumentative persuasion in international negotiations"

European Journal of International Relations, 16: 5-29.

⁶⁷²"NATO's New Strategic Concept discussed in Prague", 12 January 2010 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_60801.htm?selectedLocale=en, Recent discussions in NATO focused on the views of Allied states, particularly from Central and Eastern Europe, regarding NATO's future role in Europe and beyond. A number of speakers addressed the issue of finding the right balance between territorial defence and out of area missions as well as between NATO's commitment to Article 5 and new security challenges.

Concept, a document that will define NATO's longer-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century. They agreed that NATO's transformation, in order to ensure the provision of deployable forces prepared to conduct the full range of military operations and missions, will strengthen the Alliance's ability to confront 21st century threats. NATO leaders acknowledged that security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan's security and stability and declared that the UN-mandated ISAF mission in Afghanistan is NATO's key priority. In a comprehensive approach combining military and civilian resources, NATO remains committed to help the Government of Afghanistan to support Afghanistan's long-term security and stability, together with the international community. Leaders said that strong constructive engagement by countries of the region is also critical and pledged to reinforce cooperation with all Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan.

As an important backgrounder to the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city of Istanbul in June 2004, aimed to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the Middle East region practical and bilateral security cooperation with NATO. ICI is another example to the second track of the NATO transformation efforts, an example to the NATO's efforts to reach out other organizations and nation-states. ICI focused on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. Four of these - Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - have joined. Saudia Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative. Based on the principle of inclusiveness, the Initiative is open to all interested countries of the

broader Middle East region who subscribe to its aims and content, including the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction⁶⁷³

What, then, is the mechanism underlying such negotiations and bargaining? What makes cooperation work within the NATO? What enhances the contribution of NATO to the wider international cooperation against terrorism? Interviews that are conducted in NATO headquarters in 2005 on the clause of anonymity⁶⁷⁴ underline three requirements to be fulfilled to get cooperation work:

First, all states must be able to participate to achieve cooperation. Allies must keep all members of the Alliance acting through the Alliance norms and strategy, not outside of it. Keeping the US acting with other NATO members became a conundrum especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the United States refused NATO involvement and preferred to act largely on its own at the outset of the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, with the only notable exception being Britain's participation. The American refusal to work together with other Allies is also repetitively stressed in the literature in addition to the interviews conducted.

Secondly, decisions must be made multilaterally without fait accompli. The leadership tension obstructs cohesion in the Alliance, which is elaborated in the following section. Last, but certainly not least, is the need to reduce the regulatory and capability disparities in undertaking military interventions to stabilize failed-states, in intelligence gathering and in border security that are needed to protect

⁶⁷³Sources retrieved from the official NATO web site, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_58787.htm, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁶⁷⁴Candidate's interviews conducted with NATO civil and military officers in NATO Headquarters, Brussels, April 2005 after the Discussion Series on NATO's Transformation, WMD and Ethnic Conflict.

allies from terrorists.⁶⁷⁵ This is crucial to realize division of labor and burden-sharing among the Allies. However, these interrelated conditions are not easy to meet owing to the intra-alliance security dilemma that is examined below.

8.3.2. Handling the Preponderant Power:

The Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma

The end of the Cold War left the US as the preponderant power. The absence of any immediate balancer (similar to the former Soviet power) led to potential for divergences in threat perceptions, which are contingent upon different security cultures. End of bipolarity raised a debate on the causes of threats and how best to respond to them; a debate mainly originating in the absence of a clearly identifiable enemy.

Transatlantic relations have been uneasy for the allies since the start of the twenty-first century.⁶⁷⁶ This has continued to be lasting with regard to defining terrorism. ‘The new terrorism’ debate of the post-September 11 period demonstrated the transatlantic divergence on threat assessments between Europe and the US.⁶⁷⁷ The new terrorism debate displayed the contending approaches to fighting terrorism. Although the NATO Prague Summit of November 2002 identifies fighting against the threat of transnational terrorism as one of the goals of the Alliance, and although the 9/11 attacks opened up new opportunities for the Alliance, the allies have been slow to seize them due to their struggle among each

⁶⁷⁵ Gottschild, Thomas. 2009. “Making NATO’s comprehensive approach work: Ensuring interoperability between defence and security systems and actors” in *Re-launching NATO, or just re-branding it?*” *Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)*.

⁶⁷⁶ *A Full and Urgent Agenda for NATO in the 21st Century, An evening debate with Ivo Daalder*, Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels Security & Defence Agenda June 8, 2009.

⁶⁷⁷ *A Full and Urgent Agenda for NATO in the 21st Century, An evening debate with Ivo Daalder*, Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels Security & Defence Agenda June 8, 2009.

other.⁶⁷⁸

The struggle within NATO results from a dilemma, namely the alliance security dilemma. Although they want to maintain the pre-existing security arrangements as a means of managing threats such as the former Yugoslavian crisis, the Allies need to tackle with the dual concern of either being trapped into their preponderant partner's (America's) policies or being abandoned by it.

On the one hand, allies fear entrapment, which is the fear of being dragged into conflicts in which they have no direct stake or voice opportunity. Indeed, for some of the states, American policies were deemed detrimental and undercutting their national objectives and interests.⁶⁷⁹

In the run-up to the Iraq war, the reluctance of France, Germany and other like-minded Transatlantic Allies to engage Turkey - in planning for the defence of Turkey as an NATO-member or ally should it be attacked by Iraq - triggered what the US ambassador to NATO called a 'near-death experience' for the Alliance.⁶⁸⁰

Another example is the Turkish refusal to allow the use of its soil for the 2003 intervention in Iraq. According to Barkey and MacDowall, the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 provided a safe haven in northern Iraq where the terrorist organization PKK re-emerged from semi-hibernation.⁶⁸¹ Originating in Turkish concerns about such a development, the Turkish non-cooperation regarding the intervention was a bone of contention between the US and Turkey. This is an

⁶⁷⁸Kamp, Karl-Heinz. 2009. "Just What Is It For?" *NATO Defence College*, Rome-Chatham House, October, pp.24-25.

⁶⁷⁹Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 24, 126-132, 143, 178.

⁶⁸⁰Ian Black, 'Powell Calls on NATO to Send Troops to Iraq', *The Guardian*, 5 December, 2003, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1100481,00.html>.

⁶⁸¹Barkey, H. 2007. "Turkey and the PKK: A pyrrhic victory?" in Art R.J. and Richardson L. eds. *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 343-381; MacDowall, D. 2004. *A Modern History of the Kurds*, 3rd edition. London: I.B. Tauris; Mango, Andrew. 2005. *Turkey and the War on Terror-For Forty Years We Fought Alone*. New York and Canada: Routledge.

example to the non-cooperation between the US and Turkey that have been NATO allies since 1949. They had dissimilar concerns with regard to terrorism, independent of the fact that they have similar strategic cultures that do not shun the use of force at all times. The Turkish behaviour was an alignment strategy of ‘balking’, which is simply to say no and to increase the costs of intervention. Although the Turkish behaviour did not cancel the intervention, it forced the US to change war-plans and made it more costly.⁶⁸²

On the other hand, allies fear abandonment, the fear that their big ally will not fulfill alliance commitments in times of need. An example is a possible future case similar to the Balkan conflicts during the late 1990s and early 2000s.⁶⁸³ The dilemma is that the more they try to reduce the risk of abandonment, the more they increase the risk of entrapment, and vice versa. This constitutes the main obstacle against the intra-alliance cooperation.

To reduce the dilemma, small allies require meaningful cooperation among each other. However, it is important to highlight that this is *not* an ‘intra-balancing act’ proper: They do not build up arms against the US. Small partners are just trying to minimize the damage to their interests by forsaking cooperation with the US.⁶⁸⁴ To the extent it is seen as balancing, it was not an outright classical balancing because they did not confront the US militarily. It was the balancing of the US as ‘a transatlantic power’ within the same club, rather than attempting at matching its military power to a degree that can change the distribution of capabilities at the systemic level. Allies tried to ‘manage’ the primacy of American power. They tried

⁶⁸²Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W.Norton & Company, pp. 131, 142, 143.

⁶⁸³“Bosnia still needs international supervision: top official” Sarajevo, 26 February 2010, 22:04 CET <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/bosnia-politics.365/>, and, Chivvis, Christopher S. 2010. “Back to the Brink in Bosnia”, *Survival*, Vol. 52, Issue 1 February, pp. 97-110.

⁶⁸⁴Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. “Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity” *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 April–June, 271-30.

to constraint American policies, while at the same time maintaining their security arrangements with the US mainly through NATO.⁶⁸⁵

8.3.3. Behaving Uncooperatively to Avoid the Intra-Alliance Dilemma

Since overcoming the intra-alliance security dilemma of NATO enhances the role of NATO in establishing and maintaining cooperation against several threats including counterterrorism and since it reduces other national security concerns such as Kosovo or European and NATO enlargements, small partners (or the NATO members other than the US) looked for ways to solve it. For about two years from 2001 to 2003, major European powers such as France and Germany took the lead in trying to divert the American war-plans regarding Iraq.⁶⁸⁶ A preponderant power with a set of global interests pursued a military approach to its problems.⁶⁸⁷ As it demanded Allied support, its allies felt entrapped and tried to influence the preponderant alliance member not to pursue certain objectives that clash with their own. They tried to restrain it through a bargaining process in which allies can withhold diplomatic support, insist on more consultations during a crisis or at the dawn of an operation, threaten defection or realignment within NATO.

They also attempted to bind the preeminent partner into intergovernmental organizations such as the NATO and the UN.⁶⁸⁸ That is vividly demonstrated by the realignment within NATO during the onset of the 2003 American intervention in Iraq: As an example to the alignment strategy of binding, France and Germany

⁶⁸⁵Norris, John H. 2003. "When Alliance and Self-Interest Collide" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 16, Number 2, July; Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. "Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity" *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 April-June, 271-275.

⁶⁸⁶Zimmermann, Doron. 2006. "The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:123-145.

⁶⁸⁷Missiroli, Antonio. "Revisiting the European Security Strategy beyond 2008", *European Policy Center (EPC) Policy Brief*, April 2008.

⁶⁸⁸Walt, Stephen M. 2005. *Taming American Power - Global Response to US Primacy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 144-146.

tried to hinder American behaviour by withholding international legality and the UN mandate. They tried to tie down the US institutionally through their Security Council membership and veto power. European states that were against the Iraqi intervention of 2003 were led by France and Germany, confronting states such as Spain, Britain and Poland that approved the intervention. These realignments caused bitter criticisms by some of the European states and within the EU institutional framework.

France even politically threatened new-comer and candidate members of the EU. In reaction to the support of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, all of whom have, at the time, dates for EU membership, and in reaction to the EU members Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and Portugal which sent letters supporting Washington's stance on Iraq, French President Chirac said in 2003: "These countries have been not very well behaved and rather reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American position. It is not really responsible behavior. It is not well brought-up behavior. They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet. I felt they acted frivolously because entry into the European Union implies a minimum of understanding for the others," Chirac said. Chirac called the letters of support "infantile" and "dangerous," adding: "They missed a great opportunity to shut up."⁶⁸⁹ Thus, the disagreements revolving around the Iraqi intervention affected not only the relations in NATO, but also the relations within the EU as well. The American administration argued for the intervention to stop terrorist organizations among other justifications such as halting the proliferation of WMD.⁶⁹⁰ Different from the Cold War form of cooperation among

⁶⁸⁹“Chirac lashes out at ‘new Europe’”, *CNN* February 18, 2003
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/>

⁶⁹⁰Schori, Pierre. 2005. “Insight-Painful Partnership: The United States, the European Union, and Global Governance” *Global Governance* 11, 273-280.

allies, the contemporary form of cooperation was set back due to the disagreements about how to conduct the fight against terrorism.

The US saw 2003 Iraqi intervention as part of ‘the war on terror’. However, this had been defined by Chirac as counterproductive to the cause of fighting terrorism. Even after the terrorist attacks in Europe, French President Chirac was openly critical of the US about the way it conducts its war on terrorism, especially in Iraq: “As France had foreseen and feared, the war in Iraq has sparked upheavals that yet to show their full effects” while addressing the French diplomatic corps gathered in Paris on 5 January 2007.

He declared that the Iraqi conflict that started in 2003 ‘had offered terrorism a new field for expansion’.⁶⁹¹ Germany supported the French stance.⁶⁹² The major powers disagreed once again reminding the days of the Cold War. The alliance experienced hard times before, too. The Vietnam War and the crisis of the tactical nuclear missiles deployment in Europe caused divergences in transatlantic relations back in the Cold War days; however, the definition of the situation is still different now.⁶⁹³

The Western alliance of the Cold War had its own disagreements, but it also had clarity of purpose. It was intended to address one problem, the Soviet threat in Europe. It did so within the conceptual framework of a defensive military strategy, coupled – over the decades – with détente and political engagement with the Soviet Union. There was also clarity as to where the alliance ended, and a tacit agreement to tolerate disagreements on many issues not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty: in the Middle East regarding the Suez crisis, the various Arab–Israeli wars and the OPEC oil embargo; in Asia regarding Vietnam and China.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁹¹ “Chirac Slams Iraq War as Boost to Terrorism”, *UN Wire*, January 2007.

⁶⁹² *People Daily*, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/17/eng20040317_137707.shtml

⁶⁹³ William Park, *Defending the West: A History of NATO* Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986, p. 6; Paul Cornish, *Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 2; Dieter Mahncke, Wyn Rees and Wayne Thompson, *Redefining Transatlantic Security Relations* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 105

⁶⁹⁴ Allin, Dana H., Andréani, Gilles, Errera, Philippe and Samore, Gary. 2007. “Beyond the War on Terror” *Adelphi Papers* 47:389, 19.

Different from the Cold War years, the divergence over Iraqi intervention occurred in the absence of an existential threat. The allies disagreed on the method of fighting terrorism in the absence of a unifying common existential threat.⁶⁹⁵ The transatlantic debate on whether contemporary terrorism is new indicates that transnational terrorism is not regarded as an existential threat for all allies. Although it is a credible national security threat for most of them, it apparently does not constitute a threat as threatening as to overrule disagreements quickly.

Allies drifted apart about defining the contemporary threat. Moreover, they diverged on the means to counter it. Counterterrorism cultures of the two sides of the Atlantic accounts for such a divergence. Although the ambiguity of the new threat paved the way for different interpretations, contending national counterterrorism cultures or different security understandings were the additional reason behind different national strategies of fighting against transnational terrorism.

⁶⁹⁵Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2009. "Reshaping America's Alliances for the Long Haul" *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments* CSBA; National Intelligence Estimate, *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland*, July 2007, accessed at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf on August 26, 2008.

8.4. Counterterrorism Cultures on the Two Sides of the Atlantic

The concept of counterterrorism culture and strategic culture has been most closely connected with defence issues and with all war-fighting problems. Caroline Ziemke, one of the first to make use of this approach, has suggested that it is about a state's self-conception, mediated though the historical experience of its past conflicts. Historical experience and strategic culture are often connected though a process of reasoning by analogy. Decision-makers tend to focus strongly on the commanding heights of their past strategic experience, navigating in terms of major episodes which are regarded as successes or failures. These seminal experiences have burned themselves deeply into the national psyche and have significant unconscious meaning. Munich and Suez, more recently Vietnam and Somalia-perhaps soon Afghanistan and Iraq-are all examples of what Dan Reiter has called the 'weight of the shadow of the past'.⁶⁹⁶

The European and American responses to the terrorist attacks in their continents illustrated the contending counterterrorism cultures between them. Prior to 2003 and to the terrorist attacks in Europe, most European countries were reluctant of American policy in the Middle East. Even after September 11 attacks, despite the initial support they provided for the US, most European countries did not perceive themselves to be the main targets of transnational terrorists: They were not hit by transnational terrorist attacks yet.⁶⁹⁷ Before September 11, terrorism has been an external threat that is gauged in criminal terms, not in national security terms: ⁶⁹⁸The global terrorist threat was out there for Europe. This has changed after the bombings of Madrid and London and the threat started to be defined as an internal one still to be countered with anti-criminal or justice-based approach, as

⁶⁹⁶Dan Reiter, 'Learning, realism, and alliances', *World Politics* 46: 4, July 1994, pp. 490–526; Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances and World Wars* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam decisions of 1965* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

⁶⁹⁷Lindstrom, Gustav. 2004. "Protecting Europe", Analysis, October.

[http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=18&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[swords\]=terrorism&tx_ttnews\[poinster\]=3&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=552&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=11&cHash=8be660ce96](http://www.iss.europa.eu/index.php?id=18&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[swords]=terrorism&tx_ttnews[poinster]=3&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=552&tx_ttnews[backPid]=11&cHash=8be660ce96)

⁶⁹⁸Zimmermann, Doron. 2006. "The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:123-145; Chalk, Peter. William Roseanau. 2004. *Confronting the "Enemy Within": Security Intelligence, The Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies*, and Chalk, Peter. 2000. "The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability," in Fernando Reinares ed., *European Democracies against Terrorism- Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation* Aldershot, pp. 175-210.

examined in the discursive section through the end of the chapter.

The July 2005 terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom have re-focused attention on the threat from extremists. Parallels have been drawn with the attacks on Madrid in 2004 and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Nevertheless, different responses arose from the Atlantic Allies.⁶⁹⁹ In a nutshell, the US declared a 'global war on terrorism'. It channeled full resources of a 'national security' approach against the threat posed by a 'new terrorism', whereas Europe pursued regional multilateralism and diplomacy rather than military unilateralism against a threat that is perceived to be not so much new.⁷⁰⁰

It is instructive to look at the security and counterterrorist cultures in America and Europe *before* the terrorist attacks, and then comparatively examine whether there is any change regarding counterterrorism cooperation in rhetoric and action *after* the states were hit.

The transatlantic divergence (which is also rightly or wrongly perceived in the US as part of anti-Americanism)⁷⁰¹ has a history going at least back to the conduct of the Second World War. Lieutenant General Mark Clark, in 1944, told that "I was about ready to agree with Napoleon's conclusion that it is better to fight allies than to be one of them."⁷⁰² This is generally argued to be a consequence of power disparity. The theme of the unprecedented dominance of the United States on the world stage has been among the enduring topics of international discourse since the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁷⁰³ French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine

⁶⁹⁹Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, 917-919.

⁷⁰⁰Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence?" *International Affairs* 81, 5, 906-911.

⁷⁰¹Katzenstein, Peter and Robert Keohane. 2007. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 9-17.

⁷⁰²Silkett, Wayne. 1993. "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters*, Summer, pp. 74-85.

⁷⁰³Judge, Clark S. "Hegemony of the Heart", *Policy Review*, December 2001-January 2002.

famously characterized the US as ‘the world’s hyperpower’ though his words reportedly did not carry any pejorative meaning:

Q: During US elections, Obama read Zakaria’s book, which you wrote the introduction to in the French edition. McCain was reading Kagan. Are we in a post-American world?

A: The content of Zakaria is somewhat different than the title. Zakaria talks of a post-monopolistic world, but he thinks the US will retain its lead. I coined the word ‘hyperpower’ in 1998. In French, there is no pejorative dimension to the word; it is purely descriptive. I still think that the US remains the greatest power of all time, even though China may outgrow the US in statistical terms one day.⁷⁰⁴

Clinton administration’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed the U.S. the international order’s single “indispensable” nation, which might be seen as a benign equivalent of Védérine’s formulation.⁷⁰⁵ Henry Kissinger referred to “America at the Apex,” able to insist on its view and prevail in almost any arena. However, he worried that the US remains unsure of the ends to which it should apply its might. He was unsure of the importance of global political and military engagement at all.⁷⁰⁶ Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson echoed Védérine during his country’s tenure in the presidency of the European Union. However, he also called for Europe to position itself as a balance to U.S. domination of global affairs.⁷⁰⁷

Beyond Europe, even as the Clinton administration spoke of “strategic partnerships” with both Russia and China, leaders of those two countries had begun exploring how to transform the “unipolar” world into a “multipolar” one. In 1996 Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chinese Premier Li Peng met and, as one observer noted, “all but branded the United States a threat to peace” and explicitly labeled it the world’s “hegemon,” guilty of “repeated imposition of pressures on other countries.” Third World figures ranging from Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad voiced at least as emphatically the same analyses and concerns as had come from their European, Russian, and Chinese counterparts.⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁴CSMonitor interview with Védérine on January 27, 2010, [http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0127/Interview-former-French-diplomat-Hubert-Védérine-on-China-and-a-West-in-disarray/\(page\)3](http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0127/Interview-former-French-diplomat-Hubert-Védérine-on-China-and-a-West-in-disarray/(page)3)

⁷⁰⁵Albright, Madeleine in Online News Hour: Newsmaker: Madeleine Albright March 6, 1997-*Transcript* www.pbs.org

⁷⁰⁶Kissinger, Henry. 2001. “America at the Apex: Empire or Leader?” *The National Interest*, July.

⁷⁰⁷Persson, Goran quoted in, Kupchan, Charles. 2002. “The End of the West”, *Atlantic*, November.

⁷⁰⁸Judge, Clark S. “Hegemony of the Heart”, *Policy Review*, December 2001-January 2002.

However, since September 11, 2001 attacks, American power while impressive was not as overwhelming and unchallengeable as it had been a half-century earlier.⁷⁰⁹ Since September 11, American authorities had a hard time to prevent 19 attempted-terrorist-attacks on America.⁷¹⁰ Most of these attacks were not made public so as not to cause panic in the public. However, one of the foiled attacks became televised due to its occurrence in an international flight: The failed terrorist attempt in the Amsterdam-Detroit flight on 25 December in 2009. The number of the foiled attempts declared since 2007 was 19, which highlights the severity and continuity of the new threat. If not for the EU and the rest of the world, September 11 changed the twenty-first century in the American eyes.⁷¹¹

Yet, an eminent security analyst, Therese Delpech asserts that 9-11 does not change the European outlook towards terrorism:

Most Europeans do not accept the idea of a 'war' on terrorism. They are used to dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, justice), and have not really taken in the consequences of the magnitude of the change wrought by the events of 11 September 2001.⁷¹²

According to Tony Bunyan of Statewatch, "[o]f the eleven measures being rushed through in the EU, six were proposed before 11 September and another four were firmly on the EU's agenda."⁷¹³

⁷⁰⁹*The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Authorized Edition, New York: W.W.Norton and Company, July 22 2004, pp. 339-343.

⁷¹⁰Carafano, Dr. James Jay. 2007. "U.S. Thwarts 19 Terrorist Attacks against America since 9/11", November 13", Heritage Background Paper No. 2085 November 13. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2085.cfm>

⁷¹¹Miller, Steven E. 2005. "Review Essay-Terrifying Thoughts: Power, Order, and Terror After 9/11" *Global Governance* 11, 247-271.

⁷¹²Delpech, Therese. 2002. "International Terrorism in Europe", *Chaillot Papers* No. 56 Paris: Institute for Security Studies, p. 21.

⁷¹³Bunyan, Tony. "Statewatch Analyses of Post-11 September EU Measures Affecting Civil Liberties and Accountability," *Statewatch*, 14 October 2001, available at www.statewatch.org/news/2001/oct/14analyses.htm

American history did not record a terrorist era similar to the European ones that dealt with anarchists, the left and the ultra-right. Furthermore, separatist terrorism is relatively absent in American history. Terrorism was rarely on the main American political agenda. Although the United States has been involved in counterterrorism since the mid-1960s, it was only after the Iran hostage crisis of 1979 that terrorism featured regularly on the presidential agenda. Even then, terrorism was an undervalued political issue. In the White House there was fear of encouraging public expectations that could not be fulfilled and a tendency towards blame avoidance.⁷¹⁴ The US intelligence community was narrowly focused on the Cold War, playing to its strengths in technical collection and relying on Allied expertise for coverage in areas deemed less important. Terrorism was frequently perceived as something sponsored by the Soviet bloc and was regarded as a minor subdivision of the real problem of containing the former USSR. The US experience of terrorism has been confined to its presence overseas as experienced in the loss of 241 US Marines in Beirut in 1983.

As for the in-land, September 11 was not the first hit in the US soil. The attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 are the still-remembered faces of terrorism. Nevertheless, absence of sizeable and prolonged terrorism campaigns similar to the European ones such as the Red Army Brigades, Baader Meinhof, PIRA, ETA, and PKK caused no perception of terrorism as a domestic threat. In accordance, before September 11, there was a feeling that the country was invulnerable.⁷¹⁵

⁷¹⁴Clarke, Richard A. 2004. *Against all enemies: Inside America's war on terror* New York: Free Press, p.34.

⁷¹⁵Talbott, Strobe and Nayan Chanda. eds. 2001. *The Age of Terror-America and the World after September 11*, NY: Basic Books and the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, pp. 53-56.

While this is the limited American encounter with terrorism, American strategic and security culture in general contrasted sharply with its terrorism experience. America has a clearly defined strategic culture, which is emphasized by ‘its sense of exceptionalism’ and ‘technologism’. American exceptionalism has been the belief that its political and moral values are superior to those of the rest of the world and justify its position of leadership.

Thorne and Dunn maintain that

Exceptionalism has given America a sense of mission in the world and a confidence that its actions are in the broadest interests of humanity. This self-belief has been allied to strategies that seek ways to leverage its vast material and technological power. It has predisposed American policy-makers towards a national security culture that privileges a military response. As a superpower, the US sees the use of force as an important signal of resolve within the international community. Its military gives the US a global reach and ensures that no targets are beyond its ability to strike.⁷¹⁶

The European experience with terrorism in particular and European strategic culture in general is markedly different from that of the US. Europe has a long history of terrorism. Yet, European history of terrorism is multi-faceted for Europe includes 27 nations, which have transferred some of their sovereignty to the EU. Although each nation has a particular history of terrorism, elements of a European style have emerged during efforts against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s. Guertner indicates that Europeans have been fighting terrorism for decades, but the terrorist groups were mostly Euro-specific, with the exception of groups like Hamas or the Kurdish PKK who used Europe as a support base to attack outside the EU or committed acts of violence against very precise targets.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹⁶Rees, Wyn and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. “Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence?” *International Affairs* 81, 5, 909.

⁷¹⁷Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy”

In time, European anti-terrorism efforts have evolved into the contemporary European style of fighting terrorism, which focuses on the judiciary and regulatory anti-terrorism responses. In contrast to ‘counter-terrorism approach’ of the US, the EU advocates ‘anti-terrorism policies’ that shun the use of force and military instruments. That is the biggest difference between the counterterrorism cultures of Europe and the US.

Anti-terrorism is perceived by Europeans as a corollary of their common values such as liberal democracy, secularism and adherence to rule of law. However, the US does not interpret the same values as a reason to avoid use of force against terrorism. Consequently, the inclination to use force or the reluctance thereof lies at the heart of the contending counterterrorism cultures of Europe and the US.

The divergence on the use of force is not only limited to counterterrorism, but it is also the main bone of contention in contemporary transatlantic relations and contending strategic cultures of the Allies. Smith explains that Europe and the US need each other and will not ‘divorce’ because the relation between them is not one of classical balancing act. Even when there is no balancing in between, it does not change the differences about the political and strategic cultures of the Atlantic Allies. It is argued in the literature that Europe took lessons from the two World Wars and raised a different strategic understanding that aims to solve conflicts by means other than brute force.⁷¹⁸

Parameters, Summer, p. 36; “PKK Konusunda Saçmaladık - Türkiye-AB Parlamento Komisyonu Eşbaşkanı Joost Lagendijk, 10 Yıldır Terör Örgütünü Yanlış Algıladıklarını Söyledi”, *En Son Haber*, 23 Kasım 2007, 06:26, <http://www.ensonhaber.com/gundem/94273/pkk-konusunda-sacmaladik.html>

⁷¹⁸Brown, Chris. 2007. “European International Relations and the 800-Pound Gorilla” (review of *the International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives, and Destinations*. 2006. eds. Knud Erik Jørgenson and Tonny Brems Knudsen. New York: Routledge) *International Studies Review* 9, 732-737.

Smith argues that the EU has a distinctive identity, which is arguably soft-pedaling the US through soft-power, or balancing it in an unconventional way-normatively:

The second reason is that, *pace* the realists, the dynamic at work both within Europe and across the Atlantic is not one of the balance of power. As Richard Rosecrance has argued, the EU is a “new type of international actor,” which attracts countries towards it, rather than in opposition to it. As Europe unites, balance of power theory would tell us that it should generate an opposing coalition to balance it. Yet instead, outsiders want to join the EU or be linked with it. The EU does not threaten outsiders-it attracts them. This is because the EU does not appear to outsiders to be amassing power for the sake of pursuing exclusive EU interests, or to compete more effectively with other international actors. To assume that what is going on in Europe is merely an attempt to balance the United States is to misunderstand fundamentally the nature of the enterprise. This is not an attempt to recreate state sovereignty on a larger scale, but to overcome the problems posed by the exercise of sovereignty in Europe...European strategic culture is shaped by the European experiences of the two World Wars.⁷¹⁹

The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly recommendations, as an attempt to reach out to non-European states, neatly summarize the European approach to terrorism:

- (The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly) Considers that the most efficient remedy to fight against terrorism phenomenon, is the preventive remedy that starts by adopting a global approach in international relations based on peace, security and development, besides it aims at eradicating its root causes underlying the rise of terrorism and the conditions that facilitate its propagation by relying essentially on human development and paving the way for its causes, anchoring human rights expanding the field of consultation and participation, eradicating poverty and providing comprehensive and sustainable development for all social categories and regions.

-Affirms that combating terrorism largely depends on the methods adopted to counter this phenomenon, the most important of which being: no countering of violence by violence; no exclusive reliance on security solutions.⁷²⁰

Contemporary anti-terrorism approach of the EU, as a part of the generic European strategic culture defined above, did not emerge in one day. Countries such as France, Spain and the UK have confronted significant domestic terrorist

⁷¹⁹Smith, Karen E. “The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations”, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* Winter/Spring 2003 – Vol. IX, Issue 2, p. 110.

⁷²⁰Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly Recommendations on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct On Countering Terrorism, Athens, 27 March 2008, p. 4

movements, whereas others such as the Netherlands and Belgium have been spared a major domestic threat. Some European countries such as France have more historical associations with counterinsurgency and terrorism in an ‘end-of-empire’ context, but again these experiences differ from one another, too. Thus, although today there is a more-or-less unified stance on the way Europe defends itself against terrorism, intra-European cooperation against terrorism has been poor in that inter-state anti-terrorism structures were not built. European states addressed terrorism privately with their internal security systems.

This has started to change during the 1980s and it demonstrated its peak in the 2000s. The change into a more structured European response against terrorism was especially marked by French responses to Islamist extremism during the 1980s and 1990s.⁷²¹ The challenge of contemporary manifestation of terrorism has suited the EU’s post-World War II foreign policy attributes: Internal security of its member states and its activities in the field of justice and home affairs ensured that the EU would be the mechanism chosen for ‘regional counterterrorism’. Since 9/11 there has been a high momentum to build a more robust system of inter-state ‘anti-terrorism’ cooperation among European states.⁷²² The UK, as the nation that has used the counterterrorism approach the most, engaged in a long military campaign against the Provisional IRA. However, even the UK gradually allocated more responsibility for counterterrorism to civilian agencies.

⁷²¹Brady, Hugo. 2008. *Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy The EU’s role in counter-terrorism* Centre for European Reform, CER July 2009.

⁷²²Munday, Peter, Michael Pakenham, Alexander Nicoll, Jean-Yves Haine, Kristiina Rinkineva, Meeri-Maria Jaarva, Judith Johnson and Adrian Waller. 2006. *New European Approaches to Counter Terrorism* ESSTRT Deliverable D6-1 Final Report, Thales Research and Technology (TRT), UK International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Finland Thales e-Security (TeS), UK Project funded by the European Commission under the PASR 2004 Programme, pp. 2-7

The EU's anti-terrorism coordinator as of 2010, Gilles de Kerchove underlined repetitively that Eurojust and Europol have a leading role as of 2010.⁷²³ The EU's counterterrorist effort is marked by the regulatory approach with its focus on civil agencies. That means defending (rather than fighting) against terrorism more as a domestic problem of the Community. Kerchove stressed that Al-Qaeda has still been the primary 'internal' threat to Europe, particularly for Britain, Belgium and France.

As a response-policy, Kerchove underscores, EU state-members work at strengthening their domestic instruments legally and operationally. The regulatory response has suited current European Union supranational politics because of its strong domestic dimension that tries to rearrange and connect the internal politics of each nation under a common denominator. As Kaunert explicates, anti-terrorism is regarded as a good leeway to achieve the European goal of unified domestic and foreign policy.⁷²⁴

However, European anti-terrorism coordinator Kerchove also points out the problems of reaching a unified position: that each nation has still sovereign competence. National decisions must be respected, for example, with regard to hosting former Guantanamo detainees. Thus, while the EU member states are trying to form a unified response at the supranational EU level, differences among the member-states of the EU persists at the national level. For example, Germany decided, in 2009, not to host Guantanamo detainees, and as Kerchove underlined, it was not legal to resist such a sovereign decision.

⁷²³European Parliament TV Interview with Gilles de Kerchove, 'Interview: the End of the War on Terror and The Closure of Guantanamo', *Europarlv*, February 2, 2009.

⁷²⁴Kaunert, Christian. 2010. "The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 1, 41-61.

8.5. The Words and Deeds from September 11, 2001 to Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and London

American declarations regarding terrorism have been consistent throughout the first decade of the century.⁷²⁵ While the U.S. Government's portrayal of 'the war on terror' has been consistent, the U.K. Government's framing of the terrorist threat has evolved over time starting from the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

President G. W. Bush declared the day following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks:

"The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. *They were acts of war.* This will require our country to unite in steadfast determination and resolve. Freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we are facing a different enemy than we have ever faced."⁷²⁶

The quotation above reflects the general framework of American declarations both in tone and in the way they perceive the terrorist attacks in and outside the US. American declarations about the terrorist attacks around the world including those in Madrid and London followed the same consistent theme and tone of condemnation. They are perceived as 'acts of war' marking a new kind of terrorism that is to be answered by all means necessary.

⁷²⁵In reaching that conclusion, the study also took advantage of a scientific survey on American and British media discourse analysis: Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor *Managing Terrorism after 9/11: the War on Terror, The Media, and the Imagined Threat* The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, UK. [http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS Home](http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS+Home)

⁷²⁶The announcement of President Bush shortly before 11 a.m., September 12, 2001 at the end of a Cabinet meeting, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/etc/cron.html>

Taylor analyses the general framework of the American declarations:

The interpretation of the 9/11 events is very clear: the attacks are as an 'act of war' on civilization (problem definition) by evil terrorists (moral evaluation) motivated by hate for human life (causal interpretation) against which the world should unite to defeat barbarity and defend freedom (treatment recommendation). This frame has not been changed since the attacks and has helped the U.S. Government placing both domestic and international events that have followed 9/11 (such as terrorist alerts, counter-terrorist measures, and military operations in Afghanistan or in Iraq, but also restrictions of civil liberties) into a solid context.⁷²⁷

The initial international reaction to September 11 attacks was favourable on the side of the US. The beginning of the international coalition against terrorism took off by the tele-conference conducted between President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair who pledged his total support. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf also made a pledge of support for the US. NATO announced that it is prepared to invoke for the first time Article 5 of its Charter, which states that an attack against one member would be considered an attack against all members of the Alliance. This step was formally taken at a NATO meeting on October 2, 2001. The U.N. Security Council passed the Resolution 1368, which unanimously condemned the attacks and recognized "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" under the U.N. Charter. It called on the international community "to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks." It is important to note the criminality underlined by the UN in that it mentioned 'bringing the perpetrators of these attacks to justice'.

'War on Terror' is the American state-response against terrorism as separate from the wider inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism, while Britain has been the ardent supporter of the American conception of the War on Terror. Although Britain was the foremost supporter of the 'war on terrorism', its initial

⁷²⁷Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor *Managing Terrorism after 9/11: the War on Terror, The Media, and the Imagined Threat* The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, UK. [http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS Home](http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS+Home)

declarations were inconsistent and vague regarding what 'war' and 'war on terror' referred to. The U.K. Government did not provide a strong post-9/11 frame similar to the above-mentioned speech of the US President Bush. Taylor compares the Lord Major Speech (November 11th, 2002) regarded as the UK Government's blueprint for its anti-terrorist strategy to another speech held with George W. Bush in occasion of his state visit to Britain at the time of the Istanbul bombings (November 20th, 2003), and he underlines a change in rhetoric. The second speech marks a clear move of the British towards the US Government's frame.⁷²⁸

On 18 September 2001, France pledged support to the US: French President Jacques Chirac visited the White House and pledged "total solidarity" with the United States, although he expressed concern over the use of the term "war." Two years later, while French President Jacques Chirac addressed the UN General Assembly, in New York on September 2003, he laid out the French and German stance on the fight against terrorism in general and war on terror in particular: "... Multilateralism is a concept for our time, for it alone allows us to comprehend contemporary problems globally and in all their complexity. First of all, the settlement of conflicts that threaten international peace and security. In Iraq, the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis who must have sole responsibility for their future is essential for stability and reconstruction. It is up to the United Nations to give legitimacy to this process. It is also up to the United Nations to assist with the gradual transfer of administrative and economic responsibilities to the present Iraqi institutions according to a realistic timetable and to help the Iraqis draft a constitution and hold elections. Last, it is up to the United Nations to give a mandate to a multinational force commanded naturally by the main troop

⁷²⁸Cristina Archetti and Prof. Philip M. Taylor *Managing Terrorism after 9/11: the War on Terror, The Media, and the Imagined Threat*, The Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, UK. [http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS Home](http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/index.cfm?pbcrumb=ICS+Home)

contributor, in order to ensure the security of Iraq and all those helping with the country's reconstruction.”⁷²⁹

Chirac, representative of those European nations that were opposed to the Iraqi intervention in 2003 and then of those who were opposed to the way it is conducted, urged for the involvement of the UN as a quest of the implementation the struggle against terrorism through common values. The emphasis that is put on the centrality of the United Nations was largely absent from the US rhetoric:

In today's world, no one can act alone in the name of all and no one can accept the anarchy of a society without rules. There is no alternative to the United Nations.... Multilateralism is essential.... It is the (United Nations Security Council) that must set the bounds for the use of force. No one can appropriate the right to use it unilaterally and preventively.⁷³⁰

The above speech had been characteristic of the French and German stance against the War in Iraq in 2003. Chirac, while addressing the Conference on ‘Against Terrorism-For Humanity’ in New York on 22 November 2003 also told that:

“Our destinies are intertwined. We must stand by these peoples (the Middle Easterners). We must help them overcome the challenges facing them, help them hold out prospects of another future to their young, that of development and democracy, modernity, openness to the outside world and dialogue. Our world is characterized by the growing gap between rich and poor, by the destabilization of traditional societies, by the difficulties encountered by the developing countries’ middle classes in securing a minimum of stability. A key goal in the fight for

⁷²⁹Chirac, Jacques Speech to the opening meeting of the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly: New York, September 23, 2003,http://www.ambafranceus.org/news/statmnts/2003/chirac_NY092303_un.asp

⁷³⁰Chirac, Jacques Speech to the opening meeting of the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly: New York, September 23, 2003,http://www.ambafranceus.org/news/statmnts/2003/chirac_NY092303_un.asp

economic development is to share our prosperity in order to give each and every one a fair chance and a share in progress, and thus to diminish feelings of injustice and exclusion.”⁷³¹

As for the actions on the ground, the European Union member-states did not have combat roles, but provided mostly non-military support for the aftermath of the 2003 Iraqi intervention: In addition to the involvement of a number of EU members in providing security in Iraq, the EU's efforts since the war in 2003 have mainly focused on providing humanitarian relief, political and financial support to launch the reconstruction process. In early 2003, the EC set aside €100 million for the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq; EU Member States pledged more than €731 million. Following adoption of UNSC Resolution 1483 on 22 May 2003, the EU lifted its sanctions against Iraq. The Madrid donors conference held on 23-24 October 2003 launched the multilateral effort to assist Iraq's reconstruction. At the conference the EU as a whole pledged over €1.25 billion, including the EC contribution. The conference also welcomed the UN and World Bank's intention to establish a multi-donor trust fund for Iraq – the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.

Since October 2003, EU assistance for Iraq has widened in scope. While the humanitarian needs of the population were declining, resources for reconstruction were supplementing humanitarian work to rehabilitate core public services, and expanding to include the provision of employment, poverty reduction and the strengthening of Iraq's institutions and administration. EC assistance has also been directed to supporting the UN role in the political process and the development of Iraqi civil society and democratic institutions. Since 2003 the EU has provided

⁷³¹Chirac, Jacques Speech to the Conference "Against terrorism - for humanity", New York 22.09.2003 <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Speech-by-M-Jacques-Chirac,4744.html>

assistance amounting to €305 million from the EC budget to Iraq.⁷³²

As for the military contribution, French, Danish, German, Spanish, Greek and Italian forces undertook mostly non-combatant or minor war-fighting roles. The French and German contributions are representative of the European effort at large for they were representative of the sizeable non-military security support in training, aid, reconstruction and protection. The latter translates to protective means rather than offensive means of response.

There were more than 4,200 French military personnel currently operating in the CENTCOM AOR. The French Air Force, deploying C-160 and C-130 aircraft to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, have provided humanitarian assistance as well as national and coalition airlift support. Two KC-135 aircraft have deployed to Manas, Kyrgyzstan to provide aerial refueling. Six Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft have also deployed to Manas to provide close air support (CAS) capability. French engineers helped construct runways, a tent city and a munitions storage facility at Manas. France also provided airfield security (with dogs), a field mess unit, a deployable weather bureau, and a Civil Military Operations (CMO) team. France deployed an infantry company to Mazar-e-Sharif to provide area security up to December 2001. Two French officers served as air coordinators at the RAMCC. Atlantique aircraft deployed in Djibouti under national control are participating daily in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. France provided its only Carrier Battle Group to support combat operations in the North Arabian Sea. Aircraft from this Battle Group have flown more than 2,000 hours for OEF to date, supporting the coalition with air reconnaissance, strike and AEW missions. France's naval contribution to OEF accounts for approximately 24 percent of their entire naval

⁷³²Data retrieved from, *Commission of The European Communities Communication From The Commission To The Council and The European Parliament* Brussels, 9.6.2004 Com, 2004, 417 Final.

forces. France is the only coalition country to be flying fighter aircraft from Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan. Their Mirage and tanker aircraft actively supported the coalition (not the NATO) during Operation Anaconda and were maintaining their full support capabilities for further operations. The World Health Organization, French Embassy, Loma Linda (NGO) and French forces (500 personnel) inserted into ISAF worked to make major improvements to the Kabul Medical Institute - with equipment, books and a new curriculum.⁷³³

As for the German contribution to the fight against terrorism, there were 2,800 German personnel currently operating within the CENTCOM AOR. Germany has taken the lead in the establishment and training of the Afghan police force. German Special Operations Forces are currently in Afghanistan performing the full spectrum of SOF missions. The German Navy has had three Frigates, one Fast Patrol Boat Group (five units) and four supply ships operating out of Djibouti, in the Gulf of Aden area since January 2002. Additionally, there were two German Sea King helicopters based in Djibouti. A German A-310 (Airbus) aircraft is on alert in Germany for use as a Medevac platform. Germany led and supported the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) by providing its commander, a majority of the KMNB staff, one battalion-sized Infantry task Force, field hospital and other combat support troops. This force was supported by an air transport element operating out of Uzbekistan. Employment of Afghan war widows - USAID and CJCMOTF are planning to employ Afghan war widows to make uniforms for the Kabul police force, a micro-industry proposal made possible by a German contribution of 10 million Euros to help train and equip the police force.

⁷³³The US Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs 703-697-5131 Fact Sheet June 7, 2002, revised June 14, 2002.

Germany has conducted air transport flights in support of Humanitarian Assistance missions primarily in Afghanistan. Iraqi involvement of Germany was the first time German ships and maritime patrol aircraft have been operationally involved in a Middle East deployment in more than 50 years. Three German maritime patrol aircraft began conducting reconnaissance operations from Mombassa, Kenya. Germany conducted HA flights to support relief efforts for earthquake victims in Afghanistan.

8.6. Speeches and Actions after the Attacks in Europe

An international wave of condemnation has followed the rush-hour bombing of Spanish trains. The Madrid train bombings consisted of a series of coordinated bombings against the *Cercanías* (commuter train) system of Madrid, Spain on the morning of 11 March 2004 (3/11, three days before Spain's general elections), killing 191 people and wounding 1,800.

European Commission former President Romano Prodi told reporters that “I’m here to express our deep grief at this bloody, ferocious and senseless attack. There is no justification whatsoever behind which the authors of this bestial crime can hide. This is violence without object, without sense against which the entire international community has to mobilize itself. All the peoples of Europe are now close to Spain.”

European Parliament former President Pat Cox said, “It is an outrageous, unjustified and unjustifiable attack on the Spanish people and Spanish democracy. There is a general election due in Spain on Sunday. What happened today is a declaration of war on democracy. Let Sunday show that Spanish democracy is determined to overcome terrorism.”

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer “On behalf of the Alliance, I condemn in the strongest possible terms this mindless act of cruelty and barbarism.”

In September 2005, the Commission came up with a package including a proposed directive on data retention, a communication on radicalisation and a decision to allocate €7 million to prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks.⁷³⁴

Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso said “Terrorism is an absolute evil and before it there can only be one response: absolute determination, without doubts or hesitation.”

The UN former Secretary General Kofi Annan said “Once again we see senseless killing of innocent people. Killing of innocent people cannot be justified regardless of the cause. I offer my deepest sympathy. I hope that the perpetrators will be *brought to justice* swiftly.”

The US President George W Bush, in his reaction to the Madrid attacks, said: “We stand strongly with the people of Spain. I appreciate so very much the Spanish government's fight against terror, their resolute stand against terrorist organizations like ETA. And the US stands with them. And today we ask the God's blessings on those who suffer in the great country of Spain.”

Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, whose country held the EU presidency at the time of the bombings, “The timing of the bombings was clearly designed to wreak the greatest level of havoc... and cannot be justified by any political cause.”

French President Jacques Chirac said, “These irresponsible acts, which can have no justification, are from every standpoint to be condemned.”

⁷³⁴“European Anti-Terrorism Policy”, *Euractiv Network*, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/anti-terrorism-policy/article-136674>, accessed at 16 January 2009.

UK Prime Minister of the time Tony Blair said, “This terrible attack underlines the threat that we all continue to face from terrorism in many countries and why we must all work together internationally to safeguard our peoples against such attacks and defeat terrorism.”

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said, “These abominable terror acts that claimed so many lives fill us with deep sadness and outrage.”

US Ambassador to the EU Rockwell Schnabel, on behalf of President Bush said, “Today we stand together with all people of Europe in sorrow, but also with resolve to stop these *crimes against humanity*. There is no cause that can justify terrorism.”

Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan said, “Terrorists must know that with attacks such as the monstrous and unconscionable bombings in Madrid today they will not succeed in destroying the edifice of international law and human rights the international community has been building for so many years.”

Madrid attacks were followed by the 7 July 2005 London bombings (7/7) were a series of coordinated suicide attacks on London's public transport system during the morning rush hour. Europe has suffered from terrorism from various sources for decades. ETA and IRA have been among the most prolonged terrorist groups in Europe. A policy of increased judicial co-operation between member states had already been agreed as part of the Tampere Programme when the attack against the US took place in 2001.⁷³⁵

⁷³⁵European Anti-Terrorism Policy”, *Euractiv Network*, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/anti-terrorism-policy/article-136674>, accessed at 16 January 2009.

The anti-terrorism action plan was the immediate European reaction to the twin tower attacks which was followed by a framework decision defining terrorist offences and aligning the level of sanctions between member states. Following the Madrid bombings, however, the Council issued a declaration against terrorism and appointed Gijs de Vries as anti-terrorism coordinator. The action plan is updated every 6 months. From December 2005, the Commission decided to produce a scoreboard showing the level of implementation of action plan measures.⁷³⁶

The Hague Programme, adopted in November 2004 to succeed Tampere, includes a number of ambitious measures on exchange of information, border control, security of travel documents and police and judicial co-operation. In December 2004, the Council adopted specific measures on combating terrorist financing, civil protection policy, and prevention of recruitment, critical infrastructure protection and external security policy.

Following the London attacks in July 2005, EU interior ministers held an extraordinary meeting where they agreed that all measures already decided on should be implemented as a matter of urgency. These include: European evidence warrant; strengthening of Schengen and visa information systems; biometric details on passports; combating terrorist financing; prevention of recruitment and radicalization; greater controls over trade, storage and transport of explosives.

Thus, an energetic intra-EU institutional, regulatory and legislative overhauling took place after the attacks in Europe. Yet, the cooperation between the US and Europe remained mostly on a bilateral basis. French-US and British-US cooperation in intelligence has increased after the attacks in Madrid and London.⁷³⁷

⁷³⁶European Anti-Terrorism Policy”, *Euractiv Network*, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/anti-terrorism-policy/article-136674>, accessed at 16 January 2009.

⁷³⁷Nesser, Petter. 2006. “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe” *The Transnational Radical*

Yet again, no institutional and all-out Europe-American cooperation has materialized due to the contending counterterrorism cultures between countries such as Germany and France on one side and the US on the other.⁷³⁸

Even after the attacks in Europe, French President Chirac was openly critical of the US about the way it conducts its war on terrorism, especially in Iraq: “As France had foreseen and feared, the war in Iraq has sparked upheavals that yet to show their full effects” Chirac told the French diplomatic corps gathered in Paris on 5 January 2007. He declared that the conflict, which the US still describes as part of the ‘war on terror’ it launched in 2001 following the September 11 attacks, ‘*had offered terrorism a new field for expansion*’.⁷³⁹ Chirac said the war had repercussions for the wider region and he criticized the US-led invasion of Iraq, saying that it destabilized the region and allowed terrorism to spread.

Chirac even said France looked forward to the emergence of a multipolar world, as China, India and Brazil take on ‘the status of global powers’, with influence shared between the old and new giants. He predicted that “the rise will mark the end if the centuries long, undivided Western domination of the world” and hopefully address the “persistence of extreme poverty in a world growing ever richer” - “a moral scandal as much as an economic absurdity and a major political threat”.

Islamism Project, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) Kjeller-Norway, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:323-342; Brady, Hugo. 2009. *Intelligence, emergencies and foreign policy The EU's role in counter-terrorism* Centre for European Reform, CER July.

⁷³⁸Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes. 2009. “Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Change and Continuity or Crisis and Transformation?” *Intelligence and National Security* Vol. 24, No. 1, 6-25, February; Dittrich, Mirjam. 2008. “The Future of CFSP-The Madrid Agenda: A report from the international conference on Democracy, Terrorism and Security” *European Policy Center*, <http://www.epc.eu/en/er.asp?TYP=ER&LV=293&see=y&t=2&PG=ER/EN/detail&l=&AI=487>, Wednesday 04, June; Newsome, Bruce. 2006. “Expatriate Games: Interorganizational Coordination and International Counterterrorism” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:75-89.

⁷³⁹“Chirac Renews Attack on Iraq War”, *BBC News*, 5 January 2007, 16:09 GMT, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6234759.stm

Chirac, yet again in 2007, said that “Iraq war bred terrorism.” As one of the fiercest opponents of the US-led war in Iraq, he warned that “today the conflict had provided a dangerous new breeding ground for terrorism.” He declared that “the war in Iraq exacerbated the divisions between communities and threatened the very integrity of Iraq. It undermined the stability of the entire region, where every country now fears for its security and its independence”.

8.7. Different Counterterrorism Understandings and Different Responses after the Terrorist Attacks in Europe

After 9-11, American overseas policy was shaped by the identification of connections among ‘terrorism with a global reach’, weapons of mass destruction and ‘states of concern’. As for internal security, the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened controls at points of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts and rearranged its intelligence and security agencies, and established the Homeland Security division.⁷⁴⁰ The American perception has conceptualized the terrorist threat as a new kind of terrorism and as an act of war that must be countered militarily.⁷⁴¹

In contrast, Europe has perceived the problem differently. European countries saw their military forces useful for peacekeeping and reconstruction missions rather than in combat formations. Leaving aside the United Kingdom and Poland, most European nations did not take major roles in combat operations. Europeans were behind the frontlines of ‘the war on terror’ in Afghanistan and

⁷⁴⁰The 9-11 Commission Report-Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Authorized Edition, New York: W.W.Norton and Company, July 22, 2004, pp. 108-143.

⁷⁴¹Posen, Barry R. 2001-2002. “The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 39–55.

Iraq.⁷⁴²

The mission in Afghanistan is determining for both the future of the Alliance and the security of Western societies:

For many Americans, NATO's solidarity and effectiveness will be decided in the caldron of Afghanistan, where European Allies and Partners contribute approximately 28,000 of the 55,000 troops (including nearly 23,000 Americans) in ISAF. European and American leaders broadly agree that if Afghanistan were to become a "failed state," terrorist networks would be able again to operate there with relative impunity, posing a direct threat to an unstable and nuclear-armed Pakistan and, eventually, to the European and American homelands. But whereas American public support for the Afghanistan mission remains strong, the European public's support for the ISAF effort is wavering.⁷⁴³

European threat assessment and corollary policy that has continuously emphasized the containment of 'risk', consensus-building and diplomacy had not been in tune with that of the US.⁷⁴⁴ Domestically, European legal changes with regard to surveillance and civil rights were less sweeping when compared to those of the US. European conviction, that the 'newness' of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda has been exaggerated, led to different policies. The implications of these divergent cultures for the future of the relationship between Europe and the United States appear to be remarkable, for they seem to be long lasting into an undetermined future.⁷⁴⁵

The ambiguous features of the new threat are worth separate and special emphasis. These features severely exacerbate common stance regarding the

⁷⁴²NATO figures as of January 2009; Canada and Australia (not a NATO member) provided 2830 troops and 1090 troops, respectively. Some 10,000 additional U.S. military serve in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom's Combined Joint Task Force 101. Since late 2008, all U.S. forces in Afghanistan report to ISAF's Commander, U.S. Gen. David McKiernan. In March 2003, General McKiernan commanded all coalition and U.S. conventional ground forces that attacked into Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

⁷⁴³Michel, Leo. 2009. 'Euro-Atlantic Security Relations and U.S.-French Cooperation' in *Avenir De La Relation Franco-Américaine Groupe Stratégique Franco-Américain Projet*, Johns Hopkins University, Fondation Robert Schuman Etude and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Janvier/January, p.7.

⁷⁴⁴Lesser, Ian O. "Strategic Priorities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East" in *Avenir De La Relation Franco-Américaine Groupe Stratégique Franco-Américain Projet*, Johns Hopkins University, Fondation Robert Schuman Etude and Center for Transatlantic Relations, Janvier/January, pp. 25-31.

⁷⁴⁵Candidate's interview with the anonymous NATO military and civil bureaucratic personnel in NATO MIO Seminar, Crete, Greece, October, 2009.

definition of the threat and due common counterstrategies. Since the threat does not possess an accustomed form in the eyes of the decision-makers and civil and military bureaucracies, since it is not clear in the form of a nation-state against which established working protocols and best-practices had been used in diplomacy and military realms, it is hard even for like-minded people to come to consensus regarding the specifics of a response-policy.

The new threat is, thus, selected as a variable that complicates inter-state cooperation even in the absence of the contending counterterrorism cultures: The above-mentioned list of different features of the threat helps explain why the threat itself is an ambiguous one that is open to divergences even among states that have similar strategic and military cultures. The above-mentioned initial differences between Britain and the US and between Turkey and the US are examples to hardships among states that have similar strategic cultures. Because of the features of the threat, countries perceive the international fight against terrorism with differences.

Although the weight of the unit-level variables or preferences of states cannot be ignored, the following features of the threat seem to be more determining than the divergent counterterrorism cultures of states, especially because these features create operational counterterrorism ambiguities regardless of different national security understandings:

- *No state-control*, manipulation or sponsorship
- *Merger with organized crime and unregulated financing* that is supported by black markets and corrupt officials⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴⁶Thachuk, Kimberley. 2008. "Countering Terrorist Support Structures". *Defense Against Terrorism Review DATR* Vol.1 No.1, p.13-29.

- *Lack of a territory* (base, headquarters or address) to be retaliated at, which cancels deterrence
- *Open endorsement of indiscriminate killing* as determined choice; pursuing any means that give catastrophic effect such as exploding jets into buildings, suicide-bombing, truck-bombing or seeking WMD
- Possessing *suicide-bombers* as the smartest mobile bombs⁷⁴⁷
- *Effective combination of the pre-modern and modern skills and technology* in carrying out attacks (the use of traditional methods of money transaction such as hawala, hundis, and also modern banking system- modern weaponry and means such as explosives, GPS and the Internet)

These features complicate the implementation of a common and cooperative response at the operational level. Even when following a common strategy in the absence of different security understandings, the fight against terrorism is operationally crippled by the threat itself. These features defy organizational and bureaucratic working-mechanisms of nation-states as the following declarations by the authorities indicate.

Numerous declarations and documents emphasize the weight of the new threat with its distinct features. One of the noticeable examples is the European Security Strategy of December 2003. The distinct features seem to find their way into the latter European strategy document even before the attacks in Madrid and London occurred.

⁷⁴⁷Pape, Robert. 2005. *Dying to Win*. New York: Random House.

The document clarifies the significance of the threat with its different dimensions:

Global Challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of *increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked*.

Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are *more diverse, less visible and less predictable*.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. *Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.* Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. *Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.*⁷⁴⁸

Ambassador Ivo. H. Daalder, United States Permanent Representative to the NATO, also emphasizes the significance of the threat and the form of response it requires:

Today, in 2010, the common security threats we face demand a resolute, common response. What is notable - and new - about these threats is the reality that they are no longer limited in terms of geography. They are instead what President Obama has called “a world of threats that know no borders.” In this age of global politics, no country, not even as great and powerful a nation as my own, can deal with this complexity of challenges and opportunities by itself. We need the help of others. That is why the United States needs NATO and why NATO needs partners. These partnerships offer mutual reinforcement and reciprocity in a world that demands that we work together on a truly global scale.⁷⁴⁹

Ambassador Dell Dailey, the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, also emphasizes the deterritorialized and diffused form of the new threat. He goes on to underline that common goals and strategy are needed to

⁷⁴⁸A Secure Europe in a Better World-*European Security Strategy* Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 2-3.

⁷⁴⁹Ambassador Ivo. H. Daalder. (United States Permanent Representative to the NATO). 2010. “NATO Partnerships”, *The US Mission to the NATO* January, http://nato.usmission.gov/Speeches/Daalder_Partnerships_Vilnius.asp

defeat the new threat. However, he also points out that this has not occurred yet.

Dealing with al-Qaida is complicated by the fact that it is a decentralized enemy that is professional and highly adept at using sophisticated propaganda to exploit electronic data through the Internet, Dailey said.

“The international community, the governments and international organizations, politicians, academics, religious and community leaders, in general, *need to do better* in disrupting terrorist propaganda and its misinformation,” Dailey said.

“We can destroy terrorist leadership, disrupt terrorist networks, and eliminate terrorist safe havens, but unless we prevent terrorists from recruiting new members locally and expanding its reach globally, we will not be truly successful.” Dailey said a key component in U.S. counterterrorism policies is counter-radicalization and its precursor, anti-radicalization. “Evidence shows that terrorists manipulate grievances, whether real or perceived, to subvert legitimate authority and create unrest,” he said. Dailey likened this process to a conveyor belt in which terrorist groups convert alienated populations to extremist viewpoints and turn them by stages into sympathizers, supporters and finally terrorists.⁷⁵⁰

The post-Cold War threat assessments, including that of terrorism, suffer from the shift from state-centric threats to diffused threats that are transnational in nature. That translates to different form of cooperation against transnational threats. However, cooperation and alignment against the new threat is wrought with difficulties of reaching a common ground for action. Transnational threats are perceived differently, as being either internal or external or as being both internal-and-externals, by different governments.

In the absence of high anticipation of conventional war, transnational threats and in particular transnational terrorist threat itself is assessed differently by states. That is how the discussion of waning of major war in the preceding chapters is important in understanding the reasons why different threat assessments occur.

The new threat itself is thereby open to be interpreted differently in the absence of a unifying existential threat that may annihilate or invade countries; the Former Director General UK Security Service Stephen Lander explains:

⁷⁵⁰ Ambassador Dell Dailey, the U.S. State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, “Defeating Terrorism Requires Common Goal, Strategic Effort” *The United States Mission to the European Union*, Brussels, Belgium, October 2008. <http://useu.usmission.gov>

So far as the essentially competitive nature of intelligence work is concerned, developments since the end of the Cold War have pulled in different directions. On the one hand, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the strategic threat to the West posed by the Soviet Union have led to greater competitiveness and divisions between the former Western allies, and thus between their intelligence services. When there was NATO on our side and the Warsaw Pact on theirs, there was clarity about friend and foe. *Since then, that clarity has departed and states can now much more easily be allies on one issue and adversaries on another. Differences of European perspective on the Balkans in the 1990s or more recently on the war in Iraq make the point.*⁷⁵¹

As for the implications of the distinct features of the threat of transnational terrorism for intelligence agencies and international cooperation, Lander provides an insider view:

For the intelligence community in the UK, this has led to some schizophrenia about international relationships, with close collaboration possible with allies on some issues (such as terrorism and drugs), but no-go areas on others where there are foreign policy tensions. The UK has clearly not been alone in finding these relationship issues more complex than they used to be, with policy differences in particular about the Middle East complicating the intelligence exchanges in Europe and beyond.

Pulling in the opposite direction in respect of international cooperation since the end of the Cold War has, of course, been the emergence of a new strategic threat, that of terrorism, not this time from nationalist or separatist groups with an essentially one-country focus, such as, to cite two of many, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), but from al-Qaeda (AQ) and its like with their internationalist and wide-ranging aspirations. I might make the point here that a threat that operates virtually irrespective of nationality and national borders poses particular challenges for intelligence services and for international collaboration between states.⁷⁵²

In addition to the dimensions of the new threat (State actors vs. Non-state actors; Financial motivations and prestige; Transnational networks) as outlined by Guy Roberts,⁷⁵³ different national security understandings also contribute to diverging state responses. Yet again, ‘the new threat’ or the distinct dimensions of the threat come as an independent factor or variable that aggravates the contending counterterrorism cultures of the transatlantic partners because the divergences is

⁷⁵¹Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 3, October, p. 482.

⁷⁵²Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 3, October, p. 482-3.

⁷⁵³The candidate’s interview with Guy Roberts-NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction, NATO Seminar on Maritime Security Operations (MIO) Crete-Greece, 22 October 2009.

not counter-terrorism specific but extends to the different strategies to be followed in security and foreign policies of the Atlantic Allies.

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States and its 2006 expanded version describe broad strategic goals of the US. Those goals and the way they are articulated have become known as the Bush Doctrine: military primacy, global transformation of political regimes, pre-emption, and a willingness to act unilaterally. Most Europeans worried about the juxtaposition of ‘the unachievable goal’ of completely ending tyranny throughout the world, the confusion between pre-emptive war and preventive war, the use of 9/11 as a pretext for unilateralism, and the document’s preface declaring “This is a wartime national security strategy . . .”.⁷⁵⁴ From the perspective of most Europeans, these goals are perceived as overly-broad and in sharp contrast with the European preference for multilateralism and consensus.⁷⁵⁵ The ostensible lack of nuance was regarded as an invitation to abuse the cause of counterterrorism for other national objectives. The application of the above-mentioned elements of the Bush Doctrine in the Iraqi intervention in 2003 largely eroded the European sympathy for the US policies.⁷⁵⁶ The unilateral declaration of when to use military force against another state seems to be the point where most Europeans diverge from the Bush Doctrine’s explicit shift from deterrence to pre-emption (or to prevention).⁷⁵⁷

⁷⁵⁴Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” *Parameters*, Summer, pp.37-39; Kotsopoulos, John. 2006. “A human security agenda for the EU?” *European Policy Center EPC Issue Paper No.48* June.

⁷⁵⁵Biscop, Sven, Francesco Francioni, Kennedy Graham, Tania Felicio, Jeffrey Laurenti, Thierry Tardy. 2005. *The European Union and the United Nations-Partners in Effective Multilateralism*. Chaillot Paper No. 78, June, pp. 89-72.

⁷⁵⁶Wilkinson, Paul. 2005. *International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response*, Chaillot Paper No. 84 October, p. 31.

⁷⁵⁷‘Pre-emption’ and ‘prevention’ are used as interchangeable with one another in the NSS 2002. Moreover, Chapter V of the NSS 2002 uses a strong expression while other usages of the term in preceding chapters are relatively weaker and softer, 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United*

Previously, deterrence and containment have long been the basic strategy with regard to the states that the US confronts. However, pre-emption or prevention (the terms are used in the same meaning and logic regardless of their vocabulary and conceptual differentiation) has replaced deterrence in the case of ‘threats emanating from terrorists’. The National Security Strategy of the US 2002 uses a soft language in the chapter discussing the strategy of pre-empting terrorist groups before they attack while it retains the explicit language in Chapter V where the pre-emption against nation-state actors is spelled out in detail. Thus, European analysts and politicians, coupled with the Iraqi intervention in 2003, saw the American NSS 2002 as basically a manifesto for attacking other states.⁷⁵⁸ That seems to be perceived by Europeans as a hijacking of the fight against terrorism. The transatlantic divergence on counterterrorism lied in the strategy of pre-emption, the use of force against states, and the lack of trust that underlie the transatlantic relations as to the real objectives of the war on terror.

The French headline that declared, “Today we are all Americans,” captured the feelings of virtually all Europeans. The assistance clause of NATO’s Article V was invoked for the first time in history, and Europeans joined Americans in the continental defense of the United States. The war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan was broadly endorsed as legal and reasonable retaliatory responses. The publication of the *2002 National Security Strategy* precipitated a healthy debate among Americans and Europeans that might have ended in a strong consensus on the appropriate use of force against terrorist organizations and their sponsors. The extension of pre-emption to embrace preventive war as described in the NSS and its application to regime change in Iraq, however, derailed a critical debate on how to formalize broad alliance policies against terrorism and created instead bitter divisions between the Franco-German position and the Bush Administration.⁷⁵⁹

Alongside different security understandings or cultures, the features of the new threat also play an important part in divergent responses. Due to the different dimensions of the transnational terrorism, Lander stresses that intelligence

States of America September 2002, Washington: White House.

⁷⁵⁸Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” *Parameters*, Summer, p. 40.

⁷⁵⁹Guertner, Gary L. 2007. “European Views of Preemption in US National Security Strategy” *Parameters*, Summer, p. 33.

agencies' activities have started to become closely interlinked with the activities of government, legislation and diplomacy: "the emergence of what may best be described as *intelligence diplomacy*":

Whether it is intelligence chiefs at Camp David with the prime minister and the president, or visiting India and Pakistan to carry government messages about Kashmir, or travelling to Moscow to raise concerns about proliferation of Russian weapons technologies, this has been a feature of agency life that is new. It reflects not some general invasion of diplomatic space by spies, but the recognition by governments that there are relationships and understanding in their intelligence communities which can be used diplomatically. That recognition has arisen in the UK, I suggest, because of the far greater relevance of agency work post-Cold-War to the day-to-day concerns of government and the greater familiarity of ministers and senior officials with the agencies' business which has resulted.⁷⁶⁰

He goes on to make 'the new threat' clearer:

A comparison of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) first-order requirements for intelligence (what might best be described as Her Majesty's Government's (HMG's) wish list for other people's secrets) for today and, say, 1980 would, I imagine, make the point. In 1980, those requirements presumably included something like:

- the organisation and capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces;
- the staff identities, modus operandi and operations of the Soviet intelligence services;
- the same for the East European intelligence services;
- Soviet relations with Cuba and Angola;
- etc.

These are all important subjects given the strategic context, but hardly the day-to-day concern of ministers and Parliament. Now, I imagine that today's JIC first-order list probably includes something like:

- international terrorism, and the whereabouts, capabilities
- and intentions of AQ members in particular;
- heroin and cocaine smuggling, people, routes and methods;
- weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes and plans;
- terrorism associated with Northern Ireland;
- the Middle East peace process;
- the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan;

These were all subjects about which government is exercised at many levels. *They matter to government on a daily basis and also importantly to the media.* The two, of course, go together, pointing out that this greater government and media familiarity with the agencies and legislation to govern their activities.⁷⁶¹

Terrorism has long been a source of friction between the United States and Europe. Many terrorism scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, have argued that the

⁷⁶⁰Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. "International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 3, October, p. 483.

⁷⁶¹Lander, Stephen. Former Director General UK Security Service, London. 2004. "International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 17, Number 3, October, p. 483-4.

differences in terrorism perception have had negative implications on U.S.-European counter-terrorism relations.⁷⁶²

A survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund in 2004 points out a relative increase in non-military dimensions of counterterrorism cooperation. Both Europeans (71%) and Americans (76%) share concerns about international terrorism, and thus have a 'similar' perception of the threat. However, they differ 'markedly' in their response to terrorism; Americans prefer a military response (54%), whereas Europeans agree with this option only to a more limited extent (28%). Consequently, it is more likely for America and Europe to achieve a positive working relationship on counterterrorism issues that are of a non-military nature.⁷⁶³ Yet, European-American counterterrorism cooperation is not strong. Kaunert summarizes the state of European-American counterterrorism relations as "larger member states prefer to deal with the US on a bilateral basis rather than through the EU", which underlines an unstructured, non-unified and un-institutionalized European cooperative approach towards the US:

EU counter-terrorism policy has received significant scholarly attention recently. The Journal of Common Market Studies even published a special issue on the topic in January 2008 edited by Geoffrey Edwards and Christopher Meyer. In the introductory article, it is claimed that the entire "governance of the European Union has been changed through its responses to international terrorism," which is not too surprising if one believes the European security scholars who frequently cite terrorism as one of the most salient security threats across Europe amongst national publics. This is also underlined by the aforementioned German Marshall Fund survey of 2004. This leads Edwards and Meyer to present the puzzle that "the politics of counter-terrorism have contributed to the blurring of differences between the so-called three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty," but that "larger member states prefer to deal with the US on a bilateral basis rather than through the EU."⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶²B. Hoffman, 1999. "Is Europe Soft on Terrorism," *Foreign Policy*, No. 115 Summer, 62-76; R. Rosecrance, 1998. "The European Union: A new type of international actor," in J. Zielonka, ed., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy* The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 15-23; F. Cameron, 2007. "Transatlantic relations and terrorism," in D. Spence, ed., *The European Union and Terrorism* London: John Harper Publishing; Monar, J. 2004. "The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of Justice and Home Affairs," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9, 395-415.

⁷⁶³F. Cameron, 2007. "Transatlantic relations and terrorism," in D. Spence, ed., *The European Union and Terrorism* London: John Harper Publishing, pp.142-145.

⁷⁶⁴Kaunert, Christian. 2010. "The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 1, p. 49.

8.8. Action and Rhetoric after the Attacks in Madrid and London: Increasing Intra-European Counterterrorism Efforts, Mediocre EU-US Counterterrorism Cooperation

As highlighted in above sections, European countries fought terrorism within their borders long before Al Qaeda. Spain fought the Basque ETA, Britain fought the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Italy, the Red Brigades, and Germany fought the Red Army Faction (RAF). Counter-terrorism cooperation among European nations has developed within the framework of the TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence, and Internationalism) Group. It was formed by European police officials to exchange information and provide mutual legal assistance on terrorism and related international crimes under the auspices of the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs of the European Economic Community.

These efforts were codified under the Treaty of European Union in Maastricht 1992, and amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, and Nice 2001. As Kaunert underlines, three areas were of vital importance to create EU competences, which could then facilitate EU-U.S. counter-terrorism relation: a- police cooperation, b- criminalizing terrorism, and c- extradition.

First pillar counterterrorism measures are built on the indirect or implied powers derived from the ECJ verdict in the AETR case. The European Union derives most of its current internal legal competences in the area of police cooperation from the revisions of the Treaty of Maastricht through the Treaty of Amsterdam. According to Article 29 EU, the objectives of the third pillar are to be achieved through: a-closer cooperation between police forces, b-customs authorities, and c- other competent authorities in the Member States and the European Police Office (Europol). However, a limited competence for Europol was

already established under the Treaty of Maastricht, and thus the agency started limited operations in The Hague in the form of a drugs unit in 1994. In 1995, the Europol Convention was formally drawn up in Brussels, which came into force on 1 October 1998 after full ratification. The legal mandate of the Convention included improving the effective cooperation among police authorities of the member-states, to prevent and combat serious international organized crime, to investigate criminal areas, such as drug trafficking and other forms of crime, as well as terrorism. In 2002, the mandate was expanded to deal with all serious forms of crime. Yet, despite its clear value in combating terrorism, Europol lacks of executive powers and autonomous investigative powers.

Madrid and London bombings demonstrated the severity of the coordinated attacks with massive casualties. The Madrid and London bombings of 2004/5 represented the most shocking attacks in the EU in recent years. There have however also been an alarming number of other attempted attacks many of which went unnoticed. In 2007, almost 600 failed, foiled or successfully executed terrorist attacks were carried out in eleven EU Member States.⁷⁶⁵

In terms of prevention, the EU funded several projects including a handbook for tackling radicalisation in prisons.⁷⁶⁶ The directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for terrorist financing extended the obligation to report on suspicious transactions to non-financial business including casinos and lawyers. As a result of the regulation adopted in 2005, travellers entering or leaving the EU with €10,000 or more in cash are required to make a written

⁷⁶⁵Europol, 'EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007', <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/TESAT/TESAT2007.pdf>

⁷⁶⁶ Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005, p. 15-17.

declaration.⁷⁶⁷The EU adopted legislation⁷⁶⁸for the criminalisation of terrorist training and recruitment and of public provocation to commit terrorist offences, including over the Internet. Funds were allocated for the installation of an EU-wide Early Warning System to notify authorities of threats posed by missing or stolen explosives. Instruments to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure of the EU such as roads, railways, electricity networks and power stations are prepared.⁷⁶⁹The Commission's consultations on bio-preparedness by way of a Green Paper aimed at a package of proposals to reduce the risk of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, which have the potential to harm thousands of people, to destroy agriculture and to damage severely the food supply chain.⁷⁷⁰ The EU's work during the past 5 years was predicated on the 'principle of availability' whereby a law enforcement officer from one Member State during the course of his duties can obtain information, where it is available, from another Member State. The exchange of information and intelligence was simplified.⁷⁷¹ The incorporation of the Prüm Treaty into EU legislation provided indirect access to Member States' databases on fingerprints and DNA information, and direct, controlled access to vehicle registration files.⁷⁷²It seems likely to improve police cooperation throughout the EU by enabling them to know what information is

⁷⁶⁷Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community, OJ L 309, 25.11.2005.

⁷⁶⁸Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ L 330, 9.12.2008, pp. 20-22.

⁷⁶⁹Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, COM(786) final, and Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ L 345, 23.12.2008.

⁷⁷⁰Green Paper on bio-preparedness, COM 2007.

⁷⁷¹Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, pp. 89-91.

⁷⁷²Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, pp. 1-3; Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, pp. 10-12.

available. Conditions for access for security purposes to the VIS were adopted.⁷⁷³ Moreover, conditions for the retention of electronic communications traffic and location data were transposed by most Member States in relation to fixed telephone networks and mobile telephony.⁷⁷⁴ The Council Decision establishing the European Police Office (Europol) and replacing the former Convention aims to give the body greater operational flexibility to respond more rapidly to trends in crime.⁷⁷⁵ In addition to its information system, designed to collect data relating to serious cross border crime and to allow for its exchange, Europol's Analytical Work Files are tools to provide law enforcement services in Member States with relevant intelligence on specific criminal phenomena, including trafficking in human beings, terrorism, credit card fraud and synthetic drugs trafficking.⁷⁷⁶

The European Union has had to act internally in order to create the competences necessary to protect Europe from this particular terrorist threat. Europol reacted immediately to the attacks. The Operational Center that was created to provide 24/7 service for the exchange of information had been overhauled and enhanced after the attacks. A specialized counter-terrorist unit became fully operational with experts and liaison officers from police and intelligence services of the member-states.⁷⁷⁷ Their mission is to collect and

⁷⁷³Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008

⁷⁷⁴Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006.

⁷⁷⁵ Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol), OJ L 121, 15.5.2009.

⁷⁷⁶Commission of the European Communities Brussels, 10.6.2009 Com (2009) 263 Final Communication from the Commission To The Council, The European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Justice, Freedom and Security in Europe since 2005: An Evaluation of the Hague Programme and Action Plan {Sec (2009) 765 Final} {Sec (2009) 766 Final} {Sec (2009) 767 Final}, pp. 8-12.

⁷⁷⁷Solana, Xavier. 2004. 'Terrorism in Europe: how does the European Union respond to this

analyze counterterrorist information and intelligence in order to shape a European threat assessment. Currently, there is just 15 Europol permanent staff. In addition, 10 seconded staff members working on terrorism exist as well as 22 analysts that help connecting the dots.

As the Commission reports indicate, coordinating the EU's global action is regulated through definition of terrorism and the European arrest warrant. As for the European definition of terrorism, the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism is important. The European Commission presented a proposal to that effect to the aforementioned special meeting of EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers in Brussels on countries in September 2001. It intended to put in place a definition of terrorism, alongside penalties and sanctions that come on extradition procedures and mechanisms for exchanging information. Effectively, this is the first time such a definition has been agreed to on a supranational level, especially in the light that a number of member states did not even have definitions of terrorism.

The EU's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, agreed to politically in December 2001, firstly defines what is meant by terrorist acts in three parts: a- the context of an action; b- the aim of the action; and c- the specific acts being committed. "They must be intentional acts, which given their nature or context, may serve to damage a country or an international organization. These acts must be committed with the aim of either seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to act or fail to act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional economic or social structures of a country or international organization." In addition, a list defines eight specific acts. The definition also covers behaviors

phenomenon?' EU Council document S0266/04, 7 October.

which may contribute to terrorist acts in third countries.⁷⁷⁸

The Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism thus ensures that terrorist offences are punished by heavier sentences than common criminal offences in all EU member states would have provided for. Furthermore, it approximates the level of sanctions between member states according to the principle that sentences have to be both proportional and dissuasive. Member states are legally responsible to act in cases of terrorist incidents that take place on their own territory or that are committed against their own people. The Framework Decision is favourable for EU-U.S. cooperation in the fight against terrorism as this offence is now recognized as a criminal offence on both sides of the Atlantic. However, this framework decision also enables the EU to conclude criminal justice agreements with third countries, such as the USA.⁷⁷⁹

However, according to one report, addressing the progress of implementing the Framework Decision, “[b]y the deadline of Article 11 (1), only two Member States had introduced specific legislation on terrorism, while at least five had legislation on the matter previous to the framework decision. Six members had adopted new measures transposing the Framework Decision after the Deadline.” With reference to the incomplete and messy implementation of provisions regulating terrorist offenses, the authors of the report conclude that the behaviour of member states “may disrupt the systematic and political aim of this instrument and the clarity of implementation, and can hinder the full implementation of relating provisions.”⁷⁸⁰

Alongside the Framework Decision, the flagship of EU counterterrorism efforts has been the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 2001. Yet, it is important to highlight den Boer’s study underlining that current EU response are not initiated against the transnational terrorist wave of the new century, but already on the agenda before the attacks:

⁷⁷⁸Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 1, p. 52.

⁷⁷⁹Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 1, p. 54.

⁷⁸⁰Council of the European Union, *Report on the Implementation of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism* Brussels, 12 October 2004, pp. 6-7.

The 'Euro-warrant' had already been on the shelves, the coordinated fight against terrorism provided a window of opportunity for political decision-making on this instrument."⁷⁸¹

The Commission's proposal arguably went much further than the plans to simplify extradition law within the EU based on the 1999 conclusions of the Tampere European Council. Firstly, the EAW abolishes the term extradition, and replaces it with the term "surrender."⁷⁸² The national judicial authorities will be responsible for its enforcement, thus virtually excluding political decisions and the national executives from the decision-making process.

Secondly, the legal effect of this measure is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice if member states sign a declaration approving of this. This may be limited, but it is an improvement to the previous legal position. Thirdly, the EAW abolishes the principle of double criminality for serious offences.

Again, the importance of the European Arrest Warrant for the USA derives from the ECJ Jurisprudence and the parallelism between first and third pillar counter-terrorism measures which are built on implied powers. The fact that the EU has now agreed on an EU-wide extradition policy enabled the Commission politically to start negotiations on behalf of the Council with the USA in its extradition agreements.

Without the European Arrest Warrant, the political consensus to conclude an international extradition agreement between the EU and the USA would not have existed. For the EU, this would have meant that it might have become sidelined in future counter-terrorism agreements, whereas the U.S. would have needed to

⁷⁸¹Den Boer, Monica.2003. "The EU Counterterrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound Policy Transformation?" in Marianne van Leeuwen ed., *Confronting Terrorism - European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies*, p.195.

⁷⁸²"European arrest warrant replaces extradition between EU Member States", http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/criminal/extradition/fsj_criminal_extradition_en.htm, May 2005.

conclude 27 bilateral agreements with the current 27 member states of the EU instead. However, this is the developing legislation status; it is not the implementation status.

European Arrest Warrant would make the lengthy, cumbersome and unpredictable method of extradition among European countries unnecessary. The EU Arrest Warrant is based on the principle of mutual recognition of all the criminal judgments of all member-states by fellow member-states. It becomes an administrative procedure and is aimed at being a fast-track means of transferring suspects.

The European Arrest Warrant is seen as an essential element of the fight against terrorism, as well as the fight against organized crime at the European level as it will make it harder for criminals to find a safe haven in another EU Member State. However, some Member States experienced considerable difficulty in implementing the required legislation. Some expressed concern about their sovereignty and their country's right to protect its citizens: As for the implementation status, European Arrest Warrant is a partial success at best according to *the Final Report of the Commission of the European Communities*.⁷⁸³

The report of the Commission underlines the delay in implementation of the Warrant among the EU member-states:

Delayed implementation though now almost EU wide

The arrest warrant has been implemented by 24 Member States with up to 8 months delay (CZ, DE). Only half complied with the time limit laid down (BE, DK, ES, IE, CY, LT, HU, PL, PT, SI, FI, SE, UK). The delay was the cause of transitional difficulties. Nevertheless, as of 1 November 2004, all the Member States had transposed the Framework Decision except Italy, which still has its draft legislation before Parliament. All Member States have adopted specific legislation and several had to revise their constitutions in order to do this. However, some (DK and EE) have dispensed with binding rules for certain provisions, which do not meet the

⁷⁸³Most recent reports on the implementation status are of 2005. Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 23.02.2005 Com (2005) 63 *Final Report from the Commission Based On Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision Of 13 June 2002 On The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States* {Sec (2005) 267}, pp. 2-4.

requirement of legal certainty. In practice, from 1 January 2004, eight Member States applied the arrangements for the arrest warrant between them; by the date of enlargement the number had risen to 16, and since 14 January 2005, the date of first application in CZ, there have been 24. In 2004 the arrest warrant thus gradually replaced extradition between Member States and appears even to have surpassed it in volume terms. Only a handful of Member States exercised the right to limit its temporal or substantive scope. As regards the former aspect, some did so in accordance with the Framework Decision, once this had been adopted, in particular by ruling out the warrant's application to acts that occurred before a given date (Article 32: FR, IT, AT). Others, however, wanted to make such a limitation without complying with the Framework Decision, whether with regard to procedure (Article 32: CZ, LU, SI), the substance of the limitation (CZ, LU) or even the effective date (CZ). The extradition requests which they continue to present therefore risk being rejected by the other Member States.⁷⁸⁴

Besides, *The Annex to the Final Report* maintains that there are various problems in the implementation process of the EAW across different EU member-states as regards to⁷⁸⁵ the scope of the EAW, mandatory and optional non-execution of the EAW, determination of the competent judicial authorities, recourse to central authority, transmission problems, keeping the person in detention, decision in the event multiple requests, time limits and procedures for the decision to execute the European Arrest Warrant, privileges and immunities and competing international obligations of the states.

European Union Committee 30th Report, of Session 2005-06 European Arrest Warrant, concludes that:

Conclusion

The EAW is now widely used to secure the arrest and surrender of persons across the Union and, as the Commission's report indicates, has largely overtaken traditional extradition procedures as between Member States. Problems have, however, arisen in some Member States where their constitutions provide protection against extradition of own nationals. Questions relating to the legality of the EAW are also pending before the European Court of Justice. Until the legal uncertainty raised by this litigation is resolved it is inevitable that the effects and benefits of the EAW will not be fully felt across the whole Union and there may be caution and delays in moving forward on other EU legislative proposals based on mutual

⁷⁸⁴Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 23.02.2005 Com (2005) 63 *Final Report from the Commission Based On Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision Of 13 June 2002 On The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between Member States* {Sec (2005) 267}, p. 2.

⁷⁸⁵Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 23.02.2005 Sec (2005) 267 Commission Staff Working Document *Annex To The Report from The Commission Based On Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision Of 13 June 2002 On The European Arrest Warrant and The Surrender Procedures Between Member States* {Com (2005) 63 Final}.

recognition; for example, the proposed European Evidence Warrant (EEW) currently under negotiation in the Council of Ministers.⁷⁸⁶

A paper by Amnesty International (as a non-state entity that closely monitors and pressures governments' policies) entitled "*More Justice and Freedom to balance Security: Amnesty International's Recommendations to the EU*" published on 27 September 2004 points out that the principle of mutual recognition which forms the basis for initiatives such as the European Arrest Warrant fails to acknowledge the significant differences in the standards of justice in EU countries. Following a heated political debate, the Czech Republic and Italy was among the last Member States to adopt the arrest warrant. In the time from 2004 to 2010, the same problems of counterterrorism cooperation continue to exist according to the Commission reports.⁷⁸⁷

An eminent terrorism expert and scholar, Paul Wilkinson also reports that "the value of this measure to combat terrorism is all clear *in theory*. However, *in practice*, European Arrest Warrant has been somehow undermined by the continuing desire of the member-states to maintain total national political control and it derailed the transatlantic collaboration."⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁶European Union Committee 30th Report of Session 2005–06 European Arrest Warrant—Recent Developments Report with Evidence Ordered to be printed 28 March and published 4 April 2006 Published by the Authority of the House of Lords, p.12.

⁷⁸⁷Commission of The European Communities Brussels, 20.4.2009 Com(2009) 170 *Final Report From The Commission To The Council, The European Parliament And The European Economic And Social Committee On The Application of Council Directive 2004/80/EC Relating To Compensation To Crime Victims* [Sec(2009) 495], and, *European Union Committee 30th Report of Session 2005–06 European Arrest Warrant—Recent Developments Report with Evidence Ordered to be printed 28 March and published 4 April 2006* Published by the Authority of the House of Lords, and, *Commission Staff Working Document-Accompanying Document To The Report From The Commission To The Council, The European Parliament and The European Economic And Social Committee On The Application Of Council Directive 2004/80/EC Relating To Compensation To Crime Victims* [Com (2009) 170 Final], and, Commission Of The European Communities Brussels, 24.6.2009 Com(2009) 292 *Final Communication From The Commission Legislative Package Establishing An Agency For The Operational Management of Large-scale IT Systems In The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice* {Com(2009) 293 Final} {Com(2009) 294 Final} {Sec(2009) 836} {Sec(2009) 837}.

⁷⁸⁸Wilkinson, Paul. 2005. *International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response*, Chaillot Paper No. 84 October, p. 30-31.

*Remarks of the Commissioner responsible for the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice* Antonio Vitorino points to the weaknesses,

The EU Commission also responded very quickly to the attacks of September 11 with legislative proposals. In speaking to the European Parliament, the Commissioner responsible for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (formerly better known as Justice and Home Affairs), Antonio Vitorino, remarked: “Terrorist acts are committed by international groups with bases in several countries, exploiting loopholes in the law created by the geographical limits on investigators and often enjoying substantial financial and logistical resources. Terrorists take advantage of differences in legal treatment between States, in particular where the offence is not treated as such by national law, and that is where we have to begin.”⁷⁸⁹

EU measures are vital to achieve effective counterterrorism cooperation between the US and the EU. All of the legislative proposals are necessary for the EU to be able to conclude international agreements with the USA. Legal regulations and arrangements regarding counterterrorism, although not completed, seem to be evolving. However, ‘absence of a unified EU policy’, (without which the US-EU counterterrorism cooperation cannot be activated in full) hinders cooperation. In order to establish effective counterterrorism cooperation with the US, the EU must form a European-wide counterterrorism policy that can streamline and structure separate European state-responses. Such a policy is in the making, but it is not completed. Accordingly, EU-US counterterrorism cooperation suffers from the incomplete measures undertaken by the EU.

The European measures undertaken after the bombings in Europe are vital for transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation, yet the insufficient coordination among the European states in both legal matters and in implementation impedes US-EU counterterrorism cooperation. Ongoing European measures that are examined in this chapter are also the weak points of the inter-state cooperation between the US and the EU.

⁷⁸⁹ Antonio Vitorino as cited in Kaunert, Christian. 2010. “The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22: 1, p. 51.

In order to form an internal EU counterterrorism policy, the parallelism of first and third pillar counterterrorism measures must be regulated legally before activating such measures on the ground. Indeed, before any external action in counter-terrorism with the USA can be activated, these measures need to be first agreed to at the EU supranational-institutional level and implemented in full among EU member-states; however this does not seem to have happened.

EU-US counterterrorism cooperation is hampered by European perception and assessment that the issues of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and other types of organized crime were closely linked with terrorism and that dealing with each of these *criminal activities* separately would make little sense. Furthermore, European countries in general appear to be suspicious of allowing any external organization to interfere in their politically sensitive internal security as opposed to criminal justice affairs. This originates in the Dublin Agreement: terrorists were one's own affair; only "apolitical" criminals could be extradited.⁷⁹⁰

According a European analyst, the institutionalized arm of the European Union's counterterrorism activities acknowledge the existence of terrorism, but in its legal formulae the European states were reluctant to formally distinguish politically motivated terrorism from economically motivated crime, organized or other. The reason for the European Union's ambivalence toward the political nature of terrorist violence was that the "criminalization" and half-denial of terrorism had become the implicit and subvocal *political* sine qua non of cooperation between member states.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁹⁰Chalk, Peter. 1996. *West European Terrorism and Counterterrorism-The Evolving Dynamic* Basingstoke, pp. 127-129.

⁷⁹¹ Zimmermann, Doron. 2006. "The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29, p. 126.

Documents of the European Security Strategy, the EU Commission Staff Working Paper, and the up-date of the EU Plan of Action mention the need for integrating within the European Council's Secretariat an intelligence capacity "with a view to informing EU policy."⁷⁹² It requires coherence and the promotion of the fight against terrorist finance, and underlines the need for improving the Union's ability of preventing and handling the consequences of terrorist attacks. The report also corroborates the argument for strengthening inter-Pillar counterterrorism efforts. It states the need for "integrating the fight against terrorism into EU external relations policy."

The Union's leadership tacitly acknowledges the reluctance of national intelligence services in its member states (no incentive for sharing of sensitive information relevant to national security) and recognizes it for the principal stumbling block to effective action.⁷⁹³

It has thus accepted the significance of an autonomous intelligence analysis and assessment capability toward becoming an increasingly independent actor in European counterterrorism. The Union also realizes the shortfalls of pan-European counterterrorism efforts absent an enforceable coordination tool in general, and with respect to cross-border disaster consequence-management in particular.

The implication of all these intra-European developments is limited and bilateral cooperation of the US with each of the European states separately.

⁷⁹² *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 12, available at (<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>), accessed 25 January 2005; *EU Commission Staff Working Paper: Commission of the European Communities, European Security Strategy: Fight Against Terrorism*, SEC 2004 332, Brussels 19 March 2004; *Council of the European Union, "EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism—Update,"* Doc. No. 16090/04; Brussels, 14 December 2004 <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st16/st16090.en04.pdf>; *Gijs de Vries, transcript of article, Financial Times*, 30 November 2004, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Article_Financial_Times_30.November.2004.pdf, accessed 25 January 2005.

⁷⁹³ *Gijs de Vries, transcript of article, Financial Times*, 30 November 2004, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Article_Financial_Times_30.November.2004.pdf, accessed 25 January 2005

Bilateral cooperation is limited because it lacks most of the information that other European states may provide.

A recent example as of 2010 is the European blocking of the help for the US in tracking suspect finances: The United States criticized as recently as on February 2010 a decision by EU lawmakers to block a key data deal, calling it a “setback for EU-US counter-terror cooperation”. “This outcome is a setback for US-EU counter-terror cooperation,” the US mission in Brussels said in a statement after deputies voted not to allow access to data from the interbank transfer system SWIFT to track suspect funds. “This decision disrupts an important counter-terrorism program, which has resulted in more than 1,500 reports and numerous leads to European governmental authorities and has contributed significantly to collaborative counter-terrorism efforts between the United States and Europe” it said. In a vote in Strasbourg, 178 lawmakers rejected the deal to allow information to be lifted from the interbank transfer system SWIFT to help track suspect finances, with 196 in support. There were 31 abstentions.

The assembly's main concern reportedly is that personal information, possibly including data from electronic bank payments, could be used by US authorities and handed on to other governments. Lawmakers also fear the nine-month deal could set a precedent and tie EU hands in future talks, as a long-term agreement must soon be drafted. The US and the EU authorities have pressed the deputies in recent days not to reject the agreement, warning of a dangerous security gap, or at least postpone their vote to a later date.

“Leading up to this vote, senior US officials have communicated with numerous European Union officials, including European parliament leaders, about the importance of this agreement to our mutual security” the US mission to Europe

reported. “We also urged for a postponement of the vote so that members of the European parliament -many of whom are new to the issue- could consider all of the information available regarding the elaborate privacy protection measures that are secured in this agreement” it said in a statement.⁷⁹⁴

Even if the US tries to work with several European nations, it does not appear to be easy to add an effective EU dimension to the Atlantic counterterrorism cooperation. The Allies disagree on a plethora of issues, which are mostly ‘tried’ to be dealt with on a bilateral basis and outside the NATO institutional framework. Leaving aside the rhetoric of the politicians that try to create a mild political atmospherics of cooperation,⁷⁹⁵ US officials express frustration that the EU does not always seem to take the terrorist threat seriously, whereas European officials are frustrated at the limited US information and intelligence sharing.⁷⁹⁶ For example, the US point to the EU’s failure to list the political wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization. “Basically, we see terrorism as an existential threat and [the EU] doesn’t,” said a senior Pentagon staffer.⁷⁹⁷ EU officials are of the opinion that they have long experience in fighting terrorism, and, in the case of Hamas, the experience of the Northern Ireland peace process shows that political channels must be kept open for dialogue - a controversial analogy that is not shared by the two sides of the Atlantic.

⁷⁹⁴“EU data vote 'setback' for counter-terror cooperation”, Brussels, 11 February 2010, 15:33 CET <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu>

⁷⁹⁵Setting up a mild diplomatic climate for effective cooperation or building-up political atmospherics is arguably no small feat though, given the governments’ need for public support in democracies. Such an attempt tries to tone down the public resistance and urges approval for state policies, especially in the face of polls that indicate negative public leanings. A Financial Times/Harris opinion poll of June 2006 demonstrated that 36 percent of respondents in the five biggest member-states (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) identified the US as the biggest threat to global security. Alden, Edward, Daniel Dombey and John Thornhill. 2006. ‘Europe still sees US as greatest threat to stability’, Financial Times, 18 June 2006.

⁷⁹⁶Speeches quoted as in Aldrich, Richard J. 2004. “Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation” International Affairs 80, 4, 731-754; Declarations as quoted in Bensahel, Nora. 2003. *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*, RAND.

8.9. Findings

In order to further clarify the differences between the Allies, core narratives and assumptions at the two sides of the Atlantic is briefly presented. The candidate worked through numerous declarations and speeches of state officials and the press briefings of the bureaucratic personnel. The approximate number of texts and declarations that are reviewed is 4, 300 to 4,500. By categorizing the main themes, similarities and differences of these declarations, speeches and official texts, several conclusions are derived.

Discursive findings as to how Europeans and Americans perceive the threat throughout the first decade of the 2000s is the subject of this sub-section, which also examines the changes in states' counterterrorism rhetoric after the attacks in Europe. Importantly, these discursive findings focus on transatlantic allies, but they are not exclusively about the EU and US, they constitute the main issues and approaches of the counterterrorism discourse of most states in the world. Moreover, the institutional languages of the UN, NATO and OSCE incorporate this discourse whose main traits are outlined below.

8.9.1. Similarities of the European and

American Counterterrorism Discourses

The first similarity is that both European states and the US perceive terrorism as a non-state form of violence by individuals or networks. In spite of the labels such as 'state-sponsors of terrorism' or 'axis of evil', none of the official texts mention state-terrorism. Terrorism is not portrayed as counterinsurgency used by a state-actor either. Unaccustomed use of official language points to the mixed-methods and tactics of both counterinsurgency and terrorism by networked non-

state actors. Thus, official documents clearly indicate the features of the threat as freed from any state control.

Second similarity between the European and American discourses is that terrorism not only threatens unimaginable mass destruction and mass casualties, but also it is a threat to 'democracy', 'peace and human rights', 'ways of life', 'civilization' and 'the international system itself'.

Third, the perception of the terrorist networks or transnational terrorism is common: sophisticated, well-funded networked cells operating through complex networks that live 'among us.' Especially, Europe is concerned about 'the threat within'.

Fourth, terrorists are perceived to be abusing the freedoms provided by democracies. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, for example, argues that the 'increasing openness' and the 'free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources' in the EU creates 'an environment which terrorists abuse to pursue their objectives' (Council of the European Union 2005, paragraph 2).

Utmost importantly, in the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid and London, the EU counterterrorism discourse experiences a shift in denoting terrorism as 'an external threat', or 'global threat' to as 'the internal threat' occasionally, and 'both an internal and external threat' at other times. Even though the September 11 plot was linked to Hamburg, EU texts describe it as a 'global threat' to Western societies because it was towards at another state rather than against EU members. However, by late 2003 a change occurs and EU texts begin to describe terrorism in terms of both internal and external dimensions, a discursive evolution that is fully realized following the Madrid and London attacks. In March 2004, for example, EU leaders stated: 'Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples. The threat

of terrorism is a threat to our security, our democracies and our way of life in the European Union' (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2004). Afterwards, the notion that terrorism poses both an internal and external threat becomes an established feature of EU counterterrorism discourse.

After the attacks in Madrid and London, the EU counterterrorism discourse drew closer to that of the US about the new terrorism. However, that is a change in discourse, not in policy implementation. EU texts frequently argue that 'the nature of terrorism has changed' (de Vries) and that the 'new' kind of 'indiscriminate cross-border religiously motivated terrorism' (de Vries) is 'willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties' (Council of the European Union 2003). The logic of these assumptions is that the religious fanaticism at the heart of the 'new terrorism' means that there is no possibility of dialogue or diplomacy as a solution to terrorism.

Another similarity is the moral tone of the discourses. Terrorists are frequently described as 'evil', 'inhuman', 'barbaric', 'savages', 'faceless killers', a 'cancer on the human condition' and a 'modern scourge'. In particular, the September 11 attacks, as well as the Madrid and London attacks, are constantly described as assaults on civilized values, attacks on democracy and tolerance.

8.9.2. Differences between the European and American Counterterrorism Discourses

First and most important difference is that while the American texts refer to terrorism as 'acts of war', European texts use 'criminal acts' or 'crime', or 'a matter of criminal justice, 'prosecution and law enforcement' to refer to terrorism. This is seemingly a small difference, but it indeed gives the fundamental

divergence between the counterterrorism understandings. The discourses pictures the EU as being closer to the judicial or anti-criminal prosecution approach against terrorism, in which prevention and defense (rather than fight) against terrorism is often pronounced.

American texts, however, use counterterrorism as both referring to defensive and offensive measures including the use of force. Not even one single word such as war or another word with the same connotation exist in the European official documents such as Security Strategy papers or declarations of politicians. European texts oftentimes denote terrorism as ‘struggle against terrorism’, while the American texts almost always use ‘the war on terror’. These discursive labels and traits seem to be a clear indication of the difference in transatlantic approaches and methods.

Complementarily, commentaries of analysts and academics also include criticisms of the other side of the Atlantic either being ‘soft on terrorism’ due to criminal-based approach, or being ‘heavy-handed’ due to force-based approach.

Second difference comes with the use of the word ‘justice’. While the EU texts use it in relation to international law and human rights, American texts use it in relatively vague terms or in terms of ‘divine justice’. Accordingly, the counterterrorism discourse of the EU is arguably more secular when compared to that of the US.

Thirdly, European discourses focus on the relation between the causes of terrorism and the European policies. The Council of the European Union for example discusses the need to change the perception of the European policies among Muslims: ‘We must also ensure that our own policies do not exacerbate division’ (Council of the European Union 2003, paragraph 10). The latter kind of

approach is absent in American, British and Polish texts.

Fourth, the US frames the response to terrorism within a war-based narrative, whereas the EU views it more as a question of law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. The EU heavily stresses the importance of cooperation, while the US discourse often refers to forceful, decisive and unilateral responses if need exists. This might suggest the effect of underlying counterterrorism understandings.

Although the counterterrorism mandates rests with the sovereign member-states, the EU itself (as an institutional body of relations among European states) is a complex mechanism of intra-European cooperation. The EU, with paralleling roles of the first and third pillars at the forefront, is the platform where European states try to unify and design their counterterrorism policies.

Fifth discursive difference is the urgency put on the WMD terrorism and the connection between WMD and terrorism. It appear to be the case that while European declarations reduces the tone of urgency about ‘the risk of WMD terrorism’, the American texts and declarations clearly picture it as a top national security threat that must be responded immediately.

8.10. Summing Up the Empirical Findings

This chapter focused on the discursive examination of summit declarations, speeches of politicians, content analysis of national security strategies of Europe and the US, and the interviews conducted with the NATO authorities that work on the Allied Transformation. It tried to enliven the theoretical discussions of the previous chapters through content and discourse analyses and interviews.

To be able to clarify the analytical direction in reading the empirics and to establish the linkage with the research question, this chapter also attempted to provide a case study on the reasons of NATO transformation within the framework of the new threat. The factors that paved the way for contemporary inter-state cooperation, which is different from the previous era cooperation form, are explained.

It might be useful to sum up the findings that are derived from these items: The analyses conducted up to now concludes that even when future strategic doctrines change in form or converge in style, immutable essences of strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic is likely to make their application different.

In the wake of 9/11 and especially after the Madrid and London bombings, the European Union enacted a host of measures not only to combat terrorism, but to do so in a more efficient manner, and with a view to drawing on the assets of its member states in a coordinated and coherent way. The effect of the attacks on the Union was an unprecedented acceleration of political decision making (as opposed to implementation) of counterterrorism measures and instruments *within* Europe, rather than between the US and the EU. Thus, convergence of American and European counterterrorism efforts, especially regarding joint-action on the ground, appears to be difficult and partial at best without showing a patterned institutionalized framework.

European past counterterrorism approach and efforts (which can be read as also its counterterrorism culture or understanding) seems to be shaping an adaptation to the current terrorist threat in a way different from the adaptation of the US. This can be summarily explained, first, by the European justice model or approach towards the threat. Secondly, the EU does not have executive mandate to

coordinate and unify separate efforts of the state-members. Third, the prospects are bleak and the lack of mandate is unlikely to change soon owing to the sovereign prerogatives of states and their reluctance to implement new measures. That is, new measures that presumably aimed at giving the EU new powers (in order to form a unified European policy) are only reluctantly implemented by the European states, which seem to be foot-dragging in the implementation of the measures taken under the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. The latter is the most important intra-European counterterrorism framework without which cooperation between the US and the EU cannot be established in an effective and coordinated way.

Currently, the European states do not appear to be implementing the Framework Decision in full. Without its full implementation, no unified and institutional EU-US cooperation setting can be established, leaving the cooperation to the current bilateral and minor exchange in intelligence between the G5 (France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) and the US. Political rapprochement was partially achieved on paper by the joint EU–U.S. Declaration on Combating Terrorism adopted at the EU–U.S. summit held at Dromoland Castle, Ireland, in June 2004.⁷⁹⁸ However, even in the case of bilateral cooperation between the US and the EU, serious disagreements hinder cooperation mostly due to the above-mentioned non-unified and un-institutionalized EU counterterrorism efforts that create legal impediments.⁷⁹⁹ These developments have taken place largely outside

⁷⁹⁸Council of the European Union, “EU-U.S. Declaration on Combating Terrorism,” Dromoland Castle, Ireland, 26 June 2004, <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom> accessed 26 January 2005.

⁷⁹⁹The United States Mission to the European Union, “EU-US Counterterrorism Cooperation” <http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Terrorism/default.asp>; The European Union Delegation to the US, <http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Terrorism/default.asp>; Grant, Charles. 2009. “Making a success of the EAS”, Thursday, May 21, CER, <http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2009/05/making-success-of-eas.html>; Keohane, Daniel. 2006. “Unblocking EU-NATO Cooperation” June-July, CER Bulletin, Issue 48, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/48_keohane.html

of the NATO institutional framework, yet of course implications for the NATO work-load.

NATO has a role in contributing to the fight against terrorism, yet NATO's role in shaping a cooperative response against transnational terrorism is limited by the distinct features of a non-state centric threat against which NATO is not originally designed. What is more, NATO's transformational trajectory to adapt to the ambiguities of the new threat appears to be limited.

Two factors account for such hardship of adaptation. First factor is the examined dimensions of the threat. Secondly factor is the problems of different security understandings of the Allies and duly divergent methods in responding to transnational terrorist threat. Particularly, the transatlantic divergence on the use of force, the legitimacy of pre-emptive war, different national perceptions of the role of institutions and international law erode a common Allied approach and implementation not only for counterterrorism efforts, but also for other international security topics of the Alliance agenda.

Inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism continues in an un-institutionalized form. It occurs either bilaterally or multilaterally. Importantly though, it is outside of a single institutional framework.

As the answer to the research question of the dissertation, previously demonstrated cooperation and alignment behaviors centered on defense affairs are rarely shown against the transnational terrorist threat. It is only partly visible in the Afghan counterinsurgency effort. Yet, even then, the cooperative effort is not a clear NATO operation with regard to its decision-making, initiation of the intervention, the conduct of combat roles, and the resilience of the effort through time.

The Afghanistan case is largely an operation of the Coalition of the Willing, in which nation-states are not initially allowed to participate within the framework of NATO. NATO contributions came later in a sideline role in the follow-up to the main tasks of combat. The European Allies play a supporting role behind the frontlines of unconventional battles. NATO still tries to transform and determine the Alliance's main goals, strategy and missions.

The divergences between the Allies still impede the efforts to solve Alliance's crisis of common stance. In addition to the empirics provided, the prolonged up-dating process of the NATO Strategic Concept testifies to NATO's hardship to reach consensus. By and large, the Allies have not shown their previous cooperative and alignment behaviors against transnational terrorism.

CHAPTER 9:

CONCLUSION

9.1. Findings of the Research

To what extent nation-states, which involve in alliances or align to one another rather easily in the face of threats emanating from other nation-states, can show *these alignment behaviors* against transnational terrorist groups? The latter is the research question of the dissertation. A distillation of the chapters helps giving the answer, which is simply put as: to a large extent, nation-states do not demonstrate their previous cooperation behaviors against transnational terrorist groups. Previously demonstrated Cold War alignment and cooperation behaviors among nation-states are almost not existent this time against transnational terrorism as of the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is the first finding of the study.

This dissertation is an attempt to initiate a study about the form and dynamics of inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism best exemplified by Al-Qaeda. Importantly, this is tried to be done with an eye on

the differences between the Cold War inter-state cooperation-form and the post-Cold War inter-state cooperation-form.

Since international security is traditionally regarded as the parcel of nation-states, transnational terrorism as a non-state entity is a conceptual new-comer to the alliance theory literature. Furthermore, the scale of contemporary terrorist operations reflects a security environment structurally different from that of the Cold War. The states are posed a distinct threat in a different environment.

Does contemporary inter-state cooperation and alignment against transnational terrorism correspond to the previous alignment behaviours of states that were conducted against other states? Analyzing the role, relevance and evolving form of cooperation in general and the form of cooperation in alliances in particular regarding the transnational terrorist threat constituted the aim of the study. Thereby, the study tries to establish a nexus between the past and present of the alliance theory literature. It is an attempt to reconsider the contours of the cooperation and alliance literatures under the developments of the present era, which manifests a new structural environment as well as a distinct threat confronting states. During the Cold War, cooperation among states was mainly defense-oriented. Inter-state cooperation was ‘defense-cooperation’, which primarily focused on military contingencies and arms-build-up. However, cooperation against transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era can be named as ‘security cooperation’ that includes non-military fields of cooperation. The form of inter-state cooperation has evolved to shift from ‘defense’ to ‘security’.

The second finding of the study is that major war wanes. Decline of war among the most industrialized nations such as the EU member-states, Canada, Japan and the US is a noteworthy development given the long continuum of past

wars. The form of warfare, on the side of most developed states, has changed in form and shifted to non-military ones such as economic and normative rivalry. Terrorism, on the side of non-state entities, is becoming another form of warfare that is used against states. Non-state entities acquire a semi- or pseudo-actor status. Despite their significance, both terrorism and non-state entities are largely ignored in the alliance politics and theory literature.

Third finding is that the dominant threat profile or assessment of states has changed to include non-state centric threats. While not ignored, defense-related threats are relatively on the back-burner. Security-related threats are assessed to be profound ones. The threat of large-scale invasion of countries by other states appears to be on the decline. Contemplation of force-on-force confrontations of armies has reduced. This gave way to increasing security concerns, rather than to defense/military concerns: The threat emanating from non-state violent groups are at the forefront. Last but not least, the threat is distinct with its new dimensions.

Fourth finding is an implication of the third finding: the form of threat determines the form of cooperation among states in international security. The form of inter-state cooperation in general and particularly the cooperation form in alliances are evolving from 'defense' to 'security'. Post-Cold War inter-state cooperation (especially in the timeline of 2000-2010) demonstrates un-institutionalized re-groupings/alignments of states for particular tasks. Ad hoc cooperation or coalition of the willing type of cooperation among nation-states is carried out as a cooperation-form largely outside the institutional framework of the NATO. The conduct of the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq interventions demonstrated a group of nations that came together without an institutional scheme. State actions under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the UNSCR 1540

are other examples to the workings of the coalition of the willing type ad hoc inter-state cooperation against terrorism. Moreover, police and intelligence cooperation against terrorism is again devoid of any clear institutional or alliance framework. The latter cooperation mostly takes place in an ad hoc and bilateral fashion. Thus, coalition of the willing-type inter-state cooperation has emerged as the rising form of inter-state cooperation especially applied against the transnational terrorist threat.

Within the framework of the research question, the empirical chapter points to the following: States do not cooperate against transnational terrorism in the way and form they cooperated against other states during the Cold War. Besides, the empirical chapter underlines that the Atlantic Allies frame both the threat itself and their responses to the threat differently. The latter is, by and large, determined by the threat of transnational terrorism itself, which is also the most important determinant of the contemporary inter-state cooperation and alliance politics. The threat itself is a limit to cooperation among states.

‘The new threat’ or the distinct dimensions of the transnational terrorist threat do not appear to be conducive to give way to cohesive alignments. The distinctive features of the transnational terrorism threat make the new threat hard to define, detect and defend against. The latter hampers inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism. The definition of a common enemy, common threat assessments are not forthcoming due to the peculiar manifestations of the threat - presenting itself either internal or external one, or both. Such ambiguity/transnationality of the threat is the biggest obstacle in the way to effective cooperation among states. The threat mechanism works horizontally at the societal level in contrast to vertical, institutional, and relatively hierarchical

national bureaucratic organizations. Features of the threat create operational ambiguities regardless of different security understandings. It is both an internal and external threat with no-state control or supervision. Other features include merger with organized crime and unregulated financing, lack of territory or headquarters to be retaliated at, open endorsement of indiscriminate killing, effective combination of pre-modern and modern skills and technology. These are the chief features that make the threat transnational and ambiguous for states. Moreover, the organizational culture of states and that of terrorist entities are different from one another due to different loyalties and past experiences. The state-to-terrorist groups confrontation is an analytically and bureaucratically unaccustomed form of political contestation.

Alongside the threat factor, contending counterterrorism cultures of states and globalization also affect inter-state cooperation as analytically discussed in the middle chapters and empirically studied in chapter eight. The empirical chapter engrosses in the process-tracing of summit declarations, speeches of politicians, national security strategies of Europe and the US, and the interviews conducted with the NATO authorities that work on the Allied Transformation. It tries to enliven the theoretical discussions of the previous chapters through content and discourse analyses and interviews conducted by the candidate abroad.

To be able to clarify the analytical direction in reading the empirics and to establish the linkage with the research question, it attempts to provide a case study on the reasons of NATO transformation within the framework of the new threat and alliance politics. The factors that paved the way for contemporary inter-state cooperation (which is different from the previous era cooperation form) are explained. The empirical chapter highlights that even though future strategic

doctrines change in form or converge in style, immutable essences of strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic is likely to make their implementation different.

However, divergent counterterrorism cultures are not the only determinant. The structural variable of globalization exacerbates cooperation and alignment. It provides a terrorist-friendly environment by diffusing power-resources such as finance and means of violence. Deterritorialization of means of violence and economy provides a permissive or facilitator cause for terrorist operations, while it presents difficulties for policy-making of nation-states. Globalization interconnected issue-areas, which are previously regarded as separate, so much so that making policy choices and prioritization became harder ever. Policy-making and strategizing required trade-offs due to interlinked issues over which foreign and security policies are made. This caused duplication and inefficiency in the policy implementation of states.

This occurred in an environment of waning of major war. Given the latter and the non-state involvement that is studied, non-polarity is discussed to be the appropriate analytical scheme for the research question at hand rather than a framework based on polarity or balance of power. The waning of major war or decline of war is caused by the absence of war contemplation and anticipation in the post-Cold War era. Waning of major war, together with the distinct features of the threat, play into the relative absence of easily identifiable enemies. Alliances (as treaty-based defense cooperation) and alignments (groupings of states in general either within or outside an alliance setting) suffered from lack of consensus on the nature of the threat and the methods of response. Thereby, Allied unity of purpose has comparatively deteriorated.

In the wake of 9/11 and especially after the Madrid and London bombings, the European Union enacted a host of measures not only to combat terrorism, but to do so in a more efficient manner, and with a view to drawing on the assets of its member states in a coordinated and coherent way. The effect of the attacks on the Union was an unprecedented acceleration of political decision-making (as opposed to implementation) of counterterrorism measures and instruments *within* Europe, rather than between the US and the EU.

As discussed, no effective US-EU counterterrorism cooperation can take place before Europe manages to form a unified EU counterterrorism policy. Thus, convergence of American and European counterterrorism efforts, especially regarding joint-action on the ground, appears to be difficult and partial at best without showing a patterned institutionalized EU-US framework.

European past counterterrorism approach and efforts (which can be read as also its counterterrorism culture or understanding) seem to be shaping an adaptation to the contemporary threats in a way different from the adaptation of the US. This can be summarily explained, first, by the European justice-model or approach towards the threat. Secondly, the EU does not have executive mandate to coordinate and unify separate efforts of the state-members. Third, the prospects are bleak; the lack of mandate is unlikely to change soon owing to the sovereign prerogatives of states and their reluctance to implement new measures. New measures that presumably aimed at giving the EU new powers (in order to form a unified European policy) are only reluctantly implemented by the European states, which seem to be foot-dragging in the implementation of the measures taken under the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. The latter

is the most important intra-European counterterrorism framework without which cooperation between the US and the EU cannot be established in an effective and coordinated way.

Currently, the European states do not appear to be implementing the Framework Decision in full. Without its full implementation, no unified and institutional EU-US cooperation setting can be established, leaving the cooperation to the current bilateral and minor exchange in intelligence between the G5 (France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain) and the US. Political rapprochement was partially achieved on paper by the joint EU–U.S. Declaration on Combating Terrorism adopted at the EU–U.S. summit held at Dromoland Castle, Ireland, in June 2004. However, even in the case of bilateral cooperation between the US and the EU, serious disagreements hinder cooperation mostly due to the above-mentioned non-unified and un-institutionalized EU counterterrorism efforts that create legal impediments. These developments have taken place largely outside of the NATO institutional framework, yet of course with implications for the NATO work-load.

NATO has a role in contributing to the fight against terrorism, yet NATO's role in shaping a cooperative response against transnational terrorism is limited by the distinct features of a non-state centric threat against which NATO is not originally designed. NATO is currently not a strict collective defense organization, and it has evolved become more of a collective security organization as of 2010. Nevertheless, NATO's transformational trajectory to adapt to the ambiguities of the new threat appears to be limited.

Two factors account for the hardships of NATO's adaptation. First factor is the examined dimensions of the threat. Second factor is the problem of different

security understandings of the Allies and due divergent methods in responding to transnational terrorist threat. Particularly, the transatlantic divergence on the use of force, the legitimacy of pre-emptive war, different national perceptions of the role of institutions and international law impair Allied solidarity and sense of mission. These erode a common Allied approach and implementation not only towards counterterrorism efforts, but also for other international security topics of the Alliance agenda. In great part, inter-state cooperation against transnational terrorism continues in an un-institutionalized form. It occurs either bilaterally or multilaterally among states; importantly though, it is outside a patterned institutional or international organization framework.

As the answer to the research question of the dissertation, previously demonstrated cooperation and alignment behaviors centered on defense affairs are rarely shown against the transnational terrorist threat. It is only partly visible in the Afghan counterinsurgency effort. Yet, even then, the cooperative effort is not a clear NATO operation with regard to its decision-making, initiation of the intervention, the conduct of combat roles, and the resilience of the effort through time.

The Afghanistan case is largely an operation of the Coalition of the Willing in which nation-states are not initially allowed to participate within the framework of NATO. NATO contributions came later in a sideline role in the follow-up to the main tasks of combat. The European Allies play a supporting role behind the frontlines of unconventional battles. NATO still tries to transform and determine the Alliance's main goals, strategy and missions.

The divergences between the Allies still impede the efforts to solve the solidarity crisis of the NATO. In addition to the empirics provided in the study, the

prolonged up-dating process of the NATO Strategic Concept alone testifies to NATO's hardship to reach consensus. By and large, the Allies have not shown their previous cooperative and alignment behaviors against transnational terrorism.

9.2. For Future Research

Another finding is that nation-state decisions or policies have important consequences for international security. Although it might seem common-sense, it is not. Neorealist accounts of cooperation and alignment prioritize structural explanations and underestimate the weight of unit-level preferences and actions taken by governments. The comparison of the European and American national strategic cultures points out that the states behavior affects consequences more than the structural factor alone predicts it. Although many states confronted the primacy of American power, all of them did not align with it. Some resisted, if not militarily balanced it. Similarly, choices between unilateral and multilateral policies and choices between a criminal approach and that of a military one affect inter-state cooperation significantly.

Other relevant questions were: do the alignments of states against non-state entities entail a new outlook or perspective to international relations, or, is there need to modify and improve prevailing perspectives on alignment? Utmost importantly, are the theoretical literatures on cooperation and alliance well enough in guiding us to understand this understudied dimension of alignment dynamics against non-state entities? If there is a need to improve the prevailing literature, in what ways can it be done? What are the problems and analytical pitfalls? What may be the modest analytical steps to undertake in understanding and explaining this understudied dimension?

Although the study of state to non-state dynamics does not require a ground-breaking new approach, the theoretical literatures on cooperation and alliance are not well enough in guiding us to understand this understudied dimension. In accordance, the literature needs improvement in its approach to incorporate non-state entities and due level of analysis to examine it.

The historical approach must be applied more in order to depict change and to dissect the continuities and changes. A marriage between history and political science/international relations seems urgent than ever before, as exemplified by Mansbach. The analytical scheme proposed herein, (which includes a historical examination of the state-system, sovereignty, forms of warfare and sociological developments that are attuned to evolution of technology and ideational developments) might contribute in studying future subject-matters. As for the question of what might be the initial steps towards studying the state to non-state dynamic, it can be underlined that no single theoretical straight-jacketing is appropriate. If theories are to be advantaged, new realist and liberal research programs might be worked out in a way to incorporate the impact of non-state entities upon states. Above all, the most important emphasis is that not realist or liberal theories per se, but realist and liberal 'research programs' should be acquire priority in research. As a corollary, the level of analysis becomes vital.

It is concluded that international relations has become so complex that it cannot be examined through a single level of analysis. It requires studying the interplay among levels. The demise of the bipolar world is the most fundamental shift in international security. In accordance, the concepts of power and polarity have undergone numerous debates after the Cold War. Therefore, conceptual and

structural discussions have become a must for this study rather than a choice. Current political landscape of international relations can be approached from different vantage points: Viewed from the traditional system level of analysis, actors are structurally shaped and shoved via Waltzian analysis. However, when the vantage point shifts to the unit or nation-state level, the political landscape might be regarded as one that is channeled by states' bureaucratic decision-making processes and by two-level games, which are studied by neo-classical realists such as Schweller. Finally, from an individual level of analysis, the context may also be studied as one influenced by leaders or skilled individuals empowered with advanced technology. Most studies on alliances and cooperation work at a single level of analysis. As Graham Allison pointed out, the three levels of analysis are not exclusive alternatives. Research must press on with their connections.

The studies that focus on the repercussions of the end of the Cold War are mostly empirical - using the established paradigmatic lenses that suited the Cold War era well. Thus, there is need for alliance and cooperation politics and theory to be reconsidered and improved. This study attempted to take a modest step in that direction. What might be seen as a contribution to the literatures on alliances and cooperation is that this study introduces and discusses previously unstudied factors facing cooperation among states.

'Cooperation' had been studied from several perspectives in the literature with the problem of the security dilemma being the primary setback of cooperation under anarchy; however as yet, the implications of the shifting security ground - diffusion of power, nonpolarity and the threat itself as the limits of cooperation - are not studied. While the dissertation builds upon the extant literature that aims to explain cooperative problems among states, it examines factors or variables that are

not mentioned by the cooperation and alliance theories. The variables put forward might contribute to the literature. The in-text examination of the structural factors was not conducted previously within the framework of the alliance and cooperation literature. In particular, the threat factor and the non-state entities should be introduced into the studies of cooperation and alliance. There was no previous study that attempted to examine non-state threats systematically or in conjunction with other variables. As such, the dissertation tried to shed light on the pitfalls of cooperation and alliance under the contemporary dynamics of international security at large.

In accordance, the alliance and cooperation literatures have not only to concentrate on the interface between levels of analysis, but it must start to work on how to incorporate non-state entities into established theories. The unit, structural and threat variables can be put to work in other issue-areas that involve transnational dynamics. Alternatively, one of the variables can be singled out for further development. Yet again, another further step could be to look for intervening variables so as to develop the examination of the interplay between variables at different levels.

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