

Ali Berk Bilir

The Role of Ideology in Turkish Foreign Policy
During the Democrat Party Era

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THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE DEMOCRAT PARTY ERA

A Master's Thesis

By

Ali Berk Bilir

Department of International Relations
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara

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To My Parents



THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE DEMOCRAT PARTY ERA

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Ali Berk Bilir

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ABSTRACT

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Bilir, Ali Berk

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Samuel J. Hirst

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With the end of the Second World War, Turkey increasingly aligned with the Western powers. Turkey was a key recipient of Marshall Plan aid that sought to rebuild Europe after the destruction of the war. In the aftermath of the war, the Turkish political scene and the economy liberalized as Turkey integrated itself more with the West. These policies were followed by a power change with the defeat of the Republic's founding party, the Republican People's Party, to the Democrat Party in the 1950 elections. Adnan Menderes' ten-year rule was a period of close cooperation between Ankara and its Western partners. In this study, I have sought to examine the role of ideology in the Menderes Government's foreign policy. To capture the balance between Menderes's pro-Western ideology and his concerns about Turkey's security and economy, the thesis highlights three different cases. American financial aid to Turkey reveals the limits of Menderes's pro-Westernism

and the different approaches to developmental plans in Ankara and Washington. Turkish-Soviet relations show that his government's attitude towards Moscow was not narrowly ideological and changed over time. It was in the Menderes government's attitude towards decolonization movements and Third World nationalism that ideology had an undeniable influence on Ankara's foreign policy.

Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Cold War, Anti-communism, Development, Democrat Party



ÖZET

DEMOKRAT PARTİ DÖNEMİ TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA İDEOLOJİNİN ROLÜ

Bilir, Ali Berk

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Samuel J. Hirst

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İkinci dünya savaşının sona ermesiyle beraber, Türkiye kendisini gittikçe Batılı güçlerle hizalamaya başladı. Türkiye, savaşın yıkımından sonra Avrupa'yı yeniden inşa etmeye çalışan Marshall Planı yardımının kilit alıcılarından biriydi. Savaş sonrasında Türkiye'nin Batı ile daha fazla bütünleşmesiyle beraber Türk siyaset sahnesi ve ekonomisi de liberalleşmeye başladı. Bu politikaları, 1950 seçimlerinde Cumhuriyet'in kurucu partisi Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Demokrat Parti'ye yenilgisiyle beraber bir iktidar değişikliği izledi. Adnan Menderes'in 10 yıl süren iktidarı, Ankara ve Batılı ortakları arasında yakın iş birliği yaşandığı bir dönem oldu. Bu çalışmada, Menderes Hükümeti'nin dış politikasının arkasındaki mantığı açıklamaya çalıştım. Bu anlamda, güvenlik ihtiyacı, ekonomik kaygılar ve ideolojik sebepler gibi konulardaki araştırmalar karmaşık bir tablo ortaya çıkardı. Menderes'in Batı yanlısı ideolojisi ile Türkiye'nin güvenliği ve ekonomisine ilişkin dengeyi yakalamak için üç farklı vaka üzerinde çalışma yapıldı. Bu bağlamda,

Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye yaptığı ekonomik yardımlar, Ankara ve Washington arasındaki kalkınma planlarına yönelik farklı yaklaşımları ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Türkiye-Sovyet ilişkileri ise hükümetin Moskova'ya yönelik tutumunun katı ideoloji üzerine olmadığını ve zaman içerisinde değiştiğini gösteriyor. Son olarak ise, Menderes Hükümeti'nin dekolonizasyon hareketlerine ve Üçüncü Dünya milliyetçiliğine karşı tavrı, ideolojinin Ankara'nın dış politikası üzerindeki yadsınamaz etkisini gösteriyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Soğuk Savaş, Antikomünizm, Kalkınma, Demokrat Parti

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Chapter I: Introduction

Born in a small village in Aydın, Adnan Menderes became one of the most controversial figures in Turkish political history. In the early 1930s, his strong support for economic liberalization was visible during his entrance to politics as a member of the short-lived Liberal Republican Party. His foreign policy – like most of his policies – is generally seen in black-and-white terms. The historian William Hale, in his survey account of Turkish foreign policy, describes Menderes's "more Dullesian-than-Dulles phobia regarding the dangers of communist penetration in the Middle East."¹ Menderes's strong distrust towards communism was, in fact, one of the pillars of his government's foreign policy in the 1950s. His stay in power for a decade is often described as the high point in Turkey's relations with the West, especially with the U.S. Menderes himself often made statements favorable to the U.S. One of the founding members of the Democrat Party, Celal Bayar, described their aim as the transformation of Turkey into a "little America." With these in mind, Menderes and his Democrat Party constitute a significant part of Turkish politics in general.

This study has a single question at its core: how did Menderes's anti-communist ideology shape Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s? What is intriguing in this question is that Westernism in foreign policy is often regarded as the result of security concerns that became imminent after the Second World War. In this context, the Soviet Union's demand for revision of the 1936 Montreux treaty and territorial

¹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774* (Routledge, 2012), 102.

adjustments in Eastern Anatolia shocked Ankara. Therefore, Ankara's need for security was only answered with the alignment with the Western powers against the Soviet Union. Although this explanation gives us a good understanding of the late 1940s and 1950s, it creates a black-and-white picture. However, the reality is more complicated. After Stalin's death in 1953, a new leadership in Moscow initiated "destalinization" and portrayed Stalin in unfavorable terms both within the Soviet Union and international arena. Consequently, this new leadership wanted to initiate a rapprochement with Ankara. Nevertheless, Ankara rejected Moscow's attempts and continued to pursue an anti-Soviet foreign policy in the Balkans and the Middle East and even in Third World countries. With these in mind, this thesis aims to explain the role of ideology in the Menderes government's foreign policy.

Instead of analyzing the Menderes' government foreign policy chronologically, this study is based on three thematic case studies. The first case is U.S. financial aid to Turkey, and the thesis explores relations between Ankara and D.C. through these aid negotiations. U.S. aid was one of the main pillars for Turkey's development, according to the Democrat Party elites. U.S. Turkish relations, however, soured, especially after the 1954 economic crisis in Turkey, when Turkey refused to initiate a reform process in her economy despite American warnings. Therefore, these relations had a significant impact on Menderes's foreign policy as one of his primary aims was to stay in power, and access to U.S. money played a crucial role. The second case is Turkish-Soviet relations in the 1950s. In this second case study, the thesis explains how Menderes' government conceptualized its relations with the Soviet Union and how they perceived the Soviet Union. After 1957, when the Menderes Government faced severe domestic and economic problems, they

turned to Moscow for help—understanding the path that led to this situation reflects the limits of anti-communist ideology in Menderes's foreign policy concerns. The last case is the Menderes's government's approach towards Third World nationalism and decolonization. This case shows anti-communism in the Menderes government. As then Deputy Prime Minister and later Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu put it, Turkey acted as spokesperson of the West during the Bandung Conference. Additionally, the Menderes's government approach to the Algerian War of Independence reveals that Turkey, which had fought its own war for independence just 30 years earlier, now sided with one of the nations it had fought. Consequently, this study finds that the role of anti-communism was most prominent with Ankara's relations with the Third World and that ideology was of less significance in Ankara's dealings with the superpowers, i.e., the Soviet Union and the United States. With the superpowers, the Menderes government followed more pragmatic concerns – most importantly, economic ones.

1.1 Methodology

In terms of methodology, this thesis employs a qualitative research approach. The thesis aims to provide a synthetic interpretation of foreign policy in the broader Menderes period, and hence it draws heavily on the works of other scholars. The secondary sources included very different scopes and approaches, as the subject is not limited to foreign policy. The thesis draws on a wide range of articles and books, ranging from Turkish economics to decolonization, from foreign policy to modernization. These sources serve as the backbone of the thesis, provide

background information, and allow original conclusions based on the identification of three case studies.

Where possible, the thesis supplements this secondary literature with primary sources that are typical of political history. In various places, Turkish-language sources enrich the analysis of the Menderes government's worldview and foreign policy. TBMM documents provided direct quotations from assembly meetings, which were especially useful in chapter one, where they show Menderes's view of Turkish development as it formed in debates around land reform in 1945. The thesis uses Turkish newspapers to understand public opinion during the 1950s, to identify how Menderes's and his colleagues' policies were framed in the context of the broader Turkish political spectrum. For the sections on Turkish-U.S. relations, Foreign Relation of the United States (FRUS) documents and CIA documents were used.

Unfortunately, this thesis does not use documents from the Turkish Foreign Ministry archives. The combination of secondary literature, public Turkish sources, and U.S. government sources is a necessary attempt to triangulate in the absence of documents that would be crucial to understand the Menderes government's foreign policy. One day, if Turkish diplomatic archives are open, many of this thesis's arguments – as well as the arguments in the secondary sources that it draws upon – may be falsified or certified.

Due to the lack of resources and the prominent roles of individual leaders in Turkish foreign and domestic politics, the study often assumes that Menderes himself played a central role in the decision-making process. In this sense, the thesis is linked

with the leadership-based foreign policy analysis approach. In their influential 1962 book, Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin challenged the then-dominant state-centrist explanation in foreign policy decision making and advocated for opening up the "black box" within the state actors to explain the process better.² Margaret H. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan argue that leaders define a state's constraints and limits based on their perceptions, experiences, and interpretations.³ Hermann introduced "leadership trait analysis" (LTA) to the foreign policy analysis field, which is considered one of the most effective methods within the area. LTA focuses on seven traits: belief in ability to control events, conceptual complexity, distrusts of others, in-group bias, need for power, self-confidence, and task focus.⁴ Stephan Dyson's careful analysis of Tony Blair of the U.K. during the Iraqi war is an excellent example of this, which shows Blair's belief that his ability to control events, low complexity, and need for power affected the U.K.'s entrance to the war.⁵ Nevertheless, LTA was criticized for its overwhelming focus on the Western context.⁶

In the Turkish context, leaders' influence on both domestic and international politics is indeed prominent. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan argue that party-leaders in Turkey are prone to portray themselves as supreme leaders.⁷ Barış Kesgin has argued that prime ministers (PM) were influential actors in foreign policy-

² Thomas Preston, "Leadership and Foreign Policy Analysis," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies* (2010), 12.

³ Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, "International Decision Making: Leadership Matters," *Foreign Policy*, 110 (1998): 124-137, 126.

⁴ Barış Kesgin, Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers, *Turkish Studies* 14, no. 1 (2013): 136-157, 139.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 140.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁷ M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages," *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 3 (2007): 118-135, 120.

making.⁸ Accordingly, PMs are influential because they "control the selection and dismissal of ministers, cabinet structures and become more proficient in controlling the right to appoint the cabinet."⁹ Regardless, most of the work in the literature on Turkish leaders and Turkish foreign policy has focused on post-Cold War Presidents and Prime Ministers. To comprehend Menderes better, an initial section focuses on Menderes's adult life and how he entered politics before turning to the case studies outlined above.

1.2. Literature Review

William Hale, in that classic account of Turkish foreign policy, argues that ideology "was less important in motivating Turkey's attachment to the western alliance than traditional territorial and security interests."¹⁰ In other words, Hale suggests that Turkey's diplomatic reorientation after the Second World War and entrance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was less the product of domestic dynamics and ideas than a response to a direct threat from the Soviet Union. But Hale's later treatment of Turkey's 1957 mobilization of troops on the Syrian border suggests factors that seem to go beyond traditional territorial security concerns – it is here that he claims Menderes had "a more Dullesian-than-Dulles phobia regarding the dangers of communist penetration in the Middle East."¹¹ Perhaps an expansive definition of security might include the emergence of a communist government in Syria as a direct threat to Turkey, but Hale's use of the

⁸ Kesgin, "Leadership Traits of Turkey's Islamist and Secular Prime Ministers," 136.

⁹ Ç. Esra Çuhadar, Juliet Kaarbo, Barış Kesgin, and Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner, "Turkish Leaders and their foreign policy decision-making style: a comparative and multi-method perspective, *Turkish Studies* 22, no. 1 (2021): 1-27; 2.

¹⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 102.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 79, 94.

word "phobia" points to an anti-communism that appears ideological in its conviction. The ten years that Menderes held power were a high-point in Turkey's alignment with the West, and serve as a revealing case study to ask whether Turkey's partnership with the West has been a pragmatic response to security concerns or if it has reflected broader ideological inclinations.

Works by William Hale and others have advanced a variety of explanations for the Democrat Party's (DP) foreign policy, and they focus on different combinations of security, economy, identity and ideology. Hale's emphasis on narrowly-defined security interests is representative of much of the existing literature. Kemal Karpaz, in his 1975 book that continues to shape the field, argues that the Turkish government's foreign policy after World War II "was a by-product and an extension of the Western policy towards the Soviet Union."¹² He argues that the Soviet Union's demands for territories and bases on the Straits pushed Turkey to the West, and thus forced İnönü's government to identify itself with Western foreign policy.¹³ In a more recent work that shares a number of Karpaz's assumptions, Hüseyin Bağcı explains Turkish foreign policy in structural terms, as a product of a "power vacuum" in the region.¹⁴ The vacuum drew in the Soviet Union, and it forced Turkey to look for support elsewhere. Even though Mustafa Aydın places greater emphasis on the connections between domestic and foreign policy than Bağcı, he also suggests that geopolitics defined Turkey's decision to align with the West. Aydın stresses that there was a change in the "international system, which rapidly evolved from a 'balance of power' structure to a 'bipolar structure,'" and that, in the

¹² Kemal Karpaz, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 1.

¹³ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (METU Press, 2001), 129.

new conditions, neutrality was not sustainable.¹⁵ In a bipolar world, Turkey was threatened by one of the two superpowers and had little choice. Nevertheless, Aydın argues that changes in domestic politics contributed to Turkey's alignment with the West, most prominently the transition from a one party system to a multi-party system.

The extensive aid Turkey received from the West means that many of those scholars who emphasize security concerns also acknowledge the economic factors that played an important role in determining the Menderes government's foreign policy. Aydın, for example, argues that economic factors became increasingly important over time, and that, "Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral part of her foreign as well as domestic policy".¹⁶ Begüm Adalet, in her innovative book *Hotels and Highways*, puts emphasis on the modernization efforts of Turkey in which US aid, both in financial and intellectual terms played a crucial role. The book also allows us to observe disagreements over the implementation of the developmental projects such as the parliamentary debates during which Ahmet Ali Çınar, a MP, suggested that "foreign experts should offer suggestions instead of dictates."¹⁷ Some scholars, Burcu Bostanoğlu among them, have seen Turkey's alliance with the West in primarily economic terms.¹⁸ She argues that the early DP government aimed to modernize and develop the country with American aid.¹⁹ She stresses the importance of Turkey's place in the Truman Doctrine and the DP

¹⁵ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis* (Ankara: SAM, 2004), 49.

¹⁶ Ibid., 54.

¹⁷ Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Stanford University Press, 2018), 105

¹⁸ Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası: Kuram ve Siyasa* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi; 1999), 361.

¹⁹ Ibid., 362.

leadership's belief that U.S. aid would continuously flow into Turkey in accordance with the "mutual assistance" principle.²⁰ As important as U.S. economic aid to Turkey was, especially during the early 1950s, the amount of aid fell during the Menderes period and Menderes's government frequently clashed with the U.S. over the course of the decade.

Taken to the extreme, the emphasis on U.S. aid seems to contradict the argument of those scholars who see security as the defining factor in post-World War II Turkish foreign policy. This is the case with authors who have seen the desire for U.S. aid as a factor that predated the Soviet threat. Cem Eroğul argues that the rising bourgeoisie wanted to push Turkey into an alliance with capitalist Western countries before open tension with the Soviet Union emerged. In his account, the Soviet government's demands merely justified the Turkish elite's actions and made it easier to align Turkey with the West. The Democrats were indeed the party of big business and large landholders, despite portraying themselves as the party of the "little man." Their foreign policy was also a reflection of these interests.²¹ Even scholars who have focused less on class have arrived at explanations that see U.S. aid as a priority. Bozdağlıoğlu does this by putting emphasis on the identity of the Turkish state. In that context, the "creation of a Westernized nation is closely linked to its foreign policy since 'a westernized nation is one that was born and wants to live in harmony with Western nations with whom it shares structural and molecular similarities'".²² Therefore, he argues that gaining acceptance as part of Europe was one of the main

²⁰ Ibid., 362.

²¹ Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, (Sevinç Matbaa, 1970) 4-5.

²² Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, (New York: Routledge, 2003) 58.

pillars of Turkish Foreign Policy since its foundation, and the Menderes government's actions a natural continuation of earlier policies.²³

If one takes the Menderes period broadly, rather than focusing on the moment of alignment with the West, then emphasis on either security or economic concerns seems harder to justify. Even when the Soviet government withdrew their demands and the Cold War between the US and the Soviets entered an early version of “détente,” the Menderes government continued their harsh anti-Communist and anti-Soviet policies. This suggests that more than security was at stake, although Hale does argue that Menderes and the DP were suspicious of Moscow's intentions and did not believe the actual threat had receded.²⁴ Even if Hale is right for 1953, the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement in the later 1950s suggests that security concerns were changing. On the other hand, the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement amidst economic crisis does not confirm the idea that Menderes was un-ideological and devoted solely to the pragmatic pursuit of Turkey's economic development. Even as Menderes improved relations with Moscow, he did not avoid contact entirely. Turkey's active foreign policy at the Bandung Conference and the Menderes government's stance during the Algerian war of independence jeopardized Turkey's relations with Third World countries. Overall, the decade that Menderes's government spent in power was characterized by contradictions.

²³ Ibid., 59.

²⁴ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 88.

This study aims to explain the Menderes government's foreign policy as a complex hierarchy of considerations. Unquestionably, Menderes's foreign policy was shaped by his desire to develop the country and transform Turkey into a "little America," as the DP elites sometimes put it. DP governments hoped that American aid would flow to the country thanks to the Cold War and put American aid on the center of their economic development plans. Equally, Menderes and the Democrat Party disliked communism. Distrust of communism was connected to the Soviet security threat that emerged after the Second World War, but it was not the same thing. The Menderes government pursued rapprochement with the Soviet Union even as they played up anti-communist actions in the Middle East. This study proposes that Menderes's government followed a more traditional foreign policy vis-a-vis its relations with the world's two superpowers, and that these relations were based on the DP's understanding of Turkey's own economic and security concerns. Ideological concerns, however, were present in the Turkish government's approach to Third-World nationalism and decolonization efforts, where material gains were limited compared to superpowers.

The thesis is divided into two chapters. The first chapter in the body of this thesis, chapter two, examines the establishment of the Democrat Party and Turkish foreign policy before the Menderes period. This chapter highlights the interwar Turkish government's efforts to transform itself into a "modernized" state, and thus provides background for Menderes's politics. The chapter argues that Menderes and the Democrat Party defined themselves in opposition to the economic policies of their predecessors, and that their commitment to a particular version of economic development shaped their foreign policy in the 1950s.

Chapter three contains the three case studies on which the argument of this thesis is based. The chapter begins with Turkish-Soviet relations and explains why cooperation between Moscow and Ankara fit with the modernizing drive of the interwar years. This chapter aims to show that security concerns were not necessarily the most important aspect of Soviet-Turkish relations and in the rapprochement that occurred in the mid-1950s. The first section of this chapter argues that financial concerns trumped security or ideological concerns, and that the Menderes period even showed some echoes of the interwar period.

The second case study in chapter two examines Turkish-US relations with a focus on foreign trade and foreign aid. Turkey was highly dependent on U.S. aid and needed Washington in order to pursue its policies in the domestic and international scene. Dependence, however, was as much a problem as it was a benefit, and the chapter addresses several disagreements between Ankara and Washington. These disagreements shaped Turkish-US relations as Turkey experienced an economic crisis in 1954 and could not recover for years to come. As a result, Menderes pushed its foreign policy to acquire more aid from the US, which also affected Turkish foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and decolonization.

The last case is Menderes's foreign policy towards the decolonization process over the course of the 1950s, with a specific emphasis on the Bandung Conference and the Algerian War of Independence. As recent works of international history have shown, decolonization was a crucial diplomatic issue in the 1950s.²⁵ Turkey was

²⁵ Matthew Connelly, "Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of Algerian War of Independence," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33: 2 (2001): 221-22 & Mark

invited to Bandung and warned conference members against communism and supported the US Government and NATO in a conference that was supposed to be for the non-aligned. The policy followed by Turkey during the Bandung alienated Turkey from the Third World. Another thing that harmed Turkish prestige on the international stage was the Algerian War of Independence. Turkey sometimes abstained and sometimes voted in favor of France in the United Nations regarding the Algerian crisis. Therefore, leaders of the Algerian independence movements criticized Turkey from time to time, and this affected Turkey's relations with the Middle East. It will be explained why Turkey acted like that in these issues with an emphasis on ideology.

Chapter II: A Divided Legacy: The Democrat Party and the Economic and Foreign Policies of their Predecessors

To some extent, the Democrat Party leaders were following a foreign policy whose course was determined by their predecessors. Menderes's anti-communism and pro-Westernism pushed Turkey further towards the West, but İsmet İnönü was the one who initiated the efforts to secure British and US support against the Soviet threat. The Democrat Party was born in opposition to İnönü's Republican People's Party (hereafter RPP) but also shared much with it, and this tension is key to understanding the fault lines of Menderes's foreign policy during the decade that he was in power. While Menderes and the Democrat Party did not differ substantially from the RPP on foreign policy issues, they did differ significantly on questions of economic policy. Menderes and his allies were committed to a vision of liberal economic development that would prove to be one of the defining factors in their approach to foreign policy once they were in power.

The politics of the interwar period, especially relations between Moscow and Ankara, offer an insightful perspective on both countries' relations with each other in the 1950s. Cooperation during the interwar period, despite the fact that it ended with a serious rivalry, shows that both countries were willing to cooperate with each other if circumstances fit their interests, ideological differences notwithstanding. In this sense, the late Menderes governments' willingness to improve relations with Moscow can be read along with these lines. The Menderes government of the late 1950s saw economic opportunity in their relations with the Soviet Union after attempts to win increased aid from the US had failed.

2.1 Adnan Menderes and His Background

The young Adnan's commitment to liberal economics was visible even at the beginning of his political career. Born in a small village near the Aegean coast to a middle-class family in 1899, he lost his parents at a young age and was raised by his grandmother in Aydın.²⁶ He started his education in the İzmir Union and Progress School (İttihat ve Terakki okulu) but later transferred to the American College in İzmir. When Adnan and his friends organized themselves politically to complain about missionary activity in the school, he met Mahmut Celal (Bayar), a connection that would prove important later in life.²⁷ During the First World War, he had to quit his education as he was drafted into the army. After the Great War and the War of Independence, Adnan returned to his family farm in Aydın. He first entered political life in 1930. That year, Ali Fethi (Okyar) founded a new party, the Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, henceforth LRP), at the request of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) himself.²⁸ The LRP, in addition to being an important test case for a possible transition towards greater democracy in the newly founded Republic, also represented an alternative economic approach to İnönü's Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, henceforth the RPP).

The LRP advocated for liberalisation of the economy against what was increasingly being called "statism." Also, the LRP gained immense nationwide popularity within a short period of time, especially in the coastal areas where Adnan lived. These areas, dependent upon agricultural exports, were dramatically affected

²⁶ Şeref Demir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Adnan Menderes 1945-1960*, PhD Diss. Marmara Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2009, 2.

²⁷ Ibid., 2.

²⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd edition, (London, Oxford University Press: 1968), 280.

by the fall of agricultural products on international markets as the Great Depression began to unfold in the late 1920s.²⁹ During Fethi's visit to the Aegean region, he met with Adnan and invited him to join the LRP. Although initially Adnan rejected the idea of being in politics, he later accepted the offer and established the party's provincial presidency, to which he was elected head.³⁰ The decision to enter politics was primarily an economic question for Adnan, as he was concerned by high taxes and low production rates.³¹ Adnan's initial experience in politics was limited because LRP dissolved itself on 17 November 1930. Nevertheless, it offers a revealing view of his sensibilities. Before joining LRP, Adnan had been invited to join the RPP as well. Nevertheless, he rejected the offer due to his disagreements with party officials in the region.³² LRP not only echoed the discontent within the country towards RPP, but also showed the public support for more liberal economic policies as well, and Adnan was clearly influenced by these.

Adnan's decision to eventually join the RPP reflected a conviction that the party had begun to change. After the dissolution of the LRP, the RPP sent a delegation to the Aegean region to understand why the LRP had received so much support. The head of the delegation was Adnan's friend from his school days in İzmir, Mahmut Celal, and, when the delegation came to Aydın, they once again asked Adnan to join the party. He accepted the offer because he apparently appreciated the RPP's efforts to reconstruct itself.³³ He also demanded that the party organization in Aydın be restructured. His demand was accepted, and he became the head of party

²⁹ Günver Güneş, "Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nın Aydın'da Teşkilatlanması ve 1930 Belediye Seçimleri Üzerinde Oluşan Tartışmalar." *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 25.39 (2006): 123

³⁰ Ibid., 125.

³¹ Demir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Adnan Menderes*, 16.

³² Ibid., 17.

³³ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı?* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1993), 87.

organization in Aydın. After a while, Mustafa Kemal decided to visit the Aegean region to listen to the people and inspect the party organizations, especially in the provinces where the LRP performed well.³⁴ When Mustafa Kemal Pasha visited Aydın, he did not want to go to the party organization, as he heard that the organization was full of former LRP members.³⁵ Nevertheless, he went there for a short visit and met with Adnan for the first time. During Mustafa Kemal's visit, Adnan expressed his views on the country's affairs. Mustafa Kemal talked with Adnan for four hours and liked Adnan and his views.³⁶ Although Adnan's entrance into politics had been driven by his frustration with the economic policies of the RPP, he was clearly close to RPP's broader politics.

There is some disagreement about how Adnan went from provincial politician to parliament member in Ankara. When Mustafa Kemal completed his trip around the country and returned to Ankara, he demanded new elections in 1931. Adnan, although he did not apply to be a member of parliament, was elected as MP of Aydın and went to Ankara. Some argue that he owed his entrance into parliament to his relative, Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Others argue that Mustafa Kemal's talks with Adnan affected this decision.³⁷ Regardless, Adnan managed to remain in his position as MP for 14 years until 1945. His years as parliament member were relatively undistinguished, as he did not possess any impactful position and was never a member of the cabinet. Although it is known that he had previously sought the post of Minister of Agriculture, his star only really began to shine in 1945, during the "land reform" debates and later budget debates in

³⁴ Demir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Adnan Menderes*, 19.

³⁵ Ibid., 19.

³⁶ Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, 89.

³⁷ Demir, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Adnan Menderes*, 21.

the parliament.³⁸ He harshly opposed land reform and criticized the government, which resulted in his expulsion from the party. After his expulsion, Adnan Menderes went on to establish the Democrat Party with Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü. Up until his break with the RPP after the Second World War, there were few signs of any particular stance on Turkey's foreign policy. His entrance into politics demonstrated disagreement with the RPP's economic policies, and in particular how they affected the Aegean region, but these differences were not so great as to prevent him from joining the RPP itself. The early tension with RPP came from differences over economic policy, and this tension was what led to his establishment of an independent role for himself in 1945.

2.2 The Establishment of the Democrat Party

Adnan Menderes's path to becoming prime minister was created by the immense changes that swept Turkey's domestic politics after the Second World War. First and foremost, İsmet İnönü's government and the political elite in Turkey were eager to allow the formation of opposition movements and parties. The liberalization of Turkish politics began with İnönü's speech on 19 May, when he gave a green light for democratization. Nuri Demirdağ applied for the formation of the National Development Party, and Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu accepted the request. Later, İnönü gave a speech on 1 November 1945 and argued that "the only thing we lack is a party to oppose the government's party."³⁹ This tolerance for opposition was limited, however, as the ruling classes crushed leftist movements and organizations,

³⁸ Ibid., 2.

³⁹ *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, sayı. 6147, s. 9567.

accusing them of being Moscow's allies.⁴⁰ Menderes, with his background of relative agreement with the RPP and dissent on economic issues, was able to capitalize on this opportunity.

Menderes's moment came when the İnönü government proposed a "Land Reform Bill" in 1945 because this was an economic issue that was close to his own traditional concerns. Such a law had been discussed when Atatürk was still alive, but his death and the onset of the Second World War had seen it shelved. The new bill proposed that every farmer would receive land, and the bill promised to improve small farmers' conditions. The proposal faced strong opposition within the government, and Menderes joined that opposition. The critics argued that big businesses are more profitable and effective. To avoid decreases in agricultural production, they advocated that changes should be slow and careful. Menderes was among those who criticized the land reform bill most harshly. Refik Koraltan argued that the law was a violation of property rights, that, "The spirit of this bill is to take Ali's property and give it to Veli, no matter what they say."⁴¹ One of the dangers for Menderes and for the opposition was that most of them were landowners and the law would harm their interests. Prime Minister Saraçoğlu claimed that 6-7 people, including Menderes, came to his office and requested certain changes.⁴² Menderes's criticism of the bill was as harsh as any, and he argued that the bill bore similarities to the Nazi regime's settlement and land bill, the Erhhof Law.⁴³

⁴⁰ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 5.

⁴¹ T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem: VII., Toplantı : 2, C. 17, (14.5.1945), 70.

⁴² Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 11.

⁴³ Mustafa Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti 1946-1960*, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2004), 23.

Menderes and the opposition took advantage of the situation to expand their criticism of the government's economic policy beyond the narrow subject of the proposed land reform. Before the land bill was voted on in the parliament, Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan presented a resolution to the parliament that would later be known as the "Dörtlü Takrir." They demanded that anti-democratic provisions in the law be repealed, that the parliament be given the power to truly check the power of the executive, and that elections be made free.⁴⁴ The RPP rejected the proposal. But Menderes and Köprülü did not give up, and they criticized the government during their interview with the newspaper *Vatan*. After the interview, they were expelled from the Party. Weeks later, Koraltan argued that the expulsion of Köprülü and Menderes violated the RPP's charter. He too was expelled. Later, Bayar resigned from the parliament.⁴⁵ Before officially applying for permission to establish a new party, Bayar reportedly went to President İnönü. In their conversation, İnönü asked the proposed new party's views about secularism and foreign affairs and Bayar stated that they had no intention to divert from the RPP's policies in these matters.⁴⁶ Thus, they gained İnönü's approval. When Menderes participated in the establishment of the Democrat Party, it was consistent with the career that he had developed up until that point. His politics were those of moderate opposition to RPP, an opposition that focused almost exclusively on domestic economic issues. He was in favor of liberalization of the economy and support for the large-scale, export-oriented agriculture that was characteristic of the Aegean region that he hailed from. But, as Bayar insisted to İnönü, Menderes and his colleagues did not intend to break with the RPP on foreign policy issues.

⁴⁴ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 11.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 12

⁴⁶ Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, 62.

The Democrat Party had humble origins, but it rapidly found support in its attempts to liberalize Turkish politics. Shortly after the Democrat Party was founded on 7 January 1946, Celal Bayar gave an interview to the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. In response to a reporter's question about where the party would get its money, Bayar replied, "I think that we can find 100-200 people who would support us out of 18 million people. If we take 500 liras from each, it will make 100 thousand lira and we will manage for a year or two". Cem Eroğul argues that, given the value of 500 lira at that time, the Democrat Party intended to rely on the wealthy classes's support.⁴⁷ In the party program, the Democrat Party demonstrated its adherence to the basic principles established by the RPP and accepted the second amendment of the constitution; Republicanism, Nationalism, Secularism, Populism, Etatism and Revolutionism.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the DP set out to pursue its own goals: liberalism and democracy. In its program, the DP defined certain human rights as integral to its mission. Also, it limited the scope of etatism by defining it as a tool to promote private sector.⁴⁹ Mustafa Albayrak has helpfully clarified that whereas in the RPP's understanding, etatism meant to work for public benefit, the DP's emphasis was on development through the stimulation of the interests of the individual.⁵⁰ The initial success of the DP triggered liberalism efforts by the RPP as well. The early campaign platform of the DP provided a useful clue to the DP's understanding of development.

⁴⁷ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 13.

⁴⁸ Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, 65.

⁴⁹ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 14.

⁵⁰ Albayrak, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti*, 70.

Menderes and the Democratic Party formed their position in the context of the emerging Cold War and increasing U.S. interest in Turkish politics. The U.S. exerted influence on Turkish politics in two ways – both through criticism that encouraged Turkey to open the country for democracy and through economic and military support. Before and in the aftermath of the Second World War, the West had been critical of Turkey's one-party state and authoritarian rule. On the other hand, the *USS Missouri* visited Istanbul and indirectly showed that the US would offer its support to Turkey against the Soviet demands. The US also forgave Turkey's debt up to \$100 million.⁵¹

The DP's political positions were shaped by early conflict with the RPP, in particular on the questions of democratization and economic policies. Despite DP opposition, the RPP government passed the Land Reform and abolished land corps tax.⁵² The new rhetoric that favored increased democracy and liberalism, but the RPP continued to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies. For example, the RPP government decided on early elections in 1946 while the Democrat Party was still just a six-month-old party. The RPP decided that votes should be cast in the open and counted in secret. These developments created fear among the opposition party that there would be widespread cheating.⁵³ Nevertheless, the RPP's efforts to consolidate its supporters and take wind from the sails of the Democrat Party did not pay off. The government even abolished article 22 that forbade "associations with the purpose of propagating ideas of class distinction, class interest, and regionalism".⁵⁴ By doing so, they aimed to seek the support of workers and small business, and to

⁵¹ Ibid., 79.

⁵² Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 15.

⁵³ Ibid., 15-16-17.

⁵⁴ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993), 106.

isolate the DP by painting it as the representative of big business.⁵⁵ The attempt was a failure. The İnönü government also took some measures to open up the economy. The lira was devalued, import duties were eased, and banks were permitted to sell gold. Yet these attempts could not prevent rising inflation rates and increases in the cost of living.⁵⁶ The Democrats exploited these economic circumstances successfully. The DP leadership criticized the decision to devalue the Turkish lira, arguing that demand for Turkish exports had been increasing. They pointed out that devaluing Turkish lira would hurt the Turkish economy and increase inflation rates domestically.⁵⁷ Moreover, the Democrats forced the RPP's hand on democratization. The DP announced that they would not participate in elections until the electoral law was amended to create fair elections. Consequently, the RPP government amended the electoral law to permit direct elections.⁵⁸ The DP's stance on the devaluation of Turkish lira back in 1946 foreshadowed one of Menderes's later conflicts with US leaders, who would pressure him to devalue Turkish lira. As a result of these developments, the Democrat Party's efforts for win an election proved fruitful and, despite the RPP's confident demeanor in 1950s election, the DP won and acquired the right to form a government after the 14 May 1950 elections. 27 years of one-party rule came to an end with the DP's victory, and Turkish democracy witnessed a bloodless, successful transition of power.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 106.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 107.

⁵⁷ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 15.

⁵⁸ Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 106.

2.3 Turkish Foreign Policy during the Interwar Period

Celal Bayar's claim that the Democrat Party would not deviate from the RPP's foreign policy illustrates the importance of the interwar legacy. In important ways, the First World War and its aftermath shaped Menderes's politics by transforming Turkish relations with the West and the Soviet Union. Nur Bilge Criss argues that the newly formed Republic was, in many ways, an exception among defeated countries.⁵⁹ Turkey was an exception because the country managed to reverse the treaty it had been forced to sign at Sevres and make a more favorable treaty for itself. Turkey emerged as a status-quo country unlike Germany or Italy, the latter of which was disappointed by the spoils it got despite being a "victor" country in the Great War. After the War of Independence, the newly formed Republic signed a neutrality agreement with the Soviet Union in 1925.⁶⁰ Later on, both parties renewed this agreement in 1929.⁶¹ These relations influenced Turkish development thinking too, as Turkey adopted a more statist approach given the success of the Soviet Union's economic performance despite the Great Depression, mainly thanks to its planned economy.

Perhaps most importantly, Menderes inherited the legacy of the return of great power politics during the 1930s. In that decade, international politics were gradually changing because of Italy's and Germany's revisionist and expansionist policies. The fascist powers' increasing influence over the Balkans, for example,

⁵⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, "Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Interwar Periods (1923-1939)." *Turkish Foreign Policy* (2017), 17.

⁶⁰ Baskın Oran. *Türk Dış Politikası*, 315.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 318.

undermined Turkish attempts to uphold the status quo in the region.⁶² Consequently, Turkey opened the status of the Straits discussion in the League of Nations via addressing that circumstances had been changed since the Lausanne Treaty and demanded sovereignty over the Straits.⁶³ Most of the signatory countries supported the Turkish initiative for various reasons. For the British, this was an opportunity to increase its influence over Turkey and against the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union, this was the opportunity to close the straits to all non-riparian warships and maintain freedom of transit for the Black Sea Powers.⁶⁴ The Soviet Union had hoped to achieve this even at Lausanne but failed, and, in a letter to the Department of State, the US Ambassador in Turkey observed that the Soviet government was trying to get what they “could not get in 1923”.⁶⁵ As a result of the conference, the Montreux Convention gave Turkey the right to militarize the Straits and allowed non-littoral states transit through the Straits.⁶⁶ Moscow was unhappy about the result of the Convention because the Straits were open to all countries. Moscow had supported Turkey’s right to militarize the Straits but argued that timing of it came after Germany’s militarization of Rhineland and that would imply approval of Hitler’s revisionist policies.⁶⁷ In the aftermath of the conference, Moscow proposed a bilateral agreement to Turkey on the Straits but Britain insisted that a bilateral agreement regarding the Straits would make Montreux Convention obsolete.⁶⁸

Regardless, Numan Menemencioğlu, the General Secretary for Turkish Ministry of

⁶² Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 17.

⁶³ Seçkin Barış Gülmez, “Turkish foreign policy as an anomaly: revisionism and irredentism through diplomacy in the 1930s,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 44:1(April 2016): 36.

⁶⁴ Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 17.

⁶⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1935, vol. I, “*The Ambassador in Turkey (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*” [Istanbul, 18 May, 1935]

⁶⁶ Oran. *Türk Dış Politikası*, 21

⁶⁷ Samuel J. Hirst and Onur İşçi, “Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development,” *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 5 (June 2020): 841

⁶⁸ Oran. *Türk Dış Politikası*, 321

Foreign Affairs, remarked that a “soft answer” should be given to the Soviets, as Turkey did not want to damage its relations with the Soviets. Menemencioğlu conceded that good relations with the Soviet Union were the “corner stone” of Turkish Foreign Policy.⁶⁹ After Montreux, Turkish relations with Britain and France improved while Moscow’s influence over Ankara deteriorated. This was the beginning of the alliance with the West that Menderes would inherit.

The interwar period had another important legacy, which would influence Menderes’s politics, and that was in the economic sphere. The founding fathers of the Republic had taken control of a poor country. They could not rely on rich classes to take the initiative for the economic development of the country. The Ottoman Empire’s foreign debt and bankruptcy created distrust towards foreign investors. Therefore, the early Republican elite wanted to create a national economy that was not dependent on foreign finance. Economics, however, could not be their priority. Until 1929, the Republican elites were primarily occupied with securing the new regime’s survival. They engaged in political reforms, and they were restricted by the Lausanne treaty. By the terms of Lausanne, they had promised to pay off a large share of the Ottoman debt and had sacrificed control over their customs until 1929.⁷⁰ The Turkish economy relied on agriculture and had to import expensive items to satisfy demand for manufactured products.

The statism that Menderes opposed formed at a moment of radical rupture, during the Great Depression. As economic crisis unfolded around them, the RPP government committed to state-led development and, in particular, to state-led

⁶⁹ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*, (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007): 73.

⁷⁰ Henri Barkey, *The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey* (Boulder: Westview, 1990): 44.

industrialization. Throughout this period, the government concentrated on urbanization and industrialization, but, despite the state's initiatives on development and the economy, the elites wanted to create a national bourgeois.⁷¹ The Soviet Union supported Turkey's statist policies with credits and technological assistance, and this Soviet-Turkish economic cooperation was to have much relevance for Menderes's foreign policy. More broadly, statism was relevant for Menderes's political formation because, as Henri Barkey has shown, statism neglected agriculture and promoted industrialization. As Turkey was a heavily agricultural society, this promotion of industry created dissatisfaction among the rural class.⁷² Menderes and the Democrat Party capitalized on this dissatisfaction with RPP's industrial focus in their rise to power.

2.4 The Democrat Party and NATO

With the end of the Second World War, the Soviet government announced that they would not renew the 1925 treaty of friendship and non-aggression. That was followed by the Soviet Union's demands for a revision in the Montreux Treaty and territorial adjustment in the Soviet-Turkish borders.⁷³ On March 19, 1945, the Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Selim Sarper, had a meeting with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. In this meeting, Molotov mentioned the Soviet government's desire for a revision of the Montreux Treaty as well as the cities of Kars and Ardahan. Consequently, Sarper notified Ankara about the Soviet note and demands, which increased fear in Turkey of Soviet aggression.⁷⁴ These changed security concerns transformed Turkey's efforts to align itself with the

⁷¹ Şevket Pamuk, *Economic change in twentieth century Turkey: Is the glass more than half full? The Cambridge History of Turkey 4* (2007): 10.

⁷² Barkey, *The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey*, 48.

⁷³ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis*. 49-50.

⁷⁴ Kaan Ataç, 70. Yılında Truman Doktrini: Türkiye ve Soğuk Savaşı. *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 8, no. 1 (2016): 109.

West. After a history of neutrality, İnönü's RPP sought a pact with the US to ensure the security of Turkey. As the Cold War unfolded, İnönü could take heart in the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Later on, the İnönü government pushed for a NATO membership, but they failed to acquire a membership before the 1950s election, when the founding party of the Turkish Republic finally lost its control of the government.

The DP government did not change much in terms of Turkey's foreign policy orientation and the US believed that they would follow their predecessors. Nevertheless, the DP government was far louder and more persistent in promoting Turkey's security interests.⁷⁵ Fuat Köprülü, in a meeting in Brussels stated, "Our foreign policy, which has turned towards the West since the end of Second World War, will take a more active form in this direction as a result of this election."⁷⁶ This statement from Fuat Köprülü clearly indicates the new government's foreign policy orientation. Also, Fuat Köprülü expressed his desire to revive the Sadaabat Pact, now including Britain. Besides, DP government tried to improve its relations with Middle Eastern countries and act like a junior partner to US and UK in the region.⁷⁷ During the 1950 electoral campaign, the DP argued that joining NATO would secure democracy in Turkey.⁷⁸ Therefore, DP eagerly followed a policy to achieve what the RPP had not achieved. The Korean War brought an opportunity for the DP and Turkey to show their dedication to NATO's causes.

⁷⁵ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo-American security interests, 1945-1952: the first enlargement of NATO* (London: Routledge, 2013): 161

⁷⁶ Sedef Bulut, "Sovyet Tehdidine Karşı Güvenlik Arayışları: I ve II. Menderes Hükümetlerinin (1950-1954) NATO Üyeliği ve Balkan Politikası, *Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 11, no. 41: 37.

⁷⁷ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo-American security interests*, 162.

⁷⁸ Sedef Bulut, "38. Eklemden Güç Mücadelesi: Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye'deki Tezahürleri", *Mavi Atlas* 6, no. 1 (2018): 189.

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, threatened to extend the reach of communism, and put US prestige in danger. In response, and with strong U.S. encouragement, the United Nations decided to send troops to Korea. After the UN decision, Menderes announced that Turkey would send 4500 soldiers to Korea.⁷⁹ The DP decision meant that Turkey would send its soldiers beyond the borders of the National Pact (Misak-I Milli) for the first time since 1923.⁸⁰ The US Republican Senator Harry Cain, during his visit to Turkey, indicated that the presence of Turkish forces in Korea might affect Turkish admission to NATO.⁸¹ Nevertheless, Turkey refreshed its troops in Korea three times despite high casualties, and still could not secure NATO alliance. İnönü's RPP did not oppose the decision to send soldiers to Korea but they criticized how DP took and implement this decision without informing the Parliament. For RPP, the decision to send soldiers abroad needed to be discussed and approved in TBMM.⁸² The RPP's reaction to the Korean War clearly suggests that both the opposition and the government were on the same page regarding the Korean War. The DP was not yet diverting its foreign policy orientation from the past. Moreover, in his speech in 25 October 1951, İnönü remarked, "Essentially, there is no difference of opinion and principle in our country on foreign matters. We are committed to our alliance, the UN ideal and the US friendship".⁸³ However, other opposition voices that criticized the decision such as 17 humor magazine were shut down for being "communists".⁸⁴ Furthermore, Barışseverler Association criticized the decision as well, and they met with same fate and were arrested. This decision shows that the so-called

⁷⁹ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 545.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 547.

⁸¹ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey-Anglo-American security interests*, 164.

⁸² Bulut, "38. Eklemden Güç Mücadelesi," 192.

⁸³ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 546.

liberalization in Turkish political arena was quite limited to a particular political approach, and that Menderes was very much in line with RPP foreign policy.

During the period between 1949 and 1951, US policy towards the Middle East and the Mediterranean became clearer.⁸⁵ The newly-elected Democrat Party's pro-Western and anti-Soviet approach helped the US to pursue a new approach in the region. The US's policy of containment expanded, and they viewed Turkey and Greece more valuable than ever as those countries could stop and decrease Soviet influence in the area.⁸⁶ Policy change and the increasing military budget in 1951 allowed the US to follow a more aggressive and dynamic policy against the Soviet Union. The US sought to extend NATO's borders and merge Eastern Mediterranean and Western Europe as one. In September 1950, although they were not accepted as members, Greece and Turkey came to be included within NATO's military planning.⁸⁷ Besides, the US demanded air bases in Turkey to respond to a possible Soviet threat, but Turkey stated that they would only accept such an agreement if Turkey were invited to join NATO.⁸⁸ Together with the Korean War and changes in US policy, pressure from Ankara and Athens bore fruit. On 21 September 1951, both countries were formally invited to join NATO.

After Stalin's death, and in response to Turkish membership in NATO, the Soviet government sought reconciliation with Turkey. Nevertheless, the Soviet efforts encountered a highly suspicious Turkish response. Ara Sanjian argues that, while other nationalistic regimes look Moscow with sympathy, Ankara turned even

⁸⁴ Ibid., 546.

⁸⁵ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War*. (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 67.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 68.

⁸⁷ Smith, *NATO Enlargement*, 75.

⁸⁸ Oran *Türk Dış Politikası*, 548.

further to the West and “made reliance on the West to prevent Soviet expansionism a pillar of Turkish foreign policy.”⁸⁹ Furthermore, Turkish elites thought that the more important Turkey became for the West’s foreign policy calculations, they would receive more American aid.⁹⁰ Menderes even stated that Turkey is the bulwark of defense of the Middle East and saved the region from the Communist aggression. The logic was that it would be necessary to increase Turkey’s economic strength to sustain its role.⁹¹ Moreover, the Menderes government were enthusiastic about forming other pacts to counter the Soviet threat in Balkans and the Middle East. When NATO talks were still going on, the UK and the US had concepts of Middle East Defense Organization. However, it was an unsuccessful attempt because no Arab countries were willing to join the organization.

The US idea was to create the so-called Northern tier. According to this concept, the countries who were closer to the Soviet threat, i.e. Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, should constitute the basis for any prospective defense pact.⁹² Before the announcement of new scheme, Secretary of State Dulles visited Ankara, where he was repeatedly assured by Menderes and Bayar that they “would do everything in their power to support and carry through this American initiative”.⁹³ During Dulles’s visit, Menderes talked about his views of world affairs. He stated that the world was divided “between two opposing forces: Russia and her satellites versus those countries which frankly opposed the communist menace.”⁹⁴ Menderes also expressed

⁸⁹ Ara Sanjian, “The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 2 (1997): 228.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 228.

⁹¹ George C. McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave, 1990): 106.

⁹² Ayşegül Sever, “The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West in the Middle East,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no.2 (2006): 74.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁹⁴ *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol.IX, The Near East and Middle East (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986): 138.

his support for the British in the Suez Canal and argued that the United Kingdom was “acting as guardian of an outpost of one of the key positions of the free world.”⁹⁵

This statement of Menderes is particularly important because Egypt’s opposition was one of the reasons that previous attempts to form a defense organization in the Middle East had failed. Menderes believed that Turkey should be the “backbone” of the Middle East’s defense. According to Menderes, “Turkey’s social and political stability, the determined attitude of Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, and the very serious efforts which Turkey is making to expand her already strong forces, it is only natural that she would have a primary role in the defense of the area.”⁹⁶ In addition, Menderes and Köprülü believed that Turkey was like a “big brother” to the Middle Eastern countries and criticized the RPP governments for ignoring Arab countries.⁹⁷ Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement and thus defined Pakistan’s role in the Northern-Tier project.⁹⁸

The Menderes government also actively engaged diplomatic talks with Baghdad for a Middle East Organization. Even so, Ankara tried to pursue Northern Tier countries with its own capabilities but used American military and economic aid as a bargaining chip as well.⁹⁹ In 1955, Turkey increased its efforts for a defense organization in the Middle East and Menderes visited Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to convince them to join.¹⁰⁰ In his speech in the Iraqi parliament, Menderes said that “stability in the Middle East can only be defended if this pact to be established has connections with NATO”.¹⁰¹ Iraq and Turkey faced criticism from Arab countries.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 139.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 139.

⁹⁷ Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, 42.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 49.

⁹⁹ Sever, “The Compliant Ally?” 75.

¹⁰⁰ Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, 61.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 62

President Nasser rejected Turkey's proposal for defense of the Middle East defense, argued that Turkey had ties with Israel, and claimed that Turkey had only taken the lead in the Middle East with the support of the US, the UK and France.¹⁰²

Nevertheless, the pact was signed between Turkey and Iraq. Britain soon joined the organization on 5 April, followed by Pakistan on 23 September and Iran on 3 November 1955.

Despite Turkey and Menderes's hopes, the pact made Turkey more alienated in the region. The pact faced severe criticism. According to Ayşegül Sever, Turkey became the victim of indecisive American policies to the region.¹⁰³ Consequently, Nasser proposed a pact to Syria against the Baghdad Pact, and that triggered Turkey's reaction and Menderes's exertion of pressure to Damascus. Surprisingly for Turkey, Turkish pressure towards Syria induced UK and the US suspicions. London and Washington advised Ankara to follow a softer attitude.¹⁰⁴ The Americans followed softer policy towards Nasser as well. These events harmed Turkey's image in the Arab World and created the sense that Ankara was an aggressor. The Baghdad Pact did not do what was expected and instead it further jeopardized Ankara's relations with the Middle East.

Before the Baghdad Pact, Turkey also spent considerable time forming a pact in the Balkans as well. According to Menderes, Turkey's geopolitical role made it a natural leader in the Eastern Mediterranean region.¹⁰⁵ Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform provided new opportunities in Balkans both for Turkey and the US.

¹⁰² Ibid., 65

¹⁰³ Ayşegül Sever, "The Compliant Ally?" 75-76.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 77

¹⁰⁵ Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 51.

The US sent military and financial aid to Yugoslavia, as Josip Broz Tito was frightened by the threat from the USSR.¹⁰⁶ Yugoslavia was also open to cooperation, despite certain ideological differences. Turkey and the US wanted to fill the power vacuum in the region by forming a pact with Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁷ The Soviet threat was the main factor that drove efforts to create a pact between Socialist Yugoslavia, Kingdom of Greece, and Republic of Turkey. According to London's *The Times*, the "main purpose of the treaty is to create a common front against a possible Communist attack from the Balkans".¹⁰⁸ However, there were severe different points of view between Menderes and Tito. According to Köprülü, this treaty will create a natural connection to NATO. Furthermore, Menderes viewed the Pact as an extension of NATO.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, Turkish-Greek relations worsened due to rising tensions in Cyprus that effectively limited cooperation among these countries. Stalin's death and the new Soviet leadership's attempts to build closer relations with Yugoslavia became increasingly successful. Consequently, this led Tito to embrace a "non-alignment" policy. While Menderes reject the "non-alignment" policy, he accepted that the Balkan pact was stillborn.¹¹⁰

2.5 Conclusion

The turbulent geopolitics of the interwar period and the post-Second World War era explain much about the general context for Menderes's foreign policy in the 1950s. The other political party of the era, the RPP, showed a willingness to change its core identities, including its foreign policy and its economic politics. These

¹⁰⁶ Oran, ed., *Türk Dış Politikası*, 588.

¹⁰⁷ Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, 51.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 56.

changes may be attributed mainly to external factors such as the rising powers of the United States and the imminent threat that comes from the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the liberalization of the Turkish political environment and the economy was limited, and the more liberal Democrat Party criticized the RPP for these limitations. The DP promised more liberalization in Turkish politics. Despite differences on domestic matters, the DP pledged to follow the foreign policy initiated by the İnönü government. The threat of leftist movements, thus communism, was one of the defining factors of policies pursued by both İnönü and Menderes. Therefore, this chapter aimed to explain how the seemingly different yet so similar political parties and leaderships followed identical foreign policies.

Chapter III: Turkish Foreign Policy under Adnan Menderes: Three

Case Studies

This chapter examines three separate cases that offer a clearer explanation of the factors that shaped Menderes's foreign policy. The first case, Turco-Soviet relations, is the story of the rapprochement that was initiated by the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow after Stalin's demise in 1953 and Menderes's financial concerns in 1957. This case reveals how Menderes and Democrat Party limited their ideological, in this case anti-communist, concerns with their relationship vis-à-vis a great power. The second case is American aid to Turkey. The leadership in Washington initiated a series of aid programs to develop the Turkish economy and assist the Turkish leadership, and both İnönü and Menderes were eager to acquire American aid. However, as relations between Ankara and Washington strained, so did the flow of the aid. The third case study examines the Turkish government's actions at the Bandung Conference and in reaction to the Algerian War of Independence. In these events, the anti-communist reaction of Menderes and his elites were pronounced and alienated Turkey from the Third World. The Menderes government's position on decolonization significantly harmed the Turkish reputation in the Middle East and within non-alignment movement.

Although these three cases seem to be different from each other, each is directly and indirectly linked to one another. Turkish-American relations highly affected Menderes's treatment to Moscow and, as Menderes was disappointed with Washington's unwillingness to bail him out from the financial crisis his government

was facing, this pushed him towards Moscow to seek aid. The financial crisis of 1954 in Turkey increased Democrat Party's needs for economic aid, and the DP were more willing to show Turkey's importance to the leadership in Washington. While there were negotiations for aid going on in Washington, Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu participated in Bandung conference, only to warn neutral countries against the communist threat. Regardless of economic concerns, Ankara was sincerely afraid of communist threat and was suspicious about the Soviet Union's intentions of "peaceful coexistence". Therefore, these three cases show different dimensions of Menderes's foreign policy; security, economy and ideology which as argued, highly connected with each other.

3.1 Turkish-Soviet Relations during the Democrat Party Era

The Menderes government pursued a strong anti-Soviet and anti-Communist strategy that was shaped by economic and ideological concerns. Despite this, the late Menderes era witnessed rapprochement between these two countries, at least in the economic realm. That was not an unexpected case, given that Menderes was facing extremely unfavourable economic conditions at home and the US aid alone was not enough to bail him out.

As the previous chapter demonstrated, Menderes inherited a certain foreign policy path set up by the earlier RPP governments. Turkey pushed itself into the NATO umbrella and was formally accepted to the Alliance in 1952.¹¹¹ The Democrat Party's decision to send an expedition to Korean War and the party's enthusiasm for

¹¹¹ Behçet K Yeşilbursa., "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO 1950-52," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no.4 (October, 1999): 75.

NATO membership determined the direction of Turkish-Soviet relations, which were already at an all-time low. According to Kemal Karpaz, the Democrat Party realized that identifying Turkey with the West provided military and political security as well as economic aid, and this boosted DP's chance to win re-elections.¹¹² For the first few years that Menderes was prime minister, his government did not introduce any significant initiatives into Soviet-Turkish relations. Turkey's entrance into NATO unquestionably affected the country's relationship with the Soviet Union, but Menderes was largely following the path taken by his immediate predecessor.

Stalin's death in 1953 was the first event that forced the Menderes government to consider changes in its policy towards the Soviet Union. The post-Stalin leadership in Moscow initiated a new set of foreign policies to forge better relations with the West and with non-aligned countries.¹¹³ The Kremlin announced that it withdrew previous demands for Turkish lands and the Straits.¹¹⁴ In their note, the new Soviet leadership remarked that they wanted to improve relations with Turkey; they blamed Georgia and Armenia for the territorial demands and resolved to fix the issue at the level of the federal government.¹¹⁵ On December 1953, Menderes gave an answer to a US journalist's question about Turkish-Soviet relations and stated that "Russia's peace overtures do not have any impact on Turkish policy because there were no tangible actions."¹¹⁶ Ultimately, Menderes's government rejected a very clear attempt by the Soviet Union to put to rest some of

¹¹² Karpaz, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 263.

¹¹³ Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991*, (Routledge, London: 2006): 69.

¹¹⁴ Hirst and İşçi, "Smokestacks and Pipelines," 11.

¹¹⁵ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 512.

¹¹⁶ A. Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964*, (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1992): 339.

the security issues that had formed Ankara's anti-Soviet policies in the post-World War II period.

Scholars have largely referred to the continued security threat and ideological concerns to explain the Menderes government's decision. Suat Bilge argues that Ankara remained suspicious about Soviet intentions and interpreted this development as nothing but a new tactic by a still-aggressive Moscow.¹¹⁷ Kemal Karpat argues that Menderes's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was based not on concrete security issues but on a strong anti-communism. Karpat, like Bilge, concludes that the DP government did not believe in the politics of "peace" policies, and that they viewed this as a Soviet trap.¹¹⁸

Erel Tellal takes a slightly different approach and has claimed that Turkey's response to the Soviet's attempt at a normalization of relations should be read in terms of "bloc policy".¹¹⁹ Ankara's enthusiasm for the US's "Northern Tier" project shows this preference. The concept foresaw an alliance between Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, all of which experienced the Soviet threat. Before announcing this plan, the US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles came to Ankara in May 1953. During his trip, both Menderes and Bayar assured Dulles of their support for the American initiative.¹²⁰ They believed and argued that Turkey's military and economic power would bring the other countries into the pact."¹²¹ Tellal also demonstrates Turkey's bloc politics in relation to Turkish participation in US containment policy and as one

¹¹⁷ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, 338.

¹¹⁸ Karpat, *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*, 263.

¹¹⁹ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 514.

¹²⁰ Ayşegül Sever, "The Compliant Ally?" 74-75.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

of the leading countries in the establishment of the Balkan pact.¹²² Whether in terms of security threat, ideological anti-communism, or bloc thinking, the central accounts of Menderes's foreign policy take the rejection of Moscow's 1953 overture as a signal of the depth of Menderes's anti-Soviet politics.

Nevertheless, despite the hostility between Moscow and Ankara, the Soviet Union and Turkey returned to some of their earlier cooperation in this period. Between 1945 and 1953, the volume of international trade between Turkey and the Soviet Union was at all-time low, and, as of 1953, Turkey did not import anything from the Soviet Union. The Soviet attempts at rapprochement helped to change this situation. Turkish imports from the Soviet Union amounted to a total of 11,7 million dollars in 1954 and 1955. Similarly, Turkey exported 11.28 million dollars' worth of goods to the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1955.¹²³ Tellal argues that this was yet more bloc thinking, that Turkey used its recovering relations with the Soviets as a trump card against the West to get much needed financial aid to run its economy.¹²⁴ Yet in light of future developments, the return of Soviet-Turkish trade seems an important step in a less antagonistic Turkish policy towards the Soviet Union. The Turkish economy entered an economic crisis in 1954 because of policy choices and bad harvest of the year as Turkish economy was heavily dependent on agriculture, and needed aid to recover, but Menderes constantly rejected the US recommendation for devaluation of Turkish Lira. In this context, the Soviet Union became a more appealing partner for Ankara. As a result of the Turkish economic crisis of 1954, the Turks doubted whether the US could address Turkey's economic concerns.¹²⁵

¹²²Oran. *Türk Dış Politikası*, 514.

¹²³ Ibid., 517.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 517.

¹²⁵ Hirst and İşçi, "Smokestacks and Pipelines," 844.

Another moment when Menderes had to address Turkish-Soviet relations came in 1957, as a result of a series of political events that occurred in Syria. On 18 August 1957 President Shukri al-Quwatli appointed Col. Afif al-Bizri as chief of staff of the Syrian Army. The newspaper *Cumhuriyet* reflected Turkish fears at that time and announced that the development would put the “Syrian army at the hands of the Reds”, accusing Col. Afif al-Bizri of being “an extreme Communist”.¹²⁶ *Cumhuriyet* pushed the alarmism further on 19 August because of the alleged flight of President al Quwatli to Egypt and continued purges within the Syrian Army ranks.¹²⁷ Tension with Syria had already been increasing before these events. Syria joined Egypt and the other Arab states to protest the Baghdad Pact. Also, Syria and the Soviet Union signed an agreement that provided for economic and technical aid to Syria on 6 August 1957.¹²⁸ After that, Syria deported three US diplomats out of the country.¹²⁹ Therefore, along with newly appointed Chief of Staff, Syria became a serious topic for Turkey, the US, and the UK.

Developments in Syria were regarded as a shift to the left and thus towards Soviet influence. After a meeting in Turkey, the US diplomat Henderson impressed upon his interlocutors that the “situation in Syria is extremely serious.”¹³⁰ In September, Turkey mobilized its troops on the Syrian border. Therefore, Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in an interview with *The New York Times*, declared that, “Turkey is very weak. Under war

¹²⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 August 1957.

¹²⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 August 1957.

¹²⁸ Ömer E. Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası (1945-1970)*, (Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara; 1972): 103.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 104.

circumstances Turkey could not even last one day.”¹³¹ The US Department of State answered Soviet threats and stated that the US would back Turkey.¹³² On 22 October, the UN General Assembly gathered to discuss this issue. Although both sides accused each other of warmongering, at the end of the Assembly meeting the Syrian delegate argued that, in order to relieve the tension, Turkey should take certain measures on its borders. After the Assembly meeting, the tension started to decrease between Ankara and Damascus. Furthermore, the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent a letter to Menderes, offering to arrange a Turkish-Soviet conference.¹³³ Throughout this crisis, Turkey felt that it had been blocked by “not so friendly forces”.¹³⁴ In an issue published on 25 November 1956, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper ran an article with the title, “Why are the Russians in Syria?” The article analyzed recent developments in the country and claimed that Russians were infiltrating Syrian Ranks.¹³⁵ As can be seen in newspapers, the Turkish public was tensely watching developments in the neighbouring country. A paranoia of being invaded by hostile forces can be observed among the Turkish public, as well as distrust towards communist or left-wing movements.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union sent an economic delegation to Ankara in July 1957, just months before the Syrian Crisis arose.¹³⁶ The Soviet delegation attended the International Fair in İzmir too. The Soviet delegation stated that they came to an agreement with Turkish İş Bankası for construction of two factories.¹³⁷ Menderes still believed that he could acquire necessary aid from the US if he played his cards

¹³¹ Ibid., 107.

¹³² Ibid., 107.

¹³³ Ibid., 111-112-113.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 105.

¹³⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1956.

¹³⁶ Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War Two to Gorbachev*, (CUP Archive, 1990): 246.

¹³⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 21 August 1957.

right. He tried to promote Turkey's role in containment policy during the Syrian Crisis of 1957. But his attempt to draw the US into a confrontation with Syria and the Soviet Union failed, and Eisenhower once again rejected Turkish demands for aid.¹³⁸ This created a huge disappointment for Ankara. The Syrian crisis also rekindled Turkish suspicion towards the Soviet Union.¹³⁹ Ankara viewed this crisis as the Soviets' attempts to increase its influence in the Middle East.¹⁴⁰ Security concerns did not, however, stop Turkey seeking economic help from the Soviet Union.

After the Syrian Crisis, Turkish-Soviet relations continued to improve. According to the historian Suat Bilge, during the US plans to deploy Missiles to Turkey, Ankara and Moscow kept in contact. Turkey wanted to understand "whether an agreement with the Soviet Union was possible on some matters while still continuing its NATO policies."¹⁴¹ The Turkish Minister of Health, Lütü Kırdar, visited Moscow in December 1959, which marked the first ministerial-level visit to Soviet Union since 1939.¹⁴² During a speech in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey that year, Zorlu gave his remarks about Soviet-Turkish relations. He claimed that Turkey would try to improve relations with the Soviet Union while maintaining its bloc policy. He also announced that the Turkish government was in contact with the Soviet Union. He reminded his audience of Turkish-Soviet cooperation during the interwar period and how much Turkey had benefited from it.¹⁴³ Menderes himself planned to visit the Soviet Union in July 1960, but the coup in May prevented his visit. The coup also marked an end for the Democrat Party era.

¹³⁸ Hirst and İşçi, "Smokestacks and Pipelines," 185.

¹³⁹ Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East*, p. 248

¹⁴⁰ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, 341.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 342.

¹⁴² Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 520.

¹⁴³ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, 345.

By 1960, there were significant improvements in Turkish-Soviet relations. Soviet early initiatives were met with a muted response because Ankara was suspicious about Soviet aims and argued that Turkey wanted to see tangible actions. But the Soviet Union entered a limited barter system with Turkey that made itself a “natural partner” for Turkey.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, the Soviet-Turkish trade volume increased between 1953 and 1960. The Soviet government tried not to alienate Turkey after Stalin’s death and repeated their desire for cooperation regularly. These may be seen as the Soviet Union’s “tangible actions,” which allowed Turkey to decrease its “anti-communist” tendencies on policy-making process along with the international developments. The Cold War itself was changing, and influenced Ankara-Moscow relations. The West was engaging the Soviet Union with peaceful diplomacy, which allowed Turkey to negotiate with the Soviets without damaging its relations with NATO. Furthermore, Menderes’s disappointment with the US and the West were a contributing factor for Turkish-Soviet relations.

To summarize, the Turkish-Soviet relationship that had formed after the First World War was fruitful throughout the interwar period. In 1945, Stalin’s demands for revision of the rules of passage through the Turkish Straits and “territorial adjustments” pushed Turkey towards the West. Turkey’s initial reasoning to align itself with the West was primarily based on security-related concerns, as has been argued in the literature. Turkish distrust towards the Soviet Union and communism continued even after the Soviet Union’s efforts to achieve a rapprochement after Stalin’s death. As the security threat decreased by the Soviet side, Menderes and his colleagues still followed an aggressive foreign policy towards

¹⁴⁴ Hirst and İşçi, “Smokestacks and Pipelines,” 15.

Moscow, through series of pacts or events such as Baghdad Pact. On the other hand, despite Turkey's efforts, Turkish-American relations worsened as the Turkish economy showed signs of crisis. As Turkey's economy worsened, Menderes's need for foreign aid increased, and the Soviet Union would provide some assistance to Turkey as a continuation of a new Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" and "de-Stalinization". All these developments paved the way for the improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations, despite obvious differences such as NATO or ideology. Menderes's strong anti-communist views did not stop him from cooperating with the Soviet Union as his relations with the West deteriorated. Menderes's willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, at least economically, shows the impact of financial concerns over his ideological concerns. William Hale, Kemal Karpaz and Mustafa Aydın all argue that Menderes's strong anti-Soviet views shaped Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s. It may be true in most of his policies ranging from joining to NATO to his enthusiasm for forming a Middle East Organization, Balkan pacts and so on. Yet, he cooperated with the Soviet Union to acquire economic gains, which may be linked to his desire to increase his domestic support and slow down the deterioration of economic conditions. This also a revealing case to show financial concern's effects over shaping Turkish foreign policy.

3.2 Post-World War Economic Developments in Turkey: Attempts for Development and Growth

This case study develops the argument that there was a direct correlation between financial aid and Menderes's foreign policy. This chapter aims to show the differences between Menderes and the US regarding Turkey's economic policies and the Menderes government's efforts to acquire needed financial aid.

When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and other leaders established the Republic of Turkey, they immediately started to discuss on how to re-build and then develop the country. Support for a statist economy grew, especially after the Great Depression of 1929. The First Five-Year Plan was introduced in 1934. Although Turkey immediately introduced a second plan in 1939, it was postponed by the outbreak of the Second World War. Soon after, troubles followed for the already fragile Turkish economy. The outbreak of the war negatively affected the Turkish economy, even though the country did not participate in the War. Its trade volume decreased and the burden of the War was noticeable because of taxes such as the wealth tax of 1942. Yet, with the triumph of allied powers of UK and US, the world was a different place, and the “liberal order” was on the rise through the influence of the UK and the US. On the other hand, the Soviet bloc emphasized more statist economy approach based on Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. According to Ataöv, Turkey was already beginning to align itself with the West by 1939. This was evident in the Tripartite Pact between Turkey, France, and Britain.¹⁴⁵ Turkey’s approach strengthened after the war as the Soviets demanded Kars and Ardahan, and also a revision of the Montreux Treaty of 1936. The relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey were already in decline during the war years of 1939-1945, as Turkey increasingly traded with Germany and constantly rejected allied proposal of joining the war effort.¹⁴⁶

Korkut Boratav describes 1946 as a turning point in both the political and economic life of Turkey.¹⁴⁷ It is a political turning point because it marks the

¹⁴⁵ Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: İleri Yayınları, 2006): 177

¹⁴⁶ Onur İşçi, “The Massigli Affair and Its Context: Turkish Foreign Policy after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 55, no.2 (April 2020): 2.

¹⁴⁷ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009*, (Ankara, İmge Kitapevi, 2011): 95

transformation to multi-party system in Turkey and a break with single-party rule. The National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) was founded on 5 September 1945, and the Democratic Party was founded on 7 January 1946. The year was also an economic turning point because Turkey began to pursue more liberal, flexible economy and demand foreign aid. This was a break with the previous sixteen years, when the government had maintained a closed and protected economy.¹⁴⁸ Boratav poses the question why a country, which had successfully experienced growth and developed during the 1930s without a foreign trade deficit, all of a sudden aimed for liberalization and foreign aid? He answers that it was because of a new world order under the US and its liberal, free trade order. Turkey's transformation, Boratav argues, should be mostly understood as a result of new world order and Turkey's stance towards it.¹⁴⁹ In 1946, Boratav continues, the Republican People's Party introduced a "Five-Year Industrial Plan". According to this plan, the State was in the lead and approached foreign trade with the understanding of independence. Overall, the plan was aimed a balanced development in all areas but priority was given to industry. As part of these policies, on 7 September 1946, Turkey devaluated its currency from 1.28 dollar to 2.80 dollar, which marks the first devaluation in the Republic's history.¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, to support its industrialization, Turkey needed some financial capital, which was lacking in Turkey. Therefore, the government wanted to obtain foreign direct investments and external aid for the sake of industrialization.¹⁵¹ On the

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 96.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 98-99.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 99-100.

¹⁵¹ Feridun Cemil Özcan. US. AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy: A Narration of the Aid Bargain Process in the 1946-1958 Period. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 34 (2003). 121.

other hand, the government could not generate money through taxation due to political reasons and electoral interests. Yet, it could not decrease its military spending and redirect money to its investment plans due to the Soviet threat. In light of these circumstances, the Turkish government asked for a \$500 million loan from the American Export-Import Bank, but the bank only agreed to give \$25 million for 1946-1947.¹⁵² Despite this initial disappointment, the Turkish government pushed for further credit.¹⁵³ With the announcement of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), Turkey once again sought economic assistance from the United States. These initial attempts were also rejected by the US.¹⁵⁴ As American experts such as Max Thornburg criticized the Turkish economy and statist policies severely, the Turkish government realized that the US had no desire to support their statist economic policies.¹⁵⁵ Eventually, due to both external and domestic reasons, Turkey abandoned its 1946 plan and embraced an even more liberal economic understanding. Turkey became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1947, and of the Organization for European Economic Organization (OEEC) in 1948. Membership enhanced Turkey's place in the international capitalist order.¹⁵⁶ Yet, despite Turkey's membership in the OEEC, no credit was given to Turkey for the first fifteen months of the Marshall plan because of Turkey's favourable gold and dollar reserve, according to Özcan.¹⁵⁷ Initially, in line with the ERP, the US offered \$10 Million to Turkey, which was rejected by the Turkish government. However, Turkish government later accepted the agreement with the hopes of "possible aid increase in the future and signed the

¹⁵² Ibid., 122.

¹⁵³ FRUS, 1947, vol. V, p.3 "From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey," United States Government Printing Office, Washington

¹⁵⁴ Özcan. US. AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy, 122.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 122.

¹⁵⁶ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 102.

¹⁵⁷ Özcan. US. AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy, 123.

Economic Co-operation Agreement with the U.S. in June 1948”.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, there were serious disagreements about Turkey’s role and ways of development between European Cooperation Agency (ECA, who were responsible for carrying out the European Recovery Plan) and the US State Department. The ECA mission argued that they should evaluate Turkey’s own capabilities and merits vis-a-vis its own modernization plan, while the State Department officials intervened ECA’s decisions in order to secure Turkish governments support for US Foreign Policy objectives and interests in the region.¹⁵⁹ For example, when Turkish national elections were underway in 1950, the incumbent RPP government demanded from the ECA mission that some funds should be re-allocated to the agriculture instead of coal-mines. While the head of ECA mission Russell Dorr protested against that demand, the US Ambassador to Ankara supported the RPP’s request and even pressured Dorr to allocate some funding to agriculture.¹⁶⁰

With the electoral loss of the RPP in 1950, Turkey finally was able to transform into a multi-party system. One of the central platform issues for the Democrat Party was their criticism of the RPP’s statist economic policies.¹⁶¹ The DP, in contrast, advocated “free enterprise” and liberalism as a way forward for the Turkish economy. Up until the 1950s, a sizeable and at this point recognizable Turkish business class emerged to the political scene and they supported Adnan Menderes, who was himself a rural landlord.¹⁶² The Democrat Party also continued

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 123.

¹⁵⁹ Burçak Kesin-Kozat. “Negotiating an Institutional Framework for Turkey’s Marshall Plan: The Conditions and Limits of Power Inequalities.” in *Turkey in the Cold War*, ed. Cangül Örnek and Çağdaş Üngör (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 202.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 204.

¹⁶¹ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance* (Washington: American Enterprise Inst. For Public Policy Research, 1972), 71.

¹⁶² Dwight J. Simpson. “Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey,” *Middle East Journal*, 1965: 142.

liberalization reforms undertaken by the RPP. In 1951, the DP passed a law called “Yabancı Sermaye Yatırımlarını Teşvik Kanunu (Law on incentive to invest in foreign capital)” and as of 1954 they introduced “Yabancı Sermayeyi Teşvik Kanunu (Law of Foreign Capital Incentive)” and “Petrol Kanunu (Oil Law)”.¹⁶³ The Oil Bill, was so favourable for foreign investors that the RPP criticized Menderes for granting “capitulations”.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, the DP introduced a new Cabinet Decision on July 1950, Cabinet Decision number 11704, which reorganized import regulations. With this decision, for next three years, DP removed protection for foreign trade and capital except for tariffs.¹⁶⁵ In 1950, everything was ready for the Menderes government. US aid was available, there was popular support for liberalization, and expanding wheat production. In these circumstances, the DP government did not fear a budget deficit. They thought that by running a budget deficit in the short-term, they could finance their industrialization plans.¹⁶⁶ For political gain, they wanted to quicken the development process in the economy and use these successes during the re-election campaign. Yet, as early as 1950, the ECA Mission in Turkey started to realize that Turkey had problem. If, they argued, Turkey’s development plan continued at the current pace, it would be a “serious threat to the financial stability of Turkey”. Thus, Dorr sought the support of the State Department to pressure Turkey to undertake a development plan within its capabilities.¹⁶⁷ Russell Dorr made this comment in relation to the RPP government, but it could be still applicable to the Menderes government as well.

¹⁶³ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 102.

¹⁶⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 73.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁶⁶ Simpson, “Development as a Process,” 144.

¹⁶⁷ FRUS [1978], 1950, vol. V, p.1229-31, “Memorandum of a Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs (Moore),” [Washington, February 14, 1950]

The United States expected that the new government would act with moderation and caution.¹⁶⁸ In the agricultural Sector, according to Simpson, “the Democrats remitted agricultural taxation, accelerated the pace of land reform and established a new system of agricultural credits.”¹⁶⁹ But when Menderes came to power, he disagreed with the ECA Mission in Turkey and criticized them for their efforts to influence macroeconomic policies of Turkey. He did not like the suggestions made by the ECA Mission such as imposing tax on agricultural incomes and lowering interest rates.¹⁷⁰ In accordance with Menderes’s preference for agriculture, most of the US aid money was spent on agriculture, including on the purchase of tractors, mechanical seeders, and harvesters.¹⁷¹ These policies increased Turkish agricultural output and Turkey witnessed a rise over 50 per cent total agricultural outputs between 1950-1958.¹⁷² Finally, the government devoted some resources to the industrial sector as well. One of the failures of Turkey at this time was its inability to attract foreign capital or finance it through domestic private capital, which was lacking in 1950s. Simpson suggested that this was the reason for partial return to the “statist philosophy,” which the Democrat Party had earlier criticized.¹⁷³ After the balance of payments crisis of 1954, the DP government had to expand government-owned industries such as energy, coal, sugar.¹⁷⁴ The US repeatedly warned the Menderes government about their policies’s possible outcomes. Özcan writes, “On June 1954, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes asked the US government for a \$300 Million program loan to provide financing for imports.

The US government’s reply to this request was to suggest ‘a full, frank discussion of

¹⁶⁸ FRUS [1978], 1950, vol. V, p. 1263, “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President,” [Washington, May 22, 1950]

¹⁶⁹ Simpson, “Development as a Process,” 144.

¹⁷⁰ Özcan, “US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy,” 123.

¹⁷¹ Simpson, “Development as a Process,” 144.

¹⁷² Ibid., 144.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 145.

¹⁷⁴ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 110.

Turkey's economic problems, including the exchange rate of the Lira' as a precondition to consider any possibility of such a special accommodation".¹⁷⁵

Menderes strongly rejected any idea of devaluation of Lira. Yet, an agreement was reached, and Menderes made promises regarding the stabilization program. However, upon his return to Turkey, Menderes took only a few steps towards stabilization and even then, he was confronted by a strong negative reaction among the business sector.

All in all, Menderes did not satisfy the US demands and acted contrary to the promises he made.¹⁷⁶ It is important to acknowledge that Menderes went to Germany on 2 October 1954 for a new economic agreement. Eventually, on 22 December 1954, Turkey reached an agreement with Germany. According to this agreement, Germany agreed to open a new credit to Turkey for 225-million-mark investment loan with a special condition that 45 million of that loan will go to private enterprises.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Menderes had to go for the US once again. Weather was bad for agriculture in 1954 and output was not enough for Turkey, which in return caused an economic crisis in Turkey. Because of problems related to a shortage in foreign currency, the Turkish government once again asked for a US loan in 1955.¹⁷⁸ But Menderes could not find the aid he needed, as US officials talked about their concerns over the inflationary trends in the Turkish economy.¹⁷⁹ Menderes then protested that he had "heard nothing but criticism and cries of inflation from Americans since he had been in office." He then claimed, "In fact, there is no

¹⁷⁵ Özcan, "US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy," 125.

¹⁷⁶ FRUS [1989], 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, p. 661, "Memorandum of a Conversation," [American Embassy, Ankara, January 13, 1956]

¹⁷⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1954.

¹⁷⁸ Özcan, "US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy," 125.

¹⁷⁹ FRUS, 1955-1957, p. 631-632, "Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State," [Ankara, April 21, 1955]

significant inflation in Turkey and no danger of any”.¹⁸⁰ He was proven wrong by 1955, when there emerged serious signs of inflation. The first four years of the Menderes government was characterized by high consumption and highly ambitious development plans.

The domestic market was not sustainable enough to feed those new industries and Turkey became trapped in a vicious cycle, a cycle in which it needed constant foreign aid to feed its domestic production. Simpson quoted from a Professor Morris, “Despite a program of export subsidies (inflationary in itself) it became more difficult to sell Turkish products in international markets because of a disparity between internal and external prices and uncertainties as to the possibility of readjustment of official exchange rates.”¹⁸¹ Under these circumstances, Deputy Prime Minister Fatin R. Zorlu went to the United States to obtain a \$300 million program loan.¹⁸² The US was more cautious this time and did not want Turkey to pay its debt to European Creditors with US aid money.¹⁸³ Additionally, US experts were cautious about Turkey’s desire to field more troops than its economy could support. In this sense, US officials argued that Turkey should not field forces that it could not sustain, as the US was not prepared to fund them indefinitely. The US fiscal year plan for 1956 foresaw a 1.4 billion military aid program, and none was given to Turkey.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 631.

¹⁸¹ Simpson, “Development as a Process,” 147.

¹⁸² Özcan, “US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy,” 127.

¹⁸³ FRUS, 1955-1957, p. 634-637, Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State,” [Washington, May 18, 1955]

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 635.

The US pressured Turkey to undertake necessary measures for its economy and reconsider its investment program, fiscal, and credit policies. Zorlu understood these requests but argued that Turkey would implement these suggestions with support of the US credit. Unsurprisingly, Zorlu's request was rejected and Allen said that "there was an honest difference of opinion between our two governments as to how such an aim could be achieved. It was the view of the Turkish government that a large cash loan was required, whereas the United States government felt that this would only postpone the remedial measures which the Turkish Government must take to get its economy on a sound footing."¹⁸⁵ Despite the US refusal to extend credit to Turkey, the US increased the aid figure that year from \$70 million to \$100 million, with the expectation that the Turkish government would take certain economic steps.¹⁸⁶ Despite the increase in US credit to Turkey, the Menderes government was still neither willing nor able to take remedial steps for its economy. Instead of confronting the danger of inflation, the DP was effectively pursuing its own political agenda, which resulted in more misallocations of many government projects.¹⁸⁷ Simpson's conclusion was the following: "A sizeable number of Turkish industrial projects have been undertaken, not for their own intrinsic soundness, but for political advantages to be gained."¹⁸⁸

Between the years of 1954 and 1958, IMF officials visited Turkey and advised the Turkish government that it should devalue the Lira, should undertake deflationary measures, and that it should liberalize foreign trade. The "National Protection Law" was also a serious block the IMF's attempts to liberalize the Turkish

¹⁸⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, p. 648, Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State," [Washington, June 8, 1955]

¹⁸⁶ Özcan, *US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy*, 128.

¹⁸⁷ Simpson, "Development as a Process," 147.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 147.

economy. Menderes at first seemed to agree with IMF conditions, but later changed his mind. According to the US Embassy in Ankara, “Menderes was more concerned about his personal popularity and effective party control than about stabilizing the Turkish economy”.¹⁸⁹ In this way, the DP continued its populist policies and did not confront its electoral base.¹⁹⁰ By June 1956, the Turkish government introduced a series of measures such as the price control law, an increased Central Bank discount rate from 4.5 per cent to 6 per cent, and restrictions on the loans of commercial banks. The special TL 5.25 and 5.75 rates for tourist and other current account transactions and increased export premia were further examples of such measures. Also, Turkish officials pushed for US aid once again and managed to get another \$100 million, which satisfied some Turkish officials.¹⁹¹

As another election was on the horizon in October 1957, the Turkish government again did not take the necessary measures due to electoral interests of Menderes and the Democrat Party. Despite electoral victory, the Democrat Party lost seats in parliament. Again, the Turkish government sought foreign financial support from the US as well as from the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, the import rate has decreased by around 40% between the years of 1953 and 1958, which caused the dollar to gain in value against the lira. In July 1958, the negotiations between Turkey, the United States, OEEC and the IMF resulted in an agreement for the financial and economic stabilization of Turkey, with a plan proposed by the Turkish government.¹⁹² Nevertheless, by 4 August 1958, the dollar more than doubled its value against the lira. Thus, the DP confronted an on-going devaluation

¹⁸⁹ Özcan, “US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy,” 132.

¹⁹⁰ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 112.

¹⁹¹ Özcan, “US AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy,” 133.

¹⁹² Ibid., 135.

not of its own making.¹⁹³ The 4 August programme introduced “imposed ceilings and commercial credits and upon budget deficit, import liberalization, change in export regime and the removal of price controls and increases in SEE prices.”¹⁹⁴ And the programme supported by an aid package. Turkey received \$233 million from the US in the form of grants, loans, and the postponement of debt repayments. These policies were highly deflationary and reduced demand in many sectors, which led to a high unemployment rate in Turkish cities. There were some improvements in the economy. For example, the unfavourable trade balance was reduced from \$101 million in 1957-1958 to \$26 million in 1958-1959. Nevertheless, the 4 August decisions were not enough to save the Turkish economy, and, coupled with the DP’s authoritarian tendencies and domestic instabilities, the Turkish army intervened and removed Adnan Menderes and his government on 27 May 1960.

As this summary has shown, there was considerable friction between Ankara and Washington about the state of Turkish economy and financial aid. The US warned the Turkish government many times about upcoming financial troubles. Yet mainly due to the Menderes government’s fear of losing popularity, Menderes did not enact the necessary changes to right the economy. According to George Harris, Menderes and his party members believed that “the U.S. government would bail them out” of their economic difficulties because of Turkey’s importance to the West.¹⁹⁵ The tenacity of Menderes and the Democrat Party led to an unfortunate situation for Turkey, for Menderes’s career, and, indeed, for the Democrat Party’s leader’s life. Repeatedly, Ankara demanded financial aid from the US governments and for some time did not implement reform despite promises to do so. In response,

¹⁹³ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, 113.

¹⁹⁴ Özcan. “US. AID and Turkish Macroeconomic Policy,” 135.

¹⁹⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 73.

the US government's frustration with Menderes led to increasing spite between Ankara and Washington. Although these relations did not impact Turkey's position in NATO, these disagreements contributed to Turkish-Soviet rapprochement that began in 1957 and continued afterwards because of Ankara's increasing need for financial aid.

3.3 Turkish Foreign Policy towards Third World Nationalism: The Bandung Conference and the Algerian War of Independence

Arguably, one of the defining events that happened during the Cold War was the acceleration of decolonization across the colonial world. In international terms, perhaps the most important aspect of decolonization was the emergence of the "Non-Aligned Movement", whose members rejected membership in either the US or the Soviet camps. Yet the Turkish approach to the Third World has not been the subject of much academic study. Decolonization offers a revealing perspective on Menderes's foreign policy orientation and how he and his elites saw the rest of the world. The Turkish stance at the Bandung Conference, as one of the participant nations that was "friendly" to the US, had implications for Turkish foreign policy for years to come, even beyond Menderes's era. The Menderes government's policy towards the Algerian War of Independence, one of the most important diplomatic issues related to decolonization during his time in office, also contributed to Turkey's isolation in the Middle Eastern region, together with highly unpopular Baghdad Pact. Understanding these two key events, understanding the reasoning behind Menderes's foreign policy towards these two cases, reveals the ideological concerns behind the Menderes government's foreign policy.

During both the Bandung Conference and the Algerian War of Independence, Ankara opposed the non-aligned movement. This opposition was primarily the result of strong distrust towards the Soviet Union in the circles of Menderes's governments, and it was also a result of Menderes's need for financial aid, which he hoped to acquire from the US. By advocating NATO's position and the US position in the Cold War, the Menderes governments hoped to acquire financial aid. Furthermore, Menderes believed that if Turkey support USA in international politics and worked for their interests, then the flow of money from the US would increase.¹⁹⁶ In contrast with Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which were full of contradictions, the Turkish government demonstrated remarkable consistency in its relations with the non-aligned movement.

Turkey's distance from the politics of decolonization in the 1950s was, given Turkey's own history, surprising. World War I was a turning point for resistance movements against Western domination.¹⁹⁷ The Great War greatly damaged the prestige of colonial overlords and to some extent, their capability to rule. Although never colonized, Turkey's struggle against the punitive Sevres Treaty was framed as anti-imperialism. Turkey's factory in the aftermath of the First World War put it chronologically out of step with the great wave of decolonization after the Second World War. Even before the Second World War had ended, some nationalist leaders in the colonies hoped for a German or Japanese victory over their colonial overlords – France, the UK or the Dutch. To Americans who could not understand why some Indian leaders supported Germany, M.N. Roy, an Indian nationalist, answered,

¹⁹⁶ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 552.

¹⁹⁷ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, (Cambridge University Press, 2007): 79.

“Germany could be for India what France was for the American colonials... In the present conflict, the Indian people saw in Germany an ally whose interests were identical and in harmony with their own”.¹⁹⁸ Roy’s words spoke to the sense of international solidarity that was to characterize decolonization when the war ended.

Despite the Second World War, Europeans did not expect to lose their colonial possessions. They regard the new world order that formed around international organizations like the UN as a way to “cement white rule, not give up” empire.¹⁹⁹ But Europe’s power was diminishing and the new superpowers of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, favoured independence for the colonies. Odd Arne Westad defined two main ideological directions for anti-colonialism: Communism and nativism.²⁰⁰ For Communists like Roy, a socialist revolution was imperative for independence because otherwise independence would be an “empty shell”.²⁰¹ Communists also accused pre-colonial elites of collaboration against their own people. They wanted to copy the Soviet Union’s model as a way to go forward. Nativists, such as Nehru of India, viewed their past as a tool that can be used against colonialism. For them, rebuilding the economic, social, and military strength of their countries was the objective, and these could be achieved while embracing their own traditions.²⁰² However, Odd Arne Westad also defined a different direction that was not quite communist or nativist. He argued that there were some leaders that rejected socialist revolution and embraced capitalist development. These leaders argued that the people of their country needed to get rid of the feeling of inferiority and they needed to realize their past’s strengths as well as

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 79

¹⁹⁹ Mazower, *Governing the World*, 250.

²⁰⁰ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 80.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 80.

²⁰² Ibid., 80.

its weakness. This description fits interwar leaders such as Atatürk of Turkey or Reza Pahlavi of Iran, who wanted to modernize their countries to prevent them falling under foreign domination.²⁰³ It was less common, however, among the most prominent members of the non-aligned movements in the 1950s.

Menderes, with his attachment to the US, had little sympathy for the communist and nativist anti-colonialism that was prominent in the 1950s. India played a particularly important role in paving the way for the Bandung Conference. From the moment of India's Independence Day in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru was against the idea of choosing either the US bloc or the Soviet bloc, and he sought a "third way".²⁰⁴ Nehru was also one of the leading figures in the human-rights and freedom movements. Nehru's radicalism was not something that appealed to a landowner like Menderes. Nor did Menderes have much sympathy for another of the most prominent figures of decolonization in the 1950s, Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Nasser was a highly charismatic figure who enjoyed immense popularity after he ousted the Egyptian King and established a "modern, free Egyptian State" in 1952.²⁰⁵ The prominence of men like Nehru and Nasser, whose politics overlapped in some ways with the radicalism of Soviet socialism, helps explain the Turkish government's coldness towards the non-aligned movement.

Menderes's affinities were much closer to another conference, which happened around the same time as Bandung. In April 1954, India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Indonesia and Ceylon gathered in Ceylon's capital to discuss the

²⁰³ Ibid., 86.

²⁰⁴ Guy Arnold, *The A to Z of the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World*. (Scarecrow Press, 2010): 42.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 16.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO was part of Washington's attempt to contain Communism in South-East Asia. Asian countries hesitated to align themselves with the US and they decided that another and more comprehensive conference should be held in Bandung. In April 1955, Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia organized a conference in Bandung, where the Non-Aligned Movement was born. Peaceful co-existence, neutrality, and a strong emphasis on the sovereignty of newly independent countries were the main topics of the Conference.²⁰⁶ The rise of the Warsaw Pact and Eisenhower's regional alliances in Southeast Asia and the Middle East encouraged conference members to speak out about their concern about a nuclear Armageddon.²⁰⁷ Predictably, neither Washington nor Moscow was happy that the conference did not generate any support for either of their causes. For example, US Secretary of State Dulles argued that any country was "either with us or against us," and the logic of the conference was at odds with this statement.²⁰⁸ Indeed, the United States initially rejected the very idea of the conference. In a telegram sent by the State Department to Certain Diplomatic Missions it was stated that the U.S. worried that, "Unless non-Communist countries exercise utmost caution and alertness they will find themselves joining in adoption of resolutions suggesting common purposes with Communist bloc and which could only be misunderstood by non-Communist nations not participating in Conference."²⁰⁹

The US was also afraid that if nations at Bandung "acquired the habit of meeting...without Western participation, India and China...will very certainly

²⁰⁶ Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), FOIA (CREST), The Asian-African Conference, RDP80R01443R000300300002-5, April 5, 1955

²⁰⁷ Mazower, *Governing the World*, 259.

²⁰⁸ Arnold, *Non-Aligned Movement and Third World*, 42

²⁰⁹ FRUS, Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, Washington, January 25, 1955, 1955-1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI, p. 23.

dominate the scene and... one by-product will be a very solid block of anti-Western votes in the United Nations.”²¹⁰ Yet, the US realized that embracing a “flexible” approach would be more useful for their interests. The State Department argued that “it would be preferable for friendly Asian countries to accept invitation to Afro-Asian Conference.”²¹¹ These “friendly” countries included Japan, the Philippines, Iraq, and Turkey. For the US, the main objectives were “(1) successful rebuttal of Communist charges, and (2) encouragement of an affirmative attitude by the Conference towards Free World and U.S. achievements and goals.”²¹² The Soviets were also afraid that the US would influence conference for its own agenda. Moscow accused the US of attempting “to prevent the normal work of the Afro-Asian conference by encouraging such ‘lackeys’ as Turkey, Thailand, and the Philippines to attend and promote American Interests.”²¹³ Despite both superpowers’ position regarding the Conference, Chinese Premier Zhou regarded Bandung as an event that had “important historic significance” because it “inspired all oppressed peoples and nations”.²¹⁴ At the conference, Nasser and Nehru defined a new way of conducting foreign policy, in which neutrality was key.²¹⁵

By the time Bandung occurred, the Menderes government had already committed itself to countering the Soviet Union and communism at home and abroad. For example, Turkey established a pact with Yugoslavia and Greece in 1953 with US

²¹⁰ FRUS, Minutes of a Meeting, Secretary’s Office, Department of State, Washington, January 7, 1955, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI, p.4.

²¹¹ Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, Washington, January 25, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI, p. 23.

²¹² Memorandum From the Acting Chief of the Reports and Operations Staff (Gilman) to the Secretary of State, February 8, 1955, Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/2-866. Secret.

²¹³ CIA, FOIA (CREST), Afro-Asian Conference Developments, (RDP91T01172R000300370005-5), February 26, 1955

²¹⁴ Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011): 16

²¹⁵ Natasa Misković, Harald Fischer-Tiné and Nada Boskovska, eds. *The Non-Alignment Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade*. (Routledge, 2014): 164.

encouragement. The US also encouraged Turkey to initiate a pact in the Middle East to protect the US's extensive Oil reserves.²¹⁶ During Secretary of State John F. Dulles's visit to Ankara in May 1953, Menderes proclaimed Turkey "must be the backbone" in the defense of the Middle East. Menderes continued that "In view of Turkey's social and political stability, the determined attitude of Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, and the very serious efforts which Turkey is making to expand her already strong forces, it is only natural that she would have a primary role in the defense of the area"²¹⁷ In 1955, the same year with the Bandung Conference, the Baghdad Pact also formed. Another reason for Turkey's attendance to the Conference was Turkey's dire economic conditions at that moment, and the hope that support for U.S. policies would be rewarded.

As shown in the previous chapter, the US and Turkey had troubled relations regarding US aid. The US refused to satisfy Turkey's demand after the 1954 economic crisis in Turkey. The Bandung Conference was a chance for Turkish elites to prove their worth to the US and gain economic benefits once again. Also, it was a good opportunity to demonstrate Turkey's commitment to the West and Western Civilization. Therefore, Turkey had no intention to attend the conference and show solidarity with India, Egypt, Communist China or other nations. *Cumhuriyet* covered the Bandung conference day by day. However, almost no attention was paid to any other subject besides communism. For example, the newspaper wrote in its 19 April issue about how the Iraqi delegate attacked Communism²¹⁸. As a result of the Iraqi delegation's speech, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai turned his back to the Iraqi Prime

²¹⁶ FRUS, National Intelligence Estimate, Conditions and Trends in the Middle East Affecting US Security, January 15, 1953, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, 336.

²¹⁷ FRUS, 1952-54, Memorandum of Conservation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Turkey, Ankara, May 26, 1953, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, 140.

²¹⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 April 1955.

Minister and Nehru left the conference room. Again, *Cumhuriyet* repeated that approach the following day and reported that the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Philippines had attacked Communism.²¹⁹ Turkish delegates at Bandung also showed a strong anti-Communist stance and argued that Europe and Asia were threatened by the Soviet Union. Turkish delegations continued their attack against Communism throughout the Conference. They warned of the “threats caused by ‘middle of the road’ measures.”²²⁰ Zorlu gave Czechoslovakia as an example to show what would happen to countries that choose “neutrality policies.”²²¹ In another meeting, Zorlu urged conference participants not to dream about “peaceful coexistence” and to follow more realistic policies. He emphasized the importance of NATO for “preserving peace.”²²² In another meeting, when Nehru attacked NATO as a protector of colonialism, Zorlu responded that NATO was a stronghold of liberty.”²²³ *Cumhuriyet* relayed Zorlu’s statement he was “glad that they talked about advance of communism and how to counter it”.²²⁴ *Akşam* newspaper announced that “Turkish thesis won” which was Zorlu’s proposal to recognize the Soviet model as a new form of colonialism was accepted at the Conference.²²⁵ Nevertheless, Turkey’s position at the Bandung conference further damaged relations with Third World countries and, as a result, Turkey became more isolated in international politics.²²⁶

Another important case that helps to understand the Turkish government’s position towards decolonization is the Algerian War of Independence. The Algerian

²¹⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 20 April 1955.

²²⁰ Mustafa Aydın. "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: changing patterns and conjunctures during the Cold War." *Middle Eastern Studies* 36.1 (2000): 114.

²²¹ *Ayn Tarihi*, no. 257, April 1955

²²² *Akşam*, 24 April 1955

²²³ *Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1955

²²⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 25 April 1955

²²⁵ *Akşam*, 25 April 1955

²²⁶ Aydın. "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy", 114.

War was separate from other decolonization processes and the struggle for independence movements. Matthew Connelly has argued that the Algerian War “constituted a diplomatic revolution” as a liberation movement. Internationalization of the war was one of the main aim of the Algerian leaders long before skirmishes began. Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne (GPRA) officially recognized in a short time by third world countries once it formed and de facto recognized by the Soviet Union, despite not formally gaining independence from the French rule.²²⁷ Even before the war, the Algerians planned to exploit Cold War politics for their cause by playing on rivalry among the camps, by attempting to internationalize the conflict by bringing attention “with urban terror” and UN debates.²²⁸ Also, it shifted the colonial notion from power and progress to self-determination and human rights.²²⁹ It was one of the bloodiest chapters in decolonization, in part because the French regarded Algeria as a part of their Republic not a colony or protectorate. France deployed over a million soldiers and lost around 25.000. 400.000 Algerians were killed between 1 November 1954 and 19 March 1962.²³⁰

The Algerian problem became a major issue at the General Assembly of the United Nations, and it was an issue that the Menderes government could not ignore. When the General Assembly considered whether to address the Algerian question, votes in favor won by just a single vote. One of the 26 votes against the motion belonged to Turkey.²³¹ Although French regarded Algeria as integral to metropolitan

²²⁷ Connelly, “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization,” 232-236.

²²⁸ Ibid., 222.

²²⁹ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 105.

²³⁰ Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel. *Decolonization: A short history*. (Princeton University Press, 2019): 98.

²³¹ *Milliyet*, 2 February 1955.

France, it was hesitant to give French Algerians equal rights. After the Second World War, France awarded a new status to Algeria, the institution of a separate governing body for the territory and rights to vote for Muslims.²³² This liberalization of French rule in Algeria was undermined by the outbreak of violence in Sétif because of the French police's attempt to seize banners that criticized France colonial rule in 1945.²³³ Beginning on 1 November 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FNL) attacked various civilian and military targets in Algiers. Yet, the FNL's actions were unpopular among Algerian population and did not gather much support.²³⁴ The French condemned these attacks immediately and Minister of Interior François Mitterrand on 5 November stated that "Algeria is France; from Flanders to the Congo there is only one law, one nation, one parliament."²³⁵ On 12 November Mendès-France addressed the French National Assembly with the words: One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and the integrity of the Republic.²³⁶

With these words, the French declared that they will not give up from Algeria; thus, a bloody war that would last 7 years had begun. For France, whole situation in Algeria was a "domestic issue" and they even marked things happened in Algeria as "events", "operations" etc.²³⁷ On the other hand, the FNL's top priority was to internationalize their struggle.²³⁸ FNL got its biggest chance in 1955, during the

²³² Lizabeth Zack, "Who Fought the Algerian War? Political Identity and Conflict in French-Ruled Algeria." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 16, no. 1 (2002): 82.

²³³ Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. "Algerian Independence, 1954–1962: Case Outcome: COIN Loss." In *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies*, 75-93. RAND Corporation, 2013. 77.

²³⁴ Jansen and Osterhammel. *Decolonization*, 98.

²³⁵ Franz Ansprenger, *The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 229.

²³⁶ Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006), 88.

²³⁷ Jansen and Osterhammel. *Decolonization*, 98.

²³⁸ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace* 84.

Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Although Algeria was not recognized as an independent country, their presence at the conference helped the FLN to internationalize their struggle. The Conference members accepted an Egyptian motion that proclaimed “Algeria’s right to independence and called upon France to implement this forthwith.”²³⁹ by 1956, both Morocco and Tunis acquired independence from France, which increased the hopes for Algerian independence. Encouraged by their neighbour’s independence, the FNL decided to bring the battle to the cities; thus “battle of Algiers” began. The battle accelerated the process of internationalization because of destruction and blood it brought, which was accompanied by extensive international press coverage.²⁴⁰

Turkish foreign policy towards the Algerian War of Independence was in many ways one of the ironies of history. After all, Turkey was founded after a war of independence against “imperialist powers” that included France only 30 years previously. The Turkish war of independence and modernization reforms carried out by Atatürk were described as “a model for the struggles of ‘Eastern’ nations for independence.”²⁴¹ Moreover, Algeria was ruled by the Ottomans for 300 years and only later captured by France. However, Turkey now aligned itself with the very country who had taken Algeria from the Ottoman Empire. Turkish policy towards Algeria created disappointment in Algeria and across the Middle East. In 1965, the Algerian leader Houari Boumediene responded to a question from a Turkish journalist that the Algerians were “resentful and offended by Turkey.”²⁴² Regardless, when the Battle of Algiers gathered international outcry and France was pressured by

²³⁹ Ibid., 85

²⁴⁰ Eyüp Ersoy, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Algerian War of Independence,” *Turkish Studies* 13, no.4 (2012): 688

²⁴¹ Ibid., 684.

²⁴² Ibid., 685-86.

all sides, Turkey had no intention to join in the international pressure.²⁴³ As late as 1957, the French Prime Minister thanked Menderes²⁴⁴ while the FNL implored the Turkish government to use their influence over France via the Baghdad Pact.²⁴⁵

Towards the end of the 1950s, as Menderes's relations with the US soured and he pursued rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the French political scene was also changing. The Fourth Republic dissolved and the Fifth Republic was founded with de Gaulle's presidency. De Gaulle attempted to isolate FLN, and the best example of this policy were in Morocco and Tunisia. After these two countries gained independence, they functioned as safe havens for the FLN leadership. De Gaulle, however, successfully brokered deals with Tunisia and Morocco, so much so that Tunisian leadership urged the FLN to "accept less than full independence."²⁴⁶ Despite being abandoned by their closest supporters, the FLN leadership unilaterally declared independence and announced the formation of a provisional government of the Algerian Republic (GRNA) on September 1958.²⁴⁷ This government was immediately recognized by Morocco and Tunisia, despite their initial discouragement; all of the Arab states with the exception of Lebanon also recognized GRNA, along with China, North Vietnam and North Korea.²⁴⁸ On December 1958, the UN General Assembly debated Algeria's right to independence and called for negotiations between the two parties. The resolution failed because it did not obtain a two-thirds majority. 34 states supported Algerian independence, 19 states rejected it, and 28 states abstained. Turkey was among those states who abstained.²⁴⁹ On

²⁴³ Ibid., 688.

²⁴⁴ *Milliyet*, 21 December 1957.

²⁴⁵ *Milliyet*, 1 February 1958.

²⁴⁶ Connelly, *Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization*, 231.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 232.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 232.

²⁴⁹ Eyüp Ersoy, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Algerian War of Independence," 689.

December 1959, another resolution that called for negotiations between Algeria and France failed, and again Turkey abstained. In contrast with Turkish foreign policy, the Turkish public was supportive and sympathetic towards the Algerian cause. For example, one journalist from *Milliyet* argued that France failed to comprehend that colonization failed and that Algerians had understood what independence was and would do everything necessary to achieve it.²⁵⁰

The Menderes government's effect on Turkish policy towards Algeria and the Third World in general became even more visible after the 1960 coup. After the coup, the new government immediately made more positive remarks about the Third World and Algeria. For example, Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper argued that "Turkey belongs to the Asian-Africa bloc and always supports the case of these nations within its commitments."²⁵¹ Likewise, Turkey voted in favour of UN Resolution 1573 on the Question of Algeria, recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence.²⁵² The Turkish government also rejected another resolution that suggested an internationally supervised referendum.²⁵³

In the cases of both the Bandung Conference and the Algerian War of Independence, Turkey showed clear solidarity with its Western allies. The reasoning that drove Turkish foreign policy seems to revolve around two issues. At Bandung, economic reasons and the Turkish search for US aid was clearly part of Turkish thinking. To acquire US aid, Turkey advocated the US position, as Menderes faced

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 688.

²⁵¹ *Milliyet*, 22 September 1960.

²⁵² Eyüp Ersoy, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Algerian War of Independence," 689-690.

²⁵³ *Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1960.

an economic downturn at home. Ideological forces such as anti-communism were also influential in determining Menderes's foreign policy. Additionally, Turkey was dependent on NATO with regard to economic and military issues. In this period, Turkish foreign policy was an "extension of its Western-dependent foreign policy".²⁵⁴ Turkey, throughout the 1950s followed a very strict anti-communist policy, as can be interpreted from the Turkey-Syria crisis in 1957 or Zorlu's remarks at the Bandung Conference. It is another possibility that Turkey exaggerated the Communist or Soviet threat to acquire more aid from its allies, mainly from the US.²⁵⁵ Non-material factors such as ideology were important for shaping Menderes's Foreign Policy in 1950s, yet Algeria and Bandung shows these factors more clearly. Given that Turkey argued against neutrality and most of the 1950s leadership in the Middle East favoured neutrality over choosing a camp, the Turkish stance at Bandung pushed Turkey to isolation even more in the region.²⁵⁶ The isolation showed itself within the regional politics or even in the United Nations debates. In 1964, for example, Arab countries and Third World countries did not take side with Turkey while its Western allies also did not support Turkey. Turkey had isolated itself from the World for short-term economic gains such as the US aid or due to ideational factors such as anti-communism.

3.4 Conclusion

Taken together, the three case studies in this chapter suggest that the Menderes government had a more traditional approach vis-a-vis its relations with superpowers, as seen in these cases where economic concerns greatly affect Ankara's

²⁵⁴ Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy." 113.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 112.

²⁵⁶ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusu'na Karşı Politikası*, 78.

calculations. However, once the material needs were limited, the Menderes government adapted more ideological approach, as can be seen in the studies of Turkish foreign policy at the Bandung Conference and with regard to the Algerian War of Independence.



Chapter IV: Conclusion

When I began work on this master's thesis, my goal was to explore what seemed to be the one-sided foreign policy of the Turkish government in the 1950s. In comparison with the complicated maneuvers that maintained neutrality during the interwar period and the Second World War or NATO membership in the 1960s and 1970s despite tension over Cyprus, the 1950s seemed to me to have been a much simpler period. Such consistency suggested an ideological approach that corresponded to Adnan Menderes's well-known anti-communist and pro-Western sympathies. I set up my research plan to explore the effect of ideology on concrete aspects of Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s. The results were not what I expected.

Perhaps most importantly, the case studies of Turkish-American relations and Turkish-Soviet relations revealed that neither of these relationships were as simple as Turkey's NATO membership and pro-Western alignment suggests. To explain the complexities of the Democrat Party's approach to the world's two superpowers, background on Menderes and the Democrat Party became necessary. Ideology became important, but not in the sense of an over-arching pro-Westernism or anti-Communism. The Democrat Party's – and Adnan Menderes's in particular – understanding of economic development turned out to be a crucial part of explaining their foreign policy. İnönü had begun to liberalize the economy and move away from statism, but they advocated even more liberalization. After the Democrat Party won the election in 1950, their idea of development was tied to the continuation of US aid. Nevertheless, as this study has shown, the Menderes government and the Eisenhower Administration were often at odds and there were serious friction between them.

Consequently, this tension between Ankara and Washington pushed Turkey to rethink its relations with the Soviet Union. Despite ideological differences and the post-World War II security threat differences, Menderes was willing to consider economic relations with the Soviet Union quite early in his tenure.

Ideology – more specifically, anti-communism – was a corner stone of the Menderes government's foreign policy, but its effect was spread unevenly. Given the social and economic background of many Democrat Party members, who came from business and landowning backgrounds, the communist threat at home was something to be taken seriously. Additionally, much of the DP believed that as long as the tension between Moscow and Washington increased, so would Turkey's importance in the eyes of decision-makers in the US and the flow of aid to Turkey. Nevertheless, the effects of ideology on Menderes's foreign policy showed themselves most in the Democrat Party's approach to the Third World and decolonization. For the Menderes government, non-alignment was a Soviet trap and NATO was obliged to counter the communist threat. The Menderes government's foreign policy during the Bandung Conference and the Algerian war of Independence are the clearest examples of unqualified anti-communism

Rather than approaching the DP's foreign policy as a coherent and consistent subject, this study concludes that a case-study approach helps to understand the different dynamics that shaped Turkish relations with various countries. Broken down into case-studies, the Democrat Party era appears to have less black-and-white and more of the gray tones that are so visible in the periods that preceded it and followed it.

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