

CREATING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS: WHAT PEOPLE UNDERSTAND
FROM DEMOCRACY AND HOW THIS UNDERSTANDING INFLUENCES
THEIR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

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ABSTRACT

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The aim of this thesis is to examine the influence of different conceptualizations of democracy by ordinary citizens on their political participation. In this thesis, it is argued that an important variable has been neglected in the political participation literature, namely, the conceptual definitions people offer when they are asked to define what democracy is. To test this hypothesis, the definitions of democracy by people are divided into three categories: redistributive understanding, authoritative understanding and liberal understanding. Each definition is examined in terms of its relation to both conventional and unconventional types of participation. For the statistical analyses, the 6th wave of World Values Survey is used. Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression method is employed. The findings demonstrate that the ways in which people define democracy significantly correlate and predict political participation. Understanding democracy in terms of its liberal characteristics significantly increases both conventional and unconventional participation. On the other hand, emphasizing authoritative notions while defining democracy decreases the likelihood of engaging in both types of participation. Lastly, redistributive understanding of democracy is found to be predicting only unconventional political participation.

Keywords: Political Participation, Conceptualization of Democracy, Understanding of Democracy, WVS



ÖZ

DEMOKRATİK VATANDAŞLAR OLUŞTURMAK: İNSANLARIN DEMOKRASİ TANIMLARI VE BU TANIMLARIN SİYASAL KATILIMLARI ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

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Bu tezin amacı, sıradan vatandaşların farklı demokrasi tanımlarının siyasal katılımları üzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Bu tezde siyasal katılım literatüründe önemli bir değişkenin, yani demokrasinin ne olduğunu tanımlamaları istendiğinde insanların sunduğu kavramsal tanımların etkisinin ihmal edildiği ileri sürülmektedir. Bu hipotezi test etmek üzere, insanlar tarafından yapılan demokrasi tanımı üçe ayrılmıştır: yeniden dağıtımcı anlayış, otoriter anlayış ve liberal anlayış. Her bir tanım hem konvansiyonel siyasal katılım hem de konvansiyonel olmayan siyasal katılım türleri ile ilişkisi açısından incelenmiştir. İstatistiksel analizler için Dünya Değerler Anketinin 6. dalgası kullanılmıştır. Çok düzeyli doğrusal regresyon yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Bulgular, insanların demokrasiyi tanımlama biçimlerinin siyasal katılımı önemli ölçüde öngördüğünü göstermiştir. Demokrasiyi liberal özellikleri açısından anlamak hem geleneksel hem de geleneksel olmayan katılımı önemli ölçüde artırmaktadır. Öte yandan, demokrasiyi tanımlarken otoriter kavramları vurgulamak, her iki katılım türüne katılma olasılığını azaltmaktadır. Son olarak, demokrasinin yeniden dağıtım anlayışının yalnızca geleneksel olmayan siyasi katılımı öngördüğü bulunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi Katılım, Demokrasinin Kavramsallaştırılması, Demokrasiyi Anlamak, WVS



To my parents

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	3
2.1. Predictors of Political Participation	6
2.1.1. Unconventional Participation.....	6
2.1.2. Conventional participation.....	11
3. UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY BY ORDINARY CITIZENS.....	14
3.1. Dimensions of democracy	15
3.1.1. Liberal Dimension of Democracy	16
3.1.2. Social (or Redistributive) Dimension of Democracy	19
3.1.3. Authoritative Dimension of Democracy	21
3.2. Studies of Conceptualizations of Democracy	24
4. DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	28

4.1. Why Does Their Relationship Matter?.....	28
4.2. The Influence of Democratic Understandings on Political Participation.....	36
4.3. Hypothesis of This Study	46
5. METHODOLOGY	48
5.1. Data	48
5.2. Measurement	51
5.2.1. Control variables.....	57
5.3. Analyses and Results.....	65
6. CONCLUSION.....	74
6.1. Limitations	74
6.2. Discussion	75
REFERENCES	77
APPENDICES	
A. FACTOR ANALYSES OF THE MAIN INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES	925
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.....	93
C. TURKISH SUMMARY /TÜRKÇE ÖZET	94
D. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	108

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Countries Included in the Analysis Together with the Number of Responses	49
Table 2 Independent Variables	54
Table 3 Correlation Matrix for Democratic Conceptualizations	57
Table 4 Zero-order Correlations between Different Concepts of Democracy and Political Participation	66
Table 5 Explaining the Role of Democratic Conceptualizations on Political Participation.....	68

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Explanation and Justification of the Hypothesized Link with a Graphical Representation.....	33
Figure 2 Average Scores of Conceptualizations of Democracy by World Regions.	55
Figure 3 Conceptual Framework of the Research.....	59



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Democracy, in terms of what characteristics it entails, is a contested concept. Considering that even the scholarly debate cannot provide a uniform meaning of the concept, one cannot expect ordinary citizens to attach the same meaning to democracy. Hence, how individuals conceptualize democracy is an important research question by itself. However, the issue of how democracy is being understood has been on the research agenda of political scientists only since the 2000s (Hernandez, 2016). There is an important gap in the literature, which is the fact that researchers either examine the worldwide patterns for defining democracy (Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007), or the factors that influence these conceptualizations (Baviskar & Malone, 2004; Cho, 2015), or the influences these conceptualizations have on the attitudinal level (Alonso, 2016; Cho, 2014; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). The behavioral consequences of the conceptual definition of democracy are often neglected. To fill this lacuna, this thesis focuses on the influence of democratic understandings on participatory behavior. Prior to this thesis, only a couple of studies have focused on the possibility that citizens' conceptualizations of democracy have an influence on their political participation (see Canache, 2012; Oser & Hooghe, 2018). This relation is particularly important since political participation is the actualization of people's basic choices and thoughts, which means that it plays the role of the mediator between conceptualizations of democracy and state governing bodies.

This thesis has six main chapters. The second chapter examines the political participation literature by highlighting its importance as a subject in political science literature and the factors that are argued to be influencing it. It is divided into two different parts with each part focusing on two different categories of political

participation: conventional and unconventional. The third chapter examines different understandings of democracy, which this thesis aims to address. It also looks at the previous studies on this subject and shows the lacuna this thesis fills within this literature. In the fourth chapter, this research reviews the literature that links the democratic concepts to political participation. This chapter shows why they are important concepts and how they are crucially related to each other. While doing so, it benefits from other literatures concerned with democratization, democratic congruence, legitimacy, political values and political attitudes. The last chapter explains the data that are used, the measurements of each variable and final analyses of the research. The final findings demonstrate that the ways in which people define democracy significantly correlates and predicts political participation. Understanding democracy in terms of its liberal characteristics significantly increases both conventional and unconventional participation. On the other hand, emphasizing authoritative notions while defining democracy decreases the likelihood of engaging in both types of participation. Lastly, redistributive understanding of democracy is found to be predicting only unconventional political participation.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation is considered as a vital element of democratic citizenship (Dahl, 1998). As stated by Verba and Nie (1972) “Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is.” (Verba and Nie 1972, p. 1). If we are to dive into the origin of democracy, the term itself refers to the rule of “demos” i.e. the citizens of the state. The power to rule naturally necessitates the act of participation. Thus, participation of the “demos” in the deliberation of public policy is clearly indispensable to democracy. But what exactly does political participation mean?

Verba and Nie (1972) define political participation as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take”. Similarly, according to Kaase and Marsh (1979) political participation is “all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system”. (Kaase & Marsh, 1979, p.28). These definitions and the definitions made by other eminent scholars revolve around some basic features of political participation, that is: political participation is carried out by *citizens* (not by politicians); who are concerned with exerting *influence* over *governments and politics*; to do so, performing *actions* which are political participations; and these actions are enacted *voluntarily* (without the order of any superior institution).

In the literature, political participation is differentiated under two categories: conventional and unconventional participation. These are also referred to as institutionalized/non-institutionalized, orthodox/unorthodox or institutional/extra-institutional participation. Conventional participation encompasses activities such as voting in legislative, presidential or local elections, membership to political parties

and trade unions, contributing money to parties or candidates and so on. In short, the major characteristic of these actions is that the intended influence to political process is realized within the electoral arena. On the other hand, unconventional participation aims to affect political outcomes outside the context of elections. Some examples for this type are signing petitions, participating to boycotts, occupations and demonstrations. These unconventional “protest” activities do not require mediation of formal political institutions for people to make their voices heard.

The first empirical studies of political participation focus on the act of voting (see Milbrath, 1965; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948; Gosnel, 1930) and examines the underlying motives for voting decisions (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). However, over the past few decades, new types of activities got incorporated into the concept of political participation. At first, extra-institutional participations are considered to be irrational and destructive activities and as deviant behaviors (Gustave Le Bon, 1895). A possible reason for such perspectives might be the fact that violent forms of protests were more dominant until the 20th and 21st centuries (Roller & Wessels, 1996). Peaceful activities have become prevalent especially after the 1960s (Topf, 1995). These changes in the streets have affected the theoretical approaches to collective action, which increased the legitimacy of unconventional participation (Della Porta & Reiter, 2006).

Following this, the acknowledgement and scrutinization of these new actions started after the mass protest movements in Western democracies during the 1960s and 1970s. The groundbreaking comparative research “Political Action” (Barnes & Kaase, 1979) is considered as the first major work that touched upon the importance of studying such non-electoral forms political participation. They suggest that involvement of protest activity as political participation paints a more accurate picture of the political reality since electoral behavior is not the only way for individuals to voice their political ideas and preferences. In time, it has started to be acknowledged that non-conventional participation occupies a non-negligible space in people’s behavioral repertoire. Protest activity has become a direct component of political participation so much so that Fuchs (1991) described it as the “normalization of the

unconventional”. Thus, unconventional participation has become a part of normal participation repertoire in most Western States (Norris, 2002; Kaase, 2010). As a matter of fact, recent worldwide trends show that people have started to shift from more traditional types of participation to unconventional participation for political influence.

With the rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICTs), a new venue for political activity have become available to individuals. Through ICTs, specially through the internet, people started “participate in civic discussions and agenda building, mediated interactions with candidates and other political actors, donate to political causes, and join mobilizing efforts” (Bucy & Gregson, 2000, p. 110). These new forms of participation have drawn the attention of scholars after the crucial role they played in mass protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa (Best & Wade, 2009). The use of internet for political participation is termed as Cyber-politics and similar to offline political participation, online political participation examined under conventional digital political participation and unconventional digital political participation (for discussion Robles-Morales & Cordoba-Hernandez, 2019). The mobilization function mentioned above is under the category of unconventional digital participation. Some countries took initiatives to institutionalize participation through the ICTs in order to develop what has been described as “e-democracy”. The aim is to increase individual capacity to participate, monitor and influence political decision-making process (Macintosh, 2004). To do so, governments are making innovative initiatives such as e-participation and e-voting. Nevertheless, online participation is generally accepted and examined as non-institutionalized/non-traditional form of participation in the current literature due to its general use for political discussions, e-petitions, net-strikes etc. (for discussion Mosca & Della Porta, 2009).

2.1. Predictors of Political Participation

For a long time, political and social scientists are concerned with why some individuals participate or are more likely to participate in politics than others. They have theorized and tested many individual and contextual factors to explain these participatory behaviors. Understanding participatory behaviors of citizens is considered particularly important in the context of effective functioning of representative democracies. Broadly speaking, theories concerned with political participation of individuals revolve around three explanations: cost-benefit analysis, effect of motivation and structural opportunity.¹ This paper proposes a relatively new and understudied variable that has a potential to influence political participation: the content of democratic knowledge of individuals. The studies of this variable in relation to political participation are considerably scarce (Canache, 2012; Oser & Hooghe, 2018). Therefore, this thesis aims to fill this lacuna by providing the explanation for why as well as how different conceptualizations of democracy may affect political participation. Nevertheless, before moving on to that relation, existing theories that motivate individuals to engage in political activities should be revised both to strengthen the theoretical basis of the thesis and to assist in the statistical analyses. For that purpose, the following literature review delineates the general framework of the theories explaining political participation. While doing so, it gives more emphasis on the factors that are used as the control variables in this research.

2.1.1. Unconventional Participation

Generally, self-interest is considered as the most dominant driving force for political attitudes and behaviors of people. Advocates of this line of thought argue that people are mainly guided by their personal interests and behave in a way to receive political benefits. (Aldrich 1993; Downs ,1957) However, this perspective has been

¹ Both at the individual level as resources and at the country level as adequate institutional structures.

criticized by rational choice scholars on the ground that it entails a fundamental paradox, which is called the “paradox of participation”. The basis of rational choice theory aligns with self-interest model: individuals always try to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs (Downs, 1957). They are inherently selfish and mainly try to maximize their utility. Therefore, political participation must occur when the benefit outweighs the cost for the individual. In terms of collective action, the probability for a single person to exert influence is small and thus, the most logical behavior would be to not participate and benefit from the collective achievements others have earned (Olson, 1965). This is also referred as the free-rider problem. As Brady, Verba & Schlozman (1995) states, non-institutional activities are high-cost forms of participation in terms of money and time and the social, physical or financial risks they entail and thus, this theory applies more to unconventional participation compared to electoral participation. Then, why do people engage in protest activities? A variable that is proven to have an influence on unconventional political participation, interpersonal trust, is argued to be influencing participation through the cost-benefit calculations of individuals. (Benson & Roncon, 2014; Kaase, 1999). As Benson and Roncon (2014) stated, “trust in others may lead to the perception that there is a more stable base for a movement as well as more sanguine expectations concerning the potential impact of the movement.” (p.438). Thus, confidence that others will actively support the cause decreases the expected cost of protest behavior.

On the other hand, cost and benefit calculations are not the only driver for the decision to engage in unconventional activities. There are also factors that explain participation as actions emanating from motivation. One prominent theory that tries to explain the *motivation* behind political participation is grievance theory. It is considered as one of the first theories formulated to explain protest participation. Therefore, it is based on the assumption that unconventional participation is an irrational type of behavior. This theory suggests that conditions that generate economic difficulty might stimulate grievances which people demonstrate through protest behavior. Thus, the conditions economic downturns generate might motivate individuals to mobilize in order to reverse the undesirable economic standings.

Grievance theory has received considerable attention especially after the most recent economic turmoil in 2008 -the Great Recession- and the following protest activities across European Union. These events have triggered a new wave of theoretical and empirical studies that focused on how economic inequalities and experience of economic hardship relates to individual political behavior. Recent empirical research shows support for the predicting power of the grievance theory (Kriesi, 2012; Kern, Marien & Hooghe, 2015).

Another perspective that is quite similar to grievance theory is relative deprivation theory. As in grievance theory, the focus is on the individual feelings and emotions that possibly account for protest behavior. The feeling of deprivation arises when one compares his or her condition to others and consequently increases his or her expectations which results in psychological frustration that lead people to protest (Gurr 1970; Crawford & Naditch, 1970; Geschwender 1968). Thus, the feeling of discontent arises not from the *objective* evaluation, but from the *relative and subjective* evaluation of one's living standards. Similar to grievance theory, in the beginning of its formulation, this frustration thesis tried to explain violent outburst in the form of aggressive political behaviors (Crawford & Naditch, 1970). In terms of its source, the most influential advocate of this theory Ted Gurr (1970) argued that not only economic strains, but also other political conditions that triggers frustration among individuals have the potential to cause collective action, such as in the case of movements in the 1960s. There exists a number of empirical studies that support these classical breakdown theories in Latin American (Bellinger & Arce, 2010), Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1992) and especially in the European states where the economic recession after 2008 resulted in large protest movements (Grasso & Giugni, 2015).

However, other recent studies offer a different reality: socioeconomically disadvantaged groups have in fact lower rates of unconventional participation (Schussman & Soule, 2003). Thus, while unfavorable economic systems may provide motivational incentives for participation, they may also create apathy among citizens. Two main arguments have been proposed as the cause of this situation. First, because

socioeconomically disadvantaged groups participate less, politicians would develop less incentive to represent them (or politicians might choose to represent those who are more advantaged for their own interests) and as a result, disadvantaged people who are frustrated by the policy outcomes would stop political participation. (Wlezien & Soroka, 2007) The psychological explanation of this resonates in the application of value-expectancy theory in mobilization research. Value-expectancy theory states that if individuals expect that their political participation to social movements have no chance of being succeeded, they refrain from participation (Klandermans, 1984). The resulting situation where citizens believe that they cannot achieve government responsiveness through participation is also argued to be resulting in a democratic deficit.

Second, as a reaction to the traditional social-psychological theories, resource mobilization theory emphasized “the importance of structural factors, such as the availability of resources to a collectivity and the position of individuals in social networks, and stresses the rationality of participation in social movements.” (Klandermans, 1984, p.583). Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) defines three types of resources that explain why people cannot participate: *time* to take part in political activity, *money* to spend on contributions and *civic skills* that foster effective participation. This resource mobilization model was proposed as a reaction to socioeconomic model (SES) of participation. SES model claims that high status individuals with more resources in terms of education, time, skill and income are more politically active. The resources they possess enable them access more information about political affairs, have more professional and social contacts, which in turn facilitates unconventional participation. A more revised version of this theory is proposed by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) who argue that resources vary in relationship to SES, therefore, a resource model of participation rather than a SES model of participation is more adequate. This theory is justified on the ground that although money and civic skills are closely related to SES, distribution of free time varies along the different SES levels. It is true that people who experience economic hardship and struggle to hold on to a job would have less time and resources to

participate in protest movements. Nonetheless, according to Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995), being rich does not automatically corresponds to having more time to spend, in fact, rich might be working long hours to keep accumulating wealth. Although resource mobilization was a reaction to classical psychological theories of participation in general, advocates of the theory still acknowledges the role of certain psychological elements while explaining political participation. For example, to explain why people do not *want* to participate Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) claimed that we should focus on the “psychological engagement with politics”, that is, interest in politics. Those who are interested in politics have the motivation to participate in the non-institutionalized forms of political participation (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995)

Additional to the aforementioned theories of collective behavior, there are also societal level explanations of protest activity. The political mobilization model argues that “participation is a response to contextual cues and political opportunities structured by the individual’s environment.” (Leighley, 1995, p.188). As a contextual cue, Alesina et al. (2003), argue that cultural and ethnic homogeneity in the society can result in increased cohesiveness and consequently, collective action. Without a doubt, the resources and motivational factor are still a part of this model; however, it can also include political opportunity structures. The political opportunity structures approach concerns with the availability of an adequate environment for informal participations to arise. While it encompasses micro-level factors such as peer and family pressure as well as campaigner mobilization, in practice, structural availability is measured by looking at the level of democracy in the country since it is the most adequate political system for allowing the performance of protest behaviors (Stockemer, 2014). Democratic governments highly tolerate and sometimes even facilitate protest activities (Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon, 2010). Indeed, unconventional participation is shown to increase with democratic development (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). Socioeconomic development of the nation (in terms of the level of economic growth, the existence of recession and economic inequality) is also considered to have an effect of unconventional political

participation (Solt, 2008; Dalton, Van Sickle & Weldon, 2010). These can be viewed as the contextual conditions that possibly influence grievances and the resources at the individual level.

2.1.2. Conventional participation

Literature that is concerned with voting behavior focuses on two main dimensions; the turnout rate in elections and voting behavior for specific parties. This thesis focuses on the former dimension. Departing from here, two interrelated questions are asked; why people abstain from voting and why people decide to vote. Voting behavior studies use the term “turnout” to refer to the number of people casting vote in elections. Voter turnout at general elections has been in a decline in Western democracies (Franklin, 2004). Similarly, in the United States, voting turnout has been declining steadily since 1960s. As a response to these declines, scholars all over the world have paid greater attention to the factors affecting voter turnout. The literature review below delineates the empirical and theoretical discussions regarding voter turnout and identifies certain micro-level and macro-level factors.

For the individual level explanations, rational choice argument of “paradox of participation” that is mentioned in the previous section on unconventional participation had also been proposed for explaining voting behavior. This is also referred as the “paradox of voting”. According to this idea, the probability that one vote might influence election outcome is so low that expected benefit of voting becomes lower than the cost of voting. In other words, the probability of ending up in a position where the decisive vote of the election belongs to the voter is quite low and therefore, not voting is the most of the time, the most rational path to take (Downs, 1975). However, we know that people turnout to vote. Sociological models explain it with parental socialization, meaning that it is a result of voting habit-formation (Gerber, Green & Shachar, 2003). Similar to mobilization theory of social movements, mobilization theory for voter turnout argue it to be a function of family, peers, unions, or campaigner stimulation. These are also the cognitive engagement

models, which account for the influence of political efficacy, interest, ideological placement or partisanship. In addition to these, basic resource model (effect of educational attainment, income, occupational status etc.) mentioned earlier explains voter turnout, so much so that in their influential research, Smets and van Ham (2013) who reviewed 90 empirical studies demonstrated that resource models of voter turnout is the most commonly used individual level factors among all.

Along with the standard resource models and controlling variables of political participation, the integration of contextual factors to this study is vital since political institutional models have given the largest attention while explaining voter turnout. A number of macro-level factors have been proposed that account for voter participation. Based on the review and assessment of 83 aggregate-level studies, Geys (2006) groups these factors under three exclusive categories: socioeconomic variables, political variables and institutional variables. The first category includes population size, population stability, population homogeneity, population concentration (urban-rural distinction), previous turnout levels (whether the person voted in the previous elections), population homogeneity (ethnic fractionalization in the nation) and population homogeneity (income inequality). The second category includes political party factors such as closeness of the contest, campaign expenditures and the level of political fragmentation. Closeness along with campaign expenditures show considerable success rates. Closeness refers to the close competition between parties which is proven to increase people's tendency to participate (Crepaz, 1990). Political fragmentation is also referred as party polarization and is measured by the number of parties participating to the election, which is another important factor effecting voting turnout rates. In the third category, the effect of legal and political system factors such as user-friendly registration rules, compulsory voting, type of electoral system and the incidents of concurrent elections are examined. All variables have proven to influence turnout significantly. Following the works of Gosnel (1930) and Tingsten (1937), the saliency of compulsory voting for voting turnout has been emphasized in many comparative multivariate analyses. Studies thus far shows that the obligation to vote increases participation rate than any

other institutional factor and it increases participation even when the penalties for non-voting are nominal (Franklin, 2001). The reason for this is based on strategic cost-benefit calculations. When abstention is made more costly with penalties, participation in elections would be more beneficial (Panagopoulos, 2008.). Another important variable is electoral system. Ever since the seminal work of Duverger (1969), electoral system effects have been in the agenda of scholarly research. There are four types of system: semi-proportional, majoritarian, proportional representation and mixed systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems fosters higher turnout. First, PR system increases the number of political parties and gives voter more options, which decreases the wasted votes since the likelihood for an individual to find a party in which they like increases. Second, “it reduces distortion between the votes won by a party in an election and the number of seats it obtains” which increases the incentive to vote (Blais & Carty, 1990, p.167). Third, in PR system, every votes count, which increases parties’ tendency to mobilize and campaign everywhere.

Franklin (2002) argues that when the turnout rates are low, the effect of micro-level factors on turnout becomes salient. On the other hand, when examining the countries where turnout rates are considerably high, individual-level factors play relatively a smaller part in explaining turnout (Franklin, 2001, el. Part.). However, even when examining the macro-level factors (in countries with high turnout rate), Blais (2006) argues that micro-level foundations of institutional factors are crucial to include. Indeed, Franklin (2004) proposes a new direction where a greater focus should be given to the characteristics of the voters while looking at macro-level factors. Therefore, both macro-level and micro-level factors mentioned so far are worth including in any cross-national empirical analysis that concerns with the factors influencing political participation.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRACY BY ORDINARY CITIZENS

The abstract idea of democracy has been widely accepted as a value to apply to governance all around the world. The third wave of democratization started during 1970s in Western Europe and expanded to Latin America and east Asia, eastern Europe and even Africa (Huntington, 1991). As a result, positive evaluations of these development started to be proposed by scholars. The famous proposition on that account is made by Fukuyama, who considered democracy to be the end of human history (Fukuyama, 1992). However, not only the world experienced a “stabilization of autocratic rule especially in Islamic societies” (Kaase, 2010) but also, according to Freedom House reports, there has been a democratic erosion, in fact, “2019 was the 14th consecutive year of decline in global freedom” (Freedomhouse.org, 2020). This declining trend is what gave birth to the research question of this thesis.

Democratic recession has been measured and observed mostly at the institutional/state level. Although the influence of citizen attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviors are acknowledged, they are examined in relation to institutional/state level democratization. Such micro-level variables are disregarded as a field that accommodates a process of democratization within itself. Thus, although a declining trend of democracy is observed around the globe at the macro-level, one should substantiate these findings with a focus on micro-level democratic process. Here, this thesis pays attention to the need for “putting demos back to democracy” of Mayne and Geissel (2016) and Doorenspleet’s (2015) question of “where are the people?” in the assessment of democratic concepts. Several works have attempted to make the individual-level assessment by examining democratic attitudes and democratic support (Qi & Shin, 2011). This thesis tries to improve the existing measurements of

individual-level democratization process by examining the understanding of democracy of ordinary citizens and how it relates to individual political behavior.

But first of all, the concept of democracy needs to be clarified, which not only the concept that gave birth to thesis' research topic, but also its main subject of concern. We encounter to this concept in the speeches of political figures, in both new and traditional media channels and even in our daily political conversations we have with others. We mention it and hear it being mentioned but probably only a small number of us have actually thought about the actual meaning of the concept. Departing from here, the existing literature on this matter demonstrates that definitions of democracy varies among individuals (Baviskar & Malone, 2004; Cho, 2015; Dalton et al., 2007; Quaranta, 2018; Zagrebina, 2019). However, not only among ordinary people but even among political science scholars, democracy is a highly debated concept in terms of its meaning. It is considered to be complex and multidimensional. When that is what scholarship acknowledges, it is not a surprise that ordinary people cannot adhere to a single definition when they are asked about the meaning of democracy. The independent variable of this research is based on this inference. However, before moving on to individuals' definitions of democracy, a brief introduction to political theories on the concept of democracy is important to provide the framework this thesis delineated to categorize individuals' responses.

3.1. Dimensions of Democracy

What democracy means and what distinguishes it from other regime types is a long-lasting discussion among political science scholars (e.g., Gallie, 1956). There is one point that everyone can agree on, that is, democracy is a multidimensional concept. While this thesis examines its independent variable (the battery of questions concerned with conceptualizations of democracy), it focuses on this multidimensional feature of democracy. This democracy module essentially projects three visions of democracy; liberal, redistributive and authoritative. The following section aim to shed light on each of these visions by explaining what they mean and how are they

differentiated from each other, based on the discussions on the political theory literature.

3.1.1. Liberal Dimension of Democracy

Bühlmann, Merkel & Wessels (2008) define three types of democracy and placed them in a continuum ranging from the minimalist and maximalist definitions of democracy. The minimalist or the “elitist” type focuses on “the government by the people”; the medium or the “participatory” type focuses on “the government of and by the people”; the maximalist or “social” type focuses on “the government of, by, and for the people”. Advocates of the minimalist definition of democracy are also referred as procedural liberals that follow the tradition of Schumpeter (1975). This Schumpeterian understanding of democracy greatly emphasizes the importance of effective government and power of delegated representatives. It is sometimes referred as the elitist type of democracy because other than turnout in periodic elections, citizens are passive. Due to such great emphasis on electoral contestation, it is also called electoral democracy (Coppedge et al., 2011).

A more extended version of this kind of democracy is liberal democracy which is sometimes referred as consensus or pluralist democracy (Coppedge et al., 2011). For Dahl (1971), there are eight institutional guarantees of a liberal democracy; freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and vote, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. According to Dahl, these constitute two dimensions of democratization; contestation (“public contestation”, “political competition and participation (“inclusiveness”, “right to participate in elections and office”). Thus, right to public contestation and participation are crucial for democracies (or a democracy to be considered as a “polyarchy”) and what differentiates it from repressive governments (Dahl, 1971). As one can clearly see, the questions “People choose their leaders in free elections” and

“Civil rights protect people’s liberty against repression” in democratic module directly overlaps with the definition of democracy by Dahl.

The medium type is a combination of participatory and representative democracies. However, the emphasis is shifted to the political participation. Varieties of democracy that is linked to this type are classical Athenian democracy, participatory democracy, direct democracy and more recently, deliberative democracy. There is no doubt that participation is paramount to democracy. It is what ensures the relationship between citizens and the state in a democratic regime. For the most rudimental definition of democracy, participation of the citizen was in relation to the city-states. However, with the societal transformation that resulted in the transition from democratic city-states to democratic nation-states, the scope of participation has changed. Rather than direct participation, people started to delegate their sovereignty to representatives. Participation started to be defined by elections. As a result, “representativeness” became the general and defining feature of contemporary democracies (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1995).

Nevertheless, the discussion regarding the efficiency of electoral participation is still on the agenda of political science scholars. Participatory democrats such as J.S. Mill argued that although direct citizen participation would be ideal, such system is not possible in the large societies we live in and therefore, prioritize participation rather than the delegation of power, in a form integrated into the feature of representative democracies. Scholars such as Barber (1984) and Pateman (1970) extend this discussion and argued that delegation and representation of the decision-making power should be replaced by a direct representation by the people. What one should focus on here is why democracies would need more citizen participation and political influence? The answer lies in the principle of political equality.

Political equality is a long-established norm of democracy. By political philosophers such as J.J. Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and John Dewy, political equality is a necessity for democratic governance. It is based on the normative ideal of an inclusive society in which everyone has the opportunity influence political process. The first step of guaranteeing this equality is through constitutional means, which

means the endorsement of the rule of law and protection of individuals rights by means of legal egalitarianism. In the end, every citizen should have equal access to political influence and representation that is mainly exerted through participation. The idea behind the medium type of democracies (participatory democracies) is this premise of ensuring greater political equality. On the other hand, in the minimalist and liberal understanding of democracy, sustaining social equality through political rights for the representation/influence and participation of individuals is enough for fulfilling the political equality principle.

Thus, discussions regarding political equality in liberal democracies also touch upon the social inequalities that hinders the maintenance of this basic principle. The debate on social inequalities are over the private spheres of class, race/ethnicity, religion and gender. Among these topics, the debate concerned with gender inequality and democracy is particularly important for this thesis since in the democracy module, respondents were asked to rate the essentiality of the phrase “Women have the same rights as men” for democracies. Gender studies have emerged as a subfield that is widely emphasized in the literature. In *the Subjection of Women* (1869), Mill criticized the role of women in the society which is defined in terms of her domestic duties and commitments in home and family life. Discussions regarding the consequences of roles attributed to women for democratic development have two interrelated concerns: the representation of women and the participation of women.

In the representative side of gender inequality, even when controlled for the educational and occupational resources, women are less interested than men in running for elected office due to continuing impact of traditional sex roles (Inglehart, Norris & Welzel, 2002). Even though women become interested in being involved, the traditional and cultural attitudes held by the society (the apolitical role of women) hinders citizens to support female candidates. These problems are largely eliminated in advanced democracies; however, it continues to persist in less democratic regimes (Inglehart, Norris & Welzel, 2002) In the participation side, cultural socialization theory argues that social norms about sex roles influences both men’s and women’s social experiences which are the source of psychological orientations associated with

political behaviors (Norris, 2007). Indeed, “women are less likely than men to be psychologically engaged with politics—that is, to be politically interested, informed, or efficacious—a deficit that contributes significantly to participatory inequalities.” (Burns, Schlozman & Verba, 2001, p.9). Moreover, women are generally at home and do not have full-time jobs, burdened by domestic responsibilities, disadvantaged in terms of education and income which not only physically restrains them to house but also deprives them from the opportunity to be exposed “to informal political chat and other politicizing cues” which in turn constrains political involvement (Burns, Schlozman & Verba, 2001). In the end, it is clear that equality principle with regard to gender is not yet completely sustained due to a variety of reasons. This means that almost half of the world population cannot participate in politics for certain reasons. This is highly problematic for the consolidation of political equality principle.

Until this point, the focus was on the rather “thin” definitions of democracy. Nevertheless, for another group of scholars, these definitions fail to address various social needs and principles that democracy needs to satisfy (for discussion see Ulbricht, 2018).

3.1.2. Social (or Redistributive) Dimension of Democracy

The third type which is the maximalist definition of democracy entails representative and participatory characteristics but also encompasses social prerequisites of effective democracy. Liberal democrats advocate that as long as citizens are kept from participation, “inequality in participation is not problematic” since everyone is free in their decision to participate (Armingeon & Schadel, 2015). However, social democracy scholars argue that focusing only on the freedom in the decision to participate is problematic because there are other factors that might hinder democratic involvement. In this regard, the greatest emphasis is given to the inequalities in redistribution of material resources. Hence, even though political equality principle of classical liberal democracies guaranteed civil and political rights, economic conditions that jeopardize political equality become a subject of concern.

As Held (2006) argues “while each step towards formal political equality is an advance, “real freedom” is undercut by massive inequalities which have their roots in the social relations of private production and reproduction” (p.79). These discussions particularly accelerated after the Great Recession in 2008. During the Great Recession, the world experienced a malfunctioning democracy “...exemplified, to name just two major phenomena, by the weakness of elected politicians vis-à-vis corporations and banks, as well as by the limited impact of the will of the people on those to whom they (seemed to) have delegated their authority.” (Markowski, 2016, p.256). This situation has increased the emphasis on social welfare policies of governments and whether they should be incorporated into the concept of democracy.

In this context, scholars such as Knutsen and Wegmann (2016) and Coppedge et al. (2011) mention a *substantive* or *egalitarian* democracy that where the minimum resources for enjoying civil and political rights are supplied by the government. According to this type of democracy, the enjoyment of political equality principle depends on economic equality. In a similar vein, Sodaro (2004) argues that ensuring the economic-well-being of citizens should be considered as one of the “pillars” of “the temple of democracy”, in other words, it should be within the minimal condition for democracy along with “popular sovereignty” and “rights and liberties”. Although the institutional structure might be providing (legally) equal participation, representation opportunities as well as politically relevant resources, the structure of the distribution of wealth in civil society might prevent certain groups from reaching these opportunities and thus, exclude them from the democratic process. In other words, as Huber (1999) states in their definition of “social democracy”, “advance towards state democracy requires... the state’ capacity to implement instrumental policies effectively...: (that increase) the degree to which citizen’s *mobilization* and *participation* will translate into *influence* on social outcomes.” (Huber, 1999, p.174). Thus, one can see the emphasis on the resource dimension of democracy has two focal points: influence and mobilization/participation.

First, legally provided equal opportunities does not correspond to “equal opportunity of access to political influence” (Knight & Johnson, 1997). The literature

shows that economic distribution affects political influence. Government's responsiveness is higher for economically advantaged citizens rather than low-status groups. Those who have more resources are the ones with the loudest voices (Mansbridge, 1983). Second, income inequality among citizens affects political participation. Scholars argue that electoral abstention is related to greater experience of income inequality (Beramendi & Anderson, 2008). The gap in turnout between upper and lower economic classes emanates from the differences in educational attainment, money and skills (refer to chapter 2.1.2). Not only voting, but also other forms of political activity such as protest participation is a matter of concern. In fact, compared to extra-institutional participation, voting is relatively an egalitarian mode of participation due to universal suffrage. Other modes of participation are not equally carried out by everyone and as the previous chapter devoted to factors effecting participation shows, economic inequality is an important factor that potentially explains political participation (refer to chapter 2.1)

3.1.3. Authoritative Dimension of Democracy

Also recognizing democracy as a contested concept, Gallie states that:

Recognition of a given concept as essentially contested implies recognition of rival uses of it (such as oneself repudiates) as not only logically possible and humanly "likely", but as of permanent potential critical value to one's own use or interpretation of the concept in question whereas to regard any rival use as anathema, perverse, bestial or lunatic means, in many cases, to submit oneself to the chronic human peril of underestimating the value of one's opponents' position. (Gallie, 1956, p. 10)

Theoretical discussions presented in chapter 3.1.1 and chapter 3.1.2 are considered to be constituting the fundamental frameworks for defining democracy. This thesis proceeds on the basis of these theoretical frameworks which are predominantly drawn by the liberal view. However, there is a caveat that requires a mention, in which the above quote by Gallie (1956) touches upon. The theoretical framework provided so far is drawn by Western thinkers based on liberal values. Therefore, a theoretical stream of thought such as the one proposed by Gallie can lead

us to look for other definitions of democracy that are considered to be non-democratic. This is also the main proposition of the relativist view. As Norris (2011) argues “With the essentially contested concept of democracy, it is difficult to establish an appropriate clear-cut factual baseline of agreed truth against which to assess levels of knowledge.” The alternative “non-democratic” definitions have therefore a reserved place within the debate over democratic conceptualizations. For that reason, in this literature review, what these definitions are and where they potentially emanate from are worth mentioning since a battery of questions in the democracy module are focused on understandings that deviates from the maximum and minimum definitions of democracy.

Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami said that:

The existing democracies do not necessarily follow one formula or aspect. It is possible that a democracy may lead to a liberal system. It is possible that democracy may lead to a socialist system. Or it may be a democracy with the inclusion of religious norms in the government. We have accepted the third option. (Esposito, Voll, 1996, p.24)

To give an example of the Middle Eastern democracies, In *Islam and Democracy*, Esposito and Voll (1996) defends the possibility of an Islamic democracy. They argue that the term democracy should be taken as a type of regime that adapts to “special identities” and “authentic communities” of each nation. They state that the recent arguments produced by globalization movement that defend the particularization of societal identities is what caused the singular definition of democracy and the process of democratization. The only reason why democracy and Islamic principles are not considered to be complementary is because of democracy’s rigid Western definition and desire to export this definition rather than evolve it according to particular nations.

Another example would be the East Asian democracies. East Asian societies also have their own style of democracy referred as the Asian style democracy (Neher, 1994) Asian style democracies are based on “Asian values”. From the liberal perspective, due to the inherent “anti-democratic” characteristics of “Asian values”, Asian style democracies are not considered total democracies. However, what makes these values anti-democratic are debatable. Scholarly debate argues that these

traditional values are incompatible with “democratic” values because they are fundamentally based on Confucian philosophy, which is considered at odds with Western liberal values. Huntington (1991), for instance, stated that the undemocratic elements of Confucianism such as the overemphasis on cooperation, harmony and respect hinders Chinese democratization since they are in conflict with democratic tradition of rights against the state. Indeed, “it goes against the sensibilities of Asians raised in Confucian culture to think of themselves first. What is natural for Westerners is therefore something quite entirely different from what is natural for East Asians” (Hood, 1998). Thus, what is “democratic” for East Asian societies might not be compatible with what is “democratic” for Western societies. Here a similar argument to that of Esposito and Voll (1996) is proposed, which the attempt of Western thinkers to impose a regime that is based on Western values, on a country with different culture. The distinct historical and cultural background of Asia makes the Western style democracy inappropriate for this region.

When we turn back to the characteristics of these democracies and their relation to the questions in the democracy module, we see a lot of similarities. For instance, in Islamic democracies, we see that Islam is the ultimate source of law and thus the *interpretation of law by religious authorities* is a part of democracy. In a similar vein, since Confucian values are embedded the governing understanding of democracy of Asian nations, *interpretation of the law by religious authorities* could also be considered as a character of democracy in Asian type of democracies. Moreover, the emphasis of Asians on maintenance of harmony comes with an emphasis on political authority sustained by a strong state. Hence, the question in the democratic module asking whether *People obey their rulers* is an essential characteristic of democracy would be true for Asia style democracies. In addition to these, Countries in the Middle East and Asia had experienced a considerable number of military interventions. Thus, military has a powerful role in the politics of these nations. As a result, the definition of democracy as *Army takes over when government is incompetent* in the democracy module would actually be a part of these democracies.

Even within the Europe, Western and Eastern Europe differentiate in terms of their definitions of democracy. With the words of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, “a democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be democracy”. Illiberal democracies or also referred as electoral authoritarianisms (Schedler, 2013), competitive authoritarianisms (Levitsky and Way, 2010) and semi-authoritarianisms (Ottaway, 2013) and they are characterized by their damaged constitutional state with civil rights which are either partially suspended or not yet established. (Merkel, 2004). In other words, the regime continues to have competitive elections with a defective and curbed political space for citizens. However, it would be unfair to put these democracies with the same category of the ones described above (Islamic and East Asian). Therefore, rather than directly defining authoritative democracy, it would be fairer to consider them as definitions of *less liberal democracies*.

3.2. Studies of Conceptualizations of Democracy

Not long after military suppression in 1989 of the demonstration for democracy by Chinese students in Beijing's Tiennanmen Square, I had an occasion to talk with a participant. He told me that although he had risked his life in Beijing and some of his friends had lost theirs in the democratic cause, neither he nor they could claim to know just what democracy is. (Cunningham, 2002, p.2)

The survey questions that are used as the source of information for democratic attitudes asks “How satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?” (ESS) “How important is it to you to live in a country governed democratically?” (WVS) or whether democracy is a preferred or demanded regime type for the individual. There is a fundamental problem here. None of these questions give the definition of democracy. Thus, all these questions rely on the fact that public mass is sufficiently informed about democracy. Nevertheless, democracy is a highly abstract concept and by its nature, abstract concepts are subjective since “their categorical and evaluative existence is mediated by cognition” (Davidov et al., 2014 cited in Ulbricht, 2018) Therefore, in order to pass through such misleading presumption that there is a homogenous understanding of democracy among individuals, one needs to ask more

fundamental questions such as what people understand from democracy, how they define it or whether their definition coincide with the elements of its non-democratic alternatives.

For instance, there are claims in the scholarly debate that the public in some developing countries is supporting democracy not because they know what it means, but because they want to reach the economic standards of developed countries, which are predominantly governed by democracy (Baviskar & Malone, 2004; Dalton et al., 2007; Welzel & Inglehart, 2005). This view is supported by Dalton, Shin & Jou (2007) on their research that demonstrates a prevalence of the definition of democracy with a particular emphasis on social benefits in countries with poor economies. Another interesting finding of the same research is that even in the established democracies, 23% of the citizens cannot provide any definition of democracy when asked (Dalton et al., 2007). Even when they provide a definition, they emphasize different aspects of democracy -both within regions and within each other- such as equality, free elections, social welfare, liberty, rule of law and so on (Camp, 2001; Dalton et al., 2007; Ottemoeller, 1998; Ferrin & Kriesi, 2016). Moreover, not just being able to provide a definition, but even the ability to provide the “right” definition is problematic. Cho’s (2015) cross-country analysis based on WVS 2005-8 data shows that around 40% of the people in the world is unable to separate the characteristics of democracy from its non-democratic alternatives.

Scholars concerned with democratic knowledge has three dominant research objectives: analyzing the conceptualization of democracy by the ability to; make a definition, to make a complex/multidimensional definition and to differentiate it from its non-democratic alternatives. Researchers who focus on analyzing the first objective adopt a bilateral view of the understanding of democracy, meaning, they focus on whether people can and cannot define democracy.² Not only that “simply being able to provide any definition of what democracy means . . . independently increases demand” for democracy (Mattes & Bratton, 2007).

² “Don’t know” answers are operationalized in relation to giving any other definition of democracy.

Another objective is to examine the complexity of democratic conceptualizations. By taking the examination of bilateral view of the understanding of democracy one step further, a group of empirical analyses focus not just on the ability to define democracy, but also on the ability to make a rich definition of it. A substantial number of studies on this subject rely on surveys that has an open-ended question in which the respondents are asked to define democracy with their own words.³ The initial step of these works is to demonstrate the (dis)similarities in the definition of democracy throughout the country, the region or in between nations. Previous studies reports that understanding of democracy in terms of its basic elements such as freedom, liberty, equality, free elections and rule of law is pervasive around the world (Camp; 2001; Dalton et al., 2007; Hernandez, 2016; Thommasen , 1995). What is crucial in such findings is the proof of communality for the understanding of democratic values against the assumption that “democracy is a Western concept, understood only by affluent and well-educated citizens in established, advanced industrial democracies” (Dalton et al., 2007). Although there is no doubt that definitions of democracy are based on Western values (as discussed in the previous part of this chapter), European countries have been promoting these values and acting as “norm entrepreneur” which results in the dissemination of democratic ideals (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Therefore, the possibility for similar definitions of democracy becomes very likely. Yet, a group empirical researches also show that there are significant differences among countries and regions with respect to intensity of other definitions of democracy that are non-democratic in their nature. This group of scholars are concerned with not only the citizen’s capacity to define democracy but also the cognitive ability to separate non-democratic values from democratic values. The techniques described before are used to examine how much individuals are *informed* about democracy or whether they are *uninformed*, but this approach focuses on how people are *misinformed*. Unfortunately, there are not many studies conducted from this perspective. This is mostly due to the fact that the only

³ Majority of regional surveys use these open-ended questions. For instance, different waves of European Social Survey, Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer and Asianbarometer.

cross-national survey that provides an authoritarian dimension of democracy is the World Values Survey.

Defining democracy in terms of its distinction from non-democratic governance shed lights to a more structural confusion on people's minds. following the suggestions of Herbert McClosky's, Cho (2015) argues "to understand a political concept accurately, citizens should be able to discriminate the concept from those that contradict it" (p. 241). Indeed, the findings of Cho (2015) once again touch upon the significance of this perspective, in which she concludes that "the global waves of democratization over the last three decades have been far more successful in enlightening global citizens about the essential attributes of democracy than in dissociating them from the features of non-democracy." (p. 249) Thus, just because people are able to identify certain characteristics democracy does not mean they would not mistake it with its non-democratic alternatives when such options are presented. This study belongs to this last group of research stream. While examining the relationship between definitions of democracy and political participation, it identifies three dimensions people use to define democracy: liberal, redistributive and authoritative (refer to chapter 3.1 for the theoretical justification of this distinction). Incorporating authoritative understandings of democracy into the study enables not only to measure the ability to distinguish non-democratic characteristics from democratic ones while defining democracy, but also allows us to examine how this ability influences political participation of individuals, which extends the discussion on the importance of accounting for authoritative definitions.

CHAPTER 4

DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

4.1. Why Does Their Relationship Matter?

Literature concerned with the assessment of democratic quality predominantly focuses on expert evaluations of structural and institutional opportunities in the country (Coppedge et al., 2016). The citizen component is often neglected (for discussion Mayne & Geissel, 2016). Nevertheless, it has been tried to integrated into the measurement of democracy with the studies of legitimacy and regime congruence. Both of these literatures emphasize the significance of micro-level factors. Without a doubt, for stability, all political systems require legitimacy which they obtain from the system support of the mass public. In a broad sense, it is “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1959, p.86). Thus, a regime is legitimate when citizens confide in and support the system. Such grassroots legitimacy would provide political systems the condition it needs to operate effectively (Mishler and Rose, 2001) since “When members of the polity believe that the government is legitimate, they are more likely to defer political authorities and uphold laws.” (Levi, Sacks & Tyler, 2009, p.1). Hence, if people adhere to democratic ideals in an autocratic regime, the regime will lack legitimacy and this will possibly initiate (or accelerate) transition to a democratic governance (Mishler & Rose, 2002). Linz and Stephan (1996) argues that not only the democratic transformation of political institutions, but also popularly shared belief of democracy as “the only game in town” is an ingredient for the making of such “consolidated democracy”. Thus, we can say

that democratic consolidation is the systematic consequence of a popular commitment to democratic values (Fuchs, 2007).

A similar perspective is proposed by the congruence theory of democratization. Every regime has two sides; the demand side and the supply side. On the supply side, political institutions institutionalize certain norms and values; on the demand side, ordinary people are committed to certain ideas and values. Within the context of democratization, regime stability requires a congruence between popular demand for democratic governance and institutional supply of democracy. For Almond and Verba (1963), this congruence should be between political culture and political structure. For Inglehart and Welzel (2005) it should be between the individual support for the system and political regime. When there is incongruence between values that citizens uphold and the type of regime, a legitimacy crisis emerges and the mass opposition initiates a regime termination (Welzel & Klingemann, 2008).

Drawing on these perspectives, scholars who are concerned with the democratic legitimacy and congruence in contemporary democracies have started to emphasize the significance of citizens' attitudes and ideals. Thus, recent scholarship argues that citizens should support both ideological and practical democracy and reject practices and sentiments of anti-authoritarian systems (Shin & Wells, 2005). Although legitimacy is widely acknowledged to be an important concept, previous research that focuses on the legitimacy remains divided in terms of its measurement on the citizen-level. The most widely used individual-level factor for assessing legitimacy has been "political support". Easton (1975) defines political support under two dimensions; diffusive support and specific support. Other eminent scholars have acknowledged this categorization and followed his footsteps to measure regime legitimacy (Norris, 1999). The literature that is concerned with the measurement of diffusive support uses survey questions that either asked how respondents feel about democracy -to what extent they like democracy -(Shin & Wells, 2005), or whether they prefer democracy to other types of regimes (Morlino & Montero, 1995; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Shin & Wells, 2005; Norris, 1999).

Specific support is related to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the political regime. And when there is lack of effectiveness, state authority starts to deteriorate which would weaken its legitimacy (Linz, 1978). But how does it weaken state authority? Through the individual attitudes it causes. Therefore, specific support is concerned with the attitudes towards regime institutions such as the government, courts, political parties, political leaders and the military. Thus, in the individual-level dimension of political legitimacy, the evaluation of effectiveness is mostly operationalized by measuring the level institutional/political trust. If people evaluate the regime performance as poor, political/institutional trust erodes. Hence, in conjunction with the political support-specific support- political trust is considered to be another factor for assessing the legitimacy of a regime. So much so that according to Easton (1975), “support is confined to two major components-trust and legitimacy”. Another component of specific support is the satisfaction with democracy.

In the literature on the diffusive support for democracy, survey-based empirical research shows that in the last decade majority of the population, regardless of the nation, culture or the regime type, supports democracy (Maseland & van Hoorn, 2011; Norris, 2011; Shin & Wells, 2005). Nevertheless, if this is true, then we should be able to observe more stable and consolidated democracies around the world. On the contrary, we see a decline in the stability and maintenance of democracy around the globe (Freedomhouse.org, 2020). To explain this panorama, two interrelated problems are identified. First, the positive image about democracy which the existing research so far has established might be reflecting what Inglehart (2003) calls the “lip service” to democracy. Thus, individuals may be embracing the concept without knowing the meaning of it. This happens when individuals feel social pressure to give the “right” answer to the question, which creates what Dalton (1994) refers as “questionnaire democrats”. This brings us to the second problem which this thesis tries to address.

As stated in the previous chapter, the meaning of democracy varies among individuals and therefore, it is of primary importance to elucidate what kind of democracy people support. For instance, some countries “inhabit the wide and foggy

zone between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002, p.37). The citizens of those nations might confuse democracy with authoritarianism and subsequently, the system they claim to be supporting might not be the system that actually exists. In other words, empirical analysis based on support and demand for democracy might mistakenly portray a congruent or much more likely, an incongruent society. For instance, with a superficial examination, an authoritarian country might be shown to have an incongruence because majority of the citizens have democratic aspirations. However, in reality, they might be defining democracy with authoritative notions. Overall, by keeping these facts in mind, one cannot talk about either a proper measurement of congruence or an ideal grassroots legitimacy of democracy without a genuine consideration of the fundamental ideals and perceptions citizens of a nation holds.

A similar problem arises in specific support. For example, citizens who are unsophisticated about the meaning of democracy might evaluate the regime performance of a non-democratic country as good and democratic which would increase the level of institutional/political trust. Here, “good” and “democracy” have been referred as proximate concepts because “democracy” has been acknowledged to be perceived as the “right” and “socially desirable” regime (Inglehart, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). In a similar vein, if a citizen who resides in a democratic country understands democracy as an authoritative or a redistributive system, his or her evaluation of the government as democracy might reflect negative inferences. Not because of the s/he does not support democracy, but because s/he supports a different type of democracy. To conclude, the measurement of trust through the evaluation of regime performance would be a false indicator for the assessment of state legitimacy. In the end, more attention has to be paid to the way individual understanding of democracy translates into the support as well as the trust for the democratic regime.

These problems of validity while measuring the legitimacy for democracy have been previously addressed by many scholars (Canache, 2006; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Fuchs, 2007). In “Democrats with Adjectives” Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) argue that the “standard measures of democratic

preferences tend to overrate people's actual demand for democracy, as these measures overlook the mass values that make people appreciate democracy for the freedoms that define it" (Welzel & Klingemann, 2008, p.90). Fuchs (2007) argues that the measure of commitment to democracy that is based on the perceptions and evaluations of democracy is problematic, since people tend to mistake autocratic element with democracy. Canache (2006) addresses this issue by touching upon the fact that "democracy" is an ambiguous concept and using public opinion surveys concerned with democratic support that does not give a generic meaning during the interview would inevitably give unreliable results. In their study, Mattes and Bratton (2007) aims to measure the demand and supply for democracy. However, to find the truly "committed democrats", they argue that respondents understanding of what democracy is should be integrated to the study.

In other words, studies that focus on support and demand for democracy overlook underlying ideals that gives these preferences substance. Therefore, "as a matter of logic", an examination of the meaning of the term "democracy" that potentially influences the variables that democratic legitimation has operationalized would eliminate the problem of validity. In a similar vein, Ferrin and Kriesi (2016) argue that "legitimacy is therefore composed of these two concepts: views—the normative yardstick against which democratic reality is evaluated, and evaluations—the assessment of the practice of democracy in one's country" (p.10). That is to say, the normative ideals/views of what democracy is, is a component of micro-level legitimacy assessment. The P1 route in the below graphical representation visually demonstrates what has been discussed so far.




Figure 1 Explanation and Justification of the Hypothesized Link with a Graphical Representation

Then, what is the importance of political participation in this context? Legitimacy means popular acceptance of the governing laws and regime. Congruence means the regime supported or demanded is supplied by the governing bodies, but what happens when the state is not legitimate or the congruence is not sustained? How does a regime stay stable? These terms (legitimacy and congruence), as one can clearly see, represent abstract forces. Political participation comes into the picture as a tool that actors can translate these forces into concrete forms of reactions. In other words, political participation enables people to contextualize these abstract normative notions. The importance of participation for democratic governance lies in this premise. It enables people to act on their preferences to exert influence over governments and politics. Thus, it carries all these abstract forces and preferences into the realm of political reality. That is, political participation is a tool that people operationalize when there is an incongruence between preferences of people and the

type of regime, which is also referred as a crisis of legitimacy (Welzel & Klingemann, 2008). This crisis of legitimacy or the lack of congruence later show themselves with a process of democratization that is initiated either through electoral channels or non-institutionalized means (Fails & Pierce, 2010). The P3 route in the in the Figure 1 demonstrates this role of political participation. What is left to be examined is P2, which is the main concern of this thesis, is scrutinized from now on.⁴

Not only the political participation of the individuals has great importance for democratic governance by itself, but these participatory actions are also important in terms of the underlying ideas, values and beliefs they are rooted in. For example, an individual participating into the democratic process with the knowledge that democracy should involve the *obedience to ruler, military interference* or *interpretation of law by religious authorities* would deteriorate rather than legitimate the existing (or transitioning) democratic regime.⁵ That is why some experts even argue that “if the bulk of the public is unsophisticated, it is better for democracy that people remain politically uninvolved” (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p.27). In a similar perspective, Kymlicka and Norman (1995) argues that within the evaluation of democratic rule, “a theory of citizenship” which defines the qualities a citizen should possess needs to be incorporated. But what are those qualities? The classical theories of democracy argue that first of all, public people should participate in the deliberation of public policy, this is considered to be essential for democratic citizenship (Dahl, 1998; Verba et al., 1995). Secondly, citizens or “democrats” should be well-informed about the political issues so that they can effectively participate in discussions (Almond & Verba, 1963). As Dalton (2000) states, “any discussion of citizen political behavior is ultimately grounded on basic assumptions about the electorate’s political abilities—the public’s level of knowledge, understanding, and interest in political matters” (p.919). Thus, in democracies, if knowledge is the

⁴ Direct lines denote the existence of a relationship between the two variables whereas line with the arrow shows an influence on the direction it is pointed at.

⁵ These are the authoritative understanding characteristics in the democracy module in WVS 6th wave.

currency of citizenship like money is the currency of economics (see Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) then participation is the way to “use” this currency. Similar to economics, one would wish and expect a rational consumer. However, in reality, most scholars acknowledge the fact that citizens may fall short from the ideal democrat for this matter. Under such circumstances, if elections serve to “enhance the legitimacy of an otherwise authoritarian regime, the regime cannot qualify as a democratic type” (O’Donnell, 1998, p.117 cited in Ulbricht, 2018). So, we can infer that understanding of democracy, as this thesis also shows, considerably effects the quality of political participation. In the end, as mentioned in the title of this thesis, for the production of genuine democratic individuals it is essential that political participation is based in democratic principles.

Departing from these perspectives, there are two aims of this research: to briefly delineate the worldwide trend on how much of the public who is politically active have actually sufficient knowledge about democracy and most importantly, to scrutinize the predictive power of democratic understanding of individuals’ over their political participation. In the latter, it examines whether different conceptual definitions of democracy have an influence on the different types of political participation. For the influential force from democratic understanding to political participation (P2), one justification comes from the literature of social psychology which mentions a link between preferences and behaviors. It argues that individuals tend to act in accordance with their normative preferences (Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996). Hence, when it comes to democratic preferences, this thesis expects to observe this need for coherence in relation to political participation of the citizens. Moreover, according to Fuchs and Roller (2018), “commitment to democratic values—including the value of democracy—and democratic principles is the most important level because it determines the support of democracy at the lower levels, specific democratic attitudes, as well as democratic modes of behavior” (p.24). In fact, Welzel and Klingemann (2008) argue that intrinsic democratic preferences not only substantiate demand and support for democracy but also when the democratic preferences are high, they “nurture expressive mass actions that make these

preferences felt.” (p.80) In other words, intrinsic democratic preferences are considered to be “a source of democratizing mass pressures.” (p.77).

Another possible link can be retrieved from the literature that shows the role of adherence to civic norms or the norms of good citizen on political participation, specifically voter turnout. Adherence to abstract notions such as civic duty has proven to have a great influence on conventional participation in a way that adhere to the norms of good citizen have higher tendency to vote in elections⁶. This literature shows us that adherence to normative ideals can have an influence on political behavior. There is a group of researchers that also refer to conceptualizations of democracy as adherence to democratic normative ideals (see Norris, 2011; Oser & Hooge, 2018; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). Thus, the directional linkage from conceptualizations of democracy to political participation proves its existence also from the perspective of normative ideals literature. In conclusion, this thesis bases its research question on the argument that adherence to democratic principles/ideals/values would work as a conceptual lens that influence political behavior. A further assessment of this relation is made in the following part of this chapter.

4.2. The Influence of Democratic Understandings on Political Participation

This thesis is concerned with which ideals motivate (or depress) which type of political participation. Therefore, a thorough review that would justify the proposed links is necessary. In order to do that, conceptualizations of democracy by citizens is first examined as a democratic knowledge. Democratic knowledge, which is the subject of concern of this thesis is not given much attention for their relation to political participation. As a matter of fact, few studies are devoted to the conceptualizations of democracy in the minds of ordinary citizens. Most of the research on this topic takes knowledge as a dependent variable and tries to capture the determinants that shape them (Baviskar & Malone, 2004; Cho, 2015). The ones that

⁶ Smets and van Ham (2013) showed that among 6 studies and a total of 18 tests, civic duty significantly correlates with voter turnout with an effect size 0.94.

examine the consequences of different conceptualizations of democracy and treat democratic knowledge as an independent variable focuses only on the attitudinal dimension of beliefs and demands (Alonso, 2016; Cho, 2014; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007). This thesis embarks on a different perspective. It examines the influence of conceptualizations of democracy on behavioral dimension, that is, the act of political participation.

In the literature of cognitive science, there are four types of knowledge; factual, conceptional, procedural and metacognitive (Krathwohl & Anderson, 2009). For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is on the factual and conceptual knowledge. Factual knowledge is the least abstract and most “to the point” knowledge among these types. Names of the politicians, the years of the military coup would be good examples of this type of knowledge. Thus, a factual knowledge in the framework of politics would correspond to basic political information. On the other hand, conceptional knowledge can be basically defined as the second step of factual knowledge. It refers to the ability to classify, categorize or generalize factual information. It is structured and requires abstract thinking. In relation to political science, a conceptional knowledge enables people to answer “why” or “how” of any political knowledge. For instance, a person who has conceptional knowledge of democracy should be able to answer the question of “how/in what ways democracy separates from authoritarianism?”. On that ground, it is differentiated from factual knowledge or basic political information due to the fact that it not only about defining what it is, but also distinguishing what it is not. Undoubtedly, conceptional knowledge is the type that this thesis aims to emphasize while examining the meaning of democracy for citizens. Moreover, according to Cho (2014), who also identifies democratic knowledge as a conceptional knowledge, “what enables people to meaningfully interpret political facts and affairs – and translate those into meaningful decisions, justifications, and evaluations – is conceptual knowledge.” In other words, conceptional knowledge is used to interpret, evaluate or analyze factual knowledge and turn it into other ideas or behaviors. Therefore, this paper also emphasizes this attribution of conceptional knowledge while claiming that there is a meaningful relationship between political participation

and understanding of democracy. This categorization validates the proposition that understanding democracy will have an impact on political participation.

There are only a handful of research that build upon the conceptual dimension of democratic knowledge (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2014; Canache, 2012; Cho, 2014; Gherghina & Geissel, 2017; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Oser & Hooghe, 2018). And there are fewer studies that examine the influence of democratic knowledge on political participation (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2014; Canache, 2012; Gherghina & Geissel, 2017; Oser & Hooghe, 2018). Even the ones that focuses on this relation are not concerned with the cognitive ability of differentiation of democratic characteristics from authoritative ones. Thus, when compared to existing research on this matter, the theoretical and empirical framework this thesis has presented so far is a novel one. The literature review provided below is an attempt to widen and strengthen the discussion on the link between democratic knowledge and the tendency to participate in different types of political activities. For presenting a well-thought-out and detailed literature review, a review of the previous studies is to be delineated first.

So far, only two research papers are directly examining the topic of this thesis. The most cited article among them is the work by Canache (2012) who builds his research upon the question “Can conceptualizations of democracy affect civic engagement?”. Focusing on the multidimensional characteristic of democracy, Canache creates a democracy variable with values ranging from 0 to 3 based on the number of definitions respondents offered to define democracy. She posits that “an individuals’ ability to define democracy” may function as a conceptual tool that people use when making the decision to participate. She argues that increased complexity of the definition increases conventional participation because having a more sophisticated understanding of democracy “corresponds to a greater attachment to democratic governance”. Moreover, less complex definitions are related to unconventional behavior. However, it is important to note that she distinguishes conventional and unconventional participation in terms of legality, meaning, “attitudes towards legal protests” are considered to be a part of conventional

participation. Therefore, if we are to adapt her theoretical framework to this thesis', the expectation is an increase in both unconventional and conventional participation when individuals adopt liberal and redistributive conceptualizations of democracy.

The most recent work in this subject is by Oser and Hooghe (2018), who test whether the embracement of “political rights” and “social rights” as democratic ideals motivate people to different types of political behavior.⁷ They suggest that individuals who define democracy with an emphasis to “political rights” are more inclined to institutionalized political behavior because of “their inherent attention to political institutions and procedures”. Moreover, drawing on the literature on recent protest behavior (economic downturn in 2008), citizens who particularly emphasize “social rights” are expected to voice their concerns to a more “diverse set of actors” that “have an effect on economic and social policy.” Here, “political rights” group corresponds to ones who understand democracy by its liberal notions whereas “social rights” group correspond to the ones who adhere to redistributive notions. Based on the theoretical propositions presented by Oser and Hooghe (2018), the theoretical expectation of this thesis would be an increase in the likelihood to engage in conventional activities particularly when people understand democracy with its liberal characteristics and an increase on the likelihood of unconventional participation for people who adhere to redistributive notions of democracy.

There are other works that also focus on the conceptions of democracy by citizens (see Bengtsson & Christensen, 2014; Gherghina & Geissel, 2017). Nevertheless, the data they have operationalized for the analyses actually measures the characteristics of the ideal system for the individuals rather than their conceptualizations of democracy. Therefore, although these studies are highly relevant for this thesis, their research questions and designs does not overlap as much as that of Oser and Hooghe (2018) and Canache (2012). In their study, Bengtsson and Christensen (2014) define three conceptions of democracy: “representation”, “expertise” and “participation”. “Representation” defines a procedural-representative

⁷ They have used ESS 2012 Wave for their research.

democracy; “expertise” emphasizes the role of experts in democratic governance, corresponding to a technocratic view of democracy; “participation” focuses on the element of participation and thus defines a participatory democracy⁸. They suggest that people who use the “representative” conception are more likely participate in institutional forms of participation (voting) since the central element of representative democracies is citizen involvement. On the other hand, people who hold “expertise” definitions would be less likely to be involved in any type of participation since the technocratic view of democracy is focuses on “finding optimal solutions rather than representing diverse interests” which indicates a rather politically inactive society. Lastly, due to the high emphasis on participation in the “participation” dimension, citizens to hold this understanding are likely to be part of both institutionalized and non-institutionalized political activities.

Following the footsteps of Bengtsson and Christensen (2014), Gherghina and Geissel (2017) also study the influence of preferences for different political-decision makers on different modes of participation.⁹ They operationalize the same “representative”, “expert” and “participatory” models in their study. Their hypotheses are similar to that of Bengtsson and Christensen (2014): those who prefer political-decision makers to be politicians (representative) mainly engage in electoral political participation; those preferring citizens as decision-makers (participatory) engage in both electoral and non-electoral participation; the ones that prefer experts as decision-makers (expert) abstain from any type of participatory behavior. When translated into the dimensions of the democracy module that this thesis operationalizes, expertise function would correspond to authoritative understanding of democracy. In fact,

⁸ They have created three separate indexes. The representation index has two components: the best way to make political decisions: elected politicians, important questions determined by referendums. The participation index has three components: best way to make political decisions: regular investigation of public opinion, best way to make political decisions: citizen participation, organization of public debates for ordinary people. The expert index has two components: Best way to make political decisions: experts, decisions better be left to experts.

⁹ The concept of democracy is measured by asking “Who should make important policy decisions?”. Respondents choose from the following choices: a) 1. Citizens and 6. Elected politicians; b) 1. Elected politicians and 6. Politically independent experts; c) 1. Politically independent experts and 6. Citizens.

Gherghina and Geissel (2017) states that “expert” model is quite close to a non-democratic model. This is due to the rather apolitical role of the citizens in the expert model in which the authority of the experts has the number one role in decision-making process. Considering the components of authoritative understanding dimension that emphasizes military rule, religious authority and obedience to rulers, it can be expected that an increase in authoritative understanding would decrease political participation of any kind. In terms of “participatory” and “representative” models, they both seem to correspond to liberal understanding of democracy. Thus, based on the theoretical discussions of Bengtsson and Christensen (2014) and Gherghina and Geissel (2017), liberal understanding of democracy would increase both conventional and unconventional participation, maybe with a little bit more influence over conventional type. In the end, all these studies find a significant influence of adherence to different democratic ideals on political participation.

A possible link between different democracy conceptualizations and political participation can also be retrieved from the public opinion literature concerned with individual values. Sage handbook defines values as abstract and general conceptions which are the building blocks of human behavior (Arzheimer, Evans & Lewis-Beck, 2016). In a similar vein, “most social scientists agree that values are deeply rooted motivations or orientations guiding or explaining certain attitudes, norms, and opinions which, in turn, direct human action or at least part of it.” (Halman, 2007, p.5) Hence, values influence human behavior and in the context of this research “democratic values” argued to be influencing political behavior of citizens. Although democratic knowledge that this research is concerned with might not totally qualify to be a value, it certainly contains certain characteristics of values in terms of its role for directing attitudes and behaviors (see Alonso, 2016; Cho, 2014; Canache, 2012 ; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007; Oser & Hooghe, 2018)¹⁰. There are many types of values that are scrutinized by scholars such as human values, political core values, post-

¹⁰ Whether the democracy module contains questions that are qualified to be a knowledge, value or preference is a subject of discussion by itself. Although this thesis is closer to the idea that they are a type of knowledge, it cannot reject the possibilities that they can qualify to be something else since the nature of conceptualizations of democracy is not the main concern of this thesis.

materialist values and so on. This thesis will focus on the ones that thorough which connections with the “democratic values” can be established.

There are scholars who have found causal connections between values and political participation. For instance, Caprara et al. (2006) and Gerber et al. (2008) find a relationship between basic personal values (Big Five personality traits) and voting behavior. In another study, Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione (2010) argue that core political values is what mediates the relationship between personal values and voting behavior. However, the stance of political parties’ people would vote for the ones that are close to their values. In other words, although they have found a link between voting behavior and political values, this thesis focuses more on the turnout dimension of voting behavior. Proceeding from here, another point of departure would be studies that examine post-materialism/materialism, emancipative values and authoritarian/libertarian value cleavage. The post-materialism/materialism index asks the respondents to rank the goals of a nation they desire to have; maintaining order in the nation, fighting rising prices, protecting freedom of speech and giving people more say in government decisions (Inglehart, 1971). The underlying theory of post-materialist values is based on the idea that one’s socioeconomic environment, specifically “the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years” (Inglehart & Reif, 2016, p.12) affects the value system that person adheres to. Individuals who feel material security, who have experiences economic growth and the expansion of educational opportunities that came with it, adhere to post-materialist values. These people have a tendency to participate more in elite-challenging” non-institutional political activities. Thus, post-materialistic values are argued to be conducive to unconventional participation (Dalton, Sickle, Weldon, 2010). That is to say, people who prefer a nation to protect freedom of speech and give people more say in government decisions participate more in non-institutional protest than the ones who prioritize maintaining order in the nation and fighting rising prices.

When translated into the questions of the democracy module that this thesis is concerned with, post-materialistic values would correspond to liberal conceptualization of democracy which means that people who understand democracy

in terms of liberal characteristics have high unconventional participation. Moreover, prioritizing maintaining order in the nation and fighting rising prices can be interpreted as having authoritarian and redistributive connotations, respectively. This would mean that authoritarian and redistributive understanding result in less protest participation. Nevertheless, this connection is not de facto since not every study confirms the existence of a negative relationship between materialism and protest participation (Davis, 2000). Indeed, there are a couple of arguments posed against the reliability and applicability of post-materialist and materialist dimension. For instance, Brooks and Manza (1994) argues that the item about “maintaining order in the nation” should not be considered as a part of materialistic value structure due to its authoritarian connotation. For that reason, they have constructed a more “accurate” post-materialism/materialism index. In their version, post-materialist items are about giving people more to say at work and community, a society where the ideas are more important than money, fighting pollution and guarantying equal right for men and women. Materialist items are about reduction of inequality, providing economic opportunity, fight against crime and maintaining economic growth in the nation. Here, post-materialist values highly overlap with liberal understanding of democracy and materialist values with redistributive understanding of democracy. Brooks and Manza (1994) concludes that both materialist and postmaterialist values motivate people to participate in politics. Thus, both redistributive and liberal conceptualizations may motivate non-institutional action. Moreover, in terms the relationship between voting and post-materialist values, the general understanding is that post-materialist values are less inclined to conventional political participation. Nevertheless, Copeland (2014) argues, “if postmaterialists have more psychic energy available for politics [as argued by Inglehart], postmaterialist values should increase the likelihood of engaging in all forms of civic and political participation, including voting, campaign activities, and civic engagement.” (p.263)

Another argument is brought by Flanagan who proposes a new value cleavage termed as authoritarian-libertarian values (Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987). He argues that the value change form materialist to postmaterialist

values that Inglehart had proposed is not sufficient to capture existing (and existed) value changes. In the authoritarian-libertarian value change there is a movement towards the erosion of authority. The libertarians are characterized by “independence and self-determination, equality and freedom, self-assertive participation in elite-challenging protest activities, and the right of noncompliance to social rules and legal authorities” and authoritarians by “respect for authority, loyalty and dutifulness, obedience and resignation to one’s inherited station in life, order and social control, and patriotism and seeking security through national military might.”(p.238). Political (political party or political group membership) and civic participation (participation to voluntary organizations about health, women’s group, youth work, elderly, handicapped etc.) are found to be the same for authoritarians and libertarians. However, in terms of protest potential, libertarians are found to be more inclined to protest behavior. Once again, liberal conceptualizations would potentially have higher unconventional participation, along with considerable levels of conventional participation.

Another value index is emancipative values by Welzel (2013). This index covers four topics; “autonomy” or “defiance” covering parental emphasis on child rearing values such as independence, imagination and obedience ; “choice” emphasizing reproductive choices such as abortion, homosexuality and divorce; “equality” focusing on gender equality in terms of education, job and political involvement opportunities ; “voice” which uses the same battery of questions from post-materialism/materialism index. In relation to the independent variables of this thesis: the egalitarian orientation and choice orientation directly taps on to the “women and men are equal” question in liberal category of the democracy module; the autonomous/defiance orientation taps on to a general notion of obedience that also underlies in the authoritative category of the democracy module.

Intrinsic preferences for democracy have been linked to emancipative values that emphasize the freedom of people (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Klingemann, 2008). Welzel and Klingemann (2008) argues that for measuring a genuine intrinsic preference or demand for democracy, one must focus on a person’s

emphasis on emancipative values since they constitute value orientations that are conducive to democratic adherence of ordinary people. In other words, emancipative values are argued to be “substantiating” democratic attitudes because they represent what people value and how democratic are the things that they value. In that sense, democratic understanding is representing a similar thing, that is, “substantiating” democratic attitudes. They mention a connection between intrinsic democratic preferences – or emancipative values- and tendency to take action. Their findings show that high emancipative values increase individuals’ tendency to take actions such as signing petitions, joining boycotts and demonstrations. In a similar vein, Welzel and Deutsch (2012) find that adherence to emancipative values elevates protest behavior, meaning, less “obedience” and more “egalitarian” orientations increases unconventional participation. Overall, these results demonstrate that more emphasis on “voice”, “equality” and “choice” principles and less emphasis on “obedience” principle increases unconventional participation. Thus, people who are using more liberal notions and/or less authoritative notions while defining democracy might be significantly more engaged in unconventional participation.

The above discussion generally tells us about either the relation of political participation to liberal notions or authoritative notions presented within an authoritative-liberal duality. This lack of mention of the impact of adherence to redistributive notions on civic engagement is filled with the literature on redistributive preferences. Poulos (2012) shows that individuals who are more redistributive “are more likely to participate in a variety of avenues, such as signing petitions, writing to newspapers, and discussing politics in organizations.” (p.13). Similarly, Dawes, Loewen and Fowler (2016) demonstrate that when people have utilitarian redistribution preferences, meaning that they cared about increasing everyone’s well-being, they would be more inclined to be politically active. In addition, Grasso and Giugni (2019) show that people who prefer economic redistribution are more likely to opt for political intervention by the state to compensate for distributional inequalities in the nations (through higher taxes or other welfare measures). As a result, people who prefer “economic redistribution are more likely to be institutionally

embedded in organizational networks, both the more conventional – parties and trade unions – and the more unconventional – social movement organizations.” (p.473). In addition, as mentioned in chapter 2.1.1 and chapter 2.1.2, high levels of inequality are argued to be increasing both institutional and non-institutional activities of citizens. This influence might be resulting from the translation of high levels of inequality to increase in demand for redistribution. Therefore, one can infer that demand for redistribution might be affecting individual propensity to engage in both conventional and unconventional participation.

4.3. Hypothesis of This Study

Expanding on the empirical research discussed so far, this thesis expects to observe a significant influence of understandings of democracy on political participation. By employing a multilevel regression analysis with control variables, this thesis examines the association between three different understandings of democracy (liberal, redistributive and authoritative) and two different types of political participation (conventional and unconventional) among the individuals all around the world. The main and sub-hypotheses of this thesis are as follows;

H1₀: there is no meaningful relationship between different conceptualization of democracy (redistributive, authoritative, liberal) by people and their conventional political participation.

H1₁: people who define democracy as with its liberal attributes have higher tendency for conventional participation

H1₂: people who define democracy by its redistributive characteristics have higher tendency for conventional participation.

H1₃: people who define democracy as authoritative have lower tendency for conventional participation.

H2₀: there is no meaningful relationship between different conceptualization of democracy (redistributive, authoritative, liberal) by people and their unconventional political participation.

H2₁: people who define democracy as with its liberal attributes have higher tendency for unconventional participation.

H2₂: people who define democracy by its redistributive characteristics have higher tendency for unconventional participation

H2₃: people who define democracy as authoritative have lower tendency for unconventional participation.



CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the data that are being employed, the measurement of independent and dependent variables as well as the control variables, and operationalized method for the statistical analyses. Chapter 5.1 explains the data that are used to examine the influence of different conceptualizations of democracy on types of political participation. Chapter 5.2 clarifies how each variable is measured. It also explains the process of creating new variables for the operationalization of the main dependent and independent variables of this research. Finally, chapter 5.3 demonstrates the association between understandings of democracy and political participation along with the final multilevel analyses and their interpretations.

5.1. Data

To test the hypothesis of the influence of different democracy conceptualizations on political participation, the 6th wave of World Values Survey (WVS) is used. WVS is a large-scale, cross-national research program that focus on a variety of variables. This survey is used because of two reasons. First, WVS offers the opportunity to test the hypotheses of this thesis in a broad range of nations. Second, WVS is the only existing cross-national survey research that contains the authoritative dimension of democracy within its democracy questions. Since this thesis also concerns with the cognitive ability to differentiate democratic characteristics from authoritative ones, the use of WVS is inevitable.

For the 6th wave, surveys are conducted from 2010 to 2014 in a total of 60 countries. Nations are selected based on their democracy scores. The reason for that is the problem of preference falsification that is especially common in authoritarian

nations due to fear of punishment people experience (Kuran, 1997). As a result, citizens have a tendency to conceal their political views and state their preferences as if they are compatible with the government's wishes. Since one component of independent variable of this thesis is protest behavior, which is by definition an act against the state, it is plausible to expect that people in authoritarian regimes might refrain from stating their actual level or their intended level of protest participation. This would distort the empirical analysis. Moreover, measurement of participation in elections under authoritarian rule is also problematic because elections in authoritarian countries are predominantly "an instrument of coercion" (Solt, 2008). In light of these knowledge, for the selection procedure of nations, Freedom House project is used. Only the "partly free" and "free" countries at the time of the survey are included in the analyses.¹¹

In the end, the study covers countries from East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, featuring both advanced democracies as well as transitioning democracies. The diverse historical and cultural background of regions and nations here provides the opportunity to establish a general framework to examine the influence of different understandings of democracy on political participation. The list of countries included in this analysis, together with the year that the survey was conducted and number of respondents is as follows:

Table 1 *Countries Included in the Analysis Together with the Number of Responses*

	WVS 6 th wave (2010-2014)	
	N	Year
Argentina	1,030	2013
Armenia	1,100	2011
Australia	1,477	2012

¹¹ For a similar treatment of cases within the WVS, see Cinar and Ugur-Cinar, 2018.

Table 1 (Continued)

Brazil	1,486	2014
Chile	1,000	2011
Colombia	1,512	2012
Cyprus	1,000	2011
Ecuador	1,202	2013
Estonia	1,533	2011
Georgia	1,202	2014
Germany	2,046	2013
Ghana	1,552	2012
India	4,078	2012
Japan	2,443	2010
Kyrgyzstan	1,500	2011
Lebanon	1,200	2013
Malaysia	1,300	2012
Mexico	2,000	2012
Netherlands	1,902	2012
New Zealand	841	2011
Nigeria	1,759	2011
Pakistan	1,200	2012
Peru	1,210	2012
Philippines	1,200	2012
Poland	966	2012
Romania	1,503	2012
Singapore	1,972	2012
Slovenia	1,069	2011
South Africa	3,531	2013
South Korea	1,200	2010
Spain	1,189	2011
Sweden	1,206	2011

Table 1 (Continued)

Taiwan	1,238	2012
Thailand	1,200	2013
Trinidad and Tobago	999	2011
Tunisia	1,205	2013
Turkey	1,605	2011
Ukraine	1,500	2011
United States	2,232	2011
Uruguay	1,000	2011
All Countries	60,388	2010-2014

Source: the 6th wave of WVS.

5.2. Measurement

The dependent variables of this thesis are conventional and unconventional participation. The main explanatory variables are different conceptualizations of democracy. All dependent and independent variables are PCA (principle component analysis)-generated and are continuous variables. Rather than simply aggregating all variables that are to be included in the index, this technique allows to create an index in which the weights of each indicator (correlation coefficients) are taken into account. This technique minimizes random fluctuations and measurement errors.¹²

For the measurement of unconventional participation, people's attitudes towards participation are examined together with their actual participation rates. That is why this measurement also shows the protest potential of individuals, meaning, it measures psychological dispositions/orientations towards unconventional participation. For that reason, the scale used is called protest potential scale (see Jennings & Van Deth, 2014). It combines information on both past behavior and future intentions by giving the respondent these three options: "have done/might do/would never do". The

¹² For a similar example of variable generation, see Cinar & Kose, 2017.

problem with using a scale that only measures future intentions is that there might be disparities between the actual and attitudinal statements of individuals (see McAdam, 1986). In other words, asking people about hypothetical future action might not give us the actual participation rate in the future (Topf, 1995). Moreover, a scale that only measures past intentions would have to take into account the memory recall errors (Ayhan & Işıksal, 2005). As a result, since the variable of political action in WVS was created to surpass these problems, it is considered to be reliable for the statistical analyses.

The willingness to participate in five political actions are asked to respondents with these three options. These options were coded from 1 as “Have done” 2 as “Might do” 3 as “Would never do” in the original WVS. They are later reverse coded to prevent confusion in this research. The five questions are: *Signing petition, joining boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, Joining strikes, Any other act of protest*. These are considered to be non-violent protest types. Confirmatory factor analysis is conducted to assess the reliability of our variable construct. As expected, all five items measuring unconventional political action load uniformly into a single factor, with the factor loadings around 0.8 for every item.¹³ The eigen values indicate a one factor solution with the first factor explaining 63 % of the variance. Furthermore, for the measurement of reliability, Cronbach’s alpha analysis is conducted. This analysis is particularly important for derivative scales because it tests the reliability of the created measure. The Cronbach’s alpha value is 0.85. The generally acceptable cut-off value of alpha is 0.70, and a 0.8 or greater value indicates a very good level of reliability. Thus, unconventional participation scale is a reliable scale to conduct statistical analysis.

Conventional political participation includes responses to questions regarding the participation to national and local elections. These questions measure the voting turnout. Although membership to political parties are acknowledged as a part of conventional political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979), complementary factor

¹³ Factor loadings: signing petition 0.74, joining boycotts 0.79, attending demonstrations 0.81, joining strikes 0.79, joining other act of protests 0.82.

analysis shows that it does not form a cluster with voting behavior (for details, see Appendix A). Moreover, Kaiser's criterion of 1 for eigenvalue cutoff shows formation of only one factor which substantiates the conclusion that political party membership does not form a reliable group with voting activity (Kaiser, 1960). That is why party membership is eliminated in the second analysis. For the measurement of both national and local voting, respondents were asked "when elections take place do you vote always, usually or never?". 1 was coded as "always" 2 as "usually" and 3 as "never" in the WVS. This is later reverse coded to make the highest value represent the highest level of participation in this research. PCA is used to create and test conventional participation index. The factor loadings of national vote and local vote are both 0.95. The literature argues that a factor should at least have 3 or more variable to be reliable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), however, the conventional index of this thesis has two variables. Nevertheless, there is also a general consensus that for a factor analysis with 2 variables, the analysis becomes reliable only if the variables highly correlate with factor loadings of at least .70 (Yong & Pearce, 2013). Additionally, the Cronbach's alpha of this index is 0.89, which shows that the generated index is highly reliable.

The independent variable of this research is the conceptualization of democracy by the individuals. The democracy module containing a total of nine questions are used for the statistical analysis. The WVS asked the respondents to rate the following characteristics of democracy on a 10-point scale, in terms of their essentiality, from "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" to "an essential characteristic of democracy":

Table 2 *Independent Variables*


Liberal Dimension	Women have the same rights as man
	Civil rights protect people's liberty against repression
	People choose their leaders in free elections
Authoritative Dimension	Religious authorities interpret laws
	The army takes over when the government is incompetent
	People obey their rulers
Redistributive Dimension	Government tax rich and subsidize the poor
	People receive state aid for unemployment
	The state makes people's income equal

For the creation of each understanding of democracy variable, a PCA is conducted for three theoretically linked questions. Thus, PCA is separately conducted for each dimension demonstrated in Table 2. In the end, these dimensions are weighted according to their separate PCA results. The value range for the each newly created variable (authoritative understanding, liberal understanding and redistributive understanding) is between 0 and 1.

The theoretical divisions of these three dimensions are previously mentioned in chapter 3.1. However, to divide these nine questions into three categories, this thesis also benefits from the seminal works of Norris (2011) and Welzel and Alvarez (2014). These studies are particularly selected because they made their classifications based on WVS data. Norris (2011) classifies “perceived characteristics of democracy” under three categories: procedural (freedom and rights), instrumental (economic prosperity, punishment of criminals, state aid, taxation for welfare state) and authoritarian (military and religious authority). Welzel and Alvarez (2014), on the other hand, form four categories: liberal (equal freedoms of the people), authoritarian (military and religious authority), populist (democracy as a regime that delivers “law and order” and “bread and butter”) and social (redistributive justice) notions of democracy. The reason for the division into such four groups is because there are additional questions

in the democracy module in WVS 5th wave that Alvarez (2014) defines as the populist notions of democracy.¹⁴ This is the same reason for the use of the notion “instrumental” in Norris (2011)’s study which encompasses populist notions and social notions of democracy. Since the 6th wave does not contain these questions, theoretically, a three-dimensional division seems to be the most appropriate one to use for this thesis.

To get a better sense of the created indexes, the figure below shows the distribution of each dimension by region:



Notes: The Y axis demonstrates the mean values of each dimension. Each dimension is weighted according to the PCA results. The value range for each created dimension is between 0 and 1. The classification of World Bank is used for the regions in the X axis. <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> Source: WVS

Figure 2 Average Scores of Conceptualizations of Democracy by World Regions

¹⁴ Other questions are the same with the ones in the democracy module of WVS 6th wave.

Figure 2 shows that while defining democracy, individuals in every region of the world give the highest emphasis on liberal notions. This means that most people consider liberal notions of civil rights, gender equality and free elections as essential characteristics of democracy. This is followed by the redistributive understanding of democracy, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa where authoritative notions are slightly more emphasized than the redistributive notions. While sub-Saharan Africa along with South Asia have the highest mean values for authoritative understanding (above 0.5), Middle East and North America and Europe and Central Asia have the lowest (.33 to be exact). Nonetheless, North America and Europe and Central Asia have the highest mean value for liberal understanding. Another important thing this figure demonstrates is that emphasizing the importance of one dimension of democracy, does not automatically corresponds to deemphasizing another dimension of democracy. For instance, while defining democracy, in regions such as Middle East and North Africa and South Asia the average essentiality score people give to liberal definitions is almost the same as the average score they give to redistributive definitions. This means there are people in these regions that understand democracy both as a liberal and a redistributive system at the same time. Similarly, in regions such as North America, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, redistributive understanding act more in conjunction authoritative understanding. For example, in North America while redistributive and authoritative understanding scores are both 0.4, liberal understanding score is around 0.8 which means that redistributive notions are considered to be as unessential and as non-democratic as authoritative notions in this region. Furthermore, without a doubt, the democratic ideal in terms of understanding of democracy would be high emphasis on liberal and maybe even redistributive notions and low emphasis (almost an average score of zero) on authoritative notions. Yet, it seems that even in the regions with the highest average score on liberal understanding (North America and Europe and Central Asia), the average scores of authoritative understanding is around 0.3, which means that authoritative notions are not completely considered to be non-essential characteristics of democracy.

In conclusion, Figure 2 shows that certain dimensions of democracy are acting together. Proceeding from here, Table 3 illustrates the correlation matrix for democratic conceptualizations to further elaborate the relationship between these dimensions. As the Table 3 demonstrates, redistributive understanding significantly correlates with both authoritative understanding and liberal understanding at 0.33 and 0.44 respectively. Based on these empirical results, one can conclude that redistributive understanding has a potential to be linked with both the liberal understanding and authoritative understanding. Therefore, the most reliable path to take would be to have a three-dimensional examination of democracy conceptualizations like the ones previously proposed in the literature (Norris, 2011; Welzel & Alvarez, 2014). This allows the examination of the unique relationship each dimension has with different political participatory behaviors.

Table 3 *Correlation Matrix for Democratic Conceptualizations*

	Authoritative Understanding	Redistributive Understanding	Liberal Understanding
Authoritative Understanding	1.00	-	-
Redistributive Understanding	.33***	.00	-
Liberal Understanding	.00	.44***	1.00

Notes: **= $p < 0.05$; ***= $p < 0.01$ Source: WVS

5.2.1. Control Variables

The variables illustrated in the Figure 3, that are related to political participation are included to control for the influence of extraneous variables. All micro-level indicators are retrieved from the 6th wave of World Values Survey. These variables include *age*, *gender*, *education*, *income*, *political interest*, *interpersonal trust*, *economic satisfaction* and *employment status*. The “don’t know” and “no answer” responses are removed in all of these variables. The data for Gini index (*Income inequality*) and GDP per capita (*Economic development*) is retrieved from World Bank. For the *Democracy* index, liberal democracy (v2x_libdem) variable of V-Dem is used. *Electoral system* and *Compulsory voting* data are retrieved from the IDEA International. Lastly, “fractionalization index” by Alesina et al. is used for measuring the ethnolinguistic *Fractionalization*. Descriptive statistics for all variables in Figure 3 are given in Appendix B.




Figure 3 Conceptual Framework of the Research

5.2.1.1. Individual-Level Variables

The literature suggests that young age spurs protest participation and depresses conventional participation (Norris, 2002; Goerres, 2007). Thus, *Age* is controlled for the analyses. It is measured by the actual age of the respondent by the time of the interview. However, there are also studies that suggest a curvilinear relationship

between age and political participation. In other words, youngest and oldest cohorts engage in less political activity compared to middle aged groups due to certain generational and life-cycle characteristics each age group experience. For voter turnout, low turnout rate among senior citizens is mostly linked to health issues and low turnout rate among younger cohorts is linked to generational difference based on political socialization years. Middle aged groups have the highest participation due to having a more stable life (having a job, being married, less residential mobility) (Bhatti, Hansen & Wass, 2012). Moreover, this curvilinear relationship also shows itself in unconventional participation. This high participation rate in the middle-aged group is interpreted as the aging if “protest generation” (Jennings, 1987 cited in Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). In order to control for these effects, *Age Square* variable is also included into the analyses.

Gender is also a widely adopted control variable in participation literature. Studies show that women are more apolitical and engage less in both unconventional and conventional participation (Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2010; Norris, 2002). For the measurement, *Gender* is taken as a binary variable with 0 corresponding to male and 1 corresponding to female.

Education is another widely used control variable in political science literature. Both based on cognitive mobilization model and resource mobilization model, it is integrated into this analysis (Denny & Doyle, 2008; Kern, Marien & Hooghe, 2015; Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2010; Stockemer, 2014). Educated citizens have increased cognitive skills that makes it easier to understand and interpret political information which in turn increases their likelihood to participate (Denny & Doyle, 2008; Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2010; Stockemer, 2014). In addition, higher-educated individuals have greater access to resources resulting from their increased cognitive and civic skills that puts them in an advantageous position and consequently increases their likelihood to participate (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995; Kern, Marien & Hooghe, 2015). In the WVS series, the *Education* variable has nine levels; *no formal education*, *incomplete primary school*, *complete primary school*, *incomplete secondary school: technical/ vocational type*, *complete secondary school:*

technical/ vocational type , incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type, complete secondary school: university-preparatory type, some university-level education, without degree, university - level education, with degree. To get a more reliable and concise measure, these are rearranged into four new groups: the ones who completed no education; primary education; secondary education; university education.

As a part of the theories of grievance, relative deprivation and resource mobilization, the variables employment status, household income and economic satisfaction are controlled (see Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995; Kern, Marien & Hooghe, 2015; Smets & van Hem, 2013). The grievance literature suggests that conditions that generate economic difficulty might stimulate grievances which people demonstrate through protest behavior. The lack of a stable job or low household income can be considered as situations that generate such economic difficulties. In a similar vein, these difficulties might trigger the feeling of relative deprivation and result in protest participation. On the other hand, resource mobilization theory argues that people who have less resources have lower tendencies to participate because the struggle to hold on a job and economic hardship decreases the time and resources that enables participation. Moreover, more resources enable people to access information, create professional and social networks, increase civic skills which in turn increases political participation. Relative deprivation and grievance theories predominantly belong to social movement literature and used to explain unconventional participation. On the other hand, resource model is used to explain both conventional and unconventional participation. In fact, Smets and van Ham (2013) demonstrates that resource model of voter turnout is the most commonly used model to explain variances at the individual level. The question concerned with the occupational status of the individual had the following options for respondents to choose from; *full time, part time, self-employed, retired, housewife, student, unemployed and other.* *Unemployment* answer is coded as 1 and other answers are coded as 0. For measuring *Household Income*, each respondent was asked to report his or her household income on a 10-step scale ranging from 1 to 10, 1 being the lowest step and 10 the highest.

Economic Satisfaction is added to assess something more than the mere experience of economic hardship, that is, the individual perception of that conditions. Relative deprivation theory argues that people participate in politics when they compare themselves with other individuals and feel relatively deprived from the resources. Similarly, grievance theory states that deprivation from economic resources create grievances among individuals that result in protest behavior. Hence, both of these theories point to a psychological feeling of unrest. Since satisfaction also denotes a feeling, economic satisfaction variable might be even better for assessing the relative deprivation and grievance theories of participation. *Economic Satisfaction* is captured by asking the question “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?” 1 corresponding to *completely dissatisfied* and 10 corresponding to *completely satisfied*.

In order to control for the effect of cognitive/psychological engagement, *interest in politics* is added to the analysis. People who are interested in politics shows higher turnout rates as well as greater tendency to engage in extra-institutional means of participation. (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995; Denny & Doyle, 2008). This variable has four levels: *very interested*, *somewhat interested*, *not very interested* and *not at all interested*. The answers are reverse coded to attribute the highest value to the most interested individual.

Interpersonal Trust is also included in the analyses to control for the role of cost-benefit calculations in political participation (Benson & Roncon, 2004; Kaase, 1999). Trust in others increases the expectancy to exert a collective influence and thus, decreases the cost of protest behavior (Benson & Roncon, 2004). In addition, confidence in others might also increase the participation to the electoral process, although the sufficient data for such relation are low (see Smets & van Ham, 2013). *Interpersonal trust* is measured by asking respondents whether most people can be trusted or not. The results are recoded for 0 to correspond low level of trust and 1 to high level of trust.

5.2.1.2. Macro-Level Variables

Economic Development and *Income Inequality* are added to control for the grievance, relative deprivation and resource models of participation at the macro-level. As mentioned earlier, while economic conditions are argued to be creating grievances and the feeling of deprivation that increase the tendency to participate, the lack of adequate economic conditions might also depress political participation because of the conditions it creates such as unavailability of time, money, skills, networks and so on. Although these variables are frequently used in both theoretical and empirical studies of social movements, they are not as much acknowledged in the conventional participation literature (see Geys 2006). However, the Great Depression in 2008 and following economic crisis have increased the emphasis on these macro-level economic issues and these variables started to be integrated more into the studies of voting behavior to control for the effect of resource mobilization model. *Economic Development* is included to determine the material wealth of each country. Economic development variable is measured by the natural logarithm GDP per capita. The *Income Inequality* variable uses Gini index for its measurement. Information on both of these variables are provided by the World Bank.

The literature on voting turnout has repeatedly underlines the significant effect of compulsory voting (Geys, 2006; Gosnel, 1930; Panagopoulos, 2008; Tingsten, 1937). The general consensus is that countries that have compulsory voting experience higher levels of voter turnout due to the deterring influence of penalties. *Compulsory Voting* is a binary variable with 1 indicating the existence of compulsory voting and 0 indicating its absence. Similarly, as Geys (2006) demonstrates, the type of *Electoral System* is widely utilized in the studies of conventional participation. Proportional representation (PR) systems is argued to be fostering higher turnout. First, PR system increases the number of political parties and gives voter more options, which decreases the wasted votes since the likelihood for an individual to find a party in which they like increases. Second, “it reduces distortion between the votes won by a party in an election and the number of seats it obtains” which increases

the incentive to vote (Blais & Carty, 1990, p.167). Third, in PR system, every votes count, which increases parties' tendency to mobilize and campaign everywhere. This variable is examined on three levels: proportional representation, mixed systems (PR and plurality/majority) and plurality/majority representation. PR is coded as 1, mixed as 2 and majority/plurality as 3. Thus, as the value of electoral system decreases, the proportionality of the electoral system increases. Both *Compulsory voting* and *Electoral System* variables are created based on the data presented in IDEA International.

For the measurement of the availability of opportunity structures in the nation, *Democracy* variable is included. Liberal democracy index (v2x_libdem) in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset is used. This variable “emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority.” It examines the extent of limitations of government activities on civil liberties, independency of judiciary, the application of rule of law and effectiveness of checks and balances. These principles theoretically align with the proposition of social movement literature regarding the political opportunity structure which suggests that contextual availability considerably influences the tendency to engage in protest behavior (Stockemer, 2014). Therefore, this variable is a proper measure for examining the toleration level of state institutions, laws and regulations which would influence protest behavior. In addition to that, it also considers the effectiveness of electoral democracy, which also makes it a good control variable for conventional participation.

As another variable that focuses on the contextual opportunity structures, *Fractionalization* is measured. The “ethnolinguistic fractionalization index” of Alesina et al. (2003) is operationalized. This index covers three level of fractionalization: ethnic fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization and religious fractionalization which measure the level of heterogeneity in terms of languages that are spoken and religious and ethnic groups diversity in the nation. Alesina et al. (2003), argue that cultural, religious and ethnic homogeneity in the society can result in increased cohesiveness and consequently, collective action. In relation to voting

behavior, although increased cohesion is also expected to increase voter turnout (Cohen, 1982), there are arguments that heterogeneity (high fractionalization) might increase voter turnout (Zimmer, 1976). This thesis deems this variable as worthy of including due to the existing political climate of the years WVS 6th wave was conducted. After the Syrian war, millions of refugees have dispersed to the different regions of the world, which proliferated the emphasis on ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity on political statements of both politicians and citizens. Based on this contextual climate, the fractionalization is worth including into the analysis of political participation.

5.3. Analyses and Results

The first aim of this research is to show the trends on who participate in which type of activities in terms of their adherence to different democracy conceptualizations. These trends are illustrated in Table 4 which displays the bivariate relationships between every type of participation and dimensions of democracy understanding. All correlations are significant at $p < 0.01$. The results show that the more people define democracy by its authoritative characteristics, the more they abstain from both conventional and unconventional participation. This means that people with authoritative conceptualizations are more apolitical. On the other hand, the more people define democracy as liberal, the more they participate both in conventional and unconventional means. Thus, people with liberal definitions fit the participatory models of democracy where citizens participation by all means is highly emphasized. When it comes to redistributive understanding, the more people understand democracy as redistributive, the less they participate in institutional political activities and the more they participate in extra-institutional political activities. The results so far delineate a positive panorama about the trends in the world, that is, people who adhere to liberal and redistributive ideals participate more and consequently, increase the potential for democratic congruence and transition in the nations. In a similar vein, the ones who adhere to authoritative ideals seems to

participate less in all political activities, which would indicate a decrease in the potential for the non-democratic transition for the nations.

Table 4 *Zero-order Correlations between Different Concepts of Democracy and Political Participation*

	Authoritative Understanding	Liberal Understanding	Redistributive Understanding
Conventional participation	-.17***	.15***	-.04***
Unconventional participation	-.07***	.09***	.01***

Note: **= $p < 0.05$; ***= $p < 0.01$ Source: WVS

The selection of the model for hypothesis testing is very important and need to be done carefully by taking potential risks and nature of the data into consideration. Multilevel analysis is used because the dependent variable is continuous and the data is nested in different levels (micro and macro levels). The Wald chi-square test shows that for both conventional and unconventional participation analyses random coefficient models are a better fit than the null model, which is the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model. This highlights the fact that the data at hand have nested structure. Hence, a multilevel model instead of OLS model is justified. In addition, analysis of collinearity statistics shows that for both of these dependent variables shows that all of the independent variables have a VIF value smaller than 5, which is less than the widely acknowledged limit of 10.0 (Hair et al., 1995). This means that the data have met the assumption of collinearity. To further check the appropriateness of the application of multilevel model, an initial variance components analyses is conducted. It shows that for conventional participation, 14.52% is explained by country-level variables and 85.48% is explained by individual-level variables. On the other hand, for unconventional participation, 19.17% is explained by country-level

variables and 80.83% is explained by individual-level variables. All in all, incorporating micro- and macro-level variables in a multi-level framework proves to be necessary. Otherwise, important sections of variance would have been unaddressed in a standard OLS framework.

The following equation of the final model delineates the formal description of the multilevel analyses. Although some variables do not have strong theoretical justifications to be controlled in one of these separate analyses (e.g. compulsory voting in the analysis of unconventional participation), in order to increase reliability, all control variables are included for each analysis. For that reason, there is only one dependent variable on the equation that represents both conventional and unconventional participation.

The i denotes the individual and j denotes the country. The term α_{0j} next to every individual variable refers to impact the individual-level variable on political participation.

$$\text{Political Participation}_{ij} = \alpha_{0j} + \alpha_{1j}\text{Age}_{ij} + \alpha_{2j}\text{Gender}_{ij} + \alpha_{3j}\text{Interpersonal Trust}_{ij} + \alpha_{4j}\text{Economic Satisfaction}_{ij} + \alpha_{5j}\text{Household Income}_{ij} + \alpha_{6j}\text{Political Interest}_{ij} + \alpha_{7j}\text{Employment Status}_{ij} + \alpha_{8j}\text{Authoritative Understanding}_{ij} + \alpha_{9j}\text{Liberal Understanding}_{ij} + \alpha_{10j}\text{Redistributive Understanding}_{ij} + \alpha_{11j}\text{Education}_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad (1)$$

As one can see, the intercept of the equations is α_{0ij} . This highlights the nested structure of the data this thesis operationalizing. The term β refers to the impact of the country-level variable in political participation.

$$\alpha_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01}\text{Income Inequality}_j + \beta_{02}\text{Compulsory Voting}_j + \beta_{03}\text{Democracy}_j + \beta_{04}\text{Fractionalization}_j + \beta_{05}\text{GDP Growth}_j + \beta_{06}\text{Electoral System}_j + r_{0j} \quad (2)$$

Based on these equations, Table 5 below shows the multilevel analyses for both conventional and unconventional participation.

Table 5 *Explaining the Role of Democratic Conceptualizations on Political Participation*

	Conventional Participation (Model 1)	Unconventional Participation (Model 2)
<i>Individual-level</i>		
Education		
2	-.008 (.011)	.071*** (.009)
3	.016 (.011)	.129*** (.009)
4	.060*** (.013)	.223*** (.010)
Age	.039*** (.000)	.003*** (.000)
Age Squared	-.000*** (9.72e-06)	-.000*** (8.20e-06)
Gender (female=1)	.012* (.006)	-.062*** (.005)
Interpersonal trust	.052*** (.007)	.037*** (.006)
Economic satisfaction	.006*** (.001)	-.007*** (.001)
Household income	.002 (.002)	.005*** (.001)

Table 5 (Continued)

Political interest	.111*** (.003)	.123*** (.003)
Employment status (unemployment=1)	-.037*** (.010)	.008 (.008)
Authoritative understanding	-.028* (.014)	-.124*** (.012)
Redistributive understanding	-.022 (.015)	.038** (.013)
Liberal understanding	.127*** (.015)	.187*** (.013)
<i>Country-level</i>		
Economic development (log of GDP)	-.033 (.046)	.069* (.032)
Income Inequality	-.000 (.005)	.003 (.003)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	.233 (.244)	.086 (.152)
Electoral system	-.043 (.053)	.043 (.035)
Compulsory voting (compulsory voting=1)	.268** (.089)	.028 (.052)
Democracy	.174 (.242)	.489*** (.146)

Table 5 (Continued)

Number of observations	44,554	38,245
Number of countries	37	37
Wald Chi-Sq	6540.86***	5188.82***

Notes: ***= $p < 0.001$, **= $p < 0.01$, *= $p < 0.05$. Standard errors are shown below in parentheses.

Significant coefficients are highlighted in bold.

Sociodemographic variables (age, education, gender) are found to be statistically significant for both dependent variables. For age, on contrary to expectations, the results show that older people are more inclined to engage in both conventional and unconventional political participation. Additionally, age square results show a curvilinear relationship for both types of participation. This means that middle aged people are more inclined to participate compared to other age groups. This result is more in line with the findings of recent political participation literature (Stolle & Hooghe, 2011).

For the gender variable, women engage more in electoral participation and less in unconventional participation. It seems that gender gap has disappeared for conventional participation so much so that women now engage more in electoral participation. This is in line with general consensus that gender gap has started to diminished in the contemporary world (Norris, 2007). On the other hand, as the recent literature demonstrates, gender gap still persists in unconventional participation (Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2010; Norris, 2002).

In term of the influence of educational attainment, only acquiring a university education or higher (compared to no education at all) have significantly predicted conventional participation. On the other hand, unconventional participation is predicted by every level of educational attainment. Comparing the beta values of two dependent variables, the prediction power of education on every level is stronger for

unconventional participation. Overall, the data demonstrates that having an education most significantly predicts unconventional political participation. Regarding interpersonal trust and political interest, both Model 1 and Model 2 shows statistical significance at $p < .001$. As people trust each other more, they are more likely to engage in conventional and unconventional participation. High levels of interest also predict both types of political activity in a positive manner.

Economic satisfaction, household income and employment status are used to control for relative deprivation, grievance and resource models at the individual-level. The results show that unemployed people are less likely to vote in local and national elections. This is in line with the resource model of voter turnout (Smets & van Hem, 2013). However, this model does not hold for the unconventional participation since the results yield insignificant relationship between employment status and protest behavior. Moreover, the level of household income significantly predicts only unconventional participation. The direction of influence is positive, which means that as the economic well-being of a person increases, their likelihood to engage in protest activity also increases. This finding is also in favor of the resource model of participation (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995). Economic satisfaction's relationship with conventional participation also highlights the proposition of resource model which claims that increase in resources gives people more time and money to participate in political activities because the results show that as economic satisfaction increases, voting increases. On the other hand, lower economic satisfaction seems to predict protest behavior which gives support for the classical breakdown theories that are also visible in recent social movements literature (Grosso & Giugni, 2015; Kriesi, 2012; Kern, Marien & Hooghe, 2015). In conclusion, the most substantiated theory is resource mobilization in both unconventional and conventional participation. However, economic satisfaction seems to present support also for the classical breakdown theories while predicting unconventional participation.

Of the contextual-level variables in the Model 1, only compulsory voting yields a significant effect. On the other side, Model 2 shows that only economic development

and the level of democracy have significant effects on unconventional participation. Compared to economic development ($b = .069, p < .05$), democracy seems to have a stronger effect on unconventional participation ($b = .489, p < .001$). While these confirm the opportunity structure model of social movements, looking at the low level of significance of economic development and non-significance of income inequality, it appears that grievance and relative deprivation theories at the macro-level are not strong indicators of unconventional participation.

To turn into the core arguments of this thesis, for conventional participation, authoritative and liberal understanding of democracy seem to have strongly predicted voter turnout. The direction of influence for authoritative understanding is negative, meaning individuals who hold authoritative ideals are less politically active in conventional types of participation. This confirms the $H1_3$ of the thesis. Consistent with the $H1_1$, the relationship between liberal understanding and conventional participation is positive. This means that the more people adhere to liberal definitions the more they are likely to engage in institutional political activities. The correlational relationship between redistributive understanding and electoral participation does not seem to be apparent in the multilevel analysis. That is to say, redistributive understanding does not have a significant influencing power over the conventional participatory activities of individuals, thus rejecting $H1_2$. This result confirms the findings of Oser and Hooghe (2018) in which they observed inactivity in institutionalized participation in “the social rights group” who adhere to the social democratic ideals of democracy. On the other hand, redistributive conceptualizations seem to have positive influence over unconventional political participation ($H2_2$).

Model 2 also shows that adherence to liberal and authoritative conceptualizations are both significant predictors of unconventional political participation. When people attribute the liberal notions to the definition of democracy, their likelihood of engaging in unconventional political activities increases, confirming $H2_1$. For authoritative understanding, the beta value is $-.124$, which means that holding authoritative conceptualizations of democracy depresses unconventional participation for individuals ($H2_3$). Moreover, for conventional participation, the beta

value and significance levels are lower ($b = -.028$, $p < .05$), which points out to the fact that authoritative understanding has a higher substantive effect on unconventional participation compared to conventional participation.

Overall, looking at the coefficient magnitudes of each of these three variables (authoritative, redistributive and liberal), it seems that liberal understanding has the largest substantive effect on both types of political participation, with one unit increase in the value of liberal understanding resulting in 0.13 unit increase in conventional participation and 0.19 unit increase in unconventional participation. It is followed by the authoritative understanding of democracy with one unit increase in the value of authoritative understanding resulting in 0.03 unit decrease in conventional participation and 0.12 unit decrease in unconventional participation. Redistributive understanding has the least explanatory power among the three main variables since it does not influence conventional participation at all and a one-unit increase in redistributive understanding is only associated with 0.04 unit increase in unconventional participation.

To conclude, the findings of the statistical analysis confirms all of the hypothesis of this thesis except for *H1₂*. Apparently, redistributive understanding of democracy does not function as a predictor for conventional participation. This result may provide an additional insight about the influence of welfare policies of governments over individual's voting behavior. Consistent with the expectations, liberal understanding and authoritative understanding of democracy predict both types of political participation. While people who emphasize free and fair elections, gender equality and protection of civil rights are more likely to engage in both institutional and non-institutional activities, the ones who understand democracy as a regime where the interpretation of laws by religious authorities, military intervention, and obedience to ruler of the nation are less likely to participate in any political activity.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1. Limitations

This thesis has experienced a number of limitations that has to be taken into account while considering the results and implications. The most apparent limitation of this research is the fact that the statistical findings in multilevel analyses cannot reflect a genuine causal relationship due to the cross-sectional nature of the data that is used. Second, due to preference falsification problem, certain countries were excluded from the analysis, which in turn limited the generalizability of the research. Moreover, although undemocratic countries are excluded from the research, preference falsification problem might not be totally eliminated since “partly free” countries are included in the analyses and thus, preference falsification problem can still present itself in those less democratic settings.

Thirdly, there are difficulties that are encountered due to the lack of sufficient data. For example, there are other dimensions that can be integrated into conventional and unconventional participation variables. For instance, ideally, unconventional participation can also include activities of political consumerism or “boycotts” or e-participation and conventional participation can also include activities such as money donations, contacting government officials and involvement on campaign activities. Unfortunately, these activities are not covered in the 6th wave of WVS and thus, this thesis was unable to include them in the statistical analyses. Another difficulty is that the dates of some of the control variables at the country-level does not completely match with the survey dates of WVS 6th wave. In these cases, the data closest to the survey date of WVS is operationalized.

6.2. Discussion

In spite of the limitations, this thesis makes several contributions to the literature on both political participation and democratic understandings of the individuals. First, it complements to the literatures on democratization, legitimacy and democratic congruence by highlighting the fundamental role of conceptualizations of democracy while examining democratic attitudes. Thus, this thesis once again shows that while measuring democratic evaluations, democratic support and demand for democracy by the individuals, the fact that democracy means different things to different people should not be disregarded. Moreover, finding different definitions of democracy as an influencing factor for political participation all over the world highlights the importance of values, preferences and knowledge while examining political participation.

Furthermore, the results provide an insight to the relationship between individuals' different democracy conceptualizations and political participation, which is a quite understudied subject. It contributes to the literature with its novel perspective on the evaluation and presentation of the relationship. While previous studies have provided rather brief rationale for the link between political participation and conceptualizations of democracy, this thesis has further expanded the scope of the literature and resorted to different literatures to ground the hypotheses more firmly. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first comparative research about the influence of different understandings of democracy on political participation that includes more than one region of the world. Therefore, it provides a more comprehensive framework of interpretation and thus, enables sounder generalizable propositions.

In addition, the statistical findings of this thesis contribute to the literature with its novel insight about the influence of authoritative understandings on political participation. The importance of authoritative conceptualizations of democracy has been highlighted by a number of researches, yet, the focus is mainly on why and how people define democracy with authoritarian notion. The consequences of this

definition are highly neglected. This thesis fills this lacuna by showing the significant influence of authoritative conceptualizations over both types of participation. Apparently, the increase in the authoritative understanding of democracy decreases both electoral and protest participation of the individuals. Such disinvolvement of people who adhere to authoritative conceptions draws a positive picture for the discussion regarding the concern for participation of the unsophisticated citizenry.

Lastly, this thesis draws attention to the importance of democratic education of citizens. As the findings show, the more people use liberal (or even redistributive) notions of democracy to define it the more they engage in political participation. At the same time, defining democracy as authoritative decreases the likelihood to engage in any kind of political action. This means that a “correct” definition of democracy triggers democracy inducing activities whereas “wrong” definitions hamper them. Thus, for the processes of creation of the democratic citizens or genuine democrats, this thesis proposes an understudied dimension. On that account, this thesis opens up a relatively new venue for future academic research and policy advice on how to improve democratic citizenship.

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APPENDICES

A. FACTOR ANALYSES OF CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION

Table A.1 *Factor Loadings and Unique Variances of Conventional Participation with Party Membership*

Variables	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Party membership	0.25	0.94
Vote in local elections	0.91	0.17
Vote in national elections	0.90	0.18

B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table B.1 *Descriptive Statistics of Variables*

	Mean	Min.	Max.	Std. Deviation	N
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Conventional Participation	2.53	1	3	.68	55961
Unconventional Participation	1.50	1	3	.53	46288
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
<i>Individual Level Variables</i>					
Authoritative Understanding	.40	0	1	.25	54988
Liberal Understanding	.76	0	1	.22	56493
Redistributive Understanding	.60	0	1	.24	56528
Age	43.26	16	99	17.02	60285
Gender	.52	0	1	.43	58945
Education Level	2.68	1	4	.88	60072
Employment	.10	0	1	.30	57654
Interpersonal Trust	.24	0	1	.43	58945
Political Interest	2.34	1	4	.97	59766
Economic Satisfaction	6.07	1	10	2.41	59961
Household Income Level	4.84	1	10	2.13	58318
<i>Country Level Variables</i>					
Democracy	.59	.16	.87	.21	60388
Compulsory Voting	.29	0	1	.45	60388
Electoral System	1.86	1	3	.82	60388
Fractionalization	.42	.42	.02	.19	60388
Income Inequality	39.08	24.6	63.38	9.49	60388
Economic Development	9.20	6.83	10.88	1.22	60388

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Literatrde Siyasal Katılım

Siyasal katılım, demokratik vatandaşlığın hayati bir unsuru olarak kabul edilir (Dahl, 1998). Eęer demokrasi teriminin kkenine inersek, bu terimin kendisi vatandaşların yani "demos" un ynetim gc anlamına gelmektedir. Bu ynetim gc doęal olarak katılım eylemini de yanında gerektirir. Bu nedenle, "demos" un kamu politikalarının oluřturulduęu srece katılımı demokrasi iin aıka vazgeilmezdir. řu ana kadar birok akademisyen tarafından oluřturulmuř siyasal katılım tanımlarına bakarsak bu tanımların bazı temel zellikler etrafında dndęn gzlemleyebiliriz. Kısaca zetlemek gerekirse, siyasi katılım *vatandaşlar* tarafından gerekleřtirilen, *hkmetleri ve siyaseti etkilemek* iin yapılan, *gnll hareketler* btndr.

Literatrde siyasi katılım iki kategoride ayrılmaktadır: konvansiyonel ve konvansiyonel olmayan katılım. Konvansiyonel katılım temel olarak yasama, cumhurbaşkanlığı veya yerel seimlerde oy kullanmayı kapsamakla beraber siyasi partilere ve sendikalara yelik, partilere veya adaylara para yardımı vb. faaliyetleri de iinde barındırabilir. Kısacası, konvansiyonel katılımın en nemli ve ayırt edici zellięi siyasi srece ynelik etkinin seim alanında gerekleřmesidir. te yandan, konvansiyonel olmayan katılım, seimlerin baęlamı dıřında bir alanda siyasi sonuları etkilemeyi amalamaktadır. Bu tr iin bazı rnekler dileke imzalamak, boykotlara, grevlere ve gsterilere katılmaktır. Bu tarz protesto faaliyetleri insanların seslerini duyurmaları iin resmi siyasi kurumların arabuluculuęunu gerektirmemeleri ile konvansiyonel olan katılımdan ayrılır.

Akademisyenler uzun sredir insanların siyasal katılımının nedenlerini arařtırmaktadır. Bu davranıřları aıklamak iin birok bireysel ve makro dzeyde faktr, kurulan teorilerin ıřıęında test edilmiř ve vatandaşların siyasal katılım davranıřlarını anlamada nemli adımlar atılmıřtır. Genel olarak, bireylerin siyasi katılımı ile ilgili teoriler  aıklama etrafında dnmektedir: maliyet-fayda analizi, motivasyonun etkisi ve hem mikro hem makro dzeyde yapısal fırsatların (opportunity structures) varlığı. Bu alıřma, siyasi katılımı etkileme potansiyeli olan

nispeten yeni ve az çalışılmış bir değişken önermektedir: bireylerin demokrasi bilgisi¹⁵. Bu değişkenin siyasal katılımıla ilgili çalışmaları oldukça sınırlı düzeydedir (Canache, 2012; Oser ve Hooghe, 2018). Dolayısıyla bu tez, demokrasinin farklı kavramsallaştırılmasının siyasal katılımı nasıl etkileyebileceğinin açıklayarak literatürdeki bu eksikliği doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Fakat bu ilişkiye geçmeden önce tezin hem teorik dayanaklarını güçlendirmek için hem de istatistiksel analizde yardımcı olması amacıyla bireyleri siyasal aktivitelerde yer almaya motive eden mevcut teorilerin gözden geçirilmesi gerekmektedir. Yapılan kapsamlı literatür taraması sonucunda konvansiyonel olmayan katılımıda “grievance” (şikayet) teorisi, “relative deprivation” (göreceli yoksunluk) teorisi ve “resource mobilization” teorisini test etmek adına gelir düzeyi, ekonomik memnuniyet ve istihdam durumu; “cognitive engagement” (bilişsel katılım) modelini test etmek adına siyasete olan ilgi düzeyi; maliyet-fayda hesaplamaları yoluyla alınan katılım kararını test etmek için kişilerarası güven seviyesi; makro düzeyde “grievance” (şikayet) teorisi, “relative deprivation” (göreceli yoksunluk) teorisini test etmek için de ekonomik eşitsizlik ve Gayri safi milli hasıla (GSMH) değerleri kontrol edilmek amacıyla analize eklenmiştir. Ayrıca makro düzeyde demokrasi seviyesi de ölçülerek “opportunity structure” modeli de kontrol edilmiştir. Bu teorilerin bir kısmı konvansiyonel katılımı da içerse de konvansiyonel katılım literatürü ağırlıklı olarak makro düzeydeki değişkenlere odaklanır. Bu nedenle zorunlu oy yasasının varlığı, seçim sistemi ve “ethnolinguistic fractionalization” (etnikdilsel ayrım) da kontrol değişkenleri olarak eklenmiştir.

Demokrasinin Boyutları

Demokrasinin ne anlama geldiği ve onu diğer rejim türlerinden ayıran temel özellikler, siyaset bilimi akademisyenleri arasında önemli bir tartışma konusudur. (ör. Gallie, 1956). Anlaşabildikleri en temel nokta demokrasinin çok boyutlu bir kavram olduğudur. Bu tez de bağımsız değişkenini incelerken (demokrasi anlayışı)

¹⁵ Tez boyunca demokrasi bilgisi, demokrasinin kavramsallaştırılması, demokrasi anlayışı ve hatta demokratik değerler aynı şeye atıfta bulunmak için birbirini yerine kullanılmıştır.

demokrasinin bu çok boyutlu özelliğine odaklanacaktır. Dolayısıyla demokrasi ile ilgili soruları (demokrasi modülü olarak adlandırılan değişkenin içindeki sorular) daha iyi anlamak için demokrasinin farklı boyutlarının kapsamlı bir şekilde gözden geçirilmesi gerekmektedir. Kullanılacak olan demokrasi modülü teorik olarak temelde üç demokrasi vizyonunu yansıtır; liberal, yeniden dağıtımcı ve otoriter. Liberal vizyon ağırlıklı olarak Dahl'n tanımına dayanır. Dahl (1971) için liberal demokrasinin sekiz kurumsal garantisi vardır; örgüt kurma ve katılma özgürlüğü, ifade özgürlüğü, oy kullanma hakkı, kamu görevine hak kazanma hakkı, siyasi liderlerin destek ve oy kullanma hakkı, alternatif bilgi kaynaklarına ulaşma hakkı, serbest ve adil seçimler ile hükümet politikalarını oylamaya dayalı kurumların varlığı ve diğer tercih ifadeler hakları. Dahl'a göre, bunlar demokratikleşmenin iki boyutunu oluşturmaktadır; rekabet “contestation” ve katılım “participation”. Bu özellikler demokrasiyi alternatiflerinden ayıran temel özelliklerden sayılır. Bu özellikler ayrıca açıkça görülebileceği üzere demokrasi modülündeki “insanlar özgür seçimlerde liderlerini kendileri seçerler” ve “Sivil haklar insanları baskıya karşı korur” demokrasi tanımlarıyla örtüşmektedir. Burada demokrasi modülünde bahsi geçip direkt olarak değinilmeyen ama liberal demokrasinin içinde barındırdığı tek konu siyasi eşitlik (political equality) ilkesidir. Liberal demokrasilerde siyasi eşitlikle ilgili tartışmalar bu temel ilkenin sürdürülmesini engelleyen toplumsal eşitsizliklere de değinmektedir. Sosyal eşitsizliklerle ilgili tartışma, sınıf, ırk / etnisite, din ve cinsiyet üzerinden tartışılır. Bu konular arasında, cinsiyet eşitsizliği ve demokrasi ile ilgili tartışmalar bu tez için özellikle önemlidir, çünkü demokrasi modülünde katılımcılardan demokrasiler için “kadınların erkeklerle aynı haklara sahip” ifadesinin ne kadar doğru olduğunun değerlendirilmesi istenmiştir. Mill (1869), kadınların evdeki ve aile hayatındaki görevleri ve taahhütleri üstünden toplumdaki rollerinin tanımlanmasını eleştirmiştir. Bu atfedilen rollerin kadınların temsilde ve katılımında önemli bir handikap işlevi gördüğü literatürde defalarca bahsedilmiştir (Inglehart, Norris & Welzel, 2002; Norris, 2002, 2007). Bu nedenle liberal demokrasilerde siyasi eşitlik tartışmalarının kadın erkek eşitliği önemli bir yer kaplamakta ve bu nedenle demokrasi modülündeki bu konuyla alakalı değişken de teorik olarak liberal anlayış kategorisine yerleştirilmiştir.

Yeniden dağıtımcı demokrasi anlayışı demokrasinin maksimalist tanımının içinde yer alır ve sosyal demokrasi olarak da nitelendirilir. Bu demokrasi anlayışı, temsili ve katılımcı özellikleri barındırmakla beraber aynı zamanda etkili bir demokrasinin sosyal ön koşullarını da kapsar. Liberal demokratlara göre vatandaşlar aktif olarak katılımdan uzak tutulduğu sürece insanlar arasında meydana gelebilecek siyasal katılım ya da etki gücündeki eşitsizlik sorun değildir çünkü herkes katılma kararında özgürdür (Armingeon ve Schadel, 2015). Diğer taraftan, sosyal demokrasi literatürü, yalnızca katılma kararındaki özgürlüğe odaklanmanın sorunlu olduğunu savunmaktadır, çünkü demokratik katılımı engelleyebilecek başka faktörler de vardır. Bu bağlamda en çok bahsi geçen sorun maddi kaynakların dağılımdaki eşitsizliklerden kaynaklanan sosyal eşitsizliktir. Dolayısıyla, klasik liberal demokrasilerin politik eşitlik ilkesi sivil ve siyasi hakları garanti etse de siyasi eşitliği tehlikeye atan ekonomik koşullar göz ardı edilir ve sosyal demokrasi literatürü bunu gündeme getirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Her ne kadar kurumsal yapı (yasal olarak) eşit katılım, temsil fırsatları ve politik olarak gerekli kaynaklar sağlanmış olsa da sivil toplumdaki zenginlik dağılımının yapısı belirli grupların bu fırsatlara ulaşmasını engelleyebilir ve böylece onları demokratik süreçten dışlayabilir.

Şu ana kadar bahsi geçen teorik tartışmaların demokrasinin tanımlanması için kullanılan temel çerçeveler olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu tez, ağırlıklı olarak liberal görüşle çizilen bu teorik çerçevelere dayanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, göz önünde bulundurulması gereken önemli bir gerçeklik vardır; şimdiye kadar demokrasi için sunulan teorik çerçeve Batılı düşünürler tarafından liberal değerlere dayanarak çizilmiştir. Dolayısıyla daha objektif bir bakış açısı bizleri demokrasinin demokratik olmadığı düşünülen diğer tanımlarının olabileceği ihtimaline yönlendirebilir. Bu literatür incelemesinde, demokrasi modülündeki bir dizi soru demokrasinin maksimum ve minimum tanımlarından sapan ve otoriter olarak adlandırılan anlayışlara odaklandığından, bu tanımların ne olduğu ve potansiyel olarak nereden kaynaklandıklarından bahsetmek gerekmektedir. Daha alışlagelmemiş demokrasi türlerine odaklanan literatürler Demokrasi teriminin, her ulusun “özel kimliklerine” ve “otantik topluluklarına” uyum sağlayan bir tür rejim tanımı olarak alınması gerektiğini savunurlar (Esposito & Voll, 1996). Özellikle küreselleşme hareketinin, toplumsal kimliklerin yok sayılmasına neden olduğundan ve bunun da demokrasinin

tekil tanımlarının daha çok benimsenmesine neden olduğundan bahsedilmektedir. Bu literatüre göre demokrasi kavramı ülkelerin farklı tarihsel ve kültürel arka planı göz önünde bulundurularak uygulanmalı ve değerlendirilmelidir. Dolayısıyla demokrasi modülünde otoriter olarak tanımladığımız demokrasi anlayışı aslında farklı kültürlerin demokrasiyi kendilerine uyarlamalarından doğan tanımlardır.

Demokrasi Anlayışı ve Siyasal Katılım

Bu tezin temel olarak ilgilendiği araştırma sorusu hangi demokratik ideallerin hangi tür siyasal katılımı nasıl etkilediğidir. Fakat öncelikle insanların farklı demokratik bilgilere sahip olmasının neden önemli olduğundan ve ayrıca bunun siyasal katılımı olası bağlantısının neden araştırılmaya değer bir konu olduğundan bahsetmek gerekir. İlk olarak farklı demokrasi tanımlarının öneminden bahsetmek gerekirse, bu değişken özellikle demokratik meşruiyet (democratic legitimacy) ve demokratik uyum (democratic congruence) literatürlerinin temel aldığı değişkenler üzerindeki etkisi açısından oldukça önemlidir. Bu da demek oluyor ki ülkelerin demokratikleşme süreçlerini inceleyen araştırmalar için bu konudaki verilerin önemli bir yeri vardır. Maalesef, insanların demokratik destek ve taleplerini var olan rejim türüyle karşılaştırıp uyumlarını ölçen ve gelecekteki demokratikleşme süreciyle ilgili çıkarım yapan literatür, genelde insanların demokrasiden ne anladıkları konusunda ayrıntılı bir araştırma yapmamış, ortak bir anlayışın var olduğu üzerine araştırmalarını kurmuştur. Bu problemi ele alan ve çözüm önerileri sunan birkaç önemli akademisyen vardır (Canache, 2006; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Fuchs, 2007). Örneğin, Fuchs (2007) demokrasinin algılanmasına ve değerlendirilmesine dayanan demokratik tutumlar ölçeklerinin (demokrasiye verilen desteği, güveni, bağlılığı ölçen ölçekler) sorunlu olduğunu, çünkü insanların demokratik unsurlarla otokratik öğeyi karıştırmaya meyilli olduğunu savunuyor. Aynı şekilde Canache (2006) demokrasinin soyut bir kavram olduğu gerçeğine değinerek ve bu tutumları

ölçen anket sorularının öncesinde demokrasiyi tanımlamadıkları için demokratik kaçınılmaz olarak güvenilir olmayan sonuçlar vereceğinden bahseder.¹⁶

Farklı demokrasi tanımlarının siyasal katılımı ile olan ilişkisine gelince, bu ilişkinin incelenmesini önemli kılan argümanlar yine demokratikleşme ve demokrasi literatürlerinden gelir. Siyasal katılım aktivitelerinin altında birçok kişisel görüş, değer ve tercih yatar. Bunların içeriğinin ne olduğu siyasal katılımın kalitesinin değerlendirilmesi için kritik önem taşır. İnsanların demokrasiden ne anladıklarının ölçülmesi de siyasal katılımı ile ilişkisi açısından tam olarak bu bağlamda önemlidir. Örnek verirken, demokrasiyi dini otoritelerin kanunları yorumlaması ya da ordunun gerektiğinde yönetime geçmesi olarak algılayan bir bireyin siyasal alandaki katılımı demokratikleşme süreci açısından negatif bir etkiye sebep olacak potansiyele sahiptir. Tam da bu yüzden bazı uzmanlar eğer halkın çoğunluğu sofistike değilse siyasal olarak inaktif kalmalarının demokrasi için daha olumlu olacağından bahsederler. Yani bu tezin başlığında da bahsedilen demokratik birey üretimi için insanların siyasal katılımının demokratik ilkelere dayanması elzemdir.

Şimdiye kadar, sadece iki araştırma makalesi doğrudan bu tezin konusunu incelemiştir. Bunlar arasında en çok atıf yapılan makale, "Demokrasinin kavramsallaştırılması sivil katılımı etkileyebilir mi?" sorusu üzerine araştırmasını kuran Canache'nin (2012) çalışmasıdır. Bireylerin demokrasiyi tanımlama becerisinin insanların siyasal katılım kararı verirken kullandıkları kavramsal bir araç olarak işlev görebildiğini öne sürmüştür. Daha sofistike bir demokrasi anlayışına sahip olmanın demokratik yönetime daha fazla bağlanmaya karşılık geldiği için, sofistike tanımların legal sayılabilecek siyasal katılım türlerini artırdığını savunmuştur. Bununla birlikte daha az sofistike tanımların legal olmayan siyasal protestolara katılımları arttırabileceğini söylemiştir. Bu tezin incelediği siyasal katılım türlerinin hepsi legal katılımın bir parçasıdır, dolayısıyla bu araştırmanın teorik çerçevesini bu teze uyarlayacak olursak bireyler demokrasinin liberal ve yeniden dağıtıcı kavramsallaştırmalarını benimsediğinde hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan katılımlarının artmasını bekleyebiliriz.

¹⁶ Yani örneğin "demokrasiyi bir yönetim rejimi olarak tercih eder miydiniz?" diye sorulurken demokrasinin ne olduğunun tanımı verilmiyor, sanki herkesin vereceği tanım aynıymış gibi varsayılarak sonuçlar analiz ediliyor.

Bu konuda yapılan bir diğ er  alıřma, demokratik idealler olarak “siyasi haklar” ve “sosyal haklar” ın benimsenmesinin insanları farklı siyasi davranıř t rlerine motive edip etmediđini test eden Oser ve Hooghe (2018) tarafından yapılmıřtır. Demokrasiyi “siyasi haklar” vurgusu ile tanımlayan bireylerin, siyasi kurumlara ve prosed rlere i kin dikkat g stermeleri nedeniyle konvansiyonel politik davranıřlara daha eđilimli olduklarını ileri s rmektedirler. Ayrıca, son protesto davranıřı hakkındaki literat rden yola  ıkarak (2008'de ekonomik gerilemeleriyle bařlayan)  zellikle “sosyal haklar” ı vurgulayan vatandařların endiřelerini daha  eřitli yollarla, yani konvansiyonel olmayan yollarla aktarmaları beklenmektedir. Burada “siyasi haklar” grubu demokrasiyi liberal olarak tanımlayanlara denk gelirken “sosyal haklar” grubu yeniden dađıtımcı olarak tanımlayanlara denk gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tez i in, liberal tanım konvansiyonel katılımı daha  ok arttırırken, yeniden dađıtımcı tanımın konvansiyonel olmayan katılımı daha  ok arttırması beklenebilir.

Vatandařların demokrasi anlayıřlarına farklı řekillerde odaklanan bařka  alıřmalar da vardır. Bengtsson ve Christensen (2014) ve Gherghina and Geissel (2017) yaptıkları  alıřmalarda insanların rejim t r  olarak tercih ettikleri    demokrasi kavramından bahsederler; temsil “representative”, uzmanlık “expert” ve katılım “participatory”. Temsil kavramı usul-temsili demokrasiye; uzmanlık kavramı teknokratik demokrasiye, katılım kavramı da katılımcı demokrasiye karřılık gelir. Usul-temsili demokrasilerin merkezi unsuru vatandař katılımı olduđundan “temsilci” anlayıřı benimseyen kiřilerin kurumsal katılım bi imlerine (oy kullanma) daha fazla katıldıklarını  ermektedirler.  te yandan, uzmanlık tanımlarını benimseyen kiřiler, sahip oldukları teknokratik g r ř n barındırdıđı  ıkarların temsiline bir grup yetkili tarafından yapılması anlayıřını kabul ettikleri i in, her t rl  katılımı da yer alma olasılıđı daha d ř k olacaktır. Son olarak, katılım boyutundaki katılım konusundaki y ksek vurgu nedeniyle, bu anlayıřı elinde bulunduran vatandařlar hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan siyasal faaliyetlerin bir par ası olacaktır. Bu tezin iřlediđi demokrasi mod l n n boyutlarına  evrildiđinde uzmanlık iřlevi, demokrasinin otoriter tanımlanmasına karřılık gelecektir. Dolayısıyla askeri y netimi, dini otoriteyi ve y neticilere itaati vurgulayan otoriter anlayıř boyutunun bileřenleri dikkate alındıđında, otoriter anlayıřtaki bir artıřın her t rl  siyasal katılımı azaltacađı beklenebilir. Bu  alıřmalardaki katılımcı ve temsili modellerin her ikisi de

liberal demokrasi anlayışına karşılık gelmektedir. Bu nedenle, Bengtsson ve Christensen (2014) ve Gherghina ve Geissel'in (2017) teorik tartışmalarına dayanarak, demokrasinin liberal anlayışı hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan katılımı arttırabilir.

Farklı demokrasi kavramlaştırmaları ile siyasal katılım arasındaki olası bir bağlantı, insanların değerleriyle (values) ilgilenen literatürden de de (public opinion) elde edilebilir. Sage handbook değerleri insan davranışının yapı taşları olan soyut ve genel kavramlar olarak tanımlar (Arzheimer, Evans ve Lewis-Beck, 2016). Benzer bir şekilde, çoğu sosyal bilimci, değerlerin, insan davranışını veya belirli tutumları, normları ve fikirleri yönlendiren ve açıklamaya yardımcı olan köklü motivasyonlar veya yönelimler olduğu konusunda hemfikirler (Halman, 2007). Yani değerler insan davranışını etkiler ve bu tez bağlamında “demokratik değerler” in vatandaşların politik davranışlarını etkilediği savunulabilir.¹⁷ Akademisyenler tarafından insani değerler, politik temel değerler, post-materyalist değerler vb. gibi incelenen birçok değer türü vardır. Bu tez, “demokratik değerler” ile arasında bağlantı kurulabilecek nitelikteki değerleri inceler. Örneğin post-materyalizm/materyalizm değer ölçeğinin demokratik değerleri temsil ettiğini varsaydığımız sorularla belli başlı benzerlikleri vardır. Post-materyalizm/materyalizm indeksi katılımcılardan içinde yaşamak istedikleri ülkenin hedeflerinin neler olması gerektiğini sıralamalarını ister. Seçenekler “ulusun düzenini korumak”, “yükselen fiyatlarla mücadele etmek”, “ifade özgürlüğünü korumak” ve “hükümet kararlarında insanlara daha fazla söz vermek” şeklindedir. (Inglehart, 1971). Kişiler bu seçenekleri kendilerine göre önem sırasına koyarlar; “ifade özgürlüğünü korumak” ve “hükümet kararlarında insanlara daha fazla söz vermek” ifadelerine öncelik verenler post-materyalist, “ulusun düzenini korumak”, “yükselen fiyatlarla mücadele etmek” ifadelerine öncelik verenler ise post-materyalist değerlere sahip kişiler olarak sayılır. Bu tezin kullandığı demokrasi modülünün sorularına uyarlandığında, post-materyalist değerler demokrasinin liberal kavramsallaştırılmasına; ülkedeki düzeni korumak ve artan fiyatlarla mücadele etmek

¹⁷ Her ne kadar bu araştırmanın ilgili olduğu demokratik bilginin bir değer olarak sayılması bir tartışma konusu niteliğinde olsa da tutum ve davranışları yönlendirme rolü açısından kesinlikle değerlerin belirli özelliklerini içerir (bkz. Alonso, 2016; Cho, 2014; Canache, 2012; Sarsfield, 2007; Oser ve Hooghe, 2018).

ise sırasıyla otoriter ve yeniden dağıtımcı kavramsallaştırmalara karşılık gelecektir. Araştırmalara göre post-materyalist insanların daha fazla protesto aktivitesinde yer alma eğilim göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, demokrasinin liberal anlayışını benimseyenlerden de böyle bir eğilim beklenebilir. Ayrıca bu çalışmalar materyalist insanların protesto aktivitelerine daha az katıldığını da söylemektedir, yani, otoriter ve yeniden dağıtımcı anlayışlar konvansiyonel olmayan atılım biçimlerini azaltabilir. Fakat bu ikinci argüman tartışmalıdır çünkü materyalistin kim olduğu ve nasıl ölçülebileceği konusu tam olarak net değildir (Brooks ve Manza, 1994; Davis, 2000). Örneğin, Brooks ve Manza (1994) “ulustaki düzeni korumak” içeriğinin otoriter çağrışımından dolayı materyalist değer yapısının bir parçası olarak görülmemesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu nedenle, kendi oluşturdukları post-materyalizm/materyalizm indeksinde post-materyalist öğeler “fikirlerin paradan daha önemli olduğu bir toplum” “insanlara iş ve toplumda daha söz hakkı verme”, “kirlilikle mücadele etme” ve “erkekler ve kadınlar için eşit hakkı garanti etme” ile ilgilidir. Materyalist maddeler ise “eşitsizliğin azaltılması”, “ekonomik fırsat sağlanması”, “suçla mücadele” ve “ulusun ekonomik büyümesinin sürdürülmesi” ile ilgilidir. Burada post-materyalist değerler, demokrasinin liberal anlayışı ile örtüşürken materyalist değerler yeniden dağıtımcı anlayış ile büyük ölçüde örtüşmektedir. Brooks ve Manza (1994) hem materyalist hem de post-materyalistin politik katılımlarının fazla olacağını söyler. Dolayısıyla hem yeniden dağıtımcı hem de liberal kavramsallaştırma konvansiyonel olmayan eylemi motive edebilir. Ayrıca, oylama ve post-materyalist değerler arasındaki ilişki açısından genel anlayış, post-materyalist değerleri olan insanların bu tarz konvansiyonel olan siyasal katılıma daha az eğilimli olduğudur. Bununla birlikte, Copeland (2014) argümanına göre, Inglehart’ın bahsettiği gibi post-materyalistler siyaset için daha fazla psişik enerjiye (psychic energy) sahiplerse, post-materyalist değerler oylama, kampanya faaliyetleri ve sivil katılım da dahil olmak üzere her türlü sivil ve siyasi katılımı meşgul olma olasılığını arttırmalıdır. Başka bir argüman, otoriter-liberter değerler olarak adlandırılan yeni bir değer ayrımı öneren Flanagan (Flanagan ve Lee, 2003; Inglehart ve Flanagan, 1987) tarafından gündeme getirilmiştir. Libertarler bağımsızlık, kendi kaderini tayin etme, eşitlik, özgürlük ve sosyal kurallara ve yasal otoritelere uymayan davranışlar gösterme özellikleriyle tanımlanırken otoriterler otorite, sadakat ve

dürüstlüğe saygı, düzen ve sosyal kontrol, yurtseverlik, ulusal askeri güç yoluyla güvenlik arayışı içinde olmaları gibi özellikleriyle tanımlanırlar. Siyasi (siyasi parti veya siyasi grup üyeliği) ve sivil katılım (sağlık, kadın grubu, gençlik çalışmaları, yaşlılar, engelliler vb. İle ilgili gönüllü kuruluşlara katılım) otoriterler ve libertarler için aynıdır. Ancak, protesto potansiyeli açısından, libertarlerin protesto davranışına daha eğilimli oldukları görülmüştür. Bir kez daha, liberal kavramsallaştırmaların, kayda değer düzeyde konvansiyonel katılımı ile birlikte potansiyel olarak daha yüksek konvansiyonel olmayan katılıma neden olması beklenebilir.

Diğer bir benzer değer indeksi Welzel'in (2013) özgürleştirici değerler (emancipative values) indeksidir. Bu indeks dört konuyu kapsamaktadır. Bunlardan ilki bağımsızlık, hayal gücü ve itaat gibi insanların çocuk yetiştirmede vurguladığı değerleri içerir ve “özerklik” (autonomy) ve “itaat etme” (obedience) ikiliğinin temsil ederler. İkincisi kürtaj, eşcinsellik ve boşanma gibi üreme tercihlerini vurgulayan “seçim” (choice) değişkenidir. Üçüncüsü, eğitim, iş ve siyasi katılım fırsatları açısından cinsiyet eşitliğine odaklanan “eşitlik” (equality) değişkenidir. Son olarak dördüncü değişken post-materyalizm/materyalizm indeksiyle aynı soruları kullanan “ses” (voice) değişkenidir. Bu tezin bağımsız değişkenleriyle ilişkilerine bakılırsa “eşitlikçi” yönelim ve “seçim” yönelimi, demokrasi modülünün liberal kategorisinde doğrudan “kadınlar ve erkekler eşittir” sorusuna değinmektedir; “özerklik/itaat etme” değişkeni, demokrasi modülünün otoriter kategorisinde de temel alınan genel bir itaat kavramına dayanır. Welzel ve Klingemann (2008), yüksek özgürleştirici değerlerin bireylerin dilekçeleri imzalama, boykotlara ve gösterilere katılma gibi eylemlerde bulunma eğilimini artırdığını göstermektedir. Benzer bir şekilde, Welzel ve Deutsch (2012) özgürleştirici değerlere bağlılığın protesto davranışını, yani daha az “itaat” ve daha “eşitlikçi” yönelimlerin konvansiyonel olmayan katılımı artırdığını bulmuştur. Sonuç olarak, bu sonuçlar “ses”, “eşitlik” ve “seçim” ilkelerine daha fazla, “itaat” ilkesine daha az vurgu yapılmasının geleneksel katılımı artırdığını göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, demokrasiyi tanımlarken daha liberal ve / veya daha az otoriter kavramlar kullanan insanlar konvansiyonel olmayan katılımı daha fazla ilgilenebilirler.

Yukarıdaki tartışmalar genel olarak ya politik katılımın liberal değerlerle olan ilişkisini tek başına inceler ya da çoğunlukla olduğu gibi politik katılımı etkileyen değerleri bir otoriter-liberal ikiliği içinde konumlandırır. Yeniden dağıtımçı

kavramları benimsemenin katılım üzerindeki etkisinden çok fazla söz edilmediği için, yeniden dağıtım tercihleri hakkındaki literatürden de bahsetmek bu konudaki hipotezleri sağlamlaştıracaktır. Poulos (2012), daha fazla dağıtımçı tercihleri olan bireylerin dilekçeler imzalama, gazetelere yazma ve kuruluşlardaki politikaları tartışmalara katılma gibi çeşitli yollarla siyasal katılımında bulunma olasılıklarının daha yüksek olduğunu göstermiştir. Benzer şekilde Dawes, Loewen ve Fowler (2016), insanlar faydacı (utilitarian) tercihlere sahip olduklarında, yani herkesin refahını artırmaya özen gösterdiklerinde, politik olarak aktif olmaya daha eğilimli olacaklarını göstermektedir. Buna ek olarak, Grasso ve Giugni (2019), yeniden dağıtımçı politikaları destekleyen insanların ülkedeki servet eşitsizliklerini telafi etmek için politik müdahaleyi tercih etme olasılıklarının daha yüksek olduğunu göstermektedir (daha yüksek vergiler veya diğer refah önlemleri yoluyla). Ayrıca, politik katılım literatürü yüksek eşitsizlik seviyelerinin vatandaşların hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan faaliyetlerini artırdığı ileri sürülmektedir. Bu etki, yüksek eşitsizlik seviyelerinin yediden dağıtım talebine çevrilmesinden kaynaklanıyor olabilir. Bu nedenle, demokrasinin anlamıyla ilgili yeniden dağıtımçı görüşlerin hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan katılıma eğilimini etkileyebileceği söylenebilir.

Metot ve Analiz

Farklı demokrasi kavramsallaştırmalarının siyasi katılım üzerindeki etkisi hakkındaki hipotezleri test etmek için Dünya Değerler Anketi (WVS) 6. dalgası kullanılmaktadır. WVS, çeşitli değişkenlere odaklanan büyük ölçekli, uluslararası bir araştırma programıdır. Bu anketin tez için seçilmesinin iki nedeni vardır. İlk olarak, WVS bu tezin hipotezlerini geniş bir ulus yelpazesinde test etme fırsatı sunar. İkincisi, WVS, demokrasi soruları içinde demokrasinin otoriter boyutunu içeren tek uluslararası anket araştırmasıdır. Bu tez aynı zamanda demokratik özellikleri demokratik olmayan özelliklerden ayırt etme kabiliyetini de ölçtüğü için, WVS kullanımı kaçınılmazdır.

Çalışma, Doğu Asya, Doğu Asya ve Pasifik, Avrupa ve Orta Asya, Latin Amerika ve Karayipler, Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika, Kuzey Amerika, Güney Asya,

Sahra-altı Afrika bölgelerinden toplam 40 tane ülkeyi kapsar. Dolayısıyla hem gelişmiş demokrasiler hem de geçiş demokrasilerine yer içerir. Buralardaki bölgelerin ve ulusların farklı tarihsel ve kültürel arka planları, farklı demokrasi anlayışlarının siyasi katılım üzerindeki etkisini incelemek için genel bir çerçeve oluşturma fırsatı sağlar.

Bu analizdeki bağımlı değişkenleri konvansiyonel ve konvansiyonel olmayan katılımdır. Ana açıklayıcı değişkenler demokrasinin kavramsallaştırılmasıdır. Tüm bağımlı ve açıklayıcı değişkenler CFA (Doğrulamalı Faktör Analizi) ile üretilmiştir ve sürekli değişkenlerdir. CFA tekniği, indekse dahil edilecek tüm değişkenleri basitçe toplamak yerine, her bir göstergenin ağırlıklarının dikkate alındığı bir indeks oluşturulmasına izin verir. Böylece, bu teknik rastgele dalgalanmaları ve ölçüm hatalarını en aza indirir.

Tüm mikro düzey göstergeleri, Dünya Değerler Araştırması'nın 6. dalgasından alınmıştır. Bu değişkenler yaş, cinsiyet, eğitim, gelir düzeyi, siyasete ilgi, kişilerarası güven, ekonomik memnuniyet ve istihdam durumudur. Tüm bu değişkenlerde “bilmiyorum” ve “yanıt yok” yanıtları kaldırılmıştır. Gini indeksi (Gelir eşitsizliği) ve kişi başına düşen GSYİH (Ekonomik kalkınma) verileri Dünya Bankası'ndan alınmıştır. Demokrasi indeksi için V-Dem ‘in liberal demokrasisi (v2x_libdem) değişkeni kullanılmıştır. Seçim sistemi ve Zorunlu oy verileri IDEA International' dan alınmıştır. Son olarak, Alesina ve ark.’nın ayrım indeksi etnik-dilsel ayrımı (ethnolinguistic fractionalization) kontrol etmek için kullanılmıştır. Bütün bu değişkenleri kontrol ederek yapılan çok düzeyli analizler genel olarak bu tezin hipotezlerini destekler niteliktedir.

Sonuçlara bakıldığında, demokrasinin otoriter ve liberal anlaşılmasının konvansiyonel katılımını kuvvetle etkilediği görülmektedir. Otoriter anlayış için etki yönü negatiftir, yani demokrasiyi daha otoriter tanımlayan bireyler konvansiyonel katılım türlerinde daha az aktiftir. Öte yandan, liberal anlayış ve konvansiyonel katılım arasında pozitif bir ilişki vardır. Yani, demokrasiyi tanımlarken liberal nosyonlar ne kadar kullanılmışsa, konvansiyonel katılım faaliyetlerinde bulunma olasılığı o kadar artmıştır. Demokrasiyi yeniden dağıtımcı nosyonlarla tanımlamadan bahsedecek olursak, bu tür tanımların konvansiyonel katılım üzerinde bir etkisi olmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Bu sonuç, hükümetlerin refah politikalarının bireylerin oy

verme davranışları üzerindeki etkisi hakkında ileriki çalışmalar için bir iç görüş sağlayabilecek nitelik taşır. Öte yandan, yeniden dağıtımcı kavramsallaştırmaların konvansiyonel olmayan siyasal katılım üzerinde olumlu etkisi olduğu görülmektedir. Konvansiyonel olmayan katılımı liberal ve otoriter anlayışların da önemli ölçüde etkilediği gözlemlenmiştir. İnsanlar demokrasiyi liberal kavramlarla tanımladıklarında, konvansiyonel olmayan katılım yollarına başvurma olasılıkları artmıştır. Ayrıca otoriter özellikleri demokrasi tanımının içine koymanın konvansiyonel olmayan katılımı azalttığı görülmektedir. Bütün bu demokrasi kavramsallaştırmalarının etki katsayıları incelendiğinde, her iki katılım şekline de en büyük etki sağlayanın liberal anlayış olduğu bulunmuştur. Bunu otoriter anlayış takip eder ve en az etkiye sahip boyut yeniden dağıtımcı özellikleri kullanarak tanımlamaktır. Özetlemek gerekirse, demokrasiyi tanımlarken özgür ve adil seçimleri, toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliğini ve sivil hakların korunmasını ağırlıklı olarak vurgulayan bireyler hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan katılım türlerinde oldukça aktiftir. Öte yandan, demokrasiyi dini otoriteler tarafından yasaların yorumlanması, askeri müdahale ve düzenin korunmasının bir rejim olarak anlayanların iki türlü siyasal katılım aktivitesinde de yer alma olasılıkları düşüktür.

Sonuç

Bu tez hem incelediği konu hem de sonuçları dolayısıyla bireylerin hem siyasal katılımı hem de demokratik anlayışlarını inceleyen literatürlere küçük çaplı katkılar sağlamıştır. Öncelikle, demokratik tutumları incelerken demokrasinin kavramsallaştırılmasının temel rolünü vurgulayarak demokratikleşme, meşruiyet (legitimacy) ve demokratik uyum (democratic congruence) literatürlerini tamamlayıcı niteliktedir. Dahası, bireylerin farklı demokrasi kavramsallaştırmaları ile siyasal katılımları arasındaki ilişkiye dair bir fikir vermektedir. Bu ilişkinin değerlendirilmesi ve sunumu açısından bu tezden önceki çalışmaların üstüne katarak daha kapsamlı bir çerçeve sunmuştur. Önceki araştırmalar, politik katılım ve demokrasinin kavramsallaştırılması arasındaki bağlantı için oldukça kısa gerekçeler sunarken bu tez hipotezleri daha sağlam temellendirmek amaçlı literatürün kapsamını daha da genişletmiştir.

Dahası, bildiğim kadarıyla bu tez farklı demokrasi anlayışlarının siyasal katılım üzerindeki etkisini dünyanın birden fazla bölgesinde inceleyen ilk araştırmadır. Böylece daha kapsamlı bir yorum çerçevesi sağlar ve daha sağlam genelleştirilebilir önermelerin yolunu açmıştır. Buna ek olarak, bu tezin istatistiksel bulguları, demokrasinin otoriter anlayışlarının siyasal katılım üzerindeki etkisi hakkındaki önemli sonuçlarıyla daha önce incelenmemiş bir konuya ışık tutmuştur. Daha önceki sınırlı sayıdaki araştırma sadece liberal ve yeniden dağıtımcı karakterlere odaklanmış, otoriter karakterlerin siyasal katılıma etkisini incelememişlerdir. Tezin bulgularına göre, demokrasinin otoriter kavramlarla tanımlanması hem konvansiyonel hem de konvansiyonel olmayan katılım azaltmıştır. Bu bulgu ayrıca demokrasiyi otoriter olarak tanımlayan insanların az katılımını, yani devlet politikalarına olan nispeten az etki gücünü göstermesi açısından olumlu bir tablo çizer. Bütün sonuçlar birleştirildiğinde, bu tez vatandaşların demokratik eğitimi ile ilgili düzenlenebilecek politikalara da katkı sağlayacak niteliktedir. Sonuçlara göre liberal tanımlar demokrasinin yapıtaşı olan siyasal faaliyetleri tetiklerken, otoriter tanımlar bu faaliyetleri engeller niteliktedir. Yani ideal demokratik bireyler yaratma sürecinde liberal tanımların önemli bir yeri olduğu görülmektedir.

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* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.

A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

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Tarih / Date