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ON THE ROAD TO DÉTENTE

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ON THE ROAD TO DÉTENTE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER
THE JOHNSON LETTER

A Master's Thesis

by

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To My Family

ON THE ROAD TO DÉTENTE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE
JOHNSON LETTER

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the how the Turkish-American relations altered after the Johnson letter. Referring to US-Turkey association as a “troubled alliance”, this research studies how a once middle-power and a superpower sought cooperation along common interests and how they managed to carry on with their partnership when disagreed. Turkey, as a country whose priority had been to guarantee military aid and development assistance while trying to survive at the onset of the Cold War, sought close ties with the US. It also aspired to balance the hard security threat stemming from the Soviets. Washington capitalized on supporting Turkey thanks to its geostrategic importance as Ankara served as the protector of NATO’s Southeastern flank. However, when the Cyprus issue arose as a major point of discord and the relations reached rock bottom by the Johnson Letter, in addition to

few other crises stemming from the Cold War atmosphere, Turkey's single-minded reliance on the US started to diversify. As Ankara's foreign policy maneuverability was surging, it adjusted its development aid flow and normalized its ties with the Soviets to a certain extent. The détente period was catalyst for a new Turkish foreign policy trajectory as the tension between Washington and Moscow had been reduced, it served more space for Ankara to navigate on its own course of interests.

Keywords: Cold War détente, Turkish Foreign Policy, US-Turkey Relations, Grand Strategy, Middle Powers

ÖZET

DÉTENTE DÖNEMİNE DOĞRU: JOHNSON MEKTUBUNUN ARDINDAN TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI

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Bu tez, Johnson mektubunun ardından Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin nasıl değiştiğini analiz etmektedir. Türk-Amerikan işbirliğinin bir “sorunlu müttefiklik” olduğunu noktasından yola çıkarak, Türkiye gibi orta-ölçekte bir güç ile ABD gibi bir süpergücün ilişkilerini, anlaşmazlıklar yaşandığında çıkarlarını korumaya devam ederken nasıl kopmadan diyaloglarını sürdürmeye çalıştıklarını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Soğuk Savaş öncesi önceliği uluslararası düzende hayatta kalmak olan Türkiye, bu doğrultuda askeri yardım ve kalkınma desteği alabilmek adına ABD’ye oldukça yakın bir tutum izleyegelmiştir. Bu ihtiyaçlara Sovyetler Birliği’nden kaynaklanan güvenlik tehdidinin de eklenmesi Türk-Amerikan işbirliği güçlendirmiştir; zira Vaşington için Türkiye’nin jeo-stratejik önemi özellikle Soğuk Savaş koşullarında oldukça yüksektir. Sovyetler Birliği’nin olası bir genişleme hamlesinde NATO’nun Güneydoğu kanadını koruma görevi Ankara’ya düşecektir. Fakat Soğuk Savaş sürerken Türkiye’nin ortasında kaldığı krizlerdeki ve Kıbrıs meselesi genelindeki

tutumundan ötürü – ki buna ikili ilişkilerdeki dip noktası Johnson mektubu da eklenince, ABD, Ankara’nın güvenini kırmış ve Türk Dış Politikası’nın geniş kapsamlı olmasa da belli ölçülerde tamamen ABD’ye yaslanması durumunu etkilemiştir. Bu gelişmeye yumuşama döneminden kaynaklı düşen ABD-SSCB gerilimi de eklenince, Vaşington ve Ankara’nın birbirine bağımlılığı hafıflemiştir.

Kendine daha fazla hareket alanı yaratabilecek hale gelen Türkiye, kalkınma yardımları konusunda Sovyetler Birliğı’yle belli ölçülerde işbirliğine giderek ilişkilerini bir nebze normalleştirebilmiştir. Yumuşama dönemini söz konusu gelişmelerin yaşanmasına yarattığı uygun ortamda, Ankara eskiye nazaran daha belirgin bir öncelik skalası çerçevesinde dış politika hedeflerini takip etmeye başlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Soğuk Savaş Yumuşama Dönemi, Türk Dış Politikası, ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri, Büyük Strateji, Orta Ölçekli Güçler

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INTRODUCTION

Feridun Cemal Erkin was the Turkish Ambassador to Washington DC from 1948 to 1955. Beginning with his first year of service in DC, Ambassador Erkin sought to recalibrate Turkey's position vis-a-vis international security settlements. In his memoirs, Erkin revealed the crux of his strategy and argued that Turkey was a natural candidate for any European security framework based on a Pan-American model.¹ In spite of this, Erkin added with remorse that Western Europeans and Americans were not ready to accept Turkey into their realm.

... I felt a bitter sense of despair when all doors were shut on my face one by one. Commensurate with the mounting Russian pressure, which was getting more real, so did my thoughts on firmly situating my country in an international security structure. But the diplomatic profession has taught me to have patience. Once, a philosopher said that people's patience is bound by the statesmen they ought to work with. Thus, I strove hard and hoped that with patience, I would achieve the desired outcome. I wrote to my Minister as well and said that we are destined to be partners with the West in areas of security. My successors and I shall do whatever it takes through new formulas, methods, and experiences to make our country part of a Western security structure.²

Ambassador Erkin laid out Turkey's security agenda in the early days of the Cold War in crystal clear terms. The need to cooperate with the West in areas of security was a self-evident yet challenging goal. Given the Cold War context, defensive arrangements were destined to be aligned with the West, in line with the ethos of the new Republic. Yet, it was not the sole motivation. While Turkey had strong ideological grounds for courting Western Europe and the United States as potential allies against the Soviet Union, geostrategic considerations were equally essential and shaped Turkey's decisions. After World War II, the sheer presence of Soviet designs and expansionist policies compelled Turkish policymakers to seek

¹ Feridun Cemal Erkin, "Dışışlerinde 34 Yıl: Vaşington Büyükelçiliği", II. Cilt, I. Kısım, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992: 18.

² Ibid, 25.

refuge under Western aegis. The need to balance imminent Soviet aggression with full-fledged cooperation with Western powers dictated the terms of a new security arrangement and of possible means to modernize the Turkish armed forces.

Beyond the military aspects of Turkey's recalibrated foreign policy, it would be fair to suggest that the Turkish bureaucratic elite saw a window of opportunity to develop their country through Western aid. Turkey was a recipient of significant economic assistance, which gradually made development an objective in and of itself. On the flip side, pulling Turkey away from the Soviet Union suited Western powers' interests since the cordial interwar relations between Ankara and Moscow turned sour during World War II. Turkey's latent skepticism against the West after the War of Independence was short-lived, and the young Republic soon mended fences with its former enemies. Ultimately, Soviet-Turkish relations got derailed and the rapidity of this downfall sometimes explains why it received so little attention in historical literature, compared to, for instance, the birth Turkish-American collaboration after World War II.

Despite the benefits of Turkey's alliance with the United States, their relationship was hardly without troubles. Both Turkey and the United States were positively disposed towards one another but with a vast power asymmetry. Turkey was thousands of kilometers and a mental world away from Washington hence sustaining their bilateral affairs required a lot of effort on both sides. Throughout the Cold War, they carefully stressed their overlapping goals and managed their differences, which facilitated convergence. Turkey's anti-Soviet stance until the

global détente was a crucial variable to set the pace of Turkey's association with the US.

The flow from the American side was not sustained at a steady pace either. Through the détente period, US military and economic aids were at times restrained, nonetheless never entirely ceased. Different administrations followed different momenta with Turkey such as the Nixon administration which stepped on the brakes anyway. Washington managed to keep Ankara nearby even though there had been an agenda composed of discords as much as harmony. It is worthwhile to surmise that the US-Turkey alliance survived despite the fluctuations in between, yet the accumulation of the developments from the escalation of the Cold War until the détente rendered the format of contemporary Turkish-American relations.

The easing of strained relations between Moscow and Washington during the 1960s and 70s changed the dynamics of Soviet-Turkish relations. Turkey's attempts for more balanced diplomacy, the country's problematic transition to multi-party democracy obstructed by intermittent coups, and the Cyprus problem marked the most significant turning points in US-Turkey relations. At times, US-Turkey relations were labeled as "a troubled alliance".³

To broadly understand the relations in between, initially we shall discuss the US-Turkey relations considering their power projection capabilities. Therefore, the foreign policy making processes and grand strategies of these countries could be comprehended within a conceptual framework. This has been a problematic aspect of

³ George S. Harris, "Troubled Alliance: Turkish- American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971", Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research & Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1972.

international relations literature to classify countries based on different variables to make sense of a country's status in the international system. Concerning the power definition we hereby, since this thesis does not aim to conceptualize the power structures within the international system but rather to take two countries' reciprocal statuses, the expression "power" is intended to convey a meaning to define a state's potential in a direct fashion. In this regard, we will delve into the literature on the ranking of the countries in a time frame toward the détente when the Turkish-American exchange started to evolve. By doing so, the twists and turns in Washington and Ankara's association during a period in which the spirit of the relations between a superpower and a middle-power – who used be a small power – according to the literature that we are about to see below shall be put enclosed.

Another important dimension of a better perception for US-Turkey relations given the challenges of their respective difference of status is the actual function of the détente period. For that reason, it is fruitful to seek certain answers in the literature to see how this superpower-middle/small power connections unfolded during détente. Apparently although the US remained as a superpower for the interval which this thesis is studying, Turkey's capabilities had been increasing to an extent that it inaugurated foreign policy maneuverability.

In light of the preceding conditions, this thesis demonstrates the twists and turns in US-Turkey towards the détente period after the Johnson Letter; specifically how Turkey explored its chances as a smaller power to capitalize its need for military aid and development assistance over the US. In effect, it argues that Turkey and the US had to face the challenges of each other's both domestic and foreign policy

clashes while they simultaneously had to resist the moves made by the Soviets to dissolve the Southeast flank of NATO belligerently apropos post-Johnson Letter circumstances while the Cold War tension was relatively being eased afterwards. The Cyprus issue composed the most challenging element of discord given its geostrategic significance combined with the Johnson Letter. Within the foundations of Cold War bipolarity, Turkey, among many other nations from global periphery, was being gravitated over a series of factors. Specifically, since the seeming Grand Strategy for Ankara was survival at the time, it chose to stick with the US and hence the West. But it did not mean that it isolated itself from the Soviet Union. Albeit the threat Ankara faced from Moscow permanently remained with varying intensity in due time, conceivably the second most crucial agenda item after military cooperation, the development assistance was involved among the determinants of Turkey's relations with both the US and the USSR. Countries whose competence's allowed them to stretch the limitations put upon by great powers (i.e. Turkey vs. the US) due to increased tension in between coupled with more suitable international settings (i.e. the détente) led to a relatively more autonomous foreign policy trajectory. Overall, this thesis will highlight how the prioritization of Turkish and American foreign policies strived to stick to an equilibrium despite the discords stemming from inherent and temporary differences of intentions.

Literature Review

Providing a reasonable answer to explain how US-Turkey relations differed after the Johnson letter on the road to détente comes forth in briefly two segments in the literature. First one is the categorization of the US and Turkey in an international scale of power projection capabilities. As simple it sounds, it is a vague concept.

Both tangible and intangible criteria determine whether a country is great, middle or small power. One should refer to economic and demographic data as well as military in terms of concrete numbers. On the other side, there are imponderable components adding value to a country's status in the international hierarchy. Gürol Baba and Murat Önsoy's article on this issue looks at Turkey's shift from a small to a middle power on the basis that Ankara's bilateral foreign policy actions.⁴ The decisions made by Turkish foreign policy apparatus had been centered on survival after the WWII in general terms. This was relevant regarding the relations with Washington and Moscow. What Ankara was after had long been material capabilities to improve its security and development assistance to sustain growth and progress from being as vulnerable as it was from the establishment of the New Republic. Baba and Önsoy highlights that small powers have a lower level of participation to global affairs. One can observe that until making its move to join NATO, involving in the Korean War was one of the first signs that Ankara was in transition. They label pre-WII Turkey as a "resilient small power" for its preferences on mixed and multilateral alliances; they also called it as bandwagoning.

It is a valid point based on the high number of multilateral organizations Turkey was joining. It pragmatically sought cooperation ties with Britain to balance Italy in the Mediterranean. When the Soviet Union appeared as a palpable threat for the Straits and for the Eastern border, Ankara used London as leverage again. Furthermore, as a small power by definition during early Republic, a noteworthy act of bandwagoning amongst these balance-oriented moves was, as Soner Çağaptay points out by putting it as "dropping anchor the Western alliance" declaring war to

⁴ Gürol Baba & Murat Önsoy, "Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey's Small Power and Middle Power Status", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 13, No. 51, 2016: 4.

Germany at the end of WWII.⁵ Ankara was thus acting within the spectrum of a resilient small power, fitting to Gürol and Önsoy's definition.

Speaking of the need for a volatile concept of alliance of a small power, when Turkey was turning more into a middle power, its policy options got diversified. We can position Ankara's break-off of single minded-US favoritism for development assistance after certain critical junctures with the US such as the Jupiter Missile Crisis and the Johnson Letter incident as actionable instants of a middle power. Özlem Tür and Nuri Salık asserts in their relevant article that a small power's recognition for becoming a middle power can only be done by other states acknowledging their capabilities, economically and militarily.⁶ Dilek Barlas offers a different account for Turkey's classification. Due to the fact that it is heir to a great power, which is the Ottoman Empire, she argues that Turkey is a middle power even during 1930s. She refers to the British diplomats assuming Turkey as a "small great power".⁷ Geographically, other neighboring states during the onset of the Cold War had a lesser opportunity for being a middle power compared to Turkey. Barlas ties this superiority to Turkey's comparatively wider diplomatic and military capacity inherited from being Ottoman descendent regarding the administrative orientation to high-level diplomacy.⁸

⁵ Soner Çağaptay, "Making Turkey Great Again", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Vol. 43, No. 1, Global Transformations: A Century Since the Great War, Winter 2019: 173.

⁶ Özlem Tür & Nuri Salık, "Uluslararası İlişkilerde "Küçük Devletler": Gelişimi, Tanımı, Dış Politika ve İttifakları", Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol. 14, No. 53, 2017: 9.

⁷ Dilek Barlas, "Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities and Limits for Middle-Power Activism in the 1930s", Journal of Contemporary History, Sage Publications, Vol. 40, No. 3, July 2005: 442.

⁸ Ibid, 443.

In this equation of actors with different power capabilities, great powers are usually referred at pro-status quo conservatives in the structure. So did the US; Washington favored a docile Ankara even after letting down the regime by leaving it vulnerable to the Soviets in the early 1960s. Lawrence Freedman defines great powers as bullies, and for that same reason it makes sense for small powers to unify against greater powers.⁹ Mark Katz suggests that great power may not always be capable of operating everywhere on the globe with the same efficiency. But at the same time Katz argues that a great power should be able to protect the interests of the regional powers through which it operates.¹⁰ This is one of the factors leading us to the nature of the trade-off between Washington's inclination to meet the demands for military aid and development assistance from Ankara. Through the eyes of the great power, its partnership should be built upon such a basis of utility.

Second, corresponding to the build-up to the climacteric Johnson Letter, Turkey's rationale can be categorized as dichotomous for its aspiration to seek closer relations with the US. The Cold War atmosphere had been the common denominator in the preliminary phases of the first tier and inherently in the second. The first one is as a part of its Westernization-oriented new Republican rationale and the second one is as leverage against Soviets' perpetual motive abreast of their grand strategy to expand their sphere of influence over the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Therefore in the international arena from a security perspective, the more Turkey acted in line with the US's preferences, the safer it should have gotten from potential

⁹ Lawrence Freedman, "Who Wants to be a Great Power", Prism, Institute for National Strategic Security, National Defense University, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2020: 3.

¹⁰ Mark Katz, "Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century", Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No: 10, The Belt and The Road: Pledge of the Gragon, Winter 2018: 126.

Soviet aggression.¹¹ It could also move toward a more accepted state of identity in the eyes of the Western world. This tentative positive-sum game on the foreign layer of the policy led Turkey to take action bound by more like a US-favoritism than just a European mindset, just as it had been the case for the early Republican revolutions.

At the opposite side of this cooperation, the US sought benefit as well. With Turkey aligned with the West as a new polity that was not captured by communism, it could be the farthest frontier of the “free world” thus far. In the post WWII environment, as the US and USSR had been filling in the roles of the globe’s leading powers, Turkey was geopolitically bearing much significance for both sides who were trying to posture the balance of power. This seemingly fertile set of conditions eventually gave birth to an alliance between the US and Turkey. However, inevitable discords occur as Turkish political climate could not cope with the arduous American foreign policy trajectory. The literature contains insight on the breaking points throughout the Turkish-American interaction during the early Cold War and the global détente. Namely, the relations intensified positively on the basis of military cooperation and development assistance to rising dissonance due to both parties’ distinct political climate at their domestic spheres and their other ramifications on the global agenda.

At the most basic level to identify the nature of this cooperation, the definition of the rationale behind US-Turkey relations had reasonably achieved a consensus by scholars. It was a simple equation at first glance. Both sides were meant to be better off by standing closer. However, such infrastructure did not exist.

¹¹ Bülent Alirıza & Bülent Aras, “U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Cold War Era”, Report, Center for Strategic Research (SAM), 2012: 2.

The US did not use to have any significant economic interest in Turkey which could serve as a blueprint in the midst of official diplomatic disconnectedness until 1927.¹² However, the initial phase of the new relations could fairly be characterized as more with a security-oriented approach.

World War I had already halted the ties in between, and the foundations of a fresh dialogue had to be laid down. Founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's axiom of *peace at home, peace in the world* which can arguably be deemed as the Turkish grand strategy, were setting the stage for the continuity of Turkish presence in the international realm as well as including Turkey's new frequency with the Western actors. In that regard, Turkey sought to maintain a friendly ambiance with the Soviets as long as it could while taking UK and France example for its new regime with the new civic blueprint.¹³ Amicable relations with the neighboring states in the Balkans and in the Near (Middle) East were presumed as crucial. Thus, Ankara used diplomacy to reinforce its ties with surrounding regions to secure its borders apart from its cooperation with the US.¹⁴ Although one could observe the application of the Turkish grand strategy by these steps at the onset of the Cold War, Kemal Kirişçi suggested that the actual foreign policy design was restricted to a bureaucratic elite who assessed the agenda based on national security considerations.¹⁵ This Republican elite's vision for developing the new polity prioritized Turkey's network with France and the UK. It drove the country closer to the West during the 1930s. Notwithstanding, in the eyes of the US administration, not until the 1950s Turkey earned its merit to position itself in the Western alliance formally.

¹² Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 10.

¹³ Ibid, 11.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times", Report. European Institute for Social Security Studies, September 2006: 13

The difficulties were being overcome after huge sacrifices as Ambassador Erkin referred to in his memoirs, while Ankara transformed into multiparty politics. The weak economy and military was also presenting Turkey as a liability to the US.¹⁶ With the Undersecretary Dean Acheson's urge to the Senate with the famous speech of President Truman for protecting Turkey and Greece from internal rises and outside pressures, an aid package was put in motion. Greece's case was seen more like a domestic set of incidents while the situation for Turkey in the eyes of the scholars was transpiring in a way for US to take action vis-à-vis imminent Soviet aggression on Turkey.¹⁷ With Britain stepping down as Turkey's and Greece's financial backer, a power vacuum was feared gravely enough for the US to emerge to avoid Soviets interceding.¹⁸ Imperatively on the other end of the spectrum, the relations with Germany had to be kept friendly as well. Throughout the mid 1930s, Turkish-German economic cooperation had reached its peaks as Turkey starved for military supplies.¹⁹ Though, according to İşçi, Turkish diplomatic archives reveals that İnönü was not content with the Turco-German output as he was painstakingly appointing the people to sit on the table with the Nazis.²⁰

In 1940, when Germany attacked France Ankara did also capitalize on the unique protocol from refraining Turkey to participate at a mutual counter action

¹⁶ Nathalie Tocci, "Influencing Europe Through the Back Door: the Role of US-Turkey Relations" in *Turkey's European Future: Behind the Scenes of America's Influence on EU-Turkey Relations*, New York; London: NYU Press, 2011: 105.

¹⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO 1945-52" in *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security 1920-2015*, Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017: 166.

¹⁸ Robert D. Worley, "Cold War Strategies" in *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System*, University of Nebraska Press, 2015: 116.

¹⁹ Stefan Ihrig, "The Second World War and Turkey: Another Spain?" in *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination*, Harvard University Press, 2014: 213.

²⁰ Onur İşçi, "The Massigli Affair and its Context: Turkish Foreign Policy after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Sage Publications, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2020: 273.

against the Soviets in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1939) which was ratified with the UK and France. Since Soviets and Nazi Germany were still allies at the time, Turkey literally got away without having to fulfill any obligations.²¹ On the other end, after having sharp disagreements with the Soviets on the issues of Straits and Germany's given expansionism, it would be fair to assert based on the historical consensus that when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviets, Ankara probably felt one of its significant reliefs at the time by two of its potential aggressors permeated each other. What was crystal clear for Ankara was that it definitely needed the US as an ally within the geopolitical realities listed above.

Despite the Atatürk-Lenin rapprochement in 1921 and all the interwar development assistance between Turkey and the Soviet Union, by 1936, the Soviet Union had become ostensible threat.²² In fact, the interwar harmony had a shared blueprint on a anti-imperialist concept with the inter-state exchange which was maintained until the WWII. The security rationale of both countries were factually neighboring each other in the post-WWII conditions.²³ Hirst concurs with İşçi as he underlines that the interwar period Turco-Soviet relations' theme was to build an equitable and consistence line of dialogue within the Western dominated international setting rather than fixating attention on security or nation-building.²⁴ Notwithstanding, the relations could not have been contained on the standard terms over the failure of reaching a consensus via bilateral diplomacy as security issues

²¹ John M. Vander Lippe, "A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War II", *The Historian*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2001: 66.

²² Onur İşçi, "Russophobic Neutrality: Turkish Diplomacy, 1936-1947", PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2014: 21.

²³ Onur İşçi, "Things Thus Standing", *Turkey and the Soviet Union during World War II: Diplomacy, Discord and International Relations*, I.B.Tauris, 2019: 15.

²⁴ Sam Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkey Convergence in the 1930s", *Slavic Review*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 72, No. 1, Spring 2013: 13.

surfaced and later on Ankara's foreign policy agenda was being put in motion given the circumstances in line with its envisioned trajectory for the sake of steadfastness at the onset of WWII.

One of the last bits following the strong contrast between Turkey and the Soviets on the reinterpretation of the Straits' regime in Montreux Treaty took place in the March of 1945. İşçi's article reminds that the initial diplomacy apparatus of the young Kemalist Republic had to take the issue of Straits into account on the additional basis of sovereignty rights.²⁵ The Soviets declared that they were not going to renew the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Friendship with Turkey signed in 1925 based on their demands on arranging new standard defense protocols for the shared borders. Two years later on, Soviet troops were even mobilized at those frontiers. Vander Lippe argues that Menderes government, once after having assumed power, prioritized responding to imminent aggression from the Soviets by aligning with the US to seek better opportunities to defend the country and assure that its military would transform to a higher level of current availability. According to Menderes, Lippe underlined, one had to be powerful to sit on the table with the Russians for Russians understood power and showed respect.²⁶ In accordance with Brown's article on this matter, Turkey's involvement to the Korean War was hence depicted as the first significant physical reaction toward Soviet aggression despite the army's physical incapability concerning a wide range of military equipment from small arms to means of transport at the time.²⁷

²⁵ Onur İşçi, "Yardstick of Friendship: Soviet-Turkish Relations and the Montreux Convention of 1936", *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 2019: 3.

²⁶ John M. Vander Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2000: 95.

²⁷ Cameron S. Brown, "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War", *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2008: 95.

On the Western orbit, Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were the de-facto tangible initiators of Ankara's rapprochement; not the UK – its former economic benefactor and France, its societal role model, but to the US. The next step was to crown this Western liaison with military partnership as Ambassador Erkin had been stressing. When Menderes government took the office in 1950, Turkish commitment to the West continued developing. Although domestically Democrat Party's policy agenda and political spectrum stood different from Republican People's Party, the schedule had not drastically changed in terms of foreign policy trajectory. NATO membership could be seen as a critical juncture serving to achieve the objective for securing the country. Not only military, but also economically foreign aid from the West was the way out for the Turkish government to sustain development genuinely.²⁸ It was, in that regard, benefiting the West as well since NATO's southeastern flank would be secured thanks to Turkey.

Additionally, another American argument in the literature addressed Washington as the US administration had the idea of projecting Turkey as bridge tying the Eastern world with the West throughout the Cold War for ideational and logistical purposes.²⁹ McGhee referred to the situation in his book as he mentioned the Secretary of the US Air Force Stuart Symington to Ankara. During his stay, Symington was impressed how Turkey was aware that they might have to confront a potential act of aggression from the Soviet Union and how willingly the country seemed to be ready to fight back. It was just that Ankara was seeking reassurance from Washington to make sure that US would stand together Turkey and back the

²⁸ Carter Vaughn Findley, "Turkey's Widening Political Spectrum" in *Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History*, Yale University Press, 2010: 309.

²⁹ Tocci, *The Role of US-Turkey Relations*, p. 27.

military side up with strategic concepts that would yield longer lasting results rather than short term financial remedies.³⁰ Following Turkey's admission to the organization, other military regulations were pursued in the surrounding geographies. Ankara sealed new partnerships with other countries such as the Baghdad Pact with Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the UK the Balkan Defense Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia. There had been other initiatives which will be debated in greater detail in the upcoming chapters.

From the American standpoint, Turkey's involvement in the Korean War and admission to NATO was seen and interpreted differently. While in the eyes of Turkish bureaucratic elite, it could be seen as a cry out for alliance due to critical need of security and military development to be able to deter the Soviets, Pearson suggests that the American opinion after Turkey's steadfastness and cooperation during Korean and NATO experiences gave them the misconception of taking Turkish support for granted.³¹ One could separately see this as a necessary and helpful perception on the medium run since the excellent will of Ankara provided a closer image to the US which eventually led for more unequivocal foundation for future support. Yet, Oral Sander believed that this same misconception on the long run deteriorated the relations itself.³² Another understanding advocated that Turkey had always been skeptical of American openhandedness as some foresaw that

³⁰ George McGhee, "The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained The Soviets ", New York: St. Martin Press, 1990: 51.

³¹ Robert W. Pearson & Frances G. Burwell, "The Evolution of US-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context", Report, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008: 64.

³² Oral Sander, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964", Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2016: 140.

Turkey's significance would diminish to the Western alliance once the Straits would no longer be a security shortfall as significant as it used to be.³³

The thought of defining NATO during the initial years of the Cold War as a beacon of democracy would not be completely accurate. Still, instead countries like Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal had begun their transformations to Westernized administrations. Thus, by joining NATO, Turkey had also been flourishing the modernization of its institutions for much as serving with the organization's security apparatus against the Soviets. It is also portended in the literature that the Soviets Union directly pushed Ankara away after 1936. Turkey's alignment with the West was becoming fruitful because its longing for a Western identity was also becoming concrete.³⁴

The only unsolved notion of debate was Cyprus. However, it was not a simple military issue of some discord. The Cyprus issue was like wildfire for every party which was involved. Among the critical foreign policy concerns, Cyprus has always been blazing due to its complexity since it required a wide array of cooperation.³⁵ With the UK, the channel over Cyprus mostly remained on mediation; yet broadened to a greater extent. with the US. Turkey's perception on large scale reliance to US on security cooperation came to a halt with the Cyprus crisis. It has been seen as a critical juncture in the literature; that a shift in the Turkish defensive policy making agenda to a broader spectrum – more comprehensive than the US was

³³ Nilsu Goren, "The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia Strategic Triangle: Challenges Ahead", Report, Center for International & Security Studies, University of Maryland, 2018: 3.

³⁴ Müge Kınacıoğlu & Aylin G. Gürsel, "Turkey's Contribution to NATO's Role in Post-Cold War Security Governance: The Use of Force and Security Identity Formation", *Global Governance*, Brill, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2013: 590.

³⁵ Hüseyin Pazarcı, "Kıbrıs Sorunu" in *Türk Dış Politikasının Başlıca Sorunları*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2015: 153.

needed.³⁶ As in this thesis, the main scope will be to demonstrate that the problems during the détente have their foundations starting with the 1947 course. In this regard, Tunçkanat refers to the content of the Truman Doctrine with precision over its second and forth sentences which allegedly prohibits the use of American military equipment by the Turkish forces aside from self-defense purposes. The first military engagement had been halted in 1964 due to President Johnson's reference to sentences as mentioned earlier. All of the gears and supplies of the Turkish military had thoroughly come from the US; thus putting constraints on Ankara for not taking any military action against Greece and Cyprus would mean more than crippling the country.³⁷ Taken this fundamental dilemma into consideration, the blueprint of the discord between Turkey and the US for years to come starting from back then surfaced through its links at the official beginning of the very cooperation.

Beside the developments concerning the actual escalation of the Cyprus issue, what it meant for the US-Turkey relations has the gravity for the well-being of this thesis. In this respect, since the 1950's, it evolved into a multilateral case. The constant friction had been embroiled by the minorities of the Island and had a disrupt in Turco-Greek relations. These fluctuations immediately triggered other intensification between other parties; most notably the UK and the US.³⁸ The Greek-American lobbyists had been pressurizing to members of Congress and senators to include enosis in the US foreign policy agenda by the time.³⁹ This propaganda had led the case more justifiable for the Greek parties in the eyes of the American public.

³⁶ Stephen F. Larrabee, "The US-Turkey Security Partnership in Transition" in *Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkey Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Challenge*, Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2010: 5.

³⁷ Haydar Tunçkanat, "İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü", İstanbul: Alaca Yayınları, 2019: 145.

³⁸ Michael B. Bishku, "Turkey, Greece and the Cyprus Conflict", *Journal of the Third World Studies*, University of Florida Press, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991: 167.

³⁹ T. W. Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 401, May 1972: 96.

O'Mahoney underscored the countering stance of the Secretary of State Kissinger's and President Ford's unfavorable idea on economic sanctions toward the Greek-American lobbyists. They believed that good American relations with Turkey should not have been deteriorated by economic sanctions given Turkey's geostrategic importance.⁴⁰ Even though Turkish cause on Cyprus had a vocal support on the administrative wing in the US, asserts Terry, it had been a "low-key" setting by the White House apropos the Greek American muscle for the manipulation of the cultural bias to the frame supporting arguments through organs such as Orthodox churches and ethnic clubs.⁴¹

The main problem on island between the Turks and the Greeks came forth on the legal status of these two communities in the island, and thus the Zurich-London agreements in 1959 were aimed to put in motion to bring balance as quick as possible. With the island's new constitution, right after the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, the US's objective was to mark Cyprus as another bastion against the communist wave that was feared for its transit to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore additively to Turkey, Greece and the UK; Cyprus would have been the newest brick in the wall to block Soviet influence in the area and the US were to benefit primarily from it by taking advantage of the British bases' logistics and communication hardware in the island. As the island population tumultuously disagreed on the ground rules to define their living, local communist party rallied political capital. The Johnson administration hence sought reason to intervene amidst the chances of their anti-communist stronghold could go upside-

⁴⁰ Joseph O'Mahoney, "Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in *Denying the Spoils of the War: The Politics of Invasion and Non-Recognition*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018: 115.

⁴¹ Janice J. Terry, "An Overture: The Case of Cyprus" in *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*, London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005: 44.

down.⁴² Theophanous comments that Cyprus's pertinently weak military presence had deemed it a historically geostrategic predicament to be invaded and profited. In conjunction with this statement, he affirms that Turkey had not obtained such leverage until 1974 when its military stepped in the island despite the calls by the UN amid the US's concurrence.⁴³

Other scholars considered the US and the UK as supporters of the enosis. Göktepe presumed that these two countries favored the unification of Greece and Cyprus; however they supposedly realized that Turkish side had to be offered some compensation as Turkey's compliance was obligatory to be able to reach a consensus. The American and the British hastiness had been since the Communist Party and the Workers' Union in Cyprus were well-organized and hence open to be affected by the Soviet Union conforming to their expansionist agenda.⁴⁴ On the flipside, Williams mentions the Johnson letter in 1964 had cost significant damage to the ties between Washington and Ankara amid crises in the island.⁴⁵

The breakdown of the "cool but correct" Turco-Greek relations establish during 1930s with the joint efforts of head of state Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Greek Premier Venizelos was thus torn to pieces through the crises over the island of Cyprus. Barkey and Gordon agree that when the Cyprus issue emerged in 1955, it destroyed all positivity built since the 1930s. Both countries could have benefited from a Cyprus which had consent over; Greece's economic integration to the euro

⁴² Ibid., 98; 99.

⁴³ Andreas Theophanous, "Prospects for Solving the Cyprus Problem and the Role of the European Union", Publius, Oxford University Press, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2000: 231.

⁴⁴ Cihat Göktepe, "The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations", Middle Eastern Studies, Taylor & Francis Ltd., Vol. 41, No. 3, May 2005: 432.

⁴⁵ James Williams, "Bridging the Gulf: the Search for Consensus in Cyprus," Harvard International Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 1995/96: 49.

zone could have been smoother and Turkey's military spending could have been repostured instead of being heavily spent on Northern Cyprus.⁴⁶ Mallinson points out the British at the first place was forging the discord between Turkey and Greece. Article 16 of Lausanne Treaty was forbidding Turkey to take over any lands which used be under Ottomans' jurisdiction. Yet by intending to provide Ankara a stake in Cyprus, the UK had construed its goal to keep control. At a conference to discuss so-called defense and security matters about the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus, the UK invited Greece and Turkey. Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Secretary at the time revealed that pressurizing the Greeks by bringing up the refusal of the enosis by the Turks and forcing them to accept a solution would bring the sovereignty at the hands of the British.⁴⁷

In hindsight, the literature prompts that this alliance between the US and Turkey had its categorical strengths stemming from a basis of mutual needs. Besides, this thesis will assert that there are also points of weaknesses in between and are as crucial as the others. More importantly, these strengths and weaknesses are innately co-existential.

Research Question, Methodology and Contribution

This thesis will look into the puzzling aspects of US-Turkey alliance onto the global détente period. It will delve into the problematic facets within compulsory cooperation obliged by both sides' grand strategies during the Cold War, with an

⁴⁶ Henri J. Barkey & Philip H. Gordon, "Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis", *The National Interest*, Center for the National Interest, Vol. 66, 2001: 88

⁴⁷ William Mallinson, "Cyprus, Britain, the USA, Turkey and Greece in 1977: Critical Submission or Submissive Criticism", *Journal of Contemporary History*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2009: 739.

emphasis on the 1960s and onwards. Should one look at the accrual of the problems in between from the onset of the Cold War until the peak of crises, the analysis for the Cyprus issue along with subsequent development assistance and military cooperation complications can thus yield conclusions to understand the actual tone of the Turkish-American collaboration as this thesis will demonstrate. The final objective of this thesis to project the reader how a middle power like Turkey adjusted after having faced strict backlash from its most important and integral great power ally the US while defending its national interests.

In terms of methodology, this thesis have relied on numerous primary sources. There was content letting me to reach an extensive record of official US-Turkey correspondence. US Department of State's online folder covering the years from 1802 until 1949 supported the thesis' skeleton with genuine backing. To reflect the American stance regarding the subject, the White House's Office of the Historian platform, most importantly, the online archival service of Foreign Relations of the United States have provided actual observations. Wilson Center's Digital Archives, precisely the selection of "International History Declassified" segment promoted intense comments as well. As of archival support, last but not least, the Central Intelligence Agency's declassified digitalized written material thanks to the Freedom of Information Act had been of use. Memoirs of former Turkish diplomats such as Cemal Erkin and other statesmen's were of service yielding first-hand information on the matters this thesis is involved. Beyond these primary sources, I benefitted from the abundance of secondary sources from top journals' content on my thesis's respective issues. A degree of Turkish-written collection of books from Turkish intelligentsia have also fed my narrative with substantially helpful insights.

This thesis pledges to explain how US-Turkey relations in the Global Détente were shaped throughout the political turbulences of the Cold War while Turkey was struggling hard to survive following the WWII in the new global settings and while the US was pursuing total domination by undermining its rival USSR. In the journey, Turkey's contenders were its domestic issues, at times its neighbors' issues. The reader shall see how Turkey was left alone sometimes and was capitalized by the US to balance the Soviets in Turkey's highly critical geographical spot while competing with its neighbor Greece whose faith was absolutely similar at times. Ankara attempted to maximize its military capacity and development aid from Washington in return, in short. There had been ups and down in the dialogue. Yet, it was never lost as these two states are bound by the nature of the Cold War rivalry. They were wrapped in 1945. They are still bound today, despite the status quo.

Outline

The arrangement of the chapters are both thematic and chronological. After the introductory remarks, the order has been put this way to project the links between the developments throughout the Cold War and the tuning done in return within the context of hard and soft power alongside diplomacy on behalf of Turkey and the US. Most importantly, I aimed to highlight the accords and the discords in the Turkish-American dialogue presumably to demonstrate the role of the domestic fractures following the global seism as the main inhibitors of both the US-Turkey harmony and disharmony. Specifically, I wanted to show how Turkey adjusted to the US and the realities of the Cold War simultaneously.

Following this introduction, Chapter I will be a historical overview of the Cold War atmosphere from 1945 until around 1964. This part will thus aim to orient the content with the zeitgeist of transitional post WWII to bipolarity and describe how the mutual distrust between two superpowers led to multiple crises globally. Although Turkey's position in that era will be interpreted in the Chapter II, the very background elaboration will assist for a better causality explaining why Turkey chose to pursue the particular foreign policy paradigms. Thanks to this part, we will have a clearer understanding of the globe's economic devastation and the surfacing of US-USSR rivalry. The rationale for the US and NATO to employ such strategies will be put on the table while holding Greece and Cyprus as counterbalance to have a clearer understanding.

Chapter II will comprise specific events of critical importance in which Turkish foreign policy trajectories were defined as pro-Western and when these actual implementations in that regard took place and challenged will be underscored. USSR's involvement in US-Turkey alienation will be taken at hand concerning its effect on policy decision on Turkey's behalf through a security perspective. It will at certain parts pursue a parallel timeline with the previous chapter, nevertheless, the element of Turkish foreign policy motive will be decisive. The blueprint of the Cyprus problem and its link with the tone of Ankara-Washington line will be debated.

Chapter III's primary focus will be on the problematic and developmental aspects of the US-Turkey relations, emphasizing the military scope. The Cyprus crisis, followed by a rise of anti-Westernism and ingrained military cooperation

problems with development assistance controversies will be debated for their upsurge. In a parallel timeline, we will also be looking at how the domestic tensions in both countries made their stamps on the foreign policy spheres.

In its conclusion, this thesis will provide the readers with a general reflection over the dynamics of US-Turkey relations during the détente period. Having discussed the points of discord, an outlook of how this analysis can shed light on contemporary US-Turkey relations will be questioned on a broader analysis frame. As stated above, the turbulences that these countries, - middle who had recently evolved from a small power with a great power – had been through during the Cold War détente because of their clashing priorities and the outcome of these incidents demonstrated that Turkish-American partnership would always be volatile at a certain extent. However, it did not mean that the ties were to break off at any time; instead, the bonds were indeed strong due to both pragmatic and ideological reasons for the two parties and the period which this thesis discusses is the paramount example of the reasoning of the survival of the Turkish-American alliance while the USSR still existed.

CHAPTER I: THE GLOBAL COLD WAR, 1945-1964

The defining framework for US-Turkey relations during the détente period was to a large degree shaped by the experience of the past two decades (1945-1964). Existing historical scholarship highlights the importance of situating détente within the broader international context of the twentieth century. Détente, if treated in a vacuum, gives us a monolithic understanding of US-Soviet rivalry, which ameliorated during the latter half of the 1960s and 1970s. Precisely for that reason, the new postwar international order needs to be taken seriously. Almost every country on earth, including those that had not engaged in military action but were nonetheless affected by its outcomes, participated in the making of new world order after 1945. Yet, states with relatively smaller degrees of influence – such as neutral Turkey – struggled at first to establish security arrangements in the global competition between Washington and Moscow.

In the case of Turkey, geopolitical circumstances shaped its trajectory and moved the country closer to the transatlantic bloc. This chapter covers the two decades from the onset of the Cold War until 1964, when the rivalry between the US and the USSR created new threats as well as opportunities. Hence, this chapter seeks to provide the readers with a fuller understanding of American and Soviet foreign policies before détente and demonstrate how this context should be applied to Turkey, in comparison to the developments in Eastern Europe, Middle East and East Asia which all appears to have interconnected outcomes in the complexion of the Cold War.

As John Lewis Gaddis points out that there was more into the Cold War than George Orwell refers to with great pessimism for a post-WWII world ruled by a totalitarian dictatorship which was indicating the Soviets and Joseph Stalin. Amongst the lessons learnt from the WWII, Sina Akşin asserted that it was made clear how devastatingly it could lead to a catastrophic conclusion to the international system for a group of nations to palpably lay siege to one another to majorly disturb the balance of power for the second time in the same century.⁴⁸ From a security-driven angle, the American interference had been the main reinforcing factor when combined with successful Russian struggle in their motherland against the Nazi invasion for Allies to defeat the Axis powers. Although certain names in the literature insists that the US would not be invaded under the conditions of modern warfare even back then, it could not have afforded the aftermath of a joint German-Japanese victory with respect to the tentative consequences of consecutive economic restrictions which were to be imposed upon either.⁴⁹ Despite the tentative outline of this post WWII scenario, for rather realist scholars, the de-facto nature of the rivalry had been contemplated on the idea that a physically concrete military confrontation could be possible not in mainland US but in Eastern Europe.⁵⁰ Odd Arne Westad implied that when looked at from a Morgenthau-style realist approach, it was a security-driven clash that was based on the chase of interests and needs of the great powers. In fact it could have been acknowledged that the American and Soviet governments did not have compelling differences from one another.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Sina Akşin, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl Tarihi*, İstanbul İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015: 423.

⁴⁹ Robert J. Art, "The United States, the Balance of Power, and World War II: Was Spykman Right?", *Security Studies*, Routledge, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2005: 371.

⁵⁰ Patrick Glen & Bryan R. Gibson, "An Analysis of Odd Arne Westad's The Global Cold War", London: Routledge, 2017: 26.

⁵¹ Odd Arne Westad, "The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century" in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, Vol.1, 2010: 5.

Melvyn Leffler on the economy-driven facet of the matter accentuates Franklin Delano Roosevelt's awareness for the need for economic security and independence in order to insure individual freedom. By the end of the WWII, the other anticommunist countries throughout the globe with leaders of different varieties such as Japan, Western European and Scandinavian actors perceived the role of their governments with a reformed demeanor by putting emphasis on stabilizing the business cycle, stimulating economic growth and other staple principles of a welfare state blueprint.⁵² Norman Stone at that point delineates the zeitgeist of the post WWII psyche on behalf of the great differences on economic thinking between the US and the Soviets. He puts it as the importance of the economic aspect by perceiving the milestone for the actual beginning of the Cold War as November 1945, "when the Soviets refused to join in Anglo-American plans for the resuscitation of the world's economy".⁵³

In addition to the differences between the US and the Soviet Union which had their impact on the developments following the WWII, there was the concept of power within the domestic realm. This distinction was later on reflected on the grand strategies of these superpower rivals. The US had been composed of numerous power centers. Given that the strong American mechanism for separation of powers flourished well, the President's office did not always have the upper hand versus the other branches of government. Private sector elements with relatively vast influencing capabilities had their own voice as well as with some room for military. In the Soviet Union on the other side, power was particularly centralized. From the

⁵² Melvyn P. Leffler, "Victory: The State, The West and The Cold War" in *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security 1920-2015*, Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017: 222.

⁵³ Norman Stone, "Aftermath", in *A Short WWII History*, London: US Penguin Books, 2013, 190.

1930s, with Stalin establishing his presence, the Communist Party Politburo and its general secretary maximized their capacity. Westad contends that thanks to the abolishment the other seats of power and market, the Soviet system was presented as ultimate alternative form of government to the rest of the world; precisely to the post-Colonial third world countries.⁵⁴

The subsequent capitalist crises and demises of the colonial empires later on 1945 proved that in a Weberian scale, the cleavages between were to be banished. The colonial periphery and imperial center had been going through a critical juncture. Historical institutionalism had marked the end of European colonialism in the Third World. There would be nothing more natural than the new superpowers showing interest to these geographies. Both the US and the Soviets sought action to demonstrate a model to these countries of particularly from Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia – Turkey fits perfectly as an example. When new polities rose or political changes occur during 1960s in these areas, Westad identifies this phenomenon as the globalization of the Cold War and diagnoses the key reason behind this rift as not just a “battle for influence between Moscow and Washington” but rather an attempt to “install future directions to their policies and their society”, Westad argues. Plus, based on the persistent US preponderance especially during the initial years of the Cold War, he refers to the possibility that the whole Cold War argument could have been an “American project” institute global hegemony instead of an actual competition. Nevertheless the ensuing militarization of the Soviet economy and its society made the Soviets emerge as a fierce adversary.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Westad, *The Cold War*, 10.

⁵⁵ Ibid

The analysis provided in the previous paragraph intends to shed the light on the race for global hegemony to the degree that Turkey's trajectory could be explained with more accuracy. Given the aim of this thesis, by attempting to understand the grand strategies of the US and the Soviet Union within the timeline of Cold War until the year 1964 in these upcoming sections, one will have a sounder framework on the essence of the Turkish foreign policy's entanglement in the transatlantic context thanks to a better grip to the ethos of the Cold War rivalry and its impacts. In the light of this chronologic setup, a thematic review on the history of the global Cold War is to be executed.

The Grand Strategy of the US

On the dimensions of realpolitik and ideology to have a firmer grip on the concept of grand strategy, American Grand Strategy can be narrated corollary to both; but these elements were indeed traceable to post-WWI era. To connote, Woodrow Wilson's opinions on the Allies and Germany conveyed the American ethos for balance of power ever since. Wilson's distrust for Allied powers was as sound as his cautiousness against Germany. At the first place, the US's status of "Associated Power" in the Great War was the result of Germany's doing as well as it has been Britain's and France's. After the war, with the Keynesian application, Europe could have been made prosperous by only making Germany prosperous too.⁵⁶ Thereupon, the American Grand Strategy had been through its most active decades thus far in Europe for the sake of preserving the balance of power in the continent.

⁵⁶ A.J.P. Taylor, "The Origins of the Second World War", New York; London; Toronto; Sydney: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005: 6.

The fading economy of the UK after the WWII was actually already pointing out that the British had to come up with a new blueprint to sustain its role in the international scene knowing that the large percentage of the British GNP was being spent on the far-reaching ends of their empire. Therefore, the UK administration was well aware that they would have to crop up an elucidation for the Soviets' rise in the new-born power vacuum. In this respect, Mearsheimer argues that the British empire knew exactly that the US had meant to step in at that point to contain and direct the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ The early American Grand Strategy can thus be characterized within the frames of offensive realism. The pivotal conception of this school harmonizes with the case of the Cold War. Veritably what FDR and Truman sought could be comprehended in line with the balance of power per se. Balancing coalitions used to be formed against potential hegemons throughout the near history such as in the case for Napoleonic France and Wilhelmine-Nazi Germany. In the very case of Cold War bipolarity, the theory asserts that the distribution of power would affect both buck-passing and great powers' look for opportunities to weaken their rivals and to muster their capabilities.⁵⁸ Namely, the probable European hegemon Germany in early 20th century was confronted by the UK, France and Russia while the US did not partake by an entire scale; however as Mearsheimer delivers, "buck-passing" had not been an option in Cold War as there was no match for the Soviets in Europe.⁵⁹

The American foreign policy agenda in conformity with the grand strategy persevered on boosting balance of power in Europe after the WWII. Niall Ferguson argues that the US had been instrumenting confidence to its former enemies such as

⁵⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2001: 329.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 357.

Japan and Germany. The American military presence was sustained despite the fact that the formal occupations of these territories were ended respectively in 1952 and 1955 – West Germany. By the extended stay of the troops and rearmament of the other NATO allies in the meantime contributed greatly of the stimulus of the industries as well. In sum, military and economy was revived by the US again.⁶⁰ Corollary to this military wing of the policy extension, the US also led a role on the global political economic portion of the post WWII order onward into the Cold War. By launching a constant thrust on the international finance, the US was able to guard its military initiative and enterprises.⁶¹ Stone prompts, as it was experienced in the thirties alongside unmistakable consequences, it was imperative to not let trade collapse again. Therefore, at Bretton Woods in the summer of 1944, certain international arrangements were made to keep the flow of money active to pay for trade.⁶² International trade barriers under the General Agreement on Tariffs through multilateral negotiations were reduced. Pre-depression system for fixed exchange rates was assumed preferable. Global financial structure were introduced two new institutions: the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Yet to the American allies, the feeling for being under the umbrella was solidified via the allocation of US aid grants and loans. For instance, Marshall Plan was set in motion subsequently. Ferguson emphasizes that during the period from 1946 to 1952, the sum of the total economic aid of the US was nearly aggregated 2% of the whole GNP at the day and half of it corresponded to the Marshall Plan. Came the ensuing decade, it went below 1%. The culmination of this push was even later exhibited in JFK's

⁶⁰ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*, London: Penguin Books, 2004: 82.

⁶¹ Ibid., 84.

⁶² Stone, *WWII*, 191.

words as the late POTUS at the time expressed that the US was pledging to pay for “any hardships against the success of liberty”.⁶³

The new strategic landscape, according to Paul Kennedy, manifested that the international order had been moving on from one system to another. The American superpower was artificially outweighing the Soviets’ in a vast conduct. The uniqueness was that the US had an unprecedented might both economically and militarily.⁶⁴ The industrial expansion was reflected in the economy and hence the latter was echoed in the military. To illustrate, the American GNP skyrocketed from \$88.6 billions in 1939 to \$135 billions in 1945. Although the flimsiness in the economy was still not relieved by the efforts of the New Deal, Kennedy’s view is that the “underutilized” manpower and resources had finally been well capitalized on.⁶⁵ Given the power vacuum provided by the former great powers combined with the aforementioned physical output, the US could not limit itself to its own shores in the post-1945 composition. Resembling the US-at-the-time to the British of 1815, Kennedy argues that the Pax Americana had come to existence as the American frontiers of insecurity had been emerging.⁶⁶

The era of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was different than Harry Truman’s. FDR’s approach could have been seen as appeasing based on his foreign policy decisions such as the appointment of Joseph Davies to Moscow as the American ambassador. Gaddis insists that FDR’s presumption of a relatively weaker US compared to the Soviets until American economy had been revived, was also

⁶³ Ibid., 85.

⁶⁴ Paul Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000”, New York: Vintage Books, 1989: 355.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 357.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 359.

justifying his choice of foreign policy implementation. As part of the American grand strategy which was keen on preserving the balance of power, instead of skillful diplomats who were experts of negotiating, FDR favored individuals like Davies, whose breadth was more of use rather than a diplomat's depth.⁶⁷

Hitler's expansionist aspirations with the success of Blitzkrieg on the whole of the continent was stiffened, yet FDR was in soothe. He envisioned that dictators' respect for each other would not be deep and eventually Hitler and Stalin would gobble each other. It was no secret that Hitler saw Stalin as "an agent of the global Jewish conspiracy" while Stalin's understanding of Hitler was comprised of a man of both capitalism and an imperialism.⁶⁸ Thus, FDR purposely anticipated an autocratic ally and as the Congress approved the legislation entailing military aid to any country vital to the US in March 1941. When November 1941 arrived, which was a month before the Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese, the USSR was deemed "vital" for the US by Roosevelt.⁶⁹ In relation to the points that could be summed up as similar trajectories concerning the steps which Truman followed after FDR, Leffler suggests that to counter German and Japanese militarism, Truman carried on representing the American way of life as the exemplar of a superior civilization. Forging a world centered on international organizations, non-colonial and equal access to raw materials, self-determination and a healthily flowing trade.⁷⁰

With war production lifting the US economy up and its military capabilities being supreme indeed, Truman's assumption of the presidency should have

⁶⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, "Last Best Hope", in *On Grand Strategy*, UK: Penguin Books, 2018: 283.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 284.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 287.

⁷⁰ Leffler, *The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy*, 68.

emanated at least some security. Despite the domestic agenda which consisted of problematic themes such as the social unrest, inequality and vandalism, on the foreign front the US was demonstrating a promising potential to be the new global hegemon.⁷¹ The foreign policy doctrine of the US by the time starting with Truman's presidency had been specifying how greatly the American objective was focused on maintaining a balance among the other nations. Different than his predecessor Roosevelt, Truman was most skeptical of the ties between the American allies. Before his presidency, Truman used to perceive Stalin and Hitler as morally equal dictators while he was a senator from Missouri. Kissinger ruminated that he then was in favor of leveraging the trailing party; under any circumstances in which one of these two countries appear to be overrun, the US shall intervene and reinforce the underdog for the sake of the balance of power.⁷² From another angle, Mark Trachtenberg discusses the containment policy as a result of the American Grand Strategy differently. He argues that Acheson's de facto intention by containment was not to freeze the status quo, but to "rollback" the Soviets' competence by pushing back Kremlin through creating situations of strength.⁷³

Aside from the realpolitik, the spectrum has room ideology for when discerning the American Grand Strategy. At the heart of the American foreign policy agenda, Kissinger offers a different narrative regarding the function of the US whereas the previous account of examples from the literature had been predominantly supposing otherwise. To the degree that he proclaims, all American

⁷¹ Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952", in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, Vol.1, 2010: 67.

⁷² Henry Kissinger, "Soğuk Savaş'ın Başlaması", in *Diplomasi*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2018: 406.

⁷³ Mark Trachtenberg, "Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy" in *Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics*, Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012: 251.

presidents who had served during the post war period sought universal peace and harmony on an agenda to resolving the conflict by taking the responsibility as the most capable country in the world whose yardstick would have been the endorsement of the American principles to the entire globe.⁷⁴ It was hence characterized as what had been defined as balancing, as a the very moral necessity for the US to commit to counterbalance the Soviet interpretation of this very philosophy based on Kissinger's words. This rather liberal concept appears to be in clear contrast with Mearsheimer's offensive realist predictions.

Perhaps concurrent to the initial phases in which one could observe patterns for an American Grand Strategy, the filter for implementation was fixating on the realpolitik via the commitment to uphold the balance of power system for a sustainable international order. In time, there is a pronounced shift in the rhetorical segment at the presidential level as well for the US. Notably since Wilson, the tendency had been on emphasizing the "realist" American objective including the relatively high intensity on balance of power during the eras of FDR and Truman as mentioned before. Toward the détente period, conspicuously came the office of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the focal point on describing the American discourse has become on portraying an ideal model. Thence the viewpoint of American policymakers and some scholars has surfaced as even the interwar and post WWII American presence and support to Europe was part of the US's moral duty rather than a balancing maneuver. Kissinger somehow again advocates an idealist argument as he claims that the underpinning of the American power had been the galvanic pillar for world order through a moral universalism. By helping the

⁷⁴ Henry Kissinger, "The United States: Ambivalent Superpower", in *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, UK: Penguin Random House, 2014: 276.

European economies to be rebuilt, forming the transatlantic alliance and establishing a global network for security and economic partnerships the US had been actively exhibiting its idealism at the highest degree and articulating its humanitarian principles.⁷⁵

The Grand Strategy of the USSR

Soviet Grand Strategy could be compartmentalized for a better grip on its ideological blueprint. At a conceptual level, Gaddis suggests that the Soviet Union's grand strategy was orbiting around the teachings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels at the first place. Later on it was reinterpreted with Lenin's modifications.⁷⁶ The Bolshevik reading of international history was by nature extremely critical of capitalism, but additionally the occurrence of WWI following the Industrial Revolution proved their ideological compass. Even unprecedented economic growth and development had failed to prevent total war and according to Gaddis, this was the yardstick of the failure of bourgeoisie.⁷⁷ It was thus Lenin's distinct account of acumen on Marx's ideas. What separated Lenin from Marx was that Marx had never signaled a specific way to seek stability and peace at an international level. Lenin's stance was an apparatus of Marx's definition in the sense that Lenin sought concrete answers to all the catastrophes, destruction and war which were emanated from the capitalists.⁷⁸ With the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin was demonstrating so; the Soviets had meant to go beyond saving one country – Russia from capitalism, but also by declaring war against capitalist in the midst of a total war ignited by these very capitalists.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 277.

⁷⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, "Cold War: The Deals, The Spies, The Lies, The Truth", London: Penguin Classics, 2005: 81.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 82.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 83.

Therefore, this revolution – so they thought, could have initiate a domino effect over the victim countries and societies throughout the globe only to prove that the Soviet Union would become the locomotive of the new paradigm in history. Gaddis takes the narrative back at post WWI to clarify the Soviet Grand Strategy furthermore. He associates Woodrow Wilson’s belief in ideas for having an impact on countries with Lenin’s. What Wilson stood for was the exact opposite of Lenin’s perceptions. The speech for Fourteen Wilson Principles in January 1918 portrayed an opposite already. Although the Cold War did not begin until the end of the WWII, the clash of grand strategies and worldviews had begun at the time.

It may be reductionist to see whereas American Grand Strategy with the utmost moral regards for some scholars or had it been on a pursuit for undertaking the widest arrangements on an international scale to prevent further system collapsing developments for some others. In hindsight, most of the advocates believe that the Soviet Union’s rationale had been built upon a crude expansionism with a decisive realpolitik assessment. However, there are examples of a similar composition of parts belonging to realpolitik and ideology in Soviet Grand Strategy just as in the American Grand Strategy. Raymond Garthoff, for instance, hints that the USSR being the vanguard communist state after the WWII, they were expecting the Western imperialist powers to turn against them with hostile intentions.⁷⁹

Trachtenberg as well endorses this stand point as he argues that the Soviets had their “Sovietization” agenda with an incremental implementation procedure. The central prevalent argument depicting that the Soviet goal had always been to communize Eastern Europe was said to be transforming. By such a relatively moderate tone of

⁷⁹ Raymond L. Garthoff, “Looking Back: The Cold War in Retrospect”, *The Brookings Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Brookings Institute Press, 1994: 10.

spreading communism primarily to Eastern Europe, the Politburo was said to be aiming at then “dropping the mask and revealing the true Stalinization”.⁸⁰

While the previous postulations remain comparatively ideological, there is an alternative realist reading considering the main pillars in the security oriented Soviet agenda. Pechatnov recognizes the “cynical realpolitik” within the fusion of the national interests of the Soviets, yet also emphasizes the Machiavellian defense on behalf of the USSR’s alleged defense.⁸¹ After tumultuous centuries of war and instability, Stalin was eager to establish a sound and lasting polity for the new confrontations to come. To the extent of a “geopolitical rationality” by borrowing from his Bolshevik predecessors, based on Maxim Litvinov’s observations, Stalin aspired to employ this “defensive expansion” where he believed that the Soviet soils could be better defended if the larger it had gotten.⁸² Richard Pipes refers to this concept as “the persistent tradition of Russian expansion”, but Krasnow adds to it by reminding that the Soviet leaders’ ideological obsession of living up to the Marxist promise of a communist world by not denying the fact that the Russian Empire’s diligence might have united with the Soviet leaders whose revolutionary and ideological aspirations were substituted with pragmatism in time.⁸³ Pipes also argues that Western scholars often overlook the domestic interconnectedness of Soviet Foreign Policy on the basis of the elites Communist bloc. He discusses that the root for Soviet aggressiveness can be observed among the “self-appointed” and “self-

⁸⁰ Mark Trachtenberg, “The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945” in *The Cold War and After: History, Theory and the Logic of International Relations*, Princeton; Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2012: 70.

⁸¹ Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Soviet Union and the World, 1944-1953” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, Vol.1, 2010: 91.

⁸² Ibid, 92.

⁸³ Wladislaw Krasnov, “Richard Pipes’s Foreign Strategy: Anti-Soviet or Anti-Russian?”, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Wiley on behalf of the Editors and Board of Trustees of the Russian Review, April 1979: 185.

perpetuating” elite’s way of treating its own citizens and constituents is projected in their style of performing foreign policy. After all, totalitarian regimes are by definition ineligible to change and thence immune, he says and finds the deduction presuming that one thus could concur that “Western alliance’s attempts to wane Soviet hostility had remained in the forms of treaties and dialogues in the beginning” as unconvincing. Instead, what appeared to be decisive afterwards was that in countries like the Soviet Union, eventually a systemic crisis emerges and faces forceful action. This, he expresses in the first place as the recipe for foreign policy change in the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc.⁸⁴

To be able to match the comprehensiveness of a “grand strategy”, there is benefit to consider the post WWI status as it was done for the American Grand Strategy. Thus should we go back at the beginning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Onur İşçi and Onur Önel’s work alludes to the portrayal of the fall of the Russian Empire and the birth of the USSR in 1917. Although the focal point has been on the Russian domestic politics and the fall of Romanov Dynasty, the epilogue of the book discusses the evolution of the Russian foreign policy at a degree which one could employ to get a meaning on the nature of the Soviet Grand Strategy. According to Önel’s and İşçi’s observations, Russian foreign policy had been instrumented to suppress and stifle domestic crises instead of serving to achieve the goals of grand strategy through a traditional pattern of governing anxiety in the name of the incumbents. They compared a group of rather time-honored historians such as Michael Karpovich and a newer generation. On the one hand, Önel and İşçi finds that for Karpovich-influenced scholars, the Russian imperial foreign policy agenda

⁸⁴ Richard Pipes, “Can the Soviet Union Reform?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1, Council on Foreign Relations, Fall 1984: 49.

was a production of domestic unease and despite the then-going civil unrest, they had a well-functioning parliament which was believed to have served with “an imperial responsibility”. On the other hand, the more modern approach which is also endorsed by the authors is that the thruster behind the fall of the empire was the WWI and its repercussions against the Tsarist autocracy at the domestic level had been feeding the incapability to act of the Romanov Dynasty.⁸⁵ Their epilogue can be tied to a central argument to link with the Soviet Grand Strategy in that respect.

There could be linkages between the afterward Soviet Grand Strategy through certain mutual elements between Tsarist agenda and Soviet realpolitik. Pechatnov’s hereof book sheds light on the Bolshevik strategic culture by implying that Stalinization had some strategic supplements coinciding with late-Tsarist foreign policy conception. But perhaps the common perceptions have stemmed from the realities of geopolitics. According to Hiroaki Kuroyami Stalin was neither a devoted follower of the Tsars nor Tsarism; yet he too, did not seem to separate the national interests of Russia and of Soviet Union’s.⁸⁶

On security, bearing past experiences in mind, for Soviets, their arch enemy Germany had meant to be restrained and left feeble. There had been the intention for Germany to be developed in to an anti-fascist and left-wing state to join a tentative people’s democratic Europe as well.⁸⁷ In addition, restoring the borders of 1941 had been made a priority such as Western Ukraine, Belorussian and Bessarabia was

⁸⁵ Onur İşçi & Onur Önel, “Rusya İmparatorluğu’nun Çöküşü: 1881-1917, Harp Yahut İhtilal”, İstanbul: Kronik Kitap, 2019: 338.

⁸⁶ Hiroaki Kuroyami, “Stalin and His Era”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2007: 719.

⁸⁷ Geoffrey Roberts, “Cold War Confrontations: Stalin Embattled” in *Stalin’s Wars: from World War to Cold War, 1939-1953*, Yale University Press, 2006: 350.

envisioned including maintaining influence over the Baltics. For the Western borders, stretching the line of defense until friendly states was accentuating aforementioned “out-moded concept” of Stalin’s defensive mindset.⁸⁸ Like Germany, Japan was categorized similarly by the Soviets with reference to the security threat they were posing. After all Russia and Japan had been to war at the beginning of the century as well; it was no surprise on behalf of the Soviet Union to contemplate a model within their grand strategy to demilitarize and cripple Japan. About the southern frontiers, Tsarist Russia’s ideas was not abandoned. Pechatnov’s narrative concur as he defines Kremlin’s yearning to secure the Mediterranean for the sake of protecting its “soft underbelly” enclosing most of the Soviet oil stashes.⁸⁹ Conducive to this goal, the Soviets had been seeking influence over Turkish Straits which eventually raised the tension while showed attention to Northern Iran.

On the economic narrative rooting for an early American prudence, due to the financial output by the time of the Great Depression, the USSR was not as severely damaged as the US. Lenin’s successor Stalin was getting results out of his domestic arrangements in order to keep the country in tact at the onset of the WWII. In relation to these preparations, the swift industrialization plan, the collectivization of agriculture and crude elimination of rivals proclaimed Stalin as the apparent leader of at least half of Europe already. Rise of Germany was also thought to be tamed by the deal he cut with Hitler which was brokered by Molotov. So far back in that era, the Soviets seemed promising to demonstrate that authoritarianism could actually help lift an economically devastated country back on its feet. This example was caught by some Europeans communists such as Italian, German, Spanish and French who were

⁸⁸ Pechatnov, *The Soviet Union and the World*, 92.

⁸⁹ Ibid

struggling against fascism; even historically Russian foe Polish homologues had sympathy for them. Given the fact that the democratic capitalism show no symptom to tackle the post war redistributive policy and development problems, during the interwar period especially when the US was more of an overwatch of the balance of power in Europe rather than more interventionist, the Soviets had been pondering on leading the post Great War globe.⁹⁰ Sanchez-Sibony depicts that their post war economic preponderance on international trade and finance made the US more aware of the menace derived from an geopolitically expanded autarky mirroring the Soviet Union.⁹¹

Geopolitics kept Tsarist mindset to manipulate the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East in harmony with Stalin's vision. The Soviet ambassador to London between 1932-1943 Ivan Maisky's memoirs had been put together by Gabriel Gorodetsky as the sum of Maisky's service between the years 1932-1943. In his memoirs, although he considered himself among the most successful diplomats in the *Narkomindel*, Maisky did not believe he was valuable enough for his post in London from Helsinki until Litvinov encouraged him in a personal telegram including direct support of Stalin. He had read the political situation in the 1930's in Europe as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to fix its relations with the UK. There had been an ongoing crisis of trade in between since the UK officials was regarding the deal as not within their countries best interest. The Conservative Party's government had been putting pressure on the Soviets for a more balanced agreement. As Maisky was cogitating on how to stabilize the trade issue with the UK, he was also closely

⁹⁰ Ibid, 85.

⁹¹ Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, "Capitalism's Fellow Traveler: The Soviet Union, Bretton Woods and the Cold War, 1944-1958", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2014: 298.

following Nazi Germany simultaneously with Litvinov's scrutiny. More importantly, the issue with the British was solved thanks to Litvinov's attendance to the World Economic Conference in June 1933 in London. There Litvinov met with the UK Foreign Minister John Allsebrook Simon and reached terms for the uplifting of the British sanctions on the Soviet Union in return for the release of the British engineers who had been imprisoned. This was eventually going to lead to the ratification of a new trade agreement in February 1934 and this step was going to be the cornerstone of the USSR's accession to the United Nations in the same year.⁹²

Vladimir Zubok deciphers the archival inference he grabs out of the Soviet documents as definitive of Moscow's reading of the Cold War as more of "a clash of two imperialisms" rather than a "a long twilight of struggle". His narrative features that the Soviet Grand Strategy since Stalin had been exerting influence on Middle East and Eastern Europe. Precisely, Stalin's aim was to consolidate his geopolitical attainments through diplomatic means in Yalta and Potsdam.⁹³ Even at the end of the WWII, Vojtech Mastny discusses that the British and American diplomats were hoping to win Russia's partnership via its coherent aspirations. Yet, in Tehran Conference, Stalin remarked that his goals were meant to "expand his opportunities". Thus, Charles Bohlen – the only American diplomat at the conference, was made clear that the Soviet intentions under Stalin leadership was to surface as the only military and political force on the European Continent.⁹⁴

⁹² Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Stalin ile Churchill Arasında: SSCB Büyükelçisi Mayski'nin Günlükleri", İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2019: 7.

⁹³ Vladimir Zubok, "Stalin's Plans and Russian Archives", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No.2, Oxford University Press, 1997: 296.

⁹⁴ Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 77, No. 5, Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, December 1972: 1388.

Another aspect on Stalin's establishment on the Soviet Union has been studied by Elena Zubkova. Starting from the early periods of the post WWII years, according to Zubkova's observations, Stalin's approach on foreign policy was aiming at employing a certain degree of pragmatism especially over the relations between the Soviet leadership and the Eastern European countries. However, there existed ideology in the realm of Stalin's concept. The ideological directives were temporarily overshadowed by the pragmatic intensions preserved from the recent war. In line with the previously depicted post war Soviet foreign policy, precisely on the magnitude of the borders, Stalin demonstrated tolerance and eagerness for dialogue with the Eastern European neighbors. The diversity on transition to socialism at these countries, the creation of the democratic fronts can be listed to illustrate in addition to the relaxation of the ideology for the sake of pragmatism in domestic politics as in the case of administering access for Soviet people to foreign scientific literature.⁹⁵

David R. Jones also perceives the Soviet strategic thinking as two dimensional: the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and preserving their Eurasian dynasty. In other words, the old military culture of the composition of the empire's repeatedly suffered frontiers from hostile invasion and the new military culture of 1917 had impacted the new multinational strategic culture based on Stalin's "Socialism in One Country" rhetoric. Thus the tie between Tsarist Russia and the USSR appears to have survived the polity change. Yet through the eyes of a deterministic assessment, the Soviet Union was then again surrounded by real or imagined enemies without

⁹⁵ Elena Zubkova, "The Regime and the Soviet Society in the Post War Years: Innovations and Conservatism, 1945-1953", *Journal of Modern European History*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Sage Publications Ltd, 2004: 142.

adequate sources.⁹⁶ Corollary to the argument for ideological clash between the US and the USSR, Ken Booth suggests that the role of ideology had not been what it seems for the entire time in this confrontation as he underpins that the Soviet leaders had been contemplating ideologically; however they were acting indeed pragmatically. What US and Soviet ideologies had in common in this regard was their non-compromising universalism and crusading character.⁹⁷ On the other side of the ideology factor, realpolitik presented no actual risk of confrontation the rift first occurred in 1917, as also suggested earlier by Gaddis. Geopolitical antagonism materialized by the end of WWII. George Kennan's "military proximity between Washington and Moscow" concept first occurred in Europe where it appeared as the form of geopolitical superpower rivalry. Within a short period of time, as countries in Middle and Far East got involved and looked at United States via a sense of threat by the Soviet Union – such as Turkey, Cold War became utterly globalized and hence the increasing Soviet power started to target the United States bolstered by the American distrust.⁹⁸

The Turkish Context: Relations with the Soviet Union

Should one switch gears to highlight the Turkish-Soviet relations on the verge of the Cold War after laying the blueprint, there lies benefit going back to the interwar interactions. Pertaining to the Russian narrative, Ottoman and Russian empires had shared many in common just as the high degrees of religious tolerance, the assimilation of the non-native elites and more others leading the Russians and the

⁹⁶ David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture" in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* New York: St's Martin's Press, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990: 35.

⁹⁷ Ken Booth, "US Perceptions of Soviet Threat: Prudence and Paranoia" in *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* New York: St's Martin's Press, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990: 52.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 55.

Ottomans to perceive each other jointly as dissimilar from the Western counterparts.⁹⁹ Else, in the time of need, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had contacted Vladimir Lenin in 1920 to a potential alliance against Europe which was resulted by the Bolsheviks' response of golds and guns to Ankara.¹⁰⁰ When the Soviets' utility appeared to be high and did not cost Turkey to compromise from its main track, Turkey adapted to the circumstances, as long as the equilibrium was demanding for only their uniformity in between and hence on the table. When cooperation was mutually the most beneficial road to pick, both sides had no hesitation – meaning both maximized each other's' utilities to their very own benefits. Nevertheless, the variables defining the clarity of the respective utilities and an accord involved other parties. To this end, this part is not going to be probing into the question of why Turkish-Soviet alliance did not work out which requires extensive discussion on interwar period interactions and the interpretation of the involvement of the third party countries in the meantime. Instead, it is engaging the Turkish-American relations' posture during the Cold War and to shed more light on the premise concerning why Turkey chose to rally with the US over the Soviets aside from the accounts on extensive Soviet diplomatic history nexus.

To grasp a meaning out from aforementioned reasoning peculiar to third party linkages, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 is a crucial asset between the Soviets and the Nazi Germany to entail a potential link-up between the Soviets and Turkey over the common denominators; the Straits and the Black Sea. Interwar period Soviet relations on behalf of Turkey was indeed fruitful as part of Turkey's Soviet perception of a foil against European great power politics. However Turco-

⁹⁹ Sam Hirst, "Anti-Westernism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of Soviet-Turkey Convergence in the 1930s", *Slavic Review*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 72, No. 1, Spring 2013: 36.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 37.

Soviet's mutual anti-imperialism did not remain in harmony with the Turkish political discourse when the USSR chose to align with the Nazi Germany, hence leaving Turkey no choice but to be mindful of this aggressive revisionism.¹⁰¹

The issue of the Straits was again another point of hesitation for Turkey with respect to its decision to lean on the Western identity on the foreign policy segment. It goes back a few centuries when thoughtfully combined with the common denominator of Greeks. The former Russian Empire had ostensibly supported the Greeks' revolt in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. One can come up with numerous arguments for both sides to do so including the matching geopolitical output of these events for both the Greeks and the Russians, their shared endeavor of Byzantine heritage and their Christian orthodox ambition. As the Ottomans were defeated while the Greeks became independent, the Straits were ripen as available to Russian merchant ships, yet none of these ships were allowed to be searched by the Ottoman authorities resulting by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. After having helped the palace to counter the Greeks, Mehmet Ali Paşa of Kavala revolted against the Sultan and there was the Russian Empire again, offering support to the Sultan. Although the crisis was taken under control thanks to the intervention of the UK and France who anticipated the consequences of letting Russia handle the situation by itself, Russian forces did not leave Bosphorus until 1833, when the Treaty of Hünkâr-İskelesi was ratified.¹⁰² It had been a treaty that stipulated mutual assistance however with a secret article to constrain the Ottoman Sultan to let the Russian warships to cross the Straits while no other state actor was allowed. The precedent

¹⁰¹ Onur İşçi, "Yardstick of Friendship: Soviet-Turkish Relations and the Montreux Convention of 1936", *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, ?.

¹⁰² Ahmed Şükrü Esmer, "The Straits: Crux of World Politics", *Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations*, Vol. 25, No. 4, January 1947: 292.

century has been full of such acts of unsustainable aggression. When added up, the Straits issue was on the line as the lifeblood apropos of the fate of Turkey's game plan for the Soviets.

Reasonably, Turkey's de-facto change of policy towards the Soviets came into play after the ratification of the Montreux Treaty. Grounding the preparations for war, Turkey was obliged to prescribe its line of action like all other states.¹⁰³ Within the scope of these preparations to the WWII, Montreux Treaty of 1936 was indeed a major flag pointing the demarcation between Turkey and the Soviets. Turkey's intention to modify the regime on the Straits set at Lausanne Peace Treaty could not meet the same level of reciprocity from Moscow and ultimately precipitated Turkey's adherence to the Western world's agenda vis-à-vis Soviets'.¹⁰⁴ In advance, Turkey had sent diplomatic notes to concerning parties about its desire to discuss new terms germane to rearranging certain mandates on the regulations of the Straits. Unlike the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Montreux Treaty had the allowance for periodic revisions on the New Straits regime.¹⁰⁵ The Soviets were yearning for the right to arm the Straits themselves.

With reference to securing the Straits, Turkey had been asked to thwart any passage attempt by an aggressive element. In return, the Soviets were urged for military assistance in the Mediterranean which was declined. Although invited to Moscow to review the terms, Turkey had already informed the UK about the Soviets'

¹⁰³ Necmettin Sadak, "Turkey Faces The Soviets", Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Vol. 7, No. 3, April 1949: 452.

¹⁰⁴ Baskin Oran, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I: 1919-1980", İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002: 321.

¹⁰⁵ Anthony R. DeLuca, "Montreux and Collective Security", The Historian, Taylor & Francis Ltd., Vol. 38, No. 1, November 1975: 3.

commencing initiative. In response, the UK notified Turkey that any further inaugurations would abrogate the actual Montreux Treaty, if otherwise – that should the negotiations would take place veritably within Montreux boundaries, then asserted that it would make no sense to modify Montreux’s terms. Based on Turkey’s standpoint, such action which the Soviets proposed on fulfilling their side of the deal had to be promising on the other side of the equation by means of an economic settlement. People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Maxim Litvinov alleged in October 19, 1936 to the Turkish Ambassador Zekai Apaydın that Turkey could not find common ground due to lack of support from another (specific – the UK) state. By all means, Litvinov was not sugarcoating. Through the eyes of the policymakers of the USSR apparently Turkey had being guided by a patron state and this argument seemed enough to deduce that further diplomacy would serve no good.

Other than security, for İnönü, economic realities carried vital suggestions in support of Turkey’s decisions as German market was the major determinant on Turkey’s economy, hence the country had an emerging focus to preserve the stability over a chaos which it cannot provoke under control.¹⁰⁶ Without the Soviets’ economic support, Turkey did not want to let the Soviets permeate their influence on the Straits neither directly nor indirectly. Turkey’s trajectory towards an alliance with France and the UK should have alluded an ongoing partnership with the Soviets at a certain extent.¹⁰⁷ A stern animosity from the Soviets would have been insufferable at that stage despite the issues which had been agreed to be disagreed upon. Any means to disrupt the status quo between Turkey and the Soviets would have been unpredictable and would additionally bring up economic ramifications unwantedly.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Cemil Koçak, “Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi 1938-1945, Cilt 1: Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerine bir Araştırma”, Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986: 257.

At a last attempt in 1937, Tevfik Rüştü Aras was sent to Moscow. Negotiations covered mainly Middle-Eastern affairs as Turkey had just ratified the nonaggression treaty of Saidabad with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. In conjunction with the program, Germany's and Italy's expansionist policies were also put on the table. Alas, amidst all of items on the agenda Stalin never met with the Turkish envoy. They were shown no great hospitality either and this could have been grasped as the momentous picture of the relations between these two countries.¹⁰⁸ Turkey had to prepare for the coming war and the first step had been to strengthen its Achilles' heel which the issue of the Straits and the Montreux regime. It costed the positive tone with the Soviets, but one could obviously argue that it was inevitably forthcoming. Even after the de jure outbreak of war, Turkey kept on bearing its suspicions towards Moscow as well as the UK's potential inability or unwillingness of protection vis-à-vis Soviets' demands on the Straits. In light of this build-up, Germany's advance on USSR was greeted joyfully which was a relief for the Turkish Government.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, towards the end of war, the USSR brought up the question of moving their navy across the Mediterranean by suggesting to modify the then-current regime; on the contrary, this move demonstrated Moscow's intentions as setting a new regime from top to bottom all along. Turkey's compulsion to disagree was supported by its Western partners (to be) in order to be able to check Soviet penetration to the Middle East and the Mediterranean.¹¹⁰ Unlike Middle East for Turkey which was checked regularly yet not contemplated for immediate action, Mediterranean was perceived as an area of both interbloc and intrabloc competition.

¹⁰⁸ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*, 322.

¹⁰⁹ Anthony DeLuca, "Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits", *Political Science Quarterly*, The Academy of Political Science, Vol. 92, No. 3, Autumn 1977: 506.

¹¹⁰ Süleyman Seydi & Steven Morewood, "Turkey's Application of the Montreux Convention in the Second World War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Vol. 41, No.1, January 2005: 97.

Came the 1960's, the Cyprus issue emerged as the vital question about the region of the Mediterranean; however until then, the Middle East and the Mediterranean had been essentially framed as an area of particular rivalry of Turkey's Russia versus the West. When officially joined NATO, Turkey had doubled its influence in this regard for Western alliance as one could anticipate.¹¹¹

On the grounds that Turkish rapprochement with the Soviets pervaded by severe forewarnings and ideologically utilitarian relevant arguments, American agenda emerged with more connotation. The nuance was that any prospective resolution to adopt closer ties with the Soviets on the horizon then was simply not worth the peril. Plainly, the political break-off with the Soviets was not a critical juncture for Turkey with regard to its grand strategy and encompassing the dynamics of Turkish-Russian interaction. Anyhow, given the predecessor Ottoman Empire's multi-religious and multi-ethnic legacy, the military and bureaucratic elite in the young Turkish Republic were aware of the fact that a Jacobinist, state-led top-down model for modernization were going to be imperative so that the new polity could join the Western community as soon as possible.¹¹² Ideological factors played a central role as much as the requirements of the realpolitik did their part. The existing security threat from the Soviets could not be overrun by any means which would relieve the Turkish center to fully achieve its secular and democratic ideals while flourish its territorial integrity with ever-modernizing military.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey and the Mediterranean during the Cold War" in *Turkey as a Mediterranean Power*, Turkey: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011: 9.

¹¹² Tarık Oğuzlu, "The Future of Turkey's Westernization: A Security Perspective", *Insight Turkey*, SETA Vakfı, Vol. 9, No.3, 2007: 50.

¹¹³ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Testing the Strength of the Turkish-American Relationship through NATO", *Journal of the Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013: 209.

By nature, balancing the Soviet threat made it compulsory to relegate the chances by all means necessary and available. One thus also supposedly imply that the interwar Soviet engagement on commercial and developmental terms had been an attempt to tame the inconvenient intentions until they literally failed towards the WWII. Intuitively, Turkish bureaucratic and military elite might have sought to materialize interdepending more with the Soviets as leverage against any tentative hazardous initiatives countering its pro-Western agenda that could have stemmed from the Soviets. During the tenures of Atatürk and İnönü, Turkish foreign policy agenda solidified as Europe-friendly while apparently aimed at subsisting upon the Soviets to avoid a flamboyant imbalance with rigor on its trajectory towards a Westernized country.¹¹⁴ Based on these historical realities, it is rather feasible to glean Turkey's yearning for a bargaining chip that would work both ways according to the requirements; at times to manage Soviet aggression, at other times to incite the West in line with its own ideals and unfold both sides' maximum utilities out of cooperating. This was later on crowned with NATO membership, but before that, Turkey took other steps as well. Eventually these very steps led the country via more involvement with the US as the US took over Turkey's prior military and economic benefactor, the UK by replacing it as the global hegemon in terms of economy for absolute terms.

The Turkish Context: Relations with the United States

Security had not been the exclusive aspect of the first undertaking to sprout cooperation in the interwar period. There had been earlier economic efforts on the US side to establish with Turkey. In 1937, the US had openly approached to expand

¹¹⁴ Tarık Oğuzlu, "An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from 'Security' Perspective", *Security Dialogue*, Sage Publications, Vol. 34, No. 3, September 2003: 286.

on its trade in line with the commercial policy of the Turkish incumbents. Then Acting Secretary of State Moore and Ambassador in Ankara MacMurray had been intensively working with the Turkish Foreign Ministry for reciprocal tariff reductions as evidently seen in the telegrams.¹¹⁵ The processes went on in the following years as well. Interwar cooperation with the Soviets is definitely not forsaken to be mentioned in the literature; however apparently in official documents there is evidence that in a repetitive manner in mutual agenda, Turkey had been pushing to negotiate a trade agreement with the US likewise.¹¹⁶

From a perspective that aims attention to the American foreign policy window, at this point, the US initiated the containment policy which aimed assembling countries with similar agendas on the international scale to cooperate in opposition to the potential of increase on the USSR's clout circles, which was framed as all democratic nations under threat from internal or external forces by the American authorities.¹¹⁷ On the international level, NATO was the most compelling child of this initiative, but it was not an only child. Looking at the rest of the steps taken can provide an argument on the American strategy for incepting the containment policy coupled with the post-WWII insecurity and devastation. Later not to be maintained, SEATO was a sibling meant to contain communism on Southeast Asia. Again, the main scope of the Truman Doctrine was to defend the "free world" from attacks stemming from the Communist Bloc; in SEATO's case it

¹¹⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], Diplomatic Papers, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, 611.6731/195, Telegram, 1937.

¹¹⁶ FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, 611.6731/343a, Telegram, 1938.

¹¹⁷ Department of State – United States of America, Office of the Historian, "Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 1945 – 1952: The Truman Doctrine, 1947", <<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>>.

was China.¹¹⁸ In line with this conjecture in Europe, as the Balkan Pact was ratified between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, the US was a firm supporter. By this cooperation, not only the USSR was being enclosed upon over the status quo but also then-technically communist but Soviet fearing Yugoslavia was being shielded. Whereas never joined NATO at the time, it was not surprising for Yugoslavia to be open to Western actors and influences given the politically tumultuous decades it was going through while shunning a potential move for a Soviet expansion towards their soil.¹¹⁹ Thus, it was a positive sum game on behalf of the US.

As per the same mentality, Baghdad Pact or also known as CENTO was established to cover Middle-East to a certain extent over the cooperation of Pakistan, Iran and Iraq with Turkey and the United Kingdom amidst serious opposition from Egypt and Syria. The essence of this treaty was military assistance anew against potential threats and collaboration. There was the undeniable British supremacy in the region for the past few centuries, although it was severely challenged by the Russian Empire before especially in the Middle East and East Asia in the 19th century, the inclination in terms of international political perspective was signaling a new Middle-East dominated by the US, replacing the UK. Combined with the progressively increasing Turkish-American military cooperation, the British started to appear as a supporting actor instead of a principal component.¹²⁰ In any case, at the first place, it was the stepping down of the British from supporting Turkey and Greece because of the economic crisis in 1947 and letting Truman Doctrine to take

¹¹⁸ Ronald C. Nairn, "SEATO: A Critique", *Pacific Affairs*, University of British Columbia, Vol. 41, No.1, Spring 1968: 6.

¹¹⁹ Vincent Legendijk & Frank Schipper, "East, West, Home's Best: The Material Links of Cold War: Yugoslavia 1948-1980", *ICON, International Committee for History and Technology (ICOHTEC)*, Vol. 22, 2016: 29.

¹²⁰ Richard L. Jasse, "The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 27. No. 1, January 1991: 144.

the stage.¹²¹ Soviet pressure was becoming more inevitable in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a part of the result, CENTO had been set on as another counter measure to keep the United Kingdom in play as well. Among these organizations, no region or continent was spurned. In such a mode, ANZUS was formed in the post-WWII to secure the Atlantic Ocean through a cooperation between Australia, the US and New Zealand.

On the European side, communism was feared of being read as a way to tackle the poverty and devastation which the continent was facing after the WWII. At least so was alarmed the US and foresaw a similar case for Turkey and Greece after the drastic rise on the recruitments of the communist party in Italy apart from the British decision to withdrawing from backing Turkey militarily because of the economic burdens which had been undergoing on their part.¹²² ¹²³ Turkey, amidst these developments, moreover identified the Soviet threat as imminent and thence took action accordingly by joining NATO unlike the countries of the Middle-East which did not endeavor a military safeguard due to the fact that Soviets had not pursued any enterprises in the Middle-East after the Truman Doctrine. Notwithstanding, the rest of Europe had not a path as clear as Turkey on the journey to choose its bloc based on its instigators except for Greece where the tumultuous status quo was gravely requiring a large scale intervention due to the crises going on.

¹²¹ Samuel F. Wells, "Truman Consolidates US Commitments" in *Fearing the Worst: How North Korea Transformed the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2020: 47.

¹²² T.V. Paul, "Balancing During the Cold War" in *Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era*, New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2018: 78.

¹²³ George S. Harris, "Troubled Alliance: Turkish- American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971", Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research & Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, June 1972: 25.

Given the tendency by the nation states to crop up international cooperation mechanisms, behind the predominant inducement of the US, also put the US to a chief position in the “free world alliance”. There was conformity to the decision-making and agenda-setting amidst all the policy choices. One could define the mentality of this counter-communist crusade as *Pax Americana* in which the US had the unrefined right to be complied by the other countries both in a multilateral manner in a mutual organization and in bilateral terms.¹²⁴ This very approach, in fact, had been paving the way for future problems with – not only – Turkey soon to arise in the moments of disagreements. Thus, the American role in Cold War self-evolved from care-taker to coordinator with the ignition of the Truman Doctrine.¹²⁵

Hereof making of the American Grand Strategy largely depended on military assistance to those who were surmised as “in need” against the communist threat on the parts that involved Turkey principally. For Turkey, it was a positive-sum game as well. Its army was being modernized as these aid plans were invoked and the military personnel were being trained in line with the latest developments and doctrines to be compatible with the sine qua non modern military trends. As the most essential component in Turkish foreign policy agenda had been leveling the intrusive Soviet expansionism at the time, although it first seemed to be a sort of diplomatic restoration of harmony between Turkey and the US by 1947, it later on turned into an alliance. But no matter how far Turkish impulse was positioned away from entering a bloc-oriented political route, it ended up to converging that tone alongside UK – since the UK evolved into a more active player against the Soviets’ opening to the

¹²⁴ D.F. Fleming, “Can Pax Americana Succeed?”, *The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Sage Publications, Vol. 360, July 1965: 130.

¹²⁵ Oral Sander, “Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964”, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2016: 61.

Middle-East, British was put at discomfort. Therefore, Turkey's commitment with the US began to shape its place in the Western bloc.

Turkey's undertaking of Western alliance did not have unilateral ramifications. Considering how intensely Turkey had been aspiring to be safeguarded within its partners from the West, some trade-offs were perhaps calculated way too rapidly such as, for instance, in the case of Palestine-Israel. Until the actual implementation of the Truman Doctrine, Turkey had been providing substantial support to the Arab world for the establishment of an Arab state in the region. On the other end, Truman administration was aware of the deep seated political strength of the Jewish community in the US.¹²⁶ That being an argument as of a secondary importance for the American policymakers, incorporating the Middle-East from a key ground meant a sounder containment of the USSR geopolitically. Creating a wider sphere of influence vis-à-vis Soviet goals which had been unknown to the US at time were at the heart had been the preeminent objective. Thus, Turkey supported the US's policy framework for moving Jewish community to the Arab lands including advising the ones who had been accommodating on its soil and recognized Israel 10 months later than its establishment by abandoning its former policy line.¹²⁷ For the sake of its foreign policy objectives, Turkey then sought inept legitimacy to its choice. Yet, it was later to be found that at the same planted the seeds for future friction with the Arab world in return. As the Zionist lobby and hasty public opinion in the US pressed the administration to take abrupt action as well,

¹²⁶ Bruce J. Evensen, "Truman, Palestine, and the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Taylor & Francis, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 1992: 123.

¹²⁷ Michael Ottolenghi, "Harry Truman's Recognition of Israel", *The Historical Journal*, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2004: 977.

perhaps Turkish decision making mechanism should not be assessed as ineffectively nonchalant or sloppy because of letting the Arab politick down.¹²⁸

Endorsement of the Truman Doctrine had other results than tattering relations with the Middle-Eastern countries such as in case of the ties with the Non-Aligned Movement. It had already been marked in Turkish foreign policy agenda that with the Republican era the goal was going to move along the Western partners rather than sticking with the nations of Asia and Africa. It might be anachronistic to criticize this decision which had been taken despite the consequences it brought. Taking into account that the world was not nearly as much globalized as it is today back at that specific period; interdependence particularly in a post-war era with not advanced geographies was not prioritized as in the extreme political and material scarcity of resources, hence appears to be a compelling reason not exactly to advocate but not to oppose to follow this strategy.

Although it may seem like Turkey had officially dedicated itself to the Western alliance while dissociating itself from Asia by joining NATO in 1952 and by taking a pro-Western stance in 1955 at Bandung Conference, actually in line with the decision, Turkey had before rejected to join the SEATO-led meeting of the Asian countries in 1949 to discuss the Indonesia-Malaysia problem by referring to itself as a country of different continent. In the eyes of the Turkish bureaucratic elite, Turkey was a European country, ergo it had no business in pursuing matters of the nations of Asia. Herewith, a trade-off had been put in motion by the Turkish government with the hopes of a more cogent structure of alliance with the West by immolating

¹²⁸ Bruce J. Evensen, "A Study of 'Ineptness: The Truman Administration's Struggle to Shape Conventional Wisdom on Palestine at the Beginning of the Cold War'", *Diplomatic History*, Oxford University Press, Summer 1991: 344.

abeyant seeds for the other parts of the globe. But notwithstanding this point of view from the periphery, the center of the Western alliance, the US, then later sought other efforts establishing relations, striving to avoid resentment from Asian circles.¹²⁹ Therefore apparently an ephemeral decision by the Turkish administration between the period concerning the Truman doctrine and joining NATO was again executed with the survival aptitude, leading one to surmise that Turkey would settle with a wider defensive arrangement soon after these steps.¹³⁰

Similar to the purposes of Turkey's strategy in Asian affairs, the region of Middle East was also listed as a zone of insufficient cost-effectiveness for the governing bureaucratic elite in the early Republic as well as its contradicting reading for the country's new Western ideals. It continued throughout the entire Cold War to be frank, NATO membership was the crux of Turkey's consolidated foreign policy agenda.¹³¹ Unless a matter of national security was at stake, spending effort with interventionist motives was seen as unnecessary.¹³² There is also the argument presuming that an extra motive Turkey to sever well established diplomatic efforts with the Middle Eastern countries was the fact that most of these states were not de facto independent.¹³³ Turkey purposely detached itself from the local politics to perpetuate its cooperative portrayal to the West as part of its grand strategy. Securing the mainland through treaties was the name of the game. No further cooperation was deemed required for Turkey did not share the Islamic heritage the way the Ottoman

¹²⁹ Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954-1955", *Diplomatic History*, Oxford University Press, Vol. 29, No. 5, November 2005: 845.

¹³⁰ Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy*, 104.

¹³¹ Sarah Akram, "Turkey and the Middle East", *Strategic Studies*, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Vol. 30, No. 2, Spring & Summer 2010: 245.

¹³² Emel Parlar Dal, "Transformation of Turkey's Relations with the Middle East: Illusion or Awakening?", *Turkish Studies*, Taylor & Francis Ltd., Vol. 13, No. 2, 2012: 247.

¹³³ M. Sheharyar Khan, "The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East", *Policy Perspectives*, Pluto Journals, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2015: 34.

Empire did. Additionally, Ottoman reminiscences were not exactly positive indeed on Arabic panorama. Turkey had transformed into an exemplary state for their former Middle-Eastern counterparts rather than partner which Turkey would frequently seek to have on the table. This was the actual grand strategy of the young Republic.

As aforementioned, this pattern of foreign policy making could probably be best explained with an instinct for survival on behalf of incumbents in Turkey. But the domestic settlements were being reshaped as well as promoting security within the climate. Seeking this very urgency on top, Turkey's early single party politics model had also begun to soften into a more democratically feasible display and flourish.¹³⁴ Again, one must avoid superseded interpretations out of that remark such as to claim that the initial Turkish government had been totalitarian rather than authoritarian and hence closer to the Eastern bloc by political nature. Early Turkish republic had set course to divert from its Ottoman background for the most part as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk envisaged. Therefore, when the modernization of the country began with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, it was in fact the initiation of the Westernization as well on different dimensions of the statecraft both technically and conceptually.

Ultimately, as Oral Sander suggests, while admitting that Turkey's democratic institutions grew stronger as the country orbited to the West, clearly the country's own intentions on this regard involved a modernizing ethos in statecraft as much as it was an obligation within the . In other words, the liberalization in the

¹³⁴ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, p. 66.

political climate with multi-party politics helped redefining the country's Western identity in evolution accordingly. With the introduction of the Democrat Party as the main opposition after the failed attempts to install multi-party politics in the past consecutive decades in the midst of insurgencies, Turkey had finally stepped onward thanks to the efforts of the Republican People's Party's efforts led by İsmet İnönü although the success of the multi-party regime is often attributed to a collaborate effort of the Republican, Democrat and National parties all.¹³⁵

Turkish foreign policy during the period under review here went through a number of twists and turns. But, when put in a broader historical context, the significance of early Cold War years lies elsewhere: In hindsight, it would be fair to suggest that Turkey was more pro-Western between 1945 and 1964 than at any other point in the country's modern history. During the *détente* period, Turkish policy makers adopted a more balanced diplomacy, using the Soviet Union as a foil to manage their differences with the United States. As it will be demonstrated in the upcoming section, with the period following the 1960 coup, Ankara prioritized development assistance as much as contributions to the military. When these two combined with some mismatches in foreign policy priorities in the Mediterranean, Turkey's and the US's confrontations rose mainly stemming from military matters. But also the role of societal elements and domestic politics are not to be undermined on setting the tone of the dialogue in between. The part starting with the 1960s showed that the Alliance was somewhat vulnerable when red lines were at stake. As part of the developments, the US were to witness that its former bandwagon Turkey was turning into a middle power. Ankara was about to start taking initiative to

¹³⁵ Kemal Karpat, "Chapter 13: Reformism – İnkılapçılık – Westernization and Behavioral Changes" in *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to the Multi-Party Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1959: 331.

influence the definitive consequences of the occurrences with a critical approach to Washington's.



CHAPTER II: US-TURKEY RELATIONS DURING THE 1960s

The fundamental problem between Turkey and the US throughout the 1960s was an asymmetrical adherence to their alliance in terms of actions and expectations. This is not to suggest that US-Turkey alliance resembled a house of cards, but, the two states had been cultivating differences and resentments that surfaced after the 1960 coup in Turkey. Why was there a mismatch between Turkey and the US in the global context of the Cold War and why did an otherwise cordial relationship get strained, particularly after 1963? The current chapter seeks to address problems in US-Turkey relations, as Ankara was going through a painful democratic transition in the face of a global American enterprise. Throughout the 1960s, US-Turkey channels of communication seemed arbitrary, as the US policy makers began to overlook the national interests of one ally against another over the Cyprus problem.

As Ambassador Erkin underscored Turkey's inevitability to solicit common ground as fast as possible with the West was obliging Turkey to comply with wobbly set terms, the need to balance the Soviets could not wait longer. Speaking of the rift between West's assumptions and the realities of Ankara, Lieutenant General Cemal Madanoğlu's memoirs validated how the DP leadership was distant to having a grip of the situation. He also perceived the happenings with consternation before the 1960 revolution. As Turkey's membership to NATO was complete, American military presence inside the Turkish borders was furnished with certain concessions. The new bilateral agreements mandated that Turkey let the United States establish new bases wherever they seem fit. They were told that the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu

meant to brief the command and the Chief of Staff about the novelties. Madanoğlu narrates,

Minister Zorlu, without any reluctance, said that NATO had no responsibility assisting Turkey's defenses from air, sea and land. Logistic support was provisional but was not assured. Turkish military was expected to last long enough without surrender until NATO forces could carry out a counter offensive. By performing delaying action, all the elements shall fall back from East and West to Gulf of Alexandretta, where NATO allies would disembark. In the meantime, their main task would be to defend the arrival of the reinforcements from the Taurus Mountains. We were puzzled. Even after a few more meeting with the Minister, we still did not understand why we were supposed to retreat from Ankara and Anatolia at once. Why were we asked to run away from the enemy and defend from a deeper front? I suggested that we set our forces in West, Thrace precisely. East of the Straits could be our initial line of defense. The Navy opposed. Their representative stood up and asked what was expected from them in this scenario. I told him we, the Land Forces, could just simply walk down until the Gulf of Alexandretta, the Air Force could fly and land anywhere as well, but them, the Navy had no luck(!). This was the situation in the Planning Council. I refused to convey Zorlu's sentences to the central command over official channels. This was no soldiery. The Head of Readiness Planning Department Necati Tacan later found out about what happened as he was on a business trip. I was told that he said that the Turkish military had a branch to plan its operations, thus needed no instructions or advice from NATO on how to defend its homeland.¹³⁶

The military's farsightedness could be noted as worthwhile although Foreign Minister Zorlu's conformity with the instructions from NATO. The incumbent's political paradigm was set at a categorically different passive stance. The military was rather aspired to be more of a determinant element concerning the cooperation with the West over NATO.

While Turkey had been undergoing definitive changes in the Cold War atmosphere towards a more integrated trajectory with the West, the pulse between the Transatlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact did not persist the same. Menderes

¹³⁶ Halim Tugay Madanoğlu, "Korgeneral Cemal Madanoğlu'nun Anıları", İstanbul, Kaynak Yayınları, 2019: 274.

era was a fitting example of an enthusiastic cooperation scheme between the Allies, somehow extreme and personalized at times. The transition to democracy was signaling the altercation in politics to be magnified thanks to the initiative led by İnönü; so did the Democrat Party incumbency for a critical juncture in the Republic's rationale. Following the first democratic elections in 1946 in principle, until the coup in 1960, the interaction between two countries was on the rise as far as the liberalization of the institutions. Came 1960, points in question started to crystalize combined with the degradation of the channels with the US.

The domestic policy trajectory of DP pursued a centralizing pattern as their office endured. The peak can arguably be demonstrated as the "Tahkikat Komisyonu", which was an investigative committee with colossal mandates probe any insubordination by the opposition. Harris's illustration on this particular matter intriguing. The dimension of Turkish-American cooperation was growing into a DP-American interconnectedness. Menderes's pressure on getting official invitations to the United States, his ties with then-US Ambassador Fletcher Warren, how the American Embassy was cooperating with DP to keep CHP circles away, especially how the link between the American Embassy and the opposition leadership was cut; these were all glaring signals of instrumenting the relations on arbitrary terms by the DP leadership. İnönü even once felt the need to highlight his state of concern as he spelled out that he hoped Turkish-American relations were nation-to-nation beyond DP.¹³⁷ The incumbent's stratagem to employ American aid during its 1954 election campaign brought ensuing outputs. When the US government denied the extension of the loan request by the DP leadership, it was the first blow. The criterion for

¹³⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 83.

Turkish corporatism was seemingly shifting to a mindset as if it has been a must for a patriot to be in favor of American aid. The pulse of the domestic politics was more and more invoking the DP linkage to the US as the American loans had conspicuously serving for the best interest of the incumbents. The main opposition was well aware of that. Naturally, in the light of the Cold War atmosphere, the affinity with the Americans were seen more than just an amenity, yet CHP were receptive of DP's framing of the aid as bail outs.

Over a context through which the theme "development" had been the medium to define the tone of post WWII account, one could ask Turkey's other alternative, the Soviets, for aid. However, the dubious nature of the relations between Soviets and Turkey was among the most noticeable factors explaining why such mechanism could not be established. Apart from the ideological contrast of the political identity of the DP and the Soviet ethos, the idea that Turkish reading of the Soviet Grand Strategy had been expansionist and aggressive as it was studied in detail in the previous chapter, Turkey's choice to side with the US had its reason in terms of relying on the US aid to a certain extent. Thus, Soviets' wish to rally the underdeveloped world through economic aid was marked by the West as it required a counter move to avoid an aggregation. Turkey was a rather convenient case since its options were stricken due to the country's geopolitical realities, especially from North.

At his visit to Turkey in December, 1959, during a conference in Ankara, President Eisenhower alluded to the fact that the Soviet Union had promised to distribute \$912 million to the underdeveloped countries, yet managed to hand out an

amount between \$250 to \$300 million according to American sources. The comprehensive economic strength of the West had to be mustered to prevent such gatherings around the Warsaw Pact. The monetary calculations had to be supplemented by military initiatives. Turkey, in this regard, was doing its part by maintaining a large force.¹³⁸ Minister Zorlu, following President Eisenhower in conformity, raised that the Soviets were at a point in which they themselves are mindful of the fact that there was no other way left pushing Turkey other than going to war. As he carried on by underlining the importance of coherence among allies against the Soviet efforts to trigger disagreements via crises as in the example of dispute for nuclear armament between OEEC, the Outer Seven and the French. According to the spirit of his speech and its supposed military superiority, USSR had to come believe that via its economic achievements, it would reap further challenges toward the West and thus continue pushing for the superiority of communism on the globe. To counter balance such intentions, what the West should do was to remain steadfast and remember to emphasize solidarity.¹³⁹

The commission mentioned above was a beacon of a de-facto totalitarian regime on-the-way. In the sense that CHP's awareness of American foreign policy's current trend, they rightfully feared that in the case that Turkey's trajectory shifts toward a less democratic direction, the US could reconsider its rapport apropos the country accordingly. Washington had been pursuing to establish congeal relations with autocrats in Europe like Spain's Franco and Portugal's Salazar and Asian and South American counterparts.¹⁴⁰ By doing so, Washington was also demonstrating that its

¹³⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1958-60. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey Volume X, Part 2, 1958/60: 820.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 821.

¹⁴⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 82.

foreign policy objectives was being prioritized and this was nothing like what Kissinger had been describing on the American Grand Strategy. Apparently the US was selectively seeking its best interests rather than promoting the principles of democracy and human rights as Kissinger would have argued. In this regard, when Korean Syngman Rhee's regime was publicly divorced with Washington, it was a turning point given how the US used to perceive such administrations with the conjecture of the day. Rhee used to be a prominent anti-Communist figure who was supposedly believer of the argument suggesting that the Soviets would prefer softened up advancements in East Asia instead of hot conflict, since they would not be ready to sustain a certain victory¹⁴¹. It was, such a name, that was severed the ties with. From the time he was the Joint Chief of Staff until the end of his Presidency, Eisenhower had put significant effort to Korea. Therefore Washington's decision was definitely not taken in a bed of roses. Ike's aversion to be drawn into regional conflicts was evident. In this context, as Turkey had joined NATO as a result of its participation to the Korean War, the relations between Turkey, Korea and NATO were cemented.¹⁴² For US to abandon its backing to Korea could have indicated that Turkey were next in line to be "adjusted" or to face an altered course by its ally.

In May 1960, the NATO Foreign Minister Meeting in İstanbul meant a critical juncture in the eyes of the main opposition. Secretary-General Paul Henri-Spaak underlined that the Alliance's stance on not to meddle with the domestic politics of their allies, CHP's hope on expecting an at least indirect game-changing policy effect was vanished. Should the Alliance's approach was as it had been with the Korean

¹⁴¹ Robert T. Oliver, "A Brief of Korea", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 294, *America and a New Asia*, July 1954: 38.

¹⁴² Alan R. Millett, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale and Hopeful Precedent", *The Journal of African-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 10, No. ¾, Fall-Winter, 2001: 174.

case with DP regime, then the main opposition could have been in sooth about the trajectory ahead for DP's incumbency. Secretary-General's speech, in that sense, halted the odds of Turkey sharing the same fate with Korea regarding its dialogue with the US. However, concerning the timeline of these events, another incident was waiting to take place soon enough to divert the narrative for DP other than the US and the political opposition.

The 1960 Coup

The political climate had become utterly tense after DP's latest unconventional policy moves to impede in the opposition more and more provocatively. Political unrest was spreading wider. Martial law was declared as a result of the university student riots in April 1960. War School cadets sympathized with their civilian counterparts and showed their support in the protests.¹⁴³ It was made unambiguous that DP were no longer capable of harnessing a democratic order, so read a band of officers in the military whose objective had been to put an end to DP incumbency by taking over for the sake of preserving the national unity. The repercussion of oppressiveness by the Menderes government had led to a point where CHP was rummaging for the military to intervene. Combined with DP's early politicizing deeds of the high ranking officers at the beginning of their governance, the military was finally expected stabilize the by thwarting the DP coercion. DP itself was relying upon the military's loyalty. The military was not all in harmony about its involvement in politics, thenceforth resignations had taken place in previous months. In May 27, 1960, this very group, also known as the National Unity Committee

¹⁴³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 83.

which was formed by 38 officers, overthrew the government and seized control. A moratorium was declared on all political activity.

A young republic that sought a Westernized trajectory had gotten out of control after a decade and a half after it transitioned to democracy. Among third-world countries, military interventions were prevalent, yet also, it was among NATO members. Greece and Portugal were to experience similar turn of events. These peripheral states of Europe also suffered from coups. Thenceforth, being part of the Transatlantic Alliance were not adumbrating a promise for a strong set of democratic institutions. Still, on the contrary, the US was selectively welcoming or discrediting military interventions under the roof of NATO.¹⁴⁴ The Eisenhower administration was not caught off guard. Archival evidence prompts an intriguing disclosure on behalf of the American point of view. Although the US was professedly enjoying close contact with the DP leadership, Ambassador Warren's cables to Washington told a different narrative that was portraying US as aware of DP's wrongdoings in Turkish domestic politics in the name of maintaining an authoritarian rule.

CIA's documents underscore that the coup was a result of a dissatisfaction that had grown in the last several years within the army as the results of Menderes' use of the military to suppress the main opposition party, sympathy for opposition leader İnönü and university as mentioned earlier students in addition to the reported corruption at the highest levels of the government especially in the use of the foreign funds. It is recorded as the CIA was anticipating the incident since February.¹⁴⁵ Gunn additively alludes to Menderes' fall from grace over his mismanagement of financial

¹⁴⁴ Christopher Gunn, "The 1960 Coup in Turkey: A US Intelligence Failure or a Successful Intervention?", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 2015: 104.

¹⁴⁵ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "NSC Briefing", 0002051501, F-2011-00832, May 30, 1960.

assets. Starting notably from 1954, when 1958 arrived, Turkish economy was at the brink of collapse and Menderes leadership had only made it worst despite the vast sums of support received from the US, the World Bank and the IMF. With the US struggling to regulate its balance of payment across the Atlantic, having Turkey at the border of the Soviets combined with its terrible economic output dragged the case towards a much more challenging stance. In the last bit, Turkey's defection was deemed far more unacceptable than persevering the country financially as a burden.¹⁴⁶

Washington was convinced that "Menderes' government increasingly ruthless suppression of his principal opposition" was about to develop into a military move on his behalf against İnönü and the CHP.¹⁴⁷ Chairman of the NUC and the designated head of state General Gürsel was already studied and known as well as the other high-profile name of the junta, General Madanoğlu. The differences of the opinions among the NCU members were also already identified by the US; however Washington was swayed that the NCU would restore the civilian government very soon. It was just that they too were worrying about the aftermath of the stepping down of the military. There was no unity of ideas on how to carry on with the civilian government. The junta was aiming at avoiding a single-party system restatement, thus former DP members were suspected to rejuvenate new political movements with same endeavors.¹⁴⁸ In the end, a month after the putsch, Ambassador Warren visited General Gürsel with the company of Secretary General Kunalalp and Colonel Türkeş. In his report to Washington, he shared his interpretation of Türkeş as the future replacement of Gürsel and criticized Gürsel for

¹⁴⁶ Gunn, *The 1960 Coup in Turkey*, 127.

¹⁴⁷ FRUS, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey; Volume X, Part 2, 1958/1960: 858.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 859.

being like a “Hittite idol” during the talks, for not showing any emotion.¹⁴⁹ Other CIA reports also indicated that there were jealousy among the members of the Committee and a potential internal struggle was foreseen.¹⁵⁰ The degree which the US had been involved in the situation was remarkable. Because, as might be expected, the Soviets were standing on its hind legs to exploit the circumstances.

On the matters of foreign policy, although the new regime was presumed to have an akin understanding with its Western allies as the Menderes government, it divergently gave the US authorities to be “less readily amenable to US influence on certain issues and were to show more sensitivity about Turkish sovereignty in matters arising from the presence US troops in Turkey”.¹⁵¹ Notwithstanding, it was not only about security. More urgently, the issue of aid had to be addressed. According to American sources, Khrushchev had sent two letters to Ankara, in which he was openly assuring that the Soviet aid was available for the new regime.¹⁵² For Washington, this was a significant incident because Ankara was to use this occurrence to be more persuasive on the table for more American support hinging on the odds of Washington’s zeal to sustain the aid flow. There were no hesitation through the eyes of the US that even the new regime which was seen anti-Russian, there would be a limited cooperation like Menderes’ government did. A tentative civilian takeover by a CHP led government was not feared to push more weight on the USSR side concerning aids. The Turkish goal for aid was depicted to have an extensive framework to cooperate with the West. Nevertheless, this did not mean that in contempt of the discords Turkey sought to have a go other parallels. Hirst and İşçi

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 863.

¹⁵⁰ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), “NSC Briefing”, 0002036767, F-2010-01921, June 29, 1960.

¹⁵¹ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), “Short-Term Prospects for Turkey”, 0005617859, F-2010-01912, July 19, 1960.

¹⁵² FRUS, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey; Volume X, Part 2, 1958/1960, 862.

depicts that Russian-Turkish relations at the time was centered on “economic exchanges” correspondingly. In a context of development politics just like the ordinary relations pattern of the USSR with the global south, Turkish statist industry was being fed by Soviet machinery and was returned by figs and raisins.¹⁵³ Yet again, Washington did not read such exchanges dangerous as it could be seen in the telegrams illustrated above.

Into the Cyprus Vortex

With the coup taking place in 1960, the military regime was not after a fundamental change in the system but rather preferred a swift transition – at least a part of it – to civilian government and a new constitution, the 1961 Constitution which was identified as the outcome of “the reaction of the weakened bureaucracy triggered by the military with the blessings of CHP versus the bourgeoisie, had entered in force as far as the domestic settings concerned. The emphasis on social justice, social rights and the welfare state in the 1960 Constitution were the fallout of the DP’s land bourgeoisie roots and their conducts to muster political influence at the center of this new elite.¹⁵⁴ Thus, as one can notice, the internal affairs were already looking promising to consume compelling political capital. Harris suggests that the soldiers had not put a lot of thought on how to settle after the major incident, the takeover, since the ongoing disorder was engrossing them as it had been doing so for Menderes which was removed from the office while it was preoccupied with the local political turmoil as well.¹⁵⁵ Intuitively, American papers were professing the exact same

¹⁵³ Samuel J. Hirst & Onur İşçi, “Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development”, *Diplomatic History*, Oxford University Press, Vol. 44, No. 5, 2020: 847.

¹⁵⁴ Bülent Tanör, “Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri”, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2014: 367.

¹⁵⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 86.

observation. Even the official statement by the NUC had entailed the purpose of the intervention as to thwart the brothers from fighting with one and another and then to lead to fair elections. The fate of the upcoming regime had to be decided with priority. Therefore, foreign policy could wait while the homeland was being rearranged, so thought the junta. The NUC were at the edge of being torn apart due to indecision on how to proceed to solve the long-lasting political issues. Nevertheless, the disagreements between the junta members were not about the future role of Turkey in the international arena given the bipolar context.

Inheritance of the Menderes decade, the closer relations with the US endured and the National Unity Committee was willingly pursuing it. In a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to President Eisenhower, Dulles had spoken highly of İnönü by underlining his role with Atatürk in the establishment of the republic and additionally his efforts on transitioning Turkey from “a dictatorship to democracy”. Then, he was drawing attention that İnönü had feeling that Turkey was not getting as great a quid pro quo from the US under Menderes as it should be receiving.¹⁵⁶ The circumstances brought by the Cold War atmosphere was inevitably placed at the top of the agenda. The junta’s first concern was to clinch the economic aid from the US. As anticipated by Washington, Ankara refused Soviets’ approach albeit their swiftness. What mattered the most for the US was the alacrity of the changeover to the civilian government. With the junta in office, the country’s political climate was less than predictable and American foreign policy objectives were requiring a stronghold at the time. The post-coup conspiracies in 1962 and 1963 demonstrated how fragmented the military had become following the purge. It thence

¹⁵⁶ FRUS, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey; Volume X, Part 2, 1958/1960, 790.

segregated the concentration on the foreign and defensive undertakings. Washington was well aware; in a draft memorandum, it was suggested that there had been a sense of uneasiness observed on the part of the regime. It was said that there were strong signs of friction inside the junta government and because of the continuing purge, Turkey had lowered its military presence in Korea. Apart from the military scrutiny, on the diplomatic level, the military attachés were reporting about their ambassadors. It was thus being read as a sign of low self-confidence on behalf of the regime.¹⁵⁷

Turkey's main issue was the financial assets that US had been providing with the security benefits maintained in return of its commitment. On the one hand, there were no structural change of plans ahead from the status quo regarding foreign affairs. On the other hand, the shift to the civilian government with the holding of the democratic elections was in progress, yet with turbulences. Coalitions had to be formed for a few years until the Justice Party won the elections with a clear majority in 1965. The period until the end of the makeshifts of political parties was also marked by Langley. Turkey was reported to be facing "a task to reconcile within a democratic framework the need felt by the Westernized elite to preserve and expand the secular reforms initiated by Atatürk with the reluctance to accept such reforms on the part of the tradition-bound majority".¹⁵⁸ Overall, an unsuccessful electoral result extending the military's time in office would not be the best scenario for the US. The given strife needed a political solution. To make progress, civilian government was a must; so the Washington could have his ally back well clear-headed for the Cold War was then about to get more tumultuous.

¹⁵⁷ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Draft Memorandum for the Director, Subject: Situation in Turkey", RDP79R00904A000500020024, June 21, 1960.

¹⁵⁸ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "The Prospects for Turkey: National Intelligence Estimate, Number 29.2-63, 0005618336, January 5, 1962.

Despite the coalition governments until 1965, Washington in the meantime from 1962 aspired to maintain a cloudless dialogue with Ankara. The Turkish-American cooperation portrayed a continuity from 1957 when NATO ministers had agreed to deploy medium range missiles with nuclear warhead until 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis.¹⁵⁹ It was portended in a letter from Secretary of Defense McElroy to then-Secretary of State Dulles in 1959 that Turkey and Greece had been proposed by General Norstad for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to deploy.¹⁶⁰ Although the exact details of this conversation was declared to be top secret, the letter suggests that the Department of Defense had funded eight squadrons of Thor and Jupiter missiles. Eventually, to reciprocate the Soviet nukes in Cuba, the US had stationed counterparts near İzmir. A Congressional House record was implying that Soviet missile bases in Cuba had vast importance for Washington due to the fact that should those missiles were to engage US soil, there were no ballistic missile early warning system along the southern coast unlike the ones in Alaska, Greenland and England.¹⁶¹ Ostensibly, the US was aware of the need for its overseas support for intercontinental delivery of an indefinite retaliation or a preemptive strike. These Jupiter missiles later became an issue of debate. Based on the geostrategic positioning of the missiles in Turkey, Kennedy administration decided in 1961 that the Navy's attack carriers, Strategic Air Command's B-52 and B-58 bombers and most importantly brand new Polaris submarines provided a better off comparative advantage to the US.

¹⁵⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 92

¹⁶⁰ FRUS, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey; Volume X, Part 2, 1958/1960, 788.

¹⁶¹ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), Congressional Record – House, RDP65B00383R0002001800004-9 1963.

There was, naturally, a Turkey-oriented progression to this policy choice as well. Having the modern weaponry stationed within the border was not only appealing in the eyes of the Turkish military, but it was also deemed as a tenacious deterring element against USSR. Foreign Minister Selim Sarper was briskly opposing vis-à-vis the removal of missiles off Turkish soil. The civilian government had just assumed office and had no homogeneity of policy at the time since they were coalitions. The missiles were essentially brought under the aid program, they technically belonged to Turkey. In this degree, the military outweigh any attempt by the government to send the weapons back. But when Kremlin came into play, the narrative altered. In October 1962, President Kennedy sat on table with Soviet Premier Khrushchev. To respond to Washington's demand for the withdrawal of the missiles in Cuba, Moscow made counterproposal and stipulated that the US should remove the Jupiters stationed in Turkey in return. Harris explains that this move spurred major reflection in the country while the heated diplomacy was in progress, Turkey might have been primarily targeted for a Soviet strike over the missile bases. However, Prime Minister İnönü and Foreign Minister Sarper declared Turkey's support to the US on the table against all the odds. Au contraire, Washington had sealed the deal with Moscow. Jupiters were to be pulled out as missiles in Cuba were being unpacked. Turkey, in this equation, was left in the dark as the US did not officially affirm that they were moving Jupiters back from Turkey.

In April 1963, they were legitimately dismantled. On a different note, in the same Congressional note with the one referred at above, it was put down that for the sake of weapon modernization, the removal of Jupiters from NATO bases had been

decided long ago, including Thor missiles from Britain.¹⁶² Archival evidence also suggested that Ankara was insured that Washington was willing to take the necessary steps to keep Turkey shielded at the point in which Jupiter missiles were being rendered inoperative in coordination with Moscow as the Soviet government were to take action to remove its missiles from Cuba. Turkey was mentioned as to be provided other weapons systems gifted of striking targets like Jupiters' capable of, permanently by the US while other NATO countries were called upon to support this initiative.¹⁶³ On the agenda, there was also positioning Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean which carry an equivalent number missiles. This attitude had been the spirit that the Turkish General Staff was after, Harris claims.

In retrospect, the crux of this experience concerning the crisis over the missile had demonstrated Turkey that its need for modern weaponry would always endure. Besides, in an incident of a Soviet aggression, US and NATO assistance was proved to be essential. As of then, when the Jupiter missiles had been moved out, the tensions with Soviets were relieved. Another considerable upside was the military modernization and support. The presence of aircrafts capable of delivering nuclear strikes, the reinvigorated arsenal of the military had shifted Turkey from being in the Soviet crosshairs in an event of face off in Cold War to a more challenging contender. This helped Ankara to maintain a resistant stance toward Moscow.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Message to the North American Council and the Governments of all NATO Countries", RDP80B01676R001800010027, October 22, 1962.

The Johnson Letter

Both a staple component of Turkish foreign policy and arguably the most troubling constituent of Turkish-American relations, the Cyprus issue started to put weight beginning from 1950s actually. The outcome of the disputes over Cyprus caused Turkey and Greece to fail to squander their inherent differences regardless of NATO. Greece's aspirations to unite their mainland with the Island on one side, and on the other Turkey's alacrity to protect the Turkish Cypriots and their rights. With the literature already discussed in the first chapter, hereafter, it would be complementary to add up the ramifications of the developments concerning Cyprus to Turkey's dialogue with the US. As of regular cascades in the country, again Ankara had been boiling with domestic bifurcations of the Cyprus issue. Allegedly DP-backed September 6-7 events in 1955 against the Greek minorities within the country in İstanbul was a profound example. In 1959, the British took step and the a compromise was agreed upon. Thus the Turkish community in the Island was finally granted to have a say and political rights. Yet the consensus did not last long. President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios offered changes in the constitutions targeting the elimination of the privileges of the Turkish minority in the Island in late 1963 while Turkey was dealing with the transitional problems after the coup.¹⁶⁴ A month following that, a civil war inevitably broke out.

The only hope that Turkish Cypriots had was İnönü, whose government was in the office at the time. Turkish army's capabilities to intervene was limited though. A landing on the Island required training and equipment, the military had neither of those. At best, low-impact air strikes appeared to be expedient for the Joint Chiefs.

¹⁶⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 106.

As an act of intimidation, the Navy dispatched ships from İstanbul to Mersin which was the major port geographically closest to Cyprus. This surely attracted a reaction; the Cypriot representative at the UN accused Turkey for using such tactics of intimidation. Prime Minister İnönü and then-Foreign Minister Erkin categorically denied the accusations. Veritably, Turkish strategy was to back these military initiatives by amending the violations made by the Greeks and the Greeks Cypriots of the London-Zurich accords of 1959. The accords were stating that one of the three guarantors which were Turkey, Greece and the UK could take action if concerted attempts were to remain not fruitful. Ankara was therefore keeping London and Athens in close contact before executing the retaliatory flights vis-à-vis violence conducted upon the Turkish minority. The Greek Cypriot majority's aggressions were not halting withal; the channels of diplomacy and other third parties to call for ceasefire including President Johnson.

The military hardware to be used in the sorties were provided by NATO. Plus, to a great extent except for the gendarmerie, the ground and air forces was equipped by NATO aegis. American auspices were given on the condition that they could only be used for objectives that are not offensive. It was a vague definition, later to be manipulated by Washington since in December 1963 there were no apparent American reaction to Turkish flights. Above all, letting this tension reach higher levels was posing a threat to the Transatlantic Alliance. Turkey and Greece were getting closer to an irreversible confrontation. In January 1964, Greece openly declared that it was ready to respond to any Turkish move on the Island. Washington, meanwhile was more of an observant rather than taking a stand for the fear of alienating one of its allies. NATO Supreme Commander Lyman Lemnitzer and

Secretary General Dirk Stikker was planned to come into play with visits and briefs to underscore the weakness that this dispute had been posturing with reference to the internal divisiveness.

On another line of international reaction, UN was involved in the Cyprus issue via its peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). It was not absolutely welcomed by Ankara since Turkey had little confidence in third parties' fair contribution. In addition, UNFICYP was seen as a curbing element toward Turkish ability to act freely. While the peacekeeping force was being prepared, Ankara reciprocated Athens' warning to meddle as İnönü was granted specific authority by the Turkish parliament to take action in Cyprus if deemed necessary.¹⁶⁵ The status quo was obliging the US to reconsider its reading of the events, so figured Washington. Undersecretary George Ball urged İnönü in February 1964 to give the UN mission a chance. In the meantime, violence in the Island were on the rise. After Undersecretary Ball, President Johnson instructed Senator William Fulbright as his special envoy to reinforce Ambassador Raymond Hare in joint effort bridging the gap between Ankara and Athens. But Washington's definite attitude on not supporting entirely neither sides' arguments resulted in both parties' estrangement to a certain length.¹⁶⁶ Washington was also having a hard time aspiring for the UK to make progress in the name of a solution. In a telephone conversation, President Johnson was telling Undersecretary Ball that he would prefer to see NATO on the ground rather than UN and was adding that he would tell the British that "there might as well not be a Britain anymore if they cannot handle Cyprus".¹⁶⁷ Thus, to a

¹⁶⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 110.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 111.

¹⁶⁷ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Undersecretary of State Ball, Washington, January 24, 2:05 p.m."

certain extent, antagonism toward UN involvement in the Island was a mutual feeling on Turkey and US's behalf.

For the US, the UN was considered as the worst alternative. The reason was the possibility of Russians' and Yugoslavs' potential involvement in the peacekeeping force beyond Washington's control. To avoid two NATO allies from fighting each other, now the US was yearning to put more weight over the British and NATO. Both Turkey's İnönü-led government was defined as barely staying in office, under the threat of military intervention and Greece's caretaker government too was interpreted as under high risk of being overthrown after a disappointing incident in Cyprus.¹⁶⁸ It was very clear that the two sides were in a similar domestic turmoil and the US had to act very carefully not to disturb the precarious composure at the local levels. Hence Washington sought to trump the volatile environment in the Island by compiling a task force predominantly formed by the British but also involving NATO member states military. However, the UK was not keen on taking a starring role. According to the US Ambassador to the UK, David Bruce, the British administration were prioritizing falling back to defend its two bases should the civil strife got out of control. This strategy was chosen over pushing through reinforcements due to the fact that domestic politics had been pressurizing the Conservatives back in the mainland by the Labor Party. The only priority for London was to retain its military bases in the Island after having lost marked prestige in India, Pakistan and Egypt.¹⁶⁹ On that account, another alternative solutions for Washington was being taken down out of the picture. The US was also aware that in

¹⁶⁸ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Memorandum of Conference with President Johnson", Washington, January 25, 1964, 6.30 p.m.

¹⁶⁹ Erol Mütercimler, "Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Kıbrıs Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Yönleri", İstanbul: Alfa Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 2017: 125.

case they would intervene themselves, Archbishop Makarios was going to expect to be favored over the Turks as Undersecretary Ball asserted. Resenting Makarios had the odds of ending up having a UN force with communist elements within as mentioned previously. Since the US was not among the three guarantor countries, they were not allowed to gather the disagreeing parties to sit around on a table. That was why the UK had such an importance and consequently causing much displeasure.

President Johnson was valuing the idea of waiting until a “bloodbath” in the Island to get going.¹⁷⁰ Thereupon, Turks who were being slaughtered and massacred in Cyprus was causing grave resentment in Ankara. As one of the former Undersecretaries, the Ambassador to Cyprus between 1967-1970 Ercüment Yavuzalp written down in his memoirs in 1993, there was never a nation with different ethnicities in the Island, but instead two entirely different entities and any expectation for these two groups to act in any sort of accordance was worse than forcing to marry two entirely individuals who despised each other.¹⁷¹ There was an ostensible mismatched frequency between Turkish expectations and the reality on the ground. Washington’s lack of haste for the sake of an impartial approach to the dispute between its allies was costing more than calculated. After his electoral victory and becoming the Prime Minister, President Johnson sent a message to Papandreou in Greece whose education was from Harvard; thus a familiar face to the US. The heart of the content was to show the Greek MP who were bred and educated in the US, that the US was committed to keep the Alliance together and in this regard thus valued the close touch between Washington, New York, Athens, Nicosia,

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ercüment Yavuzalp, “Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik”, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1993: 250.

Ankara and London.¹⁷² Washington was underlining to the Greek side that the Papandreou government was expected to keep closer channels with İnönü government in order to maintain collaboration.

Turkey had numerously demonstrated its steadfastness to honor his part of responsibilities in their alliance with the US; such as in the Korean War and during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet again, Harris argues that one could advocate that Johnson administration's stark opposition for Turkish military action in Cyprus had been in great contradiction with American engagement in North Vietnam.¹⁷³ In fact, National Security Council had also concluded similar deductions with Ankara concerning the events taking place in the Island. A UN report was referred at and said to have an impartial content proposing a true picture of the situation by admitting that the Greek Cypriots had been brutally pressurizing the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁷⁴ The longer was kept distant from intervening, the Greek Cypriot elements were naturally given the opportunity to muster forces and equipment while Washington was witnessing. Influential faces in the Turkish military was simultaneously urging to interfere to the Island such as the chief of the ground forces Cemal Tural. İnönü was emerging as the dove versus the hawks, Harris implies. However, with two failed coup attempts in 1962 and 1963 combined with his own military background, the limit was getting reached for Turkish national chief to thwart the hankering at home for launching an offensive. When the Cypriot parliament officially promulgated a bill for general conscription, it underscored the already massive superiority of the Greek Cypriot forces against the Turkish Cypriots.

¹⁷² FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Papandreou", Washington, February 20, 1964.

¹⁷³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 112.

¹⁷⁴ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Summary Notes of the 542nd Meeting of the National Security Council", Washington, September 1, 1964, 12:45-1:15 pm.

The domestic political environment was compelling İnönü to send the military to Cyprus. Eventually, as the preparations commenced, his wishes were plausibly to level the local yearning to take a more active role with this very move while getting away with one of US's classical stoic reactions over the Transatlantic Alliance. But, the American leadership was extremely reactive to the Turkish maneuver. It seemed to Washington that Turkey and Greece were at the brink of actual war and it could mean a severe fracture in the structure and well-being of NATO, possibly leading to losing the leverage of unity in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding, the language and the implications of this letter had heavily contributed for the Turkey-US alliance to be shaken. Turkish sentiment had then rightfully become as if they were hostage vis-à-vis a potential Soviet aggression. Consequently, the Johnson letter deteriorated the blueprint of the Turkish-American common ground as it included more of threatening sections rather than warnings as even surmising that NATO allies might had to turn against their obligations defending Turkey. Worse, President Johnson had also delivered that US military supplies and equipment were not to be employed at any part of Turkish intervention. Should a more placating approach had applied with the standing lines of communication instead of a formal written one which served to depict the situation as graver than assumed, it could have helped accelerating the normalizing process afterwards. Putting Turkey to question NATO support if the Cyprus dispute were to lead to Soviet offensive to the mainland was a strict and sizeable error, Harris covers.¹⁷⁵ One can sensibly assume that Ankara were to rightfully perceive its priorities were different than the Alliance's. It was revealed that for Washington,

¹⁷⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 115.

military assistance The dilemma between “provoked aggression” and “obligation to assist” caused Turkey to reposition its conduct on its alliance with the US.

İnönü was invited to Washington DC to discuss the issue in greater detail was swiftly leaked to the press. He sent back a reply via Ambassador Hare. The essence of his letter was clear: Johnson administration’s self-centered outlook were not to be concurred by Ankara. The public opinion thence was evolving into more pungent stage. The frustration at the domestic level could not be straightened out despite Foreign Minister Erkin’s statements claiming that the talks between İnönü and his counterparts in DC were being conducted on Ankara’s side to cement the guarantee of Turkish interests. The final communiqué of İnönü and Johnson included the validity of London-Zurich accords. In sum, İnönü’s visit to the US caused some turbulence, but also provided the required common ground without erasing the trauma of the letter. Papandreou was summoned to Washington as well after İnönü. The American next move was to involve Dean Acheson to assist UN’s mediator in Geneva, Sakari Tuomioja. Washington was compelled to pull the two sides together. Prime Minister Papandreou in his letter to President Johnson was openly mentioning that Cyprus were to fall into Communism should the US not take action in case Turkey landed troops to the Island with the goal of establishing an independent state or a federation by repetitively addressing the US as the “leader of the Free World” in an unusually frequent manner given the context of the request. His agitated rhetoric signaling any Turkish interaction was aggressive by nature and promoting that when under Turkish aggression, the Greek Cypriots were to be equipped by the Soviets should they asked for it.¹⁷⁶ Papandreou was hence looking to manipulate the US administration right after the Johnson letter; the letter from Papandreou had no

¹⁷⁶ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, “Letter from Prime Minister Papandreou to President Johnson”, Athens, June 9, 1964.

physical reference to the Soviets, yet it was all over implying that their involvement was inevitable. Finally, the Greek government was premeditated on identifying Cyprus as Cuba for Washington in such situation. In this scenario, if Turkey was to intervene and the Soviets were to react not only by arming the Greek Cypriots but also by attacking Turkey, what Johnson Letter entailed was that the US were to stand still along with other NATO allies. Papandreou's letter was a sign that Athens was indeed hoping to count on it.

UN Secretary General U Thant was mentioned in the US's mission to the UN's telegram that he had tasked UN's mediator Tuomioja to set Turkish and Greek parties separate in Geneva, should Acheson arrived. Thant had reportedly asked Papandreou to have his mediators meet the Turkish sides'; yet all the PM was at best settling for was a NATO base in the Island with Turkish participation in return for getting in line with Greece's standpoint on Cyprus's independence as a state and had no obligation except for a grey line covering the guarantees of the Turkish minority.¹⁷⁷ Even the agreement for disagreement was not being specified out loud among the parties in indirect quarrel with UN's help.

Acheson's plan, a month after the letter incident and following the meetings with the special representatives in Geneva, was ensuring a physical presence for the Turkish community in the Island while it included compensation for the ones who preferred to move to the mainland. The plan was drafted upon the unification of Cyprus and Greece in return for the island Kastellorizon (Meis). Acheson prioritized Turkey's security needs. His report implied he articulated the possibility of a Turkish

¹⁷⁷ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State", New York, June 27, 1964, 3:25 p.m.

base in Karpas region in their session with Turkish negotiators Erim and Alaçam. Acheson wrote that Erim's main objective was to bring Kastellorizon as primary agenda item, yet he was also reportedly keen on discussing Greek islands of Lesbos, Samos or Kos to be ceded for compensation of Cyprus. During Acheson's talk with the Greek representative Nikolareizis in Geneva, the base in Karpas was concerted to meet the minimum security requirements.¹⁷⁸ The US was seemingly okay with it. Expulsion of the Greeks living in Turkey was on the table as well, but Acheson had wisely urged Erim to keep that initiative in reserve to counter the Greek government in case of the failure of the protection of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁷⁹

In an American Embassy reporting, the Greek Foreign Minister Costopoulos was basing the future of the talks on the removal of the "Turkish threat", because although he was personally in favor of the interaction, he believed that Papandreou was thinking somehow differently. About the territorial concessions Erim was considering, he deemed that idea impossible except for Kastellorizon in consonance with the American documents. Costopoulos was seeing it as according to Papandreou, the alleged threat posed by the Turkish minority in the Island had to be eliminated either by the US or Turkey for Greco-Turkish negotiations to be carried on.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, Erim was a firm advocate of the argument that the Turkish community in Cyprus could never be entirely safeguarded without full partition. Acheson was hopeless about on any positive connotation from the Greek side. Erim was insisting on the cases of Western Thrace and Crete, where the Greek majority

¹⁷⁸ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State", Geneva, July 14, 10 p.m.

¹⁷⁹ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State", Geneva, July 11, 1964, 2 p.m.

¹⁸⁰ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State", Athens, July 12, 1964, 3 p.m.

was ruthless against the Turkish minority.¹⁸¹ US Ambassador to Greece, Henry Labouisse had reported that Papandreou's counter-argument was that in 1955 events of September 6-7 had been a demonstration of what could happen as a retaliatory incident in Turkey, should there had been no agreement on the table.¹⁸² Greek Representative Nikolareizis had built the premise of Greek arguments around it.

CIA did not contemplate Makarios to be under Greece's control, either. Athens was against Makarios's involvement with the Soviets; the Archbishop had nevertheless ordered torpedo boats from them. He had already renounced the talks in Geneva¹⁸³. Negotiations were in course until Makarios eventually leaked Acheson's proposal with deformities. His rationale was that any decision concerning Cyprus should had been taken by the Cypriots, these could not be the fruits of the talk which other countries were having in between.¹⁸⁴ The Americans had not foreseen Makarios's pre-emptive statement to suggest that any talks between Turkish and Greek governments could only be based on Enosis, either. He asserted that, Cyprus too, as an independent state, were to be involved in the talk; hence destroyed all the efforts put so far by Turkey, Greece and Acheson; thus the US. UN was characteristically reduced to a tool for simply keeping the US and the USSR from taking the leap in the midst of the crises and Makarios was capitalizing on the status quo.¹⁸⁵ Papandreou and Nikolareizis also admitted that Makarios was out of control and acting as he was a "relative to the USSR". CIA reports were indicating that the

¹⁸¹ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State", Geneva, July 15, 1964, 9 p.m.

¹⁸² FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State", Athens, July 19, 1964, 11 p.m.

¹⁸³ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Draft DCI Briefing for Vinson Subcommittee", RDP82R00025R000400160010-4, Date Unknown

¹⁸⁴ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State", Nicosia, June 29, 1964, 6 p.m.

¹⁸⁵ Ergün Olgun, "Kıbrıs Müzakere Süreci Seyir Defteri", Ankara: Efil Yayınevi, Aralık 2020: 21.

Greek Cypriot forces were unleashed by Makarios as he was aware of the fact that he could not keep them under control for their fragmentation; specifically ranging from crypto-communist to far right.¹⁸⁶ Terrorizing Washington with the idea of Cyprus turning into the Cuba of the Eastern Mediterranean had played well.

Makarios's disinformation enterprise triggered tumultuous developments in the North of the Island, giving birth to İnönü's authorization for air strikes. It was noteworthy for these air strikes were modeled the way the US had done so in Vietnam in August 1964. As in the Tonkin Gulf incidents, unprovoked attacks were being reciprocated. But also deployment of further forces were justified. Turkey was thus utilizing the same ethos and also the US was somehow balancing its posture between Turkey and Greece as the Acheson's draft for solution used to be underway, that Washington was not depriving Ankara from taking military measures on the grounds that protecting the minority in the Island.

After the collapse of the Acheson plan, Turkish public opinion got bitter toward the US. Accumulative to the series of disappointments on behalf of Ankara, the new paradigm was based on the belief that American interests were set different than of Turkey's. In addition to that, it was openly divulged that the balance of the Turkish-American alliance was irrevocably leaned on the US. Despite all the resentful attitude at the societal and political level apropos Washington's moves, İnönü's initiatives was the quintessence of the survival of the nexus between Turkey and NATO. While doing so, he did not give up on pushing to defend the Turkish minority in the Island either. In the meantime, Makarios had been working any

¹⁸⁶ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Memorandum: Threat of Renewed Violence and Turkish Intervention", RDP79R00967A000900010017-4, January 22, 1964.

possible adverse reactions for the failure of the initiative that President Johnson had taken. His rationale was that any decision concerning Cyprus should have been taken by the Cypriots, these could not be the fruits of the talk which other countries were having in between.¹⁸⁷ The Americans had not foreseen Makarios's pre-emptive statement to suggest that any talks between Turkish and Greek governments could only be based on Enosis, either. He asserted that, Cyprus too, as an independent state, were to be involved in the talk; hence destroyed all the efforts put so far by Turkey, Greece and Acheson; thus the US.

President Johnson's concerns over the Cyprus imbroglio addressed to Papandreu somewhat proves that the US wanted to settle Greece down as well. His ethos was that the real interests of the peoples and the real interests of the leaders had to be met germane to their homelands. Even the wording of the letter was delicate as Cyprus was referred as both sides' "homeland". By underpinning that Washington was not after imposing an outside view, it was making clear that a catastrophe was at the brink and that all sides were to be held accountable in case of the continuity of this deadlock.¹⁸⁸ Because the longer it took, the wider it got for the Soviets' window of opportunity to be involved. What remained firm was İnönü's compliance with the NATO roots. This loyalty's due was tolerably paid by the US as the C-130 E cargo planes were delivered which could in theory and practice could conveniently be employed for airborne operations regarding Cyprus.¹⁸⁹ With the Sixth Fleet waiting between Greece and Turkey, the US was trying to stabilize its impartiality. On the

¹⁸⁷ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State", Nicosia, June 29, 1964, 6 p.m.

¹⁸⁸ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece", Washington, July 1, 1964, 9:17 p.m.

¹⁸⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 120.

list of deteriorating factors for this stance, the abuse of the Turkish Cypriots was leading. Turkey continued to back its cognates; so did Greece.

Ankara and Athens had their ups and downs at the domestic level. EOKA-leader Grivas and Makarios' joint efforts to trump Greek Cypriots forces over Turks in the Island was precipitating response, yet unbalanced as usual; urging mainland to take action. For Turkish politics, the Cyprus issue, fused with İnönü leadership had a cementing effect. However, it was not the case for Greece, at least considering the depth of the political rifts in the country. The relatively slowed down conflict was in burst again as the military coup in 1967 took place in Greece. The fragile evenhandedness of the US was then in open jeopardy in the eyes of Ankara. The experiences of 1964 had taught a lesson to the Turkish regime. Military action was surmised as a mere possibility this time. President Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance as his special envoy to promote an immediate settlement to the reiteration of the crises. As traditional responses grew in Ankara, the Turkish Navy was mobilizing at the İskenderun Bay, the closest naval base to Cyprus just like the last time.¹⁹⁰ NATO's reputation had been damaged in the eyes of Ankara, but survived thanks to İnönü's determination.

This time, Greece, due to its political climate was more willing to compromise and was more politically stable. Surely, it made the Turkish reaction at the societal level to the happenings in the Island neat in the sense the US was being targeted at the mass protests. Vance's appointment to the matter combined with the status quo made it more feasible to contain. Greece's illegal reinforcements in the

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 122.

Island were to be pulled away while Turkish resistance were to let them be without promoting any aggression. Special envoy's efforts were proved to be lucrative as even Makarios were not feared to sabotage the progress of the negotiations this time. Although the main objective of the Vance mission was to stop Turkey and Greece going to war, the Cyprus issue had been brought to a stall as well in spite of the fact that it still survived. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State between 1961-1969, in one of the National Security Council meetings had expressed his gratitude to Vance. As per General Wheeler's assessment in the council meeting, Turkey had an overall advantage on land and air forces, while the Hellenic Navy was reportedly superior.¹⁹¹ CIA Director Helms concluded that there were no Soviet activity around the Island worth to be alarmed related to a potential war between Turkey-Greece. In case of a Turkish military operation, a Greek military officer according to the CIA files, expressed to the US Attaché in Athens that the primary Greek objective was to terminate the Turkish Cypriot opposition, while Makarios was knowingly expected to be equipped by the Soviets.¹⁹² With his push with Prime Minister Demirel to soothe Turkish press that was aggressively inciting Ankara to take action toward Cyprus and promoting a noticeable anti-American propaganda, Vance brought Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis's proposals to Ankara, Pipinelis's counterpart Çağlayangil. As a fruit of his work, Greek junta leader Papadopoulos and Prime Minister Kollias, except for Defense Minister Spandidakis, ended up in harmony with Vance's drafts from Athens to Ankara.¹⁹³ If Ankara was going to agree with the Vance compromise, Pipinelis had declared that he would support it in the Greek

¹⁹¹ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, "Summary of the Notes of the 579th Meeting of the National Security Council", Washington, November 29, 1967, 12:05-12:50 p.m.

¹⁹² CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Directorate of Intelligence: Intelligence Memorandum", RDP-79T00826A002900440001-6, November 25, 1967.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

Cabinet.¹⁹⁴ Prime Minister Kollias had also urged Makarios and the Cypriot Government to accept Vance's draft proposals lest "the three countries were to be put in an extremely dangerous situation".¹⁹⁵ In addition, Foreign Minister Pipinelis, based on CIA's report, requested King Constantine to make the final appeal to Makarios to accept the contested Paragraph 4. Although the appeal's last signatory was Kollias, it could be noted to glean how tackled Hellenism adjacent one of its integral segments.

In hindsight, the 1960s could be seen as a decade of successive misunderstandings, in which US policy makers played an important role. Washington underestimated their irreconcilable differences with Ankara, coupled with Turkey's own domestic political problems. The American rationale behind the Johnson letter and their change of course in the affair's aftermath was a last resort to prevent the complete dissolution of NATO'S southeastern flank. But prioritizing political stability in Cyprus over Turkey's resentments was a strategic trade-off. Meanwhile, the missile crisis constituted a critical turning point, which gave Turkey the impression that they were expendable. In other words, the Johnson letter affair, which came shortly after missile crisis, clearly manifested American priorities. In both events, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü demonstrated his country's desire for flexibility to keep the US-Turkey alliance alive while at the same time his intention to compromise as little as possible. The US reciprocated with the appointments of Acheson and Vance, whose efforts contributed to maintain a certain level of stability. Given the relatively insignificant UN support, the United States watched with

¹⁹⁴ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Directorate of Intelligence: Intelligence Memorandum, The Cyprus Situation" RDP79T00826A00300003001-9, November 27, 1967.

¹⁹⁵ CIA, FOIA Collection (CREST), "Directorate of Intelligence: Intelligence Memorandum, The Cyprus Situation", RDP79T00826A003000170001-4, December 3, 1967.

trepidation as the Turkey-Greece crisis exacerbated through Makarios's counterproductive ambitions and with Grivas's presence. Ironically, Turkey's domestic problems bore a strong resemblance to those of Greece, as the two countries struggled to save face under American aegis. Archival records from the United States demonstrates how Greece actually concurred with İnönü's discourse at times of entanglement and with the conspicuous determination of Ankara to keep things in perspective vis-a-vis their partnership with the West against Soviet attempts to liquidate NATO's southeastern flank.

From a conceptual standpoint, Turkey was now a proven middle power with respect to its policy choices and implementations. Greece on the other hand was a small power as Athens was keeping the pulse for Cyprus over both the US and the Soviet Union with the hopes of balancing Ankara. When looked in retrospect, Greece was following Turkey's footsteps in a way from a few decades behind. Due to the fact that the confrontation between the great power were getting loosened, the US had more political capital to spend on repairing its internal congruity; it did in this fashion by employing its diplomats and mediators to settle the disagreement down. However, since the initial American endeavor was not different in its spirits; meaning lack of devotion to its interests in the field where the hard work is geographically far, Washington could only stall the inevitable regarding Cyprus following its irreparable wrongdoings to Ankara.

CHAPTER III: REDEFINING THE ALLIANCE

After a decade boiling with crises, the 1970s turned out to be equally turbulent for US-Turkey relations, pertaining to each country's domestic and foreign political developments. On the Turkish side, Nihat Erim became Prime Minister in March 1971, which in turn magnified the Cyprus issue among other items in Ankara's playbook. In terms of Turkey's association with the United States, for both political and diplomatic reasons, Nihat Erim's rhetoric reflected a higher degree of commitment. Alignment with the Transatlantic Alliance continued to reflect Turkey's ultimate goal to catch up with the West, even when the Ankara government took dramatic steps to maintain a closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. This chapter shows the central role Cyprus played in the early 1970s and the ways in which Turkey returned to a balanced diplomacy, allocating significant time and effort to manage their differences with both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The incremental disagreements were tried to keep under control over İnönü administration's awareness of the Cold War realities. However, perceptibly the discords evolved into distinct controversies. For the sake of maintaining the unity of NATO bloc against the Communist alignment, the US sought to do adjustments among its partners Turkey and Greece via Cyprus. It ended up breaking the factory default settings. Turkey was faced harsher criticism by the Johnson letter. Acheson and Vance initiatives were life-savers on Washington's behalf. Yet, one should note that Ankara's ethos for sustaining while Moscow also strived to substitute US.

With the détente visibly making tangible difference, Turkey contemplated having Kremlin in its sight instead of preferring to remain completely unavailable. Jupiter crises had heated up the pan; but once the missiles were moved out a communication channel was endured. USSR slowed down the pace of the pressure it was putting until the Cyprus issue sat on the top of the agenda. For Moscow, the period from July 1964 was presenting an opportunity to accentuate the divide between Ankara and Washington. Since control over the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus was vitally important for the Soviets as well, Moscow sought advantage in bittering its narrative on framing Ankara's policy for Cyprus. Precisely, the air strikes to protect the minority in the Island from massacre before the actual landing in 1974 were propagated as NATO's. Given that supported by the archival evidence, during the talks between Turkey and Greece, moderated by the US, Soviet supply and equipment transfers to Greek Cypriots was no secret.

Khrushchev's successors Kosygin and Brezhnev toned down the aggressive Soviet discourse to pull Turkey shambling about the genuineness of the Transatlantic Alliance. Most notably, Foreign Minister Erkin visited Moscow and on that occasion, it was announced by the USSR that the Turkish Cypriots had to have the right to coexist in the Island with the Greek minority which resulted in briskness in Ankara.¹⁹⁶ Turkey's argument for Cyprus being a federal independent state was thus endorsed by the Kremlin. It lead to a series of official visits to Moscow. In fact, it was a normalization process with the Soviets after the peak of turbulence during Jupiter Missile Crisis. Soviets' support for Makarios's militia was even being ignored to a certain extent for the sake of fast cultivation of better dialogue. Harris

¹⁹⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 126.

argues that it was also the prompt of the new-style Turkish foreign policy, which had a “character”; to illustrate, instead of solely relying on the US, by keeping channels with the USSR alive, Ankara was clearing other alternatives of development assistance as well. İnönü’s prioritization of ties with the US coexisted. No strong objections were met neither from Washington nor from other NATO allies.¹⁹⁷ This relative rapprochement was at the expense of jeopardizing the relations with Washington. The détente meant greater security, this gave birth to increased exchange with the USSR.

On the critical issues of concern over the Cold War for Ankara was to be caught in the middle of a military face-off between the two superpowers. To be specific, Ankara had the same rationale during the WWII, to survive. Soviet Union’s vendetta with Germany was the relief back in the day for the same reason as two decades later approximately. Therefore, Turkey benefitted the détente and profited “the thawing out of the US-USSR nuclear diplomacy” as two superpowers aimed at avoiding mutually assured destruction while Turkey had a relief to consider that Moscow was no longer targeting Turkey’s integrity to answer Washington’s moves.¹⁹⁸ This was equally reflected on questioning NATO’s place in Turkish foreign policy agenda as the Soviet threat seemed less volatile. Perhaps, a more self-designated roadmap could have been employed at last. Soviet Union was subjected to interaction as a result.

Like the US confronting societal backlash from Vietnam and civil rights movements simultaneously, Turkey had also had a mode of protest for the relations

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 136.

with the US amidst domestic political turmoil. Popular culture was evolving toward an anti-American rhetoric. Coup attempts were taking place. Coalition governments were being formed, failed and reformed. In the meantime, political left had always been critical of the US in Turkey by mainly defending the idea that Washington was too much involved in domestic politics, hence causing more instability. Greece was at a similar spot as Turkey. Both countries were NATO-bound and military interventions did happen in near past. The more leftist circles attracted political capital, the more inclined the US got to interfere via tools like the CIA, Turkish press asserted. Just as the Greek Coup of 1967 was termed as a NATO contingency plan, similar associations could have been done for what was going on in Turkey since left-wing politics was in the verge. There were allegations in the press that the CIA backed the King and the conservatives against Greek leftists. When the Greek colonels assumed government in Athens, Turkish press immediately juxtaposed the incidents and raised alertness. The word CIA had gotten an ostensible notoriety.

The main determinants of US-Turkey relations were undoubtedly affected by domestic calculations. A CIA analyst whose previous post was Vietnam was appointed as the new Ambassador of the US to Ankara in 1968. Robert Komer used to be special assistant to the President Johnson. At first glance, it could be seen as a positive progression if thought like Acheson and Vance with respect to the halt these two provided to crises. However, the environment was not the same at that point concerning the foreign agenda. The lack of active military engagement in Cyprus had presented room for political opposition to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the country's ongoing policy scheme. Ambassador Komer's appointment was malevolent in the eyes of the Turkish critical circles due to the fact that he was a

pacification advisor in Saigon.¹⁹⁹ Through an unbiased standpoint, there was nothing wrong with resentment and disappointment on the side of Ankara for such deployment. Student protests targeted his presence. An arson took place while he was visiting Middle East Technical University. The consequences of this incident brought along broader constitutional adjustments, restrictions, made by the Justice Party. All these combined, Ambassador Komer became a person of interest in the country. His tone was not defensive either. Neither for himself nor for the American interests, he did not think of a settled down manner to meet the left wing critics. He was a de facto persona non grata for the left wing supporters and constantly asked to be recalled to Washington. On the contrary, he did not comply with the criticism and tried to do what he did best previously: he tried to meet at a common ground with his critics just as he did on his last post. His task was seemingly enlightening the Turkish society on the increased American hard presence in Turkey. After all, his duty used to be the pacification of the Vietnamese society for similar conditions, although different from many aspects. Despite all, Komer was replaced in 1969 by William Handley whose previous post before central duty was Mali and not affiliated with intelligence community.

Another headline for domestic resentment with the US was between the American troops and Turkish public. Mass protests was surging. American sailors were even thrown back to the sea by locals in the harbors of İstanbul and İzmir.²⁰⁰ American personnel in American landings and facilities were disliked for their attitude. They were allegedly selling commodities to individuals with extreme prices relieved of customs duty like smuggled goods. American military officers had been

¹⁹⁹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 139.

²⁰⁰ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I*, 693.

going through disputes stemming from superior-subordinate issues. Although based on anecdotal evidence this had always been a matter of controversy for the Turkish officers, it was then surfaced. American arrogance obliged Turkish reaction. As a result, the Pentagon read the signs and eventually dropped the number of troops stationed in the bases located in Turkey as well as moving some the compounds to outskirts, away from attention.

On domestic level, following the 1969 general elections, which was the election with the lowest voting turnout so far, political unrest surged. In December 1970, two policemen guarding the American Embassy was shot by terrorists. Few months later in March 1971, four American airmen was abducted. The responsible group for the incident were the People's Liberation Army (THKPC) led by Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, and Hüseyin İnan who were in the eyes of Washington trained guerillas. A ransom of \$400,000 had been demanded for those four American soldiers. They were eventually released as kidnappers got caught which led to another traumatic story in Turkish political history. Turkey rolled downhill again onto a new military intervention; this time a memorandum in March 12, 1971. Demirel-led Justice Party government was forced to resign. Nihat Erim was announced Prime Minister by former military – President Cevdet Sunay. Erim resigned from Republican People's Party to assume office.

The essence of Turkish left: Turkish Labor Party and Mehmet Ali Aybar were seen at the heart of the anti-American wave as well as this wave of this left-wing activism for being considered as sympathizers. Tragically being critical of the country's affiliation with the US coincided with being in favor of violent expressions

of these ideas against the authorities. When the political outbreak was answered harshly by Erim-led government, the anti-American echoes were shut majorly. Thus, Washington benefited. Erim's first policy initiative was to impose martial law. He was around a decade later going to be assassinated for what he led the charge of. THKPC's captured members were demanded to be released by Mahir Çayan, Ulaş Bardakçı and Hüseyin Cevahir as these far-left gunmen took the Israeli Consul-General Efraim Elrom as hostage. The Israeli diplomat was executed through three rounds in the forehead when their demand for the release their comrades was denied. They were partly killed, partly captured in a military operation. As a response, Erim initiated a wide range hunt for all far left activists who inspired these guerillas. Academic personnel, journalists, students and politicians were coerced and TLP was dissolved with its members getting banned from politics for five years. According to Bülent Ecevit, this was a plot by the West to put Turkey in line just as the Cold War's pulse was relatively low, to avoid any political volatility in the international arena in advantage of the Soviet Union. This whole flow of events sadly represents the de facto ramifications of the Cold War atmosphere to the societal realities in the country. Political unrest was even more triggered the troubles of Turkish-American alliance.

The Strength and Limits of NATO membership

For Ankara, the development and military assistance never lost a gram of importance. US as the leading supplier of the latter, was not to be disagreed unless it was a matter of sovereignty like Jupiter and Cyprus issues. The dependency for military development and equipment on Ankara's behalf was balanced by its allegiance to NATO. There was a tradeoff; but NATO's arbitrary outlook had

definitely damaged its reputation for Ankara. France had left the military wing of the Alliance in 1967. It surely put an example. Leftist circles heated up the debate for exit. Nevertheless, the resolution was not crystal clear. It was experienced during the Jupiter crisis, because Turkey was hosting American weaponry, it was a natural target for a Soviet attack any time. The paced down pulse of the Cold War was leveling the danger at the time compared to a few years back. In the case of an attack, Turkey was left unsure by Washington for its defense. Plus, there was no guarantee that Ankara's participation was going to be asked for another Korean War-alike offensive. Proxy wars had been going on all over the globe. Furthermore, Turkey's only call for help or aid was relevant for the members Transatlantic Alliance for the fact that the relations with the rest of the world remained underdeveloped such as with the Middle-East and East Asia.

On the flipside, Turkey's arms and military necessities were provided by NATO which was the essential element in the first place. Whether the rest of the list above justifiable, is another issue of debate. If this was the cost for survival, what other option Ankara had? In addition after France's departure from NATO's military wing, the Alliance still managed to exist and political stability for Élysée was simply destroyed as the President General de Gaulle subsequently resigned shortly after, then died a year later. Additionally, Soviet Union had just invaded Czechoslovakia. It did not build a premise for keeping a distance from Kremlin as the visit were then getting more frequent, yet it displayed that Soviet Grand Strategy was intact to the extent that it had been intimidating, Ankara ergo had to stay alert at all times. Thus NATO membership was in the end an indispensable asset.

Ankara had already started to express its disagreements for Washington's endeavors that could potentially jeopardize Turkey's interests. After repetitions of broken trust, Ankara took establishing some economic interdependence with Moscow seriously.²⁰¹ Military cooperation was never an option though. The Multilateral Force within NATO was first designed to be enacted in order to serve as leverage against France's efforts on possessing nuclear arms. This was contradicting with US's Grand Strategy. Another country with nukes would mean another player to be tamed. Thus, Washington did not want to share the leading role. Besides, De Gaulle's France was also chasing more autonomy not only in military but also in international finance. Briefly the MLF was thought to brake France's enthusiasm on its aspiration to take more charge. To preserve the balance among the members of Transatlantic Alliance, Washington did not allow Paris to act freely and break the arguable harmony between the allies. It could also be understood that Ankara was not a rogue element who was troubled by the US by itself. There were others who questioned the US's policy decisions, no matter the ideal response was.

Prime Minister Demirel, whose political rise was allegedly tied to the CIA according to leftist circles, sought benefit in portraying major events in Turkish-American relations public such as the Defense Cooperation Agreement's terms in 1969. His political projection was centered on how he was going to contain those leftist circles and political opposition.²⁰² There was an increase in transparency on behalf of the relations between Ankara and Washington, at least the political will strived to exploit the pressure on the US and Washington swerved upon reflection.

²⁰¹ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I*, 690.

²⁰² FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, "Briefing Memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger", Washington, April 17, 1975.

The rhetoric on the Justice Party government that the American had no longer so called authority to carry out operations to a third country without Ankara's blessing. In order to oversee the national security, the decision was a considered a legit one by the Turkish public opinion.²⁰³ It was also emanating from CHP's demands from the JP. A US reconnaissance had crashed in the Black Sea and this had raised disturbance from the main opposition amidst Soviet protests. American military activity which had consensus over bilateral agreements within Turkey was asked to be documented. With the DCA of 1969, Ankara had the aforementioned mandate to check the bases' activity on the basis of its national interest and security. Although it agreed terms, Washington believed Ankara was enjoying more extensive authority over the scope compared to other NATO allies.²⁰⁴ Turkey was obviously getting a firmer grip apropos erratic American foreign policy decision making. "National causes are won by standing firm", said late Rauf Denktaş, by such perseverance, perhaps Turkey showed the US how willing it was to let its fate to be controlled by the American Navy.²⁰⁵ These hardware were to be used later on in the upcoming decade.

For the past decade predominantly, military contributions from Washington with respect to its crux was focused on the modernization of the land forces. As Cyprus emerged as an agenda item that require action for Ankara, the government aspired to shift some of the intended eminence to naval forces. Apart from Turkey's own security perspective, the country being the southeastern flank of NATO, it had to be kept steadfast to be able to react in an event of need quickly. Therefore, the air force elements along with naval units stationed in Turkish bases, including the 6th in

²⁰³ Ibid, 699.

²⁰⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 160.

²⁰⁵ Bilal Şimşir, "AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs", Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003: 505.

the Mediterranean which was supposedly there to anticipate and prevent should Turkish military to step in to the Island to counter the Greek Cypriots, were American units mostly. The chief of Turkish Navy had make trip to Washington to negotiate the modernization of the naval forces in September 1966. Like Colonel Madanoğlu had mentioned in his memoirs, NATO's expectation from Turkey was to maintain a defensive line until Alliance's reinforcements arrive in an event of Soviet invasion, at the cost of retreating from Anatolia. In kind, the innovation moves were broadly targeting the land forces. But, Ankara rightfully asked for support to its presence on the seas. As a result, in 1969, Turkey successfully bought 5 destroyers and new submarines. The urgency in the sea stemming from the Cyprus issue was finally fruitful.

The last critical juncture one should evaluate to understand the symptoms of the volatility of the Turkish-American dialogue in the global détente is the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation and its ramifications. For the reason that the objective in this thesis is to illustrate the magnitude of Ankara-Washington line, not analyzing the political and historical developments between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus; we shall shift our attention to broader angle through which what the can be better understood. There had been two sides to this segment of the account. First is the material narrative; the embargo imposed upon Turkey following the military operation. Second is the foundation of the embodiment of the American succeeding policy: lobbying. The Greek and Greek Cypriot lobbyists in D.C. were amongst the ones with the most influence like the Jews, Armenians, Irish and Hispanics.²⁰⁶ In this case, the linked interest group was consisted of the Greek Cypriots who had emigrated to

²⁰⁶ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I*, 704.

the US after the mid 19th century from the Ottoman Empire. These lobbyists were going to weigh in when the Congress were assessing the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and hence causing Ankara serious trouble.

Onto 1974, Greek Cypriots in the Island had eclipsed over the abilities of the Turkish Cypriots in terms of military equipment received not only from Greece but from Communist Czechoslovakia as well as the Soviet Union.²⁰⁷ By 1974, the Greek junta had no patience for Makarios. His flirting with the Soviets made his case a Communist project and an obstacle to Enosis. His time was put to an end as the leader of the Island when Nikos Sampson – a pardoned murderer of British soldiers, was declared new chief.²⁰⁸ An American intelligence report indicated that Karamanlis government was not explicitly implicated for the ousting of Makarios but they were looking for someone to blame apart from the obvious: themselves. Additionally, the US was to be blamed because of its tilt to Turkey in the Cyprus matter based on the Greek arguments.²⁰⁹ Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit asserted that the overthrow of Makarios was the deed of Athens.²¹⁰ Thus, Ankara had a legal basis for considering this as the violation the treaties of guarantees and abolishment of the constitutional order. It was referred in the American archival evidence that Ankara was urged by Washington to ease their preference for Makarios forasmuch as Makarios would not favor being seen as a Turkish satellite. Therefore, Turkey was to accept that Makarios's reinstate at that point would only serve the Communists as he

²⁰⁷ Erol Manisalı, "Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs", Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 2003: 57.

²⁰⁸ Vamık D. Volkan, "Kıbrıs: Savaş ve Uyum: Çatışan İki Etnik Grubun Psikanalitik Tarihi", İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2008: 35.

²⁰⁹ FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, "Paper Prepared in Central Intelligence Agency", Washington, August, 29, 1974.

²¹⁰ İlker Başbuğ, "Unutulan Ada: Kıbrıs", İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2016: 52.

would seek help from the outside player to cohere its part.²¹¹ The Soviet Union was already considered as seeking to rush military equipment to those who were fighting against the coup in the Island.²¹²

In his subsequent trip to London, Prime Minister Ecevit discussed the situation in the Island with his British counterpart Wilson. Foreign Minister Callaghan was present at the talks as well. He told Ecevit that they got in touch with Secretary of State Kissinger about the happenings and that Washington was suggesting to gather a tripartite meeting.²¹³ The involvement of Ecevit held a special meaning for the Americans. Ecevit was portrayed as the one of the most politically influential figures in Turkish political life after Atatürk according to American observations. His aspirations with Karamanlis were resembled to Atatürk's with Venizelos in 1920's in the sense that both Turkey and Greece could focus on more fundamental issues such as Westernization and integration to the Western society entirely if they stopped deranging each other.²¹⁴ After Kissinger resigned due to the Watergate Scandal, the new POTUS Gerald Ford and the Secretary of State Kissinger of the new cabinet endorsed the Greek Cypriot lobby and their actions. These Greek Cypriots who were also American citizens sought the same premise concerning Turkey's use of American weapons in the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation with former President Johnson's argument on his notorious letter and hence put pressure on Kissinger to place an embargo upon Ankara on the so-called grounds that Turkey had violated its arms treaties by using its military capabilities provided

²¹¹ FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, "Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Posts", Wednesday, July 8, 1974.

²¹² FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, "Telegram from the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State", Athens, July 16, 1974.

²¹³ Başbuğ, *Unutulan Ada: Kıbrıs*, 54.

²¹⁴ FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, "Briefing Paper Prepared by Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff", Washington, undated.

by the US for an offensive. The US Congress fell to the influence of the Greek Cypriot lobby, according to Oran, and the decision to implement the embargo without waiting for the parliamentary inquiry to be eventuated was a mistake to the degree that the State Department was reading the case. The Congress had a recent history of failing to check on former President Nixon's policies on Vietnam, Cambodia and Chile while the government had been getting busy with Watergate. The trust between the executive and the legislative had weakened because the aforementioned incidents. Therefore, the need for the American public opinion's reposturing obliged the Congress to take action against Turkey.²¹⁵ The State Department was set aside. While the Congress was discussing on how to punish Ankara, the State Department was debating via its telegrams how important it was for the US to avoid a Turco-Greek standoff rather than a Greek civil war.²¹⁶ The diplomats were aware of the potential problems because of this decision they might have faced though. For instance, the argument for punishing Turkey for its allegedly illegal use of weapons was mirrored by Israeli forces against Arabs from whose point of view was also a defensive action.

The underscore of the embargo was ceasing the weapons sales and freezing the military credits. The parliamentary inquiry resulted against Turkey's use of American military equipment. President Ford, by the time had vetoed the Congress's decision twice. Within two months, despite State Department's joint efforts with President, with a close voting result. The embargo was in motion. Irrespective of the failing coalition governments in the meantime, Ankara's reaction to the decision was premediated. Turkish diplomats did their parts while their American colleagues had

²¹⁵ Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt I*, 705.

²¹⁶ FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, "Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State", Ankara, July 15, 1974.

failed to stop what came to happen. Most importantly, US-Turkey relations was defined as a separate matter than the Cyprus issue by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. There was also the American perception since the Johnson letter that the US was like well-intended overlord whose responsibility was to supply weapons to Ankara. It was not the case at all, asserted Ankara. It was the duty of the Transatlantic Alliance to ensure the Southeastern flank was defended. The embargo was meant to weaken Turkey's military capabilities and it would serve best the USSR. Hence NATO was self-sabotaging by Washington imposing these sanctions to Ankara. This embargo had completed a lesson to Ankara combined with the letter incident from 1964, that Ankara had diversify its military supply inventory, this included the amelioration of its own production. Because it was also evident that NATO was not accountable in the events of crises.²¹⁷ Another wave of reaction came from the Turkish government. Demirel and his succeeding coalitions issued a warning to the US to show that they meant business when they said they could shut the American bases down in the country. President Ford had to address the issue several times in his public appearances. In addition, Secretary Kissinger anticipated what was going to arrive upon and visited Ankara to intervene, yet he failed to stop Çankaya.

US activities including military bases were temporarily frozen in July 1975 with an executive order. Opposition parties from various ends of the political spectrum were on the same page and urged the government to take action. The Defense Cooperation Agreement was abrogated along with a new treaty that was supposed to be ratified in 1976. US military bases were restricted to NATO responsibilities, which prompted the US government to reconsider their scope of

²¹⁷ Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Tarihsel Boyutları İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri: 1821-1993", Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2018: 100.

cooperation in such a way to favor Turkey. The Defense and Cooperation Agreement specified the amount of military aid, with which the US was supposed to provide Turkey each year. This became a dilemma for the US Congress since the national budget was scrutinized annually and if this bill had been approved, then the US would have lost its chance to impose any sanctions given that they had initially agreed to supply a designated amount.

Parallel to the negotiations for the new military cooperation treaty with Ankara, Washington concurrently initiated talks with Athens as well. The total sum of US aid were quite different for each country. The Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis made this a public issue and requested at least 700 million USD to get closer to the amount promised to Turkey – 1 billion USD. Karamanlis had recently returned to the Greek political scene and this was an excellent opportunity for him to make a name for himself, while also matching the US support for Turkey.²¹⁸ Eventually, all negotiations about US aid were dropped (for both Turkey and Greece) due to delinquent bargaining. In 1977, the US Congress decided to lift the embargo, partly because sanctions pushed Turkey closer to the Soviet Union. Turkey's good will for a peaceful solution on the Cyprus issue was brought to the fore, but more importantly, it was announced that full cooperation with Turkey was a necessity to protect the US national interests.

With regards to the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, the US finally reaffirmed its role normatively as to serve as a bridge between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus to maintain stability. Otherwise the deepening of this conflict

²¹⁸ FRUS, 1969-1976; Volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, "Editorial Note", 1973-1976.

would have paved the way for the Soviet Union to intervene and further disrupt the already exacerbating discord, which now encompassed the Eastern Mediterranean. To sum up, the US embargo proved to be wholly counterproductive and did not serve its purpose. This was a clear example of how lessons of the past are often ignored , jeopardizing the possibility of a closer strategic partnership. The US Congress failed to deter Ankara from taking an active posture on Cyprus. It slowed down the Turkish military in terms of logistics, but the policy trajectory stayed put. As a middle power, Turkey's both tangible and intangible capabilities were increased. Being in possession of more means was one thing, but using them and setting them in motion for the sake of protecting self-interest was another.

CONCLUSION

The previous chapters have portrayed the evolution of US-Turkey relations starting from World War II. After having laid down the circumstances in which this Alliance was first formed then developed, the problematic aspects were described during the détente years. The imperativeness Turkey sought in aligning with the Transatlantic had incrementally diminished from the end of WWII until the early 1960s. Ankara's need for development assistance and military cooperation were the two fundamental issues regarding its priorities for cooperation with the US. However, the Soviet Union also presented itself as an alternative to promote developmental aid to Turkey. The détente was the significant variable here to comprehend why Ankara pursued such policies.

Although the mainstream Cold War narrative often emphasizes the bipolarity via nuclear armament, for countries like Turkey, the question for which side to align with was defined by aid as much as hard security. Geostrategic facts taken as seriously as needed, ideational factors played a role for Ankara to cooperate with Moscow until Soviet Grand Strategy crystallized as a promising security deficiency. Turkey, as a small power from the 1930s onwards prioritized maintaining multilateral alliances for the sake of survival. In the name of development, Çankaya and Kremlin used to share the same ethos vis-à-vis Western capitalists, that they were different than them with respect to industrial capacity. Moscow's commitments were mostly comprised of factories and industrial sites in Anatolia. Although exchanges between Ankara and Moscow had both characteristics of developmental aid and military as well during the early 1920s, they were weaker when compared

with the American aid.²¹⁹ But when it came to security, Moscow's defensive expansionism made the Turco-Soviet harmony to cease. It compelled Ankara seek a tighter grip with the Transatlantic. Actually, in the years to come, Turkey would not have favored the détente on the grounds that it would delimit its aid flow from the US. With less tension, it would mean less propensity to crises. It thus signified a problem in that regard. However, Ankara used it as an opportunity to benefit from Soviet aid as well to a certain degree.

Assessing the weight of Washington on Ankara's lens, the initial motivation behind Turkey's stress over aligning with the US was to make sure that in an event of Soviet attack that the country was defended. Moreover, through a realpolitik oriented perspective, there was also the nuclear narrative. Ankara had fears for being targeted to a nuclear strike by Moscow for its several American base presence. Hence, during the times when disagreements surfaced, Ankara, from a security perspective, had its priorities lined up as such to maintain cooperation at all costs as well as keeping the development assistance flowing in. Nevertheless, Ankara was resenting to the US in due time for choices Washington had made by putting Ankara in a state of insignificance against confrontations with the Soviets. Policymakers in Ankara had the tendency that they were being kept out of their own liberty of action by the US.

Until the détente, Turkey's primary element of concern was a security matter stemming from potential Soviet aggression. While the tension was growing higher between the US and the USSR, so did Turkey's urge to level its military up. It was a

²¹⁹ Samuel J. Hirst & Onur İççi, "Smokestacks and Pipelines: Russian-Turkish Relations and the Persistence of Economic Development", *Diplomatic History*, Oxford University Press, Vol. 44, No. 5, 2020: 835.

positive-sum game for Washington as well. A more deterrent Ankara supplemented with American contributions meant a more contained Moscow from the Alliance's southeast flank. The military cooperation co-existed with development assistance for Turkey. During the times of confrontation and crises, Washington and Ankara coherently managed to remain within reason despite the points of discord as in the examples of Jupiter Missiles or during the preliminary phases of the incidents concerning Cyprus except for the Jupiter aftermath and Johnson letter incidents. Despite these significant failures on behalf of Washington, American mediation efforts combined with the Turkish Foreign Ministry's delicate efforts to find common ground was fruitful. As Turkey became a middle power, it started using multilateral bodies in the solution of crises such as in the example of effectuating guarantor powers in the Cyprus issue.

With the pulse of the Cold War slowing down, the transcendence of the agendas began to differ. Détente meant a lower risk of a military face-off between the US and the USSR. This meant for Ankara that its significance had been reducing given that its appearance as a security liability for the West was getting less relevant. On the other side, dealing with a less aggressive Soviet Union signified that Turkey could mature its association with the Kremlin for development issues. The experiences of the 1960s had taught Ankara that it needed not entirely depend on the US, unlike two decades ago.

Turkey's physical importance to the US never meant that they were equal partners. Yet, Ankara expected a guarantee for not being constrained given that it was developing country. For Ankara development assistance was welcomed at any

degree. Even after the 1960 coup, American telegrams between the Secretary of State and Embassy in Ankara showed how willing Khrushchev was to send aid and also how ardent Gürsel was for the influx of any support. But Ankara's consent to Soviet aid was limited, yet it existed. Onto the détente, Turkey's normalization with the Soviets gained pace. High-level visits took place. Even though Head of State Gürsel did not physically meet with Khrushchev, Foreign Minister Sarper did in 1960 in New York. It was a huge step after Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow in 1939. The idea that ties concentrated on development aid with the Soviets could co-exist with the military dimension of the Transatlantic Alliance was strengthened especially when Ankara was let down by Washington during the years prior to the actual détente. The speed-up in Turkish-Soviet rapprochement can thus be seen as a result of the détente; it nevertheless did not lead Ankara to fully accept all from the Kremlin. Ankara cared to balance its commitments to the Western alliance meanwhile.

Turkey was amongst in fact the world's top beneficiaries of American aid; military and economic although it was slackening during the détente. It had been pushing for more sophisticated military aid from Washington. The predicament in the Eastern Mediterranean was getting more convoluted while Greece was emerging as a promising problem for Ankara. When the Cyprus issue became a noteworthy part of everyone's agenda, the belief deeming that all shortly faced problems with Turkish-American relations could be overcome in the long-term was proved wrong as the President Johnson sent his notorious letter to İnönü in 1964. The Cyprus crisis in 1964 was a turning point from security issues. On the one hand, Greece, who had just announced that it was supporting enosis, was backed by the US and UK. On the other hand, the USSR was supplying weapons to the Greek Cypriots in the Island.

Foreign Minister Erkin subsequently went to Moscow and sought common ground with Kremlin. Such a move would have not been possible few years back. In the following decade, President Sunay and Foreign Minister Çağlayangil made trips to Moscow as well.

The zeitgeist for the Soviets' pattern for its foreign relations during the 1960s was multidimensional on behalf of Turkey's goals. The Jupiter Crisis had shown Ankara that Washington had taken Ankara's allegiance for granted. It created stimulus for Ankara to normalize with the Soviets seeking room for development assistance. With the détente, not only with Turkey but with other countries from the opposing block, the Soviet Union increased its trade volume. That combined with the need of economic assistance and domestic political tension, anti-American tendencies and the rise pro-leftist movements, Ankara had naturally more exchange with Moscow. These developments can be interpreted as facilitators encouraging the US helping to settle Turkey's issues and complaints on its priorities such as the Cyprus issue at the time. Washington delegated special envoys to find common ground between Turkey and Greece while both countries were approached by the USSR.

In retrospect, while pre-détente shook the lines between Ankara and Washington, the actual détente served as an element of hindrance for Turkish-American association in security and development aid. As Ankara's foreign policy maneuverability strengthened, as the downside it lost the swift policy making pace. Meaning, as a small power, it was easy for Turkey to set a course and maintain quickly. After the fact that it became a middle power, great powers started to restrict

Ankara just as in the examples of Cyprus. Onto the end of the détente period, Soviet expansion toward Middle East and in the Mediterranean reminded Washington and Ankara that they had more important issues to collaborate instead of disputing over Cyprus as harsh as they used to do so by omitting what was at stake. When the détente was over based on the historical and political consensus by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it is no coincidence that the cooperation between the US and Turkey started to revitalize. Turkey's single-minded consolidation of efforts concerning military aid and development assistance over the US was put to an end; yet Ankara's paradigm has been diversified thanks to the détente.

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