

APPROACHES TO THE ROOT CAUSES OF STATE FAILURE AND COLLAPSE

A Master's Thesis

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To my parents

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COLLAPSE

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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ABSTRACT

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In the aftermath of the Cold War, failed states have increasingly been viewed as a cause for concern for the international system due to numerous humanitarian and security challenges they created. Since then, a variety of international responses have been attempted and proposed by the international community to address state failure. The ongoing nature of the phenomenon of state failure and security threats they cause prove that state failure is an entrenched problem for the 21st century. This thesis focuses on the analysis of root causes of state failure in the literature and examines different approaches to it. In doing so, it aims to make a comprehensive literature review categorized by historical, global political, individual-centered and critical approaches.

Key Words: State Failure, State Collapse, Root Causes, International Community, Security

ÖZET

DEVLET BAŞARISIZLIĞI VE ÇÖKÜŞÜNÜN TEMEL SEBEPLERİNE İLİŞKİN YAKLAŞIMLAR

Yumlu, Seda

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Soğuk Savaş'ı izleyen dönemde, başarısız devletler yarattıkları sayısız insani ve güvenlik sorunları nedeniyle uluslararası sistem tarafından giderek artan bir endişe kaynağı olarak görüldüler. O zamandan beri, uluslararası toplum tarafından devlet başarısızlığına yönelik çeşitli uluslararası tepkiler ortaya kondu ve önerildi. Devlet başarısızlığı olgusunun devam eden doğası ve neden oldukları güvenlik tehditleri, devlet başarısızlığının 21. yüzyıl için yerleşik bir sorun olduğunu kanıtlamıştır. Bu tez devlet başarısızlığının literatürdeki temel nedenlerine odaklanmakta ve buna yönelik farklı yaklaşımları incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken, tarihsel, küresel politik, birey merkezli ve eleştirel yaklaşımlara göre kategorize edilmiş kapsamlı bir literatür taraması yapmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Devlet Başarısızlığı, Devlet Çöküşü, Temel Sebepler, Uluslararası Toplum, Güvenlik

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the world order that Cold War provided, a greater degree of state breakdown occurred in the mid-1990s. States failed to perform certain minimal functions for security and well-being of their citizens. While this crisis in statehood is frequently portrayed as primarily internal in nature (Copson, 1994; Zartman 1995), its origins and ramifications involved entire regions. Compared to the earlier periods, the state breakdown that emerged during 1990s became more rampant and destructive because their implications have involved both the state and the region (Zartman, 2000). As the political violence and conflicts has increased, the literature has been concerned with identifying why the state itself ceases to perform core functions.

After Gerald B. Helman and Steven Ratner¹ published their article “Saving Failed States” in Foreign Policy in 1992, the new concept of “failed

¹ Gerald B. Helman was a U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and deputy to the under-secretary of state for political affairs. He retired from Foreign Service. Steven R. Ratner is a Professor in University of Michigan Law School since 2004.

state” gained a prominence among diplomats, politicians, academics.

Thereafter, the term “state failure” became entrenched in literature and in

Alex Gourevitch’s words:

was held responsible for just about every threat to international peace and security that existed: civil war, mass migration, ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, drug smuggling, arm trafficking and terrorism (Gourevitch, 2004: 255).

Although it was initially focused on the African states, state failure and weakness were embraced as global concerns after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Especially after these terrorist attacks, “failed states as security threats” discourse has intensified among scholars and government authorities. Since then, the concept has been utilized as a means of foreign policy tool in policy statements. In its National Security Strategy, Bush administration identified failed states as the major threatening element, even more serious than the conquering states (The White House, 2002). The concern was also explained by British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Jack Straw in September 2002. Straw said that “West must help rebuilding failed states and prevent them falling prey to terrorist leaders”. He argued that where states are weakest, terrorists are the strongest, therefore they can find safe havens in any state where government and society have collapsed (Guardian, 2002). In 2005, a report entitled *Investing in Prevention* was published by Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in Britain which presents a strategy to prevent these states from failing (Cabinet

Office, 2005). In a similar manner, National Security Strategy of 2006 recognized that US security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies. In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that weak and failings states pose “unparalleled” danger to the United States, serving as “global pathways” that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons in an article in Washington Post. Senator Chuck Hagel (2004, 64) argued that terrorism finds sanctuary in failed or failing states and existing and future challenges “come not from rival global powers, but from weak states”. In 2003, concerning the issue of Solomon Islands, Australian Prime Minister expressed a similar concern like Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy. He announced that if nothing is done now, the Solomon Islands becomes a failed state, thus international drug dealers, money launderers and international terrorism will make the problem in the future more costly (Kabutaulaka, 2004). In ASEAN Regional Forum report, Australian government also said that

We have come to understand better the impact of weak and failing states can have on global security. Afghanistan illustrated the role such states can play in providing shelter for terrorist networks (Anon., 2004).

Susan Rice, U.S. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy adviser, coauthored a major study of failed states for the Brookings Institution. She

argued that U.S. officials now understand that “weak states deserve particular attention because they can incubate transnational security threats” (Rice and Patrick, 2008: 21). State failure is thus a serious concern for government officials and leaders by causing security challenges for their state.

In academic literature, scholars also emphasized the discourse of “failed states as security threats”. Robert Rotberg (2002: 85), points out that failed states create a convenient environment for sheltering non-state actors such as warlords and terrorists. In stressing the potent relationship between illicit global flows and failed states, Mark Duffield (2000: 84) argues that “warlords and failed states may act locally, but to survive they have to think globally”. Similarly, Gary King and Langche Zeng (2001: 623) argue that failed states threaten the stability of neighboring countries by safeguarding international terrorists and allowing them to organize within their borders. According to the empirical study of James A. Piazza states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks and targeted by terrorists (2008: 469)². Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev (2002: 98) think that failed states attract terrorist organizations. Their territories are enough to accommodate entire training complexes, arms depots and communication facilities. Terrorist

² James Piazza (2008) used a simple descriptive statistics and a time series, cross-national negative binomial analysis of 197 countries from 1973 to 2003.

groups simply want to acquire de facto control over specified areas where they will be left alone and in this regard failed states becomes the most convenient disposition for them according to Takeyh and Gvosdev.

These examples from policy and academic circles indicate that, state failure has become particularly associated with the global insecurities since 9/11. At the same time, the understanding of security threats has changed too. According to foreign policy officials of the United States, twentieth century threats no longer lie in the strength of the enemies, but, on the contrary, the weakness of the other countries pose the gravest danger to the nation-state (Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein, 2005: 134). This kind of weakness is considered to have allowed small arms trade to flourish throughout Central Asia, made al Qaeda to exploit Somalia and Pakistan as terrorist grounds for attacks and heightened opium production in Afghanistan. In such a conjuncture, understanding the factors behind state failure is important for preventing a further disintegration of the state and restoring the collapsed states.

Studies of state failure have mainly sought to identify, describe and explain the areas of the weakness of these states in an attempt to understand the triggers of state failure/collapse and its prevention. Another group of studies focus on state reconstruction and policies that should be implemented. Indeed, there is a huge proliferation of concepts designating state malfunction in the literature. In this literature, states are often portrayed

in different categories: “failing” or “fragile” (Jackson, 1990; Brock, 2000; Ikpe, 2007), “collapsed” (Zartman, 1995), “hollow” (Terry, 2005), “at risk” (Ottoway and Mair, 2004), “weak” (Migdal, 1988; Buzan, 1991; Rotberg, 2004), “shadow” (Reno, 2000), “quasi” (Krasner and Pascual, 2005), “under-consolidated” (Carment, 2003), “minimal” (Desch, 1996). In this taxonomy of states, Gros (1996) distinguishes between “anarchic”, “phantom”, “anaemic”, “captured” and “aborted” states and illustrates a diversity both in causation and manifestation of state failure.

These categorization attempts point to an ongoing challenge to identify the meaning of weakness in reference to the state. At the core of the conceptual disagreement is whether weak and failed states are distinct categories. According to Robinson, “a weak state is a form of failed state” (2007: 6). Yet, others point to a distinction not just between weak and failed states, but also between failed and collapsed states. In general, a collapsed state is taken as a rare and extreme version of the failed state (Rotberg, 2003; Milliken and Krause, 2002) where “the basic functions of the states are no longer performed” (Zartman, 1995). In this regard, state weakness can be defined as the diminished or diminishing performance of a state, while state failure can be identified as the malfunction of the one or more state functions.

This thesis aims to take a closer look at the phenomenon of the failed state and the root causes behind it. The research question of the thesis is why and how some states fail or collapse, while some others do not. Thus, the

thesis will present an overview of multiple perspectives including historical, global political, socio psychological and critical. The thesis does not present new solutions. Nor does it make policy recommendations. The thesis offers a comprehensive literature review on state failure with an effort to understand root causes of state failure as analyzed in the literature. While presenting this comprehensive literature review, the concepts of failed, failing or collapsed are not taken as different terms, but used interchangeably. There exists a huge ambiguity in the literature on defining these terms, therefore it will be futile to deal with them separately.

This thesis composed of four chapters. Chapters are organized thematically in accordance with their comprehensiveness of various factors from least to the most comprehensive. In each chapter, key authors' arguments are presented.

Chapter 1 looks at the literature that focuses on human actors and the role their decision making play in mismanagement of governance. The chapter looks at four main scholars of this approach: Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, William Zartman, William Reno and Robert Rotberg. Their distinctive argument is that regime failure and mismanagement of leaders can lead to state failure.

Chapter 2 focus on the literature that looks at the colonial legacy of states and emphasizes how these can affect a state's contemporary status. European colonial system, territorial settlements, demarcation of boundaries,

and decolonization has had a huge impact on state's current situation. In this chapter, James Mayall, Charles Alao, Christopher Clapham and Jeffrey Herbst's studies are focused upon.

Chapter 3 presents the literature that focuses on the global, economic and historical environment in which the roots of the structural crisis are located. This literature looks at how globalization, global economic practices, and development aids that other states provides as well as global capitalist networks and legacy of colonial transformation can led to the state failure. The studies of Percy Mistry, Nicholas Van de Walle and Branwen Gruffydd Jones are presented in this chapter.

Chapter 4 focuses on the literature that looks at the state failure issue from a critical theoretical perspective. The literature covered in the previous chapters all accept that all states are constituted and function in the same way: "failed" and "successful" or "weak" and "strong". However, the related question that is asked is not "Is the state failing?" but rather was "For whom is the state failing, and how?" Taken together, the literature covered in the previous three chapters assumes that states are failing by developing strategies to reconstitute them or by making policy recommendations. But, this chapter presents the critical theoretical literature which maintains that the real problem is the fixed understanding of how states should function and behave. Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, Morten Bøås and Kathleen Jennings' studies will be analyzed in this chapter.

This thesis specifically focuses on the phenomenon of state failure and state collapse because the issue still poses a risk to the international system by creating numerous challenges. The violent conflicts, diseases, human rights abuses, poverty, refugee flows and civil wars accompanying state failure attest that the issue is problematic. By looking at different approaches that embrace state failure, this thesis will present a comprehensive overview of the literature focusing on the root causes of state failure.

CHAPTER 2

LEADERSHIP FAILURE AND REGIME MALFUNCTION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the literature produced by a group of scholars who argue that it is personal rule and mismanagement of the individual leaders or their authoritarian regimes that are the root causes of the failure (Rotberg, 2002; Reno, 2002; Zartman, 1995; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Rotberg (2003) argues that states fail because of the corrupt policies of the rulers, therefore the phenomenon is entirely caused by the human agency. Zartman (1995) contends that regime is a significant factor as well as leadership, thus the authoritative nature of the governments and tyranny are influential factors for state failure. William Reno's (2002) analysis introduced the term "shadow state" where the authority of an individual figure undermines government institutions through patron-client networks. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) argue that the personal rule system in which web of relations between rulers, patrons, public and rivals turn into an environment of insecurity rendering

leaders inefficient authoritarian rulers. The common point of these authors is that leaders and their decisions play a crucial role in weakening the state structure. However, while Rotberg (2003) thinks that leaders are solely responsible for state failure, Zartman (1995) argues that authoritative regimes in post-colonial Africa are also contributing factors for failure. Reno (2000, 2002) presents a complicated network where the presence of patron-client relationships gradually weakens state and argues that lack of knowledge and experience cause leaders to act irresponsibly. On the other hand, Jackson and Rosberg's (1982) analysis of "personal rule" model presents a framework where long surviving political leaders deliberately adopt strategies to keep their states weak in order not to lose their position. Therefore, leaders are depicted by these scholars as ambitious and corrupt rulers who do not hesitate to apply strategies to strengthen their grip on political power.

2.2 Jackson and Rosberg's Personal Rule Model

Carl G. Rosberg was a pioneer in the study of African politics in the United States. He led the Center for African Studies at Berkeley for many years. He was also the Chair of the Department of Political Science, 1969-1974 and the director of the Institute of International Studies, 1973-1989 at the Berkeley faculty. He also held positions at three African universities, namely, Makerere, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. He died at the age of 73 in 1996.

Robert H. Jackson is a Professor in the Department of International Relations and Department of Political Science at Boston University since 2001. His areas of interest are international relations of the Third World and post-colonial African politics. He has lectured at universities in North America, Europe and Africa and has served on university and government consultancies in Britain, Canada and Denmark. He also serves on the editorial boards of Political Science, International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, and Humanistic Perspectives on International Relations. He has co-authored a widely adopted textbook: *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (2nd ed 2003).

Jackson and Rosberg co-wrote books and articles that emphasize issues such as democracy, sovereignty, statehood and multi-ethnicity in Africa. Their studies which will be looked at in this thesis are *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (1982) and "Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa" (1984).

As defined by Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 19) "personal rule" is a type of political system of relations linking rulers not with the public or even with the ruled, but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters and rivals who constitute the system. They argued that the system is structured by the politicians and unlike the relationship between patron-client that Reno explained, personal rule model does not mention the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Furthermore, this distinctive kind of

system is more open to interferences caused by changes of personnel. Rather than institutions, this system is ultimately dependent on persons (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 19). Therefore, any change in ruling elites creates changes in this web of persons.

Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 17) argue that in spite of their different personal characteristics, belief sets or ambitions, most African leaders display similar features of behavior engendering their states to fail. They think that similar attitudes of the leaders actually form generic characteristics that establishes personal rule as distinctive kind of political system. They accept that personal rule is only one dimension to explain weak states in African political life, yet they think that it is crucial because it sheds light on the patronage and clientelism, factionalism, succession crises and coups that other approaches neglect. They argue that the independence of these African states was a fundamental change not only leading to the transfer of power from European to African rulers, but also causing a change in the nature of authority. With their independence, leaders began to change the constitution arbitrarily, ignored the delegation of a higher authority and imposed their personal rule in order to stay in office. In the cases where rulers placed their will above the constitution, it became impossible to remove them by institutional means (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 17).

According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 19), personal politics creates a system of relations between the rulers, public and clients, patrons and rivals. One of the methods that leaders apply in personal politics is a type of behavior involving coercion, violence and conspiracy. An environment of political insecurity becomes more prevalent, since leaders live in a constant fear of plots, coups or successions. As a result of this insecure environment, infightings between rulers and factions create a vacuum of effective ruling and induce state failure. Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 21) also argue that an authoritarian ruler may become an effective as well as a successful one and may not necessarily cause deterioration of state institutions. When this authoritarian type of regime shifts into a tyrannical rule, it weakens the state structure by imposing abusive and unrestrained policies.

Jackson and Rosberg (1982: 77-80) distinguish between four types of personal regimes; each designates different patterns of rule. First one is the “princely rule” which derives its conception from Machiavellian understanding. The prince displays royalist characteristics similar to those of a traditional monarchy, where the ruler is the personification of the state and guardian of its political values and practices. He tends to rule jointly with other oligarchs and is flexible enough to allow politics of accommodation. The authors maintain that the majority of Africa’s new rulers have exhibited the characteristics and methods of rule of the Prince

(Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 83). Examples given by the authors are Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Jomo Kenyetta of Kenya and William Tubman and William Tolbert of Liberia, whose personal rule determined the character of the states over which they presided. In “autocratic rule” leaders use centralized power structures. This type of ruler tends to dominate the government, the oligarchs and the state without having to share power with other leaders. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) gave the examples of President Bongo who ruled Gabon and President Banda who ruled Malawi. The “tyrannical rule” exercise power in a completely arbitrary fashion in a way that abusive and coercive behaviors can occur. Lastly in “prophetic rule” charismatic personalities reshape society in accordance with their own ideologies. These rulers are impatient with the social, economic and political conditions about them which they seen as obstacles to socialist progress. Jackson and Rosberg consider President Touré of Guinea as a prophetic ruler due to his continued emphasis on his socialist doctrines.

Jackson and Rosberg’s overall point is that personal rule is a distinct kind of political model, which operates with its specific characteristics. Unlike Zartman and Rotberg, who only briefly touch upon the personal rule approach and prefer to explain it with case studies, as will be seen below, Jackson and Rosberg present a generic understanding for African rulers depicting them as ambitious power-seekers. Accordingly, their typology not only explains weak African states according to the personal

rule understanding, but also presents an insight into the aberration and breakdown in those weak or failing states.

2.3 Zartman and Regime Failure

William Zartman is a professor emeritus of Political Science and author and editor of several books studies Africa related subjects. He is currently working at Johns Hopkins University as the Director of the Conflict Management Program. His works are *Political Elites in Arab North Africa* (1982) as the editor and contributor, *Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (1995) as the editor and contributor, *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement* (2002), *Peacemaking in International Conflict Methods and Techniques* (2007). In these books he looks at the issues of international relations, crisis management, peacekeeping and political risk analysis.

In his edited book entitled as *Collapsed States*, he considers state leaders as partly responsible for state failure. However, he argues that rulers are not the only source that is to blame; rather he posits that regime can be a significant factor causing failure. Zartman argues (1995: 2) that state failure is a condition of deteriorated regimes of second generation over established states. In this respect, states collapse, because leaders pursue authoritarian rules and tyranny and undermine state structures as a result.

However, Zartman (1995: 7) also remarks that while the tyrant's destruction ruins the state and despite the fact that various cases support this claim, this is not the "whole story". Alongside with tyranny, poor performances of the state in terms of representation, output efficiency and interest articulation are enumerated as the broad causes. He also asserts that regimes deteriorate after a passage of time unable to satisfy the demands of the groups within the population (Zartman, 1995: 8). Therefore, even if the population is content with the regime or tyrant, soon after their needs are unable to satisfy which causes the loss of legitimacy toward the ruling party. This leads to animosities between different factions and weakens the state structure.

According to Zartman (1995: 10), some characteristics or warning signals are revealed before a state collapses. He argues that these are the causes of state collapse as taught by African experience. Five factors are identified as the trigger of the state collapse. First, leaders pursue only defensive politics by keeping their rivals off, manipulating different factions and concentrating on strategies of subordination and repression. In this way, they keep away challenges and reduce threats, but they also expel the political agenda for participation and programs, namely, the elections and political platforms. Second, government abstains from making necessary but difficult choices. Such behavior prevents taking urgent decisions and leaves states amidst a governance crisis. The reason for decisional evasion

can either because of institutional incoherence, in which mechanisms of government are insufficient to their challenges, or because of political flabbiness, in which the leaders or politicians themselves are lacking firmness to take such decisions and enduring the situation. Third, power that resides at the center begins to diminish because the government no longer responds to the needs of the population. Thus, the public withdraws their support and the legitimacy of the government abolishes. Also, the center began paying particular attention to the ethnic or regional groups. Fourth, power devolves to the peripheries because center fights among itself. The center is busy to defend itself from local strongmen, thus local authorities grab power in the countryside. And finally, incumbent regime loses all of its control by leading ethnic or regional groups to dominate within the society. This is the ultimate danger sign where law and order is constantly broken and police and army units became gangs and bandits. According to Zartman (1995: 9), those five leading signs led to the state collapse if preventive measures are not taken immediately. He also adds that until it is too late, leaders do not focus their attention to the gravity of the problem. Therefore, when a state begin to experience these characteristics, state collapse somewhat becomes inevitable.

The example of Uganda illustrates Zartman's (1995) argument. In the case of Uganda, Idi Amin and his military dictatorship governed the country for eight years. Amin concentrated all the power in his own hands

and tried to prevent the opposition with purges, persecution and oppression. His rule was characterized by widespread corruption, nepotism, human rights abuses and economic degradation. However, as dissent occurred within the population, Amin's attempts to prevent antagonism proved abortive. Amin fled and left the country in state of a power vacuum. Not only politically, but also economically the country was left weakened. Thus, by the time Amin left the country, state had already collapsed entirely. In the midst of Uganda-Tanzanian War, Tanzanian forces crossed the border and what they found was a stateless society. As Zartman (1995) has pointed out, the nature of the strongman regime and performance of the state have been major contributors to the failure/collapse of Uganda.

Although regime failure is seen as the primary cause of state failure, state leaders are also found responsible in Zartman's analysis. He argues that despite the differences of tenure and characteristics of governments, in the cases of Uganda, Chad and Ghana, there exists an "established, but poorly functioning regime [which is] replaced by a military regime, that concentrated power, but was unable to exercise it effectively or legitimately" (Zartman, 1995: 3). In Chad, due to a factional civil war among guerilla victors over the previous regime, executive, legislative, judiciary and bureaucratic branches of the government collapsed in between 1980-1982. During the third republic under Hilla Limann in Ghana

(1979-1981), the center lost its ability to control government functions and lost control over the countryside. As a result, opposition groups became more organized than the state and cases of corruption and coercion increased. In Uganda, after Idi Amin had concentrated all power in his hands, a coalition of oppositions arose and left the country in a power vacuum in 1979-1981.

In the final analysis, Zartman argues (1995: 6) that state collapse was not the result of “Western-style” malfunction in the state or the badly adapted Western institutions. He accepts that African parties, parliaments and bureaucracies have difficulties in gripping the standards that Montesquieu or Weber had set, but insists that those are not the key to collapse, nor do these institutions function any better in states that do not collapse in Africa. He maintains that state collapse is not a civilizational decay or a post-colonial phenomenon, but rather it is the failure of those second generation regimes that are ruling over established states.

2.4 Reno, the Shadow State and Patron-Client Based Politics

William Reno is a specialist in African politics and the politics of “collapsing states”. He is currently teaches at Weinberg College of Arts and Science at Northwestern University. His prominent works are “Sovereignty and Personal Rule in Zaire” (1997), *Warlord Politics and African States* (1998),

“The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States” (2002), “Congo: From State Collapse to ‘Absolutism’, to State Failure” (2006).

In these works he examines the themes such as ethnicity, nationalism, commercial organizations, corruption and warlord politics in Africa.

According to Reno (2002: 837) the main reason that leads to state failure is the presence of “Shadow State” and the patrimonial rule that it breeds. With a range of activities, rulers of the “Shadow State” weaken bureaucratic institutions and ensure the enrichment of government elites in return. Reno (2000b: 434) defines “Shadow State” as “a form of personal rule; that is an authority based upon the decisions and interests of an individual, not a set of written laws and procedures, even though these formal aspects of government may exist”. Thus, the phenomenon of “Shadow State” is purely the product of personal rule of the leaders. Reno (2000b: 434) states that “Shadow State” is based on rulers’ abilities to manipulate external actors’ access to markets, both formal and clandestine, by depending on the global recognition of sovereignty by external actors. This kind of manipulation provide rulers to enhance their power and control access to economic market and resources, but at the same time it directly undermines the formal institutions of the government.

Reno (2000a: 45) argues that a closer examination of the “Shadow State” in Africa illuminates a relationship between economic and political organizations. Lack of popular acceptance of regimes in certain countries

directs rulers to relinquish support and legitimacy from citizens. Instead, they manipulate the accessibility to markets and enhance their own power. This creates an informal and clandestine economy where the rulers control all the activities of the citizens and use the global recognition of sovereignty as an opportunity to make use of personal profits. According to Reno (2002: 839), corrupt behaviors of rulers derive from the difficulties that are faced during the decolonization period.

Decolonization period during the 1950s and 1960s and subsequent border agreements between those states under UN monitoring provided a stable phase for African states. Indeed, this period created what Herbst (2000: 97-136) calls “a friendly international system” causing pacifism among rulers and leading them to adopt inefficient and unsuccessful policies. According to Reno (2002: 839), with the transition of power from colonizers to the independent states, leaders that came to power often exhibited a confused state of mind due to their lack of knowledge of how to govern. As a result, as soon as they came to power, they faced internal challenges despite the external stability. In Sub-Saharan Africa, first military coup took place in 1963 and by 2002, military rulers replaced the civilian governments in half of Africa’s states. In 1999, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan had major armed conflicts to replace existing regimes. Six of these conflicts used national armies and individuals who were once collaborators of the

rulers tried to replace them in all of them (Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 2001: 52-64). During multi-party elections, similar dangers appeared in some other African countries. 2002 election in Zimbabwe resulted to internal conflict. In Cote d'Ivoire, opposition parties boycotted the elections and forced out re-elected president in 2000. Similarly 2003 elections of Zimbabwe led to a separatist violence in the country. According to Reno, the potential dangers encourage leaders to avoid using centralized military command structures. By manipulating factional conflicts within militaries, leaders keep their rivals weak and unthreatening. They implement personalized policies and authoritative measures in their domestic policies. However, such policies led to disunion within the populace. Leaders found themselves facing with societies that include diverse factions who are uncompromising with each other.

A common strategy [that is applied] during the Cold War [is to articulate a vague sense of nationalism towards this fractioned society] usually found expression in domestic policies of economic self-sufficiency and externally in the diplomacy of non-alignment (Reno, 2002: 839).

However, this often becomes a futile attempt due to the lack of state support for policies. According to Reno, a second strategy that is applied by rulers is to provide accommodation of different parties by closing informal deals with the groups and buying loyalties. In order to enhance their own power, rulers distribute state assets. While this provides some short-term security benefits for the ruler, in the long term, they endanger themselves

by paying too little attention to the needs of the population. The issue of state failure or state collapse and its link with “Shadow State” becomes apparent at this point.

As leaders irresponsibly distribute state resources to their loyal counterparts, expenditures on the public services decrease and discontent in the society increases. Gradually, these illegal, commercial networks turn into predatory and corrupt regimes. In such situations, rulers who want to pursue reforms based on economic and political liberalization however cannot carry them out because they encounter “weak-state rulers’ dilemma” (Reno, 1998: 5). In this corrupt network, rulers want to implement reforms in order to provide economic growth and maximize their power, but since the same opportunities may become available to the local strongmen whose interests may oppose to the rulers, they cannot implement reforms. In other words, rulers’ fear that these strongmen may acquire interests and powers are at odds with their efforts to retain power. Furthermore, rulers cannot mobilize popular support against local strongmen from within the population because of the loss of legitimacy long before.

Reno (2006) tests his hypothesis on the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Zaire from 1967 to 1997), which, he argues, shows the signs of institutional state collapse. When the country gained independence from Belgium in 1960, it was viewed as the world’s first failed state as the

public order broke down and secessionist violence occurred. The Belgian soldiers that lent aid to secessionist administration were prevented and thereby the mutiny got under control. But, the real collapse happened in the 1980s as a result of the policies of Mobutu and his associates. Zaire flourished in the mid-1960s and 1970s with rapid modernization reforms conducted by President Mobutu Sese Sako (Reno, 2006: 43). By the 1980s, corruption and state decline occurred in the same state and consequently, in 1990s state collapse arose in DRC. Reno questions the failure of modernization attempts, and the effect of patronage-based politics in state collapse. He argues that rather than a corrupt despot, Mobutu seemed much like the other modernizers such as Nasser and Reza Shah (Reno 2006: 44). However, promises of rapid development was not kept during the same period, local organizations prevailed over state authority due to the loss of structural capacity to deliver goods. Patronage based politics was present during the modernization period. However, rather than the cause of economic failure, it seemed as compatible with the economic growth. But, Mobutu began to emphasize maintaining personal power in 1970s. From the perspective of economy and human rights his leadership was unsuccessful: economic growth is slowed down and some of the ministers were banished. Corruption through informal and personal connections become an essential part of the whole system of planned economy and at the cost of abandoning economic growth, Mobutu's own strategy of rule

emphasized career and social aspiration of himself and his nearbies. As a result, the country caught between various forces that pursue violent strategies to keep local support.

In short, Reno (2006) argues that African leaders have chosen to undermine their own governments in order to hold on to political power. Legacies of the colonial rule were obviously important in this analysis, however the structure of power relations and the nature of resources play a more essential role. Also, while weak-state rulers' dilemma poses challenges to the state leader and state itself, it also weakens the already precarious states and leads them to fail in the long run. Reno's analysis also indicates that rulers have a central interest to stay in power. Therefore, they render their citizens' life less secure and more impoverished, expecting that citizens eventually seek the help of the rulers for the termination of these conditions. However, as the regime loses its legitimacy, people's loyalty to the state leader also decreases.

2.5 Rotberg and Misrule as the Reason of State Failure

Robert I. Rotberg who was the president of World Peace Foundation, is the author and editor of several books and articles on intrastate conflict, peacekeeping and state failure. His well-known works are *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (2003) as the editor and contributor, *When*

States Fail: Causes and Consequences (2004) as the editor and contributor, “Renewing Good Leadership: Overcoming the Scourges of Africa” (2006). These works mostly focus on failed or weak states situated in Africa and discuss the aspects of leadership, governance, political stability and economic growth. His works about state weakness and failure are referred frequently in the state failure literature.

Rotberg makes a performance-based analysis in his article “New Nature of Nation-State Failure”. He posits that nation-states exist to deliver basic public goods such as security, health services, education, order and economic opportunity to people living within a designated territory (Rotberg, 2002: 87). However, when they can no longer deliver these public goods to their citizens, they gradually lose control over and legitimacy of people. In this regard, nation-states are seen by Rotberg as the sole responsible to maximize the well-being and prosperity of people.

According to Rotberg, a failed state is a state that is no longer able to perform the job of a nation-state in the modern world. At this point, Rotberg makes a distinction between “strong” and “weak” state. The difference between strong and weak states is based on the performances of the states (Rotberg, 2004: 2). Accordingly, states can be categorized as strong or weak based on their economic success, stability of institutions or infrastructures, but level of effective delivery of the most crucial political goods distinguishes strong states from weak states and weak states from

collapsed states. On top of the political goods, supplying security exists as the most critical one. Traditionally, a state's prime function is seen as to provide security by preventing loss of territories, cross-border invasions and eliminate domestic threats to national order (Rotberg, 2004: 3). The other desirable public goods such as rule of law, security of property and inviolable contracts, a judicial system, medical and educational services become only possible, provided that exists a proper measure of security. In Rotberg's analysis, these political goods set the criteria of strong, weak or failed in which modern nation-states may be judged. Strong states show noticeably a higher level of performance by controlling their territories and deliver a high quality of political goods, while weak states show an unsteady performance by acting poorly in some areas and performing well in other areas, but a broader crisis where signs of deterioration in economy and politics stands out. In this categorization, failed or failing states are designated as the subcategory of weakness; where the state's performance is poor enough to flunk in all of the categories.

According to this performance-based analysis, Rotberg (2002: 85) contends, "state failure is man-made". It is neither an accidental phenomenon nor caused by geography or environment. The apparent reason behind performance failure caused mainly by corrupt leaders. Rotberg (2004) argues a leader's corrupt regulations and decisions bring these weak states in the cusp of failure. In fact, Rotberg's argument goes

parallel with some other scholars in the literature who have also argued that leaders and rulers are responsible for leading a state into weakness (Zartman, 1995; Van de Walle; 2004, Reno, 1997). According to Rotberg (2002), following their succession to power, the “kleptocratic rule” of the elites has led to failure of their states. In his conception, after the ruling elite came to power, concerns of staying in office replaces considering the expectations of the citizens. State leaders focus on gaining short-term advantages, resources began to be distributed unevenly, where all the money goes into leader’s pocket and as a result, widespread corruption begins. In some other cases, leaders have to fight with different groupings as soon as they hold power. By giving privileges to one group while neglecting rest of the citizens, they cause resentments within the population, decreasing loyalties to the leadership. Citizens transfer their allegiances to some group leaders or clans in order to achieve security or economic benefits. Hence, prevalence of the military regime or some ethnic groups is encountered in failed states.

Rotberg uses the example of Zimbabwe as a case study. According to Rotberg (2004: 23), President Mugabe brought the country in the brink of failure under his corrupt rule. After Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980, Mugabe’s Patriotic Front won the elections. Mugabe discouraged domestic and international investment, weakened the courts, damaged local commerce, restricted the press and brought the country to the edge of

starvation in 2002. However, rather than trying to provide food to people, the leaders of Zimbabwe manipulated the country's food storage to punish political opponents and divisions in the government. Furthermore, international food aid was banned and only the government controlled Grain Marketing Board (GMB) was allowed to distribute food. Consequently, it was realized that GMB had insufficient stocks of foods and made a discriminatory distribution. Health and educational services has decreased rapidly. GDP per capita decreased 10 percent by each year, and inflation has risen from 30 percent to 116 percent during the same period.

According to Rotberg (2004: 23), Zimbabwe's situation can be explained by the human agency. Human factor caused a shift from strength to weakness and resource transfer from state to the ruling few. In the case of Zimbabwe, President Robert G. Mugabe, in Sri Lanka Solomon and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, in Afghanistan Gulbuddin Hakmatyar and Burrhan ul-din Rabani personally drove their country to the brink of collapse. Institutional weakness and structural flaws contributed to the failure, however these reasons are also closely related to the human agency.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter looked at the literature that analyzes reasons of state failure based on the leadership approach. The authors argue that with their

mismanagement or flawed decisions, state leaders have had an important effect on state decay.

According to Rotberg, a nation-state fails when it is unable to deliver positive public goods to its citizens. Several indicators points to state failure such as growth of criminal violence and corruption, flawed institutions, deteriorating infrastructures or declining real national and per capita levels. However, what brings states to this point to the human agency, namely, leadership decisions and policies. In fact, the leadership fault figures such as Samuel Doe in Liberia, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Siad Barre in Somalia, Felix Hauphouet Boigny in Ivory Coast, Idi Amin in Uganda and Siakka Stevens in Sierra Leone proved that their policies weaken the state institutions and even bring these states in the precipice of failure and collapse.

William Zartman makes a similar argument to Rotberg. But, he also argues that in addition to leadership mismanagement, regime failure influences states more profoundly by bringing states to the cusp of failure. Regimes are unable to exert their power over citizens after the passage of time. This is derived from the lack of experience of the second-generation regimes. The newcomers leaders have pursued authoritative policies by causing state structure to deteriorate. As a result, leaders lost control over citizens and left the state in a power vacuum where different groups vie for power.

Different from Rotberg and Zartman, Reno focuses on state leaders, but investigates the problem from a different perspective. He thinks that leaders do not undermine their own authorities intentionally. He argues that the reason why they apply insufficient or unsuccessful policies is their lack of knowledge and internal challenges that they face. Even if a state becomes externally safe, due to the presence of opposition groups, local strongmen or clans, state leaders resort to methods such as buying loyalties or balancing the interests of different groups for the sake of consolidating their power.

Jackson and Rosberg create a model from the state failure concept. In this model, they highlight important features of African politics such as clientelism and patronage, coups, purges, plots, succession crises. According to them, it has been in large part the maintenance of personal political skills and acumen of individual rulers that has determined the relative stability of the regimes. In addition to this, style of rule of the regimes depended on the personal dispositions of individual rulers. However, they argue that despite different styles of rule, different personal characteristics, belief sets or backgrounds; incumbent leaders actually follow a similar path when they first came to power. Due to the possibility of overthrow, they develop relations not with the public or with the ruled, but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters and rivals. Although Jackson and Rosberg try to concretize the approach by presenting a model,

their model also includes elements of psychology. The behaviors and the motives of the leaders in different situations are often explained in detail. Therefore, their model consists of both sociological and psychological factors in explaining the state weakness.

This chapter introduced leadership-based approach that prevails in the literature. A leadership or regime failure based approach explains “failed states” with reference to individual level factors. It explains the degeneration in states by depicting leaders as power pursuers. In the following chapter, the literature that focuses on colonial legacy and the post-colonial statehood will be looked at.

CHAPTER 3

COLONIAL LEGACY AND POST-COLONIAL STATEHOOD

3.1 Introduction

Scholars who were considered at in the first chapter elaborated on the role of state leaders, regarding them as arbitrary figureheads or unsuccessful managers of the state. Indeed, inconsistent policies and decisions of the leaders usually weaken the state structure by creating patronage-based networks. However, another group of scholars have argued that the root of the problem is not personal but historical, emanating from the legacy of colonialism. Dominance of the imperial rule, especially the European colonialism between 1914 and 1945 and the imposition of the European model nation-state to the post-colonial states are seen by these scholars as the root causes of the failure. In particular, state formation processes, territorial border settlements in the subsequent independence period, and the legacies of the end of the Cold War are highlighted to indicate that there exists a bigger picture as to why some states are failing, while some others are not.

Although state failure is encountered in any region of the world, Africa is taken as the empirical basis in most of this literature.

This chapter is to going to present an analysis of the phenomenon of state failure through a historical perspective as introduced by a group of authors (Alao, 1999; Clapham, 2001; Herbst, 2004; Mayall, 2005). Charles Abiodun Alao (1999) argues that the reason of the state failure is the peculiar characteristic of the state system which is created with colonialism. Christopher S. Clapham (1996) presents that factors such as boundary demarcation and national identity are important in state breakdown. James Mayall (2005) argues that colonial legacy is the only element that is the root cause of state failure. Jeffrey Herbst (1996, 2000, 2004) focuses on European model of nation-state and argues that this model is not suitable for the states in Africa. Herbsts' analysis is the most comprehensive one in terms of including the factors such as boundaries, population density, lack of institutions and land characteristics.

3.2 Alao and Historically Weak State Structure

C. Abiodun Alao is a Senior Research Fellow in the Conflict Security and Development Group (CSDG) and African Leadership Centre (ALC). He has undertaken extensive consultancy works for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the United

Nations (UN). His research interests consist of the politics of natural resource conflicts, rebellion and civil wars, and African security. Some of his published works consist of *Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security* (1998) as the editor, "The Problem of the Failed State in Africa" (1999), *Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment* (2007), *Mugabe and the Politics and Diplomacy of Security in Zimbabwe* (2011).

Alao presents his argument by indicating that most of the states that have recently collapsed situated in Africa. He acknowledges the historically weak structures of the African states and remarks that this weak structure is further weakened by colonialism and activities of the élite class that seize power after independence. According to Alao (1999: 84), "Africa has always been at the receiving end of the global [developments]". Throughout history, it had to deal with successive plundering, slave trade, exploitation by colonialism and neocolonialism. During the independence period, UN granted sovereignty to the African states and they became members of the international community without taking part in the creation of it.

Frequency of the failures in the post-1990 led to the questioning of whether the shifts or the policies of the two superpowers led to the state failure. According to Alao, although the incidences of state failure have gained momentum with the end of the Cold War, the phenomenon was not entirely created by it, but rather the issue dates back to the pre-Cold War period. Alao follows Zartman's (1995: 3) "two waves of collapse" argument.

According to that, the first wave of collapsed states occurred towards the end of the second decade of independence. This wave overthrew the original nationalist regimes and created a power-vacuum. Following this, a second round appeared beginning from 1980s and has continued into the 1990s. Alao concentrates on the second wave in his study because as he argues the implications of the second wave could spread into the coming century and also because most of the states affected by the first wave have already been on the path of recovery.

According to Alao (1999: 84), roots of the state failure in Africa arise from the “peculiar” characteristics of the state system, which is created through colonialism. Four interconnected features constitute these peculiar characteristics of the state system in Africa and are the reasons of state failure according to Alao. At the roots of the most recent crisis of state failure in Africa is the process of state formation. With the process of state formation, argue Alao, people with different political, ethnic and religious affiliations assembled together by colonialism to form states. Notwithstanding their diverse affiliations and non-existence of their common bonds, former colonial powers created their own proxy states in which African states did not taken any role. Therefore, after decolonization, plenty of independent states with no common historical memory or experience are occurred.

Secondly, as a result of decolonization, an artificial nature of boundaries is established and thus individual ethnic groups are divided

between two or more nations. The result was not only the boundary problems between neighboring countries, but was also the reunification attempts and self-determination of partitioned ethnic groups. Alao (1999: 94) argues that while the African countries realized that these boundaries will constitute a problem in the future, they had to comply what is imposed due to their fear of the repetition of events that was experienced during the bloody partition of the South Asia in 1947.

A third characteristic is rooted in the weak nature of economy that African countries inherited at their independence. African economy's incorporation into the capitalist framework created structural deficiencies and crises by weakening the state foundation to cope with internal challenges. As a result, economies became structurally weak to withstand the challenges of nation-building.

As a final characteristic, the nature of the *élites* and their desire to stay in power through suppression, corruption, exploitation is propounded as an element of failure as it was explained in detail in Chapter 1. Alao (1999: 85) argues that the role of the *élites*, some of whom emerged as warlords in collapsed states, is not a mere coincidence. Elites played important political, economic or military roles in the affairs of their respective countries before the collapse.

In the post-Cold War period, number of state collapses increased. Alao (1999: 86) argues that "Cold War created legacies which shook the

foundation of many governments, at those which could not stand the pressure ultimately collapsed". According to Alao, there are interrelated causes of state failure in the post-Cold War period including the weakness of the inherited state structure and difficulties coping with the post-Cold War transition, radical rise of ethno-nationalism and descending economic fortune of most African states. The inability to establish viable institutional structures resulted weak democratic traditions in African countries. Either military regimes or one party system was operational. Also, democratic values and accountability of public officers were absent in most countries. Root of the problem also emanate from the rise of ethno-nationalism. Despite the ongoing debate as to whether the rise in ethnic nationalism is a cause or consequence of state collapse, Alao (1999: 88) contends that it could act both as a cause and as a consequence according to the experiences in Africa. Alao's Liberia example supports his argument. In Liberia, oppressive leadership of President Samuel Doe led to ethnic division, which in turn brought the oppressed sections of the country together to challenge the central government and eventually resulted in the disintegration of the country. Another cause of state failure was the rise of poverty level, which deepened with a debt of US\$135 billion at February 1996. Imposed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) on countries as a means of solving their budget problem and introduction of the same structural package to all weak states

caused a negative impact on the African continent, which will be looked at in Chapter 3.

Alao uses Liberia and Somalia as case studies in his article. According to Alao, Somalia collapsed due to a number of factors. First reason was the decline of external patronage, which sustained the repressive and corrupt regime of Siad Barre. The second reason was the largely man-made famine that ravaged the country. Third reason was the country's defeat in the Ogaden War against Ethiopia. And final reason was because of the domestic opposition to the government's internal repression. By 1991, the government of Siad Barre had collapsed. The competition to fill the vacuum resulted in a breakdown of order and law and emergence of two warlords: Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi who tore the country apart. The situation deteriorated gradually insomuch that the relief materials could not reach to the starving population requiring the eventual concern of the international community.

In Liberia case, Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia to challenge the oppressive regime of the President Samuel Doe in 1989. An abortive coup by Gio/Mano ethnic group is organized against Doe who was from Krahn ethnic group. Later, Gio/Mano ethnic group who suffered massive persecution under government of Doe took the control and government collapsed within the weeks. After massacres began, a peacekeeping mission by Economic Community of West African States'

monitoring group (ECOMOG) forces was initiated. 14 unsuccessful peace agreements have signed until an accord between the warring factions.

As a whole, Alao points out that interrelated factors and characteristics that are only specific to Africa are the causes of the multiple state failures and collapses in this continent. Those factors can be divided into two groups: pre-Cold War elements that started with the colonialism and caused first wave of collapses and additional post-Cold War elements that resulted second wave of collapses. In this regard, Alao's analysis includes the nature of élites, economic poverty, rise of ethno-nationalism and weak state structure. Additionally, he asserts that colonial legacies such as artificial boundaries, nature of economies and lack of common bonds between peoples as a result of state formation are also the causes of the phenomenon. Process of state formation however, is seen as the root cause of the problem.

3.3 Clapham and Demarcation of Boundaries

Christopher Clapham is an associate of the Centre for African Studies at Cambridge University and president of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom. He specializes in African politics and international relations. Some of his works include *Africa and the International System* (1996),

African Guerillas (1998), "Discerning the New Africa" (1998), "Rethinking African States" (2001).

Clapham investigates the current situation of African states by focusing on the concepts of state building, national identity and demarcation of boundaries. He argues that Western European colonialism has totally transformed the map of Africa by partitioning the region into a collection of territories without considering the national identities (Clapham, 1996: 30).

In his study entitled as "Rethinking of African States" (2001), Clapham compares Africa and Europe and discusses the paradoxical contrast between them. He notes that considering the total transformation of borders in Europe, the map of Africa didn't undergo a substantial change as the boundaries are still pretty much the same today (Clapham, 2001: 6). Clapham explores the reasons of the weak and artificial states in Africa by focusing on the statehood and territoriality in Africa and Europe. He argues that "European states exist in order to express the identity of the groups of people who inhabit them" (Clapham, 2001: 8). According to this, the community defines the state and the boundaries are drawn in order to reflect the extent of this community. The main element of European statehood since the German and Italian unification was to reflect "national identities" by redrawing boundaries. If this condition is not met, evident tensions arise as the case in Basque province of Spain, Belgium and Northern Ireland. In Africa, situation has been very different. Unlike Europe, boundaries came

first in Africa and states have been formed within them. Most of the states are directly the descendants of the colonial partition. Although this brought formal government structures and clearly demarcated borders between states, these boundaries are usually designated without regarding the cultural, ethnic or historical identities of the people (Clapham, 1996: 30).

Within the territories, administrative hierarchies were established from the newly formed colonial capitals to the capitals in Europe. Africans only took subordinate or lower positions at the local level. In addition to this, colonizers, to a large extent, “simply established the kind of territorial structure which they assumed ... necessary and indispensable element of government” as Clapham (1996: 31) argues. The boundaries that are demarcated were essential in order to regulate competition between themselves. An important consequence of colonialism for Africa was that it not only divide the continent into state-like territories, but did it with the support of eight different colonial powers which caused the emergence of three main language –French, English, Portuguese- rule in the continent. This situation divided Africa into linguistic and cultural blocs and intensified the emergence of factions.

According to Clapham (2001: 9), due to the arbitrarily imposed boundaries, their maintenance has become the central concern for the succeeding ruling elite. Some states expressed their desire for more unity within the continent soon after the independence. Under the signatory of 32

governments, Organization of African Unity (OAU)³ is established in order to promote unity and solidarity, and to intensify the cooperation of African states. But, “rather than promoting ‘unity’ indicated by its name, [it] was actually designed to reinforce sovereignty of the individual states, and secure the peaceful regulation of their relations with one another” (Clapham, 1998: 263). The superpowers had a little interest towards those states and were content that they maintained their existing state structure. Thus, the international environment was generally secure for the African states (Clapham, 1998: 263). They did not feel threatened by outside powers and this situation made them indifferent to any kind of development.

Like Alao, Clapham points out that the emergence of weak and failed states in Africa emanate from the way these states are formed. Boundaries of the countries are not drawn according to the national identities of the people, but rather imposed borders are drawn by the colonizers. An external hand decided everything for African states without consent. Clapham’s analysis is similar to Alao’s in the sense that he also emphasizes colonial legacies of the African states as the causes of state failure. The difference is that while Alao focus on historical, social, political and economic factors, Clapham only discusses historical and social side without considering the economic reasons. Additionally, the focus of the two authors differs. Clapham mainly

³ OAU was disbanded on 9 July 2002 and replaced by African Union (AU).

focus on boundary demarcation and national identity issues, while Alao centers his attention to state structure.

3.4 Mayall and Territorial Settlements

James Mayall is an academic and Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is currently working as a Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London's School of Advanced Studies. Mayall's research interest includes international relations of African states, North-South relations, world order after Cold War, international theory, and impact of nationalism on international relations. Amongst his publications are *Nationalism and International Society* (1990), *The Fallacies of Hope: The Post-Colonial Record of the Commonwealth Third World*, with Anthony Payne (1991) and *World Politics: Progress and its Limits* (2000).

Mayall (2005: 38) argues that it is not the transfer of power or the personalities in the regime that is the root cause of state failure. He contends that the causes of the contemporary state failure can only be understood by considering the contribution of colonial legacy. Put in broader terms, Mayall argues that the concept of state is also a colonial import, therefore modern notion of statehood and its principles such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and territorial integrity should be understood as Western creations. Instead of

culturally specific concept, sovereignty is taken for granted as a universalized concept that indicated same features all around the world (Mayall, 2005: 37). Because of this understanding, Mayall maintains that European state model do not function in the same way in all nation-states. Where the state is not able to adapt its own values to the imposition or transform itself, states fail to function or collapse.

Mayall (2005: 41) states that the territorial aspect of the colonial legacy is a contributor to state failure. During the transfer of power between 1947 and 1960s, the United Nations offered a blueprint for African states. Before colonization, borders used to change either as a result of a battle or with the commercial exchanges. Under European colonial rule, despite the territorial scramble, little change of boundaries had occurred because colonizing states feared that this might destabilize their relations. Therefore, pragmatic solutions were almost always sought, such as the decision of effective control that was taken in the 1884 Congress of Berlin.⁴ By introducing this principle and with the UN demarcation of boundaries, imperial powers controlled the territories as they wish and recreated a new political map of Africa. Demarcations often determined without having a closer look of the habitants,

⁴ The Berlin Conference was called for by Portugal and organized by Germany in order to regulate European colonization and trade in Africa. The conference took place in a period where colonial activities had peaked. According to the decision of effectiveness, colonial powers could hold their colonies only if they actually possessed them. In other words, they can possess colonies if they had treaties with local leaders or if they flew their flag in there for instance.

ethnic elements or multilayered identities. These territorial aspects that come from colonial times led to hurdles for future development and instability.

Mayall (2005: 37) argues that after decolonization, Europeans did not simply disappear. In other words the legacy of Europeans continued in the African continent. They remained influential and powerful by occupying permanent seats on the Security Council as Britain and France did. However, the state that is foreseen by the colonizers and the state that actualize in Africa did not overlap at all. Another legacy of the colonial state was the policies of developmental nationalism. These were adopted in the final years of the colonial rule in an attempt to break with the colonial past. However, African governments were unable to bring the transformation which they aspired because it had colonial roots in it.

In general, Mayall's perspective looks at four colonial legacies as causes of the state failure. Anti-colonial nationalism, territorial settlements, role of economic developments and the role of social structure and political developments are explained. According to Mayall, in order to understand the problem of contemporary state failure, it is necessary to understand the contribution of colonial legacy. His main point is that European state and state-system had different consequences, for good and ill, in different parts of the world, but for Africa there is the ill consequence.

3.5 Herbst and Imposition of European Model of Nation-State

Jeffrey Herbst is the author of several books and articles including his prominent and award-winner book *States and Power in Africa* (2000). He also wrote several articles about state failure including "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa" (1989), "War and the State in Africa" (1990), "Responding to State Failure in Africa" (1996/97), *Africa and the International System* (1996), "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice" (2004). His research interests include politics of state failure and consolidation, political and economic liberalization and peacekeeping in African continent. He has been a professor of political science in Miami and Princeton University. Since 2010, he has been president of Colgate University.

In his article "Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice", Herbst analyzes the problem of state failure in Africa and proposes policy responses for the issue. According to Herbst (2004: 302), there has been a stabilized state system from World War II to the early 1990s. Except a few forcible boundary changes such as the creation of Bangladesh and annexation of Golan Heights, boundaries remained stable. However, significant number of states has failed or weakened subsequently. Herbst (2000) defines state as the main provider of certain public goods such as law, defense, order and infrastructure in society. However, in Africa few states

can exercise control over their territory, provide order or public goods and described as failing or weak states as a result. Herbst's basic thesis about the reason of failure is related to European colonialism, but factors such as population density, land, boundaries, lack of institutions also play a role.

Herbst (1996: 127) states that the imposition of the "territorial nation-state" by Europeans eradicated existing African political practices. Colonial rule of the Europeans brought fundamental changes by destroying pre-colonial practices, especially, the sovereignty. Depicting the difference between old and new conceptions of sovereignty, he argues that there are two main differences between pre-colonial sovereignty and the sovereignty that is exercised in modern Africa. The first difference is that in pre-colonial Africa power is exercised over people rather than land (Herbst, 1996: 127). Instead of nation-states, there were city states, larger empires and religiously based units in the pre-colonial environment where according to Herbst (1996: 128) exercising political control mainly meant control over people. Due to the low density of the population and the vast pieces of land, exercising political control was much easier compared to the post-independent states. However, in post-colonial Africa the opposite view takes place whereby states are seen as "territorial entities" implementing control over territories.

Second aspect that is presented by Herbst is that sovereignty was inclined to be shared in pre-colonial political practices; therefore belonging to one authority or allegiances to one figurehead was not common. On the other

hand, in post-colonial states sovereignty is centralized where there is a single, uncontested one. These two different aspects of sovereignty between the pre-colonial and post-colonial states in Africa, explain the reason why African states are instable, weak or unsuccessful to provide basic public goods. Demarcation of borders after their initial independence, imposition of European model of sovereignty and the creation of territorial states caused a severe disruption for African political culture. Hence, the idea that Africa is composed of sovereign states that have a control over in territory within their boundaries is not true as Herbst (1996: 122) argues.

In addition to these points, Herbst (2004: 303) states that although Africa is plagued by state failure, the phenomenon of state failure is not a novel concept. In fact, states in Europe experience failure since 1500. However, in terms of the process of state formation there is a huge difference between Europe and Africa. Herbst emphasizes on this difference and made his assessment based on the work of Charles Tilly. By referring to Tilly's study about European state-making, Herbst reviews the historical and current patterns of the state failure. Tilly (1975: 38) states that majority of the states in Europe after 1500 failed and the ones that survived during the 19th century failed to operate effectively regardless of the criterion that is employed. A peasantry way of life was embraced by the European state-makers in 1500. Within this peasant world, there were also a populous group of landlords and bourgeoisie, claiming their rights over land. High

population density in Europe rendered the land relatively scarce and made it a valuable asset to control. Cities began to grow as centers of trade, communication, administration and manufacturing, additionally technological developments such as firearms, gunpowder, artilleries changed the methods of warfare. Tilly (1975: 20) noted that those set of social arrangements and changes affected the emergence of states. First, Europe as it seemed had a great deal of wealth and productive capacity, but those are tied strongly to the individuals and local groups. Secondly, military innovations made wars extremely expensive by resulting that only states with sufficient amount of capital and a large population could afford paying for their security and ultimately survive in the hostile environment. Institutions of the modern state such as taxes were created to allow warmaking. However, lack of resources of the early modern states engendered Kings to fight against lords and commoners over taxes and created a web in which kings establish bureaucracies to gather information. This predatory environment was necessary for states to survive.

According to Tilly (1975: 27), European nation-state after 1500 was “a well-defined, continuous territory, relatively centralized, differentiated from other organizations and reinforced its claims through physical coercion over its territory”. A centralized state apparatus was created in Europe because continuous competition for trade and territory among states made war a

driving force in European history (Tilly, 1990: 54). According to Tilly, this process created the modern system of nation-states in Europe.

Herbst's (2000) argument indicates that the same process of centralized state apparatus is established by European colonizers in Africa but did not function in the same way. Herbst deduces that Africa is different because the structural conditions that led to the formation of state and institutions were absent in here. Firstly, land is not scarce as in the case of Europe, but labor is. Thus, in the pre-colonial period, states did not fight over land, but rather over people. In addition to this, land lost its importance since 1900 as empires with vast lands have all failed, leading the emergence of a large number of smaller states. As a result, number of sovereign states has increased from roughly 55 to 192 today. The most successful economies are described as the ones, which possess small land and bereft of natural resources. Herbst (2004: 304) posits that the land and what is underneath is gradually losing its value. Therefore, the direction of state failure is in favor of smaller units. He illustrates his point by giving the examples of Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Accordingly, despite their little land and deprivation of natural resources, these countries have the most successful economies outside of Europe since World War II. In addition to that, being rich does not depend on mining a vast hinterland, rather possessing advanced manufacturing and service sectors. Therefore, as Herbst (2004: 305) states that being small is attractive and adds that even "states that can be easily

conquered are no longer in danger because what they have is not worth fighting over”.

Following the emergence of the newly independent states, African states face problems in several ways. They lack skilled labor, capital and idea of nationality (Herbst, 1990: 125). Although other developing nations also have similar problems, this is often more extreme in the African continent. Since leadership and succession are not institutionalized, elites who came to power often faced insecurities. The fear of losing power and displacing by another, the probability of exogenous economic shocks and the existence of minority groups caused them to desperately control the major parts of the society through regulations. Another problem that is faced by the African countries is the absence of the popular identity within state (Herbst, 1990: 127). Despite the twenty-five year of nationalist period, majority of states has difficulty in creating viable symbols to attract the loyalties of the citizens. Lacks of a national consensus on major issues exacerbate the authoritarian regime. This statement indicates that threat of failure sometimes comes from within, instead of outside forces.

Overall, Herbst's perspective about state failure indicates that colonial legacies have played a big role in the weakening of state in Africa. In this regard, he makes a similar argument to Alao, Clapham and Mayall. However, he also argues that European model of the state is simply the unfit institution for Africa because process of state formation, the values of the

people and the land are entirely different for two continents. Therefore, problem of state failure in Africa does not just emanate from Africa's inability to adapt its values and structures to the European counterpart. Rather, it originates from the misconception that European model of state is suitable for Africa.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, writings of four authors in the literature are examined. Generally, they all argue that the current crisis in the nature of state emanates from European colonialism. However their perspectives differentiate at some points.

In the first part, Alao looked at the process of state formation in Africa and argued that this continent has some specific characteristics. For instance, the nature of economies, nature of élites, ethnic affiliations and boundary demarcations are all peculiar to this continent. He argued that states are failing or collapsing due to a number of interrelated factors such as legacy of historically weak state structure, Cold War transition and the policies that were adopted by superpowers during this period, economic difficulties of the newly independent states and the rise of ethno nationalism led by the demarcation of the borders. His analysis differs from other authors as he includes the rise of ethno-nationalism as a cause of the state failure rather than a consequence.

Clapham, in turn, compared state structure between Africa and Europe and showed differences between them. The differentiating point of his argument is the focus of territoriality and national identity issue in the creation of states. Alao also touched upon the nationalism issue, but Clapham highlighted the national identity and community's role in the creation of states.

In the third part, Mayall argued that the problem of contemporary state failure could only be understood through the lens of the legacy of colonialism. Therefore, he posited that European agenda and policies during this period should be analyzed. In order to unravel the puzzle of state failure, he considered four aspects of the colonial legacy. Some of these aspects are the differentiating point of Mayall from the other authors. Along with the anti-colonial nationalism and territorial settlement, he also explained the political role of economic development, which is not dealt by other scholars.

Herbst looked at the number of different factors in the last section. He made the most inclusive analysis among those four authors. Like Clapham, he first argued that state formation in Africa did not take place like in Europe. After that, he stated that imposition of the "territorial nation state" by Europe eradicated the African political practices by rendering states passive and neutral organs. And thirdly, he maintained that post World War II system negatively influenced the elements of boundaries, aids and

territories in Africa. He is different from other authors in his refusal of the idea that European model of state is appropriate for this continent.

CHAPTER 4

IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC PRACTICES ON STATE FAILURE

4.1 Introduction

The classical discourse on state failure focuses on historical (such as colonial legacy) or individual aspects (such as leadership decisions), but mostly overlooks the global context. This chapter will provide an analysis of the literature on state failure that focuses on the effects of global political economy, imperialism, development aids and unsuccessful macroeconomic policies (Mistry, 1991; Walle, 2004; Gruffydd Jones, 2008). This chapter explores the literature which states that together with the internal causes, external factors are also quite influential in state failure. What is different in this literature is that whereas the literature analyzed in the previous chapters others considered the root causes emanating from local (regime structure) or regional factors (colonial history and its legacy), this group of authors analyze global economic factors.

Percy S. Mistry, Nicholas Van de Walle and Branwen Gruffydd Jones are the main authors of this chapter who will analyze the state failure from global economic context. Percy Mistry (1992) states that African Debt Crisis is related to the current phenomenon of state failure. According to her, the debt crisis affected the institutional and human capacity of the African countries to implement good economic policies. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2008) presents a socio-political-economical perspective and argues that pre-colonial and colonial economies, processes of class formation and globalization should be examined in order to understand state failure issue.

Nicholas Van de Walle (2004) in the final section argues that development aids and macroeconomic policies have an effect on the causes of state failure.

4.2 Mistry and African Debt Crisis

Percy S. Mistry worked in prominent organizations such as World Bank, UNDP, UNCTAD and IFC and served high-ranking positions as an adviser, consultant and manager director. His specialization areas are development, debt, privatization and adjustment to multilateral institutions. Among his publications are “African Debt: The Case for Relief for Sub-Saharan Africa” (1989), *Present Role of the World Bank in Africa* (1990), *African Debt Revisited: Procrastination or Progress* (1992), “Africa’s Record of Regional Cooperation and Integration” (2000), “Financing for Development: Perspectives and

Issues”(2002), “Reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development Deficit that the Commission for Africa did not Consider” (2005).

Percy’s study entitled “African Debt: The Case for Relief for Sub-Saharan Africa” analyzes the causes and dimensions of the debt crisis in depth and suggests policy responses to the problem. As a result of this article, a remarkable group of African and Northern parliamentarians came together in a conference and adopted a comprehensive action plan for African debt relief in July 1991. Before explaining the external economic reasons of the state failure, the key events of 1970s and 1980s that destroy many of the economies in Africa, namely, the debt crisis will be overviewed as this will shed insight about the current crisis of the state and economies of the African states.

Mistry (1992: 9) argues that in addition to the factors emanating from inside such as poor governance, corrupt leaderships, prolonged civil wars, excessive spending and inaccurate economic policies of the governments, external factors also played an important role in Africa’s crisis. The 1973 oil shock caused an immediate tension between OPEC countries and USA by leading to an increase in oil prices. The global monetary shocks of 1979-1981 had a collateral effect by inducing a long and deep recession. Debt-ridden developing countries are affected particularly from the shocks where the recession lasted for 70 months instead of 16 in the OECD world, and [this] caused commodity markets and prices to collapse (Mistry, 1992: 10). Volatile exchange rate

movements in the 1980s resulted in increasing the dollar value of Africa's debts, and "protectionism in world's markets for agricultural products and low technology manufactures ... makes it particularly difficult for African countries to diversify and increase exports to hard currency markets" (Mistry, 1992: 11). In 1970s, exports to the developed nations constituted a major outcome for Africa. An important portion of the income was gained from the taxes on trade. However, with decline in the growth rate of the seven developed countries (namely the G7) trade taxes that entered in African governments' budgets has declined as well. The fiscal crisis deepened due to the interventionist economic policies of the African countries. By the end of 1990, debt of Africa had risen to over \$270 billion.

Table 1 Growth of the African Debt Burden 1982-1990 (Amounts in Billions of US Dollars)

	1982	1986	1990
North Africa			
Total Debt Disbursed and Outstanding	67.80	91.68	107.19
Sub-Saharan Africa			
Total Debt Disbursed and Outstanding	72.48	115.40	162.87
Continental Africa			
Total Debt Disbursed and Outstanding	140.28	207.08	270.06

Table from (Mistry 1992: 18)

Table 1 shows the size and pattern of the growth of this debt (Mistry, 1992: 18). Year 1982 indicates the emergence of the crisis; 1986 specifies the year in which it is understood that an urgent action is needed to relieve debt burden of low-income countries; and year 1990 shows the peak level of the debt. This table also marks and shows separately the debt burden of (a) North Africa comprising five middle income countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) and (b) Sub Saharan Africa comprising forty five countries excluding Namibia and South Africa. The debt burden increased dramatically from 1982 to 1986.

The table shows that the debt in both of the two sub-regions has increased intensely since 1982, despite the little borrowing for development investment since then. Also, the debt has grown more rapidly in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1986-90 than in North Africa, although in this period sub Saharan African countries supposed take special attention with the application of Venice terms in 1987 and Toronto terms in 1988.

During the period between 1986 and 1990, Africa's debt burden considerably worsened. The price of money, trade and interest rates are were all controlled by state. But because of the lack of democratic checks and balances that regulates borrowing and spending, decisions could not become effective and the policies that are undertaken resulted in fiscal deficits and balance of payments crises. "Continent's output stagnated and exports fell with the relative performance of the two sub-regions being markedly

different" (Mistry, 1992: 20). In this vicious cycle, public expenditures that favor patronage and rent seeking were accentuated instead of public investment. Mistry (1991: 20) argues that debt crisis management in Africa between 1982-90 had failed dismally.

In addition to aforementioned reasons of crisis, exogenous forces deteriorated the economy of the states as well in the mid-1980s. The crisis in the global political economy due to the oil triggered global recession, led to increased price of energy, higher costs of production in developed countries and limited the labor number and lowered their income. According to Mistry (1992: 21), this meant a decrease in the demand of exports for Africa. As a result, public revenues and amount of taxes fell, governments borrowed money from abroad and became ineffective by unable to provide any public goods to their citizens.

Massive lending of money was another reason of the debt crisis. Donors exerted considerable effort to ameliorate the situation, but because the debt problem in Sub Saharan Africa considered as different and relatively small than the other developing countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Middle East, achieving a durable solution became elusive. However, in relative terms the debt was much more impairing and grave than it is thought, causing steadily decline the per capita income rates of African states (Mistry, 1991: 12).

The African debt crisis shows how internal and external factors worked together and hastened the descent of the economy in such a short time. Mercy's explanation indicates that one of the structural reasons that weaken the state institutions is the occurrence of the debt crisis. This crisis is also an indicator showing that economic policies can debilitate state capacities and internal issues can easily turn into the external ones.

African debt crisis has important conclusions in terms of the emergence of the state failure and collapse. The debt crisis revealed that African countries do not have the institutional or human capacity to apply good economic policies and good governance. The creditor communities' (OECD and CMEA) negative role is also revealed as their loans to the continent have weakened the capacity of independent African states to sustain themselves. Mistry (1992: 63) argues that the continent between 1960 and 1989 "has been a large chessboard on which the games of super and sub-power rivalry in terms of trade, aid and financial flow have been played out". According to Mistry, Africa was unfortunate because the post-independence experience of continent-wide economic fiasco left a deep legacy of confusion in the continent. Confusion emerged about individual and national identity, whom to trust or what course to follow. The generation born during or just before the debt crisis and having experienced and suffered from it, lacked the sense of direction and confidence that is necessary for Africa to maintain recovery. In this sense, the emergence of the

state failure can be traced back to the occurrence of the debt crises which affected not only economies, but also individuals.

4.3 Gruffydd Jones and Global Capitalism

Branwen Gruffydd Jones is an academic whose research interests focus on the global political economy of poverty and development with particular reference to Africa, theories and histories of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, discourse and practice concerning failed states in contemporary imperialism, African political thought and postcolonial cities. She is currently working as a lecturer at University of London. Some of her published works include “Africa and the Poverty of International Relations” (2005), *Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical Realist Approach* (2006), *Decolonising International Relations* (2006) as editor, “The Global Political Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique of the ‘Failed State’ Ideology”(2008).

Gruffydd Jones (2008) argues that external conditions such as globalization and global capitalism are elements that have rendered states weak and unstable. Together with Fukuyama (2004) Gruffydd Jones explains prevalent crises in states with global political economy approach. Fukuyama argues that state failure has a number of distinct causes including economic development level, failure made by the former colonial powers, drawing of

arbitrary post-colonial borders, lack of democracy, misgovernment, widespread poverty, heavy dependence on foreign aid, and problematic programs presented by international institutions such as IMF or the IBRD. However he states that all of these causes revealed and the right environment is emerged with the end of the Cold War.

Recalling the first chapter, Rotberg and Zartman (1995, 2002) had argued that the destructive decisions of the individual leaders pave the way to state failure. According to Gruffydd Jones (2008: 184), such an approach categorizes the causes of failure in terms of internal agency by showing little regard to history, structure and the international. The author contends that there is insufficient attention to the deeply historical and structural causes of crises in neocolonial states. Therefore, Gruffydd Jones argues that the structural crises in African states can be better explained by examining the historical legacy of colonial rule in modern state formation, the specific character of state's postcolonial political economy and its structured insertion into the regional and global capitalist system.

According to Gruffydd Jones (2008: 185), the notion of "failed state" is more than just a label and should be investigated within a broader approach that provides a socio-political-economical understanding. The current discourse on failed state assumes that historical developments of particular states are isolated from economic and social relations, which constitute society. In the cases of failed or collapsed states, two key themes are usually

put forward as the cause: bad leadership and the specific culture characterized by factionalist groups or clanism. However, Gruffydd Jones argues that it is necessary to examine the nature of the pre-colonial and colonial political economy, and processes and accumulation of class formation, the relationship between colonial rule and logic of colonial imperialism.

According to Gruffydd Jones (2008), the colonial rule of Africa under Europeans at the end of nineteenth century brought both economic and strategic imperatives to the African states. States experienced qualitative changes as a result of the incorporation of society into global capitalist economy and world market. With imperialism, non-European states were integrated into global capitalist system and various forms of colonial and postcolonial states and economies have appeared. Gruffydd Jones argues that such a background prevents a generalized theory of the postcolonial state, but still some points can still be specified. First, although in Europe there existed social classes of proletariat and bourgeoisie, in other parts of the world different patterns of class relations has emerged as a result of the colonial rule. The specific particularities of these class relations affected the character of the state in general. Second, the protracted colonial rule under European powers created transformations in economies such as international division of labor and unequal economic structures on a global scale. Third, new articulations of political and economic power in colonized states have

appeared as a result of the imposition of European rule. Overall, Gruffydd Jones (2008: 192) argues that interactions between these three factors explain the appearance of corruption, authoritarianism and elite rivalry in the African states. Additionally, economic underdevelopment and the class basis of the postcolonial state led to rivalries among different groups. In the case of Somalia, for instance, clan rivalry and competition is rooted in social relations of the colonial and neocolonial political economy. In other words, Gruffydd Jones (2008: 192) argues that ubiquitous rivalries in African states rely on not culture as it is sometimes assumed, but the “specific structure of the colonial economy and the mercantile form of accumulation and underdevelopment”.

Accordingly, Gruffydd Jones’s perspective indicates that the problem of state failure is not primarily local in origin. Globally structured social, historical and economic processes have a huge impact on the issue of state failure. The form of the colonial economy had implications for the character of the colonial and post-colonial state. Until the Second World War, colonial state was developed remotely. Gruffydd Jones’s view requires inquiring into the nature of pre-colonial and colonial political economy, colonial imperialism and the relationships between different classes and their effects on economic activities. In this regard, her perspective considers state failure from a historical and global economic perspective. Like Walle, Gruffydd Jones also considers the role of the foreign aid. She posits that financial

foreign aid causes weakening of the economic structure and in the case of countries that were dependent on financial aid throughout the colonial period, their economy did not develop. As a result, international division of labor and the entry to the world market has created a chronic balance of payments deficit.

4.4 Walle, Development Aids and Bad Macroeconomic Policies

Nicholas Van de Walle is a professor at Cornell University. His research areas include comparative politics, democratization, effectiveness of foreign aid, and politics of economic reform and political economy of development, with a special focus on Africa. His recent books are *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999* (2001) and *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid Dependent Countries* (2005).

In pointing out the roots causes of state failure, Walle (2004: 98-112) distinguishes between structural and contingent factors. According to Walle, structural factors are deeply ingrained economic and sociological characteristics that are fixed in the short to medium term. Fiscal or extractive capacity of the states is the most important institutional capability for weak states. The level of extraction determines the activities that states can sustain and the quality of the public infrastructure. For instance, agrarian economies with weak market institutions, low urbanization and low population density

are difficult to tax. Thus, low levels of development tend to weaken state structure and fiscal resources available to these states become significantly lower than those available to the economies of the OECD countries. According to Walle (2004: 104), in sub-Saharan Africa the presence of these structural factors are striking, but they can only explain the propensity to fail. The move from weakness to failure to collapse however largely results from contingent factors. As defined by Walle (2004: 104), “contingent factors [are] short term events arising from the actions of political and economic agents”. External economic challenges such as major commodity price fluctuations, droughts, famines or coups can be counted as contingent factors. Walle (2004: 104) argues that in the case of state failure, two contingent factors propel the movement from weakness to failure. The first factor is the development aid relationship between the donors and the recipients and the second factor is the bad macroeconomic policies that are implemented by states.

According to Walle, regarding these factors, one perspective in the literature argues that states, which are more dependent on foreign aid are structurally weak to deal with the challenges of state building. Some suggests that this is a paradox of decolonization in Africa (Herbst, 1996-1997), and others including Walle (2004) rest their reasoning on the European capitalist framework. He argues that foreign development aid and structural

adjustment policies influenced economic activities of the developing states since the end of the Cold War.

Throughout the period from 1950 to 1995, developing African countries did not only receive military and technical assistance, but were also supported by European countries through foreign aid. Aid has traditionally been seen by donors as a temporary grant and is given to countries to complement their existing national resources. But in the case of Africa it became a permanent and indispensable aspect of economic life. After the decolonization period, colonial powers such as France and Britain maintained their presence by providing aid to the newly independent states. The donor countries have increased the amount of such aid as a result of the debt crisis in Africa in 1970s. In addition to that, structural adjustment programs have been applied to improve the policy environment in those weak states. Walle (2004: 108) indicates that from 1980 to 1993, official development assistance (ODA) that Africa received increased from 24 percent to 37 percent. This is an astounding number.

The change in the post-Cold War world economy influenced the aid recipients negatively. Serious changes occurred in this period. First, with the end of the Cold War, security motives of donors have largely disappeared and consequently foreign aid has declined. Throughout the Cold War, “superpowers were concerned with cultivating clients in all parts of the world and therefore were willing to help African nations rush ethnic

rebellions or threats from neighbors” (Herbst, 2004: 306). A secret 1963 United States document reveals that along with keeping Africa free of communists, another aim of the U.S. was “to restrain violence in general and preserve the present territorial order as the most feasible alternative to chaos” (Howland, 1963: 331). During the Shaba rebellions, a substantial aid is granted to Zaire. Likewise, the Soviet Union gave Ethiopia its military support in exchange for resisting Somalia’s irredentist claims. However, the end of the Cold War resulted in American and Soviet withdrawal from the region. Since then, less attention has been paid to the political stability of the aid recipient countries except the boundary maintenance issue. For instance, President Laurent Kabila of Zaire (now known as Democratic Republic of Congo) was threatened by a rebellion in eastern part in 1998. When he asks the support of the Americans, United States immediately said that it wanted “the government in Kinshasa to be in position to control its territory” and “believe[d] strongly in the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Erlanger, 1998), despite the evidence showed that such integrity did not exist. Secondly, donor countries have faced economic stringencies, which urged them to focus on their own economies rather than others. For instance, the United States had to deal with the issues of volatility in asset markets, trade deficits and perverse interest rate relationships (Waller, 1999). Likewise, Russian economy was also in bad shape. Existence of the so-called shadow economy led to no taxes or government statistics during that period.

In 1994, national gross domestic product (GDP) was 604 trillion rubles or about the four percent of the United States GDP for that year. And thirdly, as a result of the changes in Russia and Eastern Europe, competition for the aid has increased. In such an economic conjuncture, the system that once supported the aid recipients, abstained from giving. United States for instance, reduced its aid to Somalia from \$450-500 million a year from \$186 million in 1991.

By arguing that reduction of development aid is not the cause of the state failure or civil conflicts, De Walle disagrees with group of authors who associated the sharp increases in the number of civil conflicts of the early 1990s in Africa with the changes in the international context (Gurr, 1980, 1992; Steadman, 1996). Steadman for instance argues that two external factors have given rise to internal conflicts and undermined the external support for Africa. These external factors are end of the Cold War and dissemination of free market ideas. Likewise, Gurr and Duvall argued that there is a strong link between external economic dependence and heightened vulnerability to various forms of civil disorder. According to them, the reductions in the foreign aid, state failure and the rise of the internal conflicts are interrelated with each other (Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Laitin, 1999). The view was that the sharp declines in resources due to the end of the Cold War have triggered state failure. Laitin (1999) argued that cutback of resources results “war of attrition” between rival clans. He gave the example of Somalia to this

situation. Similarly Woodward (1995) highlighted structural adjustments as the perpetrator of the collapse of Yugoslavia. These authors suggested that foreign aid cuts may be the reason behind state failure and the violent conflicts that followed.

According to Walle, however, the factors identified above are not the causes of the state failure. The author argues that there are two widespread and overlapping premises in this literature. The first premise is that, the end of the Cold War caused the departure of the West from the region, but at the same time cutoffs overstrained African states. The second premise is the rise of market oriented SAPs in the early 1980s weakened the states. Walle (2004: 110-111) also thinks that these two factors have influenced state failure. However, although he agrees that SAPs have weakened state strength and political stability in these countries, he doesn't accept that there is an aid decline with the end of the Cold War. The author contends that aid to Africa underwent a dramatic increase throughout the 1980s (Walle, 2004: 109). However, Walle (2004: 111) argues, substantial increases in aid resources to the region allowed governments to avoid the kind of reform that might have led to economic growth and peaceful political change Weak conditionality strengthened rent-seeking politicians and corruption and led to declines in the role of technocrats who were willing to pursue rationalization of decision-making. Also, foreign aid did not bring the renewal of economy. On

the contrary vigorous persistence of fiscal crises has continued with the convenience of aids.

Walle's perspective indicates that countries become vulnerable to failure not because of decline of foreign aid cuts, but because of its increase which prevented reform in structural economic features such as low levels of economic activity and decline in state capacity. The external factors such as SAPs and foreign aids weakened the recipient country's state structures. As a result, responding to crises became a difficult task.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the literature that considers economic factors and their effects on the weakening of economy and state capacity. In accordance with the prominent authors' studies, colonial imperialism, global capitalism and foreign aid have been discussed.

Mistry looked at the African Debt Crisis. During the 1970s, several changes that occurred in the political and economic conjuncture repressed developing states of the Africa. When this conjecture combines with the wrong economic policies of the governments, a debt crisis is occurred. Mistry argued that the experience of the debt crisis in the post-independence period in Africa resulted in continent-wide economic and political failure and has left a troubling legacy of confusion and ambiguity. However, his explanation

is insufficient in the sense that it does not discuss the effect of the historical viewpoint of pre-colonial and colonial economies. In this regard, his argument is weaker than Gruffydd Jones' global economic and historical perspective.

Gruffydd Jones looked at the state failure issue from a global economic and historical perspective. She argued that unlike the generally accepted argument that identify the reasons of state failure as local in origin, global structural factors such as class relationships, colonial imperialism, pre and colonial practices, states' incorporation in the global capitalist framework engender the issue. Gruffydd Jones' explanation of state failure is more comprehensive than Mistry's and most of the second chapter authors who examine the colonial legacies as the cause of the failure without regarding the global economy.

Walle explained the state failure with the particular focus on development aids and bad macroeconomic policies and their disastrous effects on state capacity. He asked and analyzed whether foreign aid and structural adjustment programs strengthen the state structure. The assumption in the literature was that the foreign aid cuts after the Cold War led to the state failure. However, Walle objected this view by contending that there was never a foreign aid cut. According to the author, the amount of aid has increased after the withdrawal of the West, however this aid was not beneficial for the recipient state either. Instead of strengthening and

restructuring economy, foreign aid actually deteriorated the state capacity by drifting states into a peace of mind. Walle's explanation is similar to the Gruffydd Jones' in terms of focusing on foreign aid and its impact on state failure. However, while Gruffydd Jones argues that development aid cuts has also a role in weakening states, Walle contests that it is not the cuts or cessations but the actuality and the continuation of the aids that causes state failure.

CHAPTER 5

CRITICAL APPROACHES AND STATE FAILURE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the literature that questions the phenomenon of the state failure from a critical theory perspective. It will look at the distinctive arguments of the scholars in the literature who do not accept the idea that all states constitute and function in the same way. Therefore, this chapter will criticize the general approaches that identify and categorize the root causes of state failure and presents alternative questions and viewpoints about the issue.

The key authors of this chapter are Milliken and Krause (2002), Bøås and Jennings (2005, 2007) and Bilgin and Morton (2002, 2004). In the first section, Milliken and Krause's "institutional" and "functional" dimension of state failure will be looked at. According to them, the way the concept is understood is problematic. Therefore, they stressed that the general approaches that deal with the issue do not solve anything. They (2002) argue

that what is failing is not the state, but our vision about the state. The second part will present the view of Bøås and Jennings who argue that labeling states as “successful” or “failed” is actually the real problem. They examine how the Western states employ the concept of failed state to justify their interventions to the developing world and use the “failed state as security threat” scenario to their interests. In the third section, Bilgin and Morton argue that the Cold War discourse which categorizes states as “failed” versus “successful” has continued and the practitioners of this discourse focus on the supposed symptoms of state failure rather than the conditions that let this failure.

5.2 Milliken and Krause and Misconception of State Failure

Jennifer Milliken is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva who published articles and books including *The Social Construction of the Korean War: Conflict Possibilities* (2002) and “State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies” (2002) which she co-wrote with Keith Krause. Keith Krause is a Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Development Studies in Geneva and Director of Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding Programme. His research interests include armed conflicts and violence, arms control, human security, peacekeeping, peace-building and reconstruction policy,

and state building and sovereignty. Amongst his publications are *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade* (1995) and co-edited book *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Strategies* (1997).

Milliken and Krause argue (2002: 753) that current discourse on failed or collapsed states are based on two implicit yardsticks. The first one is related to the “stateness” in which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed, referred as the institutional dimension of the state collapse. The second standard is the functional dimension, which deals with the basic and normative implications of the state failure. Most of the claims about state failure in the literature rest upon these two benchmarks. In other words, the possibility of state failure is measured either with the achievement of modern statehood or with the functioning of the state. In both cases, state failure is closely linked with the process of statehood and limited itself within the boundaries of this understanding.

The traditional perspectives start from an established assumption that there is an appropriate form of order and political organization in statehood as Milliken and Krause (2002: 762) argue. Therefore, viable and successful statehood is defined in accordance with expectations that a state should fulfill. Conversely, states labeled as “failed” or “collapsed” when they are unable to meet these given standards. This traditional understanding of state failure is closely linked with the view of modern statehood that considers states alike and s functioning in the same way. This way of thinking has

important implications of how we comprehend state failure. Milliken and Krause (2002: 754) argue that “the scope of the phenomenon of state [failure] depends in large part on how one defines [the concept]”. In parallel with this argument, Doornbos (2002: 798) argues that depending on the understanding of collapse, one can possibly regard state collapse as part of the processes of state reconfiguration and formation. On this account, Doornbos argue that in the case of a state failure or collapse, a state does not necessarily disintegrate in the end, but reconstruct itself even stronger than before. This view also reverses the established understanding of state failure is a negative concept. Therefore, based on the definition, the scope of the concept may actually change.

Even though the concept of state failure changes with regard to how one defines it, many states deal with the internal crisis by unable to provide basic public goods, security, order and wealth to its citizens today. As a result, a vacuum of power depending on the collapse of the central authority, internal violence and human insecurities are witnessed in the developing world. Thus, as Milliken and Krause (2002: 755) argued, this ongoing crisis on statehood requires one to look alternative solutions rather than judging states in terms of systematic dichotomies. However, the prevalent understanding, which expects states to perform in accordance with the given goals does not explain the ongoing crisis in states. According to Milliken and Krause (2002: 755), “the linked concepts of state failure and collapse must

resonate with a broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and legitimacy of modern states” or it might serve as a harbinger to a wider phenomenon like “canary in the mineshaft”.

Milliken and Krause analyze the modern state in the dynamic historical context. The appearance of the modern state dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which settled the Thirty Years War. The treaties constitute the modern statehood, which is the outcome of a long process of economic, social and political developments. Sovereign and territorially based entities constitute the modern state by controlling vast territories with secular rulers. In its earliest form, political elites who want to consolidate their power provide security to the populace, but in exchange they collect resources and strengthen their hold on power. Sovereignty was more than just a formal, juridical label”, rather it was substantial (Sorensen, 1999: 27). The leaders often aspired to sovereignty, but it was seldom achieved, because of little control they were able to exercise over their territories. With the liberal tradition, a social contract tradition that guarantees order is established between the rulers and citizens. Practice of political economy gave rise to the preservation of property rights and markets.

Based on aforementioned narratives of state formation, three core functions, namely providing security, representation and welfare, of a state are prevalently assumed. By reifying the functions of the state, it is argued that states succeed when they fulfill these functions and in the same way,

they fail when they are unable to meet these functions (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 756). This assumption, derived from the formation of modern state, presupposes that modern statehood is the only viable and appropriate form of political organization that a state can exist. Therefore, concept of state failure is limited within the narratives of modern statehood.

Milliken and Krause accept that there are increasing incidences of crisis in contemporary states. According to them, the phenomenon of state failure challenges the Westphalian assumption that states are the ultimate construct in international relations theory. Therefore, as Milliken and Krause suggests state failure is not only a local problem, but is a potential source of insecurities for the core states of international society, which threatens the modern project of achieving political order. Scholars and policy makers have adopted a vision of the role of the state in post-colonial world that combined security, representation and welfare. However, the vision that new states were to build legitimate nations, providing these goals within a shortest period of time after their independence is somewhat naive (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 762). In this regard, such success is only possible

if the idea of state is taken completely out of its historical context and regarded as an institutional form that owes little or nothing to the historical forces that created it (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 762).

Therefore, as Milliken and Krause (2002: 762) concludes what has failed or collapsed

is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive, developmental state that sustained the generations of academics, activists and policy-makers, than any real existing state.

5.3 Bøås and Jennings and Problem with Labeling

Morten Bøås is the head of research at the University of Oslo working in the areas of Central and West Africa and Southeast Asia with the focus of security and development, conflict, regions and regionalisation and multilateral institutions and development. Kathleen M. Jennings is a researcher in Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Oslo. Bøås and Jennings co-write articles and book chapters about state failure including “Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the Failed State” (2005), “‘Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats and Opportunities” (2007) and “Rebellion and Warlordism: The Spectre of Neopatrimonialism” (2012).

According to Bøås and Jennings, the phenomenon of state failure is not new, but the issue has increasingly attracted attention since 2001. Bøås and Jennings (2007: 476) argue that after this date, the way that the concept is understood and operationalized became problematic. They argue (2007: 477) that the concept of failed state is based on a flawed assumption that all states are similar and function in the same way, which neglects the major differences in state formation. Therefore, policy responses to fix failed states rest upon generic solutions that are unable to help the situation. Furthermore, the concept is used extensively by Western states in order to

justify interventions, rather than offering effective policy formulations (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 476). Thus, failed state is just a political label that Western states utilize when their interests are at stake. Therefore, a clarification is needed to bring meaning to the failed state concept. First, one should ask for whom the state is failing and how? Such a questioning reveal that conditions and structures that bring states in the cusp of failure may be done deliberately by Western powers and thus, states called “failed” when they pose a threat to Western interests (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 476). In other words, even though they are weak, failing or failed, states are only considered as “failed” and assumed to represent a security threat to Western world, when they are unwilling to function according to the given model.

Bøås and Jennings also examine the circumstances under which failed state label is or is not applied. According to them, many states experience security, humanitarian and governance crises commonly associated with failed states, but the failed state label attached only some of them. In other states, the feature of “state functioning is not only accepted, but also to a certain degree facilitated, as it creates an enabling environment for business and international capital” (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 476). Bøås and Jennings use the Afghanistan case to show the “failed state as security threat” scenario. Several years prior to 9/11, Taliban was in power in Afghanistan and according to Bøås and Jennings, Taliban’s actions such as human rights abuses or harbouring terrorists were tolerated because they were managed to

bring stability to the country. In 1996, Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan from Sudan and established an alliance between Taliban and his al-Qaeda organisation. After Taliban came to power, U.S. were eager to persuade Taliban to sign the construction of a pipeline agreement. However, as the Clinton administration ended and Bush came to power, relations were deteriorated over time. The discussions about the pipeline project continued almost until the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Brisard and Dasquie, 2002). Until the attacks, the relationship between U.S. and Afghanistan “did not dwell on the extent to which Afghanistan was a failed state, ... but rather centered on the gospel of oil and geopolitics” (Bøås and Jennings, 2007: 479). Bøås and Jennings argue that the 2001 terrorist attacks radically altered this dynamic. The human rights situation under Taliban suddenly received a humanitarian justification for offensive intervention. Furthermore, six months after the incident President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan signed an agreement with Pakistan and Turkmenistan about construction of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. Thus, although the intervention in Afghanistan was driven more by fear and revenge than oil, in the post-intervention period, Western interests are clearly reflected. According to Bøås and Jennings (2007: 479), it is significant that “the intervention in Afghanistan ... had little to do with any humanitarian or governance based conception of state failure”.

5.4 Bilgin and Morton and Persistence of the Cold War Discourse

Adam David Morton teaches at University of Nottingham. He specializes in themes of political economy, state theory, historical sociology, globalization and development. He is the author of "The 'Failed State' of International Relations" (2005) and *Revolution and State in Modern Mexico: The Political Economy of Uneven Development* (2011). Pinar Bilgin teaches at Bilkent University. She specializes in critical approaches to security studies. She is the author of *The Middle East: A Critical Perspective* (2005). Bilgin and Morton's coauthored publications about state failure include "Historicizing Representations of 'Failed States': Beyond the Cold-War Annexation of the Social Sciences?" (2002) and "From 'Rouge' to 'Failed' States? The Fallacy of Short-termism" (2004).

According to Bilgin & Morton, there has been a recent shift in U.S. policymaking interest from 'rouge states' to 'failed states'. It is argued that practices of the Cold War continue to frame the lexicon of state failure (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 56) by facilitating particular interests and policies (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 67). In the case of 'failed' versus 'successful' state opposition, Cold War discourse on statehood still persisted by scholars and practitioners.

Bilgin & Morton (2004: 170) argue that academicians or government officials who are interested in state failure want to take immediate action.

However, rather than the conditions that permit such failure to happen, they focused on the supposed symptoms of state failure. The labels that are attached to states not only force us to make binary oppositions such as 'failed' versus 'successful' states (Bilgin & Morton 2004: 173-174), but also assert generalizations that there is an ideal form of statehood that any state should aspire to achieve. According to Bilgin and Morton, the factors that led some states to fail may actually help us to deepen our understanding and take alternative actions.

Bilgin and Morton (2004: 174) argue that existing approaches accept that the intrinsic features of the states cause "failures", but these approaches do not reflect upon the colonial background or the peripheral position of the state in global politico-economic structures. A second problem is that the prevalent approaches consider state failure and collapse as a "deviance" from the norm which this "deviance" used both as a justification and legitimacy for intervention. Another neglected problem is the role of the structural adjustment programmes and aids that are provided by International Monetary Fund and World Bank which intensify the socio-economic and political environment of the states in the developing world.

Bilgin and Morton (2004: 174) argue that in order to appreciate state failure better, a socio-economic conjuncture in which such a failure emerges should be analyzed. Therefore, an alternative approach is needed which helps to "appreciate better the forces that shape the realms of political

economy and security constraining and enabling developing states” (Bilgin and Morton, 2004: 175). One way to do this is to analyze different processes of state formation and historical circumstances which constitute different developing states. With this way, different historical and contemporary social circumstances and alternative modes of social organizations that prevail in the developing world can be appreciated. However, such an approach could only work in the long-term according to Bilgin and Morton.

In the final analysis, Morton and Bilgin argues that United States’ Cold War policy to support Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and Taliban regime of Afghanistan has eventually backfired by creating instability in those states. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of state failure which reflects the role of Western states have played in failing them through various interventions should be considered.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter looked at the literature that analyzes the reasons of state failure based on the critical approaches. The authors of this chapter argue that the way that the “failed state” concept has been understood and conceptualized is flawed. Even the failed state label is inherently political and based on the Western perceptions of Western security and interests.

Milliken and Krause argued that state failure is a potential source of insecurities which threatens the modern project of achieving political order. They pointed out that it is nearly impossible for the new states to achieve a combined security, representation and welfare. Such success is only possible by taking the state out of its historical context. Therefore, they argued that what has failed or collapsed is only the vision of the developmental state.

Bøås and Jennings argued that a dichotomy of “successful” versus “failed” is the real problem behind state failure. It is not just misleading, but also reductive and ahistoric. Because of the vision of modern statehood in mind, concept of state failure is reduced into a mere choice and labeling states become a more convenient way for developed world in order to justify policy interventions. To limit the boundaries of failed states in this rhetoric is problematic again, because the policy responses to state failure or collapse also automatically limit its scope.

Bilgin and Morton argued that the thinking and practices that prevailed during the Cold War still continues in the present day. The post-colonial states that appeared in the making of the “Third World” are now categorized in terms of their deficiency of failure. A better appreciation of the state failure is needed according to them, but this is unlikely to appear unless a socio-economic conjuncture that such failure emerges is analyzed.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The mid-1990s was a time when multiple state failures and collapses in Africa became relevant to the international community. Before the 1990s, despite the collapse of states such as Congo (now Zaire), Chad and Ghana, an international response was not directed at these states. Since the end of the Cold War, state failure has been embraced as a global concern on the Yugoslav wars of disintegration, violence in Caucasus and the turmoil in Haiti (Yannis, 2002: 819). The issue of state failure began to be viewed as a security concern especially after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 9/11 attacks “have created a situation in which the international community in general and the Security Council in particular are even more likely to support interventions in failed or failing states” (Einsiedel, 2005: 21) because after this incident, failed states started to be equated with warlordism, violent conflict and terrorist harboring. Additionally, state failure became a key focus of both scholarly analysis (Milliken and Krause, 2002; Rotberg,

2004) and policy development (US National Security Doctrine, EU Security Doctrine, High-Level Panel on Threats).

In today's globalized world, with advanced information systems and interlaced security, existence of the failed states might have serious repercussions not only for those states and their people, but also for their neighbors and their citizens. Humanitarian challenges such as refugee flows, violence, human smuggling and endemic diseases; security challenges such as extremism, terrorist harboring and drug trafficking and legal challenges such as lack of functioning government and inability of government to participate international treaties indicate that state failure and collapse is a rising problem. The cases of Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire and Balkan states display the best examples of this problem.

The thesis presented an overview of existing approaches to crises engendered by such failure of states. The reasons of state failure have been a long debated issue. Approaches in each chapter focused on different understandings of the root causes of state failure.

Chapter 1 looked at the literature that focused on leadership factor and the regime malfunction from an individual and local level of analysis. While the main focus is the leadership capabilities, legacy of indirect colonialism has also an effect shaping the system and context. Therefore, traits such as despotic systems, emergence of tribal leaders, bifurcated state are apparent. Independence period created the context which generated a

politics based on political patronage, namely, clientelism or neopatrimonialism.

The literature that adopts a post-colonial approach is presented in the second chapter. The importance of the colonial legacy had more to do with the viability and sustainability of the state over the long run. Therefore, the colonial past is examined by this literature the chapter focusing on territorial settlements, border demarcations and historical state system. Clearly, despite the changes in the statehood, state as the overarching construct is still critical for the establishment of stable and prosperous societies in the continent. Institutions of the state also remain the primary vehicle for providing functions for any given population, in particularly, security and order.

The literature that adopts a global political approach is presented in the third chapter. This literature looks at issues of global political economical practices, globalization and development aid. The chapter indicates that external factors are also quite penetrating as well as local ones since the effects of globalization, development aids of Cold War and entry to the world market are related to the state failure.

The fourth chapter looked at the literature that analyses the problem from a critical theory perspective and criticizes the current discourse on state failure. At the center of the analysis of this literature is a critique of the standard perspective which categorizes states as successful, weak, failing,

failed or collapsed. Such analyses, critical scholars have argued, ignore the changes in the statehood and limit our understanding.

In the final analysis, scholars present different perspectives on their understanding of state failure and therefore, their responses to state failure also differs. Individual focused perspective ignores the different characteristics, behaviors and worldviews of the leaders and assumes that given the same conjuncture, all leaders act in the same way. This approach also neglects the colonial history of the states or the effects of the global economic practices. Post-colonial approach considers the colonial legacy of states as an important factor in state failure, thus it investigates the root causes in the history and the process of state formation. However, it does not discuss the impact of globalization or the global capitalist networks. The global economic approach focuses on global factors, but except Gruffydd Jones who also examines the colonialism and economic practices of colonial rule, other authors do not analyze the colonial legacy in depth. Among the four approaches, the critical approach seems as the most convincing one because while other three approaches treat states in the same way and accept state failure without questioning, critical approach criticizes this existing idea in the literature. Authors in this approach present alternative views about state failure which is the strong point of this approach.

Whether state failure is a security problem or not, it seems that the international community cares for these failing states more than before. The

bulk of the literature on this issue as reviewed above shows that state failure is still an existing concern, notwithstanding changes in labeling. The contribution of this thesis to the field has been presenting a comprehensive overview and categorization of the literature about the root causes of state failure and collapse by presenting organized and categorized chapters. From a historical, global political economical and sociological perspective, state failure is a problem that is related to individual or state. On the other hand, critical perspectives offer a totally new viewpoint by focusing on the way the concept has been understood and operationalized. It allows one to ask alternative questions about the problem and instead of taking the issue as fixed and given, it question the way it is constructed. One should examine the whole picture in order to understand the depth of the problem. Therefore, different levels of analyses should be incorporated and various approaches should be taken into account, when the issue is studied.

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