

THE CITIZEN OF THE STATE AND THE STATE OF THE CITIZEN: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CITIZENIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE CITIZEN OF THE STATE AND THE STATE OF THE CITIZEN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CITIZENIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY

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This study deals with the construction and evolution of Turkish citizenship throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. How citizenship was defined, and which model was adopted for Turkish citizenship are the major questions. The state is taken as the major constructive actor as the modernization and citizenization process was from above in the Turkish case. Therefore, the legal documents, parliamentary debates, and studies of the prominent intellectuals on citizenship are analyzed. As the nation building and citizenization process went hand in hand in Turkey, those laws related with the construction of a Turkish national identity are also utilized. By taking the social and political developments into account as a background, the changes and shifts in the understanding of Turkish citizenship are traced.

The problems Turkish citizenship encounters today has its roots in the early Republican period, where Turkish citizenship was developed from above and in a republican understanding that emphasized duties towards the state. Today there is a clash between aspirations for a more liberal understanding of citizenship and the republican citizens. In the core of the problems faced today, lies the reluctance of

the state to view Turkish citizenship as a notion distinct from the quest for Kemalist modernization and official Turkish national identity.

Key Words: Citizenship; civil, political, social elements; civic republican; liberal democratic; national identity



ÖZET

DEVLETİN VATANDAŞI VATANDAŞIN DURUMU: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ VATANDAŞLAŞTIRMA SÜRECİNİN ANALİZİ

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Bu çalışma Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca Türk vatandaşlığının kuruluşu ve evrimi ile ilgilidir. Vatandaşlığın nasıl tanımlandığı ve hangi vatandaşlık modelinin kullanıldığı ana sorulardır. Türkiye deneyiminde modernleşme ve vatandaşlaştırma süreci yukarıdan olduğu için, devlet asıl kurucu aktör olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu nedenle, hukuki belgeler, parlamentodaki tartışmalar ve dönemin belli başlı aydınlarının vatandaşlık üzerine yaptıkları çalışmalar incelenmiştir. Türkiye’de ulusun kuruluşu ve vatandaşlaştırma süreci birlikte ilerlediğinden, Türk milli kimliğinin oluşumuyla ilgili kanunlar da kullanılmıştır. Sosyal ve siyasal gelişmeler bir arkaplan olarak ele alınarak, Türk vatandaşlığı anlayışındaki değişimler ve dönüşümler araştırılmıştır.

Türk vatandaşlığının bugün karşılaştığı problemlerin kökleri, Türk vatandaşlığının yukarıdan ve ödevlere önem veren cumhuriyetçi anlayışla kurulduğu erken Cumhuriyet döneminde yatmaktadır. Bugün daha liberal bir vatandaşlık anlayışı

in istemler ile cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlar arasında bir çatışma bulunmaktadır. Bugün karşı karşıya kalınan problemlerin öünde, devletin Türk vatandaşlığını Kemalist modernleşme arzusu ve resmi Türk milli kimliğinden ayrı bir kavram olarak ele alamaması yatmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Vatandaşlık; sivil, siyasal, sosyal ögeler; cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlık; liberal demokratik vatandaşlık, milli kimlik.



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Citizenship has been a key notion throughout modern history. By the rise of nationalism and the emergence of the nation-states it became crucial to define the membership status of the people and the qualifications for acquiring citizenship. Therefore citizenship is often defined as membership in a nation-state.¹ In that phase, citizenship was a notion that overlapped with the nation-state and was mostly designed and used within the parameters of the nation-state. It was sometimes used during the nation building process as a tool providing both the integrity of the state and the identity and sense of belonging for its members. From another aspect, citizenship rights in the West emerged out of the rising demands of the population for more rights.² Thus, modern citizenship was defined and used in the West as an equalizing and universalizing phenomenon that would hold the people together under a certain umbrella of the nation-state.

¹ William Rogers Brubaker, "Introduction," in William Rogers Brubaker (ed.) *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, (Lanham- New York, London: The German Marshall Fund of the US, University Press of America, Inc., 1989),

² See, T.H. Marshall *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) where the evolution of citizenship is classified as "legal, political and social."

With the emergence of critiques of modernity, the rise of new strains of thought like post modernism, globalization, multiculturalism and identity politics, citizenship fell short of meeting new demands. As an outcome of globalization and the increasing importance of supra national organizations like the European Union, on the one hand there is the problem of demolishing of the boundaries between states. On the other hand, however, there is a quite opposite tendency of the re-emergence of nationalism at micro levels, or rather, the rise of the claims for recognition of distinct identities. Those claims do not come only from ethnic minorities; there are also the identity claims of various groups based on ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual preferences. In addition to those challenges to the nation-state and citizenship as membership of the nation-state, there is also the issue of widespread migration and its outcomes, like the problem of dual or multiple citizenship and integration and naturalization of the migrants in the receiving country. Therefore, by the end of the 20th century, citizenship is one of the most debated and challenged phenomenon of modernity. Those debates vary from political discussions like the ones going on in for instance, Quebec or Ireland related with the identity and the recognition of rights related with those distinct identities, to increasing concern on the academic level.³

Turkey is witnessing similar kinds of debates over citizenship in recent years. On the one hand, there is the official definition of Turkish citizenship that dates back to the early Republican period, and on the other hand, there is a

³ For the rising concern on citizenship the publication of new academic journals on citizenship like *Citizenship Studies* might be given as example. Besides there is a growing literature on the issue, e.g. Bryan Turner (ed.), *Citizenship and Social Theory*, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993); *The Condition of Citizenship*, Bart van Steenberg (ed.), (London, California, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994); and Bryan Turner and Peter Hamilton (eds.), *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

challenge towards that official definition coming from various sections of the Turkish society. Turkish citizenship also emerged as a component of the nation building process. However, starting from the 1980s the official definition of Turkish citizenship started to be challenged in not different aspects from those of the international context. The problems related with the status of women, ethnic groups, namely the identity claims of Kurds, and Islam became a challenge to the official Turkish citizenship. On the other hand, there was the situation of the Turkish workers/migrants living in Europe, and the problem of their naturalization in the countries they lived, which led to the rise of the problem of dual citizenship. All those problems of citizenship have roots in the construction. Therefore, the early Republican period should be and is revisited for studies on citizenship.

This thesis aims to provide a detailed documentation of the construction and meaning of citizenship in Turkey throughout Republican history. It aims to highlight the relation between the notion of citizenship and the state's ideology and response to certain developments in the domestic and international context, like the transition to multi-party politics, or the aftermath of the Second World War. The thesis analyzes the state's role in the definition, construction and evolution of the understanding of citizenship in the Turkish Republic. The conceptualization of Turkishness and its overlap or distinction from the official definition of Turkish citizenship is searched. How do the components of this Turkish identity like language, culture, and ideal⁴ effect the definition of citizenship? How was Turkish citizenship defined? Are there any differences in definition and practice? How were the religious minorities incorporated into Turkish citizenship? How did the

⁴ Unity in language, culture and ideal were regarded as the core of the nation by the early republican ideologues. See, Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988).

secularization process influence the understanding of citizenship? How was Islam incorporated into the construction of Turkish citizenship, and how did its importance increase/decrease in the citizenship conceptualization? How did the understanding of citizenship change by the change in the social and political life of Turkey, for instance, by the transition to multi-party politics, or after the military interventions, and by the changing international context? Does Turkish citizenship fit to ideal-types, that is, the French model, or the German model? Or are there any shifts from one model to the other in respective periods? Was the desired Turkish citizen an active citizen, or a passive one? In other words, was Turkish citizenship inspired from republican understanding, or liberal understanding? How does the state adopt itself to the changing dynamics? How was citizenship incorporated into social and political life? These are some of the questions in mind while carrying out this study. Besides, it is intended to trace the developments and changes during certain periods, and the reflections of those changes on the understanding of Turkish citizenship.

This study is almost the first attempt to cover the Republican history from the point of citizenship and evaluate it through contemporary literature. There are studies that focus on the early Republican era and analyze Turkish citizenship within the context of Turkish modernization especially focusing on the early Republican era.⁵ This thesis differs from those studies mentioned by the attempt to cover the whole Republican history and search for the state's attitude towards citizenship, including the social and political developments as the background, the

⁵ See, for instance, Artun Ünsal (ed.), *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998); Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Modern Vatandaşlığın Farklı Boyutları," in *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999), 53-72; Ahmet İçduygu, "Türkiye'de Vatandaşlık Kavramı üzerine

situation of minorities, the role of religion, and the problems of migration. In doing so the enlisted questions is the main focus. There might be various different approaches for the analysis of Turkish citizenship, like views of the opposition, or the minorities, or the analysis of certain publications or books,⁶ but this thesis focuses on the state's role, as the determinant figure in the construction and inculcation of Turkish citizenship.

As the study concentrates on the state as the constructive figure of citizenship, a selective literature is used. The legal documents like the constitutions of the Turkish Republic,⁷ Turkish Citizenship Laws,⁸ other related laws like the Law on Settlement, Law on Physical Education, Law of Family Names, and the concerned amendments constitute the major sources. The parliamentary debates on the concerned laws are also utilized. In addition to those, the book *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları* (Civic Information and Manuscripts of M. Kemal Atatürk) is used as the main tool for understanding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's views on citizenship, together with his *Nutuk* (Speech) and other statements. As the Republican People's Party remained in power for about 20 years during the construction periods as the single party that carried out the Kemalist revolution, its party programmes are analyzed. Besides, the works of the prominent ideologues of

Tartışmaların Arka Planı,” *Diyalog*, 1:1 (1996),134-147; Nuri Bilgin (ed.) *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997).

⁶ For instance, Füsün Üstel analyzed the schoolbooks used in the course of Information about Citizenship throughout the Republican history. See, Füsün Üstel, “Cumhuriyetten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili,” *Yeni Yüzyıl*, April 24, 1995.

⁷ 1921 Constitution, 1924 Constitution, 1961 Constitution, and 1982 Constitution.

⁸ 1312 numbered and 23.5.1928 dated Turkish Citizenship Law, and 403 numbered and 11.2.1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law.

the Kemalist regime like Recep Peker⁹, Saffet Engin¹⁰ are utilized through a critical reading concerning citizenship.

The thesis covers the period starting from the mid-19th century, the late Ottoman Empire until the end of the 1990s. The late Ottoman Empire is studied in order to give a brief summary of the historical background of the emergence of the citizenship notion. This background is important since it gives the clues to the rise of the West as a reference point in Turkey for reflecting on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The second period covers the early Republican period starting from the formation of the Grand National Assembly until the transition to multi party politics in 1946. This period is crucial for understanding the nation-building process and the basis for the construction of Turkish citizenship. During that period both processes went hand in hand, the citizen that was desired to be constructed would be laden with the duty of carrying out the Kemalist revolution. The third period is from 1946 until the 1980 military intervention. That third period covers both the Democrat party period, which contributed to changes in the understanding of citizenship by mobilizing the periphery and incorporating Islam into the identity of the citizens; moreover the period after the 1960 military intervention is also covered under this period. The 1960 military intervention and the 1961 Constitution are significant in the sense that a new and more active citizen was aspired for at that certain period of time. Later, the final period is the aftermath of 1980 military intervention and the changes experienced. During the final period, the issue of citizenship began to be debated in the political and social level due to

⁹ Recep Peker, *İnkılab Dersleri Notları*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936);

¹⁰ Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938.

the rise of identity claims from various sections of the population, and in relation to international migration and dual citizenship. The division of periods is crucial in order to understand the emergence of the notion of citizenship, the new structuration after the proclamation of the Republic and the shifts it had during the republican history.

The second chapter provides a theoretical background for the thesis. The historical developments in the West and their outcomes for citizenship in different countries, which contributed to the theory, is analyzed. As mentioned above, citizenship can be defined as the membership of a nation-state. This study benefits from two distinct approaches towards citizenship, which I call as historical or historical-comparative and philosophical approaches. Marshall, whose study is the key reference for students of citizenship, can be viewed within the historical approach with his analysis focusing on the social changes and their reflections on citizenship starting from the 18th century.¹¹ I argue that Marshall's historical analysis can be utilized for subsequent periods of the history of the Turkish Republic. Brubaker makes a historical-comparative analysis. By concentrating on France and Germany, he relates the different practices of citizenship to the different nation-building processes.¹² Different conceptualizations of citizenship is analyzed under the philosophical approach. For instance, Turner analyzes citizenship as to whether it developed from above or below (active-passive) and to what extent it developed in the public or private sphere. Other scholars like Oldfield, Kymlicka and Norman, and Stewart analyze the conceptualization of citizenship as a

¹¹ T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*.

¹² William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 39-49.

dichotomy.¹³ This dichotomy is basically centered around two different strains of thought. One is the liberal tradition, the other comes from the Greek civilization and is based on a civic republican understanding. In the liberal understanding citizenship is viewed as a legal status and there is a distant relation between the state and the citizen based on the acquisition of rights and benefits from the state.¹⁴ In civic republicanism the responsibilities and duties of the citizen towards the state and the community are at the core. An individual becomes a citizen when he/she performs the duties of citizenship.¹⁵ Those theoretical approaches are used for providing an understanding of Turkish citizenship.

The third chapter provides a historical background, covering the late Ottoman period and the developments starting from the *Tanzimat* Edict in 1839. It analyzes the emergence of the notion of citizenship, and the characteristics of the Ottoman citizenship. The introduction of the notion of citizenship dates back to the end of the 19th century Ottoman Empire. The notion of citizen (*vatandaş*) first emerged during the promulgation of the Reform Edict in 1856. The underlying aim was to save the Empire from collapse by gathering the religiously and ethnically fragmented subjects of the Empire under a certain identity of the “Ottoman citizen.” In acquiring this, a set of legal reforms were undertaken, starting with *Tanzimat*,

¹³ Adrian Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?” *Political Quarterly*, 61:2 (1990), 177-187; *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1990), 1-11; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory,” *Ethics*, 104 (January 1994), 352-381; Angus Stewart, “Two Conceptions of Citizenship,” *British Journal of Sociology*, 46:1 (March 1995), 63-78.

¹⁴ Robert E. Goldwin, “Citizenship and Civility,” in Edward C. Banfield (ed.), *Civility and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies*, (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 39-55.

and continuing with the Reform Edict, Ottoman Citizenship law, and finally *Kanuni Esasi*, the constitution. This chapter covers those developments and provide a historical background for the Turkish Republic with respect to citizenship.

The main focus of the study is the Republican period that is covered in the fourth chapter. By the proclamation of the republic, the country went through a widespread transformation in every aspect. Citizenship had been one of the core elements for the nation building process in Turkey. The desired citizen of the Turkish Republic should be the carrier of the nation building and the Kemalist principles. In line with the theories of citizenship, the early republican period is analyzed. What kind of a path did the Turkish republic take for nation building and citizenship – does it resemble to the French or the German model? Or are there any shifts from one to the other in certain times or events? Or could the Turkish case be regarded as a case that goes beyond those two models, or merges the two models? As mentioned above, the republic aspired for a total transformation of the country, therefore many characteristics of the Ottoman Empire were rejected, like Islam. One of the questions deals with the role of religion, though being discarded, in the construction of Turkish Citizenship. The other question is related with the situation of the religious minorities during this process and their incorporation into or exclusion from the Turkish identity. The process of the construction of Turkish citizens is traced. In this process there are significant developments, one of them is the formation of the *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) which was laden with the task of the creation of “new, modern, conscious and responsible citizens” of the republic. In this sense, the public and private spheres were merged together in the construction of the citizen, and the private sphere of the individuals was organized

¹⁵ Oldfield, “Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?” and *Citizenship and*

as well. One of the implementations for the organization of the life of the citizens was the introduction of courses like “Information about Citizenship” to the curriculums of the schools. The main source of those courses was a book written by Afet İnan together with and according to the instructions of Mustafa Kemal, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları*. This book is also beneficial for understanding how Atatürk conceived citizenship, and its main elements. Besides, and most importantly, through the analysis and critical reading of the legal documents, the early republican definition of Turkish citizenship is searched.

It is quite evident that Turkish citizenship developed from above with almost no demands coming from below. It was tailored for the people and they were regarded as passive citizens with duties and obligations towards the state. However, this was not much of an anomaly for the period concerned. It was a period of the rise of new nation-states, and when the nation-states were formed what they needed at first was a nation devoted to the state. Besides, it was a period when modernity and the Enlightenment were at stake. Within this context, the Kemalist regime by taking the West as its reference adopted its parameters.

Many of the Western countries, with a history full of struggles for rights, have adopted a liberal understanding of citizenship whereby the rights have the utmost importance. In that tradition the state-society relations are rather different from the Turkish tradition where there is a strong state tradition¹⁶ and the people were regarded as being responsible to the state rather than the state being responsible to its citizens.¹⁷ For this reason citizenship in Turkey could not strip

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¹⁶ See, Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985).

itself from its obligations and claim its rights. It was centered around the themes of community and common good.

The fifth chapter analyzes the period between 1946 and 1980. It is covered under two sub-periods. The first is the period of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 and the Democrat Party rule until the first military intervention of 1960. This period is significant for transition in the conceptualization of citizenship. DP carried out its propaganda on the theme that “It is the nation’s turn to speak!” Therefore political participation was encouraged to a large extent. This period can be regarded as the political phase of Turkish citizenship by utilizing the analysis of Marshall. The second sub-period is the period after 1960 until 1980 when another military intervention occurred. During this time, active citizenship was at stake. The 1961 Constitution formed the basis of the rise of the understanding of a more liberal and active citizenship. This section focuses on the 1961 Constitution and the 403 numbered and 11.2.1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law amended during this period together with its social and cultural implications.

The sixth chapter focuses on the period after 1980 to the present. This period is critical for the citizenship debates in Turkey as challenges towards the official understanding of Turkish citizenship rose during this period. This chapter analyzes the legal documents of this period and tries to search for the attitude of the state towards those challenges. The amendments of the Turkish Citizenship Law that were used as a tool for deciding who deserves membership or not, is analyzed within the social and political context. Also the issue of dual citizenship and the state’s position on this issue is searched. In addition, the increasing claims for

¹⁷ Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazıları*.

identity that rose during this period, namely women, Kurds, and Islamic groups and the reflections of those claims on citizenship is analyzed.

The problem Turkey faces these days with regard to citizenship is based on the state's attitudes and responses toward the developments both within the country and in the international context. Previously the West was taken as a reference point and citizenship was constructed according to the Western models. However the state fell short of adopting the developments in the West after 1980. It could not meet the demands coming from the society about identity problems, the recognition of differences within the population. Besides, the understanding of citizenship by the population began to change. Rather than regarding themselves as the responsible combatants for the Kemalist principles and modernization of the country, people began to question the role of the state in state-society relations and began to voice their demands. In other words there occurred a major challenge in a liberal sense, viewing the state as an apparatus designed for the well being of its citizens.¹⁸ However, quite contrary to the increasing distress among the people the state still tries to stick to the early republican notions and parameters. This became quite evident during the celebrations for the 75th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic. The desired citizen of the republic is still defined by the early republican norms, the secular and patriotic citizen who would devote himself/herself to the state, and who would strive for the enlightenment of the public. Nevertheless, the success of the republic in creating that kind of citizen

¹⁸ One significant example might be the August 1999 earthquake, which hit a quite significant part of the country and its population. The state fell short of providing the necessary help for its citizens and was criticized on the grounds that it was the "duty" of the state to provide for the livelihood of their citizens. Maybe for the first time in the republican history people spoke of their rights and the duties of the state. Until that time it was just the opposite, the citizens were endowed with duties or obligations towards the state.

cannot be denied. However, there is a growing tension between those ideal citizens of the republic and those who aspire for a more liberal version of citizenship.

Since the debates at the political level concerning the issue of citizenship emerged in the 1980s, the resource for the preceding eras were limited to legal documents. This can be perceived as a problem for a study analyzing the issue at a multi-dimensional platform. This problem was tried to be overcome by reading between the lines of the legal documents concerned, with a view to the political dynamics of the respective periods in which the related laws have been enacted; as well as by resorting to the works of the mainstream thinkers. This was important in order to avoid being limited to a descriptive framework in the study. One other problem arose due to the lack of a comprehensive academic work on the topic of citizenship, but this problem can also be interpreted as an advantage for the this study since it provides a channel for future works. Currently citizenship is a notion worldwide that is taking the interest of not only many academics but also a significant issue for many states as well. This thesis provides a documentation of the construction of citizenship in Turkey and thus will provide a background information for the upcoming debates.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In recent years there has been a resurgence of concern and studies on citizenship due to the changing political and cultural dynamics of the world. The classical approaches towards citizenship have become insufficient to grasp the contemporary issues of globalization, immigration, status and/or naturalization of immigrants, demands of ethnic minorities, and the political apathy of Western citizens.¹ Nevertheless, the long established theories and practices of citizenship like that of viewing citizenship as membership of a nation-state; relations between nationhood and practices of citizenship; liberal vs. republican traditions; and the crucial question of “who would deserve membership, or not?” seem to be shaping the current debates on these contemporary issues.

¹ Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory," *Ethics*. 104 (January, 1994), 352; Bryan S. Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship," in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, ed. Bryan S. Turner, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 1.

Studies which link citizenship to the rise of nation-states perceive the former as an outcome of modernity, -i.e., a transition from status to contract.² In its simplest formulation citizenship corresponds to the status of membership in a nation-state. But this membership has different aspects. In other words, citizenship is a multi-faceted notion. For instance, Hammar delineates four interrelated meanings of citizenship; namely legal, political, social and cultural, and psychological.³ Marshall, whose analysis will be used in this study, enlists three elements of citizenship that is civil, political, and social elements.⁴ Kymlicka and Norman, on the other hand, evaluate the three dimensions of legal status, identity, and civic virtue.⁵ This study aims to highlight the evolution and merging of those elements in the process of citizenization in Turkey. The term citizenization is borrowed from Nisbet's argument that citizenship in the West is more than simply a condition or a status; it is a process, with identifiable phases in time and with contexts in history which unite it in some degree with other processes such as individualism and secularism."⁶ This study will also try to show that this process of

² Turner, "Contemporary Problems," 5.

³ Tomas Hammar, "State, Nation and Dual Citizenship," in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. William Rogers Brubaker (Lanham, New York, London: The German Marshall Fund of the US, University Press of America Inc., 1989), 81-96.

⁴ T.H. Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1965).

⁵ Kymlicka and Norman, "Return of the Citizen."

⁶ Robert Nisbet, *The Making of Modern Society*, (Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 131.

citizenization is not peculiar only to the West, but that we can point to “phases in time and contexts in history which unite with other processes” in the Turkish case as well.

This chapter aims to provide a theoretical background for the issue of citizenship and to delineate the basic approaches to the issue, which has been debated throughout the modern world history. However, there is a vast literature on citizenship sometimes focusing on different aspects of the issue. This study will be selective among these literature and focus on the studies related with modern citizenship. The theory used in this study is classified as historical or historical comparative, and philosophical approaches. Historical approach focuses on the development of citizenship within different historical contexts and its relation with the nation building process. The philosophical approach, on the other hand, focuses on the different understandings of citizenship that stem from liberal or republican understanding.

2.1 The Path towards Modern Citizenship

The notion of citizenship has its origins in ancient Greek civilization. Citizenship in the Greek city-states was a status granted to a limited portion of the society depending on ownership of property and membership in the upper class; women, peasants and slaves were excluded. Aristotle defined citizen as a man “who enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office.” Citizens were those “all who share in

the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn.”⁷ In other words as Turner states, Aristotle’s conception of citizenship required full ownership of property, self-discipline and education which would in turn create individuals with the capacity to govern and to be governed.⁸ Participation in public debates for making political decisions was the core of Greek citizenship.⁹ The understanding of citizenship of the ancient Greeks provide us both a historical background and the basis of a certain approach, that is, republican understanding of citizenship that will be elaborated below.

It is accepted by all the scholars of citizenship that modern citizenship is the offspring of the French Revolution.¹⁰ With the French Revolution nation-state and the idea of nationality was brought to the agenda.¹¹ The emergence and evolution of the nation state brought with it the question of who the members of that state are. After the French Revolution, all members of the state regardless of their status were regarded equal and as citizens together with the preposition that sovereignty rested on the nation.

⁷ Aristotle, *Politics* (ed. E. Barker, Clarendon Press, 1946), 108 cited in Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, (London and New York: Longman, 1996), 3.

⁸ Bryan Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism: The Debate over Reformism*, (London, Boston, Sydney: Allen and Urwin, 1986).

⁹ Derek Heater, *Citizenship*, 4.

¹⁰ Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order* (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1984), 49; William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (London, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992), 35.

¹¹ See, for instance, Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

The development of Western history from the sixteenth century onwards, a period labeled as modernization, led to an overall re-interpretation of basic concepts and phenomena related to the universe, man, and society.¹² In the age of Enlightenment, the political and intellectual evolution which framed the process of modernization eventually provided an alternative set of categories in the studies on society and polity. Intellectual transformation from the realm of divinity into that of positive knowledge accompanied the rise of the “modern” state. Thus, preoccupations in the area of political thought came to be structured by the zeal to provide grounds for the ideal categorization of the phenomena as requisites in the structuring of the modern state.¹³

The modern state in the Western context corresponded to the practice of nation-state. In contrast to the preceding imperial regimes, which had been commonly based on divine attributes, this practice of rule defined itself on totally different legitimization grounds. This connoted a shift in the formation of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The fact that man was conceptualized as an active, rather than a passive being in nature provided a different setting as regards the ruler vs. ruled.¹⁴

The traditional perception of the ruled as subjects was eliminated with the rise of a new concept of citizenship. Emerging in such a context, this new conceptualization

¹² Karl Mannheim, "The Origin of the Modern Epistemological, Psychological, and Sociological Points of View" in *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (San Diego, New York, London: Harvest/HBJ Book, 1985), 13-33.

¹³ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (Modernization, Kemalism, and Democracy), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993) 2nd ed., 39-48.

proposed a mutually responsive relationship between the modern state and the ideal citizen. The ideal citizen of the modern era was defined in terms of the basic traits of the state.¹⁵

Poggi, while stating the developments of the nineteenth century constitutional state, points to the change in the relation between man and state. As different from the Greek *politeia*, Poggi suggests that "the citizens' commitment to the welfare and security of the state is no longer activated by personal loyalty to the chief."¹⁶ That is, the state while distancing itself from the people transformed them into citizens, the status, which was not granted on certain basis but acquired by birth, and endowed with certain rights, and duties which were determined by legal codes and exercised equally toward every citizen.

Heater states five distinctive events or strains of thought which increased the concern on citizenship from the eighteenth century onwards as: a) the radical movement in England strengthening the tradition of political freedom and paving the way for modernization in the parliamentary form of government; b) the Industrial revolution and increasing political consciousness among the working class; c) the French Revolution

¹⁴ William Rogers Brubaker, "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis" *International Sociology*, 5:4 (1990), 380.

¹⁵ Tomas Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990); Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Citizenship, Immigration and Racism in a Unified Germany with Special Reference to the Turkish Guestworkers" *Journal of Economics and Administrative Studies*, 6:2 (1992), 200; Bryan S. Turner, "Postmodern Culture/Modern Citizens" in *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. Bart van Steenberg (London, California, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 155-6.

and its premises mentioned above; d) the socialist doctrines and movements, though having an ambivalent effect, on the one hand organizing the working class in parties and unions, on the other hand viewing the state-citizen relation as contrary to the proletariat mentality; and e) the German idealist philosophers, namely Kant and Hegel, mentioning the primacy of the state and the ethical basis of duty, which have provided new sets of arguments on the relations between individual and state.¹⁷

The Western development of citizenship also has deep roots in the evolution towards modernity. Badie mentions the evolution from community feeling to individual rationality by quoting Tonnies' theory of transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*.¹⁸ The emergence of individualism in the Western countries experiencing Reformation, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and capitalism transformed the people to individuals "characterized by the absolute value attributed to him in his singularity and by the degree of independence conceded to him *vis-à-vis* the group which he belongs and the institutions to which he is answerable."¹⁹ Thus, modernity brought about individuals stripped off from community ties and as being regarded equal members of the nation state having the initiative to demand rights from the state. That strain of

¹⁶ Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of Modern State*, (London: Hutchinson University Press, 1978), 97.

¹⁷ Heater, *Citizenship*, 63.

¹⁸ Bertrand Badie, "Community, Individualism, and Culture" in *Individualism: Theories and Methods*, eds. Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 95-96.

¹⁹ Jean Leca, "Individualism and Citizenship", in *Individualism: Theories and Methods*, 141.

thought is crucial for understanding the different developments in the West and the Turkish case, which is the focus of this study.

2.2 Nationalism and Nation-building

2.2.1 Nationalism and citizenship

As modern citizenship is defined as membership of a nation-state, it is crucial to mention briefly the relationship between citizenship and nationalism and the theories on nationalism. Heater suggests that after the French Revolution and “the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which asserted that ‘The principle of all sovereignty rests essentially on the nation,’ citizenship, patriotism, and nationhood were melded into a powerful and emotionally charged political force.”²⁰ Thus Heater adds:

The body of citizenry, identified as the nation, was endowed with sovereignty in both its external and internal guises. Nationally defined citizens formed a whole, undivided and integrated state differentiated from all others, the consummation of the post-medieval nation-state and the Westphalian state-system.²¹

This statement is crucial for understanding the construction of Turkish citizenship that went hand in hand with the process of nation building. The Turkish republic was founded on the premise that sovereignty rested on the people. During this process of nation building both citizenship and nationalism “mutually profited as political ideas and practices by their being harnessed together for the political shaping of the modern

²⁰ Derek Heater, *What is Citizenship?*, (USA: Polity Press, 1999), 97.

era.”²² Therefore, this chapter will first briefly mention the theories of nationalism, and then will focus on the studies on citizenship, which would be beneficial for the concerns of this thesis.

2.2.2 Theories of nationalism

. It is accepted by many scholars that nationalism is a by-product of the French Revolution,²³ emerging at a certain point in time. There are however, different approaches towards nationalism, either viewing it as a construct, as an “imagined community” arising out of the rise of print capitalism,²⁴ or as an evolution in modern capitalist history.²⁵ Habermas argues that nationalism is “a modern phenomenon of cultural integration.”²⁶ He adds that:

This type of national consciousness is formed in social movements and emerges from modernization processes at a time when people are at once both mobilized and isolated as individuals. Nationalism is a form of collective consciousness

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ See for instance Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*.

²⁴ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London, New York: Verso, 1991).

²⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983); Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 7th ed.

²⁶ Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” in *The Condition Of Citizenship*, 22.

which both presupposes a reflexive appropriation of cultural traditions that has been filtered by historiography and spreads only via the channels of mass communication. Both elements lend nationalism the artificial traits of something that is to a certain extent a construct.²⁷

In line with Habermas' argument the theories of nationalism are mainly divided into two lines. That is nationalism is analyzed under two main dichotomies, either as "ethnic" or as "civic" nationalisms, or "Western" and "Eastern" nationalisms. Before going into the details of these definitions of different types of nationalisms, one should bear in mind that, as Nieguth argues,

specific nationalisms have in common a core doctrine: that state and nation be identical. The process to achieve this goal can start from an existing nation that endeavors to create its own state through state-building, or it can start from an already existing state which engages in nation-building. The construction and distribution of national membership is very much dependent among other factors, on the direction of this process.²⁸

"Ethnic" nationalism, as its name connotes, emphasizes the primacy of ethnicity or the inherited cultural identity.²⁹ The ethnic nations are "perceived as social groups that exist prior to and independently from particular states."³⁰ The ethnic nations are considered as "primordial social entities" and they are the "basis for creating states."³¹ On the other hand, in "civic" nationalism nation is defined as "a community of people who inhabit a common territory and are citizens of the same state – with identical

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Tim Nieguth, "Beyond dichotomy: concepts of the nation and the distribution of membership," *Nations and Nationalism*, 5 (2), 1999, 157.

²⁹ Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," *Critical Review*, 10 (2), Spring 1996, 194.

³⁰ Nieguth, "Beyond dichotomy," 158.

political, legal and social rights and obligations.”³² It is a “freely chosen and purely political identity of the participants.”³³ It is believed that in “civic” nationalism people get together by a rational choice of forming a state in which all of them would be equal as citizens of the state, and would hold a common identity with this citizenship ties, without any consideration for common ethnicity or race.³⁴ Therefore, it is argued that in “civic” nationalism, citizenship ties are important.

Quite parallel to “ethnic”- “civic” distinctions there is an other distinction for viewing nationalism mainly developed by Kohn as “Western” and “Eastern” nationalisms. Kohn argues that in the West, nationalism grew out of a long historical evolution that dates back to the Renaissance and Reformation, and its rise was a “predominantly political occurrence, preceded by the formation of the future national state.”³⁵ He argues that, “eastern” nationalism, on the other hand, emerged late “generally at a more backward stage of social and political development: the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided.”³⁶ The “western”

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation,” 194.

³⁴ Ibid., 195.

³⁵ Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 329. It is evident that Kohn prefers “western” nationalism against “eastern” nationalism, and we can find value-laden tones in his article. This, however, is quite widespread among students of nationalism. See Anthony D. Smith, “Nationalism and Historians,” in Anthony D. Smith (ed.), *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1992), 58-80, for a critique of Hans Kohn’s study.

³⁶ Ibid.

nationalism was “an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without much sentimental regard for the past,” whereas, in the “eastern” nationalism “an ideal fatherland was created out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, devoid of any immediate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a political reality.”³⁷ Finally, Kohn argues that “western” nationalism was “based upon a nationality that was the product of social and political factors,” but “eastern” nationalism was based on traditional ties of kinship and status.³⁸ These “western” or “civic” and “eastern” or “ethnic” divisions of nationalisms are evident in the processes of nation-building.

As it is argued, in the “western” type formation of the nation-state and nation-building coincided, whereas in the “eastern” type the nation-state could be formed long after the rise of the nationalist sentiments. The differences in the processes of nation building gave way to two different types of states, the definitions of which are beneficial for this study; *Staatnation* and *Kulturnation*. While *Staatnation* is a pure political arrangement, universalist, state-centered and assimilationist; *Kulturnation* connotes a common heritage of language, tradition, religion and worldview.³⁹ These two

³⁷ Ibid., 330.

³⁸ Ibid., 331.

³⁹ Max J. Skidmore, *Ideologies, Politics in Action* (Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 270; Brubaker, “Introduction” in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed., 89-92; Habermas, “Struggles for recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* ed. by Amy Guttmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 2nd.edition. For a comprehensive analysis of the different routes towards modernity see Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

conceptions and the evolutions for the formation of those two different types of states have, as Turner suggests, different consequences for citizenship conceptualizations.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, it should be taken into consideration that those dichotomous definitions of nationalism only reflect the ideal-types. Usually, what we come across is the merge of the two definitions. Especially in the Turkish case, there is both resemblance to the “Western” and “Eastern” types, or rather we can say that there are shifts from one to the other.⁴¹ Also, the critique of Kymlicka on these “ethnic” “civic” definitions is worth mentioning here for the purpose of this study. In his book review, Kymlicka argues that cultural nationalism was regarded by most of the scholars as the component of “ethnic” nationalism, and that the cultural aspect of “civic” nationalism was ignored.⁴² He suggests that integration with a civic nation and naturalization require language of the state and familiarity with the common culture.⁴³ In addition, by referring to Tamir he notes that “ the state cannot avoid expressing a cultural identity when it adopts official languages and public holidays.”⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Bryan Turner, “Outline of a Theory of Citizenship”, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, Chantal Mouffe (ed.), (London, New York: Verso, 1992), 56. Those different types of nationalisms and citizenship practices will be elaborated in the next section.

⁴¹ See Ayşe Kadioğlu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, 2 (1996), 177-193.

⁴² Will Kymlicka, “Misunderstanding Nationalism,” *Dissent*, Winter 1995, 130-137.

⁴³ Here Kymlicka gives the example of integration to the American nation. *Ibid.*, 131.

⁴⁴ Yael Tamir *Liberal Nationalism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) cited in *ibid.*, 135.

At this point, I will briefly touch upon cultural nationalism. According to Hutchinson, in cultural nationalism,

the core of a nation is its unique and differentiated civilization, which is the outgrowth of the strivings of countless generations settled in unique homelands, each one of which has added its contribution to the common heritage. Nations are then not just political units, but creative personalities continually evolving in time, and it is to history that its members must return to discover the triumphs and tragedies that have formed them and the lessons they may draw for the future.⁴⁵

The usage of the Language and History Thesis in Turkey reflects that attempt. For the process of nation-building in Turkey one can find the “moral innovators” who

By education rather than by machine politics, aspire to redirect the traditionalist and modernist groups away from mutual conflict and instead unite them in the task of creating an integrated distinctive and sovereign community, capable of competing in the modern world. They innovate by introducing a new ideology of the nation in which the accepted meanings of “tradition” and “modern” are transformed. The “modern” (or as it is frequently designated, the “West”) is particularized to adherents as a local manifestation of a universal drive for progress to be found in all peoples.⁴⁶

The process of nation-building and the construction of citizenship in the early Republican period, which will be elaborated in Chapter IV reflects these moral innovations. Especially the case of *Halkevleri* (The People’s Houses) is quite parallel to Hutchinson’s argument that

They are above all, educational movements, and they seek to rebind the different constituents to a presumed common essence, forming decentralized clusters of historical and language societies, dramatic groups, publishing centers, agricultural centers and political parties in order to do so.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ John Hutchinson, “Moral Innovators and the Politics of Regeneration: the Distinctive Role of Cultural Nationalists in Nation-Building,” *Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 103.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

Even though Turkey cannot be classified as a third world with respect to its strong state tradition and the non-existence of a colonial past, for the purpose of this study we may benefit from Norbu's study, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*. Norbu states that "the structure of nationalism consists of two equally powerful components: traditional data (such as race, language, literature, tradition, territoriality), and egalitarian ideology (such as freedom, equality and fraternity)."⁴⁸ Norbu notes that traditional data has been the prevalent component of the early third world nationalism, and that egalitarian ideology was predominant in western nationalism. He adds:

The essence of contemporary Third World nationalism is a fusion of modern and traditional components, which typically manifest as:

- a) societal consciousness about national identity that provides the necessary dynamics of national unity;
- b) an all-encompassing value-system to guide and motivate political action;
- c) a pan-ethnic movement to generate social power that is utilized to achieve national unity and independence;
- d) a foreign policy centered upon the concept of national interest.⁴⁹

In the Turkish experience of nation-building and construction of the citizen, we can see the implementation of those elements. I will try to elaborate on this issue in Chapter IV while analyzing the early Republican period.

⁴⁸ Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 1.

2.3 Historical Approach

The historical approach that is used in this study connotes the studies on citizenship, which focus specifically on the historical contexts for the evolution of citizenship. The historical or historical-comparative approach is mainly represented by Marshall and Brubaker, and the two studies will provide a framework for understanding the Turkish citizenship.

Marshall's analysis is one of the most cited studies on citizenship. Marshall defines citizenship as a "status bestowed on those who are members of the community."⁵⁰ And those who have this status are equal with respect to the rights and duties bestowed upon them. Van Steenberghe suggests that with this definition Marshall has moved from a strict political definition of citizenship (state) to a broader and sociological definition (citizen-society).⁵¹ By taking England as his area of interest Marshall refers to citizenship comprising of three elements, civil, political and social, each signifying subsequent historical epochs. The civil element is the one that emerged in the eighteenth century and concerns the rights crucial for individual freedom, -i.e., liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right of access to justice. According to Marshall, the nineteenth century was characterized by the prevalence of the political

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1-2.

⁵⁰ Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, 92.

element, the right to participate in the exercise of political power either as the elected or elector. Lastly, the twentieth century was perceived as the cradle for the social element, which means to ensure that all shared the benefits of society.⁵² While giving an historical account of the rise of citizenship, Marshall studies the developments in capitalist history.⁵³ More specifically, focusing on the British context, he regards the development of the rights mentioned above as an outcome of the rising demands of the working class, and attempts on the part of the ruling class to meet those demands. According to Barbalet, together with the development of capitalism as a social system and the clarification and distinction in the class structure, Marshall shows that there occurs a shift in modern citizenship from "being a system of rights arising out of and supporting the market relations towards being a system of rights within an antagonistic relationship between the market and the class system."⁵⁴

Even though Marshall's analysis is usually regarded as 'welfare version,'⁵⁵ a system based on rights,⁵⁶ Janowitz argues that his sole emphasis was not on rights but

⁵¹ Bart van Steenberghe "The Condition of Citizenship: An Introduction," *The Condition of Citizenship*, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 2.

⁵² Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*, 78.

⁵³ J.M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Turner, "Contemporary problems in the Theory of Citizenship"; Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*.

that 'the corresponding duties cannot be ignored.'⁵⁷ Those duties are based on a sense of responsibility towards the welfare of the community. Janowitz lists the obligations of citizens according to Marshall as 'tax payment, education, military service, and the promotion of the welfare of the community,'⁵⁸ which are however the crucial duties attributed to citizens in every system.

Marshall's analysis is crucial in the sense that, first of all, he relates the development of citizenship and rights to the evolution in history, namely the capitalist development in England. Second is the shift in the definition of citizenship, a more sociological definition. Thirdly, the analysis of the evolution of these civil, political and social elements and rights attached to them are the remnants of the liberal version of citizenship as will be discussed below.

Marshall's analysis still provides the background of many debates on citizenship. A recent study of Işın and Wood, develops on Marshall's analysis, but adds a new element, that is identity.⁵⁹ They define citizenship;

Not only as a set of legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of membership in a state, but also as the practices through which

⁵⁶ David Burchell, "The Attributes of Citizens: virtue, manners, and the activity of citizenship", *Economy And Society* 24, 4 (November 1995); Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," 30.

⁵⁷ Marshall, *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*; Morris Janowitz, "Observations on the Sociology of Citizenship: Obligations and Rights" *Social Forces* 59, 1 (1980); Barbalet, *Citizenship*, 82. However, Barbalet argues that Janowitz overstates Marshall's points on duty. See Barbalet, *Citizenship*.

⁵⁸ Janowitz, "Observations"

⁵⁹ Engin F. Işın and Patricia K. Wood, *Citizenship and Identity*, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999).

individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights.⁶⁰

While analyzing what they term as environmental or feminist citizenships they argue that;

To understand citizenship rights in terms of the right to an identity (the right to have rights) as opposed to the passive right of status, involves, first, a reconception of the meaning of citizenship, and, second, a reconception of the means of allocating citizenship rights and the politics from which such rights draw legitimacy, from polis to cosmopolis.⁶¹

I will not go into the details of their arguments, but as it is a new study developing on Marshall and as it adds a new element of identity to Marshall's study it is worth mentioning here. As identity has become a widely debated issue in Turkey, as well as in the world, this study may provide us a key for a new approach towards citizenship.

While Marshall's focus was England from nineteenth century onwards and the development of capitalist system, another historical comparative analysis, that of Brubaker, takes France and Germany and the process of nation building in those countries which provides us two distinct paths for citizenship. Theories of nationalism or nation building also take France and Germany as two distinct cases and as reference points for understanding the evolution of nationalism, and attribute different, sometimes normative, characteristics to them, as analyzed in the previous section.⁶² Brubaker goes

⁶⁰ Ibid., 4.

⁶¹ Ibid., 1.

⁶² See for instance Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno, Las Vegas, London: University of Nevada Press, 1991). Chatterjee quoting Plamenatz ("Two Types of Nationalism" in *Nationalism: the Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, ed. by Eugene Kamenka (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), pp. 23-26) mentions the 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalisms. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial*

further and analyzes the different conceptualizations of citizenship together with the evolution of nationhood in those two countries. However, before elaborating on the French and German conceptions of citizenship, Brubaker's definition of citizenship and his model need to be mentioned. In his analysis Brubaker starts with the modern state, which he expresses as the "nation state" especially after the French Revolution, as "more than a territorial organization, as an organization of membership or an association of citizens."⁶³ Brubaker claims that in every modern state citizenship functions as "both an instrument and object of closure", it is inclusive internally but exclusive externally.⁶⁴ The state finds legitimacy by aspiring for the welfare of its citizenry. Brubaker defines citizenship as membership of the nation-state. Brubaker draws his argument from the contention that each nation-state attempts to have a certain population as its own which can be identified as something more than individuals in order that a cohesive and homogeneous nation can be constructed. By regarding the nation-state both as an idea and ideal, Brubaker delineates six membership norms for the ideal-typical model. According to this model, membership should be *egalitarian*; that is, there should be a status of full membership and no other. Secondly, it should be *sacred*; that is, citizens should make sacrifices or sacred acts for the state. Thirdly, membership should be *nation-membership*; that is, the political community should

World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Zed Books, 1986), p.1. See also "The Agenda for Nationalism", *Popular Movements, Political Organization, Democracy and the State*, ed. by Preben Kaarsholm (Roshilde, International Development Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1992), p.74.

⁶³ Brubaker, "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-state"; *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*.

overlap with the cultural community of shared language and character, which is acquired either by birth or through assimilation. Fourthly, membership should be *democratic*; that is, members should participate in the ruling process. Fifthly, membership should be *unique*; people should belong to only one state. Finally, membership should be socially *consequential*, that is, it should be expressed in a community of well-being.⁶⁵

Brubaker bases the expansive conception of citizenship in the French context, which he depicts as stemming from the principle of *jus soli* on the contention that nationhood in the French vocabulary was state-centered and assimilationist. Distinguishing the German case as *Volk*-centered and differentialist, he finds the identifying features of German citizenship to be based on blood. Taken into consideration with the theories of nationalism it is accepted that, as the emergence of national feeling and the formation of the nation state coincided in France, with regard to the institution of citizenship the egalitarian, democratic, nationalist and statist aspects were closely integrated.⁶⁶ Brubaker views the French Revolution in four different terms all coinciding with certain evolutions in the understanding of citizenship. When it is taken as a bourgeois revolution, the corresponding aspect is equality before the law, common rights and obligations. With regards to being a democratic revolution, citizenship is viewed as a *general* status, contrary to urban citizenship with certain rights

⁶⁴ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 21.

⁶⁵ Brubaker, "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State", 380-81.

⁶⁶ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 39-49.

and privileges, endowed with equal political rights and political participation. As a national revolution both nation state and nationalism came to the fore, and the nation state is composed of legally equal individuals. Finally, as a bureaucratic revolution, the citizen engages in a direct relation with the state; a total divergence from the structures of the ancien regime.⁶⁷

Germany, on the other hand, had experienced a longer nation building process. The national feeling and formation of a nation state did not coincide in Germany. Nationalism emerged long before national unification, which brought about a much different understanding of nationalism and citizenship. German nationalism was a kind of reaction to the French Revolution, and the Enlightenment, in short it was anti-western. It was based on an ethnic and cultural understanding and on Romantic premises.⁶⁸ In this respect, Brubaker notes that by drawing upon a specific ethno-cultural dimension, Germany failed to integrate the egalitarian, democratic, nationalist and statist aspects of citizenship, which had been realized in France. Such a remark leads him to conclude that evolution of citizenship in Germany displayed a diversified path among formal state membership, participatory citizenship and ethno-cultural nation membership.⁶⁹

Even though naturalization policies are not the concern of this study, it is worth to mention them briefly as those differences are reflected in the naturalization process

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ayşe Kadioğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity."

and the attitude towards immigrants in France and Germany. As France has a territorial understanding of citizenship, anyone born in the territory can acquire citizenship rights easily. In Germany, on the other hand, only those with Germanic origins can acquire those rights as the state has an ethnic and cultural understanding.⁷⁰

Before focusing on the philosophical approach toward citizenship, a study, which combines the historical evolution and philosophical characteristics, is worth mentioning. By focusing on the European context, Turner suggests that four different forms of citizenship might be depicted. These four different forms of citizenship are based on two axes, whether citizenship developed from above or below (active/passive) and to what extent it is developed in a public or private sphere. By applying those axes to the European context, Turner shows that the French case is a revolutionary context, where citizenship developed from below within a public sphere whereas American liberalism is a liberal pluralism that developed from below but in a private sphere. On the other hand, England is viewed as a passive democracy where citizenship developed from above and in a public sphere, and finally Germany is viewed as a plebiscitary authoritarianism where citizenship was instituted from above and in private sphere, his table is as follows:⁷¹

⁶⁹ Brubaker, "Introduction," 1-27; *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*.

⁷⁰ Brubaker, "Introduction" and "Immigration and Naturalization" in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship*; and "Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation state in France and Germany" *International Sociology* 5,4 (1990).

⁷¹ Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship", 45-56.

Citizenship

Above	Below	
Revolutionary contexts	Passive democracy	Public Space
Liberal pluralism	Plebiscitary authoritarianism	Private Space

Turner makes another distinction as radical and formal citizenship, which highlights the active/passive and public/private distinction mentioned above. *Radical citizenship* is the outcome of the developments of the nineteenth century in Europe, that of class struggles, wars, migration, and the emergence of new egalitarian ideologies, which paved the way for revolutionary-democratic states. *Formal citizenship*, on the other hand, by emphasizing who qualifies to be a citizen, is a criterion formed and initiated by governments with the aim of exclusion and control of the masses.⁷² Turner concludes that different historical circumstances “give rise to radically different forms of citizenship participation.”⁷³ Those historical analyses provide us a background information for the evolution of modern citizenship. But there is also another approach, which stems from the philosophical characteristics and distinctions in the understanding of citizenship.

⁷² Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism* cited in Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 25-26.

2.4 Philosophical Approach

The philosophical approach stems from different strains of thought in world history. This section will try to highlight the dichotomous characterization of citizenship as a reflection of those strains of thought. One strain of thought is related with modernity, namely the liberal thought based on natural law and Locke.⁷⁴ This thought has a rather individualistic and instrumentalist understanding, and citizenship is viewed as a legal status where there is a distant relation between the state and individual based on the acquisition of benefits and rights from the state.⁷⁵ Other strain of thought comes from Aristotle and there is a community based and ethical understanding where responsibilities toward the state and community have the utmost importance for citizenship.

There are also some similar definitions of citizenship. For instance, Kymlicka and Norman's distinction of two concepts of citizenship as "citizenship-as-legal-status" and "citizenship-as-desirable-activity" are worth mentioning. "Citizenship-as-legal-status" refers to full membership in a particular community, whereas "citizenship-as-desirable-activity" refers to the extent and quality of citizenship depending on one's participation in the community.⁷⁶ Thus, Stewart argues that this tension on the

⁷³ Turner, "Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship", p.9.

⁷⁴ Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity".

⁷⁵ Robert E. Goldwin, "Citizenship and Civility" in *Civility and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic Societies*, ed. by Edward C. Banfield, (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 43.

discussions of citizenship arises out of two different conceptions of citizenship.⁷⁷ He distinguishes between *state citizenship*; referring to a formal legal status of a nation state, and *democratic citizenship*; as shared membership of a political community, a general distinction shared by almost all students of citizenship.⁷⁸

2.4.1 Liberal-democratic understanding

The “liberal” or “liberal-democratic” understanding of citizenship is based on the basic premises of liberalism. The individual is regarded as a sovereign and autonomous being, and it is the individual, not the community that “comes first.”⁷⁹ In this understanding citizenship is regarded as “status,” arising out of a contract. This is a contract held both between the individual and the state and among the individuals.

The liberal understanding gives utmost importance to rights. According to Oldfield, “rights inhere in individuals, because individuals are both logically and morally prior to society and the state.”⁸⁰ Therefore, this social contract between the individual

⁷⁶ Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 353-355.

⁷⁷ Angus Stewart, “Two Conceptions of Citizenship”, *British Journal of Sociology* 46, 1 (March 1995), 63-78.

⁷⁸ Ibid.; Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*; Turner, “Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship”; Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

and the state is based on the state's role as safeguarding the rights of the sovereign and autonomous individuals. On the other hand, the individual citizens do not feel any responsibility towards other citizens other than to respect other individuals' rights. Goldwin noted that in the Lockean sense, which provides the basis for liberal understanding, "what is natural for us is not to act as citizens but to act as individuals, with our own personal concerns and interests ... without attention to the good of the others."⁸¹ Heater argues that in the liberal understanding, "there is no sense that the state has any organic existence, bonding the citizens to it and to each other."⁸²

The liberal understanding is "an essentially 'private' conception" which grants the individual the freedom to choose the degree of their participation in public life. As Heater argues:

The acquisition of citizenly status does not necessitate abandonment of the pursuit of self-interest. Public and private spheres are kept distinct, and citizens are under no obligation to participate in the public arena if they have no inclination to do so. Nor have citizens any defined responsibilities *vis-à-vis* their fellow citizens...If the liberal citizen is expected to feel only a limited obligation to the state *pari passu* the state is expected to impinge on the citizen's life only in a feeble way.⁸³

In other words, in the liberal understanding the primary focus is on the rights of the citizen rather than the duties. The duties, obligations or responsibilities of the citizen towards the community are quite limited.

⁸⁰ Adrian Oldfield, "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?," *Political Quarterly*, 61: 2 (1990), 178

⁸¹ Goldwin, "Rights, Citizenship, and Civility," 45.

⁸² Heater, *What is Citizenship?* 6.

We can suggest that according to liberal understanding the citizen is active. He/she has the ability to claim more rights or benefits from the state, and he/she does not have to perform specific activities in order to achieve those rights. Besides, if we trace the development of the liberal-democratic understanding of citizenship in the modern world history, those rights were achieved after long struggles of the people against the state, in other words it was a development from below.

There is a close relationship between the liberal understanding of citizenship and capitalism. Heater lists three similarities between capitalism and citizenship, as compared to feudalism. Those are:

- 1) Pre-capitalist society was based on personal subservience. In contrast, the free exercise of individual initiative is the very essence of capitalism. Similarly, citizenship grew by the extraction of rights for the individual.
- 2) Feudal structure was hierarchical; capitalism in contrast requires social fluidity. The concept of citizenship took this alteration to the logical conclusion equality of status.
- 3) *Ancien regime* society was provincially fragmented. Internal customs barriers, even provincially distinct measurements of weights and capacity, were anathema to the capitalist's essential requirement of free and open access to markets. The integration and solidification of the nation-state, so essential for the capitalist, made way for citizenship as national identity.⁸⁴

However, it should be noted that all those transformations were not related merely to capitalism itself, but as Barbalet suggests "the way in which capitalist development is likely to remove from the social structure class forces which would otherwise inhibit the progress of modern citizenship."⁸⁵

⁸³ Ibid., 6-7.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁸⁵ Barbalet, *Citizenship*, 32.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Marshall's analysis (even though I classify it under historical approach) can also be regarded as an analysis of the rise of the liberal understanding of citizenship. By focusing on the evolution of rights during the capitalist history of the Great Britain, Marshall's analysis is an account for rights-based liberal understanding. Also, it is an account of the struggle and achievements of the active citizens for the extension of rights to the wider society.

2.4.2 Civic-republican understanding

The civic-republican understanding is the other main understanding in the dichotomy mentioned above. "Republic" according to Heater stands for "a constitutional system with some form of sharing out of power to prevent concentrated arbitrary and autocratic government," and "civic" means "the involvement of the citizenry in public affairs to the mutual benefit of the individual and the community."⁸⁶ This understanding has its roots in the ancient Greek political philosophy.⁸⁷ It is mainly inspired from Aristotle who defined the citizens as those "who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn." By relying on the Greek city-states as the basis for the theory, this understanding emphasizes the importance of civic virtue and common good. Thus, Oldfield defined civic-republicanism as:

⁸⁶ Heater, *What is Citizenship?*, 44.

⁸⁷ Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," 25.

First of all citizenship is not a status, but a practice or an activity, which is underpinned by an attitude of mind. It is by acting, by public service of fairly specific kinds, that individuals demonstrate that they are citizens.⁸⁸

Contrary to the liberal understanding that places the individual at the core, the civic republican understanding emphasizes the community. Individuals are not perceived as being prior to society. They do not have any sovereignty, as it has been in the liberal-democratic understanding. Their existence depends on the social context. "Only if the community is sustained in being that the practice of citizenship is ensured continuity in time, and the identity of individuals as citizens is preserved."⁸⁹ On the other hand, the civic republican conception regards citizenship as "practice." The emphasis is on "duty" rather than "right." There are socially defined goals with duties, as in the case of being a citizen. As distinct from the liberal democratic understanding of contract, social bonds in civic republicanism are based on the communal sharing of life. An individual becomes a citizen when he/she performs the duties of citizenship.⁹⁰

The civic-republican understanding is represented by some philosophers throughout modern history. Machiavelli emphasized the importance of civic virtue (*virtù*). According to his thought:

The good citizen, effectively educated in the precepts of *virtù*, must lead an active life, whether civilian or military. In civilian life the citizen must take a positive interest in public affairs, and above all, refrain from according to priority of a private life of wealth, luxury, and ease over a commitment to the general public good.

⁸⁸ Oldfield, "Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?", 181.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.; Goldwin, "Rights, Citizenship and Civility," 46; Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity."

Military service provides the discipline necessary to convert the naturally wicked man into a virtuous, patriotic citizen.⁹¹

On the other hand, Rousseau introduced General Will as a solution for the question of “How can men subject themselves to government, which is necessary for security, while, at the same time, retaining their freedom, which is their moral right?”⁹² General will is critical for the civic-republican understanding. The community is at the core, and the citizens comprise an organic whole. Rousseau explained this as: “Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body, we incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole.”⁹³

Habermas describes the civic-republican understanding as a communitarian and ethical understanding. He notes that in civic-republican understanding citizenship is:

conceived in analogy to the model of achieved membership in a self-determining ethical community. The citizens are integrated into the political community like parts of a whole; that is in such a manner that they can only form their personal and social identity in this horizon of shared traditions and intersubjectively recognized institutions. ... Citizenship can only be realized as a joint practice of self-determination.⁹⁴

As can be seen from those definitions, both liberal-democratic and civic-republican understandings of citizenship are crucial for understanding the citizenship practices of a state. I will return to those definitions throughout this study.

⁹¹ Heater, *What is Citizenship?* 49.

⁹² Ibid., 50.

⁹³ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, (ed.) M. Cranston, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), I.6, cited in *ibid*.

⁹⁴ Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” 25-26.

2.5 Definition of obligations

As can be traced from these studies mentioned above, citizenship theory carries in itself a dichotomy of emphasis on rights and emphasis on duties. Even if the ideal seems to be a balance between the two, it is hard to point a state where this balance was achieved. Usually, rights-based account of citizenship is adopted in the West. For the case of non-western countries, Hill and Kwen Fee's study on Singapore is significant.⁹⁵ They suggest that in the process of nation building Singapore adopted a notion of citizenship inclined to emphasize duties more. The following chapters will trace this dichotomy in the construction of citizenship in Turkey.

Education and especially civic education had been regarded crucial. The Greek civic education was based on the development of individual and judicial skills, rhetoric and judgment. Furthermore, indoctrination of the youth for obedience to laws and submission to government and encouragement for military service to defend the state were emphasized.⁹⁶ Virtue and community feeling were the key elements of Greek citizenship, and education had been used for the transmission of those values to the youth.

By drawing on Hobbes' argument that "man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education"⁹⁷ and emphasizing the influence of Christianity on modern

⁹⁵ Hill and Kwen Fee, *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*.

⁹⁶ Heater, *Citizenship*, pp. 6-7.

'passive' citizen, Burchell argues that the (Christian) citizen has been formed by two parallel processes.⁹⁸ One is the external discipline imposed through formal education and the social discipline of *polizei* or police,⁹⁹ and the self-discipline gained through a new kind of civil conduct.

As the modern nation states and modern citizenship began to develop, education acquired much more importance. First of all, together with the development of capitalism and division of labor the need for qualified and educated work force increased. This paved the way for elementary education to be compulsory. With the emergence of nation states, cohesion of the population and the inculcation of the feeling and consciousness of national identity were achieved with the spread of education.¹⁰⁰ It is within this context that many states included civic education courses in their curriculums.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Bernard Gert (ed.) *Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive)*, (London: Harvester, 1978), 110 quoted in David Burchell, "The Attributes of Citizens: virtue, manners and the activity of citizenship," *Economy and Society* 24, 4 (November 1995), 543.

⁹⁸ Heater, *Citizenship*, 553.

⁹⁹ For further inquiries on *polizei* see, Pasquale Pasquino, "Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital-Police and the State of Prosperity" in *Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991); and Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, "Polizei," *Economy and Society* 9, 2 (May 1980), 172-196.

¹⁰⁰ It is worth to quote Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* here. He argues that, nationalism emerged with the developments in the print technology, through which people could get the idea of a nation. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

¹⁰¹ See Tomas Englund, "The Public and the Text," *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 28 (1), 1996; also see Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*:

Depending on the kind of regime and types of education under these regimes education might be considered either “to produce good citizens who hears the voice of ‘the State’ within him”¹⁰² or “a subject of contestation determined by the struggle within the state apparatuses and the civil society and decisively dependent on the public.”¹⁰³ However, as Heater argues, citizenship education usually refers to ‘rights and responsibilities’ simply as political rights such as voting and duties such as tax and military service, but civic rights such as equality before law, or freedom of speech are undermined.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, civic education stands as a crucial and integrative element for the acquisition of a feeling of citizenship in every state.

Military service has been one of the determining elements for citizenship throughout history, in Greek polis, Romans, and then in medieval cities. The citizen-soldiers bore arms when their city was in need of defense. Turner cites Weber’s *The City* where Weber points to the origins of citizenship to be found in the formation of an infantry and the development of the urban militia.¹⁰⁵ Civic virtue according to Macchiavelli was dependent on an armed citizenry. Therefore, modern nation states

Education for Civic Consciousness (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); and Carol Vincent “Education for the Community” *British Journal of Educational Studies* 31, 4 (December 1993), 366-380; Eric B. Goldwin, *National Service, Citizenship and Political Education*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). For the case of Turkey see Füsün Üstel.

¹⁰² Gentile’s words from *Education in the 20th. Century World*, 251 quoted in Heater, *Citizenship*, 214 for totalitarian regimes.

¹⁰³ Englund, “The Public and the Text”, 2.

¹⁰⁴ Heater, *Citizenship*, 260.

¹⁰⁵ Turner, “Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship”, 4.

exercise military service and conscription in various degrees. Starting from the French Revolution conscription was used as an integrative force for the nation. Those who had completed military service had a higher citizenship status.¹⁰⁶ Besides, after the French Revolution through military service, the idea of nationalism had been strengthened, and during their service men acquired a feeling of “us” and “others”.

Janowitz makes a significant point with regard to the relation between military service, citizenship and political democracy. He suggests that the citizen army formed by conscription may be a device for political control of the military professionals.¹⁰⁷ That argument, however, is based on the western experience and may be easily refuted in the non-western cases.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I tried to have a selective literature review of the theories on citizenship. The aim was to sketch out a mapping of citizenship, with its historical background, different traditions of thought and with its basic elements. Modern citizenship seems to be an institution emerged in the West under certain historical circumstances. However, contrary to the argument of some scholars, like Nisbet or Kohn, I argue that citizenship is not a unique institution of the West. In this thesis, I will try to show that the citizenization process was and is being experienced in Turkey as

¹⁰⁶ Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies”, *Armed Forces and Society* (2) 2, February 1976.

well. The theoretical approaches that were analyzed throughout this chapter will be utilized for the Turkish case. The nation-building process and nationalism in Turkey have always been debated by referring either to the “Western” or French model, or to the “Eastern” or German model. As one of the citizenship theories I discussed in this chapter draws parallels with different types of nation-building and citizenship practices, I will use this approach to trace the adoption of those models for citizenship. The other historical approach developed by Marshall and his elements of citizenship, namely civil, political, and social elements, will be searched for in the history of the Turkish Republic. The liberal-democratic and civic-republican understandings will be traced. As most of the scholars of Turkish politics argue,¹⁰⁸ civic-republican citizenship has been prevalent in the republican history. This study will try to show the adoption of civic-republican understanding and the shifts towards the liberal-democratic understanding in certain periods of time through utilizing legal documents, and the social and political history of Turkey. The following chapters intend to trace the issue in the republican history, to document the issue and to reach a definition or meaning of citizenship with respect to Turkey.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 227.

¹⁰⁸ See for instance, Füsün Üstel, “Cumhuriyet’ten bu yana Yurttaş Profili,” [The Profile of the Citizen since the Republic] *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 24 April 1996; Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999); E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, “Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunu: Anayasal Vatandaşlık ve Demokratik Açılım Olasılığı” [Turkish Modernization and the Problem of National Identity: Constitutional Citizenship and Possibility of a Democratic Solution], *75 Yılda Tebba’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru* [From Subject to Citizen in 75 years] (ed.) Artun Ünsal, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), 169-180.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE OTTOMAN EXPERIENCE

This chapter tries to highlight the development of the notion of “citizenship” in the Ottoman Empire in order to provide a background for Republican Turkey, which is the primary focus of this study. In this respect, the aim of this chapter is to analyze the path the Ottoman Empire took in the search for an “Ottoman” citizenship, which would be helpful for a better understanding of Republican Turkey.

The notion of citizenship was not familiar in the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century. It was this period when together with modernization attempts the question of “Ottoman” citizenship which would surpass the various identities and cleavages present within the Empire and grasp all the so-called Ottoman subjects emerged. Therefore, in this chapter, I will analyze the issue of “Ottoman” citizenship, how and why the notion emerged, and what the basic traits of the “Ottoman” citizenship were. In doing so, the modernization attempts and the social and political

developments, especially starting from the eighteenth century until the collapse of the Empire will be analyzed.

3.1 Overview of the Social Structure

Ottoman social, economic and political structure before the eighteenth century was divided into two classes. The first one was called as the *askeri*, which literally means military, but used for the ruling class that is, the “officers of the court and the army, civil servants and the *ulema*, the corps of the learned.”¹ The second group was the *reaya*, composed of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. They were the peasants, and artisans and traders.² The ruling group was not engaged in any productive activities, and therefore they did not pay any taxes. *Reaya* was the group which was engaged in production and who paid taxes. The ruling elite did not have any ties with the rest of the society.

The land system was based on granting land to local notables in exchange for military service, that is the *timar* system. However this land system was arranged in a way that when the *timar* holder died or failed to exercise his duties the land was taken

¹ Halil İnalcık, “The Nature of Traditional Society. Turkey,” in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 44; and Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 10. Also Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, (New Rochelle, New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973), 65-69; Satnford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire*.

² Ibid.

away from the family. *Timar* system was organized in a way that did not permit the emergence or strengthening of local aristocracy.³ *Timar* holders had to serve for the military when they were needed. The other regular army was composed of the Janisaries and Kapıkulu who were children taken away from Christian families and were assimilated into the army. The existence of the *timar* system, which was a barrier for the existence of an aristocracy, led to a different development in the Ottoman Empire from the Western states. In the West, aristocracy had played significant roles in modernization; they became influential actors for democracy.⁴ In addition the existence of an aristocracy had provided a limitation on the ruler's authority. In the Ottoman case, however, this lack of aristocracy gave way to a strong state tradition.⁵

3.1.1 Millet system

In order to understand the nation formation in the Ottoman Empire, Karpas argues that one has to study the *millet* system.⁶ The Empire, especially after the conquest of Constantinople was composed of different ethnic and religious

³ Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1985), 5th ed.

⁴ See Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*

⁵ See Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985).

⁶ Kemal Karpas, "Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era", *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard

communities. The state never made any attempt to assimilate the people, nor forced them to convert to Islam. Instead, starting from Mehmed II's reign, a system that was rather unique to the Ottoman Empire was put into practice.⁷ This was the *Millet* system, which was based on the differentiation of people on religious grounds.

Millet system was derived partly from Islamic law, according to which people from other religions were left free within their internal affairs; had their own judicial systems; and their material and spiritual life, honor and property were under the guarantee of the state. Moreover, they were not recruited into the military. In return for this they had to pay a certain tax, *cizye*.⁸ According to this system every community, particularly the Christians and Jews, selected their own leader who would conduct its internal affairs and who would be in touch with the state. Ortaylı argues that, the system led to closed and compartmentalized groups and, diminished the possibility of “a common Ottoman culture in written culture, science and thought.”⁹ The main characteristic of this system was differentiating people not according to their ethnic origins but according to religion and not trying to merge people into one, but accepting it as it was. Rodrigue and Reynolds suggest that it was “a recognition of difference”,

Lewis, v.1 The Central Lands, (New York, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1982).

⁷ Aron Rodrigue, “Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire: Interview with Reynolds,” *Stanford Humanities Review*, 5,1 (1995).

⁸ Cevdet Küçük, “Osmanlı’da ‘Millet Sistemi ve Tanzimat’,” [Millet Sysytem in the Ottomans and *Tanzimat*] *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, [Encyclopedia of Turkey from the *Tanzimat* to the Republic] Vol. 4, 1007.

⁹ İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Millet”, [Millet in the Ottoman Empire] *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Turkey from the *Tanzimat* to the Republic], Vol. 4, 996- 1001.

the difference which was ascribed and not articulated on the basis of rights.¹⁰ Therefore, the *millet* system was not a system of equality; each *millet* had a separate function and status.¹¹ Thus, the *millet* system functioned in quite a different manner from citizenship. While citizenship functions as an “equalizing and universalizing” institution, the *millet* system’s main function was the differentiation of the population on the basis of religious differences. Thus, due to the implementation of the *millet* system, the Ottoman Empire could not bring about a common identity for its subjects. It is argued by many scholars that this difference and the system itself paved the way for the emergence and rise of nationalistic feelings among the *millets* quite before the Turks in the nineteenth century.

3.1.2 Ottoman Philosophy of State Regulation

These implementations and structures mentioned above reflect the Ottoman philosophy of regulating the state. There was an understanding of traditionalism, based on the Ancient Law. The society was segregated into groups, which had different statuses and roles. The aim behind this was to prevent deviations and to keep everyone in its traditional place, in other words, to maintain order. Berkes argues that as no idea of individual freedom existed in the medieval system of state, there was no notion of natural rights or of citizenship.¹² Every group functioned as one organ of the body; thus

¹⁰ Rodrigue, “Difference,” 82.

¹¹ Berkes, *Secularism*, 11-12.

equality was out of the question. The values of those functions and the positions people held were always based on the will and order of God.

Consequently, the Ottoman social system was based on a certain type of order that had to be kept as it was.¹³ Kongar quotes İnalcık as “the aim of the state was to prevent the society’s traditional organization from changing.”¹⁴ That system prevented the formation of social classes as experienced in Europe and modernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire followed a rather different as well as a difficult path.

3.2 Modernization Attempts

Modernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire started during the eighteenth century.¹⁵ Mahmud II’s reign is crucial for understanding the roots of the Ottoman modernization. When Mahmud II ascended the throne the country was in turmoil. The local notables were getting stronger and were almost rebelling against the dynasty.

¹² Ibid., 13.

¹³ Berkes lists five ruling principles for the Ottoman Empire. The first is traditionalism, which suggested that every individual should remain as God willed. Second, each group should be protected from the influences that would disturb the order. Third, each group or individual should remain where it was according to the tradition. Fourth, the military and the ruling group should have no roots in the society and should pay allegiance only to the ruler. Fifth, to maintain a balance among the various status groups, which was called *nizam*, the preservation of order was necessary. See, Berkes, *Secularism*, 11-13.

¹⁴ Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze*, 58.

¹⁵ There are different views on the starting period of Ottoman modernization. Some view *Sened-i İttifak* (1808) as the starting point while others regard *Tanzimat* as the beginning.

Therefore in 1808 *Sened-i İttifak* “the first public law” in the Turkish history was proclaimed.¹⁶ According to İnalçık, *Sened-i İttifak* is the reflection of the local notables’, that is *ayan*’s, aspirations for the control of state power, and in this sense it was a traditional document.¹⁷ Even though *Sened-i İttifak* is regarded by some as the first constitutional development in Ottoman history it can be regarded as an agreement between the local notables and the State for safeguarding their powers, benefits and security. Apart from those features, it was a starting point, which would later lead to *Tanzimat* and the Constitution of 1876.

While viewing the changes in the Ottoman Empire as a kind of change from the medieval religious order to a more secular one, Berkes notes the significance of Mahmud II’s reign, as the period during which the “idea of an Ottoman state” with the people, as the basis of its sovereignty; and the Sultan, Mahmud II, as the enlightener of the people emerged.¹⁸ Those were not merely the desires of a ruler, but the traditional structure of the Empire; especially the age old army of the Empire was in deterioration and could not keep up with the technological development in the West. Those were the attempts for restoring the strength of the Empire. Therefore, modernization and westernization started from the military.

Mahmud II firstly crashed down the Janissaries and began to form a new army. As the old system of Janissaries was abolished there was a requirement for a new system, therefore conscription was to be the solution. Reform and modernization of the army, which was the original aim, did not stay within the boundaries of military issues.

¹⁶ Halil İnalçık, “Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu”, *Belleten*, October 1964, 28 (112), 603.

¹⁷ Ibid.

It spread from the military to schools, to medical schools, and especially significant for the period of Mahmud II to the centralization of government, and a new form of taxation. The first census in Ottoman history was held in 1830.¹⁹ In other words a new kind of surveillance was introduced²⁰ which could be regarded as an attempt of transition from viewing the people as a mass to, in a sense, transform that mass into the citizens of the Empire.²¹ Besides, a significant development occurred in 1831 for the inculcation of the Ottoman people, the first Ottoman newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi* began to be published, with the purpose of raising the consciousness of the people. This purpose would continue throughout the Republican history as well, raising of a secular and rational generation was seen as a crucial element in the survival of the state.²² Later, the ruling elite would emphasize on the issuing of regular newspaper

¹⁸ Berkes, *Secularism*, 92.

¹⁹ This census was applied only for men, and the ethnic characteristics based on religious differences as well as job statuses were also investigated. The total population of men was 3,753,642. See, Nuri Akbayar, "Tanzimat'tan sonra Osmanlı Devleti Nüfusu," [The Population of the Ottoman State after the Tanzimat] *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic], Vol. 5, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1239.

²⁰ For details of surveillance, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Random House, 1979); and Stewart R. Clegg, *Frameworks of Power*, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), 153-159, 167-178.

²¹ Ortaylı argues that, population records were significant formations in the 19th century, reflecting the increasing relations between the state and its subjects. See, İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* [The Longest Century of the Empire], (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1995), 3rd ed., 31.

²² Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 59, quoted in Metin Heper, "Türkiye'de Unutulan Halk ve Birey" [The Forgotten People and The Individual in Turkey] in *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru* [From Subject to Citizen in 75 Years] ed. Artun Ünsal, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), 44.

both “as a tool to strengthen the ties between the subjects and the state, as well as to declare and express its ideology and activities to its subjects and the other countries.”²³

Even though those developments roughly seem to resemble the developments in the West on the surface, a rising middle class, who would voice their demands and carry out these developments was lacking in the Ottoman experience. As can be traced throughout the following years as well, those attempts and developments were initiated by the ruler as a reaction to, and often as against the West.

3.2.1 Tanzimat Period

The developments initiated during Mahmud II’s reign continued and gained impetus after his death. In 1839 *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* was proclaimed by Mustafa Reşit Paşa. It was an attempt to reform and modernize the state attempt to hold the Empire together under a certain “Ottoman” identity. In 1826 Greeks had rebelled against the Empire and later in 1830 they formed their own state, in other words the country started to experience nationalistic movements within its territories together with increasing military defeats. It is a widely accepted view that *Tanzimat* Charter was declared partly because of pressure from the West.²⁴

The *Hatt-ı Hümayun* brought certain changes to the regulation of state affairs. First of all, the charter brought limitations to the Sultan’s powers. However, that limitation did not pave the way for popular sovereignty, even though it was “the

²³ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 39; 173-175.

abolition of the medieval doctrine of sovereignty.”²⁵ It was rather an attempt to safeguard the bureaucracy against the Sultan. From that time on the bureaucracy started to gain a control the affairs of the State increasingly. The charter had granted equal rights of liberty, property and equality before the law for everyone within the Empire for the first time in Ottoman history.²⁶ It aimed at introducing a new “Ottoman” identity that would surpass the religious cleavages, that is the *millet* system and would grasp within itself all the subjects of the Empire regardless of their religious or ethnic identities. It was an attempt to abolish the *millet* structures and to construct a new identity for all the subjects of the empire that would hold them together. *Tanzimat* was the beginning of a search for a common “identity” for the subjects of the Empire and this search would continue until the end of the Ottoman period. There were three main areas of reform; those were guarantees of life, liberty and property, just and public trials with certain regulations on the side of law; a new and regular taxation system; and a regular system of military conscription.²⁷ We can suggest that, referring to Marshall, by the proclamation of the *Tanzimat* Charter civil rights were for the first time introduced to the Ottoman society. The contents and proposals of the Edict were, according to Davison, the reflections of the French and American Revolutions, and

²⁴ See Berkes, *Secularism*, 139-141; Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 34; Davison, *Reform in The Ottoman Empire*, 234-270.

²⁵ Berkes, *Secularism*, 146.

²⁶ Ibid., Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 39.

²⁷ İnalcık, “Sened-i İttifak,” 612.

provided the basis for more change in the future, that is The Reform Edict and The Constitution of 1876.²⁸

3.2.2 *The Reform Edict*

In 1856 another edict was issued by the Ottoman government, which can be regarded as a complementary of the *Tanzimat*. The Reform Edict was the continuation and furthering of the reforms introduced by the *Tanzimat*. In line with the idea of Ottomanism the Reform Edict aimed at furthering the equality between the Muslims and non-Muslims brought about by the *Tanzimat*. The Reform Edict of 1856 laid more emphasis on the equality of the Ottoman subjects. In line with this emphasis the testimony of the Christians were allowed in some judicial matters, the tax paid by the non-Muslims in place of military service was abolished and as mentioned previously military conscription started to be implemented for everyone in the Empire regardless of religion.²⁹ In 1843 the term of military service was determined to be five years, and another seven years in the reserves. All of those developments; that is equality in “matters of military service, administration of justice, taxation, admission to civil and military schools, public employment, and social respect”³⁰ were reflections of the idea

²⁸ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 39.

²⁹ Ibid., 55.

³⁰ Ibid.

of Ottomanism. In this respect one can see the shift from the Ancient Law to more secular laws.³¹

As Davison argues, the content of the Reform Edict introduced a new concept of patriotism or “compatriotism” as the bond that would hold the Ottoman subjects together. The crucial development of the Reform Edict for this study is the introduction of the term *vatan* (citizen) for the first time.³² It was during that period that the term “*vatan*” which was previously used for the place of birth acquired a new meaning, the fatherland.³³ Those were the attempts to shift from the *millet* system into a more secular and equal identity for every subject of the Empire. Behind those attempts was the pressure from western powers and the desires to save the Empire from collapse. Another development related with the notion of Ottoman citizenship was the issuing of passports starting from 1844. Those passports were the offspring of the population records, *nüfus tezkeresi* or *nüfus cüzdanı*, and *mürur tezkeresi* (identity documents) used for domestic travels.³⁴ Those papers were issued on the basis of population censuses and for acquiring records of the subjects of the Empire. The aim was to make the people realize their responsibilities towards the state, like paying taxes and military service, by being the citizens of the Empire, in other words *nüfus tezkeresi* was “a

³¹ Ibid. , Berkes, *Secularism*, 152.

³² Bianchi, *Khaththy* Humaïoun quoted in Davison, p.56 note 15.

³³ See Bernard Lewis, “Watan” in *The Impact of Western Nationalisms*, eds. Jehuda Reinharz and George L. Mosse, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992), 169-179.

³⁴ See note 18 in Kemal Karpāt, “Millet and Nationality,” 169 cited from Kemal Karpāt, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State*, (Princeton, 1973), 75 ff.

proof of citizenship.”³⁵ Karpas mentions the usage of the notion of “*tabaayı saltanatı seniyye*” or Subjects of His High Majesty in the 1839 Edict and after 1856, as an attempt to “reconcile the Ottoman concept of nationality stemming from the *millet* experience with the European idea of citizenship.”³⁶ Finally on January 23, 1869 the first legal regulation regarding Ottoman citizenship, *Tabiiyet-i Osmaniyye’ye dair Nizamname* was amended. However, both “*tabaayı saltanatı seniyye*” and the citizenship law used to notion of *tebaa* meaning “subject” instead of “citizen”, Uluocak points to the usage of *vatandaşlık* (citizenship) and *tabiiyet* (nationality-deriving from *tebaa*) synonymously.³⁷

The reason behind the declaration of this law was to control and stop the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire from acquiring the nationality of Western states and using this citizenship in the territories of the Ottoman Empire to benefit from the capitulations. The Citizenship Law was the first of its kind in the Ottoman Empire and was prepared according to the European laws. It was composed of nine articles stating the ways of acquiring Ottoman citizenship.

The citizenship law was based on descent, that is, every individual born of Ottoman parents, or from an Ottoman father, was regarded an Ottoman citizen. Besides, territorial understanding could also be implemented in a limited manner for those born in the territory of the Empire within three years after they reach maturity. In

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Kemal Karpas, “Millets and Nationality,” 163.

³⁷ Nihal Uluocak, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku: Karşılaştırmalı Uygulamalı* [Turkish Citizenship Law: Comparative, Implementations], (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989), 3rd ed., 16.

addition, foreigners could also acquire Ottoman citizenship by the decision of the legal authorities.³⁸

3.2.3 The 1876 Constitution

The proclamation of the Reform Edict could not succeed in solving the problems of the Empire. Besides, both the nationalistic movements and the pressure coming from the Western powers were intensified. During that period an intellectual movement of opposition emerged from the bureaucratic elite of the *Bab-ı Âli*. Intellectuals working in the translation bureau of the *Bab-ı Âli* who were well educated got together and formed an association for advocating the transition to constitutional monarchy. They were known as the Young Ottomans. The members of this group had various and sometimes, diverse views to save the Empire. Their thought ranged from “constitutionalist liberalism to modern Islamism, even to the seeds of Turkism and socialism”³⁹ and they were influential both in the proclamation of the Constitution and later in the emergence of the Young Turk movement. The Young Ottoman movement was a movement of the intellectuals opposing and criticizing the ruler by using the

³⁸ Ergin Nomer, *Vatandaşlık Hukuku* [Citizenship Law], (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1993), 8th ed., 44-45; Uluocak, *Türk Vatandaşlık Hukuku*, 20-21.

³⁹ İlber Ortaylı, “Bir Aydın Grubu: Yeni Osmanlılar,”[An Intellectual Group: The New Ottomans] *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, [Encyclopedia of Turkey from *Tanzimat* to the Republic], Vol.6, 1702-1703.

press in order to create a public opinion for the first time in Ottoman history.⁴⁰

According to Berkes, the Young Ottomans were criticizing

- a) the economic plight of the masses of Muslims and the financial condition of the Empire;
- b) the increasing dependence of Turkey upon the rivalries of the great powers and the increasing interference of those powers in the internal affairs of Turkey which intensified the bitterness between the Muslim and Christian subjects of the Empire;
- c) the irresponsible policies of the government and the financial follies of the ruler.⁴¹

It was Namık Kemal, the significant member of the young Ottomans who started using *vatan* as connoting the fatherland. There was a deep patriotism rising among this group, and thus they proposed Ottomanism, a common identity for all the members of the Empire, together with constitutional monarchy as the remedy for the problems of the Empire. Even though they spoke of the equality of the members of the Empire they were strongly influenced by Islamic thought.

The significance of the Young Ottomans lies in their being the first opposition movement of the intellectuals, their usage of the press for voicing their views and their belief in Ottomanism to save the Empire. In addition they were influential in the promulgation of the constitution of 1876.

On the background of the promulgation of the 1876 constitution there were the domestic problems, the dissolution of the Empire, and the pressure of the great powers. It was both an attempt to hold the Empire together and to stop the great powers' interference in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It was a reflection of the

⁴⁰ Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu* [The Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996); Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 222.

⁴¹ Berkes, *Secularism*, 206.

bureaucracy's getting the upper hand in state affairs. Under these conditions, Midhat Paşa prepared the proposal of the constitution. It was mainly formed around the idea of Ottomanism, which would hold the subjects of the Empire, Muslim and non-Muslim together, and it would "insure that the needed reforms and progress of all the peoples of the Empire are achieved."⁴² Tanör suggests that by taking Ottomanism and a common fatherland as the premise, the 1876 constitution was realistic.⁴³ The constitutional regime of 1876 brought about changes on three grounds; transition to secular, fixed, and objective rules in state affairs; attempt for a modern separation of powers; recognition of individual rights and formation of a legislative assembly.⁴⁴ Thus the Constitution placed a lot of emphasis on the rights of the individuals. Those were; equality before the law, individual liberty, freedom of press "within the limits of law," the right of petition, right to education, right to acquire jobs in public offices, security of property, taxation according to law, and freedom from arbitrary punishment and torture.⁴⁵ But there was also an article on the Constitution stating that the Sultan could shelve the Constitution and the parliament any time he regarded as appropriate and necessary. Tanör views the constitution of 1876 as a *ferman*, by underlining the fact that the Sultan was the head of the executive and the members of one of the chambers

⁴² Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*

⁴³ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (OTAG)* [Ottoman-Turkish Constitutional Developments], (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 2nd ed.

⁴⁴ H. N. Kubalı, *Türk Esas Teşkilat Hukuku*, p.77 cited in Tanör, *OTAG*

⁴⁵ Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri "Senedi İttifaktan Günümüze"* [Turkish Constitutional Texts: Since *Senedi İttifak* until Today], (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 32-33; A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları* [Turkish Constitutions], (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi Yayınları, 1995), 6; Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 387.

were directly appointed by the Sultan.⁴⁶ Consequently, it is hard to suggest that by the Constitution of 1876 sovereignty moved from the Sultan to the public, or executive to the Assembly. Berkes notes that “the ruler was not bound by the constitution, the constitution was bound by his will.”⁴⁷

Under these circumstances, the first parliament opened in March 1877. It was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious parliament where non-Muslims were over the one third of the total number. However, those non-Muslim members took the seat in the parliament not as representatives of their religious groups but as individual members, as a result of the reflection of the state’s policy of demolishing the *millet* structures, and the idea of Ottomanism. The executive *Meclis-i Vükela* (Council of Ministers) was directly appointed by the Sultan. The parliament was composed of two chambers *Heyet-i Ayan* and *Heyet-i Mebusan*. *Heyet-i Mebusan* was formed through elections. According to the constitution, for each 50,000 men there would be one representative. The elections were two tiered. Only males and those who possessed considerable wealth and tax-payers could vote. Thus it was not a system based on general vote, which suggests that the right to vote was not viewed as a significant component of the Ottoman citizenship.

The first constitutional period lasted for a short time. Sultan Abdülhamid II postponed the meetings of the parliament; the reason was the war with the Russians. This postponement lasted for thirty years. It was a period of absolutism and censorship. However, under this atmosphere there also rose a new understanding of education. Many new schools were opened, among which the military and medical schools are

⁴⁶ Tanör, *OTAG*, 132.

significant. With the understanding to acquire not only the western technology but also the culture, those schools had a curriculum composed of contemporary ways of thinking. Therefore, the students of those schools were exposed to positivism, materialism and to a certain extent nationalism. There was unrest among those people because of Abdülhamid's absolutism, and the solution seemed to restore the constitutional monarchy. Being influenced by the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks emerged at that time. At first, like the Young Ottomans they believed in the "brotherhood of all the Ottomans" and like their predecessors their worldview was a mixture of rationalism, secularism, Islamic and traditionalist thought.⁴⁸ Consequently, with the cooperation of the Muslims and non-Muslims on July 23, 1908 the second constitutional period in the Ottoman history started. The prevailing ideology was Ottomanism and according to Tanör "it was the first and the last joint movement of Muslims and non-Muslims for a democratic and liberal consensus ground."⁴⁹ Sovereignty started to move from the Sultan to the public, and a move from the medieval conduct of state to a national and secular ideology. However, the second constitutional period faced the collapse of this ideology and the rise of nationalistic movements among both non-Muslim ethnic groups and Muslim groups, like Albanians and Arabs.

⁴⁷ Berkes, *Secularism*, 246.

⁴⁸ Tanör, *OTAG*; Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri (1895-1908)* [The Political Ideas of the Young Turks], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 5th ed.

⁴⁹ Tanör, *OTAG*; also see Aykut Kansu, *1908 Devrimi* [The Revolution of 1908], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995); suggesting that the transition to second constitutional period was a result of a widespread national revolution.

After the return to constitutional monarchy there occurred a division in the Young Turk movement, as liberals gathered around Prince Sabahattin, and the Committee of Union and Progress. As a consequence of the dispersion going on within the empire and the failure of Ottomanism, nationalistic sentiments began to emerge among the Turks. During this period, three significant strains of thought emerged with the aim of saving the Empire from collapse. These were Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism.

3.2.4 Westernism, Islamism and Turkism

Between 1908 and 1918 there were three prominent schools of thought, namely; Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism, which were; the varieties of an attempt to find a new foundation for the political existence and cultural reconstruction of the Turks, whose peril was perceived to have extended their traditional existence.⁵⁰ Those schools of thought emerged after the failure of Ottomanism, which was regarded as a solution for the collapse of the Empire that would hold the subjects of the Empire under a certain “Ottoman” identity, as mentioned previously in this chapter.

The Westernists suggested that total westernization that would cover all the aspects of life would be the solution for the problems of the Empire. They believed that “casting aside the old system of values in order to develop a new morality based upon the Western system of values” was the major issue.⁵¹ It was argued that social and

⁵⁰ Berkes, *Secularism*, 337.

moral life would be westernized as well. “Without adopting the cultural and intellectual foundations of the West, neither social reform nor Westernization could occur.”⁵² However, they were so obsessed with total Westernization that they failed to find a solution that would take the Turkish or Islamic features into consideration.

Islamists, on the other hand, argued that the core of the problem was that the Şeriat was not applied properly. The solution for the problems of the Ottoman Empire was the return to the Islamic law. Even though they accepted the superiority of the West technologically, they thought that the West’s superiority relied on their secular mentality.⁵³

Turkism emerged later than those two schools of thought mentioned above. The Turkists benefited from both the Westernist and Islamist thoughts and reached a synthesis that would make them successful. Turkism emerged not only as a political element, but even before, as a way of thinking in philosophy, literature and language. Many intellectuals of the period wrote on Turkism. Among them there were two different lines of thought. Berkes argues that one was a “critical, rationalistic, radical approach with marked (utopian) socialist tendencies” while the other was “a romantic, idealist, and nationalist tendency.”⁵⁴ Turkism developed from this second line. Ziya Gökalp is regarded as the founder of Turkism. He suggested that the basis of nationality was the common culture as:

⁵¹ Ibid., 338.

⁵² Ibid., 352.

⁵³ Ibid., 355.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 345.

The nation is not a community defined either by race, nor tribe, nor geography or politics, nor will. The nation is a community that has common features of language, religion, morality and aesthetics, in other words it is a community composed of individuals who had the same education.⁵⁵

Gökalp viewed Islam as a barrier to the rise of nationalism with “its tendency to superimpose itself as a civilization at the expense of the national cultures.”⁵⁶ The Turkists believed that modernization and westernization would be achieved only when nationalism is comprehended by the people. In addition, they argued that only the technical developments of the West should be borrowed while keeping national culture and traits. Turkism succeeded as a prominent school of thought among those three. The Committee of Union and Progress that took power adopted a Turkist worldview.

The shift from Ottomanism to Turkism, in a sense reflects the response to the changing dynamics. When it was found out that the all-encompassing Ottoman identity would not work in a collapsing Empire, then there occurred a turn towards Turkishness. This turn reflects the emphasis on the survival of the state. At first it was thought that a common Ottoman identity would hold the Empire together, but after the separation of the ethnic groups from the Empire, then the survival of the state was found in the emphasis on Turkism. One of the most prominent figures of Turkism, Yusuf Akçura advocated the implementation of Turkism instead of Ottomanism in 1904.⁵⁷

We can suggest that the seeds of the Kemalist revolution can be found in this period. Kazancıgil argues that, Kemalism was built on the reform movements that date

⁵⁵ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, eds. Mahir Ünlü and Yusuf Çotuksöken, (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1997), 5th ed., 18.

⁵⁶ Berkes, *Secularism*, 352.

back to the *Tanzimat* period.⁵⁸ As the members of the Committee of Union and Progress and the cadres of the Kemalist revolution had a similar educational background, Kazancıgil notes that the reforms made during the early Republican period were among the plans of the Young Turks.⁵⁹ Even though there are diverse views on the influence of Ziya Gökalp on the republican understanding of nationalism,⁶⁰ the Kemalist regime also viewed culture as the main determinant of nationalism. Here, we can suggest that there was not a rupture but a continuum with the Ottoman Empire, especially when Turkism is taken into consideration. Arai argues that the nationalism of the Young Turks paved the way for republican nationalism “with its efforts for the raising of national consciousness and honor of Turkishness among the Ottoman Turks who have lost those features long time ago.”⁶¹ Furthermore, the search for a common identity for the people of the state was a major issue in both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period. We can also suggest that the Kemalist regime built on the experiences of the Ottoman Empire on this issue and tried to eliminate the problems the Ottoman Empire previously faced.⁶²

⁵⁷ Masami Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği* [Turkish Nationalism during the Young Turks Period], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 20.

⁵⁸ Ali Kazancıgil, “The Ottoman-Turkish state and Kemalism,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern Turkey*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 37-55.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

⁶⁰ For instance, Kazancıgil notes that Kemalist nationalism diverged from the definition of Gökalp on the grounds of being territorial.

⁶¹ Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi*, 146.

⁶² Ayşe Kadioğlu delineates the difference between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic as regards to modernization as “progress for order” in the

3.3 Concluding Remarks: An Overview of Ottoman Citizenship

The emergence of the notion of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire dates back to the *Tanzimat*. There was an attempt to build up a common identity for all the subjects of the Empire, who held different religious and ethnic identities. This attempt went hand in hand with modernization, both were part of the need to reform in order to prevent the Empire from collapsing.

It is hard to classify the developments with regard to citizenship in the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, it was an attempt to demolish the community structures and replace them with a new kind of relationship between the state and people. Even though the developments in the Ottoman Empire might be viewed as a transition from a medieval conduct of the state towards a more secular and modern one, it is difficult to suggest that the Ottoman citizenship was based on the recognition of the people as “individuals” in their relations with the state, in other words it is not a “transition from status to contract.”⁶³ It was rather part of the desire to crash down the privileges of the *millet* structures and keep the Empire together, in other words to save the country. The citizenship law does not delineate the position of the citizen *vis-à-vis* the state; the rights and duties are not mentioned. The 1876 constitution seems liberal; most of the

Ottoman case, and “order for progress” in the republic. See, Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999), 24-29.

⁶³ Bryan S. Turner, “Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship” in *Citizenship and Social Theory*, ed. Bryan S. Turner, (London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 5.

articles related to the subjects of the Empire are about the rights of individuals. However, something seems to be missing in all those. First of all, the notion of citizenship is a modern phenomenon and is used with reference to the nation-states. In the Ottoman case, however, quite contrarily the emergence of the issue of Ottoman citizenship stems from the reaction to nationalistic movements and nation-state formations. It is an attempt to hold the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual population of the Empire together under a new identity that would surpass the other identities and serve the survival of the state.

Ottoman notion of citizenship placed emphasis on two axes, one was the legal definition of who the Ottoman citizen was, and second was the desire of incorporating the people into the Empire under a new identity, which would be different and above the identities people had. Thus, the emphasis was on the legal status and identity aspects of citizenship. Those were all for practical reasons and were imposed from above. It was not achieved by the people as a result of the demands coming from lower classes, as it was in the English case, nor a process linked with the formation of a nation-state, as it was in the French and German cases. It is not much possible to trace the liberal or republican characteristics of Ottoman citizenship. Although, the individual rights were safeguarded by the laws mentioned throughout this chapter, we cannot suggest that the individual was given the highest priority. On the other hand, I did not come across any statements about the primacy of the obligations towards the state, or an emphasis on community. Therefore, citizenship in the Ottoman Empire had been limited to a legal definition that tried to introduce a common identity which was thought to be beneficial for the survival of the state.

However, as the goals of those reform movements could not be achieved, and on the contrary the Empire faced many nationalistic movements and separations from the Empire, there occurred a transition from Ottomanism to Turkism, the only element left in the hands of the Empire. After the failure of creating a common Ottoman identity and the collapse of the Empire after First World War, the young Turkish Republic would face almost the same problems of creating a nation and the citizens as members of this nation more seriously. The next chapter will try to highlight the early republican experience of the construction of Turkish citizenship.



CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD: THE NEW CITIZEN

The introduction of the notion of citizenship dates back to the late periods of the Ottoman Empire, namely to the Reform Edict of 1856. However, the attempts for constructing an Ottoman identity started before. The *Tanzimat* Charter that was mentioned in the previous chapter attempted for the equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. Later, together with the Reform Edict and Citizenship Law of 1868, an official definition of the Ottoman citizenship was made. The notion of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire was articulated as part of the attempt to save the Empire from collapse and unite the multi-religious and ethnic population under a common “Ottoman citizenship”. The articulated citizenship notion tried to surpass the *millet* structure that had compartmentalized the society by introducing an identity above all ethnic and religious divisions. However, as noted in the previous chapter this did not succeed due to the rise of nationalistic movements among the non-Muslim and non-Turkish subjects of the Empire. After the collapse of the Empire and the War of National Independence the

Turkish Republic emerged with brand new ideas for the society, and started with the premise that “sovereignty rested on the people.”¹

The major development on the part of the sovereignty of the people was the formation of the first Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920.² It was a period of national struggle against the Western powers that were invading the Ottoman Empire after the defeat in First World War. The sultanate surrendered and the people gathered together under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal for the liberation of the country from those western powers. That liberation movement was, in a way stripping itself from the Sultan’s reign and the Grand National Assembly gathered to take charge of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Even though it was not voiced at that time explicitly it was a movement towards a republic. A new constitution was promulgated basing itself on the “sovereignty of the people”. According to Tanör, the constitution of 1921 was perhaps the only constitution that was prepared through democratic means as compared to the other constitutions.³ The deputies discussed every single issue. The constitution defined the “Turkish people” as those “the masses who were living within the boundaries of the armistice, regardless of their ethnic origin that got together on the basis of political

¹ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri (1789-1980) (OTAG)* [Ottoman-Turkish Constitutional Developments], (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 2nd ed., 227.

² This process started with Mustafa Kemal’s arrival in Samsun. He resigned from his position in the Ottoman military and started to work for the struggle against the Allied Powers. In order to attract the support of the people and to prepare the strategy few congresses were held in Anatolia (23 July 1919 Erzurum, 4 September 1919 Sivas). Those were the first steps taken in the path to the formation of the Grand National Assembly. See, Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

³ Tanör, *OTAG*, 250.

unity and independence.”⁴ In other words, the “Turkish people” was defined by a unity of political and geographical basis.⁵ However, this was the period of struggle for independence, and the definition should have to be inclusive. Even though the formation of the Parliament was a fundamental break from the Sultanate, at that time the intentions for the proclamation of the republic was not explicit, therefore this constitution had to appeal to all the people living within the boundaries of the National Oath.

After the victory in the War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed with the Allied Powers, The Republic was proclaimed in October 29, 1923. The first and major task was the formation of a nation state. Regarding the Ottoman dynasty and regulation of state as the real cause for collapse, the new Republic aimed a complete renewal. Therefore, the Republic went through widespread reforms in every aspect of life. This was a real break from the Ottoman heritage and it was also designed for the formation of the Turkish nation. It was believed that the survival of the new republic was dependent on the adoption of nationalism and secularism, and the construction of a Turkish citizenship that would be parallel to both nationalism and secularism. Therefore, as Mardin states, “Mustafa Kemal took upon a hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life in it.”⁶

This chapter tries to delineate the process of the construction of Turkish citizenship in the early republican period. Citizenship was designed as one of the

⁴ Ibid., 249.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, eds. Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst, 1981), 196.

crucial components for nation building. Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the republic perceived citizenship as the very core of the legitimacy of the Republic.⁷ Both the emergence of the notion of citizenship and the changes that notion went through during the early republican period will be analyzed. The study will benefit from the parliamentary debates, legal arrangements of the period in concern, and from the writings of the prominent ideologues of the period.

4.1 Nation-building in Turkey

Nation-states and nationalism are modern phenomena, they emerged right after the French Revolution and nation-states became prevalent figures in the international context, rather than the Empires that covered a multi-ethnic geography. Most of the scholars studying nationalism agree that nation is a construct.⁸ Nation building process carries a crucial role in this construction. The inculcation of the feeling of belonging to a nation is either carried out through the usage of printed material or through educational institutions.⁹

Most of the scholars dealing with nationalism classify it as either “Western” or “Eastern” nationalisms as mentioned in Chapter II. Western type of nationalism is the one where both the birth of national feelings and the formation of the nation

⁷ A. Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları* [Civic Information and the Manuscripts of M. Kemal Atatürk], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988) 2nd. Ed.

⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London, New York: Verso, 1991).

⁹ Benedict Anderson, *ibid*.

state coincided, the most prominent example of which is the French case. On the Eastern type, however, nationalism as a sentiment emerged long before the formation of the nation state, the example is Germany. Those different types of nation formations lead to different types of citizenship theories, as either the adoption of territorial understanding like that of the French case, or the adoption of blood principle as in the German case.¹⁰ There is also a different path adopted by the third world countries, which imitated the developments of the Western countries and the nation formation was carried out by the intelligentsia. On this case there is a problem of the limits of imitation. While benefiting from the technological and ideological developments of the West, there was an attempt to preserve the authentic culture of the country.¹¹

On the issue of nationalism Turkey does not fit either of them fully. As mentioned above, eastern type nationalism emerged long before the nation state, and there was a desire for that nation state. In the Turkish case it was “a state searching for its nation rather than a nation searching for its state.”¹² The state was found and there was the need to construct the nation, and the reforms of the republic aimed at that construction.

¹⁰ William Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, (London, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992).

¹¹ On this approach see Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Zed Books, 1986), and “The Agenda for Nationalism”, *Popular Movements, Political Organization, Democracy and the State*, ed. by Preben Kaarsholm (Roshilde, International Development Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1992). Also see, Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

¹² Ayşe Kadioğlu, “Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları” [The State Searching for its Nation: The Impasse of Turkish Nationalism], *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 33 (March-April 1995), 91-101.

Norbu's analysis that is mentioned in the second chapter provides us the key notions for understanding the nation building process in Turkey. Both the traditional data¹³ and the egalitarian ideology were combined in order to achieve a modern society yet respectful of its own values. All those notions were utilized by the Republican elite for the formation of the nation and the inculcation of the idea of belonging to a nation in the hearts of the people. Thus, a societal consciousness about national identity and an all-encompassing value system was aimed. In addition, as Brubaker noted each nation state claimed a certain population as its own, and desired this population to be something more than an aggregate of individuals, and aimed at having a cohesive and homogeneous nation.¹⁴ For this aim citizenship was both instrumental and necessary. Reinhard Bendix argues that

In the nation-state each citizen stands in a direct relation to the sovereign authority of the country in contrast with the medieval polity in which that direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men of the realm. Therefore, a core element of nation building is the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens.¹⁵

¹³ Here the traditional data does not refer to the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. It is used in a sense to connote the features that would make up the Turkish nation. Among those are language, territoriality, and Turkish culture. The Republic utilized and sometimes invented those features for the formation of the Turkish nation.

¹⁴ William Rogers Brubaker, "Introduction", in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. by William Rogers Brubaker, (Lanham, New York, London: The German Marshall Fund of the US University Press of America, Inc., 1989),

¹⁵ Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order*, (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), 74.

The people of the Turkish Republic, who claim to be civilized, must show and prove that they are civilized, by their ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living. In a word, the truly civilized people of Turkey ... must prove in fact that they are civilized and advanced persons also in their outward aspect.¹⁸

Those were the main steps taken for the creation of a nation that was composed of “civilized” citizens who were educated in modern methods, and whose modernity was reflected in their appearance. In addition, the Gregorian calendar and twenty-four hour clock was adopted. On 4 October 1926 the Swiss Code was adopted as the Turkish Civil Law. The previously used Arabic alphabet was changed to Latin alphabet on 3 November 1928, and the public usage of Arabic alphabet was prohibited.¹⁹ These were the major steps taken to demolish the ties with the Ottoman past and for the formation of a new nation.

4.1.2 The 1924 Constitution

The 1921 Constitution was amended, and 1924 Constitution was put into use. Article 88 of the Constitution stated that “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship.”²⁰ Yıldız points to the novelty in the law about mentioning Turkishness,²¹ and stresses the debates over

¹⁸ Ibid., 268-269.

¹⁹ Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 278.

²⁰ A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları* [Explanatory Turkish Constitutions], (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi Yayınları, 1995), 76.

²¹ Ahmet Yıldız, *Search for an Ethno-Secular Delimitation of Turkish National Identity in the Kemalist Era (1924-1938) with Particular Reference to the Ethnicist Conception of Kemalist Nationalism*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bilkent University, 1998, 302-303. Here Yıldız quotes the statement of reasons for article

who will be defined as Turk.²² After long debates, as Tanör notes, the Constitution stressed that Turkishness was defined in terms of geographical and political parameters rather than racial parameters, despite the existence of racial and religious differences.²³ During the same period Mustafa Kemal stated that “The people of Turkey who promulgated the Turkish Republic are called as the Turkish Nation.” In other words “the core of nationality is not race, but political loyalty.”²⁴ I also suggest that in that early phase of the period in concern, there was an inclination towards the French or the western type of nationalism based on territory.

The 1924 constitution was a liberal constitution with regard to individual rights. The basic rights and freedoms were enlisted in the 5th section, *Türklerin hukuku ammesi* (the Public rights of the Turks).-Those were, shortly, security of life, liberty, honor, and property; freedom of conscience; freedom of press and communication; freedom for forming associations.²⁵ It is noted by both Gözübüyük

88 as: “Since the Ottoman Empire had been obliterated and perished, the members of the nation could no longer be called “Ottoman.” National self-honor cannot accept belonging to a dynasty. Our state is a national state, not an international or supra-national one. The state can recognize no nation other than the *Türk*. It is not proper to consider racial differences as an obstacle to nationality since there are peoples of different origins in the country who possess equal rights. Likewise, since the freedom of conscience is certified, religion has not been considered as a hindrance to nationality as well. Turkish nation too, like all the new nationalities, could embody people of different races. But it is the community of the Turks (*Türklük camiası*) that has the capability of bringing together all the races.” See, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, 2nd period, meeting 2, vol. 7, 9.3.1340 (1924), 216.

²² Yıldız notes the different views on who would be called a *Türk* and the objections on naming the minorities as Turk. For instance, Hamdullah Suphi and Ahmet Hamdi suggested the term Turk to be used only to connote nationality rather than citizenship, and pointed to the danger in calling the minorities as Turk. See, Yıldız, *ibid.*, 303, note 106.

²³ Tanör, *OTAG*, 309.

²⁴ İ. Turan, *Cumhuriyet Tarihimiz*, İstanbul: Çağlayan Ktb., 1969, 73 cited in *ibid.*, 310.

and Tanör that the 1924 Constitution was inspired by the French Revolution. Tanör argues that the constitution had a liberal and individualistic approach; and that the limits of the liberties were not drawn by the benefits of the state, public or the society, as had been the case in the following constitutions.²⁶ However, Gözübüyük, on the other hand, argues that the constitution merely enlisted the basic rights and liberties with short definitions, but that there was not a regulation that safeguarded those rights and liberties, and that the regulation and boundaries of those rights were left to the executive.²⁷ The 1924 Constitution is one of the examples of the differences and contradictions between the discourse of the legal documents and actual practices. The Law on Settlement, The Tax on Property and other implementations that will be elaborated below are examples for this.

4.2 The Citizenship Law

As mentioned above, citizenship had been a crucial element of the nation building process and the Republic. However, the first citizenship law of the Republic had not occupied the agenda of the Parliament much. The proposal prepared by then the İstanbul deputy Tevfik Kamil Bey was read in the Parliament on May 22, 1928, and 1312 numbered and May 23, 1928 dated Turkish Citizenship Law was decided to be enacted by January 1, 1929.²⁸ No debates or questions were

²⁵ Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasaları*, 71-76.

²⁶ Tanör, *OTAG*, 308.

²⁷ Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasaları*, 54.

²⁸ *T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi*, 3rd period, 1st meeting, session 80, vol. IV

raised at the meeting about Turkish citizenship. All the articles were read and voted without any objections.²⁹

The law adopted both descent and territory principles. According to Article 1 “the children born from Turkish father or mother either in Turkey or in a foreign country are considered as Turkish citizens.”³⁰ Also, according to article 2/c “Those children born from Turkish father or mother out of wedlock in Turkey or in a foreign country, are regarded Turkish citizens.” Those articles reflect the principle of *jus sanguinis* by granting citizenship to the children of the Turkish citizens even if they were abroad, or born out of wedlock. The articles following those mentioned above were designed for the exercise of *jus soli* principle. Nomer argues that those articles were designed in a complementary manner.³¹ Article 2/a and 2/b stated that those children born in Turkey and whose parents are unknown and those children who were born in Turkey and one or both of the parents are stateless are considered as Turkish citizens. According to Article 3, “those children who were born from foreign parents in Turkey, and who are settled in Turkey can admit Turkish citizenship within three years after they reach maturity.” Besides, “the children of foreigners who were born in Turkey after January 1, 1929, are Turkish. They can admit their parents’ citizenship within six months after they reach maturity according to the Turkish laws. If they do so, they will be subject to article 9.”³²

²⁹ See *ibid.*

³⁰ Article 1, Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu [Turkish Citizenship Law], *Tabiiyet Kılavuzu* [The Guide for Nationality], (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939) p. 6; Ergin Nomer, *Vatandaşlık Hukuku*, [Citizenship Law] (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989), 8th ed., 45.

³¹ Ergin Nomer, *ibid.*

The Law of 1928 also permitted admittance of a foreign country's citizenship by the permission of the Turkish State. Those people had to leave Turkey within a year and sell the properties they have in Turkey, otherwise the government would liquidate their properties.³³ However, if they apply for readmitting they would get Turkish citizenship without residence requirement and their children will have the right to apply for Turkish citizenship and get it by the decision of the Council of Ministers.³⁴ During the early Republican period there was not an issue of dual citizenship as it was after the 1980s. But still it can be sensed that this article was designed in a way that would permit people to hold dual citizenship, as there was an opportunity for readmission. However, the liquidation of properties, which means that those people would not be permitted to engage in the economic life, leaves a question mark.

The first Citizenship Law of the Republic provided merely a definition of the Turkish citizen. Probably it was enacted, as part of the nation building process and it is evident from the parliamentary meeting records that it was not regarded as a crucial issue by its legal definition. However, the inculcation of a citizenship identity among the people was another dimension, and will be elaborated throughout this study. Atatürk's views on citizenship that was reflected in the course book "Civic Information" and the views of prominent ideologues of the period that tried to define the Turkish citizenship will be utilized. This book is crucial in order to understand what kind of citizen the regime aspired. The

³² Article 9 states that "those Turks who admit another country's citizenship without permission or join the military of a foreign country might be expelled from Turkish citizenship by the decision of the Council of Ministers."

³³ Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu, Article 8.

³⁴ Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu, Article 14.

implementations, like that of *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) that was significant for education of the masses as citizens will be analyzed. There is also another dimension related with the Turkishness, or the Turkish identity and the situation of the minorities in this process. This will be dealt with in the final section.

4.3 The Construction of Citizenship

During the early Republican period, the creation of a new Turk or Turkish citizen who had to be, first of all, "civilized" and "'patriotic'"³⁵ was the most significant civilizing mission of the Kemalist reformist elite. The Kemalist attempt at transforming subjects into citizens came into being with the rising concern of the political authority for describing who were Turks and who were not, or who the Turks were going to be.³⁶ In that ruling, the modernizing elite tried to establish a strong link between citizenship and nationality or national identity. This was regarded in most cases, as an inevitable aspect for the exercise of citizenship, and, according to their cultural objectives, for defining the profiles of *civilized* and *patriotic* citizens of the Republic. It is in this respect that they appeared to take into consideration the idea that creating a shared sense of national culture and identity was a fundamental precondition of forming and strengthening citizenship. That was the main task of the Kemalist nation-building project that required, in defining the national and cultural identity of citizens, the total elimination of Ottoman and

³⁵ Füsün Üstel, "Cumhuriyetten Bu Yana Yurttaş Profili"[The Profile of the Citizen since the Republic], *Yeni Yüzyıl*, April 24, 1995.

³⁶ Ayşe Kadioğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32/2, (1996), 177.

Islamic heritage, which was considered responsible for the backwardness of the state and society. By striving to eliminate the hegemony of traditional institutions and values over the state structure and society, the Republican elite aimed at building a “completely secular state”³⁷ and a secular socio-cultural structure. That is why the Turkish reform movement stimulated by the nationalist ideology of the Kemalist modernizing state was a sort of cultural revolution or, in the words of Mardin, a “revolution of values.”³⁸ Thanks to its preexistence as a strong, centralized state³⁹ that helped to facilitate the process of cultural and linguistic integration, the Republican state projected a particular form of a vision of socio-cultural life, a good life which each Turkish citizen should adopt. This new life would represent a common good and national interest,⁴⁰ but not a particular and individualistic one that was dangerous for national unity.

In forging a new identity, the Turkish state used its powers and agencies to accomplish its social and cultural engineering. It strove to eliminate all previously designated symbols, attitudes and manners, replacing them with its own new myths and symbols. Atatürk defined the “new” Turk thus: “we must be civilized men from every point of view; our ideas, our reasoning will be civilized from head to

³⁷ Metin Heper, “The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective,” *British Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1991: 13, 47.

³⁸ Şerif Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Transformation,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 2 (1971), 209.

³⁹ See, Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985).

⁴⁰ For a discussion and the views of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (Minister of Justice in the İnönü government in the late 1920s) on the relationship between common good and life style, see Mustafa Baydar, *Atatürk ve Devrimlerimiz* [Atatürk and Our Revolutions], (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1973), 208- 210.

toe”⁴¹. For him, the nation to which new Turks belonged was composed of citizens tied together by common language, culture and collective consciousness and ideals, being a political and social entity. This definition contains no reference to religion - Islam- or tradition. In short, the Kemalists had sought to establish a common cultural content, in large measure newly formulated and of course *secular*, to be used in forging the new Turkish citizens’ identity, and for manifesting their position as members of both the state and the organic whole (the nation).

The conceptualization of citizenship, as it was argued, came hand in hand with constructing a unique, unchangeable and historic Turkish identity that would be made possible only by newly fabricating and imposing a new monolithic culture, while ignoring ethnic and sub-cultural identities. That led to the designation of traditional/Islamic and local cultural symbols to the periphery of the public sphere, and even to the dictation and regulation of everyday life of the new Turks. The Republican civilizing elite, therefore, tried their best to “penetrate into the life style, manners, behavior and daily customs of the people, and to change the self-conception of Turks.”⁴² Each Turkish citizen, equipped with well-defined modes of behavior, had to be faithful to the his/her own state that, as a representative of collective personality of the nation and citizens, preached the advantages and goodness of being a Turk, a Turkish citizen. In other words, the Republican concept of citizenship was perceived as not only equipping its citizens with the rights and responsibilities of the public sphere, but as forming a totally new man by preaching even the rearrangement of private life, or the very life-style of the people.

⁴¹ Cited in Yılmaz Altuğ, “Atatürk and Building of a Modern State,” *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 5, 12 (1991), 34.

4.3.1 Citizenship and Civic Information

Apart from developing institutions for the inculcation of an idea of Turkish citizen that will be elaborated below, the first achievement of the republic about citizenship was the development of courses on citizenship. Civic education started with the course *Malumat-ı Vataniyye* (Information About Motherland) that was included in the curriculums in 1924. Later in 1927, it was replaced by *Yurt Bilgisi* (Information about Motherland).⁴³ Afet İnan, who was an adopted daughter of Mustafa Kemal, was commissioned to write the schoolbook *Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler* (Civic Information for the Citizen) for this course with Mustafa Kemal's own contributions.⁴⁴ This book is crucial for understanding how Turkish citizenship was perceived by Mustafa Kemal and the state. The book was designed with an enlightening mission.⁴⁵ It was mainly formed during Mustafa Kemal's discussions

⁴² Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. by Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 21.

⁴³ Üstel, "Yuttaş Profili."

⁴⁴ *Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler* [Civic Information for the Citizen] was first published in 1930 as a course book for secondary schools. Afet İnan made a presentation on "Atatürk's thoughts on the rights and duties of the citizen" in the conference series held by Türk Tarih Kurumu [Turkish History Society] on the 25th anniversary of Atatürk's death. As the presentation took attention Afet İnan decided to re-edit the book. She published *Medeni Bilgiler ve Atatürk'ün El Yazıları* in 1969, by adding Atatürk's own notes to the original book. See, *Atatürk'ün Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri*, [Citizenship Information Atatürk Wrote] ed. by Nuran Tezcan, (İstanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., Cumhuriyet Gazetesi Armağanı, 1997), 9.

⁴⁵ This is evident also in the books of the prominent ideologues of the period. For instance Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Saffet Engin and Recep Peker aimed at providing the readers with the history of philosophy, political systems and thought. Between the lines they preach the Turkish State and the Revolution, and state the

with the state elites, members of the military, lawyers and intellectuals.⁴⁶ Starting from the preface, it was mentioned repeatedly that “Atatürk wanted every right to be complemented by a duty.”⁴⁷ Afet İnan adds that, while the citizen had certain obligations towards the family, society, and the state as a member of the nation, “the nation had some obligations towards the whole humanity in respect to being a family of the civilized humanity.”⁴⁸ Thus, according to Atatürk the most civilized feature of the Turkish citizen was forming the nation as a whole within the civilized realm, as a group of persons endowed with rights and duties, free and equal and conscious of their responsibilities.

The mentality behind the collection of that kind of a book was noted by Atatürk himself as “the information that teaches the citizen the present duties and rights in their conduct of affairs among themselves or between them and the state, and generally the information on the organization of the state are collected under the name Civic Information.”⁴⁹ In the section “What is Civic Information about?” firstly the duties of the state towards the citizens are enlisted as:

- a) to provide and to promote security and justice within the country, and to preserve all kinds of liberties of the citizens,
- b) to recruit foreign politics and relations with other countries positively, and to safeguard the security of the country by keeping the defense

differences and virtues of the Turkish nation compared to others. See, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* [The Revolution of Atatürk], (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995) 3rd ed.; Recep Peker, *İnkılab Dersleri Notları* [Notes of the Lectures of the Revolution], (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936); Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* [The Principles of the Revolution of Kemalism], (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938).

⁴⁶ Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 5.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 7.

- forces ready and if necessary to preserve the rights of the nation by arms,
- c) construction of roads and railroads,
 - d) education,
 - e) social service,
 - f) economic issues like agriculture, commerce and crafts.⁵⁰

Later, the duties of the citizen are mentioned shortly, and voting was stressed as the most important duty and the most holy right of the citizen. Democracy is regarded as intellectual, individualistic and egalitarian. In line with this definition the boundaries of the state's duties towards the citizen are drawn by:

Securing the political freedom of the citizen,
Assuring the improvement of the citizen on intellectual areas such as the areas of science, social, arts and ethics,
Assuring the citizen's right to participate in the national sovereignty in the recognized ways,
And assuring that every citizen has the same political rights.⁵¹

Here, it should be noted that throughout the book only the duties and obligations of the citizens are covered and stressed, however, the rights are undermined. Citizenship was defined within the parameters of the community. Thus, the definition of citizenship was "civic republican."⁵² Liberalism was given short shrift by the prominent ideologues of the period.⁵³ Recep Peker stated that liberalism was based on the premise of freedom and inviolability. But he criticized that inviolability was only viewed from the citizen's aspect. He noted that the state should also be inviolable and the citizens have the obligation to take into consideration not only the inviolability of other citizens but also the nation's and

⁵⁰ Ibid., 15-16; *Atatürk'ün Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri*, 47-48.

⁵¹ Ibid., 45.

⁵² As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, civic republican type of citizenship relies on the importance of the duties and obligations compared to the rights. The community is important and the citizen achieves his/her citizen identity as being part of the community.

the state's inviolability. Otherwise, anarchy would occur and the nation and the state "which are above everything" will be violated.⁵⁴ It is evident that in his view, the state was given the highest priority. It is accepted that the individual liberties and freedoms are drawn within the benefits of the state and the citizens are regarded as responsible towards the state. Afet İnan notes that "for ensuring public order and defense of the country, the state needs healthy, vigorous citizens with high understanding, national sentiment and love for the country."⁵⁵ This is a typical civic republican definition that places the civic virtue at the core of citizenship.

In accordance with this Afet İnan states the duties and obligations of the citizen as follows:

The citizen pays taxes. The citizen is entitled with obeying the rules designed for public order. The citizen has certain obligations to exercise during their activities in commerce and economics towards other citizens and the state. Finally they have obligations towards the nation and humanity. Their most important duty is to participate in the elections.⁵⁶

Moreover, military service is one of the crucial duties of the citizen. The military was regarded as an educational institute where "the minds of the sons of the country are enlightened."⁵⁷ The role of the military in constructing the nation and feeling of being a citizen was expressed as;

In the military the citizens learn equality and develop their ideas of courage and initiative. In this institute they feel deeply that they are the sons of this fatherland. The necessity that every citizen should be beneficial and serving the nation and the country is felt most in the military. There the citizens

⁵³ See Peker, *İnkılab Dersleri*, 59-60, 71-73.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 72.

⁵⁵ Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 45.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 16.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 122.

learn that the only guard for the nation to be valuable, powerful and with high civilization is the military.⁵⁸

The book also covered major themes related with citizenship such as, the state, republic, and detailed information on taxation, constitution, and the regulation of the Parliament, local governments, law, and economics. As mentioned previously, the book aims at serving as an enlightening guide in the conduct of affairs between the state and its citizens.

In addition, the suffrage rights for women and women as citizens are discussed at length. Afet İnan tells in her memoirs that during the practice of the course *Yurt Bilgisi* (Information about Fatherland) one of the students objected to the selection of one of the schoolgirls as a major on the grounds that women did not have the right to participate in the elections. She told the then Minister of Interior Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, that she felt extremely sorry as a Turkish woman for not having the right to participate in the elections. She did not want to be a teacher without those rights. Later she started to study other countries where women were granted suffrage rights.⁵⁹ Later, on April 3, 1930 women were granted the right to participate in the local elections, and on 1934 they were granted full participation in general elections as well. Afet İnan based her arguments about women's suffrage rights on the grounds that women were participating in the public life, working in factories, shops. She cites the examples of other countries and notes that "women can only teach their children about freedom when they get political training."⁶⁰ Granting equal rights to women were an essential part of the modernization project. The newly establishes states regard the reforms on women's rights as part of the

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 4-5.

attempt to take a seat at the international system.⁶¹ Kemalist modernization endowed the Turkish women with the role of being the symbol of the degree of modernity. The total break with the past and the character of the new regime were reflected in this role. Women's participation in the public life was encouraged. The reason for the subordination of women was found in Islam, and the ancient Turkish history provided a reference point for the equality of women and men.

In a study about the courses on citizenship throughout the Republican history, Üstel points to two goals of the courses, namely civilization and patriotism.⁶² With respect to civilization, there was an emphasis on behaving according to the preferred codes of conduct. Üstel later depicts the militant characteristics of Turkish citizenship. Firstly, patriotism was defined as including the cultural and ethnic understanding, in addition to a loyalty based on territory. Secondly, as mentioned throughout this thesis as well, the duties and obligations of the citizen were emphasized, in other words, republican understanding of citizenship was implemented. Thirdly, the motive of threat and enemies was utilized.

Üstel makes reference to the “common good” and “good life” in the formation of the citizen. Those references reflect the merging of the public and private spheres, on the one hand through the regulation of the life of the citizens

⁶⁰ Ibid., 89.

⁶¹ Nilüfer Çağatay and Yasemin N. Soysal, “Uluslaşma Süreci ve Feminizm Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Düşünceler,” in *1980'ler Türkiye'sinde Kadın Bakış Açısından Kadınlar*, ed. by Şirin Tekeli, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 2nd ed., 328.

⁶² Üstel, “Yuttaş Profili.”

even in private life, and on the other hand by defining the social role of the citizen within the parameters of common good.⁶³

Thus, Üstel concludes with the definition of official citizenship as “an understanding of citizenship that does not differentiate between the public and private sphere, militant with respect to its reflexes. Also, social ties among the individuals strengthened by a cultural and ethnic sense of belonging are based on the share of a certain life style and common good.”⁶⁴

4.3.2 Some views on citizenship

There are some significant intellectuals of the early Republican period, who tried to contribute to nation building and to develop a sense of belonging among the people. Many scholars benefit from their books and articles while studying the early republican national identity.⁶⁵ One of them, Saffet Engin, in his book *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* defines the Republic as:

A social group gathers in order to reach a general and collective aim and makes a division of labor in order to reach this aim. They are all obliged to fulfill these duties under a natural leader. Such a nation is belonging to the

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ See, for instance Tanıl Bora, “İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği,”[Turkish National Identity in the Construction Period] *Toplum ve Bilim*, 71 Winter 1996. Tanıl Bora used *Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler* of Afet İnan, *Atatürk İhtilali* of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *İnkılab Dersleri Notları* of Recep Peker, and *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* of Saffet Engin. Also see, Yıldız, *Search for an Ethno-secular delimitation of Turkish National Identity*. Ahmet Yıldız utilized the works of almost the same people, however while excluding Saffet Engin, he benefited from Vasfi Raşid Seviğ. This study refers to mainly Afet İnan, Saffet Engin, and Recep Peker.

highest level of human evolution and the perfect section of the civilization. Because, here high ideals apprehended by everybody, is prevalent.⁶⁶

Engin, by being influenced from August Comte⁶⁷ states that Turkey had reached the positivist stage after passing through the stages of theology and metaphysics. He suggests that “we are Turks and Europeans, as a matter of fact, not to be European is not living in this century, or being dead morally.”⁶⁸

Later he starts to define the Turk; his definitions emphasize the community in the formation of the Turkish identity. He stresses that “every Turk can realize his own character only in the bosom of this national conscience.”⁶⁹ Besides, while noting that each Turk has the ability to make good judgments by his own rationale, later he suggests that “in the community Turk, consciously, likes to think as the other individuals think and act the same way, and is social.”⁷⁰ According to Engin the national era for the Turks started with the increase of collective conscience. “Collective conscience and national conscious is the social power that is composed of the total of the appropriateness of the citizens’ thought, feeling, and activity.”⁷¹ Thus, the citizens should have similarities on

⁶⁶ Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*,

⁶⁷ Auguste Comte, (1798-1857), is the founding father of sociology. He argued that the evolution of knowledge is governed by three stages. The first is the theological stage, where theology was the main source of explanation, the second is the metaphysical stage, when the essence of the phenomenon was to be discovered through the process of reason, and finally the third stage, the positivist age. “Here mind abandons its search for essences and absolutes and contents itself with the discovery of relationships between phenomena, that is with the construction of sciences. See, René Hubert, “Comte, Auguste,” *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 4, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931, 151-152.

⁶⁸ Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri* , 23.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 87.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

- 1) capacity to show same reactions to same effects
- 2) should be aware that same reactions are common in various individuals
- 3) to think on this resembling reactions and to act.⁷²

Engin defines citizenship in a collectivity and community; besides the citizens are conscious of their activities and reactions to certain events, and act in line with the community, which leaves no room for individual ideas and thoughts.

Engin's thoughts reflect the mentality of the early republican era, which one the one hand tries to enlighten the people and motivate them for modernization, by stating that "the aim of Kemalism is to rise the humanity by ensuring the highest manifestation of the reality of universal progress within the national structure"⁷³ and on the other hand tries to build up a new identity. Citizenship is used synonymously for Turkishness or simultaneously the term Turk is used for the citizen. This citizen (Turk) is defined within the parameters of the Turkish nation and has certain obligations and duties towards the state and the nation.

As mentioned previously, citizenship in the early republican period was conceived within the process of nation building and the national revolution. Even though it did not occupy the agenda as an issue, we can come across some articles of the intellectuals of the period on citizenship. On the discussion about the area of thought in Turkey, M. Şekip Tunç⁷⁴, Mümtaz Turhan⁷⁵ and Münir Serim stressed

⁷¹ Ibid., 110.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid., 193.

⁷⁴ Mustafa Şekip Tunç (1889-1958), Turkish psychologist and intellectual. Worked in İstanbul University. He chose Bergsonism as a philosophical ground for the salvation of the nation. He believed in the individual and the virtue of the individual as the core of the civilizations. His books include *İnsan Ruhu üzerinde*

the role of the citizen for the development in the area of thought. Tunç while stating that the national thought should mature more, stresses that certain requirements for this maturity should be acknowledged, one of which is full perception of citizenship.⁷⁶ He stressed the need for the unity of the country and the equal sensitivity of each citizen. “When the citizen reaches the national maturity and discerns that everything belonging to the country is related with him, and preserves this relation as a right, then we could achieve the devotion to the national thought and to the whole national life.”⁷⁷ Serim and Turhan agreed with him that every issue depends on the information about and consciousness of the country, and that each citizen should be aware that he has to show equal responsibility and care, and power for to country above everything.⁷⁸

In another article it is stressed that there is a need for dealing with the issues of patriotism and citizenship. “The duties and roles of the youth and the Turkish citizens in their confrontation with the Turkish society and the state will form around the content of those views”.⁷⁹ Zeki Mesut stressed that there is a need

Gezintiler (1943), *Psikolojiye Giriş* (1949). See *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 32, (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963), 498.

⁷⁵ Mümtaz Turhan (1908-1969) regarded the issue of education within the problem of cultural change, and relied on cultural anthropology in his studies. Hilmi Ziya Ülken suggests that he might be included in the trend of Social Science. His books include *Kültür Değişmeleri* (1951), *Maarifimizin Ana Davaları* (1954), *Garplılaşmanın Neresindeyiz* (1961). See, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 1998), 5th Ed., 458-460.

⁷⁶“Fikir Hayatında Vahdet,” *Kültür Haftası*, 10, March 18 1936, 181, reprinted in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı* [Intellectual Life in Atatürk’s Period], (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1992) eds. Mehmet Kaplan, İnci Enginün, Zeynep Kerman, Necati Birinci, Abdullah Uçman, 164-167.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 165.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

for creating a new mentality and a new spirit within the country and there is need for a new type of citizen on the path to civilization and progress. This new citizen would and should be a patriot in all his individual and social roles. “Thus, in new Turkey, the concepts patriotism and citizenship would have the same meaning.”⁸⁰ Similarly, Nermi points that revolution is not merely a change in the state system, but is “the formation of a new mentality, or more explicitly a new man, which is the major aim.”⁸¹

In most of the articles concerned, there is an emphasis on the general will and common interest. Engin, for instance, mentions the general will. General will, social intelligence and spiritual authority should be prevalent in everybody regardless of class and groups. Besides, by giving the ancient Turkish civilizations as the example, he suggests that the freedom of the citizens had been a core issue, however, this freedom was defined within the boundaries of the general will, which manifested itself in the state authority that could represent the conscience of the nation.⁸² On the other hand, Mesut emphasizes the common interest as follows:

For the regeneration and progress of the Turkish society, all citizens should work in solidarity and be directed towards the same aim and target. The measure of the acts of a real citizen is the common interest. The patriotism of a citizen, who organizes and regulates his social role as serving the common will, is solid, and therefore more productive... Now our major aim is to found a general harmony that would facilitate the realization of common desires and targets.⁸³

⁷⁹ Zeki Mesut, “Vatanperverlik ve Vatandaşlık,” [Patriotism and Citizenship], *Hayat*, 1 (7) 13 January 1927, pp. 134-135, reprinted in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı*, 473.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 477.

⁸¹ M. Nermi, “Yaşar’a Mektuplar,” [Letters to Yaşar] *Hayat*, IV (80), June 8, 1928, 24 reprinted in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı*, 487.

⁸² Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*, 189, 274.

⁸³ Mesut, “Vatanperverlik ve Vatandaşlık,” 477.

In addition, one remark points to the desire to have *civilized* citizens by noting that “ a person, who pushes his fellow citizens while getting on a streetcar, is not a citizen fully.”⁸⁴

With regard to social responsibility of the citizen, it was argued that in the modern society man was freed from isolation and became “the unity of effect and activity.”⁸⁵ Man that was defined as, “the unity of effect and activity,” is the man who feels his social responsibilities thoroughly. According to Nermi, the revolution required that kind of responsibility from its citizens, and every person should think on this social responsibility that makes him an independent citizen.⁸⁶ Those duties and responsibilities are for shaping the future. Similar to other intellectuals mentioned above, Nermi points to collectivity and community. He suggests that everyone should ask himself “What are we?” rather than “Who am I?” and disregards the individualistic understanding as if it was something outdated.⁸⁷ Thus, the responsibilities and duties of the citizens are defined within the community, or as Nermi said, “behind every social duty is the lively voice of the community.”⁸⁸

As it is portrayed in the studies quoted above, the desired citizen of the early republican period was someone aware of the duties assigned to him on the path towards civilization. This desired citizen was portrayed within the community to which he had responsibilities, and through which he could achieve his identity as

⁸⁴ Ibid., 478.

⁸⁵ Nermi, “Yaşar’a Mektuplar,” 488.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 489.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

citizen. Afet İnan stated that each right should correspond to a duty, however rights in the liberal sense are disregarded. Citizenship was a status defined within the objectives of the nation state and as different from the Western practices it was rather designed as a tool for achieving these objectives. The most significant example for the formation of this “citizen” is the formation of the People’s Houses where the people were educated for becoming full-fledged “citizens of the Republic.”

4.3.3 The People’s Houses

The project of nation building and the construction of the citizen was reflected in the formation of the *Halkevi* (People’s Houses). The People’s Houses were founded on February 19, 1932 in fourteen cities. Later in 1940, with the aim of spreading the People’s Houses to smaller regions like villages, *Halkodaları* (People’s Rooms) were to be formed. The previously functioning Turkish Hearts were closed for the reason that they had completed their aim of providing Turkish national sentiment and consciousness.⁸⁹ People’s Houses replaced them as a new institution “to transform the Anatolian society, the Turkish people into a strong and modern Turkish nation. For this reason the People’s Houses were founded.”⁹⁰ The

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ The Turkish Hearts were founded in 1912 and functioned until 1931 and were replaced by the People’s Houses. They aimed at the promotion of Turkish nationalism, and worked not only at the cultural level, but also influenced the political activities as well. See, Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)* [Turkish Nationalism since the Empire to the Nation-State: The Turkish Hearts], İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997.

significance of the People's Houses for this study is that, they were the major institutions where the desired citizen of the Turkish Republic would be raised or educated.

The social role of the people's Houses was defined as "to continue Kemalist revolutions until the sovereignty of the people is realized thoroughly, to educate and improve the people in order to elevate them to a level sufficient for the exercise of this sovereignty."⁹¹ The project of the People's Houses was regarded as the success of the Kemalist regime by the General Directorate of the People's Houses for "the education of the people, cultural development and the formation of national integrity and consciousness."⁹² In other words the People's Houses were one of the most significant projects of the Kemalist regime for the construction of a new type of citizen of the modern nation state. Atatürk declared his views on the need for the People's Houses as,

The nation should organize as a mass of people that is conscious, understanding and devoted to an ideal. It is not sufficient to have the strongest lecturing means or the most educated armies of teachers. We will not undermine the regulation of a national people's work in order to educate the people, and for the amassment of the people.⁹³

⁹⁰ Kadri Kaplan, "Halkevleri'nin Doğuş Bilinci ve Tarihsel Görevi" [The Birth of the People's Houses and their Historical Tasks], in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri: Atatürkçü Düşünce Üzerine Denemeler* [Atatürk and the People's Houses: Essays on Atatürkist Thought], (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1974), 52.

⁹¹ Anıl Çeçen, "Halkevlerinin Toplumsal Görevi" [The Social Tasks of the People's Houses], in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 190.

⁹² Halkevleri Genel Başkanlığı ve Atatürk Enstitüsü Başkanlığı [General Head of the People's Houses and Head of The Atatürk Institute], "Sunuş" [Preface] in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 5.

⁹³ Beşir Göğüş, "Halkevleri ve Halk Eğitimi" [People's Houses and the education of the People] in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 176, cited from *Halkevleri Dergisi*, 1, 1966.

Similarly, in the speech Recep Peker made in the opening of the People's Houses mentioned that there was a need for additional education after or together with schools for the training of the people in order to form the nation. Thus, the aim of the Republican Peoples party was "to organize the nation as a mass of people who were conscious, and who understood and loved each other and were tied to an ideal."⁹⁴

In the opening speeches the community was emphasized again. It was stated that everyone should spare some of his time for the improvement of the community and believe by heart for the necessity of this. "Otherwise the best-educated citizen will stay as a single citizen."⁹⁵ In the People's Houses the educated citizens would contribute to the education of the other citizens. Thus, Peker argued, the nation will solidify and turn into a community as a granite mass.⁹⁶ In the first anniversary of the formation of the People's Houses a revue named *Birlik* (Unity) was performed, which propagated "community" against "one" and "all" against "I."⁹⁷

People's Houses were formed and utilized as an institution where citizenship consciousness among the people would be elevated. In the first anniversary, İsmet İnönü reminded their expectations from the citizens as follows:

We will consider the duties of the citizens to be exercised by good will and sacrifice. We address to the citizens above everything that, if they became old enough to join the military and were invited, they should do their military service; if obligation for taxation is bestowed upon them, then they

⁹⁴ "Recep Bey'in (Peker) Nutku", [The Speech of Recep Peker] in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 11.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 15

⁹⁷ "Halkevlerinin Birinci Yıldönümü," [The First Anniversary of the People's Houses] in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 40. However, no further information could be gathered on this revue. The collection of the plays and revues held in the People's Houses did not include *Birlik*.

should consider paying their taxes as an honor. The basis of our policies and our success is the declaration of the duties explicitly.⁹⁸

Atatürk inspired the members of the People's Houses to study language, research about folklore, gather information about villages, gather a collection of customs and traditions, research history and archeology, revive folkloric dances, deal with folklore poets, travel, hold conferences, write, improve the ability for public speech, play sports, and attract people to the People's Houses.⁹⁹ In order to carry out all those duties The People's Houses had mainly nine branches. Those were: 1. Language and literature, 2. Fine Arts, 3. Performance and theatre, 4. Sports, 5. Social assistance, 6. Courses for the people and training, 7. Library and publication, 8. Village, 9. History and museums. Among them the branches of language and literature, and history and museums are significant. In the speech he made on the opening ceremony of the People's Houses, Reşit Galip Bey declared that:

Within the cultural elements that compound the national character and that shapes and strengthens the national spirit, language, literature and history are the most important ones.

The branches of language and literature, and history will aim at gathering all the people around the country studying on those areas. Under today's circumstances where every work has just started, it is especially crucial for those studying language, literature and history, to work in collaboration. The organization of this collaboration and the collaboration itself are necessary for the rise of national language, national literature and national history on a well-founded basis.¹⁰⁰

Thus, the activities of the language and literature branch were to increase the general knowledge of the people; to prepare conferences, speeches, and ceremonies

⁹⁸ "İsmet Paşa Hazretlerinin Nutku,"[The Speech of İsmet Paşa] in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 45

⁹⁹ Enver Behnan Şapolyo, "Atatürk ve Halkevleri," [Atatürk and the People's Houses] in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 68-69.

that would initiate the principles of the party to take root, and help increase the feeling of citizenship obligations; in addition to working on language and literature.¹⁰¹ The history branch, on the other hand, was founded for research on history, folklore, and ethnography.

The project of the People's Houses can be viewed as a significant part of the populism of six principles of the Republican Peoples Party. Those principles were founded on the congress of the RPP in 1931. The journal of the People's Houses *Ülkü* was issued with the aim of teaching the people the six arrows of the RPP, and providing those six arrows a theoretical framework.¹⁰² The six arrows of the RPP were founded in the 1931 Congress of the party and can be regarded as the core of Kemalism. Those are defined as "the essential characteristics of the republican Peoples Party," and are a) republicanism, b) nationalism, c) populism, d) etatism, e) secularism, f) revolutionarism.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ "Reşit Galip Bey'in Nutku,"[The Speech of Reşit Galip Bey] *Hakimiyeti Milliye*, February, 20 1932 reprinted in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 19.

¹⁰¹ Uluğ İğdemir, "Halkevleri ve Halkodaları" [People's Houses and People's Rooms], in *Atatürk ve Halkevleri*, 122.

¹⁰² *Bir Yurttaş Yaratmak: Muasır Bir Medeniyet İçin Seferberlik Bilgileri, 1923-1950* [To Create a Citizen: Information of Mobilization for a Modern Civilization], Exhibition Catalogue, ed. by Zafer Toprak, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 1998), 53.

¹⁰³ Those characteristics are explained as:

- a) The Party is convinced that the Republic is the form of government which represents and realizes most safely the ideal of national sovereignty. With its unshakable conviction, the Party defends, with all its means, the Republic against all danger.
- b) The Party considers it essential to preserve the special character and the entirely independent identity of the Turkish social community in the sense explained in Article 2 (The nation is the political unit composed of citizens bound together with the bonds of language, culture, and ideal). The Party follows, in the meantime, a way parallel to and in harmony with all the modern nations in the way of progress and development, and in the international contacts and relations.

The significance of the formation of the People's Houses should be evaluated with the formation of two other institutions at the same year, namely *Türk Dil Kurumu* [Turkish Linguistic Society], and *Türk Tarih Kurumu* [Society for the Study of Turkish History]. Those two institutions were designed for founding the grounds for national identity and for initiating social and cultural transformation. In 1931 the Society for the Study of Turkish History was founded with the aim of “promoting interest and research in the national history of the Turks as distinct

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- c) The source of Will and Sovereignty is the Nation. The Party considers it as an important principle that this Will and Sovereignty be used to regulate the proper fulfillment of the mutual duties of the citizen to the State and of the State to the citizen.

We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the Law, and who recognize no privileges for any individual, family, class, or community, to be of the people and for the people (populist).

- d) Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible.
- e) The Party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and methods in the administration of the State prepared and applied in conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilization by Science and Technique.
- As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers it to be one of the chief factors of the success of our nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State.
- f) The Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles which have since been elaborated.

“Program of the People's Party of the Republic,” (Official Translation) in Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Transformation*, (New York: AMS Press, 1973), 307-309. Originally this is the program of 1935, but the content is almost the same. I have checked and shortened this program in accordance with the program cited in Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u* [The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Kemalist Single Party Ideology and the Six Arrows of the RPP] Vol. 3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), 36-37.

from merely Ottoman history.”¹⁰⁴ The major aim of the society was to search for the history of the Turks in the pre-Islamic period. With this aim several congresses were held, the first of which took place in July 1932 in Ankara. The aim was “to spread the history thesis to masses and to develop new history books.”¹⁰⁵ The history thesis mainly aimed at the creation of a new history. In doing so, Central Asia, that was believed to be the original homeland of the Turks was revisited. In addition, the main argument was that civilization emerged and spread over the world from the Turks in the Central Asia.¹⁰⁶ This history thesis had concluded that all the civilizations in the world originated from Turkish civilization. Engin argued that “it was understood that all the great civilizations of Crete, Aegean and Greeks were in fact a common Turkish civilization. The world described by Homer in his epics was Turk.”¹⁰⁷

In parallel with the foundation of the Society for the Study of Turkish History, in July 1932 the Turkish Linguistic Society was founded. The aim was “to bring out the genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish language and to elevate it to the high rank it deserves among world languages.”¹⁰⁸ The Sun-Language Thesis

¹⁰⁴ Uriel Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern turkey*, Oriental Notes and Studies No. 5, (Jerusalem: Hadassah Apprentice School of Printing, 1954), 25.

¹⁰⁵ Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezi’nin Oluşumu (1929-1937* [Power and History: The Development of the “Official History” Thesis in Turkey], (İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), 2nd ed., 119. For the official history thesis see the whole book.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 120. Here Mahmut Esat Bozkurt argues that the Turks had long before Europe cultivated land, raised cattle, and used mines.

¹⁰⁷ Saffet Engin, “Türk Tarihi ve İnkılabı” [Turkish History and Revolution], in *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri*

¹⁰⁸ Heyd, *Language Reform*, 25. Also see, “Güneş-Dil Teorisinin Ana Hatları ve Verimleri” [The Main Points of the Sun-Language Thesis and Its

was developed during this period, which suggested that as “Central Asia was the cradle of human civilization, Turkish was the mother of all languages.”¹⁰⁹ To further the research done on Turkish language and the Sun-Language thesis several congresses were held, like on history, starting from September 1932. But those societies and theories were developed and utilized in order to facilitate the break with the Ottoman past, and the development of a new Turkish nation. Through the usage of “scientific” knowledge, it was tried to be proved that the Turks were the prominent actors in world history. The People’s Houses grew, and functioned parallel to those institutions.

The aim of the People’s Houses was, as mentioned above, to create a “new man” civilized from head to toe. This new man should be a distinguished person with his taste of music,¹¹⁰ physical structure, hygiene, and manners. This is also quite parallel to the statement that “the individual only becomes a citizen and subject of right through and thanks to the institution; the citizens obligations to it are logically anterior to his or her rights.”¹¹¹

The project of the People’s Houses is one of the significant examples of what Michel Foucault calls as disciplinary power and bio-power. Disciplinary power, has the major function of “ ‘training’, rather than selecting and levying; or

Products], *Türk Dili*, 16, April 1936, 30-32, reprinted in *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı*, Vol.2, 92-95.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 33.

¹¹⁰ See, Orhan Tekelioğlu, “The Rise of a Spontaneous Synthesis: The Historical Background of Turkish Popular Music,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32 (2) April 1996.

¹¹¹ Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: an introduction,” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1991, 32.

training in order to levy and select all the more.”¹¹² In addition, Foucault argues that “discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is a specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise.”¹¹³ In line with Hobbes’ statement that “man is made fit for society not by nature, but by discipline,”¹¹⁴ “the citizen is quintessentially a creation of techniques of social discipline, and derives his or her citizenly capacities as a product of the activity of government.”¹¹⁵ David Burchell argues that this is the key feature of passive citizen. The creation of a new type of citizen, the new man, and the ongoing emphasis on community, reflects Foucault’s views on modern governmental rationality; where he points to the tendency of “a form of political sovereignty, which would be a government of all and of each, and whose concern would be at once to ‘totalize’ and to ‘individualize’.”¹¹⁶

Bio-power is related to the biological interest in individuals by the administrative power, and might be regarded as the origin of the modern state.¹¹⁷ The emergence of censuses and the increasing concern on health and hygiene of the subjects is part of bio-power. The importance of hygiene and public health was expressed by İsmet İnönü as:

¹¹² Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 170.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Gert Bernard (ed.), *Thomas Hobbes: Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive)*, (London: Harvester, 1978), 10 cited in David Burchell, “The Attributes of Citizens: Virtue, Manners and the Activity of Citizenship,” *Economy and Society*, 24 (4) November 1995, 541.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 543.

¹¹⁶ Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: an introduction,” 3.

The basis of our Social life is the preservation and solidarity of the family. In our social structure, a strong family life, free from all kinds of anti-democratic and servile mentality, is the thing, which will occupy our attention. We have resolved to seek and to pursue continuously the procuring of all means for the protection and usefulness of the children in the family. Thus we consider the nurture of the children to be the main wealth and support of the country. The conviction that the prosperity and happiness of the country is possible only through service, and that wealth can only be secured through economy above everything else in the family and in society, shall be foremost among the activities of the party. The struggle against the high cost of living shall be pursued unceasingly and properly.

The following are the aims of our Party:

To work for the improvement of the sanitary conditions of the country along scientific lines;

To fight continually against social diseases;

To enlighten the people persistently and uninterruptedly in order that they may come to respect the laws of hygiene and health;

To open scientific institutions;

To make hygienic and social laws for the realization of our program of public health; and

To provide the means for the care and protection of those who are temporarily or permanently disabled.¹¹⁸

The increasing concern of the state over the body of its subjects were reflected on the importance given to the measures for the rise of population and struggle with the diseases like, tuberculosis, syphilis, and malaria. Those were included in the programme of the Republican Peoples Party, in addition to the concern on physical education, which was supposed to be simultaneous with the revolutionary education. In line with the party programme, a law on education was enacted which will be evaluated below.

¹¹⁷ See Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1985).

¹¹⁸ The Address of Ismet Pasha on Education," *Vakit*, November 14, 1927, reprinted and translated in Lutfy Levonian, *The Turkish Press: Selections from the Turkish Press Showing Events and Opinions 1925-1932*, (Athens: School of Religion, 1932).

4.3.4 The law of physical education

As mentioned above, the physical education of the citizens was regarded as an essential part of the education of the citizens. Article 7 of the National Education section of the RPP party programme of 1931 stated that: Our Party gives importance to all the sports groups formed by the Turkish citizens from the point of keeping the nation powerful and resolute, and regards the protection and continuation of those groups as its duty.¹¹⁹

In the following party programme of 1935, more detail was given on the views on sports and physical education. After stressing that continuity in physical education, sports activities and revolutionary education will be taken into consideration, it was stated that every person will be obliged to deal with physical education.¹²⁰ Parla argues that this article was a prescription of the forthcoming law on physical education, and sought for sportsman soldiers of the revolution.¹²¹

The law of physical education was enacted on June 29, 1938. According to Article 1 of the law, it was stated that physical education is composed of all kinds of gymnastics, sports and games that facilitates the development of the citizens' capabilities in accordance with the national and revolutionary objectives.¹²² Therefore, playing sports was defined as an obligation until the age of 45, especially for the youth (Article 4). According to Article 13, in villages, towns,

¹¹⁹ Parla, *Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi*, 73.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 77

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, "Spor teşkilatı hakkında kanun layihası ve Muvakkat encümen mazbatası" [Proposal of law on sport organization] Vol. 26, Sequence no. 332, 4.

cities, and separate districts except schools and military garrisons, which inhabit more than fifty citizens of the age of obligation for sports; clubs, in places with less than fifty citizens, sports groups would be formed. Besides, the companies, factories and institutions employing more than five hundred workers were obliged to build sports halls and swimming pools.

The reasons for sports organization were stated in the proposed law by giving the Western countries as examples. The Western countries gave premium importance to sports and physical education, because they have considered the education of the citizens as well shaped and with normal quality, to be the most important element of the defense of the country and for economic development.¹²³ Therefore, creation of a highly qualified Turkish youth in all aspects was a major aim. The proposal was introduced by the then Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, stating that physical education is a critical component of national education, and aims at raising people as beneficial persons for the nation and humanity. The reason behind the enactment of a law on physical education was expressed by the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya as:

Every regime seeks an appropriate type of citizen and finds it. We know the citizen of the absolutist regime. The man of the regime of Atatürk, the Kemalist revolution is well shaped, clever, brave, dignified, merry and serious, and defends his rights and ideas in every circumstance. We are seeking this. The aim of this physical education is intellectual, moral and ethical training. This is the type our regime entails...Being well behaved, polite, dignified and serious are the Turks' most obvious features in confrontation with the world.¹²⁴

As can be depicted, the law of physical education is a reflection of the increasing concern of the state over the body of the individuals. In that sense, it is the utilization of bio-power.

¹²³ Ibid., 1.

The infusion of the private and public sphere, which had been the case during the process of the construction of citizenship, can also be seen in this law. Şükrü Kaya, in the end of his introductory speech stated that “we would like to see our citizens serious and dignified, in their public life, as well as in their private life.”¹²⁵

4.4 The “Other” Face of the Citizenship Construction: The Turkification Process

What is evaluated so far is the abstract definition of Turkish citizenship. It is mostly related with the legal status aspect of Turkish citizenship. However, there is another aspect related to Turkish identity, and the actual practices that in a sense deviate from that abstract definition mentioned above. This section will dwell upon the situation of the minorities, and the policies implemented with the aim of homogenizing the nation. The nation was defined as a political and social group with unity in language, culture, and ideal. This was an inclusive definition in the first instance. However, the degree of inclusion varied by the difference of religion in actual practice.

While people with different ethnic and cultural origins were to be called Turks, the notion of citizenship was not defined simply in ethnic terms. That is, Turkish nationality was not regarded as the product of biology or blood ties. The new and artificially constructed or ‘manufactured’ Turkish culture was, therefore, open to non-Turkish Muslim groups, who were accepted as members of the nation

¹²⁴ *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 26, 29 June 1938, 487.

and state so long as they were willing to culturally and linguistically integrate or assimilate into the Turkish culture. This is the logic of cultural assimilation, it was not ethnic or racist. The migration of Muslim groups (Bosnians, Albanians, Macedonians) from both the Balkans and the Caucasus were accepted, and those groups were easily naturalized; however, migration of the Gagavuz Turks, a small Turkish group with a Christian origin, was hardly accepted.¹²⁶ In a similar way, non-Muslim groups (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) were called Turk only in respect to citizenship, but not to nationality; in terms of defining nationality they were seen as outsiders whether or not of Turkish origin, for they were not Muslim.¹²⁷ This shows that in determining the nature of Turkish nationality, in an implicit manner, religion appeared as a significant element together with ethnicity.

Herein lies the paradox of the official definition of Turkish identity and citizenship. While seeming to reject their Ottoman and Islamic heritage, the new regime (Republic) still continued to respect the common historical heritage with those non-Turkish groups mentioned above. Those groups were placed within the Muslim *millet* in the Ottoman Empire, and, it might be argued, there is a reflection of that *millet* system in the Turkish Republic in its recognition of the groups that previously were parts of the Muslim *millet* as Turks. In a similar way, the non-

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği" [Turkish Identity from the Ottomans to the Republic], in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik* [Republic, Democracy, and Identity], ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 81.

¹²⁷ Bernard Lewis said, "One may speak of Christian Arabs, but a Christian Turk is an absurdity and a contradiction in terms. Even after thirty years of the secular Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk." "Turkey: Westernisation," in *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization*, ed. by G. E. von Grunebaum (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955), 326.

Muslim groups remaining in Turkey were regarded as Turkish citizens as a continuation of their community status in the Ottoman Empire. But there were debates on the status of the non-Muslim communities and the problem of their citizenship during the 1920s. The debate was around equality and the assimilation of the non-Muslim population. On the other hand, it was exclusionary in the sense that the outsiders with non-Muslim origins were hardly accepted as citizens. Those issues will be elaborated below, by taking certain periods and events as a reference point. The process of Turkification will be analyzed, here policies on Turkification means, by quoting Aktar:

It is the process during which the Turkish ethnic identity began to be dominant in almost every level of social life, such as from the language spoken in the streets to the history taught at schools; from trade to the state regime in employing personnel; from special law to the settlement of the people in specific regions.¹²⁸

A French journalist who stayed in Turkey during the war of national independence, later wrote on the situation of the citizens in Turkey, in his book:

There still exist in the country two categories of citizens with unequal rights, the Muslims and the non-Muslims.

This discrimination made between the citizens of the same state, is not, however, dictated by the difference of religion. Its causes are, on the one hand, of a moral nature; on the other hand, of an economic nature. Let us examine first the former set of causes. The Muslim Turks, who alone fought for the independence of the country, remain still very much under the influence of the tragic struggle, which took place in Anatolia. No more have they forgotten the attitude taken at that time by various sections of the non-Muslim communities. Certain betrayals rendered them suspicious. And in this state of mind they no longer consider the oral manifestations of civic loyalty on the part of the minorities as being of indisputable sincerity. They wish proofs more tangible showing that the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews have become heart and soul true citizens of Turkey.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan "Türkleştirme" Politikaları" [The Policies of Turkification implemented during the first years of the Republic] *Tarih ve Toplum*, 156 December 1996, 324.

¹²⁹ Paul Gentizon, *Mustapha Kemal, ou l'Orient en marche*, (Paris: Bossard, 1929) cited in Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development* (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), 82.

In fact, the situation of the minorities had been a critical issue since the Ottoman Empire. The foreign powers tried to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Empire in matters related with the situation of the non-Muslim groups, in other words, the *millets*. The underlying reason behind both the *Tanzimat* Charter and the Reform Edict was to free the Empire from that interference by granting equal status to the non-Muslims. However, these attempts failed, and the population exchange with Greece became an issue after the Balkan War in 1914.¹³⁰ Akçam argues that Turkification had occupied the core of the governmental policies after the Balkan War, and detailed plans were made for the eradication of the non-Turkish masses from strategic areas.¹³¹

After the Balkan Wars and during and after the War of Independence around 1 million Greeks left Anatolia and moved to Greece. The agreement on population exchange was signed in January 30, 1923 in Lausanne after long debates. According to this agreement, non-Muslim Turkish citizens living in the Turkish territories would be exchanged with the Muslim Greek citizens living in Greek territories starting from May 1923, and none of them could return to the

¹³⁰ See, Ayhan Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi ve Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi Sürecinde Bir Aşama: Türk-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi 1923-1924” [A Phase in the Homogenization of the Population and the Turkification of the Economy: Turkish-Greek Population Exchange], in *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* [Tax on Property and the Policies of Turkification] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 26.

¹³¹ See, Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu* [Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Problem] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995) 4th ed., 124. Here Taner Akçam argues that the issue of the Armenians (so-called Armenian holocaust) can also be analyzed within this framework of Turkification process.

places they lived without the permission of the respective governments.¹³² This agreement excluded the Greeks inhabiting in Istanbul, and the Muslims inhabiting in Western Thrace. According to some statistics, a total of 1,200,000 Anatolian Greeks left Turkey, while 400,000 Rumelian Muslims arrived.¹³³ The law prescribed that the properties left by the migrants would be distributed to their counterparts in respective countries. However, as Aktar mentioned, the migration of the Greeks had started long ago, and the properties and houses they left had already been plundered by either the homeless Anatolian people or in some places by the people close to Ankara government. Thus, the settlement of the migrants in both countries became a problem.

The population exchange was part of the process of the homogenization of the populations of both Turkey and Greece. As mentioned above, Muslims were regarded closer to the Turkish culture than the non-Muslims. Moreover, because of the attitude of some of the sections of the minorities during the War of Independence, there was an unrest and mistrust towards these groups. By the finalization of the population exchange process, the non-Muslim population which had been one fifth of the total Ottoman population before First World War, fell to one fortieth.¹³⁴

The implications of the population exchange are not only limited to the homogenization of the nation. By having a Turkified population, firstly the intervention of the Western powers to the domestic affairs in Turkey for the reason

¹³² Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925)* [The Great Exchange: Forced Migration to Turkey] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 18.

¹³³ Ayhan Aktar, "Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi," 17.

of the minorities was eliminated.¹³⁵ In addition, the population exchange has led to changes in economic structure. Aktar benefits from a special report prepared by the then American Ambassador, Raymond Hare, that was evaluating the population exchange and noting that “while Greece benefited from the population exchange economically, it had political losses. Turkey, on the other hand, has been beneficial politically, but had economical loss.”¹³⁶ The economic loss was firstly due to the migration of the Greek merchants and craftsmen who had been prevalent in the market.¹³⁷ Secondly, the resettlement of the newcomers was not handled with plans or programs, which caused a fall in the agricultural production.¹³⁸ On the other hand, the population exchange led to the emergence of a national bourgeoisie under these circumstances.¹³⁹ This would be more significant during the period when Tax on Property was sued, which will be elaborated below, that led to further

¹³⁴ Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar* [State and Classes in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993) 3rd ed., 112.

¹³⁵ Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi,” 20, 43.

¹³⁶ Raymond Hare, “The Origin and Development of the Greco-Turkish Exchange of Populations Question,” 15 October 1930 dated and 767.68115/143 numbered special report quoted in *ibid.*

¹³⁷ For instance, the production of brick, glass, and pottery were done by the Greeks, and after their departure a major fall in the production was experienced. See, Arı, *Büyük Mübadele*, 175. On the other hand, foreign trade had almost stopped because of the departure of the Greek traders. See, Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi,” 50-51.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 47. It is stated that the migrants were resettled in unfamiliar geographic and climate conditions, by ignoring the regions they came from. This in turn led to fall in agricultural production. However, Kemal Arı suggests that the newcomers have contributed to the development in some sectors, like new methods in raising crops, and tobacco production. See, Arı, *Büyük Mübadele*, 176-182.

¹³⁹ Aktar, “Nüfusun Homojenleştirilmesi,” 49-55, Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 114-118.

elimination of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie and strengthening of the Turkish bourgeoisie instead.

According to the Lausanne Treaty signed on 24 July 1923, the non-Muslim population of Turkey, namely Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were granted minority status. The articles of the Treaty related with the minority status were between 37th and 45th articles. Those articles granted the minorities the freedoms of worship, travel and migration, right to speak their own languages, and forming their own religious, educational and social service associations.¹⁴⁰ According to article 42, the minorities had the right to regulate their own traditions and customs and their own laws in family and personal matters.¹⁴¹

However, the Republic had the intention to grasp all of its population under one law, namely the Civil Law. During the preparation of this law in 1925, the minorities withdrew from their rights granted by Article 42, either willingly or unwillingly.¹⁴² But, this did not help to the betterment of their situation, or to be accepted as full citizens of the Turkish Republic.

¹⁴⁰ Avner Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler* [Jews in the Turkish Republic], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 19.

¹⁴¹ See Ayhan Aktar, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Uygulanan Türkleştirme Politikaları," *Tarih ve Toplum* note 21.

¹⁴² See, *ibid.*, 112-113; Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler*, 68-69; Rıfat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, [The Jews of Turkey During the Republican Years: An Adventure of Turkification], (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 90-102.

4.4.1 The emphasis on Turkish language

As mentioned previously, the major components of a nation were defined as unity in language, culture and ideal. Therefore, many attempts were made on the development and spread of Turkish. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, which would ease literacy among the masses. On the other hand, a language thesis was formulated, that was mentioned above. During this process, the population that had mother tongues other than Turkish experienced pressures for speaking Turkish, and the Turkification of the names was regulated by a new law, namely the law of Family Names.

4.4.1.1 "Citizen, speak Turkish!"

During the Turkification process, campaigns for making non-Muslim citizens speak Turkish were initiated several times. Speaking Turkish was regarded as an integral part of being a nation, which was reflected in the motto of "one language, one culture, and one ideal." In 1931, in a speech he made on the programme of RPP, the party general secretary, Recep Peker, stressed the importance on Turkish as:

We should express our views about the Christian and Jewish citizens as well. Our Party regards those citizens as Turkish on the condition that they participate in the unity of language and ideal we have expressed previously.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ Parla, *Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi*, 110.

The first campaign was organized by the Student Union of the *Dar-ül Fünun* Faculty of Law, with the aim of banning the usage of languages other than Turkish by the minorities in public places.¹⁴⁴ It was stated in a newspaper that

One of the requirements of citizenship is to know and speak Turkish, which is the official language of Turkey. Those whom we admitted to citizenship should know that. They (Armenians, Greeks, and especially Jews) owe their ease, freedom and income, everything to the Turks whose language they do not want to speak.¹⁴⁵

Signs were hung to the public places, like ships, and people started to warn those speaking foreign languages. There even occurred some fights and quarrels among the people.¹⁴⁶

In response to this campaign, the Jews formed Turkish courses for their community,¹⁴⁷ and the Turkish Hearts opened Turkish courses for the minorities. The first campaign for Turkish ended suddenly, but new campaigns were to be organized from time to time in the future.

4.4.1.2 The law on family names

The law on Family Names was adopted in 1934. The proposal noted that family names were used all around the world, and that the family name states the

¹⁴⁴ Bali, *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni*, 135.

¹⁴⁵ M(ım) Halid, “Türkçe Mecburiyeti” [Compulsory Turkish], *Edirne Postası*, 22 March 1928 cited in *ibid.*, 144.

¹⁴⁶ See, *ibid.*, 130-148.

¹⁴⁷ The Jews had given priority to learning and speaking Turkish. They formed a commission for the spread of the usage of Turkish. Their principles were mainly to adopt Turkish as mother tongue, and to open courses for this. See, *ibid.* note 278, 133.

nationality of the person. Muğla deputy Nuri Bey, who prepared the proposal mentioned the people who were trying to change their names in the courts with the names Turkified by Mustafa Kemal. He added that together with a new regulation and with the help of science on the derivation of new names, this problem would be solved.¹⁴⁸

According to this law, all names that remind ranks, post, tribe, foreign race or nationality, and names that are disgusting, funny or rude would be outlawed (Article 3). In addition, the new surnames should be in Turkish, thus the foreign tags such as “*yan, of, ef, viç, iç, dis, pulos, aki, zâde, mahdumu, veled* and *bin* were prohibited.¹⁴⁹

On the banning of those names that remind foreign nationality like *Çeçen İbrahim* or *Laz Mehmet*, the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, noted that their aim was “to abolish the imaginary distinctiveness that does not exist at all.”¹⁵⁰ This is in parallel with the definition of a nation in *Medeni Bilgiler* that stressed

Today there are citizens and nationalities within the Turkish nations political and social spheres to whom Kurdish, Circassian, Laz, or Bosnian identities were propagated. However, these wrong names that are the products of the absolutist era, have not made any influence on the nation except distress other than a few tools of the enemy and reactionary fools. Because, those members of the nation also have the same past, history, morality, and law with the general Turkish community.¹⁵¹

On the other hand, Refet Bey declared that he was against the abolishing of the foreign names. This would, according to Refet Bey, conceal the real tendencies

¹⁴⁸ “Muğla Mebusu Nuri Beyin, nüfus kanununa müzeyyel 3/97 numaralı kanun teklifile soy adı hakkında 1/558 numaralı kanun layihası ve Dahiliye ve Adliye encümenleri mazbatası,” *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, vol. 23, Sequence no.203.

¹⁴⁹ “Soyadı Nizamnamesi” *Resmî Gazete*, No: 2805, 20 December 1934. Articles 5, 7 and 8.

¹⁵⁰ *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 21.6.1934, 246.

of some people. Instead, he suggested that those who want to assume foreign names should be allowed to do so, which would enable people to see those persons' real identities.¹⁵² In response to this, the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, stressed the importance of assimilation, as one of the major duties of a state. He suggested that the incongruities would be eliminated through schools and society, and the person would become "a Turk as much as I am and would serve to the country."¹⁵³ Thus, the law on Family Names would serve to assimilate the non-Turkish elements within the Turkish community.

4.4.2 The law on settlement

1934 had been a critical year for the minorities. The Thrace incidents and the enactment of the 2510 numbered Law on Settlement almost went simultaneously. The Law on Settlement is significant for the issue of citizenship as it is still used for admitting people to Turkish citizenship. Besides, as will be elaborated below, this law points to the transformation in the understanding of citizenship from territorial understanding towards a more common culture and descent oriented one.

The Thrace incidents started with the publication of an anti-Semitist journal called *Millî İnkılâp* [National Reform] in Istanbul. After that, the anti-Semitist movement increased in Turkey, especially in the Thrace region. Jews were attacked

¹⁵¹ Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler*, 23.

¹⁵² See the speech of Refet Bey, Bursa deputy, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 23, 21 June 1934, 248-249.

and their shops were plundered especially in Çanakkale, and other parts of Thrace. As a result of those attacks Jews living in those regions had to flee to Istanbul.¹⁵⁴ The rise of those attacks against Jews is regarded as the results of both the enactment of the Law on Settlement, and the influence of the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe.¹⁵⁵

The 2510 numbered Law on Settlement was enacted on June 14, 1934. According to the Minister of Interior, Şükrü Kaya, thanks to this law, the country “would transform into a country where a single language is spoken, and same thoughts and sentiment are shared by the people.”¹⁵⁶ In the introductory speech, Kütahya deputy, Naşit Hakkı Bey, noted that this law was one of the fundamental laws of the revolution.¹⁵⁷ In his long speech, Naşit Hakkı Bey mentioned the importance of the unity in language, culture and ideal and added that this law would help the assimilation of those who regard themselves as non-Turkish, or who had lost Turkish identity. By taking all the measures for the people to speak Turkish, and abolishing of the tribal organizations, those who were from other cultures or

¹⁵³ See the speech of Şükrü Kaya, Minister of Interior, *ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ For the details of the Thrace events, see Ayhan Aktar, “Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını ‘Doğru’ Anlamak” [Understanding the Thrace Jewish Incidents Properly], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 155 (November 1996); Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Yahudiler*, 100-130; Bali, *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni*, 243-264. Also see, Haluk Karabatak, “1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudiler” [Thrace Incidents and the Jews], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 146 (February 1996), 4-16; Oral Onur, “Trakya Olayları Hakkında” [About the Thrace Incidents], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 149 (May 1996), 3-4; and Avner Levi, “Trakya Yahudileri Olayı. Alınamayan Ders,” [The Incident of the Jews of Thrace], *Tarih ve Toplum*, 151 (July 1996), 10-17.

¹⁵⁵ Bali, *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni*, 243-246.

¹⁵⁶ Speech of Şükrü Kaya, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, period 4, vol. 23, 14 June 1934, 141.

¹⁵⁷ Speech of Naşit Hakkı Bey, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, period 4, vol. 23, 7 June 1934, 67.

who spoke other languages would be absorbed, and assimilated into the Turkish culture.¹⁵⁸

The first article of the Law on Settlement stated that the dispersion and the settlement of the population would be regulated according to the degree of adherence to the Turkish culture. Thus, the Turkish territory was divided into three regions: the first region is the territory where the population with Turkish culture is desired to concentrate. The second region is the territory spared for the settlement of those who were to be assimilated into the Turkish culture. The third region would be evacuated for health, political, military and security purposes, and it would be prohibited to settle in those places (Article 2).

Article 3 stated that those people from Turkish descent or those close to Turkish culture who migrate with the desire to settle in Turkey are accepted by the decision of the Ministry of Interior and are called *muhacir* (émigré). Those émigrés and refugees would resettle in the places shown and would not be permitted to leave those places (Article 7). Besides, the émigrés would be helped in their resettlement and naturalization would be made easier for them (Article 6). On the other hand, those who do not adhere to Turkish culture, anarchists, spies, nomadic gypsies and those who were deported would not be admitted as émigrés (Article 4).

The nomadic gypsies of Turkish nationality would be spread to villages of Turkish culture, foreign nomadic gypsies and nomads who do not adhere to Turkish culture would be deported (Article 9). In addition, according to Article 10, leadership of the nomadic tribes (*aşiret reisliği*) was abolished. Those two articles were designed especially for the dispersion of the Kurdish tribes. Actually, Bali

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 70.

noted that the law was designed in order to spread the Kurds after their rebellions.¹⁵⁹

Article 11 is significant for the situation of the non-Turkish minorities. The spread and assimilation of those people were safeguarded by this article. It stated that

- a) It is prohibited for those whose mother tongue is other than Turkish to collectively form new villages, wards, worker or artisan groups or to restrict a village, ward, work or arts to the same race.
- b) The Ministry of Interior, upon the decision of the Council of Ministers have to take necessary measures for the cultural, military, political, social and disciplinary reasons about those, who do not have allegiance to Turkish culture or those who have allegiance to Turkish culture but speak another language. Provided that it is not done wholesale, moving to other places and dismissal from citizenship are included in these measures.
- c) The number of foreigners settled in towns and villages cannot exceed the ten-percent of the whole population of the municipality and those cannot from a separate ward.

In Article 12, 13, and 14, the people who were to be resettled in the determined regions are stated respectively. Thus, no tribe, nomad or those not alleged to Turkish culture could resettle in the first region. Only the émigrés and population of the third region that are alleged to Turkish culture, and retired bureaucrats and officers of Turkish descent and Turkish culture could settle in the first region. In the second region, nomads, refugees and émigrés, those moved from the first and third region would be settled. In this article it is stated that it is compulsory for those who are not of Turkish race to be dispersed to villages, and to towns and cities on condition that they do not form separate wards or groups

¹⁵⁹Balı, *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni*, 246. See, Tanık Ziya Ekinci, *Vatandaşlık Açısından Kürt Sorunu ve Bir Çözüm Önerisi* [Kurdish Problem from the point of Citizenship and A Proposal for Solution], (İstanbul: Küyerel Yayınları, 1997), 161-162. And also Ahmet Yıldız, *Search for an Ethno-Secular Delimitation of Turkish National Identity*, 413-420 for the situation of the Kurds and the Law on Settlement.

(Article 13/3). In addition, those resettled people could not move to other places even after ten years of their settlement (Article 29).

The Law on Settlement is a major development for the Turkification process. For the sake of assimilation of the non-Turkish elements major rights of freedom of movement were violated. Besides, pressure for speaking Turkish intensified. The non-Turkish population was spread over the country so as to be absorbed by the Turkish culture. The Law on Settlement was a perfect reflection of the motto of the Republic “one language, one culture, one ideal.”

The pressure over the non-Turkish groups for integration with the Turkish culture had intensified in the 1930s. There are some views that relate those developments to the rise of Nazism and Fascism in Europe,¹⁶⁰ However, Parla argues that those were not related to the influence of those ideologies but were the policies determined long before the reign of Nazism and Fascism.¹⁶¹ But, during the Second World War, the policies recruited towards the minorities had some reflections of anti-Semitism. The Tax on Property is a significant example.

4.4.3 Tax on Property

The Tax on Property was issued on 11 November 1942. The Turkish government was in an economic crisis because of the increase of defense expenses that increased with the beginning of the Second World War in 1939. In addition, there were the problems of the increase of inflation, budget deficits, expansion of

¹⁶⁰ See, for instance, Bali, *Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni*, 243-244.

¹⁶¹ Parla, *Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi*, 22.

the black-market and profiteering.¹⁶² The object of the taxation was expressed by Şükrü Saracoğlu as to decrease the money in use, and to provide for the needs of the country.¹⁶³ However, the underlying reason was the elimination of the minorities from the economy, and the replacement of the minority bourgeoisie by its Turkish counterparts.¹⁶⁴

According to this law, the taxpayers were categorized into four as Muslims, non-Muslims, foreigners, and converts (those who had converted to Islam). The taxes each category should pay were determined rather arbitrarily.¹⁶⁵ The amount that should be paid by the non-Muslim taxpayers usually exceeded their wealth and were not proportional to the tax issued for the Muslim population. Those tax payers who could not pay the fixed amount were sent to working camps that were formed in Aşkale, Erzurum, and Sivrihisar. The Tax on Property was abolished in March 1944 and the debts of those who could not pay their taxes until that time were cancelled.

The Tax on Property was significant in two respects. Firstly, during the taxation process the statements made by the prominent politicians of the period reflected that the non-Muslim population was seen as guests who were financially

¹⁶² Rıdvan Akar, *Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları*, [Passengers of Aşkale: Tax on Property and Working Camps], (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1999), 52.

¹⁶³ Mahmut Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939-1945)* [The National Chief Period] (Ankara: Goloğlu Yayınları, 1974), cited in *ibid.*, 52.

¹⁶⁴ See, *ibid.*, 197-205; Ayhan Aktar, “Varlık Vergisi Sırasında Gayri Menkul Satışları ile Servet Transferi: İstanbul Tapu Kayıtlarının Analizi,” [Real Estate Sales and Transfer of Wealth During Tax on Property] *Toplumsal Tarih*, 69 (September 1999) reprinted in Aktar, *Türkleştirme Politikaları*, 215-243.

¹⁶⁵ See *ibid.*

benefiting from the “hospitality of Turkey.”¹⁶⁶ Besides, it was a violation of certain rights and the inequality between the status of the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens became apparent during this process. Secondly, because of collapse of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie due to the burden of the Tax on Property, the bourgeoisie structure was transformed. The wealthy Muslim traders took over the business of those people. This, in turn, led to the strengthening of the Turkish bourgeoisie.

Tax on Property was one of the most significant developments against the non-Muslim population during the early Republican era, and a final step taken in this period for the Turkification of the population. In the following chapter, the situation of the minorities will be elaborated with respect to their citizenship status.

4.5 Concluding Remarks

This chapter tried to highlight the construction of Turkish citizenship. The legal aspect is analyzed by the utilization of the Constitution and the Citizenship Law of 1928. The legal definition was egalitarian, and tried to benefit from both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. In the first instance, Turkish citizenship was close to the French model that was based on territory with the premise that “those who are affiliated to the Turkish State by citizenship are called as Turks.” However, later a shift can be depicted in both the attitudes towards the minorities, the emphasis on adoption of Turkish culture, and the admittance of those people who were regarded close to Turkish culture as *émigrés* and to citizenship. This shift is parallel with the German type of citizenship based on descent and unity in culture.

¹⁶⁶ Speech of the Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 January

The construction of citizenship was mainly carried out by the courses given at schools, and for the elderly through the People's Houses. The citizen defined was passive with certain duties and obligations towards the community and the state. The rights were achieved in return for the obligations fulfilled. The definition of the citizen was centered around the common good and general will. The community was given high priority.

The second part of the chapter is concerned with the identity aspect of Turkish citizenship. It deals with the situation of the minorities within this process. Through the analyzed policies and laws, it is seen that the legal and egalitarian definition of citizenship was not implemented thoroughly. While the legal definition was inclusive, the policies implemented towards the minorities were exclusionary. The aims for Turkification surpassed the acculturation of the notion of citizenship, and Turkishness became the critical issue. In other words, integration with the Turkish culture became the determinant of Turkish citizenship.

CHAPTER V

THE ERA OF TRANSFORMATION: 1946-1980

So far this study has dealt with the construction of Turkish citizenship in the early Republican period, and briefly analyzed the Ottoman case as a historical background. The early Republican era, which was analyzed in the previous chapter, is crucial in the sense that it was the period during which both the nation-building process and the construction of citizenship was carried out. The citizen constructed in this period was a civic republican citizen, endowed with duties and obligations towards the state and community. The citizenship rights were granted in return for the duties fulfilled. The desired citizen should be devoted to the Kemalist principles defined by the six arrows of the Republican Peoples Party. That is, the citizen should be republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secular, and revolutionary. Thus, the general will and common good were the main determinants for the citizen. This definition of citizenship was tried to be inculcated through institutions like the Peoples Houses and education.

The early republican period was a single party regime and the consolidation of the Republic and its reforms were the major aim. Citizenization was a major component within this process. If Marshall's analysis and classification is taken into consideration, then the early Republican period can be referred to as the stage of civil citizenship, where the legal rights and definition of citizenship is carried out. As evaluated in the previous chapter, there had been shifts from the French type of inclusionary citizenship towards a kind of exclusionary type, resembling the German type that put importance on Turkish culture and language. There was even an inclination towards an ethnicist nationalism that emphasized Turkishness. However, by the transition to multi party politics in Turkey, there occurred major transformations both in the society and at the state level.

This chapter will deal with the period starting from the transition to multi-party politics in 1946 until the military takeover in 1980. This period will be covered under two phases, the first phase is the Democrat Party rule until the first military takeover in 1960, and the second phase is the period after this takeover during which a new constitution was amended and the most liberal type of citizenship was exercised. Even though this period did not hold a mission of the conceptualization of Turkish citizenship, particularly in the first phase, its significance lies in the changing role of the citizen with regard to political participation.

Between 1946 and 1980, major transformations occurred in the Turkish Republican history. In 1946, the country was mostly composed of rural areas and the percentage of rural population in the total Population was 75,1 %. However, within the 35 years after transition to multi-party regime, urbanization accelerated

and the urban population rose to 43,9 % by 1980.¹ This had certain outcomes. The desired citizen of the early republican period was the citizen living in urban areas, and until 1946 the rural people were usually undermined. During that period this desire of urbanization was achieved to a certain extent, but the process of urbanization brought about or created its own cultural patterns, which were quite distinct from the early republican dreams. In addition, per capita income increased, and by the construction of roads even the distant parts of the country were connected to each other. Moreover, the rates of literacy, life expectancy, and other vital statistics increased.² With regard to citizenship, the conceptualization of citizenship was transformed towards a new one that emphasized political participation and to one that utilized religion as a component. On the other hand, migration of the Turkish guest workers to Germany started during this period, which later caused problems about citizenship both in Turkey and Germany. The issue of dual citizenship became one of the major problems after the 1980s, and will be elaborated in the next chapter.

During the first phase, the people found a way to show their resentment against the single-party regime through the Democrat Party (DP). The people were politically mobilized by the DP, and for the first time in Republican history, political participation had acquired an important role. This phase should be evaluated in two periods as the opposition years of the DP, during which the party tried to rely on popular support; and the DP rule, when major changes in the mentality and politics of DP are observed.

¹ *İstatistik Göstergeler. Statistical Indicators, 1923-1990.* TC Başbakanlık, Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, n.d.

In the second phase, on the other hand, by the promulgation of a new constitution (1961 Constitution) after the military takeover of May 27, 1960, a more liberal atmosphere that opened the room for more representation of different worldviews and for more of a liberal type of citizenship was experienced. This chapter will dwell upon those changes with particular reference to their impacts on Turkish citizenship.

5.1 Transition to multi-party regime

The year 1945 was significant for world history; the Second World War ended with the failure of Nazism and Fascism. The world was divided into two poles between United States and the Soviet Union, and the period of the Cold War began. Turkey had to clarify its stance in this context and chose to be ally with the West. However, the new order predominated by the West was based on capitalism and democracy.³ Thus, Turkey had to adopt itself to those in order to be accepted by this new order.

Within this context in addition to the continuously rising unrest within the Turkish society the need for transition to democracy became obvious. Therefore in 1946, the Republican Peoples Party, which was in power as a single party for more than 20 years, decided to make room for new parties in the political arena. In fact,

² Reşat Kasaba, "Populism and Democracy in Turkey, 1946-1961," in Ellis Goldberg et al. (eds.), *Rules and Rights in the Middle East*, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1993), 45.

³ İlkey Sunar, "Populism and Patronage: The Demokrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey," *Il Politico*, anno LV (4), 745.

the aim was to let the formation of a moderate opposition like the previous experiences of multi-party regime.

The previous attempts were made first on 1925 by the formation of *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Progressive Republican Party) in 17 November 1924, and second in 12 August 1930 by the formation of *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Free Republican Party). Both parties were established by the initiative of Mustafa Kemal. His desire was to exercise a kind of rational democracy where there would be an enlightened debate between the political parties over the long-term interests of the community.⁴ The desired system was a two-party system with a strong ruling party and a weak opposition. However, those two attempts had failed.

The Progressive Republican Party aimed at the preservation of individual freedom and religion from the interference of the government.⁵ However, a revolt has broken out in the east of Turkey on February 1925, aspiring for a Kurdish state and the restoration of the Caliphate. Martial Law was declared, and after the suppression of the revolt, the Progressive Republican Party was found responsible. The first attempt for multi-party regime ended with the closure of the Progressive Republican Party in June 1925.⁶

The second attempt for multi-party regime was the formation of the Free Republican Party in August 1930. Fethi Okyar was the founder of the party “by the direct suggestion of Mustafa Kemal who urged even his own sister to join the

⁴ See, Metin Heper, “The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989,” *Governance*, 3 (1990): 301-304.

⁵ Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-party System*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 46.

⁶ Ibid.

party.”⁷ The Free Republican Party criticized the government especially on economic grounds and gained popularity among the people. According to Karpat, the criticisms of the Free Republican Party was regarded by the RPP as a threat to the regime, and the Party was in a way forced to dissolve itself in November 1930.⁸ This process coincided with the Menemen Incident, which was the rebellion of the reactionaries that led to the beheading of a reserve officer. Therefore, the justification for the closure of the Free Republican Party was again related to its connection with the reactionary groups. Thus, the attempts for including opposition parties in the political life ended up in failure in the early Republican era, and no more attempts were made until 1946. Therefore, until 1946, the political participation of the Turkish citizens, namely voting, which was regarded to be the most crucial duty and right of the Turkish citizen in the early republican period, had been limited to a single party, the Republican Peoples Party.

5.1.1 The formation of the Democrat Party

As mentioned above, both the international and domestic contexts influenced the transition to multi-party regime. According to Eroğul, there were four main factors that paved the way for that transition. These were:

- 1) The desire to prevent outbursts by transferring the increasing unrest of the people towards democratic means.
- 2) The desire to find a solution to the increasing pressures coming from the wealthy classes.

⁷ Ibid., 65.

⁸ Ibid., 66-67.

- 3) The international context and the threats coming from the Soviet Union left only one choice, that is the adoption of Western model in the domestic administration.
- 4) The aim of carrying on the Westernization program that continued since the *Tanzimat* period; reached its peak with Kemalism, and that became the official ideology of the single party period.⁹

Within this context, the ex-members of the RPP, who either split from the party or were expelled got together to form the Democrat Party. Their split from the RPP was because of their opposition to the RPP during the discussions on the Land Law. As they were opposed to the Land Reform that aspired for the redistribution of land to the peasants without land, they had challenged this proposal with a strong opposition. After those debates Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü gave a proposal to the party group that was called *Dörtl  Takrir*. This proposal demanded:

A real control in the Grand National Assembly, which is the only place for the exercise of national sovereignty, the amendment of certain laws that prevent the emergence of democratic institutions and violate the populism principle of the constitution, and the immediate enactment of those changes.¹⁰

The proposal was rejected and the three deputies were expelled from the RPP. Their leader, Celal Bayar, resigned from the RPP and Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köpr   formed the Democrat Party on January 7, 1946.

⁹ Cem Ero  , “ ok Partili D zenin Kurulu u: 1945-71,”[Formation of the Multi-party Regime: 1945-71] in *Ge i  S recinde T rkiye* [Turkey in Transition], eds. Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak ( stanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992), 2nd ed., 113-115.

¹⁰ Cem Ero  , *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve  deolojisi* [Democrat Party: History and Ideology], (Ankara: Ankara  niversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fak ltesi Yayınları, Sevin  Matbaası, 1970), 11; Tefik  andar, “Demokrat Parti,” [Democrat Party], *Cumhuriyet D nemi T rkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of the Republican Turkey], 2064.

The party programme focused mainly on liberalism and democracy.¹¹ Article 1 of the party programme reflected the emphasis on the principle of democracy by stating that “DP is founded with the aim of the realization of democracy in a wider and developed understanding, and for serving the general politics to be carried out with a democratic view and mentality.”¹² Basic human rights and freedoms were emphasized. Article 7 of the party programme stated that “it is deemed necessary for the workers, farmers, merchants and industrialists, officials and teachers, university students to form associations, cooperatives, and trade unions.”¹³ In Article 5, it was stated that the Turkish society relied on the premises of family and property.

DP’s major target was furthering democracy, so they advocated “the restriction of the governmental activities, widening of the personal freedoms, and to safeguard that the political power stems from not above, but from below, from the ‘people’.”¹⁴ Besides, they aspired for economic development and more participation of the private sector in the economy. According to DP party programme, it was the states duty to contribute to the development of the private enterprise and capital (Article 17). Therefore, DP adopted a complete liberal understanding with respect to economics and noted that unless necessary there would be no interference in the market (Article 51).

¹¹ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 13.

¹² *Demokrat Parti: tüzük ve programı*, (Ankara: Doğu Ltd. O. Matbaası, 1953), 47.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁴ Feroz Ahmad, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dönemi Siyasal Gelişmeleri” [Political Developments in the Era of the Turkish Republic], in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7.

When DP's formation was permitted, it was thought that a loyal opposition would be created with a semi-liberal rightist party.¹⁵ However, it took wide support of the press, intellectuals, business circles, and the masses. DP brought about certain changes to political life in Turkey, especially during its opposition period. As mentioned above, there was unrest among the society related with the policies of the RPP as a single party. Due to this unrest combined with the rising opposition, RPP began to change some of the laws and its policies.

In the 1947 Congress, RPP modified its definition of nationalism as one based on language, common culture and history.¹⁶ Recep Peker declared the views of his party in a speech he made at the University of Istanbul:

Every individual in this group [nation] becomes part of an indivisible whole on the basis of common language and destiny born from living together on this land and is equal in sharing duty, privilege, and honor. The idea of considering the Christians second class citizens is part of history now... It is not enough to regard as Turks, only in respect to the law and Administration, those whose religion is different. In our private lives too, we must come closer to each other with warmth, and intermingle. ... a [national] culture enriched by the science, technique, and art owned in common by all mankind will strengthen Turkish nationalism ... anti-Semitism will remain the shame of the twentieth century, and if in our legislation there are anti-minority provisions they will be amended. ... we are to accept as natural the different sects such as the Alevi and embrace the Kurds with fondness... racial nationalism is irredentist and entirely anti-democratic and imperialistic... we should be careful of ideologies which trespass national boundaries and penetrate into the country to seek out and subject ideas and people to the service of foreign states ... the best means of fighting communism is nationalism.¹⁷

¹⁵ Eroğul, "Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu," 115.

¹⁶ As portrayed in the previous chapter, the themes of language, culture and history were prevalent in the early Republican understanding as well. However, the policies recruited in the 1930s were deviant from this definition and were close to a much racist understanding. In 1947 the RPP was trying to strip itself from the past experiences and to modify its understanding of nationalism towards a more inclusive one.

¹⁷ *Ulus*, March 29, 1947 cited in Kemal Karpaz, *Turkey's Politics*, 257-258.

Following that speech, there occurred some changes on the legislation regarding the minorities and non-Turkish Muslim population. The status of the minorities for military service was changed and the non-Muslims were allowed to serve as reserve officers in the army. The Kurdish tribes that were forced to migrate to the West by the Law on Settlement were allowed to move back to their hometowns in the East. In addition, the refugees and Greeks who had been subject to population exchange¹⁸ were permitted to travel to Turkey.¹⁹

The understanding of secularism was relaxed to a certain extent. In 1949, religious courses were added to the curriculum of the schools as two hours per week elective. There was a requirement of written approval of the parents for the schoolchildren to attend the course on religion. Besides, *İmam Hatip Kursları* (Prayer Leader and Preacher Courses) were opened in 10 cities and a Faculty of Divinity was opened in the University of Ankara. By the decision of the government the sacred tombs (*türbe*) were reopened for the visits of the people.²⁰

As can be depicted from the policies implemented by the RPP, it is evident that the party tried to adopt itself to the changing dynamics of politics by the formation of the DP. In this attempt, the party took two important measures. The first is the changes made in certain laws, quite in line with the developments mentioned above. In June 1946, single member district electoral system was implemented. The pressure over the press was lifted by the removal of the authority

¹⁸ According to the Population Exchange Agreement, the exchangees would not be permitted to travel to and resettle in respective countries without the permission of the governments. See, Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç 1923-1925* [The Great Population Exchange: Forced Migration to Turkey], (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 18.

¹⁹ Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 258.

of the government for the closure of the newspapers. This liberalization process continued with the autonomy granted to the universities. The second measure was the plot arranged for holding the elections a year earlier, which disabled the DP to organize in every part of the country.

5.1.2 DP in opposition

The 1946 election was one of the most controversial elections. The secret ballot system was not exercised properly and there is an ongoing debate on in this election, that the elections had not been carried out properly or respected the principle of secret ballot. Despite all those pressures, DP still won 62 of the 465 seats of the Parliament and started their activities that transformed politics in Turkey.

DP on the one hand adopted a strong opposition within the Parliament, and on the other hand mobilized the masses through public meetings. In those meeting their slogan was *Yeter! Söz Milletindir!* (Enough! It is the Nation's Turn to Speak!). This slogan was crucial as it explicitly declared that it was the nation, or the citizens who would take over the decision-making in Turkey. In that period, the major concern of the DP was to show that "it was not 'a party of the tutelage'" and that it was different from the RPP in representing the interests of the people.²¹ Here lies the significance of DP for both the political tradition in Turkey and for the notion of citizenship. Their ongoing emphasis on political power as stemming from the

²⁰ Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993), 244.

people moved the people to the core of political arena in Turkey. People started to voice their demands in the streets by attending the meetings of the DP. Eroğul suggested that this mobilization of the people by the DP is significant and interesting for political science. He points to the incorporation of the people to the political struggle by a conservative, and sometimes a reactionary party, as a contribution to the raising of the consciousness of the people.²²

In their first Congress, the DP approved a document called *Hürriyet Misakı* (Pact of Liberty). This Pact of Liberty declared that “unless the anti-democratic decrees and the sentences that violate the Constitution are cleared; a new democratic election law is amended; the leadership of a party and the presidency is separated; and the neutrality of administration is safeguarded, the DP would resign from the Parliament and ‘return to the bosom of the people’ and continue their struggle there.”²³ This Pact again placed the people at the core of the political struggle.

The novelty of the DP with respect to the status endowed to the people was the transformation of the notion of populism. As mentioned in the previous chapter, populism was one of the six principles of the RPP, and one of the key notions for the construction of Turkish citizenship. Populism of the RPP aspired for the rejection of the stratification in the society as classes, and propagated that the Turkish society was classless, a merged mass. In addition, the understanding of populism could be described as “for the people, despite the people.”²⁴ As Sunar

²¹ Kasaba, “Populism and Democracy,” 53.

²² Eroğul, “Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu,” 117, note 8.

²³ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 27.

²⁴ Sunar, “Populism and Patronage,” 749.

pointed, RPP tried to transform the social realities with an elitist historical project, and utilized populism in line with this aim.²⁵ On the contrary, DP reformulated populism as an ideology that took the desires and interests of the people into consideration, and mobilized the political participation of the people.²⁶ Also, by their policy to defend the rights of the rising bourgeoisie and the landowners, they acknowledged the existence of classes in Turkish society and became defenders of their interests. As defenders of the private sector and landowners, the DP criticized the economic policies of the RPP in power. In response to the criticisms of the DP, RPP made certain changes and amendments that were analyzed in the previous section.

The DP opposition and its aspirations for reconciliation with the Ottoman past led to a change in the Citizenship Law and Law on Passport. According to the proposal, “those who did not belong to the Ottoman dynasty by birth, but who had married a member of the dynasty and later became widowed either through death or divorce, and do not have a child can return to Turkey by the decision of the Council of Ministers.”²⁷ Those who would return Turkey in accordance with this law could not claim any rights over the property that belonged to the Ottoman dynasty.²⁸

²⁵ İlkey Sunar, “Demokrat Parti ve Popülizm”(Democrat Party and Populism), *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 8, 2076-2088.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, vol. 18, 18.4.1949, 458. The members of the Ottoman dynasty were expelled from Turkey 3 March 1924, by the abolishing of the Sultanate and their re-entrance to Turkey was prohibited.

²⁸ This had caused debates in the Parliament related with the Ottoman treasury and heritage. Osman Nuri Köni from the National Party (a party that split from the DP in 1948) questioned the government about the Sultan’s property. Karpat mentioned this discussion in *Turkey’s Politics* as related with the challenges towards secularism and notes that Köni wanted the property of the Sultan to be

The same year the second congress of the DP was held. During this Congress, the primacy of the voting rights was declared by a report. One of the delegates declared that “those who violate the principle of free elections should be punished like those who violates the honor and chastity of the people.”²⁹ *Milli Husumet Andı* (National Hostility Oath) by noting that violation of the election law was similar to the violation of natural rights, and that any violation of this kind would justify the self-defense of the citizens, proposed that anyone who was engaged in that kind of violation would be subject to the hostility of the nation.³⁰

After long struggles with the RPP in power and intense opposition, the DP came to power with the elections of May 14, 1950. The participation rate in the elections were over 80 % and the DP got 53% of the votes that led the party to hold 408 seats in the Parliament composed of 487 seats. The RPP got 39% of the votes and could be represented by a rather small number of seats, that is 60. The 1950 elections were significant for the political struggle in Turkey. The transition to multi-party regime and the change of government was achieved quite smoothly, and for the first time in Republican history, the people took hold of their lives and expressed their desires by electing the DP. In addition, the political base of the government moved from the cities to the countryside, Toprak argues “the

returned to the heirs of the Sultan. See, *ibid.*, 443-487; Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 281.

²⁹ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952* [Political Parties in Turkey 1859-1952]. İstanbul, n.p. 1952.

³⁰ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 47-48; Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 233; Kasaba, “Populism and Democracy,” 56.

mobilization of the peasants that constitute two thirds of the total electorate became the primary concern of the political parties after 1950.³¹

5.1.3 DP in power: 1950-1960

1950 elections were the beginning of the ten years of DP governments. Shortly after the elections Celal Bayar, who was the founding leader of the DP was elected as the President, and Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister. The reasons behind the success of DP was enlisted by Toprak as:

1. The economic policy which the DP program envisioned, with its emphasis on private enterprise and its professed priority for the agricultural sector, secured for the party the support of important commercial and landed interests.
2. DP was able to reinforce its clientelist network by building an efficient political machine, which functioned on the basis of reward system for individual peasants or rural communities in exchange for votes.
3. By exploiting the long-standing elite-mass gap, the Democrats successfully established an image for themselves as the party of the masses in contrast to the bureaucratic and elitist orientation of the RPP.
4. DP politicized the religious issue, which helped build a mass following for the party.³²

As analyzed throughout the whole chapter, DP's success mostly relied on the resentment of the people towards the single party regime and its policies. DP's major contribution to the political life in Turkey was the reincorporation of religion to the Turkish identity as a critical component. Besides, the periphery (the rural population) was moved to the core of politics, and from that time on the periphery had to be relied on by the political parties for achieving power. However, the aim of the chapter is not to analyze all the politics of DP, but rather highlight Turkish

³¹ Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 88.

citizenship and its transformations by benefiting from the relevant policies and implementations of the DP period.

DP's major feature was to attack the Kemalist principles defined by the six arrows of the RPP. They had challenged and transformed those principles. During the DP power, the purified and Turkified style of the Constitution was abandoned, and the earlier version was used. In 1951 the People's Houses and People's Rooms that were designed for raising the consciousness of the people with respect to citizenship, were closed down.

Even though DP utilized religion as a main component of Turkish identity, it repeatedly declared that it was strongly against the reactionary and obscurantist religious movements, and took strong measures against some of those religious groups when they were regarded as a threat to the regime.³³ However, during the DP power, major changes were carried out with respect to religion. When they came to power the first change they made was on the call for prayer (*ezan*). They returned to the Arabic reading of the *ezan* and annulled the Turkish prayer on June 16, 1950.³⁴ The radio became one of the tools of DP for propaganda, and Koran was begun to be read in the radio that gave pleasure among the rural people.³⁵

³² Ibid., 72.

³³ This attitude was particularly evident during the events caused by a sect called *Ticani* that was involved in reactionary activities and assaults to Atatürk's statues, and the events took place in the funeral of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak. DP distanced itself from those events and expressed that it was against those kinds of movements that were challenging the Kemalist regime and an "Ataturk Law" was passed in the Parliament for the protection of Atatürk's memory. See, Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 283; Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, 83.

³⁴ Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 68.

³⁵ See Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 286 and note 52 on the rise of the publications and sales of the religious books; also see Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960," in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds.

Toprak showed the importance given to religion by the DP and the increasing religious freedom by listing the rise in the number of the mosques constructed and the money spent for those and the rise in the sale of religious books.³⁶ In addition the opening of Koranic courses were tolerated and the attendance to religious courses in schools was changed. Previously the students could take religious courses upon the written request of their parents, however DP changed this process vice versa, and the religious courses became somewhat compulsory, now the student would take the religion course unless his/her parents requested a withdrawal.

DP came to power with the support of the minorities as well. In opposition, they defined the “Turk” as any citizen who considered himself as a Turk regardless of religion and race.³⁷ In addition, they nominated deputy candidates from the minorities and some of them were elected to the Parliament in the 1950 elections. Despite that approach, one of the harshest attacks towards the minorities took place during the DP government.

In 1955, there occurred an international crisis related with the situation of Cyprus, and a conference was being held in London between United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, and attacks on Turks in the island increased. The DP government arranged a plot in order to influence the conference. The plot was to organize a mass meeting in Istanbul against Greece, and a newspaper declared that Atatürk’s house in Thessallanico was bombed. A mass demonstration against the

Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991), 128.

³⁶ Toprak, *Islam and Political Development*, 81-82.

³⁷ Sevgen, Nazmi ed. *Celal Bayar Diyor ki: 1920-1950* [Celal Bayar Says], İstanbul: n.p., 1951.

Greeks broke in September 6, 1955 and the houses, shops, and firms belonging to Turkish Greeks were attacked, the churches were destroyed. The riot could only be calmed down by the military. Some of the Greeks had to leave the country. During that period, anti-communism was also at its peak, and the communists were blamed for the September 6-7 Events. However, during the Yassıada trials after the military coup in 1960, it was understood that it was a plot arranged by the DP itself.³⁸

The period of the DP was marked with a desire to be “Little America,” policies adopted during that period were imitating the US. Due to the desire to be part of the West, Turkey joined NATO in 1952. This led to the increase in foreign credit and private enterprise. As Eroğul stated, the DP did its best to serve foreign capital, the bourgeoisie, and big landowners. Also, as Sunar stated, the attempts for economic development aggravated the social differentiation and contributed to the emergence of civil society. This social differentiation led to the emergence of classes and class-consciousness. The Turkish Trade Unions (*Türk-İş*) was formed in 1952.³⁹

Although economic liberalism was applied to a large extent, the DP, which came to power with many promises for political liberalism, tried to tighten its hold over the society and politics. In 1953, by a decree the property of the RPP was taken over by the Treasury. The press laws were tightened again and the opposition was crashed. DP and especially its leader Menderes tried to initiate almost a dictatorial regime. As unrest among the society increased, the military took over power in 27 May 1960. This was the first but not the last military takeover in

³⁸ See Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 124-125.

³⁹ Alpaslan Işıklı, “Ücretli Emek ve Sendikalaşma,” [Wage Labor and the Formation of Trade Unions] in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, 335.

Republican history. The developments after the takeover will be evaluated in the following section.

The DP period introduced a new understanding for citizenship. While the early republican citizenship aspired for the passive citizen who would contribute to carry out the Turkish revolution and with his duties and obligations towards the community and the state, the DP emphasized the political participation aspect. Voting was given utmost importance, and the feeling of influencing the government, or changing the government, through elections was inculcated to the people. The DP regime was not as liberal as it aspired for when it was in opposition. However, the citizens conceived the mentality that citizens are the real decision-makers during this period, which is the period of transition to multi-party politics. Right before the military takeover, Menderes declared the importance of elections and voting in his speeches:

A great and radical transformation took place. It used to be that only one person ruled and only a few hundred participated in politics. With our democratic revolution, with one leap, millions and millions of citizens acquired the vote and became influential in the administration of our country. They became *real citizens* (italics added).⁴⁰

We trust in the Turkish nation, in its patriotism, political genius, and perception. When it becomes necessary, the Turkish nation knows to take matters in its hands and cry, "Enough! It is the nation's turn to speak!"⁴¹ If we believe in the maturity of the Turkish nation and in the virtues of democracy, we have to agree that the only way of coming to power and leaving power is through elections.⁴²

In addition, as mentioned throughout this section, the Republican definition of citizenship, which aspired for an urban citizen, was challenged by the mobilization of the rural people and the peasants. The early republican definition,

⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 2 February 1960, cited in Kasaba, "Populism and Democracy," 56.

⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 14 February 1960, cited in *ibid.*, 57.

by aspiring for the urban, modern and enlightened citizens was elitist and populism was implemented in order to carry out the modernization project. The Democrat Party, on the contrary, utilized populism by addressing the people that they were the decision-makers. As a reaction to this elitist vision, the periphery was valorized by the DP, and even though the early Republican dreams of urbanization was achieved to a certain extent during the DP period, this did not lead to a modern and enlightened culture. In other words, the rural culture was carried by the migrants to the cities and this transformed the urban culture in an unpredictable way.⁴³

5.2 The Period of 1960-1980

This section will dwell upon the period after the military intervention of May 1960. This period could be regarded as the period when there was a liberal atmosphere to a considerable extent. A shift in the understanding of citizenship was experienced during this period. The citizen of the period was active and there was the primacy of rights as compared with the duty-laden citizenship of the early republican period.

⁴²*Havadis*, 26 May 1960, cited in *ibid*.

⁴³ One of the consequences of this cultural transformation can be seen in music. The arabesque that was regarded as the music of those migrants that became popular throughout the whole country can be an example. See, Orhan Tekelioğlu, "The Rise of a Spontaneous Synthesis: The Historical Background of Turkish Popular Music," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32 (2) April 1996.

5.2.1 The 1960 intervention

As DP was reaching ten years in office, unrest among the society, especially among the university students and the military was increasing. The military had already lost its dominant status in state affairs. Together with the bureaucracy they had been regarded as the key actors of the state during the early Republican period. In fact, the tension between the political elites and the state elites had always been, and would be prevalent. The economic development model DP implemented had put the military and the bureaucracy in an economically disadvantaged position. Combined with the DP's movement towards an authoritarian regime, and the sympathy felt to the RPP and its leader İsmet İnönü, who had served in the National Independence War, the unrest of the military increased. To make matters worse, the DP tried to use the military against the demonstrations opposing its rule. Therefore, the first military intervention in the Republican history took place.⁴⁴ The military takeover claimed that "they were safeguarding democracy and the state, and the legacy of Atatürk" which would be justification for the coming interventions as well.⁴⁵ Tachau and Heper pointed that the intervention reflected the guardian type of military rule "which took control of the government for the purpose of preserving (or re-establishing) the status quo."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ See Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," *Comparative Politics*, 16 (1983); George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 182.

⁴⁵ Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, 141.

The National Union Committee (the junta) aimed to ensure that an experience like the DP power would not take place again. A new constitution was prepared by a committee composed of academics, members of the RPP and the junta. The Constitution took certain measures and developed institutions like the National Security Council (where the Head of the General Staff, and the senior military commanders would be members) and the Constitutional Court, which would have the right to invalidate governmental decrees and legislation.⁴⁷ In addition, bi-cameral system was introduced and the electoral system was changed as proportional representation with the aim of preventing the authoritarian rule of a party, which was experienced during the DP rule.

With respect to political parties, the Constitution noted that they were the crucial elements of democratic political life. It was free to form political parties without any permission. However, those political parties should rely on human rights and liberties, to the principles of a democratic and secular republic, and to the indivisibility of the state with its territory and nation, otherwise they would be closed. The decision for the closure of the political parties would be made by the Constitutional Court (Articles 56, 57).

5.2.2 The 1961 Constitution

The 1961 Constitution is significant for the transformation of the society and understanding of citizenship. The Constitution was written in a rather detailed

⁴⁶ Tachau and Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military," 21.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 22.

format, in order to eliminate the misuse of power. During the preparation of the Constitution, the Commission of Constitution benefited from the two drafts prepared by the Faculty of Law of Istanbul University and the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University. Also, the French, Italian, and German constitutions were utilized, in addition to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Human Rights Agreement and the French Declaration of Human And Citizenship Rights.⁴⁸ The Constitution was promulgated after a referendum held on July 9, 1961.

The new constitution was based on the supremacy of the rule of law. It was stated repeatedly that every issue would be carried out in accordance with the law, and in certain cases in accordance with international law. The Constitution had a preface where the main characteristics of the Turkish nation were defined by stating that:

The Turkish nation, which had lived independently throughout history and that had fought for its rights and liberty, and which had used its right to resist and had made the revolution of May 27, 1960 against a power that had lost its legitimacy by violating the Constitution and law;
Inspired by Turkish nationalism that gathers all the individuals sharing the joy and grief as an indivisible whole around the national consciousness and ideals, and that aims at rising our nation with a spirit of national unity as an honorable and equal member of the world family;
Which has the consciousness of the principle of “peace at home, peace in the world,” the spirit of the national struggle, and national sovereignty, and the devotion to the revolutions of Atatürk;
In order to consolidate a democratic rule of law with all its legal and social basis, that would safeguard the realization of human rights and freedoms, national solidarity, social justice, welfare of the individual and the society;
Approves and proclaims this Constitution prepared by the Constitutive Assembly of the Turkish Republic, and entrusts this Constitution to the guardianship of its sons devoted to freedom, justice, and virtue.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 2nd. ed., 374.

⁴⁹ Suna Kili and A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasa Metinleri: Sened-i İttifaktan Günümüze*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1985), 171-172.

It was evident from the preface that, this Constitution relied on universal norms, like human rights, social justice, and welfare and that the individual was given more importance and an active role, especially with the mention of the right to resist.

Whereas the 1924 Constitution defined the Turkish Republic in article 2 in accordance with the Kemalist principles defined by the six arrows mentioned in the previous chapter, as “ the Turkish Republic is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secular, and revolutionary,” this article was amended in the 1961 Constitution as “the Turkish Republic is a national, democratic, secular and social rule of law, that relies on human rights and the principles mentioned in the preface.”⁵⁰ This article and the Constitution as a whole reflects the desire for the introduction and the implementation of universal standards and human rights, and for a social state that seeks the welfare of its citizens.

The developments related with administration and the legislative, executive and judiciary are mentioned above. As this study focuses on the issue of Turkish citizenship, this section will dwell upon the novelties introduced by the 1961 Constitution with respect to citizenship. This detailed constitution placed importance on individual rights and liberties and aspired for a more active citizenship.

Article 54 of the 1961 Constitution defined the Turkish citizen as “everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is a Turk” and continued as

The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk. The citizenship status of child born from a foreign father and a Turkish mother will be arranged by law. Citizenship is acquired and lost under the circumstances defined by law. No Turk can be expelled from citizenship, unless he/she

⁵⁰ A. Şeref Gözübüyük, *Açıklamalı Türk Anayasaları*, (Ankara, Turhan Kiatbevi, 1995), 56, 115.

engages in activities contrary to the loyalty to the country. The decisions and implementations of expulsion can be subject to appeal.⁵¹

This article is different from the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution that stated that everyone who is admitted to citizenship through Citizenship Law is considered as Turk. The 1312 numbered Citizenship Law stated that every child born of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother would acquire Turkish citizenship. The 1961 Constitution, granted citizenship status only to those children born from Turkish fathers, and leaves the status of the children born of Turkish mothers ambiguous by stating that their status would be arranged by law. The citizenship law will be analyzed below.

The 1961 Constitution differed from the previous constitution in many respects. Firstly, the 1961 Constitution was designed in a more inclusive, humanitarian and universal manner. In contrast to the 1924 Constitution that used “Turk” as the counterpart, the 1961 Constitution used “everyone” and grasped the foreigners as well, but designed their status and the limitations of their freedoms in accordance with international law (Article 13).

The Constitution limited the interference of the state into the affairs of the individual and defined the duties of the state towards the individual, which is a significant departure from the primacy of the obligations of the citizen towards the state. In this respect, this constitution was a liberal constitution and aspired for a more liberal kind of citizenship.

The basic rights and liberties covered almost two thirds of the Constitution and were written in a detailed format. In Article 10 it was stated that everyone has inviolable basic rights and liberties. The following article safeguarded these liberties as:

⁵¹ Gözübüyük, *Türk Anayasaları*, 131.

The basic rights and liberties can only be limited through law that is in accordance with the spirit and statement of the constitution, however, this law can not restrain the core of the rights or liberties even for the reasons of morality, public order, social justice or national security.⁵²

The basic rights and liberties of the individual were mainly the immunity of private life (article 15) and residence (article 16), the freedoms of communication (article 17), travel and settlement (article 18), faith and conscience (article 19), thought (article 20), education (article 21), right to property (article 36) Under this section the freedom of the press was expressed. The right and freedoms of meetings and demonstrations, and formation of associations without taking permission were safeguarded (articles 28 and 29). The only limitations on these rights would be drawn by law for the protection of public order.

The emphasis on the social welfare state is evident in the section on *Social and Economic Rights and Duties*. Here, the rights to work (article 42), to rest (article 44), for just wage (article 45), to form trade unions (article 46), to go on strike (article 47), and social security (article 48), and medical treatment (article 49) were enlisted. Those articles reflect an evolution towards the social phase of citizenship in Marshall's analysis. However, the social rights were again granted from the above, as had been the case for both civil and political rights. The atmosphere of social welfare state would be curbed later, after the 1980 military coup and with the 1982 Constitution, which limited most of the rights and liberties granted by the 1961 Constitution for the reason that the 1961 Constitution was too liberal for the Turkish society. Therefore, the period between 1961 and 1980 can be viewed as the transitory social welfare state with active and liberal understanding of citizenship.

⁵² Article 11, *ibid.*, 117.

Those articles mentioned above also reflect the importance given to social justice. The articles on land distribution and nationalization of private properties for public good were amended for this reason. In addition, Article 41 stated that;

The economic and social life is regulated in accordance with the aims of justice, the principle of work, and a life standard for everyone that does not violate human dignity.

It is the state's duty to realize economic, social and cultural development by democratic means, and for this reason it is also the state's duty to increase national savings, to direct the investments towards the priorities, and to prepare developmental plans.⁵³

In addition, equal educational opportunities for every citizen, male or female, and sufficient nutrition were safeguarded by the Constitution. Tanör states that this social aspect was a novelty of the 1961 Constitution, the elements of which were “the object of social justice, social rights granted to the individuals and groups, the social duties bestowed upon the state, the developmental plans and the establishment of State Planning Organization.”⁵⁴

In the section on political rights and duties, firstly Turkish citizenship mentioned above was defined. This section covered basic duties of the citizen towards the state. As mentioned in the previous chapter, participation in the electoral process was regarded as the fundamental right and duty of the citizen in *Medeni Bilgiler*, the book written for citizenship education by the directions of Atatürk.⁵⁵ In Article 55 the right to be elected and to elect were enlisted. Same as the formation of the associations, the citizens were granted the right to form or join political parties without taking any permission (article 56). Other basic duties were military service (Article 60) and taxation (Article 61).

⁵³ Ibid., 128.

⁵⁴ Tanör, *OTAG*, 392.

The 1961 Constitution points to the divergence from a republican understanding of citizenship that focused on the duties of the citizen towards the state, which was implemented during the early republican period, as highlighted in the previous chapter. By this constitution, the individual was given a higher value and the reconciliation of the individual's and the society's rights and liberties had been the major target.⁵⁶ By the widening of the rights and liberties of the citizen and the limitation of the state's interference, a more liberal and active understanding of citizenship was introduced. During this period, a new citizenship law that is in use today was also amended.

5.2.3 Turkish Citizenship Law

The 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law was put in effect in February 11, 1964.⁵⁷ It took around two years for the draft to be amended. The reasons for the new law were expressed as:

The 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law has certain shortcomings with respect to content and planning, it has to be reformed especially due to the principles accepted by the citizenship law. The 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law did not take the principle of "everyone should have a citizenship; everyone should have only one citizenship; and be free to choose his/her citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship

⁵⁵ Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazmaları*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 16.

⁵⁶ Tanör, *OTAG*, 378.

⁵⁷ The Law Proposal was dated May 28, 1962. It was debated in the Parliament several times, however those debates were merely around the wording and who would be the respective authority on the admittance or loss of citizenship, the Ministry of Interior or the Council of Ministers. See, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, vol. 20, period1, 29.8.1963, 477-497, 507- 511. Also see *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, vol. 26, period 1, 11.2.1964, 504- 508.

he/she does not want” into consideration sufficiently. There are incongruities among certain articles, as has been the case for the effects of marriage on citizenship. Besides, the sentences on expulsion are not in accordance with the contemporary developments on citizenship law.

The 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law did not include any sentences on the judicial appeal for the decisions and procedures related with Turkish citizenship, and it is compulsory for a modern citizenship law to grant the right to appeal. In addition the 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law did not cover the issues of the proof of citizenship or cancellation of admission to citizenship.

The 54th article of the 1961 Constitution is so novel that the amendment of a new citizenship law instead of the 1312 numbered law is a necessity.⁵⁸

The new citizenship law was another step for the move towards the rule of law. The aim was to base the law on the universal principles of citizenship and citizenship rights. In line with this principle of the rule of law the right to appeal was included in the 403 numbered and February 11, 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law. The proposal was based on three universal principles on citizenship law. The first was the principle that everyone should have a citizenship and the situation of statelessness should be eliminated. The second was the principle that, everyone should have only one citizenship. And third one was that everyone should be free to choose his/her won citizenship and no one should be forced to hold a citizenship he/she does not want.

Another novelty introduced by the 403 numbered citizenship law was related with the status of Turkish women who married foreigners. As mentioned above, the 54th article of the 1961 Constitution stated that the citizenship status of a child born from a foreign father and a Turkish mother would be arranged by law.

⁵⁸ “Türk Vatandaşlığı kanunu tasarısı ile Mardin Milletvekili Esat Kemal Aybar’ın, 1312 sayılı Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu’na ek kanun teklifi ve Mardin Milletvekili Mehmet Ali Arıkan’ın, Vatandaşlık Kanunu’nun 10. Maddesine iki fıkra eklenmesine dair kanun teklifi ve İstanbul Milletvekili Reşit Ülker’in, Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu’nun 10. Maddesinin değiştirilmesine dair kanun teklifi ve Geçici Komisyon Raporu” [Draft law of Turkish Citizenship and the additional law proposals of deputies for Citizenship Law], *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Sequence No. 267, period 2, vol. 20.

The Statement of Reasons for the new citizenship law noted that this article determined the principle of blood (descent) for the acquisition of citizenship and stated that there would be exceptions on the part of the status of women. It is stated in the Statement of Reasons that, those children who were born of a Turkish mother and whose fathers were unknown, or who could not acquire the citizenship of their foreign fathers would be Turkish citizens. However, the status of those children who could acquire their father's citizenship, could be arranged by law. It is noted that this procedure was designed in accordance with the principles of citizenship law.⁵⁹ This created a contradiction because in the beginning of the article 54 it was stated that "the child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk." Ergin Nomer noted that this article no matter how it is interpreted did not prove successful because of this contradiction.⁶⁰

Although foreign women who married Turkish men could acquire Turkish citizenship automatically if she was stateless or lost her former citizenship because of this marriage (Article 5), the status of Turkish women marrying foreigners was different. Article 19 stated that:

A Turkish woman marrying a foreigner loses her Turkish citizenship if her husband's national law grants the husband's nationality to the woman and if the woman gives notification as indicated in Article 42⁶¹ to the effect that she has chosen her husband's nationality.

In the event the woman acquires her husband's nationality upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, she loses Turkish citizenship as of that date.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ergin Nomer, *Vatandaşlık Hukuku* [Citizenship Law], (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1989), 8th ed., 48.

⁶¹ Article 42 stated that "If the declaration is made a) before the Turkish wedding authorities, they are to be rendered to those authorities in the course of the wedding; b) before foreign wedding authorities, they are to be rendered in writing to Turkish marriage registration authorities within the month following the conclusion of the marriage."

The women who lost their citizenship were granted the right to return to Turkish citizenship within three years after the termination of marriage by article 13.

The children who could not acquire the citizenship of his father or the country he/she was born in through birth, or who was born out of wedlock are considered as Turkish citizens by Article 1. Also according to Article 19;

Minor children who lose Turkish citizenship in connection with their mother who has withdrawn from Turkish citizenship through marriage become Turkish citizens in connection with their mother in the event that the woman in question returns to Turkish citizenship.

The mentality of this procedure was expressed in the meeting of The Representative Assembly in 1961 as:

The child of a Turkish mother and a Turkish father is a Turk. It is ensured that a child born out of wedlock or with an unknown father would be considered as Turk. Under this circumstance there is not a danger of dual citizenship...What will happen if the child is born from a known foreign father? It would not be right to subject those children to the requirements for admission to Turkish citizenship even if his/her father is a foreigner. We did not consider him/her as equal with a person whose parents are foreigners. We put here a general statement that this child would be subject to a different procedure in admission to Turkish citizenship. This procedure will be designed by a special law, the Constitution only gives the directions. There is no obstacle for this person to be admitted to Turkish citizenship automatically, but we did not cite it in the Constitution. We left this possibility open-ended. There are many Turkish mothers abroad, especially in the Middle and Near East. Their children should be subject to a control due to the interests of the country and even for security. And the anomalies caused by dual citizenship should also be taken into consideration. Special measures and statements will be discussed later according to future developments. It might even be suggested that, those children might acquire Turkish citizenship after maturity if he/she likes. All those will be arranged by law according to the needs.⁶²

It is evident from this quotation that the status of the children born of foreign fathers was regarded as a matter of security of the state. In addition, during the 1960s the Turkish State regarded citizenship to be unique, therefore dual citizenship was seen as a problematic situation and attempts were made to avoid it. Besides the

issue of dual citizenship, especially regarding the status of the Turkish workers in Europe had not become a problem yet. In fact, the migration flow was at its start in other words, the dual citizenship problem of the 1980s and 1990s had its roots in the 1960s.

The other feature of the 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law was to distinguish between expulsion from citizenship and loss of citizenship. The former 1312 numbered Citizenship Law did not distinguish between those two, and all the citizens had been subject to expulsion under this law. Under the 403 numbered law those people, who acquired Turkish citizenship would not be subject to expulsion with the exception stated in Article 26. However, those who acquired Turkish citizenship could be subject to expulsion under the circumstances stated in the same article, that is:

A person abroad who has acquired Turkish citizenship afterwards and who has been engaged in activities violating the external and internal security of The Turkish Republic, and it is not possible to file public action against him or to run public proceedings and who has failed to come back despite notification within three months, may, by the decision of the Council of Ministers, be expelled from citizenship.

This provision may also be applied when Turkey is in war, in regard to persons who have become Turkish citizens upon birth.

The properties of those persons would be taken over by the Treasury and even though their arrival was not prohibited, they were not permitted to settle in Turkey. Those persons who acquired Turkish citizenship and were expelled from citizenship due to the article mentioned above could not by any means be re-admitted to Turkish citizenship.⁶³

Loss of citizenship was designed within the parameters of activities that are not in line with the loyalty of the state. Therefore, those persons who were living

⁶²*Temsilciler Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, vol. 23, 18.4. 1961, 344-349.

abroad and did not apply to the Turkish embassies in the last five years⁶⁴, or those persons who published criticisms of the Turkish government abroad would not lose their Turkish citizenship.⁶⁵ In addition, loss of citizenship was defined by Article 25 that stated:

The Council of Ministers may rule that the following persons have lost their Turkish citizenship:

- a) those who have acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining permission,
- b) those who were in any service of a foreign country not in line with the interests of Turkey and were notified in the name of the government by embassies or consulates abroad or by local administrative officials at home to give up such services but declined to do so voluntarily during the given period which may not be less than three months,
- c) those who continue to work without the permission of the government in any service of a country which is in war with Turkey,
- ç) those persons abroad who are called by the competent authorities to do their military service or, in time of war, to join home defense but have not done so within three months without excuse,
- d) those who run away to foreign countries while being forwarded for military service or after joining their units and do not return within the legally prescribed period,
- e) those members of the Armed Forces or military incumbents who are abroad on duty, on leave, for changing climate or for medical treatment and fail to return home within three months without excuse after the expiry of their terms,
- f) those persons who after acquiring Turkish citizenship by the competent authority, live outside Turkey for at least seven years without a break and do not undertake any formal contacts and transactions to indicate that they have not cut off their interest in and ties with Turkey and that they have maintained their Turkish citizenship.

But formerly exercised transaction that they would have to leave Turkey and clarify their properties was annulled, and they were given the possibility of re-admittance to Turkish citizenship. But before or during the re-admittance process, they would be considered as foreigners.

⁶³ “Türk Vatandaşlığı kanunu tasarısı,” 3.

⁶⁴ This provision was stated in the Article 11 of the 1312 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law.

⁶⁵ “Türk Vatandaşlığı kanunu tasarısı,” 2.

There were also two interim articles of the 403 numbered and February 11, 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law. The first was related with those people who were registered as Turkish citizens legally, but who had left Turkey until the end of the year 1930 and whom there is no information about, would lose Turkish citizenship after the enactment of this law. The second interim article stated that those who were expelled from Turkish citizenship due to 1312 numbered Citizenship Law could apply for re-admission to Turkish citizenship within one year after the enactment of the 403 numbered Turkish Citizenship Law.

The 403 numbered and February 11, 1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law explicitly stated that the principle of *jus sanguinis* was exercised in Turkey. It might be suggested that this principle was exercised at an almost extreme level, by discriminating Turkish women married to a foreigner from citizenship on the contention that father's citizenship is the determinant. This would, however, be changed in 1981, perhaps due to the changing international dynamics and attempts for elimination of discrimination for women.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ However, Nomer argued that those articles were not discriminatory or contrary to the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination of Women, which was enacted on September 3, 1981 and signed by Turkey in 1985. (Here it should be noted that this is a later development and during the 1960s there was almost no international debates on the status of women). Nomer stated that the concerned articles granted a more "privileged" status to women than men, rather than discriminating or subordinating them. See, Ergin Nomer, *Vatandaşlık Hukuku*, 46-47. Nevertheless, it seems a bit naïve to suggest that an article that excludes the children born of Turkish mothers and foreign fathers from Turkish citizenship, or in a way urges the Turkish women in concern to admit her husband's citizenship is a privilege.

5.2.4 The effects of the 1961 Constitution

The Constitution of 1961 introduced a liberal atmosphere for Turkish citizenship. Together with the rights and liberties to form associations, political parties, and trade unions, political participation of the citizens increased. As mentioned in the sections on DP, this politicization and political participation was introduced by the transition to multi-party politics and through the policies of DP in opposition.

During the first stage, that is the DP period, however, only rightist ideologies and religion found room for expression in political life. Leftist ideology, and especially communism was regarded as a threat, and anti-communism was prevalent during this period. However, during the 1960s and 1970s leftist ideology also became visible. The Turkish Workers Party (*TİP*) founded in 1961 was significant within this process. For the first time in Republican history, a socialist party could make its way to the Grand National Assembly, and was represented by 15 seats after the 1965 elections, thanks to the electoral system of proportional representation with 3% votes.⁶⁷ Also, Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (*DİSK*) was formed in 1967.⁶⁸ It held a socialist world view, and sought power for the working class, thus it supported *TİP*.⁶⁹ In 1963, a new law was passed that

⁶⁷ Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *State, Democracy and Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 145; İlkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development*, (Ankara: Ankara University of Political Science, 1974), 143-167.

⁶⁸ Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 219.

⁶⁹ Clement H. Dodd, *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1979), 159.

authorized the right to strike, which was included in the 1961 Constitution. This law for the right to strike enabled “the organized labor to make significant gains.”⁷⁰

The atmosphere of the 1960s contributed to the rise of interest groups. The sectors of commerce and industry organized as well. The Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry had already been founded in 1924. This was followed by the formation of another Union of Chambers of Industry, and the Confederation of Employers (*TİSK*) in 1962.⁷¹ It was also the period of the politicization of the students.

This period of active and liberal citizenship was, however, marked with ideological polarization and clashes. Therefore, a military ultimatum was issued on March 12, 1971. This was not an overt takeover, but the military urged the government to resign and stated that “the leading parties would enact a series of constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the hand of the government in dealing with the dissident, violence-prone groups.”⁷² This was the beginning of the erosion of the rights and freedoms granted by the 1961 Constitution. TİP was closed, many people were arrested, and leftist publications were also closed.

The constitutional amendments were designed so as to limit the activities of the citizens. In order to strengthen the government for safeguarding national security and public order the changes made sought

to reinforce the power of the authorities to prohibit the exploitation of “class, race, or language” to divide the nation; to restrict the press from promoting violations of “national unity”, to limit the right to form unions and associations; to specify that university autonomy should not be

⁷⁰ Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics, and the Military,” 23.

⁷¹ Dodd, *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, 164.

⁷² Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics, and the Military,” 23.

allowed to shield perpetrators of crimes; to strengthen state control over radio and television.⁷³

All those constitutional amendments were against the spirit of the 1961 Constitution. Despite all those amendments and the military's memorandum, political instability and polarization continued and increased. The clashes within the society moved towards terrorism. As the governments could not cope with this situation, the military took over power on September 12, 1980. This was the end of the active citizen, and priority given to the citizens over the state. Together with this intervention, the rights and liberties of the citizens would be curbed to a considerable extent. The period after 1980 would face other and much different problems and issues related with citizenship, which will be elaborated in the next chapter.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

The period between 1946-1980 was significant for the transformation of the understanding and conceptualization of citizenship. Turkish citizenship, which was constructed in the early Republican period as an integral part of the nation-building process, and aimed to turn the citizens into the carriers of the Turkish revolution and modernization, was transformed into a more Western conceptualization. Firstly, the people were mobilized in a way to feel that sovereignty rested upon them, and that they could change their destiny through elections by the influence of the DP propaganda. Referring to Marshall, we can suggest that starting from the formation

⁷³ George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?," in *State, Democracy and Military: Turkey in the*

of the DP, Turkish citizenship had reached to the political level. In other words, the political element became a significant element of citizenship. This feature continued afterwards.

By the enactment of the 1961 Constitution, the individual was given a higher value, and was placed before the state. The duties that were given the priority during the early Republican period, were replaced by extended rights and freedoms. Therefore, during the period between 1960 and 1980 there was a liberal understanding of citizenship. In Turner's terms, there emerged a more active citizenship, which was also encouraged by the state. This period can also be labeled as the period of the social element of citizenship, as there were many provisions that safeguarded the welfare of the people. However, this would also be a transitory period. After the 1980 military takeover, most of those social rights would be curbed. This was the result of the combination of both the domestic atmosphere and the influence of the rising new right ideology in the international context, which was a challenge to the welfare state.

To sum up, the period between 1946 and 1980 constitute a significant phase in the process of citizenization in Turkey. Most of the features of citizenship were introduced in this period, like that of political participation and the primacy of rights against duties. However, after the 1980s, the citizenship debates in Turkey would acquire another dimension, which is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

CHALLENGES TO OFFICIAL TURKISH CITIZENSHIP: THE POST-1980 PERIOD

This chapter will focus on the developments and debates emerging around the notion of citizenship in Turkey after 1980. The 1980s are important especially where the changes with respect to the role of the state and political elites, adoption of new economic policies and their reflections in the social and political life are concerned. The experiences of 1980s in a sense paved the way for the discussions, debates and challenges towards the early republican Kemalist modernization paradigm. It is these discussions, debates and challenges that will form the framework of the discussion on post-1980 experience with Turkish citizenship.

First the changes experienced after the 1980 coup and their reflections on the main theme of this thesis will be analyzed. The challenges toward the Kemalist state view will be discussed, with reference to the emergence of demands stemming from identities other than the Kemalist conceptualization of official Turkish identity.

Second, the debates over Turkish citizenship will be discussed; namely the questions of dual citizenship and constitutional citizenship. Dual citizenship debates emerged as an outcome of the ambiguous status of a large number of Turkish migrants, especially in Europe. Constitutional citizenship debates, on the other hand emerged as a suggested solution for the problems that arose due to the demands for the recognition of distinct identities coming namely from the Kurds and Islamic groups. The reasons lying behind the flourishing of these debates will be searched. This part will focus on the continuity with, changes ensued and deviations from the early republican notion of citizenship. The overall aim is to reveal the crisis of modernity with specific reference to the experience with the concept and practice of citizenship and the problems that it creates.

In order to understand the post-1980 dynamics of Turkish politics and the changes and deviations they brought to the practice and notion of Turkish citizenship, it is necessary to recall briefly the founding early republican notion of citizenship whose basis is embedded within the framework of the Kemalist modernization paradigm. In the endeavor to construct a standardized nation-state identity naturally based on Western model, Westernization, nationalism and secularism were taken as the bulwark of the Kemalist modernization policies. The aim was to accomplish this endeavor by the ideological and practical utilization of this triangle and hence ensure the creation of a sense of unity and cultural consensus in a population inherited from the multicultural configuration of the Ottoman past. The prototypical Turkish citizen was envisioned to be modern, civilized, non-religious and egalitarian so as to sweep away the received hierarchical structure divided across religious, ethnic and national cleavages. The citizenship understanding was a typical civic republican citizenship

endowed with duties towards the state and with particular emphasis on community and general will. This project was not an anomaly within the context of nation-state formation. However, when we dwell on the course it has taken throughout republican history and the issues that have formed the agenda in the post-1980 period, it becomes the core problematic sphere. In other words, what can be depicted as dubious for the latter period is that despite the emergent problems concerning identity within a new environment of global dynamics, the conventional stance insists on a response within the parameters of Kemalist modernization paradigm.

6.1 An Introduction to Post-1980 Political Dynamics

Turkey has experienced its third military takeover on September 12, 1980. The reason behind this takeover was expressed by the then head of the General Staff, Kenan Evren as “to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order”.¹ At that moment there was ideological polarization and turmoil even to the extent of terrorism within the country. Thus the military took over power in order to restore stability and return to the desired state based on ‘democratic principles.’

¹ *12 September in Turkey: Before and After*, prepared by the General Secretariat of the National Security Council (Ankara: Ogun Kardeşler Printing House, 1982), 229, cited in Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics and Military in Turkey”, *Comparative Politics*, 16 (1983), 26.

The 1980 coup was again a reflection of the military's role in Turkish politics. Same as the previous coup and memorandum, the military took over in order to stop the turmoil going on within the country and to restore democracy and democratic institutions which were perceived to be misused by the political elite. There was again a clash between the state elites and the political elites based on the long term interests of the community and the short term interests and benefits of different groups. Heper relates this opposition between the state elites and the political elites to the strong state tradition in Turkey.² Accordingly, the political elites throughout the republican history were perceived as those who undermine the long-term interests of the community for the sake of getting more votes and achieving power. By holding the view that the political parties should not be the spokespersons of the particular interests but rather they "should be the instruments of national unity, order and stability"³ the political parties were taken to be responsible for the bad conditions into which the country had fallen. Thus the military regarded itself as the guardian of the state and intervened when they thought that the regime was in danger.

After the 1980 coup there was a three-year interregnum during which a new constitution was devised. The 1982 Constitution differed from the previous 1961 Constitution on many grounds. Related with the distrust towards the politicians, the new constitution strengthened the position of the President and endowed this position with extra powers. The President would be impartial, but he would be safeguarding the

² See Metin Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington: Eothen Press, 1985).

³ Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 152.

benefits of the state. In doing so he had certain powers of appointing the members of certain state institutions such as the Constitutional Court, Council of State, Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors and Head of the General Staff. The President also had some judicial powers like submitting legislation to the Constitutional Court and calling a referendum for the laws he saw necessary.⁴

The strengthening of the authorities of the Presidency was accompanied by a similar development in another state institution: National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the President, the NSC was endowed with a more influential position in state affairs. When compared to the 1961 Constitution and 1971 amendments the recommendations of the NSC to the government were given higher priority, in 1982 Constitution, strengthening the authority of the former ever more.

Moreover, while the Article 105 of the Constitution stated that “no appeal shall be made to any legal authority including the Constitutional Court against the decisions and orders signed by the President of the Republic at his discretion”⁵ the NSC was also secured against any judicial challenge as regards to its political deeds.⁶ The mentality behind the extension of the authorities of these two state institutions and the constitutional guarantees against outside attempts to thwart their insulation was shaped by the concern with safeguarding the state.

⁴ Art. 104 of 1982 Constitution, Şeref Gözübüyük, *T.C. 1982 Anayasası*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Turhan, 1998)

⁵ Metin Heper, “State and Society in the Turkish Political Experience, “ in *State, Democracy and the Military*, 7.

⁶ Art. 4 of Law on the Structure of Constitution (Anayasa Düzeni Hakkında Kanun), cited in Gözübüyük, 1998, 15.

This concern was to be substantiated by tailoring an official ideology for the coming period. The basis for the restructuration of the political system was found in Atatürkism, which connoted a reaffirmation of the loyalty of the post-1980 state to Atatürkist principles. Thus the President “had an active role of supervising the working of the Constitution in light not only of the requirements of democracy but in accord with Atatürkist principles- among which secularism is given particular mention”.⁷ Atatürkism was revived, this time as a *technique*, serving as a justification ground for eliminating leftist and rightist ideologies.⁸ Besides, as Evin stated, it was reinterpreted continuously in order to be applicable to every occasion, and again according to Evin, the reason for that kind of adoption of Atatürkism was the lack of an intellectual basis in the military for any other substitute worldview.⁹ As previously mentioned the main focus of the state elites was the preserving the integrity of the state, as a secular nation state.

In addition, the 1982 constitution might be regarded as a perversion from the original Kemalist discourse in the sense that it placed more emphasis on “Turkish historical and moral values”.¹⁰ Thus, Islam was recognized by the state elite with regard to its importance in, at least, maintaining Turkish identity and unity, and as a crucial antidote to communism and other fractional and divisive movements. In another

⁷ Clement H. Dodd, “Kenan Evren as President: From Conflict to Compromise,” *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, ed. by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 176.

⁸ Ibid., p.8. Also see, Metin Heper, “A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative Ethics: ‘Atatürkism’ in Turkey.” *Orient*. 1 (1984), 83-94.

⁹ Ahmet Evin, “Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980, “ in *State, Democracy and the Military*, 212.

respect, it has been used to address the failure of the Kemalist progressive ideals to “propagate a social ethics” and to provide common cultural feelings and values that were “equivalent for the widely used Islamic idiom”.¹¹

Under these circumstances, in 1983 the military withdrew from power to leave the ground to civilian politics. However, the concern with stability continued and hence only three parties were permitted to participate in the elections. The pre-1980 political parties had already been closed down and were not permitted to re-open while their leaders were banned from active political engagement.¹² Thus, the elections formed a ground of competition among three parties, the Motherland Party (MP) of Turgut Özal, the National Democracy Party (NDP) of Turgut Sunalp and the Populist Party (PP) of Necdet Calp. The winner of the 1983 elections emerged as the MP, although the military seemed to favor the NDP.

6.1.1 The structure, politics, and the rise of alternative priorities

MP is significant for understanding the other side of post-1980s politics. The first side was the official structuration of Turkish politics whereby the President and the NSC were the main actors. This structuration had its implications in the flow of active politics after the transition to civilian rule, which formed the second facet. MP is

¹⁰ Heper, *State Tradition in Turkey*, 146.

¹¹ Şerif Mardin, “Islam in Mass Society: Harmony versus Polarization”, in *The Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, 163-164

significant not only for the fact that it had the chance of being the first carrier of civilian politics. A more important factor is that it introduced the dominant political stance of the coming period. The parties of the 1970s and their leaders were banned from politics, which gave MP room for both gathering the supporters of the previous parties under its umbrella, and for playing for the center. The party emerged with the claim of representing the four worldviews of the previous parties, namely nationalism, conservatism, “social democracy”, and liberalism. By combining together these four groups within itself, MP was a major attempt for the formation of the center-right in the Turkish political arena. MP had to function in an environment where the economic rather than the cultural or political affairs were left to the conduct of the political parties. This had a paradoxical impact on the running of politics: On the one hand, it provided a breathing space for the party to ensure the liberal factor in its combination in the implementation of market-based economic policies. It adopted export-oriented economy instead of import substitution industrialization. On the other hand, since cultural and political issues had originally been perceived as matters of state, this liberal stance was destined to stay within the economic sphere. The other two factors of the combination, conservatism and nationalism would form the identity of MP as far as the formers are concerned. However, this was not to secure the post-1980 official politics against conflicts that would rise on grounds of identity. Despite the arbitrary statements of Turgut Özal as both the party leader and then as the President regarding a liberal approach to these conflicts, the structure set forth and the foundation of the MP fell short of providing the ground the for ultimate resolution of these conflicts.

¹² (Provisional) Art. 4 of 1982 Constitution, Gözübüyük, 1998. (This article was amended on 17 May 1987.)

In fact, it can be argued that the structure that was set forth by the 1982 Constitution, was further strengthened by the MP government. During the rule of MP government there occurred certain changes on the position of the state elites. MP went through a debureaucratization process through which it eliminated the traditional bureaucracy and replaced it with its own cadres and formed new institutions for bypassing the bureaucratic apparatus.¹³ This led to the withering away of the effectiveness of the traditional bureaucratic elites in state affairs. Made with the aim of providing more space for independent action, the state elites seeking the interests, unity and security of the state became limited with the military and the Presidency; the two institutions which had been given priority in the pursuit of higher interests of the state.

Still, neither market economics, nor the emphasis on the conventional higher interests of the state could respond to the intensification of the problems that arose in the politico-cultural sphere, in relation to identity. The problematic nature of modernization whose major carrier has been the state came to the surface, accompanied by the prevalence of globalization, multi-national companies and consumption society that erased the borders between countries. However, Turkish domestic political scene could not provide a matching point for the ongoing problem of Turkey as related with the official ideology and the identity it introduced; i.e. ethnic, religious and gender

¹³ See Metin Heper, "The State and Debureaucratization: the case of Turkey," *International Social Science Journal*, (126) 1990; "The State, Political Party and Society in post-1983 Turkey," *Government and Opposition*, (25) 1990; "Motherland Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey: 1983-1988," *Governance*, 2(4) 1989; Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. by Larry Diamond, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p.247-261. Motherland Party's other significant accomplishments were privatization of State economic enterprises and decentralization.

identities and their struggle for recognition as distinct groups. To be more specific it was the identity crisis of the Kurds, Islamists, Alevis, and women.

6.1.2 Desegregation of the grand projects

During the 1980s, the leftist and rightist ideological stances of the previous period were suppressed, which in a way left room for the emergence of movements, based on gender, religion and/or identity that had been treated as side issues of the grand project of modernity. In this process, women's movement emerged as significant. In the past women had always been incorporated to certain grand projects as symbols.¹⁴ During the Kemalist regime they were regarded as the carriers of modernity, "sisters-in-arms" who would devote themselves to the regime and the Kemalist principles. Even the granting of suffrage rights for women were not for the sake of women's rights but in order to achieve the visibility of women in the public sphere as a modern symbol. Within other ideological movements women were still viewed as sisters struggling for the grand projects. However, the 1980s opened room for the rise of feminism and debate over the rights of women. Feminists began to discuss issues such as more participation in public life, non-discrimination and equality. However, later these issues were to be incorporated into the state structure by the formation of a State Ministry responsible for women and family and two state

¹⁴ Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Women as Object of Grand Social Projects in Republican Turkey," in *Deconstructing the Images of "the Turkish Women,"* eds. Zehra Arat and Sibel Erol; Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World,*

institutions, namely The General Directorate on Women's Status and Problems and Family Research Institute.¹⁵ But the feminist movement stood as a movement which was not directly challenging the Kemalist notion of citizenship, thus it found room for itself much easily.

The other significant movements were those which have been suppressed in order to acquire a homogeneous society. Islam from the very start of the republic was seen as the reason for the backwardness of the country and as a threat to the consolidation of nation-state identity on secular grounds. For this reason religion was put under the control of the state through the formation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the rest of the religious groups like *tarikats* and *tekkes* were closed down, and the politico-cultural role of religion was pushed to the periphery. The first ephemeral instance of the attempt to bring the periphery to the center was the Democrat Party (DP) experience in the 1950s. The DP came to power with a challenge to the Kemalist notions then represented by the Republican People's Party (RPP). The periphery was mobilized and moved to the political agenda through appealing to religious sentiments. This experience ended with the 1960 military intervention, which was set to reaffirm the loyalty to Kemalist secularism.

The panorama of the post-1980 period was quite different. On the social and moral level, there was a growing emphasis, particularly by the then president Kenan

(London, New Delhi: Zed Books Ltd., 1986); Nalan Soyarak, *The Policies on Women and Family in the Early 1990s*, unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, 1994.

¹⁵ Sibel Erol, "Feminism in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 8, Fall 1992; *Resmî Gazete* (Official Gazette) "Aile Araştırma Kurumu Kurulması Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname"[Decree in the force of law on the formation of Family Research Institute], no: 20387, December 29, 1989; *Resmî Gazete* (Official Gazette)

Evren, on religion, but this had its reflections also on the political level. In almost every speech, Evren mentioned Islam, and in a way praised Islamic values. Trying to act like a savior father figure for his people, he repeatedly stressed the compatibility of Atatürkism and religion by either quoting verses from the Koran or citing Atatürk's speeches on religion. At that period, Islam was used by the state as a tool to keep people together, the attitude, which would change by the rise of political Islam in its moderate and fundamentalist styles. The Prime Minister of the time, Turgut Özal, gave credit to Islamic movements and to Kurdish problem as an attempt to transcend to a civilian regime. Besides, by 1987 the ban over political parties and their leaders were lifted, which led to the rise of political Islam, with the formation of the Welfare Party (WP). For the Islamists, the main problem has been the exclusion of the Islamic ethos from public discourse and the inclusion of an alien secular nationalism into the larger society.¹⁶ The Alevi community, which is a sect of Islam as well, demands accommodation of their religious identity within mainstream institutions such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and they wish to establish their own religious institutions. In other words the Alevis also experience a crisis with regard to their identities. The common point of these demands is a search for a socio-political setting free from alienation and anonymity where these distinct identities can enjoy their social, cultural and political rights.

As far as the main problematique of this thesis shaped around the problematic nature of Turkish citizenship is concerned, ethnic-based issues and thus the Kurdish

"Kadın Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğünün Kurulması"[Formation of the General Directorate of Women's Status and Problems], No: 20679, October 7, 1990.

movement come to the scene. In the 1980s, the Kurdish people started to voice their demands on the recognition of their ethnic identities, the right to speak their language, and for education in Kurdish. Although the most frequently declared aims of the Kurdish movement range from cultural and political rights to federalism and separate statehood, the basic problem seems to be Turkey's failure to recognize Kurds as a distinct ethnic group.¹⁷ The issue has been integrated into the political agenda of both the state and political parties. However, since the dominant structure ensured the control of the state over political and cultural spheres, it was perceived in terms of national and state security, which in a sense led to a deadlock. As mentioned above, this approach could not, and still does not match the discussions in the global context related to multiculturalism, ethnic identities and a change in the conceptualization of citizenship. The gap concerned is between the priorities employed in the official stance on the one hand, and those employed with reference to democratic premises, on the other.

In short, by the 1980s Turkey has witnessed the shortcomings of the Kemalist identity constructed during the nation formation. The attempt to construct a cohesive and homogeneous population of citizens could only delay the problems of identity. However, those problems came to surface by the 1980s. But instead of trying to adopt more individualistic and liberal approach to citizenship by extending rights, especially in the late 1990s the state tries to adopt a stricter notion of citizenship. The gap between the state and society is increasing persistently. The state can not keep up with

¹⁶ See, Hakan Yavuz, "Turkey's Imagined Enemies: Kurds and Islamists," *The World Today*, April 1996, 99-101.

the demands coming from the society. During the republican period, the West was taken as the reference point and the major aim was to keep up with the civilization. Now the state is taking a position that is neither imitating nor taking into consideration the developments with regard to identity politics in the West. Efforts are taken in order to disregard the problems and return to the definitions of the Kemalist period. The persistent problem of the survival of the state still continues and the limits of the citizenship are drawn within the boundaries of that problem. The developments with regard to the conceptualizations of citizenship will be discussed in the following section.

6.2 The Issue of Citizenship in the 1980s

After 1985, courses on citizenship were added to the secondary school curriculum. The transformation in the conceptualization of citizenship was reflected in the course books on “Information about Citizenship.” Üstel points to the changes introduced after 1985 as “there was a return to cultural citizenship strengthened by emphasis on Islam in the education of citizenship.”¹⁷ According to Üstel’s analysis in the books published between 1985-1996, there was an emphasis on religion as a component of a nation together with race, language and common historical heritage. The emphasis on religion as “an element that makes the people live together and in

¹⁷ See, Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, “The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects,” *Security Dialogue*, 28/4 (1997), 439-452.

harmony” was complemented by the emphasis on race. “Every nation believes in the superiority of its race. This belief holds people together and enables them to be healthy and strong” was according to Üstel, the statement used as a reflection of the anxiety of cultural continuity. Another significant theme depicted by Üstel was the increasing concern on the internal and external threats to the Turkish Republic. The external threats were enlisted country by country, and a mentality of “us and others” was tried to be inculcated. It was rather significant to come across that mentality which tries to pump “the militant reflex of citizenship that had never been so strong even after the War of Independence.”¹⁹

After the 1980s, we witness four key issues related with the notion of citizenship in Turkey. The first is the annexation of new paragraphs to the Citizenship Law, which led to either widespread loss of citizenship on the part of some ex-members of Turkish Republic and admission of some others to Turkish citizenship, which will be elaborated below. The second issue is the emerging demands of different groups, like the Kurds, Islamists and women, as mentioned above. The third one is related with the former, the debates of constitutional citizenship in Turkey, expressed from time to time by the political leaders as a solution to the ongoing problems of Turkey. Finally, the fourth issue is centered around a TV serial named “The Diary of a Citizen” broadcasted on the official TV channel of Turkey TRT2 during October 1998, which depicts the desired citizen of the Turkish state at the 75th anniversary of the

¹⁸ Füsün Üstel, “Yurttaşlık Bilgisi kitapları ve Yurttaş profili”[Books on Civic Information and the Profile of the Citizen], *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 25 April 1996.

¹⁹ Ibid.

republic. This chapter will dwell upon these core issues for understanding the Turkish citizenship after the 1980s to the present.

6.2.1 Changes in the Turkish Citizenship Law and outcomes

According to the 1982 Constitution the fourth section is related with political rights and obligations. Article 66 of this section state that:

Everyone who is annexed to the Turkish State with citizenship ties is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a mother is a Turk. Citizenship is acquired and lost by the reasons clarified by law. None of the Turks can be expelled from citizenship unless behaving against the loyalty to the country. The judicial process can not be closed to the decisions and proceedings of expulsion from citizenship.

But before the amendment of the constitution, citizenship had been the issue in the state level. The debates around citizenship started in February 1981, right after the military coup. At that time the National Security Council was in charge of state affairs and they made an amendment in the Turkish Citizenship Law together with the Consultative Assembly. Even though the Turkish Citizenship Law was amended in 1964, there were considerable changes and annexations made during this interregnum period, therefore most of the data used in this section is limited to this period of 1981-1983. The changes were on three significant aspects. First was the improvement towards dual or multiple citizenship. With the amendment on February 13, 1981 “withdrawal from Turkish citizenship is subject to permission by the Council of Ministers when ... citizenship of a foreign country has been acquired in any manner or when there is a convincing evidence that someone is going to acquire a foreign

country's citizenship".²⁰ "If the person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is at the same time a citizen of another country, the withdrawal documents are immediately issued to him. If the person who wants to withdraw from citizenship is not a citizen of another country, the Ministry of Interior Affairs issues him a document of permission. When the person in question brings the documents showing that he has acquired foreign citizenship, the same Ministry gives him a withdrawal certificate. In accordance with the rationale set by the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Interior Affairs may issue permission document to a person who wants to acquire another country's citizenship. The permission document is valid for three years. Those who receive permission documents have to turn over the competent Turkish authorities the required information and documents within this period".²¹

This amendment was particularly significant for the Turkish people who had gone to, for instance, Germany as guest workers but who had eventually settled there. Previously holding dual or multiple citizenship was not permitted, however as the problems arising out of the situation of the Turkish emigrants settled in other countries this new law was designed as a solution.²² According to this law, people who would

²⁰ Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu [Turkish Citizenship Law], Article 20 (c). Trans. İsmet Tezcan.

²¹ Ibid. Article 22.

²² See for instance, N. Abadan-Unat and N. Kemiksiz, *Türk Dış Göçü: 1960-1984* (Turkish External Migration: 1960-1984) (Ankara Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1986). For the issue of dual citizenship see, Ahmet İçduygu "Becoming a Citizen in an Immigration Country: The Case of Turks in Australia and Sweden and Some Comparative Implications" *International Migration* 2 (1996); "Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the Nation-State" *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds. E. Kofman and G. Youngs, (London: Pinter Publications, 1996); and Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak, Nalan Soyarak "What is the Matter with Citizenship? – A Turkish Debate" *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35 (4), October 1999.

acquire the citizenship of another country would first apply to the authorities and get the permission documents for withdrawal from Turkish citizenship. However, after they acquire another country's citizenship, there is still an opportunity to keep the Turkish citizenship by returning the required documents to the Turkish authorities within three years period after they get the permission papers. According to İçduygu et al., Turkey decided to exercise dual citizenship for its citizens living abroad because of the practical national interests of "the wish to keep close contacts with its citizens abroad, and therefore encouraging the emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their children."²³ Even though the implementation of dual citizenship is a challenge to the general definition of citizenship that "citizenship should be unique"²⁴ Turkey had an adoptive attitude on this dual citizenship debate. Even though the Turkish emigrants had some uncertainties related with dual citizenship²⁵ they responded quickly to the new developments. Starting from the amendment of the law, until the transition to multi-party politics in November 1983, a total of 1171 people applied for withdrawal permission.²⁶

²³ İçduygu et al., "What is the Matter with Citizenship?"

²⁴ William Rogers Brubaker, "Introduction" in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. by William Rogers Brubaker, Lanham, New York, London: The German Marshall Fund of the US University Press of America, Inc., 1989

²⁵ See Ahmet İçduygu "Becoming a Citizen," and "Citizenship at the Crossroads"

²⁶ Decision No. 8/ 2425, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), March 18, 1981, No. 17283 - 42 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4183, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), February 10, 1982, No. 17601 - 21 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4399, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), April 8, 1982, No. 17658 - 21 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4548, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 4, 1982, No. 17684 - 32 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4635, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 24, 1982 No. 17703 - 20 persons; Decision No. 8/

Another significant development was related with the circumstances the country went through after the military coup. The military leaders of the period, as mentioned above in the beginning of the chapter regarded the ideological polarization in the country as the real cause of the situation, especially the left. Therefore many of the leftist intellectuals and people were arrested and put into prison. Some fled the country, however a new law was put into effect which would leave them without Turkish citizenship. The meeting on these changes on the citizenship law was held in camera, therefore the debates were not public.

According to the law numbered 2383 and dated February 13, 1981, which was annexed to the article 25 of the Turkish Citizenship Law dated February 11, 1964 and numbered 403:

4930, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 14, 1982, No. 17754 – 12 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4989, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), August 1, 1982, No. 17769 – 13 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5178, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 12, 1982, No. 17810 – 38 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5177, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 13, 1982, No. 17811 – 40 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5358, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 15, 1982, No. 17839 – 62 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5452, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 6, 1982, No. 17860 – 51 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5889, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 19, 1983, No. 17933 – 4 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5888, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 20, 1983, No. 17934 – 60 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5646, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 28, 1983, No. 17942 – 53 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6015, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), March 6, 1983, No. 17979 – 80 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6182, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), April 5, 1983, No. 18009 – 80 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6470, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 21, 1983, No. 18053 – 48 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6493, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 24, 1983, No. 18056 – 38 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6778 and Decision No. 83/ 6793, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 9, 1983, No. 18102 – 19 persons and 35 persons respectively; Decision No. 83/ 6694, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 10, 1983, No. 18103 – 44 persons; Decision No. 83/ , *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), August 28, 1983, No. 18149 – 57 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6974, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 9, 1983, No. 18160 – 26 persons; Decision No. 7118, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 16, 1983, No. 18193 – 106 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7384, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 25, 1983, No. 18232 – 155 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7380, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 27, 1983, No. 18234 – 14 persons. Total: 1171.

a person who has been engaged in activities violating the internal and external security of the Turkish Republic or the economic and financial security of the country in the form of an offence described by the law or a person who, after being engaged in such activities at home, has in any manner gone abroad such that it is not possible to file public action against him or to initiate penal proceedings or to enforce a ruling and who has failed to come back despite notification within three months, or in the case of Martial Law or Emergency Situation within one month” would lose his citizenship.²⁷

In line with this law people who had fled the country for fear of being arrested because of ideological affiliations or offence lost their Turkish citizenship.²⁸ This law and its enactment are significant for the sense that many people were left without citizenship to this extent for the first time, and it would lead to problems after the transition to civilian rule. Another significant aspect related with this law is that it determined “who would deserve the membership of the state and who would not” besides this law was used as a kind punishment towards those who did not act in accordance with the principles of the regime.

Starting from 1981 there is a large scale of loss of citizenship on the part of the non-Muslim elements of the republic for the reasons expressed in the Article 25 of the Citizenship Law paragraphs (a)²⁹ (ç), (d) and (e). According to this article,

²⁷ Published in *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), March 21, 1981, 17286.

²⁸ Decision No. 8/ 5262, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 10, 1982, No. 17808 – 15 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5762, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 10, 1983, No. 17920 – 10 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6045, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), March 2, 1983, No. 17975 – 10 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6704, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 8, 1983, No. 18101- 26 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6878, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 7, 1983, No. 18158 – 13 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7425, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), December 12, 1983, No. 18246 –4 persons.

²⁹ This paragraph is amended per law No. 2383/6 on February 13, 1981, like paragraph (g) of the Article 25 of the Citizenship Law. However, as mentioned in the

the Council of Ministers may rule that the following persons have lost their Turkish citizenship:

(a) those who have acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining permission, (ç) those persons abroad who are called by the competent authorities to do their military service or, in the time of war, to join home defense but have not done so within three months without excuse (d) those who run away to foreign countries while being forwarded for military service or after joining their units and do not return within the legally prescribed period, and (e) those members of the Armed Forces or military incumbents who are abroad on duty, on leave, for changing climate or for medical treatment and fail to return home within three months without excuse after the expiry of their terms".³⁰

The amendment of this paragraph indicates the increasing concern for those who have left the country and have not returned back. However, the two articles of the Citizenship Law- Article 20 for withdrawal permission and Article 25 (a)- seems contradictory. While one states that " a person who had acquired the citizenship of a foreign country in any manner can have withdrawal permission" Article 25 (a) states, as mentioned above that "those who have acquired foreign citizenship without obtaining permission". As the former does not mention any form of permission before the acquisition of foreign citizenship, it becomes problematic to decide who would lose his/her Turkish citizenship and who would get the withdrawal permission. Rather it seems to be a kind of method used to get rid of those non-Muslim citizens who were living abroad, even though this argument may seem rather tough.³¹ On the other hand,

text the original copy of the law is unreachable as the meeting was held in camera. Turkish Citizenship Law and the Official Gazette are used in this text, as references.

³⁰ "Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanunu" [Turkish Citizenship Law], *Yürürlükteki Kanunlar Külliyesi* [Collection of the Laws in Action], Başbakanlık Yayını, v.3, p.3851.

³¹ It is hard to enlist all the names in this text but they are available in Decision No. 8/ 2425, *Resmi Gazete* [Official Gazette], March 18, 1981, No. 17283 - 114 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4183, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), February 10, 1982, No. 17601 - 53 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4399, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), April 8, 1982, No. 17658 - 62 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4548, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 4, 1982, No. 17684 - 143 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4635, *Resmi Gazete*

there was the naturalization of large people of “Turkic origins” in a significant manner.

When the decisions of the Council of Ministers are issued in *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) it is quite easy to find pages of lists of people from Bulgarian, Yugoslavian or Afghan nationality who were admitted to Turkish citizenship.³² The legal reason for

(Official Gazette), May 24, 1982 No. 17703 – 118 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4930, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 14, 1982, No. 17754 – 57 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4989, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), August 1, 1982, No. 17769 – 70 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5178, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 12, 1982, No. 17810 – 265 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5177, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 13, 1982, No. 17811 – 53 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5358, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 15, 1982, No. 17839 – 207 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5452, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 6, 1982, No. 17860 – 65 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5889, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 19, 1983, No. 17933 – 87 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5888, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 20, 1983, No. 17934 – 196 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5646, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 28, 1983, No. 17942 – 180 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6015, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), March 6, 1983, No. 17979 – 113 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6182, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), April 5, 1983, No. 18009 – 173 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6470, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 21, 1983, No. 18053 – 216 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6493, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), May 24, 1983, No. 18056 – 78 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6778 and Decision No. 83/ 6793, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 9, 1983, No. 18102 – 20 persons and 47 persons respectively; Decision No. 83/ 6694, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 10, 1983, No. 18103 – 93 persons; Decision No. 83/ , *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), August 28, 1983, No. 18149 – 119 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6974, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 9, 1983, No. 18160 – 31 persons; Decision No. 7118, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 16, 1983, No. 18193 – 97 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7380, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 27, 1983, No. 18234 – 57 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7402, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), December 9, 1983, No. 18246 – 573. Total: 3092. I would like to thank Oğuz Tarhan for his remarks related with those developments.

³² Decision No. 8/ 2583, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), April 11, 1981, No. 17307 – 33 persons; Decision No. 8/ 2874, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), June 6, 1981, No. 17358 – 27 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4084, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), January 22, 1982, No. 17582 – 13 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4271, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), March 2, 1982, No. 17621 – 122 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4424, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), No. 17658 – 54 persons; Decision No. 8/ 4978, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 30, 1982, No. 17767 – 121 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5326, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 10, 1982, No. 17834 – 151 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5325, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 11, 1982, No. 19835 – 12 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5444, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 7, 1982, No. 17861 – 672 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5474, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette),

this admission was found in the Law on Settlement, which enabled the easy naturalization of those people who are close to Turkish culture or one of Turkic origin.³³ By analyzing those two developments we can draw some significant conclusions. Even though it seems as merely a legal process, while making non-Muslim citizens lose their citizenship, admitting others to citizenship reflects more than that. It resembles to the process of Turkification of the population in the early republican period, especially when the increasing emphasis on Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the 1980s is taken into consideration.

One example of that naturalization process mentioned above was the admission of the Afghan migrants with Turkic origins in 1982. This issue was debated in the Parliament. Because of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, those people fled to Pakistan. After a debate in the National Security Council it was decided that they would be taken into Turkey with all their belongings and settled here.³⁴ The decision

November 12, 1982, No. 17867- 452 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5492 and 8/ 5493, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 20, 1982, No. 17874 – 184 and 257 persons respectively; Decision No.8/ 5516, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 21, 1982, No. 17875 – 433 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5503, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 22, 1982, No. 17856 – 956 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5485, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), November 24, 1982, No. 17878 – 276 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5617, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), December 11, 1982, No. 17895 – 184 persons; Decision No. 8/ 5618, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), December 14, 1982, No. 17898 – 224 persons; Decision No.8/ 5642 and 8/ 5661, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), December 20, 1982, No. 17904 – 18 and 27 persons respectively; Decision No. 83/ 6237, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), April 17, 1983, No. 18021 – 78 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6785, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), July 28, 1983, No. 18118 – 11 persons; Decision No. 83/ 6976, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), September 7, 1983, No. 18158 – 103 persons; Decision No. 83/ 7187, *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette), October 27, 1983, No. 18204 – 27 persons. Total: 4199 persons.

³³ The Law on Settlement was put into effect during 1934. And it led to some significant changes in the population structure of the Republic. See Chapter IV.

³⁴ *Tutanak Dergisi*, March 2, 1982, v.6

was based on 2510 numbered Law on Settlement and annexed law numbered 1306. They would be accepted as migrants and be settled in appropriate places where they would be productive. This law was to be applied only for once. However, as understood from the decisions published in *Resmi Gazete*, later those people were admitted to Turkish citizenship. It is a significant example of the admission of people with “Turkic” origins to Turkish citizenship.

Within this three years period there were also those who were admitted to Turkish citizenship according to articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Citizenship Law. Those articles suggest that:

Article 6- Foreigners who meet the following requirements may be admitted to Turkish citizenship by the decision of the Council of Ministers.

- a) Such a person must be an adult according to his/her own national law, or if he/she is stateless, according to Turkish law.
- b) He/she must have resided in Turkey for 5 years at the time of application.
- c) He/she must have shown with his/her behavior that he/she has decided to settle in Turkey.
- d) He/she must be of good morals.
- e) He/she must not have a disease, which would jeopardize public health.
- f) He/she must be able to speak Turkish adequately.
- g) He/she must have an income or a profession, which would provide for the livelihood of himself/herself and of his/her dependents.

Article 7- In the following cases foreigners may, upon their wish, by the proposal of the Ministry of Interior and the decision of the Council of Ministers be admitted to Turkish citizenship without having to fulfill the requirements cited in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 6.

- a) Adult children born afterwards of persons who have lost Turkish citizenship for any reason,
- b) Persons married to a Turkish citizen and their adult children,
- c) Persons of Turkish stock (origins) as well as their spouses and adult children,
- d) Persons settled in Turkey with the intention of marrying a Turkish citizen,
- e) Persons who have brought industrial installations to Turkey and persons who have been or are expected to be of extraordinary service to Turkey in social, economic, scientific, technical or artistic fields,

- f) Persons the admission of which has been deemed imperative by the Council of Ministers.

Article 8- The Council of Ministers may re-admit to citizenship persons who have lost their Turkish citizenship as per this law with no need to fulfill the residence requirement.

During the period of 1981-1983 many people were admitted or re-admitted to Turkish citizenship in line with the laws mentioned above. Within this three years period there was an ongoing process of both making some people lose their citizenship and admission of others to citizenship. When compared to the previous periods there is an increasing concern on the issue. It seems as if by taking hold of the state the military regarded itself responsible for the issues related with citizenship and started to bring about new solutions to the problems. However, the changes made during this period led to other problems after the transition to civilian rule.

The issues of citizenship did not come to the agenda of the Parliament until 1989. In January 1989, a group of deputies from the Socialist Democratic Populist Party proposed a change in the Citizenship Law. It was based on the practice of Article 25 (g) which made people lose their citizenship. The new proposal after criticizing the practices of the interregnum period and regarding them as arbitrary and anti-democratic suggested that “no born Turkish citizen should be subject to expulsion from citizenship” however, this proposal was rejected with the following reasons; firstly even though people from other parties accepted that some of the laws amended during the military regime were anti-democratic and against human rights, they noted that “no Turk can be expelled from citizenship unless those behaving as contradictory to the loyalty to the country”, thus they did not accept the change of this paragraph. Secondly, as the Constitution stated that “The judicial process can not be closed to the decisions

and proceedings of expulsion from citizenship” it was decided that there was no need to state that “no born Turkish citizen should be subject to expulsion from citizenship”. Even though the proposal was rejected it paved the way for discussions on the practices of the military regime on citizenship.

Three months later, on April 20, 1989, the controversial paragraphs of the previously used Citizenship Law numbered 1312 and the contemporary law numbered 403, were put in order. The Law numbered 1312 did not distinguish between loss of citizenship and expulsion, in other words, there was no mention of loss of citizenship. People were only expelled from citizenship. When the law changed and law numbered 403 was put into effect there emerged problems. The contemporary law distinguishes between loss and expulsion, and only those who have acquired citizenship afterwards are subject to expulsion. The born Turkish citizens on the other hand, are subject to loss of citizenship. As there were numbers of people who were expelled from citizenship by the law no. 1312, there was a need to change the law, and find a solution to those people who have suffered from expulsion. All parties in the Parliament agreed on the transitory article aspiring for the solution of the problem as “those people who were Turkish citizens by birth and were subject to expulsion under the law no.1312, within two years after this law is issued, can apply for re-admittance to Turkish citizenship; the Council of Ministers is responsible for the implementation of law no. 403 article 8”. In this meeting, citizenship was expressed to be a basic human right and that no one should be expelled from citizenship arbitrarily. Also, those implementations were seen as an obstacle in Turkey’s relations with the EC, and the

military regime was criticized for its implementations on citizenship.³⁵ It was a period when the citizenship issues of Turkey were began to be discussed with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international law, and Europe.

At that time another law was annexed to the Citizenship Law. According to Article 10, “unconditional admission to citizenship may be valid as of the date of the decree of the Council of Ministers. Admission to citizenship by a decree of the Council of Ministers having conditions attached; may be valid as of the date the Ministry of Interior establishes that the conditions have been fulfilled. In the event the conditions have not been fulfilled within two years, the decree of the Council of Ministers for admission shall be annulled upon the proposal of the Ministry of Interior”.³⁶

The annulment of the Article 25 paragraph (g) came 11 years later, on May 27, 1992. The proposal was discussed in the Parliament on February 13, 1992. In the proposal it was stated that a total of 227 people had lost their citizenship in accordance with paragraph (g). By regarding those practices as anti-democratic and as against individual rights and liberties, its annulment was proposed. In the proposal it was suggested that this process was duplicating the penalty for those people who were subject to investigation for other offences. Making people lose their citizenship, in this sense, was viewed to be against universal citizenship laws. Besides, articles 140, 141, 142 and 163, according to which those people were punished, were annulled.³⁷ Thus

³⁵ Speech of Ali Haydar Erdoğan (SDPP – İstanbul Deputy), *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, v.25, April 20, 1989, period: 18, p.309-312.

³⁶ Turkish Citizenship Law.

³⁷ These articles are from the criminal law. Article 140 is related with the criticisms published abroad which are violating the honor of the state, articles 141 and 142 are on the formations of associations and organizations that aspire for the oppression of one social class over the others, and article 163 is related with those

there remained no offence. The reason behind this proposal was declared as, in order to make this law and practices of human rights in Turkey compatible with universal traditions, international treaties, Turkey's political regime and with the society's aspirations for integration with the modern world.³⁸ Thus, the annulment of paragraph (g) of the article 25 was accepted and the documents and records of the people concerned were updated, besides all their properties, which were taken over by the government, were given back.

Short after this decision, a question was raised by Adnan Kahveci on 286 people who lost their citizenship by the decision of the Council of Ministers issued in *Resmi Gazete* on March 14, 1992. Kahveci was questioning the government's seriousness about democratization, and criticizing the contradictory decisions and desires of the government as related with the citizenship issues. The answer came from the then Minister of Interior as those people lost their citizenship not because of Article 25 paragraph (g), but in accordance with Article 25 paragraphs (a) (ç) and (d). The details about those people were that, 43 people had acquired Israeli citizenship without the permission of the Turkish government, 240 of them did not return to do their military service despite the calls, and 3 people had run away to foreign countries while being forwarded. Those people could re-admit Turkish citizenship if and when they fulfill their duties or obligations. Sezgin stated that this process is related with the

activities that are against secularism and that promote the adoption of religious principles in the conduct and judicial affairs of the state. See, *Türk Ceza Yasası*, ed. Hüseyin Yıldırım, (Ankara: Olgaç Matbaası, 1981-1982).

³⁸ "Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununun 25inci Maddesinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun Tasarısı ve İçişleri Komisyonu Raporu (1/ 345)" [Proposal for the amendment of article 25 of the Turkish Citizenship law and the report of the Ministry of Interior], *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Vol. 12, February 17 1992, period: 19.

sovereignty rights of the state, and based on the mutual obligations stemming from the citizenship ties between the state and the individual.³⁹

During the 1990s, the Parliament was concerned mostly about the dual citizenship problem and legal procedures. Many times questions were raised about the process of withdrawal from citizenship, the problems and shortcomings of the system. In 1995, for instance, when Germany decided that the Turkish people living within this country could apply for German citizenship that year, the Turkish parliament had to reformulate the laws concerned with dual citizenship. There have been debates on the situation of the Turkish people living abroad and the problems they face. Even though those people had settled in other countries like Sweden, Germany, Netherlands and Denmark for about thirty years and have raised their children in those countries, they could not benefit from the economic, social or political rights fully as they were not citizens of those countries. Some countries were not implementing dual citizenship and the Turkish people living in those countries were in a dilemma of either withdrawing from Turkish citizenship or remaining as aliens in the countries they lived.

In order to solve this problem and find a solution to the status of the people living in other countries, withdrawal from Turkish citizenship was made easier. The requirement of completing military service before withdrawal was annulled.⁴⁰ Besides,

³⁹ “İstanbul Milletvekili Adnan Kahveci’nin, vatandaşlıktan çıkarılma işlemleri ve bu konudaki kararnamelere ilişkin Başbakan’dan sorusu ve İçişleri Bakanı İsmet Sezgin’in Yazılı Cevabı” [Question of İstanbul deputy Adnan Kahveci submitted to the Prime Minister on expulsions from citizenship, and the answer of Minister of Interior], *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 14.4.1992, Vol. 9, period: 19, 126-127.

⁴⁰ Paragraph (b) of Article 20 was annulled on June 7, 1995. But there were discussions on this change. It was argued that this change was against the Constitution. Article 72 states that “military service is the right and duty of every Turk”. A deputy representing the Welfare party stressed that every Turkish citizen should do this

Article 29 of the Citizenship law stating that “A person who has lost Turkish citizenship as per this law is to be treated as a foreigner as from the date of such loss. Such a person may only benefit from the rights of the foreigners as recognized by the Turkish laws in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labor” was changed by adding the statement that “However, those who held Turkish citizenship by birth, and acquired another country’s citizenship after getting the withdrawal permission by the decision of the Council of Ministers and their inheritors may benefit from the rights of the Turkish citizens in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labor, while the provisions for the national security and public order of the Turkish Republic are reserved”.⁴¹

The underlying desire in this change was to encourage dual citizenship among the Turkish migrants living in other countries. This encouragement however, was based on the promotion of the interests of Turkey in those countries by placing those people in key positions in, for example, political life. When the proposal was being debated in the Parliament, all party representatives emphasized the importance of the Turkish people’s votes, if they would have been naturalized in the countries concerned, for the formations of coalitions. In other words, those people were regarded as the representatives of Turkish interests in the countries they lived. It was not an attempt to solve the problems of those people’s statuses in the countries and help them enjoy

military service, and if this law is changed for dual citizenship then many people would try to go abroad in order not to do the military service. He noted that he was not sure about the benefits of this change. See, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, June 7, 1995, period: 19, Vol. 38, 98-101.

⁴¹ *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, June 7, 1995, period: 19, Vol. 38, 88-109.

equal rights with the natives of those countries.⁴² Hammar notes that debate over dual citizenship involves the debate over the meaning of citizenship.⁴³ In the dual citizenship debates in Turkey, citizenship in this sense was limited to a legal definition, that of acquiring the receiving countries legal membership. However, the social and cultural aspect was perceived to be reserved for Turkish citizenship. In other words, it was believed that those people who acquired another country's citizenship would still serve the benefits of Turkey in the receiving country.

While this change was being debated, some people expressed their distress about the non-Muslims who have lost their citizenship. They have pointed that if this law is enacted then those Greek, Jewish or Armenian ex-citizens of Turkey would also claim Turkish citizenship, their properties and the places they have lived previously back. Even though it was noted that those people lost their citizenship according to other articles, like that of not taking withdrawal permission before acquiring other countries' citizenship, some deputies were rather anxious about the law. The tones of their speeches were rather antagonistic about those people, and they were regarded as a threat for the security of the country. Nevertheless, those non-Muslims were not included in this change.

Starting from the early 1980s, citizenship became a significant issue in the Parliament. At first it was used as a kind of control mechanism and as away of punishment on those who were "against the regime". After the transition to democratic

⁴² See the Parliamentary debates in *ibid*.

⁴³ Tomas Hammar, "State, Nation and Dual Citizenship," in *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*, ed. William Rogers Brubaker, (Lanham, New York, London: The German Marshall Fund of the US University Press of America, Inc., 1989), 81.

multi party system, it was again an issue, but this time to meet the requirements of democracy. As it had always been the case, the Parliamentary and legal concerns on citizenship were limited to European or Western point of view. The legal codes and implementations were criticized and annulled because they were seen as obstacles for the modernizing and developing Turkey. The changes for dual citizenship, as mentioned above, were made with secondary thoughts of the Turkish people seeking the benefits of Turkey in the countries they lived and became citizens. As can be depicted from the changes made, dual citizenship was encouraged. It was stated that the citizenship laws stem out of the internal and special needs and features of each county. However, the internal problems of citizenship were not even debated in the Parliament. But as identity problems increased, and almost new and different problems related with Turkish citizenship defined by the state emerged, new discussions and debates came to the agenda.

6.2.2 The problems related with identity claims and constitutional citizenship

As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, after the 1980s there emerged movements that were challenging the official understanding of Turkish citizenship. These movements had claims for the recognition of their identities, as different from the homogenizing citizenship concept. Especially the Kurds and the Islamic groups were challenging this notion. Even though those problems might be evaluated under the “identity” aspect of citizenship, they were also closely connected to the “legal

status” aspect. Not only the Kurds and Islamic groups, but also others were demanding the liberalization of the laws, and more emphasis on social rights.

By the emergence of the problems of citizenship, some political leaders began to discuss and respond to these issues. The debates started in the early 1990s. In December of 1994, the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller reformulated the statement of Atatürk “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk” as “How happy is the one who says I am a Turkish citizen”.⁴⁴ In the speech he made in the International Press Institute General Meeting in Budapest in 1992, Demirel for the first time mentioned that:

constitutional citizenship is a notion which embraces all the citizens of a state in the common denominator of equality with regard to rights and duties. Thanks to constitutional citizenship all citizens of a state regardless of the differences of religion, language, race, or gender get the right of aspiring for and achieving duties. Every individual regardless of ethnic origins, language, religion and gender, is connected to a state with constitutional citizenship ties, and shares the joy and sorrow, thus by bringing about his/her cultural belongings gets the right of both contributing to social welfare and to get its benefits.⁴⁵

Since then from time to time President Demirel mentioned constitutional citizenship as the solution for internal peace in Turkey. The speech he made in the OSCE meeting in December 1996, like most of his statements on constitutional citizenship received attention of the journalists and scholars. This speech summarizes what Demirel understands from constitutional citizenship, when taken into consideration with the quotation above.

The best method to keep the differences and to establish harmony is to establish an understanding of a nation that has a feature of a collectivity of citizens

⁴⁴ cited in Ahmet İçduygu, “Çokkültürlülük: ‘Türkiye Vatandaşlığı Kavramı İçin Toplumsal Bir Zemin’[Multiculturalism: a Social Basis for the Notion of Turkish Citizenship], *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 33, March – April 1995

⁴⁵ Füsün Üstel, “Anayasal vatandaşlık, hangi anayasaya vatandaşlık?” [Constitutional Citizenship, Citizenship to Which Constitution?], *Radikal*, December 17, 1996.

endowed with universal and democratic values. Citizenship ties made up with that kind of understanding is the only mechanism that would provide and keep true democratic pluralism. Also, the best definition of the parameters of democratic citizenship can be found in the conceptual framework of constitutional patriotism and citizenship identity. This approach leaves no room for ethnic discrimination. Those should be undeniable values that gather the democracies around a common political vision.⁴⁶

Even though Demirel's statements may provide a rough definition of constitutional citizenship, it is not quite clear what he means or the intentions behind those statements. It seems that there is a debate going over an undefined notion without discussing its suitability or usability in the Turkish context. For instance, recently on July 15, 1999 during his visit to Israel, this time Demirel suggested that Turkey have constitutional citizenship. He noted that "the nation in Turkey is the Turkish nation. Even though people come from different origins this nation is the Turkish nation. We do not make discrimination, racism or religious differences are not exercised. We do not accept nations within a nation. Our citizens have rights and obligations, and the constitution determines everything within this framework. And this is Constitutional Citizenship". It is quite evident from this statement that the notion of constitutional citizenship is not understood well in Turkey.

However, those statements opened room for new debates on citizenship among the academic sphere in Turkey. The constitutional citizenship debate emerged firstly in a rather different context. It stemmed from the debate between the German historians on how to read the German past. The 1980s were the period of the rise of the new right and those people claimed that the Nazi past had nothing more than the past of the Bolsheviks with regard to the terror or holocaust. Historians from the right wing

⁴⁶ Ibid.

suggested that the duty of the historian was to write a history that would increase the national consciousness. On the other hand, historians from the left, especially Habermas, suggested that the past should not be disregarded. Besides the duty of the historian is to help the society to reconcile with its past, rather than to support national cohesion.⁴⁷ Thus, Habermas noted that “Nazism was not a simple era of madness in the German history but was the final point of the longstanding anti-democratic inclinations.”⁴⁸ So, Habermas suggested that the best national identification would be constitutional patriotism, that is, the exclusion of every kind of cultural or linguistic monopoly in the democratic institutions.⁴⁹

In his article “Citizenship and National Identity” Habermas relates the renewal of interest on the relation between citizenship and national identity on two developments in history.⁵⁰ The first one is the unification of Germany, the liberation of the Central Eastern European states and the rise of ethnic conflicts especially in Eastern Europe. The second is the European Community under which the European states are integrating and getting close to each other more and more. After elaborating the historical evolution of citizenship and its relations with national identity in the European context, Habermas introduced a new conceptualization. As a reflection of his

⁴⁷ Ayşe Kadioğlu, “Alman Yeni Sağ: Bir Başka Tarihbilim Tartışması”[German New Right: Another Debate Over History], *Toplumbilim*

⁴⁸ Füsün Üstel, “Anayasal vatandaşlık”

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. by Bart Van Steenbergen, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994.

theory on communication,⁵¹ he stresses the changing dynamics for the sovereignty of the people as “a procedure of discursive opinion and will formation.”⁵² In addition, he proposes a set of thinking patterns for a new type of citizenship. In a context of liberal and political culture, a communicative pluralism will be achieved which will lead to constitutional patriotism. In order to achieve this, Habermas noted that “deliberations within the decision making bodies need to be opened for and sensitive to the influx of issues, value orientations, contributions and programmes from their informal environments.”⁵³ Only then the notion of citizenship can be transformed and become more meaningful. In a parallel and more detailed article “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” Habermas stresses the significance of the constitution in the solution of the problems of citizenship and ethnic, linguistic and religious identities. Here Habermas points to the importance of acquiring an understanding of constitutional patriotism. Habermas proposes a new type of communication among people through which a consensus would be reached and the different cultures or identities would be embraced under a common understanding and responsibility of the constitution.⁵⁴

As noted above, the issue of constitutional citizenship received the attention of some academics as well. The debates varied from the non-applicability of

⁵¹ See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989).

⁵² Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,”

⁵³ Ibid. p.32

constitutional citizenship to Turkey as it was proposed for a common notion of European citizenship⁵⁵ to stressing the non-democratic character of the Turkish constitution, which can be viewed as a barrier for constitutional citizenship.⁵⁶ Among those studies, two articles of İçduygu and Keyman provide both a theoretical definition of constitutional citizenship, and discuss its applicability for Turkey. As a result of globalization and the emergence of identity politics and multiculturalism, together with the “legitimacy crisis” most countries experienced, there occurred certain changes on the conceptualization of the spirit of constitutionality. Rather than the protection of individual rights and liberties, constitutionality now stands for the “ethical code that puts into effect the cultural differences in a common denominator, a common identity code, and moves the demands of difference to the public sphere”.⁵⁷ Thus, they point to a change in the definition of constitution, a transition from a common identity to difference. The constitutional state now stands for both, respect to individual rights and for moving the demands of difference to a democratic environment. According to İçduygu and Keyman, constitutional citizenship is “the recognition of different ethnic, religious or faith groups within the nation state and safeguarding social preservation and development of each groups’ existences socially and politically, based on a kind of

⁵⁴ Jürgen Habermas, “Struggles For Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State,” in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)

⁵⁵ Nur Vergin, “ ‘Anayasal vatandaşlık’ ne demektir?” [What does Constitutional Citizenship mean?], *Milliyet*, 26 December 1996.

⁵⁶ Füsün Üstel, “Anayasal vatandaşlık”

⁵⁷ Ahmet İçduygu and E. Fuat Keyman, “Globalleşme, Anayasallık ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Tartışması”[Globalization, Constitutionality and the Debate

social contract, like through a constitution.”⁵⁸ They also suggest that “constitutional citizenship is reconstructing the understanding of citizenship, which was constructed as a political identity in meta-historical and meta-cultural level by the Kemalist modernization will, on the basis of rights.”⁵⁹ As İçduygu and Keyman suggest the application of constitutional citizenship in Turkey can be viewed as a solution to the problems the regime experiences these days. It can be implemented in order to form a democratic environment where the different identities are recognized and safeguarded, rather than being seen as threats to the regime. But in doing so, first a democratic and pluralistic understanding should be prevalent within the society, and a new constitution should be formed which would respect all kinds of differences. It should be pointed out that the recognition of differences would help solve the deadlocks the regime has.

6.2.3 *The Diary of the Citizen*

The 75th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic was celebrated as a reassertion of the Kemalist ideals. There was a revitalization of interest towards the

over Citizenship in Turkey], *Doğu Batı* 5 (November- December- January 1998-9), p.147.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.153.

⁵⁹ E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, “Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunu: Anayasal Vatandaşlık ve Demokratik Açılım Olasılığı”[Turkish Modernization and the problem of National Identity: Constitutional Citizenship and the Possibility of a Democratic Solution] *75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru* [From

early Republican period, however that period was depicted as the golden age. Most of the celebrations emphasized the successes of the Kemalist regime. Among those activities few were crucial for this study. One of them is the exhibition of a prominent bank called “to create a citizen.” In the catalogue of the exhibition there were various photographs related to the early republican period and showing the change the country went through. The themes were not categorized with direct relation to citizenship. However, it was noted that the process of creating a new citizen of the Turkish republic was a success. The ongoing desires for recognition of differences were ignored and the success of the process was related to the creation of a citizen devoted to the Kemalist principles. The newspaper advertisements of the 75th anniversary of the Republic said:

We are meeting at the Republic, because it has citizenship.

October 29, 1923 is a birthday... A birthday of a nation... It is the day when a modernization project, a major dash has started... we have made a story of success in a 75 year long dash...

The major feature this success has granted us is “citizenship” we achieved by the proclamation of the Republic. To be a nation composed of modern persons, free citizens rather than subjects is our success.

Our success story has not ended, it continues. Today, our target is to have every generation, every stratum and every individual to develop the consciousness of citizenship, and to hold it. And our republic is the meeting point for this target.

We, as the citizens who made up this success story will carry on this development. Because, we have our republic, and because we are meeting at the republic, at citizenship.”

Another significant element was the broadcasting of a serial called “The Diary of a Citizen.” It was shown in the state channel TRT2 that aspires for a more intellectual style. However, the program resembled the programs in the 1980s designed in accordance with the literacy campaign in the country. The emphasis was on how a citizen should be; therefore the tone of the program was rather didactic. The narrator

was an actor, and a professor, Süheyl Batur was the consultant of the program. Süheyl Batur appeared after every key notion about citizenship and declared his views.

The notion of citizenship was repeatedly defined as a legal tie that bound people with the will to live together, the people should not necessarily be from the same identity, religion, or race. The citizen was defined as “the one who has the power to determine both his/her future and the future of the country; who declares his/her reactions without any reservation; who struggles for his/her rights; who is participant.” Besides, the citizen lives in a territory with set boundaries, protects his rights, who is working for his/her country and is endowed with certain duties. The program aspires for the rising of the consciousness of Turkish citizenship among the people, in the 75th anniversary of the republic.

In the nine parts watched, there was an ongoing emphasis on the lack of a consciousness of citizenship rights. However, the understanding of rights was not voiced in a liberal understanding of citizenship. The emphasis on rights rather stems from an inherent devotion for the well being of the country. It was from time to time pointed that the Kemalist regime granted sovereignty to the people, but they are ignorant about it. Therefore, the importance of organizing was declared. The examples of non-governmental organizations were selected from those that are rather close to the system and devoted to the spread of Kemalist principles, like that of *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği* [Association for the Promotion of Modern Life] and *TEMA*. It seems that the underlying message is “organize, but within the parameters prescribed by the state.” Besides, the distrust of the political leaders was again prevalent, and the

formation of committees, which would monitor members of the parliament, was promoted. Organization was regarded crucial for the solution of many problems in daily life as well. The formation of local committees in the settlement regions (*mahalle*) for the betterment of daily life was given as examples. Here, the emphasis was on the revival of neighborhood ties in a very nostalgic manner. Modern life loosened neighborhood ties, but they should be revitalized in order to take control over the place people live, and for the betterment of the quality of life. The images used under the theme of organization were interesting, the most commonly used image was from the protests of "One minute of darkness for light" whose major aim was the solution of the problems related with the relations between the state and mafia. It is evident that the state did not welcome those kinds of protest, however the program depicted it as a reflection of the rise of consciousness of citizenship, without making any comments on the issue. Other images were taken from the protests of the state officials who from time to time protest either the wages or the ban over their right to from syndicates, usually at which the people are beaten by the police. There is a dilemma here, on the one hand the program aspires for the republican citizen who would perform his/her duties efficiently, but the exemplary images are taken from protests toward the state. The citizens were called to be active citizens, but in this active citizenship understanding the underlying aim was to carry on the modernizing mission, and responsibility towards the community, as has been the case in the early republican period.

The globalization process was regarded as the real cause of the emergence of micro nationalisms, politicization of religion and the rise of Islamic movements. Sencer

Ayata, a sociologist, expressed the distress about globalization: “as the social state withdraws, the individual starts to search for protection, and approaches to movements based on ethnicity or religion. Those movements have close solidarity and use the resources within themselves, but those are not distributed equally in those groups. These lead to brutal social and political clashes. The globalizing world shapes around religious or ethnic values and gives birth to a clash.” Here, it is evident that the theory of globalization has been turned vice versa, and is blamed as the cause of the identity crisis. In other words, this program regarded those developments with regard to identity as evil. Therefore, the proposed citizenship had nothing new. By preserving the distinction of public and private spheres, religion and *türban* was viewed to be the issue of the private sphere. Here there are many pictures of people dressed in Islamic manner.

The Diary of a Citizen aspired for the creation of a citizenry who would be aware of his/her rights –defined in the constitution- and defend those rights or voice their demands. The ambiguous understanding of citizenship is still at large, and seems to be limited to a legal definition, and a republican understanding that binds the individuals with duties in return for which they get rights. While constitutional citizenship was being debated at the top level of the state by the President, and there were many problems related with the problems of identity within the country, the ideal citizenship portrayed in the program was still a common and homogenizing identity. Globalization as mentioned above was regarded as the real cause of the problems related with identity. The changing dynamics in the international context related with identity, or the recognition of distinct identities was completely ignored. Besides, the

problems of citizenship were regarded as stemming from the lack of the consciousness of citizenship. This consciousness of citizenship, however, has similar connotations to the early republican notion, it is laden with duties towards the state.

The 75th anniversary of the republic was celebrated as a reassertion of the Kemalist principles and the revival of the Kemalist notion of citizen. The problems were discarded, or sometimes paid lip service. As mentioned previously, some sections of the society stated that the citizenization process was a clear success of the Kemalist regime. This statement is true in some sense. If the citizenization process is regarded as a process for the inculcation of citizens obedient and devoted to the principles of the Kemalist regime, and those who carry on their duties defined by the state, and achieve their rights in return, this is a successful process.

We can view the problems experienced related with citizenship in the 1990s as a clash between two understandings of citizenship. On the one side there is the official definition of citizenship and those who adopted this understanding, based on the republican understanding of obligations to the state in return for which rights are achieved. Besides this understanding aspires for a homogenization of the society under the unitary identity of the “Turkish citizen” obedient to Kemalist principles. On the other side there are the movements arising out of the shortcomings of the official understanding. That is, the demands for a more liberal understanding of citizenship based on the priority on rights and recognition of differences within a new definition of citizenship, rather than a single identity of a “citizen.” This clash can also be viewed from the perspective of Turner’s two axes of active/ passive and from above or

below.⁶⁰ The distinction between radical and formal citizenship highlights the active/passive and public/private distinction. Radical citizenship is the outcome of the developments of the nineteenth century in Europe, that of class struggles, wars, migration, and the emergence of new egalitarian ideologies, which paved the way for revolutionary-democratic states. Formal citizenship on the other hand, by laying emphasis on who qualifies to be a citizen, is a criterion formed and initiated by governments with the aim of exclusion and control of the masses.⁶¹ The problems faced in contemporary Turkey as related to citizenship can also be regarded as the clash between those two definitions. There is a challenge towards the passive and formal type of citizenship from below that can be viewed as a move towards an active citizenship.

The case of Merve Kavakçı reflects the clash between those two approaches. After being elected as a member of the parliament from the Virtue Party, she occupied the agenda for a long time. The first problem was related with her dressing. She was wearing a headscarf and even though there was not any regulation related with the headscarf in the parliament, her entrance to the parliament led to protest. Later, it was found that she admitted citizenship in the USA without permission. With a quick decision of the Council of Ministers, she lost her Turkish citizenship. Her dressing, marital status and other aspects of her private life were covered in the media. However, the process that made her lose Turkish citizenship was not covered thoroughly. The case of Merve Kavakçı is significant on many aspects related with citizenship practices

⁶⁰ Bryan Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship"

⁶¹ Bryan Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism: the debate over reformism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986).

in Turkey. First of all, she was elected as Member of Parliament, therefore she had judicial immunity, so it was legally not appropriate to take a decision about her citizenship status in the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, the article of the Citizenship law about having the permission of the Council of Ministers for having dual citizenship was designed to enable Turkish citizens living in countries that did not accept dual citizenship. Besides, as noted above, the article related with permission of withdrawal suggests that those who already hold another country's citizenship can benefit from this withdrawal permission. She was a woman with headscarf and elected as MP from a religious party. When all those features were taken into consideration it was believed that she was not suitable to hold Turkish citizenship. The approach towards the issue can be interpreted as "who deserves the membership of a state, and who does not." That approach was significant during the early 1980s when most of the leftists were made to lose their citizenship as mentioned in the above section. It seems that it was not specific to the military regime to try to determine who is fit for citizenship and who is not.

6.3 Concluding Remarks

After the 1980s, citizenship became a widely debated and contested issue in Turkey. The interest on citizenship firstly emerged during the interregnum period, by the amendment of new laws. The first change was designed in a pragmatic way, in order to find a solution to the problems of the Turkish migrants living abroad. This

attempt was partly due to the historical coincidence, as the problems resulting from the 20 year-long migration flow became much more visible during the 1980s, and especially with the second-generation migrants. By the amendment of the new articles, admitting another country's citizenship was made easier. In addition, those people who had acquired another country's citizenship were given the chance to hold Turkish citizenship simultaneously.

The second legal change reflected the mentality of "who would deserve membership or not." The numerous expulsions of both the leftists who had fled the country after the 1980 coup and the non-Muslim citizens who were living abroad were a significant development. It was a unique experience in Republican history.

Another novelty of the period after 1980 was the emergence of identity politics, or, in other words, claims for the recognition of different identities by the state. This was particularly in line with the rising demands for identity, multiculturalism, and globalization in the international context as well. Even though constitutional citizenship was proposed as a solution to these problems by the politicians, it was not fully described or theorized. It was rather a lip service paid by the politicians, especially when it is noticed that Demirel was talking about constitutional citizenship in international meetings. However, the issue of constitutional citizenship is still a significant issue for Turkey, and there may be more to study on it.

Despite those challenges towards the official definition of citizenship, in the late 1990s we come across a reassertion of loyalty to this definition. Citizenship is still perceived within the parameters set by the early republican definition, that is, civic republican understanding is still predominant. Although, a more active citizen was

promoted, the requisite that this activity should be in line with the duties for and concern over the community, and the Kemalist regime was stressed. However, the active citizen that flourished from within the society is quite different from what is desired.

Finally, returning to Marshall and the critique of Marshall developed by Işın and Wood, we can suggest that by the end of the 1990s, Turkey has entered the “identity” level of citizenship. In the end of the year 1999, with the candidacy status to the European Union, the issue of citizenship seems to occupy the agenda, both in the political and academic level. Even the issue of the minorities that was undermined throughout the republican history began to attract the society. The President for the first time celebrated the Christmas of the Christian citizens of the Turkish Republic.⁶² Also, the idea of granting the right for broadcasting in Kurdish was declared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, right after the Helsinki Summit. In August 2000, the International Convention on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has been ratified by Turkey. As integration with the European Union is the ultimate goal of Turkey, perhaps we might be more hopeful for the future for a new definition of citizenship.

⁶² 24 December 1999, *Radikal*.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This study was carried out with a concern for the status and identity that official Turkish citizenship has put onto its subjects. It has aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the evolution of citizenship both as a notion, and a status and/or identity, or civic virtue with a view to the official ideology. In the conduct of such a task, legal documents, parliamentary debates and studies of the prominent intellectuals on citizenship are analyzed. This documentary selection has helped to explore certain questions regarding the state's role in the conceptualization, construction and evolution of citizenship: 1. What are the criteria that were taken as principal ground for the construction of Turkish citizen? 2. How was Turkish citizenship defined? 3. How do the components of officially defined Turkish national identity like language, culture, and ideal effect the definition of citizenship? 4. Was the desired Turkish citizen an active citizen, or a passive one? 5. How were the religious minorities incorporated into Turkish citizenship? 6. How was Islam incorporated into the construction of Turkish

citizenship, and the how did its importance increase/decrease in the citizenship conceptualization? 7. Which model does the construction of Turkish citizenship fit into; French or German? 8. Was the Turkish citizenship inspired from republican understanding, or liberal understanding? 9. Are there any disjunctions between the official definition of citizenship and practice? Except for the first three questions, which were answered in Chapter IV, all the questions were (re-)asked in subsequent chapters with the aim of depicting the continuities and changes throughout the Republican era. The historical periodization of the study has been made in this respect, in order to reach a conclusion to understand the continuities and changes in the official conceptualization of citizenship. One determinative factor in this task was the changes in the social and political life of Turkey; for instance, the transition to multi-party politics, or military interventions, as well as the priorities that have been imposed by the changing international context.

In the study, the late Ottoman period was analyzed with a view to the emergence of the notion of citizenship (Chapter III). The aim was to provide an historical background for the study of the Republican era. The enactment of *Tanzimat* Edict (1839) was selected as a symbolic starting date since it initiated the enactment of a set of legal reforms that were followed by the Reform Edict of 1856, Ottoman Citizenship Law (1869) and finally, *Kamuni Esasi*, the constitution. The main intention behind the enactment of these legal reforms was a concern for strengthening the Ottoman State in the face of the intensifying discontent of different *millet*s within the territories of the Empire, which started to re-form their organic ties with the nationalist revival in Europe. Thus, the underlying aim was to save the Empire from collapse by

gathering the religiously and ethnically fragmented subjects of the Empire under a certain identity, that is the “Ottoman citizen.” The individual rights and liberties were safeguarded by the laws concerned. However, this did not cause a change in the actual status of the ruled from subject to citizen. The identity of “Ottoman citizen” did not serve the aim of creating a common Ottoman identity, either, which was very well exemplified during the First World War.

The early Republican era (1923-1946), analyzed in the fourth chapter, has displayed almost the same problem of creating a common identity, i.e. the nation, which would be one of the acute problems facing the Turkish Republic. This period was taken as one of construction of the identity of the Turkish citizen. In fact, the fourth chapter has formed the key reference point for this study, since the nature of citizenship in the Turkish context and the different problems that it has presented throughout the decades, depending on the (inter)national dynamics under consideration, have been elaborated on the basis of the peculiarity of the construction period. Throughout the chapter, the answer to the first question was formulated with a view to the “top down” official mentality. The identity of the citizen was drawn along the boundaries of Turkish nation-state. Until the 1930s, the approach towards citizenship was a reflection of the French model, that was based on territory. However, together with the changing legislation (Law on Settlement, Law on Family Names, etc.) which brought in an emphasis on Turkish language and culture, there occurred an inclination towards the German model. This had significant implications for the religious (and ethnic) minorities. The Law on Settlement subjected those minorities to forced migration, in order to homogenize the population and to create Turkified

territories. There were intense campaigns for the use of Turkish language, which was reflected also in the Law on Family Names. Based on such examples, it can be argued that the early Republican era had displayed a shift from the French model to German model. The ideal citizen of the republic was to be “new, modern, conscious and responsible.” As far as this definition is concerned, the public and private spheres were merged together in the construction of the citizen, and the private sphere of the individuals was organized as well. In line with the adoption of Western parameters and Enlightenment mentality the citizen would be secular. However, it can also be argued that Islam remained as an unpronounced feature of the Turkish national identity. The admission of the migrants from the Balkans who were Muslims, but not of Turkish origin to Turkish citizenship, while the refusal of Gagavuz Turks who were Christians, reflects this silent existence.

Due to the structure of the state-society relation molded in a strong state tradition this new citizen was defined more in terms of his duties and obligations and his rights were derived from the fulfillment of these duties. The early republican understanding of citizenship can be portrayed as “civic-republican.” The duties made up the core of the qualification for citizenship. The allegiance to the community and the common good were the main criteria for the exercise of citizenly activities.

Referring to Marshall, the early Republican era, together with the late Ottoman Empire, can be evaluated as the period for the emergence of the civil element of citizenship. The second phase, that is the emergence of the political element would come about by the transition to multi-party politics (Chapter V).

The fifth chapter was comprised of two sub-periods; one between 1946 and 1960, and second the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention until 1980. The first sub-period is important for the transformation in the conceptualization of citizenship. This period can be regarded as the political phase, by the stimulation of the political participation of the citizens as their fundamental right. This was symbolized in the propaganda of Democrat Party while in opposition: “Enough! It is the Nation’s Turn to Speak!” During that period the rural population or in other words, the periphery was incorporated into the political life. It was especially during the period in concern that the people got the feeling that the real sovereignty belonged to them. Besides, Islam was incorporated to the Turkish identity and Islamic principles were reasserted under the Democrat Party rule. In the second sub-period, active and liberal citizenship was promoted by the 1961 Constitution. Based on the rule of law and social justice 1961 Constitution and the 403 numbered and 11.2.1964 dated Turkish Citizenship Law amended during this period together had its social and cultural reflections. In this sense, the formation of the trade unions, the extensions of the right to go on strike, to form political parties and associations freely reflects the emergence of the social element in Marshall’s terminology.

This was a transitory development in the Turkish context, since by the 1980 military intervention the political and social elements were restricted to a great extent. The evolution of citizenship issue as displayed in official rhetoric *vis-à-vis* rising demands both from the society and as a result of international dynamics has formed the main topic of Chapter VI. The post-1980 period is important since it witnessed the final clash between the official conceptualization of citizenship and its practical dimension,

as exemplified in the intensification of challenges to the former. First, the period under military rule faced the problem with respect to a relatively unproblematic issue as regards the citizenship status, that of dual citizenship, which was handled merely by a legalistic approach. The second point of attention was related to the question of “who would deserve to be the Turkish citizen?” This can be taken as the main determinant for understanding the restrictive character of post-1980 military rule. Read from a negative aspect, the amendment to 1964 Citizenship Law (article 25-g), which defined the criteria for making someone lose his citizenship status also clarified the identity of the ideal citizen. In this sense, the citizen shall not be perceived as to have been “engaged in violating the internal and external security of the Republic, or the economic and financial security of the country in the form of an offence described by the law” was one example for the shattering of both political and social elements that were on the agenda in the post-1960 period. The third point that furnishes the period with significance is the rise of identity politics as an issue worldwide and its reflections on the debates concerning citizenship in the Turkish context. This was not a one-sided development, since the claims for the recognition of different identities by the state has gained acceleration throughout the 1980s, especially as in the case of Islam, Kurdish and women issue.

In this respect, especially the second and third points gain significance for elaborating on the problematic nature of Turkish citizenship, and prospects for possible alterations in the mainstream approach that would provide extensions for a new understanding of citizenship. To begin with, the second point connotes the insistence on Kemalist mentality as concretized during the early-Republican era. In this respect, it

can be argued that the emphasis on the ideal citizen who is loyal to his state and who has internalized his organic ties with the nation and his responsibilities implies the predominance of civic republican understanding. This has most recently been manifested during the celebrations for the 75th anniversary of the proclamation of the republic. The desired citizen of the republic has been defined in terms of secular and patriotic citizens who would devote themselves to the Turkish nation-state, and who would be the protagonists of the enlightenment of the public. On the other hand, as exemplified in the TV program produced for the celebration of 75th years of the republic, *The Diary of a Citizen*, it is possible to trace the signs of an emphasis on the requisite of active citizenship. However, this active standing has still been defined in terms of the nation-state, rather than the citizen in his individual identity, that again restricts the issue to the predetermined principle of sustenance of *the* state. Additionally, official standing have at times approached the problems that have been voiced within the context of claims for the recognition of distinct identities, in a rather arbitrary fashion, without challenging the early republican mentality. This can be observed in the introduction of the term constitutional citizenship by the former President Süleyman Demirel, alongside with an attempt to tailor the conceptual framework to republican requisites, which in the final analysis renders the term itself superficial.

However, neither the insistence on the established definition of citizen, nor such superficial suggestions for the handling of the problem preempt the continuity of the identity claims. On the contrary, what is at hand is a rupture between the desired and actual active citizen. Briefly, the active citizen that flourished from within the society is

quite different from the desire. It is possible to argue that 1990s have witnessed the emergence of a citizen portrait, eager to question the relative positioning of duties and authorities accorded to the state *vis-à-vis* the society and voice his demands. This can be read in terms of a liberal shift, whereby the state is perceived as an institution established for the well being of its citizens.

Quite contrary to the demands coming from the society the state still tries to hold on to the early Republican parameters for citizenship. It can be argued that Turkish citizenship is perceived as unchangeable and that cannot be challenged. This view is not only held by the state but by a certain section of the society that had adopted this civic republican definition of the early Republican period. Therefore, we can argue that the inculcation of Turkish citizenship was a success in some respects. We can also argue that there is a clash between those citizens who have adopted the republican understanding of citizenship based on Kemalist principles and those who voice their demands for a more liberal understanding.

The problem Turkey faces these days with regards to citizenship is based on the state's attitudes and responses toward the developments both within the country and in the international context. Starting from the first modernization attempts in the late Ottoman period, the West was taken as *the* reference point. This had intensified during the early republican era, when Westernization was regarded as a must. Therefore, the Western models of citizenship were adopted, together with the Civil Code, Western calendar, Latin alphabet, in short almost every daily aspect. This had continued until the late 1990s. Most of the problems about citizenship were approached by referring to the international context, international documents and EC. However, as related with the

demands for the recognition of distinct identities, the state took a reactionary attitude. This reactionary attitude was taken both towards the pressure coming from the West and to domestic demands. It might not be wrong to suggest that the relationship with the West has changed, and that the West had become the counterpart who encourages and sometimes presses for the adoption of Western values for Turkey. This condition points to a turning point in the Turkish modernization process. This requires reconsideration and re-definition of citizenship in the Turkish context. However, the reluctance of the state for an alternative and more compromising stand towards the issues that stem from the conventional understanding of citizenship asks for and triggers the emergence of new debates.

There is a close relation between citizenship and the problematic of the survival of the state in Turkey. In the Ottoman Empire the implementation of a new identity of the “Ottoman citizen” was for the sake of preventing the Empire from collapse. All the modernization attempts of the Empire can be summarized as “progress for order” by quoting the phrase Ayşe Kadioğlu used in her book.¹ By the proclamation of the Republic and the attempts for nation-building the aim was turned vice versa as “order for progress”², in other words the construction of the notion of citizenship became part of the grand project of modernization. Thus, the construction of Turkish citizenship was not a process for the sake of citizenship together with its rights and duties, but was almost a synonym for the nation that was being constructed. When we come to the end of the 1990s, citizenship is again viewed within the parameters defined by the state,

¹ Ayşe Kadioğlu, “Cumhuriyet Epistemolojisi ve Aşırı-Gerçekçi Kimlikler,” in *Cumhuriyet İradesi – Demokrasi Muhakemesi* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999), 24-26.

² Ibid., 27-29.

and this time the demands from various sections of the society for a different understanding of citizenship are usually regarded as a threat to the regime.

Nisbet suggested that there was a process of citizenization in the West, by arguing that it is more than a condition or status, and that it has certain phases and historical contexts in which it connects with other processes. Finally, we can argue that this citizenization process is not peculiar to the West, and that we can observe this process in the Turkish case as well. In Turkey this process was merged with nation-building, modernization, and democratization processes. Reflecting on the claims for the recognition of distinct identities, we can predict that the future of this process will be closely interrelated with the identity level of citizenship. However, the legal status and civic virtue aspects will also attract the future studies, especially when the demands for a more liberal understanding are concerned. It is in this respect that this study gains significance; in other words by outlining the process of citizenization with an analytical concern it stands as a pioneer study for citizenship debates in the Turkish context.

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