

**STATES' INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM  
AND  
VICTIMS' PERCEPTIONS:  
CASES OF ISTANBUL 2003 AND LONDON 2005 ATTACKS**

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**Plagiarism**

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Date: June 2, 2021

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## Özet

Bu çalışma Türkiye'nin ve Birleşik Krallık'ın yürüttüğü, uluslararası teröre karşı kurumsal yanıtları, El-Kaide tarafından gerçekleştirilen İstanbul 2003 ve Londra 2005 terör olayları çerçevesinde incelerken; bu terör saldırılarının kurbanlarının, Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık'ın kurumsal yanıtlarına karşı algılarını analiz etmektedir. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma kurumsal yanıtlar ve kurbanların algıları arasında olası etkileşimi, ilgili terör saldırıları çerçevesinde sosyolojik kurumsalcılık bağlamında ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu araştırma iki vakayı derinlemesine, nitel ve tümevarımsal bir yaklaşımla incelemektedir ve terörizm çalışmalarında siyasal ve sosyolojik perspektifleri disiplinler arası bir yaklaşım benimseyerek muğlaklaştırmaya çalışmaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın sonucu olarak, Türkiye'nin uzun vadeli kurumsal yanıtlarının ve karşı terör stratejilerinin etkisiz olduğu ve gelişmeye ihtiyaç duyduğu anlaşılmıştır. Ayrıca mülakat yapılan kurbanlar ve destekleyici mülakatlara göre, kurbanların algılarının da kurumsal yanıtları etkisiz olarak gördüğü sonucuna varılmıştır. Diğer bir yandan, Birleşik Krallık'ın kurumsal yanıtları ve karşı terör stratejileri etkili bulunurken, mülakat yapılan kurbanların algılarına göre, kurumsal yanıtlar ve karşı terör stratejilerinin etkili olduğu anlaşılmıştır.

Böylece, iki vaka sosyolojik kurumsalcılık çerçevesinde, kurumsal yanıtların içeriği ve kurbanları bu kurumsal yanıtlara karşı algıları temelinde değerlendirildiğine, Türkiye ve Birleşik Krallık'ın kurumsal yanıtları ve karşı terör stratejileri ile kurbanların bu yanıtlara karşı algıları arasında paralellik olduğu saptanmıştır. Bu sonuç, bize sadece bu iki vaka ya özgü olarak kurumsal yanıtlar ve kurbanların algıları çerçevesinde analitik genelleştirme sunmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak bu çalışma, her ne kadar nedenini görmek zor olsa da kurumsal yanıtların içeriği ve kurbanların algıları arasında görünmez fakat bağlayıcı bir ilişki olduğunu vurgulamaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** *Uluslararası terörizm, El-Kaide, kurumsal yanıtlar, kurbanların algıları, Türkiye, Birleşik Krallık*

## Abstract

This study examines the institutional responses to international terrorism carried out by Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK) in the context of the 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda, by analyzing the perceptions of victims of these attacks to the institutional responses of Turkey and the UK. Within this framework, this research is aimed at revealing potential interactions between institutional responses and victims' perceptions within the framework of relevant terrorist attacks in the context of sociological institutionalism. The research analyzes two cases in depth with a qualitative, inductive approach and attempts to blur the distinction between political and sociological perspective to terrorism studies by adopting an interdisciplinary approach.

This study found that Turkey's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were ineffective and needed to develop, and it was understood that, according to the interviewed victims and supportive interviews, victims also had a perception that institutional responses were ineffective. On the other hand, the UK's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were found effective, and according to perceptions of interviewed victims, the institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were also effective. Thus, when both cases were evaluated in the framework of theory of sociological institutionalism based on the content of institutional responses and of the perceptions of victims of these institutional responses, it was found that there is a parallel between, on the one hand, the content of long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies of Turkey and the UK and, on the other hand, the perceptions of victims to these institutional responses. This result offered us an analytical generalization in the framework of institutional responses and perceptions of victims, based on these cases only.

As a result, this study emphasized the existence of an invisible but binding link between the content of institutional responses and perceptions of victims, despite it being difficult to clearly see the causes of this link.

**Keywords:** *International terrorism, Al-Qaeda, institutional responses, victims' perceptions, Turkey, United Kingdom*

I dedicate my dissertation work to my family; Gültekin Yurtbay, Tülay Yurtbay and  
Betigül Yurtbay.

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**Abbreviations**

|          |                                                                              |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ACPO     | Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland |
| ACT      | Actions Counter Terrorism                                                    |
| AH       | American Hospital                                                            |
| ATCS     | Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act                                        |
| BBC      | British Broadcasting Corporation                                             |
| CCC      | Civil Contingencies Committee                                                |
| CICA     | Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia           |
| CODEXTER | Committee of Experts on Terrorism                                            |
| CoE      | Council of Europe                                                            |
| CONTEST  | Counterterrorism Strategy                                                    |
| CT       | Counterterrorism                                                             |
| DOP      | Defense and Overseas Policy                                                  |
| ECHR     | European Court of Human Rights                                               |
| ECO      | Economic Cooperation Organization                                            |
| EMS      | Istanbul's Emergency Service                                                 |
| ETA      | Euskadi Ta Askatasuna                                                        |
| EU       | European Union                                                               |
| FCO      | Foreign and Commonwealth Office                                              |
| GNAT     | Grand National Assembly of Turkey                                            |

|          |                                                                                  |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| HM       | Government of Her Majesty                                                        |
| HSBC     | Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation                                        |
| IDB      | Intelligence Department of the TNP                                               |
| IHD      | Insan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)                                 |
| INTERPOL | International Police Agency                                                      |
| IRA      | Irish Republican Army                                                            |
| ISIL     | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)                                            |
| ISIS     | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria                                                  |
| ISKI     | Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (Istanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi) |
| JDP      | Justice and Development Party                                                    |
| JTAC     | The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center                                              |
| MI5      | Military Intelligence, Section 5                                                 |
| MI6      | Military Intelligence, Section 6                                                 |
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                                               |
| NHS      | National Health Service                                                          |
| OSCE     | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe                              |
| PET      | Prevent                                                                          |
| PKK      | Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party)                            |
| PSNI     | Police Service of Northern Ireland                                               |
| PTA      | Prevention of Terrorism Act                                                      |



|        |                                                                                           |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| PTSD   | Post-traumatic stress disorder                                                            |
| SIS    | The Secret Intelligence Service                                                           |
| TA     | Terrorism Act                                                                             |
| TESEV  | Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) |
| TNP    | Turkish National Police                                                                   |
| UK     | United Kingdom                                                                            |
| UNESCO | The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization                     |
| UNSC   | United Nations Security Council                                                           |
| US     | United States                                                                             |
| US NAC | United States (US) National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals    |
| VBIEDs | Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices                                                |

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## **1 Introduction**

### **1.1 Overview**

Istanbul and London were shaken by terrorist attacks organized by the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in 2003 and 2005, respectively. In the wake of the attacks, both countries began taking steps to develop and renew their policies on terrorism, including institutional responses, counterterrorism policies and amendments to the rule of law. Both governments set about taking the necessary precautions to prevent possible future terrorist attacks and to minimize the damage on society caused by terrorist attacks.

This study aims to contribute towards an understanding of the institutional responses of Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK) to the 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda. The study also explores how victims were affected by terrorism and their perceptions of the institutional responses to these terrorist attacks by understanding and explaining institutional responses of both terrorist attacks with perceptions of the victims of the institutional responses. The research aims to bring a political and societal approach to the problem of terrorism by questioning the potential parallelism (or conflict) between the content of institutional responses to terrorism and victims' perception of these responses.

This study analyzes Turkey's institutional responses to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks and the United Kingdom's (UK) institutional responses to the 2005 London terrorist attacks within the framework of sociological institutionalism. The research analyzes institutional responses to Istanbul and London terrorist attacks by questioning the links between institution (by looking at institutional responses) and society (by looking at victims of the terrorist attacks) within the framework of the two



case studies. This research, therefore, analyzes both states' institutional responses to two different terrorist attacks based on the perspective of the links between "institution" and "society". Therefore, five research questions are posed in order to understand the link between institutions and societies based on these two case studies. The research questions addressed for the two research contexts, or case studies are as follows:

RQ1: What were the institutional responses of Turkey to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks during and after the incident?

RQ2: How do victims of the Istanbul terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses?

RQ3: What were the institutional responses of the UK to the 2005 London terrorist attacks during and after the incident?

RQ4: How do victims of the London terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses?

RQ5: What are the similarities and differences between the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks in terms of the institutional responses to terrorism and the victims' perceptions of those responses?

To understand the link between the responses of institutions and perceptions of victims, these five research questions will be answered separately, and then an overall conclusion will be offered by analyzing the answers of these research questions using the theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism.

## **1.2 Definitions**

In this section, the terms frequently used in this thesis are defined, including "institutional responses," "structure and functioning of institutions," "victims," "sociological institutionalism," "negative perceptions" and "positive perception".

In this study the term “institutional responses” refers to the constitutional studies and laws, policies and regulations prepared and executed by official institutions of states to prevent terrorism and to maintain order when terrorist incidents occur. Institutional responses are examined in this study in two categories. The first category includes short-term institutional responses which refers to the responses of the institutions that the state determines immediately after a terrorist incident (emergency services, health services, communications, etc.). The second category includes long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies which refer to the responses that address terrorism-related problems within Turkey and the UK in more detail, with permanent solutions aiming to prevent terrorism or re-establish the order broken by a terrorist incident. These long-term institutional responses and counter- terrorism strategies include any protocols, agreements, and rules created to prevent terrorism.

Moreover, the structures and functioning of these institutions may not always be the same. For example, even if an institution is established with the right mechanisms in a structural sense, it may experience operational disruptions or cause other institutions to fail. For this reason, the concept of “structure and functioning of institutions” has been used when examining these institutions in this thesis. The use of this concept has been especially discussed to analyze and investigate how the existence of institutions in a structural sense is reflected in practice, i.e. operationally.

As mentioned, this research analyzes the perceptions of victims of Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks. In this stage, it should be identified what should be understood by the use of the term of “victim” by this research. “Victims” of terrorism in this study are defined as people, who had been directly or indirectly affected by the terrorist incident, that is people who had witnessed or suffered from the outcomes of terrorist incidents.

When perceptions of victims of institutional responses are analyzed in this research by using the words of “negative perception” and “positive perception”, it is also necessary to explain what is meant the words of positive and negative. In this study, having a positive perception of institutional responses means that, according to victims of the terrorist attacks, the institutional responses are effective in the sense of preventing terrorist attacks or attempts to provide helpful solutions to problems created by terrorism in general. Having a negative perception of institutional responses means that, according to victims of the terrorist attacks, the institutional responses are ineffective in the sense of preventing terrorist attacks or trying to provide helpful solutions to problems created by terrorism in general. Therefore, positive perceptions of victims to institutional responses support that there are effective responses; however, negative perceptions of victims to institutional responses support the idea that there are ineffective responses.

This work considers “sociological institutionalism” as a theoretical framework. Sociological institutionalism states that institutions are not structures that make sense by themselves alone, while emphasizing that cultural values, norms, in short, are all that belongs to a person, and are attached to institutions. This work focuses specifically on victims as they explore how institutions are understood and perceived in society. Those most affected by terrorist attacks are the victims of terrorism. Although the rest of society (people other than victims of terrorism) may also have certain knowledge of specific terrorist attacks, terror victims are people who experience all the dimensions of the event not only knowing but also living. For this reason, their perception of institutional responses can be expected to be clearer, more inquisitive, and more critical than people who have never experienced a terrorist incident.

Sociological institutionalism emphasizes that institutions alone do not have significant meanings to examine. Societies, particular groups in a particular society, cultures, and norms should be considered when institutions are analyzed. The sociological institutionalism as a theoretical framework of this research provides an opportunity to look at institutional responses and in the perception of victims by analyzing the case studies together.

The concept of sociological institutionalism is explained in more depth in Chapter Two. Before analyzing the theoretical framework in a detailed perspective, it should be asked why analyzing the Istanbul and London cases of terrorism from the viewpoint of institutions and societies is important.

### **1.3 Case Studies: Istanbul 2003 and London 2005**

The political and social structures of Turkey and the UK are different and, thus, provide different insights into international terrorism. The different political, social, and religious structures of these two countries, however, were taken into account during this review. This study focused on the interaction of states with their citizens (victims of terrorism) and contributed to developing a general understanding of the institutional responses and victims' perceptions of those responses within the framework of international terrorism. Researching two countries with different structures using a case study approach allowed the interaction between the state-society axis to be evaluated from a wider perspective. It is therefore useful to first provide some background to the political, social, and religious differences between the two research contexts.

Several experimental and theoretical types of research have been conducted to date comparing especially Western countries such as France, the UK, Denmark, Spain, and the US in terms of terrorist attacks. However, few comparative case studies have

examined the link between terrorism and victims' perceptions of institutional responses in Turkey and the UK. Some of the countries mentioned above are EU members with similar levels of democracy; their populations have similar religious beliefs and share the same concerns regarding border security and the movement of terrorists within the EU.

The focus of this research was on Turkey and the UK—countries with few common characteristics but both of which have experienced attacks from international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda within a few years of each other. In this framework, significant differences between Turkey and the UK in terms of their political, social, and institutional characteristics, including concrete factors such as EU membership, level of democracy, and religious beliefs are discussed here to provide background to the research contexts.

The main differences between Turkey and the UK can be evaluated in the framework of EU membership, democracy level, and religion. All EU countries must demonstrate a certain level of democracy to meet EU standards. They must also share common norms and values to allow EU countries to focus on their joint problems and create solutions to help all members. Comparing Turkey and the UK in terms of their counterterrorism policies, democratic development, and internalization of common norms and political cultures over many years provides valuable insight to consider in interpreting the findings of this research.

The UK has been a member of the EU since 1973 and was part of the organization at the time of the 2005 terrorist attacks. It exited the EU following the BREXIT referendum. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) led to greater efficiency in the decision-making process in the EU. EU citizens can tackle terrorism by freezing assets and there is a guaranteed judicial review by the European Court of Justice (2009). Many

of the relationships between Turkey and other EU members are still very problematic, even though the Ankara Agreement of 1963 established the legal basis of the Turkey–EU relationship. Despite Turkey’s long history of attempts to become an EU member, it has still not been successful. Thus, EU membership is one of the main differences between Turkey and the UK and this affects their political and economic decision-making processes.

In terms of democratization, Turkey and the UK both have democratic regimes but there are some important differences in their levels of democracy (see Table 1). The Freedom House Reports present analyses of the levels of democracy in Turkey and the UK for the period from 2003 to 2006, thus including the time of the terrorist attacks in Istanbul (2003) and London (2005). Although Turkey and the UK both have democratic structures, their levels of democratic development are not the same, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

*Freedom House Reports for Turkey and the UK, 2003 to 2006.*

| <u>Turkey</u> |               |                       |                        |                         | <u>UK</u>     |                       |                        |                         |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| <u>Year</u>   | <u>Status</u> | <u>Freedom rating</u> | <u>Civil liberties</u> | <u>Political rights</u> | <u>Status</u> | <u>Freedom rating</u> | <u>Civil liberties</u> | <u>Political rights</u> |
| 2003          | Partly free   | 3.5                   | 4                      | 3                       | Free          | 1.0                   | 1                      | 1                       |
| 2004          | Partly free   | 3.5                   | 4                      | 3                       | Free          | 1.0                   | 1                      | 1                       |
| 2005          | Partly free   | 3.0                   | 3                      | 3                       | Free          | 1.0                   | 1                      | 1                       |
| 2006          | Partly free   | 3.0                   | 3                      | 3                       | Free          | 1.0                   | 1                      | 1                       |

Note: The scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Adapted from reports by Freedom House (2019).

As seen in the Freedom House (2019) reports, Turkey's democratic status during this period was "partly free;" however, the UK was "free" in the same period. Moreover, the UK had the best possible scores for freedom rating, civil liberties, and political rights, which contrasts with the moderate scores (3 or 4) for Turkey.

A certain level of political culture, democracy, bureaucracy, and transparency may allow developed countries to be more successful in countering terrorism compared to countries with less efficient democracies. In a country like the UK, which has an efficient democracy and where bureaucracy functions effectively, countering terrorism might be expected to be effective. However, this is not necessarily the case. A higher level of democracy may not always correspond to success in the fight against terrorism.

Another difference between Turkey and the UK relates to religion. The majority of Turkey's population follows Islam, whereas the UK population mostly holds Christian beliefs. According to a 2015 report, 98.4% of Turkish citizens are Muslims, and 1% are agnostics (World Religion Database, 2015). However, 69.4% of UK citizens are Christians, 19.8% are agnostics, 6.3% are Muslims, 1.4% are atheists, and 1% are Hindus (World Religion Database, 2015). In all EU countries combined, Christians account for the largest proportion of the population than members of any other religion (World Religion Database, 2015).

In conclusion, Turkey and the UK have different profiles in terms of EU membership experience, democracy level and religion. These differences may influence their responses to terrorism, which justifies exploring and comparing the responses in real case studies. As mentioned previously, although many terrorism case studies and comparative case studies have been conducted between EU member states and the US, there are few studies comparing the UK and Turkey, which is due to differences in their political and social structures and which also makes it difficult to



analyze these two countries together within the framework of terrorism studies. It is clear that the differences between both of these countries contribute positively and negatively to this study.

On the positive side, the obvious basic differences make us wonder how similar the results that will appear in two case studies are. However, when examining recent terrorist incidents in two different countries with certain political and social differences, the level and impact of institutional responses can also be expected to be different, which can lead to different themes. This, in turn, prevents the two case studies from being completely comparative case studies. This topic is discussed in more detail in the methodology section under the heading “case-quintain dilemma”.

#### **1.4 Importance and Aim of the Study**

According to Silke (2001), there are continuing problems with current research on terrorism. There is a heavy reliance on open-source documents and there is a lack of creating new data or knowledge; many researchers rework old material (Silke, 2001). The academic study of terrorism is also critiqued for a number of conceptual and methodological problems (Schuurman & Eijkman, 2013). One of the critiques concerns problems regarding the definition of terrorism which limit the development of the field. Another problem is overreliance on secondary sources and the associated domination of the literature review method, which restricts empirically-grounded approaches (Schuurman, 2020). Indeed, there is a lack of empirically-grounded research on terrorism (Gurr, 1988).

As a matter of fact, Bell (1977) states that there is not an agreed definition of terrorism, nor are there accepted bounds to the subject (terrorism), an effective academic approach or a consensus on the policy implications. Schimd (1982) adds that

much of the writing on terrorism is “impressionistic, anecdotal, superficial, (...) and pretentious” (p. 418). There is also a tendency for overgeneralizations and simple explanations on research on terrorism (Reich, 1990).

Moreover, in literature, there is a general uncertainty about the degree to which institutions affect individuals, and few studies investigating the impact on victims of terrorism of institutions countering terrorism. The victims of terrorism have remained atypically out of sight of public perception and academic debates (Lynch & Argomaniz, 2015). More recently, however, interest in terrorism as observed from the victims' viewpoint has emerged (Siemens, 2007).

Rather than underpinning the research with old institutionalism, this research adopted a framework of institutionalism examining sociological perspectives to understand how victims were affected by the terrorism and institutional responses. In this way, institutions countering terrorism were examined both from a state dimension and through the eyes of those who had been affected by the institutions' responses. The study examined terrorism in a more "functional" sense by looking at the state dimension and the state-victim interaction in the context of terrorism. In more detail, this study explored both the ability to understand institutions countering terrorism within the framework of sociological institutionalism and how institutions affect victims of terrorism. These themes were explored for the terrorist events in Istanbul and London: how institutional responses were perceived by victims of terrorism, and what victims of terrorism thought of institutional responses. How these perceptions arose from the institutional structures of the state within the war on terrorism were analyzed. This approach had the potential to offer insight into how institutional responses to terrorism could be improved and lay the groundwork for stronger counterterrorism strategies.

Obviously, this helps counterterrorism organizations to be prepared in line with the perceptions, criticisms, and wishes of the public.

This study is dependent on primary and secondary sources for analyzing institutional responses. However, firstly, it does not depend on these sources, by analyzing the perceptions of the victims (produced from the interviews conducted by the victims of Istanbul and London terrorist attacks). Secondly, this research combined primary and secondary sources and data gathered from the field by adopting both theoretical-grounded and empirically-grounded way of thinking. Thirdly, this research is eschewed from making overgeneralization and reaching “simple conclusions” but draws more complex and connected issues within the framework of two case studies. So, its importance lies in “creating a new way of thinking” in terrorism studies by combining both institutional and social perspectives.

### **1.5 Thesis organization**

The organization of content in this thesis is explained in this section.

This study is underpinned by the conceptual framework of sociological institutionalism. This concept and why it is appropriate for this research is explained in chapter 2.

Chapter 3 presents the literature review completed for the research. As terrorism is one of the main concepts of this study, it has been covered in the literature review from a conceptual viewpoint. In addition, terrorism has been analyzed from the framework of institutional responses and victims’ perceptions of institutional responses.

Chapter 4 reports the methodology used for the research, including the research paradigm, data collection and analysis methods, ethical and reliability issues.

Chapter 5 presents how the world views terrorism, and short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies are explained in detail.

Chapters 6 through to 8 focus on the research context of the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in 2003. Chapter 7 describes the institutional measures to address terrorism in the context of the Istanbul 2003 terrorist attacks, focusing separately on short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies in detail. Finally, chapter 8 reports on victim perceptions of the institutional responses to the Istanbul terrorist attacks.

In a similar way, chapters 9 through to 11 focus on the research context of the terrorist attacks in London in 2005. Chapter 9 presents a brief history of UK terrorism and a case analysis of the 2005 terrorist attacks in London from a detailed perspective. Chapter 10 describes UK institutional commitments to terrorism, again distinguishing between short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. Chapter 11 reports on victims' perceptions of the UK institutional responses to the London terrorist attacks.

Chapter 12 presents a cross-case analysis of the two contexts in terms of institutional responses and victim perceptions.

Chapter 13 offers some practical implications for this research by emphasizing the answers to research questions to achieve the main focus of this research: interaction between institutional responses and victims' perceptions.

Chapter 14 concludes by summarizing the research. The limitations of the study, the contribution of this research to the literature and the possibilities for future research are all outlined.

The following chapter explains the theoretical framework of this study:  
sociological institutionalism.



## 2 Theoretical Framework: Sociological Institutionalism

In this study, interpretations of the findings were made based on the theory of “sociological institutionalism”.

Sociological institutionalism is sometimes considered as a theory, and sometimes as an approach. According to Rosamond (2000), the analytic interest of sociological institutionalism is in digging into the capability of cultural and organizational patterns (namely institutions) to change preferences, interests, and identities within the social world. Furthermore, sociological institutionalism, analyses “how actors follow rules and norms, assuming that identities and culture are the sources of interests for individuals” (Friel, 2017, p. 213).

Institutions or organizations located within a state that are responsible for any political, social or economic situation can be evaluated by looking at the success of their structure and functioning and whether their strategy is effective. Such an assessment provides a structural and formal assessment. Some studies may, however, ignore the interaction of institutions with society, while addressing assessments of the structure and functioning of institutions within a stricter political science framework. Such studies on institutions are mostly seen in research with the theoretical background of old institutionalism. Old institutionalism focused on description rather than explaining or theory-building (Bell, n.d.). In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, political science started to describe and establish formal institutions of government and the modern state (Bell, n.d.).

Institutionalism focuses on formal, structural, and economical aspects of state institutions such as constitutions, rule of law, or other legal bases. McConnell (2008) argues that when states are taken as independent conceptual variables, this directs them

to commitments with their own culture and electoral politics. However, states and institutions created within states are entities that interact with society and contain many variables, rather than being independent conceptual variables. New institutionalism reveals an intellectual formation/theory that supports this view.

According to new institutionalism, organizations are significant social structures, and they influence society (Meyer, 2000). In this sense, not only official institutions, organizations, and the official practices and actions of these organizations are important, but also informal relations are of great significance, and these relations need to be examined. According to Levi (1990), the best institutional arrangements are those which incorporate a normative system of informal and internalized rules. Producing new institutional norms and rules does not mean that they are necessarily efficient; they will only be effective if people of a particular society accept and internalize them.

New institutionalism is not a single unit of thought but brings together more than one approach. New institutionalism does not consider only official institutions but also includes unofficial ones, the non-formal links and ties created within a society that significantly contribute to creating the so-called informal institutions ruling and conducting social behavior, expectations, ideals (Porumbescu, 2018). According to new institutionalism, society includes institutions endowed with causal importance to shape formal and informal organizational structures (Senge, 2013). The distinguishing characteristics of new institutionalism are widening investigations into causes beyond only the field of economic considerations (Senge, 2013). New institutionalists question economic dependencies, resources, or costs of deals (Senge, 2013). They also question cultural (Meyer, 1977) and political (Dobbin, 1994) spheres, as well as the economy sphere (Fligstein, 1991).

Weber, Durkheim and Parsons (as cited in Porumbescu, 2018) researched institutions and the connections between social forces and the nature of institutions. According to Weber et al., (as cited in Porumbescu, 2018), societies should fulfill certain functions to survive and these functions are connected and dependent on the existence of institutions, which pave the way for them to perform. The way of thinking such as finding out institutions again shows the limited or bounded the human rationality (Koelble, 1995). That means, within the framework of the concept of bounded rationality, the actions of institutions do not make sense alone, and the need to examine the culture, norms and informal ties shared by the people (society) to which the institutions are affiliated should also be considered as interaction of institutions and society.

March and Olsen argue that political institutions include all interrelated rules and issues which define suitable actions in terms of relations between roles and situations (as cited in Koelble, 1995). The process includes three phases: a determination of the situation, the role being completed, and the obligation of that particular function (Koelble, 1995).

However, people involved in institutions are actually controlled constantly by different methods in the context of the logic that institutions have themselves created. Persons taking part in organizations are controlled by different methods in the framework of hierarchies, sanctions, rules, procedures and reward structures (Koelbe, 1995).

The relationship between institutions and people (people inside institutions or people outside the institution, or institutions that feel obliged to respond and make up other segments of society) was not a commonly discussed topic in the literature. This topic can also be a problem from time to time. Because the questions of whether



institutions manage human relations or whether people affect institutions are in many cases frequently intertwined. So, how should we approach the interaction between institutions and people who are affected by these institutions? March and Olsen found the issue of how individuals might act within bureaucracies and organizations significant, because they argue that institutions are significant because of shaping and determining human behavior (as cited in Koelble, 1995). Institutions provide legitimacy to certain rules of conduct and behavior related with power relations and building of social and cultural norms (as cited in Koelble, 1995).

The question here is: Does have institutions more certain effects on people, or have people more effects on institutions? Debate around culture, structure and actions is an issue like the “chicken and egg” (Koelble, 1995).

Institutions are not structures alone existing, surviving, and continuing to function. Even corporate structures judged to be strong can collapse in an instant due to sudden unexpected events, or certain beliefs and opinions. Institutions created by humans can also be destroyed by humans. Destroyed institutions should not, however, be considered as detrimental for the development of society and the state, but rather as paving the way for new institutions that are more legitimate and internalized by society. Sociological institutionalism argues that institutions are created or changed to evolve more social legitimacy for the organization or its individuals (Nichols, 1998).

From the framework of sociological institutionalism, institutions, and the society that constitutes institutions, general structure and functioning, cultural values of the society, and perceptions of a subject or institution are important, because it is the societies that make up the institutions. However, institutions are created in accordance with certain needs and desires of societies.

As argued in this chapter, interaction of institutions with society should not be ignored, even though this topic is not always analyzed in a detailed perspective. Official institutions and organizations are significant, however, informal relations between institutions and persons should also be considered to solve political and social problems, including terrorism-related problems. This paved the way for sociological institutionalism as a theoretical framework of this thesis.

In this study, answers will be given to research questions which primarily analyzed the structure of institutional responses and perceptions of victims. Later, the findings of the research will be discussed more broadly and interpreted within the framework of sociological institutionalism. In this way, a more comprehensive interpretation can be made around the answers to the research questions and how these two case studies relate to the theory of sociological institutionalism.

Sociological institutionalism provides this research an insight that this study should not only focus on the structure of institutional responses of states, but also on how these responses are perceived, accepted, or not accepted by victims of the terrorist attacks. Thus, it is possible to identify the type of results that can be achieved from institutional responses, how these institutional responses were perceived by the victims, and what sort of parallelism or clash can be seen between institutional responses and victims' perceptions when these two cases are taken into account. Using sociological institutionalism also paves the way for analyzing the practical implication of this study in which the general results are interpreted with the main theoretical framework.

Underpinned from this theoretical framework, the next chapter, the literature review, discusses terrorism in a conceptual way, and reviews studies on institutional responses and victims' perceptions to these institutional responses.

### 3 Literature Review

As already mentioned, this study researched two case studies of terrorist attacks, the 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks. This makes terrorism a key concept of the research.

In this section, therefore, the conceptual framework of terrorism is first defined before presenting the studies on institutional responses to terrorism and the perceptions of victims.

#### 3.1 Terrorism

To successfully combat terrorism, understanding “what terrorism is” is the first step (Cardona, 1992). The words, “terror,” and “terrorism,” are sometimes used interchangeably, although they do not have the same meaning. The United States (US) National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (US NAC) argues that terror and terrorism differ conceptually. Terror is a natural phenomenon; however, terrorism is a way of using this in a conscious way (US National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Criminal Justice Research and Development, 1976).

The concept of terrorism appeared for the first time between 1793 and 1794 in a period known as the “Reign of Terror” during the French First Republic (Joppke, 2016). “Le régime de la terreur” was an instrument of governance and exercised by the recently established revolutionary state (Hoffman, 2006, p. 3). The concept of terror which emerged in discourse during the French Revolution expanded in terms of content in later periods (Tilly, 2004). Those who wrote on the concept of terrorism began using it to describe governments’ intimidations of citizens, such as defining Joseph Stalin’s use of executions to still dissent within the Soviet Union (Mayer, 2000). In the 20<sup>th</sup>

century, Stalin and Hitler, with the help of totalitarianism, established the “statutory heritage of terrorism” for future generations (Joppke, 2016, p. 729).

The concept of “terrorism” also began to be used for separatist groups such as the Basque, Irish Republican Army, and Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in internal conflicts (Schmid, 2001). Later, the word “terrorism” also began to stand out in the literature as a concept used to describe genocides and ethnic cleansing elsewhere in the world.

Considering the nature, content, and strategies of terrorism, it is difficult to define. Since terrorism is a difficult-to-understand concept, there is not an agreed-upon definition of the term terrorism in the relevant literature (de la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011). De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2011) analyzed the prevalence of the definition of terrorism and how it is generally described in academic articles. The authors tried to prove the relativity of terrorism; they reviewed articles on terrorism, analyzed 73 definitions from 55 articles, and compared the definitions with those reported by Schmid and Jongman (as cited in de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011). Considering the discrepancies found between the two studies in understanding the concept of terrorism, de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2011) emphasize that the definition can change with time and that the concept of terrorism is relative.

Although there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, academics and experts have made many attempts to define it. Terrorism is a structure that involves violence or threats by groups or individuals to achieve political and social goals (Sandler, 2011). Further, it is affiliated to power: the search for power, the obtainment of power, and the use of power to perform political change (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism is, therefore, brutality—or, similarly revealing, the threat of violence—employed and cooperated in the search for, or in service of, a political aim (Hoffman, 2006).

Defining the word "terrorist" is also difficult. States and political leaders may have their own political agendas when making decisions regarding who should be considered as a terrorist and under which conditions. So, in the literature on terrorism, a common phrase is: "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter" (McCoubrey, 1997, p. 258). Someone perceived as a terrorist by one, might be perceived as a freedom fighter by another (Aronson, 2002). This problem over defining who is a terrorist should also be evaluated within the framework of changing political interests and ideological associations in terms of international relations (Shaw, 2012). While ideological similarities among political actors can result in a common definition of terrorism, there can be great debate over the identification of a "terrorist" between those of opposite political ideologies.

According to Neumann and Smith (2008), there are three phases that enable terrorist organizations to survive and encourage them to exist: (a) alienation from society; (b) performing actions; (c) having specific decision-making processes. Causes of terrorism include global irregularities, identity problems, and poor economic policies followed by states (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). Terrorist organizations can employ various media tools to control people's hearts and minds and spread fear (Neumann & Smith, 2008). According to Crenshaw (1981), one of the main aims of a terrorist organization is to gain publicity through violent actions.

Terrorist organizations rely primarily on violence and ruthless tactics to consolidate their power in a society. In this process, terrorist organizations use various strategies to carry out their violent actions. These strategies include bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, and other types of attack with the intention of creating fear in the targeted community. In addition, technological developments, and the effects of these developments on terrorism, should be emphasized. Recent developments in

technology have radically altered the mode of operation and impact of terrorist organizations on societies. Many terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS are using online and social media tools to spread their brutal strategies and powers. Al-Qaeda brought into existence new “militant mobilization” by applying historical elements of Islamist ideology, such as “the quest for martyrdom” and “the process of religious indoctrination” (Kepel & Milelli, 2008, p. 1–2) and has since used technology to spread these messages. Jihadist groups have become more effective and more easily accessible than in the past due to the fluid connection provided by the internet and, mostly, social media helping them to attract new volunteers into their groups (Roy, 2017).

To respond to terrorist attacks, or to prevent their activities, governments need to understand the structure of terrorist organizations. According to Crenshaw (1987), there are two basic approaches to terrorism: the “instrumental approach” and the “organizational approach” (p. 14). As Crenshaw explains, the instrumental approach is founded on the supposition that the act of terrorism is an intentional choice by a political actor. The organizational approach is when an organization, as a unit, acts to achieve collective values, which involve radical changes in political and social conditions (Crenshaw, 1987).

As the architect of the terrorist attacks of the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks, it is necessary to refer to Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has seen success in attracting new members thanks to developments in technology. Al-Qaeda has benefited greatly from technological developments and uses the internet and social media to publicize violent acts and their ideology in society. One of the main features of Al-Qaeda is its creation of a kind of virtual network (Mohamedou, 2018). Today, many international terrorist organizations adopt new tactics to spread their ideologies. They use social

media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter effectively to find new members for their terrorist organizations. This creates fear and mistrust among the public.

Institutions and organizations created to combat terrorism operate at the very beginning of the mechanisms intended to protect the state against terrorism, and try to ensure security in society. In the fight against terrorism, the effectiveness of the mechanisms of action of all responsible institutions and organizations is undoubtedly a priority issue. The events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 served as a turning point for institutional responses to terrorism and are therefore relevant to this research and discussed in the next section.

### **3.2 Institutional Responses to Terrorism**

The 2000s brought shocking events. Political regime changes, wars, and further escalation of terrorism and economic crises began to change the global balance. With the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the world realized how fragile Western countries were and how much stronger and more secure they should be made. The September 11 attacks cost almost 3,000 lives but also prompted changes in global security. The rate of terror activity further increased significantly between 2000 and 2004 (Waldaman et al., 2011).

The September 11 attacks had a significant impact on international terrorism and the fight against terrorism (Aras & Toktas, 2007). September 11 has caused many concepts, ideas, and perceptions related to security to change and be questioned, as Haque (2002) emphasizes: “September 11 altered the structure of interstate relations, transformed perceptions of security, redefined the identities, friends, and enemies in world politics, restructured the criteria of state-citizen-resident relations and reprioritized the mission of public governance” (p. 172). Discussions began over what

“power” is in the context of the war on terror in global terrorism and what mechanisms should be activated to make this “power” more effective. The US declared war on terror and began taking stricter measures than before, increasing security within its borders. In turn, other countries also had to step up their own precautions, an inevitability given the scope of US global anti-terrorist thinking. Other countries, such as the UK, Canada, Italy, and Spain, also adopted the strategy of “war on terror” in their domestic and foreign policies (Owens & Pelizzo, 2009). The 2001 attacks were followed by the 2003 Istanbul, 2004 Madrid, and 2005 London terrorist attacks, all of which exposed how countries would need to cooperate in the fight against international terrorism.

Terrorism was not a new phenomenon with September 11, although it was unprecedented event, which intensified anti-terrorist strategies and policies as well as world opinion by globalizing the discourse on terrorism (Haque, 2002). The US had, however, been concerned with terrorism for many decades and had established different institutions, reflected in documents, such as Managing Terrorist Incidents, the National Program for combating against terrorism (1986), Policy on Counterterrorism (1995), Terrorism, the Future, and the US Foreign Policy (2001) (Richelson & Evans, 2001). However, even with these sophisticated prevention strategies, anti-terrorist conventions, and legal provisions, September 11 could not be prevented (Haque, 2002). The event shows how anti-terrorist institutions in the US, which aim to prevent and protect with anti-terrorist strategies and institutional structures against terrorism, cannot perform their functions effectively.

Most comparative analyses of terrorism and counterterrorism have used examples from Western countries or European Union (EU) member states. For instance, Foley (2013) compared France and the UK with regard to their counterterrorism policies, institutions, and norms. Pearce, Lindekilde, Parker, and Rogers (2019)



conducted a survey to identify the factors affecting citizens' responses to the "Run, Hide, Tell"<sup>1</sup> strategy in Denmark and the UK. Similarly, the UK had to tackle domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland for many years and Russia had to deal with domestic problems related to Chechnya (Beckman, 2007). Spain experienced terrorism carried out by the separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). One of the studies examining Turkey and the UK in terms of terrorism belongs to Demirsu (2015); in her thesis, she elaborates on the concept of panic after the September 11 terrorist attacks. She also analyzed the effects of counterterrorism measures through a multi-faceted approach – policy analysis and frame analysis. Demirsu (2017) examined the counterterrorism strategies of Turkey and the UK, the structure of these strategies and finally the relationship between terrorism and human rights.

European democracies tend to balance military-security anti-terrorist measures with controls in judicial and political manners (Wilkinson, 1986). Moreover, European policy on terrorism, the idea of terrorism as a collective threat and the need for a collective response, and the notion of terrorism as a threat to democracy which necessitates a democratic response have gained general support (Cardona, 1992). Counter-terrorist policy of the West emphasizes the rule of law (Crelinsten & Schmid, 2007); however, military approach to counterterrorism has begun to be "louder" and "ever more insistent" (Crelinsten & Schmid, 2007, p. 314). Here, there is a question for states about the balance of giving weight to military means or rule of law during countering terrorism.

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<sup>1</sup> "Run, Hide, Tell" was a strategy introduced by the Metropolitan Police Service in 2007 for public security in the UK. The motto communicates the actions required for safety in case of terrorist attacks: running to a safe place, hiding rather than confronting, and calling the police.

There are different approaches to this question from academic researchers who have been studying on terrorism for many years. Until the late 1980s, the war model began to have more significant role in counter-terrorism discourse (Crelinsten & Schmid, 2007). Neil Livingstone discusses the war model's significance in a total responses strategy and Ronald Crelinsten argues that war images became more visible during the 1980s in media, policy and scientific discourse (Crelinsten & Schmid, 2007).

Government responses are important to control terrorism (Yamamoto, 2017). Terrorists have political goals and governments have the capability to increase or implement the policy sought by terrorists. Governments control resources, bureaucracy, manage their populations, and interact with other governments (Yamamoto, 2017), so they have significant power to prevent international terrorism.

Governments try to control terrorism by their own means, which means that the most significant units used to prevent or control terrorism are governmental institutions. Institutional responses to terrorism are carried out at a state level. However, their success and effectiveness in the fight against terrorism can be questioned not only by the state but also by society. When institutions and organizations of states are taken into consideration, they cannot be independent from the people of that country. Organizations are behavioral settings for human interactions (Argyris & Schon, 1996). Organizations can develop and improve their procedures by responding in the face of failure in a positive or negative way (Argyris & Schon, 1996).

The state does not consist of institutions alone so that understanding terrorism cannot be achieved by analyzing structure and functioning of institutions, without understanding the citizens for whom the state is responsible. Radicalization is not something in a vacuum that can be solved by considering only counterterrorism strategies, institutional responses, and amendments in rules of law. The "state" serves

as the “top authority” in fighting terrorist organizations. However, terrorism not only affects the political or institutional structures of states, but also directly and significantly affects citizens' lives – in both the short and long term. Therefore, while looking at the problem of terrorism in the context of the state's policies and mechanisms of action against terrorism, it is also necessary to look at how society is affected by terrorism: what people have experienced, what sort of lessons can be learnt from their experiences and thoughts, and how these lessons could be applied to state policies in fighting terrorism. By looking at victims and understanding their perceptions, as well as looking at the structure and functioning of state responses, a bottom-up perspective and top-down structure can be analyzed together. This may lead to the creation of more permanent solutions by establishing a mutual understanding of both sides within the problem of terrorism.

### **3.3 Perceptions of Victims to Institutional Responses**

Citizenship is a main value of constitutional democracy within the framework of interactive relationships between state and persons (Oliver & Heater, 1994). The Development Research Center on Citizenship Participation and Accountability (2010) analyzes how people view institutions and how this shapes them as citizens. Citizens have certain rights and freedoms but also need to abide by certain rules in a state. However, citizens also have active roles in solving problems within their own communities, in government, or in global relations (Gaventa, 2008). Citizens are, thus, not only those who abide by the rules of the state, they have an impact on society. This perspective shows a different type of citizen and also changes approaches to state institutions (Development Research Center on Citizenship, Participation, and Accountability, 2010).

However, citizens living in a certain country may not have clear information about every terrorist attack or every institutional response to terrorism. The people who know an event best are the ones who have experienced it. Therefore, the focal sample for this research is the victims who were affected by the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks. The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985) defines the concept of “victim” as persons who have suffered harm, (physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or deterioration of the fundamental rights, through acts that include violation of criminal laws. The victims of terrorism are the people who have experienced the attacks directly and whose families, friends, and colleagues were affected (Waldman, Carmeli, & Halevi, 2011). They are people who experience terror first-hand, who are directly, or indirectly affected by terrorism. Traumatic issues are more vivid for those who are living in the immediate proximity of the events (Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). The people most affected by terrorism are the victims, who therefore think and question more about the terrorist incident they were affected by. They are expected to have a clear idea of the event, because they experienced it. Further, since they are the first people affected by terrorism, they have a number of rights that they should seek legally, they will need to use institutions for this purpose. Their experiences from these institutions may be positive or negative.

Following a terrorist attack, if those affected do not receive adequate help from the staff and institutions responsible to provide care for them (providing help for their psychological, physical, and mental wellbeing), their suffering may be increased (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). This is referred to as secondary victimization, revictimization, or double victimization (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). Such issues are caused by social and institutional agents (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). The victims may

mistrust institutions, which, in turn, may increase their social isolation and hinder their healing process (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). Survivors and their relatives' recovery process is mostly slow and painful, and sometimes complex if there are problems regarding adequate financial and psychological support, difficulties gaining information, complex judicial proceedings, or poor recognition of their state and needs (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). This process is known as "the second disaster" or "the disaster after the disaster" (de Vicente Colomina, 2019).

One of the core feelings of victims after terrorist attacks is fear. One of the main aims of terrorist organizations is achieving their political aims by spreading fear in society. The aim of terrorism is to spread fear through a perpetrator (or perpetrators) and by applying a specific violent policy on victim(s) (Le Vine, 1997). One of the clearest objectives of terrorism across the world is to create fear in society. Fear is studied in different disciplines, such as political science, psychology, and sociology, from different angles. For instance, trauma, which is studied in the framework of psychology and political psychology, may occur as a consequence of a variety of reasons, such as car accidents, rape, crime, disaster, or a terrorist attack (Plamper & Lazier, 2012). Moreover, terrorist attacks are commonly expected to cause both the victims and residents of the cities where the attacks happened to have negative feelings during and after the incident.

Fear, as a result of terrorist attacks, therefore, may also increase citizens' expectations of protection from governments (Sinclair & LoCicero, 2010). Fear of terrorism can affect individuals and communities and can lead to disruptions in society (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2012). It can cause suspicion or derogation of others, decreased trust in government institutions, pave the way for offensive counterterrorism policies, and damage social cohesion (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2012).

According to Avdan and Webb (2018), terrorist attacks are most traumatic for persons directly experiencing or witnessing them. People living in close proximity to terrorist attack sites are more likely to display post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or psychological trauma (Avdan & Webb, 2018). People living close to terrorist attack areas are likely to suffer severe psychological trauma (Cohen, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas, 2002). In the year following the September 11 terrorist attacks, New York City residents displayed symptoms of PTSD (Schlenger et al., 2002) and similarly, after the Madrid and London terrorist attacks, residents also showed PTSD symptoms (Davis & MacDonald, 2004). Terrorist acts also spread panic within populations. Victims mostly feel vulnerable, extreme fear, lack of protection, and these feelings persist intensely for a long time, so they suffer from high level of anxiety afterwards (de Vicente Colomina, 2019).

In terms of cognitive reactions, victims may feel that their lives will never be the same again, presenting hypervigilance, recurring worry, negative beliefs about the world, confusion, or disorientation. Emotionally, they may feel numbness, vulnerability, fear of death, and feelings of hopelessness. In terms of social reactions, they may feel mistrust of others, isolation, and feelings of being rejected (de Vicente Colomina, 2019).

Fear sometimes can be linked with distrust of variety of institutions placed in a state. Fear arises from distrust, which includes an inability to predict an event or judging an event likely to harm their interests (Bluhm, 1987). Variations in level of fear may be associated with variations in trust in the government (Sinclair & LoCicero, 2010). According to Leone and Anrig (2003), the fear level increased with the effects of September 11 and caused reanimation of trust in government. Sinclair and LoCicero (2010) believe that a psychological mechanism triggered by fear of terrorism affects

trust in government at an individual level. “Trust” can be studied in many ways, at an individual, or institutional level. The concept of trust should therefore be taken into consideration in a multi-dimensional context. The American Heritage Dictionary defines “trust” in a person or thing as “confidence”. People and institutions in politics and international relations may trust specific groups of people or other institutional structures.

There are two main approaches to trust: (a) the “cognitive activity approach,” which is based on calculations of predicted events and their results; (b) the “complex symbolic interaction” perspective, which includes the personal interests of an individual or perceptions of interest of others by analyzing the predicted consequences of events in terms of some self-interests and values (Bluhm, 1987, p. 335). Trust determines the engagement of persons in social interactions (Bluhm, 1987). According to Weber (as cited in Bluhm, 1987), who believes that trust established social structures, the need for trust is higher in more complex societies. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, (1993) made the concept of trust more visible in the social sciences by trying to explain it in the framework of individuals as well as in groups, by referring to collective action.

Trust in government is often evaluated in the framework of political trust or confidence in government (Anderson, 2010). The concept of “government” is used with different meanings, and should be defined carefully according to the specific research topic. According to Easton (as cited in Lavrakas, 2008), trust can be distinguished between “diffused support,” which refers to trust in the institutions within a government, and “specific support,” which refers to trust in officeholders within a state, whereas Hetherington (1998) argues that trust is awarded to the government as an institution governed by officers, so that the concept of trust depends on the institutions and the policymakers combined. Easton (1975) defines “trust in government”

empirically by relying on the specific structure's confidence, referring to the complexity of distinguishing characteristics of diffuse support and specific support. He believes that studies focusing on trust in government can relate to specific institutions, such as legislative, executive, and judiciary branches (as cited in Lavrakas, 2008). Specific support can evolve into diffuse support in different situations. A person who distrusts a state officer may begin to distrust the institutions represented by that state officer. This means that trust perception is often changeable and transferable between people, places, and institutions. Trust has a dynamic structure that changes and evolves (Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007). The September 11 terrorist attacks drew attention to the issue of trust in governments in their conduct of the War on Terror. Following these attacks, the level of trust in government declined (Chanley, 2002). However, fear, as an outcome of the terrorist attacks, may also have contributed to increasing expectations of the government to protect society (Sinclair & LocCicero, 2010).

In states governed by democratic values, the legitimacy of the state depends on citizens' trust (Putnam et al., 1993). According to Easton (1975), the effectiveness of a political system and its legitimacy can be understood through people's trust in state institutions. Confidence in government is also affected by unsuccessful security precautions of governments at different levels in various countries (Denemark, 2012). Denemark (2012) argues that Australians and Russians, who have experiences and feelings related to unsuccessful issues with security, are more likely to oppose detention powers. In Russia, this is a result of political distrust in the implementation of security issues by the government; however, in Australia, it is the result of emerging political behaviors after events (Denemark, 2012).

As a result, terrorism is a concept that is difficult to define in the literature. As there is debate about the causes of terror, it is a fact that the purpose of terror uses



people as a tool by spreading fear. As argued in this study, Al-Qaeda, one of the international terrorist groups, employs different tactics to create fear and violence, and poses major threats to countries. The September 11 attacks showed us that institutional responses to terrorism, hegemonic power or strong state concepts became insufficient to prevent terrorism. The September 11 attacks caused a change in the perception of concepts such as security, friend, enemy and power. Following that, the attacks in Istanbul, Madrid and London also led to the questioning of institutional measures in countering-terrorism in Europe. This study discusses that institutional responses cannot exist alone, and these responses interact in a positive or negative way with victims of terrorism. According to the impact and success of institutional responses, terror victims may also suffer from “secondary victimization” from time to time, but they may also receive adequate and effective help from institutional responses.

In this study, institutional responses will be examined when analyzing the terrorist attacks in Istanbul and London. At the same time, perceptions and thoughts of victims to these institutional responses will be analyzed. Along with institutional responses to terrorism, the perceptions of victims (a group of people who created these institutions in a direct or indirect way) will be revealed. In this way, the approach to terrorism will be attempted to be taken not only on the axis of the state, but also on the axis of society based on the victims.

In summary, the concept of terrorism has different meanings in the literature and is therefore difficult to define. As discussed in detail above, this study illustrated this by taking the events of September 11 as a turning point: institutional responses to terrorism issued by the states to solve, prevent, or in the aftermath of a terrorist incident are very important. They need to be applied in a rigorous manner to create the infrastructure required, but success cannot be measured from the institutional responses

alone. These strategies may have given shape to the institutional structures of society and interact with counterterrorism strategies. However, institutional responses and community reactions should not be evaluated separately, especially in terrorist events that directly affect individual lives and cause sudden and visible damage to society.

This research, therefore, focused on two countries, the UK and Turkey, which differ in democracy, EU membership and religion. It evaluated the 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks, in terms of the institutional responses and victim perceptions of those responses. Terrorism has been discussed in detail, therefore, at both the state and society levels through study of institutional responses and the impact on victims within the anti-terrorism process. There may be scope to improve institutional responses and institutions through restructuring and reassessment, especially by integrating the views of victims. Concepts such as trust, fear, trauma experienced by victims should be considered in a multifaceted way, as well as the detailed analysis of the institutional structures. Radicalization cannot be considered separately from the variables and dynamics of society; nor can state institutions in a structural sense be considered separately from the variables and dynamics of society.

As previously argued in the section of “The Importance and the Aim of the Study”, when previous research on terrorism has been taken into account, there are already some of the problems cited by Silke (2001), such as heavy reliance on open-source documents, lack of producing new knowledge and reworking of old materials. Reich (1990) has also discussed the tendency toward overgeneralizations and simple explanation.

When literature is reviewed on international terrorism, responses to terrorism and victims’ perceptions, it is seen that there is a certain division of research areas focusing on either victims’ perceptions or institutional responses. There are studies on

terrorism that tend to view the issue as “war” or “military problem”, and other studies approach the issue from the viewpoint of institutional responses and the rule of law. This research tries to combine the two perspectives (institutional responses and victims’ perceptions) by not relying solely on open sources, or primary and secondary resources, but also drawing from works on producing new knowledge such as by identifying the perceptions of victims to institutional responses and combining these perceptions with institutional responses alongside with its adopted theoretical framework: sociological institutionalism.



## **4 Methodology**

### **4.1 Approach to Inquiry**

This study adopted “within case analysis” by analyzing the Istanbul terrorist attacks and London terrorist attacks within their own unique structures and dynamics (RQ1–2, and RQ3–4). These within case analyses were then followed by a cross-case analysis, comparing the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks (RQ5).

### **4.2 Methodology**

This study adopted a qualitative case study approach. Qualitative research comprises “a set of interpretive, material practices” that make the world “visible” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). Qualitative researchers study “things” in their “natural settings,” aiming to make sense of or interpret phenomena within the framework of meanings “people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 3).

Case study research involves the study of an issue analyzed with one or more cases within a restricted context in terms of setting (Creswell, 2007). The researcher may analyze a case, or cases over time, from a detailed perspective by collecting in-depth data including different information sources and reports, a case description and case-based topics (Creswell, 2007). The literature does not contain a certain road map to follow in their case studies for researcher (Tellis, 1997). However, case study is a reliable methodology if executed with care (Tellis, 1997).

In the case studies, case analysis is very important, and care must be taken to explain the contents of cases. The case study approach is a good one if the boundaries are clearly constructed and the cases are successfully defined (Creswell, 2007).

### 4.3 Case-quintain Dilemma

The “case-quintain dilemma” is the dilemma between the case (unique research context) and the quintain (across-case issues) and which aspect should have the most attention. Although the cases studies can be compared exactly, there may be findings, which, if discussed together, may elicit more concrete preventive and protective capabilities for states dealing with terrorism.

Cases need some similarity to support multi-case research. There is an epistemological basis for this dilemma. In the qualitative understanding of the cases, the activities of the cases are experienced, taking into consideration their specific contexts and situations. Besides the experience and the interpretation of the activity, the situation is considered to shape the activity. The preference is always to study a situation rather than a case or context (Stake, 2005).

The research case has a dynamic structure in certain ways. It consists of real-time events. The case is performed intentionally, there appear to be certain obstacles in the case, and it often has unique identity. Having interactions with other cases, it plays different roles considering competition and compliance. A case has various stages of life in which a sense of the past and the future are part of the picture; however, only one of the stages can be observed. Therefore, each case is considered "unique," which is why multi-case studies are difficult. Moreover, Stake (2005) states that the case has an internal and external structure. The system is composed of certain components within the boundaries of the case although there are also several external features. Some of the external features help describe the contexts or background of the case (Stake, 2005).

Each mini case is constrained by its representation of the program or its relationship with it. However, if the study has a qualitative multi-case design, then each

case should be examined in terms of its self-centering, complexity, and situational uniqueness. Therefore, each case should be examined comprehensively by giving little immediate attention to the quintain. Accordingly, Stake (2005) argues that a multi-contextual investigation of a program is not so much an investigation of the quintain, as it investigates cases for what they enlighten us regarding the quintain. Obviously, there is no correct way. Scientists can plan an examination to give either proportionate or unbalanced consideration regarding the quintain and individual cases.

Even though these two cases are unique, a systematic analysis should uncover some understandable and observable similar or different characteristics. To try and overcome this epistemological dilemma, the cases of Istanbul and London were analyzed separately, within case analysis, followed by cross-case analysis. This research, thus, focused more on “the cases” rather than “the quintain.”

However, this research is more focused on two cases in a detailed perspective. Chapter 12 will focus on cross-case analysis between Turkey and the UK. As mentioned, this research is focused on the cases within a case analysis in a separate way of thinking to overcome the/an epistemological dilemma. The question might be posed here: why is there a need for a cross-case comparison within this research since it is adopted within a case analysis?

The answer is question relies upon on not underestimating “society-specific” differences (or similarities) between cases, even though it analyzes them separately. The road map of this study is sociological institutionalism and both cases are evaluated within this theoretical framework. However, even though relationships between research question (RQ1-RQ2, and RQ3-RQ4) rely upon a same logic such as finding potential parallels or conflict between institutional responses and victim’ perceptions, the research should also consider variation within these parallelisms or conflict between

the cases due to its theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism. Therefore, this research aimed at focusing on these two cases in separate way but not underestimating variations between these two cases under the framework of sociological intuitionism. So, there is also a need for cross case analysis to show the potential variation between the cases. For this reason, Chapter 12 focuses on cross-case analysis of Turkey and the UK.

#### **4.4 Data Collection and Analysis**

In this study, data collection and data analysis methods were chosen separately for studying on “institutional responses to terrorism” and “victims’ perceptions”.

##### **4.4.1 Institutional responses to terrorism**

In this study, institutional responses to terrorism (RQ1 and RQ3), of Turkey and the UK were analyzed in two categories:

1. Short-term institutional responses: official governmental documents about the structure and functioning of immediate responses, as well as secondary sources such as academic books, articles, and newspapers were used.
2. Long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies: primary sources included official documents, documents on counterterrorism strategies, governmental protocols, archives, and amendments in the rule of law. Also, academics, members of parliament, and experts on terrorism studies were interviewed in Turkey and the UK. In addition to these, secondary sources (e.g., books, articles, journals, and newspapers) were used throughout the research to examine the countries’ institutional responses and counterterrorism policies.

Semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with academics, members of parliament, and experts on terrorism studies in Turkey and the UK to gather data on long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. The aim of the interviews with academics was to obtain expert explanations of theoretical and academic views on terrorist attacks. Interviews with members of parliament aimed to gain an understanding of the state and institution approaches to terrorism. The main questions asked to key-informant interviewees were as follows:

1. To what extent were institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies after the terrorist attacks successful?
2. How do you evaluate institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies?
3. How should societal and institutional responses to international terrorism best be balanced?
4. What mistakes did your country make in tackling international terrorism?
5. How do you analyze the parliamentary debates on terrorism to find solutions to terrorism?

Interviewees were invited to face-to-face meetings in London and Istanbul. However, some of the academics and other terrorism experts were living outside the UK and Turkey so that the interviews had to be completed by e-mail. Eight key-informant interviews were completed, of which six were face-to-face and two were via e-mail.

Interviewees' expertise in terrorism their perspectives varied, which made ordering and presenting the data collected difficult and identifying the most important themes in terms of institutional responses to terrorism complex. However, this problem was solved using the primary and secondary sources. Essential institutional responses



for each country were determined by looking at primary and secondary sources and the elite interviews. Each case was analyzed from its unique perspective.

In this research, databases such as the Global Terrorism Database, Freedom House Reports, and World Religion Database were used. The main database, Global Terrorism Database was used to show the number of terrorism-related events and the average number of fatalities per terrorist attack in Istanbul and London. Freedom House Reports were used to show the level of differences in democracy between Turkey and the UK, and the World Religion Database was used to show the religious differences between Turkey and the UK. Together with the other main data sources, these resources strengthened the study, making it more controlled and robust.

#### **4.4.2 Victims' perceptions of institutional responses**

In this study, the process of conducting field research on victims' perceptions of institutional responses was conducted in two locations: Istanbul and London. The details about this process mentioned in the following sub-sections.

##### **4.4.2.1 Interview data collection**

To understand and analyze victims' perceptions of institutional responses, field research was completed in London from February to August 2019 and in Istanbul from January to June 2020. Semi-structured interviews were completed with victims in London and Istanbul. In Istanbul, ten victims of the 2005 Istanbul terrorist attacks (HSBC building terrorist attacks in Levent) were interviewed. Five of these were conducted face-to-face and five via e-mail or Skype. In London, four victims were interviewed: two were face-to-face, one was a Skype interview, and one was via e-mail.

Finding victims to interview was challenging for this study. To find victims, newspaper archives were searched for articles, which mentioned terrorist incidents

during the 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks. The names of the victims, who were clearly identified in articles, or who gave interviews to newspapers, were noted. An attempt was made to contact these victims through various victim associations located in London and Istanbul. However, victim associations interested in these attacks were few in number and many were inactive, as too many years had passed. There were fewer terrorism-related associations in London than Turkey, and permission procedures in London for direct interviews with victims were also challenging.

Due to this difficulty in contacting people through associations, direct contact was attempted with people who had made statements about terrorist incidents, to newspapers and television. Social media (especially Facebook) were used and if possible, the victims were contacted at their places of work by phone or email. Facebook was the most effective channel for making contact with victims.

The recruitment strategy developed into a snowballing approach, with consenting interviewees also contacting other victims, who were then also recruited. This was particularly effective for the London research context. In Istanbul, a field study was conducted with local residents in the places where terrorist incidents had occurred, and victims were reached through shopkeepers, street interviews and local managers. Additionally, some victims were also contacted via Facebook. Consenting participants gave their informed consent verbally in the audio recordings of the interviews.

There were two inclusion criteria for enrolment in the study: being born in 1985 or earlier and having been directly or indirectly affected by one of the two terrorist attacks. The interviewees were victims of the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks or the 2005 London attacks. All interviewees were born after 1985 and could recall details of the

attack they had experienced. Providing interviewees had been 18 or older during the attack, selection involved no other demographic or socio-economic restrictions.

#### **4.4.2.2 Ethics**

Before the victims granted permission and consent for the interview process, they received an ethical report that specified the study's main rules, including how their anonymity would be protected, information about the study, and information about the researcher and supervisor. The ethical committee reports were provided by both Yeditepe University and the University of Oxford.

Establishing trust and convincing the individuals to participate in the interviews were the main challenges. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the questions were carefully selected to encourage the interviewees. Any questions that could have disturbed the interviewees were eliminated out of consideration for their traumatic experiences and ongoing emotional problems. This process was controlled by talking with the interviewees in a warm and caring manner, thus establishing a trusting relationship.

The locations of the face-to-face interviews were mutually chosen in discussions with the interviewees. One of the main issues involved finding quiet places that were convenient and centrally located. Most of the interviews took place in cafes in central Istanbul or London.

The participants needed to trust the researcher; however, some were frightened of being identified even after learning the interviews would be anonymous. Attempts were made to minimize stress by (a) asking relatively general questions, so as not to upset the interviewees and (b) following up on their responses by asking more detailed probing questions, only if they were willing to discuss the issue more critically.

However, the main aim was to build trust between the interviewer and interviewees. The interviewer made every effort to be sensitive during the interview process keeping in mind survivors' past pain and traumas. To further strengthen trust, the researcher provided all relevant documents (ethical reports, names of the university, personal information of the supervisor) before conducting the interviews. Secondly, some of the victims showed insufficient understanding of this study's complicated core academic themes – counterterrorism strategies and institutional responses for example – as this required specialized knowledge. To solve this issue, the interviewer explained issues in detail. Interviewee anonymity was protected by coding; no real names were recorded. The project aims and what the interview involved were explained to all participants, followed by the interview questions.

#### **4.4.2.3 Interview protocol and design**

The interviews were (high-quality) audio-recorded for later transcription and back-up copies were saved. Contextual notes were made during the interviews, noting impressions, and a separate word file was prepared for this. After the interviews, respondents were thanked for their participation.

During the semi-structured interviews with victims, two main questions were posed:

1. What do you remember during the terrorist attacks and what have you experienced during and aftermath of the terrorist attacks?
2. What do you think about short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies?

Due to difficulties in finding sufficient numbers of victims, newspaper interviews were also analyzed as supportive victim accounts. These were initially

analyzed separately from the interviews, but were later evaluated together to answer the research question. For Istanbul, the newspapers *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* were used; for London, interviews were taken from *The Guardian*.

#### **4.4.2.4 Interview data analysis**

Thematic analysis was used to analyze the perceptions of the victims. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic evaluation is a technique for differentiating and detailing themes within information.

Thematic assessment is one technique used for dissecting qualitative information, typically applied to a selection of writings or meeting records. Braun and Clarke (2006) state that thematic evaluation is not married to any previous hypothetical framework and this way it can be employed in varied hypothetical frameworks. Therefore, it is possible to combine thematic analysis and many other theoretical frameworks and methods in research. Themes emerging from the data can be analyzed inductively (bottom-up), or deductively (top-down) (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

An inductive approach means the themes identified are strongly linked to the data themselves (Patton, 1990). According to Braun and Clarke (2006), in data-driven thematic analysis, there should be no pre-existing coding frame with inductive research; the researcher should not try to fit codes into analytic preconceptions. Although the study did not depend on a deductive approach, specialists cannot be emancipated from their "hypothetical" and "epistemological responsibilities" and "information" is not coded in an epistemological vacuum" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84).

At the beginning of all research, researchers have some ideas about what codes might emerge from their research (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Reflexivity was practiced by the researcher to address this issue.

NVivo, QSR (version 12 Pro), a computer qualitative data analysis tool, and a Windows computer were used to analyze the interview data. NVivo was selected for two reasons. Firstly, this software makes storing the interviews in separate files easy and allows for simple interview management. Secondly, NVivo was used to identify the terror attack contexts by determining the codes from the victims' interviews. Each interview was transcribed in a separate Word document and placed in a separate file folder on the computer and uploaded into NVivo.

The Istanbul and London interviews were then grouped using different NVivo projects with file names of "Interviews Istanbul" and "Interviews London" in two distinct NVivo project folders. Before the coding process began, several of the London transcripts were read by the researcher. After this process was completed for several interviews, development of the coding system was begun. The codes were established for the London interviews and then reduced to themes. Some codes were very clear, but others were too general to identify clearly. Therefore, more general codes were divided into more specific codes later on. Each code was then divided into several sub-codes in NVivo after more interviews were reviewed.

In Istanbul, the interviews were conducted in Turkish and uploaded in Turkish as Word documents in NVivo. The main concepts and results were then translated into English in an effort to prevent misunderstanding and semantic shifting during the coding process.

To address part of the research question, coding interview data using thematic analysis included allocation to one of two categories:

1. Victims' perceptions to short-term institutional responses

2. Victims' perceptions to long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies

Under these two headings, different topics were collected and classified in NVivo.

Supportive newspaper interviews were not evaluated by thematic analysis in NVivo but their contents were studied and analyzed interpretively.

#### **4.5 Validity and Reliability**

Reliability and validity in qualitative studies refers to the elements supporting credibility of the work (Padney & Patnaik, 2014). Research design should optimize credibility of qualitative research as much as possible. Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that trustworthiness is provided by establishing credibility (by establishing confidence in the truth of findings), transferability (applicability of findings to other contexts through generalizability), dependability (consistency and repeatability of the findings), and conformability (providing neutrality to the research, preventing researcher bias). If trustworthiness of a study can be optimized, credible and defensible results will pave the way for generalizability (Golafshani, 2003).

In the framework of Lincoln and Guba's trustworthiness concept, the question of how trustworthiness was provided will now be explained step by step. In this study, to ensure credibility, techniques of prolonged engagement and triangulation were applied. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend prolonged engagement between the researcher and the participants to understand an issue from a detailed perspective and to establish a trust relationship between the researcher and the participants. In this case study research, the interviews with victims of terrorist attacks of Istanbul and London were conducted by the researcher.

For establishing prolonged engagement, field studies and the interview process were conducted over a period of time in the cities where the terrorist attacks happened. The researcher spent a year in the UK (Oxford and London) for research, and conducted a six-month interview process in Istanbul, Turkey. Being in the places where the terrorist incidents occurred allowed more, and unrushed face-to-face interviews. The main focus was whether interviews could be conducted within the framework of trust and whether clear and desired answers to the questions asked could be obtained. Since all kinds of factors in human relations should be taken into account when establishing a trust relationship, each issue was considered in detail in advance. Ethical considerations to build trust are reported in section.

Triangulation refers to using multiple sources, methods, or theoretical frameworks in a qualitative research. Denzin (1978) and Patton (1999) state four types of triangulations as method triangulation, triangulation of sources, analyst triangulation, and theory/perspective triangulation. In this study, triangulation of sources and analyst triangulation was used. In addition, triangulation of sources to understand institutional responses to terrorism included the use of governmental protocols, agreements, primary sources, and secondary sources. These were analyzed with key-informant interviews conducted in Turkey and the UK and also with perception data of victims collected from interviews.

Transferability and dependability may be more complex to optimize in qualitative research. In quantitative research, researchers are mostly concerned with showing whether findings can be applied to a wider population (Merriam, 1998). Qualitative research is often specific, and findings are applicable to a certain environment or small population only, so it is often difficult to show that the findings are applicable to other environments or populations (Padney & Patnaik, 2014). Lincoln



and Guba (1985) describe qualitative research's "thick descriptions" as strengthening the external validity.

A phenomenon should be described well to provide strong external validity. In this research, cases were described in detail and both terrorist attacks were analyzed in detail. This research employed the same method and the same conceptual framework and research questions for both the Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks. Later on, a cross-case analysis was completed. Analyzing in a comparative manner contributed to understanding variations between the Turkish and UK cases of terrorism.

Dependability is also an element of reliability. Repeating the study, in the same context using same methods and participants, would achieve similar results. While standard procedures were used in both research contexts, the findings of this research may not be applicable to other contexts, phenomenon, or populations. To evaluate the extent to which findings may be valid in other settings, similar projects which adopt the same method would need to be conducted in different countries.

Conformability refers to objectivity in research. To ensure conformability in this research, regular entries were made in a reflexive journal. Using this journal, the researcher was able to identify assumptions prior to the interviews and ensure neutrality in handling those topics in the interviews. From the literature review, trust and fear were mostly discussed for measuring public opinion. This prior researcher knowledge may have risked these topics becoming forefront concepts in victim interviews. However, no direct questions were asked about trust or fear, so this bias was avoided.

To make the results more valid by analyzing the perceptions of the victims, memory was used as a tool. Before undertaking thematic analysis for the perceptions of the victims, it was necessary to look at the extent to which victims were able to

remember the terrorist attacks in question. Therefore, the first question put to interviewees aimed to measure the clarity of victims' perceptions in the framework of two terrorist attacks. In order to decide whether the victims had a clear memory of the terrorist attacks, each chapter about the perceptions of victims began with general understanding and explanation of the victims on terrorist attacks.

A further important point is about how generalization should be approached in the case studies. It is frequently debated in the literature that the results of case studies may not generally be acceptable. The main question here is: can the results obtained in these case studies be interpreted with sociological institutionalism? Here it is worth mentioning a topic mentioned by Yin about generalization in case studies.

Yin (1984) used the concepts of "analytical generalization" and "statistical generalization" by dividing the concept of generalization into two approaches. In analytical generalization, according to Yin, an outline of a theory that has been mentioned or developed in the study before, can be compared to empirical data that appears in case studies (Yin, 1984). So, the generalization appeared in this study is not a statistical generalization based on numerical data. This study aims to interpret the approach within the framework of sociological institutionalism with the findings, by giving importance to analytical generalization.

## **5 International Terrorism and Combating Terrorism**

### **5.1 Overview**


The 21<sup>st</sup> century brought new and controversial political, social, and economic problems. In the 2000s, the world faced many conflicts, civil wars, and terrorist incidents: the Nepal Civil War, for example, which started in 1996 and continued until 2009; Chad civil war 2005–2009; the Mexican drug wars that still continue. After the Second Intifada and Afghanistan war that began in 2001, the Iraq War broke out in 2003. Through all these wars and conflicts, terrorism has grown and diversified. In 2017, an estimated 26,445 people died from terrorism globally (Ritchie, Hasell, Appel, & Roser, 2013).

The September 11 New York and Washington attacks killed 2,977 people and caused more than \$60 billion in damage in New York City. But not only was there human loss and financial damage. The political, social, and economic effects of September 11 created mass fear and panic that spilled over into other Western countries. Security policies and diplomacy was reshaped across Europe and new global counterterrorism strategies were developed.

In the years following 2001, many terrorist attacks were carried out across the globe, especially in Europe. The train bombings in Madrid in 2004 killed 191 people and injured over 2,000; the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005, for which Al-Qaida claimed responsibility, killed 52 people. In November 2003, Al-Qaeda carried out a series of attacks in crowded areas of Istanbul. A bomb attack on two synagogues on November 15<sup>th</sup> killed 25 people and injured 262. On November 20<sup>th</sup>, a large explosion ripped through the HSBC building in Levent. Another explosion hit the British Consulate on the same day.

## Deaths from terrorism, 1980 to 2017

Confirmed deaths, including all victims and attackers who died as a result of the incident.



Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)

Note: The Global Terrorism Database is the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist attacks available and recent data is complete. However, we expect, based on our analysis, that longer-term data is incomplete (with the exception of the US and Europe). We therefore do not recommend this dataset for the inference of long-term trends in the prevalence of terrorism globally.

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
*Graph 1.* Deaths from Terrorism, 1980 to 2017. This figure shows the increase in deaths from terrorism over the time period 1980 to 2017 (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).

Over the previous decade (2000–2010) the average number of annual deaths from terrorism worldwide was 21,000, although with significant year-to-year variability. Over this decade, the global death toll ranged from its lowest, 7,827 in 2010, to its highest, 44,490 in 2014 (Ritchie et al., 2013).

## Number of terrorist attacks, 2000 to 2017

The source defines a terrorist attack as: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors; data does not include acts of state terrorism.

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


*Graph 2.* Number of Terrorist Attacks, 2000 to 2017. The figure shows the increase in deaths from terrorism over the time period 2000 to 2017 (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).

Between 2000 and 2017, the number of terrorist attacks in Turkey and the UK increased (see Graph 2). Despite some year-by-year fluctuations and significant differences in the actual number of incidents in each country, the general trend was upwards and emphasized the increasing problem of terrorism for both countries.

### Deaths from terrorism, 2002 to 2007

Confirmed deaths, including all victims and attackers who died as a result of the incident.



Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)

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Note: The Global Terrorism Database is the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist attacks available and recent data is complete. However, we expect, based on our analysis, that longer-term data is incomplete (with the exception of the US and Europe). We therefore do not recommend this dataset for the inference of long-term trends in the prevalence of terrorism globally.

*Graph 3. Deaths from Terrorism, 2002 to 2007. The figure shows deaths from terrorism over the time period 2002 to 2007 (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).*

Graph 3 showing deaths from terrorism between 2002 and 2007, highlights those deaths from terrorism in Turkey were at their highest in 2003, and in the UK in 2005.

Table 2 outlines the terrorist attacks that took place in various parts of the world from 2000 to 2005.

Table 2

*Timeline of International Terrorist Attacks Between 2000 and 2005 (UK Government, 2006)*

| <u>Date</u>    | <u>Terrorist Attack</u>                                                                                  |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| November 2000  | British people of Bangladeshi origin arrested for preparing explosive items                              |
| September 2001 | Attacks in US on World Trade Center and Pentagon                                                         |
| 2001–2003      | Various terrorist attacks in India, Singapore, Pakistan, Morocco, Yemen, Russia, Indonesia, and Kenya    |
| April 2002     | Attacks on tourists at synagogues in Tunisia                                                             |
| November 2003  | Terrorist attacks on synagogues and Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Cooperation (HSBC) bank in Levent, Turkey |
| March 2004     | Terrorist attacks in Madrid in Spain                                                                     |
| 2004–2005      | Various attacks in Saudi Arabia, Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, Qatar, and the Philippines                    |
| July 2005      | Terrorist attacks in London, UK                                                                          |

Although there are multiple reasons behind all the terrorist events listed in Table 3, foreign policy is a key factor. A particular foreign policy can bring peace and order to a country, but it can also bring the country into chaos and terrorism. Bennet stresses about importance of the foreign policy by referring to terrorism, NATO, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval. Foreign policy is a policy of a specific country within world politics. However, it not only refers to a specific country: foreign policy is complicated by including different countries, states and organizations. For instance, according to Bennet,

*US NATO allies were an enormous help to the US in its intervention in Afghanistan and the military intervention in and occupation of Afghanistan, which had the approval of the [United Nations] UN Security Council and was the first time that NATO as an alliance engaged in combat under the Article 5 provision of mutual assistance in the event of an attack on a NATO member (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

In terrorist attacks and wars, institutions or organizations such as NATO can provide support and assistance to member states. This, in turn, can cause a single terrorist incident or war to be extended to other countries. Sometimes they can force different countries to confront and deal with international terrorism or war. Institutions and organizations have great power and can enforce strict rules on member states when dealing with a crisis. While states definitely benefit from membership, they may also have to make political, social, or economic sacrifices to help other member countries in times of crisis.



Terrorism may not be restricted to a specific geography and can become a major problem that concerns more than one country. As seen in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, NATO allies and the UK had to grapple with substantial financial problems, and EU countries such as Germany, Belgium, and France found themselves targets of terrorism. For instance, Bennet (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019) gives an example of this situation by arguing that the US' NATO allies took casualties in Afghanistan and faced ongoing costs of deploying there, and those who contributed troops to the occupation of Iraq (such as the UK) faced high costs there as well.

With terrorism becoming an international problem, physical boundaries between states have become insignificant and much larger masses are affected by terrorism. Physical borders begin to lose their effects when larger populations become the target of different forms of terrorism. It also becomes more difficult to scope out the dates and places of potential terrorist attacks of international terrorist organizations.

In addition to this, terrorism also has a socio-economic and socio-cultural context, including internal and external dynamics that are relevant to the security intelligence process within a state or among states (A. Kart, personal communication, December 10, 2018).

The fact that the 2000s marked the start of an aggravated terrorism problem and that a strong country such as the US was attacked on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 created an extraordinary movement in the world and in diplomacy. When viewed from this angle, institutional responses to terrorism and counterterrorism strategies need to be well established, organized, and as effective as possible to provide peace and order in society and prevent potential terrorist threats. Immediate responses should also be organized and carried out in the best way to replace the deteriorated structure and bring order as soon as possible after any attack.

## **5.2 Institutional Responses to Terrorism**

People and institutions need to take certain precautions against general threats that can be encountered in daily life. These threats may include epidemics, natural disasters, or terrorist incidents and their severity may vary. When a state's defense mechanism against terrorist threats is evaluated, institutional responses should be analyzed within existing legal rules and the political culture of the state.

There are numerous factors, therefore, which might affect general discussions relevant to a terrorist attack in any society. Considering the political and institutional structures of a state, discussions about political structure, attitudes of the political figures and the work of the state institutions should be clear and solution oriented. Dialogue among political parties in the parliament, discussions on good governance, the rule of law of a state, and human rights interaction between the national government and other local communities should be priority topics to solve any sort of problems about terrorism (J. Fromm, personal communication, March 30, 2019).

The governing authorities should be able to deal with the consequences of events by protecting the lives of their citizens during any emergency situation (Anderson, 2016). Local and national authorities should create effective responses to all the threats that people face on a daily basis. From this perspective, this study analyzed institutional responses to terrorist attacks in Istanbul and London by categorizing findings into short-term institutional responses (immediate responses) and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies.

### **5.2.1 Short-term institutional responses**

Short-term responses aim at solving the problem that has occurred as a result of any sort of incident as soon as possible. The general content of the short-term

institutional responses involves incident response units, security forces, emergency services, first aid, and coordination of communication and transportation.

Local and national responses to terrorism have a significant impact on the fight against terrorism, since terrorism may have more destructive effects than the threats faced in daily life. According to Pearce, short-term institutional responses which must be governed as the most effective action in a limited time are also called immediate responses (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).

Moreover, Pearce emphasized that the immediate response after any terrorist attack should have a clear problem-solving approach within a limited timeframe with the help of relevant resources (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019). To understand the contents and effects of immediate responses, the reactions of the public to these responses should be well considered and understood. To understand both shorter and longer societal responses of society to institutional responses, it is worth considering the immediate responses of people who are caught up in it, because it provides some clues about human behavior and psychology.

Institutional responses of a state to terrorist attacks aim at solving problems related to eliminating vulnerability to terrorism, protection of citizens, survivors, and their families by producing short-term and long-term plans.

### **5.2.2 Long-term institutional responses / counterterrorism strategies**

Beside short-term institutional responses, there are long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies that play an important role in preventing or controlling a terrorist attack. There is a need to define and evaluate the long-term institutional responses to understand this study clearly.

Long-term institutional responses should be evaluated carefully to prevent future conflicts or to produce permanent solutions to any sort of threat. In the process of prevention of terrorism, long-term strategies should consider demographical, economic, political, and cultural notions that underlie the terrorism itself (National Research Council, 2002). Long-term institutional responses have a broader structure than short-term responses, including social, political, and economic issues simultaneously, due to the complexity of the problems of terrorism.

Counterterrorism strategies remain a top priority issue to provide security and to prevent any sort of terrorist threats which may include bombings, suicide bombings, nuclear weapons, biological, or chemical threats. In a state, the national security system and the government in charge mostly dominate conversations in terms of intelligence, while the police work more on active operations. The production and management of anti-terrorist strategies is another important issue that needs to be addressed in addition to institutional responses to terrorism.

States may make mistakes in their management of the fight against terrorism both politically and socially due to the complexity and fluidity in the aims of terrorist groups or the structure of terrorist attacks. In anti-terrorism strategies, the aim is not to catch and neutralize terrorists, but rather to prevent terrorism in the long term and develop strategies accordingly. According to Bennet (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019), the basic mistakes are using force in ways that create more terrorist recruits than the number of terrorists taken out by military operations, and, in comparison to the military effort, allocating too few resources to social and economic approaches to ending terrorism. It has been almost 20 years since the September 11 attacks and the West still has no effective and coordinated political

approach to countering the propaganda that terrorist organizations distribute (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019). Bennet adds:


*We have become very good at finding and killing terrorist leaders, but we are still not good at deterring or persuading potential sympathizers and recruits to terrorist groups” (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

Therefore, instead of eliminating “terrorist leaders” in the short run, anti-terrorist strategies require understanding the causes of terrorism, producing strategies, and taking steps to prevent terrorism.

So, it should be emphasized that institutional responses, counterterrorism strategies and legislation should work together to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce radicalization in a state by eliminating the recruitment of sympathizers of terrorism. Education and persuasion should be used to prevent them getting involved in any sort of terrorist group, or using legal action where possible.

### Average number of fatalities per terrorist attack

The average number of fatalities per terrorist attack is simply calculated as the number of fatalities from terrorist incidents in a given year divided by the number of attacks.



*Graph 4. Average Number of Fatalities per Terrorist Attack in Turkey and the UK between 1970 and 2017. This figure shows that Turkey's average number of fatalities per terrorist attack is higher than the UK's (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).*

Graph 4 shows the average number of fatalities per terrorist attack in Turkey and the UK between 1970 and 2017. Generally, it seems that Turkey's average number of fatalities per terrorist attack is higher than the UK's. The average number of fatalities per terrorist attack in the UK has tended to decrease since 2005, while the average number of fatalities per terrorist attack in Turkey has tended to increase, although with fluctuations year-by-year.

Within these research contexts, the 21<sup>st</sup> century has brought much internal confusion, chaos, and war, bringing terror, the Iraq War, September 11 attacks and other terrorist incidents in various parts of the world. Within the framework of security, various revisions to short- and long-term responses and counterterrorism strategies have been attempted. Terrorism has now clearly ceased to be a problem of a single state or region and has become an event that anyone, anywhere in the world can experience.

Terrorist attacks are increasing in the UK and Turkey. This suggests that counterterrorism strategies are not keeping pace with the evolution of terrorist organizations; there are failings in the systems to counter terrorism and certainly scope for improvement. Analyzing the terror attacks in Istanbul and Turkey may help to uncover lessons to help improve both short- and long-term strategies, if any.

The next chapter provides information about the general framework of terrorism in Turkey. Chapters 7 and 8 analyze the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks from institutional and victims' perspectives, respectively.

## 6 Terrorism in Turkey

### 6.1 Overview

For decades, Turkey has struggled with ethnic separatist terror and has faced a domestic threat from the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan; Kurdistan Worker's Party) since the late 1970s (BBC, 2006). More recently, alongside various European countries and the US, Turkey has been a target of global Islamic terrorism from Islamist-Jihadist international terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (also known as ISIL, "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant").


Turkey's fight against terrorism needs careful examination within these two categories of international and domestic terrorism. However, with Turkey, it is difficult to analyze causes and effects of terrorist attacks, as unconnected domestic and international terror attacks are carried out simultaneously during the same period. Moreover, each terrorist attack is complex in its relationship with society. According to Kongar (as cited in Turkish Bar Association, 2006), internal and external terrorist attacks – which might have different causes, arising from different social and political problems in Turkey – should be identified by considering the unique structure of each terrorist attack.

Graph 5 indicates the number of terrorist incidents that took place in Turkey between 1970 and 2017.



## Number of terrorist incidents

The total number of terrorism-related incidents per year. The source defines a terrorist attack as: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors; data does not include acts of state terrorism.




*Graph 5. Number of Terrorist Incidents in Turkey between 1970 and 2017. This figure shows peaks in the 1990s and again between 2010 and 2017 (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).*

Graph 5 shows that the number of terrorist incidents increased in the early 1990s, then remained at a relatively low level until 2010, but then increased again and reached its highest level in 2016. It is particularly interesting, therefore, to research what kind of institutional responses and anti-terrorism strategies have been followed and how this map against the peaks and leveling of incidents. In the framework of these questions, there is also a need to consider the consequences of these attacks in terms of the average number of fatalities per incident, as shown in Graph 6.

## Average number of fatalities per terrorist attack

The average number of fatalities per terrorist attack is simply calculated as the number of fatalities from terrorist incidents in a given year divided by the number of attacks.

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*Graph 6. Average Number of Fatalities per Terrorist Attack in Turkey between 1970 and 2017. This figure shows a decreasing average number of fatalities per terrorist attack in Turkey between 1992 and 2000 (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).*

Graph 6 shows a decreasing average number of fatalities per terrorist attack in Turkey between 1992 and 2000, although with some fluctuations. In 2003, there was a peak in the average number of fatalities. The graph shows the average numbers of fatalities per attack in 2013 and 2016 were not particularly low, but was not as high as in 1986, 1992, and 2003.

Graphs 5 and 6 together provide a macro perspective of the problem of terrorism in Turkey, in terms of the number of terrorist incidents, by showing the importance of the problem in terms of numbers and years. The increase in number of terrorist attacks and average number of fatalities per terrorist attack need to be evaluated in detail to understand to what extent Turkey has been successful in combating terrorism. As can be seen from these charts, terrorism in Turkey has an important history. Turkey has been fighting both domestic and foreign terrorism for many years. As a country that often experiences terrorism, and that has experienced many losses due to these frequent terrorist events, Turkey's institutional structure and functioning in the event of the 2003 Istanbul attacks are of great social significance for research.

A general portrait of terrorism in Turkey has been drawn above. In the next section, the terrorist attacks in Istanbul in 2003 are described.

## **6.2 Terrorist Attacks in Istanbul 2003**

The year 2003 was a turning point for Turkey in terms of renewing counterterrorism strategies and institutional responses of the government because of Al-Qaeda's brutal terrorist attacks in Istanbul. A terrorist cell with links to Al-Qaeda killed at least 57 people and wounded an estimated 700 in Istanbul by using ammonium nitrate-based vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices<sup>2</sup> (VBIEDs). Two simultaneous suicide attacks were committed against synagogues on November 15<sup>th</sup>,

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<sup>2</sup> Definition of "*improvised explosive device*:" Improvised explosive device (IED), a homemade bomb, constructed from military or nonmilitary components, that is frequently employed by guerrillas, insurgents, and other nonstate actors as a crude but effective weapon against a conventional military force. When used as roadside bombs, IEDs can interdict lines of communication, disrupt traffic, and damage or destroy targeted vehicles. Sometimes entryways or entire structures are booby-trapped with IEDs to kill or injure anyone (such as a squad of soldiers) entering the premises (Mansoor, 2018).

2003, and two more near-simultaneous suicide attacks were committed against British targets on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003 (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

At 09:29 on Saturday, November 15<sup>th</sup>, a suicide bombing was carried out using an ammonium-nitrate-based VBIED in front of Istanbul's largest synagogue, the Neve Shalom Synagogue, located in the district of Beyoğlu. The facade of the building was destroyed, and its foyer was littered with twisted metal and shattered glass. A crater of about 6 ½ feet in depth was left in front of the synagogue, in which body parts were scattered. The windows of buildings within a distance of 200 meters on the same street were shattered and those within a distance of about 100 meters on surrounding streets were damaged. In total, 70 buildings were seriously damaged, and 16 buildings sustained moderate damage (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

The next explosion occurred at 09:30 at the Beth Israel Synagogue, while an estimated 300 people were worshipping there. Beth Israel Synagogue, located in the district of Şişli, is about five kilometers from Neve Shalom Synagogue. The explosion also left a large crater in the street and smashed the windows of surrounding buildings. At least 27 people lost their lives and another 300 were wounded in these two bomb attacks. However, only six immediate deaths were reported inside the synagogues because worshippers were protected by the structures' strong walls. Instead, most of the casualties were Muslims outside the synagogues, many of whom were killed or injured by the flying glass and the fragments of masonry and automobiles. (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

On November 20<sup>th</sup>, at 10:55, terrorists from the same cell exploded a VBIED in front of the HSBC building in Istanbul's Levent district. The bomber was reported to

have parked his car in front of the building and waited for cars stopping at the traffic light before exploding the VBIED (BBC, 2003). The explosion destroyed the facade of the building and the first two stories, shattered windows of both the HSBC building and the nearby structures, caused a fire in the HSBC building, and opened a crater of about 3-meter depth in the street (Rodoplu et al., 2004).

Another bomb attack occurred at 11:00 in front of the British Consulate, located about eight kilometers from the HSBC building and 400 meters from the Neve Shalom Synagogue. The bomber was reported to have driven his truck, disguised as a food delivery vehicle, to the Consulate's gates. Although the outer wall of the Consulate absorbed much of the blast, two gatehouses were destroyed. The explosion, which left a three-meter deep crater, badly damaged at least six buildings, and caused minor damage to another 38 (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). Roger Short, The British Consul General was one of those killed on that day.

Table 3


*Dates and Places of Istanbul 2003 Terrorist Attacks*

| <u>Dates of the Terrorist Attacks</u> | <u>Hour</u> | <u>Place</u>               |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------|
| 15 November 2003                      | 09:29       | Neve Shalom Synagogue      |
| 15 November 2003                      | 09:30       | Beth Israel Synagogue      |
| 20 November 2003                      | 10:55       | HSBC Building              |
| 20 November 2003                      | 10:55       | British Consulate Building |

There are various arguments as to why Turkey was a target of terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda may have targeted Turkey due to its secular government structure. However, according to Cagaptay (2003), Turkey is one of Al-Qaeda's targets, not only because it is governed with a secular political structure, but also because the country is an ally of the US and the UK.

The terrorist attacks in Istanbul appeared in the media and all British newspapers (Deutsche Welle, 2003). The attacks on the British Consulate increased anxiety in British society and raised concerns over whether there would be attacks in the UK.

The following images, (Image 1) provide a photo essay of the cultural and societal impact of the November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003 terror attack on the HSBC building and surrounding area.






*Image 1. HSBC Building in Levent District. These images show the building in all its splendor, without damage, and were taken in October 2018, while the building was being restored and developed into a hotel (Photos: Baturay Yurtbay).*





*Image 2. Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi – İSKİ). The building of Istanbul Water and Sewerage<sup>3</sup> is located near the HSBC building and provides water to a huge part of the Beşiktaş region (Photo: Baturay Yurtbay).*

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<sup>3</sup> Istanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (İstanbul Su ve Kanalizasyon İdaresi – İSKİ): Established in 1981 with the İSKİ Law No. 2560, İSKİ is an independent budget organization affiliated to Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. In İSKİ, where the Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor is also the Chairman of the Board, the Metropolitan Municipality Council forms the General Assembly of the Administration. İSKİ has 150 water tanks in Istanbul. İSKİ water tank located in Beşiktaş is one of the largest water tanks in Istanbul.



*Image 3. Downtown Levent, Where the HSBC Building is Located. This image shows the nearby residences and small and large businesses, where people would be affected by the explosion. The left tall building is ISKI. The middle building is the HSBC building. On right tall building is the “Metrocity” shopping center (Photo: Baturay Yurtbay).*




*Image 4. The Crossroads between Levent Carşı and the Main “Büyükdere Street” Very Close to the HSBC Building. This figure shows how busy the area is on a typical day, so that many people would have been in the area on the day of the explosion (Photo: Baturay Yurtbay).*



*Image 5. A Photo Taken near the HSBC Building. This figure shows 3–4 hours after the terrorist attack at around 14:00 November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci<sup>3</sup>).*

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<sup>3</sup> Born in 1966 in Istanbul, Reyhan Erkenci graduated from the Department of Economics. She then went on to graduate in Business Administration from the Faculty of Political Sciences at Istanbul University in 1996. She worked in the private sector and left the automotive sector in 2009. She became interested in photography in the late 1990s. First discovering Ara Guler and then Magnum photographers, she devoted all her time and resources outside of work to her photographs. Her works on both photographic techniques and philosophy of photography eventually focused on the documentary aspect of photography and she worked mostly in black and white. She has been involved in several photo interview projects and won a scholarship from the "Photography Foundation." She filmed a documentary of children performing hip hop in various parts of Istanbul and tried to document public demonstrations and social events. Three of her photographs were exhibited at the group exhibition "Three Generations of Turkey" in Tabriz in 2004.





*Image 6. A Photo Taken near the HSBC Building. This photo shows 3–4 hours after the terrorist attack at around 14:00 November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 7. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the damage to the HSBC building inflicted by the explosion. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 8. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the situation of the HSBC building in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 9. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the situation of the Levent in the aftermath of the terrorist attack. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*





*Image 10. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the horror of terrorism incidents and the impact on citizens and society (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 11. On the Day of HSBC Explosion November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the horror of terrorist incidents and the impact on citizens and society (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 12. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the damaged HSBC building after the terrorist attack in Levent. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*





*Image 13. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the damaged HSBC building after the terrorist attack in Levent. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 14. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the damaged HSBC building after the terrorist attack in Levent. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 15. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. These figures show the damaged HSBC building after the terrorist attack in Levent. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*





*Image 16. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003. This figure shows the horror of terrorism incidents and the impact on society in Levent (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



*Image 17. On the Day of HSBC Explosion, November 20th, 2003. This figure shows the situation of people and emergency services. (Photo: Reyhan Erkenci).*



For Turkey, which has often suffered significant human losses and also material losses from domestic terrorism, the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks caused shocking scenes for both the country and the world. The terrorist attacks in the busiest parts of the city left questions about the effectiveness of short- and long-term institutional responses, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. These attacks exposed Turkey's vulnerability to terror both in Istanbul and in other cities around the world.

Chapter 7 presents an analysis of Turkey's short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies to address the Istanbul 2003 terrorist attacks.



## **7 Institutional Responses to Terrorism: Istanbul 2003 Terrorist Attacks**

### **7.1 Overview**

In the previous chapter, terrorism in Turkey was briefly introduced, and the Istanbul 2003 terrorist attacks were described. This chapter focuses on institutional responses to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, distinguishing between short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. The chapter thus addresses the first research question, RQ1: what were the institutional responses of Turkey to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks during and after the incident?

### **7.2 Short-term Institutional Responses**

Short-term responses include all actions that are carried out as soon as a terrorist incident occurs. For the Istanbul 2003 terrorist attacks, these short-term institutional responses are discussed below, including emergency services (EMS), communication among people and state institutions responsible for the short-term responses, identification of victims, and security measures taken after the terrorist attacks. These themes were retrieved from primary and secondary sources.

#### **7.2.1 Emergency services**

Most of the injured victims had “secondary blast injuries” and a minority of injured victims had “primary blast injuries” after the four attacks in Istanbul (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). Analysis of the hospitalization procedures and how the injured were admitted suggests that these processes were not managed well.

It was difficult to effectively coordinate allocation and transportation of injured persons to hospitals and Istanbul’s EMS due to poor communication and coordination (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). The EMS

had no effective surveillance system during the attacks, which caused problems allocating survivors to various hospitals (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). Victims were directed to government hospitals, which have sufficient medical facilities, more emergency beds, and the resources for mass casualties (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). The hospitals close to the attack sites were quickly overrun with victims soon after the incidents, while other hospitals further away were used less effectively (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

However, in the case of the Neve Shalom and Beth Israel Synagogue attacks, 76 of the estimated 328 total injured were taken to the American Hospital (AH), while just 46 were taken to Taksim Education and Research State Hospital, which was adjacent to the synagogues and had a 300-bed government level 1 trauma center with 15 ED beds (Rodoplu et al., 2005).

After the Consulate bombing, EMS sent 50 ambulances to the scene but many of the ambulances had problems finding the site of the incident (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). According to Rodoplu et al. (2004, p. 142), there were other issues contributing to inefficient hospitalization of casualties on November 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>, such as:

1. Inability of Istanbul police to immediately control security at the bomb sites
2. Inefficient on-site command and control at the bomb sites
3. All available ambulances were sent to the bomb sites by the 1-1-2 EMS (many were not needed)
4. Little medical triage by EMS at the bomb sites
5. Lack of coordination between allocation of casualties and hospital capacity to provide emergency aid

Finally, at least one report indicates that emergency responders entered all four incident sites without wearing personal protective equipment – despite the strong smell of ammonia in the air – and without robust security sweeps for secondary devices (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

### **7.2.2 Communication**

Communication was a problem during all four terrorist attacks. The lack of communication and inaccurate information flow caused panic and anxiety for people searching for loved ones.

The lack of publicly available information caused people to seek accurate information on missing loved ones from the hospitals (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). As news spread of each attack, people across Istanbul tried to call family members and friends. As a result of the call overload, city telephone lines and cellular mobile phone systems failed (Rodoplu et al., 2004). Moreover, on November 15<sup>th</sup>, people could not access the emergency phone line for about six to eight hours (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

Various rumors, such as the possibility of further explosions, began to circulate because of the lack of information about the terrorist attacks (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). With the lack of reliable information flow, unproven claims about the incidents began to surface immediately, quickly causing panic and fear, which increased still further with the failed phone systems.

### **7.2.3 Identification of victims**

This lack of communication also hindered victims from being identified properly. Government emergency units could not effectively provide personal details

of the victims and this inefficiency led to poor long-term communication between the government and victims, that is with the people most likely to need help after the terrorist attacks.

Another problem in identifying the injured arose because many survivors had lost their identification cards during and after the terrorist attacks. Similarly, serious problems arose in the process of identifying the deceased due to lost identification cards (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

#### **7.2.4 Security measures taken after the terrorist attacks**

Providing security and directing wounded people should be a priority for the immediate response to a terrorist attack. With the November 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, managing wounded people, and police operations experienced difficulties providing security and order.

When the attacks in Istanbul happened, it was reported that there were injured people trapped in the rubble (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). A rescue operation should have been launched immediately. Instead, this was delayed so that people were trapped in rubble longer than necessary, with no idea what to do or when they might be rescued. Late intervention may have aggravated fear and anxiety and slowed down future physical and psychological recovery processes.

Immediately following both sets of attacks (November 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>), bystanders reportedly began searching for injured survivors trapped in the rubble (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). However, Istanbul police did not begin to establish a security perimeter at any of the incident sites until at least 15 minutes after the attacks began (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism

Threat Analysis Group, 2008). During these intervals, many “walking wounded” left the scenes on their own to seek medical assistance at local hospitals and clinics without being documented or giving statements (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). Volunteers, onlookers, and the media were also able to move through incident sites, complicating the already difficult situations (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008).

There are, however, several reasons why the police had difficulty securing the sites and problems which made their operations more difficult. For instance, the police were hindered from securing the area due to people taking their cars and driving to try to find their loved ones (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau Terrorism Threat Analysis Group, 2008). Widespread communication outages prompted members of the public to drive to the incident sites to search for loved ones, increasing the number of people and cars at or near the sites. The streets around the attack sites, particularly the two synagogues, became bottlenecks, which prevented police from quickly gaining access. Pre-existing traffic conditions on November 20<sup>th</sup> also contributed to emergency responder difficulties in reaching the sites in a timely manner (BBC, 2003).

Unfortunately, there is also evidence that the police force lacked sufficient experienced and authoritative actors to manage the crisis. Police turnover data indicates that experienced senior police officers had been replaced by new ones and this affected the decision-making process and management of mass casualties (Rodoplu et al., 2004). The experience level of police and their ability to apply information skills during the November 15<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul is, therefore, questionable. During crisis management, the responsible actors should be well-informed and well-experienced in the problem. The crisis and potential consequences of a particular type of incident should have been assessed and planned for well beforehand. Such planning

of concrete solutions by experienced authoritative actors becomes crucial in such crises. Moreover, the concept of establishing Incident Command Posts was still relatively new in Istanbul during this time, which complicated the joint response effort (Erdogan & Iskender, 2007).

#### **7.2.5 Conclusion: short-term institutional responses**

Emergency services, communication, identification of survivors, and implementing security measures were the main short-term institutional responses after the explosions in Istanbul in 2003. Whether these short-term responses were effective is difficult to conclude on based on official reports. Reports and academic articles mainly focus on the problems that surfaced after the 2003 terrorist attacks and appear to ignore actions and procedures that went well. Weaknesses have been identified regarding all four short-term responses, but there are no reports of successes, which may present a bias in the available sources. However, police were hindered by people searching for loved ones, communication systems failed and the level of experience of police on the scene may have contributed to delays.

When the structure and functioning of short-term institutional responses to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks were examined, and official reports and academic studies were analyzed, significant issues and concerns were raised. It was found that there were significant structural and functional problems within the short-term responses such as:

1. Ineffective coordination between the hospitals and Istanbul's EMS
2. Ineffective information flow and insufficient coordination between the public and services at the terrorist attack sites

3. Growing panic and anxiety of people searching for loved ones and the failure of city telephone lines and cellular mobile phone systems because of call overload
4. Ineffective identification of victims

However, as stated earlier, the academic studies and reports on the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks mostly discussed problems and failures in the structure and functioning of the short-term responses. Focusing only on these problems might be misleading for drawing a general conclusion on the short-term responses. It is also necessary to look at the positive aspects of the four points above, which have sometimes been overlooked in official reports.

The lack of a written academic resources reporting on effective short-term institutional responses makes it difficult to generalize about their structure and functioning immediately following the attacks. To obtain more detailed information, interview data would be valuable from people involved in the emergency services, hospitals, and police forces. However, these were missing from official reports and academic literature, so this study has only been able to evaluate the structure and functioning of short-term responses using the information available.

RQ1 asked what the institutional responses of Turkey were to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, during and after the incident. The analysis above answers this in part by identifying problems during short-term institutional responses during and immediately after the terrorist attacks. However, there may be a bias on reporting so that it is not possible to definitively conclude on the effectiveness or success of the short-term institutional responses, although there is obviously scope for improvement.



### **7.3 Long-term Institutional Responses and Counterterrorism Strategies**

After the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, Turkey's counterterrorism strategies and long-term responses and whether they had been followed effectively were heavily debated. This section discusses the themes, debates and facts that have come to the fore since the attacks related to long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies.

Firstly, the main institutions participating in Turkey's counterterrorism strategies are examined. Secondly, anti-terror law is discussed, together with a definition of terrorism. Thirdly, other legislations are identified. The operations of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) against terrorism are described with examples, and the reform packages used to reach Turkey's EU accession are discussed. Finally, Turkey's international cooperation in the fight against terrorism is presented.

#### **7.3.1 Institutions in Turkey's counterterrorism process**

The main units responsible for counterterrorism in Turkey are the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense. There are also four main departments in charge of counterterrorism. These four departments play key roles in countering terrorism within the Directorate General of Security. These departments are the Department of Counterterrorism and Operations, Department of Intelligence, Department of Special Forces, and Department of Witness Protection.

In addition, the Turkish National Police (TNP), the Gendarmerie General Command, the Coast Guard Command, and the National Intelligence Agency constitute the operational framework of the counterterrorism process. These latter four

departments are responsible for providing information to the Interior Ministry (OSCE POLIS Country Profile: Turkey).

The TNP plays a significant role in combating terrorism within the General Directorate of Security in Turkey. The responsibilities of the police are indicated in the Law on Duties and Powers of the Police. The most important responsibilities of the police are providing public order, security, and guarantee of property by detecting offenders and preventing crimes (International Police Cooperation on Counterterrorism (CT) in Turkey, n.d.).

The Intelligence Department of the TNP is responsible for collecting information, conducting analysis, and producing intelligence by supporting the counterterrorism department (International Police Cooperation on Counterterrorism (CT) in Turkey, n.d.). TNP in CT department is also responsible for managing CT investigations together with prosecution (International Police Cooperation on Counterterrorism (CT) in Turkey, n.d.).

### **7.3.2 Anti-terror law and definition of terrorism**

To prevent terrorist attacks and minimize their negative effects, it is important to have a well-functioning state rule of law mechanism. According to Bennet (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019), the number of attacks has been affected as much by the quality of each country's intelligence and law enforcement efforts as by any other initiatives. All citizens should know that law is the space of assurance and this is the first step in the war against terrorism.

The main document on counterterrorism in Turkey is the "Law on the Fight Against Terrorism" (also known as the Anti-terror Law) issued in 1991 (Act. Nr. 3713). According to Aytar (as cited in Demirsu, 2015), the most important feature of this

document is its establishment of powerful executive tools for the state and society. This document emphasizes that Turkey mainly deals with the issue of terrorism within the framework of state security.

The Law on the Fight Against Terrorism Act. Nr. 3713, 1991, is divided into five main parts. In the first part, the definitions of terrorism, terrorist offender, and terrorist offenses are defined. There are also sub-sections on rules and punishments for terrorist organizations and financing of terrorism.

In the first part of the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism, Article 1 defines what a terrorist act is as follows:

*Any criminal action conducted by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, the political, legal, social, secular, or economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, jeopardizing the existence of the Turkish state and the Republic, enfeebling, destroying, or seizing the state authority, eliminating basic rights and freedoms, damaging the internal and external security of the state, the public order, or general health, is defined as terrorism (Law on the Fight Against Terrorism, Act Nr. 3713, Article 1).*

Article 2 of the Law defines “terrorist offenders” as follows:

*...any person who, as a member of an organization pursuing the objectives of Article 1, commits a crime in the pursuit of these objectives or commits not this crime, if it belongs to the*

*terrorist organization it is thus defined like terrorist offender*  
(*Law on the Fight Against Terrorism, Act Nr. 3713, Article 2*).

In recent years, however, the definition of terrorism has proved inadequate to explain which crimes should be considered terror crimes and which should not. Therefore, the context of terrorism has remained vague without a clear definition following specific and rational rules. The terms “any criminal action” or “aim of changing the attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution” and other elements are too vague and do not approach an effective definition of terrorism. In brief, Turkey has struggled to find a relevant definition of terrorism that identifies clearly which crimes should be considered as terrorist crimes.

In part 2 of the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism (Act. Nr. 3713, 1991), criminal procedures, such as procedures of investigation and trial, and period of detention are explained. Part 3 includes execution of sentences and part 4 is about miscellaneous provisions. Finally, part 5 comprises temporary rules in dealing with the crimes.

Table 4

*Law on the Fight Against Terrorism in Turkey (Anti-terror Law), (Act. Nr. 3713, 1991, amended, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010)*

| <u>Parts</u>                                | <u>Topics</u>                                       |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Part One: Definition and Terrorist Offenses | Definition of Terrorism                             |
|                                             | Terrorist offender                                  |
|                                             | Terrorist offenses                                  |
|                                             | Offenses committed with terrorist aims              |
|                                             | Aggravation of sentences                            |
|                                             | Announcement and publication                        |
|                                             | Terrorist organizations                             |
|                                             | Financing of terrorism                              |
| Part Two: Criminal Procedure                | Aggravating circumstances                           |
|                                             | Designation of competence and jurisdiction          |
|                                             | Procedure of investigation and trial                |
|                                             | Period of detention                                 |
|                                             | Non-disclosure of the identities of informants      |
| Part Three: Execution of Sentences          | Appointment of a defense lawyer                     |
|                                             | Execution of sentences and holding arrested persons |
|                                             | Conditional release                                 |
| Part Four: Miscellaneous Provisions         | Construction of prisons and detention centers       |
|                                             | Rewarding                                           |
| Part Five: Temporary Provisions             | Protective Measures                                 |

The Anti-terror Law in Turkey and the Penal Law (which is also associated with the Anti-terror Law) include broad and ambiguous definitions of many concepts and topics (Freedom House, 2016). Terrorist actions include the crimes defined in criminal law; however, these crimes are not clearly named as terrorist crimes (Commission Report of the Ministry of Interior, 2006).

The Anti-terror Law considers changing or destroying the basic structure of the state through creating panic and fear as a terrorist crime. This vaguely defined concept of terrorism raises the question of what type of crime induces panic and fear (Commission Report of the Ministry of Interior, 2006).

Turkey's definition of terrorism is very broad. The definition includes "crimes against constitutional order and internal and external security of the state" (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Turkey: Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019). According to Doğan (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018), crimes of terror need defining carefully. This definition should also consider preventive measures that need to be established (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018). Terrorist criminals should be judged on their crimes and punishments should be stricter than currently (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018). To effectively implement legal rules in the process of combating terrorism, the concepts and explanations of terrorism must be clear in the legal context (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018).

According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the principle of legality implies that offenses and sentences must be clearly defined and the use of uncertain criteria in the interpretation of a legislative provision may lead to incompatibility with the principle of the law (Insan Hakları Derneği (IHD), n.d.). In

Turkish criminal courts, judges often resort to criminalization by way of Article 2. (Insan Hakları Derneği: IHD, n.d.).

The Turkish judicial system classifies two types of terrorist offenses: terrorism with certain offenses against the territorial integrity of the state and offenses committed for creating terror. The first type of terrorism is considered to be terrorist offenses per se, while the latter type of terrorism is committed by the terrorist organizations to achieve their objectives. The Anti-terror Law toughens the sanctions against terrorist offenses and offenses with terror purposes. It also stipulates several special rules of procedure and enforcement (IHD, n.d.).

Moreover, people who are not members of a terrorist organization but commit a crime on behalf of the organization are considered terrorist delinquents and de facto members of the terrorist organization. These articles, which are, in any case, ambiguous, do not provide any details as to the constituent elements of the infringement (IHD, n.d.).

After the Anti-terror Law was issued in 1991, five separate amendments were made in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, and 2010. The changes were aimed at balancing terrorism prevention and peoples' freedoms, as well as better ordering public structure.

In the amendment of 1999, regulations were made in relation to terror victims. Soldiers suffering disability or death because of terror attacks and their families were given compensation and a regular monthly income (Terörle Mücadele Kanununun Bir Maddesinde Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı ve Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu, 1/436). Under this amendment, wives and children can use state railways, seaway city lines, municipal public transport, and other private companies'

lines free of charge. This amendment was, thus, aimed at easing the daily lives and finances of the victims and their relatives.

The Ministry of Justice prepared the draft Law Amending Certain Articles of the Anti-terror Law on April 18<sup>th</sup>, 2006 in reaction to the needs of the Commission of Justice and Constitution and the EU accession process. According to the amendment, it was basically accepted that the terror problem constituted a critical issue in Turkey. However, no improvements in the conditions related to the prevention of terrorism were achieved from this amendment (Commission Report of the Ministry of Interior, 2006).

It should be emphasized that setting up rational, practical, and powerful rules of law and law enforcement is essential to provide a secure and peaceful environment in society. Nonetheless, terrorism cannot rely on a single law alone. Rules of law are defined legally, but they should be established in harmony with society by considering people's needs.

The 1991 Anti-terror Law was an important step for the development of anti-terrorism strategies in Turkey, but it also created significant problems. One was related to Article 8, which came into force during the administration of President Turgut Özal in 1991. Article 8 of the anti-terror law reads:

*Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, regardless of the methods, intentions, and ideas behind such activities. Those conducting such activities shall be punished with a sentence of between two- and five-years' imprisonment*



*and with a fine of between 50 million and 100 million Turkish liras. (Act No: 3713, 1991).*

Article 8 of the 1991 Anti-terror Law has caused various problems in terms of freedom of speech and freedom of meeting and demonstrations. This Article shows that meetings, assemblies, and demonstrations are considered a threat against the stability and order of the state and disregards the idea that these actions might constitute personal freedoms. As a result, there has been criticism over the vagueness of the law. Human Rights Watch (n.d.) reports that based on government statistics, 5,893 persons were arrested under provisions of the Anti-terror Law in 1995, and 2,861 persons have been convicted. In the first 10 months of 1996, 1,024 persons were in custody under the Anti-terror Law and 1,934 persons were suspects in such cases (Human Rights Watch, n.d.).

In terms of civil liberties, the Anti-terror Law also creates a number of political and social problems in Turkey. Abolishing Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law would provide more freedom of speech and, thus, open the possibility of more democratic governance in Turkey. This issue was considered in the amendment of 1995.

Expanding the range of crimes described as terrorist-related can, thus, result in a violation of civil rights and freedoms, and reminds us that there is a need to focus more on human rights in Turkey. There have been no permanent solutions for the fight against terrorism and the law has been unable to distinguish a clear line between terrorist and non-terrorist crimes. This lack of a clear law can lead to human rights violations and is an obstacle to solving the problem of terrorism from the root upwards.

However, debating human rights could delay a real solution to terrorism. There are various problems dealing with terrorism, and human rights issues are just a single part of this. Although this thesis does not deal specifically with the debate over

terrorism and human rights, it is possible to consider this debate as a factor that makes the war against terrorism more difficult in the long term. If this debate grows, it can undermine the structure and functioning of institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies.

The issue of terrorism is too complicated and multi-dimensional to solve with a single law (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018). Rather than attempting this, laws should be considered as one of several tools to solve the terrorism problem (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018). So, one of the biggest failures is to see terrorism as only a military and strategic issue, which can be solved only by making several amendments to the law. In sum, terrorism should not be seen as only a military/strategic or legal problem in Turkey. Doğan argues that:

*Terrorism has social, political, and economic dimensions that should not be undermined. It requires a comprehensive approach. (E. Doğan, personal communication, December 13, 2018).*

### **7.3.3 Other legislations**

In the legal framework, Turkey has made penal reforms and some revisions in criminal law including the Turkish Criminal Code No. 5271 and the Law on Enforcement of the Punishments and Security Measures No. 5275. These have been in force since 2005 as a product of modern criminal policy (Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2013).

On December 27<sup>th</sup> 2007, the Witness Protection Committee was established to protect and take care of the lives and properties of witnesses or families affected by terrorist acts (Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2013). In 2010, the Under Secretariat

for Public Order and Security was established to develop policies for combating terrorism (Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2013). The Law on the Prevention of Financing of Terrorism No. 6415 and the Assessment Commission on Freezing Assets were also established.



Table 5

*Other Relevant Legislation on Counterterrorism Strategies in Turkey*

| <u>Other Relevant Legislation</u>                                                      | <u>Date in Force</u>             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Law on the Prevention of Financing Terrorism No. 6415                                  | February 16 <sup>th</sup> , 2013 |
| Law on Compensation of Damages Arising from Terrorism and Combating Terrorism No. 5233 | July 27 <sup>th</sup> , 2004     |
| Law on Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime                                      | October 18 <sup>th</sup> , 2006  |

### 7.3.4 Working of GNAT

In the process of combating terrorism, parliament is, of course, one of the most important political bodies that manages and controls the situation. There is, therefore, a need to evaluate the general characteristics of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) because the primary elements that govern the fight against terrorism depend on the JDP, which has governed Turkey for almost 17 years. The JDP must first define Turkey's anti-terror strategies and then inform the GNAT, especially on solving terror-related problems.

Effective cooperation between state institutions and counterterrorism units can reduce the negative effects of terrorism. States also need to formulate new solutions and create new mechanisms at an institutional level to combat terrorism. According to Kart, the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> Period Member of Parliament from the Republican People's Party as well as a Member of the Constitution Conciliation Committee of Assembly (A. Kart, personal communication, December 10, 2018), the most important problems associated with combating terror are government structure, inefficient workings, and problematic cadres in GNAT. Kart says:

*I think the cadres at GNAT are not constituted based on the expertise of political actors. Therefore, the continuity of the state's constitutional institutions has been damaged. As a result, more terrorist attacks occur and the desired solution to terrorism cannot be achieved (A. Kart, personal communication, December 10, 2018).*

According to Ali İhsan Köktürk, an MP from the Republican People's Party from Zonguldak, and member of the Judiciary Commission, the war against terror in

Turkey is in the hands of the government (A. I. Köktürk, personal communication, January 15, 2019). Köktürk says: “Fighting against terror is like a ‘plastic ball’ in the hands of the JDP. It bounces to different places in different periods that have been directed by the policies of the JDP” (A. I. Köktürk, personal communication, January 15, 2019).

The process of trying to solve the problems of terrorism may sometimes be governed pragmatically. This increased level of pragmatism, however, can cause citizens to lose confidence over whether terrorist problems will be resolved, which reduces their trust in the government. All policies and counterterrorism strategies should be developed with the aim of finding permanent solutions rather than being a “save the day” policy. Moreover, every issue should be controlled by the GNAT.

It is also important in what contexts and how these anti-terror strategies are established. Rational anti-terrorist policies alone will not necessarily prevent a problem related to terrorism. Moreover, the main aim of anti-terrorist policies needs to be more solution-oriented, by including its aims in an accurate way. Kart comments on this issue: “Unfortunately, the government used the anti-terror process as a ‘political tool’ by limiting it to a specific period, as it did in other critical topics as well” (A. Kart, personal communication, December 10, 2018).

Kart's statement critical of Turkey's policies in the fight against terrorism. If the Turkish government adopts short-term terrorism-related policies to save the day, gain public support and win more votes, this may result in a lack of constructive longer-term counterterrorism policies.

If the Anti-terror Law aims to speed up the EU accession period, Turkey would seem to be losing this game. The necessary amendments on laws and provisions on

anti-terrorism should have been made for the sake of the state and society's security rather than trying to achieve membership of the EU. In brief, the issue should not be managed pragmatically (A. Kart, personal communication, December 10, 2018). In this framework, Turkey's counterterrorism strategies might be considered as being pragmatic rather than focusing on problem-solving.

Terrorism has socio-economic and socio-cultural dimensions, involving education, health, and economic policies. The concept of combating terrorism has not achieved national success in Turkey (Turkish Bar Association, 2006). One reason for the failure of counterterrorism strategies in Turkey has been the failure to adapt these strategies to socio-economic and cultural dimensions (Turkish Bar Association, 2006). The reason for this failure lies in the political powers' failure to understand terrorism and its impacts and their regarding terrorist incidents as temporary negative incidents. This might be better addressed if society had been effectively engaged in the process of seeking solutions to terrorism.

International terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda have made terrorism a significant problem in Turkey rather than temporary negative incidents (Turkish Bar Association, 2006). According to Kart (A. Kart, personal communication, December 10, 2018), the GNAT should work in an efficient way with harmony, brainstorming on counterterrorism; Kart emphasizes that social acceptance can be achieved by involving different parts of Turkish society in anti-terror strategies.

Moreover, problems connected with the coordination of internal security units and social problems such as internal migration and urbanization prevent public institutions from establishing a successful coordinated front against terrorism (Turkish Bar Association, 2016). Such social problems, in turn, facilitate terrorism in urban areas, causing an increase in the number of people affected by terrorism.

Turkey has a different kind of terrorism problem compared to other countries because it is simultaneously trying to put an end to both internal and international terror attacks. This makes the terror problem in Turkey difficult to solve, since internal and external dynamics need handling carefully. For this reason, solution-oriented domestic policies and effective international cooperation are important in seeking a solution to the problem of terrorism in Turkey.

### **7.3.5 Reform (harmonization) packages**

To understand Turkey's anti-terror strategies, the EU application should also be discussed. To join the EU, Turkey needed to shape laws to be consistent with the accession process. At the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was declared a candidate for EU membership; the European Council in 2002 announced that negotiations would begin on the condition that Turkey successfully fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria (Müftüler-Baç, 2005). As noted by the European Commission and the Council of Europe, Turkey had to make progress in counterterrorism laws and counterterrorism policies to join the EU (Demirsu, 2015). Turkey tried to provide political criteria for the EU through constitutional amendments, overhaul of basic legal codes and harmonization packages (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey, 2007).

Reform packages were prepared mainly for two reasons: to expedite the justice system and to provide improvements in human rights issues, freedom of speech, freedom of media and the judiciary judgment process (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı/Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation: TESEV, 2013). Eight harmonization packages were introduced between 2002 and 2004. The first was issued in February 2002 included 33 articles and four provision subjects. This package was mainly aimed at hastening procedures in state affairs and the justice system and reducing the responsibility of the courts. It enacted amendments to the Penal Code, the



Anti-terror Law, the Law on the Establishment of and Proceedings at the State Security Courts and the Code of Criminal Procedure in the framework of enlarged “freedom of expression,” “the reduction of pre-trial detention periods” and to “safeguard provisions of the rights of prisoners” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey, 2007, p. 5).

### **7.3.6 International cooperation in the fight against terrorism**

As a member of the UN, NATO, the CT Committee for the CoE, and Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Turkey: Country Reports on Terrorism for 2019), Turkey has been operating intense networks for countering terrorism. According to Ozyildiz (as cited in Cameron and Cameron, 2009), Turkish agencies investigate in a detailed perspective the link between organized crime and terrorist groups, so Turkey frequently emphasizes the significance of international cooperation as a priority to achieve.

Terrorist organizations currently have international networks and can support logistics in different countries thanks to technological developments and their ability to receive necessary information (Commission Report of the Ministry of Interior, 2006). This forces states to cooperate and coordinate with each other against potential terrorist actions. Turkey belongs to the UN conventions, protocols and the Council of Europe’s (CoE) two major elements: (a) cooperation with the UN Counterterrorism Committee; (b) preparation of its country reports with the respect to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in The report of Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER, 2013). Turkey operates mainly in cooperation with the UN, CoE, International Police Agency (INTERPOL), The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building

Measures in Asia (CICA) (International Police Cooperation on Counterterrorism (CT) in Turkey, n.d.)

Turkey also joined the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a temporary member in 2008, attended the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee in Istanbul and met counterterrorism coordinators of UNSC members in Istanbul (International Police Cooperation on Counterterrorism in Turkey). The Conference on Prevention of Terrorism: Tools, Legal Instruments and Their Implementation” was held in collaboration with the UN and the European Council. These were international attempts by Turkey under the framework of the UNSC to prevent future terror attacks.

The UNSC structure and developments within this organization over time are relevant to this research. The UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004) condemns any kind of terrorism and names terrorism as the most important threat against peace and security. It also calls on states to cooperate against terrorism. It demands that all states should become party to the relevant conventions and protocols in an emergency situation. The Security Council is the most powerful organ providing peace and security among member states within the UN. The UNSC includes five permanent members (the US, UK, China, Russia, and France) and 12 temporary members. The UNSC has an important responsibility to provide security through its permanent member states. Various resolution processes have taken place in different periods to achieve this aim.

Resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted by the Security Council on September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The Security Council approved condemnation of terrorist attacks that took place in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The Council also emphasized its determination to take precautions against these sorts of acts. The Security Council reaffirmed that these acts constitute a threat to peace and security at an international level. The Council reiterated its concerns about the increase

in acts of terrorism in many regions of the world, based on intolerance or extremism. It emphasized the importance of working together of states as soon as possible to prevent terrorist attacks (UNSC Resolution, 2001).

Furthermore, the UNSC also addressed the connection between international terrorism and organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and the movement of deadly materials (UNSC Resolution 1373, 2001). Moreover, UNSC Resolution 1624 confirmed the imperative to combat terrorism under the Charter of the United Nations. According to UNSC Resolution 1624: states must ensure that any precautions taken to fight against terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law and they should harmonize with international law by condemning of all acts of terrorism (irrespective of the motivation), which are considered one of the most important threats to peace and security. Finally, the resolution reaffirms the responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security.

Table 6

*UNSC Resolutions: Solutions in 2001, 2004, and 2005*UNSC Resolution 1373 (September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2001)

- 
- Condemnation of terrorism in 2001 in New York
  - Focusing on regions in which there is intolerance or extremism
  - Calling on states to enact international cooperation by taking measures to prevent terror attacks
  - Identifying links between international terrorism and organized crime
- 

UNSC Resolution 1566 (October 8<sup>th</sup>, 2004)

- 
- Declarations on condemning of every kind of terrorism, naming it as the most important threat against peace and security
  - Calling on all states to become party to the relevant conventions and protocols to prevent terror attacks
- 

UNSC Resolution 1624 (September 14<sup>th</sup>, 2005)

- 
- Confirmation of the imperative to combat terrorism
  - Defining the Security Council's role in the maintenance of international peace and security
-

### 7.3.7 Conclusion

There are many participating institutions and activities aiming to combat terrorism in Turkey in the long term: Turkey's counterterrorism strategies, anti-terror law, definitions of terrorism in Turkey, other counterterrorism legislations of GNAT, reform packages, Turkey's EU accession, and finally, Turkey's international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

However, studying these in detail highlights problems with Turkey's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies within the framework of the Istanbul 2003 terrorist attacks. There are important gaps in the Anti-terrorism Law, which forms the backbone of legal sanctions for anti-terrorism in Turkey. There is still a problem defining terrorism in a legal sense, and there are questions over which crimes are terrorism-related.

According to many academics and experts in the study of terrorism, the lack of a clear legal component in the fight against terrorism and terrorism-related crimes constitutes a huge problem. According to the results of key-informant interviews, Turkey has remained far away from taking radical steps to solve the problem of terrorism, having tried to solve it with a single law, when a multi-dimensional approach is required. Key-informant interviewees also noted the difficulty of working in harmony with GNAT, which hinders the fight against terrorism.

Other social problems exist in Turkey, such as internal and external migration, and problems caused by urbanization, which are also seen as factors indirectly leading to terrorism. Turkey is working in cooperation with the EU, UN, and various CoE, INTERPOL, and NATO in the fight against international terrorism. Terrorist organizations have technological advantages now, enabling working across national

boundaries. While an international approach is therefore what is needed now, this can introduce tensions between anti-terrorism activities at an international level and protecting the security of citizens nationally.

RQ1 asked what the institutional responses of Turkey were to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks during and after the incident. This question should be answered by focusing separately on short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counter terrorism strategies. When short-term institutional responses are analyzed, it is clear that there are some specific problems such as:

1. Ineffective allocation of survivors to various hospitals (emergency services)
2. Inefficient hospitalization of casualties (emergency services)
3. The lack of publicly available information (communication)
4. Unidentified victims (identification of victims)
5. Trapped injured people in the rubble (security measures taken after the terrorist attacks)
6. Late intervention and aggravation of fear and anxiety that slowed down physical and psychological recovery processes (security measures taken after the terrorist attacks)
7. Question about efficiency of police forces to be able to manage such a crisis (security measures taken after the terrorist attacks)

However, it is difficult to make a general conclusion about short-term institutional responses and to put all of them into single category. This is because primary sources and academic sources mostly focus on “problems” that emerged during

short-term institutional responses. There is also a lack of primary sources and reports on general short-term institutional responses.

When long-term institutional responses are analyzed within the framework of RQ1, various pieces of information were retrieved from key informant interviews, academic literature and international reports. As a result, the results were found below:

1. There is a significant division of labor in long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies of Turkey (Institutions in Turkey's counterterrorism process)
2. There is an inadequate definition of terrorist crimes which is mostly confused with other crimes (Anti-terror law and definition of terrorism).
3. There is excessive reliance on a single law for solving terrorism in Turkey (Anti-terror law and definition of terrorism).
4. People's need for rule of law for counter-terrorism strategies are not considered seriously (expanding the range of crimes described as terrorist-related can, thus, result in a violation of civil rights and freedom problems about human rights) (Anti-terror law and definition of terrorism).
5. There is ineffective coordination at GNAT (working of GNAT)
6. There is reliance on "save the day" policies rather than focusing on stable solutions (working of GNAT)

As a result, this indicates that Turkey's long-term responses to terrorism are inadequate and its counterterrorism strategies are not well-managed. Both have scope for significant improvement.

The following chapter will focus on victims' perceptions of short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies within the framework of Istanbul case.





## **8 Victims' Perceptions of Institutional Responses: Istanbul**

### **8.1 Overview**

In the previous chapter, it has been argued that some short-term institutional responses to the Istanbul terrorist attacks were problematic, and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks or protecting the public from the effects of such incidents. This evaluation of institutional responses emerged from an internal perspective of mechanisms of action and their successes. However, they may differ from evaluations from the perspective of victims.

This chapter focuses on perceptions of victims to institutional responses in the framework of the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks. The chapter thus addresses the second research question, RQ2: how do victims of the Istanbul terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses?

To collect data on the perceptions of victims regarding institutional responses, ten interviews were conducted with victims of the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, in Istanbul. In addition to this, interviews and statements of victims taken from newspaper articles published between 2004 and 2016 (*Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers) were critically examined as supportive sources to understand victims' perceptions overall. First, an analysis of the interviews conducted with victims in Istanbul is presented, and then an analysis of the interviews sourced from newspapers.

### **8.2 Victims' General Memories of the Terror Attacks**

Before looking at the victims' perceptions and ideas about institutional responses, an attempt was made to assess how much they remembered of the event and what details they commented on; this allowed an assessment of how the event was

located in their memories. Before asking victims about their perceptions of institutional responses, therefore, they were questioned on their general thoughts about the incident and how they remembered it. This elicited a general sense of what they experienced at the moment of the attack. Later in the interviews, perceptions of victims to institutional responses were elicited from a detailed perspective under the headings of:

1. Perceptions of victims to short-term institutional responses
2. Perceptions of victims to long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies

It is important to enquire into victims' memories about the terrorist attack, because in order to be able to obtain valid and reliable results about the perceptions of victims of short-term and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies, victims must have a certain degree of recollection of the terrorist attack. Since memory is used as a tool for strengthening validation of the research, it is first necessary to look at whether victims can remember the day of terrorist attacks, how they remember it as well as what they have forgotten.

When asked what they remembered from the terrorist attacks, all victims referred to the moment of the terrorist attack and their general feelings and thoughts about the attacks. A politician, born and bred in Levent and now 55 years old, said he remembered everything about the incident despite the many years that had passed since. He described the moment of the incident as follows:

*No one knew anything at first. At that time, I had a shop in Levent Market. First came a sound wave. Imagine all the windows in the surrounding buildings, houses, shops breaking at the same time. It was a terrible sound. Then came a warmth*

*and yellow smoke. But the smoke wasn't going up, it was surrounding us, it was rapidly enveloping us. We threw ourselves to the ground. That's when I saw all the windows at Metrocity<sup>4</sup> were broken because it was so easy to see from my shop. I've been through hell, I've seen it. People were covered in blood. There was blood everywhere, people's scalps, hair and body parts strewn everywhere.*

Another victim, an education consultant, 41 years old, said she entered the HSBC building to visit a friend, who worked there. She left the building just 20 minutes before the bombing. She said:

*As soon as I got in the taxi, there was an explosion. I remember being so scared.*

A businesswoman, 52 years old, worked in a building 20-25 meters across from the HSBC building. She described the moment of the incident as follows:

*Because my friends were uncomfortable with my smoking, I opened the window behind a divider in our work area to smoke a cigarette. I was holding the aluminum frame of the glass with one hand. That's when the explosion happened, and I can feel that frame shaking in my hand right now. Everyone was panicking, trying to figure out where the explosion was.*

A bank employee, 45 years old, said:

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<sup>4</sup> Metrocity is a shopping centre in Levent.

*Büyükdere Street<sup>5</sup>... I cannot explain that situation. The first thing I saw was a destroyed municipal bus and a Taksim-Sariyer van. As we got closer, people with blood on their faces, some crying, some shouting, some hysterical. And the horrifying scenes began, with someone sitting in a taxi with no more than half his head. The closer one got to the building; the more pieces of people were lying on the ground.*



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<sup>5</sup> Büyükdere Street (Büyükdere Avenue), is an avenue placed in the Şişli district, Beşiktaş (Levent) and Sarıyer (Maslak) (European Side of İstanbul)




*Image 18. Google Earth view of Levent region: This image shows Levent, a neighborhood on the European side of Istanbul. It is one of the main business districts of Turkey, but is part of Beşiktaş Municipality. Levent and nearby Maslak district feature Istanbul's skyscrapers, many business centers and attract attention with modern architecture.*

A 50-year-old victim who was working as a consultant close to the HSBC building was in an office meeting on the morning of the attack:

*All of a sudden, we heard a terrible explosion; [We] first thought it was [an]earthquake as we still remembered the earthquake from 1999 but then I realized, this wasn't an earthquake, it was a blast. We saw a layer of yellow mist, everyone was trying to figure it out. There was something, but where and how, we could not understand. After five to ten minutes, we heard yet another explosion. When we understood what it was, I grabbed the phone in panic. Everyone hugged everyone and was also grabbing phones to try and call their families. Then we learned from the television that these explosions were terrorist attacks and that one was in front of the HSBC building and the other was in Beyoğlu; there were wounded and dead. Someone who worked in our company and was a close friend of mine had gone to the HSBC Bank, our clients, for a meeting. Fortunately, we realized the meeting ended five minutes before the explosion.*

Another victim, a chemical engineer, 53 years old, was working at Renault MA headquarters, about 250-300 meters away from the HSBC building at the time of the incident. He described the moment of the explosion as follows:

*I was on the phone at the time of the explosion. I felt our building go up and down. I thought it was an earthquake. But then we realized what happened when we saw yellow smoke rising from the HSBC building, body parts scattered in front of*

*our building, burning cars. We left the building immediately and gathered in the garden but police officers who arrived soon afterwards ordered us back into the building, saying that we might also be at risk because we were a foreign firm. We heard another explosion. That scared us even more. Our families spent several hours worrying because our phones were unreachable for a long time. We spent these hours watching people, buildings and lives destroyed, some people crying hysterically, some laughing hysterically.*

A woman, now 50, was an office worker, also at Renault MA in Levent at the time of the attack. She said she was on a regular phone call with her sister when the explosion happened. She thought it was an earthquake at first. She described the situation after the incident as follows:

*When I looked out of the office windows, there was pale dust. And then there was a mess, and I just hung up. I knew a bomb had gone off in the chaos. I ran to the window. There was a burnt-out car in the middle of the road. I think it was about 11:00. If the bomb had gone off at 12:00, it would have been a massive massacre because we would take our lunch break at 12:00 and HSBC was right in front of us. I was so scared. I called my husband. He didn't know anything. He told me to calm down, but he didn't seem to understand the seriousness of the situation. But the windows on the lower floors of the company were broken and there was a lot of damage. All the roads were blocked, and I couldn't get out of the office. Hours*

*later, I reached my car. Meanwhile, the news started coming out on TV and my husband stayed on the phone with me for a long time, both calming me down and giving me directions to drive out of the neighborhood. My only wish was to reach my child.*

The politician said that for two years after the attack, Levent Çarşı and the shops were dead and nobody wanted to come there. He commented that Beşiktaş Metropolitan Municipality had worked intensively since 2003 to restore Levent.

Victims' statements indicated that they remembered the incident very clearly, which was evidenced through how they reflected upon their feelings and thoughts down to the minutest detail. It can be concluded here that even the terrorist attacks took place in 2003, the results of the interviews and the perceptions of victims are reliable, and the data collected from the field and results of thematic analysis that will be presented in the following sections is valid.

### **8.3 Victims' Perceptions**

#### **8.3.1 Overview**

The following sections first present an evaluation of victims' perceptions of the short-term responses, and then of victims' perceptions and thoughts about the long-term responses and counterterrorism strategies.

#### **8.3.2 Short-term institutional responses**

Nine out of the ten victims interviewed expressed an opinion on the structure and the functioning of the short-term institutional responses during and shortly after the terrorist attacks in Istanbul. Five evaluated the short-term institutional responses as effective and sufficient to provide order and stability immediately after the attacks,



while four evaluated them as generally insufficient and ineffective as explained further below. One of the victims had no idea about short-term institutional responses and therefore provided no comment on this.

Victims addressed various issues when conveying their perceptions and attitudes towards short-term institutional responses. Panic, fear and suspicion, the concept of trust, and economic issues all emerged as emphasized issues and are explored further here.

#### **8.3.2.1 Panic, fear and suspicion**

Victims primarily felt fear and panic at the moment of the incident, and their subsequent actions were driven by these feelings. In this sense, it seemed that the main purpose of terrorism was not to kill people, but to spread fear and panic among the public. Terrorism is a tool for humans and terrorist organizations to fulfil their true ambitions by creating a sense of fear and panic in the masses.

Each victim emphasized different issues based on their own experiences while assessing the short-term institutional responses during, or shortly after, the terrorist attacks. Those who thought that short-term institutional responses were sufficient mostly talked about good police organization, efficiency of ambulances and the immediate help of paramedics.

There appeared to be no homogeneity amongst the perceptions of victims on short-term responses given immediately after the terrorist incident. Some victims rated short-term responses as effective, helpful and aimed at calming the public. For instance, the politician said:

*After the attack, the police immediately tried to ensure security, protecting the scene. The police officers were really trying to*

*take precautions. The cops were helpful, they were very friendly. They paid close attention to people. They tried to calm the panic. The Department of Health also worked very well; the ambulances arrived immediately.*

Not all victims experienced positive results from short-term responses. Some victims described short-term institutional responses as complex and said that they became more frightened by the lack of short-term responses and their ineffectiveness. In other words, victims who found short-term responses ineffective were not only frightened by the terrorist incident they experienced, but also by the complexity of the short-term responses. They also commented that the fear at that moment prevented them from clearly remembering details such as what they did from moment to moment after the incident, how long they had to wait for help, where or under what conditions.

Careful consideration should be given in this research into short-term responses about the question of whether victims' feelings of fear, panic or suspicion were caused by the terrorist event or by the short-term institutional responses. Both appear to have terrified and panicked the victims. Given that the main goal of terrorism is to instill fear in the public, and given that fear is used as a tool, it is not surprising that victims talk about fear and panic immediately after a terrorist incident. It is important to mention here why fear is important and worth analyzing in the framework of links between states' institutions and victims' perceptions. According to Sinclair and LoCicero (2010), citizens' expectations of protection from government may be increased because of the fear which emerges as one of the outcomes of terrorist attacks. In this sense, fear can be mitigated during the process of states' responses to terrorism.

Interviewee responses suggested that the interviewees did not have a clear knowledge of the structure and functioning of the short-term responses, and were not clearly aware of what to do. This has led to skeptical views when evaluating short-term responses. The fact that short-term institutional responses increased their fears and suspicions has resulted in victims doubting the success of these responses.

A finding from interviewee perceptions of short-term institutional responses is that they caused “suspicion.” Some victims were unsure whether actions during the immediate responses were logical or appropriately aimed at problem-solving.

For instance, the education consultant said that while the structure and functioning of short-term institutional responses were not perfect, they were moderately successful and effective in terms of organization and crime scene intervention. She said police and ambulances arrived at the scene immediately: no one was allowed to enter the area for one to two hours and the crime scene investigators spent a long time in the area. However, she was also quite confused about the crime scene and how evidence was collected. In her account of the evidence collection process she recounted:

*A few hours later, evidence was collected, and the places were washed with pressurized water. I don't know because I'm not qualified, but was it a priority to open up traffic, clean up human remains on the ground, and was there enough evidence gathered? It's always been in my mind.*

Washing everything with pressurized water within a few hours of the event raised doubts for her; she was concerned that this would prevent evidence from being collected. She was unsure whether this action as a short-term corporate response was an effective action and as a result, believes that corporate responses may not have the

expected effective mechanisms. However, she appreciated that at the same time, daily life had to go on somehow and everything had to go back to normal. Cleaning with water was also the quickest way to open the street up again to people and traffic. The education consultant appeared affected by terrorism but did not have sufficient knowledge or understanding about what the authorities needed to do after the terrorist incident.

Citizens would not necessarily be expected to understand the structure and functioning of institutions in detail. Each institution has its own specific problem-solving structure and functioning. However, it is noteworthy that she used a phrase such as “this event has always been in my mind,” when describing her suspicions about the rationality of the immediate responses. This is clearly a concern she has not forgotten. Fear also can cause suspicion or derogations of others and decreased trust in government (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2012). Here, the example of an education consultant shows that her fear caused her to have suspicion of short-term institutional responses.

This victim believes that short-term responses are ineffective. Given that fear arises in all terrorist incidents and is already considered one of the main goals of terrorism, it is not surprising that victims are afraid. But given how this fear is shaped in the following days and how it is remembered years later, fear can increasingly be replaced by feelings such as trust in institutions, trust in the state, or it can also lay the groundwork for doubts that corporate responses are working effectively.

The interviews revealed that the institutions did not provide sufficient information to victims about what they needed to do. Short-term responses are already rapid, sudden, and at times complex functioning responses in relation to the magnitude of an event. People not knowing what the relevant institutions need to do after the terrorist incident raises doubts over whether adequate information transfer can be

achieved between anti-terrorist institutions and victims in a short-term response context.

For the above case, perhaps the street may have needed to be cleared as soon as possible and re-opened to traffic (this is unknown, since there were no interviews with emergency response teams). Even if this was a requirement, however, the fact that the victim did not understand the underlying reason for the short-term institutional response led her to consider the short-term institution to be ineffective. Here, there is a problem in terms of responses of institutions to terrorist attacks. It is understood here that there is a perception of finding short-term institutional responses as unsuccessful by having a perception of distrust not only because of the ineffectiveness of short-term institutional responses but also because of the lack of information about the content of short-term responses by the victims. It might be argued here that there were effective short-term institutional responses within the framework of the Istanbul terrorist attacks; however, there is a lack of understanding of these responses by the victims as perceptions. Sociological institutionalism emerges here significant.

As can be seen from this example, institutions are not only based on certain rules and policies. These rules and policies need to be internalized by the persons. Another example of the internalization of rules and policies of short-term responses comes from the woman who was working in the offices of Renault MA, who said that people were not allowed to leave the building:

*I had the opportunity to think about it a lot later. They wouldn't let us out of the building for a long time. We wanted to get out of there as soon as possible. It was the right decision to stop us from going out. We did not go out for three to four hours. From what I understood afterwards, this was a waiting period for*

*outside security measures to be taken. As a result, yes it was effective.*

This interviewee first appeared to complain that they were not taken out of the building for a long time after the terrorist incident. However, after thinking about the issue for a long time, she understood that this was to allow security measures to be taken outside. So then evaluated the short-term responses as effective. Here, the interviewee also had no knowledge of what actions were necessary by institutions and therefore wanted to go outside as soon as possible. After understanding why they could not go outside, she decided that the waiting process inside the building was appropriate. Once she knew the purpose of the institutional response, she decided that the institution was effective, but this knowledge was required for her evaluation.

As Levi (1990) has argued, the best institutional arrangements incorporate a normative system of informal and internalized rules. So, the rules and policies of a specific institution are effective when internalized by the people of a particular society. These examples illustrate that institutions can legitimize their actions not only through their work and dynamics, but also through the perceptions they create in victims. In the Istanbul terrorist incidents, the victims did not have enough information about what to do in the short term immediately after the incident. This cannot be attributed to people's ignorance but is also due to the inability of institutions that act (or do not) within certain guidelines and rules to express themselves appropriately and effectively, to improve awareness of what they do, how, and why. This failure resulted in victims being generally suspicious of the way of working of during the short-term institutional responses. Victims' fear and panic may also have aggravated their feelings of suspicion towards short-term institutional responses.

### 8.3.2.2 Trust

Trust emerged from the interviews as another important concept. Victims indicated a lack of trust in the state, both related to short-term responses and to general discourse, when evaluating short-term institutional responses.

For instance, one of the victims of the Levent terrorist attacks in Istanbul, a 30-year-old advertiser, complained that body parts that were scattered after the explosion had also landed in the gardens of their homes, but there was no unit to help collect them. He quoted the police as having said: “You are responsible for your own apartments’ garden.” He said that after the trauma of the terror attack, he had experienced further trauma from collecting all the body parts from the gardens of his apartment building. His trust in the state decreased because of the unhelpful attitude of its institutions. This victim used the concept of trust within the concept of diffuse support as argued by Easton (cited in Lavrakas, 2008); he said that he did not trust institutions in themselves as a result of the lack of short-term institutional responses after the terrorist attacks in Levent.

There were also victims who could not clearly remember short-term institutional responses, but found them unsuccessful due to their distrust of political actors and officials in various institutions. For instance, a consultant, 52 years old, did not remember the structure and functioning of short-term responses very clearly, but still indicated that they were not effective: “I do not trust government officials in general so I do not believe the short-term responses were successful”. This victim was talking within the framework of another categorization of Easton, “specific support” (as cited in Lavrakas, 2008), by saying that she did not trust in government officials. This argument could also be analyzed within Hetherington’s (1998) definition of trust; she refers to the government as an “institution” governed by “officers,” so an explanation

of the concept of trust depends not only on institutions but also policymakers. In this sense, when discussing trust in institutions, various assessments or definitions can be made around the concept of general trust.

From this point of view, victims who spoke about their perceptions of short-term institutions often tried to defend their opinions with the concept of trust. The concept of trust was used in two ways in the victims' arguments. On the one hand, the concept of trust emerged as distrust of the structure and functioning of short-term responses for victims who found short-term responses inadequate. On the other hand, victims who already had a problem of trust in the functioning of institutional structures in Turkey's fight against terrorism declared that they did not find responses reliable or effective, without having very clear knowledge about them, or clear experiences of them.

According to Anderson (2010), trust in government is frequently evaluated under the heading of political trust or confidence in government. Victims who talked about insecurity and ineffectiveness in short-term responses after the terrorist events in Istanbul often referred to the concepts of political trust and trust in government. General political distrust (in institutions, politicians, and the structure and functioning of institutions) seemed to lead to the perception that short-term responses were unsuccessful, even if the victims did not remember anything clearly about the short-term responses.

It should be mentioned that the victims did not give the name of any politician or person who held important positions within the institutions. Victims expressed a general distrust of state security, the functioning of institutions, and distrust of the people who run the institutions. But when identifying them, they did not give a specific institution name, or person name. There might be several reasons for not mentioning



any names of institutions or persons when they talk about distrust. First, they may have held a certain fear in case of having a certain critical approach to any sort of institutions or person. They may have some fears such as facing up to some limitations or threats when explaining their thoughts (such as being unemployed, being the target of other critical thoughts such as a sensitive topic, terrorism, in Turkey). Second, they may have had general problems on distrust, so they did not necessarily mention the names of specific institutions or political figures. In the case of Istanbul terrorist attacks, victims are still far from being politically-informed. The victims' statements emphasized a poorer view of general short-term response support than specific support although this was also judged as being problematic.

### **8.3.2.3 Economic parameters**

Economic damages from terrorist attacks also emerged as a theme from the interviewees. In the aftermath of the terrorist incident, many shops were significantly damaged by the effects of the bombs, and people working in these businesses suffered financially. Material losses were greater in workplaces located near the sites where the terrorist incident occurred.

The politician interviewee reported that the people of Levent suffered considerable financial damage after the attacks. This interviewee also pointed out that there had been compensation and state support for victims of the terrorist attack, but that the state covered very little and failed to support victims effectively:

*The state covered very little of the damage. We were getting compensation for terrorism from the governor's office; the governor's office was distributing the money. It was called terror insurance. But if the damage was 500, the state was*

*giving 100. The general compensation issue made people angry. The houses here are old, most of them have wooden frames in the windows. But many people had replaced the wood with PVC. The government said 'We don't pay for PVC, we pay for wood'. The public got angry and reacted by not taking the compensation.*

The interviewee cited as an example that the material damage caused by terrorist attacks was not covered by competent institutions and state bodies; the victims noted that short-term responses were ineffective, with economic aid insufficient. He explained that not only did the victims complain about their economic losses, but they also complained that they had been unemployed for a long time. Many employers suffered huge losses; victims complained that they did not know what to eat for a long time and did not get along because they were suffering due to unemployment. Victims' statements suggest that there were failings in both the payments for material damages caused by terrorist attacks and provision of necessary assistance. These failings made the living conditions of the victims difficult and pushed them into despair.

Although victims described short-term responses to damages in terms of compensation and economic damage, the economic dimension of terrorist attacks should also be treated as more serious and long-term.

In terms of the structure and functioning of short-term responses, five victims had positive perceptions and four victims had negative perceptions. Although the issues mentioned by victims could be handled within the same framework, their perceptions even on the same subjects differed enormously. Interestingly, victims were sometimes diametrically opposed on the same issues, thinking very differently about the structure

and functioning of short-term responses. The following three points may explain victims' differences in perspectives on short-term responses.

The first common theme to come from the victims' perspectives on short-term responses is that, at the moment of the incident, victims' feelings such as panic and fear can invoke very different responses. Victims might therefore express different reactions to short-term responses. More seriously frightened individuals may give ambiguous information and talk more about feelings and thoughts, whereas less emotionally responsive individuals may explain an incident more objectively in terms of what they witnessed. Responses to emotions are, of course, very difficult to measure and vary between individuals. Someone who panics easily may not be able to clearly explain an event experienced; a person who feels fear may not remember what he or she did at that moment, or, conversely, he or she may remember very clearly and exactly what they did and in what precise order.

The second common theme to come from the victims' perspectives on short-term responses is that although victims witnessed the terrorist attack, some were unable to analyze the terrorist attack and could not clearly remember short-term institutional responses. Many years have passed, which also hinders memory recall. However, factors that may influence both remembering and forgetting should be taken into consideration.

The third common theme to come from the victims' perspectives on short-term responses is that victims were in different locations and buildings so that they were affected differently by the nature and functioning of the short-term institutional responses. Although they experienced the same terrorist incident, they experienced and witnessed different problems. For example, perspectives would vary between someone further away at the time of the incident who only heard the sound of the explosion, and

someone working in the HSBC Bank. The fear and panic invoked by the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks for these citizens would therefore vary.

### **8.3.3 Long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies**

From the ten interviews, nine victims expressed an opinion about the structure and functioning of long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. None had a positive perception of these responses and strategies. Themes which emerged from the interviews related to long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies are discussed in the following sections.

#### **8.3.3.1 Long-term fear, trauma, and empathy**

Terrorist incidents not only cause momentary panic and fear where they occur, but can also lead to long-term or even permanent changes in the minds of those, who are deeply affected by the consequences of terrorism. Their memories are shaped by the terrorist events, which strengthens the fear that emerges in subsequent generations and can prepare the ground for possible future violence. In this context, a “memory,” formed as a result of the trauma and pain of a terrorist attack, also influences reactions to future attacks. This can be used constructively or destructively to better manage the effects of an attack and potential future problems.

The politician interviewee commented that fear and panic were intense during the attack, that they were traumatized and that these feelings still prevailed in them:

*Fear ... panic ... if you ask people, everyone will talk about similar feelings. We don't know what to do. The street is a mess. Cars burned, human parts everywhere.... we're officially traumatized, and we're still feeling it.*

However, victims stated that in the short term, emotions such as fear and panic lasted for a long time. The politician said:

*For a very long time, if we put the water bottle on the table a little hard, the people in the house would jump to see if something had happened. So, the effects of the bomb attack have continued for many years. Car alarms, ambulance voices are still in our ears.*

Four interviewees had experienced psychological problems after the terrorist attacks: severe stress and anxiety. The chemical engineer said that seeing how life can change unexpectedly in an instant had shaken her mentally.

Terrorist incidents are traumatic events, and it is not surprising that many people experience panic, fear and short-term trauma at the time of the incident. However, it also seems that the panic and fear experienced at the time of the incident became more chronic in the long run, creating trauma and serious psychological problems. Long-term institutional responses were expected to be more constructive and reduce the negative or destructive impact of terrorism on citizens, but this expectation was not fully realized. Within the framework of all these issues, victims who referred to the functioning of long-term institutional responses as ineffective noted that they did not receive psychological health assistance after the terrorist incidents. An office worker, who mentioned that such events often traumatize people more than is obviously apparent, gave an example:

*These are major traumatic events for an individual. For example, a police officer I knew very well was killed and his body shattered in the attack on Levent. They gave the body to*

*his wife in a garbage bag. This is heavy stuff. It's different if you're just listening or following from social media. Experiencing it personally, it's horrible.*

De Vicente Colomina (2019), in the “Victims of Terrorism: Quality Assistance Guide,” underlines that following a terrorist attack, individuals who fail to receive help from staff and institutions suffer more, which he calls secondary victimization, revictimization, or double victimization. From this viewpoint, victims of terrorist attacks in Istanbul, who were psychologically damaged, especially those who did not receive sufficient help from the Health Council, experienced first the victimization from experiencing a live terrorist event, and were then also exposed to revictimization in the long term. In other words, the victimization they experienced affected the whole lives of victims, further strengthening the attacks’ impact indirectly through inadequate or unsuccessful institutional responses.

Related to this, victims who did not receive psychological help used more familiar words in their discourse when describing the difficulties, they faced in their lives during or after the event, or in the longer term. None of the victims, who used the words “long-term fear,” “panic,” or “trauma,” received psychological support; they stated that they did not actually have a psychological condition diagnosed by any medical doctor. They described what they felt psychologically with their own language, words and emotions. Instead of describing a diagnosis of their condition using medical language, they used everyday discourse to describe their negative psychological state.

“Empathy” was a topic that the interviewees talked about from time to time within the framework of long-term responses. While some victims faced their own pain and trauma, they also spoke of empathizing with the lives and suffering of others. One of the victims, speaking of the difficulty of trying to cope with her own fears at the time

of the incident, said she felt very bad when she saw others had died. She described putting herself in the place of the deceased's family and empathized intensely. The consultant interviewee spoke of an incident immediately after the explosion that affected her, which she cannot forget, which she described as follows:

*There's a moment I can never forget watching on TV; actor Kerem Yilmazer, whom I liked, stopped in front of HSBC Bank when the traffic lights were red. The explosion happened right then and he lost his life. Pleasant music was coming from my radio – but everything was over for him.*

Victims generally empathized when talking about other victims or deceased people who had suffered serious injuries from the incident, putting themselves in the place of the injured or deceased person's family. Victims who had been subjected to the same incident and the same painful experience together, albeit in different dimensions, often gave examples from other people and made statements that revealed the concept of empathy through their words, stating that they shared their pain. This supports the concept that traumatic events have a unifying property for the living.

New institutionalism sees organizations as important social structures with influences on society (Meyer, 2000). In the context of the terrorist events in Istanbul in 2003, it is understood that there is a parallelism between the ineffective and inadequate long-term institutional responses or the fact that the fear of this victim turns into doubt and also the belief that institutional responses are ineffective. This perspective and interpretation are also an important indicator of the validity of sociological institutionalism and that institutions are actually connected to people by informal connections. Incorporation of a normative system of informal and internalized rules is the best institutional arrangement (Levi, 1990).

### 8.3.3.2 Trust

Three out of nine victims had trust problems with the long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. Victims who found the long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies unsuccessful mentioned that the distrust caused by their evaluations of the ineffectiveness also led to distrust of different state departments, for example, distrust of the administration. The 45-year-old bank employee interviewee commented:

*I distrust government. There was terror in a place like Levent... there wouldn't even be protests here. Levent is also a very decent place. I had never experienced anything like this before. Then I lost trust in government.*

The 45-year-old bank employee introduced the topic of “distrust” with the words “I distrust government.” The interviewee said that the occurrence of such a major terrorist incident in Levent caused a loss of confidence in the administration and mentioned that he experienced distrust only because of the terrorist incident. In this statement, the victim did not mention a direct distrust or confidence in the long-term responses; he spoke of the lack of management of general approaches to terrorism. Moreover, the 52-year-old consultant interviewee said she did not think Turkey had a consistent counterterrorism policy.

The Renault MA office worker and chemical engineer interviewees said they did not feel very safe with regards to the state's fight against terrorism; sometimes they thought state authorities were dealing with terrorism in their own interests. Their trust in the state had decreased after the explosions in Levent. Another victim, the office



worker, said government policies on terrorism were taken in the interests of the country, rather than those of its citizens.

Only the businesswoman made a clear critique of intelligence:

*I never thought the state took adequate measures on terrorism. In the HSBC blast especially. How does it escape intelligence that a vehicle carrying hundreds of pounds of explosives is roaming the city center? And on the same day, there are two perfectly organized terrorist attacks. And in fact, there were two big explosions just five days before this event; I think that all forces, security, intelligence, whatever they have, should be on alert throughout the country.*

The businesswoman criticized the structure and functioning of long-term responses and counterterrorism strategies by mentioning specific institutions, the “intelligence unit,” mentioning that intelligence was insufficient and ineffective.

Another victim, who did not remember the long-term responses clearly, said they were ineffective and insufficient because he distrusted authorities. The victims also noted that their problems with distrust were due to government policies. In other words, some victims described themselves as more distrustful of government officials. As a result, they linked the issue to their distrust of state policies and believed that state policies were inconsistent.

Easton (1975) argues that there is “diffuse support,” which means trust in the institutions within a government, and “specific support,” which means trust in officeholders within a state. Victims of 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks experienced low

diffuse support as well as low specific support in the process of countering terrorism, especially within the framework of the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks.

Two victims emphasized how difficult it is for Turkey to prevent terrorism in general in the long term. Geographically and politically, Turkey is very open to domestic and international terrorism and this makes it harder to prevent terrorist attacks.

Even though the interviewees gave their perceptions of the structure and functioning of the long-term institutional responses, they could not give clear information about counterterrorist strategies surrounding the 2003 terrorist attacks. Furthermore, three of the nine respondents doubted the responses were effective, simply because they do not trust the state and its institutions.

Regarding the structure and functioning of long-term institutional intervention and counterterrorism strategies, nine out of ten interviewees held a negative perception about the ineffectiveness of institutional responses. They often referred to the general problem of terrorism in Turkey. Given the structure and functioning of long-term institutional structures, they viewed intelligence as not working properly, legal steps towards solutions as problematic, there was increasing distrust towards the state, and a growing insecurity, mostly due to inconsistent state policies and a personal distrust towards those in official roles of government. The interviewees without detailed knowledge of long-term responses or counterterrorism strategies against terror, avoided the topic of the 2003 Istanbul terror attacks by referring to the general war against terror in Turkey. Turkey having an unsolved long term terrorism problem emphasizes a further complexity.

However, additional questions also emerge from this analysis. Firstly, another issue was about conceptualizing the trust perceptions of victims. When victims were

are asked about their perceptions of the long-term institutional responses to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, some trust perceptions of victims emerged: “trust in institutions,” “trust in politicians or officials involved in institutional responses” and “trust in the state”. This means that meanings of trust of victims are very broad; their trust perception involves various definitions of trust. Another issue is that victims were not only directly addressing the 2003 attacks when questions about the content of long-term institutional responses were asked of them. They were also addressing the issue of terrorism generally in Turkey by emphasizing that terrorism causes excessive problems in Turkey and they believe that it is not always possible to evaluate terrorism problem in Turkey by only looking at specific terrorist attacks. The victims identified that the problem of terrorism in Turkey had been on the agenda for many years and that the lives of many people had been significantly affected by terrorism. It is a fact that Turkey has often been a target of international and domestic terrorism.

From the victims’ viewpoint, it is not possible to talk about a single structure that can be “blamed” or “found wrong”. According to the victims, the structure of long-term responses, which are “wrong or guilty,” were sometimes expressed through mentioning political actors, and sometimes mismanagement of institutions.

#### **8.3.3.3 New forms of lifestyles**

With the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, “small life forms” began to emerge in the lives of the victims, not often seen in urban life and with different dynamics, due to the influence of long-term responses and anti-terror strategies. The victims talked about long-term responses and anti-terrorist strategies, and about how these responses significantly affected their daily lives and shaped them.

As Beck (1992) argues, we live in a risk society where various threats and dangers are more imminent than the past. Brown and Hoskins (2010) also argue that insecurity especially is seen as a modern disease. It has been observed that victims who try to live in a risk society and continue their daily lives, especially in an environment of insecurity caused by terrorism, sometimes have disturbing ideas and start living differently to their pre-terrorist lifestyles. A terrorist incident is already a traumatic event in itself, but when victims talk about their experiences after a terrorist incident, they actually talk about how they feel compelled to create a new and different lifestyle. Fears of a terrorist attack spread in different areas, from everyday life to work life, and victims innovate in their lives. Bauman (2000) argues that global terror affects many political and social events in different forms such as political violence, biological and natural disasters, and worsens the living conditions of society. The “chain of risks,” which can trigger each other from time to time, can become more destructive when evaluated within the framework of terrorist attacks, if it is unclear when they will occur. The focus here is especially on when a terrorist incident creates small life forms that are unique, socially restrictive and security-based and which do not fit into city life.

After the 2003 terrorist attacks in Istanbul, long-term institutional responses and anti-terrorist strategies imposed certain restrictions and protective measures on victims for a certain period. Returning to normal life quickly after such a devastating terror attack has not been easy for government agencies or for the victims.

New individual life-style changes emerged in reaction to terrorist attacks. These new life-styles were shaped around fear and panic and included spending more time at home, cancelling meetings and social activities, and people remaining more isolated, alone in their homes. People were afraid to go to work and use public transport, and they were also afraid to go to crowded places such as shopping centers.

The 50-year-old consultant interviewee stressed that the impact of terrorist incidents on the public is always the same: people stay at home, worry about relatives and distrust the state. She claimed that this all causes disruption in daily life. She continued to explain that her son was a child at the time of the terrorist attacks and they planned to have a birthday party on December 9<sup>th</sup>, but her son's friends said they could not come because their parents were in panic after the terror attacks. Of course, this can be considered an example of just a minor lifestyle change that is not necessarily important in general daily life, but none the less, it is a change from normal practices.

The office worker interviewee said they did not leave their homes, which they found partially safe, for a long time after the terrorist incidents, and that they took care not to be in crowded environments. The chemical engineer interviewee said she felt constantly threatened and insecure after the incident and she especially avoided going to enclosed places like shopping malls and cinemas. She commented:

*The Levent Çarşı where we go to drink, eat or shop every day at noon or after work, is a mess, and the people who work at HSBC, who we don't know by name, but who we chat with while shopping, disappear suddenly and disastrously. This caused me to be worried and scared for a long time.*

The education consultant interviewee also said she did not feel safe in Istanbul in general and that her insecurity increased after the attacks.

The other four victims interviewed, however, said that apart from experiencing initial fear and panic, they had made no significant changes in their lifestyles as they were used to terrorism in Turkey. These victims did not take long to return to normal life. They attributed this to the fact that terrorist incidents in Turkey had been going on

for years, had become more frequent and they were thus now accustomed to this situation.

#### **8.4 Newspaper Interviews with Victims**

As described in the first part of this chapter, in interviews conducted by the researcher, the victims were asked what they remembered from the terrorist attacks and what they thought about the structure and functioning of the state's responses. Due to difficulties in finding victims prepared to be interviewed, 12 interviews were also sourced from newspapers and analyzed to complement those interviews conducted face to face. Newspaper interviews and statements from victims published between 2004 and 2016 were examined.

After major disasters, such as terrorist incidents or epidemics, life continues for those who are somehow left behind. As life goes on, states need to consider what they need to do from an institutional point of view, while society strives to stay together and heal. To enable rapid "normalization," institutions have an effective role to play to help people overcome traumatic experiences. Piraye Antika, Managing Director of HSBC Bank at the time of the Levent attacks, noted the spiritual impact of the terror incident: "I will never be the same person" ("Terör 4 Saatte Yenildi," 2003).

From the statements and interviews of victims obtained from newspapers, it is clear that the traumatic effects of the terrorist attacks were very difficult for many survivors. Although surviving a terrorist incident is a traumatic experience in itself, subsequent negative issues add to this trauma. According to newspaper interviews, there are a number of common issues that survivors complain about.

Antika is quoted as reporting that bank workers were looking after friends and colleagues who were injured or who died immediately after the incident. She reported

that HSBC bank staff tried to overcome their pain and anger through their work, returning to work as usual within four hours (“Terör 4 Saatte Yenildi,” 2003).

In her interview, she reported staff receiving praise from the Central Bank and the Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency: BDDK) for their efforts on the day of implementation of the Emergency Action Plan (“Terör 4 Saatte Yenildi,” 2003). HSBC funds lifelong education for four children left behind by three employees who were killed in the explosion and has also developed a trade project for Levent Çarşı tradesmen, so that 500 people's financial losses due to the incident will be covered (“Terör 4 Saatte Yenildi,” 2003).

Famous theater actor, Kerem Yilmazer's actress wife, Göksel Kortay, said her interview that her pain has never subsided despite the years that have passed since her husband was sacrificed in the terror attack (Kireklo, 2016). Kortay said that her heart burns whenever she hears of deaths from wars and only those who have experienced this pain can know and understand it (Kireklo, 2016). Kortay describes the theater as therapy and says she continues to act (Kireklo, 2016).

Kıymet Tezel lost her 40-year-old brother, Adem Tezel, in the British consulate explosion. On the fifth anniversary, she placed flowers on a tarpaulin on the facade of the restaurant where her brother worked and which was closed after the incident. She said she hoped such a terrorist attack would not happen again; they had suffered greatly. (“İngiliz Konsolosluğu Saldırısında Ölenler Unutulmadı,” 2008).

The family of Nadide Demirbozan, who ran a café inside the consulate building and died in the attack, said they had a very difficult day after the incident. Nadide's daughter, Zeynep, was left without a mother. Nadide's father, Ilker Demirbozan, was a

taxi driver but left his taxi business for years so as to avoid crossing the street where his daughter died. He said Galatasaray taxi, where he worked, was very close to the consulate. It was impossible for him to go to that street every day. He had visited the street once after the explosion but did not dare again (“Kızı hâlâ umutla telefona koşuyor.” 2004a).

The main issues victims of a terrorist attack complain about after the incident are long-term trauma, emotional tides and depression. Although newspaper statements found that the victims struggled for a long time and were unable to overcome the trauma of the event, there was no indication that victims received regular and serious psychological help to overcome this trauma.

Along with trauma, it became clear that the physical health of the victims was also not effectively monitored by the relevant institutions and organizations, and the treatment processes for survivors were not adequately supported. Many victims reported that although the state provided necessary surgeries, it did not provide the necessary medications and they were left to find these independently. In general, all the victims expressed dissatisfaction with the health support provided after the terrorist attacks.

Roger Short, The Consul General in Istanbul, was also among those killed in the bomb attack on the British consulate. The fifth anniversary was marked with a memorial for the 16 victims. A separate ceremony was held for British citizens and consulate employees inside the consulate after the memorial. (“İngiliz Konsolosluğu Saldırısında Ölenler Unutulmadı,” 2008). Victoria Short, Roger Short’s wife, chose to stay in Turkey instead of returning to the UK despite this painful incident. She even settled in an apartment a mile from the consulate where the explosion occurred. (Özdabak, 2010). She reported enjoying gardening and turned this hobby into a



profession; she was interested in her own garden and others such as the garden of the Swedish consulate and she described this as the goal of her new life in Istanbul. In addition, she reported also enjoying going to the movies and traveling frequently (“İstanbul’da kalmam Roger’ı mutlu ederdi,” 2005).

After the attacks, tradesmen suffered extensive damage and it was announced that their damage would be compensated (“İngiliz Konsolosluğu Saldırısında Ölenler Unutulmadı,” 2008). However, tradesmen subsequently complained about the lack of government aid (“İngiliz Konsolosluğu Saldırısında Ölenler Unutulmadı,” 2008).

In all areas where the attacks took place, trade was severely damaged. Tradesmen suffered large financial losses and their shops were devastated. They said the state gave them very little compensation, only covering a very small part of their financial losses. As a result, local shopkeepers were forced to use their own money to recover their businesses. Due to insufficient government support, commercial and economic development slowed in all regions that had suffered the terrorist attacks.

Ferhat Rüstemoğlu, who ran a dental store near the British consulate before the explosion, described that day as follows:

*Eight people died in the explosion - around and inside my shop. They pulled people out from under the wreckage. It was a coincidence that I survived and was just injured. There were 30-35 shops in medicine and dentistry. All closed, gone. The attack kind of killed this area. Most of the tradesmen are crippled here (Özdabak, 2010).*

Another tradesman, Hüseyin Hacıoğlu, who experienced the consulate explosion, said he received only one tenth of what he needed. He said the shop was a

mess. The total cost was 10 billion (10,000 Turkish lira today). The shop remained closed for 75 days.

*They gave me one billion [1,000 Turkish lira today]. This money only covered the windows (“İngiliz Konsoloslugu Saldirisinda Olenler Unutulmadı,” 2008).<sup>6</sup>*

Ferhat Karabulut, who works in a patisserie about 10 meters from the consulate door where the explosion occurred, said the shop was destroyed. He said a huge financial loss was incurred and everything changed. He added that this loss was 30 billion liras but the government gave them a cheque for 1.5 billion lira (1500 Turkish lira today) from the Metropolitan Municipality. However, his boss did not accept this saying, “Let me give you pocket money” (“İngiliz Konsoloslugu Saldirisinda Olenler Unutulmadı,” 2008).

Mehtap Sayılan, wounded in the attack on the British Consulate, reported wanting to forget every second of the year since the attacks. She said it bothered her to be remembered as the girl who the photographer, Hüseyin Yılmaz, carried to the ambulance covered in blood. Mehtap Sayılan broke seven different parts of her body and still has problems with her knee and hip. She said her healthcare expenses were covered by the governor's office, but she was forced to pay for the drugs herself. She was laid off shortly after the explosion and was unemployed for a long time. She explained that she did not want to meet with anyone who reminded her of the incident

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<sup>6</sup> On January 31st, 2004, a law was adopted which provided for the removal of 6 zeros from the Turkish lira and the equalization of 1 million lira to 1 new Turkish Lira (YTL). On January 1st, 2005, 6 zeros were discarded from the currency and new Turkish lira banknotes entered into circulation.

and made every effort to erase the incident from her memory (“Kızı hâlâ umutla telefona koşuyor.” 2004a).

Mehtap Sayılan tried to forget the attack as soon as he could but he suffered financial damage, was unemployed and spent a long time looking for a job.

Perihan Elma, who was injured in the attack on the British consulate, spent a month in hospital, underwent four operations and lost her left eye. She was also treated for partial loss of hearing in her left ear and burn marks on her face. Her husband lost his job because he had to help her with her treatment and recovery. She said her husband had started working again but that they had been in financial trouble for a long time and only the British consulate had helped them (“Kızı hâlâ umutla telefona koşuyor,” 2004a).

Perihan Elma’s story shows that a terrorist attack not only affects the lives of victims, but can also lead to various problems and financial struggles in the lives of relatives.

Gemici, who was seriously injured while working as a security guard for a private company in the Neve Shalom synagogue, lost his eyesight and had a prosthesis inserted into his left eye after months of treatment following the incident. He could also not feel the left side of his face. He has two children. Three months after the accident, his company told him to start work in the warehouse or they would terminate his employment contract. Gemici sued the company but his business contract was dissolved, leaving him with a pension as his only income (“Yaşıyor ama kırgın,” 2004b).

The trauma, physical and mental health problems of the victims were not the only issues to emerge in the aftermath of the terrorist incidents. Victims also had to be

supported financially in some way and the state had to consider this situation and provide urgent solutions. Many victims reported being fired because they had undergone too many operations or were unable to do their old jobs. Victims said that after a certain period, they received notice that they would be fired if they did not come to work. When they did not show up due to continuing ill health, they were dismissed from their jobs and ended up unemployed for a long time. The trauma of the attacks was thus made worse with the added burdens of employment and financial difficulties.

The physical and psychological problems and additional obstacles after the terrorist attacks made it very difficult for victims to return quickly to normal life. Victims tried to get their lives back via coping mechanisms according to what their socio-economic situation would allow. Some could turn to hobbies and passions to change their lives and overcome their trauma. Others, however, had no choice but to find work and try to get their lives back on track financially. Finding new work and getting back to normal was not an easy process for most victims. Many struggled to find new jobs and fix their financial situation. Some of them were injured and not in a position to return to their former employment. For some, however, it was this necessity that forced them to focus, eventually enabling them to get on with their lives and move on.

Interviews published in newspapers show that victims often complain of inadequate long-term health care, unemployment after terrorist incidents, and lack of financial assistance in the long term. Victims may suffer tangible loss, such as losing a loved one or economic damage, and may also suffer from losses such as pain, distress and diminished quality of life (Baroni, 2017). Thus, many victims had to deal with physical health issues as well as psychological issues. Victims mentioned that they suffered from psychological problems, but no medical diagnoses were reported. Moreover, there was

no information about victims who did not receive psychological support or what kind of difficulties that they experienced.

Follow the terrorist attacks that took place in Istanbul, victims could not receive psychological support from the state's health institutions. However, all victims must access support after their victimization (Baroni, 2017). The reason for not receiving support can be interpreted in light of the inadequate results of content of the institutional responses. Even though it is difficult to interpret the results of structure and functioning of institutional responses and perceptions of victims from a causation perspective (which means that ineffective institutional responses cause negative perceptions of victims); some parallelism can be seen from the victims' perceptions and institutional responses.

## **8.5 Conclusion**

The RQ.2 in this thesis was: how do victims of the Istanbul terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses?

When evaluating short-term institutional responses, victims commented on panic, fear and doubt, trust, and economic issues. Victims experienced feelings of fear and panic both due to terrorist attacks and as a result of ineffective responses. Four of the victims rated short-term responses as effective and successful, but five victims rated them as ineffective; the latter doubted whether the functioning of short-term responses was appropriate. This suspicion was mainly caused by the lack of information provided by short-term institutional responses when taking actions, so that victims' knowledge of what was happening and why was poor. The issue of trust proved to be an important concept for victims who valued short-term institutional responses. The victims, for whom short-lived institutional responses failed, voiced trust issues with the state. This

problem of trust developed within the framework of “distrust of institutional responses,” “distrust of those who govern the state” and “all kinds of distrust of the state” in general. Based on these types of distrust, victims sometimes questioned the success of short-term institutional responses, and sometimes described these direct responses as inadequate or unsuccessful. Economic parameters also guided the perceptions of short-term responses for victims who were seriously hurt by the terrorist incidents. Victims reported not receiving financial assistance from government agencies or compensation, being unemployed for a long time, experiencing a bad time financially, and thus that short-term institutional responses were ineffective from an economic point of view.

The levels of fear and panic that victims experienced and individualistic responses to terrorist events caused victims to react differently. Victims who could not remember short-term responses, for example, could not confirm whether ambulances arrived at the scene late or early. Victims being in different locations during the incident and therefore experiencing different types of short-term responses also led to variations in perceptions of short-term responses. No common opinion on the mechanism of action of short-term responses could therefore be concluded on from the interviewees’ perceptions.

Victims' perceptions and thoughts about long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were clearer than their perceptions of short-term institutional responses. All ten victims interviewed reported that in the long term, institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies conducted in Turkey had failed. They talked about suffering long-term fear and trauma. Again, the victims mentioned the concept of trust; they spoke of distrust of government, distrust of intelligence, distrust of government policies, arguing that state policies were not consistent, and also

that they distrusted state officials. They explained this perception by stating that there was a long-unsolved terror problem in Turkey. They claimed that institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were a failure. Victims claimed that their lifestyles had been affected as a result of these responses. Victims spoke of having to adopt new life forms, saying that they had to move on with their lives, feeling more restricted, at risk, with a more intense feeling of insecurity. The fact that institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were restrictive and oppressive had caused their urban lifestyles to change. They said that while they were not happy with the institutional responses in general, the long-term priorities should be measured, but these were far from reassuring.

Newspaper interviews were used to support fieldwork in this research. Victims reported changing in character, changing their ways of looking at life, pain, long-term fears, and long-term psychological problems, but they received little or no official help for these issues. In economic terms, compensation only covered a very small part of their losses and victims reported unemployment and economic hardship as long-term problems.

The next chapter will focus on terrorism in the UK in a general perspective. Later on, institutional responses to terrorism of the UK will be helpful to answer the RQ.3.

## 9 Terrorism in the UK

### 9.1 Overview

The UK has endured domestic terrorism, especially from the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as well as international terrorism for many years. One hundred and twenty-six people were killed by terrorist attacks in the UK between 2000 and 2017 (see Ritchie et al., 2013).

The “troubles” of Northern Ireland that emerged in the late 1960s spawned a number of violent republican and loyalist groups. The conflict cost more than 3500 lives. However, the conflict ended with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Therefore, the UK approach to terrorism has, to a considerable degree, been informed by the experience of both domestic IRA terrorism and international terrorism over many years (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019).

To understand terrorism and its effects in the UK, it is important to analyze both domestic and international terrorism. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Security Service (MI5) have set five levels of terrorist threats, which might affect the UK, including England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.<sup>7</sup> These threat levels are classified by MI5 as low, moderate, substantial, severe and critical. Severe and critical levels refer to a high possibility of terrorist attacks. In the distinction between domestic and international levels of terrorism, the international threat is more likely to be at the severe level in the UK. The current national threat level (to England, Wales,

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<sup>7</sup> Established in June 2003, JTAC analyses and assesses all intelligence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range of government departments and agencies, as well as producing more in-depth reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities. JTAC brings together counterterrorist expertise from the police and government departments and agencies so information is analyzed and processed on a shared basis. JTAC works especially closely with MI5's International Counterterrorism branch, which manages investigations into terrorist activity in the UK. This enables it to assess the nature and extent of the threat in this country (“Service MI5: Threat levels,” n.d.).




Scotland and Northern Ireland) from terrorism is substantial and the threat to Northern Ireland from Northern Ireland related terrorism is severe (“Security Service MI5: Threat Levels,” n.d.).

International terrorism refers to terrorism that goes beyond national boundaries in terms of the methods used, the people who are targeted or the places from which the terrorists operate. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have the capability to direct attacks against the West. The UK is a significant target for Islamist extremists. The current main threats come mainly from Syria and Iraq; however, there are also a variety from the Middle East and regions such as North, East and West Africa, South and South-East Asia. Most of the plotted terror attack in the UK have been planned by British residents. There are several thousand people in the UK who support violent extremism (“Service MI5: Threat levels,” n.d.).

Considering the average number of fatalities per terrorist attack, the worst year for terrorism in the UK was 1988, which resulted in 372 deaths. Even though the IRA has been effective since 1970, it seems that it has ceased to be a threat in recent decades.

### Average number of fatalities per terrorist attack

The average number of fatalities per terrorist attack is simply calculated as the number of fatalities from terrorist incidents in a given year divided by the number of attacks.




*Graph 7: Average Number of Fatalities per Terrorist Attack (Our World in Data).*

Above graph shows that in 1970, the average number of fatalities per terrorist attack was relatively high. The average number of fatalities per terrorist attack decreased from 1970 to 1974. After 1976, the number significantly decreased, with some fluctuations again, especially between 1980 and 2000. In 1988 and 2005, the number of fatalities rose dramatically.

### Number of terrorist incidents

The total number of terrorism-related incidents per year. The source defines a terrorist attack as: "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors; data does not include acts of state terrorism.



Source: Global Terrorism Database (2018)

OurWorldInData.org/terrorism/ • CC BY

*Graph 8: The Total Number of Terrorism-related Incidents per Year in the UK (Our World in Data).*

Graph 8 shows the number of terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2017 in the UK. According to the graph, the number of terrorist incidents dramatically increased between 1970 and 1972. After 1972, there was a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks until 1978. The number of terrorist attacks was relatively low in the 2000s; however there was then a gradual increase up to 2017.

When the above graphs are interpreted together, some clues emerge regarding the success of counterterrorism policies in the UK. In general, there has been an overall decrease in the average number of fatalities in the UK, with the exception of 1988 and 2005.

## **9.2 Terrorist Attacks in London, 7 July 2005**

On 7 June 2001, the Labor Party, led by Tony Blair, was elected in the UK general election. Later on, the Blair government was re-elected in May 2005, two months before the country witnessed one of its bloodiest attacks in terms of international terrorism.

July 7, 2005 began as a very ordinary day but then three explosions rocked the capital in very quick succession from 8:50. The first explosion was in the underground system's Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations. The second was on the Circle Line at Edgware Road. The third explosion took place on the Piccadilly line tunnel between King's Cross and Russell Square. At 9.47, a fourth bombing occurred on a double-decker bus to Hackney in Tavistock Square. Shortly afterwards, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the bombings.

Table 7

*Dates and Places of Terrorist Attacks in London, July 7, 2005*

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Place</u>                                                                    |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7 July 2005 | Explosion in Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations   |
|             | Explosion on Circle Line at Edgware Road                                        |
|             | Explosion in the Piccadilly line tunnel between King's Cross and Russell Square |
|             | Bombing on a bus in Tavistock Square                                            |



The first explosion (in the Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations) killed eight people and injured 171. The second explosion (on the Circle Line at Edgware Road) killed seven people and injured 163. On the Piccadilly line, 27 were killed and over 340 injured. The result of the tube bombings was 52 deaths and almost 700 injured people.

The background information on the 7/7 terrorists created confusion, and how these people became terrorists could not be identified clearly. In the UK, it was not well known how these people developed their extremism and when they put their ideas into action to affect society (House of Commons, 2006). To understand the reasons behind a terrorist attack, requires studying the perpetrators and how they became terrorists.

The July attacks showed there was no single profile for a British Islamist terrorist (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006). Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay, who led the 7/7 terrorist attacks, were born and bred in the UK. They were from the same background and three lived close to each other (House of Commons, 2006). It is known that three were well-educated and had no real problems in their daily lives; only Lindsay, who had strong academic achievements and was talented in music and the fine arts, seemed to be separate from the other three at that time (House of Commons, 2006).

The study of terrorism can be picked up around three questions that include the reasons of terrorism, the process of working of terrorism, and social and political effects of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). A variety of factors may help create terrorists, such as social issues, integration problems of particular groups into society, an ideology, polarization, stigmatization and psychological issues. There is not a simple answer of why people commit acts of terrorism (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019). Even though there are particular circumstances about the reason(s) for

committing these crimes, push and pull factors are nonetheless present (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).

Social alienation refers to detachment from society and is a significant type of vulnerability which causes the individuals to seek salvation in radical groups (McWeigh, 2015). Disenfranchised and alienated persons are said to be in danger to get involved in terrorism, particularly due to their lack of alternatives to their disappointments (Simons & Tucker, 2007). Pearce considers the importance of social circumstances such as alienation, however, with a little hesitation because, as she claims, there is a need to look at the issue from a wider perspective by considering individual, community and societal factors:

*I would be hesitant to say these people did this because they were living in a particular set of social circumstances in which they felt alienated, but of course that is an environment which is not helpful. You need to look at those individual factors, those immediate community factors, the wider societal structural factors to have a reasonable understanding of how something like that happens. (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).*

So, it is possible that certain factors influence the development of individuals, who are prone to engaging in terrorism but of course this difficult to determine. A multiplicity, diversity and intensity of factors can cause radicalization in individuals to different degrees or not at all.

Marc Sageman (2008), political sociologist and former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, argues that most of the threats do not come from Al-Qaeda, but



from westernized Muslims and the radicalization process from tribal regions of Pakistan. He lists inner-city areas of Birmingham, Luton, Leeds and London as places of radicalization in the UK (Sageman, 2008). Well-known terrorism scholar, Bruce Hoffman adopts a different view. According to Hoffman (2008), second-generation Muslim immigrants establish part of the problem; however, he still argues that Al-Qaeda is an important part of the problem, as an organization which is still a serious danger to Western security. The source of terrorism and how individuals become perpetrators thus appears to have complex and multifaceted explanations.

Furthermore, Pearce emphasizes the importance of looking at terrorism in a broader sense by considering all possible factors for home-grown terrorism in the framework of perpetrators:

*When you look at so-called homegrown terrorism, when you look at the perpetrators, there's always a multiplicity of factors. Certainly, it seems to be related to issues around identity, the extent to which people feel part of British society or whether they identify more with their religious identity or a political identity or another identity. There are all sorts of factors pertaining to personal circumstances, personal grievances (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).*

The reasons why some people commit these kinds of crimes could be also explained from the field of psychology of terrorism. Example reasons people become involved in terrorism include psychological problems, for glory (described as protectors of their communities), or due to psychopathic tendencies, although there is no particular character type for becoming a terrorist (J. Alderdice, personal communication, 2018).

When all these factors are taken into consideration, the psychological problems of individuals, the society and the conditions of that society, and the thoughts that proceed within the framework of “me,” “us,” and “others,” the emergence of terrorist tendencies may be very individualistic, driven by multiple factors as mentioned by Pearce.

As argued previously, it was during Tony Blair’s government that the 7/7 terrorist attacks occurred in 2005, courtesy of Al-Qaeda affiliates. One discussion relevant to the 7/7 terrorist attacks was the unsuccessful political road map of the Blair government in international politics. Common public arguments related to the Blair government pertain to the potential relationship between the Iraq War and 7/7 attacks. The Iraq tragedy remains a significant part of the 7/7 situation in the minds of British society (Rai, 2006). Interviews and surveys with UK citizens show that there was concern about the relationship between the Iraq War and its potential motivation for the 7/7 bombings (Hussain & Bagguley, 2012).

In addition to the responses of state institutions and enforcements on the rule of law, state-centric and inter-state relations play an important role, especially according to the realist perspective. According to Bennet (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019), the basic mistake was treating the fight against terrorism as a war rather than as an issue of law enforcement. The over-reliance on military force, especially in Iraq, was counter-productive, leading to many civilian casualties and creating more sympathy and recruits for terrorist organizations (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019). He gave an example of over-reliance on military forces by referring to the 2003 Iraq War.

The decision to intervene in Iraq was the biggest mistake: not only did it lead to civil war and create a base for the very kind of terrorist organization that had not

previously had a haven in Iraq before 2003, it diverted resources from building a stable and successful state in Afghanistan and allowed the Taliban to regroup (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019).

It can therefore be argued that the foreign policy decisions of states may have certain results in both state and inter-state relations. As with the Iraq War, the wrong foreign policy decisions can have consequences that lead to ideological radicalization, both from an intellectual point of view and from an action sense. As a result of these wrong decisions, radicalization in individuals may start with a thought process, and in the long run, various terrorist attacks emerge, when ideas turn into action. In short, this ideological radicalization can lead to terrorist attacks.

The implication of foreign policy on terrorism is significant in combining works on international relations and interstate conflicts (Lai, 2017). Research shows that, states which have active foreign policies are more likely to experience international terrorism. Active foreign policies create non-positive feelings toward a government (Lai, 2017). Bennet draws attention to foreign policy choices and their effects on increasing terrorist acts. According to Bennet (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019), the 7/7 attacks, like most of the post-9/11 attacks in Europe and the US, appear to have been inspired by propaganda from Al-Qaeda or ISIS but were not organized or materially assisted by these or other organizations. The UK's participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars—where it was generally the second biggest contributor after the US—likely made the UK more of a target; at the same time, the UK and others might have experienced terror attacks even if they had not contributed troops in Afghanistan or Iraq (the UK bombers were mostly second-generation Pakistani immigrants who may have had their own grievances and radicalization experiences) (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019). Also, the

number and intensity of terrorist attacks on NATO countries has only been loosely correlated with the number of troops that each country has contributed: Canada has had a fairly high number of troops and few attacks, for example, while Belgium had a small number of troops and many attacks (A. Bennet, personal communication, February 14, 2019).

One of the most important considerations in foreign policy decisions is how to protect from threats external to the nation. The concept of self-defense plays an important role in foreign policy decisions. This concept becomes even more important internationally in cases such as war, conflict or terrorist events between different states. At the same time, a state may have various arguments for ensuring its own security in the face of a particular political or social event. In this context, the issue of when and how self-defense should be prioritized as an action is paralleled with foreign policy decisions.

Therefore, considering the UK's foreign policy mistakes, the notion of self-defense and its misinterpretation in relation to terrorism demonstrates another striking phenomenon. As well as states, radical groups or Islamic fundamentalist groups have their own self-defense interpretations, and when they act in self-defense, self-defense of states and self-defense of Islamic fundamentalist groups are counterproductive. Maynard refers to the self-defense concept, emphasizing the interstate relations which might play an important role in evaluating approaches to terrorism:

*... a huge part of the fuel of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism are the sections and claims about self-defense. Perhaps distorted or misguided claims about self-defense in some ways but claims about self-defense and fighting an enemy that is fighting us. The vast majority of it is linked more clearly to*

*claims about self-defense, about Western criminal involvement and support for Middle Eastern states, et cetera, attacks on Muslims worldwide, all of those sorts of things. I think that those two things are interrelated (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

Given self-defense and the concerns of states, which might cause a sense of threat against each other, it is difficult to claim a linear relationship between foreign policy affairs and radicalization.

A short time after the attacks, the Home Secretary confirmed suspension of all public transportation. The Mayor of London at that time, Ken Livingstone, condemned the attacks, and the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made speeches promising to increase the strength of police and security services. Queen Elizabeth II visited the victims of 7/7, saying that “they (the terrorists) will not change our way of life” (“Queen Condemns Bombing Outrage,” 2005).

However, terrorism has always had the power to change lives, beliefs and thoughts. In the case of an emergency, the incident should be governed and taken under control as soon as possible by political actors. Leadership skills required include providing effective institutional mechanisms, controlling the media representation of the terrorist attacks, and providing communication between the public and the policymakers. When a society experiences a strong threat, it begins to express its fear and tries to provoke the necessary responses, and leaders find it difficult to “contain and reflect,” especially immediately following an incident (J. Alderdice, personal communication, 2018).

Moreover, what needs to be understood here is that the real purpose of terrorism is not always to threaten people's lives or change people's minds. Rather, the goal is to create fear to achieve greater goals. The victims, therefore, are not the real target of any sort of terrorist attack. Alderdice (2005) describes the victims as “symbolic targets”. He defines terrorism not as a belief system, but as a tactic that might be used by both right and left or extremists. Terrorism involves violence around fear, but the real goal is not to impress victims, but to evoke wider influence (Alderdice, 2005). To achieve the wider targets, victims of terrorist action become a tool. They have “symbolic significance” and are not “real targets” (Alderdice, 2005, p. 584). Although people were symbolic targets in this research context, ordinary people also suffered direct damage from the attacks. In the immediate and longer aftermath of the attacks, the UK developed responses to terrorism to restore order and ensure prosperity in society as soon as possible, and also developed preventive steps.

In Chapter 10, institutional responses to terrorism within the context of the London 2005 terrorist attacks in UK are analyzed, distinguishing between short-term institutional responses, and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies.




*Image 20. Central London Tube Map. This image shows the locations of the bombings with reference to the Tube stations.*




*Image 21. Map of Central London. This image shows the locations of the stations in which explosions happened: Liverpool Street, Edgware Road, King's Cross St Pancras/Russell Square, Tavistock Square.*





*Image 22. Exterior view of Russell Square Underground Station. This image shows the station during the 7/7 bombings.*



*Image 23. Russell Square. This image shows how the police cordoned off Russell Square on July 7, 2005.*

## **10 Institutional Responses to 2005 London terrorist attacks**

In the previous chapter, a short history of terrorism in the UK was briefly introduced, and the 2005 London terrorist attacks were described. The main discussions and concerns behind these attacks were also followed by an overall assessment of the main discussions and concerns behind the terrorist attack.

This chapter focuses on the UK's institutional responses to the 2005 London terrorist attacks, by analyzing short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies separately. Thus, this chapter addresses the third research question (RQ3): what were the institutional responses of the UK to the 2005 London terrorist attacks during and after the incident?

### **10.1 Short-term Institutional Responses**

#### **10.1.1 Emergency services**

The first issue indicated in the 7/7 report refers to problems with the emergency services and their varying efficiency in the four locations. ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006).

In terms of effective solutions, the responses by emergency services for the Edgware Road incident were less effective than those for Aldgate. Raising awareness about the Edgware Road explosion took longer than the Aldgate incident, because of problems with communication among the emergency services. It was also difficult to reach the people trapped underground and this decreased the level of success of emergency services in all three underground explosions ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). Because of the lack of coordination, some ambulances were sent to the wrong locations (Edwards, 2015).

In the first stage of the response to the King's Cross / Russell Square explosion, the Fire Rescue Unit did not arrive immediately ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). Communication problems also meant that the situation of passengers in the tunnel was unknown ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). In addition to this, the emergency responses at Russell Square were very slow compared with the other incident sites ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). Moreover, it was reported that emergency health service responses were mostly managed by voluntary medical staff, such as doctors and nurses from nearby hospitals ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006).

In Tavistock Square, where the bus explosion occurred, the terrorist incident was immediately apparent ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). This incident occurred in one of the main streets in the center, outside the headquarters of the British Medical Association; people therefore quickly saw the effects of the terrorist attack. Doctors and other medical staff came from the British Medical Association to the site of the incident as soon as the explosion occurred ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006).

In general, there were problems with the emergency services. In some locations, the ambulance service did not function well because of ineffective communication and consequent misdirection. The underground terrorist attacks were sited where it was particularly difficult to establish effective communication or provide immediate help to victims.

Despite these inadequate immediate health responses, the National Health Service (NHS) was successful in treating injured people after the ambulances arrived at the hospitals ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). The NHS was ready

for casualties, achieving a high degree of success in controlling the hospitals and beds (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006).

Moreover, at the time of the 7/7 terrorist attacks, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, responsible for providing guidance in case of emergency, had not been issued or published (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006). The Civil Contingencies Act (2004) includes the definition of emergency situations and potential threats which have significant effects on humans and the environment. This Act advises the public on processes required in the case of threats, covering aspects such as actions required by local authorities, transportation issues and healthcare, and aims to prevent potential terrorist attacks by understanding cause and effect relations in terrorism (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004). The Act thus plays an important role in preparing for the process of providing help during any threats, including terrorist attacks. The lack of this preparatory guidance at the time of 7/7 lead to the lack of a control mechanism and an ineffective crisis management system.

Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act (2004: “emergency powers”) has remained almost a dead letter and has never been fully implemented. The first part of the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) covers performance of emergency powers (Walker, 2014). Because the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) was not yet in use at that time, short and long-term support to victims could only be partially successful. Survivors’ families could not be supported sufficiently. According to the Report of the 7 July Review Committee in June 2006, there was a lack of plans to care for survived, traumatized persons by the attacks (Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2006). The reports shows that an estimated 1,000 adults and 2,000 of their children are likely to have suffered from post-traumatic stress as a result of the attacks (Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2006).

The report mentions that many of the survivors were still unknown and could not be in a situation of any of the support networks for survivors (Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2006). In some cases, the persons who were known to the authorities received good care and support after the terrorist attacks; however, some of victims could not receive follow-up contact advice or support (Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2006).

In times of crisis, the safety and health of passengers, especially underground, is of paramount importance. In an emergency, passengers should have sufficient support and clear direction to be able to exit safely. As three of the four terrorist attacks of 7/7 occurred underground, it was harder to manage emergency responses efficiently. In the aftermath of the attacks, the transportation services had to provide a more secure system to ease the anxiety and fear of citizens using public transport daily. After the 7/7 bombings, this fear and anxiety led to changes in engagement with public transport.

Pearce talks about to what extent daily life in London was affected following the terrorist attacks. She gave an example of this by emphasizing public response to use of public transportation. She indicates that given the scale of the attack, the public response to using public transportation after the event was not as negative as it could have been (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019). She explains her thoughts as follows:

*I know that there was some debate about the extent to which the public would be willing to engage with public transport immediately after this. There were some people who switched to using bicycles and changed, but I think, by and large, people did continue to use the networks (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).*



It is expected that, after such an attack, people would avoid public transportation and switch to transportation such as bicycles, at least for a while. The issue here is not only including a public response after the terrorist attacks or the frequency of using public transportation in London after the terrorist attacks. However, this issue indicates that people returned to using public transport as they began to forget their experiences and develop mechanisms to deal with their fear. Therefore, there is still an attempt to be “powerful” and to try to challenge “the limitations and fears created by terrorist attacks”. This issue will be examined in subsequent chapters which deal with the thoughts and perceptions of survivors.

### **10.1.2 Communication**

Effective communication is essential in any emergency. Communication is important after any incident to give advice, alleviate fear and strengthen public trust in authorities (Rogers, Amlôt, Rubin, Wessely, & Krieger, 2007). To provide effective communication, state institutions need to have sufficient knowledge of the background of the incident in question. It is reported that the first problem during the terrorist attacks happened at 8:50 and was related to communication (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006).

One of the significant criticisms to 7/7 terrorist attacks was poor radio communications in the tunnel (Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2006). The London Assembly also called the radios “inadequate” or “nonexistence” (Edwards, 2015). According to Report of the 7 July Review Committee (2006), communication within and between emergency services in London must be revised. The Report mentions that it was difficult to communicate effectively with emergency service personnel at the affected Tube stations and at Tavistock Square, sometimes with each

other and in some cases with control rooms (Report of the 7 July Review Committee, 2006).

Fear and panic need to be controlled through effective communication between the relevant institutions, especially underground. The measures taken should both reduce fear and chaos and control panic. Wherever there is uncertainty, people can react over-emotionally, which may aggravate rather than alleviate the problem, if it leads to irrational decision-making. Effective communication is an important tool to control any sort of emotion and is the best way of making accurate interactions between people, units and institutions.

The report shows that the effects of chaos and confusion on the reporting of the incident, especially in the London underground system, were problematic between 8.50 and 9.15; this is confirmed in the Report of 7 July Committee (2006) which states that it was difficult for the train drivers to get in touch with passengers when the terrorist attacks occurred. It was indicated that communications between trains and the London underground network control center were inadequate (The Report of 7 July Committee, 2006).

While criticizing communication problems and analyzing the extent to which the communication aftermath of terrorist attacks in London were effective, the potential difficulties in responding immediately to multiple terrorist attacks that happened at a similar time should also be considered. Therefore, this significant point should not be underestimated when communication problems were considered for the London case study.

In addition, in any terrorist incident where attacks take place in different places simultaneously, communications between emergency services can become inefficient



due to differences in the locations. Ambulances and police forces may have difficulty in reaching the scene and may be confused. This is what happened with the London attacks.

There was confusion about what happened where, because of the quick succession of the three underground explosions. Then the explosion on the bus in Tavistock Square caused further chaos. This was mostly because of the inadequate communication system, which directed ambulances to the wrong locations (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006).

There were also other problems that resulted poor communications immediately after the terrorist attacks. For instance, it was indicated that there was smoke in the carriages and passengers were afraid there might be fire (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006). Another problem was the lighting system in the underground in the aftermath of the attacks. The emergency lighting system did not work well during and after the explosions (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006). Therefore, it was difficult for passengers to see their immediate surroundings and find the exit (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006). This failure of the lighting system delayed the escape of passengers. All of these different problems may have made any issues about communication more difficult.

### **10.1.3 Short-term actions of the Casualty Bureau**

Where there are casualties after an incident, the City of London activates the Casualty Bureau. The Bureau has four main responsibilities: to provide information in the investigation process related to the incident; to identify persons affected by the incident; to reconcile missing persons; and to provide coordination among the units involved in this process (City of London Police, n.d.).

After any sort of serious incident, including natural disasters or terrorist attacks, people immediately try to get information on relatives and friends. Immediately after an emergency, the Casualty Bureau issues a telephone number to facilitate communication among survivors and their families. The telephone number provided and information on how to communicate with relevant people at the Casualty Bureau is disseminated with the help of the media. This process is followed by the reporting of missing persons, the provision of volunteers and officers, and coordinating with hospitals to collect the details of the injured and deceased (City of London Police, n.d.).

After the 7/7 attacks, the responsibility of the Casualty Bureau became more difficult because of the four explosions were simultaneous. People became distressed, panicked and shocked, trying to seek information about their loved ones (“Report of the 7 July Review Committee,” 2006). The Casualty Bureau received 43,000 attempted calls within 24 hours (HMSO, 2006). Because of the intensity of the repeated calls from persons who were feeling desperation and panic, the Casualty Bureau could not answer and help them efficiently (HMSO, 2006). As a result of this, the Casualty Bureau operated relatively slowly while finding and identifying survivors and communicating this information to families.

The inefficient working process of the Casualty Bureau created a more chaotic environment a short while after the 7/7 terrorist attacks. This resulted in negative feelings among the survivors and families; they felt victims had been forgotten and were considered unimportant (HMSO, 2006). Because of the failures in the process of collection of details, the survivors could not benefit from advice, support and counselling (HMSO, 2006).

One of the most important considerations throughout the investigation of a death is providing support to the family of the deceased. Families should be considered as

partners in an investigation and must be treated appropriately, professionally, with respect and according to their diverse needs. This principle must be reflected at all levels of the police service and due consideration must be given to any police action which may impact on a family, from the media statements made by a Chief Constable, to the telephone operator who responds to a query from a family member (ACPO Crime Committee, 2003).

Furthermore, family liaison is a significant resource that can be used across a broad spectrum of policing. The guidance set out in ACPO's (2003) "Family Liaison Strategy Manual" has been developed for the following events: (a) an unexplained or violent death, particularly in respect of: homicide, road death and mass disaster (b) other cases that do not involve a fatality, where family liaison might enhance the effectiveness of the police response, for example, hate crime (ACPO Crime Committee, 2003). Within the family liaison framework, deaths are investigated with the help of victims' families. The first objective for the deceased is to identify and contact the victim's family. Family liaison also creates strategic objectives, risk assessments, and supports and enacts communication between the family and the media (National Policing Improvement Agency, 2008).<sup>8</sup>

#### **10.1.4 Collection of victims' details**

The immediate collection of victims' details after any sort of incident is essential in both the short and long terms. The names, addresses, telephone numbers and other personal information of survivors should be gathered as soon as possible after any incident. Compiling these details becomes harder with time and further delays provision

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<sup>8</sup> The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) was established by the Police and Justice Act 2006. The NPIA includes practical advice which should be taken into consideration by the chief officers to ensure consistency of the public experience

of necessary healthcare, emotional and psychological help, and compensation to survivors and the families of those killed.

Due to the complexities involved in collecting survivors' details, it is difficult to talk about a single institutional response within the UK research context. For instance, hospitalized people had a greater chance of being identified as survivors. ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006). Other survivors simply left the scenes of incidents without making themselves known to emergency services or the authorities and so never benefited from any short- or long-term support. Collection of survivors' details after 7/7 was, therefore, inadequate and support could not always be provided ("Report of the 7 July Review Committee," 2006).



*Image 24. Exterior View of the British Medical Association, Located in Tavistock Square. This image shows an area very near the site of the bus bombing. (Photo: Baturay Yurtbay).*



*Image 25. The Entrance to the British Medical Association. This image shows the entrance of British Medical Association, adjacent of Tavistock square terrorist attack. (Photo: Baturay Yurtbay).*





*Image 26. Exterior of the British Medical Association in Tavistock Square. This image shows where the bus explosion occurred (Photo: Baturay Yurtbay).*

### 10.1.5 Conclusion

In summary, short-term institutional responses to 2005 London terrorist attacks were analyzed under the headings of “Emergency services”, “Communication”, “Short-term actions of the Casualty Bureau” and “Collection of victims’ details”. These topics included general findings retrieved from academic literature, reports and other primary sources.

As a result, short-term responses, particularly communication, were problematic, especially in the underground. Fear and panic following the attack also affected communications. Identification of victims who reached hospital was effective but identification of those not treated in hospitals was inadequate. This also led to survivors being unable to get the long-term help they needed. Reports and literature published on the structure and functioning of short-term institutional responses to the 2005 London terrorist attacks indicate that the close succession of the four attacks significantly hindered emergency response service functioning. It must also be emphasized that the structure and functioning of short-term responses should be analyzed by location. Despite their quick succession, the attacks happened in four different places, each with its own unique characteristics. Thus, the short-term responses were different in Russell Square, Aldgate, Edgware Road and Tavistock Square.

This chapter has drawn a general picture of the structure and functioning of short-term responses following the 2005 London terrorist attacks. Even though detailed and clear data were obtained on some issues, there is insufficient information to assess definitively whether short-term responses were successful and effective, or unsuccessful and ineffective. It can be concluded, however, that there were a number of important problems with the short-term responses and thus scope for improvement.



On August 5, 2005, shortly after the 7/7 terrorist attacks, Tony Blair announced a new plan for combating terrorism at a Downing Street press conference. The next sections discuss the UK's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies after 2005 in a detailed perspective.

## **10.2 Long-term Institutional Responses and Counterterrorism Strategies**

In this section, the structure and functioning of the state's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies within the framework of the 7/7 terrorist attacks are examined, covering a broad variety of institutions and counterterrorism strategies and explaining what place and importance each institution has in the war on terrorism. These issues are examined through sources from academic studies, official national and international reports related to terrorism, and key informant primary interview data collected in this study.

As a result of findings from academic literature, primary, sources, reports and elite interviews, main issues and concerns about long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were determined and analyzed under the headings: National security strategy; Counterterrorism strategy: CONTEST; Socio-psychological drivers of terrorism; Intelligence; and Counter-terrorism funding.

### **10.2.1 Institutions and counterterrorism**

The institutions involved in countering terrorism in the UK include various governmental bodies and agencies which are dependent on each other in a general sense, but different in terms of specialization.

The institutions that play major roles in the fight against terrorism in the UK are the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MI5, MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service [SIS]), Official Committee of Terrorism, Joint Intelligence

Committee and other police agencies such as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the police force that is the successor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland, and the police forces in Scotland (Haberfeld, King, & Lieberman, 2009). Since the 1960s, the Security Service (MI5) has been involved in counterterrorism operations and has managed threats to national security (Haberfeld et al., 2009).

The cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister, is the most prominent institution above all government departments. Within the work of the cabinet, two departments, Defense and Overseas Policy (DOP) and the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), run the short-term and long-term policies of the UK. It is within the Home Office that security and terrorism issues are primarily addressed through policies on counterterrorism, including legal issues and security problems.

Revenue and Customs is responsible for the movement of goods and services that might be used for any kind of terrorist attack. The Department of Transport provides security for the transportation system and Public Health England is responsible for public health emergencies, which might include biological or chemical terrorism.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO, n.d.) is another organization in the UK that looks to provide security and justice through international cooperation. The FCO includes a network of embassies and consulates, incorporating over 14,000 people in nearly 270 diplomatic offices. It collaborates with the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the UN and the UN Security Council to create a more secure UK globally by protecting the interests of the country. The FCO aims at reducing terrorism and conflicts to protect the UK's national security (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, n.d.). It provides national security in the UK by investing in

trade and opening new markets that create sustainable growth (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, n.d.). It also aims to protect UK citizens by enhancing the country's influence on a macro level in an international system shared with other states (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, n.d.).

In 2001, four years before the 7/7 terrorist attacks, Conflict Prevention Pools were introduced, aiming at ordering works among the FCO, Ministry of Defense, Department for International Development and the new cabinet structure to prevent any emergencies.

The Terrorism Act 2000 is the key part of counterterrorism legislation in the UK. It was passed on 20<sup>th</sup> July 2000 and came into force on 19<sup>th</sup> February 2001. The Terrorism Act 2000 developed from the Terrorism Bill by separating from the Anti-Terror Law structure in July 2000 (Fisher, 2015). The Terrorism Act 2000 sought to enhance the definition of terrorism by emphasizing that terrorism also includes the threat of violence (Hewitt, 2008). Furthermore, after adopting temporary counterterrorism measures, the government passed three new permanent laws between 2000 and 2006: the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCS) 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005, and the Terrorism Act (TA) 2006.

The Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1 defines terrorism as:

*The use or threat of a specified action where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The action is a specified action if it involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to*

*property; endangers a person's life, other than the person committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.*

In addition to this, the Terrorism Act 2000 lists a number of offences (Counterterrorism legislation: An overview, n.d.).



Table 8

*Counterterrorism Legislation in the UK*

| <u>Act</u>                                           | <u>Date</u> |
|------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| The Terrorism Act                                    | 2000        |
| The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act           | 2001        |
| Terrorism Act                                        | 2006        |
| Counter Terrorism Act                                | 2008        |
| Terrorist Asset Freezing Act                         | 2010        |
| Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act | 2011        |
| Protection of Freedoms Act                           | 2012        |
| Counter Terrorism and Security Act                   | 2015        |

As mentioned above, there are various diversified and powerful institutional mechanisms which contribute towards the fight against terrorism in the UK. Institutions have their independent and specialized areas, but fundamentally depend on each other. This research addresses to what extent these institutions are successful in managing terrorist attacks and to what extent they collaborate effectively.

### **10.2.2 National security strategy**

The scope of counterterrorism strategies and approaches within national security has changed over time to respond to more complex and diversified terrorist attacks in the UK. In earlier decades, the state focused on foreign defense and security policies, which were thought to deal with protection of the state and its interests, more than on national security. Moreover, the concept of national security has broadened in recent decades by covering different subjects relevant to threats to individuals, threats to the way of life of individuals and threats to the interests of the state (Cabinet Office, 2008).

The UK's National Security Strategy was established in 2008. This was the first publication of the single road map for the government's fight against terror and it aimed to bring together the programs of different departments and agencies responsible for protecting the UK's national security. This first National Security Strategy aimed to set out how the UK would manage security challenges and their potential drivers to protect the nation, its citizens and their way of life (Cabinet Office, 2008).

In the chapter on "Guiding Principles of the National Security Strategy," (Cabinet Office, 2008), a variety of topics is mentioned, such as tackling security challenges, approaching overseas issues multilaterally, coordinating at a domestic level,

government cooperation with local authorities and the integration of domestic and foreign policy in the UK.

In terms of security challenges, Chapter 3 of the National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2008) is interested not only in the main counterterrorism methods but also in the factors that drive instability, insecurity or conflict, such as climate change, energy competition, poverty, inequality and poor governance. Chapter 4 of the National Security Strategy (Cabinet Office, 2008) deals with UK responses to terrorist attacks by emphasizing counterterrorism strategies.



Table 9

*The National Security Strategy of the UK in an Interdependent World: Strategies and Structures (Cabinet Office, 2008)*

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Strategies &amp; Structures</u>                                                                                                                     |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2002        | Adding new Chapter to the Strategic Defense Review, and supporting of the Armed Forces in counterterrorism                                             |
| 2006        | Establishing first cross-government counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, and cross-government counter-proliferation                                     |
| 2008        | Establishing new strategic framework for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO),                                                                    |
| 2001        | Establishing the Conflict Prevention Pools to improve joint working between the FCO, Ministry of Defense, and Department for International Development |
| 2003        | Establishing Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre                                                                                                           |
| 2006        | Establishing Serious and Organized Crime Agency                                                                                                        |
| 2007        | Establishing the Office for Security and Counterterrorism,                                                                                             |



Table 10

*The National Security Strategy of the UK in an Interdependent World: Resources and Legislation (Cabinet Office 2008)*

| <u>Resources</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Increasing funding of counterterrorism and intelligence from £1 billion in 2001 to £2.5 billion, and rising to £3.5 billion by 2010/11                                                                                                                                                   |
| Having a New Single Security and Intelligence Budget across different departments and agencies                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Establishing the longest period of sustained real growth in the defense budget since the 1980s                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Increasing spending on dealing with global conflict.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| <u>Legislation</u>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| New powers to tackle terrorism and secure successful prosecutions (i.e. control orders; extend stop and search powers; punishment for encouraging and glorifying terrorism, and terrorism training; extended pre-charge detention; and extended proscription of terrorist organizations) |
| New powers for both central and local government to coordinate responses to domestic emergencies.                                                                                                                                                                                        |

### **10.2.3 Counterterrorism strategy: CONTEST**

CONTEST (2018) was an important step in revising counterterrorism strategies in the UK following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. CONTEST has a multi-dimensional and integrated approach and includes four strands: Pursue, Protect, Prevent and Prepare. The next sections evaluate these four strategies in a detailed perspective.

#### **10.2.3.1 Pursue**

The aim of the Pursue strand of CONTEST (2018) is to stop terrorist attacks in the UK. The police and prosecution should work effectively together in this process to succeed. The main objectives of Pursue are to detect and understand terrorist activity, to investigate terrorist activity, and to disrupt terrorist activity, including through prosecutions (CONTEST, 2018, p. 43). Two methods are mainly used: conviction in a court and imprisonment (CONTEST, 2018).

Pursue is also responsible for stopping terrorist attacks and uses intelligence and police to detect terrorist threats and support counterterrorism activities overseas. It aims to stop terrorist attacks in the UK and any attacks overseas, which are against the interests of the UK. As part of CONTEST, Pursue is dependent on intelligence and security agencies both within the UK and overseas.

#### **10.2.3.2 Protect**

The Protect strand is responsible for strengthening UK protection against attacks. In addition, it aims to protect the safety of the public by strengthening the mechanism of protection against terrorism in the UK and interests overseas. It aims to detect terrorists at the border and reduce potential danger to the national infrastructure.

It also aims to decrease the vulnerability of crowded places, focusing especially on specific groups that might be particularly vulnerable (CONTEST, 2018).

#### **10.2.3.3 Prevent**

The Prevent strategy is responsible for preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism in the UK. Prevent was basically established with the aim of preventing people from becoming involved in any kind of terrorist group. As a result of the Prevent strategy, the UK is more informed on the factors that lead people to join any kind of terrorist organization and connect them to terrorist activities (UK Government, 2011). Furthermore, it encompasses all kinds of terrorism, the priority being a threat against national security (UK Government, 2011).

Although the Prevent and Pursue programs involve different contexts, there are connections between them. Prevent is dependent on the success of Pursue in terms of “facilitating the disruption and conviction of people engaged in radicalization activities which are clearly illegal”; on the other hand, Pursue depends on Prevent to be able to limit the numbers of people involved in terrorist activities (UK Government, 2011, p. 31).

#### **10.2.3.4 Prepare**

The Prepare strategy aims to eliminate harm and provide quick recovery by saving the lives of people in the case of any terrorist attack at a national level. The objectives of Prepare include delivering an effective response to terrorist attacks, eliminating the effects of terrorist attacks by saving lives, and providing a quick response by optimizing the capabilities of the UK to respond to current and potential future threats (CONTEST, 2018).

Furthermore, Prepare is responsible for mitigating the impact of attacks. It tries to improve resilience at the national, regional and local levels, with the government, the police and the emergency services operating in partnership with the private sector, local government and others to ensure that communities are prepared for a terrorist attack.

#### **10.2.3.5 Critique of CONTEST**

These CONTEST strategies have received criticism, however, in particular the Prevent strategy. Warell (2019) says that, according to Home Office, so far, the Prevent program diverted more than 1,200 people from extremism and probably terrorist acts. Nik Adams, a senior police officer working in counterterrorism says that Prevent is a process of “brilliant and professional people recognizing how significant the seemingly insignificant might be” (Warell, 2019).

Criticism of Prevent emerged in 2005, querying a deficiency in terms of its ability to prevent terror and its having been prepared under intense government supervision (Briggs, 2010). Critics mentioned that the Prevent strategy marks British Muslims unequally as an accused community by securitizing society and underestimating the unity of community (Thomas, 2020).

Maynard criticizes the Prevent strategy of CONTEST:

*Although it's called 'Prevent,' really the short-term 'Prevent' strategy is really a counterintelligence or an intelligence-based strategy. It's about identifying specific threats, preventing them from coming to fruition and being able to launch an attack (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

From this point of view, preventing terrorism should be seen as a social strategy that needs to be well-planned and spread over the long term rather than just a matter

that needs to be addressed by short-term intelligence services. Preventing terrorism is, of course, a process that also involves intelligence. But an effective solution to a terrorist incident cannot be achieved in the short term with intelligence alone. Real and effective solutions can only be reached by taking political, legal and social steps and following comprehensive strategies.

Furthermore, it is not only academics, politicians or specialists who criticize the Prevent strategy. There are many criticisms of the Prevent program coming from different parts of UK society as well, such as human rights lawyers, teachers and representatives from the Muslim community, who have said that the process is discriminatory and counter-productive (Warell, 2019).

It is a fact that short-term intelligence responses are not sufficient to prevent terrorism. There is a need not only to adopt counterterrorism strategies in response to intelligence, but also to accept the reality that there must be social and political coordination to prevent further potential terrorist threats. In this context, the fact that Prevent only deals with the problems to address solving terrorism in the short term raises questions over its value. To prevent a terrorist incident, solutions that prepare the ground in both the short- and long-term need to be put forward. Maynard argues that Prevent should be evaluated by taking into account the long-term social problems:

*What we call 'Prevent' is really the broader social strategy, the long-term strategy to try and reduce radicalization and frustrate opportunities or reduce opportunities for individuals to get involved in terror groups. I'm a bit more critical of that.).*

According to Maynard, Prevent is aimed in the right direction in some ways. He believes that radicalization can still occur at a lower level (J. L. Maynard, personal

communication, February 14, 2019). Persons who are alienated and disconnected from the main communities by having weak bonds in social networks still tend to being radicalized by having the potential of getting involved in terrorist groups despite the Prevent strategy.

Prevent is far from being a long-term preventive strategy and is more of a program with short-term protection policies. One of the main concerns of the Prevent strategy is to prevent radicalized groups from coming into existence. However, what do we understand when we speak of radicalization or of the people who were radicalized?

According to Stohl, Burchill and Englund (2017), there is a division of thoughts about the meaning of radicalization and who are the radicalized, so there are some confusions about the remit of Prevent. Neumann (2013) says that academics and policymakers use the term “radicalization,” however its meaning needs to be clarified properly. Radicalization is used for beliefs (cognitive radicalization) or extremist behavior (behavioral radicalization) (Neumann, 2013). Not defining radicalization clearly also creates problems for the functioning of the Prevent strategy of CONTEST.

Given the distinction between "radicalization" as a process and a "radicalized individual", the issue of "prevention" needs to be considered more carefully. People experience radicalization not only from a behavioral point of view but also from an ideological one. In addition, for individuals, terrorist acts start by first adopting ideas shaped around radicalization and then by applying them to acts of violence. In the case of the 2005 London terrorist attacks, for example, a separate examination should be carried out on how people who were born and raised in the UK, who were thought to lead ordinary lives and showed no signs of radicalization, could be radicalized and eventually commit acts of terrorism. Preventive steps should begin before individuals reach the point of radicalization and put forward by adopting a certain social strategy.

Ineffective working of 'Prevent' therefore makes it difficult to establish a connection between society and counterterrorism strategies. It is important to emphasize what should be included in the preventive strategy and to what extent a counterterrorism strategy should be preventive.

Alderdice believes that Prevent is not a successful program and expresses his concerns as follows:

*The most contentious element of CONTEST has been the 'Prevent' program and the attempt to identify young people who may be at risk of radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. There seems to be little evidence that this program is successful. I am unconvinced that this is a good and effective program, and this is also the view of the Royal College of Psychiatrists (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019).*

Pearce argues that Prevent should be more collaborative with the groups. But in making this defense, she mentions that the concept of public or group should be questioned in more detail:

*One of the things with prevention work is that obviously governments and local authorities need to work in partnership with community organizations, but knowing which are the right community organizations, knowing which are the people who will be listened to by the community, because obviously, again, we don't have one public (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).*

In this way, there must be working to improve the situation of faith and community groups through communication with their leaders (“An Independent Review of London’s Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident,” 2016). Pearce emphasizes that it is wrong to judge a person involved in a specific crime for being within a certain group; she argues instead that the person involved in the crime does not see him / herself as from the group:

*It's problematic in and of itself to suggest that there are societal groups who should be seen as somehow responsible for these people committing these acts, because they're not speaking for them and they're not part of them (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 27, 2019).*

By labeling someone who causes terrorism within a certain group, the group becomes responsible for the crime. This can increase polarization and anger among groups within the framework of terrorism in society. Political leaders claim that Prevent targets all sort of threats and extremism, however, it targets mostly Muslims who are the subject of many cases where there is not any suspicion / evidence of criminal activity (Cohen and Tufail, 2017). Therefore, the operation of Prevent counterterrorism as a response to a terror threat is difficult to sustain (Qurashi, 2018).

Alderdice stresses that despite some issues in parliament regarding CONTEST, generally the program is well executed (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019). However, he especially emphasizes two points about Prevent. According to Alderdice, while there has been and continues to be considerable concern and debate in parliament about various provisions of the CONTEST program, in general, apart from Prevent, there is a sense that the agencies are doing what they can within their limited resources and powers (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019). He says



that parliament sees its role as ensuring that the response does not adversely affect human rights and produce a counterproductive reaction (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019). Alderdice mentions two concerns here. The first is that the Prevent program may not be effective in identifying the right individuals and may instead provoke a negative response in Muslim communities (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019). The second concern is that there are an increasing number of white right-wing attacks and Prevent is not seen by the public as being sufficiently focused on this issue (J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019).

These problems raise the questions of what steps should be taken to make Prevent work better and become more effective. One of the most important things needed for Prevent to work is good relationships between local communities, community authority figures and the police in the state. Maynard points out:

*Actually, "Prevent" has been incredibly controversial amongst many of the community or those people at-risk in communities. Not really a very good concept but nonetheless it has really been unsuccessful (at least in its early versions) in building (that) kind of trust (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

In addition to all these discussions, there are questions about how preventive Prevent should be. There should not be "unnecessary prevention" in certain spaces and it might be difficult to draw a line between what is necessary and what is not.

If Prevent is applied very rigidly and causes unnecessary problems in public spaces (without existing problems), it may create anti-Prevent groups, which could

hinder Prevent from doing the work it needs to do. Pearce talks about the negative effects of these groups on terror solutions:

*There have, of course, also been groups who are very vocally anti that Prevent agenda and so there are community groups that from a governmental point of view haven't been very helpful. That's again, as with all things complicated, nuanced, but certainly, partnership working has been a real priority and it's having some success (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).*

The fact that community groups say Prevent does not help may also show a lack of communication between community groups and the government. Prevent should be carried out as a social strategy to understand community groups from the root. Possibly community groups are not adequately understood within the functioning of the Prevent agenda and therefore radicalization cannot be prevented and the Prevent strategy cannot be implemented effectively.

Furthermore, “Channel” is part of the Prevent strategy within CONTEST and has a broad approach to recognize and give support to people who might be in danger of getting involved in any kind of terrorist threat. The “Channel” guidance was issued in the Counterterrorism and Security Act in 2015. Before 2015, this program, piloted in 2007, aimed at finding individuals at risk by evaluating the scope of that risk and then creating a plan for these individuals to support them (UK Government, 2015).

Radicalization becomes possible when individuals move into social networks that are alienated or disconnected from broader communities and the mainstream society. Therefore, one step should aim at restructuring local communities. Local

authorities have taken the necessary steps to increase communication skills among employees and started to invest in people (Briggs, 2010). This will be provided by “Channel,” “the existing multi-agency program to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalization” (UK Government, 2011, p. 8). Communities and local authorities, therefore, play a key role in this strategy. Maynard comments:

*We really don't know much about how ‘Channel’ works because so much of it is confidential. The cases have not been released, data on them can't really be released. There's been very, very little social-scientific work on the exact efficacy of “Channel”. We haven't got much evidence (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

Thus, even if “Channel” is viewed at least partially positively, the details of the program and the lack of transparency of the working processes raises doubts about its influence. The Channel Program is the most controversial component of Prevent, dividing communities and putting British Muslims under intense scrutiny (Huang, 2018). As a result, the channel program likely puts persons at risk of radicalization and promotes narratives about Islamic terrorism (Huang, 2018).

There was common agreement in the government that although Prevent established an important agenda for the UK’s counterterrorism strategy, it was not completely effective. A review of Prevent was therefore announced by the Home Secretary on November 9, 2010. According to the Home Secretary, Prevent whether Prevent was proportionate and focused needed to be evaluated, by considering its scope as well as analyzing its connections between government and local levels (UK Government, 2011). Pearce comments on this:

*There's been a real shift, if you look at the 'Prevent' agenda and the way that it's been delivered, there was a real post-2005 'We've got to do something and we've got to do it quickly'. There were some decisions that weren't necessarily very helpful and it's something that has improved over time and I think that the authorities have played catch-up in terms of understanding the communities they're working with and the best ways of working with them (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 11, 2019).*

There are ways the Prevent strand could work better, for example by developing relationships between local communities and community authority figures. Proactive and preventive interventions should be taken as early as possible. Preventive strategies work better in cooperation with communities.

According to Maynard, Prevent is improving slightly now but early versions were very centralized and heavy-handed in their attempt to discourage radicalization society (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019). Maynard believes there is a need for something much more “bottom up,” much more about involving and building, and connecting with, rather than interacting, coercing or infiltrating social movements or social organizations in civil society (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019). The Prevent strategy is therefore heavily dependent on a successful integration strategy.

The lack of a clear discussion of the socio-psychological perspective, which constitutes an important approach to terrorism, may have restricted the public's level of knowledge. It may also have interfered with problem-solving for terrorism in the long run. According to Chief Superintendent Mick Orchard, National Coordinator for

Protect and Prepare, although there is generally a low level of expectation of being caught up in a terrorist attack, people should be aware of the worst situation that they might experience (National Counterterrorism Security Office, 2019). UK citizens therefore need to be informed as effectively as possible to learn counterterrorism strategies and apply them in any terrorist incident, to be able to protect themselves.

How well people evaluate intelligence is another topic for discussion. Intelligence requires detailed investigation of the event, but there should be a limit to the information shared with the public. According to the Director General of the Security Service, not everything people want to know is shared from intelligence, because the details can involve difficult interpretations and difficult decisions (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006). Too much detail given to the public during the investigation of an event may also prevent the presence of those responsible for the event. It is also important when and under what conditions this information is provided.

Within this discussion, it should be argued that the informative “Run, Hide, Tell” video was prepared to provide information to the public and encourage them to take appropriate action in any terrorist incident, actions which may be life-saving elements. The “Run, Hide, Tell” campaign aimed to protect those in danger from firearms or terrorist attacks, by educating them about what to do during. The guidance is to run to a safe place far away from the incident, to hide, and to turn mobile phones to silent and call emergency services, when safe to do so. Pearce mentions the “Run, Hide, Tell,” video, which was originally developed and which has been run for quite a long time as a training for security staff in large organizations:

*“Run, Hide, Tell,” actually did not go into the wider public domain until 2016. “Run, Hide, Tell” was initially released in*

*a very tentative way (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 27, 2019).*

The more rigid progress of the securitization process can cause people to live in greater fear and panic. The fact that individuals feel constantly threatened causes disruption of their daily life activities, which Pearce also comments on:

*If you're going to communicate with the public about terrorism, you do need to think about potentially unintended consequences, so does it make certain sectors of society feel as if they're a community under suspicion? Does it make people feel that they're living in an overly securitized environment? (J. Pearce, personal communication, April 27, 2019).*

It's important to inform people on the "Run, Hide Tell" approach with a risk of terrorism. However, if the limits of the campaign are not set appropriately, it may cause anxiety and fear to outweigh its benefits. The informative feature of this campaign is important in the context of antiterrorism strategies, but it is useful to define the limits of the program to prevent the intervention from affecting people's daily lives.



*Image 27. Poster for the 'See it. Say it. Sorted' campaign. This image shows a poster of "See it. Say it. Sorted" was another nationwide campaign launched on November 2, 2016 by Rail Minister, Paul Maynard, at London Waterloo. The campaign aimed to encourage train passengers and others in the station to report any suspicious actions or items.*

#### 10.2.4 Socio-psychological drivers of terrorism

The world began to see different blood-painted terrorist attacks in different Western countries, strengthening Beck's (1992) argument of the risk in society. To analyze terrorism in any country, one single approach, based on *realpolitik*, is insufficient to solve the problems related to terrorism. The socio-political approach to terrorism and socio-psychological views should all be evaluated together. Even though *realpolitik* is considered important, it fails to tell us how an ethical or moral viewpoint could be helpful to understanding foreign policies (Alderdice, 2005).

According to Moghaddam (2005), psychological research on terrorism suffers from two main issues: (a) lack of powerful conceptual frameworks, and a reductionist-positivist reliance on data gathering, and (b) a tendency for researchers to split into "dispositional" and "contextual" camps. His approach on psychological research on terrorism is more in the macro perspective by analyzing terrorism in the context of evolutionary transformations and globalization. According to Moghaddam (2009), Islamic terrorism is a "defense mechanism" of fundamentalist groups who feel "threatened by the globalization" (p. 374); as he says, "The experience of threat and relative deprivation among traditional and fundamentalist Muslims arises in the context of rapid 'fractured' globalization, with its associated contradictions."

From this point of view, individual characteristics achieved in accordance with the data obtained in the field of psychology are not sufficient in the approach to terrorism for solving terrorism-related problems. In the field of terrorism, within the framework of political psychology, there is a need for research that can look at society in a broader framework. In the context of political science, globalization as a factor shaping international relations should be examined more closely with its political, social and economic dimensions. In a globalized world, radical groups and terrorism



are also conceptually and operationally globalized. Understanding societies and community groups in the sense of radicalization and international terrorism from a macro perspective will lead to more efficient results than simply adhering to personal psychological factors.

Although individuals make up society, there are differences in political approaches in the Western world about whether societies should be individual-oriented. Terrorism originating from Islamic communities can be understood better by making contextual characteristics of them rather than only focusing on “individual difference” variables (Moghaddam, 2008). In the context of terrorism, Alderdice emphasizes that the concept of group identity should be taken into consideration, rather than individual problems:

*In my view the problem is a psycho-political one in which communities of people have long felt antagonistic to Western involvement and hegemony in their parts of the world. The result is extreme feelings of anger of the ‘large group’ or community as a whole, which is manifested in extreme thinking by many and action by a few. The drivers are, however, at the level of the community, rather than at the level of the individual.*  
(J. Alderdice, personal communication, March 25, 2019).

In particular, individuals with insufficient socio-economic status may be more prone to radical actions, if they cannot develop their own capacities, knowledge and abilities for reasons caused by lack of education or poor economic conditions. To understand the factors of terrorism, the psychology of individuals, who might find themselves in a bad socio-economic situation, should also be understood.

Humans tend to develop their capacities through the availability of a good education system, adequate economic conditions and good relationships with other parts of society. Lack of these benefits risks losing the ability to develop capacities, which can lead to worse situations, including increased risk of participation in political violence such as insurgencies, terrorist actions and social movements for example for regime change, or against youth powerlessness, or unsatisfactory labor conditions.

In any counterterrorism strategy, not only do the responsible units play an important role in the process of countering terrorism, but interaction between the public and the counterterrorism units also plays a significant role. The interaction between the public and security, and the actions of private citizens, play important roles by helping detect, assess and make reports on violent extremism (Parker, Pearce, Lindekilde & Rogers, 2019). According to Williams et al. (cited in Parker et al., 2019), effective interaction between the public and security officials takes place when all are willing to coordinate and cooperate.

Alderdice (2005) approaches terrorism and political violence from a psychoanalytical angle by exploring the significance of history, regression and dissolution as well as changes in the manifestation of communal violence over time. Alderdice focuses on translating intra-psychic conflict into inter-communal conflict to understand political violence. According to Alderdice (2005), societies which have experienced poverty for a long time tend to experience more terrorism, and this process cannot be explained adequately by social or economic indicators. This means that there are certain ways of thinking and processes which shape the latter situation of society, and there is a need to look at the cause. So, “being the poorest society” is a result, and “coming out of the history of poverty” might be a reason for terrorism according to this

way of thinking. The reasons behind terrorism from this viewpoint focus on the roots of a certain way of thinking, shaped by society throughout history.

In this context, the problems related to terrorism should be addressed from a broader perspective and within the framework of permanent solutions that will come from the grassroots. Maynard states that bottom-up solutions are more rational than state-centered, rigid policies. Maynard's approach supports the idea of large group identity and community approach:

*Certainly, some of the earlier versions really took a very centralized and heavy-handed approach to how the state would actually try and discourage radicalization. I think that broad strategy was not the right approach: you needed something that was much more bottom-up (J. L. Maynard, Personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

People's sense of right and wrong in a moral sense mostly directs political and public discussions. Social dominance of specific groups and authority orientation may lead to the construction of people's world view. If a certain identity becomes exclusive to specific groups, the distinction between 'us' and 'them' becomes evident and creates polarization in the society. If the sense of right or wrong of specific groups differs from other groups, a blaming process, in which a person blames others because of their differences, then takes place in society.

Every person represents a certain community. The victims of terrorist attacks are often ordinary citizens who could be seen as, and see themselves as, 'natives' of the country—people who have been citizens of the UK for generations (J. Fromm, personal communication, March 30, 2019). The attacks are carried out by 'foreigners,' but also

people who can be seen as members of smaller groups within the UK—for example, Islamist terrorists can be seen as representing the sub-group of Islamic people living in the UK (J. Fromm, personal communication, March 30, 2019). This can lead to scapegoating of that minority by an angry and traumatized majority group. Dialogue needs to be opened with those groups, asking for their help with solving whatever grievances have led to the attack (J. Fromm, personal communication, March 30, 2019).

The main approach of states in combating terrorism should be security first, then analysis and dialogue-building. After these, coalition-building is needed within one's own country and between countries, for the purpose not only of prevention but also understanding the disturbed inter-group relations, which lead to terrorism (J. Fromm, personal communication, March 30, 2019). Good local arrangements lead to effective communication between the police and local authoritative figures (“An Independent Review of London's Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident,” 2016). The security forces should be responsible for quickly gathering information about an incident, and this information is given to them by local authorities (“An Independent Review of London's Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident,” 2016).

When different types of terrorism such as lone wolf terrorism are considered, public support for counterterrorism policies increases. Senior Metropolitan Police officials indicate that monitoring terrorist groups is very difficult, especially when lone wolf terrorism is considered, so public help becomes significant since security officials cannot work without public support (“Terror Cop: Public Critical to Stopping Attacks,” 2016).

A terrorist attack in London, regardless of the target or perpetrators, is an attack on all of London and all Londoners regardless of any particular faith or community group (“An Independent Review of London's Preparedness to Respond to a Major

Terrorist Incident,” 2008). According to Pearce, people’s reaction to the London terrorist attack was one of resilience, and it was not difficult to return to normal life afterwards. Pearce finds the response in London resilient and thinks that Londoners returned to normal after a short period of time:

*I think in London the response was actually pretty resilient. People did on the whole—Again, all of these things, whenever you're talking about public responses, I'm talking about the public as if it's monolithic, 'This is what people do'. Of course, actually, as with anything, there'll be a range of responses and there will be extremes of responses, but by and large, [for] most people, it didn't take very long for London to return to normal, if you like, in terms of everyday practice (J. Pearce, personal communication, April, 11 2019).*

#### **10.2.5 Intelligence**

Police and intelligence agencies came together in 2003 under the framework of JTAC to find better solutions to the problem of terrorism in the UK. The JTAC, established in June, 2003 within MI5, began to take responsibility for information as a cross-government communication unit for security and counterterrorism by implementing the cross-governmental counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST.

As a part of the government’s answer to terrorism in the UK, the JTAC is a unique evaluation unit in intelligence (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006). The JTAC works on intelligence related to international terrorism within the UK as well as overseas working collaboratively with a variety of government departments and providing reports and documents related to terrorists (JTAC). Counterterrorist

expertise, police, government departments and agencies work together under the umbrella of JTAC and information is shared and analyzed and processed collaboratively.

After the 7/7 terrorist attacks, many questions were raised. Was there an intelligence failure behind the 7/7 attacks? How could future attacks be prevented? What did the UK do wrong? According to the government's response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (2006), it is well known fact that Siddeque Khan was the subject of reporting of Security Service before the July 7 attacks. However, his true identity was identified after the 7 July attacks as the subject of 7 July terrorist attacks (Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, 2006).

Even though the Security Service had come across Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer sometimes in some operations prior to the 7 July attacks, their identities were not known at the time and there was also "no appreciation of their subsequent significance" (Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, 2006, p. 1). At the time, UK had more pressing priorities such as disrupting known plans to attack the UK, and a decision was taken not to investigate them further or try to identify them (Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, 2006). The reports concluded by mentioning that because of the other priority investigations at that time, and limitations on Security Service resources, the decisions about "not to give greater investigative priority to these two individuals were understandable" (Government Response to the Intelligence and

Security Committee's Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, 2006, p. 2).

In general, agencies try to fill in the gaps in knowledge to protect against any sort of threat; however, there will always be gaps in agencies' information (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006).

From this point of view, is unrealistic to expect intelligence services to always work effectively. Merely looking for an answer to whether there was an intelligence gap is not a good way to assess any terrorist attack.

Furthermore, technological developments in intelligence should be followed and used effectively in this process. According to Bennet (A. Bennet, personal communication, January 14, 2019), the US and the UK have become much better at tasks that have technical solutions: intelligence (including intelligence sharing), drone strikes, tracking terrorist financing, etc. Maynard claims that UK intelligence has sufficient technological equipment and that the counter-intelligence part is generally successful and cannot, therefore be heavily criticized. Maynard emphasizes the success of intelligence in the UK:

*My general impression of that is that it's been very successful.*

*The growth and sophistication and employment of new technology have been very effective. Britain has seen a much, much lower growth in terrorism than many other states in the world. I don't get an impression that anyone thinks when we do see terrorist attacks, major problems in counterintelligence are the issue (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, 14 February 2019).*

So, Maynard thinks that in general the British intelligence system is sophisticated, and its counterterrorism strategy is effective in comparison to most international governments and countries. Moreover, in the UK, intelligence is improving annually:

*What I would say is that, in general, the counterintelligence operations against terrorism have evolved a lot, very rapidly over the period of 2000, 2001 to now. In the 2010s, for example, the apparatus is much more sophisticated than it was in 2003, 2004, 2005 (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019).*

Domestic security is not easy to achieve and there might be a need for concessions in civil liberties. Tensions surrounding the issue of civil liberties and relations among human rights issues, citizens' freedoms and protective actions of the government might be dramatically increased in the process of solving homeland security problems. Citizens might increase their voice in the framework of civil liberties depending upon direct law enforcement and the intelligence officials responsible for protecting them.

The dilemma concerning level of protective actions of governments and what citizens should accept is a subject of major discussion in security and terrorism studies, and there is no definitive answer yet. It is not possible for agencies to learn everything about every individual by following up on information about a person: this might violate human rights (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006). Moreover, strict government security policies and the intelligence services as an apparatus intervening in civil liberties causes problems with citizens' perception of liberty. From a policing



and intelligence services' viewpoint, the more surveillance, (the more access to people's phone conversations, text messages, email), the better. Pearce comments:

*You actually get people who are going out and deliberately kind of challenging where the line is, where are we going to draw the line, where are we going to say actually that we understand you have a duty to protect society, but actually at the same time, you're now infringing on our civil liberties (J. Pearce, April 11, 2019).*

It is therefore difficult to determine the appropriate threshold between governments providing protective actions and protecting privacy of its citizens. There is no specific place for the threshold common to all cases. These discussions about balancing protective acts of security forces or government and the privacy of citizens are prompted in crises. In the context of terrorism, the extent to which civil rights should be protected is a matter of debate and there is no definitive start and end point.

Intense policies and acts which intervene in citizens' daily lives can thus damage democracy and its efficient working processes. Critical thinking is a priority in the education system and might sometimes be endangered by intense preventive actions.

#### **10.2.6 Counterterrorism funding**

The government increased the funding for counterterrorism and intelligence since the 2000s. Funding for counterterrorism and intelligence increased from 1 billion GBP to 3.5 billion GBP in 2010 / 2011, which is the longest sustained growth period in the defense budget since the 1980s (Cabinet Office, 2008). The UK's budget allocated to the war on terrorism has increased and the issue is taken very seriously. The issue that needs to be addressed, however, is whether antiterrorist strategies really need such

funding and whether terrorism is indeed such a great threat to the country. There is thus a question mark over the UK's priorities and whether there is really a need to increase funding for the counterterrorism process. Terrorism is something we need to combat; however, is it something that should be considered a priority in the UK? Maynard approaches this issue by comparing countering other threats and countering terrorism. According to Maynard (J. L. Maynard, personal communication, February 14, 2019), other threats might need more financial investment because terrorism is not actually such a major problem in terms of the number of lives lost when compared to other threats and incidents in the UK.

### **10.3 Conclusion**

RQ3 asked what the institutional responses of the UK to the 2005 London terrorist attacks were, during and after the incident?

This question should be answered in the framework of short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies.

When short-term institutional responses are analyzed, it is clear that there are some specific problems such as:

1. Difficulties reaching the people trapped underground which decreased the level of success of emergency services in all three underground explosions (emergency services).
2. Ineffective coordination and communication among some ambulances, locations (emergency services).
3. Successful treating of injured people by NHS, however inadequate immediate health responses covering all victims (emergency services).
4. Poor radio communications in the tunnels (communication).

5. Problems about communication within and between emergency services (communication).
6. Intensity of the repeated calls from persons and an inefficient answer of the Casualty Bureau (short-term actions of the casualty bureau).
7. Successful identification of hospitalized victims, but unsuccessful identification of non-hospitalized ones (Collection of victims details).

The primary sources mostly focused on problems and the main concerns about short-term institutional responses. It is difficult to reach a single conclusion about effectiveness of these short-term responses. This study focused on main issues and concerns about short term institutional responses and could not find more detailed information about emergency responses. Therefore, it is misleading to refer to short term responses as unsuccessful as a result of these findings. However, the above-mentioned problems about short-term responses are important to consider when 2005 London terrorist attacks are analyzed in terms of short-term institutional responses.

When long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were analyzed, it should be mentioned that there are effective, sophisticated institutions for countering terrorism and there is a division of labor among each unit even though these units are responsible for reporting on each other. Counter-terrorism legislation in the UK is well-developed and terrorist acts were carefully explained in the Terrorism Act. There is a multidimensional approach to solve problems about terrorism in the UK. There is a certain roadmap (National Security Strategy) aimed to protect the UK's security. The UK has also significant, well-developed, sophisticated counterterrorism strategy which is called CONTEST, including four steps: Pursue, Protect, Prevent, Prepare. CONTEST was evaluated as an effective strategy as findings from primary

sources and elite interviews, however, its Prevent strategy is found to be unsuccessful, because of seeing terrorism not as a social strategy and only focusing on short-term intelligence services. In particular, the Channel program highly criticized in the framework of Prevent, because of its unsuccessful structure. As a result of discussion about the effectiveness of intelligence in the UK, it was found from the literature and elite interviews that the intelligence services tried to do its best, but it has not a single priority. So, according to primary sources and elite interviews, intelligence is effective in countering terrorism in the UK.

Based on the academic literature, official reports and key-informant interviews, the structure and functioning of the UK's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies within the framework of the London terrorist attacks of 2005, can be considered to have been effective, with some minor mistakes. The CONTEST strategy is an effective strategy in a general sense but there are significant criticisms especially of its Prevent initiative. Further, sophisticated anti-terror laws were enforced in the UK and sufficient funds allocated for the war on terror, and intelligence agencies are effective in combating terrorism.



*Image 28. 7/7 Memorial, Tavistock Square – 1. This image shows the memorial of victims of 7 July 2005 bus explosion.*



Image 29. 7/7 Memorial Tavistock Square – 2. This image shows some of the names of the victims on the memorial in Tavistock Square.



## **11 Victims' Perceptions of Institutional Responses: London**

### **11.1 Overview**

In the previous chapter, primary sources, secondary sources and elite interviews were analyzed to evaluate the short- and long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies of the UK within the framework of the 2005 London terrorist attacks. While short-term institutional responses varied in terms of effectiveness, long-term responses and counterterrorism strategies were considered successful with only minor deficiencies.

This chapter focuses on victims' perceptions of the institutional responses and thus addresses the fourth research question, RQ4: how do victims of the London terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses?

In London, four victims affected by the 7/7 terrorist attacks were interviewed. First, memories of victims are presented in their own words. Then interviews with victims are drawn on in an attempt to understand perceptions of the institutional responses. Finally, interviews published in newspapers are analyzed to gather additional data from the victims' perspectives.

### **11.2 Victims' General Memories of the Terror Attacks**

Before asking victims' perceptions of institutional responses, victims were asked how they remember the day of the terrorist attacks and to what extent victims can remember what was happened during the terrorist attacks. In this way, the validity of victims' perceptions of the institutional responses were provided. Moreover, detailed information about what happened on the day of terrorist attacks were shown from the perspectives of the victims.

The business analyst (47 years old) remembers the 7/7 terrorist attacks very accurately. On the day of the terrorist attacks, he had travelled to work from his home, 30 miles from North London. He had taken the train from King's Cross station to go to his workplace in Regent Street. He talked openly about that day, describing it as very crowded, and remembering that he had trouble getting on the train because of it was rush hour:

*When I got on the train and it moved, at first, I could do nothing but move my arms; at that time I also had a magazine in my hand. First, a flash a light formed, and the train suddenly started to stop. We stopped almost instantly. Everyone fell forward as the train suddenly stopped. So I found myself on the floor.*

The business analyst continued recounting his memories. When the train stopped on July 7, 2005, he instantly knew it must be a terrorist attack. His first thought was whether he was having a nightmare and waiting to wake up:

*It seems like if you have a picture of what hell looks like. I did never believe things heaven or hell or those kinds of concepts. But I thought maybe I should believe it. Because, this is hell and that day, that's where I was. I got up myself. My arms and legs and, I didn't feel. But I was convinced that actually I was still alive, it wasn't some kind of afterlife and so the... I thought I could get out of here alive. I have a young daughter at home just six years old at that time and I [thought I] can't die here. So, I have to get out. And after a minute or two, I don't know how long exactly, the times are a little bit arbitrary because I*



*don't exactly remember how many seconds or minutes had gone by. And, but there is some kind of smoke or something drifting down the carriage. So, I thought it must be something like a chemical weapon. So, the smoke started drifting, that is what would be a chemical I was thinking of a nuclear attack or some sort. So, I got down on the ground and my hands to my mouth. At first, I tried to bang the window with my hands to break the glass. I assumed that whatever it was drifting through the end. I didn't know that until, I think, a week or two later. Yes so, I found out a week or so later that there were people dead, I think 2 weeks later. Twenty-five people killed in my carriage., I didn't know on the day when I left the train. Because my thoughts were just to get out of there and stay alive. It was my only thought.*

His only thought was to survive. He acted in fear and panic, and only later learned of those who had died. He was unaware of how many people had been killed in his carriage at the time.

A victim, who is currently working as a security analyst (29 years old), and was indirectly affected by terrorist attacks, described his memories on that day:

*My summer holiday had just started a couple of days before, so I was excited to have finished school for the year! I was 15 years old. I was due to play a cricket match for my school's 1st team, so I was very excited for the game. I remember watching BBC News in the morning (maybe around 8.00) whilst having breakfast and I saw the breaking news about the attacks. I think the emotions I felt were of surprise and shock. There was the*

*realization that the horror of 9/11 (Islamist terrorism targeting the West) had actually occurred in my home city, London, and my home city was now a target.*

Another victim (52 years old), who was six feet away from the bomber during the King's Cross/ Russell Square terrorist attacks, remembered everything very clearly:

*My memories of the attacks are very strong due to my proximity to one of the bombings. I was six feet away from the Kings Cross/Russell Square bomber. When the bomb went off, I had no idea what had occurred. There was an instant change between the train pulling away from the platform at Kings Cross to only 30 seconds later. I was trapped in the carriage for at least 40 minutes and was stretchered out at Kings Cross. I sustained a serious leg injury and numerous burns.*

Another victim (42), an employee of an NGO, described the terrorist attacks, commenting that he could also remember the day of terrorist attack very well.

Victims of London terrorist attacks thus still remembered the moment of the incident very well. They could describe very clearly what happened, when, and in what order.

### **11.3 Victims' Perceptions**

#### **11.3.1 Overview**

The following sections first present an evaluation of victims' perceptions of the short-term institutional responses, and then of victims' perceptions and thoughts about the long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies.

### 11.3.2 Short-term institutional responses

Three out of the four victims interviewed expressed their thoughts on the structure and the functioning of the short-term institutional responses during and shortly after the terrorist attacks.

Victims have addressed various issues when commenting on the structure and functioning of the short-term institutional responses. Fear, panic and confusion, perceptions of emergency services, and economic concerns all emerged as emphasized issues and are explored further here.

#### 11.3.2.1 Fear, panic, and confusion

The interviewed victims of the 7/7 London terrorist attacks mentioned their panic and fear because of both the attacks and unhelpful short-term institutional responses.

The interviewed victims of the 7/7 London terrorist attacks frequently mentioned the chaotic situation in the aftermath. They believed that there was turmoil immediately following the terrorist attacks, and they did not know what to do. They also mentioned that it was not clear who was the official authority, while they were trying to save themselves. For instance, the business analyst commented:

*...interesting thing was when I came to Russel Square Station, I was confused as everybody would have been confused by what was going on, and there were a few people wearing high visibility jackets. They looked like officials and I think on different occasions, they got my name and contact details from someone. So, I thought somebody would have me in the system, the system like police or health database, or something else.*

*Somebody would contact me to discover what to, give me some directions on what I should be doing. Because I didn't know what I should do in response.*

This statement shows how confused the victim was after the attack; he did not know where he should go, what he should do, and was confused about who could help.

People in a state of panic and fear may not be able to clearly process what is happening in the short term. This also sometimes impairs memory of how long certain actions took at the time, for example, finding a way out, or finding someone to ask the way out, helping others etc. They tend to remember the sequence of actions they took (when the explosion happened, where they fled to, when they spoke to the authorities, when they got help from the authorities, etc.) but were confused about lengths of time, for example how long they were separated from someone. Especially after the terrorist attacks on the underground, victims who tried to leave the scene were not sure what time it was at that point. In the framework of institutional responses, from time to time, it was unclear who was in charge, and the victims stated that they experienced fear and panic as a result of the terrorist attack but also from confusion about which unit would provide the short-term responses.

Two of the victims, in particular, while they recognized that short-term responses were trying to help, felt fear and panic due to the confusion.

Citizens' expectations of protection from the government may increase because of fears (Sinclair and LoCicero, 2010). Thus it can be argued that fear can be mitigated with states' responses to terrorist attacks and that the persons who received insufficient help from institutional responses within the framework of any sort of terrorist attacks

will have increased fear compared to persons whose needs were sufficiently provided for by the relevant institutions.

### 11.3.2.2 Perceptions of emergency services

Another controversial topic mentioned by victims about short-term responses concerned the emergency response teams. For instance, the business analyst reported that he was stuck in the police cordon and did not get enough help immediately after the terrorist attack by first-aid services. He thought it might be a good idea to go to the hospital alone. He did not experience serious physical injuries from the terrorist attacks but the next day he went to his general practitioner (GP). He complained about the lack of health aid after the terrorist attacks:

*The interesting thing was, I think on the same day on the Thursday later in the evening, the local police, not the London Metropolitan police, they came to my house. So they, because the local police came to my house, that is the information was being shared... somebody would contact me and tell me what to do from a victim's perspective and also from a health perspective. [But] I never heard anything from anybody.*

He said that he was contacted immediately after the incident and his contact details had obviously been shared, but he had not received medical advice from any institutional unit. His view was that there was no effective aftercare, and he was not satisfied with the health service responses. Seven years after the incident, he became aware of a health problem from the incident:

*As a result of that, I didn't find out until seven years later that I had a spinal injury as a result of that; that is why you see the scar here after surgery in the first spinal injury.*

However, according to a King's Cross survivor (52 years old), there were no failures in the response of the emergency services during and after the attacks. He said that medical personnel in the hospitals also did an incredible job under an immense strain. He personally benefited from the use of family liaison officers provided by the Metropolitan Police.

The business analyst victim said he had heard that victims with serious health problems, especially those living in the city, were being supported with health issues, but he was not given that support. It was his view that those living outside London did not receive help with health benefits, but those living within London did.

Another victim (29 years old) mentioned that he did not remember emergency aid because he was not directly at the scene. However, he thinks that the short-term response was good enough, as far as he could follow from the news.

Opinions thus differed between victims over whether health and emergency care were effective. Opinions varied between residents within and outside London, and by degree of the health problem, with some victims satisfied and some criticizing emergency interventions, especially in terms of health support.

#### **11.3.2.3 Economic concerns**

Another important point for the victims, who revealed their perceptions and thoughts about the short-term responses, concerned compensation for terrorism and financial support in the wake of the terrorist incident. Victims again had different views

and experiences on the compensation given to those affected by the terrorist attacks and the families of those who died.

For example, a business analyst reported asking for compensation, but he was not compensated because he was not physically injured after the attack:

*There was a set up in London, a bombings relief fund which was in conjunction with a permanent agency from the criminal injuries compensation agency. My experience of that was, it wasn't too bad. I didn't have to claim anything really, because of, I have filled in the form, but I wasn't expecting to get anything because I wasn't physically injured. This was before I realized the final injury. So, I wasn't expecting anything really. Physically injured people, they maybe didn't get as much as they hoped to get. My experience wasn't representative because I didn't really need any compensation.*

However, a King's Cross victim (52 years old) mentioned many victims received support from various groups in the short and long-term:

*I did receive money from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and a fund set up by the then London Mayor Ken Livingstone. I experienced very welcoming input from the late Tessa Jowell, who was very conscious of our concerns etc.*

In terms of compensation, these two victims had different thoughts on receiving economic help as a short-term institutional response. As for whether the victims received economic assistance, there were two main problems: no economic assistance was given to the victims, who were considered not to have serious physical problems,

for health or other reasons. In addition, the business analyst said that the relevant institutions of the state could not establish an effective communication mechanism with victims outside London, because of this situation, not every victim could be reached so it was unclear who had an economic need.

#### **11.3.2.4 Conclusion**

In summary, victims talked about fear, panic and confusion, their perception of emergency services, and economic consequences, while thinking about short-term responses and expressing their perception of these responses. Of the victims who experienced fear, panic and confusion, this related both to the terrorist incidents and short-term institutional responses. In addition, regarding financial support, some victims reported not having received assistance, but had no financial problems resulting from the attack and another pointed out that they had received significant financial assistance. There was thus no commonality between the opinions of the interviewees on the topic of short-term responses.

#### **11.3.3 Long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies**

This section presents an analysis of victims' perceptions about long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies.

Of the four victims interviewed, three expressed opinions on long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. Intelligence, awareness, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), new identity formation and solidarity all emerged as emphasized issues and are explored further here.



### 11.3.3.1 General Perceptions to Long-term Institutional Responses and Counter-terrorism Strategies

The victims stated that although they were not aware of all the long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies, they had no negative perceptions of them.

For instance, the security analyst victim, who had positive perceptions of the structure and functioning of the counterterrorism strategies before and after the 7/7 terrorist attacks, explained his thoughts:

*.... given the success of the UK government in preventing more attacks, I think the anti-terror strategies must have been generally competent. I think my attitude was that the relevant authorities (police, MI5) needed more support and backing, not criticism. I think the UK generally has a high regard for its security and intelligence agencies; I always had this attitude. I think I attributed the success of the attacks to the skill of the attackers, not the failure of security services.*

The interviewee thus believes that the UK has sophisticated security units, and its intelligence were successful. In general, he found institutional and counterterrorism responses from the UK positive. In defending this view, he expressed his opinion mainly in relation to intelligence, referring to MI5, police forces and intelligence agencies. He felt that the institutions concerned should be supported rather than criticized. This victim thus had a positive perception of long-term institutional responses and anti-terrorist strategies.

Moreover, other 2 victims of 7/7 London terrorist attacks were satisfied with long-term institutional responses. They mostly mentioned that the rule of law developed for counter-terrorism strategies of the UK seems well-prepared, and CONTEST is a sophisticated unit for countering terrorism.

### 11.3.3.2 Criticisms of intelligence

Another opinion on the issue of intelligence and the investigation of people responsible for terrorist attacks came from the victim of the King's Cross explosion, who believed that there was ineffective investigation of the bombers before the attacks:

*I strongly believe that better investigating of the bombers would have stopped the bombings. Failures by a number of agencies directly contributed to the 7/7 attacks. As previously mentioned, bombers' names were known but were wrongly thought to be on the "periphery". They were not adequately investigated.*

He noted that names of the people responsible for the terrorist attacks were known, but because there was insufficient research, mistakes were made in the intelligence section; the failure to find these people lead to the terrorist attacks.

The King's Cross victim also reported negative perceptions of other long-term responses, saying that the main failures related to the terrorist attacks were covered up, and that false information about the attacks had been given to the public. When probed, he declined to elaborate further on what issues had been covered up or what kind of misinformation had been given to the public. However, he said that he did not trust counterterrorism strategies in the wake of the terrorist incident. He had attended various security service briefings after the attacks and realized that security services had serious failings in their investigation processes:

*...but these (these meetings and briefings) also showed me that faults and missed opportunities had occurred. When we were told one thing but subsequently found out that major mistakes were uncovered, this severely dented my trust in those agencies. A lot of the survivors/bereaved felt that we were being purposely misinformed.*

The King's Cross victim said that after the terrorist incident, the victims were given false information and that the details of the terrorist incident were hidden from them. He also stated that he was skeptical about the protection abilities of the intelligence and police forces:

*Unfortunately, I did doubt the protection abilities of the government etc., especially as on the day I left hospital (21st July) there was a failed attempt to further bomb the tube network.*

The business analyst felt that the effectiveness of communication and interaction among units has improved since 2005, with better coordination between the people involved in counterterrorism, such as MI5, MI6 and Scotland Yard:

*I think there is better information sharing than there was at that time.*

### **11.3.3.3 Trust**

The victims tried to explain their concept of trust while talking about their perception of long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. As argued earlier, variations in the level of fear may be related with variations in trust in the government (Sinclair & LoCicero, 2010). According to Sinclair and LoCicero

(2010), a psychological mechanism increased by fears of terrorism affects trust in government at an individual level. As a result of perceptions of victims, trust emerges as a significant issue. Even though the victims talk about their trust or distrust in government, their approach to trust was contextually different from one other's.

For instance, the security analyst victim talked about trust within the framework of "trust in government agencies" such as intelligence, police forces and MI5. The security analyst defined the definition of trust as "trust in institutions," with particular emphasis on intelligence-related institutions. He claimed to have confidence in these institutions. However, it is important to note that this interviewee was not present during a terrorist incident, and was only indirectly affected by the events, which may account for his statements varying from those of other victims, who were at the scene of terrorist events and lived through the experiences directly.

Anderson (2010) mentions that trust in government is frequently evaluated with political trust or confidence in government. Easton (as cited in Lavrakas, 2008) says that there are two different types of trust such as "diffused support" which refers to trust in institutions within a government, and specific support which refers to trust in officeholders. The comments above from a security analyst states that he had sufficient trust in institutions such as intelligence, police forces and MI5.

However, the business analyst victim believed that intelligence could not be effective because it was awarded insufficient importance. From a security viewpoint, his confidence in administration had decreased. However, he trusted the police forces and intelligence in general, and felt trust had nothing to do with political figures. However, he also mentioned that anti-terrorist forces such as the police and intelligence could not do their jobs properly due to inappropriate policies, and therefore indirectly had a trust problem:

*My trust in government is less. Well, I think it is not so much in what the government does or all its political staff but actually the people who keep us safe. It is not the government, but it is the police government's policies and their effects on intelligence.*

As it can be understood here that the business analyst did not make any comment in terms of specific support, which refers to trust in officeholders (see Lavrakas, 2008), but he had some doubts about functioning of intelligence. He said that his trust in institutions such as the police force continued although it was reduced. Overall, he had confidence in intelligence in the UK although he felt it was less effective than before, because inappropriate policies were being pursued by the government. His confidence in intelligence declined as each year went by. His declining trust in institutions was therefore not related to structural defects in institutions, but rather to the negative impact of foreign policy decisions and the lack of sufficient resources for intelligence to prevent potential terrorist attacks. The business analyst reported that the security forces and intelligence services were financially constrained and therefore unable to effectively counter terrorism. His belief that the intelligence services could succeed had therefore gradually diminished:

*I think that they did a fantastic job with the resources they have, but the government cut the funding and their ability to do their jobs. My faith is less because I don't think they have enough resources. I knew there would be terrorist attacks, but I never imagined I would be there, but it happened. There is still a certain degree of trust in the intelligence services even though they couldn't stop every attempt. After that... I think... I*

*wouldn't say trust, but I would say that I realized. I think, in 2005, 2006, I remember some statistics. I don't remember exactly what it was. But it was something crazy like 2000 people, the intelligence services were trained to watch, with only 2400 intelligent officers. So, it is crazy... When I started to hear these things, oh my God, you know, how could they possibly monitor all these people with a few intelligent officers. In that way, I think my faith or trust has lessened in the intelligence [services].*

The business analyst-victim said that he started to worry about terrorism when the Iraq War began. His trust in government had been significantly impacted in 2002 when the Iraq war started:

*That is why I am losing trust in government anyway.*

The business analyst and King's Cross victims identified the inappropriate foreign policy actions the main causes for 7/7 terrorist attacks. They pointed out that they had become more focused targets for terrorism because of misplaced foreign policy actions, such as the involvement of the UK in the Iraq War.

These viewpoints of the business analysis and King's Cross victim thus seem aligned. The victims had no direct distrust of the institutions, but were skeptical, believing that the government paid insufficient attention to institutions such as intelligence; they emphasized that the main issue they distrusted was the government's foreign policy. Although victims were critical of intelligence primarily, their main distrust as directed at the government and foreign policy.

At this point, victims of London terrorist attacks have mistrust in intelligence and mistrust government's foreign policy actions. So, victims do not mention any specific name of any politicians. Their general approach about mistrust is based on mistrust in functioning of institutions (particularly intelligence) and mistrust in foreign policy actions of the UK.

#### **11.3.3.4 Awareness**

The victims talked about long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies, and the impact of these responses in developing their own political awareness. They became more interested in counterterrorism, trying to better understand institutional responses. The King's Cross victim commented:

*I had no knowledge of counterterrorism strategies before the attacks – however, this changed quickly. After the attacks, I attended police and security service briefings which gave me an idea of what was being done to find people involved.*

After the terrorist attacks, the business analyst, the King's Cross victim and security analyst all talked about how they began to follow the news on terrorism more carefully. Their awareness of political and social issues increased. For instance, the King's Cross victim commented:

*I have more understanding now as to the immense challenges faced by agencies in the fight against terrorism.*

The business analyst interviewee started paying more attention to the news after the 7/7 incident:

*Before the incident, it is interesting, but I know it at the high level, this is going on the world. I started becoming more interested in detail after the incident.*

Victims not only increased their awareness of state decisions about political and terrorist events, but also about impacts on their own lives. For example, the business analyst worked hard on issues such as “being a victim in terrorist incidents” “trying to seek his right within the framework of institutional responses,” “efforts to return to his old life” and “the healing process”. The business analyst stated that these terrorist incidents had caused him to question life and how he could find alternative methods to heal himself, such as training in sound therapy:

*I discovered something that really touched me, not touched me but it made me very very relaxed. It is called sound therapy, sound healing. So, I heard this, all I can do to participate and lie down on the mat and listen, close your eyes and listen very beautiful sounds. So, when I heard, I wanted to learn how to do this. The lady who's running these sessions, I asked to her where did you train to do this? She told me and as soon as I was more mobile, I applied to enroll on this course, and I was interviewed to get on the two years training to do this. That process, training process to complimentary therapists. I expect two years the process of training to be a complimentary therapist and learn more about yourself as well. I learned lots of myself about between 2010 and 2012. And it helped me to understand people much better and much more easily. This definitely changed me.*



After the terrorist attacks, victims thus both increased their political awareness and also knowledge of themselves and their lives.

#### **11.3.3.5 Post-traumatic stress disorder**

As previously argued, people living close to terrorist attacks areas more tend to suffer severe psychological trauma (Cohen, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas, 2002). It was also mentioned that New York residents displayed symptoms of PTSD (Schlenger et al., 2002), and after the Madrid and London terrorist attacks, residents displayed PTSD symptoms as well (Davis & MacDonald, 2004), after terrorist attacks.

The victims stated that they experienced a number of psychological disorders and trauma in the long term, both because of the London 2005 terrorist attacks and because of long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies related to health.

The business analyst and the King's Cross interviewee both reported experiencing PTSD for a long time, both having been diagnosed by a psychiatrist. The business analyst knew other people who has also suffered. Many victims had had to leave their jobs, because their employers could not support them for a long period:

*They couldn't find any financial resources to support their employers. I think they struggled a little bit and then people were injured as well.*

There have been tragic changes in the life of the business analyst. As a result of the challenges, he had to slow down his work pace and his marriage failed due to the stress. Although his finances were not affected immediately after the 7/7 terrorist attacks, he started to have a hard time emotionally:

*While I was at work, I distracted myself from what I was going on emotionally. Actually, in my job, I got promoted and benefited a little bit economically for maybe three years also, two or three years. Then, the stress and anxiety come from the effect of the responsibility. So, I wasn't dealing with the PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder. I was just getting more and more stressed by ignoring everything. More pressure and more responsibility at work. I didn't leave my job, I didn't leave the company but had to take a bit of more of a back seat by changing my role within the company, to where there was a kind of less pressure.*

As a result of PTSD, he was unable to handle the intense pace of work, and asked his employer if he could move to a job with less responsibility.

As previously argued in the literature review chapter, victims generally feel vulnerable, extreme fear, lack of protection, and these feelings persist intensely for a long time, so they suffer from high level of anxiety afterwards (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). Victims also may feel that their lives will never be the same again, presenting hypervigilance, recurring worry, negative beliefs about the world (de Vicente Colomina, 2019). The King's Cross interviewee also experienced severe PTSD after the attacks, which presented itself in the form of increased anxiety, anger and hyper vigilance. He felt unable to live in London. Shortly afterwards, in 2006, he moved away, which helped his recovery, but still continued to work in the city. Health issues had several impacts thus related the PTSD itself, to employment and unemployment, and financial issues.

### **11.3.3.6 New identity formation and solidarity**

Victims also mentioned that they were not able to benefit from health compensations offered by the institutions within the framework of long-term institutional responses. Additionally, although individuals considered themselves as individual victims at first, over time, they began to form a collective consciousness and tried to reflect this consciousness in various ways.

According to Volkan (1988), large-group identity continues in the future through people's references to historical events and their mental representations of the event. When a trauma is remembered again and again, "time collapses" through a bridge between the traumatic event and contemporary threats (Volkan, 1997). Victims discussing long-term support that they were struggling to benefit from referred to "we" instead of "I," having met with various community groups and Facebook groups, in an effort to make their voices heard. Online communities do not vary in functioning of organized collectivities, but the "rules of game" vary, including for instance, use of technology, personal action frames, and the timing of getting in the game of organization (Bennett and Segerber, 2012).

The victims, who moved in the direction of brotherhood and collective consciousness, supported through their having experienced the same event, mentioned that solidarity developed spontaneously. For instance, the business analyst claimed that after the terrorist attack, he felt like the other survivors were family; he had regular meetings with them, and they became friends. He also started to participate in public speaking at meetings building on these relationships and friendships and became a member of various associations. This led to a victim solidarity group, in which they called themselves "survivors" rather than "victims". They saw themselves as a group trying to survive, trying to forget about their pain, and trying to return to their old

normal lives. He also worked with many international associations and met other terrorist victims and survivors from elsewhere in the world. These networks were a kind of mutual support group or informal support group to him.

From this point of view, it seems that a collective identity called “7/7 survivors” had been created, rather than a single identity. Collective identity has a strong effect on a persons’ willingness to engage in social protest and other collective activities which promote social change (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). However, it may not be enough to say that the 7/7 survivors group became purely a collective identity. The group likewise formed a politicized collective identity. When group identification emerges for a social movement, depersonalization and politicization of that group identification may begin to take place.

As detailed above, after the events of 7/7, victims, who were affected by institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies and who occasionally failed to find what they hoped for, began to pursue their rights, called themselves survivors instead of victims and created a collective identity. However, by creating a collective identity, they created a political collective identity, opening up their pursuance of rights within the political framework.

#### **11.4 Newspaper Interviews**

In addition to the four interviews conducted, interviews with six survivors published in *The Guardian* newspaper in 2015 were analyzed. In these interviews, survivors reported what they remembered at the time of the terrorist attacks and how they had moved on with their lives afterwards.

Professor John Tulloch was on the Circle line between Edgware Road and Paddington on the day of terrorist attack. He recounted how his memories slowly came back:

*I was sitting only four feet away from the bomber, yet I came away with no significant injuries. At the coroner's inquest, it emerged that everyone around me had either died or lost limbs. I was only four to six feet away from the bomber, sitting opposite him, and yet came away with no significant physical injuries (Conner, 2015).*

Prof Tulloch mentioned that when he saw his photo on the front of the newspaper next to a photo of Tony Blair, he had felt a second trauma, because he believed that the attacks occurred due to misguided foreign policy decisions. He also mentioned that he was feeling great anger over politics, so he wrote a book title, *Icons of Wars and Terror*. He suffered from PTSD and experienced flashbacks as well as vertigo, making him vomit in the street (Conner, 2015).

Another survivor, Martine Wright, was on the Circle line between Liverpool Street and Aldgate on the day of the terrorist attacks. After the attacks, she was put into a coma for ten days. After she woke up, she learned that her legs had had to be amputated. She said that she began to think “Why me? Why am I one of the worst injured? Why have I lost both of my legs, and above the knee?” For her, the “Why me” was a big thing in the first year, but she began to feel strong with the support of her family. She became interested in sitting-volleyball and competed in the 2012 Paralympics, coming eighth place (Conner, 2015).

Martine Wright understood why she was affected by the terrorist incident scared and in the first place, but then began to ask existential questions; she remarked that she survived this period with the support of her family and had since continued her life in a different way.

Another survivor, Gill Hicks, was on the Piccadilly line between King's Cross and Russell Square on the day of incident:

*7 July 2005 is an absolute demarcation line in a split life. I look at everything before as life number one, and everything after that as a second chance (Conner, 2015).*

She described her working life before and after July 7, 2005. For her, going back to work was interesting. She had been a workaholic before, but things began to change with her new life.

*I remember being there in my wheelchair [at work], listening to the meetings they had, and I thought: "Oh my God, I've been blown up and you're still talking about that?" (Conner, 2015).*

In 2007, she set up a charity, MAD for Peace. She liked the idea of having MAD as an acronym for "Making a Difference," but also to express her anger. In 2013, she moved back to Australia and had a little girl:

*I would like to enhance my life for [her], and I want to show that the tactics of terrorism will never win (Conner, 2015).*

Although she was a survivor, who was seriously affected by terrorism, Gill Hicks, who believed that terrorism could never win, made this belief even more concrete by creating a charity.

Sajda Mughal was on the Piccadilly line between King's Cross and Russell Square on the day of the terrorist attacks. She quit her job in 2007 and then started working for JAN Trust. Her work focused on counterterrorism and working with at-risk and radicalized persons and their families.

She also referred to her approach to life before 7/7. She was not thinking about getting married or having kids until at least her mid-thirties. However, her perspective changed and not long after the terror attacks, she got married and had two daughters (Conner, 2015).

Gill Hicks and Sajda Mughal also changed the direction of their business lives after the terrorist attacks and began working with people on terrorism, radicalization and those at-risk. Some survivors thus made radical changes in their work lives and began to try to understand terrorism and people at risk. Terrorist attacks have made them question their own lives and made them become even more aware of terrorism, creating foundations to further formalize this awareness and even work proactively to combat it.

Mark Margolis was on the Piccadilly line between King's Cross and Russell Square:

*In hospital, they cleaned up my head wounds. They were throwing away the tissues and I remember the banging of the metal bin lid made me jump out of my skin. After that, I was in denial for a bit. I didn't want to believe a bomb went off in my carriage, but I felt a huge sense of relief when I realized the bombers were dead" (Conner, 2015).*

He said that some of survivors had created a website called “Kings Cross United”. Through this website, they could communicate and share information, such as how to fill out medical forms. They used this website until 2013. Afterwards, someone from Boston Medical Help service contacted him and they set up an online network for the Boston survivors:

*Our site is still a bit of a safety blanket. Although I was back to work and on the tube the next day – I felt defiant about that – there are milestones to get through. Last year I went to work for the first time on 7/7. This year I will go to the memorial service. Next year, maybe not. I’ll always take time out to think about those that died, but I also feel I owe it them to get on with my life (Conner, 2015).*

Thelma Stober was on the Circle line between Liverpool Street and Aldgate on 7<sup>th</sup> July. She lost her leg after the attacks. She was very determined and all she wanted to do was walk again:

*Whatever had happened, they weren’t going to stop me getting on with my life (Conner, 2015).*

Her first legal fight was with the NHS, because she was only offered an artificial limb that didn’t match the color of her skin:

*There have been a lot of battles since – surgery to counteract the pain of walking and another legal fight that I helped with, for a public inquiry into what happened (Conner, 2015).*



She returned to work in May 2006. However, since the attacks, she traveled by taxi rather than taking the tube. She suffered anxiety and panic attacks, but despite all the difficulties, said that she is thankful every day:

*Whatever your situation, I believe that there is hope if you have courage and you can make good out of bad things (Conner, 2015).*

Castells (2004, p. 34) states that: “[The] process of power-making must be seen from two perspectives: on the one hand seizing and/or enforcing power; on the other hand, resisting power, on behalf of interests, values and projects that are excluded or under-represented in the programs of the networks”. From this point of view, victims who did not get the help they desired from institutional responses sought to continue with a more organized struggle. People may have different responses to injustices (Gromet, Okimoto, Wenzel, and Darley, 2012). Victims may have responses such as retributive and restorative justice (Gromet et al., 2012). Retributive justice is described as the punishing of offenders and the reaffirming of societal boundaries and values (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith & Huo, 1997); however, restorative justice follows a bilateral process which means that affected persons from a process come together by determining the best repair for the harms that the offense has caused (Gromet et al., 2012). Restorative justice gives victims an active role to play in justice proceedings and outcomes (Gromet et al., 2012). Within “seeking justice” perspective, victims of the London 2005 terrorist attacks tend more to follow restorative justice by following the process governed between victims and states’ institutional responses by establishing support groups, attending public conferences and establishing various institutions that aimed to fight against terrorism.

In summary, analysis of the published interviews suggests that every survivor considers terrorism a serious problem, but they have not been helpless in the context of the terrorist events they have experienced. Rather, they have tried to develop their own fighting mechanisms against terrorism. In doing so, many have made significant changes in their lifestyles, and these important changes have also affected their professional careers. These survivors have taken their negative memories of the terrorist attacks have diverted this energy more positively with time towards their own mechanisms of coping with life.

### **11.5 Conclusion**

The RQ.4 in this thesis is: how do victims of the London terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses?

When evaluating short-term institutional responses, victims commented on fear, panic and confusion, perceptions of emergency services and economic concerns. It is difficult to make a general conclusion about perceptions of victims to institutional responses. However, there are some certain results such as fearful and panicked victims who were confused about the functioning on short-term responses. They had very different thoughts about functioning of emergence services because all victims had received emergency assistance in a different way. So, some of them were happy with the emergency services but some of them were not. As a result of interviews, it is also understood that victims had not benefited from economic assistance equally. Therefore, the result from conducted interviews only shows that there is not equal help to all victims in terms of short-term institutional responses. So, there is not a single approach of the victims to short-term institutional responses.

When victims explained their perceptions to long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies, it was found that, in general victims' perceptions to long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were positive. Even though they do not have very detailed background explanation to support their perceptions and arguments, they declared that their general perception to long-term institutional responses is positive. They do not mention any failures on countering terrorism in terms of legal sense, they do not have always detailed information about anti-terror laws or other legislations of the UK.

Victims who talked about mistrust say that their mistrust is because of mistrust in functioning of institutions (particularly intelligence) and mistrust in foreign policy actions of the UK. Victims also emphasized that they became aware of ongoing political debates after the terrorist attacks, and some of them also increased awareness of their life to heal in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. It was found that victims had PTSD because of both the terrorist attacks and the ineffectiveness of some of the long-term responses. They also developed a perception like "being united" by establishing support groups among victims and they began to be active when they did not have any answers from institutional responses regarding to terrorist attacks. They also identified themselves as survivors rather than victims. This is also a signal of "holding life", "having hope for the future" and "trying to continue to their "normal" life" before the terrorist attacks.

Newspaper interviews were used to support fieldwork in this research. Victims in the newspapers were trying coping mechanisms by various methods such as establishing trust organizations, making shifts in their life such as changing jobs, finding new meanings in life as a result of awareness developed after the terrorist attacks. Some victims from the newspaper interviews had also experienced PTSD and

had long-term health problems. They made changes in their lives and the way they lived. For instance, Gill Hicks set up a foundation to fight terrorism and Sajda Mugha set up a trust. The victims demonstrated solidarity by establishing a politicized collective identity.

Chapters 6 through to 8 reported on the case study of the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, including the background to terrorism in Turkey, institutional short- and long-term responses (analyzed from the literature, reports and key informant interviews), and the same institutional responses analyzed from interview data of victims affected by the attacks. In a similar way, chapters 9 through to 11 reported on the case study of the 2005 UK terrorist attacks.

Research questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the framework of Istanbul and London terrorist attacks were answered separately until this chapter. What sort of similarities and differences can we deduce from this comparison? In what sense can the comparative comments we receive guide us? The answer to these questions will be discussed in the next section within the framework of research question 5.

## 12 Turkey vs UK: Cross-case Analysis

In this chapter, the two cases will be compared to identify differences and similarities. This chapter thus addresses the final research question, RQ5: what are the similarities and differences between the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks in terms of the institutional responses to terrorism and the victims' perceptions of those responses?

In this chapter, first, institutional responses of Turkey and the UK will be compared and then victims' perceptions of Istanbul and London terrorist attacks will be analyzed in a comparative way of thinking. As a final point, the results will be evaluated within the framework of sociological institutionalism.

For a cross-case analysis, it is difficult to compare Turkey's and UK's institutional responses, because each case has unique dimensions and their institutions about countering-terrorism are totally different. Each case was also analyzed "within a case" analyses by having different themes on short- and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies. However, some "main points" resulted from the structure of functioning of institutional responses can be after analyzing these two cases, by doing cross-case analysis.

It should again be mentioned that this research does not seek to offer any specific conclusion(s) about the effectiveness or success of institutional responses of Turkey and the UK, but it explains main concerns and issues about institutional responses in the framework of 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaida.

As previously mentioned in the section on the case-quintain dilemma, the focus of this study is analyzing the cases in a detailed perspective. The question was asked

why there is a need for a cross-case comparison within this research, even though its focus point is on cases rather than on the quintain. It is helpful to enlighten the aim of this section by again emphasizing the need for writing this chapter. This chapter tries to analyze society-specific issues (if any) between two cases by following the road map of sociological institutionalism. Therefore, if there is parallel or conflict between the content of institutional responses and victims' perceptions (for both cases), there might be some contextual differences or similarities which can be analyzed by considering the unique dimensions of Turkish and British society.

Moreover, it is also a fact that, at this stage of cross-case comparison, the comparison between short-term institutional responses of Turkey and the UK cannot be made for three reasons.

The first is that short-term institutional responses are complex and multiple terrorist attacks in Istanbul and London are more difficult to make comparisons between. Secondly, there is a lack of primary resources on the content of short-term institutional responses of the 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London terrorist attacks, so the content of short-term institutional responses could not be determined in a detailed perspective for both cases. Thirdly, due to the lack of primary resources in the process of evaluation of short-term institutional responses, emerging themes might be considered as "problems" rather than "all-emerged short-term institutional responses in both cases".

However, the findings showed that some interpretations could be only made based on the effectiveness or success of long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies of Turkey and the UK, because some of the elite interviews and primary/secondary sources talked about effectiveness or success of long-term institutional responses, as previously argued in this study. This research does not aim

to determine success or effectiveness level for institutional responses; however, it was found that Turkey appeared to have less effective long-term responses and counterterrorism strategies than the UK as a result of findings from primary sources, secondary sources and elite interviews.

Turkey has been unable to create a sophisticated long-term institutional structure within the framework of terrorism. Definition of terrorism is problematic, and crimes of terrorism are frequently confused with other sort of crimes because of the lack of an effective legal definition of terrorism in Turkey. Parliament is far from ready to work effectively to solve the problem of terrorism. The issue of terrorism is being treated as “Agenda material” rather than being dealt with constructively. In addition, the UK counterterrorism strategies follow a more sedate, systematic path; the CONTEST strategy is generally successful (there are criticisms that PREVENT is ineffective) and institutions such as intelligence have also been found to be effective as part of a general framework.

Moreover, there are significant issues about victims’ perceptions of Istanbul and London terrorist attacks. Similarities and differences between victims’ perceptions were mentioned below with the topic of “suspicion vs. confusion”, “contextualization of theme”, “awareness vs “getting used to terror””, “trauma vs PTSD”, “identity issue” and “group dis/organization”, “forgetfulness and remembering”.

***Suspicion vs. Confusion:*** Common themes have been fear, panic, insecurity, the declaration of perceptions towards the Emergency Response Team, and the economic problems encountered in perceptions of victims of Istanbul and London terrorist attacks. Istanbul victims talked about both and the fear and panic that they felt from terrorist incidents and the ineffectiveness of short-term responses. Victims have also described themselves as “suspicious” about the mechanisms of action of short-term

responses. They doubted whether the functioning of short-term responses was handled correctly. The London attack victims, on the other hand, said that they had experienced “confusion” about short-term responses along with fear and panic. Because of this confusion, they said that they did not know where to go or what to do. In Turkey, doubt stands in the face of short-term responses, while in London, a state of confusion prevails over what should be done rather than doubt.

***Contextualization of themes:*** Although the themes mentioned may seem the same as names, the meanings that the victims of Istanbul and London assigned to these themes have not always been the same. For instance, victims often mentioned the concept of trust when considering institutional responses. They have used this concept both in describing short-term institutional responses and in explaining their ideas about long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. Victims who believed that short-term institutional responses were unsuccessful had a general distrust of the state. This distrust is presented on a broad scale in the form of distrust of institutional responses, distrust of state and distrust of the government's counter-terrorism policies. However, victims of the London attacks focused particularly on distrust of the government institution (mostly intelligence) and of the government's foreign policy decisions.

***Awareness vs “getting used to terror”:*** Istanbul terror victims talked about the concept of “getting used to terror” rather than “awareness” after the terrorist attacks. They saw terrorism problems as one of the long-term unsolvable problems in Turkey. But, in London, victims said they had awareness of the value and importance of life, and also awareness about political tensions which resulted from terrorist attacks in the UK.



**Trauma vs PTSD:** Both groups of victims mentioned the concept of trauma. In both cases, there are statements from victims that the problems that could not be solved by institutional responses cause trauma in the long-term. One of the differences here is that there is no diagnosis related to the psychological problems and trauma of victims in Turkey, and there was no psychological evaluation under the supervision of a doctor of victims after the terrorist attacks. However, terror victims in London have been diagnosed with PTSD disorder.

**Identity issue (Victims vs. Survivors):** In Turkey, people affected from terrorist attack were named as victims. But, in London, people affected by terrorism name themselves as survivors, not victims. This, in turn, gives the impression that the victims of London are stronger, trying to hold on to life and have a more hopeful view of life. Changes in work, changes in living standards and the intellectual transformation of London victims also support this interpretation. Istanbul victims, by considering themselves as “victims”, are trying to cope with problems resulting from short- and long-term problems after the terrorist attacks. They found themselves in a weaker position.

**Group dis/organization:** In Turkey, the victims of the Istanbul terrorist incident have not had an organized struggle to issues that they considered ineffective. There are also not any solidarity groups among them. This gives the impression that the victims of Istanbul are "trying to save their day" rather than seek rights from the political, economic and health sector. In 2005, London terrorist attacks “survivors”, who were engaged in a relatively more organized struggle against institutional responses, had a more active political and citizen role, attending Facebook groups, solidarity groups, participating in conversations and associations. They seem to have collectively transformed their survivor identity into a politicized collective identity.

***Forgetfulness / Remembering:*** Terrorist incidents do not only cause momentary panic and fear where they occur, they can also lead to long-term or completely permanent changes in the memory of those who are deeply affected by the consequences of terrorism. The memories that are shaped by terrorist events also strengthen the fear that emerge in subsequent generations and can prepare the ground for possible future violence. Memory can be used constructively or destructively to better manage the effects of an attack and potential problems in the future. Memory has two uses: 1. having clear information about the past and 2. shaping future life (Wertsch, 2002). Learning lessons from past international incidents can pave the way to reshaping states and societies within a global structure.

As indicated before, this study provided memories of victims of the terrorist attacks of 2003 Istanbul and 2005 London events. It was already mentioned that both victims' groups remembered the terrorist attacks, particularly long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies. However, during the field research in Istanbul, it emerged that the victims of Istanbul terrorist attacks have a tendency to "forget" any kind of issues about the terrorist attacks.

Victims of London terrorist attacks tended more to "remember" the London terrorist attacks. There are both advantages and disadvantages of remembering (or forgetting) the effects of terrorist attacks for both cases. According to Zamora (1998), memory accompanies the idea of a "usable past". The "usability" feature of the past makes the studies on social memory more attractive by shedding light on the future. Ahiska (2006, p.?) also points out that "memory engages with specters to constantly and circularly re-establish the meaning of the present." However, when these discussions were taken into account for the Istanbul case, especially based on victims, it is a fact that victims (also society) affected by the terrorist attacks directly or

indirectly tend more to forget that a terrorist attack happened in Istanbul in 2003 and that it affected many people's lives. One of the indicators of this is that the victims of Istanbul were not effectively interested in the long-term consequences of Istanbul terrorist attacks despite being affected by negatively. The victims did not appear too much on the newspaper interviews, TV channels to express themselves or request the help of relevant authorities in an active way. Many of them also continued to live in the same neighborhood (Levent). Another indicator of this "forgetting" is seen with the non-existence of monuments and public memories of the terrorist attacks of Istanbul. After the year of 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks, this devastating terrorist attack began to lose its significance in both the public's and the victims' perspectives. At the same time, there were not any monuments or any indicators that show the devastation of the Istanbul terrorist attacks. Even though memorializing is an important concept for collective memory studies, forgetfulness should also be considered. Wilson (1998) argues that memory is as much about forgetting. Goertz argues that: "the violence within silence as it is about remembering" (as cited in Neyzi 2002, p. 139). These arguments are valid for the Turkish case study.

However, when the victims of the 2005 London terrorist attacks were considered, it is a fact that they tended more to remember the day of the attacks by attending various conferences and public talks, having connections with other victims, and creating support groups of the victims affected by the terrorist attacks. In the 1920s, Maurice Halbwachs (1992) divided social memory into a lower discipline and began to talk about collective memory. Halbwachs aimed to apply Durkheim's theory to the concept of memory. Halbwachs continued to distinguish between individual and collective representations, however, he disregarded individual memory (as cited in Gedi & Elam 1996, p. 36), believing in the validity of collective memory and has since

continued his work in this direction. Thus, society cannot be defined as the sum of individual memory. There are conceptual differences between individual and collective memory. Individual memory relies on individual experiences while collective memory relies on recollections of groups of individuals.

Collective memory has a more independent structure than the sum of individual memory. Collective memory may include different emotional patterns such as fear and anxiety that may arise in individuals as a result of terrorist attacks. The indicators of “remembering” also appear as monuments, buildings and memorial days that happened in a certain order following the 2005 London terrorist attacks. The memorial places in Hyde Park and Tavistock Square Garden are main indicators of how victims and society tried to not forget the terrorist attacks in London. According to Anderson (1991), communities are shaped and reshaped by different elements such as novels, myths, ideologies, monuments and museums. People could imagine and legitimize their community more easily through these elements. Studies on memory reveal that places (especially buildings, parks, or other public spheres whose structures change after terrorist attacks) serve as reminders to communities. After September 11, various monuments were built in New York (Doss, 2011). Monuments should not be considered as ordinary structures, rather they are constant reminders of past events and by keeping the memory alive, can help us explain the causes and consequences of the events in question and learn lessons for the future. In the case of the London attacks, victims were more “attached” to their past rather than being “intense dependent”. This view also overlaps with victims’ active participation in politics, their sense of unification and their “strength” by calling themselves “survivors” rather than “victims”. This means that they have attempted to change the “future” by using their past by remembering it.

This chapter addresses the final research question, RQ5: what are the similarities and differences between the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks in terms of the institutional responses to terrorism and the victims' perceptions of those responses? As answers, it was found that it is difficult to compare short-term institutional responses of both cases; however, it is clearer that long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were more effective in the UK compared to Turkey. In the framework of victims' perceptions, it was found that victims in Istanbul felt suspicious about the short-term institutional responses, they mostly use the concept of "getting used to terror" in Turkey, and they maintained that even though they suffered from trauma, they did not receive a PTSD diagnosis in any psychological evaluation. They were also named themselves as victims which put them in weaker positions in terms of seeking their rights as "citizens", they are away from "being united" as victims.

However, victims of London were much more feeling confusion about short-term responses. They also felt awareness in terms of politically (and about life), they suffered PTSD and suffered from this in the longer term. It was also found that victims of London had a politicized collective identity by naming themselves survivors rather than victims. Moreover, the "approach to trust" of Istanbul and London victims differed from each other, while Istanbul victims had more enlarged distrust definitions, London victims had only distrust for government institutions (the intelligence services in particular) and the government's foreign policy actions. Furthermore, the victims of the London terrorist attacks tended more to "remember" the attacks, whereas the victims of the Istanbul terrorist attacks tended more to "forget" the attacks.

It can be mentioned here that even though there are some similarities between the perceptions of victims of Istanbul and London terrorist attacks, there are also significant differences between them. When this comparison is evaluated within the

framework of sociological institutionalism, what do these similarities and differences mean overall?

Sociological institutionalism analyzes the way in which actors follow rules and norms by assuming that “identifies and culture are the sources of interests for individual” (Friel, 2017, p. 213). Focuses on new institutionalists do not only include economic dependencies and resources (Senge, 2013) but also cultural (Meyer, 1977) and political (Dobbin, 1994) spheres in addition to the economic sphere (Fligstein, 1991). Victims have spoken of concepts such as fear, panic, trust, insecurity, and trauma. But they have sometimes interpreted these concepts from different angles and used them to legitimize why their perception is negative or positive against institutional responses.

The various reasons underlying this conceptualization should also be taken into account when evaluating the perceptions of institutional responses of victims who impose different meanings on the same concepts, highlighting their differences in the consensus of legitimizing and conceptualizing their answers. Although this research does not aim to determine what the differences in perceptions of institutional responses are, different understandings and conceptualizations, as seen here in this section, are one of the other "society-specific" issues that affect perceptions of institutional responses. The bond between institutional responses and societies need not be the same in every society. There can be many cultural, economic and political causes that affect the connection between institutional responses and societies' perceptions of institutions. This section states that there are similarities and differences between the perceptions of the victims of the two terror attacks, underlining that even similar results are understood differently. But it does not aim to find out what variables play a role in the similarities and differences.

The bond that each society forms with institutions is different from each other, and this bond can be fed by the many characteristics of a society.



### 13 Practical Implications of the Study

This study analyzed the institutional responses of Turkey and the United Kingdom in the 2003 Istanbul and 2006 London terrorist attacks and the perceptions of victims of these institutional responses by taking an inductive approach. The research questions posed by this study were answered one by one.

The answers were provided to each research question by explaining and understanding each question separately but also having a broader approach to form a link between states' institutional responses and victims' perceptions. As this research tries to offer a deeper understanding and explanation to states and society interactions/links from the viewpoints of institutions and victims' perceptions in the framework of Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks, there is a common point in answering all research questions. So, how can we combine the findings from these two case studies conducted in the framework of these research questions with the theoretical framework of the research?

In this section, the answer to this question will be sought and the practical implications of the research in the context of the theoretical framework will be explained. Before explaining this link, generalization and its usage in this research should be first borne in mind.

The issue of generalizing the study's results is mentioned in detail in the methodology section. Here it may be appropriate to ask the following question: How can the results of qualitative studies that interviews a small group and studies specific cases be generalized? Can the results of such case studies be linked to a specific theory or explained within a specific theory?



There is debate in the literature on the generalizability of case studies (especially single case studies). Generalization is considered with different approaches in a quantitative analysis, with different approaches in a qualitative analysis, as well as with different approaches in case studies. Yin (1984) uses this concept in two ways when it comes to generalization: analytical generalization and statistical generalization. According to Yin, in analytical generalization, a previously mentioned or developed theory sketch can be compared with empirical data that appears in case studies (Yin, 1984). In this study, the lack of sufficient number of interviews does not make it possible to conduct statistical generalization. But this study has the power and capacity to address, discuss, or compare the data obtained by analytical generalization with a certain theory. Therefore, in this study, the findings related to the perceptions obtained from the victims will be interpreted and discussed with sociological institutionalism.

As mentioned earlier, in addition to the importance of institutions in sociological institutionalism, the people who make up institutions, the culture in which institutions are intertwined, and the various conditions are of great importance. So, what kind of analytical generalization can be done when this study is evaluated in terms of its findings with sociological institutionalism, which it considers as a theoretical framework?

Long-term-institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies within the framework of the Istanbul 2003 attacks in Turkey have been examined in this study. As a result, long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies of Turkey were found ineffective. At the same time, victims' perceptions of long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism were found negative. Only when analytical generalization is performed for this case, is the ineffectiveness of institutions and the

negative perception of victims towards these institutions proof that the logical approach that sociological institutionalism is acceptable for the Turkish case.

Sociological institutionalism contends that there is a direct relationship between institutions and people. In this research, it is seen that there is a direct relationship between institutions and victims' perceptions in both Turkey and the UK in the framework of analytical generalization of the cases. In the case of Turkey, long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were evaluated independently of people's perceptions and found ineffective. The perception of the victims also supported this. On the other hand, in the case of the UK, long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies were evaluated independently of victims' perceptions and were found to be effective. The perception of the victims also supported this. In these two case studies, in which these two independent structures (institutions and victims), which were examined separately, moved in parallel with each other, it was found that these two entities were not as independent as thought. As a result, the "invisible" but "binding" power between institutions and victims has been made more visible in the framework of sociological institutionalism.

However, it is a fact that this study does not explain why. Although this study shows that a relationship exists between institutions and societies, it does not explain how this relationship was established or where it originated. This topic will be discussed in the "future research".

## 14 Conclusion

Concepts such as terrorism are concepts that are open to discussion from time to time, as well as issues that can be loaded with relative approaches and meanings. When it comes to international terrorism, the identification of terrorists/terrorist groups and their placement in a certain category can be made easier by the approach of all states.

Given the power, war and fear that terrorism wants to create, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks showed how fragile “the West” is in reality. The "West" sought new security, and the current order began to be questioned. The perception of security, the relationship between state and society, who is a friend and who is an enemy, were to be rebuilt. States entered significant processes of change from the point of view of security.

States are the most effective mechanism for combating terrorism by using their resources, bureaucratic forces, and populations. But where is society in this struggle and how important was it?

The answer to this question was attempted to be given by looking at the perception of the institutions of the victims of terrorism. Although the institutions of states were not structures that survive alone, they were structures that were open to change and should be accountable to their citizens. In this study, I also tried to understand what the perceptions of victims of terrorist attacks were. In this way, thoughts about how to build a bridge between the top-down structure and the bottom-up structure would be opened. Radicalization is not just a problem solved by institutions and counterterrorism or by the rules of law. Because it directly intervenes in people's

lives, it is insufficient to examine the concept of institution by separating it from the human focus.

Adopting these ideas, this study described the terrorist events of Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 in a descriptive way. It then led me to think about the problems created by the terror presented in two aspects: with the structure of the institutional responses and with the perception of the victims of these institutional responses.

Since there was no study in the literature that explained terrorist events within the framework of the UK and Turkey by combining them with both institutional and victim perceptions, the literature review was divided into institutional responses and victim perceptions. Comparative terrorism studies have been conducted between countries such as France, the UK, Denmark, Spain and the United States. But Turkey and the UK have not been studied comparatively on this issue.

This study adopted “within case analysis” by analyzing the Istanbul terrorist attacks and London terrorist attacks within their own unique structures and dynamics (RQ1–2, and RQ3–4). These within case analyses were then followed by a cross-case analysis, comparing the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks (RQ5).

The “case-quintain dilemma” is the dilemma between the case (unique research context) and the quintain (across-case issues) and which aspect should have the most attention paid to it. To try and overcome this epistemological dilemma, the cases of Istanbul and London were analyzed separately, within case analysis, followed by cross-case analysis. This research, thus, focused more on “the cases” than on “the quintain.”

In this study, institutional responses to terrorism (RQ1 and RQ3), of Turkey and the UK were analyzed in two categories:

**Short-term institutional responses:** official governmental documents about the structure and functioning of immediate responses, as well as secondary sources such as academic books, articles and newspapers were used.

**Long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies:** primary sources included official documents, documents on counterterrorism strategies, governmental protocols, archives and amendments in the rule of law. Also, academics, members of parliament, and experts on terrorism studies were interviewed in Turkey and the UK. In addition to these, secondary sources (e.g., books, articles, journals and newspapers) were used throughout to examine the countries' institutional responses and counterterrorism policies.

Semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with academics, members of parliament and experts on terrorism studies in Turkey and the UK to gather data on long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies. The aim of the interviews with academics was to obtain expert explanations of theoretical and academic views on terrorist attacks. Interviews with members of parliament aimed to gain an understanding of the state and institution approaches to terrorism.

In this study, the process of working on victims' perceptions of institutional responses were conducted in two different locations: Istanbul and London. Due to difficulties in finding sufficient numbers of victims, newspaper interviews were also analyzed as supportive victim accounts. These were analyzed separately from the interviews but were later evaluated together to answer the research question. For Istanbul, the newspapers *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* were used (2004-2016); for London, interviews were taken from *The Guardian* (2015). Thematic analysis was used to analyze the perceptions of NVivo, QSR, a computer qualitative data analysis tool.

In this study, to ensure credibility, techniques of prolonged engagement and triangulation were applied. For establishing prolonged engagement, field studies and the interview process were conducted over a period of time in the cities where the terrorist attacks happened. The researcher spent a year in the UK (Oxford and London) for research, and conducted a six-month interview process in Istanbul, Turkey. Triangulation of sources to understand institutional responses to terrorism included the use of governmental protocols, agreements, primary sources, and secondary sources; these were analyzed with key-informant interviews conducted in Turkey and the UK and also with perception data of victims collected from interviews. Recollections of victims were also used for validation of their perception.

RQ1 asked what the institutional responses of Turkey were to the 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks during and after the incident. To answer this research questions, short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were analyzed separately.

Some problems were founded as a result of short-term institutional responses, such as allocation of survivors to hospitals, inefficient hospitalization of casualties, the lack of publicly available information about the content of short-term responses, problems about unidentified victims, trapped injured people in the rubble, late intervention and aggravation of fear and anxiety that slowed the physical and psychological recovery processes. There were also some questions about efficiency of police in such a crisis. However, it was also mentioned that it is difficult to draw a general conclusion about the content or effectiveness of short-term institutional responses by putting all of them into single category. This is because primary sources and academic sources mostly focus on “problems” that emerged during short-term

institutional responses, and there is also a lack of primary sources and reports on short-term institutional responses of 2003 Istanbul terrorist attacks.

When long-term institutional responses were analyzed within the framework of RQ1, various pieces of information were retrieved from key informant interviews, academic literature and international reports. As a result of the findings, it was stated that there is a significant division of labor in long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies of Turkey; however, despite this significant division of force, there are major problems countering terrorism. There is an inadequate definition of terrorist crimes which is mostly conflated with other crimes. Relying on a single law and trying to solve all problems about terrorism in Turkey is another significant problem in countering terrorism. There was also ineffective coordination at GNAT and there was reliance on “save the day” policies rather than a focus on stable solutions. As a result, it indicates that Turkey's long-term responses to terrorism are inadequate, and its counterterrorism strategies are not well-managed. Both have scope for significant improvements.

The RQ.2 in this thesis was: how do victims of the Istanbul terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses? When victims’ perceptions on short-term institutional responses were analyzed, the themes described below emerged:

***Panic, fear and suspicion:*** Victims’ feelings of fear and panic both due to terrorist attacks and as a result of ineffective responses. There was suspicion about whether short-term institutional responses were well-managed by the authorities. It was found that this suspicion was caused by the lack of information provided by short-term institutional responses when taking actions, so that victims’ knowledge of what was happening and why was poor.

**Trust:** The victims, for whom short-term institutional responses failed, frequently mentioned the concept of trust. As “distrust of institutional responses,” “distrust of the state” and “all kinds of distrust of the state”. It seems that there is a wide spectrum for defining trust according to victims.

**Economic parameters:** Victims could not receive financial assistance from government agencies. Short-term institutional responses were ineffective from the economic point of view of victims.

All ten victims interviewed reported that in the long term, institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies conducted in Turkey had failed. They talked about the main themes below:

**Long-term fear, trauma and empathy:** Victims mentioned that their short-term fear turned to long-term fears because of not having adequate help from institutional responses. Victims suffered from long-term fear and trauma; however, they could not receive official medical help for these psychological problems. Some of victims talked about the concept of “empathy”. According to some of victims, their sense of empathy increased when they saw other people who suffered from terrorist attacks.

**Distrust:** The victims spoke of distrust of the government, distrust of intelligence, and distrust of government policies. They also mentioned that state policies were inconsistent, and that they distrusted state officials. They tried to justify their approach by referring to long-unsolved terror problem in Turkey. It is concluded that victims’ “distrust spectrum” is wide, and they criticized institutions, persons, policies and government in the framework of trust perception.

**New lifestyle forms:** Victims have had to adopt new life forms by feeling more restricted and at risk, with intense feelings of insecurity. Furthermore, institutional



responses and counterterrorism strategies were restrictive and oppressive, which had caused their urban lifestyles to change.

RQ3 asked what were the institutional responses of the UK to the 2005 London terrorist attacks during and after the incident? This question should be answered in the framework of short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies.

When short-term institutional responses are analyzed, it is clear that there were some specific problems such as difficulties reaching the people trapped underground, and this decreased the level of success of emergency services in all three underground explosions, ineffective coordination and communication among some ambulances, locations, and successful treating of injured people by the NHS; however, there was inadequate immediate health responses covering all victims, poor radio communications in the tunnels, problems about communication within and between emergency services, intensity of the repeated calls from persons and inefficient answer of the Casualty Bureau, and successful identification of hospitalized victims but unsuccessful identification of non-hospitalized ones.

It was difficult to reach a single conclusion about effectiveness of these short-term responses in Istanbul case. It is concluded that there were problems about short-term institutional responses which should be identified and considered when analyzing the 2005 London terrorist attack in terms of short-term institutional responses.

When long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were analyzed, sophisticated institutions for countering terrorism were placed in the UK, and there is division of labor among each unit. Counter-terrorism legislation in the UK is well-developed and terrorist acts are precisely outlined in the Terrorism Act of the UK.

While a multidimensional approach been adopted to solve problems about terrorism in the UK, there is already a road map called the National Security Strategy. The UK has also a significant, well-developed, counter-terrorism strategy which is called CONTEST, including four steps: Pursue, Protect, Prevent, Prepare. However, the Prevent strategy has not functioned well. This is because it sees terrorism not as a social strategy and it only focuses on short-term issues related to Prevent. In particular, the Channel program was highly criticized in the framework of Prevent. Discussion about the UK intelligence services was effective and functioned well, according to literature and elite interviews that the intelligence services are trying to do their best. Therefore, the UK's long-term institutional responses and counterterrorism strategies within the framework of the London terrorist attacks of 2005 are considered successful based on the academic literature, official reports and key-informant interviews.

The RQ.4 in this thesis was: how do victims of the London terrorist attacks perceive the institutional responses? To answer this question, victims' perceptions of the short-term institutional responses and long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were analyzed separately. When victims' perceptions on short-term institutional responses were analyzed, the following themes emerged:

***Fear, panic and confusion:*** There are clear results, such as fearful and panicked victims being confused about the functioning of short-term institutional responses. They were also panic and fear as a result of terrorist attacks. It was sometimes difficult to decide whether victims had fear and panic because of terrorist attacks or the content of short-term institutional responses.

***Perceptions of emergency services:*** Victims had very different thoughts about functioning of emergency services because all victims had received emergency assistance in a different way. Some of them were satisfied with emergency services;

however, there were also victims who could not receive sufficient help from emergency services.

***Economic concerns.*** Victims had not been benefited from economic helps equally.

When victims explained their perceptions to long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies, they said that their perceptions to these responses were “positive” (meaning “effective”) in a general sense. However, they had also some criticisms and additional thoughts about the content of long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies. These issues mentioned by the victims fall under the following headings:

***Criticisms of intelligence services:*** Victims sometimes criticized the intelligence services; however, some were happy with the intelligence services’ work.

***Trust:*** Victims who talked about mistrust said that their mistrust emerged because of mistrust in the functioning of institutions (particularly intelligence) and in the foreign policy actions of the UK. So, victims talked about mistrust in institutions and foreign policy particularly. This means that even though they had mistrust in the framework of London terrorist attacks, their mistrust did not include wider issues such as distrust in the government, distrust in officeholders or overall distrust about institutional responses. Their distrust perspectives were mostly focused on the intelligence services and the foreign policy of the UK.

***Awareness:*** Victims became aware of ongoing political debates after the terrorist attacks and some also increased awareness of their life to healing in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. The victims emphasized that they developed two sorts of awareness. One is political awareness, which refers to their increasing engagement

with daily politics of the UK. Another is personal awareness, which refers their lifestyle changes such as having different jobs, hobbies, or activities.

***Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD):*** Victims mentioned that they suffered PTSD after the terrorist attacks and that this medical diagnosis was named as their psychological situation. They also mentioned that they had a certain chance to receive psychological support, at least their fear and panic were analyzed in a more “detailed” and “medical” perspectives during psychiatric evaluations.

***New forms of identity and solidarity:*** Victims mentioned that they developed a perception like “being united” by establishing support groups among victims and they began to take part actively in different solidarity groups. It was found that the victims had a certain collective identity as a result of the terrorist attacks due to their tendency to being united. Moreover, it was also indicated that this collective identity was not occurring around just the feeling of unification but also a “politicized collective identity”, which refers to active participation of the victims into politics by attending various conferences and public talks in order to have their voices heard and to be able to benefit from institutional responses in a more effective and sufficient way.

Moreover, the victims of London terrorist attacks named themselves “survivors” rather than “victims”. They found themselves stronger and desired to be considered by the authorities in a various way, even though they had suffered too much and were in a vulnerable position as a result of terrorist attacks.

RQ5 asked “What are the similarities and differences between the Istanbul and London terrorist attacks in terms of the institutional responses to terrorism and the victims’ perceptions of those responses”?

It was found that it is difficult to compare short-term institutional responses of both cases; however, it is clear that long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were more effective in the UK than in Turkey. In the framework of victims' perceptions, it was found that victims in Istanbul felt suspicious about the short-term institutional responses, their short-term memories were much vaguer than their long-term memories, they mostly used the concept of "getting used to terror" in Turkey, and they argued that even though they suffered from trauma, they did not receive a PTSD diagnosis in any psychological evaluation. They were also named themselves as "victims".

However, the victims of the London attacks felt greater confusion about the short-term responses, their long-term memories/perceptions were including more specific arguments by comparing their perception to short-term responses, even though they do not have enough information about long-term institutional responses, they experienced political awareness (and also about life), and they suffered from PTSD in the long-term. It was also found that victims of London had a politicized collective identity by naming themselves survivors rather than victims. Moreover, the "approach to trust" of Istanbul and London victims differed from each other. It was found that Istanbul victims had more enlarged distrust definitions. However, London victims only had distrust in the government institutions (intelligence in particular) and the government's foreign policy actions.

Furthermore, the victims of Istanbul tended more to forget the effects of Istanbul terrorist attacks; however, the victims of London had a tendency to keep the terrorist attacks alive in their minds by trying to remember it in a certain way.

This study showed that there is a parallelism between the structure and functioning of long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies given in the framework of the Istanbul terrorist attacks and the perceptions of victims of these institutional responses (long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were found to be ineffective, and victims' perceptions were found to be negative). At the same time, the study showed that there is a parallelism between the effectiveness of structure and functioning of long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies given in the framework of 2005 London terrorist attacks and the perceptions of victims to these institutional responses (long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies were found to be effective, and victims' perceptions of these responses/strategies were found to be positive). This result strengthened the argument of sociological institutionalism which argues that there is a relationship between institutions and the society which makes up these institutions, within the framework of Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks.

#### **14.1 Study Limitations**

As a result, in this study, institutional responses were first examined in a separate category and then the perceptions of victims of Istanbul were analyzed. The same procedure was applied for the UK case. Later, the results in these two cases were compared with each other by making a separate comparison section. Then, the findings were discussed along with the theoretical framework, sociological institutionalism. In this section, the strengths, weaknesses and how the study strengthens its weaknesses will be discussed.

Firstly, in determining the themes in short-term institutional responses, the main topics from primary and secondary sources were taken as main sources. One of the limitations of this study concerns short-term institutional responses. The aim of this

study was not to reveal the extent to which the short-term institutional responses of Turkey and the UK, were effective or successful. But long-term institutional responses were analyzed as well, and some decisions were made for the effectiveness of Turkey's and UK's long-term institutional responses. Therefore, although measuring the success of institutional responses is not one of the objectives of this study, case studies have concluded that Turkey's long-term institutional response was not effective but the UK's one is effective.

This means that this study does not produce a clear result for on either the success or the effectiveness of the short-term responses. In order to identify the impact and success of short-term responses, this study needs to be slightly expanded and to do the following:

1. This study can be expanded by deciding the standards of effectiveness of short-term responses. If there are international standards, this should be looked at.
2. This study can be expanded to analyze the short-term responses by explaining and categorizing them in a more systematic way of thinking. To do this, the Emergency Response Team, hospitals, police forces, etc., which played a role in short-term responses, should be interviewed, or more detailed information about the effectiveness of short-term institutional responses should be achieved.

Second, this study examined the perceptions of victims with a small sample and supportive interviews. One of the weaknesses of this study is that the sample was small, making it impossible to make "statistical generalization" based on the perceptions that the victims developed within the framework of the states' responses to terrorism.

Although this study could not do statistical generalization, it tried to strengthen this weak side only by doing analytical generalization with interviews conducted within the framework of case studies.

## **14.2 Contribution to Literature**

In the literature, there is not enough research on institutions and victims related to the Istanbul 2003 terrorist attacks and the London 2005 terrorist attacks, and this study has tried to fill this gap by looking at institutions and perceptions of victims in these two cases. This study first evaluated the two cases with their unique dynamics by the case analysis method. The study then analyzed the similarities and differences in cases comparatively. In the section of "Practical Implications of the Study", findings in the research were interpreted with the theoretical framework, sociological institutionalism. In this sense, this study aimed to blur the line between politics and sociology as much as possible, going beyond the disciplines of "strict political science" or "strict sociology" about institutions and victims' interaction.

## **14.3 Future Research**

It is significant to mention what sort of research can be conducted based on this research and how this research can pave the way future research about terrorism, institutional responses and perceptions of victims.

It should be mentioned that this study does not have a clear argument for short-term institutional responses. By using this study, short-term responses to the Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks can be examined in a more detailed perspective. For this purpose, more detailed interviews should be conducted with the people work in institutions/organizations which are responsible for short-term institutional responses. If there are more detailed data or reports on short-term institutional



responses, future research can choose a specific issue about short-term institutional responses and analyze the specific theme in a detailed perspective. This research had a very general picture of short-term institutional responses and, using this general framework, specific issues about short-term responses can be examined in detail.

Second, future research can focus on cross-case analysis of the Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks in a detailed perspective. In this research, the priority is based on doing within a case analysis, and doing a comparison remains additional area of study in this research. However, future research can benefit from cross-case analysis and develop it for analyzing the Istanbul 2003 and London 2005 terrorist attacks to obtain more detailed comparative data. In this research, it was found that some themes were used by both Istanbul and London victims, but were approached in a different way conceptually. In both cases, the victims were in a variety of perceptions and thoughts to institutional responses (fear, panic, trust, confusion, doubt). For instance, victims have referred to concepts such as trust, but in the cases of Turkey and the UK, victims defined trust differently. What could be the reason for approaching the same concept differently for Istanbul and London victims? Is it possible to say that the differences in the socio-economic situation or democracy level differences can create variations in the approaches of the victims to the same concepts? Moreover, can variations of ethical values or norms of people shape these differences?

As mentioned previously, it was discussed that there is a relationship between institutions and perceptions of victims (practical implications of study); however, this study did not explain the reasons for this direct relationship and relevant factors that might have an active role during this process. Future studies can shed light on how these direct positive correlations might have occurred by offering some alternative explanations from cultural, political or economic sense based on Turkey and the UK.

Moreover, the same way of thinking adopted in this study's practical implications chapter (analyzing theoretical framework with the study findings) could be applied to other terrorist attacks in the framework of the interaction of long-term institutional responses and counter-terrorism strategies and victims.



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### **Key informant interviews**

Ali İhsan Köktürk (interview date: January 15, 2019). Lawyer, 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> member of parliament from Republican's People Party, and Member of Constitution Conciliation Committee of Assembly.

Andrew Bennet (interview date: February 14, 2019). Prof in the Department of Government at Georgetown University

Atila Kart (interview date: December 10, 2018). Lawyer, 22nd and 23rd Term Member of Parliament from Republican People's Party and Member of Constitution Conciliation Committee of Assembly.

Erhan Doğan (interview date: December 13, 2018). Prof. at the Marmara University, Department of Political Science and International Relations (English).

Jerry Fromm (interview date: March 30, 2019). Dr, President of the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI), Senior Consultant at the Erikson Institute for Education and Research of the Austen Riggs Center.

Jonathan Leader Maynard (interview date: February 14, 2019). Dr at University of Oxford – New College, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Politics and International Relations

Julia Pearce (interview date: April 11, 2019), Dr at King's College London, Lecturer in Social Psychology and Security

Lord John Alderdice (interview date: March 25, 2019). Liberal Democrat life member of the House of Lords, Director of the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable

Conflict at Harris Manchester College at University of Oxford, Chairman of the Centre for Democracy and Peace Building in Belfast, and Presidente d'Honneur of Liberal International.



**Appendix****Research ethics committee approval (Turkish)**

Sayı : 21568116-302.14.01-E.573

Konu : Baturay Yurtbay Etik Kurul Onayı

**İLGİLİ MAKAMA**

Üniversitemiz Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Doktora Programı öğrencisi Baturay YURTBAY'a ait tez çalışmasına yönelik hazırlamış olduğu tez araştırma önerisinin beşeri bilimler etik standartlarına uygunluğuna ilişkin Yeditepe Üniversitesi Beşeri ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Etik Kurul Onayı ekte sunulmuştur.

Bilgilerinize arz ve rica ederim.

Prof. Dr. Canan AYKUT BİNGÖL

Rektör

Ek: Etik Kurul Onayı.pdf

**YEDİTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ BEŞERİ VE SOSYAL BİLİMLER ETİK KURULU  
KOMİSYONU**

**11/2020 No'lu TOPLANTI KARARLARI**

Yeditepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Doktora Programı öğrencilerinden Baturay YURTBAY'ın tez çalışmasına yönelik hazırlamış olduğu tez-araştırma önerisi Beşeri Bilimler etik standartlarına uygunluğu Yeditepe Üniversitesi Beşeri ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Etik Kurulu tarafından değerlendirilmiş ve onaylanmıştır.

**YEDİTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ BEŞERİ VE SOSYAL BİLİMLER ETİK  
KURULU KOMİSYONU**

**11/2020 No'lu TOPLANTI KARARLARI**

Prof. Dr. Suat ANAR

Etik Kurul Komisyon Başkanı

İletişim Fakültesi, Gazetecilik Bölümü

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Eğitim Fakültesi, Bilgisayar ve Öğretim Teknolojileri Öğretmenliği  
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