

SALIM CEVIK

SUBVERTING THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DICHOTOMY

Bilkent, 2015

SUBVERTING THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DICHOTOMY: RELIGIOUS
EXCLUSION AND NATION-BUILDING IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by

SALIM CEVIK

Department of
Political Science and Public Administration
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University
Ankara
July 2015

SUBVERTING THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DICHOTOMY: RELIGIOUS
EXCLUSION AND NATION-BUILDING IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

SALİM ÇEVİK

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSTY
ANKARA

July 2015

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Professor Dr. Alev Çınar
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assistant Professor Meral Uğur Çınar
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assistant Professor Başak İnce
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Professor Dr. Gökhan Bacık
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

.....

Assistant Professor Cemil Boyraz
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

.....

Professor Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

SUBVERTING THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DICHOTOMY: RELIGIOUS EXCLUSION AND NATION-BUILDING IN TURKEY AND PAKISTAN

Çevik, Salim

Ph.D., Department of Political Science

Supervisor: Prof. Alev Çınar

July 2015

This study investigates the role of religion in nation building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. Current literature on these two countries is divided between those who claim that Islam was an essential arm of nation-building and those who claim that the role of Islam, if there was any, was merely instrumental and strategic. In that it reflects the divide in the wider literature on nationalism; between those who consider nationalism as a modern and secular(izing) phenomenon and those who underline the importance of pre-modern identities in general and religion in particular in the nation formation.

This thesis aims to go beyond this dichotomy by pointing that religion in any nation-building plays a much more complex role. It can be crucial for nation-building at a certain stage, but it may be useless, irrelevant or even an impediment at another stage of nation-building. This dissertation argues that since nation-building is a process of homogenization, the role of religion can be best analyzed through its contribution to this process at the national level.

Assimilation and exclusion are two means of homogenization and religion often contributes to national homogenization by excluding members of different religious communities. This is particularly true for the multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, with an imperial legacy.

By understanding nation-building largely as a process of homogenization, this thesis builds on the legacy of Ernest Gellner and his works on nationalism. However, it aims to go beyond Gellner by bringing the role of religion to the process of homogenization. Another important aspect of this study is that homogenization is discussed in the context of the emergence of modern state and the transition from empire to nation-state.

Key Words: Nation-building, Homogenization, Assimilation, Exclusion, Religion, Empires, Modern State

ÖZET

DİN-LAİKLİK KARŞITLIĞINI AŞMAK: TÜRKİYE VE PAKİSTAN’DA ULUS İNŞASINDA DİNİN DIŞLAYICI ROLÜ

Çevik, Salim

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar

Temmuz 2015

Bu çalışmada Türkiye ve Pakistan örneklerinden yola çıkılarak dinin ulus inşa sürecindeki rolü incelenmektedir. Her iki ülke üzerine var olan akademik literatür İslam’ı ya ulus inşa sürecinin merkezine yerleştirmekte ya da tamamen dışına atmaktadır. Bu yönüyle milliyetçilik çalışmalarında var olan bir ayrım burada tekrar edilmektedir; milliyetçilik ya tamamen modern ve laik(leştirici) bir kavram olarak ele alınmakta ya da ulus inşa sürecinde din başta olmak üzere geleneksel kimliklere vurgu yapılmaktadır.

Bu tez din ve laiklik temelli bu tarz bir ikili karşıtlığı kabul etmemekte ve din ile ulus inşa süreci arasında çok daha karmaşık bir ilişki olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Din

ulus inşa sürecinin belli bir aşamasında faydalı iken, başka bir aşamada faydasız hatta zararlı olabilir. Bu tez ulus inşasının aynı zamanda bir homojenleşme süreci olmasına dayanarak dinin ulus inşasındaki rolünün en sağlıklı olarak dinin homojenleşme sürecine katkısı üzerinden incelenebileceğini iddia etmektedir.

Homojenleşme asimilasyon ve dışlama yollarıyla sağlanabilir. Din ise genel olarak dışlayıcı bir araç olarak başka din mensuplarını ulusal kimlikten dışlamak suretiyle ulusal homojenleşmeye katkı sağlar. Özellikle imparatorluk mirasına dayanan çok etnikli ve çok dinli toplumlarda bu süreç daha belirgindir.

Ulus inşasını bir homojenleşme süreci olarak ele almakla bu çalışma Ernest Gellner'in milliyetçilik anlayışını takip etmektedir. Ancak homojenleşme sürecine dinin rolünü de dâhil etmek suretiyle Gellner'in çalışmaları geliştirilmektedir. Bu çalışmanın diğer önemli bir yanı da homojenleşme sürecinin modern devletin ortaya çıkışı ve imparatorlukların ulus-devlete evrimi çerçevesinde ele alınmasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulus inşası, Homojenleşme, Asimilasyon, Dışlama, Din, İmparatorluklar, Modern Devlet

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was written over many years in three different countries and five different institutions. Over those long years I have accumulated so much debt to so many people that I possibly will not be able to acknowledge adequately. Yet, I have to mention certain individuals and institutions. The topic and the basic questions of this dissertation were formulated while I was a visiting scholar at Columbia University. My stay there was made possible by a grant I received from TUBITAK and by the invitation I received from Lisa Anderson. Lisa Anderson did not only make my stay at Columbia possible but she was always there whenever I needed help. Her analytical insight was particularly helpful in formulating clearly defined hypotheses from my seamless thoughts. As such she had lots of influence over this dissertation and my academic career, probably more than she is aware of. I was also very lucky to receive guidance and suggestions from top scholars such as Alfred Stepan, Jack Snyder, Pierre Birnbaum and Joseph Massad. I substantially benefited from their scholarly erudition.

At Columbia I was very lucky to fill in a group of Turkish/Middle Eastern community which made my stay there both enjoyable and intellectually stimulating. Among them Hatem Ete and Nur Murphy stand out. I am also grateful to Bayram Sinkaya, Kadir Üstün, Cenk Palaz, Necmettin Kızılkaya, Mehmet Fidan, Veli Yaşın,

Murat Öztürk, Farbod Honarpisheh, Mariam Banahi and Haroon Moghul for their companionship. Ahmet Kuru who was a post-doctoral fellow at Columbia was very supportive. Since our first meeting at Columbia, he kept on providing me with guidance and help whenever I needed. Butler library of the Columbia University provided the best space to make research. I studied in every different corner of this library over my various visits to New York.

Upon my return from United States, I started working as a research and teaching assistant at Istanbul Bilgi University. At Bilgi I found the most hospitable environment possible. Frankly, I could never guess such a work environment could exist in Turkish academia. The crowded assistant room which I shared with Burç Beşgöl, Ege Özen, Cemil Boyraz, Yavuz Tüyloğlu, Sedef Turper, Kudret Çobanlı, Deniz Gözler and Ogan Yumlu at different times over two years was a work environment that I am still missing. As a teaching assistant I had the privilege of working together with Soli Özel, Gencer Özcan and Mehmet Ali Tuğtan. I learned a lot from all of them. However Bilgi was a too pleasant environment for a task as notorious as dissertation writing. I did little progress during my stay in Istanbul. Yet another nicety of Bilgi was that it allocated paid leaves to its assistants who strive for seclusion. I was lucky enough to receive one of those paid leaves and I am very grateful to Bilgi University and my department which made it available to me.

With this scholarship I spent a year at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) at the Lund University in Sweden. Umut Özkırmılı, who at the time was in the stage of moving from Bilgi to Lund, helped me arrange a visiting position at Lund. And throughout my stay at Lund, he was both a mentor and a friend. I stay indebted to him.

Lund is a perfect place for study and research and CMES had a very friendly and collegial environment. At Sweden I was also lucky to have Darcy Thompson and Bahar Ay as my officemates. I am also thankful to Leif Steinberg, Erick Hooglund and Catarina Kinvall (from the Political Science Department).

Upon my return from Lund I started working at Ipek University. I am grateful to Ipek for providing me a work environment that allowed me to focus on my dissertation. At times I might have pushed the nerves of my superiors at Ipek with a never ending dissertation but it is finally over!

Through the writing stage of this dissertation I made several visits to Pakistan. People who helped me with their hospitality and guidance during my stays are too many to count. But Naveed Ahmad Rana stands out. He always went out of his way to make my visits comfortable and efficient. I will always remain in debt for his hospitality. In Pakistan I also had the privilege to discuss with and learn from Khurshid Ahmed, Mohammad Waseem, Tariq Rahman, Ilhan Niaz, Qalb-i Abid, Ejaz Akram, and Charles Kennedy.

I had the opportunity to present part and parcel of this dissertation at the University of Antwerp, Talinn University, Punjab University and at various other conferences. I thank to all those attended to those conferences and provided me with feedback. I should particularly cite Rajeev Bhargava, Mari Toivannen, John Hutchinson, Şener Aktürk and Murat Somer for their previous comments and criticisms. Brendan O’Leary, Tristan James Mabry, Faisal Devji and Mücahit Bilici met with me on private

occasions to discuss my project. They were all very generous with their time and I am grateful to them.

Jeremy Salt supervised this dissertation from its beginning to the very late stages. Time after time I told him that I would be finishing soon. I couldn't. Towards the ends of my writing stage Jeremy retired. It is unlucky that I couldn't finish before his retirement. I hope he is enjoying his retirement but he is deeply missed. Alev Çınar quickly and graciously filled the gap and took the supervision of this dissertation. She convinced me to cut the size of the dissertation so that I would finally finish. Moreover, her comments and suggestions significantly improved the quality of this dissertation. I am grateful to her. I am also grateful to Meral Çınar, Başak İnce, Gökhan Bacık and Cemil Boyraz for accepting to be part of my committee and for their helpful comments and criticisms.

Aside from Jeremy, two other people who have seen this work from the beginning are not part of this committee due to personal circumstances or changing administrative regulations; Akif Kireççi and Umut Özkırmılı. I am also grateful to them for their support. İlker Aytürk, Berrak Burçak, Ahmet Kuru, Yavuz Tüyloğlu and last but certainly not the least, Hakkı Taş read various parts of this dissertation and contributed to its improvement. Hakkı Taş had been more than a colleague. His intellectual and friendly support through the last decade was immensely important to me. I don't think I can thank him adequately. I also want to thank Doruk Sazer, Edip Bekaroğlu, Emre Aktuna, Engin Gülbey, Onur Haliloğlu and Mehmet Özkan for their sincere and sustained friendship.

My parents long waited for me to finish this dissertation, often with patience. My sister had read the first drafts of whatever I wrote and did the initial editing. I am thankful to them. I got married in the last year of my Ph.D. work. Thus the first year of my marriage coincided with the final year of dissertation writing, having a multiplier effect on the amount of stress I am going through. Intelligence and tolerance of my wife enabled me to deal with these two processes smoothly. It is to her that this work is dedicated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ÖZET.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Problem of Definition.....	10
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation.....	16
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	20
2.1 Literature Review on Religion and Nationalism.....	29
2.2 Religion and Nation.....	31
2.3 Religious Diversity and Homogenization.....	35
2.4 How Muslim is Muslim Nationalism?.....	48
2.5 Conceptual Clarifications.....	50

2.5.1 Religion as Boundary Drawer.....	53
2.5.2 Indian Communalism or Nationalism?.....	57
CHAPTER III: EMPIRES AND NATION-STATES.....	59
3.1 Empires.....	66
3.2 Empires vs. Nation-States.....	69
3.2.1 Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism.....	70
3.2.2 Various Kinds of Rule vs. Uniformity in Ruling.....	73
3.2.3 Cosmopolitanism vs. Homogeneity.....	76
3.3 Legitimation, Religion and Language.....	79
3.4 Nation-ness and Empire.....	85
3.5 Empire in the Context of Ottomans and South Asia.....	90
3.5.1 Ottomans.....	94
3.5.2 Mughals and Raj.....	101
CHAPTER IV: RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND OTTOMAN EMPIRE.....	113
4.1 Evolution of the Ottoman Empire During the 19 th Century.....	116
4.1.1 The Empire at the Turn of Century.....	119
4.1.2 Transformation of the Empire.....	124

4.1.3 Policies of Centralization.....	128
4.2 National Question in the Context of Modern State Formation.....	134
4.2.1 Nationalism and Empires.....	136
4.2.2 Nationalism and the Ottomans.....	140
4.2.3 Diversity: From Being an Asset to Being a Problem.....	144
4.2.4 Official Nationalism and Diversity: Ottomanism in Between Habsburg and Romanov Options	148
4.2.5 Ottomanism and Religious Diversity.....	151
4.2.6 Young Ottomans.....	157
4.3 Abdulhamid and the CUP: Islamization of Ottomanism and the Emergence of Muslim Nationalism.....	160
4.3.1 Acceleration of Modernization.....	161
4.3.2 Islamization of Ottomanism.....	165
4.3.3 Ottomanism Contextualized: From Tanzimat to Abdulhamid and Afterwards.....	171
4.3.4 CUP.....	177
4.4 Religion and Nationalism Among Christians and Muslims.....	181
4.5 Muslim Nationalism.....	186

4.6 Conclusion.....	188
CHAPTER V: RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT.....	191
5.1 Emergence of the Modern State.....	199
5.1.1 British in the Indian Subcontinent-Company Raj.....	200
5.1.2 Centralization/Modern State Formation.....	203
5.1.3 The Mutiny and its Afterwards.....	210
5.2 National Question in the Context of Colonial State.....	222
5.2.1 Collaboration and the Congress.....	224
5.2.2 Muslims and the Congress.....	232
5.3 Formation of Muslim Nationalism and Pakistan.....	233
5.3.1 Separate Electorates, Weighted Representation and the Muslim League.....	248
5.3.2 Attempts for Hindu-Muslim Conciliation.....	252
5.3.3 Nationalism and Diversity.....	260
5.4 Religion and Nationalism Among Hindu and Muslims.....	266
5.5 Conclusion.....	269
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION.....	272

6.1 The Constant State of Religious Exclusion.....	275
6.2 Further Research Areas.....	278
6.2.1 Who is a Muslim-What is a Muslim: Homogenization Through Religious Assimilation.....	278
6.2.2 Comparing the Homogenization Before and After Nation-State Formation.....	286
6.2.3 Homogenization Through Linguistic Assimilation	289
6.2.4 Linguistic Assimilation.....	291
6.2.5 Structural Differences.....	295
6.3 Generalization of the Argument.....	298
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	302

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation treats the relationship of religion and nation-building with a special focus on two countries with Muslim majorities: Turkey and Pakistan. These nations are seldom analyzed in tandem since they appear as polar opposites in the Muslim world. Whereas Turkey represents “the secular state” in a Muslim majority country, Pakistan became the first modern nation-state with Islam as the state religion and has served as an inspiration for worldwide Islamic movements.¹ These characterizations have proliferated through media representations along with academic literature on both countries codifying the representation of the two countries as opposites.

Prevailing academic work argues that Turkish nation-building was an exceptionally successful project (Lerner, 1959; Lewis, 1961).² Not only did it secularize both state and society, it also replaced religious identity with a state-centric national one

¹ As the first Islamic state in the World, Pakistan precedes Iran and Afghanistan by three and five decades respectively. Moreover, it was and remains the only country that the meaning and existence of the country is explained through solely on religion. However, unlike Iran Pakistan is not and has never been a theocracy.

² These early assessments have been reevaluated in light of emerging identity crises over subsequent decades in Turkey. Today, the glorification of Turkish modernization and nation-building is increasingly being challenged. For an example, see Bozdogan and Kasaba, eds. (1997).

(Lewis, 1961: 412). This was considered a particularly exceptional achievement in a Muslim majority country because it was assumed that secularization and nation-building were bound to fail due to the presumed resistance of Islam to secularism (Gellner, 1996). Gellner even claims that the success of Turkish secular nationalism is a “double exception”: it is the exception within the exception. More precisely, the Muslim world is an exception in its resistance to secularism with Turkey as an exception within this exception (1997: 236). However, if Turkey represents the ultimate success story of the secular-national project, Pakistan represents its complete failure. In addition, whereas Turkey is celebrated as the most successful example of modernization and nation-building in the Muslim world, Pakistan has been accorded the epitaph of “failed state,” and it is often wondered whether the country will survive or not (Ali, 1983; Rashid, 2015). Moreover, it is argued that the crisis of nation-building is far more severe than that of the state in Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2002). Thus, Pakistan, which bases its identity solely on religion, constitutes a certain failure in nation-building.³ Already partitioned once in 1971, Pakistan continues to cope with persistent threats from secessionist movements.

This narrative is not only simplistic, it is also misleading. It neither contributes to our understanding of the role of religion in these countries, in particular, nor to our grasp of the relationship between religion and nationalism in general. In this dissertation, I argue that since nation-building is a process of homogenization, the role of religion can

³ It is not simply because Pakistan is considered to have failed in nation-building. Rather, according to the dominant paradigm, Pakistan was *bound to fail* since it very much needed religion to build its national identity. For example, Riaz argues that “religion was not only a social demarcator of identity but also the basis upon which statecraft had to be built. This is a marker which any nation-state should be fighting against” (2002: 55). For other works supporting the same point, see Syed (1982) and Oomen (1994).

be best analyzed through its contribution to this process at the national level. Assimilation and exclusion are two means of homogenization and religion often contributes by excluding members of different religious communities. In both cases, religious exclusion formed the very crucial first phase of national homogenization, in which Islam was flagged as the defining element of national identity and non-Muslim elements were eliminated. Thus religion played an identical role in the nation-building projects of both “secular” Turkey and “Islamic” Pakistan. In other words, I argue that religion performed a unique function of boundary-drawing in nation-building. Based on this limited, yet important, function of religion in nation-building, this dissertation will demonstrate that Turkish nationalism is not as “secular” as it is often perceived. Likewise, Pakistani nationalism is not as “Islamic” as it is often considered. This dissertation, then, also challenges the dominant narrative positing secular Turkey and Islamic Pakistan as opposites.

The narrative that posits Turkey and Pakistan respectively as secular and Islamic is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it assumes a monolithic conception of Turkish and Pakistani nations and nationalisms. However, national politics is instead a site of struggle among competing national(ist) projects (Verdery, 1993; Calhoun, 1997; Brubaker, 1996). Thus, when considering Turkish or Pakistani nationalism, we are dealing with a contested phenomenon rather than a reified, stable concept. Unless otherwise noted, in what follows I refer specifically to the official nationalisms as

represented by the rhetoric of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Turkey and Pakistan, respectively.⁴

Neither this praise of secular Turkish nationalism nor the denigration of Pakistan as a failed Islamic state reflect the complicated relations between religion and national identity, particularly with regard to the status of religious minorities and the role of religion in state affairs. In fact, despite the opposing pictures of secularism and Islamism, the status of religious minorities in secular Turkey and Islamic Pakistan reveals intriguing similarities. Very significantly, in both countries, non-Muslim communities hold minority status in both legal and cultural terms. The Lausanne Agreement, the official foundational document of modern Turkey, explicitly defines non-Muslims, and only non-Muslims, as minorities (Oran, 2005; Aktoprak, 2010).⁵ Throughout Republican history, non-Muslim minorities faced state-sanctioned discrimination in various forms (e.g., the Thrace riots of 1934, the wealth tax levied during WWII, the September 6-7 riots of 1955, limitations on religious education as amplified in the case of the closure of Halki (Heybeliada) monastery in 1971, restrictions on the building and functioning of new houses of worship, as well as the confiscation of property held by non-Muslim foundations)(see Oran, 2005; Oran, 2011; Somel, 2013; Aktar, 2000; Aktar, 2006; Reyna and Şen, 1994). These examples are

⁴ For an exploration of the nuances of Turkish nationalism, see Bora (2003). In it, Bora depicts five different strands of Turkish nationalism. Alternative formulations of Pakistani nationalism can be located along a spectrum from a more secular conception towards a more Islamic notion of Pakistani nationalism. For these varieties, see Esposito and Voll (1996: 102-123).

⁵ Through its various rulings in 1980, 1991, 1994 and 2001, the Turkish Constitutional Court declared that only non-Muslims may be defined as minorities in Turkey (Reyna and Şen, 1994: 22; İmamoğlu, 2006: 12-15). Baskın Oran (2005: 63-64) explains how the Turkish delegation at Lausanne insisted that the concept of minority would not include linguistic and ethnic groups, which was at odds with the conventional legal practice of the time. Moreover, Oran points out that the Turkish government did not accept the term religious minority, but strategically insisted on the term non-Muslim to deny any possibility of a Muslim minority with a similar legal and cultural status in Turkey.

limited to legal and state-sanctioned cases of discrimination, which is not to suggest the far more abundant cases of socio-cultural discrimination.⁶

In Pakistan, Islam is the state religion and non-Muslims were considered minorities from the very beginning. The presence of and state recognition of minorities was enshrined in the flag of the state. Whereas the green color of the Pakistani flag represents Islam, the white stripe represents its non-Muslim citizens.⁷ Today, non-Muslims in Pakistan have reserved parliamentary seats, separate electorates, and vote only for their candidates. In addition, a dedicated ministership is in place for minority affairs in the Pakistani cabinet. Despite the constitutional guarantee that each citizen has the right to profess, practice, and propagate his own religion, in practice the non-Muslim communities in Pakistan have been increasingly marginalized and suppressed (Malik, 2002; Bhargava, 2004).

However, the question of minority status is not only about legal protections or discrimination faced in these Muslim majority countries. The definition of minorities according to religious identity and non-Muslims with a corporate minority status suggests that both countries espouse a mono-religious understanding of the nation.⁸ This configuration of national identity along religious lines presents a dilemma for experts of

⁶ Bernard Lewis points out that “in some respects the participation of the non-Muslims in the public life of Turkey actually decreased after the establishment of the Republic, although their legal status on paper was higher than ever before” (1952: 39). However, it should again be noted that this legal status was that of a protected minority.

⁷ At its foundation, Pakistan had a significantly higher portion of non-Muslims residing in the eastern part of the country. When East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan in 1971, the remaining Pakistan, became significantly larger Muslim majority.

⁸ As Kemal Kirişçi (2000) and Soner Çağaptay (2006) demonstrate through an analysis of the immigration policies of the Turkish state, there is a tension between “Turkish citizenship” and “Turkish nationality” for non-Muslims of Turkey.

Turkish politics given the centrality of secularism for the Turkish state. In the case of Pakistan, though the congruence of the national with the religious may be more predictable, it is difficult to understand why the secular-minded founders followed such a policy. Their unwillingness to accord Islam a central role in the country alongside their desire to create an Islamic Pakistan seems contradictory.⁹

Recent Turkish studies literature problematizes various aspects of modernity treated as secular Kemalist nationalism in opposition to religious reactionism. Though modernization is here equated to secular nationalism, academics such as Şerif Mardin (1989) and Nilüfer Göle (1992; 2000) have pointed to the modernist nature of various Islamic movements. Alev Çınar (2005) further added to this critique by examining the nationalist character of Islamic modernization and how it projected itself as both an alternative modernity and an alternative nationalist project to the official secular nationalist one. However insightful these critiques may be, they still assume a secular nationalist project in opposition to an Islamic modernity. Thus, they do not address the religious element that is inextricably tied to the secular nationalist project. Another line of critique questions the secularity of Turkish nationalism and claims that religion gained an increasingly important role in the formation of Turkish national identity. More specifically, it is claimed that secular Turkish nationalism evolved into a synthesis of religion and nationalism over time (Capeaux, 1998; Griogordis, 2013). Gökhan

⁹ The claim that Islam is not accorded a central role in Pakistani politics may sound surprising given the religion's centrality in contemporary Pakistan. However, it should be noted that the pervasiveness of religion in contemporary Pakistani political life relies more on the policies of Zia-ul Haq (1977-1986) and developments in the post-Zia period. It is commonly accepted that in the three decades following Pakistan's independence in 1947, Islam was often used strategically by politicians; it was not allowed a major role in the conduct of state affairs (see Hayes, 1984; Baxter et. al, 2002: 171-180). This was particularly the case for Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of modern Pakistan. In his biography, Jinnah was apparently very much impressed by Atatürk and his secularizing reforms (Bolitho, 1954).

Çetinsaya (1999) and Hakan Yavuz (1993) further draw attention to the intellectual and historical roots of such an alliance.¹⁰ This Islamic element represents an inherent contradiction to the ambiguous nature of Kemalism.¹¹ Thus two separate narratives emerged: one that equates Turkish nationalism with secularism and the other that reads it in an alliance with Sunni Islam. Unfortunately, neither of these narratives is satisfactory. On the one hand, the religious element of Turkish nationalism is evident and observed primarily through the state's treatment of non-Muslim citizens. On the other hand, secularism, which often takes up radical forms of anti-religiosity, remains the dominant aspect of state ideology in Turkey.

In Pakistan, the critique originates from an altogether different direction. In the previous two or three decades, a new generation of historians questioned the Pakistani state's claim of serving as an exemplary Islamic model (Page, 1982; Jalal, 1994; Alavi, 1987). By pointing to the predominantly secular composition of the Pakistani movement's leadership and by addressing the opposition levied by religious scholars (*ulama*) against the movement, these scholars interrogated the assumed links between Islam and the Pakistani movement. Despite official claims, these scholars convincingly demonstrate that the leadership envisioned a secular Pakistan. This secular vision for Pakistan despite the centrality of Islam in the imagining of the Pakistani nation-state is an all too obvious contradiction that demands further explanation through this revisionist narrative. Moreover, these analyses are hindered by their reliance on a

¹⁰ At this point, it may be necessary to repeat that I am focusing on the official version of Turkish nationalism rather than its rivals, which are able to more seamlessly combine religion with nationalism.

¹¹ For an analysis of Kemalism as a *Weltanschauung* open to multiple interpretations and contradictions rather than a rigid political ideology, see Özbudun, 1981.

narrative that focuses on the secular leadership's instrumental usage of Islam to mobilize an essentially religious mass public. Although nationalism, is an elite project, particularly in the colonial context, it would be misleading to assume that it is solely a top-down imposition upon gullible masses. This analysis also ignores the persistence of Pakistani nationalism in the face of many alternatives and structural factors.

Significantly, defining nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan—or a host of other nation-states—as either secular or religious conceals more than it reveals. However, such a dichotomy is representative of the literature on nationalism. The emerging field of nationalism studies also suffers from such a binary approach in its treatment of religion and fails to equip scholars of area studies with the necessary theoretical concepts. This dissertation is not intended to be a study of Ottoman-Turkish politics or South Asian-Pakistani politics. Instead, it is firmly rooted in the field of nationalism studies and approaches the issue from the theoretical perspectives offered by the literature on nationalism and nation-building. I hope to demonstrate that a better understanding of nation-building will enable us to overcome the shortcomings of the approaches developed by the scholars of area studies.

This, however, can only be done if the nation-building process is contextualized within the structural transformations brought (on) by the emergence of the modern state. In an attempt to understand the nature of nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan this dissertation will thus analyze the emergence of the modern state and its transformations from the nineteenth century onwards. In that sense, it is also a study of the sociology of the state in colonial India and the late Ottoman Empire. The changing relationship between state and society is the key to understanding the nature of nation-building and

its relation to religion. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the transitional period—when the pre-modern imperial state evolved into a modern nation-state. This necessitates considering the *longue durée*, which traces the policies of nation-building in concert with the emergence and evolution of the modern state.

This perspective, I believe, will not only demonstrate the reductionism of equating nationalism with either religion or secularism, but will also show that Turkey and Pakistan do not present opposite cases of nation-building. Rather, the similarities are striking. These similarities can be observed in the changing nature of religious pluralism from the pre-modern period through the various phases in the formation of modern state. Both processes were initiated in multi-religious contexts. In his 1956 analysis, Furnivall observes the vast religious plurality in pre-modern India:

[...] probably the first thing that strikes a visitor is the medley of peoples [...] it is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix, but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community, living side by side, but separately within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labor along racial lines (Furnivall, 1956: 304-305).¹²

Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis employ this quotation with a note that this description is also applicable to the Ottoman Empire (1982: 1). However, this picture does not apply to either Turkey or Pakistan in terms of religious pluralism. According to the analyses on nominal religious adherence, in 2000, Turkey had a 99.8 percent Muslim population whereas Pakistan had a slightly lower figure at 96.7 percent (Fargues,

¹² The degree of separateness and clarity of boundaries are probably exaggerated. Current literature emphasizes mixture and hybridity rather than clear-cut, fixed boundaries. However, the fundamental assumption that these were plural societies remains unquestioned.

2001:106-107). This dissertation deals with the erosion of this religious diversity in relation to the nation-building process.

One can say that both the Ottomans and the Indians entered modernity in a fragmented society that was categorized and compartmentalized mostly through religion. However, religious differences were stressed and exaggerated in ways that did not separate the communities into segregated social worlds of their own during the pre-modern period (Marcus, 1989: 43). As Carter Findley (2010: 65) rightly points out, the politicization of these religious identities was as novel as the politicization of ethnicity. The novelty leading to the politicization and ultimate eradication of this diversity was ushered in with the modern state. Religious identities became religious nationalisms along with the process of modern state formation. This dissertation aims to elucidate the similarity of secular Turkey to Islamic Pakistan through an alternative reading of nation-building.

1.1 Problem of Definition

If this dissertation is primarily a study of nationalism and nation-building in Turkey and Pakistan, it would be logical to start by examining the definitions of nation and nationalism. Yet, as Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 4) warn, settling on agreed and adequate definitions of key terms, such as nation and nationalism, is no easy task and presents a daunting challenge to the study of nations and nationalisms. Charles Tilly moves a step further by arguing that “nation” is an entirely useless concept and what should instead be focused on is the study of the state (1975: 6). In the same vein, Eric

Hobsbawm contends that it is impossible to define a nation and instead argues that any analysis of nations and nationalism should begin with an analysis of nationalism rather than the nation (1991: 9). This is so because a group of people becomes a nation only through the ideology of nationalism. In this dissertation, I rely on Gellner's definition of nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (1983: 1). This definition links nationalism to the state as a political unit as the nation is defined through the nation-state.

Nationalism represents a new iteration of the relationship between the modern state and its subjects, who are collectively defined as a nation only as a result of this new form of relationship. Nation-building is thus linked to the formation of the modern state and its need to regulate and control its subjects. As John Breuilly (1994: 220) maintains, "the idea of the nation as a single, geographically bounded group derives from the idea of the state as a single, geographically bounded territory." Breuilly (1994: 220) also points that this new state, with its hitherto unseen monopoly of power and control over its boundaries, is no more an agent among others but an institution that imposes a final will upon all others. Thus a new relationship between the state and the subjects emerge in which state has a much higher capability, authority and legitimacy. In this new relationship a direct link between the individual subject and the government is established whereas historically this connection between the subject and the government was maintained indirectly through communal intermediaries. Aside from this vertical attachment between the state and the subject, the modern state also creates a horizontal solidarity among its subjects (who were previously segregated into communities) transforming them into a nation. This horizontal solidarity is maintained through novel

institutions such as mass education and the schooling system, *levée en masse* and the military conscription, strict border controls and custom stations and the national (meaning state-wide) media. This vertical and horizontal bonds of solidarities on the one hand contributes the emergence of the nation as an imagined community, on the other hand through the uniformity of state administration, maintains the homogeneity of this imagined community.

Through this process of nation-formation, religion often plays contradictory and conflicting roles. On the one hand, religion provides a useful pool of elements including myths, symbols, and cultural traditions that are creatively and selectively appropriated by the actors of nation-building. On the other, religion rivals nationalism as a source of community and belonging. Moreover, the universalist nature of many religions contradicts the limits of the nation and its particularism.¹³ Thus, religion is both an element of and impediment to nation-building.

Since the nature of modern state and the relation between the state and its subjects dictates that nation-building is a process of homogenization, I argue that the function of religion in nation-building can best be evaluated with respect to the role it plays in homogenization. This is particularly so for multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, i.e. transitions from an imperial society towards a national one. My treatment of nationalism and this emphasis on homogenization owes much to the work of Ernest Gellner. Indeed, by considering nation-building largely as a process of homogenization, this dissertation builds on the legacy of Gellner and his works on nationalism. However,

¹³ As Benedict Anderson (1991: 6) argues, as “imagined communities,” nations are imagined as limited and sovereign. No nation claims or desires to include the entire humanity. This lies in stark contrast to the proselytizing zeal of Christianity and Islam, among others.

it aims to go beyond Gellner and his modernist contemporaries, including Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm,¹⁴ by bringing the role of religion to the process of homogenization. Another important aspect of this study is that homogenization is discussed within the context of the transition from empire to nation-state. Thus unlike Gellner, whose main focus is on the social changes brought by industrialization, the homogenization process and the role of religion in this process is discussed in relation to the emergence of modern state.¹⁵

Furthermore, this perspective enables us to better grasp the role of religion in the Turkish and Pakistani cases. If we extend this understanding of nationalism to the Turkish and Pakistani cases, I argue that religion is a major element of nation-building, primarily via its contribution to homogenization. As I have shown above, both Turkey and Pakistan underwent a state-sponsored elimination of religious diversity, a process that led to the emergence of a religiously homogenous society. In the following chapters, I show that the emergence of the modern state, the elimination of religious diversity, and the rise of nationalism are interrelated phenomenon.

¹⁴ As it will be pointed out in the following chapter, these authors claim that nationalism replaced religion. Thus religion has no role in their analysis of nation-building.

¹⁵ As John Hall points “The fundamental insight of Gellner’s theory of nationalism that has been neglected is simple: homogenization processes have been central to the history of nationalism (Hall: 2006:38). However, the problem with Gellner’s formulation of homogenization is his insistence to link homogenization to the new social order brought by industrialization. However, as many of his critics maintain, in most cases nationalism emerged prior to industrialization. For a detailed analysis of Gellner’s works and his theory of nationalism, see Hall (1998). Despite his emphasis on industrialization, at least in one of his writings, Gellner argues that by industrialization he means “that entire syndrome of economic and social changes which is associated with the diffusion of modern technology, and which is sometimes referred to as “modernization,” and which extends far beyond the methods of industrial production in any narrow sense” (1985: 1). Although not prevalent in his other writings such an approach suits better for explaining the emergence of nationalism particularly in the non-Western context.

In the process of modern state formation, nationalism becomes the ideology that creates a bond between the state and a group of people. Nationalism transforms these people into nations by creating a shared cultural identity, which is then linked to the state. However, this identification can only be done by exclusion. As anthropologist Frederik Barth notes, groups tend to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics, but by exclusion, i.e. comparison to strangers (Armstrong, 1982:5). Through this process of identification, “nationalism defines a cultural identity for the nation only by excluding many from its fold” (Chatterjee, 1993: 155).¹⁶ Moreover, exclusions are not historical accidents or pathological deviations from a more inclusive, liberal nationalism (Kuyucu, 2005: 365); rather, it is purposefully and “crucially employed in an attempt to solder core coalitions among those included” (Marx, 2003: 21). Exclusion, then, is definitive of the nation. It is also crucial to remember that the line between inclusion and exclusion is in constant negotiation.

The primary argument of this dissertation is that the relation between religion and nationalism is best understood through the homogenizing function of religion. Religion serves this function not only through its relation to national culture, but even more so by drawing the boundaries of the nation and thus through defining who would be included and excluded into the nation. The homogenization enacted through nation-building includes both assimilation and exclusion. This is particularly so when nations are formed out of diverse, imperial societies. However, even though the equation between nation-building and homogenization is well-established in the literature on nationalism, the exclusionary function of religion through homogenization is not.

¹⁶ This is also an aspect of the parochiality of nations.

Exclusion is as important as assimilation for homogenization and, in certain cases, religion becomes the main criteria for exclusion. This dissertation also argues that such an approach is best-suited for understanding Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms since religion draws the line of exclusion and inclusion in both cases and nation-building relies on the exclusion of various religious communities (e.g. Christians and Jews in Turkey; Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistan) from the emerging national identity. I define this formation of nation through exclusions of non-Muslims as Muslim nationalism. This process of exclusion is analyzed in the context of modern state formation and the specific conditions that prioritized religion as demarcating the boundaries of the nation. The political principle legitimating this process was Muslim nationalism. In what follows, I also hope to codify a more precise definition of this process.

The nation is not a fixed and static concept, but is in a continuous process of reification. The exclusion of non-Muslims from the national status of emerging nation-states then implies that they are meant to be solely of and for Muslims. In a Gellnerian conception, the political unit is congruent with the cultural unit, which, in this case, is defined through religion. However, the prominence of religion in nation formation does not attribute any substantial power to religion in the conduct of state affairs. More precisely, Muslim nationalism is Muslim only in the sense that it is exclusive of non-Muslim. Hence, it is through Muslim nationalism that Islam becomes ethnicized and functions as an identity marker rather than as a belief system or ideology. Thus, the contours of Muslim nationalism are entirely in accord with the politics of secularism.¹⁷

¹⁷ This also means that secularism understood in a limited Rawlsian sense: “keeping religion off politics,” is not an adequate protection for religious minorities. A discussion of secularism is beyond the limited concern of this dissertation, but the main findings of the dissertation suggest that liberal secularism is an

Such an approach enables us to determine the previously neglected role of religion (boundary-drawing) in nation-building. As such, it will also enable us to overcome simplistic dichotomies between religious and secular nationalisms, thereby demonstrating the unique function of religion in the secular process of nation-building. This will help us arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the relation between religion and nationalism, as well as to better grasp the role of Islam in the nation-building of two Muslim countries.

1.2 Outline of the Dissertation

The first chapter of this dissertation treats the theoretical debates in the literature on nationalism with a focus on the role of religion in nation-building. In addition, I will contextualize my approach within the wider literature of nation-building.

This theoretical discussion is accompanied by a detailed review of Turkish and South Asian studies. In this literature review, I will outline the debate on the role of religion in the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. Specifically, in the Turkish case, this entails a thorough discussion of the historiographical debates on the emergence of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the transition from empire to republic. In the Pakistani case, this includes a detailed analysis of the debates over Partition and the role assigned to religion in the process leading to Partition.

insufficient means of protecting religious minorities. This is in line with some recent contributions to the literature on secularism (see Bader, 2007; Chatterjee, 1998; Nandy, 1995).

The chapter concludes with conceptual clarifications of possible points of misunderstanding. The terms used through this dissertation such as Muslim nationalism, religion, religious syncretism, and communalism are subject to debate and without providing their exclusive definitions it would be impossible to clarify the major claims of the dissertation. This section deals primarily with an analysis and definition of Muslim nationalism. The essentially secular and modern character of Muslim nationalism is delineated in order to avoid further confusion.

The modern state constitutes one of the key parameters of the analysis provided in this dissertation. Therefore, to better understand the key features of the modern state and how it enabled the emergence of the above-mentioned concepts and phenomena, the second chapter examines the pre-national communities under empires. By analyzing empires, I hope to demonstrate how religion has been an essential element of social organization and state society relations, as well as how these relations were structurally different from the modern form of nation-states. This contrast between empires and nation-states are analyzed through the existence or non-existence of direct control of the state over its subjects, which is linked to the issue of diversity and pluralism. By demonstrating the diversity of an imperial social setting and contrasting it with the modern nation-state, the chapter reveals the crucial role of homogenization in nation-building. Therefore, this chapter helps explicate the theoretical arguments developed in the first chapter and offers historical background for the following chapters. Aside from a general discussion of empires as a political system, particular attention is given to the Ottoman and Mughal Empires, which set the tone for pre-modern administration and society in their respective realms. By examining the pre-modern imperial period, one

can gain a better understanding of the transformation that took place as a result of modern state formation in the nineteenth century. As the chapter will show, empire is no clearer a concept than nation or nation-state. Yet, by comparing and contrasting these terms, we may arrive at more stable definitions of the nation-state and empire.

The third and fourth chapters form the core of this dissertation and analyze how religious exclusion paved the way for the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and the Indian subcontinent. Since nation-building is explored through homogenization in this dissertation, these chapters investigate the role of religion in these processes, particularly in terms of the exclusionary aspect of religion.

In both cases, as everywhere else in the world, the emergence of nationalism is linked to the formation of modern state. Thus, the politicization of religious communities and the emergence of religious nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and in the Indian subcontinent are discussed in the context of modern state formation. I will argue that since it is harder to sustain plurality in a modern state, neither the Ottomans nor the British (in India) could reconcile religious plurality with a centralizing/intervening modern state. The process of modern state formation led to the politicization of religious identities and the formation of religious nationalism. Moreover, assessing the differences between the modern state in India and the Ottoman Empire, a modernizing colonial empire and a universal modernizing empire, respectively, enables us to compare and contrast the religious nationalisms that emerged in these two cases.

This attempt to explain the emergence and dominance of religious nationalism builds on the arguments of the second chapter on empires. It considers nationalism as a transition from empire to nation-state, which suggests that modernizing reforms, such as a centralized administration, the creation of uniformity, equality through political reforms, direct rule through the extension of state power, and the creation of a collaborative network (by the colonial state) are all related to each other. Considered together, these reforms transformed empire in a manner that paved the way for nationalism.

The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation by examining the homogenizing policies of the post-nation-state period. This dissertation argued that the role of religion in nation-building can be best understood through its function of homogenization. It will be helpful to observe if and how homogenization policies differed between the transitional period that paved the way for the nation-state and the post-nation-state period. Though with exceptions, it could be argued that exclusion dominates the process of transition from empire to nation-state while policies of assimilation gain importance in the period following the formation of the nation-state. In the conclusion I return to this and undertake a brief discussion of assimilationist politics in the Turkish and Pakistani cases. Religion, while continuing its function of exclusion, can also be instrumentalized as a mean of assimilation. However, the main venue of assimilation in the nation-state period is related to language. This is an important aspect of the relation between religion and nation-building. The dissertation then concludes with a discussion on the generalizability of the arguments developed for Turkey and Pakistan while also incorporating a discussion of topics that may be discussed in future studies.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In 1935, Jawaharlal Nehru, a prominent figure in the Indian nationalist movement and future Prime Minister of India, wrote a series of articles while incarcerated. These articles would appear in *The Modern Review*, a Calcutta monthly.¹⁸ In these writings, Nehru addressed various problems of the nationalist movement in India and devoted one of his articles solely to the question of communalism. In his discussion on the role of religion in the modern life, Nehru referred to Turkey as an exemplar for Indian Muslims. Nehru argues that under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey, “[...] has ceased to be an Islamic country in any sense of the word.” In addition, Nehru claims that the Turks, who take pride in the Turanian race, gave up their religious identity for the sake of a national one (1935: 504). For Nehru, not only does nationalism very clearly develop at the expense of religious outlook, but Islam is considered as incompatible with notions of race. For Indian Muslims, the implications of this model were clear: do not support communal parties like the Muslim League (ML), stop pushing for communal

¹⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, “The Solidarity of Islam,” *The Modern Review*, (1935) Vol 58, No 5, pg. 504-505.

policies (such as quotas, federation, separate electorates, or autonomy), and support the secular/supra communal policies of the Congress movement.

Soon after the publication of Nehru's article, Mohammad Iqbal, considered the intellectual father of Pakistan, offered a rebuttal (1936) [1977]. In it, Iqbal argued that the Turks had not given up their religious identity wholesale, but had instead deemed it synonymous with national identity. This symbiosis in the Turkish model represented a perfect convergence of religion and national identity. Iqbal thus urged Indian Muslims to follow the Turkish model. For Iqbal's contemporaries, the implications of this interpretation were quite clear: religious and national identities are equivalent and inseparable. Iqbal's directive also calls for Muslims to refrain from supporting the Congress party, which does not recognize religion as concomitant to national identity. Instead, follow the ML.

Both Iqbal and Nehru, each nationalist in his own way, portray a static and reductionist picture of Turkish nationalism. Their debate, however, reflects the continuous struggle to define Turkish nationalism, as well as the larger divide when considering modernity, nationalism, and religion. In his brief analysis of Turkish modernization, Nehru, an ardent supporter of secularism and modernism, reveals his position that religion is fundamentally incompatible with both modern life and nationalism. A Nehruvian vision of Turkish nationalism remained dominant as long as the postulates of modernization theory were left unchallenged, which was the case in the 1950s and 1960s.

It is significant to note that Nehru and Iqbal were not the only ones who paid particular attention to the Turkish experience. Turkey presented an important case for the modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s. Daniel Lerner shared Nehru's belief in the dichotomy between religion and modern life. In his classic *Passing of a Traditional Society*, Lerner argues that the core of Turkish modernization was choosing between "Mecca and mechanization" (1958: 405). In another classic, *Emergence of a Modern Turkey*, Bernard Lewis declares that the choice has been made successfully. According to Lewis, in Turkey, "God had been replaced twice: as the source of sovereignty, by the people, and as the object of worship by the nation" (1961: 479). Both of these works enjoyed a broad audience, beyond students of Turkish politics. Lerner's work (and to certain extent Lewis's) became an essential fixture in courses on modernization and is considered a founding text of the modernization thesis. The Turkish experience was studied not only through the hegemonic framing of modernization theory, but also contributed immensely to the formation of modernization theory more generally and to its claim of universal applicability more particularly. With Niyazi Berkes's *Development of Secularism in Turkey*, these works firmly established a Nehruvian reading of Turkey through the dominant lens of modernization theory (1964).¹⁹

The dominant theme in these works was to consider the inevitable clash between religion and secularism, arising out of the juxtaposition, in mutually exclusive terms, of modernity and religion. I refer to this prevailing reading of Turkish nationalism, which

¹⁹ The period of 1958-1964, which include the publication dates of these three works, also represents the peak of modernization theory in the social sciences.

is in line with the official narrative of Kemalism, as the “replacement thesis.” Moreover, as will be outlined below, this approach to the relationship between nationalism and religion is not unique to Kemalism, but is part and parcel of the modernist strand in the literature on nationalism. These modernist approaches remained dominant as long as belief in Turkish modernization continued. While the unresolved problems of Turkish modernization—including conflict with the Kurdish minority and questioning the role of Islam in public life—continued to dominate Turkish politics, the adherence to the modernist reading grew increasingly fraught.

The modernist reading of Turkish nationalism had two distinct dimensions: empirical and normative. Empirically, it was assumed that Turkish nation-building was essentially an anti-religious endeavor accompanied by policies of “assertive secularism” (Kuru, 2009). Normatively, this dichotomy was endorsed and was justified on the grounds of Islam’s presumed incompatibility with the ideals of modernity and nationalism (see Gellner, 1996; Gellner, 1997). The modernist strand was criticized on both empirical and normative grounds. While the dichotomy portrayed between modernity and religion was questioned on normative bases. Subscribing to the view on multiple modernities, (see Eisenstadt, 2003), Şerif Mardin (1989), Nilüfer Göle (1992; 2000), and Kemal Karpat (2001) criticized this dichotomy and pointed to the modernist impulse of Islamic alternatives.²⁰ Alev Çınar adds an empirical dimension to this normative critique by demonstrating that the Islamic opposition also couches itself within an alternative and rival nationalist project (2005). However, these critiques did not challenge, but rather emphasized the empirical claim of the modernist narrative—the

²⁰ Also see Findley, 2010 and Heper, 1997.

official Turkish nationalism, Kemalism, is an essentially secular project in mutually exclusivist terms vis-à-vis religion.

At this point, the empirical criticism of the modernist narrative enters the picture. These critiques argued that such a portrayal of the state and Islam as disparate and separable is empirically misleading because the Kemalist state sought to regulate and utilize religion rather than eliminate it completely. Eric Zürcher (2010: 271-284), for instance, claims that Islam was employed in the service of the state throughout the Ottoman period. Despite its rhetoric declaring a rupture with the Ottoman past, the Kemalist establishment, for its part, continued in the tradition of their predecessors. Without neglecting the central importance of secularism in the Turkish political system, Ümit Cizre (1996) claims that the Turkish state maintained a strategic relationship with Islam. Adopting a “double discourse” against Islam enabled the Turkish state to integrate Islam into the political system without abandoning its radical secularism. This approach to the interaction of the state with Islam had critical implications for the reading of Turkish nationalism. Given the presumed role of Islam as an arm of the Turkish state, it is argued that Islam became a crucial element of Turkish national identity. Initially developed by a group of conservative intellectuals (see Kafesoğlu, 1985), the Turkish-Islamic synthesis soon became the official creed (Capeaux, 1998; Grigoriadis, 2013). Thus, instead of the modernist reading that focused on a struggle between official secular nationalism and its religious rivals, the new reading proposed an alliance of religion and nationalism. This presented an entirely different reading of Turkish modernization, one that is more in line with Iqbal’s reading. However, it is

important to note that this alternative reading often considers the increased role of religion as a deviation from the original creed.

While this religious element is often considered a deviation emerged during the multi-party politics era (see Jaschke, 1972), there has been a recent surge in works highlighting the presence of religious elements in 1920s and 1930s Kemalism (Poulton, 1997: 114-130; Yıldız, 2001; Özkırmı and Sofos, 2008: 161-173; Çağaptay, 2006). These important contributions reveal the paradoxical relationship between secular nationalism and Islam. However, this religious element is difficult to elucidate in the context of an assertive secularism, which is often accepted to be a paradox of Kemalism.²¹ These works focusing on the early Republican period remain mostly descriptive, with explanations relying on historical contingency. These analyses, then, cannot be extended to examine other marginalized communities, such as the Alevis, or to other historical settings.

In contradistinction to the Turkish case, there is little disagreement that Islam played a major role in the formation of Pakistan. After all, Partition was organized according to religious criteria—with Pakistan formed by unifying the Muslim-majority provinces of British India.²² In this regard, Pakistan differs from the majority of post-colonial states because its formation was based on an identity rather than on the territorial arrangements of the colonial state (Schuman, 1972: 295). Moreover, unlike Turkey and many other countries, Pakistan lacked criteria other than religion that would

²¹ For an analysis of Kemalism as a *Weltanschauung* open to multiple interpretations and contradictions rather than as a rigid political ideology, see Özbudun, 1981.

²² Bengal and Punjab, provinces that had slim Muslim majorities, were also divided along religious lines.

be incorporated as part of its definition of an inclusive national identity. What remains unclear is how the significance of religion would be translated into daily politics.

At the time of its formation, those who found themselves contained within the borders of the new state of Pakistan spoke thirty-two different languages belonging to five major linguistic families. The country was made up of five different provinces with ethnic and regional loyalties, which were quite powerful (Esposito, 1980: 14). In this diverse community, Islam was the only commonality. Therefore, Islam and Muslim nationalism were integral to the notion of Pakistani nationalism (Baxter et al. 2002: 71). Though religion is considered crucial to national identity, there is little agreement as to what this would entail. The idea of Pakistan came to mean different things to its different constituencies. As a result of this confusion, a perennial identity crisis haunted Pakistani politics leading to the partition of the country in 1971 and ongoing tensions. Esposito and Voll, for instance, emphasize that, “Pakistan has struggled throughout its history with the meaning of its Islamic identity” (1996: 102).

The ongoing debate on the role of religion in the conduct of state affairs is closely related to and reflected in the historiographical debate on the role of Islam in the formation of Pakistan. The official Pakistani historiography considers Pakistan as the culmination of a centuries-old Muslim existence on the subcontinent. (see Qureshi, 1969; Qureshi, 1977 and Aziz, 1967) Understandably, this view is supported by the Islamic oriented scholars (see Mujahid, 2001) and particularly ones affiliated with the JI (see Ahmad, 2006). However, this view is not confined to Islamists alone, but is found in the work of many scholars who attribute religion with a central role in Partition (Sayeed, 1968; Malik, 1960; Minault, 1982; Metcalf, 1982; Gilmartin, 1988 and Shaikh,

1986). In the 1980s, this Islamic reading of the formation of Pakistan was increasingly criticized by a new generation of historians (Page, 1982; Jalal, 1994; Alavi, 1987, 2002; Malik, 2008). These scholars claimed that Partition could be explained without referring to religious ideology. Instead, the focus was concentrated on British political designs, the elite politics of the Indian subcontinent, or even on a series of historical accidents. A sharp division runs through the South Asian Studies literature between “those who maintain that the role of Islamic ideology in the conduct of Indian Muslim politics was either illusory or wholly instrumental, and those who argue that Islam was the only explanatory factor behind partition and Pakistan” (Shaikh, 1986: 539-540). This division also marks the well-known debate between Paul Brass (1974; 1977; 2000) and Francis Robinson (1974; 1977; 2000),²³ which evolved into one of the fundamental debates in the literature on nationalism.

Debates on Jinnah exemplify the divide between Islamists and secularists in Pakistan, who each have their own image of Jinnah (Ahmed, 1997). Critiquing and questioning Jinnah’s dietary habits,²⁴ for instance, have had significant effects on contemporary Pakistani politics. For many, Jinnah is either “an Islamic visionary who created the first Muslim nation-state or he is the arch secularist who, by some ironic twist of fate, managed to create a confessional state” (Sayyid and Tyrer, 2002: 57). It

²³ This debate attracted attention far beyond South Asian Studies. The positions of these authors fit the debate between the constructivist and primordialist strands of the literature on nationalism. One article from each author was included in one of the most important compilations on nationalism (Smith and Hutchinson, 2000). However, it is important to recall that Robinson, particularly through his later formulations, does not fall squarely into the primordialist camp.

²⁴ Specifically, questions arise as to whether Jinnah ate ham or not, and whether he drank wine or not, which led to further speculation as to whether or not he began abstaining from alcohol at a later point in his life.

could be argued that a similar focus on the cult of Atatürk is evident in Turkey with Islamic groups appropriating him as part of their movements, albeit with a more religious personality. However, there is much more room for debate in the case of Jinnah. His untimely death soon after the formation of Pakistan makes his record on issues of Islam and politics more ambiguous. Moreover, during his very short tenure as the Governor-General of Pakistan, Jinnah made contradictory statements that provided ammunition for the arsenals of both camps. While the secularists often refer to his speech at the inaugural session of Constitutional Assembly, delivered on August 11, 1947, the Islamists argue that it should be contextualized among his statements committing to the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state. In his historic speech, Jinnah declared:

Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste, or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make [...] Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

In fact it is difficult to see under which context his seminal 11 August speech could be interpreted rather than a perfect statement of political secularism, yet it is equally true that before and after this speech Jinnah made various references to the Islamic nature of Pakistan.

The centrality of the debate on Jinnah's piety and his religious views for Pakistani national ideology arises out of the assumption that only religious people assign a role to religion in the construction of national identity, which is based upon a binary reading of its as being either Islamic or secular. The significant function played by religion in the formation of secular national ideologies is often overlooked. Moreover, it is this very perception that treats the simultaneous existence of an assertively secular political system along with clear Islamic influences as part of Turkish national identity to be a contradiction. In both countries, the debate on the relation of religion and national identity is mistakenly placed in a replacement versus synthesis nexus. Moreover, the larger debate in the nationalism literature seems to be trapped in a similar oppositional nexus.

2.1 Literature Review on Religion and Nationalism

Nationalism studies had long been affected by a binary opposition between modernists/constructivists/instrumentalists and perennialists/primordialists/ethno-symbolists (Smith, 1971; 2000; Özkırımlı, 2010). This divide likewise shaped the debate on the relation between religion and nationalism. However, I will not examine the details of this divide. As Antoine Roger points out, this division offers little because the central arguments of the modernist camp are incomparably better articulated and well-founded (2008: 3). In its approach to nations and nationalism, this study situates itself firmly within the modernist-constructivist camp. It attaches crucial significance to the birth of the modern state as a new type of relationship between the modern state and its subjects.

In this sense, nationalism as an ideology is historically modern and the nation, as a community, is a modern social construct. Both are directly related to the formation of the modern state and its desire to regulate and control its subjects. This is not to deny that people organized communally before the advent of nationalism or that they had primordial attachments. The modernist view does not claim that there was one homogenous human community fragmented into nations by the advent and spread of modernity. Rather, the claim is that the nation is a *new* form of human classification, with the link between primordial attachments and modern nations provided by the discourse of nationalism (Özkırımlı, 2010: 202).²⁵

The latter point was particularly crucial for the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire. People referring to the pre-modern significance of Islamic identity for Muslims often equate this primordial sense of Islamic belonging with the modern notion of Muslim nationalism (Karpas, 1972; Aktürk, 2009; Robinson 1974; Shaikh 1986). However Muslim nationalism entails a political claim on behalf of Muslims within a given territory by departing from the social and religious significance of Islam in the lives of the individual Muslims. It is only in this light that the opposition of the Indian ulama to Muslim nationalism and the significance of the modern state can be understood. As Talal Asad rightly points, an association of Islam with state power is the result not of Islam's commitment to nationalist ideas, but of the modern nation-state's enforced claim to constitute legitimate social identities and arenas (2003: 200). As the emergence of nations and nationalisms is

²⁵ For a brief but illuminating analysis of this point see the exchange between Anthony Smith (1996) and Ernest Gellner (1996a) on the question of "Do Nations Have Navels?"

primarily linked to the new relationship between the state and its subjects, Muslim nationalism has appeared only under this guise.

However, this divide in the literature on nationalism is not productive for the purposes of this dissertation because the analysis offered by the modernist camp lacks a deep engagement with the function of religion in nation-building. Without dealing with the larger debate between the modernists and the primordialists, I will provide a brief summary of the two approaches on the relationship between religion and nationalism and reveal the shortcomings of the existing literature. Thereafter, I will analyze the relationship between religion and nationalism. This analysis also identifies the guiding principles of this dissertation, as well as my approach to the inquiry on the relationship of religion and nation-building in the Turkish and Pakistani cases.

2.2 Religion and Nation

The relation between nationalism and religion remained understudied by scholars of nationalism until the 1990s. The modernist school considers religion—like other pre-modern identities, such as ethnicity and language—as irrelevant to the growth of nationalism. Even when the relation between religion and nationalism is discussed, this discussion is done “from the perspective of ‘nationalism as a religion’ a thesis that is much common to nationalism studies and nationalism literature” (Çıtak, 2004: 31). Thus, the relationship between religion and nationalism is considered to be a simple process of replacing or substituting nationalism for religion. Anderson (1983) exemplifies this modernist approach in his identification of the importance of the

vacuum created by secularization for the evolution of nationalism. Gellner (1983) similarly takes a modernist stance by considering nationalism “as the replacement of religion as the cultural framework of the emerging capitalist economy” (Çıtak, 2004: 34). However, both authors point to the significance of the Reformation as contributing the decay of religion. Religion is associated with nationalism not by its existence, but instead by its absence or decay. In other words, nationalism is more concerned with the decay of religion than it is with its existence. In this view, nationalism is a secular religion, an unintended consequence of Protestantism, which plays a significant, but “negative role” (by creating an institutional or moral vacuum) for the birth of nationalism.

While modernists consider nationalism from the perspective of the secularization thesis,²⁶ more culturalist and primordialist approaches consider religion as a component of a particular nationalism, for which they seek religious roots. Peter Van der Veer’s (1994), Adrian Hastings’s (1996) and Liah Greenfeld’s (1992) works are important attempts at explaining the emergence of nationalism with regard to religion. As opposed to the modernist secularization thesis, religion is considered central to the construction of the nation. Among the three authors, Hastings and Greenfeld also emphasize Protestantism, not as a decay of religion, but a transformation of “traditional” religion that eventually culminates in the birth of nations and nationalisms (a positive role).

²⁶ One reason for the rise of alternative approaches to the relationship between nationalism and religion is the apparent failure of the orthodox secularization thesis. Until the end of the twentieth century, it was assumed that religious beliefs and identities would diminish as modernity transformed society. However, the persistence of religious practices and the worldwide resurgence of religion has weakened faith in the secularization thesis. To see the shift from the secularization thesis to the desecularization thesis, see Berger (1964) and Berger (1999). For the most influential work on the secularization thesis and its critiques see Casanova (1994).

According to Anthony Smith (2003), in these disparate approaches, “the relation between nationalism and religion is perceived as an evolutionary framework that sees an inevitable movement whether *evolutionary* or *destructive* from the one to the other” (quoted in Mihelj, 2007, emphasis added). While the modernist school considers this movement destructive, culturalists deem it evolutionary.

However, it is crucial to note that most authors concentrating on the significance of religion as part of a developmental progression to nationalism are speaking primarily of Protestantism. In particular, it is argued that Protestantism contributed to the birth of nationalism through individualization, the institutional decay of church authority (Gellner, 1983), by creating a moral vacuum (Anderson, 1983), through the vernacularization of religious texts (Hastings, 1997), or the particularization and diversification of churches (Greenfeld, 1990). Emphasis has also been placed on the role of Protestantism, either negatively or positively, in constructing national identities that led to the search of a “functional equivalent of Protestantism” (Mihelj, 2007) in the non-Western context,²⁷ a search in which the Muslim World was believed to constitute an exception.

An alternative approach classifies nationalisms as either secular or religious nationalisms. Mark Juergensmeyer claims that religion’s incompatibility with the values of the secular West deems it irreconcilable with secular nationalism. However, it is clear that religions create their own nationalisms and contemporary politics is often viewed as

²⁷ The crucial role attributed to Protestantism in Western modernity is not limited to the study of nationalism. In fact, since the influential work of Weber, many aspects of modernity, including capitalism, democratization, and nationalism, are linked to Protestantism in some manner.

a battleground between secular and religious versions of nationalism (1993; 1996). This insightful point demonstrates the nationalist character of many religious movements across the globe. Still, Juergensmeyer's theory is insufficient in its fixed demarcation between religious and secular nationalisms. Juergensmeyer further neglects the paradoxical role of religion within secular nationalisms.

Anthony Marx presents the most convincing account of the role of religion in civic and secular nationalisms (2003). According to Marx, religious exclusion forms the basis of Western civic nationalism. The presence of homogenous populations in three major Western European nation-states was possible only through the coercion and exclusion of religious minorities, including Muslims and Jews in Spain, Protestants in France and Catholics in England. However, his is a historical account limited to these three states, which refers to a contingent affair of the struggles of the Reformation and Counter Reformation.

Though this study is situated in the modernist camp, it moves beyond the modernist approach when scrutinizing the relation between nationalism and religion. Moreover, the two cases and debates discussed in this dissertation reveal the limitations in explaining the complex relationship between nationalism and religion. How can we explain the secular elites' emphasis on religion in the construction of national identity? Is it primarily tactical? If so, how is it that the most radically secular nationalism in the Muslim world continues to incorporate many religious elements? On the other hand, if Pakistani national identity was derived completely from religion, how can we explain the half-heartedness of Pakistani elites in positioning religion as the basis of national identity? As these questions show, the role played by religion in nation-building is an

extremely complicated one. The prevailing paradigms in area studies are incapable of treating these complicated questions. Moreover, the burgeoning field of nationalism studies has yet to provide area specialists with adequate theoretical tools.

Based on the above literature reviews, the reader may identify three disparate dichotomies that coincide in three separate fields: Ottoman/Turkish Studies, South Asian/Pakistani Studies, and nationalism studies.²⁸ This dissertation rejects an appeal to binary oppositions that delineate the parties of the debate between those who consider religion irrelevant and those who consider it as vital to nation-building. On the contrary, it argues that the role of religion is not unilinear (destructive or evolutionary), but is instead a very complex process with varying degrees of importance—crucial at times and irrelevant at others. The key factor determining the role of religion in nation-building is that of homogenization.

2.3 Religious Diversity and Homogenization

The first Christian King of the Magyars, Saint Stephen (998-1038), told his son St. Emeric (Imre) that “a country unified in language and customs is fragile and weak” (Jazsi, 1961: 39). Karen Barkey similarly argues that both the Romans and the Ottomans believed that “difference added to the empire, [it] didn’t detract from it” (2008: 110). This attitude stands in stark opposition to European state-making, which resulted in the formation of modern nation-states. In Western Europe, the emphasis was on

²⁸ It should be noted that some of the works cited above do not conform to these dichotomies—they instead attempt to overcome or, more often, bridge them.

homogeneity rather than diversity and this homogeneity was considered a prime source of strength.²⁹

However, this emphasis on homogeneity raises a fundamental contradiction between state formation and nation-building. It is almost inconceivable that a state would forgo any territory willingly.³⁰ Nation-states are no exception. Benedict Anderson defines the transition from empire to nation-state as an attempt at “stretching the tight body of the nation to the rest of the empire” (1991: 86). However nationalism is an exclusionary ideology that transforms a strictly delineated community into a nation only by excluding many from the definition of nation (Chatterjee, 1993: 155). These two goals are clearly contradictory: a larger geographical territory undeniably entails the incorporation of diverse individuals and communities, which results in greater heterogeneity. Nationalism, however, emphasizes homogenization at the expense of those considered different.

Whereas drive to expand necessitates the broadest definition of the nation possible— territorial or civic, the ideology of nationalism often yields a more narrow

²⁹ Nationalism presupposes homogeneity as a virtue over diversity. Fischer Lundgreen and Stein Rokkan scrutinize this assumption in their contribution to the classical volume edited by Charles Tilly (1975). Lundgreen and Rokkan’s argument focus on two key propositions: 1) a homogenous population is more likely to remain loyal to a regime led by members of its own community; and, 2) the centralized policies of extraction and control were more likely to yield a high return to the government where the population’s daily life was organized in relatively uniform ways. Thus, a single successful policy could easily be generalized to all parts of a state (Tilly, 1975: 79). For Gellner, homogeneity is vital to the efficient functioning of modern industrial society. However, Gellner does not claim a direct correlation between homogeneity and efficiency. As Arash Abizadeh rightly argues in his 2002 *APSR* article, “Gellner is not necessarily committed to the position that the more homogenous society, the more efficient economy; rather he is committed to the position that there is a minimum baseline of cultural homogeneity that is required. It is just that, that baseline is very high” (505).

³⁰ There are quite a few exceptions when states pursue a policy of downsizing. For a collection of essays on these exceptions, see O’Leary et. al (2001).

definition, based on religion, ethnicity, or language. The tension between territorial expansion versus a constricted definition of the nation underlies the basic causes of conflict in diverse nation-building processes. As Prasenjit Duara argues, nations should be understood as relationships based on inclusions and exclusions (1995; quoted in Eley and Suny, 1996: 151). The decision of where to draw the line of inclusion and exclusion is a major source of nationalist conflict. Alternative nationalist projects often differ on how to define and delimit the nation. Conflicts between irredentist, separatist and pan movements, civic and ethnic varieties of nationalisms, as well as religious and secular nationalisms are part and parcel of the disagreement between the contradictory impulses of enlargement and homogenization. This contradiction is particularly important for our discussion, as it also reveals the point at which religion is either functional for nation-building or when it is an impediment. According to Eric Hobsbawm, nineteenth century liberal nationalism was especially noteworthy due to its power of unification and enlargement (1991: 39). This unification attempt was not confined to the oft-cited examples of Germany and Italy. Rather, in their attempt at modernizing, empires would include their entire citizenry as part of their newly propagated imperial nationalism. However, in every case of nation-building, an elite attempt at fostering cultural unity accompanied efforts of political unification (Esherick et. al, 2006: 5).

The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion play their part in the contradiction between enlargement, territorial expansion, and homogenization. There are three policies that a modern state can follow with regard to the diverse nature of its citizenry: assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion (Mylonas, 2012; Aktürk, 2012).

Assimilation is the only policy that enables homogenization without excluding any individual. Thus, from the perspective of state elites, it is the most preferable and most often observed policy of nation-states and nationalizing states. At times, when assimilation may not be an option, states either accommodate this diversity by either assuming a multi-cultural order or maintaining their mono-cultural definition of the nation by instead excluding the perceived inassimilable elements.³¹ However, accommodation should not be included as part of the strategies of nation-building. Mylonas, who offers accommodation as a policy of nation-building, defines it as a situation “where the ‘differences’ of a non-core group are more or less respected and institutions that regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place. The host state grants the status of ‘minority’ to that non-core group” (2012: 22). However, the very fact that accommodation is accomplished by granting minority status means that these groups are not incorporated into the nation-building process. Accommodation is instead a mere strategy with which to negotiate diversity, not one of nation-building (which essentially aims to expel this diversity). Members of the accommodated communities, then, are citizens, but not nationals of the state. If a narrow notion of legal citizenship is taken as a criterion, accommodation should be defined as a form of inclusion. However, if the sociologically more relevant criterion of nationhood is instead considered, accommodation indeed represents a form of exclusion.

³¹ If the nation is understood as a form of practice, accommodationist policies entail a deviation from it. Thus, accommodation is a policy that I would associate with multi-nationalist states. There are two different forms of assimilationist policies: 1) assimilation to the cultural values of a dominant group; or, 2) assimilation of each and every group to a newly emerging, neutral cultural milieu. In practice, both demand the subscription of the entire nation to one cultural element. It is also clear that many accommodationist policies within the nation-state form are thinly veiled forms of assimilation.

The literature on nation-building often focuses either on the means of assimilation (a modern education system, military service, social mobilization, the emergence of a common market, the economic rationality of assimilation for minorities, and, of course, the deliberate efforts of states in cultural engineering (Gellner, 1983; Deutsch, 1953; Conversi, 2007; Rokkan, 1975; Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973; Laitin, 1998; Brubaker, 1996; Birch, 1989; Poulantzas, 1978) or on the policies of exclusion with a focus on how and why it turned violent (Horowitz, 1985; Rae, 2002; Snyder, 2000; Mann, 2005; Bulutgil, 2009). Harris Mylonas analyzes why states varyingly prefer either exclusion or assimilation by referring to international factors such as the foreign policy goals of the state and its alliance preferences (2012). Each of these works is useful, and I do not intend to challenge them in general. Instead, I take a more modest approach and argue that the elements of differentiation between groups have a decisive impact on the policies of assimilation or exclusion.

Here, with regard to assimilation and exclusion, there is a major difference between religion and language—two major markers of identity. The nineteenth century has demonstrated that large-scale conversion from a major institutionalized religion to another is near impossible. No such conversion took place among believers of Christianity, Islam, Judaism or Hinduism throughout the modern era. Where large scale religious conversion did take place, as in South Korea and large parts of Africa, it was from animistic or local religions to Christianity or Islam. More recently, conversion in Russia and Albania saw a shift from atheism to Christianity or Islam, respectively. Despite large-scale conversion from animism and atheism to established world religions, the transfer between these religions is far less likely. In light of such experiments, even

the zeal of missionary activities is often limited to intra-confessional conversion, such as that of Armenians to Protestantism or Catholicism (Salt, 2002; Lindner, 2009). This suggests that assimilation is not an option when it comes to the management of religious diversity states either accommodate or exclude, with the adaption of the latter strategy as contingent upon the failure of the first. Secession should also be considered a form of exclusion from the point of view of seceding. Any group demanding secession on the claim of having a distinct national identity does not only exclude itself from the larger political community, but, since it is modeled on the notion of a homogenous nation-state, it also excludes the out group members from the seceding national identity. Therefore, each secession based on the self-determination of one minority creates new minority problems.

The two nation-building cases that this dissertation deals with exemplify the failures of accommodation through religious plurality and subsequent exclusion. There are various reasons for the failure of accommodation, and they are scrutinized in the third and fourth chapters. However, it is crucial to recall that the emergence and structure of the modern state, with its unifying and homogenizing impulses, make the tolerant accommodation of diversity highly unlikely.

The following observations can be made with regard to religion and language in the policies of assimilation and exclusion:

- 1- The first priority for states is to maintain the largest territory possible along with its population;
- 2- The state first aims to assimilate the population within the territory;

- 3- Linguistic assimilation is often easier to achieve. In most cases, attempts are then made for co-religionists to be assimilated linguistically;
- 4- Religious assimilation is easier within the same religion or from a local religion towards a major institutionalized religion. Therefore, nationalizing states often try to eradicate or blur sectarian differences;
- 5- It is quite difficult to assimilate from a major institutionalized religion to another;
- 6- If it is impossible to assimilate (either religiously or linguistically), and the state sticks to its mono-cultural definition, the second option is to pursue exclusion;
- 7- If exclusion is impossible without territorial loss, then there are two options:
1) either downsize the territory (partition); or, 2) widen the definition of the nation;
- 8- Partition may take place on religious (India-Pakistan) or linguistic bases (Pakistan-Bangladesh);
- 9- The broadening of national identity may either result in a shift from ethnic to civic nationalism, (India after partition, recent debates in Turkey on “Turkiyelilik” which can be translated as being a member of Turkey, as opposed to being a Turk) or from a religious nationalism towards a secular one (Albania, Germany, Eastern Arabs).

If the state is unable to either assimilate or exclude its linguistic minorities, it is then forced to shift towards a more civic version of nationalism to prevent any loss of

territory. If the state is unable to either assimilate or exclude its religious minorities, it is then forced to secularize national identity.³²

If we look at nation-formation in Turkey and the Indian subcontinent, we observe unique policies aimed at the homogenization of religious and linguistic diversity. Pakistan and Turkey were both formed according to a notion of religious homogenization through religious exclusion. In 1912, a large Christian minority (20.2 percent of the population) inhabited the area comprising modern Turkey. However, in the succeeding decade, which saw the emergence of modern Turkey, the Christians of Anatolia experienced a religious cleansing through mass killings, forced deportations, and the Lausanne Agreement (a creative measure of enforced population exchange). As a consequence of the religious cleansing of Anatolia, the 1927 census estimated that the non-Muslim population represented a mere 2.2 percent of the total population. Through nationalization, religious homogeneity was primarily dealt with through exclusionary mechanisms, albeit some ethno-linguistic plurality was accommodated under the banner of Muslim nationalism. With the inception of the nation-state in 1923, this linguistic diversity was subjected to assimilationist policies.

Though the advent of the modern state in the nineteenth century was a turning point in state-society relations and the emergence of national forms and ideologies, the rise of the nationalizing state of modern Turkey represents yet another. While the first

³² Though no universal structural explanation has yet to account for the circumstances under which exclusion is more preferable than accommodation or partition, contingency often shapes the struggle between assimilation and exclusion. Demography, however, certainly plays a role. In order for exclusion or assimilation to be viable alternatives for the state, it needs a sufficient core population, *staatsvolk* (O'Leary, 2001), which means it should be able to tolerate the loss of the excluded and should have a realistic expectation that future members could be assimilated into the core population.

phase of nationalization was based on the religious exclusion of non-Muslims, the second phase was primarily based on the assimilation of intra-Muslim plurality. In line with the above observations, “non-assimilable” religious groups were excluded while “assimilable” Muslim minorities, be they sectarian (Alevi) or ethno-linguistic (Kurds, Albanians, Arabs, Circassians, Laz, etc.), were the main targets of the assimilationist policies of the nationalizing state.³³

While the religious homogenization of Turkey was done through violent and non-violent means of shifting the people, in Pakistan, this was accomplished primarily (though not exclusively) by shifting borders. When Pakistan was formed as an independent state, its territories were arranged so as to include as many Muslims and as few non-Muslims as possible—a sort of religious gerrymandering. While Pakistan was formed through the unification of the Muslim majority provinces of the Indian subcontinent in the northwest and northeast, with one thousand miles separating the two wings of the country. Bengal and Punjab, which had slight Muslim majorities, were divided in a way that ensured the Muslim homogeneity of Pakistan. Although each of these provinces was populated almost entirely by the same ethno-linguistic community, they were divided on the basis of religion, with only the Muslim majority parts of West Punjab and East Bengal incorporated as part of Pakistan.³⁴ After this shift in borders, the

³³ Namik Kemal’s views on the spread of Turkish among non-Muslims and Muslims reflect this attitude of exclusion vis-à-vis non-Muslims and assimilation for Muslims. According to Kemal, “it is impossible to encourage the spread of our language among Greeks or Bulgarians, but it is surely possible among Albanians and Laz, namely Muslims. If we set up regular schools in their countries and carry out the programs which are now not fulfilled, the Laz and Albanian languages will be utterly forgotten in twenty years.” (Arai, 1992: 3).

³⁴ At this point, one may argue that leaving these territories out were not part of the Muslim League’s project, but were forced to accept it (see, for instance, Jalal, 1994). At one point, Jinnah defined Pakistan as moth-eaten Pakistan after it was clear that West Bengal, which included the major port of Calcutta and

population exchange, inspired by the Turkish-Greek case, became a serious option under consideration for Pakistan and India. Despite neither the Pakistani state nor the Indian state enforcing such an exchange, Partition saw one of the largest population transfers in history. Approximately fourteen million people suddenly found themselves on the wrong side of the line after Partition and migrated—a violent process, which cost nearly one million lives. Just as in case of Turkey nearly a quarter century ago, Pakistan was formed as a relatively homogenous Muslim state with enormous ethno-linguistic and sectarian diversity. Similar to the Turkish state, the Pakistani state was fashioned as a self-consciously nationalizing state in which the real aim was to become a solid and cohesive nation. This process entailed the formation of a society with one language, one religion, and one culture. Thus, the formation of the nation-state in Pakistan, similar to Turkey, was followed by a policy of linguistic homogenization that backfired and led to the subsequent succession of East Pakistan in 1971 as Bangladesh.

By considering nation-building as a process of homogenization, it is then easier to understand the relationship between religion and nationalism. The key concept that determined the conflicting roles of religion was homogenization. This was particularly true for multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, which was particularly the case when transitioning from an imperial society to a national one. In this process, Islam is employed by political entrepreneurs (no matter what their personal allegiance to religion might be, if any) to foster the sense of homogenous society. Thus it has a definite, albeit

East Punjab, would not be included in Pakistan. However, it is undeniable that Jinnah would have expected this once he argued that Pakistan would be a state for Muslims. The Muslim demand to include non-Muslim regions into Pakistan is based primarily on economic reasons, and the desire to include a major port like Calcutta in Pakistan.

limited role in nation-building. Since Islam used as a tool of homogenization, it loses its functional role as soon as religious homogeneity is secured and, at this point, Islam is replaced by efforts aiming at ethno-linguistic homogeneity. The success of this phase depends on the conditions of state formation. The first phase for creating a homogenous society is to *exclude* non-Muslims and then *assimilate* the different ethnic communities of the Muslim faith to that of the majority ethno-linguistic community. Religion is necessary for the first phase, but unnecessary for or even harmful to the second phase.

Thus, nationalization (homogenization) followed similar patterns of religious exclusion and linguistic assimilation in both countries. At this point, it should be noted that although the basic parameters of this process can be best analyzed through a two-phase historical analysis, these processes are ongoing and never complete (since perfect homogeneity is never achieved). Both phases then continue to operate simultaneously. This leads to a persistent tension in examining the true role of religion for defining national identity. The inclusion of Islam as an inherent part of national identity, along with its simultaneous suppression, is one of main reasons for the enduring anxieties in considering the role of religion in national identity.

This dissertation focuses primarily on the process of religious exclusion, with only cursory remarks on the policies of assimilation (including religious assimilation targeting minority sects or ethno-linguistic assimilation). The process of homogenization and its first phase, religious exclusion, was pursued due to the modern state's inability to safeguard religious diversity. Thus, as a process, religious exclusion began before the emergence of these two nation-states and was indeed what led to their formation. I define this ideology as Muslim nationalism. Taking the famous Gellnerian definition of

nationalism as the congruence between the political unit and the cultural unit (1983: 1), I argue that these politics may be labeled “Muslim nationalism.” The cultural unit in this case was defined as religious commonality—as opposed to speaking the same language in the Gellnerian scheme. Moreover, the political unit would emerge as corresponding to this religious identity. Ultimately, what results would be a state for solely Muslims, which would not incorporate any other significant religious community.³⁵ The different circumstances of these two Muslim nationalisms correspond with what Charles Tilly defined as “state led nationalisms vs. state seeking nationalisms” (1975: 133-134). Therefore, the political developments in each case expose considerable variations; however, both cases still fit the category of Muslim nationalism.³⁶

Determining the role of religion in nation-building process has important theoretical implications for the treatment of the dichotomies of ethnic and civic nationalisms, as well religious and secular nationalisms. This dissertation destabilizes the dichotomy of religious and secular nationalisms by revealing a very crucial function of religion, which cannot be labeled as either religious or secular.

Another minor contribution pertains to the ethnic-civic dichotomy in the nationalism literature. This is probably the most persistent dichotomy used in the literature of nationalism. The widespread usage of this dichotomy arises out of its usefulness rather than its accuracy. This dichotomy often helps to project a notion of

³⁵ It is important to note that this state is not necessarily an Islamist one. It would be a state for Muslims, but not necessarily an Islamist one. This is a vital distinction and though there are similar cases throughout history, it often escapes attention. A short discussion with comparisons to the Israeli case is provided at the end of this chapter.

³⁶ It is possible to formulate the Turkish case as a form of state-led Muslim nationalism in contrast to the Pakistani case, which is more accurately described as a state seeking Muslim nationalism.

“good” nationalism (western/civic/territorial/secular/democratic/old/emancipatory) versus “bad” (eastern/ethnic/ blood-based/religious/exclusionary/new/authoritarian) nationalisms. It is assumed that although the former nationalism fit realities, in the latter, realities were forced to fit the nationalist paradigm. Thus, while the former was liberal and peaceful, the latter was authoritarian and violent. In reality these distinctions are based on strategies of homogenization rather than on the notion of homogenization itself (Brubaker, 1996).³⁷ Nationalism, both in its civic and ethnic forms, is a homogenizing ideology. Very crucially, in civic nationalisms, it is homogenization through *assimilation* while in ethnic nationalisms, it is homogenization through *exclusion*. Thus, ethnic nationalisms hold the potential to turn more violent, yet state coercion in civic nationalism, even in the paradigmatic cases of Western Europe, should not be neglected (see Weber, 1976).

Though widely used, this dichotomy is similarly criticized (see Yack, 1996; Kymlicka, 1995). The critiques do not claim that these concepts are entirely unproductive or misleading. However, the critiques maintain two points:

- 1) No nationalism is entirely civic or ethnic. Rather than treated as two distinct types, this dichotomy should be considered a spectrum along which various nationalisms are located—with some leaning more to the ethnic or civic poles than others;

³⁷ Brubaker who is responsible for the penetration of this dichotomy in the literature by his 1994 work on the comparison of French and German nationalisms repulsed the usage of this dichotomy later on. He rightly points out that nationalism is primarily about culture. However, if culture is considered an ethnic element and civic nationalism is considered a means of political allegiance devoid of culture, no nationalism would qualify as civic. In contrast, if culture is considered a civic virtue and ethnicity is understood simply as blood ties and descent, then almost no nationalism would qualify as ethnic (Brubaker, 1999).

- 2) Even if we consider that nationalisms are not civic or ethnic, but somewhere along the spectrum, we should remember that these positions are not constant. Any nationalism can take on a more ethnic nature at some point and become more civic at another or vice versa.

I agree with both criticisms and consider them to be important contributions for better understanding the ethnic-civic dichotomy. However, based on the above observations and my analysis of these two nation-building cases, I would add that any nationalism might *simultaneously* occupy multiple positions on the spectrum. Thus, nationalisms in Pakistan and Turkey are based on the exclusion of non-Muslims (typical of ethnic nationalism) *and* the assimilation of Muslim elements to the mono-cultural concept of nation propagated by the nationalizing state (typical of civic nationalism). Moreover, both strategies target specific communities and are applied simultaneously. Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms reveal different levels of ethnic and civic elements simultaneously.

2.4 How Muslim is Muslim Nationalism?

It is clear that religion played a central role in the formation of the nation. However, I do not claim that it was purely a religious movement. I define the role of Islam in national identity as a negative component of national identity, which means that it is used only as a means of exclusion from the national community, but is not a criterion used to positively define national identity. National identity is religious in the sense of being

anti-Christian and anti-Hindu, but is not used to define who is a Muslim. This helps elucidate the emphasis of secular nationalists on Islam.³⁸

Such an approach will help us understand why religion is perceived within a nationalist framing by modernist elites. It will also allow us to understand why religion was later abandoned by the very elite who instrumentalized the use of religion as a stage of nation-building. Moreover, this approach will also facilitate an understanding of why religion harbored such importance among secular elites as the defining criteria of the nation and why the secular elites had been so antagonistic towards and skeptical of the non-Muslim minority. Thus, this dissertation will offer an alternative and novel narrative on the relation of religion and nation-building, which will reveal the contextual nature of the relationship and the various functions religion serves as an instrument of homogenization. By presenting parallel lines of development in two unique cases, I will offer some general explanations of the evolution of nationalism in the Muslim world.³⁹

³⁸ The ascendancy of Islam in the national identity of Pakistan compared to Turkey can be better understood as the result of the ascendancy and continuing centrality of anti-Hindu sentiment and the perceived Hindu threat in Pakistan compared to the intensity of anti-Christian feelings, ~~and~~ the perception of Christian threat in Turkey. This is partly because Pakistan was an offshoot of the giant Indian body politic. Thus, in terms of demographic, military, and economic means, India was undoubtedly more powerful than Pakistan. In contrast, Turkey was the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire. Its main Christian adversary at the time of state formation Greece, was a miniscule power compared to Turkey. For the centrality of anti-India sentiment for Pakistani national identity, see Bangash, 2015: 19-29.

³⁹ However, despite several very similar lines of evolution in national identity in the cases of Turkey and Pakistan, there have produced very different results. Some possible explanations for this difference are explored at the conclusion of the dissertation.

2.5 Conceptual Clarifications

Religious exclusion

It should be clear that the term religious exclusion in the Turkish and Pakistan contexts implies the formation of national identity through the exclusion of non-Muslims. It should not be assumed to entail the exclusion *of* religion from politics and the public sphere.

What does religious nationalism mean?

The concept of religious nationalism has appeared more recently, as the dominant modernist view of nationalism would consider it an oxymoron. Hastings, Greenfeld, Smith, Juergensmeyer, and Van der Veer each employ this term in their work. However, the meaning in each remains somewhat ambiguous. The source of this ambiguity is partly due to the fact that most researchers use the term religious nationalism as part of their own agenda and may not be referring to the same phenomena. We can point to two different and, to a certain extent, contradictory usages of the term. For instance, it is possible to define the concept through either religion or through nationalism. The first usage (Hastings, 1997 and Juergensmeyer, 1993) defines a religious community, which may also be nationalist. Despite the universalist tendency of many world religions, a religious community can also hold nationalist political ambitions as well. This is particularly the case when ethnicity and religion coincide and religious conflict soon gains a nationalist coloring (as in the Irish case). Most anti-colonial nationalisms also follow this tendency (Razi, 1990).

The second usage treats the notion of religious nationalism as a form of nationalism. The religious qualifier signifies the functionality and importance of religion for nationalist leaders, who invoke religion to garner support or, as most right wing politicians do, to demand more religious influence as part of the definition of the nation (Van der Veer, 1994; Smith, 2003). My usage of the term is more closely related to the latter usage. I also define religious nationalism as a specific type of nationalism. However, I try to emphasize religion as an identity marker, rather than adherence to a particular faith (see Jalal, 2000). Thus, religious nationalism is related to the community of believers, not the belief itself.

What is Muslim nationalism? Is it unique to Islam or are there also Christian or Jewish nationalisms?

In line with my understanding of religious nationalism, I employ Muslim nationalism as a type of nationalism rather than a new form of religiosity. This diverges from other definitions, such as that of Jenny White (2013), who uses the concept to define a religious movement.

Moreover, Muslim nationalism is not necessarily related to piety. As is evident in many of the cases discussed in this dissertation, Muslim nationalism has functioned as a political tool of secular elites both in Turkey and Pakistan. In this role, religion is important not as a faith, but as a marker of identity. It creates boundaries between identities (or bounded identities). In this regard, Muslim nationalism resembles the emerging Christian Right in Europe. Over the previous two decades, we have been witnessing the emergence of what may truly be called Christian nationalism. For

instance, In France, although society has been secularized in many spheres of life and with church attendance at a minimum, Christianity has remained at the very center of political life. Christianity in France does not represent a matter of faith, but instead serves as an identity marker. In the French case, Christianity has functioned to exclude the undesired elements from national identity, rather than performing the cohesive function that religion has often taken in the early stages of nation-building. The exclusion of Muslims from French identity, in particular, and from European identity, in general, can accurately be referred to as Christian nationalism. Here, similar to Muslim nationalism, the cultural unit expected to be congruent with the political unit is defined in religious terms instead of ethnic and linguistic ones.

The Zionist project provides an even better example of religious nationalism deployed as a tool of secular nation-building. In *Der Judenstaat* (1896), Theodor Herzl describes the Zionist utopia. However, the mistranslation of the title into English as “The Jewish State” reveals the nature of religious nationalism (the accurate translation should be “The State of the Jews”). In essence, Herzl’s project does not address the religious nature of the state to be established as a Jewish homeland. At the time of the early Zionist movement, Zionist members were thoroughly secularized. Thus, there was no desire to make Judaism relevant to the functioning of the new state. In that sense, it was not a Jewish state, but would become a state of and only for Jews. Once again, religion helps forge bounded identities and the limits of the nation rather than function as a belief system. Although it may also serve a function of cohesion—not in terms of faith but in terms of identity—its main function was to exclude the Muslims, Christians (incl. Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Quakers, etc.), and Druze who were already residing

on the land where “The State of Jews” would be established. Today, despite the increasing importance of orthodox Jewry in Israeli social and political life, a large segment of the Israeli population remains secular. According to the latest statistics, forty percent of the population officially declares themselves to be atheist or agnostic. However, the religious exclusion of Muslims persists, evidence that religious nationalism based on the exclusionary function of religion is by its very nature a secular project.

2.5.1 Religion as Boundary Drawer

This is a study of nationalism, not of religion. Thus, it is not focused on how Islam, Hinduism, or Christianity approaches nationalism and the religious treatments of the issue. Instead, its focus is on the emergence of nationalism through the transition from an imperial system to a centralized modern state, and how a religiously delineated national identity became dominant through this transition. However, since religious nationalism is at the center of this study, two things should be clarified with regard to the notion of religion.

- 1) Since this study is about nationalism rather than religion, there is no specific concentration on Islam. Muslim nationalism is chosen as the focus of the study to preclude religion from becoming a variable;
- 2) The main argument of this study is to scrutinize the function of religion as an instrument of homogenization in nation-building. There has been a recent surge of works that take a critical stance against such an instrumentalist

approach and instead invite us to take religion more seriously. According to Oberoi, “The common proposition that religion was an ideology for attaining social goals among certain privileged social groups (or for the state elite) does not by itself exhaust the phenomenon of religion” (1994: 20).

One complication with the instrumentalist view is its elitism, which accords no agency to the ordinary man in making history. The masses are not always vulnerable to manipulation by elites, and successful social movements are those in which the elites and the masses meet. However, this study focuses on the elites precisely because nationalism begins as an elite project

While in Lahore, a religious scholar originally from Uttar Pradesh in India (UP) related to me that he was fully aware of the material sacrifices he was making when he participated in the movement for Pakistan: “There was nothing to gain materially, and I was aware and willing to make that sacrifice for the cause of religion.” There is no doubt that he and many others considered the call for Pakistan as a religious cause. It is not uncommon for people to make sacrifices for a cause, whether religious or otherwise, and to reduce humanity to a totality of interest-maximizing rational actors would be misleading. I do not intend to question the intention or sincerity of these people, which is not an object of study. However, this study has a more modest and limited concern: it attempts to analyze the function of religion in nation-building by contextualizing the actions and policy outcomes of nation-builders through different phases of political action.

Another problem in the study of religion is whether there were clearly marked religious communities in the pre-modern period or not. Part of the problem is related to

the syncretic character of Hinduism. Unlike the monotheistic religions of Middle Eastern origin, it is difficult to define Hindu ideology and a bounded Hindu community that follows it. The Vedas, Upanishads, and other sacred Hindu texts do not define a religion called Hinduism. Hinduism, as a term, was coined only in the nineteenth century. It was under British rule that “communities like the Shaivites, Vaishnavites, and Lingayats, each with their own history and specific view of the world tied together under the blanket category of Hinduism” (Oberoi, 1994: 16). Census operations also reflect an attitude that soon created the Hindu majority within India (Cohn, 1984).

Thus, religion was essentially treated as a local practice. Even Islam in India, with its Sufi overtones, was highly syncretic, making it difficult to differentiate Muslims from Hindus. Ambiguity and fluidity were the hallmarks of the Indian socio-cultural environment and religious affiliations were equally uncertain. This owed much to the nature of Hinduism and its offshoots, such as Sikhism. However, two points are paramount: first, it is not necessarily unique that the syncretic tradition of Hinduism resulted into a syncretic religious tradition in India. Studies of the early Muslim arrival to Anatolia reflect an equally syncretic relation between Christians and Muslims, as well as between Islamic teachings and the pre-Islamic Shaman cultures of Turkic nomads (Kafadar, 1995). It was through the administrative organization of the Ottoman Empire that clearly segregated religious communities emerged and a gulf between Muslims and Christians became visible. Secondly, even in India, elements of orthodoxy were evident just as much as syncretism. The clear distinction seems to be related to the difference between urban and rural areas, thus related to the effects of administrative systems and the existence of a high culture. Francis Robinson’s interesting study reveals that the

madrassa curriculum of the Ottomans and Mughals were almost identical through the Middle Ages (1997). Despite the syncretic efforts of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, Islam and Hinduism (or its local branches to be more precise) were clearly divided in terms of religious teaching and social organization. A study on urban Hyderabad during the Mughal period reveals that Muslims and Hindus were aware of communal differences and had a complex notion of distinct communal identities. They lived together “not as enemies but certainly not as friends” (Kakar, 1996: 10).⁴⁰

Plurality of religious identities went through a process of homogenization and unification in the process of modernization, particularly through the modern state’s desire and Enlightenment-inspired rationale to classify and measure. A new cultural elite, representative of this enlightened vision, campaigned aggressively for a puritanical, singular tradition. Towards the end of nineteenth century, Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj, among the Hindus, and Sing Sabha, among the Sikhs, conducted zealous missionary campaigns to “purify” their respective religious traditions and defended a singular tradition in contrast to the multiple identities of the pre-modern period. The struggle between a puritan understanding of Islam and its more syncretic versions predate modernity and was reflected through the struggle between Akbar and Ahmad Sirhindi (popularly known as Imam-i Rabbani). The evolution of Mughal royalty from Akbar to Aurangzeb was in itself a story of the increasing purification of religious teachings. However, in the midst of massive Sikh and Hindu religious revivalist campaigns, as well as the spread of Christian missionary activities, the modern period

⁴⁰ Once again, the similarities between the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire are striking. Referring to Sudhir Kakar’s description of Hyderabad, Bruce Master argues that “that characterization would be appropriate for the cities of Ottoman Arab world as well” (2001:38).

also reflected the emergence and spread of many revivalist Muslim movements in North India and Bengal. The Faraizi movement in Bengal and the intellectual and political tradition of the heirs of Shah Waliullah in North India are cases in point. However, these were essentially religious campaigns, and, as I hope to demonstrate in the relevant chapters, they have little connection with the Muslim nationalism that led to Partition. Muslim nationalism is a specific type of nationalism related to nationalism rather than Islam.

2.5.2 Indian Communalism or Nationalism?

The word communalism is often used to define the state of politics in the Indian subcontinent. Its departure from nationalism or religious nationalism remains vague. Though it is used to characterize religiously-defined political conflicts in India, it is almost never applied to similar conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or Ireland. In this sense, communalism seems to be an Eastern version of nationalism. However, I believe that there is a more substantial difference, and will utilize Muslim nationalism and Muslim communalism in deliberately distinct meanings. Muslim communalism refers to communal politics based on the demands for special prerogatives, such as separate electorates or quotas, for the Muslim community in India. In that regard, it resembles the consociational/confessional model of contemporary Lebanon, in which each community has its share in the political system according to census data. However, all religious communities, however neatly and exclusively defined they may be, operate under the

same political unit. Nationalism, however, mostly concerns separate political institutions. Religious nationalism is also related to separate political institutions.

Therefore, in the case of India, Muslim nationalism emerged as a political ideology only after Iqbal's famous demand for autonomous Muslim majority states in 1930. This only became an important and viable political alternative after the Lahore resolution of 1940, when Muslim communalism was an effective political force in certain provinces beginning in late nineteenth century.⁴¹ Muslim communalism, on the one hand, was demanded by the elites of Muslim minority provinces and concentrates on minority privileges. Muslim nationalism, on the other, was about territorial arrangements and autonomous political institutions, and was then demanded by Muslim majority provinces. Even though Muslim communalism was vital to the success of Muslim nationalism, the two phenomena are distinct in their political organization, support bases, as well as their political agendas and demands.

⁴¹ A clear religious consciousness can be traced back several centuries. However, it should not be conflated with nationalism or even communalism. Thus, pointing to violent clashes between Muslims and Hindus before modernity does not connote the pre-existence of communalism. Though I will pursue this in more detail in the next chapter, at this point I argue that religious awareness should be linked to political institutions and a share of power to be considered communal.

CHAPTER III

EMPIRES AND NATION-STATES

This chapter forms an analysis of empires and imperial societies. It is not merely a historical study of a political system; rather, empires are analyzed as a form of pre-modern political organization with the purpose of contrasting and comparing them to modern states. Through this comparison, it will be revealed that the relationship between the state and society in the pre-modern era was fundamentally different from that of the modern state. This difference is traced through the degree of direct state control over its subjects, which is linked to issues of diversity and plurality. This dissertation understands nation-building as homogenization and by contrasting the diverse and pluralist nature of empires with the uniformity of the modern nation-state, the crucial link between modern state formation, homogenization and nation-building will be revealed.

In addition, this dissertation argues that the task of religion in nation-building is linked to its function of homogenization and mostly focuses on the exclusionary role of religion in the transition from empire to nation-state. Thus, this chapter analyzes empires and nation-states to reveal the process of homogenization accompanying the transition

from the Ottoman Empire and British Raj to Turkey and Pakistan. Since the primary focus is on the role of religion in homogenization, special attention is given to religion in pre-modern polities and its alteration in modern state formation. The discussion with regard to empire will be further substantiated through an analysis of state-society relations and the role of religion in the Ottoman and Mughal Empires. Since homogenization is contextualized within modern state formation and the transition from empire to nation-state, the study of these two empires also offers historical background for Turkish and Pakistani nation-building.

There is a strong tradition in scholarship on nationalism of contrasting empires with nation-states. Since nationalism is taken as one of the primary reasons for the collapse of empires, empires and nation-states are considered antithetical to each other, in fact “mortal enemies,” (Kumar, 2010: 119). Two seminal works that have shaped our understanding of nationalism and nation-states both point to this contrast. While the historical teleology of Ernest Gellner (1983) definitely locates empire with the political culture of pre-modernity, Benedict Anderson (1983: 93) points to “the inner incompatibility of empire and nation.”⁴² The convention of contrasting empires and nation-states holds in scholarship that both denounces and celebrates the birth of the nation-state. The first critique of the idea of nationalism and nation-states—a fierce critique—in the English language came from Elie Kedourie, a conservative historian with nostalgia for the bygone empires and the imperial system. (See Kedourie, 1960; Kedourie, 1971) While Kedourie longed for the imperial system, Rupert Emerson

⁴² Here Anderson echoes Hannah Arendt who declared the “the inner contradiction” of the two principles of nationalism and imperialism (Arendt 1958: 153, quoted in Kumar 2010: 122).

(1960) was celebrating the demise of empires and the birth of nation-states. Emerson's *From Empire to Nation* begins with the creed, "Empires have fallen on evil days and nations have risen to take their places." The tendency to celebrate the nation-state has been particularly strong among the mainstream American political science that had pride in the country's origins as a republic that gained independence from an empire.

The convention of contrasting empires and nation-states, however, does not translate into scholarship on empires. Empires as political systems received only scant attention from political scientists. One reason for the lack of attention was the negative connotations attached to the concept of empire. Partially triggered by the Cold War conditions, the labeling of the Soviet Union as an empire (in some cases pointing to the anomaly of its existence in an age of nation-states) or indeed as an "empire of evil" loaded the idea of 'empire' with derogatory terms such as oppressive, backward, pre-modern...etc. (For an early but sophisticated version of this genre see Niebuhr, 1959). Another reason for the lacuna in scholarship, as Alexander Motyl (2001: 3) pointed out, was the "conceptual sloppiness of the left." As the scholars with leftist leanings failed to differentiate between the concepts of empire and imperialism, they associated empire with the latest stage of capitalism. As a result, they either excluded all pre-capitalist empires from their scope of study or claimed that these pre-modern empires were capitalist in one way or another.

Due to these derogatory connotations loaded onto the idea of the empire, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's (1963) *The Political Systems of Empires* remained for decades as the only seminal work on empires. Yet even in this work, the examination of empires clearly remains a historical study on the development and evolution of political systems.

Empires, defined as “the historical bureaucratic societies,” are perceived as belonging to a distant past; thus not really relevant to the political problems of our age. In this lacuna in the scholarship of the concept of empire⁴³, Michael W. Doyle’s 1986 study of *Empires* stands out as a particularly important study on the subject. Not only as, “a voice in wilderness” (Motyl, 2001: 1), but also as a precursor of the forthcoming literature.

As problems of the nation-state system became more evident in the post 1991 era, empires as political systems began to receive increased attention from scholars. This new interest resulted in a series of valuable publications that proposed an examination of empires and their political systems as systems that could hold solutions to the problems of the contemporary age (Howe, 2004; Barkey and Von Hagen, 1997; Motyl, 2001; Barkey, 2008; Esherick, Kayalı and Van Young, 2006; Ferguson, 2004, Maier, 2006; Cooper, 1997; Cooper, 2005). In most of these works, empires are described as political units that managed to govern diversity much more effectively and peacefully than the nation-states. Contrary to the previous convention of naming empires as “prisons of nations,” this new literature points to the “opportunity structures of the empires” (Comisso, 2006). The more nation-states became the norm in international political system, the more empires were portrayed negatively. As the euphoria of nationalism fades, nostalgia for empires replaces it.

43 But not necessarily of imperialism, which have always been a central topic particularly among the Marxist writers. Here I am referring to the study of empires as a distinct form of political organization, not as a structure of power. Pre-modern forms of power and sovereignty and how it is different from modern forms of power and government continued to attract attention from the scholars of power. For the seminal work, see (Foucault, 1964). Yet, their discussion is only tangentially relevant for this study.

Although most empires are known for their longevity,⁴⁴ even for their claim on an “everlasting state,” the twentieth century witnessed the collapse of every empire on the world map (Mann, 1990: 3). Despite this, empires continue to leave their marks on contemporary history since the nation-states, as successors to empires, inherit many characteristics and problems of their respective empires. As we attempt to understand the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan, we are inevitably obliged to go back to the imperial history and to the period of transition from empire to nation-states as the elementary processes of nation formation. This chapter will examine the common qualities and structures of empires, the nature of imperial societies and their legacies in the successor nation-states. This chapter will also be an attempt to define the ways in which empires have shaped the formation of the successor state. More specifically, a discussion of the imperial model in South Asia and the Ottoman Empire will be offered as two case studies. Thus, it will also provide the historical background for the two nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan.

However, before dealing with the imperial background of two countries, a few points should be clarified. As mentioned in the introduction, the main idea that guides this dissertation is that the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan are also processes of transition from empires to nation-states. Although both Pakistan and Turkey can be considered post-imperial countries, Turkey is not a post-colonial country where as Pakistan is. It will be revealed in the following chapters that this is a

44 This is a recurrent theme on the recent literature on empires. Karen Barkey (2008: 15-27) goes to the extent of claiming that, it not interesting that empires finally collapsed but that they lived for so long, thus she proposes that more important topic of study is their longevity rather than their decline.

significant difference that is reflected in the differences between the nation-building processes of the two states.

There is no ambiguity in defining Turkish nation-building process as a transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. The issue is a little more complicated when it comes to Pakistan. The lands that make up Pakistan belonged to the Mughal Empire in the middle ages and in early modernity. By the eighteenth century the British had come to dominate the subcontinent primarily through the East India Company. The Mughal Empire continued its existence, albeit on a much more limited scale, on the subcontinent simultaneously with the Company and several other small scale princely states. It was only after 1857 that the British government took the full responsibility of the subcontinent and terminated the juridical authority of the Mughal Empire. The period after this event in 1857 is known as the *British Raj* (literally meaning, rule) in which the Indian subcontinent is ruled by a colonial empire.

In this study, I understand the British Raj as an empire in itself; not only because of its vast size or its imperial characteristics recently attributed to it by some scholars (c.f. Metcalf Thomas:2007), but also because Pakistan was not simply a post-colonial state that gained its independence from the colonial masters of the Western Europe post WWII. Pakistan also broke away from a political body that would control the Indian subcontinent. Therefore, Pakistani nationalism was not only an anti-colonial nationalism but it was a peculiar type of sub-nationalism in a colonial setting (Breuilly, 1994: 206-213). In fact, in the years preceding the independence the issue at stake was not whether Pakistan would be able to gain independence from the British- it was becoming clearer by then that British would not be able to maintain its hold on the subcontinent-, but the

problem was whether Pakistan would ever be able to come into existence separate from the giant political body of the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, the British Raj was not only an empire in the political sense. It was an empire, perhaps more so, in the social sense. For most of their rule, British did little, and indeed had no interest, to change the social make-up of the subcontinent they inherited from the Mughals.⁴⁵ Although their various decisions had been crucial in the politicization of identities and thus were crucial for the formation of the nation-states in the subcontinent, the British were acting in an imperial society they inherited from the Mughals. It becomes clear in this context that Pakistan constitutes a case of transition from an empire to a nation-state.

Yet there is still another important difference between Turkey and Pakistan. Turkey was carved out of the central parts-or the metropole- of the empire whereas Pakistan was not the center of the Raj. It had been carved out of areas that might be defined as the peripheral to Delhi. The difference is not merely geographical; Turkey inherited a state from an empire; in a sense it lost an empire. Pakistan on the other hand gained independence from an empire- in a sense it is a defector of the empire. This means that Turkish nationalists possessed a state while they were dealing with the nation-building process whereas in the Pakistani case state building and nation-building were undertaken simultaneously. This difference had largely shaped the nation-building processes in the post-independence era and as it will be pointed in the conclusion

⁴⁵ There was always a debate among the British officials on the extent of British involvement and reform in the Indian society. This debate is best reflected in the Anglicanist and Orientalist debate on the education policies in India. While Anglicanists pushed for a complete Western education, the Orientalists favored the continuation and advancement of the traditional Indian education. For this divide see Robb, 2002: 137-143.

chapter, they are crucial for an understanding of the divergences between the Turkish and Pakistani nation-building processes.

3.1 Empires⁴⁶

The concept of empire is hard to define. Many definitions have been offered by political scientists and international relations experts; all of them with certain virtues but also certain deficiencies. According to the three most sophisticated and most referenced definitions offered so far, an empire is:

(1) a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect rule. The central power exercises some military and fiscal control in each major segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates the two major elements of indirect rule: (i) retention or establishment of particular distinct compacts for the government of each segment; and (ii) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center. (Tilly, 1997:3)

(2) a hierarchically organized political system with a hub like structure—a rimless wheel—within which a core elite and state dominate peripheral elites and societies by serving as intermediaries for their significant interactions and by channeling resource flows from the periphery to the core and back to the periphery. (Motyl, 2001:4)

(3) a “negotiated” enterprise where the basic configuration of relationships between imperial authorities and peripheries is constructed piece meal in a different fashion for each periphery, creating a patchwork pattern of relations with structural holes between peripheries. In that construction we see the architecture of empire emerge: a hub-and-spoke structure of state-periphery relations, where the direct and indirect vertical relations of imperial integration coexist with horizontal relations of segmentation. (Barkey, 2008:1)

⁴⁶ The arguments in this and next subtitle owe mostly to these works: Maier, 2006; Barkey and Von Hagen (eds.) 1997; Motyl, 2001; Barkey, 2008; and more than others to the edited volume of Esherick, Kayalı and Van Young, (eds.) 2006.

A good definition should be valid for every empire, and it should also be able to differentiate empires from other political formations. The problem with such a definition is two-fold: 1) problem of inclusion: empires are among the most common forms of political organization in the pre-modern era⁴⁷ and they represent a diversity that could not possibly be included in a definition to stand true for all these diverse political settings. 2) The problem of differentiation: As Walker (2006) has pointed out; the main difficulty is differentiating empires from multi-national states, particularly from ethno-national federations. Based on these difficulties Walker goes as far as to offer a nominal definition: accepting political institutions that defined themselves as empires as empires. Even such a nominal definition is not void of problems. On the one hand, some of the political bodies that would be defined empires, as we understand them, did not define themselves as empires. Most importantly the Ottomans never called themselves as the Ottoman Empire, but instead preferred names like the ‘Sublime State’ or the ‘Everlasting State.’ On the other hand, it would be very hard to accept Byzantium Empire prior to its collapse in 1453 as an empire though it continued to fashion itself as an empire (Motyl, 2001: 59-61).

As no definition can possibly pass the above tests of inclusion and exclusion, I am not claiming to provide a definition devoid of the same problems. However as a working definition through this dissertation I understand empire as a large and

⁴⁷ Absolutist kingdoms, tribal confederacies, feudal states, patrimonial states and city states are other forms of political organizations. Wimmer and Yuval (2010:870) provides a good chart showing the percentage of the world’s surface area occupied over the past two centuries by empires, modern nation-states, and other political institutions. The dominance of the empires is clear as late as 1815, when almost sixty percent of the entire world surface was controlled by empires. In less than two centuries, this area diminished to zero.

composite political structure formed by a conglomeration of peoples and territories. These conglomerations stand side by side and are linked indirectly to the political center. Center has limited control over these territories and communities and rules them only through intermediaries. This indirect rule provides the peripheral communities with internal autonomy resulting to a plurality of administrative rules and regulations throughout the empire. These central elements of empires can be better understood if they are contrasted with more familiar modern political structures. Perhaps, a more accurate understanding of empires may be formed by examining what they are not and how they differ from other political entities. This necessitates a classification of various political entities and this can be done either on chronologically or territorially.

Territorial classification puts empire on the one extreme of a spectrum. Empires are big. They command vast areas with diverse populations. At the other end of the spectrum, there are city states.⁴⁸ In this context, it is the modern day states, or the nation-states that represent a midway between the small-scale city states and large scale empires. This detail is important to understand the formation of nation-states as they come to existence either through the unification of various city states (the typical examples being Italy and Germany) or through the dismemberment of empires (the most typical case being the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire).⁴⁹

Chronological classification groups political organizations according to the level of complexity of their political systems. Clearly reflecting the dominance of orthodox

⁴⁸ Even then, there are complex cases like Venice and Athens, who were city states, but through their overseas conquests also established colonial empires (Doyle, 1986)

⁴⁹ It is this classification which puts the nation-state and empire in a stark contrast and defines them in mutually exclusive terms.

modernization theories in 1950's and 1960's, in these works such as Niebuhr (1959) and Eisenstadt (1963), empires represent a somewhat middle ground between the primitive political entities and the modern states. They have a certain level of complex political system, which is more developed than clan or tribe based states, but their system is not as differentiated and developed as the modern states.⁵⁰ This approach as we will see in the next section is crucial to grasp the centrality of traditional elites and religion for the imperial systems.

3.2 Empires vs. Nation-States

In either classification, compared to nation-states, empires appear more complex in terms of the composition of its population and territory but less developed when it comes to effective control of the people and territory. The concepts of core and periphery, indirect rule and ethnic or religious diversity are elements that are common to almost every definition of empire. What follows is an examination of empires with regard to these common elements. The aim is to lay out the contrasting points between empires and the nation-states without overlooking the variations within the empires.

⁵⁰ In the historical trajectory provided by Niebuhr (1959: 1) the history is divided into five steps rather than three; from primitive community to the city state, empire, nation-state and modern super-state. Empire again represents a middle ground in this trajectory.

3.2.1 Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism

Compared with nation-states one of the most distinctive aspect of empires is their hierarchical nature, as opposed to the theoretically egalitarian nature of the nation-state. Many different manifestations of the hierarchical nature can be traced in the political structure of the empires. In its most visible form, almost every empire is a monarchy (with the exceptions of the French and Roman Empires after the declaration of republic). Monarchy and the nobility associated with the throne underline and institutionalize the inequality in the society. In contrast, nationalism is tied with republicanism to the extent that the emergence of the idea of nationalism is often associated with the French Revolution. Equal citizenship is the key for both the republican values and the national solidarity.

Another manifestation of hierarchy in the imperial systems is observed in the distinction between the metropole or the core and the periphery. A distinctive feature of the empire is that an empire is a form of domination in which a strong core/metropole dominates and rules the periphery.⁵¹ The system is based on the exploitation of the resources of the periphery in favor of the core. Although, the residents of some regions in the nation-states, particularly regions populated by groups of different ethnicity or identity, complain—in many cases rightfully—that their region is being dominated and

⁵¹ This however, doesn't mean that the distinction was simply and sharply drawn between the center and the periphery. At certain cases there was also a hierarchy among the peripheries. As already mentioned the Raj had immense power of its own and distinguished from other colonies (peripheries). Senegal had a distinctive position in the French Empire, while Hijaz had always retained a privileged position in the Ottoman Empire. So in many cases, what we see is not only a hierarchy between the core and periphery, but multiple hierarchies throughout the empire. This point is also related with the administrative contradistinction of empire and nation-states discussed in the next subtitle.

exploited by the core, nation-states work to undo this imbalance.⁵² At least in theory, this is a temporary situation that is eventually cured. The redistributive policies in nation-states work in the opposite direction; resources are shifted from the well-off parts of the country to the poorer regions with the final aim of eradicating any economical hierarchies within the country.⁵³

While the nation-states, at least in theory, strive to create equality among their regions, the distinction between the core and periphery is essential to the definition of empire. The “core” here might refer both to the geographic core as also sometimes called as the metropole, and to the ruling group of people. In either case, the separation between the core and the periphery presents itself in many variations. The most well-known example is the difference between contiguous land based empires and maritime sea empires.⁵⁴ The distinction between the core and periphery, both in territory and

⁵² If the state elites fail to eradicate this diversity, the process often leads to emergence of a counter nationalism in the exploited regions. Economic exploitation of a certain region within a nation-state is defined as “internal colonialism” and had been a significant factor in the emergence of sub-state nationalisms in many contemporary cases. For the relation between internal colonialism and nationalism see, Hechter 1977; Nairn, 1977.

⁵³ Philosopher David Miller (1993) has therefore defended the nation-state from a leftist point and argued that nation-states enable the redistribution of wealth better than other political entities and therefore should be defended by the left not despised.

⁵⁴ Even in such a seemingly clear difference the distinction is relative rather than absolute. Land based empires can and had also dealt with acquiring overseas territories. While building the largest land based empire in Europe, Napoleon was simultaneously forcing his chances on overseas territories like Egypt, while England, the prima facie example of a sea based empire had also absorbed Wales, Scotland and Ireland in what is so often called ‘internal colonialism’ (Khoury and Kennedy, 2007). Similarly Ottomans, a definitely land based empire had waged, though unsuccessfully, a struggle with the Portuguese to dominate the Indian Ocean. Certain empires such as the German Empire at the end of nineteenth century, with its large possessions in the continental Europe and its overseas colonies in Africa and East Asia can be considered as a mixture of land and sea empire (Motyl, 2001: 19). Based on such accounts, the importance and even the validity of this distinction had been questioned (Cooper, 2005; Khoury and Kennedy, 2007), but despite such cases of ambiguity the distinction is both real and important. We will

population, is obvious in the sea based empires, where the core is usually populated by an entirely different group of people than the periphery. While the geographic and ethnic definitions of the core easily overlap and are clearly distinguishable in sea-based empires the land based empires show an interesting amount of variety in that regard. First of all, the territorial distinction between core and periphery is blurry in the land based empires. Subsequently, it is more difficult to talk about a dominant ethnicity. Instead, the ruling core is most often defined by their adherence to a certain culture, ideology or religion.⁵⁵

Land based empires also show a great deal of variation when it comes to defining the core. The size of the core changes from empire to empire. For instance the core of the Ottoman Empire is much larger compared to that of the Mughal Empire. But even then, the core of the empire might change over time. The Ottoman core shifted from Istanbul and the Balkan provinces to Istanbul and the Anatolian provinces. Throughout the Ottoman history, one can also notice the transformation of the imperial elite; while the empire relied more on the Greek elements in the early stages, subsequent

soon come to an important aspect of this division in the patterns of tolerance, inclusion and accommodation prevalent in the contiguous land empires and maritime sea empires.

⁵⁵ Russians and Ottomans both objected to any ethnic definition and instead preferred a ‘composite palace culture’ unlike the colonial empires, open for the inclusion of conquered people. (Esherick et al., 2006: 12) Similarly, Romans may have despised barbarians, but once they accepted Roman law and classical civilization, they would be politically integrated into Rome (Doyle, 1986: 121). Mughals, themselves outsiders to the subcontinent, never referred to ethnicity as a marker of ruling core. For them, the crucial cultural element of that ‘composite palace culture’ was the use of Persian. This even included the Hindus. Thus, despite the central role of Islam in the Mughal Empire, the Hindu elites, as long as they command Persian, had always been a part of the ruling elite. These examples also show that the core feels a considerable civilizational superiority towards the periphery. However, despite certain exceptions like Han Chinese or Shi’i Safavids, land based empires do not try to forcefully assimilate the periphery to their higher civilization. Yet unlike the colonial empires, they keep the way open for the peripheral elites to willingly assimilate into this high culture and become part of the core.

centuries reflected the increasing importance of Muslim and Turkish elements⁵⁶ in the imperial core (Esherick, et al, 2006: 11).

In any case, a geographically defined core constitutes lands that are adjacent to the capital and for that matter, one also needs to underline that the capital city in imperial systems has a much more important role than the capitals in the nation-states. As the seat of throne, the capital is the only city which legitimately and definitely is part of the core, in a sense “core of the core” (Meinig, 1986: 370 quoted in Motyl, 2001:13). Thus, people in the capital city were always more privileged than other subjects. For instance, in the Ottoman Empire, even after the egalitarian reforms of Tanzimat, which aimed to create larger uniformity within the empire, the Istanbulites were exempt from both conscription and taxation⁵⁷ (Findley, 2008: 24).

3.2.2 Various Kinds of Rule vs. Uniformity in Ruling

Providing such privileges to the residents of the capital may sound strange for the people of nation-states, however, these differential treatments were quite common among empires. Indeed, it can be argued that another important difference between nation-state and an empire lays in the fact that empires employ various kinds of rule throughout their territories and populations, whereas nation-states strive for uniformity in their rule

⁵⁶ Yet, Turkish should be better understood as the Muslim elements of the empire that learned the court language; Turkish. This shift starts with the end of devshirme system in late sixteenth century and gains another momentum during the Abdülhamid II era.

⁵⁷ Another place that was and remained exempt from taxation and conscription was Hijaz, due to its special religious importance.

(Pomeranz, 2005). Although it is not uncommon that nation-states may treat a region differently (usually due to the lack of complete interpenetration), in theory this difference is a temporary aberration. On the other hand, empires are conglomeration of territories all having different levels of relation with the imperial body politic. Aside from the already mentioned difference between the core and periphery, it is common for the empire to have special treaties with certain regions of the empire. In that sense, the periphery of the empire also reflects a variation with regard to the level of their incorporation to the system. This is partly due to the fact that imperial growth takes place over a long time through piecemeal conquest of already existing polities (Tilly, 1997:3). This not only creates enormous diversity in the organizational structure for the peripheries, but also results that imperial frontiers are poorly defined. Unlike nation-states whose territory is mostly fixed and clearly demarcated from other nation-states, imperial territories are subject to continuous change and in most cases an imperial territory is surrounded by a chain of tributary states and princedoms with varying levels of incorporation to the imperial center (Kasaba, 2006: 200-201). Thus empire is not a simple domination of a core over a single periphery, but it is a conglomeration of many peripheries, each of them connected to the core at various degrees. Different treatments need not necessarily be territorial. Empires can apply special treatment to different communities. The most obvious example of such a differential treatment is the *millet system* employed by the Ottomans, in which the legal arrangements were communal rather than territorial. Thus one can also say that Ottomans were not simple conglomeration of territories, but it was also a conglomeration of communities scattered throughout the empire.

Diverse treatment of communities and territories in the empires is actually a result of the fact that empires employ indirect rule. While the nation-states with their modern bureaucracy rule their territories and subjects without any intermediaries, empires are either unwilling or unable to penetrate the territories they rule at the level of nation-states (Eisenstadt, 1962; 1963). Once again referring to the core and periphery distinction, an empire has a strong center and rules over the periphery through the peripheral or communal elites.⁵⁸ Thus incorporation of peripheral elites is crucial for the maintenance of the empire. In Johan Galtung's and Alexander Motyl's formulation, peripheral elites represent "the center in the periphery." As such, empires are not mere forms of ruthless domination, where the core benefits exclusively to the detriment of the periphery. Instead, it is a more sophisticated form of domination-relation, where both the interests of the center and the "center in the periphery" coincide. Empires are able to continue their rule and owe their longevity to this delicate balance. Therefore, Karen Barkey (2008: 1) defines empire as a "negotiated enterprise," pointing out that this balance is maintained through a complex set of negotiations between the core elites and the peripheral elites and the terms of the arrangement are continuously re-negotiated. The empire's integrity would be under threat if the core loses the consent of the peripheral elite either; i) through the divergence of interest between the core and the peripheral elites. For instance, many historians claim that the fall of Mughals started with the rule of Aurangzeb as Aurangzeb lost the consent of many Hindu elites, through his re-incorporation and strict application of previously abolished *jizya* taxes; ii) or through the emergence of a new peripheral elite which challenges the "center in the

⁵⁸ Nation-state, particularly the more republican French version (thus the Turkish version as well) also insists that "no communal structure would stand between the republic and its citizens" (Taspinar, 2004).

periphery.” In the Ottoman Empire, since the end of eighteenth century, newly emerging lay leaders posed the greatest threat to the Ottoman rule, while the religious community leaders remained by and large loyal to the Ottoman rule. Particularly the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul had remained as a pro-Ottoman force throughout the nineteenth century while there were many independence movements on the side of non-Muslim communities of the empire. Ottoman territorial integrity only fell under threat when the authority of the Patriarchate was challenged first by the newly emerging lay leaders of community, mostly merchants empowered by their increasing wealth, and later by the low level clergy which led to the disintegration of the Greek Orthodox Church and the emergence of new Orthodox Churches such as the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870.⁵⁹

3.2.3 Cosmopolitanism vs. Homogeneity

This level of diversity takes us to another important feature of empires; the composite and cosmopolitan nature of the empires. Once again the contrast between the nation-states driven by their quest for uniformity and homogenization is striking. Multi ethnic and multi-religious society is a common feature of empires, whereas at least in theory, nation-state is the political body that is congruent with one cultural unit (Gellner, 1983: 1) and thus it is a state “of and for the nation” (Brubaker, 1996).

⁵⁹ In certain ways Ottomans unwillingly contributed to this result. In their desire to reform what they considered to be a corrupt leadership, Ottomans undermined the authority of their prime partners; millet leaders, thus contributed to the emergence of lay leaders. For a detailed analysis of how the Ottoman reforms had transformed the balance of power in the millet system, and finally created a major challenge to Ottoman sovereignty, see Davison, 1963: 114-136.

At this point, Dominic Lieven (2007: 409) reminds us not to forget that, “it was far easier to sustain a civilized acceptance of diversity in a pre-modern empire in which government did not aspire to do much more than fight wars, raise taxes and preserve order.” Therefore, diverse and cosmopolitan nature of imperial societies is also a result of the lack of penetration by the imperial states. Building on this point, David Laitin (2009: 616) claims that “diversity is not a defining aspect of empire; rather it is an implication of its structure.” As such, cosmopolitanism, differential rulings and the indirect rule over periphery and hierarchy are all related with each other.

Although acceptance of cultural diversity is a result of the political system of empires, they still show variation in their treatment of diversity. Once again land based empires are more open to diversity and they keep routes open for the peripheral elites. Provided that one accepts, adopts and defends the imperial ideology (Roman law, Islam, Orthodoxy, Communism or Capitalist democracy in Roman, Ottoman, Russian, Soviet and American empires) a peripheral elite member can get to very high positions within the imperial structures. Particularly in the first three centuries, the bulk of the Ottoman administration and most of the grand viziers were recruited from the conquered peoples in Balkans. The Romans even surpassed the Ottomans in that sense, and after a century of the conquest of Spain, a Spaniard became the Roman Emperor, whereas the overseas Spanish Empire in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries blocked the career ways of the peripheral elites and transformed them into creoles. This as Anderson (1991: 47-66) famously shows saw the roots of nationalism in this colonial empire. The contrast is also helpful in explaining why the millennium old experience of land empires didn’t result in

the new imaginations of political community in terms of nation where as in a few centuries the colonial administration made such alternative imaginations possible.

Given the cultural diversity as almost a given situation for empires, Karen Barkey (2006) provides three alternative strategies employed by empires to manage this diversity; toleration, co-optation and incorporation. Ottoman millet system, which will be discussed more in detail, provides an excellent case of toleration where different communities were tolerated to keep their distinct, though inferior position and their leaders remained in control over the community without being forced to convert to the imperial ideology. However, it should not be forgotten that toleration is not unconditional. The social order in the empires is based upon a hierarchical compartmentalization of communities and toleration is conditional upon the sustainment of this order. Thus anything that threatens; i) hierarchy (such as the enrichment and upward mobility of non-Muslim traders), ii) compartmentalization (such as the blurring of the group boundaries as in the cases of Alevis, Alawites, Druzes etc), iii) order within community (such as emergence of reformers like Sabbathai Sevi within the Jewish community) is considered anathema and dealt harshly. Thus, those individuals and communities that do not fit with the established social categories face with the heavy hand of the empire rather than its toleration. On the other hand the *devshirme* system which enables the peripheral elite to incorporate to the power center of the empire, provided that they accept the imperial ideology (convert to Islam in the Ottoman case) is an example of incorporation strategy. The Mughal emperor Akbar's attempt of creating a syncretic religion with elements from both Islam and Hinduism is

also another attempt of incorporation, whereas the more common policy of appeasing Hindu elites and their recognition by the Mughal emperors is a case for toleration.

3.3 Legitimation, Religion and Language

We have so far contrasted nation-states and empires on the social, political and administrative aspects of their systems. All these differences between empires and nation-states are most clearly reflected in their legitimizing ideologies and virtues. In this section, we will compare how the imperial states and nation-states legitimized themselves in general, and in particular, we will look at the function of religion and language as sources of legitimacy. Different social and political roles attributed to language and religion in an imperial state and a nation-state will enable us to better grasp the differences between an imperial and a national setting.

Ernest Renan has famously defined nation as a “daily plebiscite.” It is the entire citizenry who participates in the plebiscite and such a definition points to a high level of belonging and participation. Thus, nationalism often develops a “militant sense of shared identity, including linguistic and sometimes religious identity. Nation-state will be strong on indices of belonging. In general and allowing for a great range, nations are better at equality, empires at tolerance” (Maier, 2006: 29). Empires lack- ever if they aspire to- such high levels of identification and belonging and this lack of belonging provides another angle to understand the structure of empires.

We have already mentioned that political forms can also be classified chronologically through their level of complexity, and as such empires fall somewhere

between primordial polities and modern polities. In the chronological classification of Eisenstadt, empires or “historical bureaucratic societies” in his terminology, differ from previous regimes like patrimonial polities or city states as the complexity of the imperial system has created a differentiated society in which power is centralized outside the domains of communities, traditions and ascriptive lineages. However, the society is not as differentiated as the modern states. Although lacking the communal belonging of the previous polities, empires also lack the completely differentiated modern political forms such as independent citizenry. In the absence of such modern political forms, individuals were still members of traditional societal groups as well as being members of the political community and traditional power centers such as religious establishment and aristocracy were still providing power and political representation (Eisenstadt, 1962). Thus both the more primordial political bodies and the modern political bodies rest on the identification of the people and the political power; either through ascriptive identification or through modern forms of identification achieved through modern political ideologies (nationalism) and modern forms of political membership (citizenship). In contrast, we have already seen that Barkey (2008) defines empires as “a negotiated enterprise” between the elites. It is the lack of belonging and limited differentiation of society that necessitates the crucial role of elites in the formation of empires. And “because empires are about elites, they are also about inequality and stratification. They remain or become hierarchical institutions, stabilizing gradients of power geographically and gradients of status and reward within their component societies (Maier, 2006). As hierarchical relations are indispensable to an empire, empire is also a form of domination. As we have seen, it represents the domination of a ruling

elite over the rest of the society, of the core over the periphery and in most cases (most particularly in sea empires) of an ethnic group (or peoples to be nation) over another ethnic group. This form of domination had been justified by a universal ideology that enabled empires to keep the elites united and rule over diverse societies for long centuries.

In theory, nation-states rule through the consent of its citizens. This consent is maintained through a very high level of identification of state and the people through popular participation of people. Nationalism and its virtues of equality and populism provide the ideological justification of the identification of state and people. Compared with nation-states, empires demand less, so they need less in terms of ideology and belonging. However, inherent inequality of the system and low indices of belonging necessitate that empires also needs some sort of legitimating ideology and belonging. However, unlike the nation-state this belonging is limited to the elites and need not reach to every individual (in lack of a concept of modern citizenship). In that sense, empires also lack the communal belonging of city states and patrimonial empires. They display a certain level of differentiation, but lack the ideological vigor and belonging of nation-states. In this context the supranational imperial ideology serves a “symbolic expression of rule, the glue that offered the spiritual cohesion of the elite upper classes of the empire, encouraging their participation”⁶⁰ (Barkey, 2008: 99).

⁶⁰ However this participation is limited both in depth but also in scope. As Eisenstadt puts it “The continuity of these systems was contingent upon a constant balance between the political activity of some segments of the population and the non-involvement in central political issues of the greater part of the population. The limited political involvement could assure some of the more flexible political support, while the apathy, in its turn, was necessary for maintenance of the traditional legitimation of the rulers” (1962: 279).

Thus, a universal ideology is essential for the universal empires. Even Walker's above quoted "self-referential definition suggests an important aspect of imperial rule: the conscious and confident projection of an imperial ideology and institutions" (Esherick et al, 2006: 6). Throughout history, elements of this universal ideology have showed variance. In the colonial empires it was the claim of *mission civilisatrice* that colonial elite argued for justification of their rule. Twentieth century portrayals of Soviets and USA as empires would also point to their ideological orientations as the new secular religions; and the legitimizing device of the empire. Aside from being universal, these ideologies also connected the core elites in Moscow and Washington with the "peripheral elites" in different capitals. But in most traditional empires it was religion that served as the most efficient component of the imperial ideology. There is no doubt that religion was the most important part of the identities of individuals in the pre-modern ages, but it was also an essential feature of state structure as well. First, the rulers justified and legitimized their sovereignty through religion. Second, the society and state-society relations were mostly established within the confines of religious rule and under the observation of religious elite. When one refers to the significance of imperial ideologies and institutions, the inevitable implication of this emphasis would bring religion into the discussion, as "every empire had appealed to religion to justify its rule" (Esherick et.al, 2006:11). And neither the Mughals nor the Ottomans were exceptions to these general rules. The British Raj as a colonial power however wasn't concerned with religious justification for the British Rule, yet they considered that deference to Islam and Hinduism is crucial for the maintenance of their rule. As we will

see later on, in the final analysis, it was the British who contributed most to the solidification and exploitation of religious identities in the subcontinent.

Although religion might play a role in the shared identities created by the nation-states, nation-states mostly emphasize common language to justify their shared identity. In order to clarify the differences between the ideological leanings of empires and nation-states, we can also look at the contradictory roles of religion and language in empires and nation-states.

Religion with other elements of tradition provided not only a justification but also a sense of universality essential for empires. In Karen Barkey's (2008: 99) words, "Many imperial states maintained authority over their populations through the legitimization of a supranational ideology that included a religious claim to be protectors of a *world religion*: Islam or Christianity, for example, which they connected to an elaborate ideology of descent and lineage"⁶¹ (emphasis added). In contrast to the central role of religion in empires, Benedict Anderson claims that nationalism has filled the vacuum left by religions. As such, there is a deep connection between the origins of nationalism and secularism, although later emergence of religious nationalisms all around the world makes this link dubious now. Even when religion served as an important aspect of national identity such as in the Balkan nationalisms, this had been only possible after the collapse of the universal (imperial) churches and the emergence of the local-national churches.⁶² Similarly, the idea of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state

⁶¹ When empires confronted each other in the international arena, they developed such ideologies partly in relation to each other, as was the case with the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires.

⁶² "A whole tradition of Balkan national historiography is premised on the assumption that Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Church played a major role in nation-building...(In reality) It was the

could be imagined only after the universal concept of ummah had been institutionally and symbolically destroyed with the abolition of Caliphate. As the most extreme form of a unity of religion and state, the linkage between the state of Israel and the quasi universal Judaism creates an anomaly in the international political system. Israel's claim to represent the world Jewry undermines its position as a member of modern nation-state system, as this claim creates ambiguity in the definition of citizenship in Israel and also creates hierarchies among its subjects. Aside from being a colonial settler country in twentieth century and lacking clearly delineated territories, its claim to represent a world religion contributes to the anachronic nature of Israel in modern political system (Massad, 2007). Thus, while religion had a central importance and had a universal outlook in empires, in the modern nation-state system, it either lost its significance or it had been particularized and lost its universalizing mission.

Language is another realm where the difference between the nation-state and empire in terms of legitimation and ideologies is most significant. In the imperial system, there is no need for a common language that unites the entire society. In contrast, language is the tool of differentiation and stratification of the society. Moreover, languages like Latin and Persian serve as universal identification that unites elites from different communities. Thus in a sense they are part of the universal aspect of the empire as people from different groups can be included to the core once they acquire the palace language. We have already pointed out that Persian was key to the inclusion into the Mughal elite. This enabled the Hindus to take part in the high

eventual abandonment of the ecumenicity of Orthodoxy, and the 'nationalization' of the churches, that brought intense national conflicts into the life of the Orthodox Church and nurtured the assumption concerning the affinity between Orthodoxy and nationality" (Kitromilides, 1989: 178-179).

administrative roles in the Mughal system and to be part of the ruling elite. (For a more detailed analysis of the role of Persian in the Mughal system, see Alam, 1998). Similarly, Romans allowed the *barbarians* to become Roman and enter the ruling elite once they acquired Latin and Roman law. When we look at the nation-states we see an entirely different picture. While language was an instrument of stratification and hierarchy in empires, in nation-states it serves for unification and equality.⁶³ However, national languages lack the universal aspect of imperial languages and create boundaries among the elites (of different nationalities). While imperial languages united different elites and stratified the elites from their folks, in the nation-state language serves to unite the elites and the common people while simultaneously creating divisions among different elites. Thus, language is a good example of the ideological differences of empires and nation-states; one universal, inclusive and outward looking; the other particular, exclusive and inward looking.

3.4 Nation-ness and Empire

All in all, empire is a political system that is hierarchical, non-uniform in its ruling mechanisms and structures, and open to diversity with its cosmopolitan multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature. These features are in stark contrast to the nation-states' egalitarianism, direct and uniform means of rule, their tendency to homogenize, and

⁶³ However, there are important exceptions as language doesn't serve this function in Pakistan. Rather than being an egalitarian force, use of language is quite hierarchical (priority given to English, then to Urdu and finally to vernaculars) and deeply attached to class issues. (For the linkage of language and class, see Rahman, 1998) That's why language in Pakistan has so far been a source of division as well as unification. This is the one of the most important problems in the nation-building process in Pakistan.

“one nation one state” principle. Such a contrast, underlined by so many scholars in the nationalism literature is certainly important but considering that few nation-states really fit into the homogenous egalitarian claims, “this contrast is relative, not absolute” (Kumar, 2010: 131). Empires and nation-states have a common historical trajectory, as “most nation-states, or what became nation-states, are, like most empires, the result of conquest and colonization” (Kumar, 2010. see also, Niebuhr, 1959). As mentioned throughout the discussion above, despite their theoretical rejection of the imperial elements, in reality most nation-states have features that resemble empires; they mostly include more than one nation. Despite their claim to uniformity, there are strong deviations in terms of the ruling of certain regions, some groups almost always complain that they are dominated and exploited by the center, etc. At the same time, throughout their drive for increased centralization, empires gained features of nation-states such as higher levels of egalitarianism, uniformity and direct rule. Esherick, Kayalı and Van Young, (2006: 12-16) point that, facing the threatening success of European nation-states, “the ruling elites (of empires) responded (to strains of modernity) with economic and political reforms akin to those of the nation-state projects of Western Europe, thus throughout the nineteenth century they displayed a pronounced trend toward national and ethnic self-definitions.” Based on such observations, they warn us that, “the objective distinction between the old empires and new states are often murky at best.” (2006: 3). Considering such ambiguities, Kumar (2010: 134) argues that “the behavior of states may tend at one time towards empire, at another time towards a concern with nation-ness.”

However, such ambiguities within the political trajectory of the same state do not necessarily mean that we should give up the distinction between empires and nation-states as “the distinction between imperial and nationalist ideologies seems real and significant” (Kumar, 2010: 131). Both empire and nation-ness are still useful as analytical categories even though neither of them perfectly fits the political realities. In this regard, both empires and nation-states should be considered as ideal types in the Weberian sense. As a scholar who dealt extensively with such conceptual problems, Alexander Motyl (2001: 20) rightly points that “reality may be messy, but that is all the more reason to use concepts that are less so.” As such no state would perfectly fit the definition of either empire or nation-state (no nation-state has complete equality or uniformity whereas through their centralization attempts, empires show some features of nation-states) but nevertheless the distinction between imperial ideology with its emphasis on diversity and nation-state ideology with its emphasis on uniformity provides us a useful tool to evaluate the policies of states (Maier, 2006). Accordingly, most empires would evolve towards being a nation-state, in the process of modernization, yet up to a certain point we would still define them as empires with their perceived similarity to the ideal type of an empire rather than a nation-state.

This point is crucial for a balanced understanding of the evolution from an empire to nation and also the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan. “This perception might be one way of considering the fact that empire and nation can, at different times, alternate in the striving of states... The tension between nation and empire could often be seen within the same country, including some of the most powerful, at the same time” (Kumar, 2010: 131). This also fits the findings of the most

recent scholarship on the alternative policies that dominated the political scene both during the late Ottoman period and also during the period that led to the succession of Raj and the partition of South Asia (see, Zurcher, 2000; Hanioglu, 2006; Desai, 1990). This point is important also for the structuring of this dissertation. Following chapters all deal with the alternative political options pursued by the political elites. The emphasis in chapter 4 and chapter 5 is on the politicization of religious identity and the ascendancy of Muslim nationalism in the Ottomans and among the Indian Muslims. The concluding chapter points to the marginalization of Muslim nationalism in the form it existed during the transitional period in favor of a narrower, more linguistic and particularistic national identity, thus in the overall, these chapters give us a picture of an evolution initially from plural imperial polity towards an imperial version of national identity which was later homogenized on religious grounds and finally further homogenization upon the formation of nation-state through ethno linguistic assimilation. However, the reader should be aware that, in any of these periods the pursued policy was neither fully dominant nor consistent. At each point, there were always alternative policy options, defended by various members of the political elite and implemented at varying degrees of success by them. In that sense, this evolution shouldn't be taken as a strongly chronological linear evolution. Rather it is a process full of contradictory moves, containing the seeds of alternative ways; roads that have not been taken (Comisso, 2006). Despite the lack of such chronological consistency, the wider map of the "roads taken" still provides a consistent move towards augmenting homogeneity; once again with alternative policies (defended and maybe even pursued with less success than the actual path taken) at each point.

That is why this study avoids a strict periodization and instead takes a thematic approach. It is not possible to certainly distinguish at which point the Ottoman state stopped being a prime case of imperial polity and “opted-out of empire” (Barkey, 2008: 264-296). This evolution, though more real than apparent, took place in the course of a large time period, with many drawbacks and contradictions. Similarly, at the realm of ideologies, it is not possible chronologically to differentiate at what point more imperial ideologies like Ottomanism had been dominant and at what points alternative modes of nationalist projects such as Muslim nationalism and Turkish nationalism had been dominant. Instead, the recent scholarship points to the simultaneous existence of these ideologies among the political leaders and the state policies. (For the first article that pointed to this approach, see Zurcher, 2000. This point had been recently enforced by another important scholar of late Ottoman period. See Hanioglu, 2006. A very intriguing comparison of alternative national-imperial project and the paths taken and not taken with regard to the German and the South Asian-Indian cases, see Desai, 1990).

Such an approach will also enable us to understand the seemingly contradictory actions of political elites. If we see empires and nation-states as variable forms of the “political imagination,” alternative possibilities that were open to political elites depending on the circumstances of the times (c f. Cooper, 2005), then pursuing empire or pursuing “nation-ness” could be a strategic choice shaped by the available state capabilities (Kumar, 2010: 120). This coexistence of both options and the tension between them stems from the contradictory impulses of enlargement and centralization-homogenization as already discussed in the previous chapter. While providing us with a better understanding of the seemingly contradictory motives and actions of the political

elites, this approach still enables us to see the wider picture of transition from an empire towards a nation-state.

3.5 Empire in the Context of Ottomans and South Asia

What implications does the discussion on the nature of empires have on the relations between state and religion in the Ottoman realm and in South Asia? At this point, we might need to look at how the imperial structures in these realms dealt with such features of empire as hierarchy, stratification, dominance, and indirect rule. For the purpose of this dissertation, the role of religion and the relations between state and religion as well as the role of religion in the social relations are particularly important for us. We have already seen that religion is important both as a legitimizing device of the empire (and the inherent inequalities of the empire) and also as a universalizing mission; an imperial ideology suitable for the universal pretensions of the empires. This same rule applies even more vigorously to the Ottomans and Mughals.

In the study of empires, Ottomans had mostly been compared with the Mughals, but almost never with the British Raj. The reasons for that seems apparent; the Mughals and Ottomans share a lot in common as Islamic universal agricultural empires, while the British Raj is a different style of empire; a part of the western colonial empire systems of modernity. In his seminal study “The Venture of Islam,” Marshall Hodgson (1974) had identified Mughals and Ottomans (along with the Safavid Empire in Iran) as the “gunpowder empires,” referring to the significant changes in the technology of warfare, which made the existence of such strong centers of power possible. Moreover, these

empires had been successful partly due to their ability to “control forms of religious knowledge deployed for the maintenance of hegemony and legitimacy” (Khoury and Kennedy, 2007: 235). In the period of the three empires, religions came to be again institutionally and even intellectually associated with the state and its fate (Hodgson, 1993: 194). This increased importance of religion for the states ruling in the early modern period is by no means unique to the Islamic world. Despite the common assumptions to the contrary, the early modernity (circa 1500-1800) has brought increased unity between church and state rather than church and state separation in Europe as well as through the Islamdom.⁶⁴ Ottomans and Mughal Empires co-existed in this time span that is often called as early modernity (whereas Ottomans survived into modernity and Mughals gave way to British Raj).

Moreover, it is not only their existence in the early modern period that singles out the Ottomans and Mughals. They are further differentiated from other Islamic experiences as “in the Ottoman Empire and in the Indic Timuri Empire, Islam was on relatively new ground, ruling a population which in majority was not Muslim” (Hodgson, 1974: 7).⁶⁵ This necessitated skillful management of this religious diversity and the non-Muslim populations leading to an increased toleration and to a high degree

⁶⁴ The declaration of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose region, his religion) by the Westphalia agreement indeed paved the way for the creation of national churches even more connected with the state than previous universal Roman Catholic Church. Thus it would be fair to say that “modernity is perhaps not so much about the separation of church and state as it is about the control and identification of the former by and with the latter” (Tezcan, 2009:566).

⁶⁵ As Karen Barkey (2005: 10) reminds us “at first, while the Ottomans conquered land in the Balkans, they acquired a predominantly Christian population and it is only with the expansion of the empire into Arab lands in the sixteenth century that a balance between Christian and Muslim populations was reached.” She also argues that this high population of non-Muslim population in the Ottomans and particularly at the heartlands of the empire had pushed Ottomans to develop a unique imperial model that enables them with co-optation and tolerance.

of the incorporation of the non-Muslims to state administration. For that matter, the Ottomans and Mughals share a similar attitude of tolerance, though they employed different strategies for this policy. However, as it will be discussed below, in both cases, the solution for the religious diversity was found within the *dhimmi* (*zimmi* in Turkish) concept of Islamic law.

Based upon many such resemblances and being contemporaries, both the Ottomans and Mughals had been often considered to have similar state structures and thus they are considered to be “comparable,” notwithstanding the recent emphasis on their differences (see Dale, 2009; Bayly 2007: 332). Moreover, British Raj, another contemporary of the Ottomans should be included in the spectrum of comparison as the apparent differences between the British Raj and the Ottomans would decrease once we have a more nuanced grasp of the Raj (Bayly, 2007: 332). Even the most apparent division of a sea based empire and contiguous land based empire had lost its significance as the British Empire in India transformed from limiting itself to coastal, fortified entrepots such as Bombay, Calcutta towards taking control of the large lands (Adas, 2010). At the time the British had legally established the British Raj, contiguous land base of the British Indian Empire was larger than the entire Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the Raj transformed itself in time to a land based agricultural empire whose basic revenues relied on land taxes. Again in terms of its military structures, rather than relying solely on naval power, nineteenth century British India had one of the strongest army in the world as it was directly controlling one of the largest land based empires (Khourry and Kennedy, 2007).

Even more important is the fact that British Raj reflected the same features of a centralized cosmopolitan agricultural empire both in terms of its administration but also in terms of the problems it faced through its assertion of central authority. In sum, “both empires ruled vast territories that were inhabited by peoples of widely different faiths, customs, ethnicities, and more; both made accommodations to these differences even as they sought to erase them; both advanced a universalizing mission while acknowledging its limits; both asserted authoritarian powers and conceded local autonomy” (Khoury and Kennedy, 2007: 234). Moreover, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, British refrained from transforming the society they inherited from Mughals well until the nineteenth century. It was only then the British transformed themselves from the role of colonial merchants towards the role of empire builders. It is only in the nineteenth century that they took decisive steps to rule their empire in ways qualitatively different from their Mughal predecessors. This century was also a century of transformation for the Ottoman state and in this process both empires faced similar challenges particularly with regard to decentralized and diverse nature of their society. These points will be discussed in detail in the following two chapters since their methods of managing that diversity at a time of top-down modernization had led to increased politicization of religion.⁶⁶

Indeed the commonalities around the idea of empire and the similarities between the structures and policies of the Ottoman Empire and the British Raj had already

⁶⁶ At this point it should also be kept in mind that increasing importance of religion for the British Empire was not limited to its “Indian branch.” Indeed, if we gave up the binary distinctions of religious east and a secular western modernity we will see that religion was central to the British Empire both in India and England. See Van der Veer, (1999).

attracted the attention of some scholars and manifested by the devotion of a special issue to the comparisons of these two empires in 2007 by the *Journal of Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*. In their editorial article Dina Rizk Khoury and Dane Kennedy define the aim of this special issue as to “de-orientalize” the Ottomans and “orientalize” the British in the hope of restoring continuities and connections between the history of the Ottoman Empire and the British Raj.” In a similar fashion my aim in this comparison is to point out how these similarities had constructed similar paths for the nation-building processes of Turkey and Pakistan.

3.5.1 Ottomans

“Whoever claims that all people are equal must be hopelessly mad” wrote a resident of Ottoman Aleppo in eighteenth century in his personal notebook among other sayings (Marcus, 1989:37).⁶⁷ Like in all empires, inequality was inherent to the social and political fabric of the Ottoman Empire. It was a society that was both hierarchical and stratified on many levels. The basic hierarchy among the society was between the ruling elite composed of civil officials, religious and military leaders who exercised authority in the name of the sultan and ruled over the *re’aya* (literally meaning flocks).⁶⁸ Like in every society there were other levels of hierarchy as well between rich and poor, literate and illiterate, urban and rural and so on. Aside from these common hierarchies, the Ottoman society was also hierarchical in terms of religion; Islam being the religion of

⁶⁷ Based on his other notes, Marcus suggests that he is probably Christian.

⁶⁸ The standard reference books for Ottoman social history are Inalcık, 1973 and Inalcık and Quataert (eds), 1994.

state and the court was superior to other religions. Thus, the societal pyramid of the Ottoman Empire was structured along two axes—horizontal and vertical. The vertical axis separated Muslims from the other monotheistic religions, while the horizontal one divided the society into different social classes. The ruling elite, who are defined by Peter Sugar (1977: 34-43) as “Professional Ottomans,” were recruited from all three recognized religions (Bieber, 2010:14).

From its inception to its demise Ottomans remained an Islamic Empire, although the central role of Islam became more prominent in the process of empire formation and through the rivalry between the Catholic Habsburgs and became more clearly defined as the Orthodox Sunni Islam through the rivalry with the Shi'i Safavids.⁶⁹ The traditional Islamic law constituted the basic component of the legal system aside with the Sultan law, and at least in principle the latter had to be confined to the limits and the dominance of the former. Despite variances in their individual piety, all the sultans had publicly endorsed and glorified Islam as Ottoman ruling institutions were defined and legitimated in preeminently Islamic terms and Islamic appeals motivated Ottoman soldiers (Findley, 2010: 64). In his detailed study of the power structures within the Ottoman Empire, Colin Imber gives particular attention to the legitimizing tools of the Ottoman dynasty. Giving a chronological order of different narratives and tools, both secular and religiously inspired, implemented by the dynasty to legitimize its rule, he concludes that

⁶⁹ Obviously the process was reciprocal, and the same rivalry shaped and sharpened the religious ideology of the Habsburgs and Safavids.

those of Holy Warrior⁷⁰, successor to the Seljuks and Caliph were the most efficient and enduring ones (Imber, 2002: 114-127).

Religion was central to the societal organization as it constituted the primary mode of affiliation in the traditional societies. Despite the ethnic diversity of the empire, the religion prevailed over ethnic boundaries; at least certainly so until the nineteenth century. Thus an ethnic Albanian could be a Muslim Greek Orthodox or Roman Catholic and these identities primarily shaped his or her social relations. No ethnic consciousness comparable to nation-states existed (Hanioglu, 2008: 24-27). Accompanying ethnic diversity there were linguistic diversity as well. However, “language couldn’t offer a safe marker of identity as languages were associated with different social and occupational contexts and not necessarily with ethnicity.” For instance, Ottoman Turkish (distinct from folk Turkish), was the main language of administration while Greek was the *lingua franca* of commerce in the entire East Mediterranean (Özkırımlı and Sofos, 2008: 16). As common to many other empires, Ottomans also had a multi layered language system. “One might say that the empire had one imperial language for the bureaucratic elite (Ottoman Turkish), three major *lingua francas* (Turkish, Arabic, and Greek), and a host of local languages split into a variety of dialects. The absence of widely read publications perpetuated the linguistic fragmentation of the empire.” The evolution of Ottoman Turkish is particularly striking. “In a way, Ottoman resembled Latin as used in medieval or early modern Europe as it supplanted Persian as the literary language of the cultured upper classes.” However,

⁷⁰ As the Holy Warrior, The Ottoman Sultans waged war against other Muslims as well as non-Muslims. In order to justify war against non-Muslims the Ottoman Chroniclers presented their Muslim adversaries as either hindering the Holy War (through alliances with the Christian enemies of the empire) or as heretics even infidels (most notably in the case of war against the Shi’i Safavid dynasty) (Imber, 2002:121)

those who used the Ottoman language were not necessarily Turks. Rather, they constituted the educated upper classes of a variety of Ottoman groups. Thus, to a certain extent the language formed a transnational link bonding elites together within the empire and alienating them collectively from their respective peoples (Hanioglu, 2008: 34-36). The insignificance of language and ethnicity as markers of identity is also revealed through the censuses. The first official census of 1830 was based entirely on religion while ethnic or linguistic differences were almost completely ignored (Karpas, 1985).⁷¹

Aside from Islam's official dominance, 1830 census points to the demographic dominance of Muslims as they constitute the majority of the population. Although there are no reliable censuses before this date, it is safe to say that once again, the demographic weight of Muslims increased through the formation of empire and especially in the early sixteenth century following the conquest of Arab lands. However, even then, Christians constituted more than one third of the population. Thus, they constituted a very sizeable minority that could not be easily discarded. Moreover they constituted the majority in the European lands of the empire including the Balkans; the core of the empire. The apparent importance of religion in the social life accompanied by a very sizable non-Muslim population led to a very delicate management of this religious diversity known as "millet system."

Referring to the millet system as a tolerant form of rule compared with the oppressive and violent rules in Europe dates back to John Locke's *A Letter Concerning*

⁷¹ The Ottoman disregard on ethnicity and nationality in classifying the society continued throughout the nineteenth century. This can be read as a deliberate attempt of the state which considered ethnic emphasis as detrimental to its survival. However, to a certain extent, this attitude is reflective of the centuries old tradition of a society divided along religious lines rather than ethnic lines. For this discussion, see Davison (1977).

Toleration and Voltaire's *Toleration* (Barkey, 2008:109). Since then, millet system had been a subject of academic inquiry and controversy as it has been either portrayed perfectly harmonious society or as a society where savage Turks had repressed the Christians and Jews. The recent portrayal of Islam as an essentially oppressive religion in the wake of 9-11 by the pundits of Western academia and their subsequent contribution to the debates on the "clash of civilizations" also contributed to the increased attention on the millet system of Ottoman Empire as a model of toleration.⁷² In their attempt to refute the arguments of Islam as an essentially oppressive religion, eminent scholars like Alfred Stepan (2001) and Karen Barkey (1994) declared that the millet system was much more open and tolerant compared with its contemporary Western European models. As Anthony Marx (2003) had demonstrated while the Ottomans were institutionalizing a new model of coexistence, European states were going through a stage of religious exclusion that had been influential for the development of nationalist(or proto-nationalist) feelings. Will Kymlicka (1992) even looked upon the millet system as "a model of pluralism and tolerance" that might be relevant for the contemporary societies. Although accepting inequality between Islam and other religions, millet system was a fairly tolerant system that enabled Ottomans not only forcefully rule but also to incorporate the non-Muslims at varying levels.

Millet (millah in Arabic) is a term used in Quran to denote religion, and in the Ottoman system millet refers to confessional communities who were led by their religious leaders. These communities possessed a high degree of autonomy in the

⁷² Ironically the most important study in the field that dominated the literature for more than two decades is an edited collection, co-edited by Bernard Lewis, (and Benjamin Braude) (1982); one of the pioneers of the Islamic exceptionalism thesis.

conduct of communal affairs such as the collection of religious taxes and financing and maintaining of religious services, maintaining a communal legal order based on respective religious law particularly with regard to private law. Another aspect of millet system that would eventually become crucial in the age of nationalism is that millets had educational autonomy as well. They had their own educational institutions which was financed and directed by the community and thus were not subject to government regulation.

Historians had been discussing different aspects of millet system, to the extent of questioning whether it existed at all, and if existed the extent of its institutionalization and penetration of the society. The conventional wisdom (see Karpas, 1972) dates the millet system to the reign of Mehmed II, and attaches it a central importance in the construction of Ottoman state system as Ottomans established themselves as an empire and an heir to the Romans. Some scholars severely questioned the validity of the common norm which dates the construction of three different millets to the policies of Mehmet II and even defined this dating as a myth. (Braude, 1982) Whatever might be the merit of these discussions, for the purpose of this dissertation it would suffice to mention that millet system (even though not officially declared and institutionalized with this name until the nineteenth century) had been a consistent (though arranged on ad-hoc bases) feature of Ottoman's way of coping with the religious diversity of their subject populations.

Until the emergence of millet system the Ottoman system's relation with the non-Muslims were shaped by the classical teachings of Islam. The system was tolerant and non-Muslims had protection and religious freedom, but they had no administrative

power. There was no organized and institutionalized system seeking for the incorporation of non-Muslims to the political system of the empire (Karpas, 2006: 351). In that respect millet system represents a special kind of arrangement within the limits of Islamic dhimmi concept.

Upon the impact of Islam in the institutional developments and arrangements in the Ottoman system, the relationship between the Muslim communities and non-Muslim communities can be described on three word “ separate, unequal and protected” (Barkey, 2008:120). Particularly for the future legacy of this system on nation-building the notion of separateness is crucial. Here religion is the primary marker of identity and the millet system was aiming to maintain such separateness. Minna Rozen (2002) and Ahmet Refik (1998) cites *fermans* belonging respectively to sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that tries to maintain the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims and warns against the blurring of this distinction (quoted in Barkey, 2008). This distinction had been tried to maintain by “physical markers of difference” (Barkey, 2008: 121), symbols of domination and subordination (Kenanoğlu, 2004) and even through preventing physical proximity (like forbidding the building of a church or synagogue or even non-Muslim houses close to a mosque). In that regard even the neighborhoods had been effectively separated. The state added further to the sense of separate corporate existence in the minority communities by treating them as units with collective administrative responsibilities such as imposition of various taxes as lump sums on entire communities or holding the entire community responsible for the conduct of its members (Marcus, 1989: 43). Different millet were treated like corporate bodies and allowed their own internal structures and hierarchies; indeed the Ottoman state

encouraged this by dealing exclusively with their leaders rather than individual members (Poulton, 1997: 48).

Taken into consideration such aspects, millet system represents an ideal form of imperial rule over distinct but separate communities through intermediaries. Millet system is central to the Ottoman indirect rule of different religious communities, and as such it should be understood as an administrative strategy on the behalf of Ottomans to rule efficiently over such a diverse society. In that regard Karen Barkey (2008) effectively uses the “legibility” concept developed by James Scott (1998). Through the creation of millets, Ottomans transformed their religious diversity into legible units that enables them to maintain control and effective mobilization of resources. It is not surprising that both the Austrian and Russian imperial ideologues had examined millet system as a possible solution to their problems of heterogeneity.

3.5.2 Mughals and Raj

It is now almost a cliché in the South Asian Studies to point out that empire has been a constant feature of the Indian subcontinent (Bose and Jalal, 2004:3). With its triangular geography surrounded by the Indian Ocean on two sides and the Himalayan Mountains on the north, the subcontinent represents a geographical unity. Within this unity exists an almost endless sea of differences (of faith, ethnicity, language, culture) making the subcontinent simultaneously a unity and one of the most diverse societies on earth.⁷³

⁷³ This diversity is still valid in modern India, as well, which makes it hard to define India as a nation-state. It certainly has some imperial character not only with regard to its diverse society but also with regard to administrative plurality and indirect rule. Therefore political scientists have often pointed to

Thus, regionalism with its local identities and autonomous local rulers on the one hand and empire formation and the imperial unity on the other hand had been two opposing forces at work in the history of subcontinent.⁷⁴ Initially Hinduism⁷⁵ (and Sanskrit) and at a later stage Islam (and Persian) had been two important features of imperial-ness in the subcontinent by creating a degree of social and cultural unity among the elites. This produced an ever larger bond through the localities in the subcontinent notwithstanding many diverse and different local practices (Robb, 2002: 8). Mughal Empire is one of the series of imperial structures in the history of subcontinent and they represent the most typical features of an empire; they rule over a wide region from a very strong center (albeit, this center is quite small in terms of its geographic reach in comparison to the Ottomans or to many other empires: mostly limited to Delhi, Agra and Lahore) through the use of intermediaries. Their subjects are extremely diverse in belief and culture, but remained by and large autonomous and maintained their diversity. These centrifugal forces worked mostly in accordance with the central authority but the struggles between

Indian exceptionalism, or needed to define India on particular terms. A recent attempt by leading comparativists Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz (2011) is to define India as a “state-nation” rather than a nation-state.

⁷⁴ It is precisely this imperial character of managing plurality is the constant feature of all empire building processes in India. Stanley Wolpert’s (2000: 39) account of Gupta dynasty that ruled India between the fourth and sixth centuries stands true for the remaining of Indian history as well as for other imperial forms outside the subcontinent: “By leaving local customs and mores alone, interfering as little as possible with the private, familial habits of people in disparate provinces and limiting imperial rule to the collection of taxes and overall maintenance of security against invasions, Gupta monarchs assured their prosperous tenure for almost two centuries. Much of the secret of their success was the “weakness” of their rule, its minimally intrusive nature.”

⁷⁵ Indeed, Hinduism itself through its millenniums long existence showed an adaptability and flexibility towards other cultures and belief system. As empires are conglomeration of different peoples and territories, Hinduism is a conglomeration of different cultures and belief systems.

the central authority and local forces also make up an important dimension of the Mughal history.

“The Mughal Empire, like other pre-modern political systems of that scale, operated by a hierarchic distribution of authority among different levels of society.” The Mughal emperors were called as *shahinshah*, “king of kings” pointing to the level of power distribution and implicitly acknowledging the existence of peripheral power centers (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 29). Indirect rule through local rulers called *zamindars* were central to Mughal administration. Zamindars, who were equivalent of Ottoman *ayans*, were responsible for the maintenance of order and the collection of taxes in their respective areas as well as providing arms when necessary. It was Aurangzeb who strived for more central control, thus it is his desire to remain as the only power holder of the subcontinent more than his religious policies have created unrest and tensions among local power holders. Following his rule is the start of the emergence of regional kingdoms, which would formalize the diffusion of power.

Hierarchy was not only an administrative reality. Similar to the eighteenth century Ottoman man, people in South Asia laid no claim on equality as well. Stratification and hierarchy had been a consistent feature of the life at Indian subcontinent as the society was organized around castes and tribes. Louis Dumont’s famous study *Homo Hierarchius* (1970) defined a Hindu society through its creation of hierarchies, although the recent scholarship underscored that his presentation “as if Hindus constituted a particular kind of humanity” (Robb, 2002: 19), is both exaggerated

and gives the castes a distinctive and stable character that they do not possess.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, caste hierarchies and occupational stratification stood against any illusion of egalitarianism.

With the supremacy of Islam in Indian political life starting at the latest from the twelfth century onwards, religion became another criterion of hierarchy and stratification. Despite many syncretic tendencies Islam had always been an important arm of the Mughal state. The Mughal Emperors had assumed the title of caliph, representing the centrality of Islam to their rule (Malik, 1963: 20-21).⁷⁷ Even a ruler like Akbar who showed no signs of personal piety (at least after 1585) referred to Islam as a mean of justification (Robb, 2002: 94). However, from a comparative analysis the distinguishing aspect of Mughal rule is not the centrality of Islam in state affairs but exceptionally high level of Hindu incorporation to state administration. “The Mughal Empire fostered a society in which, under a Muslim lead, Muslims and Hindus shared in

⁷⁶ The confusion mostly arises due to the differences between *varna* and *jati*. Varna is the four fold caste hierarchy described in Hindu scripture; Priests (Brahmins), Warriors (Kshatriyas), Traders (Vaishyas) and Cultivators (Shudras). At the bottom lays the Untouchables who do not belong to any castes, thus referred as outcastes. Varna is an ideal described in Hindu scriptures, but in practice caste as experienced by Indians means jati. Jatis are essentially local groups with a known local order of hierarchy which is far more complex and also more fluid than the four-fold division in literary descriptions. Moreover, jatis can raise higher in the ladder of hierarchy. This often happens due to increasing economic prosperity followed by the cultural adoption of higher castes, a process defined by scholars as *Sanskritization*. Furthermore, entirely new jatis can emerge due to migration or splitting of older groups. But it is crucial to note that it was group mobility, validated according to the conventions of the system, but not individual mobility. By this way it is possible to claim that allowing group mobility made this hierarchical system more resilient than strict literal descriptions would enable (Brown, 1984: 19-22).

⁷⁷ However, as Malik (1963: 20-21) points, this also meant a denial of an outsider authority (like the Ottoman sultans who also declared themselves as the universal Caliphs). However, we see that with the demise of the Mughal authority and the rise of British as the new masters, the concept of a universal caliph had started to resonate with the Muslims of India. The importance of this concept of being a part of the universal ummah and the centrality of a caliphate would prove essential to the later development of Muslim nationalism in India.

a common political and cultural life which in important sectors they carried out in common.” The emperor Akbar, the first to have an effectively long reign, tried to create an Indian version of Islam that would eventually incorporate with Hinduism. This attempt failed, in fact created a strong backlash of Islamic revivalism; but “Indian Islam remained nonetheless a world to itself, in which - in contrast to the practice in the Ottoman Empire, which also possessed large non-Muslim populations - non-Muslims did not even pay the legal poll-tax. Indian Islam was distinguished not only by its special relations to Hinduism (at all levels) but by its own emotional tone” (Hodgson, 1993:194-196). As already mentioned, the Ottoman millet system was based upon the *dhimmi* concept of the Islamic law. Dhimmis were also defined as ‘the people of book’, thus as a concept it didn’t include Hindus. However, in practice since the establishment of first Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent by Mohammad Qasim, a young Arab general at the early eighth century, the Hindus were treated as dhimmis and were incorporated to state apparatuses (Malik, 1963:4-5).⁷⁸

It is also true that after Akbar’s (reigned between 1556-1605) failed attempts to create a complete incorporation of Hinduism and Islam through his *din-i ilahi*, subsequent Mughal emperors paid more homage to Islam and with the rule of Aurangzeb (reigned between 1658-1707), Islam and Islamic law became entrenched in

⁷⁸ In fact the extension of dhimmi status to the followers of religions other than Christianity and Judaism dates back even to an earlier time, to the reign of the second Caliph Omar and the invasion of Iran by the armies of Islam. After the conquest of Iran, Zoroastrian population of Iran was accepted as dhimmi, based upon the similarity of their belief system to the monotheist ideals of the “religions of book.” But it is with the acceptance of Hindus, a religious group that clearly defies any conception of monotheism, as dhimmis that the word dhimmi practically became the equivalent of non-Muslim. Prof Malik claims that the distinction between non-Muslims that were people of book and other non-Muslim was effectively abandoned at the early dates of Islam and bases his argument to a fatwa given by Abu-Hanife (Malik, 1963:301).

the Mughal system. Thus, it is possible to consider the religious policy of Mughal emperors as two competing attempts represented by Akbar; an increased accommodation between Hindus and Muslims and a greater orthodoxy represented by Aurangzeb. Series of struggles and succession wars in which the succession struggle between Dara Shukoh and Aurangzeb was decisive were in part a contest between Akbar's conciliation and Shah Jahan's (Akbar's son and heir) iconoclasm (Robb, 2002: 94-95).

Historians so far have not reached a consensus on the real role of Islam in the policy preferences of Aurangzeb. While the dominant tradition has always contrasted Aurangzeb with Akbar, and portrayed him as a religious bigot whose religious zeal had prevented him from preserving the delicate balance the Mughal system had established with regard to its relations with Hinduism and Hindu chiefs. According to this narrative, by the end of Aurangzeb's rule, the religious compartmentalization of India was complete both by through implementation of Islamic law and the supremacy of Islam against Hindus and Sikhs and also through social grievances. This narrative doesn't only portray Aurangzeb's religious policy as the main explanatory factor behind the Mughal decline, but also mistakenly portrays him as the founder of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent.⁷⁹ In contrast, Akbar is portrayed as the representative of the cosmopolitan and secular conceptualization of an all-inclusive Indian identity, which transcends over communal divisions. According to this narrative the evolution of Mughal system from Akbar to Aurangzeb represents the failure of cosmopolitanism and the hegemony of

⁷⁹ And of course his Hindu rivals like the Maratha leaders Shivaji and Shambaji are depicted as the founder of *Hindutva*, Hindu nationalism, which in fact didn't emerge any before then 1920's.

communalism. Recently historians have challenged such a portrayal of Aurangzeb. Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf (2006: 20-24) point to the facts that most of Aurangzeb's military campaigns had targeted the Muslim dynasties,⁸⁰ and more importantly, he continued to incorporate the Hindu elites into his system.⁸¹ Aside from his many Hindu generals, during his reign, more than one fourth of the *mansabdars* (tax collecting governing officials, with high administrative powers and military duties; roughly equivalent of Ottoman timariot elites) were Hindus. Thus, although encouraging a more austere Islamic style in the courtly culture, Aurangzeb "shifted but didn't fundamentally alter the religious policy of the empire."⁸²

Considered in this light, there is a more familiar reason for the Mughal decline of power, "imperial overstretch" (Kennedy, 1989) rather than religious intolerance.

⁸⁰ It is surprising to learn from Stanley Wolpert (1991: 43) that Aurangzeb's military campaigns stirred up hatred among the Hindus in Deccan. Yet, one wonders why the Hindus in Deccan would be stirred up with hatred when the Muslim dynasty already ruling Deccan is defeated by another Muslim dynasty from the north. Moreover Ayesha Jalal points to the negative reactions of Muslims in Deccan to Aurangzeb's conquests: "The Bijapuri poet Ansari compared the situation (Aurangzeb's overrunning of the city-states of Bijapur and Golconda) in his conquered homeland to the advent of *kufar* (infidelity) and found little pleasing about the new circumstances. A Muslim conqueror being billed a *kafir* in a poetic lament about the destruction of a style of life is a warning against any facile equation of an individual's religiously informed identity with an undifferentiated community of Islam" (2000: 12).

⁸¹ As the elite are not necessarily united by religion as in many other imperial cases, it was Persian which provided the unifying common culture of elites. As a non-Indian language, Persian also helped to distinguish the ruling elite from the rest of society, just like the Ottoman Turkish did in the Ottoman Empire (for more detail, see Alam, 1998).

⁸² Another important point is that Akbar's policy of forcefully creating harmony between Islam and Hinduism seems to have created a backlash in the long run. The struggle against accommodationist and syncretic policies of Akbar had opened a way of religious reformation and increased consciousness among the Muslims of the subcontinent. The religious revival of Muslims starting with Ahmed Faruk Sirhindi also known as Imam Rabbani reached a new climate by Shah Waliullah Dahlavi. The sunni reformist movements of Sirhindi and Dahlavi and later followed by the disciples of Dahlavi had influenced the community feeling among the Muslims of India. But more importantly, the zeal of these movements convinced the British to the compact, homogenous and distinctly separate from Hindus nature of Islam and Muslims in India.

Aurangzeb conquered more territories than any other Mughal ruler, but already by the end of his reign, central control over this enormous territory was becoming more and more impossible to maintain. Moreover, Aurangzeb was not willing to share his power and wealth with the intermediaries, or intermediaries of his empire were too greedy to accept the offered shares. In the few decades following Aurangzeb's death in 1707, local power holders such as zamindars, princes of tributary states and defiant government officials started to challenge the central rule. The most important of such defiant officials was Nizam-ul Mulk, who as an imperial prime minister withdrew to Hyderabad and asserted his autonomy there, and even defeated Mughal armies. Soon he was dignified as the Mughal viceroy for the Southern parts of the empire. Other local officials in important provinces like Bengal and Awadh also asserted their local autonomy. All these peripheral power holders remained loyal to Mughal sovereignty only in name and became de facto rulers of their territories. As it will be seen in the next chapter, the sweeping away of the power from center to the periphery during the eighteenth century pretty much resembles the same process that occurred in the Ottoman Empire roughly during the same time. Nizam of Hyderabad is pretty much like the Mohammad Ali of Egypt who exactly one century later became de facto ruler of Egypt and defeated his imperial master in 1826. The qualified success of the Ottomans in re-asserting the central authority through the nineteenth century was managed in the Indian subcontinent by the British power.

Despite the extreme doctrinal opposition, Muslims and Hindus lived in the subcontinent together for more than a thousand years (Wolpert, 1991: 99). The nature of their relation with each other during this period is still a matter of academic controversy.

It is natural that on such a large time span and a large geographical-demographic-cultural variation one can find instances of harmony, co-optation and even syncretism as well as rivalry, enmity and violence. However, in general it would be safe to say that what characterized the communal relations usually was the lack of violence. Moreover, historians also question the level of communal awareness in pre-modern periods (for an important example, see Bayly, 1985) and given the highly syncretic character of Indian Islam and Sufism many scholars point to the lack of clear differentiation and markers of identity among the communities. For further analysis, it seems necessary to make a distinction between the rural, where religious orthodoxies and learning were largely absent and the urban where both the arm of state and the influence of a high culture were evident. Religious syncretism and harmony seem to prevail in the rural. This is not to say that urban centers lacked such harmony, however, communal awareness was much more visible and higher in the urban centers. As Sudhir Kakar's (1996: 10) analysis of the urban center of Hyderabad points, "it was a multicultural coexistence rather than any merger into a single, composite culture; Hindus and Muslims lived together separately." He defines their relationship as (and Masters (2001: 38) finds it equally appropriate for the Muslim-Christian relations at the Ottoman –Arab-urban centers) "they were more than strangers, not often enemies, but less than friends."

The literature influenced by the post-colonial studies has tended to associate the increasing importance of communalism to the policies of the British. Thus, Pandey's (1990) seminal study bears the name, "Construction of Communalism in the Colonial North India." The title gives us the gist of the book; communalism is *constructed* by colonial masters. Pandey's book puts forward many strong cases and convincingly

demonstrates the role of the British in the politicization of religious identities. However, British did not invent or even construct communal identities *ab initio*.⁸³ Failure of Akbar's syncretism, and subsequent revival of religious thought and religion's increased dominance in the rule of empire had certainly contributed to the communal awareness. Yet, as Bayly (1985: 203) reminds us, communal awareness is not communalism and

“analyses of consciousness seem to lead nowhere if taken out of context. Religious differences were more likely to become communal conflicts when they coincided with shifts in political and economic power. Conflicts between Hindu and Sikh peasantry and Muslim gentry, or between Muslim peasantry and Hindu gentry did not inevitably lead to polarization on communal lines. Preconditions are not the same as causes.”

In this light, what Findley (2010: 65) said for the Ottoman Empire stands also true for the Indian subcontinent: religious difference had always existed, but the politicization of these differences was as modern as the politicization of ethnicity.

Thus, important as it may be for the historians of Mughal empire, the discussion over the exact level of the role of Islamic orthodoxy and religious syncretism in the policy of Mughal emperors is little relevant for the formation of religious nationalisms in the subcontinent. In either case, it is anachronistic to define such policies as nationalist (secular-all inclusive or religious-communalist) at a time period where no all-Indian conceptualization of either Islamdom or Hinduism was present. In fact all the processes of nation-buildings in India, be it the larger Indian nationalism or more communal oriented Hindu or Muslim nationalisms, started during the late stages of British Raj. The Mughal rule is relevant only to understand the society that British

⁸³ As they didn't invent caste *ab initio* (Robb, 2002: 19) but definitely gave it a new, more common and rigid meaning (Dirks, 2001).

inherited; a fragmented multi religious society with high levels of tolerance and syncretism. But it was also a society, despite the lack of communal administrative organizations and legal systems (as was the case in the Ottoman Empire), which had eventually reached a certain level of communal consciousness.

Moreover, whatever might be the increasing use of religion is true for Mughal history, the distinguishing aspect of Mughal history is not its incorporation of Islam to the official discourse of the empire (which would be the expected norm) that differentiates Mughals in the Islamic history, but it is the level of syncretism and integration of Hindu elites to the system that differentiates Mughals. Despite the apparent supremacy of Islam, unlike the Ottomans, the Mughals had not institutionalized a religious policy similar to the millet system, which would be separate and hierarchical.⁸⁴ Indeed, it was the British who institutionalized the organization of society on religious grounds. If we apply James Scott's legibility concept to the Indian history, the way Barkey applied on the Ottoman history, we can safely claim that many of the British policies, which can be defined as part of "colonial governmentality," (Scott, 1995) had led to the introduction of categories such as caste and religion for the administrative and organizational needs of the colonial state. Thus, it was more the vision of the British rather than Muslim's own conceptualization that led them to conceive themselves as part of an all-Indian Muslim community. However, in 1947, the Muslims of the subcontinent shared the same vision with the British. How this transformation happened and the role of administrative policies of the colonial state

⁸⁴ Moreover, contrary to other historians who underline the policies of Aurangzeb as the reason of Mughal collapse, Hodgson (1974: 59) claims that this difference led to the early collapse of the Mughals compared to Ottomans.

constitutes the next chapter. In the second half of the nineteenth century, both the Ottomans and Indian subcontinent experienced a religious revival, albeit on different terms. Yet the subsequent result had been the politicization of religious identity, and the emergence of Muslim nationalism.

As a result, we can say that both the Ottomans and Indians entered into modernity with a fragmented society categorized and compartmentalized mostly through religion. The religious differences, stressed and exaggerated in so many ways, however, did not separate the communities into segregated social worlds of their own (Marcus, 1989: 43). In the next two chapters, we will look at the story of how these religious compartments of the society gained political significance and transformed themselves into religious nationalisms. In a way, it is the story of the transformation of religious consciousness to religious nationalism and the ascendancy of religious nationalism over alternative political identities.

CHAPTER IV

RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND OTOTMAN EMPIRE

Why could not religious diversity, an integral part of the Ottoman Empire and the Indian subcontinent, be endured? Moreover, what is the relation between the erosion of religious diversity and nation-building? How and why did religious communities evolve into religious nationalism? This chapter seeks to answer these questions in the case of the Ottoman Empire and will be followed by another chapter addressing the Indian context. In both cases, as everywhere else in the world, the emergence of nationalism is linked to the formation of the modern state. These chapters will also examine the politicization of religious communities and the emergence of religious nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and Indian subcontinent in the context of modern state formation. It will be argued that due to the difficulty in sustaining plurality within a modern state, neither the Ottomans nor the Raj could reconcile religious plurality with a centralizing modern state. Rather, modern state formation led to the politicization of religious identities and the codification of religious nationalism. In the process, religion became an exclusionary ideology that enabled the formation of national boundaries. Thus, the exclusion of non-Muslims was crucial to nation-building and national homogenization.

This attempt to explain the emergence and dominance of religious nationalism builds on the previous chapter concentrating on empire as a pre-modern form of political organization. It further seeks to explain nationalism as a transition from empire to nation-state while pointing out that modernization reforms, such as the centralization of administration, the promotion of uniformity and equality through political reforms, and direct rule through the extension of state power are inter-related. Taken as a whole, these reforms transformed various aspects of empire in ways that helped precipitate nationalism.

The nineteenth century marked the beginning of a new era, both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Indian subcontinent, as well as the emergence of the modern state. The emergence of the modern state also resulted in the transformation of the imperial social structure, which was based on a diverse, hierarchical and composite society ruled through multiple forms of administrative plurality. The new social structure was instead characterized by increased uniformity in all realms of life, administration, identity and citizenship. This process disrupts the social balance and is always resisted by both traditional centers of power and by those for whom increased state activity entails increased burdens, such as taxation and conscription. In contrast, pre-modern states, with less involvement in the daily lives of their subjects, offered limited services, yet demanded much less in return. The increase in the state's capacity to deliver services also comes with the burden of increased obligations to the state. As Jurgen Habermas writes, "the expansion of state activity produces the side effect of a disproportionate increase in the need for legitimation (1975: 71)." Since this process entailed the transformation of imperial forms, structures of legitimation were also radically altered,

particularly religion and language, to some extent, acquired new meanings and social functions.

The problems arising from such a rapid transformation in the nineteenth century were further exacerbated in the Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman Empire for disparate reasons. Whereas the British were suffering from a colonial legitimacy crisis in the Subcontinent, the Ottomans were managing the creation of a modern state in the face of nationalist challenges. Though nationalism poses a dangerous threat to every empire, the crisis in the Ottoman territories was even more severe due to the Ottoman center's incapacity to counter the force of nationalist powers. Both states aimed at overcoming these problems by creating formulas subservient to their political order. While Ottoman attempts at centralization and modernization led to the creation of what Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) and Benedict Anderson (1991: 83-112) called "official nationalism," the British resorted to imperial methods of collaboration, alliance-building and divide-and-rule tactics. In addition, though Ottoman weakness was a major obstacle in the face of the success of official nationalism, the colonial, racist character of the Raj prevented even the introduction of an official nationalism. However, the modernizing nature of the Raj resulted in the evolution of an anti-colonial nationalism and, at a later stage, led to the formation of what John Breuilly (1982: 199-217) called "sub-nationalism in a colonial state."

This chapter and the following chapter analyze the introduction of the modern state along with the transformation of the old order in both cases. It also attempts to illuminate the emergence of nationalist projects within each of these processes. Thereafter, it investigates the success of Muslim nationalism both in the Ottoman

Empire and the Indian subcontinent among alternative nationalist projects. A century of reforms aimed at instilling loyalty among non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire ultimately led to their exclusion from the nationalist project and the dominance of Muslim nationalism. On the other hand, Indian Islam, the most hybrid and syncretic of all Islamic traditions, formed the basis of a state exclusively established for Muslims in the Indian subcontinent.

4.1 Evolution of the Ottoman Empire During the Nineteenth Century

The entire nineteenth century, defined by İlber Ortaylı (1999) as “the longest century of the empire” reflects the continuing attempts of the state to reform itself as well as the state-society relations. In this “Century of Ottoman Transformation” (Karpavich, 1972) the magnitude of the challenges posed both by the external enemies and also by the internal turn-overs compelled the state elite not only to reform the state but in a sense to “re-invent” it (Hanioglu, 2008: 41); a process that eventually paved the “road out of empire” (Barkey, 2008: 264-296).

Through these reforms, the three basic features of empires outlined in the previous chapter in order to help contrast empires with nation-states went through a radical transformation;

- 1) center-periphery distinction was undermined as attempts to centralize the entire empire was underway (with regard to the real and actual control imposed directly by the state without intermediaries).

- 2) uniformity was imposed in the administration of the empire as autonomous and distinctly treated communities (like millets, but also autonomous regions in the periphery) gave way to an understanding of universal and uniform citizenry.
- 3) diverse identities were melted (or grouped) if not necessarily undermined along the way by an over-arching common identity; a process of creating a nation with varying levels of common denominators; Ottoman, Muslim and Turk.

In this chapter, we will look at these transformations from the perspective of changes in state organization and state-society relations and how these changes initiated a process of transition from an empire towards a nation-state. This process included administrative homogenization, increase of direct control and elimination of intermediary power holders inevitably resulting in the need of a more egalitarian social system. This increased integration of state and society and the undermining of traditional power balances resulted with the search for a new structure and a political culture structure corresponding it (Karpas, 1972). The overall restructuring of the state-society relations necessitated a new social contract fundamentally different from the centuries old social system of the empire. Thus, these administrative reforms also brought the question of what Lewis has defined as the search for a “corporate political identity.” This search also brought drastic changes to the legitimation system of the state and the function of religious and ethno-linguistic identities.

What we witness throughout the nineteenth century is a transformation from an empire toward nation-ness. While empire as the political body that enables the separate coexistence of different communities was evolving toward disintegration, nation-ness emerged as a solution to thwart the dissolution of the state. Emergence of the question of political identity that would link the state with its subjects was both the symptom and the result of this transformation. As nation is a discursive construct, the nineteenth century also witnessed the rivalry between alternative forms of nationalisms. On the one hand, the rivalry was between an all-encompassing imperial nationalism (Ottomanism) and its more particular adversaries of ethnic and religious nationalisms (For the earliest analysis of this rivalry, see Akçura, 1904 [1977]). On the other hand, increasingly from the second half of the century, the content and meaning of the official imperial nationalism itself became an area of contestation. All alternative national projects coexisted and interacted with each other and fed each other as the success or advent of any national project provoked rival national projects. As these national projects evolved and competed with each other through the age of reform until the formation of a new state in 1923, it was the religious nationalism that appeared as the eventual victor. Thus, the story of this chapter is more about the creation, evolution and the ultimate victory of religious nationalism(s) in the empire. This, however, does not mean the victory of tradition (religion) over the modern forces (nation). As Findley (2010: 65) has pointed out, “religious differences had always existed, but the politicization of these differences was as modern as the politicization of ethnicity.”

4.1.1 The Empire at the Turn of Century⁸⁵

Traditional reading of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the Ottoman Empire in particular and the Islamic world in general as a continuous history of decline has been severely criticized by the more recent scholarship (see, Kireççi, 2007; Salzmänn, 1993; Barkey, 1994). It is argued that rather than being passive bystanders of the European-World history, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire were active, though very much weakened, participants of the world history in the making. The Islamic societies were also far from being stagnant, fatalist and passive.⁸⁶ Thus, despite the previous portrayal of a decaying society, current scholarship underlines the vitality of the state and society and their desire and ability to confront the challenges they have faced. Thereby, contrary to the previous reading of the reforms as western imposed, the indigenous urge for the reforms has been underlined.

Aside from acknowledging the reforming capacity of the state and society, another contention is on the nature and destiny of the reforms. Reading of the Ottoman century of reforms shaped by the ideological appeal of modernization in general and secularism in particular (Berkes, 1964) and then as a constant move toward modern Turkey is long abandoned. Similarly, the recent scholarship also questions the teleology of considering the reforms of late Ottoman history as a conscious prelude to the “emergence of modern Turkey” (a la Lewis). These evolutionary, modernist histories

85 Quite justifiably, the nineteenth century is the most studied period of the six century long Ottoman history and probably constitutes the strongest field of Ottoman historiography. There are plenty of excellent books that provide a detailed historical account of the century. In this brief historical sketch, I am mostly relying on the authoritative works of Hanioglu, 2008; Karpas, 1972 and Ortayli, 1999. Other works are also cited when necessary.

86 For a detailed analysis of a Middle Eastern city, on the eve of modernity, Abraham Marcus’s (1989) detailed study of Aleppo in the eighteenth century is illuminating and challenges the stagnant portrait of the Middle East.

suffer from an overdose of ideological teleology and an assumption of the superiority of modernist ideology. In contrast, the history of the nineteenth century is too complex to allow a linear story either from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey or from religious order to secularism. Even the supposedly most obvious of the evolutions, the one from an empire to a nation-state is not that straightforward as the imperial social and administrative structures often coexisted with the newly emerging national ideas and institutions. Therefore societal change should be understood as the response of state and society to multiple challenges brought by modernity and the advent of Western powers rather than been driven by an ideology of modernization (Hanioglu, 2008: 3). This would enable us to contextualize the change and also to explain the seemingly contradictory aspects of the change.

Another fallacy of the previous scholarship on the Ottoman reforms is the excessive emphasis put on the European impact (see particularly, Davison, 1963 and Davison, 1990). Obviously an important factor in the reform movement, the European impact served more as a catalyzer rather than a cause for reforms. It is true that the imminent European threat to the empire's survival stimulated the desire for reforms; however, the main urge for reforms comes from the internal dynamics (Karpas, 1972: 243). Moreover, the benevolent reading of European influence as guiding the Ottomans through the reforms (a la Davison) has been criticized as European intervention and meddling appears to be one of the fundamental problems the reformers have faced and eventually the main reason for the qualified failure of the reforms (Anscombe, 2014). Thus, "while the influence of Western ideas cannot be ignored, it has also been shown

clearly that these steps originated from within the empire and as such reflected the interests, demands and contradictions of indigenous groups” (Kasaba, 2008:4).

Ottoman urge for reform dates back to the seventeenth century, when Koci Bey in 1630 urged the Sultan to take measures in order to get the empire back to the golden days of Suleiman the Magnificent. However, the urge for reform became more apparent and urgent as the empire first lost its military superiority then subsequently became unable to cope with the rising military power of European empires; particularly the Russians and Austrians. Different dates have been provided as the turning point for the apprehension of the necessity of far reaching reforms. While most Middle Eastern experts mark 1798, the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon as the beginning of an era of modernization (Cleveland, 1994), the Ottomanists in general and the experts on Balkan and East European takes the date back, more plausibly, to the severe defeat of the Ottomans at the hand of Russians in 1774 (Hale, 2002; Anderson, 1966; Davison, 1990). It was after this defeat that state’s weakness and its vulnerability vis-à-vis its enemies became apparent.⁸⁷ 1789 is also considered as a turning point, not as the year of French Revolution, but as the year of the enthronement of the first self-consciously reformist sultan of the empire; Selim III (see Karpat, 1972; Findley, 1980; Findley, 2010).⁸⁸

⁸⁷ This date is also significant as the inculcation of the Ottoman Sultan for the first time as the protector of a Muslim group outside its domain, the Crimean Muslims, as a part of the peace agreement that ended the 1774 Ottoman Russian War. Similarly the Russians continuously used an over-stretched interpretation of this agreement in order to meddle in to the affairs of Ottoman Orthodox population (see Davison, 1976), thus severely contributing to the politicization of religious differences. At least one historian also dates the Treaty as the beginning of political Islam, or pan-Islam (see Landau, 1990), though this interpretation seems a little over stretched and anachronistic.

⁸⁸ Shaw and Shaw (1977) and Ortaylı (1999) takes 1808, the enthronement of Mahmud II as the beginning of a new era. All these are justifiable preferences and choosing one event and date over the others inevitably has an arbitrary aspect. I preferred 1789 and the enthronement of Selim III as the beginning of first attempts of state centralization, though resulted in a failure. Despite their shortcomings,

As Selim was enthroned, the empire was engaged in another losing war with Austria and Russia. War ended in 1792 and only Western intervention saved the empire from a more humiliating peace settlement with Russia. The need for reform was apparent and, as always, the initial locus of the reforms was addressing the military weakness of the empire. However, in order to improve the military power, the empire needed better finances and thus a military reform necessitated far reaching administrative transformations. “The twenty-odd papers on the question of reforms submitted to the Sultan at his own request stressed the need for civil reform, for economic recovery and for a comprehensive plan for reform to be reached by deliberation and universal consent” (Karpat, 1972: 252). Thus, it is apparent that the Ottoman state elite at the time was aware that the extent of military reform necessitated far reaching changes and the military reform could only be achieved if it was supplanted by an administrative restructuring of the system. Indeed this awareness resulted in the first attempt, though not very successful, of administrative reorganization program in 1795. As part of the military reform a new military unit was formed and this new army was labeled *Nizam-ı Cedid* (the New Order), hinting the anticipated extent of reforms.⁸⁹ What at the time was unanticipated by the reformers was the political and social consequences of these reforms. Despite the awareness that reforms had to exceed the military realm into the administrative realm, there was no awareness that these reforms would lead to an entirely new social order. Instead, the Selim’s reforms, despite not

and unlike the previous reformers whose emphasis was on the revival of the old golden days rather than creating an entirely new system, these reforms set the precedents for the subsequent reforms in enhancing state centralization and emerging of a modern state apparatus and bureaucracy, which in due time was accompanied by a novel ideology.

⁸⁹ This is significant, because all the previous reform movements of the eighteenth century, however important they may be, were addressing solely the military realm. This awareness that an entirely new system might be needed is what differentiates the Selim reforms from his predecessors.

being limited to military, were formulated within the mindset of the old order, thus Selim represented “between old and new” (Shaw, 1971). However, his failure also made it clear for the next generation of reformers that what needed was not only strengthening the Ottoman system but to transform it (Cleveland, 1994: 61).

Military reform needed better finances; however the state lacked the administrative capability to extract the necessary resources from its subjects. Through the past two centuries the Ottoman system was effectively and excessively decentralized. Particularly the long and exhaustive wars with the Russians and Austrians during the eighteenth century put the Ottoman finances in dire positions. The urgent solution to the financial necessities was the privatization of the land system and introduction of the life term tax farming. Although initially successful in increasing the revenues that were urgently needed in the course of the long eighteenth century wars, introduction of life term tax farming ruined the Ottoman finances in the long run. Moreover, it resulted in the emergence of a wealthy and powerful provincial group of notables, who were called *derebeys* or *ayans*, even in the central areas of the empire. As these local derebeys increased their power, the central control of the state over these territories declined (Barkey, 2008: 226-263). It was particularly the strength of these ayans that prevented the success of the 1795 administrative reform program of Selim III. While state’s authority was curbed by ayans in its central lands, in the far flung territories local dynasties increased their power to the level of being practically

autonomous. Indeed at the turn of the nineteenth century, the control of the Ottoman center was almost non-existing beyond the core provinces of Rumelia and Anatolia.⁹⁰

Thus at the turn of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the sultan was challenged on two grounds; territorially his control did not extend beyond the core, and within the core he was sharing the power with the local leaders. 1808 Sened-i Ittifak represents the bottom level of the strength of the sultan and the center with regard to the local power holders. Although saved the day for the new incumbent sultan, the deal was a proof of his powerlessness and his lack of control over his subjects. “As such, it accurately reflected the balance of power at the time. Mahmud II signed the document half-heartedly after his advisers admitted that it ‘violated his sovereignty, but could not be resisted’ under the circumstances” (Hanioglu, 2008: 58).⁹¹

4.1.2 Transformation of the Empire

From that point on a century long attempts of administrative reforms targeting centralization and the extension of state control both territorially-horizontally (by starting to assert state’s authority on the periphery as well) and vertically (by increasing state’s grip over the subject people). Throughout the time what constitutes the center has showed variance and the century witnessed a competition between the sultan (and court) and the sublime-port (bureaucracy) as the main center of power. Throughout the reign of

⁹⁰ Large parts of the empire such as North Africa, Syria, Egypt and Iraq all acquired a *de facto*, though temporary, autonomy while Arabia went under the control of the Wahhabis. Even in Rumelia, which is the core of the empire, the upheavals among the Kirjalis, and ayans like Pasvanoğlu and Tepedelenli Ali Pasa in Janina, weakened further the government's authority by forcing the army to fight these rather than the Christian rebels (Karpas, 1972: 249).

⁹¹ The original document does not exist. Once reasserted his power, Mahmud destroyed this “pernicious document” (menhus belge) (Ortaylı, 1999:36).

Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) the court managed to establish itself as the center of power. The modern bureaucracy which was formed by Mahmud II managed to exert its influence over the sultan during the interim Tanzimat period (1839-1876). Although the patterns of power sharing at the center have showed variance and the competition between the court and the Sublime Porte has never ceased (and indeed deeply affected the outcome of many political developments), the consistent pattern of the century was the increase of the power of the center at the expense of the periphery. In that regard, “there were important continuities across the major periods of the Tanzimat, Abdülhamid II’s reign, the Second Constitutional Period and the War for Liberation” (Kasaba, 2008:4).

However, this was no typical process of centralization that aims to increase the power of center vis-a-vis the periphery. Centralization in a classical imperial form meant the reorganization of power sharing between the center, periphery and intermediaries of power holders in favor of the central power. Thus centralization means providing a more efficient flow of resources from periphery toward the center and guaranteeing the flow of orders from center to the periphery. In a typical centralization, multiple deals are struck in order to maintain the vertical integration of power from the periphery toward the center through intermediary power holders (Barkey, 2008:264). However, the nineteenth century Ottoman centralization aimed to eliminate these intermediaries. “To the far-sighted contemporaries it was clear that... a loosely bound association of disparate, semi-independent territories could not expect to survive long in the Napoleonic era.” In order to survive the empire needed to establish a new balance between center and periphery. However, building such a new balance was “so closely

bound up with the structural characteristics of the state that traditional measures of reform were no longer sufficient. To survive, the empire's leaders had to do more than change the state; they had to reinvent it." (Hanioglu, 2008: 40-41).

It was also untypical because it was a process of reform which led to the creation of modern forms of power that enabled unprecedented level of control over the subject people. The nineteenth century reforms also correspond to the transformation of sovereignty from a personal-judicial level to a deeper, more widespread and more penetrating level, defined as "governmentality" by Michel Foucault. Thus nineteenth century centralization attempts mean the introduction of modern government. This led to far reaching changes in the formation of state and the nature of state-society relations such as the formation of a bureaucratic arm, introduction of state sponsored education institutions, increased communication between the state and its subjects as well as increased interaction within the society. Such measures that enabled states unprecedented levels of power to control and penetrate into the society also transformed the societal relations in general and inter communal relations in particular. Evolution of the modern forms of power also means the disruption of the delicate balance of empires which rested on the passivity of most of the society and active involvement and support of the limited segments of the society (intermediaries of power), in favor of an increased identification between the ruler (which impersonalized and took the shape of modern state) and its subjects (which transformed to a citizen), and the active participation of the entire society in support of the sovereign (state). As this delicate balance of empires was broken, new forms of engagement between the ruler and the society were developed, which have changed the traditional roles of the ruler and the subject and have brought

new responsibilities and expectations on both sides. This also means that the tacit contract between the ruler and the subjects in the traditional polities based on the compliance of the former and the limited involvement of the latter has changed. Such a change also meant a total transformation of the state organization and its relation with the society. Indeed a new form of state qualitatively different from the traditional empire was being formed. Key features of traditional empire discussed in the previous chapter, such as indirect rule through intermediaries of power holders and plurality of political and administrative arrangements were unacceptable in this new form of state. Elimination of intermediaries and uniformization of administration also targeted the hierarchical and compartmentalized nature of society. All these transformations resulted with the necessity of a new social contract which involves a new arrangement (or a contract) of the roles; duties and obligations of the ruler and the subject. Declaration of the Tanzimat Edict at the end of Mahmud II's reign in 1839 points to the first attempt of these searches for a new contract; a search which continued throughout the century and found its most typical form among the constitutionalist movements. Thus, this long century of centralization (read also as the formation of modern state) is accompanied with new arrangements of state-society relations. Evolution of empire toward nationness and the emergence of nationalism and national questions should be understood in this context of transformation. What follows is an account of major reform policies which transformed the empire toward a modern state, and on the way of this transformation we will also witness different attempts of defining a new social order.

4.1.3 Policies of Centralization

The centralization policy had administrative, economic and military dimensions. It was targeting the autonomous power holders in order to bolster the authority and control of the center. Logically, the centralization policy started in the Ottoman heartlands in which the state followed a combined approach of punishment and reward toward the notables. The ones who accepted and yielded to the power of a more assertive center managed to protect their economic power, while those unable or unwilling to adapt to the new realities disappeared. By 1820, the center had asserted its control over all Anatolia and Eastern Rumelia. Finally in 1822, the major remaining power holder at the Balkans, Ali Pasha of Yania, was eliminated. Having achieved certain control of his heartland, Mahmud finally moved on to deal with the military dimension of the reforms.

The major moment of the Ottoman reforms was the abolishment of Janissary units in 1826. With the elimination of an important power center and the creation of a new army loyal to himself, the sultan was finally capable of asserting his power.⁹² The same year the sipahi units were also abolished and a new salaried cavalry was formed. As a related development, timar system was abolished in 1831. The abolishment of timars was partly related to the center's increasing control of land, but it also led to the elimination of the provincial armies that had threatened the center in the past. As a result of these changes, "the Ottoman state now possessed a single military organization under unified command. This was a major accomplishment in centralization" (Hanioglu, 2008: 59). With these military reforms, for the first time in its history, the Ottomans met the

⁹² It also destroyed the entire balance of power within the Ottoman political system. Ulama who were the traditional allies of the janissaries also lost power and were effectively removed from the power struggles (Hanioglu, 2008: 59).

famous Weberian criterion of a modern state: an institution which claims legitimate monopoly of violence in a given territory.

As the central authority established in the heartlands of the empire, the military re-organization enabled the state to take far more steps to extend its control over the periphery. Administrative reorganization and the creation of a modern bureaucracy were the next steps of centralization. While a modern government was formed in the center, a bureaucratic army was gradually established in order to take the periphery under the direct control of the central government. At the center, the ministerial system was transformed as the office of The Grand Vizierate evolved and divided into different ministries, such as Ministries of Civil Affairs (later became the Ministry of Interior in 1837), and Foreign Affairs, that undertook different functions of state administration. In 1833, *Tercüme Odası*, was founded as a result of increased relations with Europe and the replacement of Greek Dragomans with Muslims. This chamber would serve as the training ground for a new generation of Ottoman diplomats as well as a new intelligentsia. As part of ministerial reforms, certain functions were assigned to new councils, - some of which later became ministries. For instance, the courts, which had been under the *Kadıasker* now fell under the jurisdiction of the *Şeyhülislam*. The establishment of a Ministers' Council (*Meclis-i Vükela*), along with the creation of a Military Council and a Judiciary Council, was followed by the establishment of committees for public works (*nafia*), agriculture, trade and industry (Karpas, 1972: 255).

While central government was being re-organized, a professional bureaucracy was gradually created in order to keep the provinces under tight control of the center. Tax farmers were removed by centrally appointed officials. Thus local officials were

brought under increased control of the center. Finally “in 1838 the state allocated cash salaries to all officials; henceforth, all other sources of income, including the collection of transaction fees, were shut down. This was not only a major step toward creating a centralized, monetary economy; but it also bolstered the status and image of officialdom under direct control of the center” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 69-70). The Sublime Porte with barely seventy three people in the sixteenth century first evolved into a reformist bureaucratic elite, and ultimately into an army of civil bureaucrats. Through the process the number of personnel employed by Ottoman bureaucracy increased from a mediocre 1000-1500 at the end of the eighteenth century to numbering fifty thousand to one hundred thousand people from 1876 to 1909 (Findley, 1980).

It was this bureaucratic army that tried to bring the periphery under the direct control of the center, as the loyal bureaucrats representing the center replaced the autonomous intermediaries of power. Tanzimat bureaucrats, who were the results of Mahmud’s administrative reforms, continued his reforms, and the drive for further centralization remained the major theme for the rest of the century. “Having achieved a reasonable degree of centralization in the heart lands of the empire, the Tanzimat statesmen set their sights on reforming provincial government. Their major project was to make local administration uniform throughout the empire.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 86). For that end, Law of Vilayets (1864) modeled on the French administrative system was introduced and all provinces were placed under the new regime (Karpas, 1972: 259).

As the main dimension of the creation of a bureaucratic arm for the center was to increase control over the periphery, the initial step for this control was “to amass accurate information about the population of the empire.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 61). The

first empire wide census was done in 1831 with the aim of “securing information on various forms of property and on the number of people in the empire in order to levy taxes and draft men into the army. This was in fact a prelude to general conscription.” (Karpas, 1972: 257).⁹³ Another direction of the flow of information was from the center to the periphery, and in the same year the publication of the first official Ottoman newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events) was started. As an instrument to keep the provincial administrators informed of the reform programs, it became required reading for all civil servants (Cleveland, 1994: 77)⁹⁴

Increased communication constituted an important aspect of the efforts to bind the empire more tightly together. This started with an extensive reform of the Ottoman postal service as of 1825. Building of new roads also appeared high on the agenda of public development. These attempts of increased communication and transportation continued throughout the century with the introduction of telegraph (1855-64), and railways (1866), chiefly as the result of the government's efforts to communicate with its field representatives and rapidly transport its troops. Particularly the introduction of telegraph radically changed the nature of the relation between the center and provincial administrators as the central administration acquired the means of instant communication with its representatives in the provinces. In 1871, the government issued

93 The frequency and reliability of the censuses continued to increase throughout the century. Abdülhamid II, the main centralizing figure of the century, was particularly keen on sustaining the flow of information from the periphery towards the center through repeated censuses. As it will be seen in the next chapter, British administration in India also gave high importance to repeated and extensive censuses as a way of increasing their control over the territory and the people of India.

94 With the establishment of a modern press, especially of *Ceride-i Havadis* and of *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (1860), the full impact of modern communications began to be felt. (Karpas, 1972: 261) While *Takvim-i vekayi* was an official gazette aiming to disseminate the government's views, these two journals prepared the ground of the emergence of a new intelligentsia and created venues for public debates on political and economic problems. Moreover, these journals also contributed to the simplification of written language, thus bridged the gap between the elite and ordinary people (Sadoğlu, 2010: 81-86).

a new set of provincial regulations which enhanced the powers of the governor, as representative of the central government, and applied equally to all the provinces of the empire. The formation of a uniform provincial bureaucracy under direct control of central administration through novel means of communication created an entirely different type of provincial ruler. Sir Charles Eliot, one of the contemporaries of this transformation, perceptively explains the change: Traditional (pre-modern) Vali “had a proprietor’s interest in his estate and was anxious to promote local interests and send as little money to Constantinople as possible. He was a centrifugal force and in his way promoted independence, whereas modern Vali entirely centripetal” (Poulton, 1997: 60).

As a result of these reforms, modern government became not only more systematized and standardized but also its grasp over the society increased. “The apparatus of government acquired more information on its subjects, became more visible, and penetrated more deeply into the fabric of daily life throughout the empire.” But the strengthening of the state rested on increased burdens on people which led to social discontent (Hanioğlu, 2010: 70).⁹⁵ Moreover the extension and standardization of administration made the preservation of local traditions undesirable, which in the classical period had not only been tolerated but encouraged. This contributed to increased unrest in the periphery (Hanioğlu, 2008: 88). As the increase of government

95 The most typical of increased burden is more taxation and conscription. But there are other ways in which people were forced to pay the burden of this modernization. For instance, the extension of road system was an important part of the reforms. Men from each region where new roads were built had a compulsory service of twenty days in every five year working for the road construction. (Hakkı, 1309: 89-91, quoted in Ortaylı, 1999:151).

control extended spatially towards the periphery and vertically into the daily lives of people, an inevitable resistance ensued.⁹⁶

In order to balance such discontent and mobilize people in favor of the reforms, the state introduced two main policies; broadening the participation of people in governance, and the introduction and spread of modern education. Mahmud II formed a consultative council very much similar to those consultative organs formed in other modernizing empires. The more enduring and important form of participation however took in local administration as in 1845 a special council of local notables were formed in order to promote reforms, but also to provide some sort of representation for this powerful group at the time of extensive state centralization (Karpas, 1972: 260). Non-Muslims were also included in these local councils, and as such this can also be seen as another attempt to further incorporate them into state structure. However it was preconditioned that non-Muslims would not constitute the majority even if they were the majority of the population of the respective region. Moreover, they were present in these councils as representatives of their millets-communities, thus their existence in these local councils buttressed communalism rather than undermining it. As such, these councils reflect the traditional notion of religiously compartmentalized society. Formation of such councils points both to the increased legitimacy problems and the need of support for the reforms as well as to the changing nature of state-society relations.

In order to increase the support of people in favor of reforms, another instrument the state resorted was education. But in order to achieve this end, a standardized and

96 For a very detailed analysis of how formation of modern forms of government initiated a backlash from the society see Khaled Fahmy's (1997) seminal work on Ottoman Egypt under the rapid modernization of Mehmed Ali.

centralized schooling system was necessary. As in all pre-modern polities, in the Ottoman Empire schooling was primarily a communal concern. Moreover, as already pointed in the previous chapter, due to increased autonomy and high levels of communal organization, each millet had their own autonomous schooling system. In order to centralize and standardize the education system, a Council of Education was founded in 1845 followed by a Ministry of Education in 1867. However, the extent of education reforms and their success in instilling loyalty to the state was quite limited. The initial scope of education reforms in the Mahmud II era targeted the training of new personnel for the ever expanding bureaucracy, while the Tanzimat rulers' aim of spreading education in order to promulgate the Tanzimat ideology found very limited grounds for implementation. As will be discussed later, the major success in making use of modern and standardized education in order to bolster state ideology was achieved during the reign of Abdülhamid.

4.2 National Question in the Context of Modern State Formation

Local resistances, defiant intermediary power holders unwilling to submit to the central authority, incompetent officials, and a traditional society who want to preserve its traditional organization were all centrifugal forces that resisted to the centralization attempts of the state. Increased use of education and local participation were only partially successful in overcoming these challenges. However, the most dangerous of all the centrifugal forces for the empire was the newly emerging ideology of nationalism. This was an entirely new challenge for the state.

Centralization policies also required a new meaning in the age of nationalism. As it had been argued, the extent of centralization policies also posed a fundamental challenge to the nature of the empire. It is hard to sustain the mosaic character of empires at the time of administrative unification. Empire as the political body that enabled the separate coexistence of different communities was evolving toward disintegration, yet the centralization and administrative unification which were employed as the remedies to stop disintegration of the empire also started to transform the empire toward nation-ness. Thus one can say that nationalism in the context of modernization becomes a double-edged sword. As a modern political ideology it is used both by the centralizing state administration and by the peripheral opposition toward this modernizing state.⁹⁷

There is a widely shared agreement among the scholars that nationalism as an ideology emerged in relation to the formation of modern centralized state. Yet, there is a point of disagreement on which of these two rival forms of nationalism emerged first. Different scholars discussing different cases provide contradictory narratives. The problem is partly related to the fact that nationalism emerges and develops within phases. As Hroch's (2000) seminal study on nationalism in East Europe point, the emergence of the national idea and its dissemination, and the mobilization of large

⁹⁷ In his memoirs Rıza Nur clearly reveals the double-edged nature of nationalism in an imperial political setting: "We saw that a Circassian club had opened in our neighborhood. Then an Albanian association was formed. Soon after, an Arab philanthropic society appeared! ... Circassians wanted their freedom, as did the Albanians. The members of all these clubs were graduates of our own schools.... Hence the Bulgarian...Albanian... Arab independence movements were all manned by those reared and educated in our country, our schools ... I am dying for the Turkish cause, but I am carrying this cause like a secret bowl in me. I do not tell about it to anyone. For I know that if we do that, our action will legitimate the explication of the inner thoughts of the others. And that would mean the fragmentation, the extinction of the empire." (quoted in Göçek, 2002:15. Thanks to Yavuz Tüyoğlu for bringing this quotation to my attention).

segments of the society for this ideal take place in at least three distinguishable phases. Thus as it is impossible to point out a clear date for the emergence of any national idea and nationalist movement, it is almost impossible for most cases to clarify whether the national idea first emerged from the ranks of centralizing state (as Hobsbawm, Giddens and Mann argued) or, on the contrary emerged as a form of resistance against the ever more centralizing and intrusive state (as Gellner, Breuilly and Anderson argued). (see, Day and Thompson: 2004: 54-59). Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, it should suffice to mention that these two rival forms of nationalisms have emerged and evolved in reaction to each other.

4.2.1 Nationalism and Empires (Official Nationalism and Its Rivals)

Nationality problem in the empires in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular should also be considered from two different angles; one from the state's desire to promote its own version of nationalism (official nationalism) and the other from the rival forms of nationalisms emanating from the peripheries and often resulting in secessionist movements. It needs to be re-emphasized that neither other empires nor the Ottoman Empire in its classical form were multi-national states. Defining an empire as multi-national is anachronistic. Correct label would be "non-national" or "a-national" as the classical empire belongs to an age before nationalism. The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of nationalism in two different and often rival forms; one coming from the state and aiming to transform its subjects into co-nationals and the other coming from people (and in any case this is a very limited segment of the people) aiming to create a state for the particular people conceived as a nation. Thus throughout

the nineteenth century subjects of the empires started increasingly to imagine themselves as members of a particular nation, while at the same time imperial institutions promoted an alternative national identity that would cover the entire empire. This second form of nationalism which aims to transform the dynastic realm into one concept of nationhood is defined as “official nationalism” (Anderson, 1991: 83-112; Seton-Watson, 1977). In the context of modern state formation, official nationalism aims to fully mobilize the energies of society in the service of the modern state without undermining the dynastic and patrimonial principles that formed the basis of their political legitimacy (Roshwald, 2001: 8).

Thus, formation of official nationalism within the empires should be understood in the context of modern state formation and the age of nationalism. All empires of the nineteenth century, and indeed the eighteenth century in the case of Russian and Habsburgs, were going through a process of administrative centralization. This process transformed the traditional organization of imperial societies that were based on conglomeration of territories. Elimination of intermediaries and direct control of state over its subjects brought certain administrative homogenization that inevitably brought a cultural homogenization. However, Anderson rightly warns us that policies of centralization should not be confused with the policies of promoting an official nationalism. At least until the mid-nineteenth century, none of these centralization processes were based on an intention of nationalization. The clearest case is Habsburgs who turned to the uniform use of German instead of Latin during the late eighteenth century. As Anderson quotes from Jazsi, “the Habsburgs were *not* consciously and consequentially Germanizing power...There were *Habsburgs who didn't even speak*

German. Their measures were dictated by the intent of unification and universalism of their empire.” (Anderson, 1991: 84). However as nationalism found an audience among the minorities of these empires (Ruritarians) the empires themselves (Megalomanians)⁹⁸ undertook a conscious project of nation-building. This attempt of transforming all the subjects of the empire into an all-inclusive imperial national identity is called official nationalism. The aim is to compete with the nation-building processes of Western Europe and combine the nationalization with retention of dynastic power. Thus, according to Anderson (1991: 86), it developed *after* and *in reaction* to the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since 1820s.

Although making the important distinction between the centralization policies which were not consciously nationalizing and the later conscious policy of building an official nationalism, Anderson however overlooks the central role of this prior centralization for the emergence of official nationalism. Even if one accepts that official nationalism is not a direct outcome of centralization policies, it should also be added that official nationalism would have never come to the table without prior centralization. As it was argued above, the centralization policies that empires in continental Europe followed at least since the mid-eighteenth century were qualitatively different from the traditional centralization of imperial systems. In many ways these policies followed the French and English centralization attempts that preceded them by two centuries. The previous centralization of France and England was crucial for the emergence of a national identity through a more organic and slow process.⁹⁹ However as Jazsi (1961:

⁹⁸ For the parable of Ruritarians and Megalomanians, see Gellner (1983).

⁹⁹ Though not necessarily more benign. For the brutality of nation-building in the Western Europe, see Weber (1976).

32) points, this two centuries time lapse changed the nature and outcome of centralization policies followed by the empires as unlike their West European counterparts, the imperial monarchies in the East of Europe undertook these centralization policies at an age of nationalism. Thus centralization in these empires took place in a multi-nationalizing¹⁰⁰ (the term is no more anachronistic!) social setting. Although the resistances of the peripheral power centers to the centralization policies in European empires are similar to the ones in Western Europe, in the case of empires these resistances quickly acquired a nationalist cloak.

Thus, centralization of empires and nationalism are linked to each other in two different ways. First through administrative uniformity, centralization creates a threat for the peripheral power centers and for the communal autonomies and accelerates their adaption of nationalism. Second, centralization creates a more intrusive state which needs additional means of legitimation founded in the creation of official nationalism. Thus official nationalism becomes a requirement both to counter the centrifugal forces of peripheral nationalism and to mobilize the people in favor of the intrusive modern state. Here the contrast with the imperial model based on the participation of limited segments of the society is too evident and puts a clear distinction between traditional empire and modern imperial nationalism.

¹⁰⁰ I preferred multi-nationalizing rather than multi-national in order to highlight the processual aspect of the period. Although empires were not multi-national, they were becoming so with the rising tide of nationalisms.

4.2.2 Nationalism and the Ottomans

Throughout the nineteenth century nationalism was a destabilizing power for the entire Europe. As Napoleon's armies marched through Europe singing *Marseillaise*, they also spread this new ideology to the territories ruled by the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, local uprisings, traditionally a result of maladministration or excessive taxation, now took a nationalist color. With the 1848 revolts, nationalism became the primary threat for the multi-ethnic empires of Habsburgs and Romanovs. Yet the problem was even graver in the Ottoman context "because of the weakness of central control, the severity of socioeconomic problems, and the structural reality of an empire dominated by Muslims but well-nigh encircled by Christian powers" (Hanioglu, 2008: 115).

Since nationalism was an ideology spreading from Europe, it is not surprising that the peoples who had the most connection with the European neighbors of the Empire, the Serbs and Greeks, were the first to be influenced from this new ideology. As certain Serbs and Greeks fell into the appeal of nationalism, religion played a pivotal role in both cases, albeit in completely different manners. The relation between the religious identities and the emergence of nationalism is discussed at the end of this chapter. However, the level of nationalist consciousness in these revolts should not be exaggerated. Partly due to European intervention, these "local uprisings, ostensibly indistinguishable from their numerous historical antecedents, took on a deeper significance at the age of nationalism" (Hanioglu, 2008:51). However, partly due to the slow but steady spread of nationalist consciousness and more importantly partly due to the European desire to provoke potential conflicts and use them as a pretext for intervention, nationalism became the dominant threat for the integrity of the empire

throughout the nineteenth century. Yet, this is only one side of the emergence of nationalism; the one coming from the periphery. The center also played its due share in the evolution of empire toward nation-ness.

The unprecedented transformation of the social and political system of the empire described above coupled with the centrifugal challenge of nationalism made it mandatory for the reformers (center) to re-establish the system. Thus, the Ottoman social fabric which was classically divided on two axis; a horizontal axe dividing the society into two social classes of a ruling-elite and reaya, and a vertical axe dividing the society into separate and hierarchical existences of monotheistic religions had to be re-invented on more egalitarian and uniform manners. In fact the classical social organization was already obsolete: On the one hand Christian supremacy in commerce and education challenged the established hierarchies (Issawi, 1982), on the other hand due to difficulties of sustaining mosaic nature of society at a time of administrative unification, separate coexistence started to disintegrate. When Mahmud II declared that; “From now on I do not wish to recognize Muslims outside the mosque, Christians outside the church, or Jews outside the synagogue” (quoted in Hanioglu, 2008: 74), he was hinting for the need of a new social organization. This search for a new social contract materialized for the first time in the declaration of Tanzimat in 1839.¹⁰¹

This new social contract is based on the prioritization of state and direct allegiance to the state instead of intermediaries; religious or otherwise. Thus it can be

¹⁰¹ Tanzimat Degree of 1839, was in reality instrumental chiefly in accelerating the centralization and bureaucratization of the Ottoman empire... the edict merely expanded upon and crystallized ideas and policies developed and implemented in the past (Karpas, 1972: 258). But it also corresponds to the new ideological foundation of the reformed state-society relations. The reformers of the state, who by now were aware that these reforms also meant a complete transformation of the state structure and thus necessitated a new social contract between the state and society, formulated the decree as a first attempt of providing an ideological base for the new state-society relations.

considered as the first significant attempt in the formulation of an Ottoman nationhood that would include all subjects of the empire. As such it can be understood as the extension of Peter Sugar's (1977: 34-43) category of "professional Ottomans" to include the rest of the society as well. In that sense Tanzimat is the first step of a series of attempts to remove both the horizontal and the vertical axes that divided the society and to submerge these categories under the banner of the newly forming Ottoman nation.¹⁰² "As such the edict was a significant first step toward the transformation of hitherto Muslim, Christian, and Jewish subjects into *Ottomans*" (Hanioglu, 2008: 74).

Formation of the Ottoman nation is well reflected in the change of legal categories. A new legal category of *ecnebi* (foreigner) was introduced in order to refer to all foreign nationals regardless of religious affiliation. As Anderson (1991: 6) mentions unlike the universalist aspirations of empires and world religious systems, a significant aspect of nations (both as legal and discursive categories) is their "limited" ness.¹⁰³ Thus, defining the foreign is essential for the construction of national and *ecnebi* defines the limits (and the "other") of Ottoman nationality. This was complemented with the introduction of Ottoman as a legal term "to replace the old distinction between Muslims and dhimmis. Finally, the important designation of dhimmi was replaced by "non-Muslim Ottoman." The Ottoman Law of Nationality of 1869 formalized these concepts." (Hanioglu, 2008: 74).

¹⁰² Contrary to the common assumption, Tanzimat Edict does not clearly refer to equality, but it promises the universal and equal application of the new laws. Thus it reveals a desire for establishing a single legal system which was already hinted by Mahmud's above statement (Hanioglu, 2008: 73-74). The equality of non-Muslims and Muslims that was implied in the Tanzimat Edict was the main theme of Islahat Edict declared in 1856. The process towards the emergence of a single legal system also means that administrative homogenization is coupled with legal homogenization.

¹⁰³ It is this universalisms of the empires that enables-pushes them to tolerate diversity. In contrast the limited nature of nations and nation-states provides the necessary condition for homogenization.

Throughout the century, efforts to create a modern state have continued and evolved hand in hand with related attempts of creating a new social contract and finding a new social balance. Thus administrative, economic and military developments and a search for a corporate political identity suitable for the new realities on ground have continued in a dialectic relation to each other. Put in different words, as the modern Ottoman state was being formed, qualitatively different from the pre-modern imperial structure of loosely connected territories and conglomeration of peoples, the inevitable result of the process was the evolution of a modern political ideology: Ottomanism. “The development of a distinct Ottoman identity was actively supported and cultivated by the Ottoman state both as a part of these reforms and as a way of strengthening them.” (Kasaba, 2006: 200).

Thus, the promotion of this national identity in the Ottoman Empire, like in other empires, has two dimensions; first a reaction toward peripheral nationalism and second a consequence of centralization and modern state formation. Based on Anderson’s above argument, it is possible to claim that the project of building an Ottoman nationality was partly a reaction to the nationalist uprisings of Greeks and Serbians. Particularly in their attempt to deal with the Greek Revolution which continued for nine years, the Ottomans themselves were influenced by the language and vocabulary used by the rebels (see Erdem, 2005). Through the experience of Greek Revolt, Ottoman administrators realized that nationalism was a potent force to fight against, usually by adoption of the same tools used by their opponents (Erdem, 2005: 81).¹⁰⁴ Yet, official nationalism in

104 Erdem (2005: 82) also quotes Mustafa Reshid Pasha defining Ottoman Empire as Turkistan right after the Greek independence. Yet this singular example should not be exaggerated since multiple examples prove that Ottoman administrators particularly when confronted with a nationalist uprising avoided the

general and Ottomanism in particular, was not only a reaction to the secessionist nationalisms but it was also deemed a necessary consequence of social and political reformations. However, as we will see below, these attempts for the evolution of an all-inclusive Ottoman identity creates a hitherto nonexistent problem of the relationship between this larger identity and sub categories of identities, as well as the relationship between sub categories.

4.2.3 Diversity: From Being an Asset to Being a Problem

With the idea of Ottomanism we can start talking about a nation project. As the evolution towards nationalization was primarily a result of the transformation of the definitive aspects of an empire toward the definitive aspects of a nation-state, the process is equally reflected in the changing nature of state-society relations and more particularly on state's approach toward diversity.

In this process of nationalization, the state was transforming itself from the previous imperial structure, which was based on a conglomeration of territories connected to the center in varying levels and ruled through intermediaries, toward a more centralized system in which the center eliminated intermediary levels of power holders. As such the previous imperial model which enabled various kinds of rules and regulations evolved toward more uniform rules and regulations. As the loosely held territories and subjects were tightened up under the direct control of the modern state, the imperial society which was based on a hierarchical and cosmopolitan nature started to evolve toward a more egalitarian and uniform social relations. As it was discussed in

usage of national vocabulary either due to the existence of traditional mindset or due to the practical considerations. See Davison (1977).

the previous chapter, as the state manages to penetrate deeper into the society, the sustaining of the acceptance of diversity becomes more and more difficult (Lieven, 2007; Laitin, 2009). Establishment of direct state control over the subjects leads to administrative homogenization which is also coupled with a certain degree of legal homogenization. Maintenance of social and cultural plurality in the face of increasing state interference and administrative homogenization is a challenge that all modern states are facing (see Young, 1976 and chp.3 of this dissertation). Ottoman state was no exception to this.

As the Ottoman Empire evolves toward nation-ness, the most explicit manifestation of this transformation can best be observed with regard to the attitude toward diversity. As Barkey (2008) and Rodrigue (1995) points, diversity was not only tolerated but also praised in the classical period which represents an imperial society. Most typical example of this attitude is the invitation of Jews from Spain to the Ottomans in 1492 with the hope that these Sephardic Jews would help to advance the trade of the Empire. It was believed that the existence of diverse communities did not detract from the empire, but contributed to its human resource. Compare this with Cevdet Pasha's, a leading Ottoman statesman and scholar of the Tanzimat era, complaint on the diversity of empire:

The lands of exalted state (of the Ottomans) do not resemble the lands of any other state. In its every corner, you can find unique conditions. No province resembles another province; nor does any given part of a province resemble another part of the same province. Therefore it is impossible for a method of administration that might be conceived by the state to be applied equally and uniformly everywhere (Quoted in Kasaba, 2006: 203).

However, this was not regarded as a source of weakness in the classical period. Indeed, the strength of the Ottoman Empire depended not on the consistency of its practices and the uniform allegiance of its subjects, but on the fluidity, flexibility, and ambiguity that were hallmarks of many of its central practices (Kasaba, 2003). Classical empire lacked any sense of a uniform identity, or a uniform system of rule, or even a uniform system of education. Introduction of all these homogenizing tendencies clashed with the previous social and political categories, and in the nineteenth century these clashes had the potential to fire up to nationalist secessionism.

In the previous chapter we have also seen that the Ottoman Empire was exceptionally successful in managing its religious diversity through millet system. However, in their desire to build an Ottoman nation, the Tanzimat statesmen were locked in the paradox of millets. The creation of an all-encompassing Ottoman nationality could only be built if the millet barriers were broken down. Thus following the Islahat Edict of 1856, they urged on a reform of the millet system that eventually undermined the power of clergy as the leaders of different millets. “With the Islahat Edict millets had become more of a purely religious organizations rather than dealing with all the aspects of the relation between the individual and the state.” (Poulton, 1997: 52). In doing so however the Ottomans weakened their traditional allies. The patriarches were allies of the Ottoman *Empire* but they were not and could not be the allies of Ottomanism. They were targets of this transformation just like other intermediary power holders; such as ayans. “Even giving fixed salaries to Christian clergy was proposed which would transform them to state officials rather than community representatives.” (Poulton, 1997: 52). This is similar to the bureaucratization of provincial administration

through administrative homogenization. Thus while elimination of administrative intermediaries and their replacement by the central bureaucracy was successful,¹⁰⁵ the same process was unfeasible and destructive when extended to religious intermediaries.

Diversity which marked the empire and which was seen as an asset turned into a liability in the context of nineteenth century reformation. As such the introduction of some sort of uniformity throughout the empire meant the evolution of empire toward a more national social organization. The process of nationalization was meant to overcome this diversity in time as the society would become more homogenous. Homogenization of this troublesome diversity was, *inter alia*, the story of transition from an empire to a nation-state.

The “transition toward a modern imperial model infused with national imagery and identity” was a common feature of all modernizing empires (Barkey, 2008: 292) and historical and political trajectory of Ottomanism would be better understood if it is contextualized on the nationalism problem of the nineteenth century empires. It is important to evaluate the official nationalisms of these empires together as the nationalist movements, both the separatist ones and the official ones, were influenced deeply by the movements across the borders (Roshwald, 2001).

¹⁰⁵ We have already mentioned that centralization and bureaucratization of the state administration were particularly important in that aspect. Transformation of Vali from a provincial intermediary toward a state official reflects the way state dealt with administrative intermediaries.

4.2.4 Official Nationalism and Diversity: Ottomanism in Between Habsburg and Romanov Options

Anderson argues that official nationalism was a universal phenomenon common to all empires of the nineteenth century. Thus he argues that this attempt to unite the dynastic realms into some sort of a nation-state was in no way unique to the land based universal empires and can be traced among the British and French colonial empires. This assertion should be taken with a grain of salt. As it was previously discussed in this dissertation, the British colonial state's policies in India do not entirely prove Anderson's assertion (see chapter 5). As Anderson himself also concedes, there are certain differences between universal land based empires and the sea based colonial empires in the implementation and possible results of official nationalism (1991: 83-112) . As it was discussed in the previous chapter the difference comes from their diverse ways of managing plurality and different patterns of tolerance, inclusion and accommodation. The logic of official nationalism, to the extent that it was applied, in the colonial cases was self-contradictory and often a lip service was paid to the idea of official nationalism, while the colonial policies of subjugation and discrimination remained in practice.

Moreover, even if we limit our focus to land based universal empires, it would be misleading to assume, as Anderson seems to do, a uniform pattern since there are important variations among the universal land empires with regard to the ways official nationalisms are formed. The two most important land based empires of the nineteenth century that of the Habsburgs and that of the Romanovs followed different strategies with regard to forming an official nationalism and can be considered to form two

different ideal types. While the Habsburg model is based on a more federalist understanding, the Romanov model is based on excessive centralization. The difference between these two models is not trivial as the Habsburg model in its extreme form would mean a confederation of modern nation-states, while the Romanov model in its extreme would cease to have any attribute of an empire and would take the form of a nation-state. The Habsburgs attempted to maintain the plural identities of their empire and offered Habsburg identity as an umbrella concept. This necessitated a more federalist organization of state structure and conceding more autonomy to local groups in return for their subjugation to the imperial identity. Thus they did not attempt to erase sub identities but tried to offer the Habsburg identity (framework) as the over-arching ideology of a multi-national state. The extreme result of these policies was the *Ausgleich* (compromise) in 1867 which transformed the empire into a dual monarchy.¹⁰⁶ This being unable to solve the problems, toward the end of the empire, proposals for a triple monarchy also came into table which would consider Germans, Magyar and Slavs as the three constituting nations of the imperial identity. On the other hand, the Russians followed a vigorous policy of centralization and assimilation. They used Orthodoxy and Russification as the means of creating an official nationalism. Their turn toward nation-ness is more complete and radical compared with the Habsburg model which aimed to

106 Yet as late as 1907, Otto Bauer, Austrian social democrat, would warn that this dual monarchy was an extreme compromise that threatened the survival of the empire intact and the empire should be once again transformed into one realm (Reich). He warned the Habsburgs not to follow the fate of House of Bernadottes, who until 1905 was ruling over Sweden and Norway in a similar fashion of dual monarchy. That year, Bernadottes had to yield to Norwegian nationalist demands for holding a referendum in Norway for independence in which only 184 people voted for the continuation of dual monarchy. Fearing that *Ausgleich* would result in an independent Hungary, Bauer searched for a formula that would allow the nationalities to survive under the imperial umbrella. His proposition is forming a federative yet united state, in the line of the United States of America. It is certainly not a coincidence that around the same time Ziya Gökalp would also propose the Ottoman Empire to re-organize itself imitating the United States of America.

preserve imperial plurality in a federal-national system. Anderson's (1991: 86) famous assertion of "stretching the tight body of the nation to empire" fits more perfectly to the Romanov case.¹⁰⁷

The Ottomans followed neither way consistently and vacillated between the Habsburg model of federal plurality and the Romanov model of centralization and assimilation. This vacillation is most evident in their approach to millet system which simultaneously followed the contradictory policies of undermining millet boundaries in order to promote a sense of unity across the multi-faith society and policies of promoting and safeguarding the privileges and group specific rights of non-Muslim communities. Understandably, the peripheral powers opted for a more plural form of Ottomanism a la Habsburg while the central bureaucracy and particularly the Turkish element within the army inclined toward a more centralized system. The Bulgarian demands that the Ottoman sultan should be declared the Bulgarian Czar certainly imitates the *Ausgleich* model. A similar proposal would be raised later on to transform the Ottoman state to a dual monarchy of Turkish and Arab kingdoms. The assimilationist strand within the CUP, which considered Turks as the *millet-i hakime* and argued for the Turkification of Muslim elements, was the most extreme form of

107 It still should be noted that these empires weren't as consistent as it is implied. Habsburgs turned to more centralizing policies during 1850's following the 1848 revolts, while Russian policies of centralization and assimilation which was formulated by Kont Uvarov in 1830's as Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationalism, took real pace only after 1880's, under the reign of Tsar Nicholas III. However, apart from certain fluctuations and to a certain extent, both empires followed these two different paths mentioned. Thus Romanovs and Habsburgs can be considered as ideal type models in the promotion of official nationalism.

Romanov-style Ottomanism.¹⁰⁸ The contribution of Russian immigrants in this strand of Ottomanism is also worth mentioning.

In certain ways the trajectory of Ottomanism can be read within this dilemma and vacillation between the federative-pluralist Habsburg model and the centralist-assimilationist Romanov model.¹⁰⁹ Thus the desire to construct a nation from the peoples of the empire inevitably brings the problem of the relation between this new national imagery and the existing socio-political categories of the empire. Particularly, “the reconciliation of this new, nondenominational ideological basis of the state with Islam’s traditional centrality in the legitimizing framework of the empire remained the most delicate and challenging issue.” (Hanioğlu, 2008: 74).

4.2.5 Ottomanism and Religious Diversity

The appeal and the strength of the Ottomanist project often go unrecognized through the retrospective reality of the imperial collapse. However, Ottomanism made certain inroads among the imperial elite, though unsatisfactory it may have been. Future leaders of many post-imperial nationalist projects were true Ottomans in their personal and political lives. The most striking example, Sati’al-Husri who is often credited as the intellectual father of Arab nationalism was and remained a die-hard Ottomanist until the very end and remained loyal to the empire as long as there was an empire (see

108 With all due respect, it is impossible to agree with Karpas (2009:18) who argues that the Ottoman nationalization process differs from Habsburgs and *Romanovs* (emphasis added), as Romanov version of official nationalism is the more complete and extreme form of Ottoman-CUP ways.

109 Here I am not implying that Ottomans consciously or subconsciously tried to follow or imitate Habsburgs or Romanovs, but that the two alternative approaches to official nationalisms available to Ottomans are best represented by these two empires. Thus Romanovs and Habsburgs can be considered as ideal type models in the promotion of official nationalism. The Ottoman case however lacked any such consistency.

Cleveland, 1971). In the final analysis, the failure of the Ottomanist project testifies to nothing but the contingent nature of nations and national projects in contrast to the essential quality attributed to the nation by most nationalists. Yet, the appeal of this new ideology as it was propagated by the Tanzimat leaders was limited only to certain segments of the society. Despite all the attempts of creating a universal education system- a sine quo non for any nationalization project- the state lacked the capabilities to do so. In the end the aim of educational institutions remained limited to staff the growing bureaucracy. The spread of Christian schools and their numerical and qualitative superiority to state schools prevented the formation of national consciousness through education.¹¹⁰ Despite growing means of communication and the publication of new journals which became the venues for political discussion and the spread of new ideas, the high rates of illiteracy limited the dissemination of these ideas.

One of the important dimensions of the Tanzimat period is that it is a period of transition; a transition from a decentralized empire to a centralized state which would eventually define itself more on national terms. As it was a period of transition, Tanzimat reforms created dualism in almost every field.¹¹¹ It preserved many of the old institutions while creating numerous new ones. As such the imperial model and imperial institutions coexisted with the newly nationalizing state model and institutions. The concept of one Ottoman society (or one nation) coexisted with the traditional understanding of conglomeration of societies as Ottoman citizenship coexisted with the communally organized millet system. Attempts for legal uniformity which would

110 There were four different types of schools. This plurality in itself was an impediment to nationalization (Zurcher, 2004: 63).

111 Davison (1963: 408) claims that “this is not a fatal dualism as the critics have said, but may on the contrary be viewed as a part of the normal process of growth.”

provide the basis for a secular Ottoman idea coexisted side by side with the communal-religious courts and legal plurality of the traditional system. Mindset of the traditional society lived on side by side with a great transformation of values and attitudes. The idea of an egalitarian society was introduced but this did not mean that the entire mindset changed radically. Despite the desire to create an Ottoman subject irrespective of religious differences, the Sublime Porte continued to deal with millet organizations through the Foreign Ministry well into the end of the Tanzimat.

The main obstacle in front of Ottomanism was the religiously divided nature of the society. Nationalism was still absent among the Muslim communities, so separatist nationalism was uniquely a Christian problem. Thus transformation of members of various millets to non-Muslim Ottomans was the “acid test of Ottomanism” (Findley, 1982). Ottoman statesmen took brave steps for this purpose and, despite European criticisms; progress achieved by the Ottoman state was far beyond what European Empires achieved in their own realms.¹¹² Yet in the final analysis, the Tanzimat was unsuccessful in creating an Ottoman nation and failed in the task of incorporating non-Muslims to this national identity. The primary reason for this failure was the unwillingness of non-Muslims which was no doubt provoked by external intervention and compounded by the extent of European protection provided for the non-Muslims.¹¹³

112 For a comparison, even in Britain, the most liberal of European powers legal obstacles set for the Catholics and the Jews were abolished only in 1829 and 1846 respectively (Kymlicka, 1992: 37). Of course this was the case in the metropole. In colonies like India, such discrimination continued until the very last moment of British rule.

113 Through the eighteenth and increasingly the nineteenth centuries, it became a very common practice among the local Christians of the Empire to attain the citizenship of a Western power in order to attain the protection of that power. Particularly in trade, benefiting from the capitulations of that country, these non-Muslims had a comparative edge over Muslim Ottomans (Issawi, 1982: 272-277; Zurcher, 2004: 11).

Moreover, the Tanzimat era created a reaction among the Muslims of the empire and paved the way for the future emergence of Muslim nationalism.

Thus Tanzimat reforms resulted in the deepening of the very divisions that they wanted to erase. Three transformations throughout the Tanzimat era feed this result.

1) The creation of a two distinct elite over determined by religious divisions.

As the works of Keyder (1997), Göçek (1996) and Issawi (1982) demonstrate, nineteenth century witnessed the ascendancy of Christians in the commercial sector and almost complete elimination of Muslim bourgeoisie. While commerce was concentrating at the hands of non-Muslims, another avenue opened up for the future generations of Muslim elite: the bureaucracy. As already mentioned, throughout the century Ottoman bureaucracy grew more than fifty times. And this bureaucracy was and remained essentially a Muslim dominated institution. Despite the efforts of Tanzimat statesmen in including non-Muslims into the bureaucratic arm of the state, and despite the limited progress they have made, even in the foreign ministry, the institution in which non-Muslims have considerable advantages due to their language skills, non-Muslims remained a minority. Widening the gap (or deepening the division) further was the almost complete non-existence of non-Muslims in the military.¹¹⁴ This was due to the reluctance of the non-Muslims rather than state sanctions. The necessary reforms that would enable the employment of Christians in the military and

114 There were some Christians in the army during the early Ottoman period, this was quickly abandoned. There was limited conscription after 1908, but it was very small. Navy however was a different matter and relied on Greeks for a long time. Attempts to replace them by Muslims resulted with the dearth of skilled crew. (Poulton, 1997: 46)

their rise to the rank of colonel were done fairly early in the Tanzimat period. However, non-Muslims preferred to use their rights to buy off the military service. Soon the process was institutionalized, thus the abolished jizya made a return in the form of purchased military service.¹¹⁵ Surprisingly, military ceased to be a decisive institution in state affairs from 1826 until 1909. Despite this unequivocal unimportance of military in state affairs in this period, absence of non-Muslims from the military is still very important for the fate of nation-building process. Regarded as schools where national identity is inculcated, militaries in every nation-building project is decisively important thus the exclusion of non-Muslims from military had long lasting effects. Most of the future leaders of CUP and modern Turkey grew up in this entirely Muslim institution. The roots of the CUP were to be found in the resentment felt by young Muslim bureaucrats and officers towards the changing balance of power in favor of the Christian bourgeoisie and their European patrons (Zurcher, 2010: 276). While the Christian bourgeoisie under the protection of European powers tended toward separation, the Muslim intellectuals (Young Ottomans), a result of growing bureaucracy, seized upon Ottomanism as a nationalist ideology of their own and defined its content (Karpas, 1972: 261).

- 2) Millet reforms: Not only the elite, but the society itself was also religiously divided. We have already mentioned that Tanzimat statesmen were locked in

115 To be sure the problem was twofold. Although not very common there were instances of non-Muslims in the military as well. Yet in these cases, putting Muslims under non-Muslim command always created a problem. Non-Muslims were not willing to do military service, but military was not very willing to incorporate them either.

the paradox of millets. On the one hand millets provided an efficient way to manage this religious plurality, but on the other hand the separate coexistences of millets had the potential to get politicized and become means of European intervention. Since non-Muslims were the main targets of the Ottomanism project, the state, through the Tanzimat reforms, aimed to ameliorate their social disadvantages and thus hoped to impede the nationalist inclinations on behalf of them. Betterment of the non-Muslims' position was also essential in order to thwart the European intervention. For these purposes, following the declaration of Islahat Edict (1856), the government considered dealing with the ancient millet privileges. As it had been mentioned in the previous chapters, millet system was created as an ad hoc arrangement and despite its social existence since the reign of Mehmed II, it was never formalized. As part of the efforts to increase the rights of non-Muslims in the Ottoman social system, the state had institutionalized and formalized the millet system and gave it a formal base through the declaration of millet constitutions. Another hope was to save the non-Muslim subjects from the yoke of their clergy whom the Ottomans thought were becoming increasingly corrupt and oppressive. Thus the millet reforms which followed the Islahat Edict had paradoxically institutionalized and deepened the very cleavages that the Ottomans hoped to erode. The dualist character of the Tanzimat reforms is once again evident. On the one hand the state was espousing or at least propagating an egalitarian idea of nationhood,

while on the other hand simultaneously maintained the divisions through extending group specific rights and privileges.

- 3) The resentment among the large Muslim masses who considered the outcome of the reforms as a loss of position *vis-a-vis* the non-Muslims. This feeling of resentment got more heated as the Muslim refugees had to flee towards the shrinking core of the Empire. This migration was important as it transformed the demographics of the empire, and also important in the sense that it contributed to the Muslims' feeling of resentment. Particularly the Muslim intelligentsia and the Muslim middle class mentioned above, who were in certain ways a by-product of Tanzimat reforms, turned against the Tanzimat statesmen in the process. Young Ottomans were the first generation who voiced the Muslim resentment in the Empire.¹¹⁶

4.2.6 Young Ottomans

Young Ottomans was a group of intellectuals and low level bureaucrats who reacted against the bureaucratic absolutism of the Tanzimat pashas. In that regard they were typical representatives of religious-cum political opposition toward the authoritarian-modernizing state that emerged during the fifteenth century England and France (see, Breuilly, 1994: 76-81). However, unlike their counterparts few centuries back in Western Europe, they were opposing an administration that already formulated its own official nationalism, and their opposition targeted a modification and supplementation of

116 As such they are often considered as the precursors of political Islam (see Turkone, 2003).

the official nationalism. They wanted to create some sort of constitutional system which would introduce elections and some sort of a representative system. This way they aimed to overcome the legitimacy crisis which the intrusive state organization led to. They were also simultaneously committed to the idea of Ottomanism and argued that this could be better defended in a constitutional system.

We have already seen that local representation and limited participation were offered, as early as 1845, by the Tanzimat administration as antidotes to the unrest and the legitimacy crisis caused by the intrusive state. However, “the leaders of the Tanzimat feared, with good reason, that their polyethnic, multi-faith empire would not survive the introduction of a truly representative system of government.” (Hanioglu, 2008: 76). On the other hand they were aiming to instill a sense of Ottomanness as a supranational identity that would encompass all religious differences. For this ideal they refrained from making use of explicit Islamic references for the newly emerging identity. The reasons for this failure are already discussed above, yet the Young Ottoman policy can be understood in contrast to those policies of the Tanzimat period. On the one hand, they demanded a constitutional order and a full representative system. They argued that an Ottoman identity could be instilled only through a constitutional system in which all elements would be defined primarily as equal Ottoman citizens, thereby ending community specific privileges.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, they developed “a theoretical justification and an ideology for the emerging centralized modern institutions in terms of Islamic political tradition and Ottoman principles of government.” (Karpat,

¹¹⁷ This would also remove the logical base for European intervention.

1972: 262). Yet their dual aim of promoting an Islamic ideology and a constitutional system based on equal citizenship was self-contradictory.

As it will be discussed in the next chapter, Young Ottomans encountered the same problem that Gandhi and other Congress leaders would face two generations later in India. They were defining Ottomanism as an all-inclusive shared ideology. However, the emotional aspects of this national identity were increasingly defined on Islamic motives and values. Similarly Gandhi's definition of India, as an all-inclusive national identity, lacked the emotional support from the Muslim masses as the nation was increasingly defined through Hindu culture, rituals, motives and history.

Moreover, as recent works on democratizations have demonstrated, elections and democratic transition may not be the most conducive environment for nation-building (particularly see Snyder, 2000 and Mann, 2005). As Linz and Stepan (1996: 16-37 and 401-433) point, democracy building and nation-building may have contradictory outcomes and in the case of Young Ottomans, the 1877 elections "instead of overcoming sectarian divisions through the institution of universal representation, reinforced the communitarian basis of society by allotting quotas to the various religious communities based on projections of population figures derived from the census of 1844" (Hanioğlu, 2008: 119. See also Kayalı, 1995).

Thus, the Young Ottoman attempt to solve the Tanzimat's contradiction of "the ideal of an overarching Ottoman identity clashing with the increasing autonomy of religious communities within the empire and bureaucratic centralization conflicting with political fragmentation" ended up producing new ones (Hanioğlu, 2008: 104). In the

final analysis, attempts to create an Ottoman nationality failed in the face of religious divisions. Not only did the reforms deepen and formalize these divisions, through the transfer of leadership from pro-state clergy towards independence oriented intelligentsia and bourgeoisie, they actually contributed to the politicization of these divisions. Thus, “the attempts toward integration failed as far as most of the Christian subjects were concerned, for the idea lacked the emotional appeal held by their own brand of nationalism.” (Karpas, 1972: 261). It is this Christian nature of secessionism that eventually gave Ottomanism its Islamic color. Young Ottomans’ reaction to this Christian supremacy and the voice of Muslim resentment soon found a rallying point in the persona of Caliph-Sultan Abdülhamid II. This also marked a crucial shift from an all-inclusive and supra religious imperial ideology toward a more Islamic oriented imperial ideology. It can be called the start of Muslim nationalism within the imperial context. It can also be considered as the end of Ottoman paradox of maintaining plurality in a centralizing state, and reformulation of Ottomanism on a more centralist-assimilationist Romanov model.

4.3 Abdülhamid and the CUP: Islamization of Ottomanism and the Emergence of Muslim Nationalism

After decades of demonization in Ottoman historiography, in the contemporary scholarship Abdülhamid is re-evaluated as a key figure who continued and extended the Tanzimat reform program. As Tanzimat represents the emergence of the modern state, Abdülhamid took this modernization attempts to unprecedented levels. As the modernization program of Tanzimat necessitated a fundamental change in state-society

relations and the introduction of Ottomanism as a panacea to the multiple problems emanating from the modernization, Abdülhamid's extended modernization program resulted in a similar need for modern means of legitimation. In that regard Abdülhamid era can be said to constitute both a continuation of and a rupture from Tanzimat and its ideology of Ottomanism. On the one hand, Abdülhamid continued the implementation of this official nationalism (and was more successful in its spread through education compared to failures of Tanzimat period), on the other hand this official ideology of Ottomanism acquired a definite Islamic mark in this period. More significantly, this switch to the Islamization of the official ideology was not a result of Abdülhamid's personal religiosity and thus was not limited to his reign. Indeed this Islamization of the official national ideology accelerated during the CUP regime – particularly after 1913 and reached its peak during the period of 1920-1924. Therefore a structural analysis of this transformation is necessary. Once again alternative politics followed by contemporary empires are also consulted in order to better grasp and contextualize the evolution and the fate of Ottomanism and its increasing Islamization.

4.3.1 Acceleration of Modernization

In many ways the period of Abdülhamid shows strong resemblances with the preceding Tanzimat period. Here one is tempted to accept Stanford Shaw's (1989) characterization of Abdülhamid as "the last man of the Tanzimat." He embarked on the reform program that was initiated by his grandfather Mahmud II and continued throughout the Tanzimat era. A consistent feature of his reign was the process of centralization which was under way for the last seven decades, but now carried even more rigorously. Technological

advancements strengthened the central power's hand even more than ever in the state's attempt to increase its control over the subjects. We have already mentioned the crucial role of telegraph in enhancing the power of central administration. However, Abdülhamid's attempts of increasing centralization extended also to the more visible realm of roads and railways. During the latter part of Abdülhamid's reign the railroad system reached 5883 kilometers, while the highway system was lengthened from a mere 6500 kilometers in 1850 to 23,675 kilometers in 1904 (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 227-228). Thus, in many ways, Abdülhamid, the Ottoman Petro, was loyal to the spirit of Tanzimat and his reign represents the "culmination of Tanzimat." (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 172-271). Since Abdülhamid era was the time when formation of a modern centralized state took pace, this modernizing state also faced the same challenges Tanzimat leaders had faced -increased state intervention was creating backlashes among the peripheral forces. This increased legitimacy deficit, necessitated the introduction of novel means of legitimation (for a very detailed analysis of the legitimacy structures of Abdülhamid era, see Deringil, 1998)

The new legitimacy structures that Abdülhamid introduced in order to meet the challenges of an increasingly modernizing state can roughly be classified around three items; creating a personality cult around himself, glorification of the Ottoman dynasty and increasing use of religion. This policy is by no means unique, and the parallels with Uvarov's trilogy of autocracy-orthodoxy-nationality are evident.

Development of a personality cult around the ruler was a common measure that most modernizing empires had followed. Thus from Meiji restoration in Japan to the consolidation of British colonialism in India during the post-mutiny period, creation of a

personality cult was a common feature of the era. In all these cases, creation and historicization of such a cult necessitated a process of inventing a tradition. Abdülhamid also took an extensive project of inventing traditions around his dynasty in which the Caliphate was the central pillar. Similarly, the British in India followed the same policy when Queen Victoria was enthroned as the Empress of India (*Kaiser-i Hind*) in 1874. Her coronation ceremony which was supposed to be based on Mughal traditions was in fact a prime case of an invention of traditions. Imperial symbols, particularly coat of arms, were quite important in this invention process. (see Deringil, 1993 for the Abdülhamid era and Cohn, 1983 for the British Raj. The parallels in the strategies used for inventing traditions are evident).

Another characteristic of the Abdülhamid era which was shared by his contemporaries was the increasing use of religion as a mean of legitimation. Similar to Russian Tzar's emphasis on Orthodoxy and Habsburg Emperor's pretension of being the protector of the true Catholic faith, Abdülhamid started to emphasize his role as the caliph and underlined Islam as the central pillar of state. Late nineteenth century modernization resulted with increasing importance attached to religion in state affairs. Thus even in Britain, the most liberal of all empires, religion acquired a more central role during the Victorian age than her predecessors (Van der Veer, 1999). However, in the Ottoman case this regeneration of Islam's central role conflicted with the previous Tanzimat policy of creating a secularized concept of Ottoman nationhood. The reasons and consequences of this shift are discussed in detail below.

However, the most important dimension of Abdülhamid's attempts of increasing the legitimacy of the empire and creating adherence of the subjects was the attention he

paid to education. We have already mentioned that educational reforms in the previous Tanzimat era were too limited to impose any feeling of Ottoman-ness to the society. This was partly so, since the educational reforms' main target, at least for the initial stages of the Tanzimat period, was to train personnel for the growing state administration rather than educating and transforming the population. This urgent need for educated staff diverted the path the reformers should follow. In most cases the reforms were mainly starting from the wrong end -such as establishing a university without any widespread primary or secondary education institutions (Ortaylı, 1999: 194). It was only in 1869 that Tanzimat bureaucrats finally devised a regulation which would follow a French styled three layer education system. Like in all other modernizing states, the Ottoman statesmen believed in the transformative power of education. It is during the Abdülhamid period that an extensive reform of mid-level schools (*rüşdiye and idadiye*) was undertaken.¹¹⁸ In 1895, an impressive number of 1.358.508 pupils, out of a population of about six and a half million people between the age of five and twenty five, attended school (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 112-113).

Schools are one of the most important “ideological apparatuses of the state” (Althusser, 2003). Almost all the nineteenth century states had considered education as an important apparatus for nationalizing their populations. Indeed mass education is one of the distinctive features of modern states and societies as opposed to traditional societies in which education was limited only to the privileged classes. The crucial role of mass education in the nation-building process is one of the few themes that almost all

¹¹⁸ Despite previous emphasis on education, “the development of an empire wide system of government schools occurred only under Abdülhamid. The 1880s became a major period for the development of public education around the world, the Ottoman Empire included.” (Findley, 2010: 153).

theoreticians of nationalism (Smith, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson) agree on.¹¹⁹ Modernization of state and society came with the formation of modern ideologies that linked the state with its subjects. It was through these schools that states promoted these novel ideologies. Importance of education in spreading novel ideologies and loyalty to the state was already recognized by the Tanzimat administration. Thus with his successful attempts of spreading mass education, Abdülhamid was achieving an unfulfilled Tanzimat dream. However, the ideology-Ottomanism propagated by Abdülhamid was radically different from the Ottomanism of the previous Tanzimat era.

4.3.2 Islamization of Ottomanism

Nationalization of the Ottoman Empire was both a response and a result of the modernization reforms undertaken since Tanzimat. As the main modernizer of the Empire, the process of nationalization continued under Abdülhamid's reign with greater success. However as already mentioned, Abdülhamid pursued a different and more Islamic strand of official nationalism. There are basically two reasons for such a shift: 1) increased inter-communal tensions and increasing Muslim resentment 2) changing demographics.

119 An important aim of the education policies of these modernizing states is the *mission civilisatrice*. However, mission civilisatrice plays a paradoxical role in colonial states. While the aim of producing an Ottoman man, if successful, might indeed create loyalty towards the Ottoman state and help to strengthen it, in British India, Macaulay's aim of creating brown colored Englishmen would help to increase loyalty only in so far as these Brown Englishmen would not be discriminated against themselves. As, this is impossible in a colonial empire, the educational reforms undertaken in the Raj were self-destructive. Contrast this with the increasingly important roles taken by the sons of traditional Arab and Kurdish elites in the Ottoman Empire. As these peripheral notables were not blocked in the manner they were in colonial empires (or in Anderson's phrasing were not denied from the pilgrimage to the capital), these educational reforms helped to instill a sense of solidarity and loyalty towards the state and the throne. For the relation of the sultan with the peripheral notables and the integration of Arab and Kurdish notables to the central Ottoman administration, see Rogan, 1996 and Deringil, 2003.

Peaceful coexistence of different religious communities was the dominant feature of the Ottoman history. However, this stability was based on a certain worldview where each community had its legitimate place and rank and nobody attempted to go beyond its legitimate realms. This stability was already undermined with the emergence of a Christian bourgeoisie as the intermediaries between European capitalism and the Ottoman markets. As this group increasingly dominated commerce throughout the empire, it destabilized the previous social order. Yet the real destabilization of the previous balance came as a result of Tanzimat reforms, and particularly with the 1856 Edict of Islahat. Feeling a loss of superiority in the social and political realm coupled with the increasing superiority of non-Muslims in the economical realm cultivated a strong sense of resentment to the ongoing changes among the Muslim masses. European intervention exacerbated the situation. Clear European intervention and pressure in the declaration of 1856 Edict was a source of resentment. Extensive protection and citizenship rights granted to non-Muslims by the European states were other sources of resentment. With all these reasons it is not surprising that early inter-communal tensions started in regions where trade was a major source of income and where European presence was stronger. Thus in the mid-nineteenth century Lebanon turned into an area of communal conflict between the Druzes, Muslims and Christians (Akarlı, 1993) These tensions occasionally spread to nearby urban centers such as Damascus and Aleppo (Masters, 2001). European powers and particularly France was very eager to intervene in these conflicts as they fashioned themselves the protectors of the Christians in the empire. While European intervention, always in favor of non-Muslims, increased the feeling of contempt toward Europe, it provided the means for independence for

the nationalist movements. Considering a European intervention as the only feasible scenario of independence, Armenian and Bulgarian nationalists started large scale agitations and terror attacks against the Muslims of the empire hoping inter-communal conflict to lead to European intervention and eventually to independence. Bulgarians succeeded in this scenario as the Ottoman state suppressed Bulgarian atrocities ruthlessly, the Christian public in Europe had encouraged intervention and in 1878 this resulted in Bulgarian independence. The tensions with the Armenians and the Muslims as well as the Armenians and the Ottoman state continued until the whole scale expulsion of Armenians from Anatolia in 1915.

Moreover, the nineteenth century witnessed the spread of European colonialism throughout the world as most of the Muslim communities outside Ottoman realms were occupied by European powers. Thus the resentment against Europeans was a global phenomenon and as interaction between Muslims all around the world increased, this feeling of resentment also spread and multiplied.¹²⁰ Thus as Nikki Keddie (1969:20) pointed, when Abdülhamid came to power he responded to a Muslim reaction toward greater Islamic identification as much as he created it. Abdülhamid capitulated on an already existing feeling of resentment (voiced by Young Ottomans already) and promoted Islam as “a last line of defense against the corrosive effects of nationalism” (Hanioglu, 2008: 142). By the 1870’s, nationalism started to gain ground among a limited segment of Muslim population as well, evident in certain cases such as the formation of Prizren League by the Albanians and the start of *Nahda*, a literary

120 For example the first contact between the Indian Muslims and the Ottomans started at late nineteenth century as the famous Indian Muslim scholar-poet Maulana Shibli, visited Ottomans and tried to create awareness among the Ottoman Muslim public on the plight of Indian Muslims. His visit attracted widespread attention and created enthusiasm among the Muslims in Istanbul. Upon his return such visits and contacts have increasingly continued.

awakening among the Levanten Arabs. By promoting Muslim nationalism instead of a secularized notion of Ottomanism, Abdülhamid aimed to curb down the potential threat of separatist nationalism among the Muslims of the empire.

A more important reason for the shift in Ottomanism can be found in the changing demographic make-up of the Empire. Tanzimat leaders often complained about the diversity of the society as an obstacle in the modernization and nationalization of the state and society. For the reasons discussed above, this limited their success in creating and spreading the official ideology of Ottomanism. However, when encountering the same challenge, Abdülhamid had to deal with a different society. The demographic nature of the Ottoman state had drastically changed in the last century. While the extremely diverse nature of Ottoman society limited the success of nation-building project of the Tanzimat regime, Abdülhamid inherited a much more homogenous society than Tanzimat leaders. Tanzimat leaders were trying to develop a collective identity out of a formidable degree of diversity. Even in 1876, the composition of the first Ottoman parliament was impressive in its diversity, perhaps unique in the history of multi-ethnic empires: Out of 125 deputies 77 were Muslim, 44 Christian, and four Jewish. The religious diversity that the Tanzimat leaders tried so hard to manage through various reforms and attempts of egalitarianism was much diminished by 1878. During the 1877-1878 war with Russia, the empire lost most of its remaining territory in Europe. This brought a radical demographic shift. On the one hand, the Christian populations had diminished as a result of the loss of territories mainly populated by Christians. On the other hand, faced with ethnic cleansing, large flocks of Muslims from the lost territories had migrated to the Ottoman territories.

By the time of 1878 war, Muslim immigration to the empire was already an ongoing process and this flow of population continued on to the very end of the empire. If one source of Muslim immigrants were coming from the Ottoman losses at the Balkans another equally important source was coming from the Russian conquests in the Muslim populated areas at the north and east of Black Sea. Thus both at the Balkans and the Caucasus, Muslims facing ethnic cleansing were migrating to the Ottoman Empire in large flocks. From 1856 to 1865 and thereafter two to three million Caucasians were forced to immigrate to the Ottoman lands. By 1879 about 13 percent of Bulgaria's Muslim population were killed and 34 percent were made refugees. In the Balkan wars 812,771 Muslims from the lost European territories were made refugees aside from the 632,408 death. (McCarthy, 1995: 167).

With this demographic transformation, the remaining land became essentially a Muslim majority Empire, as the Muslims constituted nearly 80 percent of the population. Thus, the very demographic nature of the Ottomans that made them develop the tolerant millet system; having substantial numbers of Christian populations and ruling over territories where the majority was not Muslim, has changed. What is more striking is that in this new situation the Christians were not majority on any large territory. Thus the most important danger of nationalist secession of Christian territories was largely removed. It is this demographic shift that accounts for the difference between Tanzimat policies and Abdülhamid policies. Nationalism theorists point to the crucial role played by a *staatsvolk* to be the base of nation-building project (O'Leary, 2001). Now, Abdülhamid had a solid majority on which he could build a nation. As such the threats that faced the state were changing. While secession of Christian

majority areas was no longer a possibility, nationalism was starting to find ground among the Muslim populations of the empire. As centralization reached new grounds, the reaction of Muslim periphery to these centralizations gained increased importance and emergency.

As a result of these social and demographic changes Abdülhamid developed a corporate identity based more on Islam. In fact he did not repudiate Ottomanism but gave it a more Islamic coloring which was now more possible given the majority position of Muslims. The Ottoman state of the twentieth century was not an "empire," but a new type of Muslim state with its own unique cultural, religious, ethnic, and social characteristics derived from the life of the people it ruled (Karpas, 1991: 547). Construction of Ottoman nationalism, like all other nationalization attempts, faced the dilemma of creating an all-inclusive national identity and defining that national identity among the highest common denominator possible. However, the problem that Ottomans could not solve was the relationship between this supra identity of Ottomanism and other sub identities. In the end they ended up narrowing the definition of Ottomanism. As Muslims were now a clear majority everywhere, the new demographic situation enabled to put Islam as the common denominator of the nation.

Like in any nationalism project, the boundaries of the nation are subject to constant shift and social-political bargaining. The fate of Ottoman official nationalism was also subjected to similar boundary shifts. Its boundary has shifted in the due process to represent a more homogenous society. The idea which was initially created as a measure to include all members of the society and considerably the Christians who had secessionist ambitions had narrowed itself as the inclusion of Christians became both

impossible and perhaps to a degree secondary in importance. The exclusion of Christians from the official ideology, however, did not mean the reassertion of tradition over society. Underlying the importance of the inclusion of Muslims and exclusion of non-Muslims was a result of the search of a creation of a bond between the state and society. Thus in its nature it was a modernizing attempt. It was modern in both senses. On the one hand, it was the strength of central state and modern institutions attached to it that make such a project feasible. On the other hand, it was this modernity of the state that created the need for a common bond between state and society. The narrowing of the original Ottomanist idea through exclusion of non-Muslims in fact continued until the collapse of the empire. Abdülhamid's major rival, the Young Turk movement who in the end succeeded in overthrowing him also formed its political orientation on a Muslim nationalist Ottomanism that was based on the exclusion of non-Muslims.

4.3.3 Ottomanism Contextualized: From Tanzimat to Abdülhamid and Afterwards

Despite the inconsistency of Ottoman administration in its application of official nationalism à la Habsburg or Romanov, one broad generalization can be made; through the historical process Romanov model gained ascendancy over the Habsburg model. It is possible to claim that despite apparent inconsistency, Habsburg model dominated the Tanzimat era, while with the absolutist reign of Abdülhamid a shift toward a more Romanov version of Ottomanism emerged in which Islam became the central pillar of official nationalism. The struggle between the different strands of official nationalism also dominated the opposition politics. The ideological split of CUP in 1902 in two different groups led by Prince Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza can better be understood as

a split between two alternative forms of official nationalism (For the detailed analysis of the 1902 Paris Congress of Young Turks and events leading to the split, see Ramsaur, 2004: 81-133). Within this split among the Young Turks, it is no surprise that non-Muslim elements sided with the decentralizing version of Sabahaddin while the Muslim and Turkish elements opted for a more centralizing version of official nationalism. However, the evolution of Ottomanism toward a more assimilationist-centralizing version continued well through the CUP administration with never ending inconsistencies. Yet after 1913, the extent of centralizing and homogenizing tendencies of Ottomanism a la Romanov reached to the extent that Ottomanism irrevocably transformed into Muslim nationalism. In order to understand options available for Ottomanism and how and why Ottoman statesmen pursued a particular brand of it in contrast to other options, a quick look over the Habsburg and Romanov versions and transformation of the Ottoman realm might be helpful.

The difference in terms of the formulation of official nationalism among different empires is more a result of different conditions and different composition of the empires rather than being merely ideological. In the Habsburg Empire, Germans constituted only 23 percent of the empire's overall population. Moreover, Germans of Habsburgs were a minority among the Germans of Europe as the majority of Germans were living in the newly formed bordering German nation-state. Thus Habsburgs did not and probably could not follow any policy of Germanization. In contrast, Russians constituted more than forty percent of the Romanov Empire and they formed an important majority throughout the core regions of the empire. Besides, unlike the Habsburgs, they were not threatened by any other state that would claim rivalry on the

allegiance of its Russian populations. This Russian population constituted a solid base to formulate policies of nationalization and assimilation.

In terms of demographic diversity, Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat era resembled the Habsburg Empire rather than the Romanovs. Moreover Tanzimat statesmen were contemporaries of Metternich and in him they found their role models and ideologue. Metternich was struggling to maintain centralization without undermining the imperial-plural nature of the state. Thus the problems facing the Habsburgs were more similar to the Ottomans and despite the common assumption of French influence on the Ottoman statesmen, at least for the Tanzimat statesmen, it is possible to say that Habsburgs in general and Metternich in particular was more influential as a model (Ortaylı, 1999: 240).

However, we still can not say that Tanzimat statesmen entirely or consistently followed Habsburgs. The common problem facing all the empires was the difficulty to sustain the mosaic character of the empire at the time of an administrative unification. In order to overcome this, Habsburgs followed a more federalist attitude which aimed to preserve and coexist diverse identities and communities under the banner of an inclusive Habsburg identity, while the Russians opted for excessive centralization that aimed to transform the empire into a typical nation-state based on state-nation congruence. Tanzimat statesmen never considered federalism as a valid alternative. For them federalism was a pretext for separation and they resisted all such demands (Davison, 1977). As it had been discussed already, the Ottoman state was excessively decentralized in the previous centuries and the common theme of all the nineteenth century reformers was the emphasis they have put on centralization. Indeed this

obsession with centralization created certain absurdities such as the creation of an agency for beggars (*dilenciler kethüdası*) in Istanbul that would function as a central body for all the beggars of the empire (Ortaylı, 1999: 148). Thus it is possible to say that while the diverse nature of Ottoman society was more suitable for a federalist-plural version of Ottomanism (Habsburg model), the evolution of state organization and state-society relations were leaning towards a more centralizing-assimilationist (Romanov model).

In their attempt to promote their form of official nationalism, Ottomans were doubly disadvantaged with regard to their contemporaries. Both the Habsburg and Russian centralization attempts started much earlier than the Ottoman Empire. They entered the nineteenth century, the age of nationalism, with stronger and more centralized political bodies. Moreover, these empires were more homogenous than the Ottomans at least in terms of religious diversity. The Habsburg dynasty had aligned itself with the Catholic Church since the reformation wars and the formation of the empire (Jazsi, 1961: 155-162). Catholic Church remained the major centripetal force for the empire at the age of nationalism. However, it is true that since the eighteenth century Russian expansionism had led the Russians to include a substantial number of Muslims to the Russian Empire. Yet it is imperative to consider that the Russian policy of centralization and assimilation did not extend beyond the Ural Mountains where the majority of the Muslim population lived. Thus the Czarist Empire had a double policy with regard to its subjects. The empire tried to create a nation-state from its Christian subjects through Russification policies. Yet the newly conquered Muslims lands were

treated pretty much as colonial possessions and thus the Muslims were excluded from the newly emerging nation.¹²¹

The Ottomans could not follow either policy as the Christian populations were very wide spread and they were majority in the most important European possessions of the empire. Indeed as it was already pointed, nationalism was primarily a Christian problem in the empire until the end of nineteenth century. Under these circumstances the Ottomans vacillated between creating a common identity for all its subjects and preserving communal differences. However main features of the empire that pushed Tanzimat statesmen for a more plural version of official nationalism (demographics and the crucial importance of Christians for the Ottoman state) started to change throughout the century. Their inability to develop a definition of Ottomanism that would convince the non-Muslim subjects to remain in the Empire and the changing demographics of the Empire finally led the Ottomans to define Ottomanism more and more with a Muslim content and the imperial nationalism of the Tanzimat period started to evolve toward Muslim nationalism. As the empire evolved more toward a clearer national definition, it also lost its imperial character which enabled it to rule over and benefit from diversity.

Thus we can safely say that starting with the reign of Abdülhamid, or more precisely following the 1878 War, Ottomanism started to gain a more Islamic character

121 Indeed it is possible to claim that this was more or less a universal model as the empires of Europe transformed the imperial core into a nation-state while keeping their overseas possessions as colonial possessions. However Romanovs was the first land based empire that followed this double policy. To a certain extent Ottomans also developed such a policy in their attitude toward the distant and peripheral Muslim elements at a later stage. Deringil's (2003) article provides insights on the Ottoman state elite's attitude toward the tribal populations of Libya considering them as primitive societies that needed to be elevated to the level of civilization through the civilizing mission of the Ottoman Empire. Erol Ülker's (2005) important study on contextualization of Turkification during the CUP regime also points to a similar "double policy" where certain elements within CUP made a distinction between the imperial core (Anatolia) that needed to be homogenized and nationalized while the peripheral regions (Arab and Kurdish lands) were to be centralized but not necessarily Turkified.

and the Ottoman nation increasingly meant Muslim Ottomans. This did not necessarily mean a whole scale exclusion of Christians from the state, but referred to a progress in which the nation was defined more and more through religious representation. Thus, the ideal Ottoman subject of Tanzimat era, who was deprived from religious denomination started to be defined through religious representation, and the initially secular concept of Ottomanism increasingly started to represent Muslim Ottomans. However, this alliance between Islam and the state was fundamentally different from the classical alliance existed in pre-Tanzimat period. It is wrong to conclude that the relation between state and religion, after four decades of attempts of detachment turned back to its original form. The situation of a non-Muslim *reaya* in classical era who belonged to one of the established millets and showed state his/her allegiance through the millet organization is fundamentally different from the non-Muslim *citizens* of the post Tanzimat era.

The situation of a non-Muslim in the classical era during which the population remained largely passive, and state and individual relations were conducted through millet intermediaries is fundamentally different from the non-Muslims in the post Tanzimat era, during which the subjects were mobilized actively in favor of the state and an attachment (nonexistent in the classical era) between the state and individuals was created. “The state now demands not passive obedience but conformity to a unilaterally proclaimed normative order” (Deringil, 1998: 11). The Ottoman state in the late nineteenth century was transformed from being a Muslim dominated empire into a Muslim nation-state. Thus, as the classical *reaya* were transformed into citizens, non-Muslims who were traditionally considered as members of certain millets increasingly became minorities in a nationalizing state and were increasingly considered as obstacles

in the formation of a homogenous nation. This fundamental difference resulted in their exclusion from the newly created congruence of community and state: a process culminated into a decade of promoting religious homogeneity by many means until 1924. War, deportations, ethnic conflicts-cleansings and population exchanges were all different means through which the religious homogenization was achieved. Paradoxically, the exclusion of non-Muslims accelerated and finalized under the secularist regime of CUP.¹²²

4.3.4 CUP

It is customary to consider CUP's rise to power as a breakthrough in the Ottoman and Turkish history and there is great truth to that. The discrepancy between the personal piety of Abdülhamid and the lack of religiosity of many leading CUP members further substantiates an impression of a rupture by the CUP regime. Indeed most of the Young Turks, even more than being non-religious, had a negative attitude toward religions in general and Islam in particular, that is so well demonstrated by Hanioglu's article "Garpcilar" (1997). Yet they "adopted a Muslim variant of Ottomanism quite similar to the ideology promoted by Abdülhamid II." (Hanioglu, 2008: 145). As an organization CUP was composed mainly of Muslim civil servants and army officers and in its early days it was not even open to non-Muslims. It was a political movement of the Ottoman Muslims for Ottoman Muslims (Zurcher, 2010: 277). During the early days of their revolution and in the hype of constitutional order, they officially declared their loyalty to

122 Recent debates on religious minorities and secularism in Europe and elsewhere challenges the conventional expectations that religious minorities are the ones benefiting from secularism. Indeed the recent literature on secularism points that suppression of religious minorities in secularizing societies is not necessarily paradoxical (see, Bader, 2007; Chatterjee, 1998; Nandy, 1995)

the all-inclusive concept of Ottomanism formulated as *ittihad-ı anasır*,¹²³ yet in a similar fashion to the failure of the original Ottomanist project and shift to Ottoman Muslim nationalism, they also based their practical policies, and in time even their discourses, on Muslim nationalism. Once again Muslim nationalism of CUP was partly shaped by the overwhelmingly Christian nature of separatist nationalism. Particularly following the Balkan War, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the national identity gained pace and a wholesale exclusion of Christian from the national identity started. In its climax, this exclusion is unprecedented as the capacities available to CUP leaders after a century of modern state formation was unprecedented as well.

Muslim nationalism of CUP had two dimensions; economic and demographic. Economic dimension aimed for a transfer of wealth from Christians toward Muslims. For that end, the programme of National Economy (*Milli İktisat*) was launched in 1914. The main target of the programme was to build a strong bourgeoisie among the ranks of Muslim entrepreneurs. Conditions of wartime enabled these entrepreneurs to make excessive profits under government protection. (Zurcher, 2010: 219-220).

The second aspect of the CUP nationalism was demographic engineering in order to create a homogenously Muslim population in Anatolia (For a detailed analysis of demographic engineering of CUP, see Dündar, 2001; 2008). Demographic change in Anatolia was shaped by two forces; immigration of large flocks of Muslims from the territories lost in the Balkan War and the forceful expulsion of non-Muslims from Anatolia. Muslim migrants were settled in a way to ensure the transformation of Muslim

123 Unlike the 1877 elections, the 1908 elections “eliminated the quota system in the hope for forging an Ottoman unity unless shackled by primordial attachments.” It was hoped that enforced centralization would maintain unity (Kayalı, 1995: 281).

minority places to Muslim majority. The more decisive aspect of religious homogenization was the expulsion of non-Muslims which started right after the Balkan Wars. The Greeks living in the West Coast of Anatolia were forced to migrate to Greece. Ayhan Aktar (2010: 26-32) rightly defines this deportation of Greeks as the precursor of the population exchange took place after Lauzanne Agreement. In the Eastern Anatolia, Armenians were deported *en masse* to the Syrian Desserts after the introduction of the Law of Displacement (*Tehcir Kanunu*) in 27 May 1915. While many died without ever reaching to Syria, Tehcir resulted the complete cleansing of the Armenians from Anatolia. The religious cleansing of non-Muslims from Anatolia was completed after the promulgation of forced population exchanges by the Lauzanne Agreement (see, Bayar, 2014; Yıldız, 2001: 26-32). In a way the population exchange in the Lauzanne Agreement completed a process that was already underway for a decade. As a result of this agreement, 1.200.000 Greek Orthodox, some of whom spoke Turkish as mother tongue, from Anatolia migrated to Greece. And in response approximately 500.000 Muslims, from various ethnic backgrounds, had migrated to Turkey. After this final step Turkey was almost completely homogenous in the religious terms.

Despite their personal secularism and their desire to diminish the role of Islam both in the public life and in state affairs, it was the CUP cadres who firmly and irrevocably established Muslim nationalism. This is crucial to understand the nature of Muslim nationalism. Religion in Muslim nationalism serves a social force of cohesion and unity. Thus it has a function of homogenization. Particularly in the Ottoman case, religion had been functional in excluding certain sectors of society. As recent studies in nationalism underline, what constitutes the nation is partly defined through what the

nation excludes. Thus, exclusion is constitutive of both nation and modernization (Wimmer, 2002). In the same line, it would be safe to say that Young Turks' differentiation from the Christians was a constitutive aspect of their mindset. This is not only evident from the fact that all founders of the movement were Muslims, but the founding charter of the crucial 1906 Society of Freedom explicitly forbids the membership of non-Muslims to the committee (Zurcher, 2010). This was particularly so since it was the struggle against the Christians in the Balkans that shaped the political trajectory and mindset of the CUP leaders. Thus, we can say that Christians was the constitutive other of the Ottomanism of Young Turks. So their Ottomanism was in fact an anti-non-Muslim Ottomanism that can safely be defined as Muslim Ottoman nationalism.

It would be wrong to put too much emphasis on the world views of the CUP leaders with regard to their adoption of Muslim nationalism or Turkish nationalism. The entire concept of nation emerged in the Ottoman case as a centripetal force that would prevent the empire from disintegration. Thus it had a practical aim, to save the empire. This practical necessity dictated the emergence of nationalism in the first hand but it also dictated the definition of nation. Nationalism is constituted through the constant negotiation of its boundaries by including some groups, meanings, and practices and excluding others (Göçek, 2002: 1). Thus since the first introduction of the concept of an Ottoman nation in the Tanzimat period, the meaning and boundary of this nation continuously shifted. The initial desire of an Ottoman nation which would include all the members of the state remained as a constant hope for the state elites. However, as the political realities such as wars, European intervention and emergence of secessionist

nationalisms dictated otherwise, certain groups were excluded from the definition of nation.

4.4 Religion and Nationalism Among Christians and Muslims

The conventional wisdom sees a direct evolution from millet identities toward nationalism. Based on the central importance of religion in many post-Ottoman nationalities, this narrative sees in the millet organization the roots of nationalism as millet system enabled different communities to maintain organizational autonomy and cultural distinctiveness (Karpas, 1982, recently repeated by Aktürk, 2009). Although being partly true, “this interpretation is based on a backward projection of the conditions that emerged in the late nineteenth century rather than historical realities” (Kasaba, 2006:205). The problem with this narrative is that it gives an over-generalized account and among many other things misses the deeply anti-clerical roots of Greek nationalism. Inevitably then, the Greek nationalist movement attracted the deep hostility of the Orthodox establishment and clergy. In 1802, a Greek monk was warning the youth for the degenerative effects of Europe, where “the most atheistical lackeys of the arch atheist Voltaire spew up from the foul smelling gorges the most irreligious insults and blasphemies against the Divine Majesty” (quoted in Kasaba, 2006:213). The millet system and Christian religious institutions were obstacles for the spread of non-denominational Ottoman nationalism.¹²⁴ However, with regard to evolution of their own secessionist nationalism, these institutions played paradoxical roles. Thus despite being limited to Christian subjects, these popular nationalisms had contradictory relations with

¹²⁴ The Islamic institutions and the central role played by Islam in the imperial system provide a similar challenge to the spread of this non-denominational ideology.

religion. This is quite similar to the formation of Muslim nationalism during the Abdülhamid and CUP eras.

As we have seen, the Greek Orthodox Church had preserved its privileges of the Byzantine era after the Ottoman conquests. In what is often called as *Byzance après Byzance*, the institutional autonomy and imperial-ecumenical character of the Church have remained untouched after the Ottoman conquests. Moreover the juridical authority of Patriarchate was extended to the rest of the empire, thus the authority of Patriarchate reached to unprecedented levels and territories compared with the Byzantium era. In that sense the church had a special position of “an empire within an empire,” and thus it was vulnerable to nationalism as much as the empire was. Greek nationalism was the first nationalist challenge that Greek Patriarchate had to face. Greek was the Church language, but it was also the language of commerce and intellect throughout the Eastern Mediterranean (Christians). The central role of Greek Patriarchate and Greek language had contributed to an early development of Greek nationalism in three different ways; 1) Greek language and its universal use provided the necessary “high culture.” 2) Existence of an elite; both religious and commercial. 3) Being open to European influence through commercial networks.

Greeks also had the advantage of *Philhellenes* in Europe who under the influence of Classical Romanticism saw in the Greeks of the nineteenth century the intellectual forefathers of the European civilization. This was another tension between the Greek nationalism and the clergy for whom ancient Greeks represented nothing but paganism. However, despite the resistance of Patriarchate, with the political support they got from the European countries, and particularly from the British, the Greek nationalists

acquired their independence in 1829. This was the first region that broke of the Ottomans through revolt and clearly showed that internal unrest and nationalism was now as dangerous as the external enemies of the empire.¹²⁵ However, the Patriarchate's hostility to nationalism in general and Greek nationalism in particular continued well after the Greek Independence. Indeed the Patriarchate recognized the independent Greek State in 1856, almost thirty years after the Ottoman state itself recognized it. As an imperial institution, the high clergy considered nationalism as a potentially disruptive force that would undermine and limit its ecumenical authority - an apt prediction to be confirmed by the course of events throughout the century.

The Serbian case was a somewhat different. With regard to European influences the Serbians were like the Greeks. They did not have the commercial networks of the Greek elites, but through their close contacts and geographical-linguistic affinity with the neighboring Habsburg territories they were open to ideological influences from Europe. However, it was not only geography that put the Serbs into a distinctive position among the Christians of the Empire. Unlike the claims of later nationalist mythologies, Serbs were the main collaborators of the Ottoman expansion throughout the fifteenth

125 Once again the dynamics between the religion and language in this newly established Greek state is entirely similar with the later evolution of the Turkish state. The nation was primarily defined through religion and adherence to Greek Orthodoxy. Thus, even Orthodox groups who were not members of the Greek Orthodox Church, like the Serbians were excluded from the national ambitions. The state was primarily targeting the Greek Orthodox who were not completely Greek speakers. However, as soon as the state was established, a new process of homogenization started which aimed to linguistically homogenize the nation. Primarily through the education system, but also with the support of the military and judicial institutions, the state aimed to linguistically assimilate the Albanian and Vlach speakers of Greek Orthodox faith. The Greek case particularly had an irredentist dimension, thus the target of linguistic assimilation was not limited to the citizens of the new Greek state, but was targeting the entire Greek East- all the members of the Greek Orthodox Church. The University of Athens, with its graduates spreading all over the Eastern Mediterranean, was particularly instrumental in the Hellenization of the Greek Orthodoxes and transforming them to members of the imagined community of Greek nation and potential members of the Greek irredentism. Thus religious differences were considered non assimilable and were excluded from the national group, while linguistic differences were considered assimilable and were included in the nation (Kitromilides, 1989).

and sixteenth centuries. This enabled them to keep their own church organizations and unlike the other Orthodox people in the Ottoman Empire, they were not part of the ecumenical Greek Church. This enabled them to have their own high culture, their own elite open to politicization and nationalization (Hastings, 1997: 124-147). The rivalry between the ecumenical claims of the Greek Patriarchate and the autonomy of the Serbian Church transformed the Serbian clergy to the leaders of the demands for autonomy-secessionism. In a way Serbian clergy played the role of Greek bourgeoisie-intelligentsia as the leaders and protagonists of nationalist movements. Thus church clergy and millet organization played opposite roles in the Greek and Serbian cases. While the universalist-imperial Greek clergy resisted nationalism, the particularism of Serbian clergy and their struggle with imperial religious institutions (Patriarchate) pushed them to hold a line with the nationalist forces against the empire. Thus the first two secessionist movements in the Empire had two contradictory relations with religion. However, despite this difference they were both targeting a special Christian population. Thus, to a certain extent, both can be considered as Christian nationalism. In their attempt to link the state with a particular Christian population, they excluded other religious denominations, particularly the Muslims from their respective national states. Thus the formation of the secular Greek nationalism and religious Serbian nationalism both resulted with the large scale expulsion and ethnic cleansing of Muslim populations, even when those Muslim communities were Greek or Serbian speakers.

Although the peculiar role of religious institutions can help us understand the very early development of nationalism among the Greeks and Serbs,¹²⁶ similar contradictions with regard to religion-nationalism relation can be observed in the later nationalisms of Christian communities of the empire. In a sense, the struggle between the Greek nationalist bourgeoisie-intelligentsia and the Greek Patriarchate replicated itself decades later as the struggle between the secular-nationalism oriented Armenian *amira* class and the Armenian patriarchate, while the role played by the Bulgarian clergy in the evolution of Bulgarian nationalism, particularly after the formation of a separate Bulgarian exarchate in 1870 was parallel to the role played by the Serbian clergy almost a century ago. Thus one generalization can be made that religion is an impediment to the spread of nationalism as long as it is aligned with the imperial-universal institutions, while it would be a force for nationalism once it is associated with a particular people-district or state. Another conclusion well in line with the thesis of this dissertation is that religion plays contradictory roles in the formation of nationalism and nation-states and it would serve nationalism as long as the state is associated with the homogenizing function of religion and this is irrespective of the personal religiosity of nationalist leaders. In that sense it is reminiscent of the relation between Islam and Ottoman-Muslim nationalism of Abdülhamid and CUP periods. Thus, either under the reign of pious Caliph or the secularist officers it was a period of the re-alignment of the state with the Muslim population. Thus, like the Christian nationalisms preceding them, whether religious or secular, these Muslim nationalisms are also based on the exclusion of Christians.

¹²⁶ This early development of nationalism among the Greeks and Serbs had always been a problem for the modernist account of nationalism as the emergences of nationalism in these two cases clearly predate the features of modernity such as industrialization, mass education or even print capitalism.

4.5 Muslim Nationalism

The Ottoman state of the twentieth century was not an "empire," but a new type of Muslim state with its own unique cultural, religious, ethnic, and social characteristics derived from the life of the people it ruled (Karpas, 1991: 547). Like in any nationalism project the boundaries of the nation is subject to constant shift and social-political bargaining. The fate of Ottoman official nationalism was also subjected to similar boundary shifts. Its boundary has shifted in the due process to represent a more homogenous society. The idea which was initially created as a measure to include all members of the society and considerably the Christians who had secessionist ambitions had narrowed itself as the inclusion of Christians became both impossible and perhaps to a degree secondary in importance. The exclusion of Christians from the official ideology however doesn't mean the reassertion of tradition over society. Underlying the importance of the inclusion of Muslims and exclusion of non-Muslims was a result of the search of a creation of a bond between the state and society. Thus in its nature it was a modernizing attempt. It was modern in both senses. On the one hand, it was the strength of central state and modern institutions attached to it that make such a project feasible. On the other hand, it was this modernity of the state that created the need for a common bond between state and society. The narrowing of the original Ottomanist idea through exclusion of non-Muslims in fact continued until the collapse of the empire. Abdülhamid's major rival, the Young Turk movement who in the end succeeded in overthrowing him, also based its political orientation on a Muslim nationalist Ottomanism excluding the non-Muslims of the Empire.

How justified is to define the policies of Young Ottomans or Abdülhamid, let alone the CUP as Muslim nationalism? Both the Young Ottomans and Abdülhamid period had already been suggested as the periods of emergence of Islamism (Turkone, 2003 and Karpas, 2001). The problem is partly related to the definitions. Nationalism is defined as the congruence of political and cultural units. Thus Muslim nationalism means that the nationality of that particular state is defined through religion. As Anderson underlines, nationalism is both “territorial and limited” thus it is fundamentally different from religions which are not bound by any territory in their claim to universality. The religious policies of Abdülhamid precisely aimed at strengthening a particular state. His emphasis on caliphate as a universal institution was more a result of his desire to strengthen the state rather than to establish a worldwide religious renewal.

As it is mainly related with institutional arrangements and state power, either formation of a state or strengthening of the state, Muslim nationalism should not be confused with other religious revival movements of the time. Indeed, as John Voll points, movements of religious renewal and revival are a constant feature of Muslim history. One can even talk of a tradition of change. These revivalist movements became ever more frequent and widespread at times of crisis. Thus, whenever Muslim societies experienced the crisis of modernity, a religious renewal and revival movement have also flourished. Losing its political superiority much before than the Ottoman realms, the Indian subcontinent started to experience a wave of reform embodied in the important personality of Shah Waliullah in the eighteenth century. This religious reformism in the Indian subcontinent is well studied and well documented (see, Rizvi, 1980; Metcalf,

1982; Rahman, 1999). A less well known and less studied religious revival movement started in the Ottoman realms by Mevlana Halid (see Mardin, 1991 and recently Findley, 2010). Another well-known religious revival movement that touched upon both India and the Ottomans was the reformism of Cemaleddin Afghani. Being more political compared with the other two religious movements, Afghani cannot be considered as a Muslim nationalist either, since his emphasis was on the universal ummah rather than a particular and limited state. Moreover, his emphasis on anti-colonialism led him to ignore the religious differences in certain cases like India.¹²⁷

Thus despite the fact that Muslim nationalism and Islamic revivalism probably affected each other and contributed to the development of each other, they actually are two different phenomenon; one addressing mainly the newly emerging centralized state aiming at institutional adaptation and political socialization while the other addressing mainly the Muslim societies addressing for religious reform (Karpas, 1972: 262).

4.6 Conclusion

In the previous chapter we have contrasted the empires and nation-states with regard to their approaches to certain values such as equality, diversity and plurality. We have pointed that nation-states praise equality and uniformity while empires praise hierarchy and plurality. As a result nation-states pursue homogenization while empires are content with diversity of the society. We have also pointed that as imperial societies both Indian subcontinent and the Ottoman realms were home to very diverse societies which were

¹²⁷ However, the reformist traditions of Afghani and Abduh have contributed to the emergence of nationalisms and can be considered as form of proto-nationalism (see Keddie, 1969). Moreover the intellectual heritage from Afghani to Abduh and then to Rashid Rida, provides an important linkage for the emergence of Arab nationalism (see Kedourie, 1962).

largely organized through hierarchical, autonomous and separate coexistence of religious communities. With the emergence of the modern state in the nineteenth century, decentralized and indirect rule of the empires gave way to a more centralized and direct rule. Through this process it became almost impossible to sustain the previous fragmented character of the society. Increased state intervention, particularly state's attempt of establishing a uniform and centralized administration, created a backlash and led to the politicization of previous communal identities. As the previous communal organization was centered on religious affiliation, particularly in the Ottoman Empire and to an extent in the urban India, formation of the modern state led to a politicization of religious identities. In the age of nationalism, this soon led to rival religious nationalisms.

The creation of a more intrusive state and disruption of the old social balance combined with the ever increasing threat of nationalism, led the state to formulate an official nationalism. The demographic realities of the Empire gave an Islamic coloring to this official identity. Given the demographic nature of the state, Abdülhamid allied the official nationalism with the majority population. Thus the Ottoman Empire tried to overcome its legitimacy deficit by the re-alignment of religion and state. The British being the colonial rulers in India lacked all of these instruments. The racist and exclusionary nature of the Raj prevented the introduction of any sort of official nationalism. As such the power sharing mechanisms and incorporation of local elites to the system maintained the logic of separate coexistence of distinct regions and communities. This limited inclusion of the people in the system however remained unsatisfactory as the mass politics increasingly dominated the Indian scene. While the

Ottomans aligned themselves with the majority community in such a situation, the logic of colonial rule forced the British to forge an alliance with the minority groups.

CHAPTER V

RELIGION, NATIONALISM AND COLONIALISM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

The previous chapter examined the formation and eventual triumph of Muslim nationalism in the late Ottoman period and demonstrated how Muslim nationalism shaped the formation of the new Turkish Republic. More specifically, it aimed to contextualize the emergence of nationalisms in the late-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire through the process of modern state formation and the modern state's increased need for legitimacy and mobilization. It also sought to reveal the relation between the modern state's difficulty in maintaining plurality along with the eventual hegemony of a religiously-based official nationalism. In effect, the previous chapter showed how religious exclusion was the most crucial part of national homogenization. This chapter similarly attempts to locate the relation between the founding of Pakistan and the evolution of Muslim nationalism in the context of modern state formation in the Indian subcontinent. The aim, then, is to contextualize the emergence of religiously-based nationalism through the specific conditions of the emergence of the modern state in the subcontinent, the colonial nature of the modern state, and its system of alliance. At the outset, the idea that a particular ideology of Islam created Pakistan appears obvious.

However, it is precisely because of this that we need to examine the phenomenon in more detail. The vital role of Muslim nationalism is far from straightforward, and Pakistan does not represent the final iteration of the centuries-long development of Muslim identity in the Subcontinent.

In fact, a historical analysis would reveal that the eventual victory of Muslim nationalism in India is even more surprising than in the Ottoman Empire. As discussed in the third chapter, the Mughal Empire, unlike the Ottoman, never institutionalized a millet-like system to classify communal bodies. As such, there were no millets that could form the basis of future religious nationalisms. In contrast, the dominant form of religious life in the subcontinent was its syncretism.

Thus, when Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy of India (1884-1888), described the Muslims of India in 1888 as “a nation of 50 million, with their monotheism, their iconoclastic fanaticism, their animal sacrifices, their social equality and their remembrance of the days when, enthroned at Delhi, they reigned supreme from the Himalayas to Cape Cormorin” (quoted in Hardy, 1972: 1,) he was certainly mistaken and projecting his own vision onto realities on the ground. However, as Peter Hardy pointed out, Dufferin’s vision was shared by the majority of the Muslims in 1947. The story of this transition is the subject of this chapter.

Moreover the Muslims of the subcontinent showed remarkable variations in terms of their geographic, occupational, linguistic and cultural features. Muslims, constituting almost a quarter of the Indian population, were scattered unevenly throughout the subcontinent. The majority of the Muslims were concentrated in the

North West and the North East parts of the subcontinent. They were a slight majority in the Punjab and Bengal provinces. They were an absolute majority in Sindh and NWFP (North West Frontier Province). The remaining Muslim population was scattered around the entire subcontinent; having a more substantive population in UP and Bombay, while having few in the Deccan. Moreover, the Muslims were also divided occupationally as much as spatially. They were peasants and landlords in Punjab, while in Bengal they were mostly landless farmers. They were much better off in UP while in Sind and NWFP, they were such a majority that it is impossible to compare them with others. Even more importantly, the interests of Muslims in Muslim majority provinces and the ones in Muslim minority provinces were contradictory in issues relating to community representation, federation, centralization, autonomy and separate electorates. Thus the Muslim positions with regard to the politics of nation formation were polar opposite in the Muslim majority and minority provinces. In overall, the Muslims of India did not represent a unified and solid community of interest to justify their compartmentalization into a separate all-India communal category for purposes of political representation (Jalal, 1995: 13).

Of course it is possible to argue that the eventual creation of Pakistan in the face of such oddities is a testimony to the power of religion as a source of national identity and political legitimacy. However the later history of Pakistan warns us not to make such quick conclusions. As Ayesha Jalal (2000:572) reminds us “the inefficacy of the Pakistani state’s Islamic card is a powerful indictment of the argument that the religious factor in ‘Muslim consciousness’ outweighs all other considerations.” Moreover, throughout the Islamic history and in the modern history of Indian subcontinent, Islam is

used to justify different political programmes and organizations. Thus politicization of religious identity and the emergence of Muslim nationalism leading to the creation of Pakistan is not a natural and inevitable phenomenon but the result of certain political developments. It is these developments that we will analyze in this chapter. This chapter is not a historical narrative of political developments until 1947 but an analysis of how religion became a homogenizing power through exclusion (of followers of other religions) and through its power of uniting (members of the same faith).

Since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, four different explanations had been proposed to understand the emergence of Muslim nationalism and the creation of Pakistan.¹²⁸ One explanation is to understand Pakistan as a result of the divide and rule policies of British colonialism (see, Chandra, 1984; Sarkar, 1983; Page, 1982). According to this narrative, in an attempt to thwart the evolution of Indian nationalism, British purposefully emphasized the Muslim identity and supported the Muslim elite as a collaborator against Indian nationalism. Moreover, through institutional arrangements such as the introduction of separate electorates British maintained that Muslims will develop a separate identity different from the composite Indian nationality. This narrative is of course the official narrative of Indian nationalism (see Nehru, 1936). Second narrative considers Pakistan as a natural and inevitable result of Muslim history in the subcontinent. According to this narrative, Muslims had always maintained a

¹²⁸Despite the vitality of South Asian scholarship and many contributions to the region's historiography both by the indigenous and foreign scholars, these narratives remain by and large unchanged. In a significant book on the formation of Pakistan written more than fifty years ago, Khalid B. Sayeed (1963) identifies similar narratives and in a more recent article over-viewing the current state of historiography, Francis Robinson (2000a: 211-212) would identify exactly the same narratives as dominant. Contemporary scholarship, Robinson argues, did not indeed produce any new explanation, but different works supporting one of these four narratives maintain that the origin of Pakistan cannot be easily explained through one narrative. The recent scholarship makes us aware of the subtlety of the question and ensures that different narratives should be taken into account for different aspects of the phenomenon.

separate and distinct identity and therefore it was more than natural that they would demand their own political institutions and eventually their own nation-state (see, Qureshi, 1969; Aziz, 1967; Robinson, 1974; Shaikh 1986). Taken to the extreme, this is the official Pakistani policy that is based on the “two-nation theory.” A third narrative understands the formation of Pakistan as a result of Muslim elite politics in India. According to this narrative it was not a historically formed Islamicate identity, but the instrumental choices of Muslim elites, who are defined by Hamza Alavi as *salariat*, that maintained the formation of Pakistan. Fearing to lose their privileges in a Hindu majority India, these professionals maintained that they would be a dominant force within a small but Muslim dominated state (see Brass, 1974; Alavi, 1987). Like the first narrative that blamed colonialism, this narrative is also supported by the Indian nationalists and the Congress. A fourth narrative puts the blame not on the Muslim insistence of separation but on Hindu exclusiveness. According to this narrative Hindu leaders of the Congress were either unwilling or unable to accommodate the religious diversity of Indian society and Muslim demands that came as a result of this diversity. This is the narrative mostly used by the Muslims within Congress like Azad and later Muslim academics of India such as Mushir-ul Hasan (see Azad, 1959; Hasan, 1979).

All these narratives partly capture the reality and it is not easy to rule out any one of them. However, it should be clear that I am not proposing an approach that would combine these four meta-narratives, particularly because they are clearly incompatible and were developed against each other.¹²⁹ Yet the real reason behind the abundance of

¹²⁹The perennialist view that understands Pakistan as the culmination of the evolution of Muslim consciousness in India is in a clear collision with the instrumentalist view that puts emphasis on the strategy and material gains of Muslim elite, and particularly those of the UP. These counter explanations

narratives is the fact that they are looking at different aspects of nation-formation. In the case of the formation of Pakistan we are faced with at least two entirely separate phenomenon; 1) the formation of Muslim as a social and political category, and thus as a “community” 2) the transformation of this “community” into a nation with its own state. The second phase does not naturally follow the first and a political process, that needs to be analyzed, links these two separate historical phenomena.

Neither of these phases took place in a vacuum and they need to be contextualized in the political processes of the emergence of Raj as a modern state, the formation of anti-colonial nationalism and religious conflict in the subcontinent. Just as the emergence of Ottoman Muslim nationalism can be understood in the context of triangular relationships between secular Ottomanism and Christian separatism, the emergence of Muslim nationalism in India can also be understood in its triadic relationship with secular Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism.

However, there is a fundamental difference between the Muslim nationalism that emerged in the Ottoman Empire and India. While the Muslim nationalism of Ottomans was a “state centered nationalism,” the Muslim nationalism in India which resulted in the formation of Pakistan was a “state seeking nationalism” (Tilly, 1994: 133).¹³⁰ Thus,

were also known as the Robinson-Brass debate, but later exchanges between these two scholars made it clear that neither of them insists on a perennial or instrumentalist position and in the final analysis their difference is a matter of degree rather than being complete opposites. Robinson (2000: 13) argues that his position “was only to indicate that politicians were more constrained by personal histories and cultural forces than Brass would have one believe.”

¹³⁰“What was state-led nationalism? Rulers who spoke in a nation's name successfully demanded that citizens identify themselves with that nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state. What of state-seeking nationalism? Representatives of some population that currently did not have collective control of a state claimed an autonomous political status, or even a separate state, on the ground that the population had a distinct, coherent cultural identity” (Tilly 1994: 133).

while it was the state in the Ottoman case that carried the process of nation-building and homogenization, in the Pakistani case, it was a social group who claimed to be the leader/speaker of a community that led the initiative of nation-building and the formation of a state based on religiously homogenous notion of a Muslim nation.

The Muslim nationalism in India emerged as a counter nationalism to the Congress nationalism which itself emerged as an attempt of power sharing and eventually capturing the colonial state. Thus, in order to understand the emergence and success of the Muslim nationalism in India, we also have to look at the emergence and organization of the modern state in India and the emergence and organization of the Congress movement as well. However, our main focus is on the Muslim nationalism, thus we will look at the Congress movement for its relevant aspects to the emergence of Muslim nationalism.

Moreover, the three alternative forms of nationalisms; the Hindu Nationalism, the Muslim nationalism and the secular Indian nationalism are all related with the formation of modern colonial state. It is not that the colonial state created these divisions. India was always a multi-religious society with sporadic communal tensions, yet the politicization of this religious plurality and the emergence of religious nationalism was a modern phenomenon that took shape under the political framework of the colonial state. The Muslim nationalism also emerged in this colonial context as anti-colonial sub nationalism. Anti-colonial nationalism that started to emerge towards the end of nineteenth century and represented by the Congress movement succeeded in terminating the British rule in India, yet it failed to prevent the evolution of an anti-Congress Muslim nationalism represented by the Muslim League (Muslim separatism).

Thus the eventual success of the Pakistani movement means two interconnected phenomena; the failure of Congress nationalism to keep the Muslims in, and the success of the Muslim League to keep Muslims out.

The aim of this chapter is not to provide a political history of the Pakistani movement per se, but to understand the processes and the reasons behind the emergence of a religiously homogenous state from an extremely diverse sub-continent. Homogenization is related with the emergence of nationalism which itself is related with the emergence of modern state and colonialism. Thus, in a chronological order we will first look at the emergence of the modern state and how the colonial nature of this state effected the formation of modern state and its relation with the society. Then we will look at the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism within this context of modern colonial state formation. Since anti-colonial nationalism basically aims to capture the colonial state, these three phenomenon, modern state formation, colonialism and the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism are related with each other. Then we will try to see how this anti-colonial nationalism was unable to keep the sub-continent united. This necessitates an analysis of the relations between the Congress Movement and the Aligarh Movement and their relations with the Raj. That takes us back to our starting point; the emergence of the modern state and its colonial nature.

5.1 Emergence of the Modern State

Just like the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire also went through a steady process of decentralization throughout the eighteenth century.¹³¹ Nevertheless “in contrast to the Ottoman empire the decline of central power in India was not replaced by a stable decentralism” (Hodgson, 1974: 146). The decline of the Mughal power in the center vis-a-vis the peripheral power was both much quicker and also more definite. The Mughal center never recovered from its decline and never managed to reassert its authority in the periphery. While the Ottoman Empire went through a continuous process of centralization and modern state formation starting from the turn of nineteenth century, roughly in the same time it was the British who started to establish a centralized modern state in the subcontinent.

In the previous chapter it was argued that formation of modern state is related with nationalism on two separate grounds; nationalism in the context of modernization becomes a double edged sword-tool. As a modern political ideology it is used both by the centralizing state administration (official nationalism) and by the peripheral opposition (separatist nationalism) towards this modernizing state.

¹³¹Dominant narrative on eighteenth century is to depict it as a dark century of decline. Although the century reflected a decline in terms of the political power of the Mughal dynasty it is not clear if the overall social and economic life experienced such a decline. Chris Bayly's (1988) detailed study of eighteenth century India reflects a much more complicated and uneven picture. There were economic decline and anarchy in certain parts of the subcontinent but there were also instances of economic development and growth of intra-subcontinent trade. Bayly argues that the real problem was that there was no political structure that would correspond to this economic development and sub continental trade and this political framework was later maintained by the British rule. Thus the real story of the eighteenth century, according to Bose and Jalal is decentralization rather than decline (2004: 38-41).

Unlike the official nationalism which aims to strengthen the modern state by mobilizing subjects in favor of the state, or separatist nationalism which aims to build its own modern state, anti-colonial nationalism aims to *capture* the modern state. Thus, anticolonial nationalism is inevitably shaped and limited by the modern state that it aims to capture.¹³² The political organization and framework of this modern state has inevitable effects on the nature of the anti-colonial nationalism. These all hold true in the Indian case as well. Since the story of anti-colonial Indian nationalism is the story of Congress *becoming* Raj, the evolution formation and organization of the Raj has decisive influences in the nationalism of Congress. Roots of the successes and failures of the nationalist movement and its trajectory are all shaped by the nature of the colonial state. This is not to deny Indian agency but to point out the structure they operate in. Thus we need a brief overview of the formation and development of Raj.

5.1.1 British in the Subcontinent- Company Raj¹³³

The British originally followed the Portuguese in their quest to benefit from trade with India. The English East India Company was formed initially at Bengal in 1610 and

¹³²In most cases post-colonial state formed by the anti-colonial nationalism also sticks to the territorial arrangements of the colonial state and appropriates colonial boundaries as the boundary of the nation. For instance, when the Chinese authorities told the Indian government in 1959 that the two countries should have no difficulty in negotiating a boundary settlement, since the existing boundaries were the product of an imperialist power, India made it clear that the boundaries were integral to her conception of nationhood, and the people enclosed by it had always regarded themselves as Indians. Similarly Pakistan also appropriated the Durand Line drawn by the colonial state as definitive of the Pakistani territory (Embree, 1989: 67).

¹³³The historical narrative in this section relies on Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006; Bose and Jalal, 2004 and Brown, 1984.

remained as a trade organization until the mid-eighteenth century. As the Mughal imperial power was declining through this century, the European companies and various regional powers were getting powerful in the subcontinent. The British had to contest more with other European powers and the emerging regional powers than with the Mughals in order to gain control of the subcontinent. Initially confining their control to the strategically important seaports of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, the Company rule started to extend its control throughout the eighteenth century. The first British land conquest started in the resource rich province of Bengal following the Company victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. As a result of its conquests in the second half of the century, the company started to transform itself into a state organization and its nature had changed from “an organization originally created to accumulate profits from oceanic trade (to a state) now drew its basic sustenance from land revenues.” (Bose and Jalal, 2004: 53). As a result of Company’s increasing dominance of the subcontinent, the British government brought the Company under its direct control and through Lord North’s Regulating Act of 1773 and Pitt’s India Act of 1784 brought the Company under the parliamentary supervision. As a result of this state formation and supervision from London, the position of governor-general was created as the sole responsible head of the Company’s state and Warren Hastings was appointed as the first governor-general.

Although the company started to take direct responsibility of the lands that it controlled and started to transform itself to a regional state within India in 1757, it was during the governor-generalship of Wellesley (1798-1805) that they consciously started to build an empire in India. C. A. Bayly (1988: 5) points to the influence of the Napoleonic Wars and the rise of imperial nationalism at home as the main driving force

behind this empire-building process. Lord Valentine's defense of Wellesley is quite instructive to reflect the mood at home: "In short, I wish India to be ruled from a palace, not from a counting-house; with the ideas of a Prince, not with those of a retail-dealer in muslins and indigo" (quoted in Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 68). Not denying the importance of the nationalist fervor in England, Bose and Jalal (2004: 48-49) also point to the political economy of the empire building. Under the pressure of British merchants the British government gradually abolished the Asian trade monopoly of the East India Company. Then it was the land revenues that made the Company compensate for its loss of trade monopoly.¹³⁴ After twenty years of aggressive war campaign, by 1818 British transformed themselves from being a regional power to being the imperial master in India. Thus at a time when the Ottomans were going through an intensive transformation of their political and social system, the British rule was transforming from a colonial merchant type towards a land based empire. In order to extract the maximum level of agricultural revenue and land taxes, this land based empire needed, like the Ottomans did at the same time, an extensive level of centralization which resulted in the creation of a modern bureaucracy, an educational reform necessary to staff this newly emerging bureaucracy, an increase in the means of transportation and communication which resulted in the construction of modern railways but also introduction of telegraph, and as a combined result of educational and communicational developments the emergence of a new public sphere of journals, gazettes and a subsequent intelligentsia who introduced a whole set of ideas and debates through these newly emerging media.

¹³⁴The ruler of provinces in the British system was called "collector" signifying the centrality of land revenues to the British rule (Brown, 1984:53).

5.1.2 Centralization/Modern State Formation

The extent of the rupture that came with the British rule is still a topic of academic controversy (see Hesterman, 1985; Robb, 2002: 148-153). Scholars often debate on the elements of continuity and change that the British rule brought, particularly in the initial phases of the Company rule. In fact, like all empire formations, the building of a British Empire in South Asia “has been a gradual process, embodying a complex interplay of forces of change and continuity, and of modernity and tradition” (Malik, 2008: 89). Even the state itself does not completely represent a break off from the past as the British, like their predecessors, built their empires through forming local allies and the alliance network of the British Empire is pretty much a continuation of the alliance system of the Mughals. However, by the middle of the nineteenth century this regime and its influence may be described as ‘modern’. The most familiar answer, downplaying any continuities, is a narrative of evolving state capabilities (Robb, 2002: 149).

Thus the British Empire that was formed in the two decades between 1798 and 1818 was qualitatively different from the Mughal Empire whose juridical authority under they remained until 1857. In fact the Mughal Empire was not a state in the modern sense of the word and did not possess “boundaries” but instead had varying amounts of authority with its “inner frontiers” (Breuilly, 1994: 219). The Mughal Empire ruled through a series of intermediary power holders. It was this layered nature of sovereignty that enabled them to keep *de jure* authority until 1857 despite the fact that their *de facto* power was limited to the Red Fort in Delhi. Thus particularly during the nineteenth century the Mughal Emperors were also named as *shah-en-shah* pointing to the layered nature of sovereignty. The regional kingdoms and power holders like the

Marathas, the Nizam of Hyderabad or the Nawab of Awadh (Oudh) all had de facto authority in their respective realms though they remained under de jure rule of the Emperor. These regional power holders themselves also ruled thorough intermediaries called *zamindars*.

In contrast to the loosely woven web of suzerainty claimed by pre-colonial empires, the British established an essentially unitary state structure in India (Jalal, 1995: 12).¹³⁵ This is the first introduction of the modern state and its power in the sub-continental history. The development of the modern state meant tighter control of the society by the state. This modern administration was three layered. At the top was a central government appointed by the crown. Below this central government were provincial governments which were in turn divided into districts. At each level there was a governor with an executive and legislative council. There were few slots for the representatives of the Indian society in these councils and the formation of these councils and the number of Indians to be included was a matter of bargain between the colonial administration and the various indigenous power brokers including the nationalist movements.

¹³⁵The princely states constitute an exception to this administrative centralization and unitary state structure. These states remained under the nominal administration of their hereditary princes and had certain autonomy and flexibility in the administration of their internal affairs. These states were those British preferred not to annex mostly for economic reasons. Constituting one third of the entire Indian territory, the princely states only possessed one fifth of the population and were not economically or strategically crucial to the British dominance. Thus indirect rule co-existed with the establishment of direct rule of British colonial state. The princely states however, never played a significant political role and always remained loyal to the colonial state. At certain times, particularly in 1932, the British tried to play the princely card in order to thwart the development and success of the Congress movement. For the purposes of our discussion, we need not to pay attention to the princely states, as nationalist movement was always very weak there and even that was mostly imported from the regions under the direct rule of British Raj.

Through various administrative re-organizations British did not only ensure the complete control of London over India, but the administration in India also became strictly centralized. “The Charter Act of 1833, which brought the Supreme Government in to being, had also granted the Governor-General in Council control over the entire revenues of all the territories in British India.” (Seal, 1973: 331) The fiscal control over the provinces was later supplanted by the complete military control as the Bombay and Madras military commands were abolished in 1893. The central command in Calcutta also extended its influence in the conduct of the relations between provinces and the princely states. Thus for the first time in the history of subcontinent, the army was unified under direct and immediate control of the central authority. Lack of such control previously allowed the emergence of local power centers that could be used against the central authority (Embree, 1972: 9). As a result of these fiscal, political, diplomatic and military centralizations, Anil Seal (1973: 331) concludes that “during the nineteenth century the provinces had been degraded into mere agents of the centre.”

The assertion of central authority on the vast subcontinent was of course helped by the developments in the transportation and communication technology. Throughout the nineteenth century the Raj made enormous investments for the spread of railways, telegraph lines and postal services. This horizontal pattern of the extension of central authority and vertical deepening of its control over the society was indeed a common phenomenon of all modernizing states of the nineteenth century. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this pattern of modern state formation was also evident in the Ottoman Empire as well as in all other universal empires. Moreover, we have seen that such unity is essential for the emergence of nationalism in these modernizing states; either through

the form of official nationalism that comes from the modernizing state or through the form of separatist nationalism that develops as a reaction to the modernizing state. In India, the Raj was certainly a unifier and its unifying impulse was not limited to its being the “common enemy.” English educated elite who were the forbearers of Indian nationalism was the first all-Indian group and this was a product of British rule and political control at the all-India level, something never existed as consistently and strongly before. At this stage in order to understand the relation between the modern state and the emergence of nationalism in the Indian case, it might be appropriate to ask whether the Raj was a prototypical modernizing empire of nineteenth century or not.

How does the colonial nature of the modern state relate to the formation of nationalism(s) in the subcontinent? Partha Chatterjee, a leading scholar of anti-colonial nationalism, starts his analysis of colonial state by asking a critical question on the relation of modernity and colonial;

Does it serve any useful analytical purpose to make a distinction between the colonial state and the forms of the modern state? Or should we regard the colonial state as simply another specific form in which the modern state has generalized itself across the globe? If the latter is the case, then of course the specifically colonial form of the emergence of the institutions of the modern state would be of only incidental, or at best episodic, interest; it would not be a necessary part of the larger, and more important, historical narrative of modernity. (1993:14)

The question is rhetorical and is intended to draw attention to the distinctive aspects of the colonial state. The colonial nature of the modern state formation has shaped the political process on two grounds that had distinctive effects on the formation of nationalisms in the subcontinent. One feature of the colonial regime, as pointed by Chatterjee himself and many others is its racist character. A second and equally

important one is the relation of the colonial state with political unity. As we have seen above, Raj as a modern state created an unprecedented degree of administrative unity through the subcontinent; something inconceivable before the advent of modernity and its technological tools. However, the relation between administrative unity and political unity works in opposite direction among modernizing universal empires and colonial empires. While the Ottomans and other modernizing empires of the nineteenth century would try to create a political unity where it did not exist, the colonial state would consider political unity anathema to itself. Political unity is the first stage of nation-building and all empires who espoused to promote official nationalism would put a keen emphasis on the promotion of unity. However, colonial states can not pursue official nationalism. Thus they have to follow traditional imperial policies of alliance building, collaboration and divide and rule tactics. For this they have to insist on the heterogeneous and divided character of the society. Therefore it is not surprising that all the British officers insisted that there is no such thing as “Indian” and promoted a vision of India as a conglomeration of diverse peoples, religions, caste groups etc. Moreover the underlying logic of this vision was the assumption that interests of these diverse groups were irreconcilable, making a neutral outsider, i.e British, to remain as the arbiter among these irreconcilable interests. The logical conclusion would of course be the inability of the indigenous to rule themselves and the necessity of the British rule for the self-development and justice in the subcontinent. As we will see below both of these aspects of the colonial state had decisive effects on the fate of nationalisms in the subcontinent. The British legacy on the emergence and development of nationalisms in

the subcontinent would be shaped through the contradictory features of unifying impulse of the modern state and divisive impulse of the colonial state.

As in all modernizing states bureaucracy played a central role in this affair of centralization and maintaining administrative unity. “The actual work of administration, whether at the central, provincial or district level, was in the hands of Indian civil service (ICS)” (Embree, 1972: 10). In fact, from its beginning to the end the British Raj was a bureaucratic empire. In the initial phase of British control in the subcontinent, the ICS emerged as a lucrative career path as many of its members returned home with fortunes. The level of corruption and surreptitious wealth the members of ICS gained was one of the major reasons of arguments on “drain of wealth”¹³⁶ and eventually became a scandal at home (Dirks, 2009). In an attempt to prevent corruption and to protect the efficiency of bureaucracy, by 1853, the entry to the ICS was done through competitive examinations rather than patronage. However “through the latter part of the century the ICS was increasingly unpopular as a profession, partly because of the widening opportunities at home, professional grievances in India, and the health

¹³⁶Aside from the huge prestige it brought to British Empire, India’s vast resources contributed to the farewell of British Empire in two crucial realms; economy and military. In terms of economics India was perfectly fitting the example of a colony which would provide cheap raw material and a market for the end products of the metropole industry. As a market India was indeed huge which accounted for almost half of British exports. This pattern of trade between Britain and India also maintained that in terms of balance of payment India owed a huge deficit to Britain. This British surplus was used to finance the British trade deficit vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Indian military was equally important for the Britain’s leading role in global politics. The Indian army did not only guarantee British control of India but used for various excursions into the north (towards Afghanistan), to the East (in order to increase British influence at South East Asia) and to the West (to maintain British colonization of East Africa and later Middle East). Needless to say that all these huge military operations conducted for the favor of British Empire was financed through Indian revenues. Thus Anil Seal argues that (1973: 329) “about a third of the total expenditure of the Indian government in the four decades before World War I was on its army.” One can easily predict that these rates would skyrocket during the two World Wars in which the Indian contribution was crucial for the eventual British victory.

hazards, uprooting, and family disruption which an Indian career demanded” leading to increased concerns that the number and quality of the recruits were declining (Brown, 1984: 92). On the other hand, “in recognition of ICS’s position in the power structure, that the early nationalist leaders made admittance of Indians to the civil service as a central part of their demands” (Embree, 1972: 10). It is this conjunction that paved the ways of the collaboration between the Raj and Indian elites. Since *raison d’etre* of the Raj was a British state enterprise which used Indian resources to serve British economic and political interests (Stern, 1993: 134), the extension of state apparatus and its control over the society made Indian collaboration a necessity for two reasons; first, as the state’s grasp and control over the society deepened, in the lower echelons of the administration the British needed the local knowledge of the indigenous. Secondly, to staff the ever expanding administration by the British was over expensive. Thus, the British were willing to let Indian elements to take their part in the administration. The point is important as it reflects an element of imperialism that is often overlooked by the nationalist historiography. The interaction between the colonial powers and the indigenous society can also be seen in terms of collaboration and westernization as much as it is of domination and resistance (Breuilly, 1994: 218).¹³⁷ However, collaboration had its limits and at a certain stage had the risk of putting the previous collaborators in collusion with the Raj. We will later turn on the importance of collaboration between the Indians and the British for the development of both the Congress movement and the Muslim League. However, before explaining the indigenous reaction to the colonial state and the emergence of nationalism in the

¹³⁷The issue of collaboration is also related with the above discussion on the elements of change and continuity, and the role of indigenous society on the making of history.

subcontinent, we need to pay attention to a significant event that not only shook the foundation of the colonial state but also shaped the British vision of India and shaped their relation with the indigenous society; the 1857 Revolt. The paradoxes of a colonial modernization would be best observed in the post 1857 policies and these policies would also shape the nature and evolution of nationalisms in India.

5.1.3 The Mutiny and its Afterwards

Even though modern state formation and centralization in India was the leitmotif of nineteenth century politics, this process faced a twist in the middle of century. The extension of British control in the subcontinent, both horizontally (territorially) and vertically (increasing control over society) was paused in 1857 by a military mutiny starting in the regiments of Bengali army which quickly spread to most of north India and shook the British sovereignty from its foundations. For a while the revolt was so powerful that British were on the edge of losing their entire control in India and the re-establishment of British dominance was only completed in the spring of 1858.

It is customary to mark the 1857 events as the breaking point for the subcontinent's history and also a founding moment of the Pakistani movement.¹³⁸ In fact 1857 Mutiny does not constitute a fundamental rupture in terms of modern state formation in India which was already under way before the Mutiny. The process of centralization and extension of state power started earlier and continued throughout the

¹³⁸Khalid B. Sayeed's (1968) important study is a good example. The title of his book is *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1947*. Also works of Sumit Sarkar (1983), K. K. Aziz (1967) among others take 1857 as the breaking point.

century. However, 1857 was particularly important for it made it clear to the British the problems that comes with the modern state formation and the lessons they gained from revolt shaped their later policies. Therefore we need to pay a particular attention to the events, how they developed, but more importantly how they were perceived by the British and how this perception shaped the colonial policies and the relationship with the society and the colonial administration.

There is even disagreement over naming the event. The British state defined the events as The Mutiny. Those who focused on the "mutiny" theme projected it as the work of a set of discontented *sipahis* who were offended with the introduction, in 1857, of the new Enfield rifle. Use of these rifles required the bullet to be bitten before loading and rumours that the grease used on the bullets was either from the fat of cattle or pigs created strong animosities and was perceived as an attack on Hindu and Muslim religious beliefs (Pati, 2007: 1686).

In its beginning 1857 *was* a military mutiny. If the immediate cause of mutiny were religious sensitivities, the underlying cause was the deteriorating conditions of the military class. As the British control expanded, the Bengali *sepoys* were sent to military campaigns far away from their hometowns, often including overseas campaigns. Moreover their economic conditions were deteriorating and their future prospects were getting increasingly low, as the style of successful career changed from one in the military to commerce under the Company Raj (Hardy, 1972: 31).

In contrast to the British, the later Indian nationalists would define the rebellion as the "First War of Indian Independence." V.D. Savarkar's 1909 book with the same

title was the first work written on the events of 1857-58 by an Indian, and continues to inform the Indian nationalist historiography. The latter also underlined a factor of unity that cut across religious boundaries. Much before Savarkar and other Indian nationalists, Marx and Engels also defined the events of 1857 as “War of Independence” and hailed the unity displayed by the Hindus and Muslims who opposed British colonialism during the rebellion (Pati, 2007: 1686-1687).

While labeling the Revolt as a mutiny is clearly a British centric reading, to define it as a nationalist war or rebellion is equally anachronistic and misleading. It is true that “factors of racial subjugation and common misery created a sense of oneness that was, however, untainted by ideas of national sovereignty” (Pati, 2010: 10). As Tara Chand (1972: 42), a well-known nationalist historian and statesman of India, has admitted “the war against the British was not inspired by any sentiment of nationalism, for in 1857 India was not yet politically a nation... (Insurgents) were moved by personal loyalties rather than loyalty to a common motherland.” “The fact of a common enemy did not paper over the cracks in Indian society” (Jalal, 2000: 35).

In fact, as Chris Bayly (1988: 169-171) points out, the Revolt was not a “solitary unheralded thing, but only the climax of many decades of sporadic revolts, urban as well as rural.” These revolts were mostly due to economic hardships and mal-administration and over taxation. In that regard they resemble the Serbian and Greek Revolts the Ottomans faced in early nineteenth century. Just as Serbian and Greek Revolts were not nationalist uprisings (see Anscombe, 2014), so was not the 1857 Revolt.¹³⁹ These

¹³⁹Moreover, unlike the Greek and Serbian Revolts, in the 1857 Revolt there was not even a nationalist intelligentsia. Thus even if one accepts Hroch’s (2000) seminal contribution that nationalism develops

sporadic revolts “were too heterogeneous to coalesce, and even the Mutiny when it came, remained fragmented and uncoordinated: in every district the government could find supporters and as well as enemies” (Bayly, 1988: 178-188).

The fragmented and heterogeneous nature of 1857 was deeply linked to the nature of British control in the subcontinent. As the British control was not uniform and British policies differed significantly from place to place, so were the Indian reactions to the revolt. There was as much collaboration as resistance. In the end the British would never be able to suppress the Revolt without significant support from the indigenous society. The Punjab remained loyal and provided large regiments of military power. This would later shape the nature of Indian army and the entire Indian army will be made of Punjabis.¹⁴⁰ In general it is possible to claim that those who benefited from the British rule did not only remain passive but actively collaborated with the British while those that suffered most were the leaders of the Revolt (Brown, 1984: 85-89).

The Revolt is an important turning point of the subcontinental history, since it created significant changes in the perceptions of the British. The immediate effect of the Revolt showed itself on the legal aspect of British sovereignty. The initial result of the Revolt was the abolishment of both the Mughal crown and the Company rule. The Company was ruling under the facade of a Mughal Empire, while being under the supervision of British parliament. With the suppression of the Revolt, these anomalies ended. Members of the Mughal dynasty, which was nothing more than a name, were

through distinguishable phases from cultural awakening to the formation of nationalist intelligentsias and then to the mass mobilization, 1857 Revolt wouldn't qualify as a nationalist uprising.

¹⁴⁰This was also the roots of the famous “Martial Races” theory.

either executed or exiled while the Company was transferred to the Crown and India nominally became the territory of the British Crown and direct governmental control was established. It became evident that India was too precious and too difficult for the Company to rule. “With the direct assumption of authority by the British crown in 1858, the British became, in a sense, “insiders” in India for the first time (Gilmartin, 1988: 12). Hereafter the supreme executer of India, governor general, was also called Viceroy, pointing that he is now the representative of the crown as well as the parliament. In terms of the state organization and even of the personalities, little has changed. However the relation of this state with the indigenous society has radically transformed. This change will also give us a better apprehension of the difference between a modernizing universal empire and a colonial empire and how this difference influenced the nationalisms in the subcontinent.

In certain ways British response to 1857 was in line with the policies of other modernizing empires. In the previous chapter we have seen that limited representation, education and creating a sense of loyalty towards the dynasty were the main policies of modernizing empires in order to appease the discontent in their society. Establishment of Crown rule should be considered as a first step of promoting loyalty around the persona of the sovereign. Inclusion of India to the British crown was later completed with the declaration of Queen Victoria as the Empress of India; *Kaiser-i Hind* in 1876. At a time when Abdülhamid II and other monarchs were relying on “invented traditions” in order to sacralize the dynasty, Victoria tried to do the same in India. As Bernard Cohn’s (1983) seminal study demonstrates, her coronation was full of symbols that were supposed to be belonging to the Mughal tradition. In reality they were all recently invented.

However, such glamorous coronations were later followed by the Viceroys as a way of spreading personal loyalty to the crown and its representatives in India.

Aside from the creation of personal loyalty, limited representation and education were the main mechanisms all modernizing empires of the nineteenth century applied in order to overcome the legitimacy problems created by the formation of modern/interventionist state and British were already employing them before the Mutiny and continued to do so with increasing fervor. The British Raj, like all other contemporary empires, pursued a rigorous policy in spreading education. It was also one of the lessons of the Mutiny that the more educated classes remained more loyal. However, even education in the colonial context has its own contradictions as the western educated would later assume the leadership of the nationalist movement. However, the role of westernized elites and their ideological formations should not be overestimated in the development of anti-colonial nationalism.¹⁴¹ What mattered more was the problem of representation.

Limited representation of local voices had already started in 1830's when indigenous people were included in local bodies. Even though they had no executive power they were serving as consultative bodies. The locals in these bodies were nominated rather than elected. Throughout the century the level of Indian participation has extended beyond local bodies to more country wide bodies and also from consultative bodies to the legislative and executive councils. Soon after the Revolt, in

¹⁴¹Anil Seal whose 1968 book on the emergence of Indian nationalism was responsible for the orthodoxy of understanding Indian nationalism through the development of an English educated elite and their assimilation to the European notions of freedom and nationalism, would soon (1973) admit that he grossly exaggerated the role of western education in the emergence of Indian nationalism.

1861 the Indian Councils Act enabled the nomination of Indians to the highest council; the Viceroy's Legislative Council. The process also took an important turn with the introduction of local elections in 1880s. Thus for the first time members of local bodies were elected rather than nominated. Thus there had been a steady extension of representative institutions on three grounds: (i) they spread from local to provincial and national bodies, (ii) the nature of these bodies shifted from consultative to legislative and executive, and (iii) the membership to these bodies shifted from being through nomination towards election. Extension of this election to national bodies and increasing Indian representation would later constitute an important subject of nationalist demand and a struggle among the Muslims and the Indian National Congress.

In its moderate phase, the nationalist movement asked for equal opportunities and more representation. This was acceptable for the colonial state as well up to a certain point. However, as colonial rulers the British could not accept the idea that Indian population can rule itself. In order to substantiate this position they developed a number of ideological arguments and tried to justify the need for British rule over the subcontinent. As we shall see, the main objective of British rule starting from the last quarter of the century is to keep the real power at the hands of British, while yielding to increased demands for more Indian representation and participation. The administrative adjustments the British made to accommodate Indian representation without losing actual control had not only shaped the fate and development of anti-colonial nationalism but also remained an ongoing legacy for the post-colonial states.

Under the direct control of British government the extension of modern state formation and the stricter control of society as its corollary continued after the Revolt.

The modern government continued to penetrate deeper into the society through its bureaucratic apparatus and used objective legal rules and institutions, and penetrated more directly through society with its taxes, records and information, and its larger agenda of interference and control (Cohn, 1996). However, despite the inevitable tendency of the modern state to intervene deeper, one of the main lessons British learned from the Mutiny was the danger of intervening in the social, cultural and religious realm. Thus refraining from social reform was one of the legacies of the Revolt. In general it is possible to say that a conservative attitude shaped the British policies in the post 1857 period.

The conservatism of the British policies was also in line with the ideological changes at the metropole. As Thomas Metcalf points out the British liberalism was also going through a change and the British liberalism of 1860s was fundamentally different and certainly much more conservative than the liberalism of 30s “when a group of earnest young men, brash, self-confident, and aggressive, had set out to remodel England according to the principles of Ricardo and Bentham” (Metcalf, 1964: ix). The prosperous and complacent country lost most of its vigor for a reform and when combined with the lessons of Mutiny in India, conservatism became the hall-mark of post-mutiny British policies in India.

This conservatism also shaped the alliance preferences of the Raj and thus had decisive effects on the political history of the subcontinent. Rulers of the Raj prior to 1857 often considered themselves as agents of the interests of the middle and lower classes; while creating an alliance between the British and the traditional Indian gentry became the cornerstone of British policy in post-1857 period (Fontera, 1965: 714). This

was partly based on a very conservative vision of India which was considered to have “an unchanging social order comprised of a mosaic of separate communities, whose ‘natural leaders’ spoke for them” (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 133). It was also based on a more pragmatic observation that those who have something to lose did not join the Revolt. Thus, the British concluded, the government should create vested interests as a safeguard against potential disruptions. What the British defined as the “natural leaders” of the society were those among something to lose and their alliance was an important aspect of the British control of the society. The natural leaders usually included the traditional gentry, urban magnates and the religious leaders. In general this was in line with the Orientalist depiction of India as hierarchical, authoritarian, divided and religious. India was defined as a conglomeration of peoples with an inner hierarchy. Those at the top of the hierarchy were the ones the British should incorporate.

Indeed, the landed gentry and the princes proved their importance and power throughout the Revolt either as allies or as adversaries. In the words of a British official, princes were the “breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave” (Metcalf, 1994: 191). Aside from the natural leaders, the British also considered the newly emerging western educated elite as another group of allies. The importance attached to the western education partly comes from the assumption that “an educated Indian was a loyal one”, thus spreading education was also related to the British desire of creating vested interests in the Indian society. But more importantly, the educated elite also had a distinct function that could not be provided by the “natural leaders”. Traditional gentry and religious hierarchy was useful in maintaining order in the society however, they were less than useful when it came to providing the necessary

skilled man-power British needed for an efficient administration. For a while the British tried to incorporate the sons of the ruling elite and the urban magnates to the bureaucratic apparatus. Canning College was established in order to produce English educated professionals the British needed for efficient administration from the heirs of traditional gentry. However, the traditional elite who secured their positions as the natural leaders had little incentive in pursuing such a career. Instead it was the middle class families who were ready and able to make the needed sacrifice to let their sons become English educated professionals.

There was a mutual dependence. The western educated natives were essential for the effective administration, while government auspice was essential for the western educated as they lacked the financial comfort of landed gentry (Brown, 1984: 135). In a sense both the natural leaders and the English educated were the collaborators of British system and had different functions; the prior to maintain peace and order and the latter to create efficiency of the bureaucracy. This collaborator system would go into trouble when the interests of these two groups collided. Such a collision would often take place on the issue of admission to the very limited positions of representation. The British almost always favored the natural leaders over the western educated pushing western educated to form bodies and to act in coordination in order to protect their rights to representation.

One of the most important conclusions of Metcalf's seminal work on the post-Mutiny India is that this alliance preference, which according to Metcalf was an inevitable result of the conservative turn in the policies, made the Empire "more stable and fragile at the same time." (1964: viii). The empire became more stable as it

managed to incorporate the traditional elite in its collaborative system, however it became weaker as the British lost their sympathy to the western educated elite for a share of power and thus “were disabled from meeting the nationalist challenge in a friendly and responsive manner” (1964: viii). The missing part in Metcalf’s otherwise compelling narrative is the colonial nature of the British system. True to the spirit of Macaulay Anglicanism, here Metcalf seems to suggest that a possible power sharing mechanism could have been established if British remained true to the liberal principles. The problem is that these principles were self-destructive for British sovereignty, thus a colonial state would inevitably subvert them.

Another aspect of the conservative shift in the policies of the Raj showed itself in the religious realm. As we have mentioned, religious sensibilities were the immediate cause of the Revolt. Thus not to interfere in the religious realm was the clearest lesson of the Revolt. Direct interference to the religious realm was never a significant aspect of the Company Raj. Aside from the governor generalship of William Bentinck (1828-1835) and his abolition of *sati*, the British usually refrained from intervention in this realm. However, the lesson that hurting religious sensibilities might create a conducive environment for the discontented to rise up became a new apprehension. From this point on missionary activities received less and less support. Traditional religious orthodoxy, as it is understood by the British, were favored over religious reformists such as Ram Mohan Roy. However religion continued to be a significant venue of raising discontent against the British and in the early stages of nationalist opposition more radical elements among the nationalists would often refer to religion in order to mobilize the people. Half a century after the Revolt, Tilak would make use of the ‘age of consent’ as an issue to

raise anti-British feelings. However, as Breuilly insightfully mentions, even though he could cite ancient texts for his arguments, his was a nationalist objection, more concerned by the issue of right to self-rule rather than preserving religious orthodoxies (1994: 171). Yet the infusion and instrumental application of religion in the nationalist discourse was difficult to confine and needed to be delicately balanced in a clearly multi-religious society whose basic political principles were clearly segregated on religious principles. As the extremists within the Congress under the leadership of Tilak tried to provide a Hindu ideological underpinning to Indian nationalism or at least a Hindu idiom to its day to day political agitation, this had an adverse effect of feeding communalism (Chandra, 1984: 410). In the long run even the rhetoric of Gandhi who was clearly opposed to communalism would create unrest among the non-Hindu masses as his Indian nation was also a Hindu one.

This British attitude with regard to religion was also in accord with the Orientalist view of India as a land essentially different from the West. India was portrayed as the other of West, and while it was assumed that Western societies were guided through secularized reason, the Orient was supposedly under the sway of religious bigotry. Moreover, India was not only depicted as a religious society but it was also defined as a religiously divided country. The unity displayed during the Revolt by different religious groups was a surprise to the British and to prevent it happening again was a central policy of the British. In that regard, “the revolt cast a shadow of apprehension over succeeding generations of colonial rulers, but did not divert them from their course. In terms of religious diversity, belief in the impossibility of common

cause between Indians of different religions was shaken by events, but as we will soon see, reaffirmed as a mainstay of policy” (Robb, 2002: 147).

In fact it is possible to conclude that policies of British Raj in post 1857 period became increasingly contradictory. These contradictions were not only shaped by the desire of modernizing a land based empire but they were exacerbated and appeared to be impossible to solve due to the colonial nature of this empire. On the one hand, the spread of education and the creation of vested interest were pursued. On the other, a heavy conservatism, for which social reform was "no longer compatible with the requirements of political security"(Metcalf, 1964: 133), shaped the perception of the British policy makers. In such an environment an uneasy combination of the modern state formation with increasing penetration of the society and a medieval state system, which relied on the support of intermediaries (the natural leaders), shaped the post 1857 policies of the British Raj. These contradictions certainly shaped and influenced not only the colonial state but also the anti-colonial nationalism which targets to take over this colonial state.

5.2 National Question in the Context of Colonial State

John Breuilly (1994: 156-169) identifies four main political approaches¹⁴² to the study of anti-colonial nationalism. These are domination, westernization, collaboration and resistance approaches. The domination and resistance approaches are linked to each

¹⁴²He also defines economic and culturalist interpretations of anti-colonial nationalism, but these interpretations “can do little more than indicate certain limits within which nationalism will operate.” (Breuilly, 1994: 167)

other as they both emphasize the domination of colonial state over the society. The colonial state was established through conquest and survived by the exploitation of the resources of the colony. The domination approach puts the strength of the imperial power to the center of its analysis and understands the success of anti-colonialism through the decline of this imperial power, while in an attempt to pinpoint the agency of the indigenous society, the resistance approach understands anti-colonialism as the resistance of society to the domination by the imperial power. Thus these two approaches provide available discourse to the nationalist historiography as well by understanding nationalism through the prism of domination and resistance. In our quest to understand Indian nationalism we can dismiss both approaches. Not because there was not domination, nor resistance to it, however, reducing nationalism to a history of resistance to the British rule presumes an Indian national identity that was clearly non-existent through most of the colonial period. It cannot explain the factional divides within the indigenous society and cannot differentiate nationalism from other sources of resistance, particularly the religious identity.¹⁴³

Thus even though domination-resistance was a historical aspect of colonialism; we cannot understand anti-colonial nationalism in general and Indian nationalism in particular through this approach. For a better grasp of anti-colonial nationalism in general and Indian nationalism in particular, Breuilly rightly proposes to link the domination to the collaboration and westernization approaches. Westernization approach

¹⁴³Of course nationalist historiography would insist on an essential and timeless existence of an Indian nation (which of course should have included Pakistan and Bangladesh, but doesn't) and its struggle with the British. This narrative would also understand the 1857 Revolt as the First Indian War of Independence, which would be, as it is discussed above, anachronistic.

understands nationalism primarily as a political ideology and traces the evolution of anti-colonial nationalism through the expansion of Western ideas through education institutions set up by the colonial state. The collaboration approach focuses on the collaboration between the colonizer and the indigenous elites and understands anti-colonial nationalism through the disruption of the collaborative system.

5.2.1 Collaboration and the Congress

The British were self-aware of their need for local allies not only in order to maintain order but also in order to rule efficiently. British military might was sufficient for rule and order but without indigenous collaboration, India was impossible to rule efficiently.

“We rule India by British bayonets and native tahsildars” was a favorite British epigram mostly used after 1857 (Hardy, 1972: 108). In recognition of the need for collaboration, in 1858, soon after the establishment of Crown rule Queen Victoria declared that;

So far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, (shall) be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our services, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity duly to discharge (Roberts, 1958: 383-84, quoted in Stern, 1993: 140)

The similarity with the Tanzimat declaration which argued for equality among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire is striking. Yet unlike the Ottoman Empire, the British did not try to follow up to their promises. Given the colonial nature of the British sovereignty in India they could have never followed it.

Despite the legal changes in the state system, the colonial nature of British rule in India remained unchanged. It continued to be a colonial administration informed by

racial prejudices. It was governed in the name and for the benefit of the British. It continued to invest in the modernization of the administration and state apparatus in order to increase efficiency. There was room for indigenous participation to the system, yet the “systems of nomination, representation and election were all means of enlisting Indians to work for imperial ends” (Seal, 1973: 330). However, as the western educated natives demanded more impartial politics and better positions in the government system, they started to get into a collision with the Raj administration, since the Raj was and remained a discriminatory institution. The underlying ideology of the Raj’s discrimination was racism. In the nineteenth century this gave a “scientific” character to the discrimination employed by the Raj. The Raj tried to overcome the need for native collaboration at high posts through Anglo-Indians. Anglo Indians were the descendants of European settlers and they were considered to be a combination of the high qualities of European races with the necessary local knowledge. They were the “creoles” of the British Empire in India.

Anderson famously defined the creoles as the pioneers of nationalism in Latin America. The discriminated creoles, whose pilgrimage to the capital was blocked, were soon to revolt. In India, creoles were the ones who were favored against the western educated Indians. Thus they were the allies of colonialism. This time it was the westernized educated who had the potential to turn nationalist, as they were discriminated against the Anglo Indians. The western educated were forced to stay in the subordinate positions as the higher positions were reserved for the Anglo Indians. This

discrimination became more visible and evident through the Ilbert Bill¹⁴⁴ in 1883. “The Ilbert controversy forced the British for the first time to seriously consider how they should accommodate the demands of India’s educated for a share of political power” (Metcalf, 1994: 222).

It also forced the English educated elite to consider the need for a better organized and concerted action for a share of power. Thus, there is direct link with the racism of the regime and the evolution of collaboration towards anti-colonial nationalism and it is no coincidence that Indian National Congress was formed in 1885, only two years after the infamous Ilbert Bill, as an institution to defend the rights of these western educated elite. However, considering that the primary focus of the Congress is to organize the newly emerged western educated elite for getting better positions in the government administration, we can say that Congress initially was another instrument of collaboration between the government and the native population. Thus in its early phase the Congress was an institution with a narrow focus. It didn’t challenge the Raj but it tried to find a better place for its members in the Raj. As a collaborationist institute it had to be a loyal organization and in its first meeting in 1885, W.C. Bonnarjee, the president of the meeting had to underline that “there were no more thoroughly loyal and consistent well-wishers of the British Government than himself and his friends” (Zaidi, 1986: 16). Dadabhai Naoroji who presided over the second

¹⁴⁴ The Ilbert Bill basically proposed that Europeans and Anglo-Indians could be tried by an Indian judge. This proposition was faced with hysteria and a campaign led by the Anglo-Indians asked for its annulment. Thus, it was a clear testimony to the prevalence of racism at the time. Government had to compromise and accepted that any European on trial will have right to have a jury at least half composed of Europeans (Brown, 1984: 130).

annual convention of Congress also declared, the organization was not against Raj but “another stone in the foundation of stability of that government” (Embree, 1972: 33). Naoroji was aware of the mission of the Congress as the representative of the western educated but also he was equally aware of the expectations of the government from the class of western educated when he frankly declared that “the educated classes have become true interpreters and mediators between the masses of our countrymen and our rulers” (Zaidi, 1986: 26).

However, the collaboration between Congress elites and the Raj was not easily sustainable. One problem was that as it became more and more difficult to combine racism, discrimination and placating the demands of an increasing number of western educated elites, the collaboration between the Raj and the western educated represented by the Congress started to shake. Another problem was the extent of collaboration. The essence of collaboration was to ensure that the real power were to remain in the hands of the British. While there was an ever increasing amount of potential collaborators, financial constraints and racial prejudices forced the government to make certain adjustments to placate an increasing number of collaborators. The dislocation, and discontent, of the First World War also forced the Raj for a reconsideration of the fundamental nature and objectives (Metcalf, 1994: 225).

Following WWI, the British political arrangements in India i.e the 1919 and the 1935 Constitutional Acts focused mostly on placating increasing demands on power sharing/self-government while keeping the real power in the hands of the British. This could have been done on two separate grounds. One was a keen attempt to keep politics confined to locality and province, while keeping the real executive power at the central

level. This was the gist of the 1919 and the 1935 political reforms. These reforms, particularly the 1919 reforms made a deep impact on the nature of Congress politics and the development of nationalism in India. The 1919 reforms basically did two things; on the one hand, it extended the electoral franchise and made the potential collaborators to fight for public support in order to benefit from the advantages of a representative position in the government administration. Thus the Indian politicians, usually residing in the provincial capitals, in post-1919 period had to seek popular support in the localities. Through this arrangement local politics was linked with provincial politics, meaning that local conflicts, be it religious sectarian or class based is now linked with provincial level politics. While indigenous politics was locked in the local-provincial level, the real executive power, particularly the power to control fiscal arrangements was shifted from province to the center, or in other words, upwards from provincial level to the all India (national) level, where they would be securely placed at the hands of British.¹⁴⁵ Thus, while on the lower end the Indian politician is forced to create ties and power bases in the localities, in the upper end the emphasis of the politics shifted towards the all India (national) level. This linking of locality, province and national level is crucial for the emergence of Indian nationalism and shift of Congress from its moderate phase towards a mass movement (Seal, 1973). Studies on Indian nationalism and Indian National Congress often take 1920 as a turning point for the nationalist movement, since from 1920 onwards Congress became a mass movement. Up to this

¹⁴⁵Thus Ayesha Jalal (1984:9) convincingly claims that “The 1919 reforms were not intended to be a first step towards the grant of responsible government at the centre. They merely tackled on some political concessions to divert Indian political attention to the provincial arenas. The principle of diarchy aimed to limit the Indian say in provincial self-government into the less important subjects... the reforms ensured that no single community would dominate the ministries; the balance of power was firmly kept in the government’s hands.”

point Congress politics was confined to a very small minority elite, “a microscopic minority” in the words of Curzon. With the extension of franchise, and with the linking of local politics to the national level, Congress finally started to acquire the characteristics of a mass nationalist movement.

Finally the politics in India shifted from saloon rooms to the streets and this didn't only change the style of politics but also the content also shifted. And once the politics is moved to the streets religion acquires a more central role in politics.¹⁴⁶ The communal conflicts were dominant throughout 1920's. As we will see below these communal conflicts came after a period of Hindu Muslim alliance symbolized through the the Khilafat Movement, thus the radical increase in the number of communal conflicts might be surprising. No doubt that this was so for the Congress elite which was unable to contextualize this sudden and radical increase in the communal conflicts. The initial Congress reaction was to blame the British for perpetuating the communal conflicts in order to divide the nationalist opposition. This is still the main argument in the classical work of Gyanendra Pandey (1990) and this line is repeated particularly by the scholars of the Subaltern School. As we will soon see the British did indeed relied on such communal divisions and even when they were not the perpetrators of these divisions they “accepted the fact of such divisions with the air of a man struggling joyfully in the grip of a benevolent fate.” (Hardy, 1972: 134)

However, the pioneering works of Jack Snyder (1995; 2000) and others on the nature of early democratization would reveal that such conflicts in the early stage of

¹⁴⁶Part of Gandhi's mass mobilization was made possible through the Khilafat movement.

electoral politics is not unexpected at all. In the sudden need of acquiring mass mobilization the politicians in the early stages of electoral politics play on the local conflicts and ethnic and sectarian divisions as these have the power of mobilization. In cases where there are no sufficient institutional mechanisms, these divisions can easily turn violent. Thus the sudden eruption of violence in India in 1920's is by no means unprecedented. While in the European cases that Snyder focuses the politicians played the ethnic card, the politicians in India played the religious card. This was so because, as we will see below, the nature and organization of politics in India made religion a more conducive card to play with. As David Gilmartin (1991: 107-111) mentions, the political structure of colonial state transformed religion to a form of "ethnic identity." The very nature of separate electorates made it unnecessary for the politicians to reach out to other religious communities, since every politician would only need the support of his co-religionists in politics. This inevitably gives the upper hand to the more radical ones. Such communal conflicts and violence is of course an important element on the growth of religious nationalism, however, as we will see below, communal conflict is not necessarily the same with religious nationalisms. Thus through this decade which was characterized by mass religious mobilization, the Muslim politics in India was on the verge of collapse. As Ayesha Jalal (1994) rightly points, all India level Muslim politics was meaningful as a device of power sharing at the centre, and since the British political reforms was deliberately designed to keep Indian politics confined to the local and provincial level and inhibited any power sharing at the centre, the political fortunes of Muslim politicians like Jinnah hit the rock bottom. Muslim League as an organization was and remained ineffective throughout the decade and Jinnah wondered around

wilderness. The fortunes of ML would start to change only when a real power sharing at the center become a plausible expectation initially upon the 1935 Constitutional Reforms and more importantly with the British entry to the WWII.

The second and more persistent aspect of British policies to deal with the nationalist demands for power sharing was the implementing the classical policies of divide and rule. This policy was pursued through the construction of a political realm based on exclusive and adversary communities, whose peaceful coexistence would necessitate an outsider, i.e British. Hence were the various political reforms in which the British envisaged the use of political power through separate communities or special interest groups. This was partly based on a sincere British vision of India as a land of a conglomeration of castes and religious communities. This vision was voiced by a Punjab official during the discussion in 1882 on Ripon's local self-government reforms; “representation in India should be of the real atoms of which Indian society was composed, namely religious communities, castes and classes, not of opinions and geographical areas” (Hardy, 1972: 135). But as the British knowledge on India deepened, the imperial strategy of divide and rule seems to be the main motivator for carefully calculated programmes of power devolution. The final aim of these policies was to ensure that an Indian majority (Congress being the most likely and even the only candidate for this) would come out of the election box and dominate the ministries. The culmination of these policies would be the 1932 Communal Award where almost every possible group, Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, Depressed Castes, Industrialists, Anglo Indians, Princes were accorded a reservation in order to ensure that a representative Indian majority would not emerge. Thus it was not only the Hindu- Muslim divide the

British capitulated on, but in the long run, this division remained as the only decisive one.

5.2.2 Muslims and the Congress

An important aspect of the Congress, particularly for understanding the evolution of Muslim nationalism, was that it was not only an organization of western educated, but also primarily a Hindu organization. Except a brief interval following the Lucknow Pact (1916) and the Khilafat movement (1919-1924), the Muslim participation in Congress remained significantly low. Francis Robinson (2000a: 213) points that if we take the attendance rates at the annual December gatherings of Congress as a criterion, Muslims although constituting more than twenty percent of Indian population, amounted to less than six and a half percent of the participants of the Congress gatherings between 1892 and 1909. Why this was so might appear as an important question in order to understand the emergence of a separate Muslim nationalism. However one must resist the temptation to reach an easy conclusion of the pervasiveness of communalism among the Indian elite or to the exclusivist tendencies of Hindu-Congress elites. In fact the absence of Muslims during these years can better be understood through a deeper examination of the formation of the Congress and should better be understood as a contingency created by the expansion of British colonization and British institutions in the subcontinent.

The Congress was primarily an organization for the Western educated and initially it was dominated by the three presidencies, where the British presence was the longest and thus the Western educated most populous. The dominance of delegates from

Bombay, Calcutta and Madras is equally recognizable if one looks at the participants of early Congress meetings (Brown, 1984: 177-181). These were regions where the Muslims were either insignificant in terms of population or were mostly members of subordinate classes. As Seal (1968: 308) points out “in none of the three most westernized provinces was there a large elite of educated Muslims who could be drawn into Congress.” Even the small groups of Muslim elites in Bombay were mostly members of commercial classes and they did not have any significant educated elite. Moreover the limited educated Muslim elite from Bombay did not hesitate in joining the Congress as was the case of young Jinnah in early twentieth century (Brass, 1974). The highest strata of Muslims in the subcontinent were from UP and Punjab and these provinces along with Bihar and CP were commonly considered “backward” in Congress politics (Brown, 1984: 177). The Punjabi Muslim elites belonged to the traditional landed elite and hence were absent from Congress but never absent from the collaboration links of Raj. The specific reasons for the absences of UP Muslims, where the highest strata of Indian Muslims and the best educated of them resided, however are important and had significant effect on the evolution of a separate Muslim nationalism. These are discussed below under the title of Muslim nationalism.

5.3 Formation of Muslim Nationalism and Pakistan

The Congress nationalism was unable to keep Muslims in, but how did the Muslim League managed to convince the diverse Muslim communities to follow a singular policy and rally behind the idea of Pakistan? This of course needs an analysis of the

relation of Muslims with the British and the Congress. This is no easy task, for throughout the entire period neither the Muslims, nor the Congress, nor the Hindu nationalists nor even the British followed a uniform and consistent policy at the entire region and at the entire time period.

The Congress itself was a battle ground between the Hindu right which was outright anti-Muslim and the secular nationalists. Its relation with Muslims and other minorities changed through the phases of intra-party politics. Even after 1920 when Gandhi, a religious leader who did much to accommodate Muslims to the Congress, and gradually Nehru, an outright secularist who detested religious politics, dominated the Congress, they were never free from the pressures of Hindu Mahasabha. It is possible to claim that this pressure prevented them to take more accommodationist positions at certain junctures. Despite the pressures of Hindu right, at least at two significant moments the Congress had built an alliance with the Muslim leadership which included some of the so called Muslim communalists and separatists. 1916 Lucknow Pact which was masterminded by Jinnah himself was the first alliance built between the Congress and the Muslim League. Later during the early 1920's alliance between Gandhi and Muslim Khilafat leadership was a significant turning point in the Indian history for this was the first time the political scene in India turned to base itself in mass politics. It was also this alliance and the mass support provided by the Muslims that secured the leadership of the Congress for Gandhi. The Khilafat movement also brought religion to the center of this mass politics, and therefore was condemned by Jinnah at the time. Therefore it would be simplistic to think that it was only British who manipulated and sacralized politics in order to play one religious group against another. There were

important strands of revivalism on both sides of the religious divide and the power of these revivalist movements also introduced religion to the center of public politics.

The British policy vis-à-vis the Muslims also changed throughout the time. As we have discussed above, the British were convinced of a vision of India as a conglomeration of religious communities. Religious communities not individuals were the basic units of Indian society. Thus the British policies were not targeting individuals but religious communities as it was assumed that religious groups had corporate interests, thus they needed to be administered accordingly. This is not a millet system that each religious community would have a quasi-autonomous corporate structure, but the British vision of India was similar to the Ottoman system where the corporate religious groups lived not together but side by side. Religion was an important identity marker in the Indian society, but under the British rule it became more rigidified and gained political recognition.

In the immediate aftermath of 1857, the British found Muslims as the real perpetrators of the Mutiny and thus they started a systematized bashing of Muslims. This process included the exclusion of Muslim gentry from Government offices and more importantly from the military and favoring of Hindus in every competitive prize. However, as we will see below this policy gradually started to change by 1880's and eventually the Muslims were favored over Hindus.

The attitudes of Muslims with regard to their relations with Hindu majority and with regard to British domination also show so much variation. Rebellion and armed struggle (as in the cases of Shah Abdul Aziz or al-Afghani) was an aspect of Muslim

response as much as looking for British auspices and collaboration (as in the case of Sayyid Ahmad Khan). Westernization and secularization can be detected as much as religious reform and revivalism. Reform, rejection, and revivalism were some of the strategies that Indian Muslims adopted in their quest for self-definition (Malik, 2008: 90).

Yet it is striking to notice that the roots of Muslim nationalism go back to the more conciliationist responses rather than to resistance. Thus the entire idea of Muslim nationalism needs to be distanced from the notion of a religious revival. Despite the plurality of the Muslim responses to the British rule, they can still be classified under three groups; (i) radical revivalism and outright rejection of British, (ii) non-political revivalism of ulama and (iii) political revivalism of pro-British Muslim groups.

The first group mostly refers to the armed resistance and jihad waged against the British. This tradition has its roots in the eighteenth century religious revivalism and it was Shah Abdul Aziz, the son of great Delhi scholar Shah Waliullah that declared India *dar-ul harb*. In the early nineteenth century armed resistance gained dominance in North India under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad Bareilly and through the Faraizi movement which gained dominance in Bengal. Thus this group in fact pre-dates the Mutiny. The second group refers to the revivalist attempts of ulama which is best represented by the formation of the madrasa of *Deoband* at 1864. The ulama of Deoband were less interested in resisting the British than creating religious awareness among the Muslim masses. Thus they were aiming to increase religious piety and practice in a political environment ruled by non-Muslims. They tried to remain aloof from politics and avoided any political clashes with the political authority and instead concentrated on

individual and social piety and the spread of religious education. *Firangi Mahal* seminary established in Lucknow can be cited as another famous example of such piety based non-political revivalist movements led by religious seminaries in colonial India. Loss of state power and the end of Islamic dynasty in the subcontinent is a stimulus for the emergence of such revivalist movements as the new political environment in which Muslims are no more the supreme rulers led to a panic to preserve self-identity and thus to increased self-consciousness. It is also possible to claim that their disinterest with the British rule was based on a conviction that British are too powerful to fight.¹⁴⁷ When the political climate started to change in post-WWI period and once the British control of the sub-continent started to shatter, the majority of the Deobandi ulama sided with the anti-colonial nationalism.

The response developed by the third group of Muslims was also based on a conviction that the British were in India for the foreseeable future and Muslims should adopt to this reality if they want to protect and improve their social and religious status. The social base of this group comes from the Urdu speaking *ashraf* families of the Gangetic Plain; the United Provinces in British India, and it found a representative in the towering personality of Sayyid Ahmad Khan.¹⁴⁸ The United Provinces, corresponding to Delhi and Uttar Pradesh in contemporary India was the political center of the Mughal

¹⁴⁷Formation of such religious seminaries in the second half of the nineteenth century can also be understood in the light of British policies after 1857. As it is recalled, one of the primary lessons British learned from the 1857 Revolt was not to interfere in cultural and religious realm. Thus it is possible to claim that just like the Muslim ulama understood the difficulty and the danger of waging a war against the British, the British officials also understood the risks of interfering in the religious realm. These seminaries flourished in such a political context.

¹⁴⁸Already during the 1857 events many Muslims, including Sayyid Ahmad, had actually sided with the British.

Empire and the heartland of high Muslim culture in the subcontinent. Ashraf families of the region were the highest strata of the Indian Muslims often combining landed wealth and a real or imaginary aristocratic lineage that tied them to the court.

The first group of revivalists was both anti-British and anti-Hindu while the second group tried to remain neutral and apolitical. When the mass politicization of 1920's pushed the ulama into politics, the majority of them sided with the Congress against the British. The third group from the beginning was pro-British and their political adversaries were the Hindus rather than the British. However it was this group and their political actions which form the basis of the Muslim nationalism and the movement for Pakistan. Thus the revival of religious militancy or religious orthodoxy is not directly related with the notion of Muslim nationalism. The Muslim nationalism as it evolved in the subcontinent was more anti-Hindu than anti-British. In line with the general observations on anti-colonial nationalism, collaboration was a significant element in the birth and development of Muslim nationalism in a colonial context. We need to look at Sayyid Ahmad and his policies in more detail to see how an intersection of colonialism, collaboration and elite conflict lays in the roots of Muslim nationalism.

Sir Sayyid was born in 1817 into a Muslim landholding ashraf family with a lineage as court servants. He started his career as a legal subordinate in the British government in 1839. When the Revolt started in 1857, he did not only remain loyal but went out of his way to save the British families. From this point onwards he insisted on loyalty to the British and on the importance of Western education if the Muslims were to be benefactors of this loyalty. His most lasting legacy was shaped when he founded the Anglo-Oriental College in 1875 which was later turned into Aligarh Muslim University

in 1920. The college and the university left an important mark on the history of the Muslims of the subcontinent as Aligarh became the center of Muslim educational and political activity and the leaders of the Aligarh institution became the leaders in Muslim political activities (Brass, 1974: 168)¹⁴⁹.

The emergence of Aligarh movement in late nineteenth century was not a coincidence. The British suppression of 1857 Revolt made it certain that they were not leaving soon. The initial British assessment of the 1857 Revolt mistakenly considered it as a Muslim dominated revolution; a final attempt of the previous masters of the subcontinent to regain their position. This was reinforced by the British assessment of Muslims being fanatical and Islam forbidding foreign rule, while Hindus, according to the British, were passive by nature and their religion did not forbid foreign domination.

“After 1857', wrote Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) in his autobiography, 'the heavy hand of the British fell more upon the Moslems than on the Hindus” (Hardy, 1972: 70). The inevitable result of this British approach would be a rapid decline in the status of the Muslims throughout the subcontinent. Thus due to the British discrimination in post 1857 period Muslims fell way behind Hindus and could not benefit from the advantages of British modernization programs. They were uneducated and thus were unable to take part in the administrative posts open to the indigenous.

This is a generally accepted position, or at least it was so at the time. Contemporary research provides a much more complicated picture and the hegemony of

¹⁴⁹The crucial Simla Deputation which shaped the fate of Muslim politics in the subcontinent and found the ways for the formation of ML was headed by Mohsin-ul Mulk, the general secretary of Aligarh. Six presidents of ML and two prime ministers of Pakistan were graduates of Aligarh. Jinnah himself was not among the alumni, but he left a considerable amount of money to the university in his will.

the discourse on “Muslim decline” seems to be a powerful testimony to the fact-shaping nature of communal myths (Young, 1976: 297). In fact “so great were the differences between the positions of Muslims in one part of India and another that their standing relative to other communities can be defined only at a local level” (Seal, 1968: 307). The Muslims were definitely a backward community in Bengal, but certainly not so in north India and particularly not in the UP. In Punjab they were landlords and peasants, while the Hindus were peasants and urban money lenders. In Sindh and N.W.F.P they were such a majority that it was impossible to compare their situation to any other group. Yet the dominant narrative of Muslim backwardness was the theme upheld by S.A. Khan and it found resonance with the British authorities within two decades of the Revolt. William Hunter’s 1871 book was a semi-official voice that argued that Muslims remained backward under the British rule and British should take measures to improve their position. His book concentrating on Bengal was relying on factual truths but the problem was the extension of his arguments to the rest of India.

As a member of a Muslim ashraf family in the UP, S.A. Khan was certainly aware that his community in UP was not in a backward situation, but he was equally aware that they could become backward if the trend continued (Stern, 1993: 172). In 1886-87 the Muslims were holding 45.1% of all judicial and executive posts open to the natives in the province while constituting only 13.4% of the population. Thus it is not only that they were not underprivileged but they were clearly over privileged. However, their proportion in the same posts was 63.9% in 1857 and through a steady decline fell into 34.7% in 1913 (Sarkar, 1983: 77). Thus there is a clear process of decline from over extreme over privilege to modest over privilege.

However, contemporary research reveals that this relative decline was not due to a disinterest on the side of the Muslims to the new system of government or to the English education and to all the benefits that comes attached with English education. Indeed the Muslims of the UP were even more responsive to English education compared with the Hindus, as they were a more urbanized and better educated group in relative terms. However, the sheer numerical superiority of the Hindus made it certain that no matter how well they organize and mobilize, the Muslims would lose the control of the province (Brass, 1974). Moreover it was not only the Hindu middle class of the UP, but also the Hindus from Bengal that threatened the supremacy of Muslim aristocracy in the UP. Since Bengal was the first region that British had established their control, the English education there had a much longer history and in any case of impartial admission through competitive examinations, the Western educated Bengali middle class (*Bhadralock*), which happened to be pre dominantly Hindu, would dominate all the government positions available. Thus opening the gates for middle class western educated and an indiscriminate admission of Indians on the basis of merit to government service would inevitably result with Hindu/Bengali domination. Thus the superiority of the Muslim aristocracy in the UP was threatened by the rise of a new middle class who, due to the demographic realities of the province, was Hindu dominated. The Muslim aristocracy in the UP that dominated the Aligarh movement resisted this trend by demanding special favors from the British through a policy of ultimate loyalty. This was in accordance with the British conservatism in post 1857 India and their allergy towards the ever expanding and ever assertive *babus*.

Moreover, the position of Muslim elite in the UP and their relation with their Hindu counterparts were shaped by the very unique conditions of the province. Yet, the local developments of the UP created the pre-conditions of Muslim nationalism to find a base in this province. The elites of the UP would play the leading role in Muslim politics in the subcontinent until the very end and just before the formation of Pakistan. Even though Pakistan became a reality due to the spread of Muslim nationalism to the Muslim majority provinces, in its initial phase Muslim nationalism was led by Muslim minority provinces. The specific local conditions of the UP that made the province a fertile ground for the formation of Muslim nationalism was shaped during the decline of Mughal power in the eighteenth century. At this stage it is also important to remember that UP was the heartland of Mughal power and court life. The path breaking work of Chris Bayly (1983) had demonstrated that the decline of Mughal power created diverse career paths for the Muslim and Hindu elites of the UP. Throughout the eighteenth century while the Muslim elite, the ashraf, concentrated on the service gentry, the Hindu elites dominated the merchant class. Thus just like the divergence of the career paths of Ottoman Muslim and Christian elites in the eighteenth century impeded the development of Ottoman nationalism, a similar divergence in the UP created the suitable social base of community based politics. As the Mughal power declined, the fortunes of Muslim elites in the province also declined. However, as we have already mentioned, the eighteenth century was not a total decline of Indian society. Economic developments continued and the Hindu dominated merchant class continued to prosper. The Muslim service gentry did not hesitate to offer their service to the new masters as we can see in the example of S.A. Khan however in relative terms (both in comparison to the Hindu

merchant class and in comparison to their previous positions) they still experienced a decline in fortunes. It is under these conditions that the Muslim service gentry of the province felt a threat to their career paths.

This divergence between the career paths of Muslim and Hindu elites had given the British perfect opportunity to benefit from the divides within Indian society. Moreover it was also in conformity with the British desire to create vested interests in India. From their immediate indictment of Muslim “fanaticism” as the Mutiny’s primary cause, the British in post-Mutiny India soon came to the judgment that Muslim “separateness” from Hindus offered the Raj a political opportunity. The opportunity to use religious divisions among Indians to rule them (Stern, 1993: 170).

In his social programme S.A. Khan, like Deobendis, put special emphasis on education but unlike the Deobendis his emphasis was on modern education. Since the main motive of his activities was concentrated on the improvement of the social standing of his community, the main thrust of his political and educational activities were targeting to increase the Muslims’ gain from administrative posts and political positions that British created. So his policies, like the early phases of the Congress movement, were collaborationist. Thus, in fact, Sayyid Ahmad and his followers shared a common agenda with the Congress movement in the sense that their initial focus was on better means of education and increased participation to the government positions. Yet, the Aligarh movement and the Congress were rivals particularly because they shared a common agenda were competing for the same limited government enterprises and positions. The existence of two rival groups for limited collaborationist positions created a difficulty for the British to placate such demands but it also enabled them to

play these groups against each other. In fact this remained a major dimension of British policy in the subcontinent and the main motive for the Anglo-Muslim conciliation.

The Aligarh Movement differed from the Congress in terms of its social and ideological background as well. While the Congress was a body of English educated middle class, the Aligarh Movement under the leadership of S.A. Khan was led by the traditional gentry. The western educated elite were the first group with an all India outlook. English language helped them to transcend the local-provincial boundaries and in their political orientation they were more concerned on all-India matters. In contrast, S.A. Khan was clearly provincial, communal and feudal. While the Congress insisted on impartial admission to government posts, S.A. Khan was unabashedly aristocratic in his defense of family lineage over merit. In a speech he delivered in 1887 that directly criticized the Congress he made the following remarks:

It is very necessary that for the Viceroy's Council the members should be of high social position. I ask you- Would our aristocracy like that a man of low caste or insignificant origin, though he maybe a B.A. or M.A., and have the requisite ability, should be in a position of authority above them and have power in making the laws that affect their lives and property (Malik, 1982: 343-344)

The aristocratism of S.A. Khan was perfectly in line with the conservative attitude of British in the post 1857 period. The gist of his policy was to provide loyalty to the British and since this political programme is based on the recognition of the British as the legitimate rulers of the Indian Muslims, he was inevitably against any pan-Islamic ideals. Thus, he was in a clear collision with al-Afghani who was in India during 1879-1882 and tried to promote feelings of pan-Islamic unity among the Indian Muslims. The two went into bitter collisions accusing each other for heresy and attacking each other's

innovations in religion. Yet despite an apparent disagreement on religious doctrines the real and underlying source of their disagreement seems to be their different attitudes towards the British rule, as Aziz Ahmad (1967) points both al-Afghani and Sayyid Ahmad were equally heterodox in their religious teachings. Though he passed away by the time Khlilafat Movement started, it is easy to predict how S.A. Khan would have resisted it just like Jinnah did. In his time, S.A. Khan never considered Abdülhamid II as a legitimate figure for Indian Muslims and rejected his use of Caliphate.

In order to maintain Anglo-Muslim conciliation and to receive British support, Sayyid Ahmad advised his followers to remain aloof from politics. His way of receiving concessions was not political struggle but ardent loyalism. This way he opened up a venue to the British to collaborate with the non-nationalist groups and their natural leaders. Muslims of Sayyid Ahmad were not the only non-nationalist group that British collaborated with, but they were the most decisive for the future of subcontinent's history.

In accepting the offer of collaboration the British also accepted the image of Muslim as a backward community. The Government Commission's report spoke of 'the Muhammadans' as a 'class' who 'have fallen behind in the race of life under British rule' (Hardy, 1972: 122). Thus Muslims were represented as a backward group in need of corporate group concessions to protect them from the more advanced Hindu nationalist elite. The image benefited the Muslims.¹⁵⁰ It also justified British recognition of special

¹⁵⁰One clear and early benefit was the increase in the proportion of Muslims enrolled in education. The initial impact was on lower levels rather than higher education, but the sharp rise in the decade after the publication of Hunter's work in 1871 in Muslim enrollment is striking. Figures for 1871-2 showed that Muslims in the three provinces longest exposed to English education, Madras, Bombay and Bengal (with Assam), formed 4.4 per cent, 8.2 percent and 14.4 per cent respectively of the school and college

Muslim interests (Breuilly, 1994: 209-210). This alliance was also in line with the conservative policies the British adopted after 1857 and the importance they put on the natural leaders of the society. The ashraf of UP were considered as the natural leaders of the Muslims and representative of their interests. Not surprisingly “that interest was interpreted rather narrow terms related to the preoccupations of those elites. The concern with education and access to administrative positions resembled the concerns of the contemporary Congress leadership” (Breuilly, 1994: 209). Yet the British who dismissed Congress as a “microscopic minority” considered the demands and interests of ashraf as representative of the larger Muslim interests.

In reality the UP Muslim ashrafs’ claim to be representatives of all Muslims in India was as hollow as that of the Congress leaders to represent Indians. “In so shapeless, so jumbled a bundle of societies, there were not two nations, there was not one nation, there was no nation at all. India was the mother of new nationalisms struggling to be born” (Seal, 1968: 339). Thus the problem was two-fold; British were assuming an India wide Muslim community, and were accepting the UP Muslim ashraf as their leaders. This was in line with the post 1857 British vision of India as a “social order comprised of a mosaic of separate communities, whose ‘natural leaders’ spoke for them” (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006: 133). And as we have seen above, the British administrative unity and electoral system was crucial in transforming local communities to an India wide scale and helping for the emergence of nationalisms in the

population and in 1881-2, 6.5 per cent, 14.7 per cent and 23.8 per cent. This represented a considerable improvement both absolutely and relatively to their proportion of the population in those provinces, which in 1881-2 was 6.1 per cent, 10.9 per cent and 28.6 per cent. In the North-Western Provinces and the Panjab in 1871-2, Muslims were 17.8 per cent and 34.9 per cent of the school and college population respectively and in 1881-2 16.8 per cent and 38.2 percent. (Hardy, 1972: 121) However, this rise of a new group of educated Muslim urban professionals would later on change the internal power balance with in the ML as well and open the ways of cooperation among the Congress and the ML for a while.

subcontinent. However, through their institutional arrangements the British made it sure that at least one of these newly emerging nations would be defined through religion.

Collaboration transforms social categories to political realm (Scott, 1995: 209). By allying the ‘natural leaders’ with the Raj, the government included the UP elite to the collaboration network of the political system. Through this collaboration with the government, being a Muslim started to be a political asset and Muslim leaders acquired a vested interest in being Muslim. “Communalism became a positive political force only when linked with elite conflict. It only did this when, in a particular political context, the appeal to the religious identity became an important resource for some elites. This context was created by the way in which certain Muslim elites, not necessarily representative of the Muslim community as a whole combined with the government to create special communal forms of political action within the collaborator system” (Breuilly, 1994: 213). Electoral politics as we will see below was crucial for the creation of this political context. Politicization of corporate differences started with the introduction of communal electorates in 1882, where communal electorates were used for the first time. However, since the power of these bodies was quite limited so were their effects on the spread of communal politics. The real intersection of politics with communal differences started with the British promise of further political reforms in 1906.

5.3.1 Separate Electorates, Weighted Representation and the Muslim League

1906 marks the real turning point in terms of Muslim politics in India. Two events in this year, the formation of Simla Deputation to visit Lord Minto (the Viceroy) as the representatives of the Muslim community and the formation of the Muslim League sowed the seeds of the partition and the formation of Pakistan. Both events were led by the members of the Aligarh Movement and were in full accord with S.A. Khan's policy of loyalty. However, unlike S.A. Khan, the formation of the ML would mean the entry of Muslims into the political arena, whereas SA insisted to remain aloof from politics. This can be better understood as a result of the changes in the political climate in India rather than a break from the tradition of SA. Resignation of conservative Curzon as viceroy in 1905 and his replacement by Minto was signaling the end of strictly paternalistic style of Curzon. The subsequent announcement of political reform in 1906 by John Morley, the liberal Secretary of State for India, was hinting the changing nature of political scene and was an incentive for the Muslim leaders to form political bodies to negotiate with the British. Moreover the Congress' ability to raise passions and surmount pressure over the government in 1905 on the issue of partition of Bengal¹⁵¹ was also an inspiration for the Muslim elites. It is not a coincidence that the first session of the ML was held in Dacca even though the organization was clearly dominated by the UP elites. However, even though style was more political compared with the Aligarh movement, the ML was nevertheless in line with the tradition of loyalism and was

¹⁵¹ Curzon administration declared the partition of Bengal into East and West halves in 1905. This created outrage among the Hindu Bengalis who were dominant in the urban and rural life in the united province. The partition was annulled in 1911 due to strong opposition of the Hindu Bengalis.

formed as an anti-Congress movement. The objective of the ML as it was outlined in their founding resolution was “to promote among the Mussulmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British Government” (Embree, 1972: 51).

On 1 October 1906 a delegation of thirty-five Muslim notables under the leadership of Aga Khan visited Lord Minto in his summer court in Simla. This deputation known as the Simla deputation is a landmark in the Muslim politics of the subcontinent. The delegation was clearly dominated by the UP Muslims. In terms of class divisions it was reflecting the supremacy of the landed elite; a difference that marked the Congress from the Aligarh Movement from the beginning.

The Panjab and Frontier provinces, with their fourteen million Muslim population, had seven members on the Simla deputation and East and West Bengal, with their twenty-five and a half million Muslim population, one. The U.P. with its seven million Muslim population, had eleven. The deputation included eight members of princely families or states' ministers and six *zamindars*. The middle-class professional man of the U.P. was 'represented' by two lawyers (Hardy, 1972: 157).

The deputation made two important demands both of which found favorable audience. First of all, the deputy asked for the implementation of separate electorates for the elections of envisioned provincial councils. Secondly, the deputation argued that the share of the Muslims should be estimated not merely on their numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of the community and the service it had rendered to the defense of the Empire. This special treatment is usually called as “weightage.” Lord Minto replied that he is entirely in accord with the delegation. This granting of separate electorates was reflected in the diary of Lady Minto as “nothing less than the pulling back of sixty-two millions of people from joining the ranks of seditious opposition”

(quoted in Menon, 1997: 10; Sayeed, 1968: 29). David Page (1982: 14) also argues that the Raj strengthened the hands of traditional Muslim gentry who had so far been loyal allies in the collaborative system of the Raj. According to Page the traditional gentry was by the time under the pressure of a new group of western educated Muslim elite who were seeking for more concerted action with the Congress as a way of politics. Moreover, through weightage granted to the Muslims, Raj also weakened the potential power of the Congress in the UP. This tactic would be enlarged later in 1932 through the Communal Award. When Morley-Minto reforms were declared in 1909, both demands of the Simla Deputation were met. This could be defined as the first real victory on the side of the ML and the culmination of S.A. Khan's policy of loyalty. However, as we will see below, its real effect will be evident upon the extension of electoral enfranchisement through the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in 1919.

Introduction of separate electorates is the culmination of two interrelated processes and a turning point in the evolution of nationalisms in the subcontinent: (i) the religious differentiation among the elites and (ii) the building of a bond of unity among the elites and the masses. As it has been discussed in the third chapter, the imperial societies are marked by a hierarchical social structure in which a cosmopolitan elite often marked by an ideology and a courtly culture rather than ethnic or religious markers is strictly differentiated from the subject populations (see Gellner, 1998). The certain segments of the common mass might share ethnic or religious identities with the elite but are still separated from them as they do not possess the unifying cultural-civilizational element. As it had been pointed in the third chapter, Persian, similar to Latin in Europe, was the unifying cultural element of the North Indian elite and court

life and it was shared by the Hindu as well as the Muslim elite. This court culture in India also helped to maintain a hierarchical organization of society and distinguished the traditional elites sharply from the masses. However modern states, and particularly its organs of elections and representations, create a tie among the elite and the ordinary man, which is a crucial stage of nation-building (see Gellner, 1983). The separate electorates in India created such a tie with the Muslim elite and the ordinary Muslim. The effect of such a tie became more important as the franchise was extended through the constitutional acts of 1919 and 1935. However, the more decisive effect of the separate electorates was the differentiation of the Hindu and the Muslim elites. Indeed this was a process ongoing since the removal of unifying Mughal court culture and system. However introduction of separate electorates was the most decisive point in this process of differentiation. Communalism became a positive political force only when linked with elite conflict. Separate electorates provided the necessary political context in which religious identity became an important political resource.

Introduction of separate electorates are akin to the formation of millet system in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike the millet system, separate electorates did not imply any notion of communal autonomy. However, the separate electorate, like the millet system in the Ottoman Empire, did fix the religious community as a defined, bounded clearly separated (segregated) entity. Moreover by marking off a Muslim community and instituting elections *within* it, the British inevitably created arenas for ritual competition in which over time personal commitment to Islam melded with public assertions of religious solidarity. Introduction of elections and the organization of separate communities politicized these communities. The elections did not only separate the

Muslim elite from the rest. As the franchise extended, it also made it imperative for the Muslim elite to create ties with the Muslim masses and contributed to the formation of a Muslim nation in the subcontinent. The 1877 elections in the Ottoman Empire which were conducted by the principle of separate electorates deepened the divisions of millet system and was an impediment for the development of a supra-communal Ottoman identity (see Kayalı, 1995). In a similar vein, the separate electorates provided the development of a new communal rhetoric, and ultimately, of the Pakistan movement. The Congress had to overcome the divisions coming as the burden of communal electorates. Its inability is also the story of the Congress to prevent partition (Metcalf, 1994, 224-225).

5.3.2 Attempts for Hindu-Muslim Conciliation

The separate electorates and the weightage were rewards that the Muslim elite gained through loyalism. However, this position would start to change within a decade for two unrelated reasons. First shock to the ML was the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911. This showed the limits of success to be gained through loyalism and “no bombs no boons” became the new slogan of the Muslim masses. Second, with the start of WWI, the British position and its strength appeared more fragile than it was assumed to be. Thus, the Muslims were more encouraged on raising their demands through political action. The process was also supplanted by the growing of a new western educated middle class among the Muslims partly owing to the prerogatives of their policy of ultimate loyalty. As this group of urban professionals joined the ML they formed a new

group with in it what was then called the liberal wing. Among these urban professionals, a famous Muslim lawyer from Bombay, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was also a leading politician among the ranks of the Congress also joined the ML in 1913. The liberal group increasingly raised its discontent against the traditional gentry's policy of ultimate loyalty and urged for concerted action with the Congress against the British. Moreover the entry of the Ottoman Empire and thus the Caliphate into the war on the side of Germans and against the British was also an element that made the British increasingly unpopular in the eyes of the large Muslim masses. The shift of attitude on the side of Muslim leaders has been demonstrated on two occasions: (i) through the Lucknow Pact of 1916 and (ii) the launching of Khilafat movement three years later.

The Lucknow Pact was master minded by Jinnah and earned him the reputation of the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity. It provided the Muslims a chance to protect their prerogatives as the Congress agreed to accept both the separate electorates and the weightage system, while the Congress could now become more assertive in its power struggle against the British and could make the claim that it is the representative of all India. The Lucknow Pact clearly had a bias towards the Muslim minority provinces as against the Muslim majority provinces, thus reflected the dominance of the UP and other Muslim minority provinces in the politics of the ML. According to the agreement "Congress agreed that in the Muslim minority provinces of U.P., Bihar, Bombay and Madras, Muslims should have 30, 25, 33 and 15 per cent of the elected Indian membership respectively. In the Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and the Panjab, however, they should have 40 and 50 percent respectively" (Hardy, 1972: 187).

The alliance stroke at Lucknow between the ML and the Congress was later developed and got a mass character through the Khilafat Movement. As a result of their victory in WWI, in 1919 the British occupied Istanbul; not only the capital of the Ottoman Empire but also the seat of Caliphate. This led to mass demonstrations all around India led by the All India Khilafat Committee (see Minault, 1982). Gandhi capitulated on the opportunity and supported the Khilafat Movement by declaring non-cooperation movement. Thus, on the one hand, with the help of Muslim support, he gained the control of the INC. On the other hand, the mass movement phase of the nationalist movement had started. He also considered this a chance to overcome the communal divisions. However, the alliance fell apart when the Turkish government abolished Caliphate and Gandhi called off the non-cooperation movement.

The Khilafat movement stirred up religious passions throughout the subcontinent, however its failure and the abolishment of Caliphate by the Turkish government also meant the end of pan-Islam as a political ideal. In this environment politico-religious passions aroused in the subcontinent turned inside and pan-Islamic solidarity was gradually replaced by the spread of Muslim nationalism. This can be best observed through the writings of Mohammad Iqbal on the issues of nationalism, pan-Islam and Caliphate. Initially an ardent enemy of nationalism, considering it as an obstacle for the unity of ummah, Iqbal shifted to embrace Muslim nationalism and the demands for a Muslim nation-state in the subcontinent.¹⁵²

¹⁵²For an analysis of the transformation of Iqbal's views on nationalism, see Jalal, 2002: 563-578.

With the collapse of Khilafat movement and the alliance Khilafatists made with Gandhi, the Congress-Muslim League alliance that started with the Lucknow Pact also came to an end. The lasting effect of the Lucknow Pact, however, was that it opened to negotiations *with the Congress* the questions of special position enjoyed by Muslims aristocracy in British India. British government continued to be a party to such negotiations, particularly through setting the administrative and constitutional framework that both the Muslim League and the Congress operated. But in the end, it was with the Congress that Muslim politicians had to settle (Stern, 1993: 176). This proved to be an impossible task as the Congress increasingly tended towards a mono-cultural and centrist conception of nationhood.

Thus the Hindu-Muslim unity which dominated the political scene for almost a decade starting from the Lucknow Pact had disintegrated rapidly and dramatically. The unity was replaced by communal conflicts and violence that dominated the scene through 1920's. This religious frenzy and violence can not only be explained through the arousal of religious feelings by the Khilafat movement. More important seems to be the effects of the 1919 Constitutional Act. As it is mentioned above, with the amendments made, the electoral franchise was enlarged enormously which linked the local politics to the provincial politics. This brought the masses into the politics for the first time and Gandhi was the symbol of the extension of mass politics in India. However this sudden extension of franchise had its due effect on the inter-communal harmony. The pioneering works of Jack Snyder (2000) David Mansfield (Snyder and Mansfield, 1995, 2005) and Michael Mann (2005) demonstrated the risk of rising violence in the early stages of electoral transitions. Professional politicians in need of mass support and

mobilization often refer to cultural elements which in turn arouse fear and suspicion in the other cultural community. Thus Snyder and Mansfield (1995) concludes, early phases of democratic transition in many countries come with the burden of ethnic conflict if necessary safeguards are not taken by the administration. The Raj had few incentives to take such safeguards and for the British any inter-communal conflict would only perpetuate the underlying ideology of colonialism in India, i.e the necessity for the continuation of British rule as an arbiter among various factions of Indian society. Moreover the constitutional arrangements, most notably the communal electorates, which organized the political life through religious ascriptions, resulted that in India violence is not ethnic but religious-communal. The communal electorates did not only channel the violence from ethnic to religious (in any case both were community bounded), but also intensified the violence due to the logic of electoral system. Any politician had to draw support only from his religious community and did not need, or even was not allowed, to garner support from other communities. Such an electoral design would definitely radicalize the politics and lead to violence which in turn would bolster communalism. This vicious cycle dominated the Indian politics until the end and placed the communal problem to the center of Indian politics and Indian nationalist movement.

Muslim political movement in India was initially about the recognition of corporate Muslim identity and the political arrangements and benefits this recognition brought, rather than the establishment of an Islamic state or even a Muslim state. Thus this kind of political arrangements, which found their best example through the separate electorates, can be called communal. Yet as long as they are not related with territorial

separation, they cannot be called Muslim nationalist. The demand for territorial arrangement either in the form of federation, confederation or partition came much later than separate electorates. Mohammad Iqbal raised the issue for the first time in 1930 and it became the official ML policy only after the Lahore Resolution in 1940. Although there was a demand of a separate territorial organization for Muslims, the language of Lahore Resolution was deliberately vague to ensure that confederation or even federation would have sufficed rather than partition.

At this point we should note that separate electorates/weightage and federation were two different strategies that benefited different segments of the Muslim groups in the subcontinent. Roughly said, it could be said that the first formula favored the Muslim minority provinces particularly the Muslim elite from UP, while the second formula favored Muslim majority provinces. In that regard it was not a coincidence that starting from the Simla deputation, defenders of separate electorates were dominated by the Muslims from minority provinces and the arrangements which gave special statuses to the elites of minority provinces always worked to the detriment of the majority provinces. In Bengal, the Muslims were so backward that given the limited franchise their slight majority would never translate into political dominance in the province. In Punjab, the Muslim landlord elite followed a non-communal politics through the Unionist Party. Here a cross communal alliance of Hindu and Muslim landlords dominated political scene to the benefits of landed elite (that was Muslim and Hindu alike) and to the detriment of urban money lenders, who were almost exclusively Hindu. The British later on would include the Muslim Punjab elite to its base of local allies through the granting of the Communal Award in 1932. The Communal Award which

basically meant an extension of separate electorates to all the groups defined as minorities in India (Christians, Sikhs, Princes, Business interests, Anglo-Indians, Depressed Classes) reserved 51% of the provincial council in Punjab for the Punjabi Muslims, thus ensured their control of Punjab. Secured the helm of the control of their own province, Punjabi Muslims had little interest in joining the activities of the UP led ML.

As long as the political scene in India was confined to the provincial level, the ML had no chance of victory as its sole power base would remain the Muslims of minority provinces. This was best reflected in the terrible results the ML gained in the 1937 elections. According to the election results the ML had no support in the Muslim majority provinces, and its power base was confined to the urban UP. This would at least be sufficient to make them coalition partners in the UP, but the overwhelming Congress victory among the Hindu constituencies of the UP made it sure that Congress didn't need any ML support to form the provincial government in the UP either. This left the entire political apparatus of ML out of power. It is surprising to see that ML swept the election polls only nine years later in 1946. This could be understood in the changing nature of political organization in the subcontinent as the locus of politics shifted upwards from province to the national level. This led to a change of attitude among the Muslims of majority provinces as now they had their own reasons for being against the Congress domination. Their protection however was not separate electorates/weightage but federalism. Yet INC's insistence on a strong center pushed these provinces to support the movement for Pakistan. As these provinces resisted against the domination of center, Pakistan movement gave them to create their own centers (Page, 1982: 259).

Congress victory in the 1937 elections created the first chance of a national government. With the perception that British were sooner or later to leave India, it became certain that the Congress would be the new raj and control a powerful central state apparatus. In this coming scenario, Muslims would either demand a strong presence in the central power apparatus through separate electorates and reservations in the center, or they would demand provincial freedom which would undermine the central power. Thus the power would either be shared at the central level, or it would be dissolved to the provinces. “Pakistan grew as a part of a search for power sharing. Two-nation theory and Islamic ideology (discourse) matured under the impetus of this frustration and search, not the other way round” (Hayes, 1984: 51). Partition of India along religious lines also means the inability of such a power sharing. This was partly related to the inability to find a space for a *corporate* Muslim identity in the larger umbrella of Indian nationalism. Muslims could of course be Indian nationalists, as many nationalist Muslims like Azad were, however Congress couldn’t manage to come up with a plural Indian nationalism that would not only recognize the corporate Muslim identity, but also would strike some sort of power sharing with the corporate Muslim body.

Unlike the Ottoman case, in India Muslim nationalism did not start from a state but targeted the formation of a nation-state. In the previous chapter we have seen that the evolution of Ottoman state from an empire to a nation-state, then to a Muslim nation-state led to the emergence of Muslim nationalism. In the Indian case, it has a reverse order; first the Muslim nation and nationalism was formed and second this nationalism achieved statehood. Muslim political movement in India was initially about

the recognition of corporate Muslim identity and the political arrangements and benefits this recognition brought, rather than the establishment of an Islamic state or even a Muslim state. The inability to protect this corporateness in a centralizing/intervening state transformed this corporate political identity into a nation and nation-state. As it will be discussed in the next chapter this shift also changed the course of intra-Muslim politics.

5.3.3 Nationalism and Diversity

Similar to what happened in the Ottoman Empire, and in any empire for that matter, the evolution of an all-inclusive national idea created a hitherto non-existent problem of the relationship between this larger identity and sub categories of identities, as well as the relationship between sub categories. In that regard anti-colonial nationalism does not differ from official nationalism. The Congress and the newly emerging Indian nationalism also faced the same challenge of accommodating provincial, religious and linguistic diversity within the frame of all inclusive Indian nationalism.

In the previous discussion with regard to the similar dilemmas faced by the official nationalisms of nineteenth century we have depicted that there are two approaches to the problem of diversity; the federal Habsburg model and the centralist Romanov model. Just as debates on nationalism in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire can be understood as a struggle among alternative visions of an Ottoman nation, most of the debates among Indian nationalists can better be understood as alternative

visions of an Indian nation. There emerged two alternative and rival conceptions of nationhood; one composite and plural, other monolithic and individualistic.

The idea of a composite Indian nation lies behind the notion of separate electorates, the Lucknow Pact and the Khilafat movement. This was also in line with the vision of early nationalist movement. Initial swadeshi movement was in favor of federalism and coexistence of a multiplicity of identities (linguistic, religious, regional). In early 1920s, the Provincial Congresses were reorganized along linguistic lines, thus linguistic plurality was accommodated, as it reflected the pluralist nature of the nationalist movement (Young, 1976: 283). However, Congress couldn't achieve the same when it was faced with religious plurality.

Moreover, the ulama and other Muslim leaders who supported the Congress through the Khilafat Movement also saw India as a minimal federation of religious communities in which Muslims would be allowed to become members of an *imperium in imperio*. They were not to form a separate state, or a nation in any sense acceptable to Western political thought but they were to form a separate legal and religious community with self-governing institutions of their own (Hardy, 1972: 194-195).

Here the dilemma of Ottomanism vis-a-vis the millet system was replicating itself. The Muslims that were willing to pursue a joint struggle with the Congress was demanding something akin to the millet system. The Ottoman system in its attempt to create a modern Ottoman nation had weakened the most important ally of the system; the millet leaders. Similarly the Congress leadership could not find a way to reconcile their united vision of nationhood with the communal leadership. In the process they

weakened the hands of their most important allies and strengthened the separatist Muslims.

It was the Ottoman desire to strengthen the central power that prevented them to create a plural framework of Ottomanism that could accommodate religious diversities and the millet establishments. The nature of nationalism in India was entirely different. Official nationalism was non-existent, despite the fact that colonial state provided the political and institutional framework for the evolution of a national imagination. However this national imagination was anti-colonial, in that it had a claim of representing the people of India against the colonial administration. It claimed to capture the colonial state in the name of the people who were now defined as the Indian nation. For four reasons this anti-colonial nationalism was unable to accommodate pluralism:

First of all, the emphasis put on unity against the colonial invader prohibited the chances of plural accommodation. Since anti-colonial nationalism tries to capture the colonial state, it is obliged to confront the main arguments of the colonial state. Thus, the emphasis on unity “was to a great extent a reaction to the colonial thesis of India’s hopeless divisions, which needed an imperial hand for the establishment of peace, order and cohesion” (Sen, 1998: 18). Gandhi emphasized the syncretic character of Hinduism as a source of unity while secular Nehru denied this but still claimed there was an essential unity of India (Sen, 1998: 18-19). The British desire to foment divisions within the society in order to prevent the transfer of real power forced the Congress to promote a notion of indivisible unity. Religion was only one among many instruments that British emphasized in order to keep real power with themselves. They also tried to make use of diarchy, 1932 communal award and 1935 attempts of federation through the

support of princes (Stern, 1993: 145-147). This forced the Congress to take a firm stance on unity against the colonial desire of divide and rule.

Secondly, the ideological leanings of the Congress high command, prototypically represented by Nehru, were in favor of individual secularism that abhorred the idea of communally organized politics. The Nehruvian secularism was not only against Muslim communalism but also against Hindu Mahasabha. Moreover, this was also the point of divergence between Nehru and Gandhi, as the latter put emphasis on religious identities and argued that India can unite different religious communities. However, in the scheme of mass politics and electoral representation, the denial of communal representations meant the denial of minority communalism. Due to the electoral logic of majoritarianism, non ascriptive universal individualism works in favor of the majority community. Thus individualistic nationalism threatened the minority communalism that feared infinite domination due to its minority status. This was the logic of the demand for separate electorates and various constitutional safeguards.

Muslim nationalism in contrast was a very radical but a definite solution to the problems of majority and minority. Asserting that Muslims were a nation avoided the logic of numbers. As a community, they were confined to being a minority, as a nation they were equal partners (Jalal, 1994: 52)

Thirdly, This fear of domination felt by minorities could have been overcome by a federal framework which put more power to the provinces rather than center. Indeed the later politics of Muslim League was dependent on the strengthening of provincial powers that would provide a safeguard against the majoritarian domination. Once again

the ideological leanings of the modernizing Congress, elite who considered a strong center necessary for rapid modernization prevented such a federal framework (once again the Congress high command was at odds with the anti-modernist critique of Gandhi). The contradiction between social pluralism and the assumed need for a strong center was also a factor that afflicted Ottomanism with a paradox. Here the Congress experienced exactly the same problem.

Finally, the contradiction between a desire to strengthen the center and the peripheral and minority demands of provincial-federal framework was not only an outcome of ideological clashes but was shaped by the political framework of the colonial state administration. In their desire to lengthen their actual control over India, the British considered the inclusion of Indian elements to provincial administration and keeping a strong center firmly under their own control as a mechanism to delay the transfer of actual power.

For reasons of imperial administration, the Raj adhered to the vision of a conglomerate India, where diverse groups could be rallied in support. In the process of becoming the Raj, the Congress tried to overcome this by promoting an opposite vision of India based on individualism rather than communal, ascriptive identities. In the final analysis, it was this “one nation-one party” approach of the Congress that prevented the pluralistic formulation of nation that transformed Muslim communal consciousness into Muslim communal politics and to Muslim nationalism. Failure in the management of religious diversity pushed the Muslims elites to create their own one nation-one state that would at least solve the question of religious plurality through destroying it and creating religious homogenization.

The colonial administration insisted on the divided nature of India to justify the continuation of colonial rule. To counter this narrative the Congress had to define India through its unity. However, it proved to be impossible to combine this unity with the institutionalized (and politicized through elections) diversity of India. In this context Muslim leaders countered Congress's notion of unity through emphasizing their difference and tried to reach a power sharing agreement with the Congress. "In order to have a meaningful political power at the center, the League and other Muslim leaders had to accept an equation with ML and the Muslims of the subcontinent. This equation brought unity to the Muslims, but simultaneously excluded non-Muslims" (Jalal, 1994). Thus in order to overcome the unity underlined by the INC, which prevented a satisfactory power sharing, the Muslims opted to create their own unity through separation of the subcontinent along religious lines. As we will see in the next chapter, the newly formed Pakistan was in fact a mirror image of the INC, which underlined "essential unity of India," as the Pakistani leaders underlined the unity of the Muslims of the subcontinent. It is no surprise that Pakistan itself would go through the same crises as the Congress and would fail to accommodate the diversity, this time couched in terms of linguistic and ethnic identities.

In fact, one can easily say that the modern Indian state still struggles with the same problem and the creative solutions the Indian state developed with regard to the linguistic and religious divisions attracted widespread interest and appreciation from the scholars with diverse backgrounds. With a century old history of diversity accommodation, today Indian secularism is presented as an ideal model of religious accommodation and promoted as an example to the continental Europe (see Bhargava,

2006). The success of Indian secularism is yet to be seen although the success of Indian scholars on expanding the horizons of debate on secularism and in formulating creative strategies to overcome the contemporary problem of diversity management deserves full appreciation. The Indian model is also equally applauded, with more justification, for its peaceful management of a linguistic diversity in a state that has 13 official languages (see Stepan and Linz, 2011). However, it should be noted that contemporary Indian solutions to these problems of diversity represents a fundamental difference from the 1930's Congress policy of one nation, one party. In that regard it is not the success of Nehruvian enlightened doctrine of individualistic, secular nationalism that enables peaceful accommodation of diversity, but on the contrary it is the retreat of Indian state from this ideal that enabled this accommodation. In that regard one can easily say that India today is less national than it had been a century ago. Its political organization resembles a middle ground between the imperial-federalist framework of pluralism and nation-state centralism. In that regard Stepan and Linz define India not as a nation-state but as a new form of polity which they label as state-nation. Therefore the contemporary framework of Indian politics and the Congress should not be confused with the pre-partition politics. Indeed one can argue that the current creativity of the Indian model is a result of the previous failure of Nehruvian nation-state.

5.4 Religion and Nationalism Among Hindus and Muslims

In terms of religious diversity the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires showed considerable similarities. Both empires were ruled by nominally Muslim dynasties and

Islam was an arm of state power and an important instrument of legitimation. However, the majority of the population remained non-Muslim¹⁵³ and both states showed remarkable levels of tolerance with regard to their relations with the non-Muslim subjects. In general a peaceful coexistence was the norm for the pre-modern period. However, they had a remarkable difference with regard to their religious policies; while the Ottoman Empire developed a policy of accommodation through creating corporate religious bodies called millets, the Mughals did not have any such system. Instead syncretism was more evident in the Mughal way of religious life and it is often believed that Indian Islam was the most syncretic of all Islamic traditions. Devotional cults and Sufi practices that evolve around the interception of Hinduism and Islam were quite dominant particularly in rural India. Indeed Marshall Hodgson (1974: 59) considers the lack of any system resembling Ottoman millet system as one of the reasons for the earlier collapse of the Mughal dynasty in comparison to the Ottoman dynasty.

In the previous chapter we noted the exaggerated orthodoxy that considers a direct lineage between the millet system and the later day nationalisms of the Christian communities. A similar debate exists on the subcontinental history. Where should we find the cultural roots of religious nationalisms, or communalism to employ the more widespread usage, in the subcontinent? In line with scholars like Pandey, Chatterjee and Freitag, this chapter demonstrated that it was during the British rule that communalism emerged. However, this strand of argument is criticized for going to the extreme position of denying of any pre-modern existence of communal consciousness. For

¹⁵³ In the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims became majority of the empire in the sixteenth century after the conquest of Arab Middle East. However, non Muslims continued to constitute a substantial part of the population of the empire.

instance in reviewing various contributions made to the study of Islamic revival in the nineteenth century India, Francis Robinson (2000a: 256) asserts that “there is an Islamic reality and that the historian must accept this before genuinely and profitable study can begin,” implying that constructionist approaches deny the pre-existence of communal/religious identities.

This is an unfair criticism that misrepresents the constructivist approach to nations and nationalism and confuses communal consciousness with communalism (for this point also see, Bayly, 1985). The modernist/constructivist approach to nations and nationalisms do not negate the pre-existing marker of identities. But only with the advent of modernity and modern state formation these markers become politicized for distinctively different political purposes. Similarly in the Indian case religious identities always existed, but got politicized in the particular way they did only under the context of colonial state. To pinpoint the politicization of religious identities under the framework of modernizing colonial state do not need a negation of the religious identities themselves.

Colonial government in India created the necessary structural transformations for the emergence of the idea of a nation and an ideology of nationalism. Yet on the other hand the colonial policies also deepened and fixed the already existing communal and cultural divisions and politicized these divisions through transforming real life-local identities to a supra local imagined level. Thus the colonial government on the one hand created the sub-strata of nationalism on the other hand it created the impediments for the evolution of an atomized individualistic national consciousness. The only alternative was to formulate a national culture that would be accommodative of the deepened

divisions of the society. This was the official Congress policy at least as it was defined by Gandhi. However this option was subverted by the colonial regime's desire to manipulate and divide and rule tactics and also by the centrist-modernist ideology of the Congress establishment.

Critiques of this view such as Van der Veer (1994: 20) argues that seeing the foreign hand as the only explanation of the origin of religious nationalism denies Indians political agency and conceals the "indigenous" ness of Indian nationalist politics. However, the issue is not about foreign vs indigenous as much as it is about the impact of centralized sovereign state. There was a Hindu-Muslim divide before colonialism as well but colonialism did three things: (i) sharpened the divide, (ii) gave these communities supra local and all India identification, (iii) enumerated and transformed them into majorities and minorities. The modernizing nature of British had many unifying influences in India, however the colonial nature forced British to take a stance against political unity. Thus it is certain that divide and rule was always a card on the British administration. However, as Sayeed (1968: 6) says, "if the British had planned to divide Hindus and Muslims, it seems that Congress and Muslim League leaders did little to frustrate the British designs".

5.5 Conclusion

Muslim elites acquired a vested interest through British policies that could only be preserved by certain political and constitutional arrangements such as weightage or federation. As religion defined the electoral base of the Muslim elites and became the

source of their political power vis-à-vis the Congress and the Raj, demands for political recognition of this religious bond led the formation of Muslim nationalism. Congress in contrast insisted on the abolishment of all such prerogatives. In their own version of nationalism, they rightly considered these as obstacles to the development of an individualistic/liberal Indian nationalism.

Whether the Muslim League really demanded or wished an independent Pakistan, or used this demand as a bargaining chip in order to force the Congress to accept a weak center/strong province formula does not change much in depicting the evolution of Muslim nationalism. In either case, an Islamicate identity would be both the uniting bond with the elites and the common folk and more importantly, it would be represented by a political structure, either in the form of an independent state or in the form of autonomous strong provinces in a weak federation. In either case it would be the state of Muslims for the benefit of Muslims. In contrast Congress insisted on a strong centered India with a notion of Indian nation made up of individuals. Thus what is often defined as a struggle between Muslim communalism and Indian secularism is in fact a struggle between alternative forms of nationalisms and alternative visions of nation-states; one with a plural/composite national character and federative political organization and the other with a individualistic/non-ascriptive (or alternatively homogenous) national character and centralized political organization. The second option prevailed, partly due to ideological preferences, miscalculations and to the administrative and ideological legacy of the Raj and Pakistan came into fruition. Thus, when Nehru and Jinnah agreed upon partition, they also agreed on the notion of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state. Since Pakistan was a state for the Muslims and this also

implied the exclusion of non-Muslims from the nation. However this does not necessarily meant the physical exclusion of Hindus and Sikhs on a purposive plan. In contrast, mostly for economic and strategic reasons, Jinnah's vision of Pakistan was one with a considerable non-Muslim minority represented in the white strap in the Pakistani flag. However, they were minorities; not members of the nation. They might have even preferential statuses but whatever their political and legal rights would be, they would be defined as minorities. Jinnah was planning to benefit from the Hindu middle class and from their expertise particularly in the economic field. But more importantly, the large Hindu and Sikh minority in Pakistan would be a safeguard for the remaining Muslim minority in India. Thus, he argued, the partition would do no harm to the Muslims that remained on the other side of the border line, while the ones that remained in Pakistan will finally have a state of their own. However naïve his vision might be, and miscalculated as the horrors of partition proved, he did not insist for a forceful population exchange. But his notion of Muslim nationalism made it almost inevitable that religious homogenization that occurred through the shifting of borders would be accompanied with the shifting of peoples over the newly created borders as well.

Thus, the emergence of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state, with the final agreement of all parties, Jinnah, Congress and the British, also meant that a centralized state with a homogenous nation continued to shape the policies of Pakistani state. Post-partition Muslim nationalism continued to be a homogenizing ideology and the state an instrument of this homogenization.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Academic debate on the relation between religion and nationalism in general and the relation of religion to Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms in particular, is polarized around two conflicting approaches: Either nationalism is considered an essentially secular ideology, whereby nation-building turns into a secularizing process, or religion is positioned in alliance with nationalism and as an important instrument of nation-building. Nevertheless, both approaches are reductionist and incapable of explaining the contingent and paradoxical relationship between religion and nation-building.

In order to comprehend the role of religion in nation-building, this dissertation offers to examine the homogenizing function of religion. This is especially the case when nations are fashioned out of diverse, imperial societies. The inability of modern states to co-opt the plurality and diversity of society is intertwined with nation-building and homogenization, which occurs either through assimilation or exclusion. Though most of the literature on nationalism focuses on the assimilationist policies deployed with the formation of the nation-state, this dissertation concentrated on the transition from empires into nation-states and on the exclusionary role of religion in this transition.

Historically, nation-building has been shown to be a process of boundary-drawing that determines who will be included as part of the nation and who will be excluded from it. In both cases of the Ottoman Empire and the Indian subcontinent, religion helped demarcate the boundaries of the nation and contributed to national homogenization by excluding non-Muslim elements from the national community. However, the historical legacy of homogenization did not end with nation-state formation; instead, both nation-states persisted as homogenizing political entities by attempting to homogenize their already relatively homogenous religious populations through standardization and assimilation. In this conclusion, I will briefly address the processes of homogenization that were guided by the newly formed nation-state. In addition, I will point to the continuities and ruptures vis-à-vis the previous process of homogenization that paved the way for the nation-states.

The previous chapters examined how the inherent diversity of imperial society became troublesome for the course of modernization-centralization. Nation-state formation, then, brought a concurrent process of religious homogenization as well. Thus, through the course of transition from empire to nation-state, this diversity was partly eliminated through religious exclusion. The nation-states forged out of the Raj and Ottomans were fairly homogenous in terms of religious divisions.¹⁵⁴ Further, after

¹⁵⁴ Although this dissertation primarily considers Turkey and Pakistan, religious homogeneity existed in other heir states as well. In particular, the Balkan states emerged as predominantly Christian states and India became more Hindu than ever before, despite retaining a substantial religious minority of Muslims and other religions. On the one hand, this enabled the strengthening of Hindu nationalism, which came to power during the 1990s. However, on the other hand, the lessons learned by Congress leaders from Partition led them to develop a more plural form of secularism in comparison to European ones. For the evolution of Hindu nationalism and the rise of the BJP, see Jaffrelot (1996). For Indian secularism and its pluralist nature, see Bhargava (1998; 2007).

the initial stages of nation-state formation, including large-scale population exchanges and sectarian conflicts, both Turkey and Pakistan became nation-states for Muslims with small non-Muslim communities that were legally defined as minorities. However, even after this, both states continued to deal with the problem of diversity since the overwhelmingly Muslim population possessed a high degree of internal diversity in itself, too. This diversity can very roughly be defined according to two parameters. Firstly, this nominally Muslim population was internally divided by sectarian divisions and variations in religious practices. Therefore, the exclusion of non-Muslims resulted in only a certain dose of religious homogeneity while religious heterogeneity continued to exist among members of the same religion. Secondly, the nominally Muslim subjects belonged to diverse ethno-linguistic and cultural communities. Overshadowed by the dominance of religious divisions in the pre-nation-state period, this heterogeneity became the central problem of newly formed nation-states and the main target of their drive to further homogenization.

Unlike the previous period when diversity was overcome through a process of divisions, boundary creation/maintenance and subsequently exclusion, in the nation-state period the dominant strategy of homogenization was assimilation. This of course does not mean religious exclusions ended after nation-state formation. Even the tiny religious minorities of both states continued to decline as exclusionary politics of the states continued to operate after nation-state formation and to an extent still continues (Oran, 2005; Malik, 2002).

6.1 The Constant State of Religious Exclusion

This dissertation argues that as the founding ideology of the formation of Turkish and Pakistani states, Muslim nationalism functioned as the boundary marker in the definition of the nation, and, hence exclusion of non-Muslims from the national identity. However, in the nation-state period, non-Muslims acquired a liminal status as they became the citizens of the new nation-states even though their exclusion from the national identity continued. Thus a discord between the legal notion of citizenship and the socio-political notion of nation emerged. Practical solution to this discord was granting minority statuses to non-Muslims. This discord, however, was manageable as long as non-Muslims remained an insignificant and marginalized minority.¹⁵⁵ The nation-state period witnessed the continuing exclusion of non-Muslims to ensure their marginalization. In a way it was the continuous exclusion of non-Muslims that made these states essentially Muslim nationalist. Moreover, nation is not a reified category but it is continuously re-defined and re-constructed. The exclusionary practices that transformed the imperial society to a nation, continued after the formation of nation-state. Exclusion of non-Muslims in the nation-state period had two dimensions: discriminatory practices targeting the specifically non-Muslim citizens and legal separation of non-Muslims through their identification as minorities. Discriminatory policies can be orchestrated by the state or it can be initiated by the social actors. I will not get into details of discrimination towards non-Muslims in these two different political settings as reports on such cases are abundant (see Bhargava, 2004; Malik, 2002; Aktoprak, 2010; Oran,

¹⁵⁵ As Gellner (1983: 2-3) maintains there is no sacred percentage figure below which a minority will be benignly treated and above which he will become offensive in a nation-state. However it is certain that the principle of nationalism opens room only for a small number of non-nationals in a country.

2005). In any case, as a result of these discriminatory acts, the tiny non-Muslim populations of these two countries have shown a steady decline (Fargues, 2001). In that sense, the nation-state period has witnessed to a continuing process of homogenization through religious exclusion.

In terms of the continuous process of religious exclusion, what is more telling than the dwindling numbers of non-Muslims and discrimination they are facing is their continuing status as minorities. Non-Muslims in both countries are legally minorities. This separateness was established by the Lauzanne Agreement in Turkey and was sustained through the decisions of Constitutional Court. In Pakistan this minority status was even more developed as non-Muslims, against their wills (Rais, 2007:113), were granted right to separate electorates as well as a ministry dealing with the affairs of non-Muslims. This status is actually assigned as a way of protecting these communities from discriminatory acts. In fact, whether this legal status helps to fight with discriminatory practices is open to debate; however, it clearly keeps defining the nation in terms of religious identification and indeed performs as the basis for the religious exclusion in socio-political terms. Thus, from the prospect of defining the nation even if the non-Muslims were treated positively as long as they were granted a corporate minority status, this means that they are outside the line that draws the boundaries of the nation. In fact, further this status is established, the firmer is the exclusion of non-Muslims from the national body.

Constant demarcation of national identity along the religious lines reflects itself most clearly over the migration patterns in both countries. As it was discussed in the preceding chapters, migration had already played an important function in the process of

the nation-state formation. It was through the population exchanges that religious homogeneity of the both nation-states was secured. This process, however, did not end with the nation-state formation. As Kemal Kirişçi rightly points out, “immigration and refugee policies of a state is an important indicator of the country’s nationalization policies. Policies over migration and the decision who is to be admitted is invariably closely linked with prevailing definitions of national identity” (2000:3). Thus, migration policies of the nation-state period are important indicators of the continuing exclusionary function of religion in the homogenization process.

In the Turkish case, the exclusionary function of religion can be best observed with regard to the denial of the migration of Gagavuz Turks into Turkey in 1930s (see Grigoriadis, 2013). Gagavuz people were Christian Turks mostly living in Romania. When they demanded to migrate into Turkey during the 1930s, the high noon of assertive secularism in Turkey, their demands were rejected. However in the meantime, many Muslim communities of the Balkan Peninsula, like the Albanians, Bosnians and Pomaks, who did not have any ethnic affinity and did not speak Turkish were admitted and even encouraged to migrate into Turkey. This is a clear indicator that the process of religious exclusion continued after the formation of the nation-state. Similarly, the migration patterns of Pakistani state also exhibit that the fundamental criteria for the inclusion into the nation is the religious affiliation. As an illuminating example, throughout the 1950s communal violence in East Pakistan led to the forcible departure of the entire Hindu population to India (Samad, 2013). However, after the secession of East Pakistan, the remaining Bihari community in Bangladesh was allowed to migrate

into Pakistan. Thus, while non-Muslims were pushed to migrate from Pakistan, Muslim migration into Pakistan was accepted.

6.2 Further Research Areas

The migration patterns clearly reveal that homogenization through religious exclusion continued after the formation of nation-state. Homogenization is an ongoing process, since perfect homogeneity is unattainable. While this dissertation approached homogenization from a very particular perspective; exclusionary function of religion, there are other means of homogenization. These alternative means of homogenization can be religious or non-religious (mostly linguistic), and the strategy of homogenization can be based on assimilation as well as exclusion. It is possible to develop this research also by taking into consideration of alternative means of homogenization. Before ending this dissertation I will first briefly point to the new functions of religion in homogenization and then the non-religious aspects of homogenization and nation-building. Through these remarks, a comparison between the homogenization processes of pre-nation-state and nation-state periods will be presented. Such a comparison will reveal in what ways this research can be extended.

6.2.1 Who is a Muslim-What is a Muslim: Homogenization through religious assimilation

While homogenization could be attained either through exclusion or assimilation, the focus of this dissertation was on exclusion. In other words it was more interested in the

boundary drawing itself (a la Barth, 1969), rather than the definition of what remained within the boundary. This was also true for the nationalist movements that created Turkey and Pakistan. Through the period of nationalist mobilization, a positive definition of the nation (rather than a negative one which only clarifies the “other”) and the role of religion to this nation were left deliberately vague.

However, upon nation-state formation, the state had to deal with defining what is inside the boundary. Religion in this period continued to be the boundary drawer; thus it was an instrument of exclusion. On the other hand, through definition of within boundary, it also became, to a certain extent, an instrument of assimilation. In other words, once religion and national identity became congruent, defining religion became inevitable for the definition of nation. Thus, the question “who is a Muslim?” transformed to “what is a Muslim?” Turkish state developed a comprehensive effort in defining Islam through state institutions. This process was based on the denial of alternative interpretations of Islam and development and promotion of a unique and monopolized religious discourse by the state.

Series of legislation changes on 3 March 1924 marks the core of Turkey’s policy on religion. Three changes are important for the purpose of homogenization and nation-building; unification of education (tevhid-i tedrisat) which meant the abolition of all madrasas, abolition of the office of Shayh-ul Islam and of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti), and the formation of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) and Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü (Directorate-General for Pious Foundations). A year later, these policies were supplanted by the banning of religious orders (tariqat) and the closing down of all

shrines and dervish lounges. The Law on the Dissolution of Dervish Lounges also made it mandatory that only Diyanet personnel can use religious titles. Thus through Diyanet and its personnel, the state established control over religion. The unification of education strengthened this control as it enabled the state to control the production and dissemination of religious knowledge. Thus, these measures did not only aim to make religion subservient to the state, as is often pointed, but it also aimed to monopolize the religious discourse. Through this monopoly the state interfered into the non-political realm as well, and as such, Zurcher rightly points that these reforms constitute a radical break with the previous secularization processes of the Ottomans (2004: 187). This monopolization can be observed more closely through Diyanet, which is authorized to oversee “all cases concerning the Exalted Islamic Faith which relate to beliefs (itikadat) and rituals of worship (ibadat)” (Davison, 2003: 337). By turning all religious people into paid employees of the state, Diyanet becomes a crucial institution for the state control over Islam (Toprak, 1995:35). But its more significant function is promoting a singular interpretation of Islam in order to reinforce national unity. This is made evident through one of its stated objectives, “to give service in protecting and strengthening social stability, peace, national unity, and solidarity.” (Pınar, 2013: 510).

Thus, through this state version of Islam, religion acquired a new function of homogenization. While Islam, like all other religions, is multi-vocal, the state attempted to homogenize the religious discourse through monopolizing Islamic discourse. This led to the denial of alternative readings of Islam particularly the Alevi Islam. Thus the Kemalist state policy on religion was based on the denial of Alevism (see Pınar, 2013). This is often considered as a paradox since Alevi Islam is more in line with the secular

ambitions of Kemalism and Alevis have been staunch supporters of the Kemalist reforms (Bruinessen 1996; Shakland, 2003). However, from a perspective of homogenization this denial is perfectly in line with the policies of nation-building. At this point it is important to remind that Islam promoted by Diyanet was considered as a threat by many Islamist circles as well (Ulutaş, 2010). What matters at this stage is not necessarily the version of Islam that is promoted but the fact that a monopolization of religious discourse is pursued as a corollary to other policies of homogenization. Aside from institutional changes and the replacement of all diverse religious institutions by state controlled Diyanet another crucial policy that enabled homogenization of religious discourse was the unification of education. By asserting its control over religious education, Turkish state managed to create a monopoly over the production of religious knowledge. This monopoly was another significant aspect of the attempts on the homogenization of religious discourse. Its significance will be revealed when Pakistan's religious policies are discussed. Thus on the one hand Turkish state asserted its control over all the traditional power bases of ulama and high Islam, while on the other hand it demolished alternative forms of social Islam (low Islam) by demolishing dervish lounges and banning tariqas. (On the difference between high Islam and low Islam, see Gellner, 1981; Güngör, 2012). "Through these processes one state-favored religion is promoted and replaced the diverse interpretations and practices of Islam" (Soner and Toptaş, 2011).

The problem of defining a Muslim emerged in Pakistan more clearly around the debates on the Ahmadi community.¹⁵⁶ During the process of nation-state formation the

¹⁵⁶ On Ahmadis see Friedmann, 1989

focus was on the boundary, thus on the question of who is Muslim rather than what does it mean to be a Muslim. Thus when inquired about the status of Ahmadis in 1944, three years before the partition, Jinnah would say 'Who am I to declare a person non-Muslim who calls himself a Muslim? (Saeed, 2010: 25).¹⁵⁷ However, upon the formation of nation-state, it is no longer possible to avoid the controversies on defining Muslim and Islam (question of what is a Muslim). Hence the status of Ahmadis became a contentious issue in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.¹⁵⁸ Around the question of Ahmadis was of course the larger issue of defining Islam; a matter not relevant to the drawing of boundaries (emergence of the group) but directly related to the definition of the community within the boundary (definition of the group).

In this endeavor Pakistani state was much weaker than the Turkish state and it couldn't single handedly define what a Muslim is. Instead a long struggle marked by the anti-Ahmedi riots of 1949, 1952-3 and the subsequent formation of Munir Commission in 1954 represents the delicate attempt of secular state elites finding a common ground with the ulama. As it had been discussed in the fourth chapter, Indian ulama largely

¹⁵⁷ In a similar vein Sunni-Shi'a distinction was also largely irrelevant in the process of partition. Muhammad Qasim Zaman (1998: 691) approvingly quotes W.C. Smith's justification for having little to say on the Shi'a in his study of modern trends in Indian Islam: "there is nothing in the differences between Sunni and Shi'a fundamentally relevant to those processes (of modernization). The two groups diverge over what answers are to be given to questions which today do not arise." It might be also helpful to remind that both Aga Khan, the first president of the Muslim League, and Jinnah himself were Ismaili Shi'a.

¹⁵⁸ A slightly similar controversy exists with regard to the *Dönme* community in Turkey. Dönmes were included in the forced population exchange as Muslims, and they were forced to migrate to Turkey. Just like Ahmedis, their self-declared Muslimness was sufficient to be considered as nominal Muslims. However, once the state acquired the duty of defining the Muslim, their status also became controversial. They were included in the wealth tax in 1942 as a separate community. They were forced to pay double the tax Muslims paid but they weren't subject to the same amount as non-Muslims (see, Aktar, 2006). Thus they are a fringe case that emerged as a result of the question on the definition of Muslim.

avoided any support to the idea of Pakistan. However, once Pakistan is formed as a state of Muslims through a period of high usage of Islamic vocabulary, they tried to capitalize on the possibility of turning Pakistan into an Islamic state. This inevitably got into a crush with the modernist secularizing ideology of ML. The secular state elite was committed to the notion of Muslim nationalism, thus observing religion as the boundary drawer but had no intension on making Islam the primary element in defining inside of the boundary. The ML leadership remained true to this nationalist tradition and resisted the ulama in their attempt to hijack the Pakistani movement. Thus, they made lip service to Islamist demands while trying to formulate a nation on secular cultural terms. However the Ahmedi problem also showed the state elite of the urgent need to define Islam. As the Munir Report in 1954 discovered, when it is left to the ulama, “no two learned divines can agree on the definition of Muslim” let alone the issue of a good Muslim. In this endeavor Pakistani state took steps very similar to Turkey.

Soon after the publication of the Munir Report, Pakistani state took steps to nationalize and homogenize religion and assert a monopoly over religious discourse. The first step was the establishment of Auqaf (Endowments) Department and nationalization of waqfs—in 1960 (Cesari, 2014: 50-53; Malik, 1996:55-85). While Turkish state abolished all shrines, Pakistan nationalized them and took them under state control. Thus while sufi loges were shut down and sufi leaders were banned from having religious titles in Turkey, in Pakistan they became state officials and their seminaries and lodges became state property. In this vein they became instruments for spreading state ideology. Moreover, through appointing imams and khatibs to the mosques affiliated with the waqfs and shrines, the Pakistani state tried to control the Friday

sermons as well. Another aspect of the nationalization of the awqaf was that state now controlled the curriculum of the religious institutions controlled by these waqfs.

Same year The Central Institute of Islamic Research was formed which would later change its name to Islamic Research Institute (IRI). In 1962 formation of Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) accompanied IRI¹⁵⁹ (Malik, 1996: 33-54). Both institutions were formed to develop a “true version” of Islam. Just like Turkish Diyanet they were “to define the fundamentals of Islam in a liberal and rational manner” (Saeed, 1994: 95). These two efforts were accompanied by Ayub governments’ consistent attempts to marginalize the ulama and autonomous religious forces. In fact both the CII and Auqaf Department has a similar goal with Diyanet; enable the state to be the sole authority in defining Islam thus homogenizing the religious discourse and thus instrumentalizing religion in the quest of homogenous nation.

Another aspect of religious homogenization is related to religious education. Education is always an important instrument of nation-building. It is through mass education that modern state promotes the idea of nation to its citizens (see Gellner, 1983). Thus every nation-state pays particular attention to education in its policies of nationalization. Religious education is also crucial for the relation between religions and nation-building. For the nationalizing states religious education aims the “blurring of sectarian divisions to promote a singular and unified Islam” (Cesari, 2014:88). In order to homogenize education in general and religious education in particular, Turkish state took more radical steps compared to the Pakistani state. The law on the unification of

¹⁵⁹ Both of these institutions were preceded by the formation of a Board of Talimat-i Islamiya consisting of ulama in 1949, with the aim to advice on matters, which might have come out of the Objectives Resolution. The Board’s recommendations were, however, rejected as being impractical (Binder, 1963).

education abolished all madrasas and forbade private religious instruction. Thus Turkish state maintained complete monopoly on the production and dissemination of religious knowledge. As a result of this monopoly, within a generation, the entire corpus of religious clergy were educated and indoctrinated through the state institutions. Through this process, monopoly of the singular state version of Islam was maintained. As the republican history would reveal, diverse interpretations of Islam developed only in realms outside the reach of state control.

In Pakistan, the state was never as radical as the Turkish state and it was unable to extend its control over religious education. It is not only that madrasahs not being outlawed; in fact they flourished through the Pakistani history. At the time of its formation there were 147 madrasas in Pakistan. By 2005, the number is estimated to be around 13,000 (Nasr, 2010: 142; ICG Report, 2005: 6). Aside from the very few controlled by the provincial auqaf (which were nationalized in 1960), the majority of them belong to private sector. Moreover, not only the ownership but also the entire decision of curricula is controlled by the responsible mullah. This not to deny the fact that there are traditions; but each mullah is free to choose his approach and curricula as major policy decisions regarding doctrinal preferences, curriculum and the selection of teachers and students remain the exclusive prerogative of the ulama (Ahmad, 2000: 186). In order to establish Government control over religious education, in 1962 the Ayub government took the initiative and set up a committee to discuss the syllabus of madrasas. However no binding decision could be taken. A similar effort was repeated through the Report of 1979 again with no success in establishing control over the madrasas (Zaman, 1999: 310-314). This reflects lack of Pakistani state's control over

religious education, thus its inability to define what a Muslim is. It also sits in stark contrast with the Turkish case which abandoned all madrasas within a year of its foundation and monopolized religious education.

Only in 2001, after 9/11 and amidst surmounting international pressure, Pakistan Madrasa Education Board was set up and in 2002 the government issued the Madrassa Registration Ordinance to regulate religious schools by bringing them under the formal educational system of the country. According to the ordinance, Madrassas must register to the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board and the respective Provincial Madrassa Education Boards (Looney, 2003: 265). The plan was only partially successful since the sanction on madrasas that did not register was limited to cutting financial aids.¹⁶⁰ “Even this limited incentive is undercut by the fact that most of the schools receive little or no government funding to begin with.” (Looney, 2003: 266).

6.2.2 Comparing the Homogenization Before and After Nation-State Formation

While retaining its function of exclusion, religion gained a new function of assimilation in the nation-state period. Thus while “religion as an identity marker” was instrumentalized as a boundary drawer to exclude certain groups from the fold of the nation, “religion as a faith” was instrumental for assimilating those that fell into the boundaries of the nation. While it is possible to say that nation-state forms a rupture as the assimilationist aspect of homogenization dominates the policy realm, it is also possible to say that there is continuity with regard to the process of homogenization. In

¹⁶⁰ They might face fines or even closure but in practice this has not been the case (Looney, 2003: 266).

fact, the process of nation-building starting from late imperial times to the nation-state period can be read as a process of augmenting homogeneity. Since nation-building is a continuous process, homogenization is also a continuous process that links the transitional phase from an empire to a nation-state and the nationalizing policies of the nation-state era. Thus through different stages of nation-building, continuity is observed with regard to the process of homogenization, while the means of homogenization represents a radical break. This break can partly be observed and briefly discussed above, with regard to the changing function of religion as religion acquired an assimilationist function in the nation-state period. However this break can be better observed if other instruments of assimilation such as ethnicity and language and their function of homogenization are taken into picture. Thus, a topic for further inquiry would be the relation between other forms of assimilation and religion in the nation-state period. Some tentative hypothesis can be reached based on the perspective provided in this dissertation. These hypotheses need to be scrutinized and can form the starting point of future studies.

While the focus of this dissertation had been on the initial (pre-nation-state) period of nation-building and on the exclusionary function of religion in the homogenization process in this period, homogenization in the nation-state era is largely shaped by assimilation. This difference is already pointed with regard to the changing function of religion in these two periods. Moreover, while religion was *the* sole criterion of exclusion it now became only *a* criterion of assimilation. In other words, religious exclusion almost exclusively serves homogenization in the process of transition from an empire to nation-state while other means of homogenization enters and dominates the

policy realm in the nation-state period. Thus, in the nation-state period, the means of homogenization multiplied, inevitably leading to the decreased importance of religion. Moreover, the newly acquired function of assimilation necessitated that religion became under state control. Thus, the same institutions that are used as means of religious assimilation also served as means of religions' subjugation to state authority. As such it also means the denial of religion to control the state and also to define the nation. In fact it is possible to say that the contradiction and tension between the religions' being the sole authority in drawing the boundaries of the nation and its inability to define the nation is a continuous source of friction and political crisis in both countries.

Thus as assimilation dominated over exclusion, (defining within the boundary over drawing the boundary) non-religious criteria such as ethnicity, culture and language became the dominant (over religion) means of assimilation. In other words, religion single handedly defines the nation in negative terms (who does not belong to the nation), whereas ethnicity, culture and language define the nation in positive terms. These two different phases can be summarized as religious exclusion and linguistic assimilation. Thus assimilation of religious discourse in the nation-state period is only a step towards further homogenization. As it had been pointed above, internal diversity of the Muslim population had two different dimensions. The population was still religiously heterogeneous in terms of sects and religious practices. Policies on religious assimilation targeted this diversity. However, more importantly, this nominally Muslim population belonged to diverse ethnic, linguistic and cultural communities. Assimilation of this diversity was the dominant theme of the nation-building in the nation-state period.

6.2.3 Homogenization Through Linguistic Assimilation

In the nation-state period, both Turkey and Pakistan were based on a mono-cultural notion of nationalism with the one nation- one culture-one language approach that was the hall mark of a nation-state. The homogenizing tendency continued after the formation of the nation-state as the multiple identities were denied recognition in favor of a uniform national identity. However, the style of Pakistan and Turkey in their search for a homogenous nation was different.¹⁶¹ Turkey having a considerable ethnic majority and a powerful state apparatus smoothly associated the nation with the dominant ethnicity and executed a policy of ethnic assimilation (see Yıldız, 2001). Language as was the case in Pakistan was central to this process of assimilation. However, Pakistan lacked such an ethnic base that could be associated with the homogenous nation. Thus, the Pakistani leaders opted for a more integrationist strategy hoping that through the modern forces of communication and integration, a mono-cultural nation would emerge in time. But their approach was not pluralist either and was based on the denial of diversity. Jinnah's 15 June 1948 speech at the Quetta Municipality reflects the mood of Pakistani nationalism: "We are now all Pakistanis- not Baluchis, Pathans, Sindhis,

¹⁶¹ This difference is also related with the position of modern state in the emergence of Muslim nationalism in these two contexts. In the Turkish case, Muslim nationalism emerged among the ranks of a modernizing state as it became increasingly difficult for this modernizing/interventionist state to maintain social plurality and diversity. The Muslim nationalism of India is a splinter ideology. It developed in reaction to the threat of a modern/interventionist state in which the Muslims would be a perpetual minority. It lacked the state apparatus in its evolution as much as it lacked the ethnic core. Moreover the leaders of the new state were ethnically and culturally the minority of the new state. Unlike the Turkish case where the state went through a period of official nationalism that witnessed to the policies of "stretching the tight skin of nation to the empire" the leaders of the new state didn't go through such a phase in Pakistan. And they lacked the demographic and institutional capabilities to do so.

Bengalis, Punjabis and so on...we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else” (Jinnah, 2000: 268).

A very powerful center was considered necessary in both contexts to create this homogenous nation. In Turkey this showed itself as an overly centralized state in which the whole power is concentrated at the center. This overwhelming power of the center transformed state society relations to a form of center-periphery relations (Mardin, 1973). In Turkey the issue of further nationalization/nation-building meant the extension of state and its ethnic/cultural identity even to the most remote regions of the country and assimilation of cultural/communal/ascriptive identities to the state centered national identity. As such this further homogenization had a clear ethnic dimension.

In Pakistan however, nation-building involved the problem of ethnic/provincial/linguistic identities with the newly emerging national identity. Unlike Turkey where the assimilationist strand left no room for micro identities, the integrationist nationalization of Pakistan had to co-opt with the micro identities along with the expectation that in the long run they would disappear through the forces of modernization and the extension of state control. In Pakistan administrative organization is a federation in form, but in practice it had been a highly centralized, top-down style of control associated with authoritarian rule (Samad, 2013). In fact particularly during the early periods of Pakistan, the federal units were defined as administrative and geographic units rather than reflecting their ethno-linguistic nature (Kazi, 1994). This was in line with the vision of Jinnah who never hid his disgust for provincial identities and called people to give up their provincial identities in order to build up a nation (Jones, 2009: 44). Similarly many nationalist leaders after him “have regarded

provincialism as a threat and have never seemed able to build *on* it, preferring instead to work *against* it” (Hayes, 1984: 54). Thus, through the Pakistani history a monolithic notion of Pakistani nation was promoted instead of a multi-national or even a multi-ethnic Pakistan. However, the dominant ethnic group, the Punjabis, saw the opportunities of letting their demographic superiority to the service of the integrationist nation-building process, and equated themselves with the nation. This is the process of “Pakistan becoming Punjabistan” (Samad, 1995). Hanif Ramay, former chief minister of Punjab, argues that in this process “Punjab lost its identity in order to gain a larger Pakistani identity, it began to perceive itself alone as Pakistan, while others started calling Pakistan the greater Punjab” (Ahmad, 1998: xix).

6.2.4 Linguistic Assimilation

Thus, nation-building in the nation-state era continued to be a process of homogenization. Diversity was not tolerated as the ultimate aim was to create a homogenous nation in line with the western liberal nation-state model. This tendency was the most evident in issues regarding the problem of national language. Language would play a key role in the integration/assimilation process and the emergence of a mono-cultural nation. In both cases, the desire of creating a uniform citizenry and a homogenous nation was largely shaped through policies of linguistic assimilation. Language is so central in the nation-state period that it is possible to claim linguistic assimilation serves as the center of the nationalization policies. Hence my hypothesis is that the nation-building in both cases can be roughly defined in a bi-phased expression; religious exclusion and linguistic assimilation.

Unlike religion, language has always been a central concern of the nationalism literature. Both Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) accord language a central place in the emergence of nationalism and the process of nation-formation. As Hans Kohn pointed out language is directly related with the notion of other and the leading nationalist ideologues of the nineteenth century like Fichte, Herder or Mazzini all have defined nations through language (Sadoğlu, 2010: 27).

As it was discussed in the first chapter, unlike religion language provides opportunities of assimilation. Considering that assimilation is one of the main, and the prioritized strategy of nation-building and homogenization, language is integral to almost every nation-building case. While religious assimilation is limited to standardization of intra-religious discourse and assimilation of the members within the religious community, linguistic assimilation can include diverse linguistic communities.¹⁶² Moreover emphasis on linguistic unity is also related with the well-functioning and administrative efficiency of the modern(izing) state. Thus assimilation of diverse people into a single language is a common theme of nation-building projects, be it official nationalism of empires, separatist nationalisms or the post-colonial nationalisms. This is valid for the Turkish and Pakistan nation-buildings as well.

¹⁶² However, the integrative capacity of language is limited by the religious differences. In the Subcontinent, language became a function of the divisions between the Hindus and Muslims where a common lingua franca was divided as Hindi and Urdu. Hindi and Urdu are basically the same two languages written with different scripts. Thus while in most cases nationalists try to assimilate multiple language groups into the dominant linguistic group in the Indian case, the religious nationalisms had led to the pluralization of a single dominant language along the lines of religious divisions. Limitation of linguistic assimilation by religious differences can be observed in the Ottoman case as well. Namik Kemal's views on the language and religion with regard to nationalism are very instructive. He claims that it is not possible to teach our language to Greeks or Bulgarians, but it is quite possible to teach it to Muslims such as Lazs or Albanians. If the necessary precautions are taken Albanian or Laz will be entirely forgotten in twenty years' time (Sadoğlu, 2010: 78-79). Thus he hints that religious difference is an obstacle in spreading nationalism.

Both countries applied similar state policies as they established language to the center of nation. Thus both states developed a policy of “language planning” (see Fishman, 1972) as a part of nation-building. The project was further homogenizing the multi-ethnic Muslim nation with a linguistically homogenous nation. In Turkey, Turkish was not only considered as the single official language, speaking “vernacular languages” in the public was also outlawed.¹⁶³ State designed campaigns, like “Citizen Speak Turkish” were promoted in order to enforce the public use of Turkish. In Pakistan, Urdu was considered the only official language, despite the fact that Urdu was spoken by less than ten percent of the population. Moreover, in East Pakistan -today’s Bangladesh-, which constituted slightly more than half of the population, Urdu was completely an alien language. Thus both state pursued mono-linguism as part of nation-building processes (for a detailed analysis, see Rahman, 1996; Ayres, 2009; Aslan, 2007; Sadoğlu, 2010). In both countries institutions were formed and supported to spread the usage of Turkish and Urdu. Türk Dil Kurumu and Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu was supported as part of the efforts of language planning (Aytürk, 2008; Jaffrelot, 2002).

These policies were guided by a perception that equates modern nationalism with language. Thus Atatürk would equate being Turk with speaking Turkish (Türk demek dil demektir), claim that speaking Turkish was the prerequisite of being a Turk. Without speaking Turkish one could not belong to the Turkish society thus had to remain outside the boundaries of the nation (Sadoğlu, 2010: 214). Jinnah would claim

¹⁶³ This constituted a major violation of the 39th article of the Lausanne Agreement, which guarantees the use of vernaculars in public life and in certain public offices like the courts. For example, this article guarantees the right to have an interpreter in courts for those who can’t speak Turkish. The ban on the public use of vernaculars was lifted in 1991. However, Turkish continues to be the sole language of public offices.

that a mono-linguistic society was necessary for the functioning of modern state; “without one state language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function... the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language.” (2000: 150). Similar to Jinnah, Liaqat Khan would also claim that “it is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language” (Farroqi, 1972: 69).

Thus, the national communities which were previously delineated along religious lines were now defined as Turkish speaking Turks and Urdu speaking Pakistanis. However, unlike the religious delineation this would not mean the exclusion of members of ethno-linguistic communities but their assimilation into the linguistic nation. Both Jinnah and Atatürk were aware of the incongruence between the linguistic communities and the nation. However, language was instrumentalized as a mean of homogenization and nation-building. In Ziya Gökalp’s definition “members of the nations are not those who speak the national language but are the ones who will speak the national language in the future” (Sadoğlu, 2010: 164).

Thus, linguistic assimilation was an integral part of the attempts of erasing diverse identities and creating a uniform and homogenous nation in both cases. In Turkey, except from the larger Kurdish minority, all non-Turkish Muslim communities were linguistically assimilated into Turkishness (Türklük) through Turkish (Türkçe) language. However, in its attempt to assimilate diverse ethno-linguistic communities to Urdu speaking Pakistanis, Pakistani state failed largely. Today even though Urdu is largely understood around Pakistan, it is the first language of less than ten percent of the population (Jones, 2009: 74). This failure was first became apparent in the emergence of

Bengali nationalism, around demands of parity for Bengali with Urdu, and the partition of Pakistan in 1971. Even since then, various ethno-linguistic groups are mobilized in demands for separation or linguistic recognition. As was the case with regard to religious assimilation, Turkish state was relatively more successful than the Pakistani one in achieving linguistic assimilation. Before concluding this dissertation some suggestions will be provided to explain this difference.

6.2.5 Structural Differences

Through this dissertation parallels in the Pakistani and Turkish cases were underlined. In both cases, religious exclusion helped demarcate the boundaries of the nation, while the assimilation of people within this boundary took place after the nation-state formation. However while both states share a nationalizing ideology and a mono-cultural definition of nation, the structural conditions in both countries were enormously different. Before concluding this brief analysis on the nation-state period, these differences need to be pointed. This difference also accounts for the contemporary differences between two countries despite a parallel historical evolution.

With regard to its struggle with ulama two facts weakened the hand of Pakistani leaders: as it was discussed in the previous chapter as of its inception ML has been dominated by the Muslim minority provinces which now remained on the other side of the border. This meant that the real power base of most ML politicians disappeared upon the partition. Jinnah himself was from Bombay and his lieutenant Liaqat Ali Khan was from the East Punjab both of which now remained in India. ML was barely organized in

the provinces which made Pakistan and lacked the institutional infrastructure and popular support. Extension of ML organizations into these provinces started only few years before the partition and was largely incomplete at the time of state formation. Thus Samuel Huntington (1968: 422) defines the birth of Pakistan as “pre-mature.” With this limited power base, ML leaders lacked the institutional power to confront the more traditionally established ulama. Second decisive factor was the sudden deaths of the Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, the only two leaders with a national stature and popular support, soon after the partition. Jinnah died of tuberculosis in 1948, only a year after the formation of Pakistan and Liaqat Ali Khan, who replaced him, was assassinated in 1951. Thus within four years of independence ML remained without a leader that would have a nation-wide legitimacy. What followed was a period of collapse that not only witnessed to power struggles among different factions of politicians, bureaucracy and the army but also to a struggle in defining the identity and the orientation of the country. The role of religion in the state administration was the central part of this struggle. Throughout the movement for Pakistan the state religion relations and the role of Islam in state administration were left deliberately vague. This vagueness on the one hand contributed to the Pakistani movement as it enabled people with different degrees of religiosity to rally behind the idea of Pakistan while on the other hand it created a Pakistan that is “insufficiently imagined” (Oldenburg, 1985). Pakistan meant different things to the Punjabi rural people, to the urban notable from UP, to the Sindi supporters, to the Bengalis of East Pakistan, to the ulama and to the lawyer-politicians of ML. This vagueness on the identity of Pakistan and the weakness of ML leadership to single handedly push its agenda delayed the declaration of the constitution until 1958, 11 years

after independence. When compared with the Turkish republic which declared its constitution in 1924, a year after its formation, the severity of the ideological fight on identity and the weakness of leadership can be better observed.

What made the situation even worse was the limited state capability. Pakistan was the splinter of the Indian Raj and the main areas that benefited from the modernizing projects of the colonial rule were left at India. Moreover, in West Pakistan eighty percent of industrial bases were owned by non-Muslims (Cohen, 2004: 49). Since Raj was a colonial state, all top leaders and decision makers were British. There were only a handful of Indians in the administrative body among whom even a more little margin were Muslims who became Pakistani citizen. Thus, at the time of partition there were only a hundred and one Muslim civil servants (out of a thousand and four hundred) in the ALL-India Services (AIS) and merely four Muslim military officers (out of six hundred) of the ranks of Lt. Colonel in the army (Niaz, 2010: 65; Cohen, 2004: 41). Under these circumstances, British hastily declared in 3 June 1947 that their withdrawal and the partition would take place by 14 August, meaning that institutions of the federal government had to be built from scratch in less than three months. The task of reconstituting the executive apparatus of the state was taken by an initial corps of about a hundred and sixty civil servants out of which about forty were British who stayed on for a while. Of the Muslim members, many of them were in fact juniors with less than ten years of experience but they were elevated to senior positions out of despair (Niaz, 2010: 94).

This stands in stark contrast to the Turkish case with regard to the state capability as well as the leadership. Turkish state was a direct inheritor of the Ottoman

Empire both in terms of state institutions as well as the state cadres.¹⁶⁴ Dunkwart Rustow (2000: 376) maintains that at the time of its formation Turkey inherited eighty-five percent of Ottoman bureaucracy and ninety-three percent of its military. Thus, there was a functioning state from the very beginning. This state machinery already proved its strength as it was powerful enough to conduct a two years long armed struggle in 1920-1922. The republican leadership was drawn largely from the CUP cadres which were already ruling the empire since 1908 (Zurcher, 1984). Thus there was direct continuation of institutions and personnel. Despite the Republic's rhetoric of a clear rupture, there was only a smooth transition in terms of state institutions. Thus, it is safe to say that in the Turkish case, the state was there and it had to deal with nation-building whereas in Pakistan both the state and nation had to be built simultaneously. This had detrimental effects on the nation-building process of Pakistan (Jahan, 1972).

6.3 Expansion of the Argument

This study argued that one way of approaching to the role of religion could be done through looking at religion's function in the process of homogenization. It is also argued that this function primarily reflected itself in the process of exclusion. In contrast, assimilation often took place within the same religious community and often constructed around ethno-linguistic identities. How generalizable are these arguments to other cases of nation-building? Is this a unique feature of Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms or is it generalizable?

¹⁶⁴ For a comparative analysis, in a different setting, which points to the role of institutional continuity for state power and stability, see, Anderson (1986).

Israel is a prime example of a nation-building through religion drawing its boundaries. Moreover, openly secular composition of the founders of the Zionist movement also testifies to the secular nature of religious nationalism. In Israel, like in many other cases, religion serves the function of exclusion, while assimilation of the members of the same religious community have taken place only in the nation-state era.

While Israel is a special case with regard to the relation of religion and nation-building, the arguments of this dissertation can be generalized to a much larger sample, particularly to the cases that involve a process of nation construction in an extremely diverse setting, mostly in cases of transition from empire to nation-states. Thus a similar pattern can be observed in many post-Ottoman states like Greece. Greek nationalism was initially shaped by a process of religious exclusion. All non-Greek-Orthodox people, mainly Muslims but Serbs as well, were excluded from the nation. While Greek Orthodoxy drew the boundaries of the nation in the process of nation-state formation, various ethnic communities were linguistically assimilated into Greek nationality only after the nation-state formation (Kitromilides, 1989). Thus, nation-building involved religious exclusion and augmenting homogenization. It would be fruitful to extend this analysis to other cases of transitions from an empire to nation, particularly to the post-Romanov states.

However, there are also important exceptions among the post-Ottoman cases, particularly if the given community is thoroughly multi religious; if the religious minority is too numerous and well established to the fabric of society. Albania and Egypt are prime examples of this. In such cases due to the inability of religious exclusion nation-building processes did not include a process of religious

homogenization. However, it is important to remember that dominant form of nationalism is often challenged by rival versions of nationalism. Thus, even in the thoroughly multi-religious societies, secular nationalisms can be confronted by a more parochial religious nationalism. In Bosnia, the rivalry between Bosnian nationalism and the Bosniac nationalism is a case in point (Magas, 2003).

A similar rivalry can be observed in the Indian subcontinent as well. India is a battle ground between secular composite nationalism of the Congress and the Hindu nationalism of the BJP. In a BJP style nationalism, the boundaries of the nation is drawn through the lines of Hinduism and Sanskrit serves a function of linguistic assimilation. However, accommodation instead of homogenization is always an option; though it needs political skills to manage it. The Congress party whose vision is based on accommodation rather homogenization, and thus pursues policies of plurality and diversity is a deviant case that often raises interest among the political scientists. Since the Congress version of nation-state is pluralist rather than homogenizing, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz (2011) claim that India is a new model of political organization. They define India not as a nation-state, but as a state-nation. Bangladesh on the other hand is a typical case of nation-state shaped by homogenization. However, the Bengali nationalism has been developed in reaction to Pakistan. Thus from its inception, it has been based entirely on secular-cultural terms and ethnicity. However, taken from a larger perspective, the emergence of Bangladesh is also a case of religious exclusion followed by linguistic assimilation since the modern day Bangladesh has been initially shaped by the partition of the Bengal province along religious lines. Thus, contemporary Bangladesh is also formed by an initial phase of religious exclusion and then a process

of linguistic assimilation. Thus, three years after its bloody partition from Pakistan on entirely secular terms, in 1974 Bangladesh changed its name to Islamic Republic of Bangladesh. From a historical perspective it is possible to claim that Muslim nationalism emerged first, which was later replaced by an ethnic Bengali nationalism and which was later replaced by a more Islamic Bangladeshi nationalism. In other words, while Pakistan forms the “other” of Bangladesh in ethnic/linguistic terms, India (and West Bengal province in India) continues to be the “other” in religious terms. Bangladeshi nationalism emphasizes both religion and ethnicity/language and represents a further process of homogenization (Van Schendel, 2004).

Thus the conflict between the diverse nature of societies and the homogenizing impulse of nation-building can be observed in most cases. It would be fruitful to extent this analyses into other cases of nation-building from diverse societies. Diversity is a social fact, whereas pluralism is a political choice. However, nation-builders seldom make this choice.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abizadeh, Arash. 2002. "Does liberal democracy presuppose a cultural nation? Four arguments," *American political science review* 96(3): 495-510.
- Ahmad, Aziz. 1967. *Islamic modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London; New York: Routledge.
- , 1998. *Ethnicity and politics in Pakistan*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ahmad, Khurshid. 2006. "Pakistan: Vision and reality, past and future," *The Muslim World* 96(2): 363-379.
- Ahmed, Akbar. 1997. *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*. London: Routledge.
- Akarlı, Engin Deniz. 1993. *The long peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Akçura, Yusuf. 2005 [1904]. *Üç Tarzı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Politics). Ankara: Lotus.
- Aktar, Ayhan. 2000. *Varlık Vergisi Ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları* (the Wealth Tax and the "Turkification" Policies). Istanbul: İletişim.
- Aktoprak, Elçin. 2010. *Bir "Kurucu öteki" olarak: Türkiye'de gayrimüslimler* (The Constitutive Others: Non-Muslims in Turkey). Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İnsan Hakları Merkezi.
- Aktürk, Şener. 2009. "Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman legacy: mono-religious and anti-ethnic definition of Turkish nationhood," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45(6): 893-909.
- , 2012. *Regimes of ethnicity and nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

- Alam, Muzaffar. 1998. "The pursuit of Persian: language in Mughal politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 32(02):317-349.
- Alavi, Hamza. 1987. "Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology," In Hamza Alavi and Fred Halliday, eds., *State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- , 2002. "Social forces and ideology in the making of Pakistan," *Economic and Political Weekly* 37(51):5119-5124.
- Ali, Tariq. 1983. *Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death of a State*. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books.
- Althusser, Louis. 2003. *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları* (Ideology and the Ideological apparatuses of the State). İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities*. London:Verso.
- Anderson, Lisa. 1986. *The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Anscombe, Frederick. 2014. *State, faith, and nation in Ottoman and post-Ottoman lands*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Arai, Masami. 1992. *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Vol. 43. Brill Academic Pub.
- Armstrong, John. 1982. *Nations Before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Asad, Talal. 2003. *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Aslan, Senem. 2007. "“Citizen, Speak Turkish!”: A Nation in the Making,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13(2): 245-272.
- Ayres, Alys. 2009. *Speaking Like a State*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Aytürk, İlker. 2008. "The first episode of language reform in Republican Turkey: the Language Council from 1926 to 1931,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Third Series)* 18(03): 275-293.
- Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. 1959. *India Wins Freedom*. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.

- Aziz, K. K. 1967. *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*. London, Chatto & Windus.
- Bader, Veit-Michael. 2007. *Secularism or democracy: associational governance of religious diversity*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Barkey, Karen. 1994. *Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- , 2005. "Islam and toleration: Studying the Ottoman imperial model," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 19(1-2): 5-19.
- , 2008. *Empire of Difference*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , and Von Hagen, Mark. (eds.) 1997. *After empire: multiethnic societies and nation-building: the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Baxter, Craig and et al. 2002. *Government and Politics in South Asia*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Bayar, Yeşim. 2014. "In pursuit of homogeneity: the Lausanne Conference, minorities and the Turkish nation," *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 42(1): 108-125.
- Bayly, Christopher A. 1983. *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1170-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1985. "The Pre-history of 'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India, 1700–1860," *Modern Asian Studies* 19(02): 177-203.
- , 1988. *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2007. "Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780-1916," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27(2): 332-344.
- Berger, Peter (ed.) 1999. *The desecularization of the world: resurgent religion and world politics*, Washington, D.C. : Ethics and Public Policy Center; Grand Rapids, Mich. : W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co.
- Berkes, Niyazi. 1964. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.

- Bhargava, Rajeev (ed.) 1998. *Secularism and Its Critics*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- , 2004. *Inclusion and Exclusion in South Asia: The Role of Religion*. No. HDOCPA-2004-01. Human Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- , 2006. "The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism." In Thirukodikaval N. Srinivasan, ed., *The Future of Secularism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 20-53.
- Bolitho, Hector. 1954. *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*. London: John Murray Publishers.
- Bora, Tanıl. 2003. "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102 (2/3) :433-451.
- Bose, Sugata and Ayesha Jalal. 2004. *Modern South Asia*. New York: Routledge.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel and Kasaba, Reşat (eds.) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Brass, Paul. 1974. *Language Religion and Politics in North India*, London; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1977. "A Reply To Francis Robinson," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 15(3): 231 – 234.
- , 2000. "Elite Groups Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity Among the Muslims of South Asia," In John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith eds., *Critical Concepts in Political Science: Nationalism*, vol 5, New York, NY: Routledge, 879-912.
- Braude, Benjamin and Lewis, Bernard (eds). 1972. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers.
- Breuilly, John. 1994. *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brown, Judith. 1984. *India: Origins of a Modern Democracy*. New York : Oxford University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the new Europe*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- , 1999. "The Manichean myth: Rethinking the distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism." In Hanspeter Kriesel, et al., *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*. Zurich: Verlag Rueger, 55-71.
- Çağaptay, Soner. 2006. *Islam, secularism, and nationalism in modern Turkey: who is a Turk?* London; New York: Routledge.
- Calhoun, Craig. 1997. *Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Capeaux, Etienne. 1998. *Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentezine* (From the Turkish History Thesis to a Turkish-Islamic Synthesis). İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Casanova, Jose. 1994. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Cesari, Jocelyne. 2014. *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: religion, modernity, and the state*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Çetinsaya, Gökhan. 1999. "Rethinking nationalism and Islam: Some preliminary notes on the roots of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" in modern Turkish political thought," *The Muslim World* 89(3/4):350-376.
- Chandra, Bipan. 1984. *Communalism in modern India*. New Delhi: Vikas.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993. *The Nation and Its Fragments*. Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- , 1998. "Secularism and Tolerance." In Rajeev Bhargava, ed., *Secularism and Its Critics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 345-379.
- Çınar, Alev. 2005. *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Çıtak Zana, 2004. *Nationalism and religion: A comparative study of the development of secularism in France and Turkey*. Ph.d Dissertation, submitted to Boston University.
- Cleveland, William. 1971. *The making of an Arab nationalist; Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and thought of Sati' al-Husri*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
- , 1994. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Cohen, Stephen P. 2004. *The Idea of Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

- Cohn, Bernard. 1983. "Representing Authority in Victorian India." In Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 165-210.
- , 1984. "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia in Culture and History of India," *Folk* 26: 25-49.
- , 1996. *Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: the British in India*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Conversi Daniel, (2007) "Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should We Still Read Ernest Gellner?," *Nations and Nationalism* 13(3): 371-394.
- Cooper, Frederick. 2005. *Colonialism in question: theory, knowledge, history*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Davison, Andrew. 2003. "Turkey, a "Secular" State?: The Challenge of Description," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102(2/3): 333-350.
- Davison, Roderic. 1963. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- , 1976. "'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility': The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered," *Slavic Review* 35(3): 463-483.
- , 1977. "Nationalism as an Ottoman problem and the Ottoman response." In William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds., *Nationalism in a Non-national State: the Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 25-56.
- , 1990. *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: the Impact of the West*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Day, Graham and Andrew Thompson. 2004. *Theorizing Nationalism*. Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Deringil, Selim. 1991. "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)," *IJMES* 23(03): 345-359.
- , (1993) "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35(1):3-29.
- , 1999. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*. London: I.B. Tauris.

- Dirks, Nicholas. 2001. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- , 2009. *Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Doyle, Michael. 1986. *Empires*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Dumont, Louis. 1970. *Homo hierarchicus; an essay on the caste system*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Dündar, Fuat. 2001. *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları iskân politikası 1913-1918* (The Committee of Union and Progress's Policy of Muslim Settlement 1913-1918). İstanbul: İletişim.
- , 2008. *Modern Türkiye'nin şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin etnisite mühendisliği, 1913-1918* (Code of Modern Turkey: Ethnic Engineering of the Committee of Union and Progress, 1913-1918). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 1962. "Religious Organizations and Political Process in Centralized Empires," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 21(03): 271-294.
- , 1963. *The political systems of empires*. London, New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- , 2003. *Comparative civilizations and multiple modernities*. Boston: Brill.
- Embree, T Ainslie. 1972. *India's Search for National Identity*. New York: Knopf.
- , 1989. *Imagining India: essays on Indian history*. Delhi; New York : Oxford University Press.
- Emerson, Rupert. 1960. *From Empire to Nation*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Erdem, Hakan. 2005. "Do not think of the Greeks as agricultural labourers." In Faruk Birtek and Thalia Dragonas, eds., *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*. London: New York: Routledge, 67-84.
- Esherick, Joseph, Kayalı, Hasan and Van Young, Eric (eds.) 2006. *Empire to nation: Historical perspectives on the making of the Modern World*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Esposito, John L. 1980. "Pakistan: Quest for Islamic Identity." In John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 139-62.

- , and John O. Voll. 1996. *Islam and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fahmy, Khaled. 1997. *All the pasha's men: Mehmed Ali, his army, and the making of modern Egypt*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fargues, Philippe. 2001. "Demographic Islamization: Non-Muslims in Muslim Countries," *SAIS Review* 21(2): 103-116.
- Farroqi, Muqimuddin. 1972. *Pakistan: Policies that Led to Break-up*. New Delhi: Communist Party of India.
- Findley, Carter. 1980. *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- , 1982. Findley, Carter. "The acid test of Ottomanism: the acceptance of non-Muslims in the late Ottoman bureaucracy." In Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society* v.2. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 339-368.
- , 2008. "The Tanzimat." In Reşat Kasaba, ed., *The Cambridge History of Turkey* 4. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 11-37.
- , 2010. *Turkey, Islam, nationalism, and modernity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fishman, Joshua. 1972. *Language and Nationalism*. Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers.
- Foucault, Michel. 1991. "Governmentality." In. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Furnivall, John Sydenham. 1956. *Colonial policy and practice; a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*. New York: New York University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1981. *Muslim Society*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- , 1996. *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Enemies*. New York: Penguin.
- , 1996a "Ernest Gellner's reply: 'Do nations have navels?'," *Nations and nationalism* 2(3): 366-370.
- , 1997. *Encounters with Nationalism*. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.

- , 1998. *Language and solitude: Wittgenstein, Malinowski, and the Habsburg dilemma*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilmartin, David. 1988. *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the making of Pakistan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- , 1991. "'Divine Displeasure' and Muslim Elections: the Shaping of Community in Twentieth Century Punjab." In D. A. Low, ed., *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge. 1996. *Rise of the bourgeoisie, demise of empire: Ottoman westernization and social change*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- , 2002. *Social Constructions of Nationalism in Middle East*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis. 2013. *Instilling religion in Greek and Turkish nationalism: a "sacred synthesis"*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Güngör, Erol. 2010. *İslam Tasavvufunun Meseleleri* (Issues in Sufism). İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1975. *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hall, John A. (ed.) 1998. *The State of the Nation: Ernest gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanioğlu, Şükrü. 1997. "Garbcılar: their attitudes toward religion and their impact on the official ideology of the Turkish Republic," *Studia Islamica* 86: 133-158.
- , 2006. "Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889-1908." In Hans-Lukas Kieser, ed., *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*. London and New York: IB Tauris, 3-19.
- , 2008. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hardy, Peter (1973). *Muslims of British India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hasan, Mushir-ul. 1987. "Pan-Islamism Versus Indian Nationalism: A Reappraisal," *Itinerario* 11: 1-14.

- Hastings, Adrian. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hayes, Louis. 1984. *Politics in Pakistan: the struggle for legitimacy*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Herzl, Theodor. 1984 [1896]. *Der Judenstaat*. Bremen: Faksimile-Verlag/Versand.
- Hesterman, Jan. 1985. *The inner conflict of tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. 1991. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hodgson, Marshall. 1974. *The Venture of Islam*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
- , 1993. *Rethinking world history: essays on Europe, Islam, and world history*. Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 2000. *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among the smaller European nations*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hutchinson, John. and Anthony Smith (eds.) 2000. *Nationalism: critical concepts in political science*. New York: Routledge.
- İmamoğlu, Altuğ. 2006. *Azınlık vakıfları ve yabancıların taşınmaz edinimleri* (Ownership of Real Estate by the Foreigners and the Endowments of Minorities). Ankara: Yazıt Yayıncılık.
- Imber, Colin. 2002. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Iqbal, Muḥammad and Latif A. Sherwani. 1977. *Speeches, Writings, and Statements of Iqbal*. Lahore: Iqbal Academy.
- Issawi, Charles. 1982. “The Transformation of the Economic Position of the Millets in the Nineteenth Century.” In Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 261-286.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe 1996. *The Hindu nationalist movement in India*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- , 2002. "Nationalism without a nation: Pakistan searching for its identity." In Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*. London: Zed Books, 7-50.
- Jahan, Rounaq. 1972. *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*. New York: Columbia University Press
- Jalal, Ayesha. 1994. *The Sole Spokesman*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1995. *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: a comparative and historical perspective*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 2000. *Self and sovereignty: individual and community in South Asian Islam since 1850*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Jaschke, Gotthard. 1972. *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık* (Islam in the New Turkey). Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi
- Jazsi, Oscar. 1961. *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-1948. 2000. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Jones, Owen B. 2009. *Pakistan: Eye of the storm*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1993. *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press.
- , 1996. "The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism," *Journal of International Affairs* 50(1): 1-21.
- Kafadar, Cemal. 1995. *Between two worlds: the construction of the Ottoman state*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Kafesoğlu, İbrahim. 1985. *Türk-İslâm Sentezi* (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis). İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı.
- Kakar, Sudhir. 1996. *The colors of violence: cultural identities, religion, and conflict*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kasaba, Reşat. 2006. "Dreams of Empire, dreams of nations." In. Joseph, Esherick, Hasan, Kayalı, and Eric Van Young, eds., *Empire to nation: Historical*

perspectives on the making of the Modern World. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

----- (ed.) 2008. *The Cambridge History of Turkey. Vol. 4.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Karpat, Kemal. 1972. "The transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3(03): 243-281.

-----, 1982. "Millet and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era." In Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the Functioning of a Plural Society.* New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 141-170.

-----, 1985. *Ottoman population, 1830-1914: demographic and social characteristics.* Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press.

-----, 1991. Review of *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East.* by David Fromkin. *The Journal of Military History* 55(4):546-547.

-----, 2001. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State.* New York: Oxford University Press.

-----, 2006. *Osmanlı'da Değişim Modernleşme ve Uluslaşma* (Change, Modernization and Nationalization in the Ottoman Empire). Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.

-----, 2009. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji* (Identity and Ideology from Ottomans to Today). İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

Kayalı, Hasan. 1995. "Elections and the Electoral Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27(03):265-286.

Kazi, Aftab A. 1994. *Ethnicity and Education in Nation-Building in Pakistan.* Lahore: Vanguard.

Keddie, Nikki. 1969. "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History* 41(1): 17-28.

Kedourie, Elie. 1960. *Nationalism,* London: Hutchinson.

----- (ed.) 1971. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa.* New York: World Pub. Co

Kedourie, Sylvia (ed.) 1962. *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology,* University of California Press.

- Kenanoğlu, Macit. 2004. *Osmanlı millet sistemi: mit ve gerçek* (Millet System and the Ottomans: Myths and Realities). Istanbul: Klasik.
- Kennedy, Paul. 1989. *The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Khoury, Dina Rizk, and Dane Keith Kennedy. 2007. "Comparing empires: The Ottoman domains and the British Raj in the long nineteenth century," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27(2): 233-244.
- Kirişçi, Kemal. 2000. "Disaggregating Turkish citizenship and immigration practices," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36(3): 1-22.
- Kitromilides, Paschalis. 1989. "National Question in the Balkans," *European History Quarterly* 19: 149-94.
- Kumar, Krishan. 2010. "Nation-states as empires, empires as nation-states: two principles, one practice?," *Theory and Society* 39(2): 119-143.
- Kuru, Ahmet T. 2009. *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1992. "Two models of pluralism and tolerance," *Analyse & Kritik*, 13: 33-56.
- , 1995. "Misunderstanding Nationalism," *Dissent* Winter: 130-137.
- Laitin, David. 2009. "Empires in Macro Sociology," *International Studies Review* 11(3): 615-617.
- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, New York : Free Press ; London : Collier-Macmillan.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1963. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Linz Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Looney, Robert E. 2003. *Reforming Pakistan's Educational System: The Challenge of the Madrassas* Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca Dept Of National Security Affairs.
- Maier, Charles. 2006. *Among empires: American ascendancy and its predecessors*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

- Malik, Hafeez. 1963. *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*. Washington D.C: Public Affairs Press.
- , 1982. *Political profile of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: a documentary record*. Islamabad: Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization, Islamic University.
- Malik, Iftikhar. 2002. *Religious minorities in Pakistan*. London: Minority Rights Group International.
- , 2008. *The history of Pakistan*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Malik, Jamal. 1996. *Colonialization of Islam: dissolution of traditional institutions in Pakistan*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
- Mann, Michael, 1990. *The rise and decline of the nation state*. New York, NY, USA : Basil Blackwell.
- , 2005. *The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing*. Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20(1): 5-38.
- Marcus, Abraham. 1989. *The Middle East on the eve of modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mardin, Şerif. 1973. "Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?," *Daedalus* 102(1): 169-190.
- , 1989. *Religion and social change in modern Turkey: the case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi*. Albany: State University of New York.
- , 1991. "The Naksibendi order in Turkish history." *Islam in modern Turkey*: 121-142.
- Marx, Anthony. 2003. *Faith In Nation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Masters, Bruce. 2001. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab world: the roots of sectarianism*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, Justin. 1995. *Death and exile: the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press.
- Metcalf, Barbara D. 1982. *Islamic revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- , and Thomas, R. Metcalf (2006). *A Concise History of Modern India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. 1964. *The aftermath of revolt: India, 1857-1870*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- , 1994. *Ideologies of the Raj*. Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press.
- , 2007. *Imperial Conncetions: India in the Indian Ocean arena, 1860-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mihelj Sabina, 2007. "Faith in Nation Comes in Different Guises: Modernist Versions of Religious Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 13 (2): 265–284.
- Miller, David. 1993. "In defence of nationality." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 10(1): 3-16.
- Minault, Gina. 1982. *The Khilafat Movement: religious symbolism and political mobilization in India*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Motyl, Alexander. 2001. *Imperial Ends: the decay, collapse, and revival of empires*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mujahid, Sharif. 2001. *Ideology of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University.
- Mylonas, Harris. 2012. *The politics of nation-building: making co-nationals, refugees, and minorities*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal 1935. "Orthodox of All Religions, Unite!," *Modern Review* Vol. LVIII, No. 6:625-631.
- Niaz, Ilhan. 2010. *The culture of power and governance of Pakistan, 1947-2008*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Niebuhr, Ronald. 1959. *The Structure of Nations and Empires*. New York, NY: Scribner.
- Oberoi, Harjot. 1994. *The Construction of religious boundaries: culture, identity, and diversity in the Sikh tradition*. Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oldenburg, Philip. 1985. "'A place insufficiently imagined': language, belief, and the Pakistan crisis of 1971," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 44 (04): 711-733.

- O'Leary, Brendan. 2001. "An iron law of nationalism and federation," *Nations and Nationalism* 7 (3): 273-296.
- , Lustick, Ian S. and Callaghy, Thomas (eds.) 2001. *Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders: The Politics of Moving Borders*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oomen, Tarik. 1994. "Religious Nationalism and Democratic Polity: The Indian Case," *Sociology of Religion* 55 (4): 455-472.
- Oran, Baskın. 2005. *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar* (Minorities in Turkey). Istanbul: İletişim.
- Ortaylı, İlber. 1999. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Longest Century of the Empire). Istanbul: İletişim.
- Özkırımlı, Umut and Spyros, Sofos. 2008. *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Özkırımlı, Umut. 2010. *Theories of Nationalism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Page, David. 1982. *Prelude to partition: the Indian Muslims and the imperial system of control, 1920-1932*. Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pandey, Gyanendra. 1990. *The construction of communalism in colonial North India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Pati, Biswamoy. 2007. "Historians and Historiography: Situating 1857," *Economic and political weekly*: 1686-1691.
- , 2010. *The Great Rebellion of 1857 in India: exploring transgressions, contests and diversities*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Pınar, Candaş. 2013. "Religion–state relations in Turkey since the AKP: a changing landscape? Evidence from parliamentary debates on the Alevi matter," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 33 (4): 507-520.
- Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2005. "Empire & 'civilizing' missions, past & present," *Daedalus* 134 (2): 34-45.
- Poulton, Hugh. 1997. *Top hat, grey wolf, and crescent: Turkish nationalism and the Turkish Republic*. New York: New York University Press.
- Qureshi Ishak H. 1969. *The Struggle for Pakistan*. Karachi, Karachi University Press.
- Qureshi Saleem M. M. 1972-1973. "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered," *Pacific Affairs* 45 (4)

- Rae, Heather. 2002. *State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples*, Cambridge University Press.
- Rahman, Fazlur. 1999. *Revival and reform in Islam*. Oneworld Publications.
- Rahman, Tariq. 1996. *Language and Politics in Pakistan* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rais, Rasul Bakhsh. 2007. "Identity Politics and Minorities in Pakistan," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 30 (1): 111-125.
- Ramsaur, E Ernest. 2004. *Jöntürkler: 1908 İhtilalinin Doğuşu* (The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908). İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları.
- Rashid, Ahmed "Pakistan's Slide into 'Failed State' Status," *Financial Times* 11 February 2015, <http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2015/02/11/pakistans-slide-into-failed-state-status/> (retrieved in 27 February, 2015).
- Razi, Hossein 1990. "Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East," *The American Political Science Review* 84 (1): 69-91.
- Riaz, Ali. 2002. "Nations, Nation-State and Politics of Muslim Idnetity in South Asia," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 22(1-2): 53-58.
- Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas. 1980. *Shah Wali Allah and His Times*. Canberra: Ma'rifat Publishing.
- Robb, Peter. 2002. *A History of India*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave.
- Robinson, Francis.1974. *Separatism among Indian Muslims: the politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1977. "Nation Formation: The Brass Thesis and Muslim Separatism," *Common Wealth & Comparative Politics* 15 (3): 215 – 230.
- , 2000. "Islam and Muslim Seperatism in 912-940." In John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith eds., *Critical Concepts in Political Science: Nationalism vol 5*. New York, NY: Routledge, 879-912.
- , 2000a. *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*. New Delhi; Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Rodrigue, Aron. 1995. "Difference and tolerance in the Ottoman Empire," *N. Reynolds. Stanford Humanities Review*: 81-92.

- Roger, Antoine. 2008. *Milliyetçilik Kuramları* (Theories of Nationalism). İstanbul: Versus Kitap.
- Roshwald, Aviel. 2001. *Ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires: central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Rustow, Dunkwart. 2000. "Askeri Miras (Military Legacy)." In L. Carl Brown, ed., *İmparatorluk Mirası: Balkanlar'da ve Ortadoğu'da Osmanlı Damgası* (Imperial Legacy: Ottoman Imprint in the Balkans and the Ottomans). İstanbul: İletişim, 360-380.
- Sadoğlu, Hüseyin. 2010. *Türkiye'de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikaları* (Nationalism and Language Policies in Turkey). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Saeed, Javaid. 1994. *Islam and modernization: a comparative analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
- Saeed, Sadia. 2010. *Politics of Exclusion: Muslim Nationalism, State Formation and Legal Representations of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan*. Ph.d Dissertation submitted to Columbia University.
- Salt, Jeremy. 2002. "Trouble wherever they went: American missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the nineteenth century," *The Muslim World* 92 (3-4): 287-313.
- Salzman, Ariel. 1993. "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics and Society* 21: 393-423.
- Samad, Yunas "Managing Diversity in Pakistan: Going Beyond Federalism (W-131)," *Policy* 2013.
- , "Pakistan or Punjabistan: Crisis of National Identity", *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, 2(1).
- Sarkar, Sumit. 1983. *Modern India: 1885-1947*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin. 1968. *Pakistan: The Formative Phase. 1857-1948*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Sayyid, S., and I. D. Tyrer. 2002. "Ancestor worship and the irony of the 'Islamic Republic' of Pakistan," *Contemporary South Asia* 11(1): 57-75.
- Schuman, Howard. 1972. "A Note on the Rapid Rise of Mass Bengali Nationalism in East Pakistan," *The American Journal of Sociology* 78(2): 290-298.

- Scott, David. 1995. "Colonial governmentality," *Social Text* : 191-220.
- Scott, James. 1998. *Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Seal, Anil. 1968. *The emergence of Indian nationalism: competition and collaboration in the later nineteenth century*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1973. "Imperialism and nationalism in India," *Modern Asian Studies* 7(03): 321-347.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1977. *Nations and states: an enquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of nationalism*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Shaikh, Farzana. 1986. "Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies* 20(3): 539-557.
- Shakland, David. 2003. *The Alevis in Turkey: the emergence of a secular Islamic tradition*. London; New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Shaw, Stanford. 1971. *Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- , 1989. "Sultan Abdülhamid II: Last Man of the Tanzimat," In. *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu (Bildiriler)* (Proceedings of the International Symposium on the 150th Anniversary of the Tanzimat): 179-197.
- , and Ezel Kural Shaw. 1977. *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Anthony. 1971. *Theories of Nationalism*. London, Duckworth.
- , 2003. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From voting to violence : democratization and nationalist conflict*. New York: Norton.
- Stepan, Alfred, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav. 2011. *Crafting state-nations: India and other multinational democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Stern, Robert W. 1993. *Changing India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sugar, Peter. 1977. *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354-1804*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Syed, Anwar Hussain. 1982. *Pakistan, Islam Politics and National Solidarity*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Taşpınar, Ömer. 2004. *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition*, London: Routledge.
- Tezcan, Baki. 2009. "The Second Empire: The Transformation of the Ottoman Polity in the Early Modern Era," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29(3): 556-572.
- Tilly, Charles (ed.) 1975. *The formation of national states in Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- , 1994. "States and nationalism in Europe 1492–1992," *Theory and Society* 23(1):131-146.
- , 1997. "How empires end." In Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen, eds., *After empire: multiethnic societies and nation-building*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1-11.
- Toprak, Binnaz. 1995. "Islam and the secular state in Turkey." *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*: 90-96.
- Türküne Mümtazer, (2003) *İslamcılığın Dogusu*, Istanbul: Lotus.
- Ülker, Erol. 2005. "Contextualising 'Turkification': nation-building in the late Ottoman Empire, 1908–18," *Nations and Nationalism* 11(4): 613-636.
- Ulutaş, Ufuk. 2010. "Religion and secularism in Turkey: The dilemma of the directorate of religious affairs," *Middle Eastern Studies* 46(3): 389-399.
- Van Bruinessen, Martin. 1996. "Kurds, Turks and the Alevi revival in Turkey," *Middle East Report* (1996): 7-10.
- Van der Veer, Peter. 1994. *Religious nationalism : Hindus and Muslims in India*. Delhi; New York : Oxford University Press.
- , 1999. "The Moral State: Religion Nation and Empire in Victorain British and British India in Nation and Religion." In Peter Van der Veer, ed. *Religion and Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 15-43.
- Van Schendel, Willem. 2004. "Kim Ulustan Yana? Bangladeş'te Milliyetçi Söylem ve Kültürel Çoğulculuk Talepleri (Who Sides with the Nation? Nationalist

- Discourse and Demands for Cultural Pluralism in Bangladesh)." In: Willem Van Schendel and Erik J. Zürcher, eds., *Orta Asya ve İslam Dünyasında Kimlik Politikaları* (Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World). İstanbul: İletişim, 141-190.
- Verdery, Katherine. 1993. "Whither" nation" and" nationalism"?, *Daedalus* 122(3):37-46.
- Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press.
- White, Jenny. 2013. *Muslim nationalism and the new Turks*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. *Nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict: shadows of modernity*. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press.
- , and Yuval Feinstein. 2010. "The rise of the nation-state across the world, 1816 to 2001," *American Sociological Review* 75(5): 764-790.
- Wolpert, Stanley. 1991. *India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- , 2000. *A New History of India*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Yack, Bernard. 1996. "The myth of the civic nation," *Critical Review* 10(2): 193-211.
- Yavuz, Hakan. 1993. "Nationalism and Islam: Yusuf Akçura and Üç Tarz-i Siyaset," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 4(2):175-207.
- Yıldız, Ahmet. 2007. *Ne Mutlu Turkum Diyebilene* (How Happy he is Who can Say I am a Turk). İstanbul: İletişim.
- Young, Crawford. 1968. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Zaidi, A Moin. 1986. *Congress Presidential Addresses, Volume One: 1885-1900*. New Delhi: Publication Dept. Indian Institute of Applied Research.
- Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 1998. "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi 'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies*, 32(03): 689-716.
- , 1999. "Religious education and the rhetoric of reform: The madrasa in British India and Pakistan," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41(02): 294-323.

- Zurcher, Erik Jan. 1984. *The Unionist factor: the role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish national movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- , 2000. "Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims an Turkish Nationalists: Identity Politics (1908-1938)." In Kemal Karpat, ed. *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers,
- , 2004. *Turkey: a modern history*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris
- , 2010. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. London; New York: I. B. Tauris.