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UNRAVELING DIPLOMACY

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UNRAVELING DIPLOMACY: TURKISH AND AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ON THE CYPRUS CRISES OF 1954-1967

A Master's Thesis

by

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To my beloved parents



UNRAVELING DIPLOMACY: TURKISH AND AMERICAN
DIPLOMATS ON THE CYPRUS CRISES OF 1954-1967

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ABSTRACT

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Cyprus has been a problem for Turkey since 1954 and the entangled conflict attracted the attention of the United States as well. While the situation of the island required mediation and diplomacy, it not only concerned the two communities of Cyprus but also the two allies; the United States and Turkey to confront with the major crises often. One of them was the 1964 Letter Crisis and the other one was the Conflict of 1967 which brought Turkey and Greece to the threshold of war. It was mediated by American diplomacy and described as a success by George Ball. Deadlocks and crises hurt the relations between the two states and the diplomacy that the United States called successful, in actuality meant disappointments and therefore were unable to address all their priorities for Turkey. This thesis argues that a catastrophic success was the result of bilateral relations and for this purpose, the thesis; surveys the effects of Turkish and American diplomats by combining their memoirs and archives.

Keywords: Cyprus, Diplomacy, Turkey, The United States of America

ÖZET

DİPLOMASİ ÇÖZÜMLEMESİ: 1954-1967 KIBRIS KRİZLERİNDE TÜRK VE AMERİKAN DİPLOMATLAR

Erçelik, Dilara

Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Owen Miller

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Kıbrıs, 1954'ten beri Türkiye için bir problem teşkil ediyordu ve çatışma karmaşası Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin de ilgisini çekmişti. Adanın durumu arabuluculuk ve diplomasiyi vazgeçilmez kılarken, sadece Kıbrıs'ta yaşayan iki toplumu değil, iki müttefik olan Türkiye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni de zaman zaman büyük krizlerle karşı karşıya getirmişti. Bunlardan en büyüğü 1964'te yaşanan mektup krizi, bir diğeri ise Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ı savaşın eşiğine getiren ve Amerikan diplomasisiyle çözülen, sonunda da George Ball tarafından bir başarı olarak tanımlanan 1967 anlaşmazlığıydı. Art arda gelen çözümsüzlükler ve sorunlar iki ülke ilişkilerini derinden etkilemiş, Amerikan tarafının başarı olarak nitelediği diplomasi, Türkiye için istediğini elde edememe ve hayal kırıklıkları anlamına gelmiştir. Bu tez, ikili ilişkilerde yıkıcı bir başarı elde edildiğini savunuyor ve bu yolda Türk ve Amerikan diplomatların hatıratlarıyla arşiv çalışmalarını birleştirerek onların bu süreçteki etkilerini inceliyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Diplomasi, Kıbrıs, Türkiye

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LIST OF DIPLOMATS

American Ambassadors to Turkey

Fletcher Warren	1956-1960
Raymond A. Hare	1961-1965
Parker T. Hart	1965-1968

American Ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus

Fraser Wilkins	1960-1964
Taylor G. Belcher	1964-1969

Turkish Ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus

Emin Dirvana	1960-1962
Faruk Şahinbaş	1962-1964
Mazhar Özkol	1964-1966
Özdemir Benler	1966-1967
Ercüment Yavuzalp	1967-1972

Turkish Ambassadors to the United States of America

Feridun Cemal Erkin	1948-1955
Ali Haydar Görk	1955-1957
Suat Hayri Ürgüplü	1957-1960
Melih Esenbel	1960

Bülent Uşaklıgil 1960-1962

Rıfat Turgut Menemencioğlu 1962-1967

Melih Esenbel 1967-1974

Other Diplomats Mentioned

George Ball 1961-1966

(Under-Secretary of States)

James Riddleberger 1958-1959

(American Ambassador to Greece)

Dean Acheson 1964

(American Mediator)

Nihat Erim 1954-1967

(Special Representative of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and İsmet İnönü)

Cyrus Vance 1967

(Special Representative of President L.B. Johnson)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Objectives

So much sacrificed over the small island of Cyprus, and it was rather a peculiar experience for its people as well as four other states; Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is located 40 miles away from the south of Turkey and 250 miles from the closest Greek island Rhodes, about 500 miles from mainland Greece. Although the United Kingdom was still the colonial power over the island, the time for decolonization came for Cyprus as well just like the other colonized states in various places at the time. The rivalry between Greece and Turkey attracted other countries into the conflict. The British saw it as a problem like Palestine and possibly another Cuba for the Americans because of the potential Soviet threat. On the other hand, it was the beginning of a national policy which created a continuing dilemma for the Turkish foreign policy.

Cyprus was a homeland for many civilizations in history such as Egyptians, Greeks, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, and

Venetians, finally in 1571 by the Ottoman Empire. Turkish Muslims along with Greek Orthodox populated areas were the major populations living on the island as well as a small number of Armenians, Maronites, and Latins. There has never been a Cypriot nation even before this conquest; rather there were two major different nations; with different languages, religions, and ethnicities with only one thing in common which was this island they called home. When Ottomans annexed the island, the Greek Orthodox Church became the highest position with its archbishop on top as a political leader as well for the Greek community there, this tradition continued for a really long time. Joseph S. Joseph explains what contributed to this situation in Cyprus after the Ottoman rule and during the British rule which consists of a time frame of about four hundred years:

- Church dominance, *millet* system, fragmented ethnic education, antagonistic national loyalties, political polarization, and the British policy of 'divide and rule' – contributed to the preservation of the ethnic identity of the two Cypriot communities and a generation of a political schism between them. Four centuries of geographic proximity and physical intermingling did not produce inter-communal bonds strong enough.¹

In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire, the latest rulers of the island, made an alliance with the British Empire to keep Cyprus safe giving Ottomans sovereignty while keeping safe from the threat of Russian expansionism. The deal worked until the British annexed the island on November 5, 1914 and finally with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the newly founded Republic of Turkey recognized the British sovereignty on the island. After Britain took control of Cyprus, many of the Turkish Cypriots immigrated to Turkey. However, the United Kingdom did not want all of the Turkish Cypriots to leave the island in order not to face *pro-enosis* i.e. union with

¹ Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, 18.

Greece which comes from Byzantine Empire, Megali Idea, actions by Greek Cypriots. Archbishop Makarios, who was influential both in Cyprus and in Greece, insisted on Greek government that it finally paid off in 1954 and because the Greek people were also pro-*enosis*, Greece took the issue to the United Nations. Until 1951, the Orthodox Church, communists and Greeks were leading the separatist Cypriots but after that date, Greece also started claiming the island openly. The 16th clause of the Lausanne Agreement states that the lands separated from the Ottoman Empire will be determined by the relevant parties. Thus, Turkey was included in the issue of Cyprus by the United Kingdom. Especially with the help of British efforts, again, the United States was brought into the vortex of Cyprus as well.

The United States had three different presidents; Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, from 1954 to 1968 but each of their policies toward Cyprus remained the same: Greece and Turkey should reach an agreement between themselves. That was the declaratory policy. However, things did not go as they planned and the more time passed, the more the situation became entangled and required American mediation which in turn led to the actual policy: American intervention. Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Menderes finally sat around the table for an agreement in 1959 which resulted with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Both parties were feeling sanguine and people were even dreaming of going for a visit to Cyprus together. The United States supported this agreement and was satisfied that its two allies finally made it here. However, the new republic eventually caused new problems to develop. President Makarios of Cyprus, who was elected archbishop in 1950 and the leader of the Greek Cypriot community henceforth,

was complaining about the constitution and how it was not working right, this exasperated the conflict between the communities of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Finally, the Christmas massacre of 1963 changed the direction of everything, affected American policy as well and required the United States to become more involved in the unfolding chaos. The U.S. was occupied with the Cold War and containment policy at the time and what was happening between Turkey and Greece was challenging for the Americans as they were representing another threat aside from the Soviet Union in that perspective. While the U.S. was facing communism and the Soviet problem, they could not risk two parties of the same alliance to shake the grounds of NATO. This was not the only problem, both of the alliances were important for the interests of the U.S., therefore, they should not have estranged one of the parties.² Furthermore, there was the communist party, AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People) in Cyprus which was gaining power with the support of the Archbishop Makarios, and this posed more of a threat in the island too.

The main interests for the U.S. were to keep NATO's southeastern flank solid and avoid any possible involvement of the Soviets and their threats against its allies and itself as much as possible. Turkey, on the other hand, was rather in a different position than the U.S. as they had a long history with this small island and their kinsmen were living in Cyprus, who identified themselves solely as Turkish for years. This thesis starts with the government of Adnan Menderes in 1954 and the coup d'état in 1960, which began a new period in Turkey with the heavy influence of the military on the governments for years to come, even though Süleyman Demirel came to power in 1965 establishing rather an autonomous rule. This political instability affected foreign policy

² Uslu, *the Cyprus Question*, 72.

and the Cyprus issue even more. Turkey was going to approach Cyprus as a national cause and it remains a matter of honor even today. That was why Turkey was so disappointed when they received the memorable Johnson letter, which took away Western, rather U.S., support that as Turkish foreign policy was so heavily depended on. This was also a matter of the national security concern for Turkey in case the island would be in the hands of any nation. Only three decades prior, Turkey fought its Independence War against Greece and the fact that they came so close to face each other in the crises that occurred in 1964 and 1967 showed that a war, again, was possible.

This thesis pursues Turkish and American diplomats who influenced the period and managed to prevent bigger crises of Cyprus from 1954 until the end of 1967. It seeks to answer the question of how the efforts to mediate in the Cyprus crises affected and shaped US-Turkish relations during this period. According to this thesis, it was a catastrophic success.³ It was catastrophic, especially for Turkey, because the relationship which had been solid until 1964 was shaken from the ground with Johnson's letter as Turkey was expecting the U.S. to understand and support its national cause, its Cyprus policy, as explained above.⁴ In terms of crisis management, however, it was a success for the United States as declared by the Under Secretary of State George Ball because the American desire was mainly not to solve the problem, but rather to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey, and they managed to do so with the

³ The term was used by Geoffrey Lewis in his book: *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*. He uses the term in the context of Turkish language; however, this thesis only takes the term and changes the meaning according to the thesis.

⁴ Some scholars like Oral Sander claim that the first time the relations were alarming was in 1955 when the U.S. did not support the Menderes government and he also explains the reason why the aids were raised with the year of 1958 was because of the growing strategic importance with Sputnik and the conflicts in the Middle East. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri(1947-1964)*, 135.

last of the crises in 1967. Thus, because of this catastrophe Turkey never approached the U.S. or the other Western states, in this regard, as the same again because it felt alienated in the international arena and instead of trying to understand the stakes of Turkey; the United States focused on the Soviet threat under the Cold War perspective more. American policy-makers, on the other hand, were aware of the impact – the catastrophe they caused with the letter in 1964 and once more, in 1967, when the following crisis was to be avoided, they acted with immense care and successful diplomacy so that they would not fuel anti-American sentiments, caused by the letter, further in the country. Thus, they achieved a success for their part with the arbitration but it was merely a success for Turkey as they could not accomplish their goals with the situation of Turkish Cypriots. This paper also shows that prevention of the invasion was for the benefit of the Turkish officials because of the lack of military preparedness with the crisis of 1964. On the other hand, failed American diplomacy resulted in catastrophic relations that were going to stay in the minds of Turkish people as a reminder and a lesson for their foreign policy.

Because the aim of the thesis is also to discover history of this time period through diplomats' eyes, many diplomats are included in this thesis; however, some of them were more prominent with their acts, responsibilities, memoirs, legacies and they played a more pivotal role. It is also hard to draw a line between them and those who did not necessarily write their memoirs as they added remarkable content as well by managing correspondence and diplomacy, such as, Fletcher Warren, Raymond Hare, Fraser Wilkins and Taylor Belcher. On the other hand, although each diplomat was taking part in the history making, this thesis focuses on those who had more to say

about the crises and the Cyprus situation as well as Turkish-American relations.

Ambassador Melih Esenbel, who helped cover most of the period from 1954 to 1960 of London-Zurich Agreements in this thesis with his memoirs, was one of the most outstanding diplomats in Turkish history as he, later in his life, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He enlightens the policy-making process behind closed doors and how the Turkish Republic, under Adnan Menderes administration, took up the cause of Cyprus. Under Secretary of State George Ball, on the other hand, managed the period when the United States decided to be involved actively from 1958, and he was the one handling the correspondence between the ambassadors and directing them how to apply their policies. In fact, although he was the one expressing that the main aim of the U.S. was not to solve the problem, he commissioned Dean Acheson as a mediator to find a solution between the two allies in Geneva but the efforts were futile.

Ambassador Ercüment Yavuzalp, Parker Hart, and mediator Cyrus Vance were the actors in the 1967 Crisis of Cyprus and they shaped history with their own acts as Vance acquired the freedom from President Johnson, and Yavuzalp was in the field, witnessing every single conflict and living conditions there in the first hand and Hart was in Ankara, in the diplomacy traffic. Yavuzalp brings out a perspective that general history books or academic essays tend to overlook which are the events he experienced when he was on duty there. Diplomacy making does not necessarily focus on what people go through, for example, while his account does that, Vance's mission only centers on the three capitals, and does not include the problems of people. In a way, Yavuzalp fills in the gap that Vance did not direct his attention to and Vance's duty was absolute: to prevent a possible war between the allies. Furthermore, what Yavuzalp's

book lacks in terms of Vance's mission, as he writes in his book; he was merely a spectator of Vance, Parker Hart addresses every detail about the mission of Vance. Hart does not only describe his fellow diplomats but also expresses the situation in Ankara and Washington. Leaders and ministers are always under the spotlight, despite this; this thesis tries to reveal that there are many other diplomats who played a big role in history.

1.2.Historiography

Although Cyprus and Turkish-American relations are heavily studied topics and the books along with articles cover most of the literature on the subjects, investigating both Turkey and the United States by introducing diplomats' perspective on the specific time frame has not been done fully. They either keep it at the general history level or use diplomats' accounts as references. However, some of the works are able to reflect on the question of how these diplomats and the mediation efforts by some of them on Cyprus between 1954 and 1967 affected the Turkish-American relations. The period which is this thesis' focus was overshadowed by the invasion of 1974, so it was relatively less researched. This thesis looks into the subject only through Turkish and American perspectives, works and archives, and even though the Greek side had to be mentioned in some place, they are mostly the general knowledge of history obtained from archives, memoirs or newspapers. Thus, Greek and British perspectives are not the center of attention. In order to understand what the diplomats were trying to do, of course, Cyprus had to be in the focus as well and that is the reason why Turkey, Cyprus and the United States are intertwined in the thesis. To give a better perspective, it is also useful to divide the historiography into two for the books which target the U.S.-Turkey

relations and the ones mostly focusing on Cypriot history per se. Although Cypriot books had to mention the U.S. and Turkey, they do not necessarily get into the relationship between them and the same problem happens with the books regarding the relationship between Turkey and the U.S.

One of the most comprehensive books on the topic is Claude Nicolet's *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*. Nicolet has done very detailed work with archives and government sources. The French historian dives deeply into crises and looks into the Turkish side as well, even though it is mostly focused on Cyprus, and surveys the events that led to that thoroughly. Because of the variety of his sources, he contemplates the most objective, comprehensive and accurate work. He also conveys the ambassador memoirs, however, naturally probably because of the language barrier, he lacks the Turkish diplomats and that is where this thesis will try to fill in that shortcoming. He uses British sources as well to criminate Americans and their conspiracy plans according to him. He gives the example of the presence of Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to counter the possible attacks from Turkey which actually supports the claims of Turkish media on how the United States prevented 1964 invasion not only with this but also with Johnson's letter by using Dean Acheson's correspondence with British Lord Hood.⁵ Nicolet was aware of the Turkish interests and after letter crisis, he demonstrates how the Turkish were so upset with the mediation efforts of the U.S. by offering lease and moving away from their initial plan of sovereign base with the Second Acheson Plan. Because British High Commissioner Clark and American Ambassador Fraser Wilkins were leaning on the amendment of the constitution and Wilkins made a mistake of making the Thirteen

⁵ Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 274.

Points of Makarios look better, Nicolet describes a more general situation: “the misjudgment as to the explosiveness of the situation seemed to be common throughout the State Department, even up to Secretary Rusk himself. While Wilkins predicted no trouble on the island even though the communities were arming themselves at a worrying pace, Rusk made it clear to the Turks that the U.S. would not take their side in the dispute.”⁶

Turkish Scholar Nasuh Uslu’s book, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance* is another very detailed work on the subject. He surveys whether Turkey was dependent on the United States, or if it was a patron-client relationship. According to him, it was not fully a patron-client relationship, especially after 1965. Although the U.S. was a major force for financial and military aid to Turkey, it was not the only source for Turkey as it had other allies and agreements on the issue from different countries. He was able to present the U.S. policy on the question of Cyprus as they wanted to contain the problem, leave the Soviets out of the question entirely, counter possible invasions by Turkey, persuade Greece not to humiliate Turkey and avoid a war between the allies. Uslu also points out how the U.S. did not try to estrange Turkey as it was an important ally for them. He says that the effects of Cyprus on the relations between the two countries were the American efforts to start talks between Greece and Turkey, and Vance’s mission was an important one of them. He also says that the efforts of mediation in 1967 were almost the same as the 1964 crisis except more safe; however, it also made Turkey focus on the Cyprus question without an outsider.⁷ In his other book *the Cyprus Question as an Issue*

⁶ Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-197*, 291.

⁷ Uslu, *the Turkish-American Relationship*, 196.

of *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, Uslu says that the U.S. did not particularly involved in a “romantic relationship” with Turkey thus, they did not have to approve the Turkish policy toward Cyprus specifically just because they had an alliance.⁸ The book surveys whether Turkey behaved as a “satellite” of the U.S. His book lacks the participation of the diplomats from either side except George Ball and not even in the conflicts as this thesis focuses on.

Turkish Scholar Oral Sander explains that he mostly tried to use the American perspective, foreign policy to have a more objective writing in his book, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)*. He says the reason why the relationship between them always improved was because Turkey was situated in a strategic place in the Middle East. According to Sander, Turkey’s participation in NATO made an enormous effect that nothing else had ever done because not only did they establish very close relations but also contributed to their common defense strategy. Sander emphasizes when the Soviet threat was present in the Middle East in 1957 after Sputnik, the U.S. gave its full support to the security of Turkey but it was not the case during the 1964 Cyprus crisis and he associated this shift with the change in the international situation and American interests at the time. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the agreement following that made Turkey a less vital ally for the U.S. as Jupiter missiles were removed and détente began. Sander says, as a common belief, the relations between the two countries after the 1964 crisis deteriorated. The letter of Johnson made the perfect impact for Turkey to not only depend on the alliance of the West and the U.S. but also turn its head to the Soviets as well as other Third World Nations.

⁸ Uslu, *the Cyprus Question*, 4.

Melih Esenbel, the author of the book *Ayağa Kalkan Adam (The Man Who Rises)*, was working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara from 1954 until 1960 and then he became the Ambassador to Washington D.C. for three years. He returned to that position in 1967. He was at the right place at the right time witnessing the crises in first account and that makes him pivotal for this thesis. However, his book does not cover the period after the London–Zurich Agreement although he ends his book by saying that he would continue, the second book does not exist. He was working closely with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, so it is a precious source to look into history through his eyes. That is the reason why his work is used heavily in this thesis for the period between 1954 and 1960.

Turkish Ambassador Ercüment Yavuzalp makes up for what archives and general history books lack with his memoir book *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*. He was posted to Cyprus as the Turkish ambassador in 1967 and he wrote his memoirs from that time vividly. He observes other diplomats in Cyprus as such American Ambassador Toby Belcher and experiences the daily events there as well as the situation Turkish Cypriots were in but the most important event was the 1967 conflict which Turkey was so close to intervene and his diplomacy making as well as his actions during this time prove the importance of diplomacy as in one example only with his one telegraph which was to correct a misunderstood situation prevents an instant intervention from Turkey. He and Cyrus Vance, although they could not really work together, were able to prevent a possible war between Greece and Turkey.

In *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a Firsthand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968*, although Cyrus Vance does not have a memoir book to

describe his mission in Cyprus in 1967, American Ambassador to Ankara Parker T. Hart makes up for it and explains almost every detail. So, because he both shares his own opinions, experiences, and Vance's, thus makes it an important primary source for this thesis. He also gives information about Turkish government at the time which gives an insight of the situation as well.

Nihat Erim, who later became the Prime Minister of Turkey, was first Menderes' in 1950s and later İnönü's representative in the 1960s on Cyprus situation wrote his memoirs in a book called *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*. He was in the whole policy-making process of Turkey on the issue by giving advice on the matters and working with British and Greeks on creating the London-Zurich Agreements. He was also working closely with Turkish Ambassador to Washington Turgut Menemencioğlu as he was the representative in the Security Council. He was able to give an analysis as well as an insight of the events. Although he was a supporter of neither Menderes nor İnönü, he served as an advisor for both of them. Even though he was against İnönü, he gave a speech in the Grand National Assembly asking for support for a vote of confidence for his government so that with his experience in governing İnönü could handle the foreign policy on Cyprus. Erim was the one who was telling İnönü on April 11 to push for Americans as well.

Monteagle Stearns, the author of *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, was an American diplomat who expressed his thoughts and experiences on American foreign policy. He writes in the very first pages that America was "better at military than diplomatic planning and more sensitive to headlines than to history." And he says that with its sixth fleet the USA was dominant in the

Mediterranean since 1947 started with the Truman Doctrine to secure Greece and Turkey. He argues that the American mediation was just to prevent the threat of a war in 1967, rather than solving the problem and he also says that the U.S. was trying to fit Cyprus policy along with its allies, Greece and Turkey, into its containment policy. Monteagle Stearns says: “It was the first of many periods in our relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey when we underestimated the extent to which regional concerns would influence their behavior and overshadowed the global missions we had assigned to them.”⁹ He is talking about the American expectations of other countries and how they were supposed to act the way of their policies such as containment because America had one mission which was being more powerful against the Soviets and this little island was disturbing that. In this thesis, the argument has the same basis and shows how the U.S. even risked deteriorating its relations with Turkey especially in 1964.

George S. Harris, an American scholar, uses many Turkish and foreign newspapers in his book, *Troubles Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971* to review the events and analyze the Turkish – American relations which were especially troubling. He portrays well the process of how they became really close allies after the Second World War, peaked during Menderes administration and how Johnson’s letter “created a sharp divide.” American hesitation to be involved in the matter of Cyprus had many consequences and one of them was to avoid alienating Greece or Turkey, and this policy led to the establishment of the United States peacekeeping force. His work is used as a reference in this thesis for as it gives a broader perspective for the events.

⁹ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, 27.

Christopher Hitchens says that the “Turkish invasion was not ‘the climax of struggle for union with Greece’, but the outcome of a careless and arrogant series of policies over which Cypriots had little or no control” in the preface of his book *Cyprus*. He also explains how the states related in the introduction of this thesis, caused the 1974 invasion of Turkey. Hitchens says that *enosis* was never a feasible solution and it continued to be so even after the partition which happened with the 1974 invasion. “Distinguished acts of arson, sadism and vengeance were committed...The Turkish Cypriots were made to feel threatened as Turks.”¹⁰ Hitchens takes the 1964 incidents as the date for the replacement of the British with the Americans as George Ball was the mediator in this case. He gives a good observation of British plans and at some places uses Melih Esenbel as well which is different from the other historians’ accounts. Since he mostly focuses on the period after 1974, Cyprus crises both in 1964 and 1967 were almost skipped or rather summarized in his book.

Brendan O’Malley, and Ian Craig’s book *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage, and the Turkish Invasion* shows clearly the British interests on Cyprus and how they used and manipulated the Turkish fear, which was the possibility of British leaving the island, so that they could have the Turkish dragged into the matter and Greek Cypriots would not be facing British alone. When Turkish was involved in the matter, the U.S. started supporting Britain in the matter as O’Malley and Craig explains in chapter three. They portray British and American policies on Cyprus and what kinds of strategies were used well. They were able to give American Ambassador Raymond Hare’ works as a try to prevent a crisis; however, Vance’ mission almost completely is out of the picture. Claude Nicolet criticizes the authors about the Cyprus position on

¹⁰ Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 55.

joining NATO by referring to an NSC Report 6003 saying that “Such documents from the American NSC, in addition to those from British military elites, which declare a general unwillingness to have Cyprus belong to NATO, should provide for enough evidence for the serious historian to disregard the wild assertions by authors like O’Malley and Craig that independence of Cyprus was forced on the Cypriots by the U.S. to acquire the island as NATO territory.”¹¹

British historian William Mallinson argues in his book *Cyprus: A Modern History* that “Turkey had no rights whatsoever on Cyprus”¹² according to his interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty while apparently Britain who annexed the island although it was given temporarily by the Ottoman Empire, had the right to colonize and decide who could have a thing to say over it. Although Mallinson was able to give some of the involvement of George Ball, which is more based on his book rather than the correspondences he made, he fails to do so with other diplomats and rather give interpretation of the events and he does not give a detailed approach of the US-Turkey relations either. The other half of the book deals mostly with the period after the 1970s which is not the scope of this thesis. All in all, Mallinson fails to bring an objective approach and lacks evidence.

Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi is a three book series and from the preface written by Vehbi Zeki Serter, who was a Turkish Cypriot historian, it is understood that they were written as school books for high school students and for those who want to understand what Turkish Cypriots went through from 1878 until 1973. He talks about all the details about the struggle of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people. What he

¹¹ Nicolet, *The United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 163.

¹² Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, 25.

focuses on is more of the policies of the parties in this conflict and mostly the reactions from the Turkish people in his first book of the series. Vehbi Zeki says it was the partition that was for the best of the island and if it was not left during the agreements, it could have been achieved. In his third volume, Vehbi Zeki only mentions Cyrus Vance's visit on behalf of Johnson and that he was the mediator during the crisis without giving details. In his conclusion Vehbi Zeki emphasizes Turkish Cypriots did not only stand against Greeks and Greek Cypriots but also to the imperialist British who happened to take Greek Cypriots' side. He mentions how the British forced Turkish Cypriots to sing their anthem and did not let them learn Turkish history nor their culture. In 1958, the conflict became a crisis between the two communities. On the contrary of their consensus on establishing a new nation, it was seen as only a stepping stone to enosis. In 1963, they activated their plan of Akritas and attacked Turkish Cypriots. Although he was able to paint a vivid picture of the time, he was rather biased.

British scholar H. D. Purcell studies the comprehensive history of Cyprus in his book *Cyprus* from the very early times of Alexander to 1968 when Cyprus became a republic. While half of the book deals with the early era, the other half does not even come to the point where the island was partitioned in 1974 as it was published in 1969 which made it lack some of the archival documents. He argues that without Turkey's protection to Turkish Cypriots, they would have returned to their motherland and he also says that without compensation and their returning, the Cyprus issue could never be solved. However, as of today, it is known that Cyprus is partitioned and although it is still one of the international issues, people on the island are living there without a conflict or taking each other's lives. What the book does is focus on the Cypriot

individuals rather than Turkish or American diplomats and their effects on the issues. Although Purcell says that “the Turks’ distrust of the Greeks is understandable, in view of General Grivas’ stated intention to annihilate them.” He is the supporter of Turkish Cypriots leaving their homes, to put differently, the appeasement of the bully. The British also argues that although Turkey’s biggest debate about the Makarios’ attempt to nullify the 1960 Agreement was that the treaties could not be destroyed unilaterally, but Purcell gives the example of how Greece did not go to war with Serbia in 1915 or Turkey left Great Britain and France alone in the Second World War. He is basically comparing war times to “supposedly” peacetime with very different positions.¹³ Although the main focus of this thesis is on the diplomats rather than who was guilty or innocent, Purcell could be just as biased as Zeki Serter, who was Turkish Cypriot historian, on the opposite side if a comparison had to be made on it. What is lacking in his book is the process of the diplomacy during the crises and the people who were responsible for the policy making are, in fact, left out as the focus is on Makarios and Grivas mostly and also probably the lack of archival sources as they were just being written back then as well as the core of Turkish-American relations.

Joseph S. Joseph argues in his book *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* ethnicity and its relationship with superpowers, NATO, the United Nations and the European Union along with its effects on politics. The reason why Turkish Cypriots avoided negotiations was because they were not in a strong place to argue against Greek Cypriots. Although Joseph names a chapter the Diplomatic Front, he only talks about Makarios’ change of policy in 1963 rather than explaining and going into the depth of the policymaking process of the native nations. What Joseph uses, in the section of 1967

¹³ Purcell, *Cyprus*, 304-307.

crisis, is the memoirs of George Ball but rather than how it happened he focused on what happened along with the U.S. and Soviet Union theory that he approaches as conspiracy. As he explains: “the USA expressed concern over the destructive implications that a deterioration of the conflict could have on the Western defense system, while the Soviet Union approached the 1967 crisis as an ‘imperialist conspiracy’ aimed at bringing Cyprus under NATO control.”¹⁴ On both of the crises happened in 1964 and in 1967, Joseph focuses on the US-Soviet relations in one chapter –Superpower Politics- and on another one, he purely examines them under the perspective of NATO allies but not Turkey per se.

1.3. Resources and Methodology

The thesis lets the diplomats and diplomatic correspondence tell the history of their own. In other words, archives and diplomat accounts are used heavily. One of the most important primary sources in this thesis is the archives of the Foreign Relations of the United States that includes the volumes: 1958–1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, and 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. They have the correspondence, memorandums, telegraphs etc. between diplomats who made the policy-making process possible during the crises which build the basis of this research.

The second archival source is the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin which was published between 1964 and 1986 (excluding 1974-1983) but the thesis

¹⁴ Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, 71.

covers the years of 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967. The bulletin reports every single event that happened during the years it was published and it has documents like speeches, newspapers, events, meetings etc.

Another crucial source of the thesis is the books, memoirs of the diplomats who served between 1954 and 1968 and made the effort to write their precious experiences to shed a light on the mystery of the past such as; Under Secretary of State George Ball, with his *The Past another Pattern*, Ambassador Ercüment Yavuzalp's *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, Parker T. Hart's *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, Turgut Tülümen's *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, Nihat Erim's *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs* as the reasons were explained above. Newspapers along with the interviews of the diplomats will be used as primary sources as well. Cyrus Vance, although does not have a book on Cyprus specifically, gives interviews explaining the details of his actions along with American consular employees like William N. Dale, Fraser Wilkins, George Albert McFarland, John A. Baker and McCaskill.

Chapter II tries to explain the origins of the foreign policies of the United States and Turkey, specifically focused on Cyprus and the relation between them as well in order to lay a background and it is getting into detail with Cyprus from 1954 to find a common ground among the parties until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus with the Agreements of London–Zürich. Ambassador Melih Esenbel guides through the chapter with his own experiences along with other diplomats' correspondence and their way of managing the situation.

Chapter III focuses on the period between 1963 until 1967 when things changed the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. especially after the crisis of 1964

with the letter of Johnson. This thesis shows how it was an example of American brinkmanship and also a catastrophe for the relations.

Chapter IV: Under Secretary of State George Ball tried to repair the relations after the letter and to do it, he assigned Dean Acheson as the American mediator but it was not going to work after so many talks in Geneva. Then another crisis came in 1967 which brought Greece and Turkey close to a war. Ambassadors Ercüment Yavuzalp, Parker T. Hart, American mediator Cyrus Vance came into stage and dealt with the conflicts with their experiences not only for their countries' interests but also for general good as well. It was counted as a successful arbitration, especially for the Americans.

Chapter V concludes the thesis and encapsulates the effects of Turkish and American diplomats in diplomacy making as well as the results of the policies of Turkey and the U.S. Finally, it explains how the whole period gave the meaning to catastrophic success.

CHAPTER 2

THE FIRE SPREADS

In order to analyze how the state craft was used to arbitrate in the Cyprus crises and how this changed the US-Turkish relations during the period between 1954 and 1967 from the perspectives of both countries, it is vital to understand how the policies of the nations were shaped in the history and how they perceived the situations. Although neither the United States nor its diplomats were effective from 1954 until the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as they rather chose a policy to give the British to handle their own business, they were also supporting the movement of anti-colonialism which encouraged the separatist Greek Cypriots so much. Turkey, on the other hand, realized that they could no longer support the status quo, as the Turkish Ambassador Melih Esenbel stated, because the conditions were ripe enough for them to act on it as the Turkish Cypriots started to be affected by the growing conflict. This chapter is about the origins of the catastrophe that was going to shake the grounds of the relations among the NATO allies.

After the Second World War, when Europe was struggling with rebuilding its demolished cities, the only country that survived the war without ruins in its cities was the United States of America among the Allies and this was not its sole advantage: they were also able to build a strong economy from war. Thus, the Americans were ready for marketing besides helping its allies who were deprived by the war. However, it did not take long for disputes between the Allies. The Soviet Union had a different agenda from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, thus the disputes over Germany started creating problems. Meanwhile, the Soviets were pushing on Turkey to get a new agreement on straits between the Soviet Union and Turkey so that their war ships could pass through the straits and they could have military bases there in return for Kars and Ardahan provinces that they held since 1921. Although the United States was cautious on the issue, the British ensured Turkey on their safety.¹⁵ On March 5, 1946, the Prime Minister of the U.K. Winston Churchill gave a speech on the threat that was approaching; he used the term “iron curtain” to describe the Soviet influence in Europe. This was the beginning of a new era which was going to be called the Cold War. It was rather an ideological warfare between democracy - capitalism and communism even though there were times that the nations came so close to open war and in some places like Korea and Vietnam they actually did in a way, and mostly it was the counter ideologies that were fighting with each other through other nations. Meanwhile, on April 5, 1946, USS Missouri came to the shores of İstanbul to show support to Turkey and Greece.¹⁶ In order to stop the spread of communism and the Soviet influence in

¹⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 82.

¹⁶ Baskın Oran argues that the arrival of Missouri is disputable because the Soviets gave their first diplomatic note to Turkey on August 7, 1946. That means Missouri did not act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. He also says that Turkey resisted for a while against the Soviet pressure because the last of the

Europe along with helping Europe to rebuild its economy, the U.S. initiated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947 and 1948. Although Turkey was neutral in the Second World War –at least until the end of it-, it was included in these benefit packages which proved how much the U.S. did not want Europe to fall under the Soviet influence. However, Scholar Oral Sander says that the main reason of the Truman Doctrine was the future and the safety of Europe rather than the Soviets and also adds that Greece needed aid more as their economy was so bad and there was the chance of them falling under communism.¹⁷ The Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement signed on July 12, 1947, between the two states was the beginning of a new alignment between the U.S. and the Republic of Turkey as the economic ties were going to last for years to come, strengthening political relations as well. After Turkey sent its troops to the Korean War in 1950 as the U.N. forces, it also joined NATO in 1952. From the point of view of the U.S., they wanted Turkey to join NATO because of the demand to increase security precautions against the Soviets and one of the biggest reasons of it was because the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons in 1949, allied with the communist China in 1950 and Turkey was close to the Soviet Union geographically that showed a critical spot for the military bases. And for Turkey, NATO meant security as well, against the traditional Russian threat since the Ottoman Empire.

In 1954, Cyprus started to become an issue in the Mediterranean under the British rule. There were two basic reasons for the United Kingdom to have Cyprus: one was being able to reach the oil of the Middle East and two, having troops on the island against a Soviet threat because of the Cold War. As the British Prime Minister Anthony

diplomatic notes was sent 5 months before the American assistance that actually began with the Truman Doctrine. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası 1. Cilt*, 496.

¹⁷ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)*, 11-15.

Eden said: “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is as simple as that.”¹⁸ Especially after the Suez Crisis, the U.K. started losing its influence in the Middle East and in Mediterranean, thus the U.S. emerged as the state to fill in this power gap. Americans were not the only ones to do it, since the Soviet Union was also trying to use its influence in this arena under its Cold War policy. The Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which served as a defensive organization, was established by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. Egypt and Syria started getting closer to the Soviet Union. For the United States, the Pact made them get into the Middle East without being a party among the conflicts of British-Egyptian, Arab-Israeli and North Africa. However, in order not to isolate Egypt and Israel, the U.S. did not join the pact officially but took part in almost all of its actions.¹⁹

While Britain was dealing with the *enosis* actions - EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) attacks in Cyprus, the U.S. was following a different policy around the world and on June 20, 1955, American President Eisenhower said “That every people has the inherent right to be the kind of government under which it chooses to live and the right to select in full freedom the individuals who conduct that government.”²⁰ Encouraged by the words, Greek Cypriots were fiercely pursuing their ideal, *enosis*, against the British tyranny. However, Eden tried to make it internationalized so that it would not look anti-colonial and more of a Turkish-Greek issue.²¹ Until the period of 1963, Britain wanted to have the American support but the

¹⁸ O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, 7.

¹⁹ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)*, 134.

²⁰ Address by President Dwight Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly, June 20, 1955.

²¹ O'Malley and Craig, *the Cyprus Conspiracy*, 19.

U.S. remained its rather passive position as they did not want to be embroiled in the turmoil.

From 1948 until 1954, the Turkish government followed a policy to calm the people saying that Britain was not leaving the island and that there was no such thing as a Cyprus problem. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes' policies in the 1950s, which finally led to the alienation of Turkey in the United Nations, made Turkey side with the U.S. in the Middle East as well as Eastern and Third World countries. Turkey was aware of the situation in Cyprus, which could bring two states -Turkey and Greece- face to face, and could put NATO alliance into danger against the Soviet Union.

In March 1954, Turkish Ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin told the U.S. Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs William Baxter that "it is not international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the bases of majority wishes of the population, but there are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account."²² This became a basis on some of the points that Turkey kept arguing as its policy from that on as the geographical considerations referred to the national security of Turkey.

2.1. Struggle for Common Ground

Turkey was following the policy of status quo in the beginning when the separatist activities of the Greek Cypriots began against the British rule. The U.K. wanted to involve Turkey more into the situation to show the world it was not an ordinary anti-colonial movement and playing into the hands of Turkey was also useful for them as well. It was the Turkish Ambassador Melih Esenbel who pointed out to

²² Baxter, Memcon: "Turkish Views on Cyprus," 10.3.54: *FRUS 1952-1954*, VIII, 682.

Prime Minister Menderes the fact that the British Empire was already dissolving and the Turks should not wait for fate to take its own course. The U.S. finally decided that they could not just watch the events unfold. And again, the U.S. had to change its first position toward Turkish Cypriots because of the insistence from Turkey and the policy of the Americans was simple for this period: independence or a partnership agreement. Their policy started to be alarming for the relations between Turkey and the U.S. as Turkey thought the U.S. was leaning toward *enosis*.

It was December 17, 1954 Greeks brought the Cyprus issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations. There was also already an alliance signed between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia on August 9, 1954 and Greece's position against Turkey's interests made Turkish government question the Greek motives. British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd spoke during the U.N. session and gave many reasons why it was not a matter of the United Nations. Some of these were that Cyprus had never belonged to Greece, along with Greek Cypriots, and then there were also 100,000 Turkish Cypriots living on the island and the main purpose of Greece was to annex the island. If self-determination was a must, that should not have affected the other countries' borders. As a result, the General Assembly decided to delay this situation for another time which made Greece furious and the Greek government made a declaration that its policy would continue while Menderes said the Cyprus issue was over after the decision.

Cyprus was so far from being over, neither for Turkey nor for other countries who were trying to protect their interests. Melih Esenbel, who was a senior diplomat - also worked in the U.S. in 1945-1952- explains the title of his book *Ayağa Kalkan*

Adam in the introduction as *The Man Who Rises*, referring to Turkey as the man who finally got up and took up the case of Cyprus instead of just watching from the sidelines as it had done for almost a decade. He was working close to the Prime Minister Menderes during his government and was able to witness the events first hand.

Esenbel was the General Secretary of Economic Cooperation during the time Menderes went for a visit to the U.S. in 1954. On the way back, they decided to meet with the Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos in Athens. The main reason for the visit was to discuss the Balkan Pact, although this pact was not going to last long because of the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. It was on April 1, 1955, Greek Cypriots started their terrorist acts by attacking official buildings. They were terrorizing the British to make them leave the island and they also made a shift in their attacks to Turkish Cypriots as well so that no nation could interfere their way to unify the island with Greece. On August 24, Menderes gave a speech about the position of Turkey on Cyprus and declared that Turkey was certainly following its policies in Cyprus and that was when *the man* finally rose. On August 26, 1955, Turkey and Greece attended the London Conference with the British invitation and it was important to Turkey as they were recognized and also included in this issue as an arbiter.

The U.K. sent an invitation to Turkey for the London Conference and now Turkey was on the international arena for Cyprus and had the right to say a word for the future of the island as well. Turkey set its policies toward Cyprus: the status quo could remain but self-determination could not be allowed. The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan said that whoever had Cyprus had the control of Turkey's backdoor and this sentence alone gives Turkey the reason to fight for not only the sake of Turkish

Cypriots but also for its own national security.²³ On 28th August, Turkey sent a diplomatic note to the British Embassy in Ankara to remind them of their duty to be the policeman on the island and keep the Turkish Cypriots safe. The fact that the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs was not supportive of Turkish policies of Cyprus made Menderes dissatisfied, although the British showed that they were not necessarily against them either at the conference on August 30, 1955. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mehmet Fuad Köprülü stated that the security on the island must be provided, the terror should be banished and two communities should have the equal rights as it was in a confederation. After the news of attacks to the house where Atatürk was born and to the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, many Greeks living in Turkey were attacked as well on September 6-7, 1955.²⁴ Most of the Greek population living in Istanbul had to leave the country and in order to stop the violence; the government had to issue martial law.

Separatist Greek Cypriots turned their violence from British to Turkish Cypriots and many from both sides were injured on March 9, 1956. The following weeks witnessed many Turkish Cypriots being killed. Greek Cypriots who were not supporting EOKA actions and also the ones with the British were treated as traitors and according to scholar Claude Nicolet Turkish Cypriot deaths were accidental but when they cooperated with the British, they also became targets themselves. When the terrorists attacked, they just enlisted more Turkish Cypriots, thus Turkey became more

²³ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 39-46.

²⁴ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi*, 1:74-82.

important to the British.²⁵ Involving Turkey meant to create a more complicated matter rather than just an anti-colonial movement against the U.K.

Because the U.S. policy was to stay out of Cyprus during the Eisenhower government, there was not much active involvement, rather the British were trying to convince them to solve the situation with them and Americans kept rejecting it. The U.S. was trying to convince the British to settle on a constitution with the Cypriots rather than forcing them into one. Starting in April 1956 the U.S. was getting more and more aware of the seriousness of Cyprus as the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a telegram to Ankara, saying that “the growing feeling NATO should not sit idly by.”²⁶ When Makarios was exiled in March 1956 to Seychelles, the U.S. did not like the idea and after a year they made it clear to British that an agreement could not be reached without him and Makarios was finally released with the American efforts.

Meanwhile the American-Turkish relations were hitting a dead end. Sixty percent of the budget of Turkey was spent on the military expenses; the necessity of having 500.000 troops all the time was a huge burden on the weak economy of Turkey. That was why when Turkey asked the U.S. for more financial aid, the request was rejected twice. According to Osman Yalçın, this situation showed that the U.S. could not comprehend the difficulties Turkey was in. He also asks the question if giving more aid is a starting point for an alliance.²⁷ Nihat Erim who started working on Cyprus officially on November 16, 1956, by the request of Menderes states in his memoirs that the most advantageous discussion points of Turkey were the Western Thrace, Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, Greeks of İstanbul and some of the islands in Aegean Sea as

²⁵ Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 79.

²⁶ Dulles, Deptel Ankara 1638, etc., 4.4.56: *FRUS, 1955-1956*, XXIV, 356-357.

²⁷ Yalçın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, 102.

they conveyed to Americans and British.²⁸ It was not only to show their strength in diplomacy and how they should be included in the Cypriot issue but also to clarify to other nations that Turkey could do whatever it took to get their voice heard.

Although the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff suggested *taksim* i.e. partition, over breakfast unofficially to Settar İlksel, Turkish Ambassador to Greece, on 7 October, 1956, later when Britain brought partition to the agenda, Turkey accepted, yet Greece was reluctant to do so.²⁹ Turkey started following the *taksim* policy on Cyprus from then on and even though Turkey settled for some solutions, it always kept open the policy-making process when there was no longer a solution. Lord Radcliffe, who was assigned to create a solution for the parties, came up with a constitution named after him. He suggested in this constitution proposal that the island would stay under the rule of the queen but there was going to be a parliament in which the Greek senators would be more than Turkish Cypriots and only one ministry would be given to Turkish which was meant to deal with the Turkish Cypriots living on the island.

Although Turkey did not like the terms, it had the guarantee of the future of the island under Britain, and meant that the U.K. would be the one who was responsible for the island as well as its problems. However, because the clause did not have self-determination, the Greek side did not accept the terms. Lenox Boyd, the British Secretary of State for Colonies, mentioned self-determination and also stated that even though self-determination took place, they would not allow the island to unite with Greece. Thus, Lenox Boyd took the case to the House of Commons on December 19, 1956 saying that partition would be on the agenda too. James Callaghan, a Member of

²⁸ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 20.

²⁹ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi*, 1:87-92. Purcell, *Cyprus*, 293.

Parliament for Cardiff South East, asked why partition which was so provocative was a case and Lenox Boyd answered that it was only logical to give the same rights to Turkish Cypriots living only 40 miles away from Turkey. This strengthened the hands of Turkey. Menderes explained that Turkey was determined to see the final decision. He said that they could not just give away 120 thousand Turkish Cypriots to foreigners and leave Turkey's security in danger. Melih Esenbel says that it was best to underline Menderes's last sentence to make healthy arguments about Turkish foreign policy.

Turkish committee under Professor Nihat Erim, who was the former Deputy Prime Minister and owned the newspaper New Nation–Populist at the time, went through the Radcliffe rules as the representative of Menderes and in order to find an orthodox way to resolve the issues, they came up with some terms: first the Greek side must stop its terrorist activities and then agree to participate at a conference with the U.K. and Turkey. However, terrorism intensified in the region instead, in February 1957. Around this time, Cyprus also came on the agenda of the United Nations. Greece was insisting on self-determination and blaming Britain for torturing the people of the island and Britain was criticizing Greece as it was supporting terrorism.³⁰ Erim also prepared a report on Cyprus which had a result on why Turkey should accept self-determination and *enosis* was definitely out of question on November 24 and Menderes said his report was now a basis for the government on the issue.³¹

Esenbel, in an interview with the newspaper *Tercüman* published on July 30, 1983, about the secret talks with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1956, told that:

³⁰ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 53-66

³¹ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 31.

“These talks were put in minutes. During these talks Macmillan gave some kind of assurance to our Prime Minister. According to this, the period of autonomy was reduced to seven years and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives were to be on the Governor’s administration. But to placate Greece they were given ‘advisory’ duty. Before, it was described as ‘co-operation’. And when Macmillan also gave his assurance that after these seven years the right of self-determination will be used within the framework of Lennox-Boyd’s statement and thus the road to taksim too would be opened, we assumed a positive stance.”³²

The author of *Cyprus*, Christopher Hitchens argues that it was not clear to make distinction whether Britain was trying to provoke the Turkish to take up the cause in Cyprus or Turkish government would take that action anyway to protect its kinsmen. He also says that given the reason Cyprus was an internal affair; British rejected the Greek party while bringing Turkey into the matter.³³

Meanwhile an opportunity for Americans to lead the world politics came with the conflicts of the Middle East. President Eisenhower announced the Eisenhower Doctrine on January 5, 1957, which meant that the U.S. was going to take the role of the great power in the Middle East because the British lost their reputation over the Suez Crisis and the U.S. did not want the Soviets to have an alliance with Egypt and Syria. This doctrine was immediately supported by the Turkish government. According to Sander, Turkey took the chance of showing its importance in the area to get more financial aid to counter the Soviet threat.³⁴ This situation was a step forward for the U.S. involvement with Cyprus.

It was the night of January 20, 1957 when British Governor of Cyprus Sir John Harding had a dinner with Nihat Erim and said that Turkey should try to have as many allies as they could so that they could have the majority in the U.N. and if Greece was

³² Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 44.

³³ Hitchens, *Cyprus*, 45.

³⁴ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)*, 153.

not willing to have a three-way agreement then the U.K. and Turkey should deal with Cyprus with an agreement once and for all. He also asked for the educated Turkish to migrate to Cyprus to strengthen the Turkish Cypriot community on the island.³⁵ On February 8, Erim and Foreign Minister Zorlu visited Dulles in his own house and after telling him the perspective of Turkey; Dulles said they did not want to force Greece otherwise; the following government could fall under Communism. Zorlu said it was just an excuse, some kind of tactic that the Greeks used and upon the question of Dulles about the wishes of Turkey, Zorlu said they wanted Americans to recognize Turkey as an arbiter in the U.N. and Dulles replied that he would speak with the British.³⁶ Although Dulles' words show that British would have the last words, the situation was ripening for the U.S. as well.

On February 22, 1957, Indian delegate Krishna Menon suggested that Cyprus was an issue that should be discussed among the three countries only (Britain, Turkey, and Greece) and it was accepted by the United Nations. Although Greece was against all of the compromises given primarily by Britain and other organizations like the U.N. and NATO, Britain freed Makarios hoping that he would help releasing the tension among Greek Cypriots but this act made the relations between Turkey and Britain bitter. Turkey sent its official statement that the partition of the island was the only feasible solution to the U.S., Britain, Greece and other NATO allies on May 15, 1957. Greece finally achieved its goal to make self-determination of the island the agenda of the

³⁵ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 50.

³⁶ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 66.

United Nations on December 12, 1957. This decision raised protests in Turkey. Self-determination was not accepted in the General Assembly.³⁷

Melih Esenbel told his situation back then and how he was supposed to be posted in Paris to NATO, but Prime Minister Menderes did not want him to leave saying that “Melih, -he always called me by my name- we have been working together for many years. I understand you need to work abroad but in this tough time I cannot let you leave. There is an early election. It is going to be in October 1957. Stay with me for 7-8 months. In fall 1957 after the elections, you can go wherever you wish to, he said. Of course I could have only accepted this kind offer... This duty lasted not 7-8 months but 3 years.”³⁸ When Menderes called Esenbel to brainstorm before the press meeting on February 7, 1957, Esenbel described how he had the chance to express his thoughts on Cyprus and he mentioned that British colonies were disintegrating and they should have acted accordingly instead of just promoting British status quo. Although Menderes only nodded to Esenbel, he defended the same mentality Esenbel said to him and also blamed Greece for providing weapons to Greek Cypriot separatists.

American Ambassador to Turkey, Fletcher Warren gave a statement on 27 February, 1957, about Turkish Cypriots who could either live under the Commonwealth or choose to live under an independent nation. Esenbel criticized this notion as Turkish Cypriots were alienated from the right of self-determination. According to Esenbel, because of Turkey’s persistence on partition made the British take the United States to their side and on March 24, the U.S. advised parties to settle down on an agreement, however, Esenbel also points out that the United States ignored their position on

³⁷ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi*, 1:101-08.

³⁸ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 67. Translation provided by the author of this thesis.

Makarios whom Turks did not even want to deal with. Although there was an offer of mediation by Secretary General of NATO Lord Ismay, it was accepted by Turkey but rejected by Greece. The statement by the U.S. on April 23, made Turkey believe that they were leaning toward supporting the Greek intentions but Turkey could not understand this as they had never tried terrorism as a way to gain in the international arena unlike Greece and also blamed Greece for deteriorating relations between Turkey and Greece because of their irresponsibility. Later, the U.S. supported neither idea; *enosis* nor partition, they suggested two options instead: independence or partnership agreement. Turkey insisted on partition.³⁹

President Eisenhower said “if we supported partition, including most of the NATO partners, Greece might find it very difficult to oppose”⁴⁰ in March 1957, made it clear that the U.S. was leaning toward that. However, the Greek lobbying in the United States was pressuring the administration to find another solution besides partition or *enosis*. Acting Secretary Herter wrote the first U.S. choosing a possible solution for Cyprus: “U.S. now believes that either independence within or outside the Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing *enosis* are worthy serious consideration.”⁴¹

On July 18, 1957 the U.S. prepared a draft of its objectives:

1. Support concept of the attainment by the Cypriots of a government of their own choice in a manner that will protect the legitimate interest of our allies and of all groups on the island.
2. Pursue policies designed to preserve NATO unity.

³⁹ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (I): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 84-85.

⁴⁰ Memcon, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, 21.3.57: Ann Whitman File, International Series, Bermuda Conference, March 20-24, 1957, box 3, DDE-Library, 12.

⁴¹ Herter Deptel London 7312, etc., 16.4.57: *FRUS, 1955-1957*, XXIV, 473.

3. Support efforts to retain continued access to NATO members and continued denial to the Soviet Bloc of the strategically important bases on Cyprus
4. Avoid involving the United States in a settlement that will require significant U.S. economic or military support.⁴²

British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd sent a letter on January 9, 1958 to Dulles, saying that they were not in a position to disregard the promise; the partition, in case of self-determination which they gave to Turkish Cypriots: firstly, because they made them in public; secondly, it would affect Turkish government. He told Dulles that Sir Hugh Foot, the governor of Cyprus, had a five-year plan to bring peace to Cyprus by convincing both parties to unite under one government and Lloyd said that he was expecting Dulles to see Menderes and convince him to see the plan was better than partition.⁴³ Five days later, Walworth Barbour, US Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom, reported that Turkish authorities were not opposing the plan of Sir Hugh as it would not change what was proposed in 1956, and for Greek part, Foot presented his plan to Makarios and offered him to participate in the process as a last chance as he was still in exile at the time. On the same day, Turkish Government rejected the Foot Plan as they were expecting partition of the island between Greece and Turkey and if that happened to fail, they would discuss the terms among them. From the telegram dated January 22, 1958, the American Embassy in Turkey reported to the Department of State that an Anglo-American force could affect the government of Turkey in a bad way as they were also pressured from the Turkish public. Thus, it was advised “non-involvement” for the U.S. government. On January 28, while Turkish

⁴² Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 105.

⁴³ *FRUS*, 1958–1960, Volume X, Part I, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union, Cyprus, Document 170.

Cypriots were protesting for partition, the British killed 7 civilians and 70 of them were injured.⁴⁴ While the discussions continued in the international arena, Greek Cypriots did not really stop terrorizing Turkish Cypriots.

The National Security Council discussed Cyprus at its 353rd meeting on January 30 that violence on the island increased, even Turkish Cypriots started attacking the British as they wanted partition and Greek Cypriots wanted nothing but an independent, united Cyprus. The American Embassy in Greece sent a cable to the US Department of State on February 4, 1958, and Greece said they were not responsible for EOKA actions, and also stated that self-determination was not something to be compromised, the Government of Greece could not accept partition in any way, if Turkey intervened in Cyprus militarily and in case of the absence of British, Greece would respond.⁴⁵ This was what ignited the American concerns on the possibility of a war between Greece and Turkey.

Secretary of State Dulles reports the plan to the American Embassy in the United Kingdom on February 22, 1958 saying that without really mentioning Turks about the partition, they would try to assure them to some degree of a military base on the island to ensure the minimum security for Turkey as they were convinced that Greeks were not expecting less than of the whole island.⁴⁶ It was proving the Turkish doubts on Americans were in favor of Greek interests.

The Turkish government accepted the military base plan under some conditions: first, it would require three of the bases in cities and second, they would obtain them swiftly and grant Turkish Cypriots autonomy. However, it was later

⁴⁴ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi*, 1:112.

⁴⁵ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 182.

⁴⁶ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 189.

realized the base that was offered was in fact a non-real base and had many binding conditions such as Greek approval. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu rejected it and made it clear that the military base plan is non-negotiable in that way. The United Kingdom did no longer need the crucial position of Cyprus after losing the Suez Canal but it still could be essential to keep its military bases considering the Cold War threat. British government no longer wanted to deal with the island as there was strong criticism against its dominance over the island and saw it as an economic burden. Although Britain was leaning toward Greece to hand over the island, they also did not want to jeopardize the relations with Turkey.⁴⁷ So they used Turkish Cypriots for their interests when they were enlisting them as policemen in the island against the terrorist activities of Greek Cypriots and now that they became aware of the fact that the island was more of problem than an advantage, it was easy to switch sides for them.

On May 23, 1958, Lloyd sent the details of a new plan to John Dulles and according to that Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece would participate in the position under British sovereignty and separate Houses of Representatives for each community. Finally, they could have dual citizenship. British Ambassador to the U.S. Harold Caccia set the terms for Greek Cypriots in his letter dated June 3, 1958, to Dulles. As reported by that, Greek Cypriots would give “specially-favoured status, dual nationality, constitutional advance, ending the emergency, and finally co-operation between allies.” Although the United States did not give the British the guarantee of the acceptance of Greeks, they hoped to persuade them with advantages like these. Though

⁴⁷ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 203.

it looked like it was only for the benefit of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots would also enjoy the same terms as they both could have the autonomy to run the internal affairs.⁴⁸

On the evening June 7, 1958 there was a bomb attack outside of the Turkish Press Office in Nicosia and that caused Turkish Cypriots to march to Greek Cypriots' districts and kill two of them. As the situation intensified, the people of Greece criticized Turkey as well as the United States (because the U.S. did not support Greeks at the Tripartite Conference and their resolution at the 10th U.N. General Assembly in 1955 as they even considered withdrawing from NATO).⁴⁹ However, Emin Dirvana, Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus after independence, said that the responsible persons for this attack were Turkish terrorists who planted the bomb there and caused Turkish Cypriots to shout "Partition or Death."⁵⁰

American Ambassador to Greece, James Riddleberger stated in his telegram sent to the Department of State on June 12, 1958 that Averoff was concerned about making Turkey a rightful party which would later make it impossible to prevent them saying anything in any situation regarding Cyprus and how the U.S. was taking a pro-Turkish position along with the U.K. To give an example of the American unfairness, he gave the example of the attack of Turkish people to Greeks living in Istanbul in 1955, blaming the U.S. did not take the necessary measures after the riots against Turkey. Averoff even said "the Turks were barbarians and barbarians enjoyed liberty of action that was not possible for civilized peoples." As it was clear in the telegram that Averoff was also disturbed by Germany's decision to set up factories in Turkey rather

⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 206.

⁴⁹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 208.

⁵⁰ Purcell, *Cyprus*, 294.

than in Greece.⁵¹ Britain was scared that there would not be any solution for Cyprus and it might even have to leave without settlement like in the case of Palestine. Another concern, which was also an American one, was that the issue would go to the U.N. and become international which Soviets could be included in. That was why the U.S. asked both governments to give serious thinking to the British plan, yet when Britain presented it on June 13, both parties rejected it.

A day later, Ambassador Riddleberger sent an aide-memoire from Permanent Under-Secretary at Foreign Office that the riots in Istanbul were so intense, the Government of Greece was even thinking about cutting all diplomatic ties with Turkey and the possibility of leaving NATO.⁵² On the other hand, Turkish Ambassador in Greece explained the situation in Istanbul to him by saying that even a small stone thrown to the windows of Turkish Embassy in Greece would ignite the riots more and made it clear that American mediation was a must to calm both countries.⁵³ While people in Greece were demonstrating against America, the Government of Greece severed the relations with Turkey by withdrawing Greek personnel at the NATO Headquarters in Izmir on the same day.

American Ambassador Warren in Ankara saw Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu on June 15 and wanted to learn about the violence of Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots. He said, “The government of Greece had been stirring up trouble for years. During period EOKA terrorism 30 Cypriot Turks [were] killed but world opinion is now excited because four Cypriot Greeks [were] killed. Why the change? The government of Turkey has consistently avoided creating excitement through radio broadcasts such as

⁵¹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 215.

⁵² *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 219.

⁵³ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 222.

done by Athens.” However, Ambassador Warren reported he was not convinced by Foreign Minister Zorlu’s explanation when he asked about the Turkish broadcasts chanting for partition. He finished the telegram with his comment: “I sensed Zorlu’s extreme attitude prompted in part by: (1) Extreme irritation that GOT must accept foreign aid, (2) annoyance that Cyprus problem is being discussed in NATO and (3) resentment that NATO may try to bring pressure on GOT.”⁵⁴

The same day Karamanlis said that Greece was ready to give up on *enosis* and self-determination for self-government under Britain and wanted the U.S. to support it and President Eisenhower approved it. At 8 p.m. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes sent a telegram to President Eisenhower via American Embassy saying that Turkish Cypriots were being terrorized for almost two years and that allies were not really there for Turkey and they supported the idea of partition as the best option for both communities. He also said that there was a strong public opinion on the issue and although they would do their best to keep things under control, it was not always easy to act against them as a government.⁵⁵ After the United States pressured Turkey third time in June 1958, Menderes ordered Esenbel to make it clear to American Ambassador Warren that Turkey would not accept any counter argument against its partition policy and Warren did not request seeing Menderes from that moment again. This was the beginning of the disappointment of Turkey in the U.S. –apart from the financial aid rejection- which was also the origins of the catastrophe of the relations.

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan explained to the parliament on June 19, 1958, the Macmillan Plan. It invited the representatives of Greece and Turkey in a

⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 225.

⁵⁵ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 229.

conference in Cyprus and the plan was to give both communities their autonomy for dealing with their own affairs. The international status of the island would remain for seven years. So the system offered them a separate House of Representatives as well and the governor would act accordingly to the consultation of the communities. Because the plan tried to be fair between the two communities, it was in the benefit of Turkey as well.

The government of Greece was not fond of the British idea of the Tripartite Conference in Cyprus; they would rather eliminate Turkey and continue talks bilaterally. Many cables were transferred between the four countries; the U.S., the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece. However, it was not easy to settle on the terms of the British plan. Britain convinced Turkey about appointing a Consul General in Nicosia and although Greece was not on board fully, the United Kingdom announced to put its plan on action and invited Turkish and Greek governments to the conference anyway.

In July 1958, the United States intervened in Lebanon upon the invitation of the President Chamoun according to Eisenhower Doctrine. This created a problem between Turkey and the U.S. too as the Americans used the Incirlik Air Base without really consulting Turkish government and that made Turkey question the privileges that were given to the U.S. It was interpreted as the Americans used the base for their own interests, bypassing the NATO limitations. And the foreign reporters and journalists were easily allowed in the base while the Turkish ones could not get in because it was a U-2 base.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964)*, 169.

On October 6, 1958, Minister of the American Embassy Carlos Hall in Ankara, reported that Turkish Foreign Minister stated Turkish Government would attend any conference whether it was governments only or community level but not on the North Atlantic Council under NATO's Secretary General Spaak. Zorlu also said, "Off-the-record, Mr. Hall, I blame you for Turkey's present weakened position with respect to Cyprus," according to Hall, he was referring to the Consulate General deal.⁵⁷ The reason why Turks did not want General Spaak and his paper which he presented on July 16 was because it was favoring self-determination which was the red line for Turkish foreign policy.

Secretary General Melih Esenbel told Carlos Hall as the "last word" that Turkey could not accept Spaak paper, the conference was not available for the time to discuss the final solution of Cyprus as the parties were too divided to agree on something common. Hall explains, "Esenbel added GOT feels NATO being used as pressure tool by Greece. Turkey does not wish NATO to become another UN. Esenbel said: 'we are now making demarche to US as we would at UN.' In his usual calm mood, he concluded GOT would not submit to Greek 'blackmail' of being put between nutcracker jaws of UN and NATO."⁵⁸ The Greek Government was not really keen on joining a NATO sponsored conference either. Greek Prime Minister Averoff suggested a new position on Cyprus to the American Ambassador Riddleberger on November 10, 1958 that an independent Cyprus could be established with the guarantees of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom with shared government of two communities in the

⁵⁷ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 278.

⁵⁸ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 279.

island and special minority rights as well as freedom of religion. Riddleberger said that unless the U.K. was willing to give up Cyprus, it was just a fantasy.

At the meeting between Americans and Turks in Washington, November 18, 1958, the Cyprus issue was on the table again. Although the conference was, at first, the Greek idea, during the Macmillan Plan, it was turned down by the Greeks themselves after everyone had agreed on it and the same happened with the partition proposal as well. The Turkish government did not want to include many people in the matter nor did they want it to be discussed in the United Nations. However, they were finally convinced of the presence of General Spaak.

From November 24 to December 4, there were several discussions about Cyprus on the request by Greece in the United Nations. Iranian Resolution had the most support among seven resolutions and had the votes of Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was about the three related countries to decide the fate of Cyprus.

2.2. London–Zurich Agreements of 1959

Negotiations finally paid off and the discussions on premier level started on February 5, 1959, which would result in the Agreement of London-Zurich and Melih Esenbel witnessed these talks as Secretary General. About the second clause of the third article of the agreement which issued one sided intervention, Esenbel told Fatin Rüştü Zorlu that it also included military intervention so it had to be specified. After his contact with Evangelos Averoff, he told him that he was aware of what that clause meant but speaking into existence in parliament would be suicide and told him jokingly if Esenbel was trying to get him into trouble. Esenbel describes the optimistic air after

the Zurich Agreement and how people were even talking about Menderes and Constantine Karamanlis could pay a visit to Cyprus together one day but Esenbel stated that he could not trust Greece and Greek Cypriots to change and he turned out to be right later. After Esenbel's return from Zurich on February 11, Menderes and he invited Ambassador Fletcher Warren and gave him the details of the consensus of Zurich. Ambassador Warren was pleased according to Esenbel's takings.⁵⁹

Especially the Turkish youth was arranging protests on Cyprus and the only policy that was preserved was the partition of the island in Turkey. Because of that, when the Turkish government went to Paris for London and Zurich Agreements on February 11, 1959, the fact that partition was left for the sake of agreement was kept secret from public knowledge.⁶⁰

Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers started talking about the independence of Cyprus and Turkey was pressing for 50-50 for the governance of the island. On February 6-11, 1959, Menderes and Karamanlis met in Zurich and came up with an accord on the last day which later Archbishop Makarios also gave his support to as well. The result of these talks was the happiness of the U.S and the United Kingdom. On February 17, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Averoff and Zorlu along with the representatives of two communities, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük met at the London Conference in Cyprus. They agreed to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, a Treaty of Guarantees, a Treaty of Alliance, and the British declaration of granting independence to Cyprus. Although Makarios objected at first, he was convinced later. Makarios returned to Cyprus after 3 years and EOKA leader George

⁵⁹ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 125-128.

⁶⁰ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi*, 1:137.

Grivas, who was described as “‘fanged dynamo’ (Byford-Jones) as ‘the little man who looks like a cross between Groucho Marx and Adolf Hitler’ (Lord Caradon),”⁶¹ went to Greece after declaring a ceasefire. On December 13, 1959 Archbishop Makarios was elected president and Dr. Küçük became Vice President.

On a question about why Turkish people were trying so hard to get 30% representation while they made only the 20% of the population, Ambassador Fraser Wilkins answered that:

Well, this was part of the London-Zurich agreements. It stems back to the fact that under British rule, in order to help the Turks, who were generally at a lower economic, cultural, and sociological level than the Greek Cypriots, the British tried to compensate by giving them a higher percentage of jobs in the government. It was 30:70 on the political side and 40:60 in the police, because the Turkish Cypriots made good policemen; For example, the average per capita annual income among the Greek Cypriots is about five hundred dollars a year, and among the Turkish Cypriots, half that, say two hundred and fifty. Most of the Greek Cypriots are engaged in service industries in the towns, whereas the Turkish Cypriots are generally poor peasants on the land.⁶²

In also Greek Parliament, there was a strong opposition against the agreement and M. Venizelos blamed Makarios for betraying *enosis*, it was also discussed that Radcliffe and MacMillan Plans were better than the current agreement and they missed their chances by rejecting them back then. There were also some voices on how Turkey took its old land back, lost with the Treaty of Lausanne.⁶³

Melih Esenbel was the key to this chapter as he wrote his experiences as a first hand witness. Although he was actively taking part in the issues for the following years, he did not write the time after London–Zurich Agreements. He was able to fill in the gap of Turkish policies with his takings on them. Esenbel wrote that the first time the United States was involved in the issue when Ambassador Warren explained a few

⁶¹ Purcell, *Cyprus*, 256.

⁶² Fraser Wilkins, recorded interview by William W. Moss, February 23, 1971,4, John F. Kennedy Oral History Program.

⁶³ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 139-140.

thoughts to him on behalf of his government on March 25, 1957. Warren was telling him that the parties should begin negotiations immediately before the coming U.N. meeting otherwise it would hurt NATO and in order to achieve a solution, the British and the Greek Cypriots start the talks at the same time and Makarios should definitely be included. Esenbel explained that he was referring to Turkish position against Makarios and how he implied to change this attitude. Americans were taking a position against *taksim* (partition) which was the main Turkish policy toward Cyprus. Turkey was criticizing how the U.S. was encouraging the talks between Greek Cypriots and British, ignoring the Turkish Cypriots' rights to determine their future but offering them only two choices: either they would live under the British Commonwealth or as another independent nation on their statement dated April 23.⁶⁴

It all started on December 17, 1954 which marked the time when Cyprus became an international issue that brought many of the crises with itself by Greek efforts and continued until London-Zurich Agreements signed on February 19, 1959 in Lancaster House in London, between Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Cypriot community leaders (Archbishop Makarios III and Dr. Fazıl Küçük). First, Turkey did not want to see Cyprus as its responsibility, since it was under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and what was happening in the island was considered as internal affairs. However, especially after Greek Cypriots living in the island started attacking Turkish Cypriots as well, the situation there forced Turkey to be more involved and seek a solution for their well-being and when Britain invited Turkey to conferences; it gave Turkish government the official position in the talks. It was now time to find a common ground for the benefit of the parties. The U.K. was not willing to deal with

⁶⁴ Esenbel, *Kıbrıs (1): Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, 78

Cyprus so much as the situation there was getting more and more complicated so they pursued the only feasible solution: negotiations. It did not work, for a long time, until finally Greeks were convinced that on the way to *enosis*, they had to be free of the British rule for good. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus was born under the London–Zurich Agreements with the guarantors of Turkey, the U.K. and Greece.

Nihat Erim, who was also working on the constitution, took a note on May 14 that they were trying to prevent Greeks from imposing anything on them and even though they said they did impose, he was finding ways to protect the rights of Turkish.⁶⁵ Erim also says that the biggest disagreement on the constitution was the separate municipalities and this unpleasant topic was going to cause a huge crisis later.

⁶⁵ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 112.

CHAPTER 3

IN A SHOW OF BRINKMANSHIP

“You’ve got it wrong son. There’s only one solution to this island, and that’s partition.”⁶⁶

US Assistant Secretary of State George Ball

3.1. The Christmas Inferno

Turkey was following a Western-oriented foreign policy until the 1960s and although Greece and Turkey were able to solve their problems when they finally settled for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, it was not going to be that easy for the coming years. In fact, the violence, which had been reflected on the British mostly until this time, was going to be directed at the Turkish Cypriots as their Greek counterparts finally broke free from the British tyranny and the only problem was the Turkish Cypriots between them and their goal of unifying with Greece. Violence was going to

⁶⁶ Guardian, 2.4.88.

turn into systematic terrorism and a conflict. Turkish foreign policy really started questioning its strategy and reconsidered its relations with the West and the United States only wanted to alleviate the problems without being able to contemplate the consequences. No matter how much they wanted to stay away from the conflict, they had to act on it but the requirement of active diplomacy making was after the establishment of the new republic. US-Turkish relations were going to be damaged like it had never been and when George Ball delivered the letter of Johnson; brinkmanship was tantamount to diplomacy now and catastrophe was on the doorstep for both countries.

Reality of the Cold War made the United States have to reconsider its every decision on its policy toward Cyprus as it showed delicacy in every way. The Soviet Union fixed its eyes on this island in the Mediterranean and the stakes for the U.S. was too high as the communist party, AKEL, in Cyprus was gaining more power and the United Kingdom wanted to show that they were still present. On January 14, 1960, the Department of State told that the U.S. financial aid to Cyprus would be modest unlike the new republic's expectations and it would not jeopardize the British interests, also the U.S. government made sure that they would not send soldiers to the military of Cyprus.⁶⁷ And, NSC Report 6003 stated that Cyprus was not seeking NATO membership in its first years of independence and the U.S. should not try to guarantee that unless the Cypriots were demanding such thing.⁶⁸

The National Security Council Report dated February 9, 1960, emphasized on the importance of the island for the United States with the British bases on it, in case of

⁶⁷ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 342.

⁶⁸ Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 163. NSC Report: "Statement of U.S. Policy toward Cyprus" (NSC 6003), 9.2.60: *FRUS*, 1958-1960, X, pt. 1, 825, 826.

a dangerous situation with the Soviet Union, radio communication stations for Americans to reach the Middle East, and the American-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation. Because the islanders were leaning toward communism with AKEL party, the U.S. government did not want to convince them to join NATO as the chances were low, but the U.S. still had its interests in the middle of Mediterranean and this report represented those interests.

On the other hand, Turkish Premier Menderes was overthrown by military junta on May 27, 1960, and there was a continuing political instability as there were coalition governments because of military interference until the Justice Party won elections in 1965. Changing Turkish foreign policy was not the issue for the military junta, the National Unity Committee, when they came to power. Although they demonstrated the importance of American alliance to Turkey, the Eisenhower administration made it clear that America would want Turkey to return to the civilian government.⁶⁹ On the other hand, there were speculations that the U.S. had conspired with the Turkish military for coup d'état because Menderes government did not follow the American advises on devaluation, reduction on the investments and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's words on how strategically important Turkey was to the U.S. thus the economic aid should continue or else they would look for it somewhere else.⁷⁰ Of course, there were counter arguments as well saying that the Turkish military was being discredited by implying the coup was a mastermind plan of the U.S.⁷¹ Foreign policy making was left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; however,

⁶⁹ *New York Times*, September 17, 1961.

⁷⁰ Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, 21.

⁷¹ Orhan Erkanlı, *Askeri Demokrasi: Orhan Erkanlı'nın Anıları*, Güneş, 1987, 221-222.

the military almost always took part in every important decision making process just as it happened in the crises of Cyprus 1963-64 when they pressed for invasion.

Between 1960 and 1964 Turkish officials reiterated the policy of Turkey toward NATO. However, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Cemal Gürsel on 28 June, 1960, which made it clear that Soviets would support Turkey if they kept their neutral position.⁷² And later, even though Turkey decided to stay in NATO, they were ready to normalize the relations. This was a turning point and an improvement of the relations between two states. Détente with the Soviets always made Turkey play this card when they were faced with the unwanted decisions of the United States.

The Republic of Cyprus was established on August 16, 1960 and the U.S. recognized it the same day. Fraser Wilkins was appointed to Cyprus as the first American Ambassador and arrived on September 16. The United States announced how pleased they were about this conclusion. In this newly established republic, the first issue for the Americans was the communication facilities. There were CIA's Middle East Communications Activity (MECA) place and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and finally Voice of America (VOA) which the U.S. wanted to keep its rights to maintain their presence. They could not have an agreement with Makarios on the communication facilities and they could not prevent AKEL from running its political actions. Ambassador Wilkins also explains that there were other American interests beside copper mine and radio station such as; the Forest Oil Corporation of Pennsylvania, exporting oil by American companies, and the British bases at Larnaca and Akrotiri.⁷³ On the other hand, London-Zurich Agreements were so important to

⁷² Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 48.

⁷³ Fraser Wilkins, recorded interview by William W. Moss, February 23, 1971, 7.

Turkey because for the second time in Ottoman History since the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, Turks were able to put their flag on somewhere they lost –the first one was Hatay although its situation was a bit different- and it was a success because Turkey had given up its rights on Cyprus to the U.K. with the Lausanne Agreement and was able to become at least an arbiter with Cyprus again through these agreements.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, the government changed in the United States. In September, 1961, new President John F. Kennedy approved Proposals for US Action in Cyprus to call for an aid program. The assistance included a possible American university, helping with the water shortage, and a social insurance program. These were discussed when President Makarios visited the U.S. in June, 1962 as well. In order to prevent Soviet influence in the island, the U.S. tried to be more convincing. Kennedy's aim was to get Makarios to establish his own party in order to prevent communist political movements in the island as well as stopping the conflict with Turkish Cypriots.

Things started to change for the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. when the Cuban Missile Crisis arose in October, 1962. Turkey, along with Britain and Italy had agreed to have stationed the American intermediate-range ballistic missiles on their lands. Although the agreement was made in 1959, they were installed in 1962 and on October, 22, 1962, American President Kennedy ordered for the quarantine of Cuba because of the Soviet missiles installed in this island. Turkish military did not want the Jupiter missiles to be removed from Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper said

⁷⁴ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 174. Although Erim states it as flag, he probably talks about the military presence and having rights in the island and being on the table. According to Baskın Oran, the Republic of Turkey rejected the Ottoman regime not the state and that is why, Turkey completely changed some of its aspects like the language and declaring the Sultan as a traitor but also took the responsibility of some of Ottoman actions in the past and inherited such things like its psychology and Armenian discourse. He also explains the similarities and differences in his book. Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt I*, 24.

in May 1961 that “they had just gotten from their parliament the appropriations for the Turkish side of the cost of those missiles, and it would be very embarrassing to go right back to them and say that they were being taken out”⁷⁵ Apparently, they could not realize the danger at the moment. The unconditional support for the U.S. made Turkey look actually naïve as the U.S. did not even consider Turkish position in the situation. And Turkish officials were disappointed.

While Johnson was visiting Cyprus, Greek Cypriots protested him and the policy of the U.S. giving the reason that Americans were trying to get *enosis* under control. They sent an open letter to Johnson saying that he should be promoting self-determination for the island. President Makarios started convincing many of the foreign countries that the constitution was not working. Although Turkey protested against his acts some time, it was not enough as Turkey was too late to act upon the issue.⁷⁶ Vice President Lyndon Johnson visited Cypriot Vice President Küçük at his office on August 32, 1962, and Küçük told him that Turkish Cypriots were ready to work on this bi-communal nation but Greek Cypriots still believed in *enosis*. He expressed that although Turkish Cypriots were trying to implement the rules of the constitution, the Greek side was not really helping with that as they refused to do so, just like Makarios went to decide foreign policy on his own disregarding the Minister of Defense whose job was supposed to do it. Because all of these obstacles, Turkish Cypriots asked the U.S. to support and assist them.⁷⁷

Considering how related states were always intervening for Cypriot affairs, President Makarios was not so wrong either. After all, the United Kingdom had what it

⁷⁵ Bernstein, “The Cuban Missile Crisis”, 102.

⁷⁶ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarih.*, 2:109-115.

⁷⁷ FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 264.

wanted and ninety-nine square miles of Cyprus was the property of Great Britain and Cypriots had no say in it. Inside the halls of the parliament, however, Turkish Cypriots were feeling like they were not taken seriously as the Greek Cypriots were discussing the matters beforehand and in cabinet meetings, although the common language was English, Dr. Küçük was having a hard time understanding it since his second language was French and he was also complaining that his Greek colleagues were not consulting him on the foreign policy.⁷⁸

Turgut Tülümen, who had been a diplomat in Cyprus, was transferred to Ankara to the Bureau of Cyprus and now he was giving commands rather than following them after 14 months in the island. He was one of the few diplomats who wrote a book on the Cyprus issue with his experiences but his was more of the summary and his little encounters with leaders rather than revealing unknown things on the issue. As he interpreted Turkey's difficult situation with inner politics like the military junta was still in power after the coup d'état and Turkey could not come to itself because of that. When Makarios came to visit Turkey in 1962, Tülümen was assigned as the translator between him and Prime Minister İnönü. İnönü was telling him how important the relations between Greece and Turkey were and how hard Atatürk and Venizelos tried to build a friendship and it would be a shame to jeopardize it.⁷⁹ Tülümen describes the situation when he came to Cyprus as a diplomat and how the Consulate-General picked up the executive work of Turkish Cypriots there in his memoirs in 1960. Although the Republic of Cyprus was just established and two communities were supposed to act together, everything from cultural activities to shops were different,

⁷⁸ Stephens, *Cyprus A Place of Arms*, 173

⁷⁹ Tülümen, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, 52.

they were not trading with each other unless it was totally necessary and they were painting their houses different colors just to be able to differentiate. His takings on this are important in the way to understand how the two communities were inherently feeling different from one another.

President Makarios abolished the separate municipal councils on December 30, 1962. And in February, he withheld the £400,000 grant from the Turkish Cypriot communal chamber. As the dispute continued, the U.S. did not want to force Turkey to stay calm because of the Jupiter-Polaris negotiations that the U.S. wanted to place nuclear heads in Turkey against the Soviet Union.

In January, 1963, American Ambassador Raymond Hare met with Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin about how Zurich-London Agreements were no longer working and that could lead to some problems. Washington was not willing to intervene in the situation.⁸⁰ According to George S. Harris, the United States did not want to intervene in the Cyprus issue fearing it might alienate one of the parties. In January 1963, Secretary of State Rusk made it clear to the Embassy in Nicosia saying that “any effort by either party to draw us into dispute should be politely but firmly rejected.”⁸¹ And a NATO peacekeeping force was rejected by the Cypriot president, so the only feasible solution was the establishment of UNFICYP (United Nations Peace force in Cyprus).⁸² In October, the same year, Erkin made it clear that if no precautions were taken, then the only solution would be partition.

On the question if Americans were playing any role in Cyprus, Charles W. McCaskill, who was an Economic/Commercial officer, answered that as:

⁸⁰ Topur, Tuncer. *Yunan'la Sirtaki*, 91-92.

⁸¹ Rusk, Deptel Nicosia 276, 9.1.63: *FRUS*, 1961-1963, XVI, 540.

⁸² *New York Times*, February 1, 1964.

Ambassador Wilkins was in touch with the government all along. For example, there was a reported sighting of a Turkish flotilla off the northern coast of Cyprus. This was the sort of thing that could have provoked a reaction from the Greeks; it terrorized the people on the north coast, including some of our FBIS people. It was assumed of course that the Turks were headed toward Cyprus. The Embassy checked this out with Washington, which checked it with Ankara, and we were able to tell the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that it was only a "Turkish exercise." Of course, it was gunboat diplomacy, a show of force, but we played a key role in reassuring the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that they were not under immediate threat from the Turks.⁸³

On April 1, 1963, Ambassador Hare reported what he discussed with Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin about Cyprus. Erkin was saying the only thing the Government of Turkey was expecting from Makarios was to obey the international agreements. Hare commented that: "This is tendency of Makarios personally to take positions and make statements which not only exacerbate situation here by confirming worst suspicions of Turks but also seem to be in clear conflict with policy of moderation which Government of Greece reportedly endeavoring exert. If this correct, would seem that this particular problem is of type which might be approached as thing in itself. Problem is who is going to bell the cat," referring to Makarios' statements in press to provoke Turkish Cypriots.⁸⁴

The problems were growing more and more; Under Secretary of State George Ball sent a telegram on April 4, 1963, to the American Embassy in Cyprus saying that Makarios' aim was to eradicate London-Zurich Agreements and the constitution, which provided Turkish Cypriots their guarantees, and he was trying to maintain his power while the ultimate goal was no longer *enosis*. He also said that Makarios was bold enough to take the issues to the U.N. as he could make his case more convincing there and get more supporters as a new republic freed from colonialism. Greek Foreign

⁸³ From an interview on July 7, 1993 by Charles Stuart Kennedy, ADST.

⁸⁴ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 277.

Minister Averoff sent a letter in the same month to Makarios stating that the Government of Greece would never support unilateral changes on international agreements.⁸⁵ The United States made it clear that if Makarios took the case to the United Nations, he would not have the American support and they advised him to solve the conflict by communicating with Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was the fear of the Soviet involvement for the Americans.

Late of August 1963, American Ambassador Wilkins saw Makarios and found out that he was rather determined to deal with Turkish Cypriots in his own way, by not talking with them and just expecting them to accept his changes in the governance of Cyprus. Wilkins said, “I commented that I thought he was on wrong track in handling matter in this way, adding that it would seem wiser quietly to make some arrangement behind scenes with Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara. I believe I made some headway this morning in persuading him to make another quiet effort with Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara, but Makarios is firm believer in using press for purpose of negotiation; consequently it remains to be seen how far he will go in seeking quiet talks with Turkish Cypriots and with Ankara.”⁸⁶ Wilkin’s efforts to find a peaceful solution were undermined by Makarios and this was just the beginning for the American efforts.

On October 1, 1963, at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the U.N., Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin explained the situation in Cyprus by saying that Makarios was not respecting the Constitution of Cyprus and trying to change it unilaterally. Although Britain and Greece tried to convey him to take another way to deal with things, he did not seem persuaded. Erkin made it clear that the government of

⁸⁵ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 278-279.

⁸⁶ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 288.

Turkey was respecting the constitution and would keep doing so, unless Makarios continued ignoring the rights of Turkish Cypriots, then Turkey would not have any other choice but to go back to its former policy of partition for the sake of Turkish Cypriots living on the island.⁸⁷

On October 3, 1963 Turkey, as a guarantor sent a diplomatic note to Makarios since it was in the London and Zurich agreements for Turkish Cypriots to found the municipalities and Makarios was trying to prevent it from happening. While Cyprus was submitting to the U.N., some radical Greek Cypriots were sending telegrams stating that London and Zurich Agreements were forcefully signed and Rauf Denktaş, prominent leader of Turkish Cypriot community along with Dr. Küçük, protested against these allegations by saying that they were just preparing a rightful base for their aims like self-determination and *enosis*. On November 30, 1963, President Makarios officially suggested revising the constitution but it was protested harshly not only by Turkey but also by Britain.⁸⁸ On the other hand, Greek Cypriots perceived separate municipalities for a way to partition and they were protesting against it.⁸⁹ So it was more of finding a scapegoat for both of the sides to implement their own interests on the way to either partition or *enosis* than to find a solution.

President Makarios prepared the Thirteen Points which consisted of abolition of veto rights of the president and the vice president, unified municipalities and justice system. He thought these were not working and wished to change and gave a copy to Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom and to Turkish Cypriots' leader Dr. Küçük. On December 12, 1963, Turkish Ambassador in Washington Turgut

⁸⁷ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 289.

⁸⁸ Serter, *Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi 2*, 149-151.

⁸⁹ Joseph, *Cyprus*, 27

Menemencioglu explained that the government of Turkey did not want a similar crisis as in the 1950s and abolition of veto power of the Vice President was unacceptable, also because of the communist threat. Deputy Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Secretary of State John Jernegan said that it would be best if Küçük at least replied to the points which could be discussed instead of rejecting them thoroughly and the Ambassador agreed on it.⁹⁰ It is also undeniable that Makarios was trying to nullify the bi-communal administration and it is clear that would cause, under the conditions, Turkish Cypriots to be stripped away from their rights which they agreed in the first place thinking they would be implemented under London-Zurich Agreements.

On December 21 evening, Greek Cypriot policemen stopped a car and wanted to body-search a Turkish Cypriot woman who was accused by the Greeks of being a prostitute as if it could make it any better and this event ignited the outbreak of Bloody Christmas of 1963 which led to 364 of Turkish and 174 of Greek Cypriots casualties, Greek sources were taking the action as a rebellion to the government of Cyprus. As a result, about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population and around 1200 Armenians had to leave their homes and moved into the enclaves. American Consular/Political Officer George Albert McFarland, Jr., who just moved to Cyprus and was a suspect for both sides (Greeks thought he was pro-Turkish and Turkish Cypriots thought he was a spy) as he knew Turkish, witnessed the events and explained them as:

And then the next three or four months, the Turkish Cypriots, who were then 18 percent of the population, were driven back out of their villages into about five per cent of the Island's area, where they've stayed for the next 10 years. This, today, would be called, of course, "ethnic cleansing." In those days, we couldn't see it that way.⁹¹

⁹⁰ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 299.

⁹¹ George Albert McFarland, Jr. interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker. ADST, 1999.

On December 22, 1963, Ambassador Wilkins reported that he talked with Küçük and learned that Greek Cypriot police were harassing Turkish Cypriots. Makarios agreed with Küçük on establishing a joint Turkish/Greek Cypriot police force and a commission of inquiry. Wilkins also said that even when he was writing, there were clashes and American people were told to stay away from crowds. The next day, although Foreign Minister Erkin came from Paris with good news on having beneficial talks with Venizelos, he was immediately asked to the headquarters of Turkish General Staff as there was a great danger for the Turkish Cypriots. According to Ambassador Hare, “Erkin said he had first suggested consultation as provided by treaty but İnönü felt this would be too slow to meet possibly imminent holocaust and felt should proceed forthwith to intervention. He accordingly instructed Erkin so propose to British and Greek Governments through their Ambassadors here and also make same request of USG through me.”⁹²

The following day, the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a telegram to Turkey urging them to be moderate and responsible as the U.S. and the U.K. had different intelligence that neither side planned the aggressions. Same day, Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus Faruk Şahinbaş went to see Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot saying that EOKA attacked Turkish Cypriot women and children. He also stated that Turkish Armed Forces would act even without a civilian government and he was referring to administration change with the previous coup; Turkish public opinion was also becoming so sensitive on Cyprus. Talbot ended the conversation by congratulating Turkey for joining the tripartite ceasefire.⁹³ American Ambassadors, Raymond Hare,

⁹² *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 301-302.

⁹³ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 304.

Fraser Wilkins were doing their best to negotiate between the states with the help of George Ball. On the other side of the sea, there were huge protests taking place and Ankara was never so close to intervene.

On December 25, the United Kingdom suggested a joint military intervention; Greece and Turkey gave their full support. The British were trying to get the invitation from Makarios. Things were becoming worse as Turkish public was furious and Turkish Cypriot police were not even getting paid as Foreign Minister Erkin told Ambassador Hare on December 28.⁹⁴ On the same day, the Department of State sent a telegram to the Mission to the United Nations expressing that the U.S. would not intervene in the talks unless it was necessary and in order to find a solution, it would suggest the parties to find common grounds. The U.S. was aware of the fact that Greek Cypriots wanted to take their case to the U.N. since they could have more support for their case. Americans made it clear that they would not desire Cyprus to ignore the agreements which made Cyprus a republic. Four days later, Ambassador Wilkins reported that the recent event might justify Makarios' desire to renew the constitution and Greek Cypriots wanted to get rid of Greece and Turkey from Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. Turkish Cypriots returned to follow their former policy of partition again. Wilkins suggested that instead of radical solutions, Turkish Cypriots could manage their internal affairs because partition would require a population movement. It was understood before that the U.S. was supporting Turkey but Wilkins stated because the Sixth Fleet was in the Aegean Sea, it was interpreted as the U.S. had prevented Turkish invasion.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 307.

⁹⁵ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe Region; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 309.

The new republic brought many problems with it and because Greek Cypriots' main goal was *enosis* and it could not happen while Turkish Cypriots were in the management in the government. Moreover, the founding agreements that the republic was built upon, prevented from that happening. In order to nullify the agreements, President Makarios had to show the world that they were not working right, so he was taking every chance to take his case to the United Nations, however, the United States was against that as it meant also including the Soviet Union into the matter of NATO states and give them a saying on the matter. In the meantime, the two communities, Turkish and Greek Cypriots were already separating from each other; Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their government jobs, so the conditions were becoming worse and worse. Although Makarios wanted to have the power to rule this new state on his own as the president, his way of dealing things was not the best as he should not have gained the hostility of Turkish Cypriots more. President Makarios had to leave *enosis* as Cyprus became an international issue and it was the age of decolonization which was the reason why Cyprus wanted to free from British Empire in the first place and *enosis* would give Turkey the reason to invade the island.⁹⁶ That was why Makarios was trying to nullify the agreements as then it would mean they did not dishonor an agreement.

3.2. Letter Diplomacy

After the attacks on Turkish Cypriots in December 1963, the Treaty of Guarantee prevented Prime Minister İnönü to act on Cyprus quickly as the conflict became more intense there and on January 3, 1964, he said to the National Assembly that Turkey had to look for all diplomatic ways before intervention. He also had another

⁹⁶ Joseph, *Cyprus*, 46.

plan which was to shape American policy for its own benefit by threatening an intervention on Cyprus because avoiding a conflict was the top priority of President Johnson. And he used it at least five times from 1963 to 1964. The reasons why İnönü did not want to invade in those years were listed under three categories according to Turkish scholar Süha Bölükbaşı: “İnönü’s personality, Soviet support for Makarios, and the lack of readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces.”⁹⁷ There was also the risk of going to war with Greece; the doubt of the public was not ready for the causes for war. İnönü also answered why they did not act immediately: the process of intervention was dependent on conferences and talks and if these talks did not have any result, then the right to intervene immediately would be applied. He also said that raid, occupation would be the acts of someone who went offensive and that was why someone would not take an immediate action was someone who did not have that mindset.⁹⁸

On January 7, 1964, the Committee of Cyprus was established in Ankara. Greek Cypriots increased their attacks more and more on Turkish Cypriots. George Ball described the circumstances that the U.S. had already so much to deal with Vietnam, Panama, Indonesia, Congo and disputes over Berlin with the Soviets when the British Ambassador called him on the issue of Cyprus on January 25.⁹⁹ In order to ease the situation, Britain suggested stationing NATO soldiers on the island. After Turkey made it clear to accept that on the condition Americans would also send its soldiers, the U.S. came up with a plan on January 31, with the terms like: none of the nations would send its troops on the island while the NATO soldiers were there and both parties -Turkey and Greece- accepted the terms. George Ball explained the NATO plan to McNamara:

⁹⁷ Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 60, 65.

⁹⁸ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 221.

⁹⁹ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 340.

We should insist...1- that the duration of the force be limited to three months, 2- that the Greeks and Turks not to use their unilateral intervention rights for three months, and 3- that they agree on a mediator who was not representative of any of three guarantor powers but from another NATO European country.¹⁰⁰

Makarios did not like the plan, instead insisted on the situation to be included in the U.N. Security Council. Realizing he was not going to get what he wanted, Greek Cypriots bombed the American Embassy in Nicosia and the U.S. allowed a thousand American people to leave the island. After the British request for the U.N. Security Council, the council gathered to discuss the situation there. British delegate Sir Patrick Dean argued that it was really harsh on the island and Cypriot delegate Kyprianou said the two communities were living there in peace. Turkish delegate Turgut Menemencioğlu emphasized that Turkey was not in a position to be blamed rather to protest.

By the end of January 1964, Greek and Turkish sides were on the deadlock during the London Conference. British asked for the help of the United States as the communities of both parties did not like them very much because of the colonial past. The government of Lyndon Johnson, who took the place of the assassinated President Kennedy, decided that it was best to include NATO rather than the United Nations but it was not likely since Cyprus was not a member of NATO. Because the elections were coming up in the U.S., Johnson was thinking of sending American troops to Cyprus as the last resort. Although there was a plan of 10,000 Allied force to keep the peace in Cyprus, President Johnson first wanted to exhaust all of the diplomatic ways. Ball “stressed that the United States should avoid becoming the mediator in Cyprus: ‘Anyone who settles this is going to come down hard on the Greeks.’ The United States

¹⁰⁰ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 341.

should stay in the background.” So instead of American mediation, Western European mediation, the Ball plan, which would require having 1,200 American soldiers on the peacekeeping force, was established.¹⁰¹ Ball came for mediation after Makarios rejected NATO forces on 4 February 1964. His role was to convince Makarios that the peacekeeping force was necessary in order to prevent an intervention by Turkey.

Three days later, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent notes to the five member of the U.N. implying that some nations were enforcing their own policies on the people of Cyprus and that their aim was to bring the NATO forces that the islanders did not pursue such policy and he also gave out a warning to those nations that there would be consequences. Later on March 4, President Johnson was going to reply to this warning with a rather gentle response telling him that the U.S. was not trying to deteriorate the situation in the Mediterranean.¹⁰²

The U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Labouisse reported in his telegram dated February 10, 1964 that American troops in Cyprus were not welcomed and even Makarios stated that he did not want them there and they were afraid they would be a target of hit and run. Ambassador Wilkins tried to persuade Makarios into accepting a peacekeeping force in Cyprus as it was becoming such a bloodbath there and finally he was willing to accept a force which did not include NATO nations except the United Kingdom.

After the 1963 Christmas slaughter, Britain approached the U.S. and George Ball was assigned by President Johnson to deal with the crisis in Cyprus. It was February 12; George Ball along with three other State Department assistants met with

¹⁰¹ Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Acting Secretary Ball, January 28, 1964, 6:35 p.m., Tape 64.08, Side B, PNO 1)

¹⁰² Uslu, *the Cyprus Question*, 32-33.

Makarios for the first time and British High Commissioner was with them as well. “Ball found Makarios to be cool, devious, and uncompromising. In Ball's opinion, Makarios was a tough, cynical politician disguised in the glittering garb of a cleric.” No matter how much they tried to convince Makarios to step back, making it clear otherwise Turkey would launch an invasion and neither the U.S. nor the British would stand in their way, it did not work. What they wanted was also to have Makarios accept a multinational peacekeeping force, on the contrary Makarios insisted on respecting the unity of Cyprus by the U.N. National Security Council. According to Ball this meant: “Makarios’s central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots.”¹⁰³ While the brutality was so clear to Ball and other Americans, it is a wonder why they had to obey his requests even though Greek Cypriots could just bomb the American Embassy on top of everything else. There are some reasons like the Greek lobby in the U.S. and continuing threat of the Cold War but it makes one to question if the American diplomacy was a real success after all of those lives lost. This, in fact, could be counted as another catastrophe.

After talking to Makarios a few more days, he was sure that he could not talk sense in Makarios and left for Britain. There, he came up with the idea of creating a peacekeeping force without the consent of Makarios, rather with the help of the three guarantor powers: the U.K., Turkey and Greece. Ball explains his plan: “They should move forces into Cyprus simultaneously. Those forces would be organized on the pattern followed in Vienna during the four-power occupation after World War II- only this time, three, rather than four, men in jeep- and all operations would be conducted

¹⁰³ Bill, *George Ball : Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 184

together. The force would stay in Cyprus until an effective international force, within the framework of the United Nations”¹⁰⁴ However British did not agree on that, and left Ball without any solutions although he was so sure İnönü would agree with that. It is clear to see that the British presence was still strong on Cyprus; even so the Americans still had to agree with them first.

After the attack against Turkish Cypriots in Limassol on 12 February 1964, any U.N. Security Council resolution that could reject the right of Turkey to intervene by the guarantors’ agreement signed in 1960 was going to be dismissed by the United States as well. Rusk said after the talks which George Ball had with Turkish government, he was convinced that Turkey was ready to invade if another incident like Limassol happened again and the government of Greece also made it clear that they would not back down. Because of that, he suggested preventing the unilateral move from Turkey while Prime Minister Papandreou rumored that they might be willing to meet with Turkey. Ambassador Labouisse saw Papandreou on February 20 at night and responded Greek accusations of taking the Turkish side by saying that the U.S. was not supporting either nation, yet it could not ignore the fact that Makarios was trying to dissolve the treaties. On the other hand, he said the U.S. was forcing Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus as well. According to the Ambassador, Papandreou was willing to make the dangerous situation eased at once.¹⁰⁵

During the discussion in the Security Council on February 28, 1964, Russian delegate started his speech by saying that Rauf Denktaş did not represent Cyprus as it had already been represented by Kyprianou so Denktaş should not even be speaking.

¹⁰⁴ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 347.

¹⁰⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 17.

Then, Denktaş -President of Turkish community parliament- spoke how over 20,000 Turkish Cypriots became homeless and 800 of them lost their lives because of Greek Cypriots. The U.N. Security Council resolution was to send troops to Cyprus to keep peace but even that was not enough to stop Turkish Cypriots getting killed by Greek Cypriots. Turkey sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. and Britain, later turned into an ultimatum to attack Cyprus. On March 17, 1964, U Thant, Secretary General of the U.N., declared that a peacekeeping-force in Cyprus was established. Finnish diplomat Tumioja officially became the U.N. mediator.

Although the March 4, 1964, United Nations resolution dictated peacetime until the U.N. peacekeeping force came to its position in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots continued their harsh attacks on Turkish Cypriots, breaking the ceasefire. Upon this case, Turkey sent another diplomatic note to Makarios on March 13, to stop its attacks otherwise the Government of Turkey would pursue its right to invade obtained from the Guarantor Agreements signed in 1960. Although the U.N. peacekeeping force started its duty on March 27, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin of Turkey stated that the tortures and killings continued in front of the force which became a huge disappointment for the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁰⁶

Erim met with İnönü in Çankaya on March 11 and while they were walking, İnönü told him that they would not send troops to Cyprus as they were discussing among the generals all the time. Erim supported the diplomacy over bloodbath and he admits that although he criticized İnönü for not intervening immediately on December 23, 1963, when İnönü told him that the military was not ready, Erim accepted the reality

¹⁰⁶ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. I, 11.

and supported İnönü's policies from then on.¹⁰⁷ It also indicates that the diplomatic notes from Turkey about invasion were hardly true as they did not have the means to do it. This, on the other hand, is another display of successful diplomacy as it mostly worked especially against the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. had to come up with better diplomacy to keep the peace among the parties every time. However, it also makes one to question whether it was worth having worse relations in the end.

Prime Minister İnönü gave a speech to Time Magazine reiterating Turkey's policy on Cyprus and the fact that Turkey was never going to abandon Cyprus "if our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up and then a new kind of world order will be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place. I had faith in the leadership of America, which has the responsibility within the Western alliance; I am suffering now as a result of this attitude."¹⁰⁸ Allies failed to persuade Makarios to stop his actions on Turkish Cypriots. Although the U.S. was not into the idea of an U.N. intervention because of the risk of involving the Soviets, Makarios rejected the NATO intervention and so, the United Nations was left as the only choice.

According to Consular Officer McFarland, Fraser Wilkins started drinking so much because of the stress. And when George Ball saw him that way, Wilkins had to pull out from his position and he never became an ambassador again.¹⁰⁹ On April 7, 1964, new American Ambassador to Cyprus Taylor Belcher spoke with Acting Foreign Minister Stella Soulioti and he later reported the conversation to the Department of State saying that, "I find it very disturbing that Greek Cypriots seem determined to push

¹⁰⁷ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 259.

¹⁰⁸ *Milliyet*, 16 April 1964, *Cumhuriyet*, 17 April 1964.

¹⁰⁹ George Albert McFarland, Jr. interviewed by Lewis Hoffacker. ADST, 1999.

on with hard a line. We note series of event such as refusal allow Denktash free access to Cyprus, apt of acting Ministers, treaty denunciation, pressure on Turk Army contingent all seemingly designed with some idea of ‘unconditional surrender’ and thereby complicating already almost impossible problem faced by Mediator.”¹¹⁰ From the cables of the State Department and the missions abroad, it is clear that it was Makarios who constantly worked his way to create problems rather than taking a compromising position.

Prime Minister Papandreou explained to Ambassador Labouisse on April 10 that the government of Greece would not try to implement *enosis* nor self-determination, rather just support for the independence of Cyprus, not to provoke Turkey but if the independent country decided to go for *enosis* then it would be their natural right. Papandreou said he had forbidden Makarios to take actions against Turkish Cypriots when he visited Athens as well.¹¹¹ Acting Secretary George Ball responded to Turkish Ambassador to Washington Menemencioğlu’s concerns on April 11, about the U.N. resolution saying that although the U.N. resolution was planning to use Greek Cypriot police in Greek quarters the same with Turkish ones would be on duty in Turkish quarters. There would also be an international police contingent which made the Ambassador sanguine. However, although Cypriot constitution set 2,000 police, Makarios increased it to 5,000 later illegally and the only supposed 600 Turkish Cypriot police were disbanded. About Makarios’ visit to Athens, Menemencioğlu said, “Papandreou had encouraged Makarios by saying Greeks would stand with Cypriots to the end. No Greek has said anything against the bloody actions of Makarios. It is

¹¹⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 30.

¹¹¹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 31.

Papandreou, he continued, who brought Makarios and Grivas together. Situation would be grave if Grivas went to Cyprus since it would mean encouragement of military action.”¹¹² So his words contradicted Papandreou’s claims.

On April 29, Foreign Minister Erkin along with Ambassador Menemencioglu saw President Johnson. Johnson told Erkin that how Turkey and the United States were such close allies and how Prime Minister İnönü was such a great leader and a friend of his, then Erkin assured him that Turkey would not intervene, yet they had to be prepared. Johnson also said he would press Makarios on not to humiliate Turkey. While they were leaving, Johnson gave them two medallions for İnönü and for Erkin. The same day Johnson talked to J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, about sending him to Athens and Ankara. Because Cyprus was left out of the question Ball said, “To make forcefully clear, particularly in Greece, that national interests both countries go far beyond current preoccupation with Cyprus problem” on the matter referring to NATO interests.¹¹³

When Johnson called for order in Cyprus at the end of April 1964, Erkin thought it was to ease the situation in Cyprus, meaning that would put an end to Greek aggression. The *Cuba of the Mediterranean* resemblance was also put forward by Erkin to get the support from the United States and that would also ground a possible Turkish intervention by stating the closeness of the relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴ Now, Turkey was ready and eager to modernize its military by establishing a National Force, and through that they were able to provide their own military units

¹¹² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 32.

¹¹³ Ball, Deptel Nicosia 815, 3.5.64: Lot66D110, Entry 3051B, Conference File 2392: Sen. Fulbright’s Trip to Europe and Near East, May 1964, box 347, NARA.

¹¹⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 111.

which were self-reliant, apart from NATO. Thus, through fundraising, Turkey was able to create a landing craft and buy the other necessary equipment.¹¹⁵ Fulbright finished his meetings and reported that the best solution would be double-*enosis* in order not to humiliate Turkey and because Greece would not give any territorial concession to Turkey, however, Washington did not welcome the idea.¹¹⁶ Apparently the U.S. did not want to have the hatred of Greeks by forcing them into an agreement or concession of any territory.

George Ball sent a telegram to Rusk on May 10, 1964, saying that the Soviet Union would not want Cyprus to accept *enosis* in any cases as it would mean going under NATO control. He also said that the *enosis* connotations of Papandreou could actually be useful as it meant the island would stay under a NATO country rather than under the control of “the wolf in priest’s clothing.” In order to achieve this, they were aware of the question of Turkish Cypriots and to solve it, Ball thought a territorial concession would be made to Turkey by Greece and the arrangements could be made for Turkish Cypriots who wanted to leave the island as well.¹¹⁷

Papandreou was against the idea of concession of any territory. Meanwhile, the situation in the island became more intense with the abductions and possible killings of these abducted Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were also smuggling heavy arms while Makarios replied to these allegations as exaggerated. After the vicious attacks against Turkish Cypriots and abductions in May 1964, İnönü made Americans aware of the severity of the situation there before launching an operation on the island while Erkin did not want to involve the U.S. as the diplomats in the ministry as well as the

¹¹⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 154.

¹¹⁶ Joseph, *United States Policy towards Cyprus*, 234.

¹¹⁷ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 41.

military were opting for the intervention. Süha Bölükbaşı suggests that the reason İnönü's delay of action and taking American advice may be because he did not want to intervene at all. The other reason was to prevent possible Soviet aid to Cyprus.¹¹⁸ On June 4, Erkin told Ambassador Hare that a possible intervention decision might have come from the Cabinet meeting. American Ambassador to Greece Labouisse made it clear that Papandreou was only supporting *enosis* and in case of an intervention, Greece would also act against Turkey. Bells for war were ringing.

On Tuesday, June 2, while Acting Secretary Ball was hosting a reception with his wife Ruth for Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel, he received an emergency note from Ambassador Hare that Turkey decided to take military action. On June 4, he received a letter drafted by the Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland and his deputy, Joseph Sisco which was the "diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb."¹¹⁹

The United Nations could not stop the aggressive position of Makarios against the Turkish Cypriots, thus the Turkish invasion became imminent. Early that day, Ambassador Hare wanted an extension from the Turkish government to let the United States know about the invasion and upon this extension came the letter of Johnson. On June 5, President Johnson sent the famous letter to İnönü which was going to mark the date for the relations between the two nations deteriorated. In the letter, he first said that although Turkey was acting according to its right to intervene in the Treaty of Guarantees, they should have exhausted all of the diplomatic ways such as talking to other guarantors. Then, he said that Turkey could not use the military equipment given by the U.S. with the agreement of 1947 which required the consent of the United States.

¹¹⁸ Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 74-76.

¹¹⁹ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 350.

And such an act would result in the slaughter of Turkish Cypriots. Although İnönü asked Ambassador Hare for secrecy about the intervention, Johnson said unless Turkey decided not to intervene, they had to take the situation to the NATO Council and the United Nations Security Council.¹²⁰ The letter was published in the *Hürriyet Newspaper* January 13, 1965 and it faced a great backlash as Johnson did not want Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus. There were critics on Turkish government about being under the influence of the U.S. and the president of the time Süleyman Demirel strongly rejected those claims as he also defended that their right to intervene did not disappear now just because the newspaper revealed and published the letter. Some newspapers also wrote that because Turkey followed the orders from the U.S., they lost their chance in Cyprus. There were also other views among the press that the most crucial threat in Cyprus was communism. The main problem was not the United States but İnönü and they were under the impression that Johnson was acting according to the equilibrium as the big power of the world.¹²¹

¹²⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 54.

¹²¹ Şahin, "Türk Basını'nın 1964 Kıbrıs Olaylarına Bakışı." 1486, 1987.

CHAPTER 4

SUBTLETIES OF ARBITRATION

The diplomats had to carry the burden of repairing the relations which had excruciating blows with the crisis of 1964 by the letter. However, the connection between Turkey and the United States were severely damaged, thus making it harder for them to fix it. This was the perspective of the Turkish side. Because they had followed a west-oriented policy and even isolated the Third World countries for the sake of this policy, Turkey was expecting a mutual connection and devotion to its alignment. The 1964 crisis was not going to be the last and Turkish people realized that it was not always a good policy toward the United States. Nonetheless, the United States would use its diplomacy power that started with George Ball and Acheson Plans right after the disaster of 1964 and with the special envoy Cyrus Vance in the crisis of 1967. This time it was hardly a catastrophe but also a success, especially for the Americans.

4.1. Acheson Plans and Geneva Talks

George Ball paid two failed visits to each capital; Ankara and Athens, and he returned to the U.S. with a memorandum stating that President Johnson should invite both of the prime ministers to Washington. Ball introduced Dean Acheson as the American mediator and although İnönü agreed to meet him in Geneva, Papandreou was not so willing to do so; then he finally agreed that Acheson would be in the next building only for consultations. Before Acheson moved to Geneva, he and Ball went over almost every possible way to have a settlement and Acheson finally came up with the Acheson Plan in Geneva and according to that: Cyprus could choose enosis in exchange for territory on the Karpas peninsula that would be given to Turkey and Turkey could have a large military stationing there to keep its shores safe, in some areas where the Turkish Cypriots community is the majority, they would have their own administration, the Turkish Cypriots living in the Greek parts were to be protected under the minority rights of Treaty of Lausanne, an international commissioner would be appointed to monitor the minority rights being applied rightfully and finally, Turkey was going to have the Greek island of Kastellorizon(Meis).

On June 11, President Johnson saw Greek Ambassador Matsas in Washington D.C. telling him that the U.S. did what it could to stop the imminent threat of war by pressing Turkey but the ultimate solution would be achieved only if two parties came together on an agreement. Matsas said,

The whole trouble lay in the continuing Turkish threat to invade Cyprus. The President interjected: "Or in your support of what Makarios is doing—or in arms imports." The Ambassador replied that otherwise Makarios would have felt isolated. There were two dangers: The Greek-Turkish tensions and the risk of Makarios drifting to "the other side." Both are the consequence of the Turkish threats. If only the US could secure Turkish agreement not to invade, then tensions would be reduced and

there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus, etc. etc. The President emphasized that we could not get the threat called off until the Greeks had agreed to talk.¹²²

Matsas saw President Johnson to ask them to be the mediator for the conflict, yet Johnson made it clear that Turkey and Greece should have been the ones to come together and discuss on 11 June, 1964. When Prime Minister İnönü went to the USA, former US Secretary of State Acheson made it clear the USA did not want the island to be controlled by an enemy country. Yet Turkey also made it clear its national security came first and that *enosis* was not even an option in that case. The American attitude towards Turkish national security made it seem like it was open to bargain.¹²³ The same day, George Ball saw İnönü and he said:

America, I told him, was not partial to the Greek side; indeed, we recognized that the Greek Cypriot majority had largely created the problem by terrorizing the Turkish Cypriots. I made clear that we totally mistrusted Makarios... İnönü was deeply troubled and personally hurt by the scolding he had received from President.¹²⁴

Ball talked to President Johnson later that day about his takings on the change of policies of Greece and Turkey. What he understood from the Papandreou government was that Greece did not want a Greco-Turkish war, neither the extension of the communist threat in Cyprus, Papandreou no longer wanted to deal with Makarios and did not even want to include him in the talks, and both Greece and Turkey wanted the U.S. to work for a settlement urgently. That was why the U.S. was getting more involved in the situation by bringing the two parties together and trying to make them achieve a solution between them by becoming a mediator.¹²⁵

¹²² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 62.

¹²³ Topur, *Yunan'la Sirtaki*, 129,136.

¹²⁴ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 354.

¹²⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 64.

According to American Embassy in Greece, Papandreou government was also under immense pressure, just like Turkey, from the Greek public opinion since Papandreou even criticized Karamanlis government for the “sell-out” of London and Zurich Agreements. So the public was expecting him to be more aggressive about Cyprus. And there was also the possibility that his government would fall down by coup d’état in the case of a Turkish invasion.¹²⁶

Meanwhile, Prime Minister İnönü disagreed with some points in the letter but agreed to postpone the intervention and sent a letter to reply to Johnson's letter on June 13. He began his words by saying how disappointed he was and the way the letter was written was away from common courtesy. He said that when the conflict started at the Christmas of 1963, the U.S. said they were not a party to be involved in the matter. Although Turkey tried to explain itself about how the Turkish Cypriots were threatened and how Greece and Greek Cypriots were rejecting the agreements, İnönü emphasized that the U.S could think of Turkey’s attempt of intervention would result in partition instead of its actions were to prevent any more conflict. He made it obvious that Turkey would do everything by the rights of the Guarantors’ Agreements. He ended his letter by accepting Johnson’s invitation to the United States.¹²⁷

When Turkish President Cevdet Sunay visited the U.S. on April 2-13, 1967 and could get neither the financial assistance nor the support for Cyprus cause marked a new era as it opened the way for closer relations with the Soviets and followed a different policy than the U.S. for the first time in Arab-Israel War started in June 5.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 67.

¹²⁷ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 16, 103-110.

¹²⁸ Fırat, 1960-1971 *Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, 260.

Ball wanted Cyprus to be parted between the two motherlands and he tried to convince Makarios on this as well as the presence of NATO forces on the island. When Grivas, who had become a General, went back to Cyprus again, Americans were so hasty to get in touch with his lieutenant, Iliades. So, it would be easier to control with a probable divisive diplomacy.¹²⁹ However, American policy in June with Johnson's letter proved otherwise as they prevented Turkish invasion and possible partition of the island. In July, about 4,000 Greek troops went to Cyprus and General Grivas was there as well so that he could keep soldiers in order and tried to build up around 35,000 troops in ready. Greek government was thinking that the U.S. was trying to force them into negotiations by threatening them with a Turkish invasion and Turkey was suspecting that Americans were pro-Greek because they prevented their invasion.

In the morning of July 14, American mediator Acheson met with the Greek Representative Nikolareisis in Geneva and told him that both of the parties had to sacrifice a little in order to achieve an agreement. So, he suggested that a Turkish Cypriot assurance under Greek sovereignty which could protect their property, life etc. He thought of a self-ruled area for Turkish Cypriots who would still answer to higher Greek Cypriots authority.¹³⁰

Acheson talked with both Turkish and Greek representatives and Turkish side found his suggestion of land small and Greek side did not even want to give them any part of the land. On this occasion, when Johnson saw Greek Ambassador Matsas and he said:

Fuck your Parliament and your Constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fleas continue itching the elephant, they may just get

¹²⁹ Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, 36.

¹³⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 85.

whacked by elephant's trunk, whacked good... We pay a lot of good American dollars to the Greeks, Mr. Ambassador. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about Democracy, Parliament and Constitutions, he, his Parliament and his Constitution may not last long.¹³¹

A conflict also occurred between Greece and Makarios governments and Makarios no longer wanted *enosis* rather have an independent country. The only thing they agreed on was self-determination and Papandreou wanted *enosis* before the situation went to the General Assembly of the United Nations. When Ambassador Labouisse saw Papandreou on July 31, he reported the talking between them: "When I was pointing out to Papandreou the ways in which Greece was being 'used', including giving military support to Makarios, Papandreou replied that he recognized this, but asked what would happen if Greece withdrew its support? He answered his own question by saying things would be even worse and there would be no control over possible military adventures; moreover, it would surely result in 'others, particularly the UAR' giving more support 'which has been promised.'"¹³²

While Geneva negotiations were taking place under Acheson mediation, news of another attack on Turkish Cypriots came on 6 August 1964. When Erim spoke to İnönü, he explained what would happen if Turkey attacked Greek Cypriots as there was the risk of war and the annihilation of Turkish Cypriots on the island. He advised him to solve the problem with the Americans by resembling the U.S. to a mother with many children: Americans would look after the child who cried. Erim describes İnönü's mood as he did not want to bring Turkey on the edge of war and Turkey did not have the

¹³¹ Comment to the Greek ambassador to Washington, Alexander Matsas, over the Cyprus issue in June 1964. As quoted in *I Should Have Died* (1977) by Philip Deane, 113-114.

¹³² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 97.

required military equipment either.¹³³ After Greek Cypriots attacked on Kokkina (Erenköy), which was a very important place to prevent any counter attacks from Turkey by acquiring 5 km of beach, İnönü was expecting a response from the U.S. but he went on ordering reconnaissance flights on the specific region anyway; however, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force İrfan Tansel was not pleased with the order as he was expecting to bomb the targets and he went to do that, which shows how powerful the military was in Turkey after the coup d'état of 1960. Next day, the government also aligned with the Air Force and that also shows the division between the government and the military as it was clear that between 1961 and 1965, Turkey had a rather complicated administration with coalition governments which was called “military democracy.”¹³⁴ Same day, the U.S. and Britain agreed on a U.S. Security Council Resolution for a ceasefire. Also Khrushchev warned Turkey to be aware of the results of the attack. Soviet threat was not in vain, Khrushchev, a week later assured Makarios’ regime that the Soviet Union would not stay neutral if an invasion started.¹³⁵

Secretary of State Rusk sent an urgent telegram on August 7, upon the Greek and Turkish Cypriots conflict to three of the capitals; Ankara, Nicosia and Athens telling Ambassadors to calm the situations in those places and not to act on something that could escalate a bigger problem. Next day, Secretary of Defense McNamara called President Johnson on an urgent matter saying that Cyprus was becoming more dangerous as in response to Turkish attacking one of the harbors in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots started slaughtering the Turkish Cypriots and the following day President Johnson talked to George Ball on the phone and Ball stated that unless Turkey stopped

¹³³ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 383.

¹³⁴ Fırat, *1960-1971 Arası Türk Dış Politikası*, 85.

¹³⁵ Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 83, 87.

the airstrikes in an hour or two, Makarios would start a general massacre on Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile İnönü was also having trouble keeping his cabinet under control as they wanted an intervention right away. Ball also threatened both of the governments: Turkey with condemnation by the world if attacked Cyprus and Greece as murderers “by all civilized people” if they went ahead for a massacre.¹³⁶ On the same day, Ball urged Ambassador Labouisse to see Papandreou to make Makarios stop asking for help from the Soviets and that no other foreign power could be involved. At 7 p.m. Ambassador Hare saw İnönü and convinced him to stop airstrikes by the next day if Makarios also stopped attacks in Kokkina. Although Hare wanted him to stop attacks by sunrise, İnönü said the time was not enough for exchange of opinions and made him extend it to 9 in the morning at last. William N. Dale who was working as Counselor, Mutual Security Affairs, in Ankara during the time explains how Hare convinced İnönü saying that:

How did he do it? He managed to persuade them that if they did, they would have no support, that it would endanger their tie with NATO, which was very important to Turkey at that time. I guess it still is, but it was extremely important. He told them that it would certainly make it difficult for the United States to continue and on the scale it was and the aid which Turkey needed to develop. Lastly, he said it wouldn't solve the problem at all, because it would tend to isolate Turkey, and they would find they couldn't hold onto whatever they had won, because they would be so isolated from the West. Turkey has a strong desire to be associated with the West, because they need to balance it against the Soviet Union, which for centuries they've looked on as the major threat.¹³⁷

Although a ceasefire was established, it did not extinguish the fire among the capitals and 35 Greek Cypriots died as a result from the airstrikes. On August 15, mediator Acheson saw Greek representatives in Geneva to tell them Turks would not accept a lease base, it should be sovereign and they also wanted the whole Karpas

¹³⁶ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 111.

¹³⁷ Dale, William N. Dr. Henry E. Mattox. ADST, September 19, 1988.

Peninsula but Greeks clarified that it was not possible in any way. So there were two options before Greece: one was that they could keep the negotiations on the table, two they would abandon the talks in Geneva and Makarios would go to the U.N. General Assembly to obtain full independence but according to Acheson it would not be worse than Greco-Turkish War.¹³⁸ Next day, President Johnson sent a message to the Papandreou stating that an agreement could be achieved and until that, diplomacy should never be abandoned so he encouraged Papandreou to keep the negotiations in Geneva on the basis of mediator Acheson and to use his influence in Cyprus to remove the blockade so that Turkish Cypriots could have access to food and basic needs. He also said the Karpas Peninsula was strategically important to Turkey as it was closer to İskenderun to prevent foreign attacks.¹³⁹

On August 18, Ambassador Belcher met with Makarios to discuss the food and supplies for Turkish Cypriots upon the letter of Johnson. Makarios compared kerosene for Turkish Cypriots needing to bake bread with land registry records, saying why they would give them that while Greek Cypriots could not reach the post office because it was in Turkish zone. Belcher said it was not the same thing to compare and he should be allowing them to get to food, otherwise the world would see him as someone who starved children and women. Makarios finally agreed.¹⁴⁰

Ambassador Labouisse' takings on Papandreou were the summary of the situation in Greece:

Papandreou's reaction to the events of the last ten days has shown, not surprisingly, considerable emotion and some inconsistency. For example, while he was allegedly threatening Kyprianou with a parting of the ways in the event of a Soviet alliance, and

¹³⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 124.

¹³⁹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 126.

¹⁴⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 130.

was also in effect asking US and the Turks to accept his pledge of good faith in giving the Turks a fair deal in the event of enosis, he was at same time withdrawing the Greek elements from Sixth ATAF and LANDSOUTHEAST and presiding over a meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defense which decided to disengage, as necessary, military, naval and air units of the Greek forces now assigned to NATO.¹⁴¹

After Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou went to Moscow, the United States was appalled and they tried to rush a solution for Cyprus immediately, Rusk tried to convince them to give Turkey 5% of the land and reach an agreement, he also said that President Johnson would be disappointed if Greece allowed communism take over the island rather than just sacrificing 5%. The U.S. apparently felt so threatened that they even asked the Greek King to act on if the government was not able to handle it. Rusk even commented that the Government of Greece could just take the matters in its own hands and enacted *enosis* without Makarios.¹⁴²

Although Acheson told Ball that the political talks were not working and asked to return home, Ball said: "I urged Acheson to stay on. To 'liquidate' the Geneva operations would please Makarios and make him even more intransigent. If His Beatitude ever decided that the United States had grown indifferent, he would recklessly attack Turkish Cypriotes, and the Turks would be forced to intervene."¹⁴³ He also told him that those talks were not in vain and he convinced Papandreu to talk with Turkish. On August 20, Dean Acheson presented his second plan and it included the points such as: Cyprus could either prefer independence or union with Greece, a military base which was leased to Turkey for fifty years on the Karpas peninsula, a guarantee for the rights of Turkish Cypriots and finally a commissioner appointment. Although Turkey was

¹⁴¹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 131.

¹⁴² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 137.

¹⁴³ Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, 358.

looking optimistic at the first Acheson Plan, they rejected the second one immediately as it did not even propose a territorial succession. From the takings of Ball, it was clear that the diplomatic actions of the Americans kept Makarios under control rather than killing off the Turkish Cypriots. However, the way Rusk acted on the actions of Cypriot government's visit to Moscow shows that Americans could just try anything to keep the island from falling into communism even if that meant to waste the causes of both Turkish and Greek. What was important and decisive were the interests of the U.S., not the allies' national concerns.

On August 22, the Geneva talks were concluded without an agreement since Turkey wanted a land with full sovereignty as İnönü said he could not persuade the public with anything less, and Greece never wanted to give that. The United States, on the other hand, had the illusion that just because they were NATO allies, they had to find a solution but those two countries were being forced by their internal affairs and their own interests came before the Soviet threat. Prime Minister Papandreou also stated that he did not have the authority to impose such an agreement on Greek Cypriots as he did not have the ability like İnönü had on Turkish Cypriots no matter how much he wanted to implement the Acheson plan.¹⁴⁴ Erim states in his memoirs on August 26, that Acheson suggested Turks to invade Cyprus secretly and the Sixth Fleet would not stand in their way, on the contrary it would protect them but because Acheson did not want Erim and General Sunalp to write his words down, when they conveyed the message to İnönü, he said he could not act on only by words which Acheson did not even want them written down.¹⁴⁵ The same situation took its place in Denktash's diary

¹⁴⁴ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 143.

¹⁴⁵ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 406.

dated August 26, 1964, Acheson told Nihat Erim and General Sunalp, if they invaded the island Karpas where it was supposed to be given Turkey in return for *enosis*, 6th fleet of the U.S. would not stand in their way. It was discussed among the American officials that if Turkey attacked the island, Athens and Nicosia agreed to declare *enosis* though.¹⁴⁶

Tuncer Topur, who was another Turkish diplomat, interprets how the United States lost its way since it could go behind its ally, Turkey, with Greece and come back with results that were offensive to Turkish side. Knowing that Turkey was ready to settle with 22% of the island, they only suggested 3%. The Acheson mission failed. Greece had no choice but to endorse full independence for Cyprus in the U.N. That meant the island could go under communist influence as well as join with Greece. The U.S. did not want the island to be under the Soviet influence and that was why Americans had the same interests with Greece and insisted on *enosis*, minority position for Turkish Cypriots and a NATO base for Turkey for 50 years.¹⁴⁷

In order to have more influence on Cyprus, Prime Minister Papandreou decided to send more troops; mostly technicians not to take much attention but enough to have effect on Greek Cypriot community. Makarios almost fully dismissed Papandreou and did not want *enosis*. On the other hand, top secret information came from Costopoulos that Kyprianou and Georkadjis agreed to push for *enosis* if the situation became available.¹⁴⁸

Compared to 1974 efforts of Greek Americans, they were not as devoted as they were in 1964, they and the congress did not think Johnson's policy toward Cyprus

¹⁴⁶ Topur, *Yunan'la Sirtaki*, 168-169.

¹⁴⁷ Topur, *Yunan'la Sirtaki*, 163-165.

¹⁴⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 148.

was unlawful.¹⁴⁹ However, after the attacks of Turks in August 1964, the Greek Americans took a stronger position: they protested and sent thousands of cables and letters and even suggested cutting the aid and assistance to Turks. According to Bölükbaşı, Congressmen still perceived the events on the other side of Atlantic as Cold War diplomacy even though there was a pro-Greek lobby heavily.¹⁵⁰ John Baker, who was a Political Officer on Cyprus Affairs in the United Nations in New York, says that the Greek lobby was not really pressuring the U.N. as they normally did to the White House. According to him, after the crisis of 1963, Greece was only supporting Makarios partially and the fact that the pro-*enosis* group would generate a problem between Turkey and Greece was disturbing for the Greek government.¹⁵¹

Because of the blockade in Erenköy by Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots were unable to reach food and other basic materials and people were left there to starve to death. Although Turkey attempted to send help to people in need, Makarios rejected all of it, giving the reason that Cypriot government was providing their needs and the fact that they were in that condition was the fault of their own. On September 10, 1964, Turkey informed the government of Greece, Secretary General of the U.N. and the government of the United Kingdom saying that the help would be sent and it could be done under the control of the United Nations. In order to see the situation, a contingent including Turkish Charge D'Affaires, the U.N. Peacekeeping Force Commander General Thimayya and other representatives from the Red Cross went there on September 12, and immediately issued the help to be sent. Ironically, Makarios accepted

¹⁴⁹ Bölükbaşı, *The Superpowers and the Third World*, 90.

¹⁵⁰ Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 92.

¹⁵¹ John A. Baker, Jr. interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in September 1992.

that the help could be sent and offered that if Turkey did not have the means to do it, the government of Cyprus would do it.¹⁵²

From December 1963, over a year, 56,000 out of 120,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced, became unemployed, or became refugees who could only live on the help from the Red Crescent because of the harm Greek Cypriots made.¹⁵³ Minister Erkin explains the Turkish policy in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on January 25, 1965 that Turkey had a simple policy toward Cyprus which included the expectation of respect to the London Zurich Agreements and not accepting the annexation of the island to Greece as well as the wellbeing of Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵⁴

On February 13, 1965, the government of İnönü fell and he resigned from the position of Prime Minister. Three days later, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü established the new government and Hasan Esat Işık became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Işık made his first press conference on March 9, 1965, and upon a question from a journalist about the U.S. and how they prevented the intervention, thus the Turkish people's anti-American feelings, he answered that Turkey would rather have a different policy before, referring to the disappointment of Johnson's letter but he also emphasized that he did not dwell on whether the U.S. prevented Turkey or allowed Greek troops to go to the island. Lastly, he said the relations were close but there might be some overreactions to the disappointments.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol II, 13-14.

¹⁵³ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 3, 6-9.

¹⁵⁴ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 4, 69.

¹⁵⁵ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 5, 55-56.

Işık answered Secretary General U-Thant's letter dated April 1, by saying that he was clearly biased and overstepped his mission.¹⁵⁶ In spring 1965, the relations between Greece and Turkey became so tense; especially Papandreou was so harsh on his statements against Turkey. Because of Cyprus and Greece's nonnegotiable attitude resulted with the pressure on Greek people living in Istanbul. The negotiations between Greek ambassador to Turkey with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Ambassador to Greece with Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed the terms that could be achieved starting from Turkish Ambassador Tuluy's visit to Prime Minister Papandreou on 31 May, 1965. Following days the visits were made and in return for *enosis*, Turkey asked for 18% land of the island and Greeks rejected it immediately. Before that, Averoff told Tuluy that in return for *enosis*, one of the military bases of Britain could have been handed to Turkey and a special status for the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁵⁷

Ambassador Hare reported from Ankara on September 8 that İnönü was being criticized especially in his own party and Turkey was leaning toward neutrality policy caused by xenophobia for the U.S. and even getting out of NATO was on the table.

When Kyprianou visited the Soviet Union in September 1964, he talked with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov who stated that they would prefer Cyprus as an independent state; however, if the wish of Cypriot people was to join with Greece then they would also respect that. When American Secretary asked him again about his visit to Soviets on December 4, at the U.N. session, he said Soviets did not

¹⁵⁶ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 7, 39.

¹⁵⁷ Tülümen, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, 81.

change their policy on the independence of Cyprus but they were leaning toward the rejection of *enosis* along with Turkish opinion.¹⁵⁸

Turkish Deputy Secretary General Nihat Erim reproached Under Secretary Ball on December 29 and told him that the U.S. stopped the invasion of Turkey while they did not even condemn Greece for sending 10,000 troops to the island. Although the new Foreign Minister said they did not focus on things like this, it was just another disappointment for Turkish in Americans.

Ambassador Belcher talked to Makarios on the phone on January 23, 1965, and Makarios told him that he would not give any reasons to Turkey for invasion and he was not planning *enosis* either. On the matter of Turkish Cypriots, he stated that they were free to live under the Cypriot authority but they were rather choosing to stay in their ghettos. He also interpreted the Soviet change in their policies against them because the Soviets had more interests in Turkey than Cyprus.¹⁵⁹ Turkey was also trying to get better relations with the Soviet Union to get Americans to do what they want on the matter of Cyprus and this shift of diplomacy also suited the Soviet motives as it meant for weakening NATO.¹⁶⁰ Turkey was making a maneuver which would be for its benefit later as well and they were not really wrong thinking this way, considering how Rusk was so disturbed by the same move of Cypriots.

When Kyprianou visited Washington on February 4, he asked what the United States thought about the Cyprus situation and George Ball responded that the U.S. had always been a supporter of negotiations and the parties should decide between them with discussions and the U.S. already tried being a negotiator with Dean Acheson but it

¹⁵⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 168.

¹⁵⁹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 171.

¹⁶⁰ Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History*, 45

did not work. However, Kyprianou constantly asked for a solution that the U.S. could think of and Ball again responded that the U.S. did not have any solution and could not suggest one. Again, Kyprianou pushed for a solution that the U.S. should have and support the majority and according to him, any nation could have the option to stay behind but not the U.S. as it was against its ideals.¹⁶¹ He obviously was asking for the U.S. support on the matter rather than their objective approach of being a mediator.

Ambassador Labouisse called Papandreou on March 16 about Cyprus and learned two important things: Makarios was pressuring Turkish Cypriots more and more, and the Soviet heavy equipment was brought into the island by Greeks trained in the United Arab Republic. Furthermore, Greece as a NATO ally had its citizens trained with Soviet weapons behind the Americans' back. Thus, Labouisse expressed how shocked he was. Papandreou defended that saying it was better in Greek's hands rather than Soviets' referring to their weapons.¹⁶²

Turkish Prime Minister Ürgüplü set some terms to Ambassador Hare on March 19 in order to prevent provocation on the island and two days later Labouisse delivered these to Papandreou and he guaranteed that there would be no obstacles for the rotation of Turkish troops on the island, no restrictions on Red Crescent shipments, no economic blockade and more cooperation with UNFICYP.¹⁶³

On March 26, 1965, the U.N. mediator Galo Plaza suggested a report that the Greek Cypriots would renounce *enosis* and there would be no partition either, there would not be military on the island and Turkish Cypriots' rights as minority would be protected under the U.N. watch. Ball sent a telegram to Rusk on April 6, 1965 saying

¹⁶¹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 175.

¹⁶² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 180.

¹⁶³ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 183.

that, “Under these circumstances I think you should take a strong line with Işık. You should emphasize that Turkey is tearing itself apart over a situation that involves only 100,000 Turks and that the world is getting tired of the stubborn inability of a handful of people to live together. We have made a great effort to assist Turkey to find an honorable solution. But Turkey’s position does not improve with time.” He also listed some points in the U.N. mediator Plaza’s report such as debarring *enosis*, demilitarization, human rights, autonomy for Turkish Cypriots in some areas for Rusk to tell to the government of Turkey.¹⁶⁴ At the meeting in Washington between the contingents of Cyprus and the U.S. on June 10, Kyprianou said if there was no discussion about *enosis*, then there was no need for talks between Turkey and Greece as Cyprus was an independent state. He also clarified that the government of Cyprus and the U.S. should work together on consultations.¹⁶⁵

Political situation in Greece got complicated and Papandreou was no longer serving as a Prime Minister. On September 24, 1965, Turkish contingent met with Americans and they also talked about how weak the Greek government was and could not negotiate. Ball reiterated that any revision to the constitution would be unacceptable and they had always said so.¹⁶⁶

Erim shares his conversation with Ambassador Hare after a dinner on November 7, stating their wrong doings in the Cyprus matter. Hare defended saying that they were trying to mediate between two friends; Greece and Turkey. Erim answered

¹⁶⁴ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 186.

¹⁶⁵ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 193.

¹⁶⁶ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 207.

that it was wrong because they treated the right friend with the wrong attitude.¹⁶⁷ His sentences represent the reasons for the catastrophe of the relations in the eyes of Turks.

On the contrary to Greek government, Turkey was strong at the time with newly elected Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who had established a stronger civilian government since 1950. Turkey could not accept anything that could propose a possible *enosis* which gave Turkish Cypriots a minority position and that was why they did not endorse the Galo Plaza report. Although Demirel did not want to deal with Cyprus too much but rather to achieve a successful deal so that he could focus on the domestic problems, he continued the almost same policy toward the island like his predecessors. On December 18, 1965, Resolution 2077 (XX) passed by a vote of 47 (including Greece and Cyprus) in favor, 5 opposed (including the United States and Turkey), and 54 abstentions (including the Soviet Union). The resolution called for respect of the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Thus, it was a huge loss for Turkish foreign policy as Turkey was taking its intervention right from the London-Zurich Agreements. New Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil did not consider the resolution as binding. So, officially the United Nations interfered in bilateral agreements.

Johnson's letter of 1964 was the beginning of the period for Turkey that the U.S. was not an ally to lean on fully by not allowing Turkey to use NATO units to implement its right to invade and it also made people question the liability of NATO in case of a crisis with the Soviet Union. So, this situation finally led to the concern of military dependency on foreign sources and it was no longer even a question anymore.

¹⁶⁷ Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, 441.

After the crash of American reconnaissance plane in the Black Sea in December 1965, Turkish policies toward America were primarily restricted.

The reasons why Turkey could not intervene in Cyprus were both the political dependency on the U.S. and also Turkey needed to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin's visit to Moscow on October 30, 1964 marked a change of policies of the Soviet Union. They basically accepted the legal rights of Turkish Cypriots and made it clear that they did not support *enosis* nor the Greek Cypriot power over the Turkish Cypriots and two communities should have balance between them. And that signifies the beginning of the multi-faceted Turkish foreign policy and it continued with the Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel in November 1964. He stressed on diplomatic and economic power along with good neighbor policy. This policy gave fruits to the Soviet economic assistance to Turkey. It is also important to note that the same year on August 19, there was the threat of Soviets getting included in the issue and Erkin made it clear that if such thing happened, they would prevent Soviet ships to pass through Bosphorus Straits.¹⁶⁸ Although Turkey did not allow the U.S. bases in Turkey to be used to resupply to Israelis during 1967 the Arab-Israeli War especially with the impact of its multifaceted policy, some of the Arab states such as Syria and Egypt were still supporters of Makarios. However, because Turkey was not consistent with its policies toward Third World nations, the U.N. Resolution 2077, 18 December 1965, did not come out to the favor of Turkey as they recognized Cyprus and third party nations could not intervene.

Turkish public opinion was blaming Americans for the failure of intervention in Cyprus as well as the lack of preparedness of Turkish Armed Forces. There was even

¹⁶⁸ Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974*, 272.

a press report suggesting that the U.S. intentionally helped Greece by delivering 44 landing craft and did not do the same with Turkey.¹⁶⁹ The Demirel Government started to reorganize the U.S. bases and the personnel in Turkey. Joint Defense and Cooperation Treaty between the U.S. and Turkey was signed on July 3, 1969 which was giving the Turkish government the full control of the installations and activities over American bases in Turkey.

Upon the question of why Turkey was not sending troops to Cyprus while there were 10.000 Greek troops on the island, Demirel replied it by saying that it would mean war and that was why they were not rushing into it. He also added that the situation could not make a way to *enosis* at the press meeting on January 4, 1966.¹⁷⁰ After the release of the letter of Johnson's in a newspaper, Demirel said that they did not find it appropriate for that to be released and responded to the allegations that the İnönü government was under the influence of the United States was truly wrong on January 14, 1966. The next day, the response of the İnönü's government to the U.S. was released to the press by the current administration.¹⁷¹

On January 27, 1966, Vice President of Cyprus Dr. Küçük gave another speech on how Turkish Cypriots were willing to negotiate with Greek Cypriots, this was the second suggestion he made as the first one was declined by Greek Cypriots. Makarios made it clear on January 28, 1966 that he was not against the talks between Greece and Turkey under the condition of *enosis* and that Turkey could not get any territory in return.¹⁷² He knew Turkish people would not settle on agreement without any

¹⁶⁹ Çetiner, Yılmaz. *Cumhuriyet*, 30 April 1965.

¹⁷⁰ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 16, 87.

¹⁷¹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 16, 59.

¹⁷² *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 16, 73-75.

guarantees of Turkish Cypriots living there and because that an agreement already failed, the only solution was a territorial concession for them.

On January 28, Çağlayangil saw Ambassador Parker T. Hart and upon his question about past relations between the two communities in the island, Çağlayangil answered: “They had never lived together without irritation and conflict, but problems always of local nature until possibility of *enosis* and independence gave rise to increased conflict.”¹⁷³

On March 8, 1966, the letters between the former Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and Makarios dated August 29, 1964 were released and in Papandreou’s letter, he said how he wanted Makarios to keep calm and the main focus was *enosis*. However, he was acting rather reckless and giving Turkey reason to intervene. Makarios replied that he was also making *enosis* the primary concern and there was no such plan as a sovereign state but it was just to find a solid ground at the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁷⁴

American Ambassador to Greece Talbot invited the Prime Minister Stephanopoulos to lunch on May 6 along with Raymond Hare, who was now Assistant Secretary, and when the talks came to Cyprus, Stephanopoulos said he was willing to keep negotiations with Turkey and these talks could stay as a secret too; however, if Makarios learned, that would cause a problem. He suggested that the most peaceful solution would be *enosis* and it would secure the Turkish Cypriots from the reckless

¹⁷³ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 221.

¹⁷⁴ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 18, 78-81.

acts of Makarios and if Turkey could not agree on *enosis* then one of the British bases could be changed into NATO bases in which Turkey could also participate.¹⁷⁵

The governments of Greece and Turkey were eager to have discussions and ready to search for a settlement but they were afraid of getting interrupted by either the press or military. When the Stephanopoulos government fell toward the end of 1966, former Foreign Minister Toumbas called Çağlayangil to assure him that they still wanted to settle but this settlement would be on *enosis* in return for a base. However, Makarios was objecting to such an idea as he only would consider a NATO base including Turks.¹⁷⁶

Çağlayangil invited new Ambassador Parker Hart to tell him Greek-Turkish relations would not improve without solving Cyprus crisis and that Cyprus could not be discussed outside of Turkish-American relationship on 21 February, 1966. Tuncer Topur explains how Hart mentioned in his memoirs that he was not aware of the secret conversations between Toumbas and Çağlayangil. However, he also says he was aware of all the telegraphs as an ambassador and he sent a copy of Paris protocol to contribute if necessary to American Embassy in Ankara in 1966.¹⁷⁷ That questions the integrity of the memoirs of Hart.

On June 11, 1966, Çağlayangil gave a speech to the Greek newspaper *Eleftheria* saying that Cypriot government was established through the talks between Greece and Turkey, which was the way to solve problems again, through talks.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 231.

¹⁷⁶ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 243.

¹⁷⁷ Topur, *Yunan'la Sirtaki*, 203.

¹⁷⁸ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 21, 57.

The U.S. activities and intervention around the world like Dominican Republic and Indonesia affected Turkish people and their perceptions toward them. They were even thinking, according to the newspaper *Ulus* dated June 21, 1965, what the U.S. was doing in Vietnam to support a friendly regime could happen in Turkey, against them as well. So, the doubts against the CIA's interactions with other countries and how they affected the elections was also voiced by RPP Secretary General Bülent Ecevit as "an invisible Ministry of Foreign Affairs" for CIA in June 1966.¹⁷⁹

On November 26, 1966, the government of Turkey released a book where yearly achievements recorded and there, the situation that Cyprus was in before the Justice Party came into power and it was explained as:

Cyprus was under an illegal order, there were ten thousand Greek troops, Turkish Cypriots were cut their communications with Turkey and they were living in enclaves. And the Justice Party was determined not to give in under threats, support Turkish Cypriots financially as well as morally. What they were able to do after they came into power was listed as: Greek Cypriot actions against Turkish to limit their movements were prevented after November 1965. The rotating of the Turkish troops took place without sacrifices. The immigrants were placed into the houses from tents.¹⁸⁰

Although the talks between Greece and Turkey started in June 1966, because the Stephanopoulos government fell, they had to stop in December. The arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Cyprus became a problem; the newly established Greek government assured Turkey that they were kept under control. However, Turkey wanted them to be given to the U.N. peacekeeping force.¹⁸¹ It was going to show how Turkey was right on worrying about the arms when it came to the crisis of 1967 when those arms were used against the Turkish Cypriots.

¹⁷⁹ *Ulus*, June 21, 1966.

¹⁸⁰ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 26, 66-68.

¹⁸¹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 27, 109.

British policy toward Cyprus was also stable and that was to keep their bases. Because of that, it tried to benefit from this conflict of interest. Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus could not be changed and that was: Cyprus could not get under any of the country's control. Agreements could not have been changed by one party referring to London-Zurich Agreements mostly. One of the communities of the island could not get under one of the nation's sovereignty and the Lausanne Agreement could not be broken. Prime Minister Demirel confirmed the previous policy of previous government officials with his meeting with Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis.¹⁸² According to William Hale, the relations between Turkey and the U.S. severed starting from 1964 until 1980.¹⁸³

4.2. American Intervention

On January 25, 1967, Ambassador Melih Esenbel to Washington saw Secretary Rusk on the issue of Czech arms in the hands of Makarios. He stated that Turkey wanted these weapons to be contained by the U.N. and made it clear that the Demirel government would have to airdrop weapons to Turkish Cypriots in case Makarios distributed them.¹⁸⁴

Ambassador Ercüment Yavuzalp describes the time -in which he was sent as the Turkish Chief of Mission to Cyprus but not as an ambassador as Turkey did not want to recognize the brutal actions of Cyprus - because of the most severe times for Turkish Cypriots. - He left his position in Paris for Cyprus in February 1967 and stayed there for four years. There was not really an official communication between Turkey and Greek Cypriots and it was provided through the peacekeeping force. He says he felt

¹⁸² Tülümen, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, 118.

¹⁸³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 104

¹⁸⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 249.

responsible to write what actually happened there. Thus, he wrote his memoirs in a book named *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik (Being an Ambassador in the Cyprus Fire)*.

Yavuzalp describes American Ambassador to Cyprus Toby Belcher's position as almost a Greek Cypriot friend; he says he was not able to be fair between Turkish and Greek Cypriots' side.¹⁸⁵ He also tells about the living conditions in the island. Greek Cypriots police were controlling everything that was brought into the places where Turkish Cypriots were living and their so-called patrolling was so harsh that when they allowed a Turkish farmer pass through the enclaves, they first broke his eggs then let him go. The communication with the world was cut for Turkish Cypriots in enclaves, and every day they endured raids from Greek Cypriots. For Turkey, one of the most pessimistic things was that the U.N. recognized Greek Cypriots as the Cyprus government and Greek Cypriots did not need a peacekeeping force to maintain their daily life but Turkish Cypriots did.¹⁸⁶

On March 13, 1967, the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zeki Kuneralp told the press that Turkish Cypriots would not live under any other nation or government; they would live freely upon a question about what Turkish government victory would be, after he came back from Cyprus.¹⁸⁷

On April 21, 1967, the Greek junta overthrew the government and the military regime lasted until 1974. The new government of Greece was pressuring Makarios on an agreement with Turkey. On July 12, the Department of State sent an air gram to the NATO capitals stating the Greek opinion which included a sovereign base to Turkey,

¹⁸⁵ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*,. 24.

¹⁸⁶ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, 34-37.

¹⁸⁷ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 30, 55.

guarantees of Turkish Cypriots via secret agreements in return for *enosis*.¹⁸⁸ The new government's agenda was broadcasted the next day through radio and according to them; *enosis* was the goal to be achieved while considering the minority rights for Turkish Cypriots.¹⁸⁹

The Justice Party was not willing to let Americans use the bases in Turkey during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War to get the support of Arab countries about Cyprus in the United Nations. Many of the students protested in June 1967 in İstanbul against the Six Fleet before Arab-Israeli War as they thought President Johnson kept it there to intimidate Turkey about the invasion in 1964.¹⁹⁰ İnönü used to blame the U.S. in order to get away from the criticism of him in the country and feeding anti-Americanism. On the other hand, Demirel followed an opposite policy and did not blame the USA. Demirel only used the arrangements of an intervention to make the U.S. interfere so that he was able to choose peace rather than intervention and have a rough career.¹⁹¹ So, Demirel was successful in a way to manipulate the public by avoiding military conflict and also agreeing on a resolution.

It was on September 9-10, 1967, an important meeting took place: Demirel and his Greek counterpart Kollias met in Keşan and Alexandroupolis (Dedeğaç); however, the talks resulted in no progress. The parties were rather hopeful in the beginning but Greeks conditioned *enosis* and the whole discussion turned into *taksim* for the Turks. Naturally, they could not agree on anything reasonable for either side.

¹⁸⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 295.

¹⁸⁹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 31, 35-36.

¹⁹⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 169.

¹⁹¹ Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 154.

On September 28, 1967, Archbishop Makarios clearly stated that the talks between Turkey and Greece were of no use.¹⁹² Two days later, Rauf Denktaş and his two friends were captured by Greek Cypriots while they were trying to get to the Turkish side of the island. He was in exile after his speech in the U.N. and Yavuzalp describes how he did not like the way Ambassador Belcher's stance on the issue: Belcher accepted the fact that Denktaş was right for his desire to return the island but the way he did was impractical. Yavuzalp mentions Klerides's memoirs and says how he spoke to Grivas and Makarios on how important Denktaş was and killing him would bring nothing but shame on Cyprus. He also demanded his moving to police station from military barracks and if they had not made it happen, he threatened them to confess that his arrest was against the European Convention on Human Rights and the Constitution.¹⁹³

In the afternoon on November 15, Greek National Guards passed the points of the United Nations and Turkish Cypriots started fighting with them in Agios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) and Kophinou (Geçitkale). The very next day, Turkey demanded a ceasefire from Greek Cypriots and threatened military intervention, it was followed by a warning for Greece to remove its troops from the island as well as Grivas and compensation for the victims.¹⁹⁴

Although the government of Greece asked Grivas and other Greek officers in Cyprus to refrain from their actions, which could further cause a conflict, they stated that they were not taking orders from Athens but only from Nicosia. On November 17, President Johnson sent a telegram to Makarios for peace and to Turkish President Sunay

¹⁹² *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 37, 27.

¹⁹³ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik.*, 51-58.

¹⁹⁴ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 38, 84.

and King Constantine of Greece as well. The next day, when Ambassador Hart gave the same letter to Çağlayangil, he received an immediate response saying that the Turkish Cypriots were being tortured, killed and similar accounts occurred in front of the U.N. forces and although Turkey sent help to the displaced people running from massacre through the Red Crescent, they did not even want the help as they were very angry at Turkey for not acting on for the sake of their well-beings. Çağlayangil made it very clear that they would not leave 120,000 Turkish Cypriots alone this time and he also expressed his disappointment by saying: “Since 10:00 PM today Erenköy (Kokkina) has been surrounded by Greek forces and subjected to heavy firing. I had expected that given this situation (the entire present situation) our American friends would come and tell us that they regret that they have prevented in the past a Turkish initiative and that they would say: ‘now the decision is yours.’”¹⁹⁵

When Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish villages, Geçitkale and Boğaziçi, one of the biggest crises after 1963 Christmas killings, almost brought Greece and Turkey to war in November 1967. Ambassador Yavuzalp went to see Greek Ambassador Alexandrakis to talk to him about the situation and how Grivas did not have the right to bring two countries on the edge of a war. He specifically said that he went there on his own, without any commands from the top. Alexandrakis said he understood the dangers and he was going to visit Makarios immediately. Yavuzalp also said even though they had their differences, there was no lack of respect between the two ambassadors. When the fire ceased, there were 22 dead on the Turkish Cypriots side and all of the men from the villages were taken into custody and interrogated. The problems were not only the attacks of Greek Cypriots but also that the Turkish Cypriots

¹⁹⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 311.

were hurt because Turkey did not even fly in its military jets to the island and did nothing, this made Turkish Cypriots more and more hostile and impatient toward Turkey, thus Yavuzalp sent a telegraph to Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that these people ran out of patience and Turkey must have showed its dedication. Çağlayangil sent an answer stating that Turkey was not going to give up on these people and was willing to do whatever it takes.¹⁹⁶

Rauf Denктаş described the situation as follows:

The operation was ferocious in its intensity and effect. Within a few hours, 28 Turks were murdered and scores were wounded. Turkish homes were ransacked and deliberately set on fire. Some of the wounded had kerosene poured over them and were then set on fire... The Kophinou attack was planned to demonstrate the fiery spirit of the enosis struggle and to prove to Turkish Cypriots that Turkey could do nothing about it.¹⁹⁷

Yavuzalp sent another telegraph to Turkey saying that the situation became steady and there was nothing serious between the two sides and he confirmed this information by asking the peacekeeping force on the island. Turkey was ready to launch an attack on the island if he had not told them it was all alright. He explains that with these words: “Of course, all of these gave me great responsibility. If I had not believed that this news was fake and insisted on it, our planes would have bombed our own men because they would think the Greeks invaded the village and this could have been a major disaster. Otherwise, if my opinion was wrong, then it would be my responsibility to prevent an operation that had to be done. The night when these happened was one of the longest nights I've ever had.”¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, 84-88.

¹⁹⁷ Denктаş, *the Cyprus Triangle*, 50-51.

¹⁹⁸ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, 92. “Tabii, bütün bunlar bana büyük bir sorumluluk yüklemişti. Ben eğer, bu haberin yanlış olduğu kanaatine varıp bunda ısrar etmesem, uçaklarımız, köyü Rumlar işgal etti diye kendi adamlarımızı bombalayacak ve bu büyük bir facia olacaktı. Aksi, yani benim

Dr. Küçük gave a speech to *Agence France-Presse* on November 22, 1967, saying that when Grivas was asked to return to Greece, he refused to take all of the responsibility; rather he blamed Greek junta and Archbishop Makarios. According to Küçük, the Greek government wanted to show that they were able to conquer Cyprus. He also stated that unless the Greek troops withdrew from the island, the Archbishop would not negotiate.¹⁹⁹

On November 22, former Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance was called on duty as a special envoy for the case. Between November 23 and December 4, he went to three capitals; Ankara, Athens and Nicosia as a negotiator. After Johnson's letter, it was understood that America would prevent Turkish landing on Cyprus and again it could make the parties to settle. Johnson administration gave Cyrus Vance one mission only and it was to prevent a war and to make it possible Washington was ready to give him all the support. "Few are the young and upwardly mobile politicians on Capitol Hill or the White House staff who are so self-denying as to seek anonymity in such a mission. But such emissary was Cyrus Vance. He achieved his objectives not only because of his exceptional abilities but also because of his humility. He came, he accomplished, and he returned to his privacy."²⁰⁰ Ambassador Hart explains the achievement of Vance and how he managed to handle this extraordinary situation.

Although Johnson was against the intervention again, he did not choose the same way before and this time acted through Ambassador Hart conveying his discomfort on the matter. As a response, Demirel wanted Greek soldiers on the island to

kanaatim yanlış olsa idi, o zaman da yapılması gereken bir operasyonu önlemiş olmanın sorumluluğu bana düşmüş olacaktı. Bunların cereyan ettiği gece, geçirdiğim en uzun gecelerden birisi oldu."

¹⁹⁹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, Vol. 38, 87.

²⁰⁰ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 5

return to their homelands and the exodus of the National Guard.²⁰¹ This brought out two things: one; the United States could have done a similar thing without damaging the relations between the two countries before and two; did Hart's words actually represent a warning of another *Johnson's Letter*? Of course because this was not made public, it did not attract a similar reaction.

Cyrus Vance, in his interview with Paige Mulhollan, says how sudden it was him to leave just the day before Thanksgiving. On November 23, the student demonstration in Kızılay (Ankara) took place against Cyprus policy of Americans and the United States Informative Service Office had to be closed. The plane carrying Vance and his team landed in an airport outside of central Ankara instead of the regular one because of the negative approach of Turkish people against the U.S. which Johnson's letter started. Vance clearly states that he took his orders directly from the President and that he was in touch with the State Department during the negotiations. The important thing was to find a *common ground* for both of the parties, then try to mediate and then they would not try to mediate if there had been no common ground but it was a limited time as Turkey was expected to invade the next day.

On 22 November, 1967, Greece rejected Turkey's diplomatic note on the withdrawal of troops from the island which was sent five days ago. Greece did not want the Turkish mobilization on the Thracian frontier since it was a direct threat to them. Hart interprets the fact that Greece did not mobilize its forces fast, as they did not want a war because that would be a disaster for both sides but especially for Greece. Two days later, Çağlayangil told Hart that the ruling party reached a decision to make a move into Cyprus and an answer from Athens would be able to stop it. As Hart delivered the

²⁰¹ Bölükbaşı, *the Superpowers and the Third World*, 137.

message to Vance, there was a tough response since it was like an ultimatum by Turks. Greeks agreed to withdraw the negotiable number of troops in return for a Turkish stand-down. After several changes on the language, the final draft of a text was proposed to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The draft meant to comply with the London-Zurich Treaties of August 16, 1960 which required Greece and Turkey to withdraw their troops they sent after December 1963 and following the withdrawal of excessive Greek troops, Turkey would act upon the issue intervention crisis. Hart also mentioned that the Greek government regarded treaties were no longer intact. “Up to now he had been acting somewhat as a postman, trying to get the parties to see their best interests and build their own bridges. However, he now believed that the time had arrived for him to put forward on his own responsibility a synthesis that he had personally and privately developed.”²⁰² Hart shows how Vance was able to accomplish his mission by not only acting like a messenger but rather putting his own skills forward. Vance basically proposed a stand-down for Turkey and the return of the Greek soldiers. Turkish authorities clearly stated that the time was limited and Çağlayangil specifically mentioned that time was not up to them but rather on the political situation in Turkey. When Vance left for Athens, he described how the situation was very delicate and although Pipinelis was not reluctant in the beginning, later considering the future of its country, he had an agreement with Vance.

Secretary of State Rusk sent a telegram on November 23, to the ambassadors of the three capitals saying that “We need not apologize to any of your host governments for the harshest pressures we may put on in the interest of maintaining peace. The issues in Cyprus itself are, strictly from the point of view of the US national interest, trivial

²⁰² Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 75-85

compared to peace between Greece and Turkey. Our responsibility is to support that central US national interest.”²⁰³ On the same day, Vance reported that he finished the first round of talks and Turkey was only talking about Turkish Cypriot suffering, Greek illegality and their honor. The only way out was Greece to withdraw its troops. However, Vance stated that he sensed a hope within them, it was clear they were not going to attack while Vance was on his mission.²⁰⁴ After going back and forth between the two capitals –Ankara and Athens- Vance and the Ambassadors Parker T. Hart and Philips Talbot from those cities came up with a four-point settlement which they presented to both countries and eventually Turkey wanted some terms to be changed and Greece as a country just experienced a coup did not want to be alienated by the United States.

On November 28, the government of Greece accepted the draft of Turkey and even agreed to withdraw its excessive troops from the island within 45 days instead of 3 months as they wished in the first place. However, they also said that they could not force Makarios on the National Guard problem. Thus, the following day Rusk sent a telegram to Vance on how to convince Makarios to settle, recommending him to have a calmer manner and positive approach and that Greece needed his support along with the friendship of the United States.²⁰⁵ There were also the U.N. and NATO representatives –José Rolz-Bennett and Manlio Brosio- and Vance says that the whole operation was successful because of the cooperation by the parties. He says the freedom he had from President Johnson was enormous and it enabled such a great autonomy.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 318.

²⁰⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 319.

²⁰⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 331.

²⁰⁶ Paige E. Mulhollan. *Secretary Cyrus R. Vance*, 1969, 31-38.

Although Adams suggests in his paper that “the United States had no more diplomatic cards to play on stopping the Turkey”²⁰⁷ and that was why Vance had to make Greece to withdraw its excessive troops from the island. Since 1947, Turkey has taken \$2,1 billion in aid and more grants for military expenses from the United States, this was also one of the reasons why Vance’s mission was a success according to the *Financial Times* on November 28, 1967.

On the 579th meeting of the National Security Council in Washington on November 29, it was clear that the war between Greece and Turkey was avoided and Vance was in Cyprus to convince Makarios to the agreement. General Wheeler said that Turkey had the military power in their hands but Greeks were more advantageous in naval. CIA Director Helms reported that “We have no reports of Soviet military activity in the area. However, the Russians are fishing in troubled waters by egging on the Turks and telling the Cypriots that Turkey was bluffing.”²⁰⁸

Although Demirel criticized İnönü for not being more forward, he acted rather the same when he came to power himself.²⁰⁹ During Demirel’s presidency, the Cyprus issue was taken as bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece which meant that if not handled carefully, it would lead to a war. Demirel chose a quiet way to deal with Cyprus, he did not mention how to solve the Cyprus crisis but he always preferred territorial federation. After the conflict on November 15, 1967, although the Greek troops on the island were around 30,000, the preparation of a landing was ordered by Demirel.

²⁰⁷ Adams, T. W. “The American Concern in Cyprus.” 102.

²⁰⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 332.

²⁰⁹ Bölükbaşı, .*The Superpowers and the Third World*. 129.

On December 3, Vance saw Makarios and he rejected again to paragraph 4 of disbanding the National Guard saying that he could not agree to anything under Turkish pressure no matter how much even the government of Greece endeavored to convince him to do so. Vance told Makarios that the present situation was the result of their actions on November 14-15 by killing many innocent civilians and a price had to be paid. Kyprianou said they would prefer to go to the Security Council as the aggressor was clearly Turkey.²¹⁰

Because of the Galo Plaza Report, (the U.N. mediator Galo Plaza Laso reported that EOKA led the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and to finally make *enosis* happen and the biggest reason of this conflict was, again, *enosis*.) Hart said that Turkish people were suspecting that the U.N. Secretary General was biased against them but he argued otherwise. In the rose garden of Archbishop, Vance along with his team, Makarios made a comment of Klerides who was normally friendlier to Turkey did not do anything and because Turkey was ready to invade the island, he criticized Turkey as an aggressor. The comment apparently ignored the fact that so many of the Turkish Cypriots were living under very harsh conditions, facing racism and suffering. Greek Ambassador Menelaos Alexandrakis reported that Greek forces were going to leave. On December 3, 1967, U Thant published a text about the situation in Cyprus stating that he was sanguine about the situation of Cyprus and the danger of war disappeared for the moment. Hart said after Vance's mission:

Vance succeeded not only because the Department of State and the White House left him alone in a fast-moving situation, or because of his personal qualities, but because he never lost sight of a common need shared by the parties. Neither Greece nor Turkey wanted a war, and the fact that Makarios was quite willing to risk one (believing that the United States would be able to stop it at the last moment, as in 1964) dictated a

²¹⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 340.

strategy between Greece and Turkey of groping for the commonality of vital interest between them.²¹¹

Prime Minister Demirel said that as it happened in Cuba, Soviet Union withdrew its armaments from there, Greece withdrew its troops from Cyprus and Turkey was not bluffing and could risk a war.²¹² Soviet Union urged Turkey and Greece to prevent a war along with Germany and France. The reason why the Soviets did want neither Turkey nor Greece on the island in full control was the fact that the island had a strong communist party AKEL and it could be a NATO place in the hands of its rivals.²¹³

When Cyrus Vance was appointed to Cyprus crisis and was negotiating between the parties and it was again one of those nights that the tension was peaked, Turgut Tülümen, who was working at the Turkish Embassy at the moment, was hosting a dinner in Athens, he described how he felt relieved with German journalist Karl Kerber's call saying Vance did not fly to Ankara meaning it was alright for the moment.²¹⁴ Vance's move was affecting everyone and each side was expecting a solution which could fit to their cause.

In a tripartite ambassadorial meeting in Rhodes, Ambassador Hart makes this observation that two thousand Turkish people lived in Rhodes and there was not a problem like Cyprus. On his visit to Cyprus during Christmas week in 1967, Hart also mentioned his memories with Makarios:

Makarios opened by remarking that I must have had some tense moments during recent days. I replied that indeed this was the case, and I wanted to state with no ambiguity that the Turks had not been bluffing. If it came to another crisis like the one just passed, I was absolutely sure that the United States government would not be able

²¹¹ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 94-101.

²¹² Turkish Foreign Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 39, 29.

²¹³ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 82.

²¹⁴ Tülümen, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, 126.

to restrain the Turks from a landing on the island... I felt let down by the attitude of Makarios. It seemed to me that he had learned nothing from recent events. The Turkish Cypriots living in enclaves (some 25 or 30 percent in all) already had their own police, indeed their own defense system. A de facto fragmentation already existed. Did Makarios think this would melt away?" He asked after Makarios was telling him about Turkish Cypriots' situation although it was not Hart's job to listen all that.²¹⁵

While Hart was visiting the island, Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration was founded with Zeki Kuneralp, Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş. Neither Hart nor Washington was happy with the news at all and objected to it. However, the aim of its foundation presented more of a figure that negotiated with Greek Cypriots than a Turkish Cypriots government. The Cyprus government did not see it that way and condemned the administration by forbidding its officials to contact them. The United States and other governments criticized this approach but that could not change anything. The U.N. Secretary General's similar approach encouraged Makarios so; he also called for elections and whether the law of 1963 or 1965 (this would leave Turkish Cypriots out) was going to be used was unclear.²¹⁶

Ambassador Hart summarizes his role in the period of this crisis took place:

So ended the second phase of the intercommunal negotiations, not without some progress on the least sensitive issues and with agreement to enter a third phase in 1969. So ended, incidentally, my direct concern with these problems in the change of administrations in Washington and my access to official information and participation. The outlook was neither encouraging nor discouraging, but it was clear that a mediator my U.S. role could induce the parties to narrow the gap in their basic positions. To avoid raising the ante, we could only urge flexibility and realism, and we could backstop advice from the United Nations Secretariat and its closely observant representatives in Cyprus. This we did.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 109.

²¹⁶ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 113-114.

²¹⁷ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, 123.

Because of the lack of communication of the embassy, Ambassador Yavuzalp mentions how they were not able to involve much during Cyrus Vance's mission to prevent the war. He explains how Turkish Cypriots' temporary government was established and he gives the reasons as Greek Cypriots did not honor the 1960 Constitution, because of the bloody events like 1963 Christmas massacre, and Turkish who were working in the government with Greek Cypriots felt insecure and had to leave their positions unwillingly. Greek Cypriots were blaming Turkish Cypriots as rebels for leaving their posts and breaching the constitution.²¹⁸ There was also a conflict between Turkish Cypriots, although TMT (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı - Turkish Defense Organization) mujahedin were really helpful for the community in the beginning, later the ones who had power in their hands started using it against its own people. Dr. Fazıl Küçük was also against these mujahidin. So it was necessary for Turkish Cypriots to establish a strong government for themselves. Yavuzalp told them to start on their own otherwise Turkey could have been criticized for diminishing people's opinion by imposing its own system.

Nasuh Uslu explains the stance of Turkish people at the time: "The majority of Turkish critics thought that this time the American attitude was totally different from its stance during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. They believed that the Americans now distinguished the guilty from the innocent and pressed Athens to accept the Turkish demands and thus favored the Turkish position."²¹⁹ İlhan Selçuk, a leftist Turkish author, criticized the American mediation saying that Turkey lost the perfect moment to solve the Cyprus problem once and for all. However, the most of the public like the

²¹⁸ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, 114.

²¹⁹ Uslu, *the Turkish –American Relationship*, 196. *Cumhuriyet*, 23 November 1967, 1, "Durum."

press and the politicians believed that the U.S. was finally able to differentiate between the oppressed and oppressor, thus making Greece agrees on the points that Turkey required.²²⁰

As of 1968, it was no longer about *enosis*, rather an independent Cyprus and Turkish minority according to Kyprianou. Immediate threat of war ceased, yet Cyprus had a long way to become untangled. For the 25 January 1968 presidential elections, there was another conflict among Turkish Cypriots. In such a delicate time, there were two candidates for vice presidential election while one candidate opted for the sake of having a strong side: Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Mehmet Zeka Beyin. Yavuzalp invited Zeka Beyin to the embassy and talked with him in a respectful way as he describes, and explained why only one candidate was necessary because they could not let Turkish Cypriots to have a division at the moment. In short, after four days of talking, Zeka Beyin withdrew.²²¹

Based on the Zurich and London agreements, 600 Turkish soldiers were stationed in Cyprus and half of these soldiers were changed in every six months, during Yavuzalp's mission, 8 of these took place and as he told, most of them were problematic because of the Greek Cypriots. In one of those changes, some Turkish soldiers broke the windows of Greek Cypriots shops on their way to port. General Martola tried to give Yavuzalp an envelope with terms like compensation paid to Greek Cypriots and Yavuzalp rejected the letter giving the explanation that even Greek Cypriots did not want compensation for anything with such a strong language. General

²²⁰ Uslu, *the Cyprus Question*, 103-104.

²²¹ Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik* , 139-143.

was surprised and he toned it down after a few letters and retracted compensation.²²²

Yavuzalp describes the mentality of Greek Cypriots and they were thought to hate Turks in a brainwashing level. He says this was the reason why Turks and Greeks could not meet in a logical ground.

The reason why Turkey even risked their alliance with NATO states in the 1960s was because of the detente with the Soviets as Turkey did not need to worry about the threats coming from the Soviets and the possible risk of an attack by Greece on Turkey was the central national security issue. There were several points that ruled the Turkish public in terms of foreign policy with the United States. Students were protesting against the Americans for their diplomacy interventions on Turkey related to Cyprus. The press was also using the same rhetoric and Turkish Labor Party was spreading the idea that the U.S. was the cause of problems in Turkey and also the United States was not a reliable ally because of its blockings of Turkey's ambition and interests.²²³

The Soviet factor which was active for 1964 was absent in the 1967 crisis. In fact, the Soviet Ambassador informed Turkey that the USSR did not oppose Turkish intervention. Greek lobby in America was rather silent in 1967 compared to their activities in 1974 and even in 1964.

It is also vital to mention why the U.S. needed the Turkish alliance especially during the Cold War era since Turkey had the straits that could control over the Soviet warships and its geographical position was able to control the best way to the Persian

²²² Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, 160-162.

²²³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, 129.

Gulf's oil.²²⁴ American bases in Turkey were also independent from the Turkish government which enjoyed those rights until 1973 Arab-Israel War.

According to Turkish Ambassador to Nicosia in 1970, Asaf İnhan described the Cyprus situation and the whole process as a continuation of the Lausanne Agreement and the Independent War of Turkey because of the hatred and the destructive attitude of Greeks that had been going on for years.²²⁵

Greece and Turkey were in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1974, and then Henry Kissinger transferred them to the Bureau of European affairs (EUR). Cyprus was still a big problem even years after, for EUR. The U.S. policy on Cyprus was to focus on solving the crisis for the moment rather than understanding the people living there and bring out a more desirable solution. First with Johnson's letter to Turkey in 1964 preventing Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the relations between the two countries were shaken as Turkish people were feeling betrayed. It was true that stopped Turkey from intervening but did not solve the situation and until 1974, they kept delaying the end. On the other hand, it was never their intent to solve it either according to Monteaegle Stearns.²²⁶

Until July 15, 1974, Turkish Cypriots lived their own political life in the enclaves and some villages with Greek Cypriots, and then Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides ordered the Cypriot National Guard to overthrow Makarios and take control of the Government of Cyprus. That was when, in 1974, Turkey finally implemented its right from 1960 Guarantor Agreement for an invasion and the island was separated. The problems with the island still continue as of today.

²²⁴ Uslu, *the Turkish-American Relationship*, 101.

²²⁵ İnhanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991): Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor*, 17.

²²⁶ Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, 13.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the relations, which were thriving especially since the Second World War and with the Truman Doctrine, started to crumble. First, when Turkey requested more financial assistance in 1955-56 and the U.S. rejected the Menderes government twice. It was forging one of the first disappointments in history of their relationship. Second, was the request from the Americans about withdrawing the Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles because of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Turkish side; however, could not, in fact, comprehend the scale of the danger of having these missiles in its lands which made Turkey a direct threat for the Soviets and a place to be annihilated immediately. Third was Cyprus.

While the official policy of the U.S. was only to be involved in the matter to support an agreement between the relevant parties, the circumstances and the persistence of the states led the United States to take on the role of a mediator. Secretary of State Rusk summarizes the American perspective with these words: “Turkey is tearing itself apart over a situation that involves only 100,000 Turks and that the world

is getting tired of the stubborn inability of a handful of people to live together.”²²⁷ The United States could not grasp how important Cyprus was to Turkey and also to Greece as well, and kept seeing it as a problem under the Cold War perspective rather than on a national level. When the conflict became more and more severe, with armed militias of both communities, diplomacy became equally important. Greece wanted the land for itself as the majority was Greek and they had the *enosis* idea. Turkey did not want to be surrounded by possible threats coming from any state who could own Cyprus, so it was a strategic and national security position for them and also Turkish Cypriots were getting alienated, threatened by their neighbor community. Cyprus contained the military bases for the United Kingdom, so the British interest was access to the oil of the Middle East, allowing them to show their strength to the Soviets that they were still in the Mediterranean.

There were two main driving forces for the United States, which led to their involvement in the situation: firstly, the security of NATO allies and secondly, the fear of the Soviets. They were afraid that their actions could alienate one of their allies, NATO’s southeastern flank would be broken down and its containment policy toward the Soviet Union would fail and as a result Cyprus would become communist. Turkey learned that the U.S. was not always a reliable ally when it came to their own interests from the lessons learned from the crises of 1964-1967 and when the U.S. tried to stop Turkish intervention; with the letter from President Johnson and with Cyrus Vance’s diplomacy. Still, the diplomacy making started and the actors were not only the presidents or the leaders of the states but also diplomats like Under Secretary of State of George Ball, Ambassadors Melih Esenbel, Raymond Hare, Parker T. Hart, Ercüment

²²⁷ Ball, Deptel Teheran Tosec 16, 6.4.65: SDSNF, 1964-66, POL 27 CYP, box 2096, NARA, 2.

Yavuzalp, and the American representative Cyrus Vance along with many others. While Esenbel, Hart and Yavuzalp were able to witness the events and helped to both narrate and analyze the situation, Vance, on the other hand, was on a special mission by President Johnson himself, and along with George Ball as they tried to avoid a war between Greece and Turkey.

It was the Turkish senior diplomat Melih Esenbel who made Prime Minister Menderes to see beyond the British status quo in 1957 and had a new foreign policy toward Cyprus by taking up the cause. He criticized American Ambassador Warren's sayings on Turkish Cypriots by accusing him of denying their right of self-determination and according to Esenbel, the reason why the U.S. did not insist on British ruling on the island nor *enosis* was because Turkey persisted on their policy of partition. He also defended Turkish interests in 1958 when Greece was using both NATO and the U.N. to put pressure on Turkey making it obvious they would not have a political stance against the U.S. as well just like the U.N.

Another Turkish Ambassador, Ercüment Yavuzalp reveals what really happens to Turkish Cypriots, including their daily endurance and disappointments. He went to see Greek Ambassador Alexandrakis to warn him about the situation that Grivas created in fall 1967 and that he should be stopped as the two countries were facing war because of him. Yavuzalp says that he acted on his own as the situation required immediate action at the time just like the Turkish military jets were about to bomb the villages thinking they were swarmed with Greek Cypriots and he prevented massacre on their own people. When it came to the vice presidential elections in 1968, Yavuzalp went to see Zeka Beyin who was the other candidate for the position along with Dr. Fazıl Küçük

and told him that Yavuzalp explained to him that they should not create duality and they should be united instead. From the withdrawal of Zeka Beyin, it was understood that his talks with him actually worked. Yavuzalp also made it clear that because the Greek Cypriots indoctrinated hating Turkish Cypriots, they could not come together for a consistent agreement.

George Ball, who was the Under Secretary of State, was an important diplomat and an underestimated character who tried to mediate between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. He was the one commanding ambassadors to work through the possible ways to calm the people of three countries and finally to avoid a war which was the main reason for the U.S. policy. He was aware of Makarios' intentions about abolishing the London-Zurich Agreements to get his wants, *enosis* first then an independent country without Turkish Cypriots. He also knew that if the U.S. was going to be the one to mediate between them would risk getting one of the allies offended and he tried to avoid as much as possible. Thus, he came up with the Ball Plan which included American soldiers in the peacekeeping force. He also tried to convince Makarios for that and later Greeks to give up territory in exchange of *enosis*, although that was not successful. He encouraged Dean Acheson to be the mediator and came up with the Acheson Plan as well. Ball also made Johnson aware of the situation in Greece and how Papandreou did not want a war; both parties were desperate to have American mediation. What he actually wanted was eventually the partition of the island between the motherlands but Makarios was on the way. During the August crises, Ball threatened both Turkey and Cyprus to stop attack, warning that they would face shame in world politics. He managed the crisis diplomacy and directed the ambassadors accordingly.

Cyrus Vance, special envoy of Johnson, flew among the three capitals; Ankara, Nicosia and Athens in a very strict time as the next day Turkey was expected to invade Cyprus. He could not land on the civilian airport of Ankara because of the backlash from the Turkish people. So, Vance worked through an angry public as they believed Americans prevented the intervention of 1964. Vance was able to convince Greece to withdraw its troops and Grivas to leave from the island which eventually prevented the intervention of Ankara and successfully mediated peace. Ambassador Parker Hart is crucial on the mediation of Cyrus Vance as his book shows a great deal of Vance's strategies and according to Hart, Vance was successful in his mediation because of the freedom he acquired from Washington.

The U.S. was not able to bring a solution the way Turkey expected but George Ball was thinking that they favorably implemented the crisis diplomacy as they prevented Cyprus from becoming a Soviet satellite, avoided a war between Turkey and Greece, and was successful in maintaining the rather cooler relations between those states. What the U.S. did back then was to bring immediate solutions rather than solving the problem and it did work, they implemented the diplomacy of arbitration effectively. Ball was not only doing his job, but also was shaping American foreign policy on the Cyprus situation and perhaps that is partly why when the crises were averted, he happily admitted success because he was the mastermind. While it was rather a fruitful result for the U.S., it was fatal for the relations between the two countries. Thus, it was a catastrophic success for the United States and Turkey.

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