

Diplomatic Coercion: Theorizing and Measuring Diplomatic Sanctions

by

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Diplomatic Coercion: Theorizing and Measuring Diplomatic Sanctions

Koç University

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To my dear wife Kübra and beloved son Ömer

ABSTRACT

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This dissertation investigates the role of diplomatic sanctions in world politics by focusing on their coercive potential. While states frequently employ diplomatic sanctions for various foreign policy purposes, little is known about their true functionality, thanks to the lack of adequate scholarly attention. To better understand the dynamics of diplomatic sanctions and how they interplay with other coercive tools, this dissertation aims, first, to develop an appropriate analytical and theoretical framework to analyze diplomatic sanctions within the broader concept of coercion; second, to identify the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that distinguish them from other coercive and non-coercive instruments in order to evaluate their comparative utility; third, to determine the conditions under which states are more likely to employ diplomatic sanctions through a comprehensive analysis of the potential explanatory variables; finally, to uncover the signaling value of diplomatic sanctions by analyzing whether or not they predict the use of other coercive tools - namely economic sanctions and military measures in subsequent encounters. To do so, this dissertation primarily uses the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset, compiled as part of this project, and adopts both quantitative as well as qualitative research methodology, which includes mini case studies. Consistent with the existing literature, the results of the onset analyses indicate that democracies are less likely to use diplomatic sanctions against one another but more likely to employ them, especially against non-democracies, and they are also more likely to be the targets of these sanctions. Additionally, the propensity to employ diplomatic sanctions is higher between joint members of IGOs and allies, which are commonly considered to have conflict-reducing effects. Intuitively, rivalry increases the probability of diplomatic sanctions onset. The results suggest that relative power capabilities and economic interdependence do not have significant effects on their initiation. In addition, the study also demonstrates that while diplomatic sanctions can be employed as one of the initial steps to escalate the pressure on the target state gradually, they can also communicate the intention of de-escalation between rivals.

Keywords: diplomatic sanctions, coercive diplomacy, signaling, crisis bargaining

ÖZETÇE

Diplomatik Zorlayıcılık: Diplomatik Yaptırımları Kuramlaştırma ve Ölçme

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Bu tez, diplomatik yaptırımların uluslararası ilişkilerdeki zorlayıcı rolünü araştırmaktadır. Devletler, dış politika amaçları doğrultusunda sıklıkla diplomatik yaptırımlara başvurursa da bu konu özelindeki akademik ilginin yetersiz kalmasından dolayı, diplomatik yaptırımların gerçek işlevi tam olarak anlaşılabilmiş değildir. Bu tez, diplomatik yaptırımların temel dinamiklerini ve diğer zorlayıcı diplomasi araçları ile nasıl etkileşime girdiklerini daha iyi anlamak için, öncelikle diplomatik yaptırımları zorlayıcı diplomasi kavramı içinde analiz etmek üzere uygun bir analitik ve teorik çerçeve geliştirmeyi; ikinci olarak, diplomatik yaptırımları diğer araçlardan ayıran kendine özgü niteliklerini belirleyerek karşılaştırmalı faydalarını tespit etmeyi; üçüncü olarak, devletlerin diplomatik yaptırım uygulama ihtimallerinin hangi koşullar altında daha yüksek olduğunu belirlemeyi; ve son olarak da diplomatik yaptırımların ekonomik yaptırım ve askeri güç kullanımını öngörüp öngörmediğini analiz ederek sinyal değerini ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Bunları gerçekleştirmek için, öncelikli olarak bu proje kapsamında derlenen Diplomatik Yaptırımlar Veri Seti kullanılmış ve hem nicel hem de kısa vaka analizlerini içeren nitel araştırma yöntemleri benimsenmiştir. Sonuçlar, literatür ile uyumlu bir şekilde, demokrasiler arasında diplomatik yaptırım olasılığının daha düşük olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca, demokrasilerin hem diplomatik yaptırımlara başvurma hem de bu yaptırımların hedefi olma olasılıkları daha yüksektir. Analiz sonuçları, genellikle çatışma azaltıcı etkilere sahip olduğu düşünülen uluslararası kuruluşlara ortak üyeliğin ve ittifakların, diplomatik yaptırımların uygulanma ihtimalini arttırdığını göstermektedir. Ek olarak, devletler arası rekabet de diplomatik yaptırımların uygulanma ihtimalini artırmaktadır. Ayrıca, göreceli güç kapasitesi ve ekonomik karşılıklı bağımlılığın diplomatik yaptırımların kullanımı üzerinde önemli bir etkisi gözlemlenmemiştir. Bu çalışma, diplomatik yaptırımların hem hedef devlet üzerindeki baskıyı kademeli olarak artırma stratejisinin ilk adımlarından biri olarak kullanılabileceğini hem de rakip devletler tarafından gerilimi azaltma niyetinin bir sinyali olarak işlevselleştirilebileceğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: diplomatik yaptırımlar, zorlayıcı diplomasi, sinyal, kriz müzakeresi

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ABBREVIATIONS

ATOP	Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions
BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
CINC	Composite Indicator of National Capability
COW	Correlates of War
ELN	National Liberation Army
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICB	International Crisis Behavior
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
MID	Militarized Interstate Disputes
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreements
TIES	Threatened and Imposed Economic Sanctions
TSC	Targeted Sanctions Consortium
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

On March 17, 2021, Russia recalled its ambassador from Washington after US President Joe Biden commented in a TV interview, calling Russian President Putin a "*killer*" and asserting that "*Russia would pay the price*" for its meddling in the 2020 US presidential elections.¹ The diplomatic relations between the two countries deteriorated further following the Biden administration's imposition of both diplomatic and economic sanctions on Russia on April 16, 2021, in response to alleged Russian election interference and hacking of federal agencies.² As a result, Washington expelled ten Russian diplomats and imposed economic restrictions against several Russian people and companies. In retaliation, Russia immediately expelled the same number of US diplomats and demanded that the US ambassador to Moscow leave the country.³ Russia also barred eight current and former state officials, including the FBI Director, Director of National Intelligence, and Secretary of Homeland Security, from entering the country.⁴ After leaving ambassadorial posts vacant for months, the two countries agreed to return their ambassadors as a result of the Biden – Putin summit in Geneva on June 16, 2021.⁵

¹ "Russia Recalls Its U.S. Ambassador for Consultations after Biden Comment on Putin," *Reuters*, March 17, 2021, sec. U.S. News, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-ambassador-idUSKBN2B92N1>.

² "US Expels Russian Diplomats, Imposes Sanctions for Hacking," *AP NEWS*, April 16, 2021, sec. Moscow, <https://apnews.com/article/us-expel-russia-diplomats-sanctions-6a8a54c7932ee8cbe51b0ce505121995>.

³ "Russia, Retaliating against Washington, Asks 10 U.S. Diplomats to Leave," *Reuters*, April 16, 2021, sec. Finance, <https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/kremlin-says-putin-decide-counter-sanctions-against-washington-2021-04-16/>.

⁴ "Russia Expels 10 US Diplomats as Part of Retaliation for Sanctions," *Guardian*, April 16, 2021, sec. World news, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/16/russia-expels-10-us-diplomats-etaliation-sanctions>.

⁵ "Putin Says U.S., Russia to Return Ambassadors After Summit," *Bloomberg.Com*, June 16, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-16/putin-says-u-s-and-russia-will-return-ambassadors-after-summit>.

The recall of Russian and US ambassadors from their respective services was an unprecedented move in recent history since both countries had paid due attention to maintaining their diplomatic ties at the highest level despite the ongoing tensions in the relations. As this event demonstrates, states may prefer to downgrade or completely cut off their diplomatic relations with other states despite the importance of preserving diplomatic ties, even in cases of deteriorated relations.⁶ Diplomatic sanctions are a critical component of international politics. States frequently use them to achieve various objectives, and there are reasons to believe that diplomatic sanctions will likely persist as a critical instrument in world politics. Moreover, diplomatic sanctions are not confined to major powers, as middle and minor powers use diplomatic sanctions similarly. This makes diplomatic sanctions a common tool most states use regardless of their power capabilities. For instance, Belarus expelled the US ambassador to Minsk and recalled its ambassador back following Washington's decision to increase its economic pressures regarding the human rights conditions in the former in 2008.⁷ Furthermore, states targeted by diplomatic sanctions often express their regrets over the sender state's decision or attempt to revert it. Israel, for instance, expressed its disappointment at Armenia's decision to recall its ambassador over Israeli arms sales to Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in October 2020.⁸ Related to this point, states often respond to diplomatic sanctions with reciprocity. The new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset compiled as part of this project reveals that in one hundred and thirty cases out of nine hundred and seventy-four, target states retaliated to diplomatic sanctions in kind. This suggests that the target states carefully observe the diplomatic sanctions and react to them in one way or another. Additionally, in cases of false media reports about the imposition of diplomatic sanctions, the alleged sender states take great pains to correct these claims. For instance, upon the circulation of news that claimed that Rwanda expelled one of Uganda's

⁶ Eric Neumayer, "Distance, Power and Ideology: Diplomatic Representation in a World of Nation-States," *Area* 40, no. 2 (2008): 228–36.

⁷ Clifford J. Levy, "Belarus: U.S. Ambassador Told to Leave," *The New York Times*, March 8, 2008, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/world/europe/08briefs-belarus.html>.

⁸ "Armenia Recalls Ambassador to Israel over Arms Sales to Azerbaijan," *Reuters*, October 1, 2020, sec. Aerospace and Defense, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-azerbaijan-israel-idUSKBN26M76L>.

diplomats on April 10, 2006, Rwandan officials rebuffed this news.⁹ Last but not least, the international and domestic public often demand leaders to impose diplomatic sanctions, especially in gross human rights violations or civil wars. These factors indicate that policymakers and the public take diplomatic sanctions very seriously. Despite these, the role of diplomatic sanctions has been underappreciated in academic circles, except for a few studies, resulting in a situation where their true functionality in international politics has remained chiefly uncovered.

1.1 Why Studying Diplomatic Sanctions Matters

Before articulating the significance of studying diplomatic sanctions, it is imperative to define what diplomatic sanctions are. According to Maller, diplomatic sanctions can be defined as “*severing formal diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrading ties from the normal level of diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes.*”¹⁰ As noted by Berridge, the application of formal severance of diplomatic ties has transformed over time.¹¹ Before World War II, states primarily cut off their diplomatic relations as a prelude to war. This move was a signal that the peaceful resolution of disputed issues was not possible anymore.¹² During the Cold War period, the severance of diplomatic relations was primarily used as a method to demonstrate ideological dissatisfaction with another regime. It has transformed once again in the aftermath of the Cold War, as severing diplomatic relations has been used as a punitive and coercive tool to change the target state's behavior. Subsequently, states have employed diplomatic sanctions over various issues, such as countering ongoing atrocities, human rights violations, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.¹³ When the coercive nature of diplomatic sanctions is considered, they can involve various diplomatic actions ranging from recalling an ambassador to restricting the travel of diplomatic personnel and

⁹ Steven Baguma, “Rwanda Refutes Uganda Diplomat’s Expulsion,” *The New Times*, April 11, 2006, sec. News, <https://allafrica.com/stories/200604110098.html>.

¹⁰ Tara Maller, “The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (2009): 512.

¹¹ G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 5th ed. (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015).

¹² Berridge.

¹³ Tara Maller, “Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of U.S. Diplomatic Disengagement” (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011).

breaking off diplomatic relations. This dissertation primarily focuses on the coercive aspect of diplomatic sanctions.

Studying diplomatic sanctions matters for a diverse set of reasons. Among them, widening and improving the available approaches to answer the fundamental questions of international politics and foreign policy decision-making are of particular significance. As contended by Sorokin, one of the main themes of global politics is to understand how, why, and to what effect states exercise influence.¹⁴ With this regard, it can be stated that understanding how leaders make decisions during a crisis and why they choose a particular foreign policy instrument, along with its intended purposes and outcomes, becomes a critical task. When faced with a disputed issue, states can take various actions to influence the behavior of other states. In the broadest terms, these actions might be peaceful or confrontational. The ultimate shape of these influence strategies depends on which goals are pursued and which means are utilized.¹⁵ Hence, this requires a thorough analysis of the available tools at the statesmen's disposal, a topic widely criticized due to insufficient focus.¹⁶

Existing literature suggests that apart from doing nothing and resorting to brute force, which represents two extremes on the left and right sides of the scale, policymakers can exercise influence through coercion, accommodation, or mixing these two strategies.¹⁷ Accommodation strategies can be broadly defined as influence attempts implemented by offering the opponent potential or actual benefits or rewards to reduce tension or improve relations.¹⁸ It can involve making concessions and offering economic, political, or military incentives.¹⁹ Coercion strategies, on the other hand, involve the threat or actual imposition of punishment in order to influence target behavior. It can take various forms, including

¹⁴ Gerald L. Sorokin, "The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (1996): 659.

¹⁵ Sorokin, "The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions."

¹⁶ Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and Nice Laws," *World Politics* 36, no. 3 (1984 1983): 383–406.

¹⁷ Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, "Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65, no. 6 (July 1, 2021): 1039–66, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002721994174>.

¹⁸ Timothy W. Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," *International Security* 35, no. 4 (2011): 155–89.

¹⁹ David Cortright, *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

diplomatic and economic sanctions, as well as military measures such as mobilization.²⁰ Although these strategies are generally analyzed in isolation as strict and ideal forms, policymakers, indeed, employ them together, therefore applying a hybrid strategy, which is generally called the “carrot and stick” approach.²¹

Despite the existence of a host of alternative foreign policy options for decision-makers, coercion methods have received the most scholarly attention among these strategies. In contrast, accommodation strategies and hybrid methods have suffered from neglect.²² Additionally, among the available coercive instruments, military methods have become the main focus of research,²³ while economic coercive measures have only recently begun to proliferate,²⁴ resulting in an apparent dismissal of diplomatic sanctions as coercive tools.

Although there are apparent differences between accommodation strategies and diplomatic sanctions as they fall into different categories, it can be suggested that the underlying reasons for their neglect stem from a similar approach adopted by the scholarly community to statecraft tools, which is inclined to prioritize tools based on their coercive capabilities. Accommodation strategies are overlooked due to their very nature, which does not impose costs on the target as they rely on rewards and incentives.²⁵ On that account, Rock revisits the strategy of appeasement, which has gained a bad reputation both among scholars and policymakers thanks to the “Munich Analogy,” and identifies cases where appeasement can produce successful policy outcomes. Yet, more importantly, he argues that “*even if they [successful cases] could not [be found], this would not in itself prove the futility of the strategy.*”²⁶ His argument is based on the ground that the failure of the strategy should be investigated as to whether it is implemented properly at the policy level and whether correct

²⁰ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

²¹ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

²² Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

²³ Rob De Wijk, *The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West’s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters* (Amsterdam University Press, 2014).

²⁴ Dursun Peksen, “When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature,” *Defence and Peace Economics* 30, no. 6 (2019): 635–47.

²⁵ David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” *World Politics* 24, no. 1 (October 1971): 19–38, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009705>.

²⁶ Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 14.

assumptions are made about the strategy. Based on this, it can be stated that before deeming certain strategies futile, it is essential to identify conditions under which a particular strategy provides advantages and for what purposes they become valuable and feasible. Similarly, the neglect of diplomatic sanctions is based on the acknowledgment that they are not costly enough to coerce an opponent and, therefore, are considered futile.²⁷

In light of this discussion, understanding the nature and subtleties of various influence strategies, as well as identifying the conditions under which they might bring about desired outcomes, is critical. This understanding helps avoid making erroneous assumptions about a specific strategy and allows for a better grasp of when and how a particular strategy becomes useful. Hence, this dissertation is an attempt to understand the central dynamics of diplomatic sanctions by analyzing their distinct features, implications of these features, and their utility for policymakers, especially in crisis bargaining. As such, this dissertation aims to make critical contributions on both practical and theoretical levels. It intends to broaden our understanding of the available foreign policy instruments by highlighting diplomatic sanctions' coercive potential, enabling scholars and policymakers to better assess the comparative utilities of influence strategies.²⁸ Additionally, this dissertation speaks to the literature on economic sanctions and militarized conflicts, thereby making it possible to adopt a more comprehensive approach to develop new insights or reevaluate some of the critical assumptions and findings about the causes and consequences of these influence strategies. Moreover, the dissertation aims to enrich the discussion on signaling and crisis bargaining by highlighting the distinct characteristics of signaling with diplomatic sanctions and its potential usage by policymakers in diverse settings for signaling purposes.²⁹ Last but not least, the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset, the first ever attempt in this field, can offer a crucial addition to various research areas when combined with other datasets, enabling investigation of untouched avenues in the field.

²⁷ Matthew Krain, "The Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions and Engagement on the Severity of Ongoing Genocides or Politicides," *Journal of Genocide Research* 16, no. 1 (2014): 25–53.

²⁸ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, New Edition (1985; repr., Princeton University Press, 2020).

²⁹ James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997): 68–90; Francesco Giumelli, *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War* (ECPR press, 2011); Danielle L. Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2020).

1.2 Research Questions

This dissertation seeks to answer several key research questions regarding the role of diplomatic sanctions in international relations. First and foremost, how do diplomatic sanctions fit into the larger coercion framework?³⁰ This requires adopting an appropriate analytical framework that incorporates diplomatic sanctions and other coercive tools. Only after this endeavor is undertaken will it become possible to analyze their coercive potentials, thereby paving the way for subsequent analyses. The second research question is: What are the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that affect their utility for policymakers? Identifying peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions and distinguishing them from other coercive and non-coercive instruments becomes an essential first step to evaluating their comparative utility with respect to other instruments. This is a non-trivial task because the results can help establish underlying assumptions about diplomatic sanctions and guide the development of specific hypotheses based on their unique features. The third research question is: Which factors influence the initiation of diplomatic sanctions? Understanding when and under what conditions states resort to diplomatic sanctions can provide critical insights into the main functionality of diplomatic sanctions in international politics. This analysis becomes even more crucial because its results can closely be examined alongside the main findings of existing research on the onset of economic sanctions and militarized conflicts. This may allow for the comparative assessment of coercive tools, thereby shedding light on how they differ in functionality. Finally, do diplomatic sanctions predict the sender state's use of more coercive tools - namely economic sanctions and military measures in subsequent episodes? This inquiry aims to uncover the signaling value of diplomatic sanctions in international politics. Given the problem of private information, it becomes imperative to discern whether diplomatic sanctions can credibly communicate intentions between states and signal any meaningful messages.

³⁰ Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2017).

1.3 Argument Overview

To address the aforementioned research questions, one needs an appropriate analytical framework and an available dataset designed explicitly for testing hypotheses about diplomatic sanctions. The absence of such a dataset is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, where a novel dataset is introduced. Concerning the analytical framework, the apparent dismissal of diplomatic sanctions as coercive tools in the scholarly community arguably results from applying an inappropriate analytical framework. Existing studies constrain coercive instruments based on whether they can successfully achieve a single and strict objective, generally defined as changes in the target state's behavior in the desired way. Therefore, this approach results in a priori consideration of diplomatic sanctions as ineffective foreign policy instruments to achieve this very objective, resulting in their exclusion from the analyses.

Hence, drawing from Baldwin's statecraft approach,³¹ I contend that diplomatic sanctions can be considered coercive influence attempts exercised through negative diplomatic instruments when coercive methods are defined with respect to means without predefining or attributing certain ends a priori. Moreover, when behaviors are broadly perceived to include such as beliefs and attitudes, diplomatic sanctions can be considered coercive influence attempts aimed at changing the target behavior. It should also be noted that this adopted approach also acknowledges that policymakers pursue multiple objectives with multiple targets. Therefore, it is possible that a foreign policy initiative might fail with respect to specific goals and targets while being successful with others.

After laying out the analytical framework, it becomes essential to identify the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that differentiate them from other coercive tools in order to determine their utility. To start with, concerning the discussion about potential costs, which are considered one of the critical components of coercive tools, diplomatic sanctions can impose discernable costs on both target and sender states in various ways. As such, diplomatic sanctions can impose legitimacy costs on the target state, which might become greater if they become an international isolation campaign.³² Moreover, diplomatic sanctions

³¹ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

³² Anthony John Christopher, "The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1948–1994," *GeoJournal* 34, no. 4 (1994): 439–46.

can be costly for the sender state by depriving it of critical information about the target,³³ disrupting economic benefits³⁴, and reducing its capacity to pursue its interests in the target state³⁵ through diplomatic channels and public diplomacy. Notwithstanding these costs, while obviously more costly than inducements or diplomatic protests, diplomatic sanctions remain less costly for both the target and sender states when compared to economic sanctions and the use of force. This feature of diplomatic sanctions has critical implications for their comparative utility.

In addition, in contrast to economic sanctions and the use of force, diplomatic sanctions do not require substantial military and economic resources. This feature renders them equally available to small and major powers, which is only sometimes feasible for other coercive tools. Moreover, since diplomatic sanctions do not impose high costs on the target state, they are less likely to trigger a target backlash in the form of more coercive measures. This renders them a comparatively less escalatory tool. Therefore, coupled with the previous point, diplomatic sanctions are more likely to be reciprocated in a tit-for-tat manner regardless of the states' power statuses.³⁶ This may be important, especially for small powers when they encounter relatively more powerful states, as it allows them to demonstrate their disapproval while avoiding unwanted escalation. Furthermore, another peculiar characteristic of diplomatic sanctions is their applicability to both high-salient and low-salient issues, owing to their less costly and escalatory nature. This feature might become key, given that economic sanctions and the use of force might be considered too excessive, particularly in less salient issues. Finally, diplomatic sanctions also stand apart from economic sanctions and the use of force since they do not directly alter the balance of power between states. Building on these idiosyncrasies, I contend that since the target state may perceive diplomatic sanctions as less threatening, it may be less concerned about relative gains and reputation,

³³ Brandon J. Kinne, "Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014): 247–59.

³⁴ Selwyn J. V. Moons and Peter A. G. Van Bergeijk, "Does Economic Diplomacy Work? A Meta-analysis of Its Impact on Trade and Investment," *The World Economy* 40, no. 2 (February 2017): 336–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12392>.

³⁵ Ronald Peter Barston, *Modern Diplomacy* (Routledge, 2019).

³⁶ Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40, no. 1 (1986): 1–27.

thus reducing its inclination to engage in escalatory behavior in response. This aspect of diplomatic sanctions could be particularly crucial in alliance and rivalry dyads where the anticipation of future conflict can play a critical role in the unfolding of events.

Regarding the question about factors affecting the initiation of diplomatic sanctions, I formulate hypotheses by taking into consideration the above-mentioned unique characteristics of diplomatic sanctions. Chapter 4 is devoted to this analysis. Regime type, economic interdependence, joint membership in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), relative power capabilities, alliance, and rivalry are the primary variables analyzed for this task. Firstly, I hypothesize that the use of diplomatic sanctions between democracies should be less likely due to the distinct features of democratic dyads, such as shared norms of peaceful conflict resolution and institutional constraints.³⁷ However, thanks to their cost-effectiveness and less escalatory nature, diplomatic sanctions emerge as a viable option for democracies to address issues pertaining to democracy and human rights in other countries, especially in non-democracies, which results in increased frequency of their use by democracies. In light of this, I hypothesize that democracies should employ diplomatic sanctions more frequently, particularly against non-democracies. Moreover, given their tendency to take action in such cases, I also hypothesize that democracies should be more likely to be the targets of diplomatic sanctions because of the high probability that their sanctions will be reciprocated by non-democracies. Secondly, because diplomatic sanctions may disrupt ongoing economic relations, thereby increasing concerns for potential economic losses,³⁸ I hypothesize that economic interdependence between states should decrease the use of diplomatic sanctions. Thirdly, considering that IGOs provide platforms for negotiation and coercion is a method used to obtain favorable outcomes from bargaining,³⁹ I anticipate that joint membership in IGOs should increase the use of diplomatic sanctions. This is because states may view diplomatic sanctions as a less confrontational alternative to employ during negotiations due to a reduced likelihood of target backlash. Fourthly, given that diplomatic

³⁷ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–38.

³⁸ Neumayer, "Distance, Power and Ideology."

³⁹ Todd S. Sechser, "A Bargaining Theory of Coercion," in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, ed. Kelly M Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 55–76.

sanctions do not necessitate significant resources and that target backlash is less likely, I hypothesize that relative power capabilities should have a minimal impact on their use. Fifthly, the less escalatory nature of diplomatic sanctions should be more pronounced between allies due to the reduced concern for relative gains and reputation, stemming from a lower expectation of future conflict.⁴⁰ This is in addition to the fact that diplomatic sanctions may enable allies to secure concessions in a cost-effective manner, thereby increasing their use. Given this, I hypothesize that the use of diplomatic sanctions should be higher between allies since it allows them to tackle disputes without provoking escalation. Finally, in rivalry dyads where disputes over minor issues persist, and the risk of escalation is high,⁴¹ I hypothesize that diplomatic sanctions should be used more frequently. This should be the case because diplomatic sanctions enable states to respond to rival provocations, especially on relatively less salient issues, while avoiding escalation.

In Chapter 5, I investigate how the employment of diplomatic sanctions interacts with the use of economic sanctions and military coercion instruments. Since diplomatic sanctions appear to be a cost-effective first step on the escalation ladder, I anticipate that they can be employed as part of a gradual escalation strategy.⁴² Additionally, the evolving international norm of peaceful conflict resolution makes non-military approaches more acceptable. Based on these, I hypothesize that diplomatic sanctions should predict the sender state's subsequent use of economic sanctions and the use of force. However, I also expect diplomatic sanctions to play a distinct function in rivalry dyads where uncertainties about each other's capabilities and resolve are lower, thanks to repeated interactions.⁴³ States in rivalry dyads may use diplomatic sanctions to communicate their intention not to escalate, particularly in cases where the triggering event is less salient. Building on this, I hypothesize that in rivalry dyads,

⁴⁰ Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴¹ William R. Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (2001): 557–86.

⁴² Alex Braithwaite and Douglas Lemke, "Unpacking Escalation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 2 (2011): 111–23.

⁴³ Douglas B. Atkinson, Joshua Jackson, and George W. Williford, "Rivalry, Uncertainty, and Militarized Compellent Threats," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (2021): ogz079.

the use of diplomatic sanctions should not predict the sender state's subsequent use of economic sanctions and the use of force.

1.4 Research Methodology

To answer the research questions, I primarily rely on quantitative analyses while complementing them with mini-case studies, especially in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The newly collected Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset is the primary data source for quantitative analyses. This dataset encompasses instances of diplomatic sanctions employed from one state to another between 1990 and 2010 in a dyadic format. It involves both the threat and imposition of diplomatic sanctions and also contains additional information about each case, such as whether it is a retaliation, supported by international organizations, or applied by multiple countries. I use a variety of data sources to operationalize other variables, including Polity IV,⁴⁴ COW's MID,⁴⁵ and alliance datasets,⁴⁶ TIES,⁴⁷ and the Global Sanctions Database,⁴⁸ among others.

In Chapter 3, I present a descriptive analysis to identify any trends or patterns derived from the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset and have an initial insight. I conduct a regression analysis in Chapter 4 to assess the validity of hypotheses regarding the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. I use the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset by restructuring it as a time series cross-sectional directed dyad format and then limit the analysis to politically relevant dyads. The dependent variable of this analysis is the onset of diplomatic sanctions, which is coded as 1 for each dyad if a diplomatic sanction was imposed during that year. With respect to the potential explanatory variables, as noted above, I analyze regime type, economic interdependence, joint IGO membership, relative capabilities, alliance, and rivalry.

⁴⁴ Marshall Monty, Gurr Ted, and Jagers Keith, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2017" (Center for Systemic Peace, 2017).

⁴⁵ Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no. 2 (1996): 163-213.

⁴⁶ Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008* (CQ Press, 2008).

⁴⁷ T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the TIES Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 5 (November 1, 2014): 541-58.

⁴⁸ Gabriel Felbermayr et al., "The Global Sanctions Data Base," Working Paper, School of Economics Working Paper Series (LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, 2020).

Additionally, I carry out a complementary regression analysis to assess the impact of states' power statuses on the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. This is done by limiting the universe of cases to a combination of possible power status dyads.

In Chapter 5, I employ a multimethod approach to test and illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions as both signals of escalation and de-escalation in non-rivalry and rivalry settings, respectively. In the quantitative part, I perform two separate analyses to assess specifically whether diplomatic sanctions predict the sender state's subsequent use of economic sanctions and military force. In these analyses, the data structure remains similar to the one used in Chapter 4. However, this time, the onset of economic sanctions and the use of force are used as dependent variables, while the onset of diplomatic sanctions is employed as the primary explanatory variable alongside other relevant control variables. The data for economic sanctions is obtained from the TIES dataset,⁴⁹ and the data for the use of force comes from COW's MID dataset.⁵⁰ Additionally, I narrow down the scope of cases to rivalry dyads in each analysis to test the hypothesis regarding the de-escalation effect. To identify the rivalry dyads, I use Thompson's rivalry dataset.⁵¹ While quantitative analyses help unveil the associations between variables, they may suffer from various weaknesses, such as potential biases in data collection, vulnerability to measurement errors, and limitations in capturing complex causal relationships and contextual nuances, among others.⁵² Therefore, to complement these quantitative findings and provide a better understanding of the dynamics at play, I conduct three mini-case study analyses. The first two cases analyze the China-US Taiwan Crisis in 1995 and the South Korea–Japan Textbook Crisis in 2001 to illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions as part of a gradual escalation strategy. The third mini-case study focuses on eight different crises that erupted between Venezuela and Colombia between 2000 and 2019 to illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions to signal de-escalation intent in a rivalry setting. These cases are selected after carefully examining the TIES economic sanctions,⁵³

⁴⁹ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

⁵⁰ Jones, Bremer, and Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992."

⁵¹ David Dreyer and William R. Thompson, *Handbook of International Rivalries*, 1st edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011).

⁵² Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (MIT Press, 2005).

⁵³ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

the International Crisis Behavior,⁵⁴ Near Crises,⁵⁵ and the newly compiled Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset.

In Chapter 6, I also present a mini case study in which I analyze the diplomatic sanctions involving multiple countries by investigating the EU's diplomatic sanctions against Iran in 1997 and Russia in 2018 and 2022. Although this dissertation focuses explicitly on the diplomatic sanctions employed unilaterally, it acknowledges that states can also implement them multilaterally with or without the mandate of an international organization. In order to provide some preliminary insights into multilateral implementation, this mini-case study highlights some of the critical dynamics observed in these cases. Since the existing chapters have specific focuses, this analysis is presented in the conclusion chapter to maintain consistency throughout the dissertation.

1.5 Structure of Dissertation

The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 serves as the theoretical linchpin for the subsequent analyses. It begins with a review of the relevant literature on coercion to identify potential reasons why the scholarly community neglects diplomatic sanctions. Then, it presents Baldwin's statecraft approach before applying it to diplomatic sanctions and discussing its potential implications. It is followed by a discussion on the available foreign policy tools at the disposal of policymakers with the goal of identifying the position of the diplomatic sanctions among them. Next, the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that differentiate them from other coercive tools and their implications are examined. Finally, a section is devoted to the signal of resolve debate, an essential topic in the coercion literature. It then assesses the utility of diplomatic sanctions with respect to their signaling value, which will be used as a theoretical background for the analysis in Chapter 5.

Chapter 3 introduces a novel dataset on diplomatic sanctions, which has been compiled for this dissertation. It first discusses why we need a new dataset by highlighting

⁵⁴ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Michael Brecher et al., "International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 15," <http://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/Data-Collections/>, 2023.

⁵⁵ Evgeniia Iakhnis and Patrick James, "Near Crises in World Politics: A New Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38, no. 2 (March 1, 2021): 224–43, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219855610>.

the limitations of existing ones, which are primarily designed with economic sanctions in mind, thus restricting their applicability in the analysis of diplomatic sanctions. It is followed by a discussion of the data collection process, data sources, coding decisions, and variables. Finally, it ends with a presentation of the descriptive statistics in order to acquire initial insights into the patterns of diplomatic sanctions.

Chapter 4 deals with the question of which factors determine the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. It starts with a review of the relevant literature on conflict and economic sanctions in order to identify theoretical and empirical findings regarding the effects of respective variables on the onset of conflicts and sanctions. Next, hypotheses about their effects on the use of diplomatic sanctions are developed by critically analyzing these insights in light of the distinct characteristics of diplomatic sanctions. After presenting the research design and data in detail, the results of the main analysis are discussed alongside the results of the complementary analysis, which focuses on the effects of power statuses. The results of the main analysis reveal that, consistent with the hypothesized relationships, diplomatic sanctions are less likely between democracies; democracies are more likely to employ diplomatic sanctions, and they are also more likely to be the targets of diplomatic sanctions. Additionally, as anticipated, diplomatic sanctions are more likely between joint members of IGOs, allies, and rivals. However, relative power capabilities and economic interdependence do not produce a significant effect. While an insignificant impact is expected for relative power capabilities, the lack of substantial effects for economic interdependence invalidates the hypothesized relationships.

In Chapter 5, the connections between diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and the use of force are explored. The chapter first briefly discusses the importance of uncertainty in international politics and highlights the role of signaling resolve to overcome the effects of uncertainty, especially in crisis bargaining situations. It then dives into the idea of the gradual escalation strategy and explains the circumstances under which states can employ diplomatic sanctions as part of this strategy. Shifting the focus to rivalry dyads, the chapter next discusses the distinct features of rivals by highlighting some of the critical conditions that enable rivals to use diplomatic sanctions to signal their intention of restraint. After presenting hypotheses, the research methodology for quantitative analyses is introduced, and

the results and their interpretations are discussed. Next, the chapter presents three mini-case study analyses to illustrate hypothesized relationships. The findings from both quantitative and case study analyses suggest that while diplomatic sanctions can be employed as one of the initial steps to gradually escalate the pressure on the target state, they can also communicate the intention of de-escalation between rivals.

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by discussing the study's main findings and their implications for the theory and practice of international politics. Additionally, it presents a mini case study analyzing the EU's diplomatic sanctions to illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions by multiple countries. It also discusses some of the limitations of the overall research with the intention of highlighting potential areas for improvement.

Chapter 2

THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the end of the Second World War, states have shown a decreasing preference for direct military actions, making coercion or coercive diplomacy, backed by the threat of force, a more appealing strategy.⁵⁶ While existing studies of coercion have focused on various coercion techniques, including economic and military ones, the scholarly focus on its employment through diplomacy has been meager. On the one hand, the existing literature on diplomacy demonstrates a tendency to focus on the cooperative aspects of diplomatic processes, covering a broad range of topics such as establishing diplomatic relations, diplomatic procedures, negotiations, mediation, conflict resolution, and prevention. For instance, despite its comprehensive diplomacy coverage, the SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy does not provide content for diplomatic sanctions and disengagements.⁵⁷ Consequently, the classical approach to diplomacy predominantly focuses on aspects related to dialogue and peaceful methods.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the existing literature on coercion tends to disregard diplomacy as a coercive tool because of its perceived ineffectiveness in bringing about substantial effects.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Robert J. Art, "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," *Security Studies* 5, no. 4 (1996): 7–42.

⁵⁷ Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, and Paul Sharp, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* (Sage, 2016).

⁵⁸ Bruce W. Jentleson, "Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits, Theory and Policy," in *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* (Routledge, 2009), 423.

⁵⁹ There are few studies analyzing the coercive aspects of diplomacy. These include: Tara Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions," *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (2010): 61–79; Maller, "The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism"; Krain, "The Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions"; Susan Aurelia Gitelson, "Why Do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers?: Lessons from the African Experience," *International Studies Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1974): 451–84; Joseph C. McKenna, *Diplomatic Protest in Foreign Policy: Analysis and Case Studies* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962); Paul Gordon Lauren, "Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy," *International Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (1972): 131–65; Anthony Jordan and John P. Tuman, "Explaining Expulsions of U.S. Diplomatic Personnel from Latin America, 1991–2016," *Latin American Policy* 9, no. 2 (December 2018):

This chapter will scrutinize the coercive nature of diplomatic sanctions within an analytical framework adopted from Baldwin's statecraft approach.⁶⁰ One of the primary purposes of this chapter is to investigate the unique features of diplomatic sanctions influencing their utility for policymakers. By viewing foreign policy through the lens of purposive behavior and defining diplomatic sanctions as attempts to exert influence through negative diplomatic means, this chapter aims to provide a rationale for why policymakers find diplomatic sanctions an appealing tool and employ them frequently despite their reputation as an ineffective instrument in the academic community.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I conduct a detailed review of the literature on coercion and examine how diplomatic sanctions find their place. Second, I present critical aspects of the analytical framework offered by Baldwin and apply it to diplomatic sanctions. Third, I discuss certain subtle characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that influence their comparative utility. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a discussion on signaling through sanctions and investigate the signaling value of diplomatic sanctions.

2.1 Coercion Literature

Coercive diplomacy is a unique strategy that relies on the threat of force to influence target state behavior.⁶¹ Alexander George, one of the pioneering figures in the coercion studies,⁶²

238–57, <https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12149>; Ketian Zhang, "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea," *International Security* 44, no. 1 (2019): 117–59.

⁶⁰ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

⁶¹ For an early literature on the coercion and coercive diplomacy, see: Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Little, Brown and Company, 1971); Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition*, 1st edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); George, *Forceful Persuasion*; Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy* (US Institute of Peace Press, 2003); Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice* (Springer, 1998); Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1978); Melanie W. Sisson Blechman James A. Siebens, Barry M., ed., *Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: The Use of Force Short of War* (London: Routledge, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003026358>; Lawrence Freedman, *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford University Press, 1998); De Wijk, *The Art of Military Coercion*.

⁶² Jack S. Levy, "Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (2008): 537–52, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00648.x>.

explains coercive diplomacy as follows: “*The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade to comply with the demand.*”⁶³ As such, one of the underlying purposes of coercion strategy is to influence the target state’s will and incentive structures through credible signals. These signals are intended to convey that there will be severe consequences if the target state fails to align its behavior with the coercer’s demands.⁶⁴ Generally, the literature on coercive diplomacy highlights two primary forms: compellence and deterrence.⁶⁵ In the broadest sense, while compellent threats are designed to compel the target state to change its behavior, deterrent threats are intended to prevent the target state from changing its behavior.⁶⁶ In this regard, it can be stated that although both compellence and deterrence strategies share certain similarities in terms of aiming to affect target behavior, they differ in how they achieve this goal. While the former requires the revision of behavior, the latter pursues the maintenance of the status quo.

Although coercion strategies can involve elements of force to a certain extent depending on how they are employed, it is worth noting that they cannot solely consist of brute force. To highlight this point, Schelling distinguishes between coercion and brute force. He contends that brute force aims to achieve strategic objectives solely through violence and, therefore, does not concern itself with affecting target incentives.⁶⁷ Moreover, Schelling considers both deterrence and compellence as coercion strategies. George, on the other hand, categorizes compellence campaigns based on whether they are offensive or defensive. As such, he classifies offensive compellence as blackmailing and defensive compellence as coercive diplomacy.⁶⁸ In this sense, George explicitly excludes deterrence from the definition of coercive diplomacy, focusing solely on measures given in response to the target state moves.⁶⁹ Consequently, George’s conceptualization of coercive diplomacy addresses a

⁶³ George, *Forceful Persuasion*, 4.

⁶⁴ Lawrence Freedman and Srinath Raghavan, “Coercion,” in *Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Paul Williams (Routledge, 2008), 216–28.

⁶⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press., 1966).

⁶⁶ Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, ed. Kelly M Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 5.

⁶⁷ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

⁶⁸ George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

⁶⁹ George.

specific aspect of the compellence strategy, which is defensive in nature. The following scholarship on coercion and coercive diplomacy has adopted diverse definitions, operationalizations, and measurements,⁷⁰ sometimes incorporating prefixes such as military coercion,⁷¹ strategic coercion,⁷² or economic compellence,⁷³ resulting in a lack of conceptual clarity.⁷⁴

For this study, coercive diplomacy is used interchangeably with coercion and is understood in a broader sense. As such, its usage here includes both military and non-military tools, including economic and diplomatic ones or their threats. It can also involve positive inducements but cannot solely consist of them, as coercion always includes a cost or harm to the target or their threat.⁷⁵ Additionally, as stated above, coercion does not involve measures that rely solely on brute force. These points will be discussed in more detail in the following sections to identify the position of diplomatic sanctions within the range of potential statecraft tools available to policymakers.

2.2 Oversight of Diplomatic Sanctions in the Literature

Reviewing the extant literature on coercion reveals an evident disregard for diplomatic sanctions as instruments of coercion. This typical indifference manifests itself in two forms: while some studies explicitly exclude diplomatic sanctions from their analyses, citing ineffectiveness as their excuse for this choice, others implicitly ignore them without a mention. Exemplifying the first attitude, a recent Rand report on coercion, although it covers a set of alternative coercive instruments, dismisses diplomatic sanctions, noting that they are "*too weak to coerce a determined adversary*."⁷⁶ Similarly, in his comparative analysis of influence strategies, Drezner primarily investigates economic inducements by comparing their feasibility with economic and military coercion methods. However, he excludes

⁷⁰ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory," *International Studies Perspectives* 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 153–70, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00425.x>.

⁷¹ Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

⁷² Freedman, *Strategic Coercion*.

⁷³ Art and Greenhill, "Coercion."

⁷⁴ Patrick C. Brattan, "When Is Coercion Successful?," *Naval War College Review* 58 (n.d.): 99–120.

⁷⁵ Greenhill and Krause, *Coercion*.

⁷⁶ David C. Gompert and Hans Binnendijk, *The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries without Going to War* (California: Rand Corporation, 2016), 15.

diplomatic sanctions from this analysis by noting in a footnote that “*this option is only useful for extremely minor affairs of states.*”⁷⁷ Additionally, Greenhill and Krause, in their analysis of coercive diplomacy, state that “*Coercive diplomacy can involve only the use of force (threats or actual use), only economic means, or a combination of force and economic measures,*” thereby implicitly excluding diplomatic methods.⁷⁸ Similarly, Brattan dedicates a section to economic sanctions and military methods in his critical review of the coercion literature. However, he dismisses diplomatic sanctions altogether.⁷⁹

The oversight of diplomatic sanctions can be attributed to a priori acknowledgment of their perceived ineffectiveness in achieving specified foreign policy objectives. This acknowledgment predominantly results from a view that bringing about observable changes in the target state's behavior is coercion's primary objective. This approach also constitutes a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of coercive methods.⁸⁰ Based on this perspective, coercion has principally been perceived as a function of military force thanks to its assumed effectiveness, leading scholars to investigate the effects of limited use of force and its threats on target behavior.⁸¹

With the burgeoning literature on economic sanctions, which has been considered an alternative to the use of force, considerable attention has been directed towards understanding the role of economic measures and their associated threats as tools of coercion.⁸² Recent applications have further expanded the concept of coercion to include additional domains

⁷⁷ Daniel W. Drezner, “The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements,” in *Power and the Purse* (Routledge, 2000), 199.

⁷⁸ Art and Greenhill, “Coercion,” 14.

⁷⁹ Brattan, “When Is Coercion Successful?”

⁸⁰ Giumelli, *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling*.

⁸¹ Pape, *Bombing to Win*; Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*; De Wijk, *The Art of Military Coercion*; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Military Coercion in Interstate Crises,” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (2005): 533–47.

⁸² Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (2003): 643–59; Dawid Walentek et al., “Success of Economic Sanctions Threats: Coercion, Information and Commitment,” *International Interactions* 47, no. 3 (May 4, 2021): 417–48, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1860034>; Taehee Whang, Elena V. McLean, and Douglas W. Kuberski, “Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 1 (January 2013): 65–81, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00629.x>; A. Cooper Drury, “Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The US President’s Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions,” *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (2001): 485–508.

and tools,⁸³ such as those in cyberspace,⁸⁴ and migration⁸⁵. However, despite this growing interest in coercive instruments, subsequent empirical studies have shown that these coercive methods, including economic sanctions and military coercions, might not be as effective as theoretically expected, resulting in a fervent debate about their ineffectiveness.⁸⁶ This has created a paradoxical image where leaders continue to use these tools despite their disputed effectiveness in the academic community.

Consequently, while some scholars attempt to identify the conditions under which military and economic coercive methods can produce successful outcomes, others contend that leaders resort to these tools for purposes other than changing the behavior of the target. These purposes are referred to as symbolic purposes.⁸⁷ This latter approach has been prevalent, especially in the literature on economic sanctions.⁸⁸ In line with this approach, Galtung has offered a new framework, categorizing sanctions based on their usage purposes. These are called "instrumental" and "expressive" purposes. Accordingly, the former aims at inducing policy change, and the latter serves international signaling functions.⁸⁹ Lindsay has further refined this approach by offering a fivefold typology of sanction goals. Among these goals, three align with Galtung's instrumental goals: compellence, subversion, and deterrence, while the remaining two, international and domestic symbolism, correspond with

⁸³ Greenhill and Krause, *Coercion*.

⁸⁴ Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace," *Security Studies* 26, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 452–81, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396>; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, *Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁸⁵ Kelly M. Greenhill, "Migration as a Coercive Weapon: New Evidence from the Middle East," in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, ed. Kelly M Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 204–27.

⁸⁶ For exchanges among scholars regarding the effectiveness debate on economic sanctions: Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 50–65; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 66–77, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539263>; David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," *International Security* 23, no. 2 (1998): 189–98; David A. Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," *International Security* 24, no. 3 (1999): 80–107.

⁸⁷ Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (1967): 378–416.

⁸⁸ Jerome Felix Venteicher II, "What Economic Sanctions Signal: Cheap Talk, or Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is?" (PhD Thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2009).

⁸⁹ Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia."

Galtung's expressive category.⁹⁰ According to Lindsay's classification, international symbolism involves sending messages to the international community about disapproval of the target state's perceived wrongdoings, while domestic symbolism appeals to domestic audiences to increase support or prevent criticism on issues critical to domestic public opinion.

Regarding the ongoing debate about the instrumental and symbolic use of sanctions and their effectiveness, Baldwin, although he mainly focuses on economic sanctions, has introduced an alternative analytical framework that applies to various coercive methods.⁹¹ His statecraft approach helps address the apparent paradox between scholarly findings on the effectiveness of coercive methods and their utilization by policymakers. When applied to diplomatic sanctions, this analytical framework becomes significant in understanding their role in statecraft.

2.3 Baldwin's Analytical Framework

Baldwin puts forth an analytical framework for understanding how economic statecraft operates. Adopting a comparative perspective when discussing the utility of a particular instrument emerges as one of the crucial aspects of this framework. In this regard, Baldwin states, "*Policy making involves making decisions, and decision making involves choosing among alternative courses of action.*"⁹² From this standpoint, he suggests that to evaluate the utility of a foreign policy instrument, it is required to compare it with alternative actions by considering factors like effectiveness and associated costs for each available method. He argues that without such a comparison, the assessment of success, effectiveness, or usefulness would be misguided.⁹³ He then proceeds to categorize foreign policy instruments available to policymakers. Building upon Lasswell's classification,⁹⁴ Baldwin offers the following categorization:

⁹⁰ James M. Lindsay, "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination," *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (1986): 153–73.

⁹¹ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

⁹² Baldwin, 13.

⁹³ Baldwin and Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," 189.

⁹⁴ Harold Dwight Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936).

1. "Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols.
2. Diplomacy refers to influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation.
3. Economic statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.
4. Military statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons, or force."⁹⁵

A closer look at the definitions of each statecraft instrument reveals that Baldwin pays a great deal of attention to means rather than ends, therefore refraining from attributing any predefined objectives to them. To ground this approach, Baldwin contends that defining tools with respect to objectives makes it quite difficult to compare them in terms of their utility in achieving the same policy objectives.⁹⁶ In the case of the sanctions debate, defining sanctions with reference to the particular objective of changing the behavior of target policies suffers from this limitation. Moreover, Baldwin views foreign policy as a purposeful action to achieve specific goals. As such, he argues that policymakers use foreign policy instruments to attain desired ends rather than for their own sake.⁹⁷ Building on this, he criticizes the view that sanctions serve only symbolic purposes and asserts that such a view implies that sanctions are undertaken for their own sake.⁹⁸ Baldwin also notes that categorizing certain foreign policy behaviors as serving solely symbolic purposes stems from an inability to identify their instrumental aspects thanks to having "*faulty analytical frameworks*."⁹⁹

In addition, building upon the social power theory, he considers foreign policy instruments as "*influence attempts*" on other actors designed to induce changes in the behaviors and actions of their targets.¹⁰⁰ However, at this point, Baldwin introduces a nuanced approach. He broadly defines behavior to the extent that it can include "*beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions, and/or predispositions to act*."¹⁰¹ The following excerpt is a good demonstration of Baldwin's approach to the issue:

⁹⁵ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, 12.

⁹⁶ Baldwin and Pape, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," 189.

⁹⁷ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, 14.

⁹⁸ Baldwin, 100.

⁹⁹ Baldwin, 99.

¹⁰⁰ Baldwin, 7.

¹⁰¹ Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," 88.

*“When sanctions are used to signal—or send a message—to other countries, they constitute influence attempts in precisely the same sense that firing a shot across the bow of a ship or some other show of force is an influence attempt. Attempting to change how other countries think is an influence attempt regardless of the means used. Using sanctions for signaling purposes is not an alternative to using them as instruments of statecraft; it is statecraft.”*¹⁰²

As the above excerpt demonstrates, this approach helps identify various methods states can use to exercise influence. This aspect is often overlooked in the sanctions literature, where such measures are occasionally considered symbolic.

Baldwin also clearly distinguishes between the targets and objectives of influence attempts. He holds that *“Targets and objectives vary in number, specificity, and importance.”*¹⁰³ After emphasizing that influence attempts can have multiple goals and targets, he contends that success can be defined at varying degrees, rendering a dichotomous success-failure approach misguided.¹⁰⁴ As such, an influence attempt might fail with respect to some objectives and targets but could be successful with others. Moreover, highlighting that choices involve costs,¹⁰⁵ he suggests that in evaluating sanctions, one should consider not only the cost-effectiveness of the specific tool but also that of alternatives when reaching a conclusion about success.

2.4 Diplomatic Sanction within the Framework of Coercion

Baldwin's statecraft approach provides a robust framework for analyzing diplomatic sanctions. In essence, this framework emphasizes that foreign policy instruments should be defined based on their inherent characteristics rather than predefined objectives attributed to them. It also underlines the fact that leaders can have multiple objectives with respect to various targets. Additionally, this framework allows for identifying various techniques used by policymakers for coercive or instrumental purposes by considering state actions as influence attempts and defining the concept of behavior broadly to include beliefs, opinions, predispositions, etc. Furthermore, it also calls attention to the fact that while choosing among

¹⁰² Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, XX.

¹⁰³ Baldwin, 15.

¹⁰⁴ David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (June 2000): 167–82, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.167>.

¹⁰⁵ Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice.”

alternative tools, leaders consider their effectiveness and relative costs. While Baldwin's *Diplomacy* category, listed in his classification of statecraft, appears to emphasize the aspects of deal-making and negotiation, he also notes that one can broaden these categories by distinguishing between negative and positive sanctions.¹⁰⁶ This allows the inclusion of coercive use of diplomacy. He also uses the term "*diplomatic pressure*," underscoring the possibility of its coercive usage.¹⁰⁷

Based on this analytical framework, diplomatic sanctions can be broadly defined as influence attempts carried out through diplomatic means. Maller provides one of the most cited definitions of diplomatic sanctions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, she defines diplomatic sanction as "*severing formal diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrading ties from the normal level of diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes.*"¹⁰⁸ This definition aligns with the analytical framework applied in this study, as it allows for including negative diplomatic influence attempts without specifying particular foreign policy objectives.

After defining diplomatic sanctions, it becomes imperative to identify potential foreign policy tools in the statesman's toolbox to make sense of how and where diplomatic sanctions find their place. As such, while this study is primarily concerned with coercive methods, it's important to note that states can also exercise power through what is generally called positive sanctions. Positive sanctions, also known as positive incentives or inducements, can be defined as "*actual or promised rewards.*"¹⁰⁹ Baldwin asserts that positive sanctions imply actual or promised improvements in one's initial position, while negative sanctions involve its deprivation.¹¹⁰ Based on this distinction, it can be stated that while negative sanctions aim to change target behavior through punishment or imposing pain, positive sanctions aim to induce behavioral change through encouragement and reward.¹¹¹ Some scholars hold that positive sanctions can provide flexibility to the sender state and

¹⁰⁶ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, 13.

¹⁰⁷ Baldwin, 35.

¹⁰⁸ Maller, "The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism," 512.

¹⁰⁹ Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," 25.

¹¹⁰ Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions."

¹¹¹ Haass and O'Sullivan, *Honey and Vinegar*.

reduce the risk of escalation or backlash from the target.¹¹² Positive sanctions have predominantly been analyzed in terms of economic incentives, but they can also be offered in other forms. According to Wallensteen, positive sanctions can include a broad range of policies, including economic measures such as tariff reduction and extending most-favored-nation status, as well as diplomatic and military measures such as providing diplomatic support and initiating military cooperation.¹¹³

Based on the above discussion, the foreign policy tools available to decision-makers in a crisis can be considered along a continuum. Figure 2.1 demonstrates this continuum. It ranges from non-coercive measures on the left to complete violence on the right. Coercion stands in the middle. Based on this scale, the methods within the non-coercive category can include appeasement and accommodation strategies and positive sanctions or inducements. Concerning the coercion category, coercive methods, as previously mentioned, can consist of both positive and negative sanctions, but they cannot solely rely on positive sanctions. In such instances, they would lose their coercive nature and fall into the realm of non-coercive measures. Therefore, diplomatic, economic, and military coercion methods can be classified within this category. Regarding the violence or brute force category, it should be noted that while limited use of force to signal or influence the bargaining process can be considered part of the coercion strategy if it is employed to defeat the adversary, it should be categorized as brute force.¹¹⁴ As such, the brute force category includes measures that aim to attain objectives solely through military violence or war.¹¹⁵

Moreover, within the category of coercion, there also exists a continuum ranging from less coercive to more coercive measures. Diplomatic sanctions can be positioned on the left side of this continuum. This indicates they are less coercive than economic sanctions and military coercion methods due to their relatively low costs. This assertion will be further

¹¹² Timothy M. Peterson, "Positive Sanctions, Incentives, and Foreign Policy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. Juliet Kaarbo and Cameron Theis (Oxford University Press, 2024), 396–410.

¹¹³ Peter Wallensteen, "Positive Sanctions: On the Potential of Rewards and Target Differentiation," in *International Sanctions* (Routledge, 2005).

¹¹⁴ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Coercive Diplomacy as Crisis Management," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2020, <https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1624>.

¹¹⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

elaborated upon when discussing the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions in the upcoming sections.




Figure 2.1: Diplomatic sanctions within the framework of coercion.

After defining diplomatic sanctions and positioning them within the coercive diplomacy framework, it becomes crucial to outline the potential forms and types of diplomatic sanctions. Negative diplomatic sanctions contain numerous diplomatic actions ranging from the expulsion of ambassadors to restricting the travel of diplomatic personnel and breaking off diplomatic relations. Opening or expanding embassies, accrediting ambassadors, and supporting membership in international organizations can be examples of positive diplomatic sanctions. It is worth noting that while the term "sanctions" can sometimes be used to refer to both negative and positive measures in the literature, in the remainder of this dissertation, the word "sanction" is used with a specific reference to negative measures.

2.5 Use of Diplomatic Sanctions

States can use diplomatic sanctions for various purposes, including compellence, deterrence, punishment, and signaling.¹¹⁶ States can employ diplomatic sanctions to address the problematic behavior of a target state to discourage it from repeating such actions in the future. In addition to deterring the target state, sanctions can indirectly influence third parties by becoming a critical component of an indirect coercion strategy.¹¹⁷ In this form of

¹¹⁶ Richard N. Haass, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy* (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), 1.

¹¹⁷ Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvik, "Theorising Indirect Coercion: The Logic of Triangular Strategies," *International Relations* 33, no. 3 (2019): 455–74.

application, sanctions function as a deterrent by signaling the sender state's disapproval of specific policies to observant third parties, who may potentially adopt similar problematic policies in the future. In a regional or global context, powerful states can implement indirect coercion to publicly communicate acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. Moreover, diplomatic sanctions can also be used to compel a target state to get an immediate concession and bring about behavioral changes. Additionally, diplomatic sanctions may signal the sender's commitment to the issue by demonstrating that more punitive measures, such as economic sanctions or military actions, could follow. This signaling mechanism has received considerable attention in the literature, especially within bargaining accounts. Given the importance of this topic, the upcoming sections will discuss the concept of signaling resolve and its implications for diplomatic sanctions.

In addition to their use as stand-alone tools, diplomatic sanctions can also be employed as part of a mixed strategy alongside other coercive tools. For example, after analyzing the HSE dataset, Maller finds that economic sanctions employed by the US between 1947 and 2002 were accompanied by diplomatic sanctions in 38% of the cases.¹¹⁸ Moreover, an analysis of the TIES dataset, which mainly contains economic sanctions episodes between 1945 and 2005 and provides some limited data on diplomatic sanctions, indicates that diplomatic sanctions supplement economic sanctions in 3% of the cases.¹¹⁹ The relatively low number of diplomatic sanctions cases in this dataset can be attributed to the project's primary focus on economic sanctions since diplomatic sanctions cases are only collected if they are identified during the data collection process for economic sanctions episodes. Additionally, the analysis of the Global Sanctions Database, which contains various forms of sanctions such as trade, financial, arms, military assistance sanctions, and travel restrictions between 1950 and 2022,¹²⁰ along with the newly compiled Diplomatic Sanctions

¹¹⁸ Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed," 2011.

¹¹⁹ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

¹²⁰ Constantinos Syropoulos et al., "The Global Sanctions Data Base—Release 3: COVID-19, Russia, and Multilateral Sanctions," *Review of International Economics* 32, no. 1 (2024): 12–48, <https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12691>.

Dataset, reveals that diplomatic sanctions were employed in 39 percent of cases where another sanction was imposed or in effect in the same year.¹²¹

States can apply the mixing of coercive strategies in several ways. Firstly, states can combine coercive tools by employing them sequentially as part of a gradual escalation strategy. While this topic will be covered in detail in Chapter 5, briefly, in this form of usage, states use diplomatic sanctions in the initial stages of a crisis to demonstrate their resolve to escalate pressure if the target state fails to acquiesce. Subsequently, if the initial measures prove ineffective, the sender state may resort to more coercive measures such as economic sanctions or military coercion. As illustrated in Chapter 5 in detail, this was the case when China initially employed diplomatic sanctions in response to the US decision to grant a visa to the Taiwanese president.¹²² Only after the US failed to comply with China's demand to reverse its visa decision did the latter employ military measures to increase the pressure.

Secondly, states can concurrently use diplomatic sanctions alongside other coercive tools. In this form of usage, these coercive measures are applied simultaneously or in parallel rather than sequentially. This simultaneous application allows states to convey stronger messages by combining the potential impacts of diverse coercive methods. For instance, this was evident during the three-way crisis that erupted in March 2008 between Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia.¹²³ The crisis unfolded after Colombia's military crossed the border into Ecuador in pursuit of a prominent FARC leader and killed him. Ecuador considered this action a violation of its sovereignty. In response, Ecuador immediately broke diplomatic relations with Colombia and mobilized its troops to the border.¹²⁴ Venezuela also became involved in the dispute by recalling its ambassador and deploying troops to its border with Colombia in solidarity with Ecuador.

¹²¹ The residual category of "Other" in the Global Sanctions Dataset is dropped because diplomatic sanctions are coded in this category.

¹²² Suisheng Zhao, *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis* (Routledge, 1999).

¹²³ Simon Romero, "Crisis at Colombia Border Spills Into Diplomatic Realm," *The New York Times*, March 4, 2008, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/americas/04venez.html>.

¹²⁴ Rory Carroll and Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Threat of War as Venezuela and Ecuador Order Troops to Colombian Border," *The Guardian*, March 5, 2008, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/05/colombia.venezuela>.

Thirdly, states can also strategically combine various forms of diplomatic sanctions, employing them concurrently or sequentially. This approach can be adopted when the sender state lacks significant economic or material capabilities, which makes it challenging to respond with economic or military measures. Instead, they might apply diverse forms of diplomatic sanctions to leverage their combined coercive capabilities and potential costs. States can also prefer this approach when the issue of contention is considered relatively less significant, and the use of economic or military measures might be deemed excessive. In such circumstances, mixing diverse forms of diplomatic sanctions might enable the sender state to convey stronger messages either at once or gradually over time.

It should also be noted that states have the flexibility to combine various positive and negative sanction types, either concurrently or sequentially. For instance, diverse forms of diplomatic sanctions, including both positive and negative measures, can be mixed with a diverse set of economic sanctions, again including both positive and negative ones, and employed simultaneously or subsequently throughout the dispute. It's important to note that sequencing doesn't necessarily follow from less coercive to more coercive measures, as states might apply these methods without regard to this rank order.

2.6 Peculiarities of Diplomatic Sanctions

The following sections will discuss the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that differentiate them from other coercive methods in order to identify factors affecting their utility for policymakers. As such, this section will discuss the potential costs associated with diplomatic sanctions for both the sender and target states, the availability of diplomatic sanctions to both small and major powers, their limited impact on the balance of power, and their potential applicability across issues of varying salience. It will then discuss their possible implications on the utility of diplomatic sanctions.

2.6.1 Cost of Diplomatic Sanctions

Since the actual or threatened costs are underlying elements of any coercive instrument, it is imperative to understand how diplomatic sanctions can impose costs on the sender and target states. Upon preliminary examination, any aspects related to the reasons states establish

diplomatic relations can be considered potential areas of costs for both sender and target states. As such, quoting Neumayer, the following can be regarded as possible areas where diplomatic sanctions become costly for both the sender and target state: “*Through diplomatic representation, states promote their political and economic interests, they negotiate, coordinate and solve problems, they gather the information that is not otherwise publicly available, they convey messages to foreign representatives, protect their citizens, facilitate scientific and tourist exchange and do many other things more.*”¹²⁵

More specifically, regarding the potential costs of diplomatic sanctions to the target state, the most salient among them is the legitimacy cost.¹²⁶ Severance of diplomatic relations can impose a legitimacy cost on the target state by signaling to the international community that the target state's actions or policies have breached acceptable boundaries of international norms and principles.¹²⁷ Depending on the level and extent of legitimacy cost, this may become a critical concern for a target state as it may influence its interactions with other international actors, such as its ability to form alliances, maintain economic partnerships, and gather support for its foreign policy initiatives. The legitimacy cost may loom larger if it becomes an international isolation campaign.¹²⁸ In this vein, in their analysis of economic sanctions concerning their ability to signal dissatisfaction with the target state, Peterson and Drury hold that sanctions send strong signals of disapproval, resulting in an “outcast effect.”¹²⁹ While they assert that economic sanctions can send “*a stronger signal than simple diplomatic anger*”,¹³⁰ given that diplomatic sanctions differ chiefly from mere diplomatic anger due to the differences in associated costs, they can indeed convey strong signals of disapproval with effects similar to economic sanctions through analogous mechanisms. They also note that the variation in states' capacity to yield the outcast effect significantly depends on whether the sender state possesses soft power capacity and moral authority. This effect

¹²⁵ Neumayer, “Distance, Power and Ideology,” 228.

¹²⁶ Christopher, “The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1948–1994.”

¹²⁷ Kinne, “Dependent Diplomacy.”

¹²⁸ Timothy W. Crawford, “The Strategy of Coercive Isolation,” in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, ed. Kelly M Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 228–50.

¹²⁹ Timothy M. Peterson and A. Cooper Drury, “Sanctioning Violence: The Effect of Third-Party Economic Coercion on Militarized Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 4 (August 2011): 580–605, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002710393915>.

¹³⁰ Peterson and Drury, 3.

can become more significant when diplomatic sanctions are applied internationally with the involvement of multiple states. In this context, in his analysis of the diplomatic sanctions campaign against South Africa from 1948 to 1990, Christopher concludes that the international effort to isolate South Africa diplomatically played a crucial role in marking South Africa as a pariah state and significantly contributed to the eventual dissolution of the apartheid regime.¹³¹

Regarding the cost of diplomatic sanctions to the sender, which is a crucial factor in credible signaling mechanisms, a set of factors seems to generate costs. Firstly, a reduction in diplomatic relations can lead to losing critical intelligence and insights about the target state. Maller's articles prudently discuss this point, underpinning the main theory behind her research.¹³² To reiterate those points and build upon them, it can be said that information gathering is one of the main functions of a diplomatic mission.¹³³ Maintaining a diplomatic mission in the host country becomes crucial in terms of providing a deeper understanding of local situations, including social, political, and economic developments.¹³⁴ Additionally, diplomatic missions serve as crucial sources of intelligence for states and facilitate gathering sensitive information about the host country. The release of WikiLeaks documents, which include certain diplomatic cables from US diplomatic missions to the State Department, supports this claim.¹³⁵ Diplomatic missions can utilize official channels through intelligence liaison officials within the mission who have contact with their governmental counterparts in the host country. This official communication allows for the exchange of information and insights through established diplomatic channels.¹³⁶ Additionally, diplomatic missions leverage human intelligence strategies, where agents operate under diplomatic cover to gather intelligence discreetly.¹³⁷ This covert approach enables states to access valuable

¹³¹ Christopher, "The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1948–1994."

¹³² Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed," 2010; Maller, "The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism."

¹³³ Kinne, "Dependent Diplomacy."

¹³⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy*.

¹³⁵ Michael Gill and Arthur Spirling, "Estimating the Severity of the WikiLeaks US Diplomatic Cables Disclosure," *Political Analysis* 23, no. 2 (2015): 299–305.

¹³⁶ David M. Malone, "The Evolving Nature and Role of the Diplomatic Mission," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 18, no. 2 (June 2012): 225–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2012.710751>.

¹³⁷ Michael Herman, "Diplomacy and Intelligence," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 9, no. 2 (July 1998): 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299808406081>.

information that would not be possible otherwise through official channels, enhancing their understanding of the geopolitical landscape. In summary, the severance of diplomatic ties denies the sender state access to firsthand intelligence on critical developments within the target state. As such, this information loss may hamper the sender's ability to make informed decisions about the target state's policies and intentions.¹³⁸

Secondly, diplomatic sanctions can impede the sender state's ability to influence the host state to promote its interests. One of the central tasks of diplomacy is to promote the sender state's national interests and defend its policies abroad.¹³⁹ From this perspective, diplomatic missions are crucial to exercising power and wielding influence over the host state. As such, diplomatic officials can play a pivotal role in enabling the sender state to have influence over decision-making processes within the host country. This influence can be exercised in various ways, primarily through dialogue and persuasion activities with key incumbents in the host country's government.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, the available influence channels extend beyond governmental channels, encompassing public diplomacy activities that help promote a positive image of the sender state within the host country.¹⁴¹ By leveraging public diplomacy initiatives, diplomatic missions can enhance the sender state's reputation among the local population. To sum up, diplomatic sanctions can impose a significant cost on the sender state as they can impede its ability to influence the host state in promoting national interests.

Thirdly, the severance of diplomatic relations can negatively impact the sender's economic interests. Diplomatic missions often play a key role in fostering economic partnerships and facilitating trade agreements between countries.¹⁴² The absence of diplomatic ties may obstruct the negotiation and implementation of economic interactions, constraining the sender's economic engagement with the target state.¹⁴³ One leg of the

¹³⁸ Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed," 2010.

¹³⁹ Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*.

¹⁴⁰ Patricia M. Kim, "Using Diplomacy to Shape China's Behavior: Coercion, Bargaining and Persuasion in US-China Relations, 1971-2003" (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University, 2016).

¹⁴¹ Ali Fisher, "Looking at the Man in the Mirror: Understanding of Power and Influence in Public Diplomacy," in *Trials of Engagement*, ed. Scott Lucas (Brill Nijhoff, 2011), 271–95.

¹⁴² Neumayer, "Distance, Power and Ideology."

¹⁴³ Brian M. Pollins, "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?," *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 2 (1989): 465–80.

“Economic Diplomacy” literature underscores the importance of permanent foreign missions in promoting the economic interests of the sender country.¹⁴⁴ For instance, in his analysis of the impact of foreign services on a country’s exports, Rose finds a positive correlation between the presence of embassies and consulates and the level of exports to that country. Consequently, he concludes that foreign services play a significant role in promoting exports and thereby contribute to the country's economic interests.¹⁴⁵ Building upon Rose’s work but narrowing down the scope of the investigation, Afman and Maurel analyze the impact of foreign missions on exports from transition economies to market economies. Their study defines transition economies as countries that transitioned from the Soviet economic system to market economies. They also find strong support for the export promotion role of diplomatic missions for these specified sets of countries.¹⁴⁶ Other scholars have also analyzed the promotional effects of different components of diplomatic missions, such as the budget of export promotion units in embassies,¹⁴⁷ on various samples and generally found a positive association.¹⁴⁸ In summary, because diplomatic sanctions can disrupt the valuable role that diplomatic missions play in fostering economic interests, they can impose a significant economic cost to the sender state. The extent of this potential economic fallout can be more significant for countries having higher levels of economic interconnectedness and interdependencies.

Finally, diplomatic sanctions can also create domestic audience costs like other coercive methods do. Leaders imposing diplomatic sanctions on a target state might face an internal public backlash if a lack of follow-up steps on issues valued by domestic constituents is perceived as backing down.¹⁴⁹ In a similar vein, diplomatic sanctions can also incur reputational costs for the sender state, influencing how the immediate target and the

¹⁴⁴ Moons and Van Bergeijk, “Does Economic Diplomacy Work?”

¹⁴⁵ Andrew K. Rose, “The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade: Embassies as Export Promotion,” *World Economy* 30, no. 1 (2007): 22–38.

¹⁴⁶ E. R. Afman and M. Maurel, “Diplomatic Relations and Trade Reorientation in Transition Countries,” in *The Gravity Model in International Trade*, ed. Peter AG Van Bergeijk and Steven Brakman, 2010, 278.

¹⁴⁷ Kichun Kang, “Overseas Network of Export Promotion Agency and Export Performance: The Korean Case,” *Contemporary Economic Policy* 29, no. 2 (April 2011): 274–83, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2010.00214.x>.

¹⁴⁸ Rose, “The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade.”

¹⁴⁹ Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power,” *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (2011): 1003–23.

international community perceive it.¹⁵⁰ Given that a reputation for resolve and credibility is a critical consideration for states shaping their behaviors,¹⁵¹ if the sender state fails to implement subsequent measures, it risks being perceived as irresolute. This might diminish its influence and potentially undermine its broader foreign policy objectives in subsequent encounters with the target and other states.

It should be noted that the cost of diplomatic sanctions can vary depending on which type of diplomatic sanctions is employed, given that the severity of diplomatic sanctions can also vary. For example, the closure of a diplomatic mission can significantly impact economic interests, whereas a temporary recall of ambassadors or diplomats may not have the same effect. The legitimacy cost can also differ based on the severity of the diplomatic action; a complete breakdown of relations can incur higher legitimacy costs compared to a temporary recall of a diplomat. Moreover, contextual factors can also play a crucial role in determining the impact of these costs. For instance, if the target state relies on international recognition due to being a newly established state or facing internal legitimacy problems, and if the sender state possesses the power to create an outcast effect, the impact of legitimacy costs might be amplified.

Notwithstanding the potential costs associated with diplomatic sanctions, they remain relatively low compared to those of economic sanctions and military force. However, certain forms of diplomatic sanctions, such as breaking off relations, may entail higher costs than some forms of economic sanctions, like those targeting individuals or imposing partial bans. Nevertheless, the literature considers diplomatic sanctions primarily suitable for symbolic purposes due to their lower costs. However, its less costly nature makes it appealing for leaders to pursue specific foreign policy objectives.

¹⁵⁰ Anne E. Sartori, "The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes," *International Organization* 56, no. 1 (2002): 121–49.

¹⁵¹ Sartori; Ryan Brutger and Joshua D. Kertzer, "A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs," *International Organization* 72, no. 3 (2018): 693–724; Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, "Reputation and Status as Motives for War," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 371–93.

2.6.2 Availability of Diplomatic Sanctions

Related to the less costly nature of diplomatic sanctions, one of the distinct characteristics of diplomatic sanctions is their widespread availability to both minor and major powers. Unlike the use of force, which often requires significant military capabilities and resources,¹⁵² and economic sanctions, which can be influenced by a state's economic prowess,¹⁵³ diplomatic sanctions do not primarily rely on material resources. Hence, regardless of military capabilities and economic strength, diplomatic sanctions become available to states of varying sizes and capabilities to utilize. While diplomatic sanctions can be considered an additional tool for great powers, they are critical for small states, particularly in their interactions with major powers. Putting aside whether diplomatic sanctions can help small states effectively counter a great power adversary,¹⁵⁴ they provide a means to communicate disapproval of the adversary's behavior and showcase their stance to the wider international community. In this regard, diplomatic sanctions can be viewed as a crucial instrument for small states.

While finding a universally agreed-upon definition in the scholarly community is challenging,¹⁵⁵ small states are traditionally analyzed as possessing limited material capabilities, although not entirely devoid of power. This perspective has faced widespread criticism in recent literature, primarily due to its reliance on a resource-based conception of power.¹⁵⁶ Acknowledging that even the most capable states struggle to achieve their objectives against relatively less powerful states, scholars have proposed alternative mechanisms through which small states exert power and ensure survival in the international system. Building on Long's examination of the power sources of small states,¹⁵⁷ it can be stated that they can exercise power through the utilization of complex interdependence,¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Benjamin O. Fordham, "A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on American Decisions to Use Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 5 (2004): 632–56.

¹⁵³ Amanda Murdie and Dursun Peksen, "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activities on Economic Sanctions," *The Review of International Organizations* 8 (2013): 33–53.

¹⁵⁴ Gitelson, "Why Do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers?"

¹⁵⁵ Matthias Maass, "The Elusive Definition of the Small State," *International Politics* 46, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 65–83, <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2008.37>.

¹⁵⁶ Tom Long, "Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power," *International Studies Review* 19, no. 2 (2017): 185–205.

¹⁵⁷ Long.

¹⁵⁸ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr, *Power & Interdependence*, 4th edition (Boston: Pearson, 2011).

the strategic use of soft power,¹⁵⁹ engagement with international institutions,¹⁶⁰ and the promotion of norms and ideas through norm entrepreneurship.¹⁶¹ Additionally, small states can enhance their influence by aligning with great powers or forming groupings with fellow non-great powers. Among these methods, small states can also appeal to diplomatic sanctions to influence other states, including major ones. As such, diplomatic sanctions, thanks to their less costly nature, become available to both small and great powers, which is not always the case for economic sanctions and military coercion.

It should also be noted that diplomatic sanctions are not applicable when two countries do not have diplomatic relations, as is the case with the US-North Korea and US-Iran relationships. However, in such instances, states can exert pressure on other countries through persuasion or coercion to apply diplomatic sanctions to the selected target state.

2.6.3 Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions on Balance of Power

Coercion strategies can potentially disrupt the relative balance of power between the sender and target state, which, in return, can substantially influence the bargaining process. This influence is particularly pronounced in coercive military measures, when implemented as a denial strategy, in particular.¹⁶² Economic sanctions can also alter the balance of power by adversely affecting the target economy,¹⁶³ thereby restricting the availability of resources for military purposes. Hence, diplomatic sanctions can be distinguished from military coercion and economic sanctions as they do not directly affect the balance of power, while indirect effects are possible.

Slantchev, in his formal analysis of military coercion strategies, finds that military mobilization can change the balance of power in favor of the sender state, therefore

¹⁵⁹ Alan Chong, "Small State Soft Power Strategies: Virtual Enlargement in the Cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 3 (September 2010): 383–405, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2010.484048>.

¹⁶⁰ Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 39–75.

¹⁶¹ Christine Ingebritsen, "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 1 (March 2002): 11–23, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037001689>.

¹⁶² Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

¹⁶³ Özgür Özdamar and Evgeniia Shahin, "Consequences of Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art and Paths Forward," *International Studies Review* 23, no. 4 (2021): 1646–71.

increasing the probability of its winning. He concludes that this results in an increased audience cost, becoming a significant leverage in the bargaining process.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, in their analysis of economic sanctions, McCormack and Pascoe contend that sanctions can effectively alter the balance of power by undermining the military capabilities of the target state.¹⁶⁵ Using the impact of Western economic sanctions on the Russian economy as the main case, they contend that sanctions have compelled Russia to reduce its military expenditures due to the adverse economic effects on the budget, resulting in an overall decline in the Russian military capabilities.

Although it can be argued that diplomatic sanctions do not directly impact the balance of power, as they do not affect economic or military capabilities significantly, their influence can be observed indirectly. One such indirect effect is evident in cases where one state expels the diplomatic mission of the target country while the other allows the sender state's diplomatic mission to continue operating. Although this may not directly impact the balance of power, it can create an information imbalance, as one of the states is denied access to critical intelligence about the other. This information disparity could be strategically advantageous, especially in militarized disputes. Additionally, Crawford argues that diplomatic isolation may reduce the alliance options of the target state, thereby making it more vulnerable to becoming the target of militarized conflict initiations.¹⁶⁶ Since realist literature considers two primary mechanisms for a state to increase its national power - internal and external balancing strategies,¹⁶⁷ diplomatic sanctions can prevent the target state from exploiting the second option by weakening its relations with potential supporter states. It should be noted that this effect of diplomatic isolation is more likely in cases where a sufficient number of states follow suit and create an image of an outcast. In summary, despite the potential for indirect effects, diplomatic sanctions seem less likely to shift the balance of power in favor of the sender state, thus lacking a crucial aspect that could influence the bargaining processes.

¹⁶⁴ Slantchev, "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises."

¹⁶⁵ Daniel McCormack and Henry Pascoe, "Sanctions and Preventive War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 8 (2017): 1711–39.

¹⁶⁶ Crawford, "The Strategy of Coercive Isolation."

¹⁶⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

2.6.4 Use of Diplomatic Sanctions Across Issues

States engage in interactions with each other on a daily basis. Most of the time, these interactions are not confrontational and involve day-to-day business. Moreover, when they have disagreements, it is not necessarily over high-salient issues. When the issue of contention is less salient for involved parties, using force is not always the initial or most feasible option.¹⁶⁸ Although it is widely asserted that states conduct their affairs under the shadow of military force, even for the low salient issues,¹⁶⁹ they, nevertheless, exercise strategic restraint most of the time. This applies even to states with relatively greater material capabilities. The global norms discouraging the disproportionate use of force, be it limited, is one of the underlying reasons for this strategic restraint. This is in addition to the costs associated with the military moves; even successful military campaigns incur various costs to the sender. Similarly, while a powerful alternative to military force, economic sanctions are not universally applicable. Even though they can be employed for less salient issues, most disputes between states do not merit the imposition of economic sanctions. Routine trade quarrels or minor economic disagreements are often resolved through alternative means, which might be coercive or non-coercive.

Diplomatic sanctions emerge as a feasible strategy, allowing leaders to respond in a balanced way in situations where both economic and military instruments might be an overreaction. For instance, diplomatic sanctions can be particularly feasible in response to publicly expressed harsh remarks about the sender state or its ruling figures, a common use case for such measures. In such a context, diplomatic sanctions help express dissatisfaction with the target state's behavior without risking an escalation. However, this does not imply that diplomatic sanctions are confined to less salient issues. For instance, states can strategically employ them as part of an escalation strategy for more salient issues,¹⁷⁰ as discussed in Chapter 5. Historical records based on the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset indicate that policymakers use diplomatic sanctions to address various problems. They range from less-salient ones, such as in response to espionage activities, to high-salient ones, such

¹⁶⁸ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

¹⁶⁹ Sechser, "A Bargaining Theory of Coercion."

¹⁷⁰ Braithwaite and Lemke, "Unpacking Escalation."

as to address terrorism or national security concerns.¹⁷¹ This suggests the strategic utility of diplomatic sanctions across a broad spectrum of issues, which is, once again, not always the case for economic sanctions and the use of force.

2.7 Implications of Peculiar Characteristics of Diplomatic Sanctions

The aforementioned peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions - being less costly, having no discernable effect on the balance of power, being available to both great and small powers, and being feasible to employ both for salient and less salient issues, affect their strategic utility and attractiveness for policymakers depending on the strategic context. As such, the following section will discuss the implications of these attributes. Table 2.1 presents the comparison of peculiar characteristics of coercive methods.

Table 2.1: Comparison of peculiar characteristics of coercive methods.

	Diplomatic Sanctions	Economic Sanctions	Military Coercion
Cost	Low	Moderate	High
Availability	Wide – across small and great powers	Moderate – medium and great powers	Narrow - medium and great powers
Effect on balance of Power	Small	Moderate	High
Issues	Wide – across less and high salient issues	Moderate – medium and high salient issues	Narrow – high salient issues

As outlined above, diplomatic sanctions impose varying costs on both the target and sender states. This distinguishes them from inducement strategies, as the latter typically rely on rewards rather than punishments. Similarly, because diplomatic sanctions may entail tangible costs, their coercive severity is higher than verbal diplomatic acts, such as official

¹⁷¹ Maller, “Diplomacy Derailed,” 2010, 63.

condemnation or diplomatic protests.¹⁷² Nevertheless, their costs are generally lower when contrasted with economic and military coercion methods. These characteristics of the costs of diplomatic sanctions have certain implications, which become critical, especially in determining their level of utility.

Firstly, the lower costs to the sender impact their effectiveness in sending credible signals, a topic discussed in more detail in the upcoming section. To briefly mention, the target state may perceive diplomatic sanctions as signals of resolve or lack of resolve. Because they are not cost-free, they can be considered a credible signal of resolve. However, the target may also interpret these measures as a signal of non-resolve given that the sender state preferred a less costly instrument instead of more costly alternatives. Secondly, the costs of diplomatic sanctions to the target state are also lower than those of more coercive measures. This attribute may be crucial in shaping the target's response. While economic and military coercion methods carry higher risks of target backlash, potentially leading to an escalation of the dispute, the lower cost of diplomatic sanctions to the target makes it less likely that the target would respond with harsher measures. Additionally, because diplomatic sanctions do not directly affect the balance of power between states, it further reduces the possibility of a harsher response from the target. Hence, this feature may become pivotal in circumstances where the sender state is willing to demonstrate its disapproval or dissatisfaction with the target behavior to a certain degree while unwilling to risk an escalation. This implies that diplomatic sanctions can be feasible when an impetus exists to take action, yet it is not beyond demonstrating disapproval. Diplomatic sanctions can become a viable option for global norm enforcement purposes, such as the promotion of democracy and supporting human rights, allowing for the expression of dissatisfaction with the target while minimizing the risk of escalation.

Moreover, for similar reasons, diplomatic sanctions can help manage rivalry relations where the risk of escalation is inherently high due to the persistence of historical enmities.¹⁷³

¹⁷² McKenna, *Diplomatic Protest In Foreign Policy*; Koji Kagotani and Wen-Chin Wu, "When Do Diplomatic Protests Boomerang? Foreign Protests against US Arms Sales and Domestic Public Support in Taiwan," *International Studies Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2022): sqac043.

¹⁷³ Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* (University of Michigan Press, 2000).

Diplomatic sanctions can enable the sender state to respond to a disputed issue by imposing a certain level of cost on the rival state while limiting the severity of target backlash. By doing so, diplomatic sanctions can be used to alleviate immediate tension in a rival dispute. Furthermore, they can also be effective in managing relations between allies, where using more coercive measures, particularly military ones, risks distorting common security interests.¹⁷⁴ In such cases, diplomatic sanctions can restrain the escalation of the dispute while also addressing the disputed issue.

While diplomatic sanctions may reduce the risk of target backlash, it does not imply that the target will ignore or fail to respond. On the contrary, their lower cost makes it more probable that the target state will reciprocate, particularly in a tit-for-tat format, meaning the target is likely to respond in kind rather than with harsher measures. This implies that there is a high likelihood of reciprocal diplomatic sanctions in general, compared to economic sanctions and military measures, where a reciprocal response is not always preferred due to the risk of escalation or because they may not be feasible at all.¹⁷⁵ Moreover, this becomes particularly significant when small powers encounter great powers. Aware of the potential risks associated with employing harsher measures, which could trigger a stronger response in return, small powers, as the initial sender, may opt for diplomatic sanctions to avoid provoking a harsh backlash from the more powerful state. In similar logic, diplomatic sanctions, thanks to their reduced potential to provoke harsher measures in the subsequent episodes, allow small states to reciprocate the initial sanctions imposed by great powers. Overall, it can be stated that the less costly and escalatory nature of diplomatic sanctions reduces the significance of relative power capabilities, enabling relatively less powerful states to frequently use them against powerful targets, both as initial and reciprocal sanctions.

¹⁷⁴ David H. Bearce, Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States," *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (2006): 595–625.

¹⁷⁵ Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations"; Dursun Peksen and Jin Mun Jeong, "Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Sanctions Reciprocity: Explaining Targets' Counter-Sanctions," *Defence and Peace Economics* 33, no. 8 (2022): 895–911.

2.8 Coercion and Signal of Resolve

The upcoming sections will discuss the signaling through coercive methods and examine the signaling value of diplomatic sanctions, in particular. This topic has been extensively studied as one of the underlying mechanisms impacting the effectiveness of coercive tools, making it worthy of detailed analysis. In his articulation of coercion, Thomas Schelling notes that “*The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy – vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.*”¹⁷⁶ Additionally, as noted by Sechser, “*Coercion is fundamentally about bargaining.*”¹⁷⁷ This observation highlights the importance of communication between the sender and target states within a coercive bargaining process characterized by uncertainties regarding private information. This makes signaling of resolve and credibility a critical component of coercion.

Uncertainty is a central concept in international relations, impacting state relations across various domains such as security, cooperation, and the functioning of international institutions.¹⁷⁸ Scholarly attention has focused on understanding the sources of uncertainty and its effects on actors' preferences in international relations, particularly in the context of why states go to war.¹⁷⁹ Specifically, the bargaining approach posits that war is a part of the bargaining process.¹⁸⁰ Historical evidence reveals states engage in warfare by foregoing mutually accepted agreements, thus incurring the costs of conflict. Uncertainty about capabilities and the willingness to fight has been considered one of the underpinning factors for this consequence.¹⁸¹

Given the presence of uncertainty, the ability to credibly signal resolve becomes critical in preventing conflicts, as escalation is more likely when states are uncertain about their true resolves.¹⁸² Hence, without reliable mechanisms for credibly revealing private

¹⁷⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2.

¹⁷⁷ Sechser, “A Bargaining Theory of Coercion,” 56.

¹⁷⁸ Muhammet Bas, Elena McLean, and Taehee Whang, “Uncertainty in International Crises,” *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 15, no. 2 (2017): 165–89.

¹⁷⁹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹⁸⁰ Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2002): 1–30.

¹⁸¹ James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.

¹⁸² Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 1 (2003): 27–43.

information regarding resolves and capabilities, peaceful resolutions of conflict may not be achieved. As such, credibility becomes a critical factor in the presence of uncertainty, potentially leading to unwanted outcomes. This problem becomes more intricate because states have incentives to misrepresent their true intentions in order to achieve better outcomes.¹⁸³

In this context, scholars propose that resolved states can distinguish themselves from unresolved ones by using costly signals. Costly signals are assumed to allow a state to demonstrate its resolution by bearing the associated costs, while unresolved states do not. As Morrow puts it, the logic of costly signaling relies on the successful separation of resolved and unresolved types.¹⁸⁴ If both types could take the same actions, then distinguishing between them would be impossible. Therefore, Morrow suggests that the resolved state should undertake actions unlikely to be pursued by an unresolved state, enabling it to communicate internal information to the target and other domestic and international observers. Hence, by incurring the costs associated with the action, the resolved state can reveal its determination to escalate if necessary. In line with this, Baldwin also asserts that when a state chooses to incur costs to demonstrate the issue's significance, this action should not be dismissed.¹⁸⁵

As such, the literature on costly signaling highlights two primary signaling mechanisms. In this regard, Fearon's seminal work distinguishes between two ideal types: ex-ante and ex-post costs.¹⁸⁶ Ex-ante costs are sunk costs where the sender state incurs costs regardless of the target state's response. Military mobilization is one of the literature's most frequently referenced ex-ante costs.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, as per ex-post costs, the sender state pays the price in the future depending on the target state's response, also known as audience cost. It is proposed that leaders face the possibility of being punished by domestic

¹⁸³ Matthew D. Cebul, Allan Dafoe, and Nuno P. Monteiro, "Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances," *The Journal of Politics* 83, no. 3 (July 1, 2021): 975–91, <https://doi.org/10.1086/711132>.

¹⁸⁴ James D. Morrow, "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics," *Strategic Choice and International Relations* 86 (1999): 86–91.

¹⁸⁵ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

¹⁸⁶ Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests."

¹⁸⁷ Evan Braden Montgomery, "Signals of Strength: Capability Demonstrations and Perceptions of Military Power," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43, no. 2 (February 23, 2020): 309–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626724>.

constituents if they fail to follow through on their threats.¹⁸⁸ Hence, by threatening the target with follow-up measures, the sender state indeed ties its hands. Since the audience cost has a lot to do with the domestic political structure, it is generally assumed that democracies create higher audience costs compared to autocracies.¹⁸⁹ This is because of the roles played by democratic institutions, such as competitive elections, the existence of opposition parties, and a free press.¹⁹⁰ However, other scholars contend that autocracies can also suffer from substantial audience costs, raising questions about the democratic advantages of generating audience costs. For instance, Weeks asserts that non-democratic leaders can also be held accountable by their constituents when elites in the autocratic country manage to coordinate their strategies, and foreigners can observe the possibility of elite coordination.¹⁹¹ While these two types of costly signaling mechanisms are often studied as separate ideal types, their real-life applications exhibit both effects simultaneously. For instance, Slantchev demonstrates with a formal model that military mobilization can indeed create both sunk costs and tying hand costs concurrently.¹⁹²

In addition, Quek introduces two additional costly signaling mechanisms by expanding upon the sunk and hand-tying costs framework. These are installment costs and reducible costs.¹⁹³ Installment costs are sunk costs that will be paid in the future. Unlike the original sunk costs, which are incurred ex-ante, installment costs are distinguished by being ex-post. Yet, similar to sunk costs, they are non-contingent, meaning the costs are incurred regardless of the target state's response. On the other hand, reducible costs are incurred ex-

¹⁸⁸ Kenneth A. Schultz, "Looking for Audience Costs," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 1 (2001): 32–60; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92; Graeme AM Davies and Robert Johns, "Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 725–37.

¹⁸⁹ Robert A. Hart Jr, "Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions," *Political Research Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2000): 267–84.

¹⁹⁰ Kenneth A. Schultz, "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998): 829–44; Kenneth A. Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): 233–66.

¹⁹¹ Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): 35–64.

¹⁹² Slantchev, "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises."

¹⁹³ Kai Quek, "Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms," *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 2 (2021): 537–49.

ante but contingent on the target's response, as the sender can offset the cost in the future based on the response.¹⁹⁴

2.9 Signaling through Sanctions

Although diplomatic sanctions differ from economic sanctions in certain aspects, they still share important elements because both are non-military methods. This makes it imperative to first look at the literature on economic sanctions in order to understand the signaling values of sanctions in general. As such, the following section will discuss existing literature on economic sanctions with regard to their signaling properties and use these insights to understand signaling with diplomatic sanctions in a comparative manner.

In light of the above discussion, economic sanctions are considered one of the costly signaling methods.¹⁹⁵ It is suggested that the sender state can send new information about its commitment to the issue through the imposition of economic sanctions, thereby allowing the target state to update its prior belief about the sender's resolve.¹⁹⁶ This is in addition to the potential audience costs incurred by the sender state.¹⁹⁷ The literature appears to have a consensus on the existence of costs associated with economic sanctions for both the target and sender states. However, there appears to be disagreement regarding the size and impacts of these costs.¹⁹⁸

While sound theoretical frameworks exist regarding the economic sanctions' costly signaling mechanisms, empirical results indicate that the theoretical expectations do not always hold. This inconsistency between theoretical assumptions and empirical findings has raised suspicions about the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a means of credible signaling. In this context, Schwebach argues that the costs associated with the economic

¹⁹⁴ Quek.

¹⁹⁵ T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 27–50.

¹⁹⁶ Taehee Whang and Hannah June Kim, "International Signaling and Economic Sanctions," *International Interactions* 41, no. 3 (2015): 427–52.

¹⁹⁷ Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," 1994; Schultz, "Looking for Audience Costs."

¹⁹⁸ Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington DC: Petersen Institute for International Economics, 2007); Hart Jr, "Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions."

sanctions make it feasible to signal resolve in a cost-effective manner compared to military alternatives. Yet, because these costs are relatively lower, especially for the sender state, this provides irresolute states with significant incentives to use economic sanctions as a bluff. He concludes that the same property that renders them credible ways of signaling also diminishes their effectiveness as credible signals.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, scholars also suggest that since the sender states design the sanctions in a way that minimizes their reverse effect on themselves, this further diminishes the signaling value of economic sanctions. In this line, Lektzian and Sprecher find that because sanctions are primarily designed to minimize costs for the sender while maximizing costs for the target, they fail to act as a credible signal of resolve.²⁰⁰ Relatedly, while the costs of economic sanctions are expected to be pivotal for their signaling function, these costs, both for the sender and target, appear to be so low that they can be dismissed compared to the costs associated with using force.²⁰¹ Along this line, Whang and Kim find that economic sanctions fail to function as costly signals due to their cheapness, making it challenging for the target state to distinguish a resolved sender from an unresolved one.²⁰²

Turning back to the diplomatic sanctions, as discussed in the previous sections, they entail certain costs for both the sender and target states. When a state uses diplomatic sanctions instead of less costly alternatives such as verbal condemnation, diplomatic protests, or inducements, it demonstrates its willingness to bear associated costs, therefore signaling its commitment to the issue. In this regard, diplomatic sanctions can be seen as providing states with a cost-effective signaling mechanism to express their resolve in a dispute. Using diplomatic sanctions for the purposes of signaling resolve can also be justified based on the leaders' utility calculations. Since resolve can be understood as a determination to stand firm and take necessary actions in case of target non-compliance, sending this message at a lower cost without resorting to military force or implementing severe economic measures in the

¹⁹⁹ Valerie L. Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or Lack of Resolve," in *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice*, ed. Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (MacMillan, London, 2000).

²⁰⁰ David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 415–31.

²⁰¹ Matthew Daniel-Marion Shaffer, "Economic Agreements and Interstate Conflict: A Policy Substitution Model of Coercion," 2013.

²⁰² Whang and Kim, "International Signaling and Economic Sanctions."

first place seems reasonable. Hence, leaders may initially opt for less coercive tools just because they are comparatively cheap. This makes them a feasible instrument to be employed as an initial step within the framework of a gradual escalation strategy.²⁰³ Conversely, just like economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions can also signal that the sender lacks the determination or resolve to follow through in a dispute.²⁰⁴ By employing diplomatic sanctions at the onset, among other potential available coercive tools, states may send a signal of reluctance to engage in more aggressive measures as they initially opt for less costly actions. However, it is possible that this ambiguity can make diplomatic sanctions a critical tool, such as for the management of rival relations. Chapter 5 will attempt to deal with this ambiguity and analyze the signaling function of diplomatic sanctions in detail.

2.10 Chapter Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the often-overlooked role of diplomatic sanctions as a coercive tool in international relations. While economic and military methods of coercion have been extensively studied, diplomatic sanctions have received comparatively little attention in the coercion literature. It is suggested that this oversight may stem from a prior acknowledgment of their ineffectiveness in achieving desired objectives. Adopting Baldwin's statecraft approach, this chapter has sought to fill this gap by examining the coercive nature of diplomatic sanctions. As such, diplomatic sanctions are analyzed within the spectrum of coercion and positioned towards the less coercive end compared to economic sanctions and military coercion methods.

The applied analytical framework in this chapter has aimed to resolve the apparent paradox surrounding diplomatic sanctions. Despite being regarded as ineffective tools of statecraft, policymakers often resort to diplomatic sanctions. By viewing foreign policy decision-making as purposive behaviors and defining diplomatic sanctions as attempts to exert influence through negative diplomatic means, this chapter has intended to highlight some of the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions that affect their utility for

²⁰³ George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

²⁰⁴ Dustin H. Tingley and Barbara F. Walter, "Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 6 (2011): 996–1020.

decision-makers. In this regard, one of the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions is their relatively lower costs compared to economic and military coercion methods. While this factor has often led to their dismissal as an ineffective tool, this chapter contends that their lower cost can increase their utility by making them an attractive option depending on the pursued foreign policy objective. Moreover, their lower costs make them available to both minor and major powers. As such, diplomatic sanctions can become an important or even the only viable option, particularly for small states in their encounters with great powers. Furthermore, despite economic and military coercive methods, diplomatic sanctions have only a limited effect on the balance of power, reducing the risk of target backlash in the form of more coercive measures. Finally, diplomatic sanctions can be used for less salient and high salient issues, which is not always true for economic and military coercion methods.

Chapter 3

INTRODUCTION OF DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS DATASET

The concept of diplomatic sanction and its usage as a coercive tool is puzzling in itself, considering that diplomacy is generally understood as a peaceful way of solving problems.²⁰⁵ Proponents of diplomatic engagement suggest that states should keep communication channels open and maintain dialogue even in the most disputed issues, during which diplomatic initiatives could yield the most value. Those scholars also contend that cutting off diplomatic ties results in unintended consequences, thereby making diplomatic sanctions ineffective.²⁰⁶ Hence, the extant literature on diplomatic sanctions focusing on their consequences generally holds that diplomatic sanctions are ineffective tools in getting compliance from the target. For instance, analyzing the impact of diplomatic sanctions on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, Maller finds that the former undermines the effectiveness of the latter because of the diminished ability to signal real intentions and develop appropriate sanctions regimes thanks to the lack of adequate and private information about the target.²⁰⁷ In another study, Maller also finds that diplomatic sanctions produce adverse outcomes when employed for countering terrorism as they cause “*loss of valuable intelligence, a diminished public diplomacy capability, and the potential radicalization of moderates in the target regime.*”²⁰⁸ Overall, Maller makes a case for diplomatic engagement. In a similar vein, Krain also finds that diplomatic sanctions do not contribute to the mitigation of ongoing genocides and politicides as they solely reduce “*the flow of information without*

²⁰⁵ Berridge, *Diplomacy*.

²⁰⁶ Maller, “Diplomacy Derailed,” 2010.

²⁰⁷ Maller.

²⁰⁸ Maller, “The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism,” 512.

credibly signaling intent or commitment.”²⁰⁹ It should also be noted that Krain’s findings reveal that diplomatic engagement suffers from similar weaknesses in terms of terminating ongoing atrocities. Additionally, according to the UN’s special research report, diplomatic engagement is mentioned as a preferable option to diplomatic disengagement, as keeping the communication channels open is considered a more effective tool for encountering emerging humanitarian crises.²¹⁰ Exemplifying this rationale, no UN-authorized diplomatic sanctions are currently in effect.

Hence, there appears to be a somewhat consensus in the scholarly community that diplomatic sanctions are either too weak to be used for foreign policy purposes or ineffective in addressing key issues. Yet, as the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset demonstrates, decision-makers frequently use diplomatic sanctions despite their assumed ineffectiveness. This paradoxical situation necessitates careful and detailed scrutiny of diplomatic sanctions in order to have an in-depth understanding of their underlying mechanisms and when and why leaders use them. To do so, a comprehensive dataset designed specifically for diplomatic sanctions is needed, which can help bridge the gap between the scholarly community and political leaders and answer critical questions about diplomatic sanctions. With the new dataset, it can become possible to conduct comparative analyses by incorporating it with other available datasets, such as on conflict and economic sanctions, thereby providing an opportunity to investigate new and fruitful research areas.

In this chapter, I will introduce a new dataset on diplomatic sanctions imposed and threatened by a single state against another one between 1990 and 2010. First, I will present the available datasets in the field and discuss their weaknesses and limitations in analyzing diplomatic sanctions. Then, I will detail the data collection processes and coding procedures for each variable and also spell out some of the critical decisions I made. I will then conclude with a brief descriptive analysis of the new dataset, highlighting critical observable patterns.

²⁰⁹ Krain, “The Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions,” 26.

²¹⁰ “UN Sanctions,” Special Research Report (UN, 2013), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf.

3.1 Why a New Dataset?

At present, no large-scale dataset specifically designed for diplomatic sanctions exists. However, this does not imply that there is no data for diplomatic sanctions. With a great deal of recent research on economic sanctions, many scholars have compiled comprehensive datasets on economic sanctions, and some of them include information about diplomatic sanctions to a certain extent. However, these datasets are not compiled for the purpose of answering questions related to diplomatic sanctions. For instance, the Threatened and Imposed Economic Sanctions (TIES) database provides data on diplomatic sanctions; however, it only includes diplomatic sanctions episodes that were used in conjunction with economic sanctions.²¹¹ Hence, this dataset misses most of the cases of diplomatic sanctions that were applied alone or with other measures. Regan et al.'s diplomatic intervention dataset also offers data on diplomatic sanctions employed during civil wars.²¹² Yet, the data on diplomatic sanctions in this dataset is confined to the cases of ambassador recalls employed during the civil wars and, therefore, does not cover the imposition of diplomatic sanctions for other purposes as well as in other forms. As such, it only includes five cases of ambassador recalls, lacking many other cases. The Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) dataset also includes diplomatic sanctions cases, however, only imposed by the United Nations Security Council.²¹³ As such, the TSC does not cover diplomatic sanction cases imposed by states, thereby missing the most common form of diplomatic sanctions. Another dataset, the GIGA, covers only incidents of diplomatic sanctions imposed and threatened by the EU, the US, and the UN, thereby merely focusing on what is called democratic sanctions and leaving other incidents out.²¹⁴ In a similar vein, the EUSANCT Dataset, building upon the TIES and the GIGA datasets, contains only democratic sanctions.²¹⁵ Maller's study also provides an index of diplomatic sanctions imposed by the US, thereby missing data on diplomatic sanctions

²¹¹ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

²¹² Patrick M. Regan, Richard W. Frank, and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 1 (2009): 135–46.

²¹³ Thomas J. Biersteker et al., "UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)," *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (2018): 404–12.

²¹⁴ Felbermayr et al., "The Global Sanctions Data Base."

²¹⁵ Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman, "Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?," *Democratization* 22, no. 6 (2015): 957–80.

imposed by other states.²¹⁶ Additionally, Berridge also offers an index of incidents of severance of diplomatic relations between states with limited information on each case.²¹⁷ Moreover, there are also other dataset projects that are designed to measure the level of diplomatic relations between states. Among them, COW's Diplomatic Exchange dataset provides information about diplomatic representation and exchanges between states,²¹⁸ and it is widely used for understanding the dynamics of dyadic diplomatic relations. However, because this dataset specifically tracks diplomatic representation, it does not offer direct information about diplomatic sanction cases, including their types, reasons, and other details. More specifically, although it is possible to identify cases where there is a reduction in the level of diplomatic relations, the dataset does not provide information about the causes of these reductions. Consequently, it lacks the contextual information to determine whether these reductions are used as coercive tools in the form of diplomatic sanctions in response to specific actions taken by the target state or for other non-coercive purposes, such as the sender state's economic considerations. Moreover, it does not offer information about diplomatic sanction types other than the reduction in the level of representation. Similarly, Moyer et al.'s Diplometrics Diplomatic Representation dataset also offers information on the level of diplomatic representation on an annual basis.²¹⁹ Although this dataset includes information about ambassador recall and expulsion cases, it lacks details about these cases and does not include other types of diplomatic sanctions. Additionally, Nicklasson and Towns' GenDip dataset, which offers information on the gender classification of ambassadors alongside diplomatic representation, also suffers from similar limitations.²²⁰ Hence, none of the existing datasets and indexes provide comprehensive data on diplomatic sanctions. Additionally, most

²¹⁶ Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed," 2011.

²¹⁷ G. R. Berridge, *Talking to the Enemy: How States without "Diplomatic Relations" Communicate* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

²¹⁸ Reşat Bayer, "Diplomatic Exchange Data Set, V2006.1," 2006, <http://correlatesofwar.org>.

²¹⁹ Jonathan D Moyer, Sara D Turner, and Collin J Meisel, "What Are the Drivers of Diplomacy? Introducing and Testing New Annual Dyadic Data Measuring Diplomatic Exchange," *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 6 (November 2021): 1300–1310, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320929740>.

²²⁰ Birgitta Niklasson and Ann E. Towns, "Diplomatic Gender Patterns and Symbolic Status Signaling: Introducing the GenDip Dataset on Gender and Diplomatic Representation," *International Studies Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (2023): sqad089.

of them are designed to test specific hypotheses related to research questions that are not directly related to diplomatic sanctions.

Given the insufficiency of existing datasets, the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset is specifically designed to understand the main dynamics of diplomatic sanctions and test potential hypotheses about their use. It should be noted that the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset does not contain data on non-recognition incidents, which is a distinct form of diplomatic sanctions. This self-constraint is applied based on the fact that they are relatively less common, particularly in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the period covered in this dataset, compared to the severance of diplomatic ties. Additionally, since the two forms of diplomatic sanctions -severing ties and non-recognition might be used for different purposes by policymakers and produce different outcomes, it is assumed that combining the two forms in the same dataset might confound the variables and reduce the utility of the dataset. Moreover, despite the existence of cases where states change their decisions to recognize another state, in the majority of the cases, recognition and non-recognition cases have a static nature, showing no variance over a long period of time, making it hard to analyze quantitatively.

3.2 Data Sources

To extract data on diplomatic sanctions, I primarily relied on Nexis Uni,²²¹ an online platform providing worldwide news. Many data collection projects, such as MID dataset,²²² and Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset,²²³ have widely used Nexis Uni as their primary source of data. For each diplomatic sanction type, I carried out a keyword-based search with the alternative wording specifications. For instance, for ambassador recall, I searched for the following keywords: ambassador w/s recall, envoy w/s recall.²²⁴ Nexis Uni provides documents related to various fields under the news, company, finance, and legal categories. For the purposes of this research, I conducted a keyword search under the category of news

²²¹ It was called LexisNexis before.

²²² Glenn Palmer et al., "The MID4 Dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 222–42, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214559680>.

²²³ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

²²⁴ For the list of other keyword specifications please see Appendix A.

in order to eliminate unrelated cases. Additionally, Nexis Uni allows users to choose among different sections, such as titles, headlines, or entire documents within the newspaper article, to carry out keyword searches. I first searched the entire document; however, thanks to the high frequency of irrelevant documents, I decided to do the keyword search only in the headline section, which includes the article's headings and subheadings. By doing so, I was able to eliminate thousands of irrelevant search results and reduce the overall pages to manageable numbers. Nexis Uni also allows for the choice of data sources, yet I did not limit the data sources in order not to miss any cases of diplomatic sanctions. If many data sources provide information about the same case, I relied mainly on information provided by the Associated Press, Agency France Presse, Xinhua, Interfax, and BBC Monitoring as the primary sources. If the provided information in the news was not verified and relied only on unconfirmed reports, I did not include these cases in the dataset.

3.3 Dataset and Coding Procedures

The diplomatic Sanctions dataset is comprised of 974 cases of imposed and threatened diplomatic sanctions between states. The time period covers between 1990 and 2010. To reiterate, diplomatic sanctions are defined as *“actions one state takes to sever formal diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrade ties from the normal level of diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes.”*²²⁵ By this definition, a sanction case involves, first, a sender state and a target state. Second, the act of diplomatic sanctions should be carried out for foreign policy purposes. Regarding the first point, in order to determine state entities, I relied on countries listed in the COW's State System Membership dataset.²²⁶ Hence, diplomatic activities carried out, such as by the Vatican and other non-state actors, including international organizations, are not listed in the dataset. The reason for this decision is based on the fact that diplomatic sanctions employed by non-state actors constitute a relatively small portion of the overall incidents. Additionally, even in the cases of UN or EU-mandated diplomatic sanctions, states are the main entities that will make the ultimate

²²⁵ Maller, “The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism,” 512.

²²⁶ Correlates of War Project. (2016) “State System Membership List, V2016.”
Online <http://correlatesofwar.org>.

decision of implementation. Regarding the second point, the diplomatic actions taken by states that appear to be limiting diplomatic relations for purposes other than foreign policy are not qualified as diplomatic sanctions. As a result of this, several diplomatic actions are not included in the dataset.

Firstly, diplomatic actions taken by the sender state out of concern for the behavior of its diplomatic personnel - particularly out of duty activities in the host state or because of the allegations or accusations brought by the sender state to its diplomatic personnel, are not qualified as diplomatic sanctions. For instance, Latvia's recall of its ambassador from Estonia after he was caught drunk driving against the flow of traffic on October 24, 2007, was not included in the dataset.²²⁷ Similarly, the case where Romania recalled its ambassador to Portugal on May 31, 2009, after a Romanian court charged him with collaborating with secret police during the communist era, was not qualified as diplomatic sanctions.²²⁸

Secondly, diplomatic actions following routine procedures, particularly after a change in the sender government or expiration of the service term, are not qualified as diplomatic sanctions. Additionally, nonroutine diplomatic actions as a result of a regime change in the sender state with the purpose of removing diplomatic personnel loyal to the previous regime are not qualified as diplomatic sanctions. For instance, on May 6, 2009, the junta regime in Guinea recalled thirty ambassadors from around the world, including the US, China, and European countries, by a presidential decree after five months into the new regime took control.²²⁹ This event was not coded as a diplomatic sanction.

Thirdly, diplomatic actions taken by the sender state with the intention to assuage the target state's concerns are not qualified as diplomatic sanctions. For instance, Indonesia recalled its ambassador to Australia on June 15, 2005, after the latter's complaints regarding the ambassador's unfriendly attitudes and remarks, in order to maintain good relations with Canberra.²³⁰ This incident was also not added to the dataset. In a similar vein, states' compliance with diplomatic sanctions, such as withdrawing diplomats and recalling an

²²⁷ "Latvian Ambassador Caught Drunk Driving, Gets Recalled," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, October 24, 2007.

²²⁸ "Romania Recalls Its Portugal Ambassador," *UPI*, May 31, 2009.

²²⁹ "Guinea Recalls 30 Ambassadors, from US to China," May 6, 2009.

²³⁰ "Indonesia Pledges to Replace 'Unfriendly' Ambassador to Australia with More Personable Envoy," *IHS Global Insight*, June 15, 2005.

ambassador on the request of a sender state, is coded as a diplomatic sanction for the latter only.

3.4 Variables

Each diplomatic sanction event contains information about several variables.²³¹ The first set of variables identifies the event, the sender, and the target states, as well as the start and end dates of sanctions. For country identification, standard Correlates of War country codes are used. An event is created when the diplomatic action carried out by a sender state against a target state is qualified as a diplomatic sanction in accordance with the criteria mentioned above. If there is more than one sender state against the same target on the same issue, each action is coded as a new event. An event is considered to start when the sender makes a threat, or the sender actually implements sanctions against the target. If the exact start day of the sanction is not reported in the sources, the first day of that month is coded as the start date. In case both days and months are not available in the data sources, the start day is coded as January 1 of that year. When the start day is reported, but there exists uncertainty about it, the publication day of the newspaper is coded as the start day. A similar approach is applied to code the end dates. However, because of the unavailability of data, most of the end dates remain missing in the dataset. One reason for this unavailability of end dates might be related to the fact that newspapers and media outlets might be less interested in featuring the end of a crisis than its start.

The next set of variables pertains to the characteristics of the diplomatic sanctions. A variable is created to identify the types of diplomatic sanctions both for threat and actual imposition cases. Primarily drawing upon the TIES dataset,²³² which lists “expulsion of ambassador, recall of ambassador, temporary closing of embassies and ending diplomatic contact” as diplomatic sanction types, and also expanding it, twelve types of diplomatic sanctions are specified for actual imposition cases, and seven types are identified for threat cases. In certain situations, the sender imposes or threatens more than one diplomatic sanction against the target. To specify these cases, a variable is created for the companion diplomatic

²³¹ The full list of variables and their descriptions can be found in the Appendix B.

²³² Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005.”

sanctions, which represents sanctions undertaken simultaneously with the primary sanction. Moreover, to identify instances where diplomatic sanctions are implemented under the auspices of an international organization, the abbreviation of the international organization is provided as a new variable. Cases where an international organization urges its member states to take diplomatic action without having binding power are not included in the dataset. Additionally, the cases where multiple countries undertake diplomatic actions against the same target on the same issue are also specified with a variable. In order to differentiate between retaliatory and non-retaliatory diplomatic sanctions, a variable is created to capture the cases where the sender state undertakes diplomatic sanctions in a tit-for-tat move. In these cases, only the follow-up diplomatic sanction employed by the target of the first sanction is coded as the reciprocal sanction.

Determining issue types and issue salience presented significant challenges during the coding process. Regarding the issue types, since states use diplomatic sanctions on many different occasions ranging from territorial disputes to denial of visas, this situation makes it challenging to combine cases under similar categories. In order to overcome this very challenge, previous dataset projects have adopted either broad categories to focus on similarities between issue types while risking combining different issue types under the same category or preferred more detailed categories in order to better capture the subtleties among each issue type, this time however, missing certain similarities across issues. For instance, the MID dataset presents four possible issue types in its classification of militarized conflicts, which are territorial issues, regime issues, policy issues, and others.²³³ On the other hand, the TIES dataset presents a fifteen-category issue type variable; some of these categories include containing political influence, containing military behavior, retaliating for alliance or alignment choice, and improving environmental policies.²³⁴ Additionally, the TSC dataset offers an in-between approach to this challenge by using a nine-category issue type variable, which includes such as nuclear non-proliferation, democracy support, and good governance.²³⁵

²³³ Palmer et al., "The MID4 Dataset, 2002–2010," 4.

²³⁴ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

²³⁵ Biersteker et al., "UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)."

Although most of the issue types observed during the militarized conflicts and economic sanctions cases appear to be relevant to diplomatic sanctions cases, there remain many issues specific to diplomatic sanctions. Yet, these are hard to classify with the existing categories of issue types in the literature. This requires the inclusion of new issue-type categories. Because of concerns about keeping the analytical value of this variable while also addressing underlying differences between the issue types, two variables are created to specify the kind of issues at stake as well as issue salience. The issue type variable contains 16 categories, thereby allowing the differentiation among the cases based on their subtleties. The categories of issue types and their definitions are primarily derived from the TIES dataset in order to maintain consistency between existing datasets and also enable each dataset to speak with one another.²³⁶ Moreover, while it differs chiefly from the issue type, following Ang and Peksen,²³⁷ the issue salience variable is created to give a better sense of how the sender state perceives the issue at stake. In classifying issue saliences, a narrower categorization is adopted. As such, the following categories are included to identify issue salience: diplomatic, political, normative, military, economic, and insecurity. Finally, issue summaries are provided with a variable.

3.5 Descriptive Statistics

Figure 3.1 demonstrates the frequency of diplomatic sanctions cases over time. On average, there are 46 sanction cases per year. Four years - 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2008 - exhibit a higher frequency of diplomatic sanctions. In 1992, the international community employed diplomatic sanctions against Yugoslavia due to the latter's attack in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Out of a total of 82 cases in 1992, Yugoslavia was targeted in 33 cases (40%).

The reason for the peak in 1995 is primarily related to Nigeria's execution of nine human rights activists. In response to this event, the international community imposed diplomatic sanctions, and Nigeria retaliated in the same manner. Hence, out of 84 diplomatic sanctions cases in 1995, Nigeria was involved in 40 cases (47%) as either a sender (17) or a

²³⁶ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

²³⁷ Adrian U-Jin Ang and Dursun Peksen, "When Do Economic Sanctions Work?: Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes," *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 135–45.

target (23). In 1997, Iran became the target of international sanctions after a German court ruled that Iranian top leaders were responsible for the killing of an Iranian opposition figure in 1992. Out of 66 cases in 1997, Iran was involved in 28 cases (42%) either as a target (22) or a sender (6). In 2008, Serbia implemented diplomatic sanctions against countries recognizing the independence of Kosovo. Out of 61 cases in 2008, Serbia was involved as the sender state in 21 cases (31%). Target states did not retaliate to Serbia's diplomatic sanctions.




Figure 3.1: Frequency of diplomatic sanctions between 1990-2010 based on the data compiled as part of this dissertation project.

Notwithstanding the ups and downs in certain years, Figure 3.2 demonstrates that there is a declining trend in the use of diplomatic sanctions, particularly after 2000. This is not surprising given that, as mentioned above, the peak points in the use of diplomatic sanctions are associated with diplomatic actions involving more than one state, and the majority of these cases (157 out of 208 cases) occurred between 1990-2000. Additionally, 44 cases out of a total of 48 diplomatic sanctions, which were undertaken as a result of a ruling by an international organization, took place between 1990-2000. This is in addition to the fact the remaining 4 cases occurred in 2001. Hence, these figures reveal that joint diplomatic actions

involved by multiple states, either under the auspices of an international organization or on the basis of individual decisions, dropped dramatically in the 2000s.




Figure 3.2: Trend of the use of diplomatic sanctions between 1990-2010 based on the data collected for this dissertation project.

Regarding the types of diplomatic sanctions, Figure 3.3 illustrates that those actions involving ambassadors (i.e., ambassador recalls and expulsions) are, by far, the most frequent type of diplomatic sanctions, comprising 519 of the cases out of a total of 974 (53.28%). This is followed by diplomatic actions involving diplomats (22.99%) and the closure of diplomatic missions (8.72%). Reduction of the level of diplomatic representation compromises only 0.61 percent of the cases. Additionally, the use of the threat of diplomatic sanctions is relatively low. These figures suggest that based on the rank ordering of the sanction types in terms of their seriousness and severity, states prefer to undertake relatively moderate diplomatic actions (e.g., ambassador recall and expulsion of a diplomat) while using harsher (e.g., break-off relations) or softer actions (e.g., threat) less frequently.




Figure 3.3: Frequency of diplomatic sanctions types between 1990-2010 based on the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset.

Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 illustrate the ten most common sender and target states, respectively. Just like being the most sender state of economic sanctions²³⁸, the US is, by far, the most frequent sender of diplomatic sanctions, being involved in 66 cases out of a total of 974 cases. The United Kingdom and Russia, the two members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), follow it. Interestingly, the other two members of the UNSC, France and China, are not among the top common sender states.

²³⁸ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, “The Hegemon’s Purse: No Economic Peace between Democracies,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 1 (2008): 111–20.




Figure 3.4: The most frequent sender states between 1990-2010 based on the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset.

Thanks to the two Gulf Wars, Iraq is at the top of the most common target list, followed by Iran, which was targeted by multiple countries several times because of its human rights violations and policies supporting non-state actors. Three top sender states - the US, Russia, and the UK - are also among the top ten target states, mainly because they were retaliated against for their imposition of diplomatic sanctions. This suggests that relatively powerful states are being frequently targeted by diplomatic sanctions.




Figure 3.5: The most frequent target states between 1990-2010 based on the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset.

In more detail, as Table 3.1 illustrates, despite being in the top sender and target states list, major powers are not inclined to target one another as major vs. major dyads constitute 24 cases out of a total of 974 (2.46%). It is worth noting that during this period, between 1990 and 2010, only seven major powers existed in the system, which makes this observation reasonable. Interestingly, major vs. minor and minor vs. major dyads have roughly equal frequency (17.97% and 12.73%, respectively). At face value, this suggests that states retaliate against diplomatic sanctions in the same manner when they are targeted, regardless of the relative power capabilities. Moreover, minor vs. minor dyads constitute the majority of the cases, accounting for 66 percent of the total. Additionally, the total number of cases where the sanctioning state is a minor power accounts for 79 percent of the cases. This reveals that diplomatic sanctions are one of the foreign policy tools that are frequently used by minor powers. However, it should also be noted that since the classification of states based on power statutes is taken from the COW's System Membership Dataset,²³⁹ it does not differentiate among minor powers. A more nuanced classification of powers, which includes middle powers, might reveal interesting results.

Table 3.1: Frequency of diplomatic sanctions based on the major - minor power statuses.

Directed Dyad Type	Frequency	Proportion
Major vs. Major	24	2.46 %
Major vs. Minor	175	17.97 %
Minor vs. Major	124	12.73 %
Minor vs. Minor	651	66.84 %
Total	974	100 %

²³⁹ "State System Membership (V2016)," Online, Correlates of War, accessed July 26, 2021, <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership>.

With regards to the distribution of sender and target states across world regions²⁴⁰, Western Asia is the region where both the most frequent sender (114) and the most frequent target (155) states are located. Analyzing the regions of the sender and target states at the dyadic level reveals that pairs of 245 out of 974 dyads (25%) are located in the same region. This suggests that despite the economic sanctions and militarized dispute dyads where geographical proximity appears to be one of the important factors for determining the use of these instruments, diplomatic sanctions dyads can be comprised of states from different regions. This might be related to the nature of diplomatic relations, which is relatively less confined to geography.

Concerning the distribution of diplomatic sanctions based on regime types, a dichotomous classification of states as either democracy or autocracy is employed based on the Polity 2 score from the Polity V dataset.²⁴¹ Adopting a common approach in the field, countries with a six or higher score on the Polity 2 variable are considered democracies.²⁴² After dropping cases where one of the participants' democracy scores in the dyad are not available, Table 3.2 illustrates that democracies are more prone to employ diplomatic sanctions, comprising 61 percent of all cases, making democracies the most frequent sender states. Interestingly, democracies also frequently target other democracies, with roughly the same frequency of autocracies targeting democracies (24.0% and 24.4%, respectively). This is in addition to the fact that the cases where autocracies target autocracies are the less frequent ones among these regime-type combinations (14%). This overall pattern is telling regarding the ongoing discussions about the effects of regime types on state behaviors, particularly how democracies behave in general.²⁴³ Considering diplomatic sanctions as one of the coercion methods, this observation based on the diplomatic sanctions frequencies challenges the assertion that democracies are less aggressive in general but holds that they

²⁴⁰ For identifying world regions, the United Nations Statistics Division's categorization is used.

²⁴¹ Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, "Polity V Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018," *Center for Systemic Peace*, 2020.

²⁴² Peksen and Jeong, "Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Sanctions Reciprocity."

²⁴³ Dan G. Cox and A. Cooper Drury, "Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace and Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 6 (2006): 709–22; Christopher Hobson, "Democratic Peace: Progress and Crisis," *Perspectives on Politics* 15, no. 3 (September 2017): 697–710, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592717000913>; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

are comparatively less aggressive against fellow democracies, giving some support for the democratic peace propositions. It is worth noting that autocracies are also less likely to target fellow autocracies, implying that there is also an autocratic peace to a certain extent when it comes to employing diplomatic sanctions. It should also be noted that further classifications within democracies and autocracies might reveal interesting results.

Table 3.2: Use of diplomatic sanctions across regime types.

Directed Dyad Type	Frequency	Proportion
Democracy vs. Democracy	223	24.0 %
Democracy vs. Autocracy	346	37.3 %
Autocracy vs. Democracy	226	24.4 %
Autocracy vs. Autocracy	133	14.3 %
Total	928	100 %

Regarding the issue salience, Figure 3.6 displays that diplomatic issues are the most frequent ones in the dataset, accounting for 324 cases out of 974 (33.26 %), followed by political issues (31.10 %). On the other hand, economic and military issues (1.43 % and 7.08 %, respectively) are the less common issue types. This suggests that diplomatic sanctions might be more likely to be used on issues that are perceived by the sender states as not involving military and economic dimensions. Hence, on diplomatic and political issues, the use of diplomatic sanctions might be the first choice of states. In contrast, economic and military issues might be responded to in the same way.




Figure 3.6: Frequency of diplomatic sanctions based on the categories of issue salience.

Figure 3.7 presents the frequency of diplomatic sanctions across issue types. The *Diplomatic Behavior* category, which includes issues pertaining to diplomatic crises such as the target state's refusal to issue entry visas, forging fake passports, as well as retaliatory moves to diplomatic sanctions, is the most frequent issue type. The majority of the cases in the *Diplomatic Behavior* category consist of reciprocal sanctions (130 out of 178). Moreover, the *Support for Non-State Actors* category, which includes issues concerning the target state's policies towards non-state actors, including terrorists, assassins, kidnappers, political dissidents, or former political leaders, is the second most common issue type, suggesting that diplomatic sanctions are also frequently employed on security issues.




Figure 3.7: Frequency of diplomatic sanctions based on the issue types.

3.6 Chapter Conclusion

As the new dataset displays, diplomatic sanctions are one of the foreign policy tools frequently used by leaders for their foreign policy purposes. Although the literature on coercive diplomacy and sanctions has provided significant insights into the determinants of economic and military tools, as stated in the previous chapter, diplomatic measures have received scant attention since there is a tendency not to consider diplomatic sanctions as forms of coercive diplomacy thanks to their less costly nature. The lack of a comprehensive dataset on diplomatic sanctions has further contributed to this scholarly neglect, making it hard to analyze.

With the introduction of a new and comprehensive dataset that is explicitly designed for diplomatic sanctions, this project aims to provide insights into the dynamics of diplomatic sanctions. The descriptive analysis of the new dataset demonstrates that there has been a declining trend in the use of diplomatic sanctions, particularly since 2000. The preliminary analysis shows that the declining trend might be related to the reduction in the number of diplomatic sanctions cases involved by multiple countries against the same target on the same issue for this period. Additionally, the results show that the US is the most frequent sender state, which is also true for economic sanctions.²⁴⁴ Moreover, the figures display that minor states frequently use diplomatic sanctions against both minor and major powers. This is in addition to the fact that the majority of the diplomatic sanctions are employed by democracies, which suggests that democracies are not less aggressive in their foreign policy preferences if one considers diplomatic sanctions as a confrontational means. The descriptive statistics also reveal that leaders can use diplomatic sanctions for a broad range of issues, including diplomacy and security.

The new dataset can be used to analyze the conditions that lead decision-makers to initiate diplomatic sanctions. Among the existing few studies, scholars have examined the question of diplomatic sanction effectiveness and its outcomes,²⁴⁵ but no study has approached the conditions that lead to their employment. Additionally, the new dataset can help establish a connection between diplomatic sanctions and other coercive tools, which is

²⁴⁴ Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, "The Hegemon's Purse."

²⁴⁵ Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed," 2010; Krain, "The Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions."

lacking in the current literature. While there is scholarly attention to unveil the relationship between economic sanctions and the use of force, as this topic has been analyzed in great detail, specifically with regard to the questions of substitutability and complementarity,²⁴⁶ diplomatic sanctions are excluded from these analyses. With this new dataset, these analyses can be expanded to include diplomatic sanctions, thereby completing one of the critical missing blocks in the coercive diplomacy literature. Finally, by combining the new dataset with the existing available datasets on other issue areas, novel and fruitful research avenues can be exploited.

²⁴⁶ Morgan T. Clifton, Palmer Glenn, and Zaccariello David, “Are Economic Sanctions a Substitute for the Use of Force?,” 2010; A. Drury and Johann Park, “Mids, Economic Sanctions, and Trade: The Effect of Economic Coercion on Military Disputes,” in *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada*, 2004; Lektzian and Sprecher, “Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict.”

Chapter 4

ONSET OF DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS

The previous chapter introduces a novel Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset that covers the period between 1990 and 2010 and presents observable patterns regarding the nature of diplomatic sanctions through descriptive statistics. This chapter builds upon this new dataset and provides an empirical analysis of the factors that influence the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. While existing studies have examined the effectiveness and outcomes of diplomatic sanctions to a certain extent,²⁴⁷ there is a gap in the literature regarding the conditions that lead to their use. As discussed in the previous chapter, the absence of an appropriate dataset specifically designed to test hypotheses about diplomatic sanctions has considerably contributed to this gap. With the introduction of the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset, it becomes possible to develop theoretical frameworks and conduct empirical analyses about diplomatic sanctions. Thus, this chapter seeks to fill this gap by using a new dataset and provide insights into the circumstances under which states impose diplomatic sanctions.

To do so, this chapter will build upon the theoretical and empirical studies in two key areas of international security, namely militarized disputes and economic sanctions.²⁴⁸ While diplomatic sanctions may share certain similarities regarding the factors affecting the decision to employ economic sanctions and the use of force, they also possess unique characteristics. Hence, the peculiar characteristics of diplomatic sanctions, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, will guide the development of hypotheses specific to

²⁴⁷ Maller, "Diplomacy Derailed," 2010; Krain, "The Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions"; Maller, "The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism."

²⁴⁸ Bas, McLean, and Whang, "Uncertainty in International Crises."

diplomatic sanctions. Moreover, this chapter will also rely upon the two prominent paradigms in international relations, namely the realist and liberal approaches, in order to identify a comprehensive set of potential variables that can impact the use of coercive tools in general.²⁴⁹ Notwithstanding the competing perspectives within each approach and at the risk of simplifying these divergences,²⁵⁰ it can be broadly asserted that the realist approach places great emphasis on the role of uncertainty and power capabilities in international relations, assuming a more conflictual relationship between states, in general.²⁵¹ On the other hand, the liberal approach underlines the importance of institutions and norms, anticipating a greater tendency towards cooperative behaviors among states.²⁵² Drawing from the realist approach, this study will incorporate three key variables that are considered influential, especially in the onset of conflicts but also in the initiation of economic sanctions. These are relative power capabilities, alliances, and rivalries. Additionally, three well-studied Kantian variables from the liberal approach, which are democracy, economic interdependence, and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), will be incorporated.²⁵³ Each of these variables will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. This chapter will also conduct a complementary analysis that focuses on whether the impacts of these variables differ based on major and minor power statutes.

This chapter is organized as follows: It begins by discussing the relevant theoretical approaches and empirical findings in the literature on the use of force and economic sanctions and then develops hypotheses about the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. In the subsequent section, the research methodology, including data, research design, variables, and operationalizations, is presented. Additionally, the results of the main and complementary

²⁴⁹ Acknowledging the differences between the realist and neorealist approaches, as well as the liberal and neoliberal approaches, this study will use the terms "realist" and "liberal" respectively as the primary purpose of using these paradigms is to determine potential variables.

²⁵⁰ Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, 1998, 29–46; David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (Columbia University Press, 1993).

²⁵¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

²⁵² Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton university press, 1984).

²⁵³ Christopher C. Anderson, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Emily U. Schilling, "Kantian Dynamics Revisited: Time-Varying Analyses of Dyadic IGO-Conflict Relationships," *International Interactions* 42, no. 4 (August 7, 2016): 644–76.

analyses are reported and discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings and their implications for the literature.

4.1 Democracy and Diplomatic Sanctions

The effects of regime types on interstate relations have received a great deal of attention, becoming one of the mainstream research agendas in the field.²⁵⁴ Repeated empirical findings have revealed that there is a separate peace between democracies. Democratic peace theory, based on these empirical findings, proposes that democracies seldom, if ever, go to war with one another. As claimed by Jack Levy, “*This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.*”²⁵⁵ The democratic peace research program has typically offered two explanatory models: normative accounts and institutional constraints accounts.²⁵⁶

Normative accounts highlight the importance of norms embraced by democratic citizens in resolving their disputes through peaceful methods and the practice of compromise in dealing with their conflicts. Proponents of normative explanations suggest that by externalizing the domestic democratic norms in their foreign affairs, democracies seek peaceful resolution of disputes and political compromise in their interaction with other states, particularly with democracies.²⁵⁷ Institutional constraints accounts, on the other hand, focus on the impact of democratic institutions on the behaviors of democratic states. Advocates of institutional constraints accounts hold that democratic institutions such as electoral competition, division of powers, checks and balances, and accountability of leaders in front of the public help restrain the leaders of the democracies. One critical mechanism through which democratic institutions exert constraint has a lot to do with the leader's accountability to the public and citizens' shared interest in maintaining peace. Accordingly, it is suggested that citizens prioritize peace and stability over conflict and instability, as it serves their goals

²⁵⁴ Jarrod Hayes, “The Democratic Peace and the New Evolution of an Old Idea,” *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 4 (2012): 767–91.

²⁵⁵ Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988): 662.

²⁵⁶ Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986.”

²⁵⁷ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*.

of self-preservation and material well-being. As a result, this places limitations on leaders, curbing their potential ambitions in their foreign policy preferences.²⁵⁸

Mesquite et al. present a nuanced perspective on the institutional structure of democracies. They posit that the size of the winning coalition and selectorate in a political system shapes the leaders' policy preferences, affecting their propensity to engage in a conflict. This structure becomes critical in determining whether leaders will prioritize delivering services to the broader public or allocating resources to a small elite group. As such, in democratic political structures where the size of the winning coalition is assumed to be larger, the provision of public goods through effective policies becomes a critical consideration for leaders of democratic states. Based on this theoretical framework, they conclude that democratic leaders have strong incentives to pursue peaceful resolution of conflicts in order to avoid the economic and political costs to the public that might result from conflicts.²⁵⁹ Additionally, within the strand of the institutional constraints accounts, the audience cost theory suggests that democratic leaders are more likely to follow through on their threats due to the higher possibility that they may face considerable domestic audience cost if they renege on their promises.²⁶⁰ The theory suggests that the existence of audience cost allows democratic leaders to credibly signal their resolve to the leaders of the target state, thereby increasing the possibility that the latter acquiesce to the demands, reducing the risk of military conflict.²⁶¹ Moreover, it is also suggested that the presence of transparent decision-making procedures in democracies helps reduce uncertainty between states, thereby facilitating political compromise in their disputes with fellow democracies. This mutual transparency is assumed to make democracies better equipped to resolve their differences compared to non-democratic countries.²⁶² It is worth noting that the extensive empirical research indicates that while democracies tend to have peaceful relations with other democracies, this does not necessarily imply that they are inherently less conflict-prone when

²⁵⁸ John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 87–125.

²⁵⁹ Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (MIT press, 2005).

²⁶⁰ James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92.

²⁶¹ Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?"

²⁶² Bas, McLean, and Whang, "Uncertainty in International Crises."

compared to non-democratic regimes, thereby undermining the monodic theories of democratic peace.

Scholars seeking to understand the potential pacifying effect of democracies on lower levels of conflict have extended their research to economic sanctions. As such, numerous studies have investigated the impact of regime types on the use and consequences of economic sanctions. These investigations have culminated in the "economic peace" hypothesis. Building upon Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s institutional theory and public choice framework, Lektzian and Souva find that democracies tend to impose economic sanctions more often due to the presence of diverse interest groups who might favor economic sanctions in order to increase their wealth. However, they also find that the existence of higher audience costs in democracies, which enables them to send credible signals, along with the incentives of democratic leaders to implement successful foreign policies to maintain their offices, results in a decreased propensity for democracies to target other democracies.²⁶³ In a similar vein, Cox and Drury, building upon Lektzian and Souva's study and expanding it, incorporate the concept of sanction-relevant dyads, which consist of state pairs engaged in some level of trade. Based on these improvements, they find that, in addition to the democratic institutional constraints, the presence of shared democratic values, as well as democracies' ability to resolve their disputes quickly, contribute to the validity of the economic peace hypothesis.²⁶⁴ In another study, Wallace examines a broader time period compared to the previous studies and uses the more representative TIES dataset instead of the HSE dataset. His findings reveal that the economic peace hypothesis holds only under specific conditions. He contends that the pacifying effect of joint democracy is more pronounced in security issues, while its impact on non-security issues is not statistically significant.²⁶⁵ In addition to these studies, Drury et al. introduce a distinction between the threat and imposition stages of economic sanctions. Their research indicates that democracies are less inclined to use diplomatic sanctions against other democracies during the threat stage.

²⁶³ David Lektzian and Mark Souva, "The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and Domestic Institutions," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 6 (2003): 641–60.

²⁶⁴ Cox and Drury, "Democratic Sanctions."

²⁶⁵ Geoffrey PR Wallace, "Regime Type, Issues of Contention, and Economic Sanctions: Re-Evaluating the Economic Peace between Democracies," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (2013): 479–93.

However, if the initial threat fails to yield the desired outcome, democracies are more likely to proceed with imposing economic sanctions.²⁶⁶ It should also be noted that other studies challenge the economic peace hypothesis. For instance, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, building upon Cox & Drury's research and refining their overall research design, find that the economic peace argument does not hold when controlling for the distinct sanctioning behavior of the United States.²⁶⁷

Based on the preceding discussions and taking into account the unique characteristics of diplomatic sanctions, the following inferences can be drawn regarding the relationships between regime types and the use of diplomatic sanctions. While diplomatic sanctions can emerge as a less coercive alternative for democracies to resolve their disputes with other democracies, even the less costly form of coercion might not be a viable or preferred option for them. This might be true because, based on the logic of normative accounts, the presence of a shared norm of peaceful resolution of disputes through political compromise and negotiations may indeed reduce the use of diplomatic sanctions between them. In this regard, Dixon and Senese find that democracies are more likely to resolve their disputes through negotiations instead of "*coercive or violent means*" as they externalize their domestic democratic norms.²⁶⁸ Furthermore, the finding that democratic dyads have a propensity to de-escalate conflicts and are able to resolve their disputes more quickly²⁶⁹ may manifest itself in a decreased reliance on diplomatic sanctions as they may search to avoid escalation and prolonged conflicts. Based on this logic, I anticipate that the pacifying effect of joint democratic dyads on the initiation of militarized disputes and economic sanctions can potentially apply to diplomatic sanctions.

On the contrary, because democracies are inclined to express their disapproval of the policies against democracy and human rights in non-democratic countries through coercive

²⁶⁶ A. Cooper Drury, Patrick James, and Dursun Peksen, "Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy: The Complex Case of Economic Sanctions," *International Interactions* 40, no. 1 (2014): 25–51.

²⁶⁷ Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, "The Hegemon's Purse."

²⁶⁸ William J. Dixon and Paul D. Senese, "Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 4 (August 1, 2002): 548, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002702046004004>.

²⁶⁹ William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (1994): 14–32.

methods,²⁷⁰ it is reasonable to anticipate that democracies will employ diplomatic sanctions more frequently. This expectation is further supported by the above-detailed assertion that democracies have a greater sensitivity to the costs associated with the negative repercussions of disputes. In this sense, diplomatic sanctions may allow democracies to avoid severe costs associated with military action or economic sanctions due to the lower likelihood of the target backlash in the severe form. This makes diplomatic sanctions a feasible instrument to employ, particularly for democracy and human rights purposes. Based on this logic, I anticipate that democracies are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions. Additionally, when this is combined with the high frequency of target reciprocation to diplomatic sanctions, I anticipate that democracies are also more likely to be the targets of diplomatic sanctions.

Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H1a: *Democracies are less likely to use diplomatic sanctions against other democracies.*

H1b: *Democracies are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions.*

H1c: *Democracies are more likely to be the targets of diplomatic sanctions.*

4.2 *Economic Interdependence and Diplomatic Sanctions*

Just like the regime type, economic interdependence, the second leg of the Kantian tripod, has received significant attention in the literature regarding its impact on the probability of conflict. While some scholars have identified a positive correlation between economic interdependence and war, the majority of empirical studies indicate a decreasing effect on the likelihood of conflict.²⁷¹ The literature provides two primary causal mechanisms. The first explanation, which relies on the economic opportunity-cost logic, suggests that economic interdependence gives states incentives to resolve their disputes through peaceful methods by creating mutual economic interests. This requires states to prioritize the preservation of peace in order not to disrupt economic benefits.²⁷² Additionally, proponents of this approach

²⁷⁰ Cox and Drury, "Democratic Sanctions."

²⁷¹ William Reed, "Information and Economic Interdependence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 1 (2003): 54–71.

²⁷² John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (2003): 371–93.

suggest that domestic constituents also have incentives to put pressure on their leaders to pursue policies that support the improvement of economic ties because they benefit largely from trade and other economic activities, therefore further reducing the likelihood of hostile behavior in economically interdependent dyads.²⁷³ The second approach highlights that economic interdependence helps resolve the problem of asymmetric information in a dyad by allowing leaders to signal their resolve credibly. It is assumed that economic interdependence increases the options available to policymakers to demonstrate their intentions through non-military methods by creating new ways of conveying private information, thereby contributing to a decreased likelihood of conflict.²⁷⁴ In addition to these two explanations, other scholars also assert that economic interaction can enhance mutual understanding between states, therefore reducing the possibility of misperceptions and facilitating peaceful relations between states.²⁷⁵

To revisit the literature on militarized disputes, Norman Angell, in his seminal book, argues that the presence of financial and economic interdependence, among other factors, makes war unprofitable and equally harmful to the warring parties, thus rendering war irrational.²⁷⁶ Similarly, Polachek, by using trade as a measure of economic interdependence within dyads, finds a negative association between trade and conflict.²⁷⁷ Additionally, Bliss and Russett find that the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is stronger in jointly democratic dyads. They contend that this stems from democracies being more likely to engage in trade with one another.²⁷⁸ Finally, by building upon the opportunity-cost framework, Krustev demonstrates that economic interdependence has a decreasing effect on the duration of the conflicts.²⁷⁹

²⁷³ Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*, 1st edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

²⁷⁴ Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001): 391–438.

²⁷⁵ Jack S. Levy, "War and Peace," *Handbook of International Relations*, 2002, 350–68.

²⁷⁶ Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (1909; repr., Cosimo, Inc., 2007).

²⁷⁷ Solomon William Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 1 (1980): 55–78.

²⁷⁸ Harry Bliss and Bruce Russett, "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection, 1962–1989," *The Journal of Politics* 60, no. 4 (1998): 1126–47.

²⁷⁹ Valentin L. Krustev, "Interdependence and the Duration of Militarized Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 3 (2006): 243–60.

Scholars have also investigated the impact of economic interdependence on economic sanctions, but their findings have been mixed. In parallel with the assumptions in the literature on militarized disputes, Lektzian and Souva find that as trade dependency increases, the likelihood of using economic sanctions decreases due to the expected cost to both the sender and the target.²⁸⁰ However, in contrast to this finding, Drury et al. demonstrate that economically interdependent dyads are more likely to use sanction threats. They also find no statistically significant relations between economic interdependence and the actual imposition of economic sanctions.²⁸¹ Silva and Selden, studying European states' sanctioning behavior, find a modest positive association between economic interdependence and the use of economic sanctions. They observe that despite high levels of economic interdependence between European countries and Russia, European states still chose to use economic sanctions against Russia.²⁸²

I anticipate that the assumptions regarding the conflict-reducing role of economic interdependence at higher levels of coercion can also apply to diplomatic sanctions. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, there is a close relationship between economic and diplomatic relations. Studies have demonstrated that a country's diplomatic mission has significant impacts on its economy, particularly on exports.²⁸³ This suggests that there is a high likelihood that severing diplomatic ties can disrupt economic ties, thereby depriving both the target and sender states of economic benefits.²⁸⁴ This may lead states to hesitate to impose diplomatic sanctions. Based on this logic, I anticipate that economic interdependence may lead to a decrease in the use of diplomatic sanctions because of a potential breakdown in economic relations and the subsequent loss of economic benefits.

Based on these discussions, I hypothesize that:

H2: *Economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of diplomatic sanctions.*

²⁸⁰ David Lektzian and Mark Souva, "An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 848–71.

²⁸¹ Drury, James, and Peksen, "Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy."

²⁸² Paul M. Silva and Zachary Selden, "Economic Interdependence and Economic Sanctions: A Case Study of European Union Sanctions on Russia," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (2020): 229–51.

²⁸³ Moons and Van Bergeijk, "Does Economic Diplomacy Work?"

²⁸⁴ Rose, "The Foreign Service and Foreign Trade."

4.3 Intergovernmental Organizations and Diplomatic Sanctions

In addition to regime types and economic interdependence, studies that link liberal ideals to peace have investigated the role of international institutions and organizations, which is the third leg of the Kantian tripod, in promoting peace and cooperation between states. In this regard, Keohane asserts that international institutions can facilitate cooperation between states by providing credible information, endorsing shared norms and values, and reducing transaction costs.²⁸⁵ Moreover, Pevehouse and Russett also contend that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), which are considered as one kind of international institution, can also help states to address credible commitment problems through institutionalized monitoring, endorsement of peaceful dispute resolution through respect for law, and socializing member states to prescribed behaviors.²⁸⁶ Additionally, applying a bargaining perspective, Axelrod holds that international organizations can preclude cheating problems by reducing the level of uncertainty regarding the private information states keep to themselves through repeated and institutionalized interactions. It is suggested that regularized interactions can increase the cost of cheating by raising the risk of being punished in subsequent iterations.²⁸⁷ This is in addition to the fact that these repeated interactions can also heighten the reputational concerns of states in case they are caught cheating.²⁸⁸ Additionally, by linking different issue areas, international organizations can discourage states from cheating in that cheating in one issue area might result in punishment in another linked issue area. Moreover, international organizations can help increase the available information about states' intentions and capabilities and facilitate their communication, enabling credible signaling of intentions and resolve.²⁸⁹

Being one of the most prominent pioneers of this research agenda, Russett et al. empirically find that there is a statistically significant and negative relationship between joint

²⁸⁵ Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

²⁸⁶ Jon Pevehouse and Bruce Russett, "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace," *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (2006): 969.

²⁸⁷ Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 2 (1981): 306–18.

²⁸⁸ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (1985): 226–54.

²⁸⁹ Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (1984): 1–23.

IGO memberships and conflict, which suggests that in dyads, the higher the number of joint memberships in IGOs, the less likely the conflict is.²⁹⁰ Boehmer et al. offer a more nuanced approach by considering that not all IGOs are created equivalent; therefore, they do not have the same impacts on interstate peace or conflict. Based on this observation, they account for the different structures, mandates, and member cohesion of IGOs and find that IGOs can promote peace only when they have specific characteristics.²⁹¹ They demonstrate that cohesion among members enhances IGOs' effectiveness in promoting peace, and IGOs with a security mandate and extensive institutional structures are more likely to contribute to peace. Furthermore, Pevehouse and Russett, in their examination of the interaction between IGOs and democracy, discover that IGOs that are predominantly comprised of democratic states are more successful in reducing the risk of conflict.²⁹² Moreover, Shannon et al. show that shared membership in IGOs not only prevents conflict initiation but also decreases their durations by addressing commitment problems and facilitating the quick cessation of hostilities.²⁹³ Finally, Shannon asserts that IGOs play a critical role in conflict management processes, particularly in territorial disputes, by fostering multilateral talks.²⁹⁴ It should also be noted that while there are numerous studies supporting the pacifying effects of joint IGO memberships, other studies also find negative or insignificant results, raising questions about this relationship.²⁹⁵

The scholarly attention given to the relationships between joint IGO memberships and militarized conflicts does not apply to economic sanctions as there exists only a limited number of studies in this area. Among these studies, Drury et al. find that while joint membership in IGOs reduces the likelihood of actual imposition of economic sanctions, its

²⁹⁰ Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-85," *International Organization* 52, no. 3 (1998): 441-67.

²⁹¹ Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?," *World Politics* 57, no. 1 (2004): 2.

²⁹² Pevehouse and Russett, "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace," 969.

²⁹³ Megan Shannon, Daniel Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke, "The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration," *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (2010): 1124.

²⁹⁴ Megan Shannon, "Preventing War and Providing the Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 2 (2009): 144.

²⁹⁵ Anderson, Mitchell, and Schilling, "Kantian Dynamics Revisited."

effect is reversed at the threat stage.²⁹⁶ Regarding the positive association found at the threat stage, authors assert that states may resort to this method in order to leverage the bargaining power of threats during the negotiation process. Nonetheless, the results of their analysis demonstrate that at the imposition stage, there is a 75% reduction in the predicted probability of sanction imposition when the number of joint IGO memberships is increased from its minimum to maximum values. Additionally, investigating a specific form of institution, namely preferential trade agreements (PTAs), Hafner-Burton and Montgomery find no direct link between joint membership in PTAs and the use of economic sanctions.²⁹⁷

Returning to the discussion on diplomatic sanctions, in order to analyze the impact of IGOs on the use of diplomatic sanctions, it is imperative to consider the assertion that coercion fundamentally revolves around bargaining²⁹⁸ and that IGOs serve as facilitators of negotiation²⁹⁹. In this regard, it can be stated that while IGOs may help settle disputes between member states through facilitating information exchange and communication and therefore reducing the need for resorting to more severe coercion methods like economic sanctions or the use of force,³⁰⁰ they do not necessarily prevent members from employing alternative coercive or non-coercive methods. Member states may indeed appeal to alternative instruments, which are comparatively less severe, to bolster their bargaining leverage. Based on this logic, I anticipate that the joint membership in IGOs may enhance the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. This expectation arises from the distinctiveness of diplomatic sanctions, which are considered less coercive and escalatory in terms of provoking target backlash. Consequently, I anticipate that states may consider IGOs as platforms for negotiating their disputes while aiming to avoid an unwanted escalation. However, they may employ diplomatic sanctions to influence the bargaining process with the intention of leveraging their relatively less conflict-prone nature compared to other coercive measures.

²⁹⁶ Drury, James, and Peksen, "Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy."

²⁹⁷ Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, "Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 2 (2008): 213–42.

²⁹⁸ Sechser, "A Bargaining Theory of Coercion."

²⁹⁹ Bruce Russett and John Oneal, "Triangulating Peace," *Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, New York, 2001.

³⁰⁰ Drury, James, and Peksen, "Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy."

Based on these, I expect that:

H3: *Common IGO membership increases the likelihood of diplomatic sanctions.*

4.4 *Relative Power and Diplomatic Sanctions*

In addition to three strands of Kantian variables, studies investigating peace and conflicts, particularly within the realist school of thought, have looked at the role played by relative power capabilities. Realist tradition has offered two competing explanations. According to the balance of power approach, it is suggested that power equality between states can promote peace by way of deterring states from engaging in conflict because of the uncertainty about the possibility of an ultimate victory by either side.³⁰¹ On the other hand, the power transition approach challenges this account with the assumption that radical power differences disincentivize the less powerful side from engaging in conflict-inducing activities, as they know that winning is unlikely, therefore promoting peace instead of conflict. Additionally, according to this approach, a more or less equal distribution of power within dyads incentivizes rising but dissatisfied states to challenge the current status quo in order to enhance their status, thereby promoting conflict.³⁰² Conflict is even more likely when the challenger experiences rapid growth, paving the way for a quick catch-up with the dominant power.³⁰³ In light of this discussion, Reed suggests that both accounts embrace the notion that power parity increases the level of uncertainty, yet they differ in the interpretation of how this uncertainty affects state behavior.³⁰⁴ While the balance of power approach assumes cautious behavior from states when the relative power capabilities approach parity, reducing the possibility of conflict, the power transition approach suggests the opposite.

Early research examining the influence of relative power capabilities on militarized disputes has revealed that power parity promotes conflict, giving support to power transition

³⁰¹ Hans Joachim Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Knopf, 1985).

³⁰² Suzanne Werner, "The Effects of Political Similarity on the Onset of Militarized Disputes, 1816-1985," *Political Research Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (2000): 343-74.

³⁰³ Jacek Kugler and Abramo FK Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," *Handbook of War Studies* 1 (1989): 171-94.

³⁰⁴ William Reed, "Information, Power, and War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003): 633-41.

theories.³⁰⁵ For instance, Geller, by analyzing the militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1986, find that power parity and shifts towards parity in enduring rivalries dramatically increase the risk of war when compared to power preponderance, which is more likely to promote peace.³⁰⁶ Analyzing the power dynamics within the Asian region, Weede also finds that power preponderance is more likely to promote peace than conflict.³⁰⁷ Subsequent theoretical advancements and empirical research have provided further support for the pacifying effect of power preponderance and, conversely, the conflict-enhancing effect of the balance of power within dyads.³⁰⁸

Considering its effects on economic sanctions, Drury et al. investigate the impact of relative capabilities, measured by the CINC scores, on the likelihood of economic sanctions, assuming that relatively capable states are more likely to impose sanctions on less capable targets; however, the results do not provide support for their assumptions.³⁰⁹ On the other hand, Cox and Drury, incorporating relative economic power instead of overall relative power capabilities in their analysis, find that it has a statistically significant and positive impact on the use of economic sanctions.³¹⁰ Other scholars also find similar results when capabilities are operationalized as relative economic power.³¹¹

Turning back to diplomatic sanctions, I anticipate that relative power capabilities may not have a significant or discernable effect on their initiation. This is based on the assumption that unlike economic sanctions and military force, which may require significant resources and careful consideration of potential target responses, diplomatic sanctions are less resource-intensive and less likely to provoke severe reactions from the target. Therefore, diplomatic sanctions may not necessitate a serious consideration of relative power capabilities, making them feasible tools for both small and major powers. In addition,

³⁰⁵ David Garnham, "Dyadic International War 1816-1965: The Role of Power Parity and Geographical Proximity," *Western Political Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (1976): 231-42.

³⁰⁶ Daniel S. Geller, "Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993): 173-93.

³⁰⁷ Erich Weede, "Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition among Contiguous Asian Dyads, 1950-1969," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20, no. 3 (1976): 395-411.

³⁰⁸ Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 2 (1992): 309-41.

³⁰⁹ Drury, James, and Peksen, "Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy."

³¹⁰ Cox and Drury, "Democratic Sanctions."

³¹¹ Wallace, "Regime Type, Issues of Contention, and Economic Sanctions."

particularly for less powerful states, diplomatic sanctions may become the sole available tool when they encounter a relatively more powerful state. Lacking alternative means to counter, less powerful states may consider diplomatic sanction as their only choice even if there is an inequality in terms of relative capabilities. Additionally, the same attributes may also allow relatively powerful states to employ diplomatic sanctions with a similar frequency thanks to their less costly and escalatory nature, which makes them a viable tool for relatively powerful states to address comparatively minor issues. Consequently, I anticipate that states will use diplomatic sanctions independent of their relative power capabilities.

Therefore, I formulate the following hypotheses:

H4: *Relative power capabilities do not have a discernible effect on the likelihood of diplomatic sanctions.*

4.5 Alliance and Diplomatic Sanctions

Alliances are a critical component of international politics; however, there appears to be no consensus on their effect on conflict. Both theoretical and empirical studies have yielded competing results. In line with conventional wisdom, some scholars suggest that allies are more likely to have peaceful relations due to the convergence of their interests, particularly the ones pertaining to security, which, in return, reduces the likelihood of conflicts between members of an alliance.³¹² Other scholars, on the other hand, draw attention to the temporary nature of the alliances and contend that they help states coordinate their actions around a common security challenge and, therefore, do not necessarily carry meaning or have impacts on the state behaviors beyond this.³¹³ This line of scholarship expects no direct relationships between alliance membership and conflict initiation. In sharp contrast to conventional wisdom, Bueno de Mesquita, based on the expected utility theory, argues that allies are more likely to engage in warfare compared to non-allies.³¹⁴

Scholars offer primarily two explanations for the pacifying effects of alliances between member states. The first explanation is based on the notion that because alliances

³¹² Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, 62 (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

³¹³ Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads."

³¹⁴ Bremer.

are formed against a common security challenge, preserving the alliance cohesion and its security umbrella function becomes a matter of survival, depending on the severity of the common threat. In order not to weaken this functionality, it is commonly expected that allies refrain from engaging in conflictual behaviors.³¹⁵ Hence, it is suggested that shared security interests strengthen the need for mutual reliance, therefore reducing the likelihood of conflict within an allied dyad. The second explanation focuses on the role of alliances in providing internal information about the member states.³¹⁶ An alliance, through regular interactions, joint military exercises, and intelligence sharing, enables its members to exchange information about each other's overall capabilities as well as strategic intentions, which are otherwise private. This, in return, reduces the problem of uncertainty regarding capabilities and intentions in the relations. In addition to these two explanations, scholars also highlight the role of alliances in creating security communities among member states through mutual identification and shared norms and values.³¹⁷ By joining an alliance, states not only demonstrate their willingness to commit to mutual defense but also develop a sense of collective identity and shared interests, through which cooperation among member states is fostered while the extent of misunderstandings and misperceptions is reduced. Consequently, this helps develop a shared understanding of what constitutes acceptable behavior in resolving conflicts between allies.

Regarding the effects of alliances on militarized conflicts, Oneal and Russett find that alliances reduce the likelihood of conflict within a dyad when they are formed to commit to common security interests against external enemies.³¹⁸ Additionally, Bearce et al. demonstrate that alliances reduce the propensity for conflict by facilitating communication, increasing transparency, and providing internal information about the capabilities of member

³¹⁵ Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison and Aaron Gold, "Moral Hazard at Sea: How Alliances Actually Increase Low-Level Maritime Provocations between Allies," *International Interactions* 46, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 111–32.

³¹⁶ Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States."

³¹⁷ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.

³¹⁸ John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Is the Liberal Peace Just an Artifact of Cold War Interests? Assessing Recent Critiques," *International Interactions* 25, no. 3 (1999): 213–41.

states.³¹⁹ They also find that this effect is conditional on dyads where there is power parity. Mattes and Vonnahme's study reveals that nonaggression pacts can reduce the likelihood of conflict by increasing both the domestic and international audience costs for potential offenders.³²⁰ Finally, Kim et al., by utilizing a continuous measurement of alliance ties, find further support for the conflict-reducing role of alliances.³²¹

Regarding economic sanctions, Drezner suggests that allies are less likely to levy economic sanctions on one another due to the lower level of expected future conflicts when compared to adversaries. However, paradoxically, he also argues that economic sanctions are more likely to succeed when imposed by an ally because the allied target will be more willing to concede, thanks to being less concerned about a future conflict.³²² Unlike Drezner's claims, Lektzian and Souva find that allies are more likely to use economic sanctions. It should be noted that they use alliances as a proxy for the similarity of foreign policy between states in their analysis. However, they also note that this result is largely influenced by the US sanctions against Latin American countries, implying a distinct behavioral pattern specific to the US.³²³ Other studies also find similar results regarding the impact of alliances on the use of economic sanctions, which is primarily shaped by the distinct US sanctioning behavior.³²⁴ On that account, Cox and Drury suggest that, as the superpower, the US has incentives to use economic sanctions against its allies in order to maintain alliance cohesion.³²⁵

For understanding the initiation of diplomatic sanctions among allies, Drezner's assertion that allies are less concerned about future disputes and therefore less preoccupied with relative gains and reputation, provides a useful framework.³²⁶ As mentioned above, Drezner suggests that allies are less inclined to use coercive methods with one another,

³¹⁹ Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States," 595.

³²⁰ Michaela Mattes and Greg Vonnahme, "Contracting for Peace: Do Nonaggression Pacts Reduce Conflict?," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 4 (2010): 925–38.

³²¹ Hyung Min Kim, Jungmoo Woo, and Jae Chul Lee, "What Is the Relationship between Alliance and Militarized Conflict? Analysis of Reciprocal Causation," *Armed Forces & Society* 46, no. 4 (2020): 539–63.

³²² Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*.

³²³ Lektzian and Souva, "The Economic Peace between Democracies."

³²⁴ Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, "The Hegemon's Purse."

³²⁵ Cox and Drury, "Democratic Sanctions."

³²⁶ Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*, 50.

particularly when the potential costs of deadlock are relatively low.³²⁷ This expectation regarding allies' attitudes towards economic sanctions can be extrapolated to diplomatic sanctions, albeit with a potential divergence in outcomes. Contrary to Drezner's findings on economic sanctions, I hypothesize that allies are more likely to initiate diplomatic sanctions against one another. This expectation is based on the unique characteristics of diplomatic sanctions, which are inherently less escalatory. As discussed previously, unlike economic sanctions, diplomatic measures are less likely to provoke severe target responses. I assume that the less escalatory nature of diplomatic sanctions will be particularly more pronounced within an alliance context, where the extent of expected future conflicts, as well as concerns for relative gains and reputations, are lower. Based on this, I anticipate that diplomatic sanctions may become a critical tool for policymakers seeking to address disputes without alienating their ally and provoking an escalation. In this regard, diplomatic sanctions may offer a viable means for allies to manage their relations during periods of disagreement, providing a pathway to handle disputes while minimizing the risk of an unwanted escalation and, therefore, preserving the security benefits of the alliance. Moreover, Drezner also asserts that within allied dyads, there is a greater likelihood of the target concession due to the lower level of anticipated future conflicts and the potential costs involved for the target, making concession a more favorable option than defiance.³²⁸ If the possibility of target concession is high in an alliance context, then diplomatic sanctions could emerge as a suitable tool to elicit concessions from the ally. This could be the case because diplomatic sanctions impose less cost on the sender compared to economic sanctions, making them a more appealing and cost-effective choice for securing concessions with a lower risk of escalation. Consequently, in allied relationships where a concession is achievable, and the risk of future conflicts is low, diplomatic sanctions may be preferred as a means to achieve foreign policy objectives while maintaining alliance cohesion.

Therefore, I expect that:

H5: Joint alliance membership increases the likelihood of diplomatic sanctions.

³²⁷ Drezner, 250.

³²⁸ Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*.

4.6 Rivalry and Diplomatic Sanctions

Studies examining the causes of interstate conflicts have systematically analyzed the impacts of enduring rivalries between state pairs. The existing research has repeatedly shown that the likelihood of conflict is higher in rival dyads compared to other dyads, putting rivals at the highest risk of war.³²⁹ Subsequent theoretical and empirical advancements in this research field have revealed that particular characteristics of rivalry dyads have considerable impacts on this observed higher propensity for conflict. For instance, Thompson holds that rival states' behaviors take place "*in a psychologically charged context of path-dependent hostility,*" underscoring the importance of historical experiences and psychological factors in shaping the trajectory of rivalry relations.³³⁰ Additionally, the disputed issue giving birth to the rivalry as well as contributing to its endurance over a long period of time often remains the same, which makes any concession from either side less likely as this would amount to conceding to the root cause of the hostility. Hence, rivals are more likely to sustain or escalate disputes even if it is not the optimum strategy.³³¹ Coupled with the fact that the possibility of conflict in the future over the same or another issue is more likely between rivals, decision-making in rival dyads is also shaped by future worries. This effect is even exacerbated by the presence of a high level of mistrust between rivals about their real intentions, making any form of compromise hard to achieve and the resolution of disputes without escalation difficult.³³² Therefore, rival dyads are distinct in that the present behavior of states in a rivalry is contingent upon their past interactions, and their future considerations are also affected by their present decisions.³³³

Regarding economic sanctions, in the same study where he analyzes alliances, Drezner also investigates the effect of rivalry within a dyad on the onset and success of sanctions. Drezner suggests that, since the expectation of future conflict is higher within a rival dyad due to the factors mentioned above, this exacerbates concerns about relative gains

³²⁹ Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*.

³³⁰ Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics," 558.

³³¹ Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993): 148, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600766>.

³³² Michael Colaresi and William R. Thompson, "Strategic Rivalries, Protracted Conflict, and Crisis Escalation," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 3 (2002): 263.

³³³ Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics."

and reputation. As a result, he argues and also finds that there is a high likelihood of the use of economic sanctions in rival dyads. However, he also finds that inducing compliance from the target, if it is a rival, is less likely because the target is also reluctant to concede due to similar concerns.³³⁴ Unlike Drezner's study, Peksen and Jeong specifically examine the impact of rivalry on reciprocal economic sanctions, where the effect is expected to be more profound.³³⁵ They anticipate that the initial sanctions further intensify the existing tension and hostility, increasing the concerns for reputation, therefore making compliance less likely. Yet, their analysis does not yield any statistically significant association between rivalry and reciprocal economic sanctions. They interpret this finding in the following way: since the initial sanction results in heightened hostility in both rivalry and non-rivalry dyads, their effect is not discernable. Providing a different perspective on the relationship between rivalry and economic sanctions, Lim and Tanaka analyze the rivalry between Japan and Korea. Their work reveals that when a state levies an economic sanction on its rival, the domestic population prefers the maintenance of the external pressure despite the adverse effects inflicted on them, thereby not supporting the de-escalation of tension and termination of the imposed sanctions. Their psychological explanation, based on experimental findings, suggests that the high costs associated with the sanctions serve as a triggering factor for anger, leading citizens to support the maintenance of sanctions.³³⁶

In considering the impacts of rivalry, I expect that diplomatic sanctions can serve a unique function due to the distinctive characteristics of both diplomatic sanctions and also rivalry dyads. As discussed previously, rivalry dyads are marked by an increased likelihood of conflict, amplifying concerns related to reputation and relative gains, which could become critical in future encounters.³³⁷ Moreover, the persistent hostility between rival states has the potential to elevate seemingly minor issues to a high level of importance, thereby increasing

³³⁴ Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*.

³³⁵ Peksen and Jeong, "Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Sanctions Reciprocity."

³³⁶ Sijeong Lim and Seiki Tanaka, "Why Costly Rivalry Disputes Persist: A Paired Conjoint Experiment in Japan and South Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 66, no. 4 (2022): sqac063.

³³⁷ Van Jackson, *Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).

the risk of escalation to more severe and costly conflict.³³⁸ This is in addition to the increased domestic pressure on policymakers to respond to disputes with coercive measures.³³⁹ Given the risks of escalation associated with economic sanctions or the use of force, I anticipate that diplomatic sanctions can offer a means for rival states to take action without risking further escalation while also demonstrating a response to the immediate disputed issue. This effect may be pronounced, especially in cases involving less salient issues. Hence, considering the lower risks of escalation due to the less costly nature of diplomatic sanctions, decision-makers in a rival dyad can perceive diplomatic sanctions as a readily available option at their disposal. Based on this assumption, I anticipate that rivals are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions.

Therefore, I expect that:

H6: *The existence of rivalry within a dyad increases the likelihood of diplomatic sanctions.*

4.7 Research Design

To test the hypothesis formulated in the preceding sections about the use of diplomatic sanctions, time-series cross-sectional data, which covers periods between 1990 and 2010, is used. In accordance with the convention in the literature,³⁴⁰ directed-dyad-year unit of analysis is employed to account for peculiar characteristics of the sender and target states. The primary benefit of using directed dyadic data is that it gives control over the features related to both sender and target states, such as their regime types, thereby enabling the addition of these features into the analysis separately. The directed-dyad research design makes a distinction between cases based on the sender and target states in that the US - Canada dyad, for instance, is recorded as both the US - Canada and Canada - US for the relevant year. In order to deal with the requirement for a control group that consists of cases

³³⁸ David R. Dreyer, "Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry1," *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 779–95, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00609.x>.

³³⁹ Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics," 562.

³⁴⁰ Graeme AM Davies, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts: A Directed Dyad Analysis, 1950-1982," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 5 (2002): 672–92.

where diplomatic sanctions did not occur but could potentially occur,³⁴¹ politically relevant dyads are used by following the convention in the conflict literature.³⁴² When this control group is combined with the diplomatic sanctions cases, they represent the universe of potential cases. Politically relevant dyads are based on contiguity and major power statuses and offer a universe of state pairs where they could have a chance to get into conflict in one form or another. In order to organize the dataset in this format, the data is arrayed to include politically relevant country pairs for a given year.³⁴³ The temporal period of the analysis is determined by the availability of the diplomatic sanction onset data which records data points for the years from 1990 to 2010.

The outcome variable is the onset of diplomatic sanctions. Following the practice in the previous research on economic sanctions,³⁴⁴ and militarized conflicts,³⁴⁵ it is coded 1 if the diplomatic sanctions are initiated by the sender in the respective year and coded 0 otherwise. To determine the outcome variable, namely Diplomatic Sanction Onset, the original Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset, which is presented in the previous chapter, is employed. To briefly mention here, the Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset reports threatened and imposed diplomatic sanctions by a state against another state and, therefore, includes only the countries enlisted in the COW country list. This results in the exclusion of international organizations and non-governmental entities from the analysis. Additionally, in certain years, there is more than one diplomatic sanction case. In order to preserve the nature of the dyad-year analysis, the dataset includes only the last diplomatic sanctions that occurred in a given year. Additionally, in cases where more than one country exerts diplomatic pressure on the same target, a new dyad is created for each individual sender state and the same target in the dataset. For instance, if the UK and the US imposed diplomatic sanctions against Iran, it is

³⁴¹ Douglas Lemke and William Reed, "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 1 (2001): 126–44.

³⁴² Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke, "The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration."

³⁴³ The directed dyadic dataset is obtained from Eugene Software 3.2 by D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam. <https://eugenesoftware.la.psu.edu/>

³⁴⁴ Wallace, "Regime Type, Issues of Contention, and Economic Sanctions."

³⁴⁵ Brett Ashley Leeds, "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 3 (2003): 427–39.

included as two distinct cases, one for the US-Iran and one for the UK-Iran. As a result, there are 356 diplomatic sanction onset cases in the overall politically relevant yearly dyads.

The explanatory variables are determined as follows. To examine the impact of regime type on the use of diplomatic sanctions, a dichotomous variable is created for both the sender and target states based on their democracy scores. The democracy scores are obtained from the Polity V dataset using the Polity 2 score, which assigns a numerical value to each state for each year.³⁴⁶ These scores range from -10 to 10, with higher values indicating a higher level of democracy. Following the established convention in the literature³⁴⁷, the variable takes the value of 1 if its Polity 2 score exceeds 6, indicating it is a democracy and 0 otherwise. After identifying the regime type for each state, a new dichotomous variable called "Joint Democracy" is created. This variable is assigned a value of 1 when both the sender and target regimes are democracies and 0 otherwise. Additionally, to test the additional hypothesis about the use of diplomatic sanctions by democracies, the analysis includes two dichotomous variables, "Sender Democracy" and "Target Democracy", which capture whether democracy is the regime type of the sender and target states, respectively. Following the convention in the literature,³⁴⁸ "Economic Interdependence" variable is created by summing up the exports and imports within a dyad and then dividing it by the GDP of both the sender and target states, respectively. The variable is then assigned the lower score resulting from this calculation based on the assumption that the less dependent state has more leverage and is thus more likely to use coercive methods.³⁴⁹ For robustness check to account for the asymmetric dependency within a dyad, two variables, "Sender Dependency" and "Target Dependency", are created to capture the extent of trade dependency of each state within a dyad. These variables are calculated by dividing the total trade by each state's respective GDP. The data for dyadic trade is obtained from COW's trade

³⁴⁶ Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, "Polity V Project."

³⁴⁷ Reşat Bayer and Michael Bernhard, "The Operationalization of Democracy and the Strength of the Democratic Peace: A Test of the Relative Utility of Scalar and Dichotomous Measures," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27, no. 1 (2010): 85–101.

³⁴⁸ Russett, Oneal, and Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace."

³⁴⁹ Drury, James, and Peksen, "Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy."

dataset, which provides information on dyadic exports and imports for each year.³⁵⁰ The GDP data is obtained from a new dataset composed by Fariss et al., which utilizes a latent modeling framework that accounts for uncertainty.³⁵¹ This data is taken from the V-Dem Project's comprehensive dataset that includes data sources external to the project. To assess the impact of joint membership in IGOs on the use of diplomatic sanctions, COW's International Governmental Organizations Data Set is utilized.³⁵² The dataset has the following criteria to identify an IGO; accordingly, it must have at least three member states defined in the COW state system, it must organize regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and it must have a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters. As a result, the variable named "IGO Membership" is created by taking the natural logarithm of the total number of IGOs shared by both sender and target.

In order to evaluate the potential impact of the relative power capabilities within a dyad on the prospect of the use of diplomatic sanctions, COW's National Material Capabilities dataset is employed.³⁵³ The dataset provides values for total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure on an annual basis. Based on these values, the dataset also presents a calculated CINC (Composite Indicator of National Capability v6.0) indicator score for each state. In the analysis, a variable called "Relative Capabilities" is created by taking the ratio of the sender state's CINC score to that of the target state. To measure the effect of joint alliance membership in a dyad, a new variable named "Alliance" is created using the COW's alliance dataset.³⁵⁴ The dataset contains four classes of formal alliances between states: defense pact, neutrality, non-aggression, and entente. To briefly outline the difference between these alliance types, a defense pact signifies the highest level of military commitment from members, while neutrality requires parties to remain neutral in a conflict, and non-aggression

³⁵⁰ Katherine Barbieri, Omar MG Keshk, and Brian M. Pollins, "Trading Data: Evaluating Our Assumptions and Coding Rules," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 5 (2009): 471–91.

³⁵¹ Christopher J. Fariss et al., "New Estimates of over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66, no. 3 (2022): 553–91.

³⁵² Jon CW Pevehouse et al., "Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 Datasets," *Journal of Peace Research* 57, no. 3 (2020): 492–503.

³⁵³ J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985," *International Interactions* 14, no. 2 (1987): 115–32.

³⁵⁴ Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008*.

prohibits the use of force against alliance members. Additionally, an entente requires consultation among allies in case of a dispute, which represents the least commitment form. The alliance variable is dichotomous and coded as 1 if both countries in a dyad share at least one type of formal alliance in a given year and 0 otherwise. For robustness check, a new variable called "Defense Pact" is created in order to test whether the effect of the alliance variable changes when only the defense pacts are included. It is coded as 1 if both countries in a dyad have a defense pact and 0 otherwise. Moreover, both alliance and defense pact variables are created, this time, with the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset as an alternative measurement specification of the alliance.³⁵⁵

To assess the influence of rivalry within a dyad, a dichotomous variable called "Rivalry" is created based on Thompson's rivalry dataset.³⁵⁶ Thompson defines strategic rivalries based on three factors: competition, enmity, and the presence of potential for militarized conflict due to perceived hostilities. As such, a critical component of Thompson's rivalry definition is that it is based on perceptions held by the adversaries, which are derived from an analysis of the diplomatic history. The dataset categorizes rivalries into four types: spatial, positional, ideological, and interventionary. Each rivalry can have more than one dimension, but at least one dimension is required to be considered as a rivalry. Therefore, dyads that have at least one dimension of rivalry are coded as 1, while those without any dimensions of rivalry are coded as 0. As an alternative measurement of rivalry, Peace data, which assigns a peace score on a continuum and specifies a range of possible state relations ranging from severe rivalry to lesser rivalry and security community, is also used.³⁵⁷ As such, three dichotomous variables are created to identify potential rivalries: severe rivalry, lesser rivalry, and a combination of both, for the robustness analysis.

To deal with the omitted variable bias, potential covariates of diplomatic sanctions onset are included in the analysis. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, being the most frequent sender of diplomatic sanctions, the US might have a distinct pattern of behavior,

³⁵⁵ Brett Leeds et al., "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944," *International Interactions* 28, no. 3 (2002): 237–60.

³⁵⁶ Dreyer and Thompson, *Handbook of International Rivalries*.

³⁵⁷ Paul F. Diehl, Gary Goertz, and Yahve Gallegos, "Peace Data: Concept, Measurement, Patterns, and Research Agenda," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38, no. 5 (2021): 605–24.

which may then influence the overall results. Hence, to control for this effect, a dichotomous variable called “US Sender” is included. It is coded 1 if the sender state is the US and 0 otherwise. Given that states having any form of militarized inter-state disputes are more likely to close their diplomatic missions and recall their diplomatic corpus, a dummy variable, called “MID”, is created in order to control for a potential effect of ongoing militarized dispute. This variable is assigned a value of 1 if there is an ongoing MID in the dyad and 0 otherwise. The data for the “MID” variable comes from COW’s Militarized Interstate Disputes v.5 dataset.³⁵⁸ Additionally, to control for the potential impacts of ongoing economic sanctions in a dyad, another variable, called “Economic Sanctions”, is created. Similar to the MID variable, it is coded 1 if there is an ongoing economic sanction in the dyad and 0 otherwise. The data for economic sanctions is obtained from the Global Sanctions Database.³⁵⁹ Similarly, states are also more likely to recall their diplomats and close their diplomatic missions in cases where the target country is going through an intrastate war, which may put the security of the sender state’s diplomatic corpus in danger. Hence, to control for this effect, a dummy variable called “Intrastate War” is created, which is coded 1 if there is an ongoing intrastate war in the target country and coded 0 otherwise. The data for *Intrastate War* is obtained from COW’s Intra-State War Data v5.1 dataset.³⁶⁰

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression is used to test the hypothesis both in the main analysis and power status analysis. To address the temporal dependence in the estimations, the method offered by Carter and Signorino is followed and three counter variables for the year since the last use of diplomatic sanctions, and year squared and year cubed, are included.³⁶¹ Additionally, to preserve causal integrity and address the issue of endogeneity, all independent variables are lagged by one year, following the convention.³⁶² Moreover, the estimations are clustered by the dyad code with the

³⁵⁸ Glenn Palmer et al., “The MID5 Dataset, 2011–2014: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 4 (2022): 470–82.

³⁵⁹ Felbermayr et al., “The Global Sanctions Data Base”; Syropoulos et al., “The Global Sanctions Data Base—Release 3.”

³⁶⁰ Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War: 1816-2007* (Washington DC: Cq Press, 2010).

³⁶¹ David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data,” *Political Analysis* 18, no. 3 (2010): 271–92.

³⁶² Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, “The Hegemon’s Purse.”

assumption that while different dyads are independent, there is a dependency within each dyad over time, given the nature of the time series data. Hence, robust standard errors are adjusted accordingly. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data.³⁶³

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables for politically relevant dyads.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Diplomatic Sanction Onset	50092	.007	.084	0	1
Sender Democracy	50092	.53	.499	0	1
Target Democracy	50092	.53	.499	0	1
Joint Democracy	50092	.282	.45	0	1
Economic Interdependence	50092	.013	.045	0	1.019
IGO Membership	50092	3.595	.494	-18.421	4.654
Capability Ratio	50092	88.933	485.874	0	15933.702
Alliance	50092	.16	.366	0	1
Rivalry	50092	.023	.149	0	1
US Sender	50092	.064	.246	0	1
Intrastate War	50092	.068	.252	0	1
MID	50092	.021	.143	0	1
Economic Sanctions	50092	.1	.3	0	1

4.8 Data Analysis and Discussion

Table 4.2 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis.³⁶⁴ Model 1 includes the variables for testing the hypothesis related to the effects of regime types, along with the control variables. In Model 2, an additional variable is added to test the economic interdependence hypothesis. Model 3 expands upon the previous model by including the “IGO Membership” variable. Model 4 includes an additional variable for “Relative

³⁶³ The cross-tabulation, correlation matrix, missing values, and missing value patterns of variables can be found in Appendix C, Table 1-12.

³⁶⁴ Running relogit and probit models do not substantially change the results. See Appendix C, Table 13 for the results.

Capabilities”, and Model 5 incorporates the “Alliance” variable. Finally, Model 6 is the full model, including the “Rivalry” variable and all respective explanatory and control variables. All models include control variables to account for the potential impacts of the US’s distinct sanctioning behavior, the presence of a militarized interstate dispute as well as economic sanctions between the sender and target states, whether the target country has experienced an intrastate war, and also temporal dependence variables.³⁶⁵

The results provide strong support for the hypothesis about the effect of regime type on the use of diplomatic sanctions. The results demonstrate that the “Joint Democracy” variable is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, and it has a strong negative effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions across all models. This suggests that democracies are less likely to use diplomatic sanctions against other democracies, as hypothesized above. Hence, while democratic peace does not fully apply to diplomatic sanctions, it can be claimed that jointly democratic dyads have a pacifying effect on their use. Additionally, the “Sender Democracy” variable is also statistically significant at the 0.001 level and has a positive effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions across all models. This denotes that democracies are more likely to resort to diplomatic sanctions compared to non-democracies. This finding is also consistent with the democratic peace theory’s suggestion that democratic countries are more likely to initiate a conflict. The results for the “Target Democracy” variable are also statistically significant across all models and have an increasing effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions. This implies that while democracies are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions, they are also more likely to become the targets of diplomatic sanctions. Taken together, these findings may suggest that because democracies employ diplomatic sanctions alongside other coercive tools to promote democracy and human rights,³⁶⁶ they may be more inclined to use diplomatic sanctions in general. However, since target states can also reciprocate in kind by using diplomatic sanctions, which is not always possible for the use of force or economic sanctions, democracies may become frequent targets.

³⁶⁵ I also conducted additional models with alternative specifications of diplomatic sanction onset by excluding threats, retaliatory sanctions, IGO-supported sanctions, and multilateral sanctions separately and excluding all of them. However, the results did not change significantly. Please refer to Appendix C, Table 14, for the detailed results.

³⁶⁶ Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman, “Not All Dictators Are Equal: Coups, Fraudulent Elections, and the Selective Targeting of Democratic Sanctions,” *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 1 (2015): 17–31.

Table 4.2: Results of the logistic regression analysis for diplomatic sanction onset.

	Model1	Model2	Model3	Model4	Model5	Model6
Diplomatic Sanction Onset						
Sender Democracy	0.829*** (0.203)	0.827*** (0.203)	0.779*** (0.203)	0.779*** (0.203)	0.961*** (0.211)	1.151*** (0.217)
Target Democracy	0.693** (0.219)	0.696** (0.219)	0.668** (0.212)	0.665** (0.212)	0.825*** (0.220)	1.022*** (0.223)
Joint Democracy	-1.279*** (0.267)	-1.321*** (0.274)	-1.742*** (0.277)	-1.737*** (0.276)	-2.017*** (0.289)	-2.212*** (0.295)
Economic Interdependence		1.730* (0.819)	-0.772 (1.447)	-0.760 (1.448)	-0.911 (1.484)	-1.127 (1.301)
IGO Membership			1.308*** (0.231)	1.287*** (0.233)	1.050*** (0.226)	0.957*** (0.209)
Relative Capabilities				-0.000124 (0.000265)	-0.000155 (0.000286)	-0.000159 (0.000281)
Alliance					0.534** (0.181)	0.437* (0.186)
Rivalry						1.342*** (0.280)
US Sender	0.590** (0.208)	0.599** (0.209)	0.748*** (0.208)	0.770*** (0.217)	0.693** (0.225)	0.751*** (0.211)
Intrastate War	0.566** (0.181)	0.577** (0.182)	0.552** (0.185)	0.548** (0.185)	0.532** (0.184)	0.563** (0.174)
MID	2.121*** (0.226)	2.103*** (0.230)	1.988*** (0.226)	1.983*** (0.227)	1.920*** (0.218)	1.489*** (0.250)
Economic Sanctions	0.597*** (0.167)	0.607*** (0.168)	0.727*** (0.167)	0.722*** (0.168)	0.722*** (0.166)	0.725*** (0.158)
Sanction Years	-0.258** (0.0843)	-0.260** (0.0842)	-0.248** (0.0815)	-0.248** (0.0815)	-0.244** (0.0803)	-0.215** (0.0784)
Sanction Years^2	0.0230* (0.0110)	0.0232* (0.0110)	0.0195+ (0.0106)	0.0196+ (0.0106)	0.0196+ (0.0106)	0.0173 (0.0105)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000804* (0.000397)	-0.000811* (0.000397)	- (0.000385)	- (0.000385)	- (0.000384)	-0.000602 (0.000382)
Constant	-4.893*** (0.223)	-4.905*** (0.224)	-9.440*** (0.823)	-9.358*** (0.835)	-8.743*** (0.816)	-8.712*** (0.778)
Observations	50092	50092	50092	50092	50092	50092
chi2	382.8	408.3	435.0	435.3	413.4	426.2
r2_p	0.0879	0.0884	0.101	0.101	0.104	0.115

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results do not provide consistent evidence of the effect of economic interdependence. In Model 2, there is a statistically significant and positive association between economic interdependence and the use of diplomatic sanctions. However, in the subsequent models

where other variables are included, the coefficients become negative, offering partial support for the hypothesis. Nevertheless, this negative association does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels.³⁶⁷ Hence, considering the results of the full model, namely Model 6, it suggests that there is no statistically significant association between economic interdependence and diplomatic sanctions. The initial hypothesis was that because diplomatic sanctions have the potential to inflict considerable economic distress on both the sender and target states by disrupting economic relations, I anticipated that states would refrain from using them in order not to risk benefits derived from the ongoing economic interactions. However, the results do not support this assumption. It is worth noting that the impact of diplomatic sanctions on economic ties may vary depending on the type and severity of the diplomatic sanctions employed. It can be assumed that the negative effects of diplomatic sanctions may be more pronounced in cases where more severe sanctions are employed. In other words, while recalling a diplomat alone may not necessarily have a discernible effect on economic interactions, thereby attenuating the impact of economic interdependence, the closure of a diplomatic mission or the complete severance of diplomatic relations might exert significant economic damage. Consequently, the absence of an observed effect may be attributable to the varying degrees and types of diplomatic sanctions and their differing repercussions on economic relations.

Regarding the effects of joint IGO membership, the results provide strong support for the initial hypothesis, which anticipated an increasing effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions as the joint IGO membership variable is positively associated with the use of diplomatic sanctions. Although the inclusion of other variables reduces the coefficients of the “IGO Membership” variable, it remains statistically significant at the 0.001 level across all models. While a careful exploration of the causal mechanisms explaining this relationship is required, I anticipated this effect based on the logic that states may perceive IGOs as platforms to negotiate their disputes with the aim of getting the most favorable outcome while also preventing an escalation to higher levels of conflict. To achieve these seemingly competing objectives, states may view diplomatic sanctions as a less confrontational

³⁶⁷ Running the model with the Sender Dependency and Target Dependency variables do not substantially change the results. See Appendix C, Table 15.

alternative to employ during the negotiation process to increase their bargaining leverage, thereby utilizing them to achieve desired outcomes and signal their intentions. Therefore, the observed positive association may be attributed to the comparatively less conflict-prone nature of diplomatic sanctions in contrast to other coercive measures, which may make them an appealing tool within the context provided by IGOs.

The results for the “Relative Capabilities” variable lend support to the initial expectations regarding the indiscernible effect of relative power capabilities on the use of diplomatic sanctions. The variable has a negative sign across all models, yet it does not reach statistical significance at the conventional levels. This result suggests that the sender state's power capabilities relative to the target do not have a significant impact on the decision to use diplomatic sanctions. To better understand the effect of relative power capabilities, a separate analysis is conducted with the full model. In this analysis, a new variable is created to capture the overall power parity within a dyad, therefore disregarding its direction. This variable is obtained by taking the CINC score of the more powerful side within a dyad and dividing it by the lower score.³⁶⁸ However, once again, the results are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that relative power capabilities are not good predictors of diplomatic sanctions. Based on this result, it can be inferred that states do not appear to take power capabilities into consideration when deciding to use diplomatic sanctions. As stated in the hypotheses section, this may be related to the fact that diplomatic sanctions do not require the sender state to have tremendous material and economic capabilities to employ and that a target response in the form of harsher measures is less likely compared to other coercive measures. This may result in the sender state being less concerned about relative power capabilities.

Considering the alliance variable, the results support the initial expectation that it has an increasing effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions, as indicated by its positive coefficient across the models. While it varies between the two models, it is also statistically significant at conventional levels. Given this, as elaborated in the hypothesis section, one possible explanation could be that due to the lower level of expectations of a future conflict as well as

³⁶⁸ The results of the logistic regression with the alternative operationalization of relative power capabilities can be found in Appendix C, Table 16.

reduced concerns for reputational factors, allies may become predisposed to use diplomatic sanctions without worrying about the possibility of an escalation of a dispute. This may be true because, within the alliance context, states may view diplomatic sanctions as a tool that does not potentially disrupt alliance ties while still allowing them to express their stance in a dispute. However, it should also be noted that rerunning the model with the defense pact variable changes the results as the positive effect loses its statistical significance. This suggests that although diplomatic sanctions can be employed more frequently between allies in general, the existence of defense pacts, which denotes the highest level of military commitment, between states appears to have neither increasing nor decreasing effect on their use. To better account for this result, further research is needed.³⁶⁹

The results for the “Rivalry” variable demonstrate that it has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that the likelihood of diplomatic sanctions is higher in rivalry dyads.³⁷⁰ This result is consistent with the initial hypothesis. I anticipated this effect based on the logic that because the likelihood of experiencing a militarized conflict is high in rivalry dyads and the escalation of even seemingly minor issues to higher levels of conflict is also more likely due to the persistence of historical hostilities and domestic public pressures, leaders of rival states need alternative mechanisms to manage this intricate situation. In such a strategic setting, thanks to their less confrontational nature, diplomatic sanctions may appear as a less risky and escalatory alternative to other coercive tools for rival states. As such, rivals may view diplomatic sanctions as a measure to employ without triggering a harsher response from the adversary, thus avoiding the risk of conflict escalation while also expressing their disapproval.

Regarding the control variables, the “US Sender” variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions across all models.³⁷¹ This

³⁶⁹ Please refer to Appendix C, Table 17 for the results. Additionally, running the model with the alternative specifications of the alliance and defense pact variables based on the ATOP dataset produces negative but statistically insignificant effects.

³⁷⁰ Conducting the analysis with the alternative measurements of rivalry do not substantially change the results. See Appendix C, Table 18.

³⁷¹ I ran additional models by replacing the US sender variable with the other permanent member states of the UNSC, namely Russia, China, the UK, and France. The results show that only the “Russia Sender” variable has a statistically significant and positive coefficient. Please see Appendix C, Table 19 for the results.

result aligns with the findings in the economic sanctions literature, as the United States, being the world's dominant power in terms of military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities during the analyzed period, is predisposed to using diplomatic sanctions frequently as a foreign policy tool. The "MID" variable is also statistically significant, with a positive sign across all models. This indicates that the presence of a militarized interstate conflict within a dyad is likely to increase the use of diplomatic sanctions. Similarly, the "Economic Sanctions" variable also has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that the presence of economic sanctions has an increasing effect on the use of diplomatic sanctions. It should be noted that, like other variables, the "MID" and "Economic Sanctions" variables are lagged by one year to address the issue of reverse causality. The "Intrastate War" variable also exhibits a positive relationship and is statistically significant in all models, suggesting that countries experiencing intrastate conflicts are more likely to be the targets of diplomatic sanctions. This effect may stem from the sender state's security concerns regarding its diplomatic corps and missions, as discussed in the previous section. Additionally, it could be interpreted as a manifestation of the sender state's disapproval of the internal affairs of the target country.

It is also important to demonstrate the substantial impacts of these variables on the use of diplomatic sanctions. To do so, the predicted probabilities of diplomatic sanctions onset for statistically significant variables in the full model and their marginal effects are calculated and reported. Predicted probabilities are calculated by setting all temporal dependence variables to zero, continuous variables to their mean values, and dichotomous variables to their most frequent values.³⁷² Regarding the dichotomous variables, the most frequent values are 1 for the "Sender Democracy" and "Target Democracy" variables and 0 for the rest. Before elaborating on the results, it should be noted that the following raw probabilities can be considered too small. However, this is a common pattern in rare events data, given that diplomatic sanctions cases constitute only a minor portion of all cases in the determined universe. In this regard, instead of looking at the absolute percent changes in probabilities, it is imperative to adopt a comparative perspective as it gives a better sense of

³⁷² Predicted probabilities are calculated by using the margins command in Stata.

the substantial effects. As such, Table 4.3 demonstrates the predicted probabilities for the combination of regime types within dyads.

Table 4.3: Predicted probabilities of diplomatic sanction onset by regime-type combinations.

Variables	Democracy vs. Democracy	Democracy vs. Autocracy	Autocracy vs. Democracy	Autocracy vs. Autocracy
Constant	0.00479*** (0.00101) 0.00280 - 0.00677	0.0156*** (0.00273) 0.0102 - 0.0209	0.0137*** (0.00266) 0.00849 - 0.0189	0.00497*** (0.00109) 0.00283 - 0.00712
Observations	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Predicted probabilities are calculated by setting all temporal dependence variables to zero, continuous variables to their means, and dichotomous variables to their most frequent values.

Starting with the democratic senders, the results demonstrate that the predicted probability of diplomatic sanctions onset when a democracy targets another democracy is 0.004. However, the predicted probability increases to 0.015 when a democracy targets an autocracy. This suggests that a democracy's use of diplomatic sanctions against another democracy is nearly four times (0.015/0.004) less likely compared to its use against an autocracy. When looking at autocratic senders, the results are intriguing as autocracies also demonstrate a similar pattern, where their targeting of fellow autocracies is less probable compared to democracies. As such, the predicted probability of diplomatic sanctions onset when an autocracy targets another autocracy is 0.004, which increases to 0.013 when targeting a democracy. Taken together, these findings reveal that in both democracy-democracy dyads and autocracy-autocracy dyads, the probability of diplomatic sanctions is low. This result suggests that in addition to the pacifying effects of joint democracy dyads, it appears that there is an autocratic peace when it comes to deploying diplomatic sanctions.

Table 4.4: Predicted probabilities of diplomatic sanction onset for the remaining dichotomous variables

Variables	(1) Alliance	(2) Rivalry	(3) US Sender	(4) Intrastate War	(5) MID	(6) Economic Sanctions
Constant	0.00739*** (0.00192) 0.00363 - 0.0111	0.0181*** (0.00623) 0.00586 - 0.0303	0.0101*** (0.00264) 0.00490 - 0.0153	0.00838*** (0.00214) 0.00418 - 0.0126	0.0209*** (0.00746) 0.00626 - 0.0355	0.00983*** (0.00228) 0.00537 - 0.0143
Observations	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Predicted probabilities are calculated by setting all temporal dependence variables to zero, continuous variables to their means, and dichotomous variables to their most frequent values.

Considering other statistically significant explanatory variables, Table 4.4 reports the predicted probability of diplomatic sanction onset when the respective binary variables are kept at 1 while holding other variables at their specified values. Additionally, Table 4.5 presents the marginal effects of statistically significant dichotomous variables when the respective variable is changed from 0 to 1 while again holding other variables at their specified values.

Taken together these two tables, the results demonstrate that the probability of diplomatic sanction onset when states are part of an alliance in a dyad is 0.007, which implies a 0.002 percentage point increase compared to non-allied dyads. Hence, a shared alliance appears to increase the probability of diplomatic sanctions by 54%. Considering the rivalry, the predicted probability of diplomatic sanctions is 0.018 when states in a dyad are rivals. Compared to the baseline probability, this represents a 0.013 percentage point increase, suggesting that the presence of a rivalry increases the probability of diplomatic sanctions by 277%. Looking at the control variables, the results suggest that when the sender state is the US, the probability of diplomatic sanctions increases by 110%. The presence of intrastate

war in the target country increases the probability by 75%, while the presence of MID and economic sanctions in the dyad increases the probability by 335% and 105%, respectively.

Table 4.5: Changes in the probabilities of diplomatic sanction onset.

Variables	Alliance	Rivalry	US Sender	Intrastate War	MID	Economic Sanctions
Constant	0.00260* (0.00139) -0.000125 - 0.00533	0.0133** (0.00568) 0.00216 - 0.0244	0.00530** (0.00215) 0.00108 - 0.00952	0.00359** (0.00154) 0.000563 - 0.00662	0.0161** (0.00673) 0.00290 - 0.0293	0.00504*** (0.00165) 0.00181 - 0.00828
Observations	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092	50,092

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The baseline probability is calculated by setting all temporal dependence variables to zero, continuous variables to their means, and dichotomous variables to their most frequent values. First differences are calculated by changing dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.

For the continuous “Joint IGO Membership” variable, the marginal effect is calculated by changing the variable from its mean value to one standard deviation above the mean. Hence, Figure 4.1 demonstrates the results of the predicted probabilities of diplomatic sanctions for Joint IGO Membership.³⁷³ It demonstrates that the predicted probability increases to 0.008 from the baseline value of 0.005. This suggests a 60% increase in the probability of diplomatic sanction onset.

³⁷³ Please refer to Appendix C, Table 20 to see the results in table format.



Figure 4.1: Marginal effects of the Joint IGO Membership on probabilities of diplomatic sanction onset.

4.9 Diplomatic Sanctions Onset and Power Statuses

Table 4.6 presents the results of the logistic regression estimates with the full model specifications, which includes all potential explanatory and control variables and also takes into account different combinations of power statuses within a dyad. The primary purpose of conducting this analysis lies in the belief that the effects of the variables tested in the previous part may be contingent upon the composition of the dyads based on their power statuses. There are theoretically motivated reasons to assume that the behaviors of major powers differ significantly from those of minor powers.³⁷⁴ Major powers, having the willingness and opportunity to employ different sets of foreign policy tools that may not be fully available to other powers due to their overall national capabilities, may exhibit distinct characteristics. However, as discussed previously, diplomatic sanctions appear to be equally available to

³⁷⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (WW Norton & Company, 2001).

minor powers. This might require considering potential differences between major and minor powers in analyzing the effects of these variables.

Table 4.6: Logistic regression results based on power statuses.

	Major Sender	Major vs. Minor	Major vs. Major	Minor Sender	Minor vs. Minor	Minor vs. Major
Diplomatic Sanction Onset						
Sender	0.777*	0.752 ⁺	14.39***	1.282***	1.460***	0.796*
Democracy	(0.379)	(0.386)	(1.067)	(0.258)	(0.328)	(0.398)
Target	0.875*	0.515	15.71***	1.059***	0.828*	0.925*
Democracy	(0.405)	(0.429)	(1.220)	(0.278)	(0.395)	(0.410)
Joint Democracy	-2.281***	-1.900***	-16.42***	-2.140***	-1.505**	-2.591***
	(0.486)	(0.526)	(1.094)	(0.378)	(0.504)	(0.572)
Economic	-2.789	-1.604	-1.121	0.0792	-1.507	-0.537
Interdependence	(2.824)	(3.125)	(3.736)	(1.068)	(1.728)	(3.576)
IGO Membership	1.296***	1.076***	-1.509	0.675*	0.435	0.820 ⁺
	(0.293)	(0.275)	(2.706)	(0.276)	(0.385)	(0.438)
Relative	-0.000202	-0.000183	-0.258*	-0.0191 ⁺	-0.0357*	0.766**
Capabilities	(0.000332)	(0.000309)	(0.109)	(0.0109)	(0.0157)	(0.277)
Alliance	-0.0917	0.0684	-1.147	0.748**	0.0671	1.569***
	(0.332)	(0.366)	(0.818)	(0.246)	(0.259)	(0.378)
Rivalry	0.819	1.572**	-0.831	1.445***	1.499***	1.679***
	(0.736)	(0.550)	(0.710)	(0.324)	(0.318)	(0.380)
US Sender	0.955***	0.950***	1.252 ⁺	0	0	0
	(0.228)	(0.247)	(0.657)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Intrastate War	0.465 ⁺	0.540*	0.162	0.630**	0.522	0.371
	(0.259)	(0.271)	(0.546)	(0.243)	(0.343)	(0.367)
MID	1.668**	1.663**	1.160**	1.330***	1.177**	1.485**
	(0.338)	(0.416)	(0.430)	(0.333)	(0.382)	(0.454)
Economic	0.484*	0.477*	-0.344	0.902***	1.282**	0.604*
Sanctions	(0.214)	(0.229)	(0.722)	(0.229)	(0.408)	(0.256)
Sanction Years	-0.0965	-0.191	0.829**	-0.290**	-0.288	-0.260
	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.318)	(0.110)	(0.193)	(0.178)
Sanction Years^2	0.00402	0.0189	-0.110**	0.0265 ⁺	0.0284	0.0224
	(0.0147)	(0.0157)	(0.0402)	(0.0149)	(0.0464)	(0.0223)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000210	-0.000761	0.00362*	-0.000890	-0.000809	-0.000731
	(0.000532)	(0.000576)	(0.00142)	(0.000545)	(0.00279)	(0.000752)
Constant	-9.630***	-8.821***	-12.84	-7.833***	-6.637***	-8.289***
	(1.085)	(1.015)	(9.738)	(1.025)	(1.499)	(1.496)
Observations	21881	21041	840	28211	7170	21041
chi2	219.7	169.7	460.0	257.9	149.3	157.7
r2_p	0.105	0.0947	0.219	0.133	0.177	0.0956

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Power statuses are obtained from Eugene software, which is determined based on the COW's State System Membership dataset.³⁷⁵ Accordingly, during the period between 1990 and 2010, the following states were considered major powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Germany and Japan have been added to the list since 1991. The rest of the states are coded as minor powers. It is worth noting that there were only 840 major - major power dyads during this period due to the existence of only a handful of major powers, and only 24 of them experienced diplomatic sanctions during this period.³⁷⁶ Based on this, while the presented results may not be highly reliable for major - major power dyads, they are included in the analysis with the hope that they provoke thought and stimulate further discussion.

With regard to the “Sender Democracy” variable, the results of the power statuses analysis are consistent with the findings in the main analysis, as it has positive and statistically significant results at different levels across all power status combinations. This suggests that regardless of the sender and target states’ power statuses, democracies are more likely to implement diplomatic sanctions. This result further strengthens the robustness of the findings for the “Sender Democracy” variable in the main analysis. Additionally, the “Target Democracy” variable has a positive association with the use of diplomatic sanctions across all potential power status combinations, except the Major vs. Minor power dyads. It has a statistically significant effects at the levels ranging from 0.1 to 0.001. The results indicate that while being a democracy increases the probability of facing a diplomatic sanction, this effect is not significant when the sender state is a major power and the target is a minor power. Considering the “Joint Democracy” variable, the results in the main analysis are supported across all combinations in this analysis, as it is statistically significant at varying degrees and has a negative relationship with the use of diplomatic sanctions. This suggests that the pacifying effects of jointly democratic dyads are significant, independent of the power statuses.

³⁷⁵ Correlates of War Project. 2017. “State System Membership List, v2016.” Online, <http://correlatesofwar.org>

³⁷⁶ Please see Appendix C, Table 10 for cross tabulation.

In line with the main analysis, the “Economic Interdependence” variable has a negative effect across all power status combinations except for minor senders. Yet, none of them reach statistical significance at the conventional levels. The positive and statistically significant effects of the “Joint IGO Membership” variable in the main analysis appear to vary based on the power status combinations. While it has a positive sign across all combinations, except for major-major power dyads, it fails to reach statistical significance in major-major and minor-minor power dyads. Therefore, the results suggest that the increasing effect of joint IGO membership on the use of diplomatic sanctions does not apply when a major power faces another major power, as well as when a minor power faces another minor power. However, its effect is robust when the dyad consists of major and minor powers.

The results of the “Relative Capabilities” variable present intriguing findings. The negative and insignificant results obtained in the main analysis appear to change with the power status combinations. Accordingly, while it maintains the negative sign, it becomes statistically significant in major-major and minor-minor dyads. This implies that the sender states do indeed take relative power capabilities into consideration when they face a state with the same power statuses, which is contrary to the findings in the main analysis. Moreover, its effect on the onset of diplomatic sanctions becomes positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in minor-major dyads. This suggests that minor powers, when they have a relatively smaller power gap with the target major power, are more likely to employ diplomatic sanctions. However, it should also be noted that because power statuses are a function of states’ power capabilities, the results of this analysis should be approached with caution.

The results for the “Alliance” variable indicate that the positive and statistically significant effect in the main analysis appears to lose its significance, except for the minor sender state and minor-major dyads. This suggests that the observed positive effect in the main analysis is primarily driven by the behaviors of minor powers when they face a major power in the alliance context. Regarding the “Rivalry” variable, its positive effect becomes insignificant for major power senders and major-major power dyads, while it still applies to other dyads. This implies that, except between major powers, rivalry seems to increase the probability of the use of diplomatic sanctions.

4.10 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the potential factors influencing the decisions to initiate diplomatic sanctions. To achieve this, a new dataset covering the threat and imposition of diplomatic sanctions between 1990 and 2010 has been utilized. Given the scarcity of literature on the onset of diplomatic sanctions, two dominant paradigms in the field of international relations—the realist and liberal approaches—have been employed to determine potential variables that may have impacts. Consequently, regime type, economic interdependence, joint IGO membership, relative power capabilities, alliances, and rivalries are included in the analysis.

The results of the analysis have revealed significant insights into the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. Firstly, in support of the democratic peace and economic peace hypotheses, democracies appear to be less likely to employ diplomatic sanctions against other democracies. This finding holds across all models and is robust. Additionally, the results indicate that democracies are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions and become targets of such sanctions. It should be noted that while the analyses provide strong support for these hypotheses, further scrutiny is necessary to determine the exact causal mechanisms linking regime type to diplomatic sanctions. Secondly, contrary to theoretical expectations, economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on the onset of diplomatic sanctions. This result remains unchanged even when controlling for the power status of states. One possible explanation for this outcome is that while severing diplomatic relations may entail some costs for the sender, these costs may not be significant enough for states to consider or, alternatively, might be contingent upon the severity of the employed sanction. Thirdly, the results confirmed that there is a positive relationship between the joint IGO membership and the onset of diplomatic sanctions. It is noteworthy that the effects of joint IGO membership vary depending on the power statuses of the sender and target states, becoming insignificant for major-major and minor-minor dyads.

Fourthly, while the results of the main analysis provide some support for the hypothesis that expects an indiscernible effect of relative power capabilities on the use of diplomatic sanctions, as the variable fails to reach statistical significance, it exhibits a complex pattern in the complementary power status analysis. This requires further scrutiny

in future research. Fifthly, the presence of alliance ties is positively correlated with the onset of diplomatic sanctions, which confirms the theoretical reasoning. In the power statuses analysis, this positive effect seems to be driven by the behavior of minor powers. Finally, the results also provide strong support for theoretical expectations regarding the effects of rivalry, indicating an increasing impact on the initiation of sanctions. However, the power status analysis suggests that this effect is primarily shaped by the involvement of minor powers in the dyad, whether as senders or targets.

Overall, the results demonstrate that while certain theoretical expectations derived from the literature apply to diplomatic sanctions, others do not. This suggests that when employing diplomatic sanctions, states' considerations differ from those involved in other coercive tools. It is also important to keep in mind that diplomatic sanctions are not employed in isolation; they may be used in combination with other coercive tools. This necessitates further investigation into the use of diplomatic sanctions in conjunction with other coercive tools.

Chapter 5

INTERPLAY BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, AND USE OF FORCE

This chapter aims to analyze the interplay between diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and the use of force in foreign policy. As presented in the previous chapters, diplomatic sanctions are frequently employed by decision-makers for various purposes and over issues ranging from high to less salient. However, it remains unclear whether the use of diplomatic sanctions can predict the sender state's resort to more severe forms of coercion in subsequent encounters, potentially functioning as a means of escalation. Understanding this functionality is important in order to have better insights into the signaling value of diplomatic sanctions. In this regard, the primary research question to be addressed in this chapter is whether the use of diplomatic sanctions increases the likelihood of the sender state's use of economic sanctions and military force or not. Second, by adopting a targeted approach, this chapter also intends to understand the relationships between these coercive tools by focusing specifically on strategic rivalries, where the risk of escalation is higher compared to non-rivalry dyads. These analyses, taken together, can help establish as to whether the use of diplomatic sanctions shows differences depending on the strategic context and also better observe the signaling function of diplomatic sanctions and their intended usage by decision-makers in different contextual settings.

Interstate militarized conflicts are among the foremost concerns in international relations due to their high potential for inflicting enormous material, economic, and humanitarian costs. Consequently, they have received significant attention in the field, with particular attention given to understanding the underlying causes that lead to their

eruptions.³⁷⁷ However, early theoretical and empirical research on militarized disputes, particularly on their onset, has remained notably isolated because studies have commonly treated the nonmilitary measures employed before the eruption of armed disputes as something that does not have a direct bearing on them.³⁷⁸ This approach has resulted in an inability to better understand the entire trajectory leading to militarized disputes. In order to overcome this limitation in the existing research, a burgeoning research agenda has emerged to understand the impacts of the use of economic sanctions on the subsequent militarized conflicts.³⁷⁹ Several studies reveal that economic sanctions are escalatory in that they possibly increase the risk of using force in ensuing episodes.³⁸⁰ While these research efforts have significantly contributed to our understanding of the relationship between one form of non-military coercive method, namely economic sanctions, and the use of force, we still do not know the impacts of diplomatic sanctions on both economic sanctions and the use of force. This creates a significant gap in our knowledge of how coercive diplomacy works in its entirety.³⁸¹ Hence, this chapter aims to make a critical contribution to the ongoing discussion in the literature regarding the relationship between economic sanctions and the use of force in achieving foreign policy objectives by incorporating diplomatic sanctions, one of the key missing dimensions, into the discussion.

In this chapter, I contend that diplomatic sanctions can be used as part of a gradual escalation strategy. When there is uncertainty about the adversary's resolve and capabilities in a dispute, states may resort to various coercive methods, especially in the early stages, to signal their determination to the disputed issue. However, because they are constrained by

³⁷⁷ Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads"; Slantchev, "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises"; Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States"; Michael A. Allen and Benjamin O. Fordham, "From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More Powerful States," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (2011): 1025–45.

³⁷⁸ Drury and Park, "Mids, Economic Sanctions, and Trade"; Venteicher II, "What Economic Sanctions Signal."

³⁷⁹ Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion"; Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict"; David H. Clark and William Reed, "The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 609–24; Peterson and Drury, "Sanctioning Violence"; Hyung Min Kim, "Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Militarized Conflict Focusing on Reciprocal Causation," *Defence and Peace Economics* 31, no. 5 (2020): 532–49; Venteicher II, "What Economic Sanctions Signal."

³⁸⁰ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

³⁸¹ George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

the availability of resources and also wary of the potential repercussions of costly and risky actions, leaders have incentives to employ the least costly and risky measures, if possible, in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives.³⁸² This is in addition to the fact that the evolving international norm of peaceful dispute resolution since the Second World War has made non-military measures more acceptable ways of conducting business in international relations.³⁸³ Therefore, under these circumstances, leaders may opt for increasing pressure gradually to address an ongoing dispute due to concerns about cost-effectiveness and evolving international norms. In this context, diplomatic sanctions may signal that more coercive measures will follow unless the target complies with the sender's demands or adjusts its policies accordingly. I also assume that even if the use of diplomatic sanctions fails to yield the desired outcome and leaders are aware of this, it is still logical for leaders to use diplomatic sanctions at the onset due to the possibility of settling the dispute without paying higher costs, even if that possibility is slight.

However, I also contend that diplomatic sanctions may serve a distinct function in rivalry dyads, which are characterized by a higher likelihood of militarized disputes stemming from enduring competition and hostilities.³⁸⁴ In such dyads, seemingly trivial issues can lead to potential escalation, making the use of costly measures risky and dangerous. Despite these challenges, rivalry dyads possess a critical attribute: the existence of a relatively low level of uncertainty about each other's resolves and capabilities compared to non-rivalry dyads, thanks to the repeated encounters, interactions, and, more importantly, experienced militarized disputes in the past.³⁸⁵ Consequently, leaders of rival states may prefer alternative methods that allow them to respond cautiously to their adversaries without risking further escalation, particularly on issues that can be considered less salient. Given this rationale, I anticipate that leaders of rival states employ diplomatic sanctions primarily to signal the intent of de-escalation when the imperative to demonstrate resolve is low. In fact, this is in exact opposition to the previous contention, where I highlighted the role of

³⁸² Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States* (Georgetown University Press, 2016).

³⁸³ Alice Ackermann, "The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 3 (May 2003): 339–47, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343303040003006>.

³⁸⁴ Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics."

³⁸⁵ Atkinson, Jackson, and Williford, "Rivalry, Uncertainty, and Militarized Compellent Threats."

diplomatic sanctions as the initial step in the escalation chain. Due to their less costly nature, diplomatic sanctions pose the least risk of escalation compared to economic sanctions and the use of force, rendering them an attractive option for managing relations in rivalries.

The results of the time-series cross-sectional analyses indicate that in politically relevant dyads, the probability of using economic sanctions increases when there is a use of diplomatic sanction in the previous year; furthermore, the probability of initiating a militarized conflict also increases under the same conditions. This supports the assumption that states utilize diplomatic sanctions as part of a gradual escalation strategy. However, in rivalry dyads, the use of diplomatic sanctions in the previous year does not appear to be related to either the initiation of economic sanctions or militarized conflicts. The three case study analyses help illustrate the functionality of diplomatic sanctions in different contextual settings.

This chapter begins with a brief summary of the existing literature on uncertainty and the importance of signaling resolve credibly to address the problem of uncertainty. It then discusses how sanctions, economic and diplomatic, can help in doing so. The chapter then presents the concept of the gradual escalation strategy by highlighting how diplomatic sanctions can be used within this framework. The subsequent section explores the critical attributes of rivalries and then discusses how diplomatic sanctions can become a significant tool for managing rivalry relations. Next, the results of the quantitative analyses are reported and discussed, followed by illustrative mini-case studies. Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion remark and a discussion of the study's limitations.

5.1 Diplomatic Sanctions and Signal of Resolve

Chapter 2 provides a detailed examination of the importance of credible signaling of resolve as one of the critical functions of coercion attempts.³⁸⁶ The following will briefly summarize the key points to establish a theoretical framework for this analysis. According to the bargaining approach to war, it is asserted that states fail to settle their disputes due to uncertainty about their resolves, capabilities, and intentions.³⁸⁷ Accordingly, this approach

³⁸⁶ See Chapter II in this thesis for more detailed discussion.

³⁸⁷ Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War."

suggests that, in order to address the problem of uncertainty, states use signals to demonstrate their true resolves and capabilities. As noted previously, existing research denotes that states can send credible signals by incurring costs, which can take the forms of sunk and political costs.³⁸⁸ These measures primarily include military actions, given the high potential costs associated with them, such as military mobilizations,³⁸⁹ joint military exercises,³⁹⁰ or compellent threats.³⁹¹ A growing literature also highlights the importance of non-military and less costly foreign policy tools that can help reveal information about state preferences and capabilities, such as coercion through migration policies,³⁹² diplomatic isolation,³⁹³ coercion in cyberspace,³⁹⁴ and particularly economic sanctions.³⁹⁵ Among these tools, economic sanctions have been extensively studied in terms of costly signaling, as they are commonly considered as a means to signal the sender's commitment to an issue by imposing economic and domestic political costs on the sender state.³⁹⁶ It should also be noted that while the literature on economic sanctions offers potential mechanisms for costly signaling, other studies also note that economic sanctions can be a weak tool for demonstrating resolve.³⁹⁷

Despite a considerable amount of research on uncertainty in international politics and methods to communicate resolve and signal commitment, the role of diplomatic sanctions within this context remains a subject of inquiry. It is imperative to examine whether diplomatic sanctions, one of the frequently used foreign policy tools, help states send signals in any meaningful manner. As presented in Chapter 2, diplomatic sanctions can generate

³⁸⁸ Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests."

³⁸⁹ Montgomery, "Signals of Strength."

³⁹⁰ Raymond Kuo and Brian Dylan Blankenship, "Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 3–31, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211023147>.

³⁹¹ Filip Viskupic and Douglas B. Atkinson, "When States Resist: Regime Type, Relative Power, and Militarized Compellent Threats," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3, no. 4 (2018): 431–43.

³⁹² Greenhill, "Migration as a Coercive Weapon."

³⁹³ Crawford, "The Strategy of Coercive Isolation."

³⁹⁴ Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, "Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited," in *The Power to Hurt: Coercion in Theory and in Practice*, ed. Kelly M Greenhill and Peter Krause (Oxford University Press, 2018), 176–204.

³⁹⁵ Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals."

³⁹⁶ See Chapter II in this dissertation for more detailed examination of the literature on the use of economic sanctions as signal of resolve.

³⁹⁷ Whang and Kim, "International Signaling and Economic Sanctions."

costs for the sender state, both in the form of sunk and political costs.³⁹⁸ However, these costs are relatively low compared to economic sanctions and the use of force. This property of diplomatic sanctions allows them to send two competing signals.³⁹⁹ On one hand, because of the self-inflicted costs, they can indicate that the sender is sufficiently resolved and capable of taking further and harsher measures if the dispute is not settled. On the other hand, the use of diplomatic sanctions can also imply that the sender lacks resolve and has limitations when it comes to implementing more coercive measures, as they opt for less costly actions at the outset. Consequently, the information revealed through diplomatic sanctions can serve as both a signal of resolve to escalate and a form of cheap talk.⁴⁰⁰ Given this dual nature of diplomatic sanctions, one way to make sense of the true function of diplomatic sanctions is to assess their use within the broader coercive diplomacy framework in relation to other coercive methods. This necessitates taking into account the procedural dynamism of international disputes and focusing on state behaviors before more severe coercive methods are employed. Moreover, thanks to the above-mentioned dual nature of diplomatic sanctions, states might also use sanctions in order to signal their intention of de-escalation, depending on the strategic context. Hence, the following sections will discuss these points in order.

5.2 Diplomatic Sanctions and Escalation

States have a range of tools at their disposal that include both coercive methods, such as economic sanctions and military threats, and non-coercive methods, such as negotiation, diplomacy, and inducements. They can also combine these methods depending on the nature of the dispute and strategic objectives. Hence, as Baldwin suggests, when faced with another state, leaders often opt for employing various coercive tools before considering the use of military force.⁴⁰¹ In this vein, Bloomfield and Leiss highlight the procedural and dynamic nature of conflicts⁴⁰² and suggest that conflicts consist of sequential stages and evolve based

³⁹⁸ See Chapter II in this dissertation for more detailed examination of the literature on the use of economic sanctions as signal of resolve.

³⁹⁹ Max Abrahms, "The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics1," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 660–71, <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12098>.

⁴⁰⁰ Tingley and Walter, "Can Cheap Talk Deter?"

⁴⁰¹ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

⁴⁰² Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars*, First Edition (New York: Knopf, 1969).

on state interactions.⁴⁰³ This perspective indicates that conflicts are not static events but rather dynamic processes compromising distinct stages. According to Huth and Allee, these stages may involve the eruption of a dispute, negotiation attempts to resolve the dispute, escalation through various means, and, in some cases, further escalation to a militarized crisis or war.⁴⁰⁴ Hence, one can think of these steps as resembling an “escalation ladder”.⁴⁰⁵

The escalation ladder delineates the sequential progression of actions in a dispute, which is widely considered a key component of the bargaining process. With each escalatory action, parties seek to showcase their determination and assess that of their opponent, thereby revealing and also acquiring additional information at each stage.⁴⁰⁶ While the metaphor of the escalation ladder has been frequently applied to understand the dynamics of the US and Soviet Union relations during the Cold War with a focus on the use of conventional military measures and nuclear deterrence, recent studies have expanded its application to emerging military technologies.⁴⁰⁷ Other studies also incorporated non-military means of escalation.⁴⁰⁸ When applied this way, beginning with the lower level of diplomatic maneuvers, the ladder ascends to more intense stages, including economic sanctions, political isolation through diplomatic means, and military buildup. The highest rung on the escalation ladder involves the deployment of military force on a large scale, signaling the sender’s intention of resorting to a comprehensive and sustained military campaign. In a similar vein, Drury and Park, based on Baldwin’s classification of statecraft tools, contend that “... *each coercive tool is the logical (although not necessary) precedent to the next tool. Essentially, propaganda is*

⁴⁰³ Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.”

⁴⁰⁴ Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, “Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no. 6 (December 1, 2002): 754–90.

⁴⁰⁵ Huth and Allee.

⁴⁰⁶ Russell J. Leng, “Escalation: Competing Perspectives and Empirical Evidence,” *International Studies Review* 6, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 51–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1521-9488.2004.00449.x>.

⁴⁰⁷ Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Evaluating Escalation: Conceptualizing Escalation in an Era of Emerging Military Technologies,” *The Journal of Politics* 85, no. 3 (July 2023): 1151–55, <https://doi.org/10.1086/723974>; Sarah Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving beyond Effects-Based Logics,” *Journal of Cybersecurity* 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): tyz007, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyz007>; Nadiya Kostyuk, Scott Powell, and Matt Skach, “Determinants of the Cyber Escalation Ladder,” *The Cyber Defense Review* 3, no. 1 (2018): 123–34; Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (2019): 122–45; Forrest E. Morgan et al., *Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century* (Rand Corporation, 2008).

⁴⁰⁸ Drury and Park, “Mids, Economic Sanctions, and Trade.”

complementary to diplomatic sanctions, which are complementary to economic sanctions, which, in turn, complements military actions."⁴⁰⁹ They argue that in cases where the applied strategy fails, leaders can consider using more coercive methods, therefore hedging their risks. Hence, each method used as part of the escalation chain can be interpreted as a step to send stronger messages to the opponent. Drury and Park also note that the process of conflict doesn't always follow a strict sequence; as is also proposed by Dixon, some interstate conflicts may erupt abruptly with a direct military confrontation.⁴¹⁰ Nonetheless, they contend that most conflicts generally adhere to this sequential process. Moreover, Alexander George's conceptualization of the "gradual turning of the screw" strategy, which relies on the incremental increase of the threat of coercive pressure, fits well into this framework.⁴¹¹

Leaders often choose to gradually escalate tension when addressing their disputes with other states.⁴¹² This strategic approach allows them to respond to disputes in a measured manner and to assess the effectiveness of each step before considering more forceful actions. There might be several reasons for leaders to adopt this path. To begin with, given that states engage in disputes with other states on issues ranging from low salient issues to high salient ones, such as trade disagreements, territorial disputes, or issues concerning human rights, not every crisis warrants the use of force. This is the case even if a state possesses adequate actual and latent capabilities. This implies that the leader's decision regarding which tool to use can be contingent upon the salience of the issue, among other factors.⁴¹³ In this regard, the fact that the number of dyads experiencing militarized conflict is significantly lower than the potential dyads suggests that employing military force is not the immediate go-to option for states. Moreover, when confronted with more salient issues, leaders also consider the costs of available options at their disposal to help achieve their objectives before making a decision among them,⁴¹⁴ and often opt for cost-effective options. This pragmatic approach seeks to

⁴⁰⁹ Drury and Park, 4.

⁴¹⁰ Drury and Park, 2.

⁴¹¹ George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

⁴¹² Braithwaite and Lemke, "Unpacking Escalation."

⁴¹³ Michael Brecher, *Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality* (Oxford, UK: Pergamon, 1994); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises, 1929-1985," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 1 (March 1991): 143-69, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002791035001008>.

⁴¹⁴ Lisa J. Carlson, "A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 3 (September 1995): 511-34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002795039003006>.

minimize risks and potential fallout associated with more coercive measures.⁴¹⁵ This cost-benefit analysis aligns with the logic that, even in cases where states have the resolve to use force, the possibility of achieving the same results with lower costs can make options other than military ones more viable and attractive.⁴¹⁶ Furthermore, the possibility of domestic repercussions may further shape the leaders' decision-making process, leading them to prefer less costly alternatives since the risk of losing political office as a result of a domestic backlash due to a failed military campaign looms large.⁴¹⁷ Moreover, the evolving global normative landscape, especially since the end of the Second World War, favors non-violent dispute resolution methods, thereby providing states with strong incentives to settle their disputes through less coercive methods.⁴¹⁸ Leaders, cognizant of these norms, may choose to exhaust less coercive instruments before employing military force, therefore exhibiting their commitment to international norms and principles. In this vein, the United Nations collective security principle also proposes the sequential imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions before resorting to the use of force.⁴¹⁹

The earlier studies investigating the link between economic sanctions and the use of force have commonly assumed that economic sanctions can substitute for the use of force in achieving foreign policy objectives due to their virtue of costly signaling mechanisms.⁴²⁰ Based on this, economic sanctions were historically considered and also offered a peaceful alternative to war.⁴²¹ In this line, Drezner also contends that empirical studies provide support for the theoretical claim that economic sanctions act as an alternative to war.⁴²² Yet, while these studies assumed a negative relationship between economic sanctions and the use of force, the following empirical and theoretical studies have generally denoted a positive

⁴¹⁵ Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats*.

⁴¹⁶ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

⁴¹⁷ Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003): 585–602.

⁴¹⁸ Paul Van Tongeren, Hans Von Van De Veen, and Juliette Verhoeven, eds., *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781588261892>.

⁴¹⁹ Kim, "Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Militarized Conflict Focusing on Reciprocal Causation," 532.

⁴²⁰ Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals."

⁴²¹ Fredrik Hoffmann, "The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Peace Research* 4, no. 2 (June 1967): 140–59, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336700400204>.

⁴²² Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion."

relationship between them. Clark and Reed, in their examination of foreign policy substitutability, find that economic sanctions and the use of force complement each other rather than serve as substitutes.⁴²³ Drury and Park, in their analysis of the effects of using economic sanctions before a militarized conflict, find a similar positive association.⁴²⁴ They also argue that employing economic sanctions increases the risks of more severe militarized disputes because their use heightens hostility between adversaries, therefore escalating the conflict's severity. Lektzian and Sprecher offer a more nuanced perspective, asserting that sender states, aiming to minimize the costs of economic sanctions on themselves while maximizing costs on the target, end up sending a weak signal of resolve.⁴²⁵ However, when combined with audience costs generated by the imposition of economic sanctions, especially for democracies, it increases the risk of war. Moreover, Peterson and Drury find that economic sanctions imposed by major power democracies carry a significant risk of triggering military conflicts, either originating from the sanctioning state or involving a third-party state.⁴²⁶ Kim also finds that not only do economic sanctions increase the risk of militarized conflict, but militarized conflicts also lead to increased economic sanctions, highlighting the reciprocal relationships between the two.⁴²⁷

In light of this discussion and following Venteicher's study, which analyzes the relationship between economic sanctions and military coercion,⁴²⁸ I assume that as an initial move along the escalation ladder, states might opt for diplomatic sanctions, comparatively a less coercive form and more aligned with the international norms, to deal with foreign policy crises. After the employment of diplomatic sanctions, if the dispute remains unresolved in favor of the sender state, the sender state, in return, can escalate the conflict by levying economic sanctions or using military measures. This approach may allow states to potentially deter adversaries or influence their behavior without paying a high cost at the onset. It should also be noted that while there are incentives for sender states to use diplomatic sanctions as

⁴²³ Clark and Reed, "The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution."

⁴²⁴ Drury and Park, "Mids, Economic Sanctions, and Trade."

⁴²⁵ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

⁴²⁶ Peterson and Drury, "Sanctioning Violence."

⁴²⁷ Kim, "Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Militarized Conflict Focusing on Reciprocal Causation."

⁴²⁸ Venteicher II, "What Economic Sanctions Signal."

part of a gradual escalation strategy to signal their intention of escalation, it does not necessarily mean that the target state will perceive this action as a credible signal of resolve.

Based on these assumptions, the following hypotheses are derived:

H1a: The use of diplomatic sanctions will be positively related to the use of economic sanctions.

H1b: The use of diplomatic sanctions will be positively related to the use of military force.

5.3 Diplomatic Sanctions and Management of Rivalry Relations

While states can employ diplomatic sanctions as an initial step as part of a gradual escalation strategy, they can also serve a different function in rivalry dyads. Rivalry dyads exhibit distinct features compared to non-rivalry dyads as they are characterized by persistent competition and enduring hostility, which creates a higher likelihood of disputes and escalation to all-out war.⁴²⁹ Hence, rivalry dyads are marked by a consistent expectation of future disputes.⁴³⁰ The historical animosity and competitive nature of the relationship create an environment where conflicts are highly anticipated and also considered a critical component of the ongoing interaction between the rival states.

Thompson contends that “*the combination of expectations of threat, cognitive rigidities, and domestic political processes make strategic rivalry a potent factor in world politics.*”⁴³¹ Based on these attributes, the following can be assumed. Firstly, in rivalry dyads, the historical context of conflict over shared issues contributes to a heightened threat perception. Rivals, having experienced past conflicts, are more prone to mistrust their adversaries, fostering a perception of persistent threat and a greater likelihood of future confrontations. Secondly, in rivalry dyads, perceptions held about the other become resistant to change due to psychological baggage accumulated over time. This leads to a cyclical pattern of hostility, reinforcing rigid and less responsive cognitive structures. In this context,

⁴²⁹ Diehl and Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry*.

⁴³⁰ Brandon C. Prins, “Interstate Rivalry and the Recurrence of Crises: A Comparison of Rival and Nonrival Crisis Behavior, 1918–1994,” *Armed Forces & Society* 31, no. 3 (April 2005): 323–51, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0503100302>.

⁴³¹ Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” 562.

Dreyer argues that behaviors that might be perceived as neutral or friendly under different circumstances can be viewed through the lens of a rivalry image, resulting in increased tensions and potential escalations.⁴³² Thirdly, domestic factors can play a crucial role in the persistence of rivalries. In this vein, Thompson argues that cognitive biases developed to justify and maintain these rivalries are mirrored in domestic politics.⁴³³ As such, the support for the continuation of the rivalry by the domestic public considerably constrains the leaders in their decisions with respect to the opponent. He also asserts that those leaders who are overtly opposing the maintenance of rivalry are less likely to be selected for key decision-making roles. Similarly, Dreyer finds that the public pressure for the maintenance of rivalry is higher when the disputed issue is over a territory.⁴³⁴ Relatedly, leaders of rival states find themselves under great pressure to take assertive actions against their opponents in order to uphold the country's image due to the increased public concerns for the reputation of having resolve and strength.⁴³⁵ This results in a tendency to attach heightened meaning to issues that may have low salience in other contexts, thereby giving rise to the possibility that even seemingly minor incidents can lead to increased tensions. In such an environment, the demonstration of resolve and strength becomes crucial but also dangerous as actions intended to display resolve can be easily misinterpreted, therefore leading to unintended consequences and potential escalation to militarized disputes.⁴³⁶

Nevertheless, rivalry dyads benefit from a reduced information problem, which minimizes the uncertainty regarding each other's capabilities and resolve.⁴³⁷ Atkinson et al. contend that rivals are well-informed about their opponent's strengths, as well as their willingness to endure costs, because repeated disputes and past wars provide valuable insights.⁴³⁸ They can also learn how their opponents would behave in a given crisis over time

⁴³² Dreyer, "Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry1."

⁴³³ Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics," 562.

⁴³⁴ David R. Dreyer, "Issue Intractability and the Persistence of International Rivalry," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 5 (November 1, 2012): 471–89, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894212449090>.

⁴³⁵ Jackson, *Rival Reputations*.

⁴³⁶ Prins, "Interstate Rivalry and the Recurrence of Crises," 328.

⁴³⁷ Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, *Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries* (University of Michigan Press, 2002).

⁴³⁸ Atkinson, Jackson, and Williford, "Rivalry, Uncertainty, and Militarized Compellent Threats."

and adjust their behaviors accordingly.⁴³⁹ This accumulated knowledge over time reduces the level of existing uncertainty and contributes to a more stable environment. Atkinson et al. conclude that “... *at most points in time, the information problem will not be meaningful, since both states have repeatedly shown that their rival cannot force them to make concessions.*”⁴⁴⁰ As a reflection of this reduced uncertainty and a relatively stable strategic environment, studies demonstrate that although the likelihood of a militarized conflict is high in rivalry dyads, its realization is not always the case. In this regard, Goertz and Diehl contend that “*rivalries only periodically escalate to the level of militarized conflict and can persist in the absence of such conflict for a significant period of time.*”⁴⁴¹ In a similar vein, Conrad asserts that while rivalry dyads are closer to all-out war than to full cooperation on a scale, antagonism in rivalry does not always result in armed conflict.⁴⁴² Hence, he concludes that “*Rivalry status, therefore, indicates an unusually adversarial relationship between two states, but one that may or may not result in frequent physical combat.*”⁴⁴³ This suggests that states in rivalry dyads act cautiously to avoid escalation to the point of armed conflict if not necessary, leading them to employ alternative methods to manage rivalry relations.

I anticipate that in circumstances where the pressure to take action is high, even for seemingly minor issues, and uncertainty about resolve and capabilities is low, diplomatic sanctions emerge as a critical means to manage tensions that could potentially escalate to militarized conflict. The lower costs associated with diplomatic sanctions, for both the sender and the target, reduce the risk of escalation compared to economic sanctions and the use of force.⁴⁴⁴ Similarly, diplomatic sanctions provide a means to alleviate domestic pressure to take more coercive actions. As such, diplomatic sanctions may play a unique role in rivalry dyads, enabling sender states to take action without risking an unwanted escalation. To sum

⁴³⁹ Russell J. Leng, “When Will They Ever Learn?: Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 379–419, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002783027003001>.

⁴⁴⁰ Douglas B. Atkinson, Joshua Jackson, and George W. Williford, “Rivalry, Uncertainty, and Militarized Compellent Threats,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (2021): 3.

⁴⁴¹ Goertz and Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries,” 156.

⁴⁴² Justin Conrad, “Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism: An Unprobed Link,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 4 (2011): 532.

⁴⁴³ Conrad, 532.

⁴⁴⁴ Ketian Zhang, “Calculating Bully: Explaining Chinese Coercion” (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018), <https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/122472>.

up, rivalry dyads are prone to produce numerous crises, both minor and major ones, due to the historical animosity, making it not only impractical but also dangerous to resort to military power consistently. Diplomatic sanctions, being a measured response, offer leaders a crucial option to signal their intent not to escalate the situation further, conveying a message of restraint.

Building upon these assumptions, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H2a: *In rivalry dyads, the use of diplomatic sanctions will not be related to the use of economic sanctions.*

H2b: *In rivalry dyads, the use of diplomatic sanctions will not be related to the use of military force.*

5.4 Research Design and Data

To test the hypothesis about the interplay between coercive tools and diplomatic sanctions, I have adopted the research design employed by Lektzian and Sprecher, who investigate the relationship between economic sanctions and militarized conflicts in their analysis.⁴⁴⁵ To do so, two distinct analyses are conducted—one to explore the relationship between diplomatic sanctions and economic sanctions and another to investigate the relationship between diplomatic sanctions and militarized interstate conflicts. In each analysis, particular attention is given to discern the specific impact of diplomatic sanctions within rivalry dyads. More specifically, the first analysis assesses the influence of diplomatic sanctions on the initiation of economic sanctions, examining whether diplomatic sanctions can predict the use of economic sanctions in politically relevant dyads and rivalry dyads. Similarly, the second analysis evaluates the effect of diplomatic sanctions on the initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID), investigating whether diplomatic sanctions heighten the likelihood of such conflicts in the same dyads.

In the initial analysis, the dependent variable is defined as the use of economic sanctions. Both threatened and imposed sanctions are included. Sanctions data are drawn from Morgan et al.'s TIES data set,⁴⁴⁶ which is commonly used in economic sanctions

⁴⁴⁵ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

⁴⁴⁶ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

research.⁴⁴⁷ Economic sanctions are defined in the TIES dataset as follows: “*actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change one or more of its policies.*”⁴⁴⁸ The TIES dataset contains economic sanction episodes, both threatened and imposed, covering the period between 1945 and 2005. The original dataset provides details about economic sanctions on an episode basis, including the sender states (up to five), the primary sender, the target state, and whether any international institution is involved. For this analysis, the TIES dataset is transformed to create sender–target dyad years. Since the focus of the analysis is on the use of coercive tools by states, economic sanctions used by non-state actors, including international institutions, are omitted. Following Anderson et al.,⁴⁴⁹ in cases where sanctions are employed under the auspices of international organizations, the countries cited as the primary senders in the TIES dataset are included; otherwise, those cases are excluded from the analysis. Consequently, the outcome variable is coded as 1 for the first year of economic sanctions and 0 otherwise. The main independent variable for the initial analysis is the use of diplomatic sanctions in the previous year. Data for diplomatic sanctions are derived from the original Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset introduced in the previous chapter. It provides information on both threatened and imposed diplomatic sanctions for sender–target pairs on a yearly basis. Additionally, it includes information only for countries listed in the COW country list. Like economic sanctions, both threatened and imposed diplomatic sanctions are included in the analyses. Since economic sanctions data ends in 2005 and Diplomatic Sanctions Data starts in 1990, the availability of dependent and key independent variables restricts the analysis to the period between 1990 and 2005.

For the second analysis, the dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Conflict. The conflict data is drawn from Dyadic MID Data (version 4.01),⁴⁵⁰ a key

⁴⁴⁷ Walentek et al., “Success of Economic Sanctions Threats”; Wallace, “Regime Type, Issues of Contention, and Economic Sanctions”; Kim, “Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Militarized Conflict Focusing on Reciprocal Causation.”

⁴⁴⁸ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005,” 542.

⁴⁴⁹ Anderson, Mitchell, and Schilling, “Kantian Dynamics Revisited.”

⁴⁵⁰ Zeev Maoz et al., “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 3 (March 2019): 811–35, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718784158>.

database in conflict studies. The MID dataset classifies the level of hostility in a conflict into several categories. These are none, threat to use force, display of force, use of force, and war. Following the convention in the literature,⁴⁵¹ the outcome variable is coded as 1 if the HIHOST variable is other than None, and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable for the second analysis is similar to the first one: the use of diplomatic sanctions in the previous year. However, it excludes cases where economic sanctions accompany diplomatic sanctions to isolate the impact of diplomatic sanctions. Therefore, the independent variable is coded as 1 if diplomatic sanctions are used without economic sanctions and 0 otherwise. Due to data availability in the economic sanctions dataset, the second analysis is also limited to the period 1990–2005.

In each analysis, I primarily test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis examines whether diplomatic sanctions can predict the use of more coercive tools, indicating an escalatory nature. The second hypothesis, in the context of rivalry dyads, explores whether sender states use diplomatic sanctions to signal their intent of de-escalation, thus suggesting a non-escalatory nature. To test the first hypothesis, politically relevant dyads were employed. These dyads are frequently utilized in the literature to define the universe of states with a potential for conflict. The determination of politically relevant dyads is based on the contiguity of state pairs and their power statuses, with at least one of them being a major power.⁴⁵² To test the second hypothesis, I have limited the universe of states to rivalry dyads. Additionally, for a robustness check using an alternative operationalization of rivalry, the analysis has been restricted to crisis dyads. The data to create rivalry dyads are obtained from Thompson and Dreyer's strategic rivalry dataset.⁴⁵³ In this dataset, rivalries are defined based on the following factors: competition, enmity, and the presence of perceived hostility that could turn into a militarized conflict. To determine the rivalry dyads, dyads that possess at least one of the four rivalry categories (spatial, positional, ideological, and interventionary) are coded as 1, and otherwise, 0. The universe is then limited to dyads that have a value of 1 for rivalry. To determine the crisis dyads, following Lektzian and Sprecher, I have utilized

⁴⁵¹ J. Joseph Hewitt, "Dyadic Processes and International Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 669–92.

⁴⁵² Lemke and Reed, "The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads."

⁴⁵³ Dreyer and Thompson, *Handbook of International Rivalries*.

data from the ICB project.⁴⁵⁴ The project determines the crisis dyads based on the perceptions held by the decision-makers for the existence of existential threats and the increased probability of militarized conflict. Since the project relies on perceptions rather than actions, these dyads differ from MID dyads.⁴⁵⁵ Hence, the crisis dyads are coded as 1 if they are categorized as having a crisis in the dataset and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the universe of states is then restricted to the crisis dyads.

In both analyses, the unit of analysis is the directed-dyad-year. Here, the first state represents the sender, and the second state represents the target.⁴⁵⁶ Directed dyads are commonly employed in economic sanctions and militarized conflict research for their advantages in integrating characteristics of the sender state.⁴⁵⁷ To address the omitted variable bias, potential covariates of dependent variables for each analysis are included. In the first analysis, variables noted as having an impact on the onset of economic sanctions in the literature are selected. One factor that appears significant in the literature for determining the onset of economic sanctions is the sender state's regime type.⁴⁵⁸ Research shows that democracies are more likely to impose economic sanctions.⁴⁵⁹ Hence, to control for this effect, a variable is created to check whether the sender state is a democracy or not. The data for democracy comes from the Polity IV dataset, specifically its Polity 2 score, which provides a value for each state for each year ranging from -10 to 10.⁴⁶⁰ Following the established convention in the literature,⁴⁶¹ a binary variable is created and coded as 1 for

⁴⁵⁴ Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*; Brecher et al., "International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 15."

⁴⁵⁵ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

⁴⁵⁶ The directed dyadic dataset as well as regime type, alliance, rivalry, capability, IGO, trade, GDP, capital distance data is obtained from peacesciencer package. Steven V Miller, "{peacesciencer} : An R Package for Quantitative Peace Science Research," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 6 (November 2022): 755–79, <https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221077926>.

⁴⁵⁷ Peterson and Drury, "Sanctioning Violence"; Timothy M. Peterson, "Dyadic Trade, Exit Costs, and Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 4 (June 2014): 564–91, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713478794>.

⁴⁵⁸ Wallace, "Regime Type, Issues of Contention, and Economic Sanctions."

⁴⁵⁹ Lektzian and Souva, "The Economic Peace between Democracies."

⁴⁶⁰ Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002," 2002.

⁴⁶¹ Bayer and Bernhard, "The Operationalization of Democracy and the Strength of the Democratic Peace."

states with scores higher than 6 indicating democracies and 0 for the rest, implying non-democracies.

The capitalist peace literature underscores the significance of dyadic interstate trade in influencing the likelihood of conflict, suggesting that states tend to avoid conflict to preserve economic benefits.⁴⁶² This logic is also applicable to economic sanctions. To address this effect, a total trade score for each dyad is calculated by summing the two-way flow between state pairs and subsequently log-transforming the result. The data for trade is obtained from COW's Trade (v4.0) dataset,⁴⁶³ which includes information on bilateral trade flows, as well as total imports and exports, measured in current U.S. dollars. Some scholars assume that economically stronger states are more likely to use sanctions to coerce their weaker targets to exploit their vulnerabilities.⁴⁶⁴ To account for the differences in the economic powers of the sender and target states, a new variable is created by dividing the sender state's GDP by the total GDP in the dyad and then log-transforming the result. GDP data is obtained from a new dataset developed by Fariss et al..⁴⁶⁵ To control for the effect of relative power capabilities in the dyad, COW's National Material Capabilities index (v6.0) is used.⁴⁶⁶ This variable is constructed by calculating the ratio of the higher score to the lower score in a dyad, and then it is log-transformed. Some scholars argue that economic sanctions are more probable in alliance dyads because other forms of coercive statecraft may not be applicable between allies.⁴⁶⁷ To account for the impact of joint alliance membership in a dyad, a new variable is generated using data from COW's alliance dataset.⁴⁶⁸ The variable is coded as 1 if the pairs have at least one of the four alliance ties defined in the dataset (defense pact, neutrality, non-aggression, and entente) and 0 otherwise. Moreover, studies also control for the sanctions initiated by the United States to ensure that the US's distinct sanctioning behavior does not influence results.⁴⁶⁹ The United States, as a result of its global economic

⁴⁶² Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 166–91.

⁴⁶³ Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins, "Trading Data."

⁴⁶⁴ Murdie and Peksen, "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activities on Economic Sanctions."

⁴⁶⁵ Fariss et al., "New Estimates of over 500 Years of Historic GDP and Population Data."

⁴⁶⁶ Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985."

⁴⁶⁷ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

⁴⁶⁸ Gibler, *International Military Alliances, 1648-2008*.

⁴⁶⁹ Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, "The Hegemon's Purse."

and military dominance, has been a primary sanctioning country and has used economic sanctions globally.⁴⁷⁰ Consequently, to control for the US economic sanctions, a dichotomous variable is created to indicate whether the sender is the US or not.

For the second analysis testing the impacts of diplomatic sanctions on the initiation of MID, the variables that are cited as potential factors impacting the initiation of MID in the literature are included. As such, to control for the democratic peace assumption that proposes that democracies are less likely to fight with one another, a binary variable is created, taking the value of 1 if both the sender and the target of the MID are democracies and 0 otherwise. The data for democracy is obtained and operationalized in a fashion similar to the one mentioned above for the first analysis. Moreover, research shows that joint alliance membership,⁴⁷¹ relative power capabilities,⁴⁷² and total trade⁴⁷³ can also impact the likelihood of conflict. Therefore, the same variables that were created for the first analysis are utilized for the capability ratio, alliance, and trade variables. Additionally, following Lektzian and Sprecher,⁴⁷⁴ to account for the impact of differences in economic development levels within a dyad, a new variable is generated by taking the logarithm of the lower GDP value. Finally, a new variable is created by taking the logarithm of the distance between capital cities to account for the geographical distance between states. Research suggests that greater distances between states result in fewer opportunities for interaction, thereby reducing the probability of conflict.

For both analyses, logistic regression is employed due to the binary nature of the dependent variables. Consistent with the common practice in the literature, temporal dependency variables are incorporated into the analysis using the method proposed by Carter and Signorino.⁴⁷⁵ This includes three counter variables for the years: year since the last use of diplomatic sanctions, year squared, and year cubed. Additionally, following Lektzian and

⁴⁷⁰ Murdie and Peksen, "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activities on Economic Sanctions."

⁴⁷¹ Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States."

⁴⁷² Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads."

⁴⁷³ Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace."

⁴⁷⁴ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

⁴⁷⁵ Carter and Signorino, "Back to the Future."

Sprecher,⁴⁷⁶ to maintain causal integrity and address the issue of endogeneity, all independent variables are lagged by one year. Furthermore, the estimations are clustered based on the dyad code, assuming that although distinct dyads are independent, a dependency within each dyad over time exists due to the nature of the time series data. Therefore, robust standard errors are adjusted accordingly.⁴⁷⁷

5.5 Results for Diplomatic Sanctions and Economic Sanctions

One of the initial objectives of this chapter is to establish a link between the use of diplomatic sanctions and economic sanctions. As hypothesized earlier, I predict that economic sanctions will succeed diplomatic sanctions in politically relevant dyads, therefore becoming one of the initial steps in the escalation chain. Hence, I anticipate that the employment of diplomatic sanctions will heighten the probability of resorting to economic sanctions in subsequent encounters. However, I also predict that in rivalry dyads, where uncertainty about resolve and capabilities is relatively low, diplomatic sanctions will not be followed by economic sanctions. Hence, I expect that the use of diplomatic sanctions will not be related to the likelihood of resorting to economic sanctions in rivalry dyads.

Table 5.1 presents the results of logistic regression analysis assessing the impact of diplomatic sanctions at time t-1 on the initiation of economic sanctions at time t in three distinct dyads. Models in Column 1 and Column 2 focus on politically relevant dyads, while models in Column 3 and Column 4 examine rivalry dyads, and models in Column 5 and Column 6 investigate crisis dyads. For each dyad, two models are developed to test the hypothesized effects. The Diplomatic Sanction variable is omitted in the first model, and it is included in the second model, while control variables are kept constant across the two models in each dyad. Considering the results for the first two sets of models that focus on politically relevant dyads, it is indicated that when the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable is included, it is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, suggesting a positive effect on the use of economic sanctions.

⁴⁷⁶ Lektzian and Sprecher, “Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict.”

⁴⁷⁷ The descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations, correlation matrices, and missing values for these analyses can be found in Appendix D.

Table 5.1: Logistic regression results for the effect of diplomatic sanctions on the onset of economic sanctions.

	Without DS - Pol Rel (1)	With DS - Pol Rel Dyads (2)	Without DS - Rivalry Dyads (3)	With DS - Rivalry Dyads (4)	Without DS - ICB Dyads (5)	With DS - ICB Dyads (6)
Economic Sanction						
Diplomatic Sanction		1.233*** (0.306)		1.135 (0.765)		0.954 (0.599)
Sender Democracy	0.624* (0.258)	0.617* (0.257)	0.0650 (0.693)	-0.0827 (0.638)	4.755** (1.520)	4.308** (1.537)
Total Trade	0.146* (0.0626)	0.146* (0.0627)	0.0644 (0.0904)	0.0693 (0.103)	-0.169*** (0.0482)	-0.163*** (0.0481)
GDP Ratio	-2.074*** (0.524)	-2.025*** (0.522)	-0.733 (1.601)	-0.667 (1.439)	-5.299*** (1.293)	-4.880*** (1.332)
Capability Ratio	0.724*** (0.126)	0.712*** (0.125)	0.760* (0.376)	0.697+ (0.369)	3.906*** (1.003)	3.691*** (0.961)
Alliance	0.476** (0.179)	0.499** (0.177)	-0.00143 (0.722)	-0.295 (0.797)	-5.219*** (1.225)	-5.363*** (1.036)
US Sender	1.434*** (0.210)	1.427*** (0.207)	0.470 (1.262)	0.400 (1.348)	-7.519*** (2.192)	-7.152*** (1.991)
Time since last Economic Sanctions	-0.517*** (0.106)	-0.516*** (0.107)	-0.00680 (0.501)	-0.0307 (0.508)	-2.560** (0.805)	-2.552*** (0.705)
Time since last Economic Sanctions^2	0.0835*** (0.0189)	0.0836*** (0.0189)	0.0432 (0.0864)	0.0456 (0.0883)	0.429* (0.169)	0.428** (0.148)
Time since last Economic Sanctions^3	-0.00387*** (0.000912)	-0.00387*** (0.000913)	-0.00372 (0.00399)	-0.00379 (0.00408)	-0.0182* (0.00829)	-0.0181* (0.00721)
Constant	-1.663 (1.111)	-1.773 (1.110)	-1.346 (2.560)	-1.610 (2.618)	15.92*** (4.015)	14.75*** (3.943)
Observations	37259	37259	1307	1307	313	313
chi2	591.9	609.7	50.76	50.96	59.76	90.14
r2_p	0.237	0.241	0.207	0.220	0.465	0.478

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To gain better insight into the effect of diplomatic sanctions, the predicted probability of the initiation of economic sanctions is calculated, and the results are presented in Table 5.2. The results reveal that the probability of economic sanctions at time t increases from 0.005 to 0.01 when there is a diplomatic sanction at time $t-1$.⁴⁷⁸ Consequently, the probability of a sender state employing economic sanctions is approximately three times higher when it has used diplomatic sanctions in the previous year compared to when it has not used them. Examining the results of the goodness of fit tests indicates that the inclusion of diplomatic sanctions as an independent variable increases the model's explanatory power.⁴⁷⁹ The difference of 1.466 in BIC provides some support for the model with diplomatic sanctions, although this support is relatively weak.

Overall, the results of the regression analysis give strong support for the hypothesis that the use of diplomatic sanctions increases the subsequent use of economic sanctions. This result indicates that diplomatic sanctions are used as a means of escalation in politically relevant dyads.

Table 5.2: Predicted probabilities of economic sanctions based on diplomatic sanctions.

Variables	Economic Sanctions - Pol Rel Dyads
No Diplomatic Sanction	0.00502*** (0.00136) 0.00237 - 0.00768
Diplomatic Sanction	0.0170** (0.00709) 0.00314 - 0.0309
Observations	37,259

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

⁴⁷⁸ Predicted probabilities are calculated by setting time variables to zero and other variables to their median values.

⁴⁷⁹ Adrian E. Raftery, "Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research," *Sociological Methodology*, 1995, 111–63.

Examining the logistic regression results for the rivalry dyads produces the opposite effect. The analysis of models in Column 3 and Column 4 reveals that the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the use of diplomatic sanctions does not have a significant effect on the use of economic sanctions in rivalry dyads. Looking at the measures of goodness of fit also suggests that the addition of the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable does not increase the model's explanatory power, as the difference of 5.227 in BIC provides positive support for the model without diplomatic sanctions. Similar results are also observed in the crisis dyads. For the robustness check, the results for models in Column 5 and Column 6 indicate that the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable does not hold a statistically significant value at conventional levels, implying that diplomatic sanctions do not have a significant effect on the use of economic sanctions in crisis dyads, too. Similarly, the goodness of fit test results also show that the addition of the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable does not contribute to the model's explanatory power, as the 4.503 differences in BIC provide positive support for the model without the diplomatic sanctions variable. The overall results suggest that while leaders utilize diplomatic sanctions as a means of escalation since their use is associated with a higher likelihood of economic sanctions in politically relevant dyads, their employment for escalatory purposes appears to be diminishing in rivalry and crisis dyads.

5.6 Results for Diplomatic Sanctions and MID

The second objective of this chapter is to establish a connection between diplomatic sanctions and militarized interstate conflicts. As hypothesized above, I predict that diplomatic sanctions will be followed by militarized interstate conflicts in politically relevant dyads. Hence, I expect that the use of diplomatic sanctions will increase the probability of initiating militarized interstate disputes. Similar to the expectation regarding the initiation of economic sanctions, I also predict that in rivalry dyads, diplomatic sanctions will not be followed by militarized interstate disputes, thanks to the low level of uncertainty about resolve and capabilities. Therefore, I expect that the use of diplomatic sanctions will not be related to the propensity for militarized interstate conflicts in rivalry dyads.

Table 5.3: Logistic regression results for the effect of diplomatic sanctions on the onset of MIDs.

	Without DS - Pol Rel	With DS - Pol Rel Dyads	Without DS - Rivalry Dyads	With DS - Rivalry Dyads	Without DS - ICB Dyads	With DS - ICB Dyads
MID						
Diplomatic Sanction		1.641*** (0.253)		0.371 (0.347)		-0.875 (0.553)
Dem-Dem	-1.327*** (0.258)	-1.314*** (0.254)	0.120 (0.366)	0.0818 (0.371)	-0.471 (0.620)	-0.263 (0.618)
Capability Ratio	-0.221*** (0.0639)	-0.218*** (0.0628)	0.150 (0.128)	0.141 (0.129)	0.0758 (0.114)	0.0514 (0.116)
Alliance	0.169 (0.169)	0.161 (0.168)	0.0702 (0.283)	0.0626 (0.281)	-0.258 (0.413)	-0.221 (0.407)
Capital Distance	-0.511*** (0.0695)	-0.510*** (0.0683)	-0.198 (0.152)	-0.187 (0.152)	-0.125 (0.199)	-0.113 (0.196)
Economic Development	0.301*** (0.0606)	0.292*** (0.0613)	0.233* (0.113)	0.226* (0.114)	0.0973 (0.138)	0.131 (0.139)
Total Trade	-0.0325*** (0.00883)	-0.0331*** (0.00890)	-0.0216+ (0.0124)	-0.0218+ (0.0124)	0.0249 (0.0186)	0.0253 (0.0192)
Time since last mid	-0.420*** (0.0776)	-0.412*** (0.0778)	-0.301* (0.121)	-0.305* (0.121)	-0.227 (0.241)	-0.215 (0.243)
Time since last mid_2	0.0453** (0.0149)	0.0438** (0.0149)	0.0247 (0.0242)	0.0253 (0.0242)	0.0516 (0.0547)	0.0495 (0.0549)
Time since last mid_3	-0.00195* (0.000776)	-0.00187* (0.000778)	-0.000907 (0.00126)	-0.000925 (0.00126)	-0.00353 (0.00320)	-0.00344 (0.00320)
Constant	-1.891** (0.587)	-1.855** (0.586)	-2.918* (1.383)	-2.910* (1.374)	-0.863 (1.906)	-1.243 (1.925)
Observations	37477	37477	1290	1290	312	312
chi2	508.2	564.6	35.52	37.30	11.16	13.23
r2_p	0.160	0.167	0.0551	0.0562	0.0343	0.0425

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5.3 represents the logistic regression analysis testing the effect of diplomatic sanctions at time t-1 on the initiation of a MID at time t in three distinct dyads. Similar to the first analysis, models in Columns 1 and 2 focus on the impact of diplomatic sanctions in politically relevant dyads, while models in Columns 3 and 4 focus on rivalry dyads, and models in

Columns 5 and 6 focus on crisis dyads. Hence, the results of the first two models reveal that diplomatic sanctions have a statistically significant effect at the level of 0.001. This suggests that the possibility of a MID onset increases when diplomatic sanctions are used in the previous year. Considering the predicted probability of MIDs for the model in Column 2, Table 5.4 indicates that the probability of a MID is approximately 4.7 times higher when there is an imposition or threat of diplomatic sanctions at time $t-1$. This is evident as the predicted probability increases from 0.02 to 0.1. The goodness of fit test also supports the inclusion of the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable, as the difference of 22.533 in BIC provides strong support for the model with the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable.

Table 5.4: Predicted probabilities of MIDs based on diplomatic sanctions.

Variables	MIDs - Pol Rel Dyads
No Diplomatic Sanction	0.0211*** (0.00354) 0.0142 - 0.0280
Diplomatic Sanction	0.100*** (0.0279) 0.0454 - 0.155
Observations	37,477

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Looking at the results of the models for rivalry dyads, it appears that the use of diplomatic sanctions does not have a statistically significant effect on the onset of MID, just like it does not on economic sanctions. When considering the goodness of fit test results, it demonstrates that the model without the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable does have better explanatory power, as the difference of 6.173 BIC gives strong support for the model lacking the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable. Looking at the results of the models for crisis dyads also reveals similar results, as diplomatic sanctions do not appear to be statistically significant at conventional levels. Additionally, the goodness of fit test results for the crisis dyads give positive support for the model lacking the “Diplomatic Sanction” variable. Overall, similar

to economic sanctions, the results strongly support the hypothesis that diplomatic sanctions are positively associated with the likelihood of initiating militarized interstate disputes, thereby serving as an escalatory tool in politically relevant dyads. Additionally, the results suggest that there is no relationship between diplomatic sanctions and the initiation of militarized interstate conflicts in rivalry dyads.

5.7 Mini Case Studies

While the quantitative analyses provide significant support for the hypothesized relationship between the use of diplomatic sanctions and more coercive measures, they are limited by several factors inherent to the adopted research design and quantitative methodology. Specifically, the research design primarily focuses on measuring the impact of diplomatic sanctions employed one year before the initiation of economic sanctions or the use of force. While this method is commonly used in literature,⁴⁸⁰ particularly in analyzing economic sanctions, it poses challenges in making specific claims about using coercive tools within the same crisis episodes. Moreover, the quantitative methodology may suffer from pitfalls such as concept validity, vulnerability to measurement errors, and the inability to capture contextual nuances.⁴⁸¹ To address these limitations and leverage the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative approaches,⁴⁸² this section will incorporate mini-case studies. These case studies are intended to help better assess and illustrate the hypothesized relationships, particularly the use of diplomatic sanctions as a gradual escalation strategy in non-rivalry dyads and their use as a signal of restraint and de-escalation in rivalry dyads.

In order to demonstrate the use of diplomatic sanctions as part of a gradual escalation strategy in non-rivalry dyads, two cases are selected. These are the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 between the US and China and the South Korea – Japan Textbook Crisis in 2001. The cases are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior dataset,⁴⁸³ and the TIES economic sanctions dataset.⁴⁸⁴ It's important to note that the state pairs involved in these two cases

⁴⁸⁰ Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

⁴⁸¹ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.

⁴⁸² Sidney Tarrow, "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (1995): 471–74.

⁴⁸³ Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*.

⁴⁸⁴ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

during the dates of the crises are not listed as rivals in Thompson's rivalry dataset.⁴⁸⁵ While the Taiwan Strait Crisis has been extensively studied in the literature,⁴⁸⁶ particularly regarding its coercive aspects, there has been limited focus on the role of diplomatic sanctions. Given the various forms of coercive methods applied during this incident, studying this case provides an opportunity to illustrate their functions and how diplomatic sanctions are being utilized alongside the other coercive tools. Additionally, this case is also critical in understanding how coercive methods are being used between two great powers as it occurred between China and the US. Moreover, this case also merits investigation due to its significant potential for militarized conflict,⁴⁸⁷ as some scholars argue that it represents one of the most critical issues that China might seriously consider military action.⁴⁸⁸ Additionally, the Taiwan issue has played a pivotal role in China-US relations and will likely remain significant in the foreseeable future, increasing its policy relevancy. South Korea – Japan textbook crisis is critical to demonstrate how coercive methods can be used between non-great powers. The case also allows us to demonstrate how different forms of diplomatic sanctions are employed to escalate the dispute in order to put pressure on the target state. Moreover, given that the disputes over history textbooks persist between the two countries,⁴⁸⁹ this case also holds policy relevance. While the crisis did not escalate into a militarized conflict, it helps to illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions in relatively low-stakes issues.

To illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions within rivalry dyads, eight diplomatic crises between Venezuela and Colombia that occurred between 2000 and 2019 are analyzed. It should be noted that the two are listed as rivals in Thompson's rivalry list. As such, analyzing eight different crises that occurred over a long period is believed to allow us to

⁴⁸⁵ Dreyer and Thompson, *Handbook of International Rivalries*.

⁴⁸⁶ Andrew Scobell, "Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 2 (2000): 227–46, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2657901>; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 87–123; Qimao Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions," in *Across the Taiwan Strait* (Routledge, 1999).

⁴⁸⁷ Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," in *China and the World* (Routledge, 2018), 287–308.

⁴⁸⁸ Scobell, "Show of Force."

⁴⁸⁹ Kan Kimura, "Discovery of Disputes: Collective Memories on Textbooks and Japanese—South Korean Relations," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 17, no. 1 (2012): 97–124; Myon-Woo Lee, "Textbook Conflicts and Korea-Japan Relations," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 15, no. 2 (2001): 421–46.

compare and contrast the use of different types of diplomatic sanctions and observe the common patterns across the individual incidents. Moreover, it can also provide insights into the use of diplomatic sanctions, specifically in the Latin American context, offering a regional perspective. The following sections will provide a contextual background of the crisis, the unfolding of the events, and their analysis for each case.

5.8 Mini Case 1: US-China Taiwan Crisis

5.8.1 Background

Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US in June 1995 triggered a chain of events that significantly escalated the risk of militarized conflict in the region.⁴⁹⁰ This visit occurred against the backdrop of a longstanding dispute between China and Taiwan resulting from the Chinese Civil War in 1949.⁴⁹¹ Following the Communist Party's victory on the mainland and the retreat of the Kuomintang government to Taiwan, the dispute between these two entities persisted, paving the way for cross-strait tensions.⁴⁹² During the Mao period, the possibility of using force against Taiwan remained a serious option, yet with Deng Xiaoping, a peaceful method of unification was pursued, which constituted the basis for the "one country, two systems" formula.⁴⁹³ This approach suggested the unification of Taiwan with mainland China while granting autonomy in its economic and domestic affairs to a certain extent. As such, the two countries experienced relatively improved relations during the 1980s with increased economic interactions and human travel exchanges, culminating in quasi-official talks across the strait.

Since 1949, the Taiwan issue has played a critical role in determining the foreign policy preferences of the People's Republic of China. China has adopted its own version of the "One China Principle" and asserted itself as the sole representative of the entire China

⁴⁹⁰ Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation."

⁴⁹¹ Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford University Press, 2003).

⁴⁹² Zhao, *Across the Taiwan Strait*.

⁴⁹³ C. L. Chiou, "Dilemmas in China's Reunification Policy toward Taiwan," *Asian Survey* 26, no. 4 (1986): 467-82, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2644159>.

while regarding Taiwan as a renegade province.⁴⁹⁴ In line with this stance, China has prioritized the prevention of Taiwan's independence and its international recognition as one of the key foreign policy objectives. This has significantly influenced China's relations with other countries, particularly with the US. In 1979, the US officially recognized China and consequently terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Starting in 1972, the two countries have defined their relationship through three communiques outlining the nature of their diplomatic engagement.⁴⁹⁵

Against this backdrop, the US decision to grant a visa to the Taiwanese President sparked enormous concern for China as it viewed this action as a significant national security issue potentially bolstering Taiwan's independence goals.⁴⁹⁶ Therefore, this move increased China's distrust of Washington, raising suspicions about the US commitment to the "One China Principle". It is also important to note that this event unfolded against the backdrop of already heightened tensions between the US and China, fueled by the US decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 1992, contrary to previous promises by Washington to reduce arms sales.⁴⁹⁷ Consequently, this visit, combined with the existing concerns, further deepened Chinese worries about the US stance on Taiwan's independence.⁴⁹⁸ China responded with a series of coercive actions, including diplomatic sanctions and military measures against both the US and Taiwan.

5.8.2 Unfolding of Event

Since the termination of relations with Taiwan and recognition of China in 1979, the US had refrained from allowing Taiwanese presidents and other senior officials to pay non-transit visits to the country. However, in May 1995, there was a notable departure from this stance

⁴⁹⁴ Adam P. Liff and Dalton Lin, "The 'One China' Framework at 50 (1972–2022): The Myth of 'Consensus' and Its Evolving Policy Significance," *The China Quarterly* 252 (December 2022): 977–1000, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S030574102200131X>.

⁴⁹⁵ Najam Rafique, "US-China Relations: The Three Principles of Cooperation," *Strategic Studies* 22, no. 1 (2002): 7–25.

⁴⁹⁶ Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," *The China Journal* 36 (July 1996): 87–93, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2950374>.

⁴⁹⁷ Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation."

⁴⁹⁸ Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis."

when the US granted permission for Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's "private" visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. This marked the end of a 16-year ban.

Initially, the Clinton Administration denied the request,⁴⁹⁹ but after a Congressional pressure, the visa was granted. In the announcement of the decision, the State Department highlighted that he would come "*in a strictly private capacity and will not undertake any official activities.*"⁵⁰⁰ State Department also noted that this decision does not imply a change in the US China policy. Hence, in June, Lee attended the university's graduate reunion and delivered his talk as the main speaker.

China reacted to the White House's decision to grant a visa with increased anger and demanded its cancellation after summoning the US ambassador and lodging diplomatic protest.⁵⁰¹ Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed regret by stating that this decision is "*an extremely serious act of brazenly creating two Chinas. . . that damages China's sovereignty and undermines its cause for peaceful reunification.*"⁵⁰²

In the days following, China warned of retaliation if Washington did not reverse its visa decision without specifying which measures would be taken.⁵⁰³ Subsequently, China's initial response came through the cancellation of high-level meetings between state officials. This included postponing the scheduled visit of the Chinese Defense Minister to the US, canceling the visit of the Chinese Air Force chief, and delaying bilateral talks with the US on nuclear cooperation and arms proliferation.⁵⁰⁴

⁴⁹⁹ Martin Fletcher, "Clinton Bans Visit by Taiwan Leader to Placate China," *The Times*, May 16, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3T2M-72F0-00H1-F0MJ-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰⁰ "Clinton Administration Allows Taiwan President to Visit," *The Associated Press*, May 22, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-TFM0-008G-74NG-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰¹ "China Calls on U.S. To Reverse Taiwan Visa Decision," *Associated Press Worldstream*, May 23, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJD-W490-0070-10JK-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰² "China Blasts US over Visit: Washington Lifts Ban with Visa for Taiwan's President," *Financial Times*, May 23, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SNR-M4M0-009K-N2TH-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰³ "China Planning Retaliation for U.S. Visa for Taiwan President," *The Associated Press*, May 25, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-TBM0-008G-72H6-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰⁴ "China Postpones More Meetings in Diplomatic Row with U.S.," *The Associated Press*, May 28, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-T8B0-008G-70FT-00000-00&context=1516831>.

Upon Lee's visit, China further escalated the tension by recalling its ambassador to the US on June 17, 1995, noting that the recall decision was not permanent.⁵⁰⁵ The US side responded with regret as the State Department stated, "*We very much regret that the Chinese Government has chosen to withdraw its envoy from Washington, and we hope that his absence from Washington will be temporary.*"⁵⁰⁶ While initially stated as temporary, the ambassador's return was delayed due to the ongoing strains in the relations.

The recall decision coincided with the departure of the US ambassador to China due to the end of his service. As Beijing delayed the approval of the new US ambassador's appointment, both countries were left without ambassadors in the following months, marking the first time this had occurred since the establishment of relations.

As tensions escalated between the two countries, China reiterated its expectation for Washington to take action to mitigate the event's negative impact.⁵⁰⁷ Reflecting this, China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated, "*So I believe it is now up to the United States to take the initiative, to take concrete measures, to rectify its mistakes.*"⁵⁰⁸ In an escalation, China resorted to the display of force through missile tests and naval and air exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan between 21 and 28 July 1995. This occurred just three days before the first official meetings between Chinese and American Foreign Ministers since the crisis began.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁵ "China Recalls Envoy to U.S.," *United Press International*, June 17, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SKG-DBW0-0001-X13P-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰⁶ By Elaine Sciolino, "Angered Over Taiwan, China Recalls Its Ambassador in U.S.," *The New York Times*, June 17, 1995, Late Edition-Final edition, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3S89-7VH0-0005-G1T9-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰⁷ "China keeps up anti-US tirade over Taiwan visits," *Agence France Presse – English*, June 20, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD-X0T0-0031-V07H-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰⁸ Leon Mangasarian, "China's Foreign Minister Says Washington Must Move to Repair Ties," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, July 14, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3RPR-T120-0094-N2HX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁰⁹ Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation."

Washington expressed concerns that these actions did not “*promote stability in the straits.*”⁵¹⁰ China continued its show of force with missile tests and exercises in August 1995.⁵¹¹

The Chinese ambassador to the US resumed his position on August 28, 1995, after more than two months.⁵¹² China approved a new ambassador on September 22, 1995, as tensions began to cool down following the foreign ministers' meetings on August 1, 1995.⁵¹³ Yet, another crisis escalated as China intensified its military maneuvers in March 1996, aiming to influence Taiwan's first democratic elections held on March 23, 1996. In response to China's military actions, the US dispatched an aircraft carrier battlegroup to the region. The Chinese military activities ceased following the elections.

5.8.3 Analysis

The "Taiwan Strait Crisis" has received significant attention from the scholarly community, and some of these studies have also highlighted the coercive aspects of the crisis.⁵¹⁴ However, these studies have primarily focused on the military coercion episodes, such as the 1996 military maneuvers between China and the US, while overlooking China's overall strategy since the crisis's initiation. At the onset, China employed diplomatic coercive methods, including postponing high-level officials' meetings, halting bilateral talks, and recalling its ambassador. However, as the US appeared non-compliant, China escalated the tension by resorting to military coercive methods, such as test-firing missiles and conducting naval and air exercises near Taiwan.

⁵¹⁰ “United States Concerned about China’s Missile Tests,” *Agence France Presse – English*, July 25, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD-WVS0-0031-V2V5-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵¹¹ “China to Hold Missile Test for Second Time in a Month,” *The Associated Press*, August 10, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJF-R1B0-008G-754S-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵¹² “Beijing Approves New US Ambassador to China,” *Agence France Presse – English*, September 22, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD-WM60-0031-V3GW-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵¹³ Peter Wilson, “China’s Frosty Relationship with US Starts to Thaw,” *The Australian*, August 30, 1995, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:49NV-F220-01S8-H2GX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵¹⁴ Xu Xin, “Coercion against Foregone Losses: Beijing’s Strategy During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” *Ritumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 9 (2002): 15–44; Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,” *International Security* 27, no. 2 (2002): 48–85; Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000): 51–86; Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation.”

The diplomatic sanctions imposed by China aimed to express its dissatisfaction with the US decision to permit the visit of the Taiwanese President. These measures had multiple targets and purposes. While the immediate target was the US, China also aimed to signal its disapproval of Taiwan's overseas diplomacy. Furthermore, given that Taiwan's relations with other countries are crucial to China's relations with those countries, it can also be stated that China used these sanctions to send a message to the international community about what behaviors it considered unacceptable regarding the Taiwan issue.

Furthermore, in addition to their punitive and deterrent purposes, China also employed diplomatic sanctions as part of a gradual escalation strategy. From the outset, by implementing costly diplomatic measures, China demonstrated its commitment to the issue and signaled that it would escalate with harsher measures if the US failed to comply with China's demands. When the US did not reverse its decision and take steps to mitigate the negative implications, China escalated the crisis by resorting to military measures to demonstrate its resolve.

The scholarly community has debated whether China intended to escalate the crisis to the level of military incursion, particularly with Taiwan.⁵¹⁵ Some scholars argue that the Taiwan Strait crisis signaled a fundamental policy shift in China, a move away from the doctrine based on the peaceful resolution towards a new one based on the real possibility of war. Conversely, others, emphasizing China's military culture that historically prioritizes conflict avoidance to achieve foreign policy objectives,⁵¹⁶ suggest that China did not intend to escalate to full-scale war, even from the outset. Despite the debate about Beijing's ultimate intentions, this case illustrates how diplomatic sanctions were utilized as part of a gradual escalation strategy. Diplomatic sanctions became a viable and cost-effective measure for China at the onset to demonstrate the issue's importance for Beijing and signal that it would escalate the crisis if the US failed to acquiesce.

⁵¹⁵ Scobell, "Show of Force."

⁵¹⁶ Jonathan R. Adelman and Zhiyu Shi, *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840-1980* (Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993).

5.9 Mini Case 2: South Korea – Japan Textbook Crisis

5.9.1 Background

Japan's screening process for textbooks sparked a year-long crisis between Seoul and Tokyo in 2001. The tensions escalated when Japan initiated the revision of new history textbooks for junior high schools, a routine procedure conducted every five years to assess their appropriateness. South Korea expressed strong dissatisfaction with the narratives presented in the textbooks. They argued that the books distort the history of World War II by justifying Japanese wartime atrocities against its Asian neighbors, that they gloss over Japanese colonization of South Korea, and that they reflect Japanese nationalist sentiments.⁵¹⁷ This was not the first instance of a crisis between the two countries over history textbooks, as similar issues strained the relations in the 1980s and 2000s.⁵¹⁸ Additionally, China was also involved in the crisis by criticizing the developments surrounding the history textbooks.

The Korean peninsula was under Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945⁵¹⁹, a period marked by controversies, including compulsory Japanese-language education, forced labor, and the exploitation of comfort women during wartime.⁵²⁰ These issues have had a lasting impact on the relationship between the two countries.⁵²¹ In the 1990s, the two had taken steps to improve their relations and overcome the grievances stemming from the war and colonial era. Particularly, since taking office in 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung aimed to enhance relations with Japan, advocating for a "forward-looking" partnership.⁵²² As such, President Kim visited Japan twice and gradually lifted longstanding bans on Japanese cultural products such as films and pop music. Both countries had worked to improve cultural, economic, diplomatic, and military ties. Yet, the 2001 textbook crisis strained relations, and

⁵¹⁷ Lee, "Textbook Conflicts and Korea-Japan Relations."

⁵¹⁸ Alexandra Sakaki, "Japanese-South Korean Textbook Talks: The Necessity of Political Leadership," *Pacific Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2012): 263–85.

⁵¹⁹ Kevin J. Cooney and Alex Scarbrough, "Japan and South Korea: Can These Two Nations Work Together?," *Asian Affairs* 35, no. 3 (2008): 173–92.

⁵²⁰ Claudia Schneider, "The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617 (2008): 107–22.

⁵²¹ David Hundt and Roland Bleiker, "Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan," *Asian Perspective* 31, no. 1 (2007): 61–91.

⁵²² Yoshito Sengoku, "Forward-Looking Strategic Cooperation between Japan and South Korea," *Asia-Pacific Review* 19, no. 2 (November 1, 2012): 1–5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2012.739495>.

this event unfolded against the backdrop of the two countries co-hosting the 2002 World Cup soccer finals, necessitating close cooperation.

Scholars have proposed alternative explanations for the roots of the crisis, citing factors such as South Korea's democratization in 1987, which emboldened Koreans to protest against Japan, and the rise of nationalism in Japan during the 1980s, which sparked reactions from Koreans.⁵²³ While the risk of escalation into a militarized dispute seemed distant, the measures employed by South Korea as part of its crisis management strategy underscored the issue's significance.⁵²⁴ Initially using diplomatic coercive methods, Seoul escalated the crisis by implementing economic and military sanctions against Japan to make it comply with its demands.

5.9.2 *Unfolding of Event*

The crisis between South Korea and Japan erupted in February 2001 following media reports about Japan's ongoing history textbook screening process. Seoul criticized the textbooks as distorting historical facts regarding Japan's colonial and wartime history, demanding Tokyo prevent their approval for publication. In this line, the South Korean parliament's education committee unanimously passed a resolution demanding Japan to retract the publication of textbooks. In a written statement, they emphasized, *"It is a clear historical fact that, under the lame cause of building a 'Greater East Asia of Co-Prosperity Sphere,' Japan invaded Korea, China, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries and committed such atrocities as forcing women to become 'comfort women' for Japanese soldiers."*⁵²⁵

Following this, South Korea issued a diplomatic protest after summoning the Japanese ambassador and officially demanded the halt of textbook issuance.⁵²⁶ In response to mounting pressure, the Japanese Education Minister stated that the screening process

⁵²³ Kimura, "Discovery of Disputes."

⁵²⁴ Kimura.

⁵²⁵ "Protest Statement Issued over Japan's History Textbook," *Japan Economic Newswire*, February 26, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42FH-K4J0-00JR-G3M9-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵²⁶ Jun Kwan-Woo, "South Korean FM Summons Japanese Envoy over History Books," *Agence France Presse – English*, February 28, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42G3-S700-00GS-K0DV-00000-00&context=1516831>.

would take into account the concerns of neighboring countries, which is also mandated by a guideline adopted in 1982.⁵²⁷ However, despite the revisions to the original draft, Seoul found them unsatisfactory, leading to the continuation of the tension.

The controversial textbook was approved on April 3, 2001. In response, South Korea issued a formal protest expressing deep regret over the decision and demanded that the Japanese government take fundamental measures to prevent the distortion of history.⁵²⁸ Additionally, the South Korean ambassador to Tokyo was temporarily recalled on April 9, marking one of the severest diplomatic actions taken since the recent improvement in relations at that time between the two countries.⁵²⁹ The South Korean Foreign Ministry, during the announcement of the recall decision, stated, "*Our objective is clear. We want to see the textbooks rewritten to avoid incorrect descriptions of history.*"⁵³⁰

The South Korean ambassador returned to his position after ten days, with the Foreign Ministry stating, "*The government believes the strong diplomatic action of recalling the ambassador has achieved its goal to a certain degree.*"⁵³¹ This decision followed a diplomatic letter from the Japanese Foreign Minister expressing regret. Upon returning, the South Korean ambassador delivered a letter urging Japan to rewrite the textbook.⁵³²

Following this, South Korea officially demanded that the Japanese government make thirty-five changes to the controversial textbooks and stated they were prepared to take

⁵²⁷ "Japan Promises to Screen Textbook 'With Consideration for Asian Neighbors,'" *Xinhua General News Service*, March 2, 2001,

<https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42GH-N060-00RC-9156-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵²⁸ "South Korea Formally Protests at Tokyo's Approval of Text Book," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 3, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42RB-T640-00GS-K05P-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵²⁹ Jun Kwan-Woo, "South Korea recalls ambassador to Japan over textbook row," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 9, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42SM-MST0-00GS-K092-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁰ "South Korean Envoy Returns Home in Protest over Japanese History Textbook," April 10, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42SV-KPJ0-009F-R10V-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³¹ Charles Lee, "S.Korean envoy to return to Japan," *United Press International*, April 17, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42VB-9WR0-00RC-84MX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³² "South Korea to send its ambassador back to Tokyo," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, April 18, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42VF-3TK0-0094-N16D-00000-00&context=1516831>.

countermeasures if their requests were unmet.⁵³³ These revision demands were compiled by a task force in South Korea, which studied the materials for about one month.⁵³⁴ To increase pressure, South Korea announced on May 7, 2001, that they indefinitely postponed a joint naval exercise scheduled to be held in June with Japan.⁵³⁵ However, Japan rejected the demands.⁵³⁶

In response to the refusal decision, South Korea reacted regretfully by stating that *"Tokyo's refusal reflects a clear disregard for the concerns and interests of the Korean people,"*⁵³⁷ and took several economic and military measures. As a result, South Korea indefinitely banned new imports of Japanese cultural goods, including pop music, TV programs, and computer games, which had been facilitated since 1998.⁵³⁸ Seoul also announced freezing bilateral military exchanges and the cancellation of high-level visits between senior military officers.⁵³⁹ The South Korean Defense Minister emphasized that *"South Korea-Japan military exchanges must proceed on the basis of a correct understanding of history and mutual trust, with the support of the peoples of the two countries."*⁵⁴⁰

⁵³³ "South Korea demands Japan revise textbooks despite Tokyo's refusal," *Agence France Presse – English*, May 3, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:42YR-WH80-00GS-K0N3-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁴ Cho Kyung, "S. Korea Demands 35 Revisions to Japan's Textbooks," *Japan Economic Newswire*, May 7, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:430N-YT50-00JR-G1T3-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁵ Paul Shin, "Seoul Calls Off Military Exercise," *Associated Press Online*, May 7, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:430K-T050-00BT-N2J3-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁶ C.W. Lim, "Japan Refuses to Change Textbooks," *Agence France Presse – English*, July 9, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:43FT-YFW0-00GS-K01R-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁷ "Seoul criticises Japan's refusal to revise controversial textbooks," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, July 9, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:43G4-BJF0-0094-N1NX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁸ Shino Yuasa, "Japan Regrets South Korean Sanctions in History Book Dispute," *Agence France Presse – English*, July 12, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:43GN-RYT0-00GS-K2XX-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵³⁹ "Leadall: S. Korea Announces Measures to Protest Textbooks," *Japan Economic Newswire*, July 12, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:43GJ-S200-00JR-G09J-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁴⁰ Don Kirk, "Seoul Retaliates Over Japanese Texts ; New Era in Relations Halted With Cuts in Military and Cultural Ties," *The International Herald Tribune*, July 13, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:43GR-7SG0-002R-B09C-00000-00&context=1516831>.

The tensions in relations began to decrease after Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited South Korea on October 15, 2001, where he expressed apologies for Japan's actions during the colonial period.⁵⁴¹ In the same week, South Korea and Japan agreed to establish a history research institute to address disputes surrounding history textbooks.⁵⁴² Subsequently, on October 23, 2001, the South Korean Foreign Minister announced that they were considering resuming cultural and military exchanges with Japan.⁵⁴³

5.9.3 Analysis

The South Korea – Japan Textbook crisis has been analyzed from various perspectives in literature,⁵⁴⁴ but its coercive aspects have not become the focus. This textbook crisis consists of several coercive attempts and provides a good illustration of how leaders can employ coercive strategies throughout such crises. At the onset of the crisis, South Korea utilized diplomatic sanctions by canceling high-level visits and recalling the ambassador. However, when Japan failed to comply with South Korea's demands, the latter escalated the pressure by resorting to economic and military sanctions. This included banning the import of new Japanese popular culture products and completely halting military exchanges.

Diplomatic sanctions served several purposes in this crisis. First, South Korea utilized diplomatic sanctions to express its disapproval of Japan's decision to approve history textbooks that it perceived as distorting historical facts and whitewashing Japan's wrongdoings during the colonial and wartime periods. In this sense, diplomatic sanctions stand as one of the initial costly reactions, in addition to verbal condemnations, to punish Japan's behavior.

⁵⁴¹ "Japan's Koizumi visits South Korea amid protests," *Associated Press International*, October 15, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:446Y-2CD0-00BT-M2GK-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁴² "Japan, South Korea Agree to Set up History Research Institute," *Associated Press International*, October 20, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4480-TPC0-00BT-M05X-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁴³ "South Korea Considers Resuming Exchanges with Japan," *Associated Press International*, October 23, 2001, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:448M-S2D0-00BT-M1CJ-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁴⁴ Sakaki, "Japanese-South Korean Textbook Talks"; Schneider, "The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective"; Lee, "Textbook Conflicts and Korea-Japan Relations."

Second, diplomatic sanctions were employed as part of a gradual escalation strategy during the crisis. The decision to recall the ambassador had a significant impact in terms of signaling resolve, mainly because it occurred during a period of increasing diplomatic and economic engagement between the two countries. Additionally, the maintenance of diplomatic contact had been crucial in this period of rapprochement, especially with the upcoming 2002 World Cup tournament requiring enhanced diplomatic cooperation. Therefore, the recall of the ambassador became a serious signal of resolve to escalate, given the context of the relationship between South Korea and Japan at that time. This was evident in Japan's response, as they attempted to resolve the issue after the recall decision by sending a special letter from the Japanese foreign minister to its Korean counterpart. However, after Japan refused to make changes suggested by South Korea in textbooks, South Korea applied economic and military sanctions to escalate the crisis further and put pressure on the Japanese side.

This case illustrates how diplomatic sanctions were employed to signal resolve in a dispute as part of a gradual escalation strategy. The sequencing of coercive measures, starting with diplomatic sanctions and then resorting to economic and military sanctions, supports the hypothesis developed in the first part of the chapter. Similar to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, diplomatic sanctions were the initial step due to their cost-effectiveness. More costly measures, including economic and military sanctions, were only applied after diplomatic sanctions failed to yield the desired outcomes.

5.10 Mini Case 3: Venezuela – Colombia Crises between 2000-2019

5.10.1 Background

The relationship between Venezuela and Colombia has remained contentious throughout history, becoming one of the longest-standing strategic rivalries.⁵⁴⁵ This relationship has been marked by persistent disputes over borders, migration issues, and ideological differences, especially in recent decades. Consequently, the two countries have experienced constant ups and downs, as both sides commonly adopt a zero-sum approach in their dealings with each

⁵⁴⁵ Dreyer and Thompson, *Handbook of International Rivalries*.

other. The relations further strained after Chavez became president of Venezuela in 1998 and Uribe assumed office in Colombia in 2002.

In Colombia, President Uribe aimed to establish security amidst significant challenges. The country had suffered greatly during the 1990s due to internal conflicts between left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries, including attacks by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the adverse effects of the narco-industry on political and economic stability.⁵⁴⁶ These factors collectively weakened the state apparatus in Colombia, leading to an insecure and unstable environment. In order to address these challenges, Uribe pursued a pro-US foreign policy, building a strong alliance with the United States.⁵⁴⁷ This alliance led to the establishment of Plan Colombia in 2000, a partnership aimed at providing military and economic assistance to combat terrorism and narco-trafficking.⁵⁴⁸ Additionally, Colombia signed a deal in 2009 allowing US military personnel to operate from military bases within its territory to support its counter-terrorism efforts.⁵⁴⁹

In contrast, Venezuela under Chavez pursued a leftist ideology and adopted an anti-US stance, seeking to foster unity among Latin American countries.⁵⁵⁰ This ideological divergence, coupled with Colombia's close relationship with the US and its handling of leftist insurgent groups, contributed to strained bilateral relations. Moreover, Chavez's willingness to involve himself as a mediator in Colombia's conflict with FARC further complicated the situation, leading Colombia to accuse Chavez of sympathizing with the insurgent group. The tensions over similar issues in their relations have persisted even after changes in leadership in both countries.

⁵⁴⁶ James F Rochlin, "Who Said the Cold War Is Over? The Political Economy of Strategic Conflict between Venezuela and Colombia," *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (March 2011): 237–60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.560467>.

⁵⁴⁷ Patrick W. Quirk, "US–Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980–2010)," in *Great Powers, Weak States, and Insurgency: Explaining Internal Threat Alliances*, ed. Patrick W. Quirk, Governance, Security and Development (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 37–100, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47419-9_2.

⁵⁴⁸ Jonathan D. Rosen, *The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond* (SUNY Press, 2014).

⁵⁴⁹ "Colombia Agrees Deal to Step up US Military Presence," *The Guardian*, October 30, 2009, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/30/colombia-agreement-us-military>.

⁵⁵⁰ Andrés Serbin and Andrei Serbin Pont, "The Foreign Policy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: The Role and Legacy of Hugo Chávez," *Latin American Policy* 8, no. 2 (2017): 232–48, <https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12122>.

Against this backdrop, the two countries experienced frequent disputes during the 2000s, triggered by border issues, military incursions, accusations of harboring terrorists or paramilitaries, and immigration issues. Diplomatic relations were suspended entirely after the political turmoil in Venezuela in 2019, only to be restored in 2022. Despite these frequent disputes, they managed to avoid tensions escalating to more severe levels, such as armed conflict, by restraining their actions and employing less coercive tools. Various forms of diplomatic sanctions were frequently applied during these crises, sometimes accompanied by economic and military coercion. The following section will outline the main crises between Venezuela and Colombia during the 2000s, highlighting the role of coercive tools, particularly diplomatic sanctions, in each crisis.

5.10.2 *Unfolding of Events*

On November 24, 2000, a crisis between Colombia and Venezuela erupted after Venezuela allowed a FARC leader to deliver a speech in the parliament. In response, Colombia recalled its ambassador, stating that the decision was made to "*evaluate the current state of relations between the two countries*."⁵⁵¹ Colombian President Pastrana considered this move as an interference in their internal affairs.⁵⁵² Before the eruption of this event, Colombia had been criticizing Venezuelan leader Chavez for his alleged sympathy towards the Colombian insurgent group.⁵⁵³ Additionally, tensions between the two countries were also heightened due to Chavez's opposition to the US-funded Plan Colombia,⁵⁵⁴ which he claimed would lead to an influx of refugees, drug dealers, and insurgents into neighboring countries, thus

⁵⁵¹ Jared Kotler, "Colombia Recalls Ambassador to Venezuela after Rebel Speech in Congress," *Associated Press International*, November 24, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41RM-JV70-00BT-M0G0-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵² "Venezuela Appeals to Colombia For Normal Relations," *Xinhua News Agency*, November 28, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41SG-CGP0-00RC-930M-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵³ "Colombian-Venezuelan Relations Strained after Ambassador Recall," *Agence France Presse – English*, November 25, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41RV-GVS0-00GS-K0XB-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵⁴ Fabiola Sanchez, "Venezuela's Chavez urges Colombia to revise anti-drug strategy," *The Associated Press*, December 8, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41VM-4P30-009F-R28V-00000-00&context=1516831>.

destabilizing the region.⁵⁵⁵ Following Colombia's decision to recall its ambassador, Venezuela also recalled its ambassador to Colombia in a tit-for-tat move on November 27, 2000, three days after the latter's decision.⁵⁵⁶ The tension between the two countries eased after Venezuela decided to return its ambassador in January 2001.⁵⁵⁷

The relations between the two deteriorated, this time after Venezuela accused Colombia of abducting a FARC leader by entering Venezuelan territory and offering a bounty to local officers on December 13, 2004. Considering this move as a violation of sovereignty, Venezuelan Interior Minister Chacon stated, "*This definitely signifies a violation of the sovereignty of the Venezuelan state, which we categorically reject.*"⁵⁵⁸ Subsequently, the Colombian government admitted that they offered cash rewards to locals but denied the involvement of Colombian officials in the kidnapping operation. Following the release of the investigation findings regarding the abduction, Venezuela recalled its ambassador on January 13, 2005.⁵⁵⁹ Chavez stated, "*With much pain I have recalled the ambassador in Bogota and he will not return until the Colombian government offers us apologies.*" He also noted, "*I've ordered all agreements and business with Colombia to be paralyzed.*"⁵⁶⁰ As part of this, Venezuela announced the suspension of a pipeline construction plan between Venezuela and

⁵⁵⁵ Andrs Caizlez, "Worries Grow Over U.S.-Backed Anti-Drug Plan," *IPS-Inter Press Service*, November 21, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41R3-6090-001G-V499-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵⁶ (November 27, 2000; Monday). Venezuela calls home ambassador to Colombia amid tensions. Associated Press International. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41S8-H2D0-00BT-M18T-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵⁷ "Venezuela calls home ambassador to Colombia amid tensions," *Associated Press International*, November 27, 2000, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41S8-H2D0-00BT-M18T-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵⁸ "Venezuela Says Colombian Police Involved in Rebel's Capture, Recalls Ambassador over 'Violation of Sovereignty,'" *Associated Press International*, January 13, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4F7V-FXJ0-00BT-M3RV-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁵⁹ "Venezuela Calls Back Ambassador to Colombia in Diplomatic Row over Captured Rebel," *The Associated Press*, January 13, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4F7V-J8J0-009F-R428-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁶⁰ "Venezuela Suspends Ties With Colombia," *Associated Press Online*, January 14, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4F82-DJ00-00BT-N2KF-00000-00&context=1516831>.

Colombia.⁵⁶¹ Initially, by refusing to apologize, President Uribe stated that Colombia has the “right to free itself from the nightmare of terrorism” and also insisted that they did not violate Venezuelan sovereignty as they considered the use of bounty hunters a “legitimate method” to address the terrorism problem.⁵⁶² However, Colombia later stated that they would not repeat the same action. The strained relations normalized when Venezuela returned its ambassador after over two weeks.⁵⁶³

The next crisis was instigated after Colombian President Uribe dismissed the Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez from his existing role as one of the mediators in negotiations for the release of the hostages held by the FARC in November 2007.⁵⁶⁴ Uribe’s decision came after it was revealed that Chavez directly engaged with Colombian generals for the hostage negotiations, prompting criticism from Uribe.⁵⁶⁵ It was followed by an exchange of insults between the two leaders, as Chavez publicly condemned Uribe’s decision by stating that Colombia “deserves a better president”, while the Colombian President accused Chavez of wishing for a rebel government in Colombia.⁵⁶⁶ In response to Uribe’s decision, Chavez recalled the Venezuelan ambassador on November 27, 2007, and stated that relations would be put on hold.⁵⁶⁷ However, Colombia announced that they would not recall their ambassador.

⁵⁶¹ “Venezuela Suspends Relations with Colombia in Row over Bounty Hunters,” *The Canadian Press*, January 14, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4F82-X670-01G6-919M-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁶² “Venezuela’s Chavez Suspends Diplomatic and Trade Ties with Colombia,” *The Associated Press*, January 14, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4F82-FV00-009F-R4TG-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁶³ “Venezuela’s Ambassador Back in Colombia, Relations Approach Normal after Dispute,” *Associated Press International*, February 1, 2005, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4FCW-WW70-00BT-M3XF-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁶⁴ Simon Romero and Jenny Carolina Gonzalez, “Colombia Ends Venezuela’s Hostage Mediation Efforts,” *The New York Times*, November 23, 2007.

⁵⁶⁵ “Colombia Rules out Ambassador Recall in Venezuela,” *Xinhua General News Service*, November 27, 2007, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4R7J-M5G0-TWMB-317T-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁶⁶ “Venezuela Recalls Ambassador from Colombia after Hostage Talk Dispute,” *Xinhua General News Service*, November 27, 2007, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4R7J-M5G0-TWMB-3183-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁶⁷ “Venezuela recalls ambassador amid spat with Colombia,” *Agence France Presse – English*, November 27, 2007, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4R7B-MYW0-TWMD-60K9-00000-00&context=1516831>.

The tensions eased in December after the two countries agreed on a hostage rescue plan offered by Venezuela.⁵⁶⁸

In March 2008, tensions that had recently cooled down between Colombia and Venezuela were reignited, this time with the involvement of Ecuador, raising concerns about a potential armed conflict. The crisis sparked after Colombia entered Ecuadorian territory and bombed a FARC camp, resulting in the death of a top FARC figure and dozens of others.⁵⁶⁹ In support of Ecuador, Venezuela ordered the closure of the Venezuelan diplomatic mission in Colombia. As such, Chavez stated, "*Let all diplomatic officials return. We are in a state of alert, and we will support Ecuador in any circumstance.*"⁵⁷⁰ Additionally, Venezuela expelled the top Colombian diplomat and other diplomatic personnel from the embassy.⁵⁷¹ The crisis also involved a show of force as Chavez ordered the military to move to the Colombian border, placing them on high alert.⁵⁷² Ecuador also deployed troops to its border with Colombia. The tension de-escalated after one week when the three countries' leaders met at a summit and reached a deal.⁵⁷³ Following this, Venezuela announced the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with Colombia by sending back the ambassador and other mission personnel and allowing their Colombian counterparts to return.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁶⁸ "Colombia Accepts Venezuela Hostage Release Plan," *Xinhua General News Service*, December 26, 2007.

⁵⁶⁹ Ian James, "Venezuela, Ecuador Order Troops to Colombia Border over Deadly Attack on Rebels," *The Associated Press*, March 3, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4S01-TWB0-TW8Y-S02K-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷⁰ "Venezuela Puts Army on High Alert, Closes Colombia Embassy," *Xinhua General News Service*, March 2, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4S01-TV10-TWMB-31NM-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷¹ "Ecuador, Venezuela Cutting Colombia Ties," *Associated Press Online*, March 3, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4S02-0550-TWCX-P04R-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷² "Venezuela Deploys Troops to Border with Colombia: Chavez," *Agence France Presse – English*, March 2, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4RYT-VK50-TWMD-6139-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷³ Juan Castro Olivera, "Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela Agree to Settle Dispute," *Agence France Presse – English*, March 8, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4S13-NP70-TWMD-614F-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷⁴ "Venezuela Normalizes Diplomatic Ties with Colombia," *Agence France Presse – English*, March 9, 2008, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:4S19-G8V0-TWMD-60VW-00000-00&context=1516831>.

In July 2009, Venezuela announced that it would freeze diplomatic relations with Colombia and recalled diplomatic personnel, including its ambassador.⁵⁷⁵ President Chavez also threatened to sever all relations with Colombia, including economic ties, if the perceived aggression persisted.⁵⁷⁶ This decision came after Colombia accused Chavez of supplying military equipment to FARC, based on the claim that weapons found in a FARC cache were of Swedish origin and were sold to Venezuela.⁵⁷⁷ Caracas denied these accusations as lies. Tensions eased in the following days, and the Venezuelan ambassador returned to his post in early August.⁵⁷⁸

One year later, in July 2010, a new dispute arose when Colombia alleged that top FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) figures were being sheltered in Venezuela.⁵⁷⁹ The Colombian Defense Minister asserted that "*the reason for the deterioration in relations between Venezuela and Colombia is the continued and permanent tolerance of the presence of terrorists in that country.*"⁵⁸⁰ Caracas rejected these allegations and recalled its ambassador in response. Colombia also recalled its ambassador to evaluate the situation in a tit-for-tat move.⁵⁸¹ The relations were restored after President Chavez and newly elected Colombian President Santos agreed to improve their relationship in August.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁵ "Venezuela Freezes Diplomatic Ties with Colombia," *Xinhua General News Service*, July 28, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7W87-GGV1-2PP6-N30F-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷⁶ Christopher Toothaker, "Chavez recalls Venezuela's envoy to Colombia," *Associated Press International*, July 29, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7W87-GGM1-2PFT-712G-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷⁷ Arthur Brice, "Venezuela Freezes Relations with Colombia," *CNN*, July 28, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7W87-GGC0-Y927-G0RW-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷⁸ Jorge Rueda, "Chavez: Venezuela to Return Ambassador to Colombia," *Associated Press International*, August 8, 2009, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7WBK-5GX1-2PFT-7064-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁷⁹ "Venezuela recalls ambassador to protest Colombia rebels charges," *Xinhua General News Service*, July 16, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7YYH-6C60-Y958-C53F-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸⁰ "Venezuela recalls ambassador to Colombia amid rebel row," *Agence France Presse – English*, July 16, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7YYH-6C60-Y95B-G0WS-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸¹ "Colombia Recalls Caracas Ambassador in Rebel Feud," *Agence France Presse – English*, July 22, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:800T-1GG0-Y95B-G4C2-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸² "Colombia and Venezuela restore ties," *Aljazeera*, August 11, 2010, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:804W-SXY1-2SDX-243P-00000-00&context=1516831>.

The two countries experienced another diplomatic spat in August 2015 following a border dispute. The crisis began after Venezuela closed a large border crossing and declared a state of emergency in certain border cities following an attack by paramilitaries on the Colombian side that wounded three border patrol personnel a week earlier.⁵⁸³ Caracas also deported thousands of Colombian immigrants. In response to these developments, Colombia dispatched officials to investigate the situation in the border city where the incident occurred; however, after they had not been allowed, Colombia recalled its ambassador to Caracas.⁵⁸⁴ Colombia also criticized the crackdown on immigrants, describing it as a tragedy.⁵⁸⁵ In a tit-for-tat move, Venezuela also recalled its ambassador, with Foreign Minister Rodriguez stating, "*We'll review our relations with Colombia due to the aggression suffered by our people because of paramilitary groups and an economic war.*"⁵⁸⁶ The tension persisted with verbal exchanges in the following days. However, the two countries managed to reach an agreement in September to return their ambassadors to their respective positions.⁵⁸⁷

The latest confrontation between Venezuela and Colombia, as part of this analysis, unfolded amidst political upheaval in Venezuela in 2019, when the country experienced a presidential crisis due to the contestation between Maduro and Guaido to be the country's legitimate representative.⁵⁸⁸ During this ongoing turmoil, Venezuela severed diplomatic ties with Colombia after Maduro accused the Colombian government of "*being used for attacks against Venezuela.*"⁵⁸⁹ This decision came after increasing tensions on the borders of the two

⁵⁸³ "Colombia, Venezuela recall ambassadors amid dispute," *Associated Press International*, August 28, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5GSV-07K1-JC65-535N-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸⁴ "Colombia, Venezuela recall ambassadors amid dispute."

⁵⁸⁵ "Colombia, Venezuela recall ambassadors amid border tension," *Agence France Presse – English*, August 28, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5GSV-0721-DY93-M0PS-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸⁶ "Venezuela recalls ambassador from Colombia amid border crisis," *Xinhua General News Service*, August 27, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5GSV-0601-DY91-H0D0-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸⁷ "Venezuela, Colombia Agree to Return Envoys to Both States' Missions," *Philippines News Agency*, September 22, 2015, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5H05-XKM1-F12F-F4CS-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁸⁸ José Briceño-Ruiz, "The Crisis in Venezuela: A New Chapter, or the Final Chapter?," *Latin American Policy* 10, no. 1 (2019): 180–89, <https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12165>.

⁵⁸⁹ Yurleis Infante, "Venezuela Cuts Ties with Colombia," *Xinhua General News Service*, February 24, 2019, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5VH4-XC41-DY91-H202-00000-00&context=1516831>.

countries, as humanitarian aid trucks were transported through Colombia to Venezuela.⁵⁹⁰ Refusing to acknowledge Venezuelans' need for humanitarian aid, the Maduro government viewed this move as Colombia's support for the opposition. Consequently, the Maduro government broke off relations and recalled its diplomatic staff while expelling Colombian diplomatic personnel.⁵⁹¹ Venezuela also closed its borders with Colombia, which significantly impacted economic ties between the two countries. Three years later, the two countries restored their relations after several world governments withdrew their recognition of the opposition government, and a new leftist government was elected in Colombia.⁵⁹²

5.10.3 Analysis

Analyzing eight diplomatic crises between Venezuela and Colombia, which were triggered by issues ranging from interference in domestic affairs to accusations against state leaders, offers an opportunity to demonstrate how diplomatic sanctions can be used to address disputes at different levels of salience between rival states. Table 5.5 shows the summary of events. A significant recurring pattern observed across these cases is the emergence of similar issues as points of contention. This highlights the nature of rivalries, wherein states repeatedly dispute over the same or similar issues, rendering them intractable. Furthermore, in each crisis, diplomatic sanctions emerge as the primary tool utilized by both countries, often replacing official condemnations or diplomatic protests. This underscores the presence of mutual understanding in terms of interpreting signals sent through coercive tools, which may contribute to the de-escalation function of diplomatic sanctions. Moreover, while in some cases, diplomatic sanctions are complemented with economic or military measures, they are also employed as standalone tools in the rest. Even when economic coercive

⁵⁹⁰ "The Latest: Venezuela Partially Closes Colombian Border," *Associated Press International*, February 23, 2019, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5VGR-03W1-JC65-53T3-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁹¹ "Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Neighboring Colombia," *Associated Press International*, February 23, 2019, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5VGX-Y6Y1-DYN6-W0G7-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁵⁹² Regina Garcia Cano, "Venezuela, Colombia take step toward normalizing ties," *Associated Press International*, August 30, 2022, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:668G-SP61-DYMD-64S1-00000-00&context=1516831>.

measures are used, they are carefully calibrated to avoid disrupting economic relations. For instance, during the 2005 crisis, Venezuela suspended a pipeline construction plan in addition to recalling its ambassador, demonstrating a cautious approach to avoid immediate economic fallout. Similarly, in the 2009 crisis, Venezuela froze diplomatic relations and recalled all diplomatic personnel while also threatening to suspend economic relations. However, it limited its economic measures to the threat level without actually imposing them, thereby leaving economic relations intact.

Notably, during the 2008 crisis, Venezuela employed a dual strategy of using diplomatic and military coercion instruments in response to Colombia's intrusion into Ecuadorian territory. As such, Venezuela mobilized its troops to the Colombian border and closed its diplomatic mission in Bogota. This case illustrates the use of coercive tools as part of a mixed strategy applied simultaneously. It is important to note that unlike the previous two case studies—the China-US Taiwan Crisis and the Japan-Korea Textbook Crisis—where diplomatic sanctions were applied as part of a gradual escalation strategy, followed by more coercive tools in a sequenced manner, in the 2008 crisis, both coercive tools were applied simultaneously. Therefore, this situation differs from the use of diplomatic sanctions as part of a gradual escalation strategy, wherein coercive strategies are employed in a complementary manner to signal the intention of escalation.

In addition to these, unlike in previous case studies, in each crisis, even if the target fails to change its behavior in line with the sender's demands, the sender refrains from implementing harsher and more severe coercive measures. This aligns with the expectation that diplomatic sanctions are employed as signals of de-escalation within rivalry dyads. Moreover, an important pattern observed is the tit-for-tat reciprocation of diplomatic sanctions, which represents a less severe form of target response. This reciprocal sanctioning dynamic is evident in crises such as those in 2000, 2010, and 2015, demonstrating a consistent response pattern. This is in addition to the fact that once diplomatic sanctions are reciprocated, the initial sender also refrains from escalating the conflict further. This observed behavioral pattern further supports the hypothesis regarding the role of diplomatic sanctions in de-escalation.

Table 5.5: Summary of Venezuelan-Colombian diplomatic crises (2000-2019)

	Triggering Event	Initial Sender	Type of Diplomatic Sanctions	Accompanying Coercive Tool	Reciprocity
The 2000 Crisis	Speech delivered by a FARC leader in the Venezuelan parliament	Colombia	Ambassador Recall	No	Tit-for-tat
The 2005 Crisis	Kidnapping a leader of FARC by entering Venezuelan territory	Venezuela	Ambassador Recall	Economic Measure (Suspension of pipeline construction plan)	No
The 2007 Crisis	Dismissal of Chavez as a mediator in hostage negotiations	Venezuela	Ambassador Recall	No	No
The 2008 Crisis	Colombia's military incursion into Ecuadorian territory	Venezuela	Closure of Diplomatic Mission	Military Measure (Mobilization of troops)	No
The 2009 Crisis	Colombia accused Chavez of supplying military equipment to FARC	Venezuela	Freezing Diplomatic Relations	Economic Measure (Threat of suspending economic relations)	No
The 2010 Crisis	Colombia's allegations that terrorists are being sheltered in Venezuela	Venezuela	Ambassador Recall	No	Tit-for-tat
The 2015 Crisis	Venezuela closed a large border crossing	Colombia	Ambassador Recall	No	Tit-for-tat
The 2019 Crisis	Perceived Colombian support for the opposition	Venezuela	Breaking of Relations	Economic Measure (Border closing)	No

Overall, the crises analyzed in this section help illustrate the use of diplomatic sanctions and their functionality in terms of signaling restraint and de-escalation within the rivalry context. In this regard, the cases demonstrate that, unlike the previous two cases where diplomatic sanctions are complemented with other coercive tools to increase pressure incrementally,

diplomatic sanctions are not followed by other coercive measures in the analyzed cases. Additionally, when the initial diplomatic sanctions are reciprocated, they come in a tit-for-tat format, therefore not escalating the conflict beyond its current level. Moreover, the initial sender does not attempt to escalate when it is reciprocated in kind, which, combined with the previous point, reveals the possibility of a mutual understanding between states regarding the intent to de-escalate.

5.11 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter examines the interplay between diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and militarized interstate disputes. Specifically, it attempts to understand whether the use of diplomatic sanctions increases the possibility of employing more coercive tools. While doing this, particular attention is given to understanding the effects of using diplomatic sanctions in different contextual settings. With this purpose in mind, the effects of diplomatic sanctions are analyzed in politically relevant and rivalry dyads. This distinction is made primarily based on the assumption that the level of uncertainty about resolves and capabilities is lower in rivalry dyads compared to non-rivalry dyads. The results demonstrate that leaders use diplomatic sanctions as an escalation tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. However, diplomatic sanctions operate differently in rivalry dyads, conveying a message of restraint. Moreover, the mini case study analyses illustrate how diplomatic sanctions are utilized by China and South Korea as part of the gradual escalation of the crisis in order to signal their resolve and pressure their targets. Additionally, the mini-case study analysis of eight crises between Venezuela and Colombia demonstrates the use of diplomatic sanctions in rivalry dyads to signal restraint and de-escalation intent.

This study makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, it incorporates diplomatic sanctions within the broader framework of coercive diplomacy.⁵⁹³ Theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effects of coercive methods—both military and non-military—during the bargaining process.⁵⁹⁴ By incorporating diplomatic sanctions—a key but overlooked dimension—into the discussion, this study aims to enhance our understanding

⁵⁹³ George, *Forceful Persuasion*.

⁵⁹⁴ Greenhill and Krause, *Coercion*.

of how coercive diplomacy operates during the crisis bargaining process. The results indicate that contrary to widely held assumptions that diplomatic sanctions are typically employed when states are not committed enough to escalate the issue further, sanctions can predict the use of more coercive tools, thereby signaling sender resolve. This would be the case even though the target does not interpret this as such. The reasons why the target state fails to receive this message, thereby not perceiving it as a credible signal of resolve, require further scrutiny. One potential answer could be the presence of a gap between the sender and the receiver.⁵⁹⁵

Secondly, this study also contributes to the literature on escalation by integrating diplomatic sanctions as one of the critical rungs leaders use in their gradual escalation strategy. While cost-effectiveness and alignment with international norms are assumed factors that make diplomatic sanctions attractive tools in the context of gradual escalation, further investigation is needed to understand the actual causal mechanisms at play.

Finally, this study provides new insights into the dynamics of rivalry relations by incorporating diplomatic sanctions, allowing leaders to signal restraint. While the signal of restraint approach is not new in the literature, as accommodative signaling proposed by Snyder and Diesing⁵⁹⁶ also shares similar logic and has been recently employed in the context of cyber operations,⁵⁹⁷ its application to rivalry dyads through the means of diplomatic sanctions is novel. While the results support this argument, the actual causal mechanisms operating under the hood necessitate further examination. Additionally, the signaling restraint approach implicitly assumes that there is a mutually shared understanding of the message between the leaders of the rival states.⁵⁹⁸ This assumption should also be tested empirically in future studies.

⁵⁹⁵ Kai Quek, "Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of Sender-Receiver Gaps," *The Journal of Politics* 78, no. 3 (July 2016): 925–40, <https://doi.org/10.1086/685751>.

⁵⁹⁶ Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Columbia University Press, 1974).

⁵⁹⁷ Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan, "Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises," *Security Studies* 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 32–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2040584>.

⁵⁹⁸ Fiona S. Cunningham, "Accommodative Signaling in Cyberspace and the Role of Risk," *Security Studies* 31, no. 4 (August 8, 2022): 764–71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2140601>.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Main Findings and Implications

This dissertation investigated the role of diplomatic sanctions in foreign policy through several research questions. Firstly, it sought answers to the questions of how diplomatic sanctions fit into the broader framework of coercion and what their comparative utilities are. Chapter 2 primarily tackled these questions at the theoretical and analytical levels. It first focused on the factors that caused their neglect in academic circles despite its frequent usage by policymakers. To highlight the coercive potential of diplomatic sanctions, I adopted Baldwin's statecraft approach since it provides a robust framework to analyze foreign policy instruments in a comparative manner by highlighting some of the overlooked aspects of foreign policy decision-making.⁵⁹⁹ Of particular importance is its emphasis on the possibility that decision-makers can pursue multiple objectives with multiple targets. This is in addition to the acknowledgment that policymakers consider the comparative utility of available tools to achieve their objectives before choosing among them. When considered in this way, it allows us to move beyond the longstanding effectiveness debate, which is preoccupied predominantly with compellence purposes, thereby overlooking other potential aspects or purposes for which these tools might be employed. After applying this perspective, it became imperative to identify the distinct features of diplomatic sanctions in order to grasp their comparative utility better. In this regard, some of the potential ways through which diplomatic sanctions can inflict costs on both target and sender states were discussed. These involve legitimacy costs for the target, economic costs for both, and informational costs, as

⁵⁹⁹ Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*.

well as the costs of the inability to pursue interests in the host countries, for sender states. Given that coercion requires some sort of punishment against the target, whether actual or threatened, the impacts of associated costs become crucial in understanding the functionality of coercive instruments.

At this point, I highlighted the fact that while the costs of diplomatic sanctions are apparently higher than those of inducement strategies and mere official diplomatic protests, they are nonetheless lower than the costs of economic sanctions and the use of force. Yet, while this relatively less costly nature of diplomatic sanctions can be considered the *ultima facie* reason for its dismissal as a coercive tool, I pointed out that this very feature, indeed, makes diplomatic sanctions attractive for policymakers as it has several crucial implications that render them feasible to employ in certain settings. Based on this characteristic, I highlighted that diplomatic sanctions become available to both small and major powers since they do not require significant material resources; they can be used for both less salient as well as high salient issues; and they do not significantly alter the balance of power. There are other additional implications, such as diplomatic sanctions not likely to incite a severe response from the target; they can be reciprocated more often, particularly in kind; and they can be used both for signaling resolve or non-resolve.

Secondly, I attempted to answer the question of which factors determine the initiation of diplomatic sanctions. Answering this question is of critical importance since it helps uncover conditions under which policymakers become more or less likely to choose diplomatic sanctions to pursue their goals. Inspired by a similar research agenda on the initiation of militarized conflict and economic sanctions, I aimed to explore the effects of some critical attributes of international politics, such as regime type, economic interdependence, and relative capabilities, on leaders' decisions to use diplomatic sanctions. I believe this effort is important since it helps reveal some of the dismissed or unthought functionality served by diplomatic sanctions in international politics. Moreover, given the potential connection between coercive tools and their usage in tandem by policymakers in the form of mixed strategies, it can be stated that understanding the conditions that lead to diplomatic sanctions might also offer significant insights into our comprehension of economic sanctions and the use of force. This could be the case because the factors leading

to the diplomatic sanctions could also have critical implications for the implementation of other coercive tools. As such, this endeavor can complement previous findings in the literature or provide novel perspectives about other coercive tools.

Chapter 3 dealt with this question to a certain extent by presenting some descriptive statistics based on the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset. This effort provided initial insights into the onset analysis. Chapter 4 was completely devoted to this question by analyzing a comprehensive range of potential variables cited as having significant impacts in the coercion literature, particularly on the onset of economic sanctions and militarized conflicts. While this scrutiny helped uncover the influences of certain factors on the onset of diplomatic sanctions, it also facilitated a comparative analysis of how these critical variables operate at varying levels of coercion, shedding new light on our understanding of international politics in general. Therefore, the results of this analysis have significant implications for several strands of the international relations literature as they relate to a wide variety of subfields, including Kantian peace, power capabilities, alliances, and rivalries.

Regarding the relationship between regime types and diplomatic sanctions, one of the main findings indicated that jointly democratic dyads are less likely to use diplomatic sanctions with one another. This result provides further support to the democratic peace⁶⁰⁰ and economic peace⁶⁰¹ arguments, as the peaceful nature of relationships between democracies also extends to lower levels of conflicts. While the actual causal mechanism leading democracies to behave in this way is not settled in this research, I assumed that, in line with the normative account of the democratic peace argument, because democracies externalize their domestic norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts, they refrain from using even the lower level of coercive methods, thereby resolving their disputes through more peaceful alternative methods. This result was also supported even when controlled for the potential distinct US behavior that might drive the results.⁶⁰² The overall implication of this finding is that in contrast to the assertions that democracies use less coercive means to

⁶⁰⁰ Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *American Political Science Review* 93, no. 4 (1999): 791–807.

⁶⁰¹ Lektzian and Souva, "The Economic Peace between Democracies"; Cox and Drury, "Democratic Sanctions."

⁶⁰² Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, "The Hegemon's Purse."

resolve their disputes in lieu of military measures such as economic or diplomatic sanctions, it appears that democracies are not willing to resort to even less coercive methods when disputed with another democracy. This requires looking at alternative dispute resolution techniques applied among democracies. Moreover, the results also revealed that democracies are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions against non-democracies. This finding is also consistent with the results of the economic sanctions and use of force research, where a similar relationship is observed. While I attributed this result to democracies being more active in taking action against non-democracies for democracy and human rights purposes, further research is needed to determine the actual causal mechanism behind this.

One of the significant implications of this finding is that diplomatic sanctions enable democracies to be involved in issues extending beyond their immediate national security concerns in order to uphold and consolidate international norms. In this regard, diplomatic sanctions can be considered as providing democracies with the ability to demonstrate their disapproval of anti-democratic behaviors in other countries in a cost-effective manner. Moreover, the results also demonstrated that democracies are more likely to be the targets of diplomatic sanctions, which is not the case for economic sanctions and the use of force. As for the explanation for this result, I highlighted the possibility that because reciprocation to diplomatic sanctions in kind is easy and almost the norm thanks to the less costly and risky nature of diplomatic sanctions, when faced with democratic sanctions, non-democracies also retaliate, thereby increasing the likelihood of democracies being targets of diplomatic sanctions.

Considering the relationship between economic interdependence and diplomatic sanctions, the results showed that there is no significant association between them. This implied that policymakers do not concern themselves with the potential economic costs in deciding to employ diplomatic sanctions. This result stands in opposition to my initial expectations, as I anticipated a negative effect with the assumption that states would avoid disrupting economic benefits by way of downgrading their diplomatic ties. This result appears to reveal, once again, the complicated subtleties of economic interdependence and its implications on global politics, as studies investigating their effects on economic sanctions

and the use of force also yield competing results.⁶⁰³ It is also worth noting that since the analysis included all types of diplomatic sanctions without differentiating them based on their potential to create economic costs, this might have driven the results given that not all types of diplomatic sanctions have the same effect on economic relations. For instance, the impacts of a temporary recall of an ambassador on economic relations can be assumed to be lower compared to those of the closure of a mission or complete cut-off of diplomatic relations. Therefore, while the results indicate at face value that policymakers do not take economic relations into serious consideration when using diplomatic coercive tools, further research is required to uncover the exact relationship.

The analysis of the effects of joint IGO membership on the use of diplomatic sanctions indicated a positive relationship. This result implies that despite widely held assumptions about the conflict-reducing role of IGOs, about which empirical studies also find mixed results,⁶⁰⁴ diplomatic sanctions can become a critical tool for states during the bargaining process within the context provided by the IGOs as they allow states to leverage their interests through less confrontational means without risking an unwanted escalation. Yet, identifying the true causal mechanisms necessitates future work. The results also highlight the fact that while several research finds a negative relationship between joint IGO memberships and conflict,⁶⁰⁵ it appears that these states manage their disputes at lower levels of coercion, therefore emphasizing the importance of less coercive instruments in helping alleviate interstate tensions.

The analysis of the impacts of relative power capabilities on the initiation of diplomatic sanctions yielded no statistically significant relationship between them. I anticipated this effect with the assumption that because diplomatic sanctions do not require significant material resources and that they are not likely to trigger target backlash other than retaliation in kind, states can use them without being concerned with relative power capabilities. This result has critical ramifications for international relations since relative capabilities are assumed to be one of the critical factors determining state behaviors,

⁶⁰³ Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace."

⁶⁰⁴ Anderson, Mitchell, and Schilling, "Kantian Dynamics Revisited."

⁶⁰⁵ Andreas Hasenclever and Brigitte Weiffen, "International Institutions Are the Key: A New Perspective on the Democratic Peace," *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 4 (2006): 563–85.

particularly within the realist research program.⁶⁰⁶ While both theoretical and empirical studies have associated favorable power capabilities with increased assertiveness to a certain extent, the use of diplomatic sanctions appears not to align with this logic. One observable implication of this finding is that small powers can use diplomatic sanctions when they encounter great powers or relatively more powerful states, becoming a critical tool in their limited arsenal. Moreover, this finding can also be related to counter-hegemonic strategies, which become more meaningful in a strategic setting where the US had dominated world politics and been considered a hegemon during the analyzed period.⁶⁰⁷ In this regard, because differentials in power capabilities are not significant factors, diplomatic sanctions can be considered one of the available tools to counter hegemony by other great powers and non-great powers without risking a severe response from the hegemon.⁶⁰⁸

Considering the impacts of alliances, the results suggested that allies are more likely to use diplomatic sanctions against one another. As for the explanation for this effect, I contended that because the expectation of future conflict is lower between allies, the less escalatory nature of diplomatic sanctions becomes even more prominent, making their use more feasible and less risky in an alliance setting. In one sense, this result contradicts the generally held assumption that alliance ties have conflict-reducing effects if one considers diplomatic sanctions as one form of conflict. Yet, in another sense, it can also be asserted that because allies are more likely to resolve their disputes through less coercive measures, this also suggests that through the functionality served by diplomatic sanctions, allies can overcome their disagreements without the need to resort to more coercive measures. In this regard, the implications of this result provide critical insights into how allies manage their relations, a topic that has not received enough scholarly attention.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁶ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

⁶⁰⁷ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990): 23–33; G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27.

⁶⁰⁸ Kai He, "Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception, and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War," *Security Studies* 21, no. 2 (2012): 154–91.

⁶⁰⁹ Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States."

Finally, regarding the impacts of rivalry on the use of diplomatic sanctions, the results indicated that diplomatic sanctions are also more likely between rivals. Based on the assumption that in rivalry dyads where public demand for a response in case of aggression is higher even for relatively less salient issues, and the risk of escalation is also heightened due to the existing animosities, diplomatic sanctions appear to be feasible tools that allow the leaders of rival states to respond to disputed issues while avoiding unintended escalation. This result has critical implications for our understanding of how rival states manage their relations without engaging in higher levels of confrontation.⁶¹⁰

The final research question I examined in this dissertation sought to uncover the relationships between diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions, and the use of force. This topic has remained understudied thanks to the predispositions in the scholarly community to analyze each tool in isolation and the unavailability of data for diplomatic sanctions.⁶¹¹ Consequently, while several studies have examined the link between economic sanctions and the use of force,⁶¹² the lack of diplomatic sanctions within these analyses has created a gap in our understanding of overall coercion. Discovering the link between these coercive tools is imperative in order to grasp better the entirety of the foreign policy decision-making process as well as to identify their usage by decision-makers for various foreign policy purposes. The first part of Chapter 5 was devoted to this task, where I analyzed diplomatic sanctions as one of the feasible initial options in international dispute escalation. Assuming that leaders may prefer to address their disagreements with other states by employing less coercive tools at the outset and incrementally increasing the level of coerciveness if the crisis persists, diplomatic sanctions can become handy in this context. I contend that because less coercive tools can allow leaders to elicit target acquiescence in a cost-effective manner, and international norms favor peaceful conflict resolution, which discourages states from resorting to more coercive instruments such as the use of force at the outset, this leads policymakers to search for alternative and less costly foreign policy tools. Diplomatic sanctions may become one of the first go-to options in such a context.

⁶¹⁰ Gary Goertz and Patrick M. Regan, "Conflict Management in Enduring Rivalries," *International Interactions* 22, no. 4 (April 1997): 321–40, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629708434896>.

⁶¹¹ Most and Starr, "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and Nice Laws."

⁶¹² Lektzian and Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict."

Based on this reasoning, I hypothesized that leaders may use diplomatic sanctions as part of a gradual escalation strategy through which they demonstrate their commitment to the disputed issue and resolve to use more coercive measures if the target fails to change its behavior. In this form of usage, leaders intend to increase coercive pressure gradually in subsequent steps on the escalation rung. The results of the regression analysis indicated that the use of diplomatic sanctions in one year increases the probability of economic sanctions and the use of force in the following year. In addition to this quantitative research, I illustrated this form of usage through two mini case studies where I analyzed the crisis between China and the US over Taiwan in 1995 and also between South Korea and Japan in 2001. In the first case, in response to Washington's decision to grant a visa to Taiwanese President Kim, China reacted by imposing diplomatic sanctions. As the US refused to comply with the Chinese demands, China resorted to the display of force as its next step by conducting naval exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan. Similarly, in the second case, South Korea's initial reaction to Japan's history textbook monitoring process was to implement diplomatic sanctions, yet, unable to get what it wanted, South Korea, this time, resorted to economic sanctions by increasing the pressure. Both cases demonstrated that diplomatic sanctions are employed as part of a gradual escalation strategy, through which the sender states initially sought to settle the disputes through diplomatic sanctions. However, upon their failure, they increased the pressure by using more coercive measures to change the behavior of their targets.

This result has significant implications for policymakers and academics as it implies that when diplomatic sanctions are used, there is a higher likelihood of an escalation of a crisis through more coercive tools. This further suggests that the sender state may indeed use diplomatic sanctions to signal its resolve. Yet, the other significant implication is that while the sender may intend to communicate its commitment, the target appears to be interpreting this move as a signal of weak resolve or a bluff. This discrepancy between the sender state's intent and how the target perceives it requires future work.

In the second part of Chapter 5, I analyzed the relationships between the same coercive tools within the context of the rivalries. I assumed that diplomatic sanctions could serve a distinct function within rivalry dyads where the risk of experiencing frequent disputes

over the same or similar issues is high, and even relatively less salient issues can become high-level disputes. These are in addition to the increased domestic public pressure on the leaders of the rival states to take coercive actions in case of perceived aggression. Therefore, in such a strategic context, the leaders of the rival states find themselves in a situation where there is a high pressure to take action. Yet, a high risk of escalation accompanies this. At this point, I hypothesized that because uncertainty about resolves is lower between rivals thanks to the repeated interactions and diplomatic sanctions are not likely to create a target backlash in severe forms while also allowing leaders to express their disapproval through inflicting some costs, it becomes a feasible tool to manage rivalry relations. The result of the regression analysis provided strong support for this hypothesis.

To complement the quantitative analysis, I analyzed eight diplomatic crises between two rivals – Venezuela and Colombia- that erupted between 2000 and 2019. The case study analysis revealed that in addition to being a frequently used tool between rivals - a finding obtained in the onset analysis, diplomatic sanctions were indeed used as signals of de-escalation in examined cases where each case ended without escalating further. The result has critical implications, particularly for rivalry studies. While existing studies have devoted a great deal of attention to the relationship between rivalries and the eruption of militarized conflicts, as well as the factors affecting their emergence and termination, few studies have addressed the issue of how rival states manage existing tensions and maintain more or less stable relationships. By highlighting the unique functionality of diplomatic sanctions, this dissertation makes a critical contribution to this strand of the literature. Also, it opens new avenues for future research that can consider other potential ways through which rival states manage their tensions to prevent escalation. It should also be noted that the result of this analysis does not necessarily mean that diplomatic sanctions help terminate or resolve long-lasting enmity between rivals; rather, it implies that they offer ways for leaders of rival states to alleviate immediate tension, which may risk further escalation.

6.2 Multilateral Diplomatic Sanctions: EU Case

Although this dissertation primarily focused on diplomatic sanctions imposed from one state to another, thereby looking at their unilateral employment, sanctions can, indeed, be

implemented in a multilateral fashion with or without the auspices of an organization. Several studies have found that multilateral cooperation is a key factor in producing successful sanction outcomes.⁶¹³ In the context of diplomatic sanctions, their imposition by multiple countries can yield significant impacts by allowing them to send stronger messages of disapproval as well as increasing the legitimacy cost for the target with the potential consequences of the outcast effect. In order to better understand this aspect of diplomatic sanctions, this brief analysis will discuss multilateral diplomatic sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU).

While the EU possesses limited military instruments to be applicable in global security crises due to lacking its own functioning military force, it has several critical assets at its disposal that can be turned into important foreign policy instruments. These include a strong economy and significant diplomatic and political capabilities, which allow the Union to pursue its interests through leveraging reward or punishment mechanisms.⁶¹⁴ Hence, the EU has recently increased its reliance on sanctions to influence other states, rendering sanctions important components of their foreign policy arsenal.⁶¹⁵ The EU has officially embraced a vision based on the targeted sanctions approach, which intends to impose costs on leaders or selected individuals whose actions are deemed responsible for the wrongdoing.⁶¹⁶ This approach is motivated by concerns about sanctions' negative externalities and unintended consequences on the target population, such as deteriorating

⁶¹³ Bryan R. Early and Robert Spice, "Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters: When Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help Sanctioning Efforts?," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11, no. 3 (2015): 339–60; Daniel W. Drezner, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000): 73–102; Navin A. Bapat and T. Clifton Morgan, "Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (2009): 1075–94.

⁶¹⁴ Henrik Larsen, "The EU: A Global Military Actor?," *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 3 (September 1, 2002): 283–302, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037003673>.

⁶¹⁵ Clara Portela, *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?* (London: Routledge, 2010), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203847510>.

⁶¹⁶ Daniel W. Drezner, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 1 (2011): 96–108; Clara Portela, "Are European Union Sanctions 'Targeted'?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 912–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1231660>; Clara Portela and Andrea Charron, "The Evolution of Databases in the Age of Targeted Sanctions," *International Studies Review* 25, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): viac061, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac061>.

humanitarian conditions, increased state repression, and adverse effects on levels of democracy and human rights.⁶¹⁷

To better grasp the EU sanctions in general, Giumelli et al.'s research provides a comprehensive analysis based on a newly constructed dataset on the EU sanctions.⁶¹⁸ The database covers the period between 1994 and 2019 and includes the following measures as sanctions: arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes, financial restrictions, trade restrictions, and diplomatic restrictions. Their analysis reveals that the use of sanctions as foreign policy tools has increased over the years. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that travel bans and asset freezes are the most commonly used types of sanctions, while diplomatic restrictions are the least common, being used only nine times in total. The other two less common types are financial restrictions and trade restrictions. Among the reasons for applying sanctions, democracy promotion ranks first, followed by crisis management and post-crisis management. They conclude that sanctions help improve the global actorness of the EU beyond its perception solely as a normative power.⁶¹⁹ Based on these findings, two significant inferences can be made about the EU's sanction usage patterns. First, less costly and risky sanction types - travel bans and asset freezes, are preferred over more costly trade and financial restrictions. Second, diplomatic sanctions are not preferable compared to other restrictions.

While Giumelli et al.'s analysis illustrates critical patterns regarding the EU sanctioning behavior until 2019, it should be noted that since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has imposed unprecedented sanctions on both Russia and Belarus in supplement to the sanctions previously applied since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Recently, in addition to travel bans and asset freezes, which blocked approximately

⁶¹⁷ Özdamar and Shahin, "Consequences of Economic Sanctions"; Reed M. Wood, "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976–2001," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (2008): 489–513; Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury, "Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy," *International Interactions* 36, no. 3 (August 30, 2010): 240–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2010.502436>; Cristiane Lucena Carneiro and Laerte Apolinário, "Targeted Versus Conventional Economic Sanctions: What Is at Stake for Human Rights?," *International Interactions* 42, no. 4 (August 7, 2016): 565–89, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1036989>.

⁶¹⁸ Francesco Giumelli, Fabian Hoffmann, and Anna Książczaková, "The When, What, Where and Why of European Union Sanctions," *European Security* 30, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1797685>.

⁶¹⁹ Giumelli, Hoffmann, and Książczaková.

€21.5 billion worth of assets belonging to Russian individuals and entities, as well as some €200 billion worth of assets from the Central Bank of Russia, these measures also included trade and financial restrictions such as removing several Russian banks from SWIFT messaging system. According to the official figures, as of February 2024, these trade restrictions amounted to €48 billion in exports to Russia and €91.2 billion in imports from Russia.⁶²⁰ Moreover, on the diplomatic front, the EU has suspended the regular Russia-EU talks and visa facilitation agreement. Hence, the latest waves of EU sanctions against Russia appear to differ from those observed until 2019.

While the impacts of these sanctions are still yet to be seen, studies analyzing the initial economic impacts of recent sanctions on Russia suggest that they seem to have remained lower than expected so far, citing Russia's ability to develop new trade ties with the global South, particularly with China, restructure its economy, and increase defense spending, among other factors.⁶²¹ The following sections will analyze the diplomatic restrictions applied by the EU to better understand their functionality within the overall EU foreign policy by focusing on diplomatic sanctions against Iran in 1997 and against Russia in 2018 and 2022.

6.2.1 EU vs. Iran - 1997

The crisis between Iran and the EU erupted in April 1997 after a German court ruled that Iranian top leaders were responsible for the assassination of Iranian opposition figures in Berlin in 1992, which was deemed as a terrorist attack. Immediately after the court ruling, Germany recalled its ambassador to Iran and expelled four Iranian diplomats in protest of the alleged Iranian action.⁶²² Germany also noted that it cut off the "critical dialogue" with Iran,

⁶²⁰ "EU Sanctions against Russia Explained," accessed February 20, 2024, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/why-sanctions/sanctions-against-russia/sanctions-against-russia-explained/>.

⁶²¹ Benjamin Parkin, Max Seddon, and Polina Ivanova, "Russia Has Proved Resilient to Western Sanctions, Says Oleg Deripaska," September 25, 2023, <https://www.ft.com/content/3652bbb5-a0f9-4d54-adc6-03b645a44306>; David J. Lynch, "With Russian Economy Far from Collapse, U.S. Opts for Tougher Punishment," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/02/23/sanctions-treasury-russia-economy/>.

⁶²² "Bonn expels iranian diplomats, recalls ambassador after trial," *Xinhua News Agency*, April 10, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SP2-F830-009B-H3BG-00000-00&context=1516831>.

which constituted the basis of the EU – Iran relations since 1992. Germany was the leading supporter of this policy.⁶²³ In a tit-for-tat move, Iran also withdrew its ambassador from Germany, denying the responsibility for the killings.

In solidarity with Germany, while not binding, the EU invited its members to recall their ambassadors from Iran.⁶²⁴ The EU stated, "*The European Union condemns this involvement of the Iranian authorities and regards such behavior as totally unacceptable in international affairs.*"⁶²⁵ Following this recommendation, all EU countries withdrew their ambassadors except Greece and also suspended the "critical dialogue" with Iran. In addition to these measures, the Union also canceled a high-level meeting between the EU and Iranian officials, which was scheduled for May. Other countries worldwide also followed suit as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway recalled their ambassadors while Japan suspended high-level talks.⁶²⁶ Iran responded to these moves with reciprocity in kind by announcing that it would also recall its ambassadors.⁶²⁷

Similar to their response to the call by Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini for the execution of Salman Rushdie in 1989, where they collectively recalled their ambassadors,⁶²⁸ the EU once again attempted to isolate Iran diplomatically. The joint reaction of the EU and other countries can be regarded as a critical attempt to isolate Iran with the potential to create an outcast effect or pariah status. While the move was not intended to compel Iran to

⁶²³ "Bonn expels Iran diplomats - ambassadors recalled after trial," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, April 10, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3RPR-R9W0-0094-N422-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶²⁴ Tom Buerkle, "EU Recalls Envoys as Iran Is Found Guilty of Terror; No Break in Ties Expected Despite Policy Shift," *International Herald Tribune*, April 11, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-1890-002R-B05H-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶²⁵ "EU cuts off critical dialogue with Iran," *Associated Press International*, April 10, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3RY4-57R0-00BT-M179-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶²⁶ "Japan Suspends High-Level Ties with Iran," *United Press International*, April 15, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SKG-BBB0-0001-X1MM-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶²⁷ Chen Ming, "Iran to Recall Ambassadors from European Countries," *Xinhua News Agency*, April 12, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SP2-F7V0-009B-H2FF-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶²⁸ Edward Cody, "EC Recalls Diplomats from Iran," *Washington Post*, February 20, 1989, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/02/21/ec-recalls-diplomats-from-iran/1c23a903-af35-4337-8c84-3c4735b1c376/>.

immediately change its behavior since the event had occurred five years ago, it involved some aspects of punishment, constraining, and signaling. In this sense, it can be suggested that it aimed to punish alleged Iranian behavior, deter Iran from taking similar actions in the future, and demonstrate to Iran and other third-party observers that such behaviors were unacceptable.

Greece's decision to abstain from recalling its ambassador deserves some more attention as it came as a surprise to other member states, which was considered a move negatively affecting solidarity within the Union. In explaining their stance, Greek officials stated, "*We think that the isolation of Iran is not the best way to protest.*"⁶²⁹ Moreover, Athens also expressed opposition to imposing potential economic sanctions on Iran, further aggravating cohesion within the Union. The Greek ambassador to Iran was withdrawn one week later after Athens succumbed to increasing pressure to take action yet noted that good relations with Tehran would continue.⁶³⁰ Greece's initial unwillingness to join the rest of the member states indicates the extent of the difficulties in taking collective actions when implementing coercive strategies in a coordinated manner. This attitude highlights how competing interests of individual countries might make it challenging to develop, implement, and sustain organized coercive policies. This complexity becomes even more prominent in multilateral coercive attempts where unity within respective stakeholders is lower than the Union and the level of coerciveness higher than diplomatic sanctions. This includes multilateral coercive efforts such as economic sanctions or military coercion methods under the auspices of the UN or other regional organizations. Greece's hesitancy at the beginning can also be interpreted as signifying the degree of importance attached to diplomatic sanctions as coercive tools due to their potential costs and damages to the ongoing relations.

The case also demonstrates the utility of diplomatic sanctions in terms of allowing European countries to express their condemnation of Iranian behavior in a visible and resolute manner while avoiding a potential economic fallout that would have resulted from

⁶²⁹ "Germany 'Surprised' at Greece Breaking EU Ranks over Iran," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 11, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-3D80-0025-F34P-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³⁰ "Greece Recalls Ambassador to Iran for Consultations," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 17, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-3C50-0025-F0DF-00000-00&context=1516831>.

implementing economic sanctions. From the onset of the crisis, the EU countries made it clear that they would not consider economic sanctions despite the enormous pressure from the US to take coercive economic measures, viewing diplomatic sanctions as insufficient. For instance, by expressing their opposition to the economic sanctions, the French Foreign Ministry stated, *"In general, embargoes do not seem to us to be an appropriate measure."*⁶³¹ In a similar vein, in response to criticisms for not undertaking harsher measures with respect to Iran, the German Foreign Minister stated, *"You cannot reproach us for following our economic interests."*⁶³²

The events unfolding during the European ambassadors' return to their respective places are also telling. Although European countries displayed their intention to send their ambassadors back to Tehran in less than one month,⁶³³ Iran did not accept the return of German and Danish ambassadors,⁶³⁴ which marked the beginning of another round of diplomatic crisis. In this regard, the Iranian Foreign Minister stated, *"The German and Danish ambassadors will not be welcomed here. If they never return to Iran, we will not be sad, and may even be happier."*⁶³⁵ As the crisis continued, Iran demanded that the German ambassador return the last. However, this demand was rejected by the EU countries as they insisted on returning all ambassadors simultaneously.⁶³⁶ The EU ambassadors returned to their posts in November after more than seven months since the beginning of the crisis

⁶³¹ "EU Backs Away from Tough Action on Iran Iran," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 11, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-3D80-0025-F33H-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³² Robert Wielaard, "EU to send ambassadors back to Iran despite U.S. appeals," *Associated Press*, April 29, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3T8G-8DP0-000Y-K4MD-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³³ "EU Slaps Ban on Ministerial Contacts with Iran Iran," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 29, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-38T0-0025-F4NV-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³⁴ "URGENT Iran rules out return of German, Danish ambassadors," *Agence France Presse – English english*, April 30, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-38J0-0025-F428-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³⁵ Mehrdad Balali, "Iran Halts Dialogue with EU, Rules out Return of German, Danish Envoys," *Agence France Presse – English*, April 30, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TD9-38G0-0025-F3WD-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³⁶ "Germany Won't Accept 'discrimination' against Its Ambassador," *Associated Press International*, September 10, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3RWN-0SR0-00BT-M344-00000-00&context=1516831>.

following a face-saving deal where the ambassadors would return in two groups, and the German and French ambassadors would be in the second group, returning last.⁶³⁷ The deal was reached after a moderate government came into power in Iran.

The evolution of the crisis indicates that states pay utmost attention to maintaining diplomatic ties, thereby refraining from prolonging coercive efforts, as exemplified by the EU's consideration of sending their ambassadors back in a short period. Additionally, while acknowledging the prominence of the supreme leader in Iranian foreign policy, considering that the diplomatic spat ended after a new and moderate government came to power in Iran, this suggests that leaders or governments appear to be playing important roles during the evolution of coercive episodes and their termination. Furthermore, the way Iran insisted on not allowing the return of German diplomats and sustained the crisis for a longer period can also be considered a nuanced form of diplomatic coercion, as it allowed Iran to express its disapproval of German behavior.

6.2.2 EU vs. Russia - 2018 and 2022

The already-heightened tension between the EU and Russia since 2014 due to the Russian annexation of Crimea inflamed after the poisoning of a Russian double agent and his daughter with nerve agents in Salisbury, England, in March 2018. The British side accused Russia of carrying out the assassination attempt, claiming that the nerve agent was similar to those produced by the Soviet Union. The UK expelled twenty-three Russian diplomats in the aftermath of the incident.⁶³⁸ However, Russia vehemently denied the accusations and also responded to the UK's move by expelling the same number of British diplomats in return. In solidarity with the UK, the EU also decided to recall the EU ambassador to Russia for consultations by noting that "*it is highly likely that the Russian Federation is responsible and that there is no plausible alternative explanation*" for the nerve agent attack.⁶³⁹ In explaining

⁶³⁷ "EU, Iran agree to exchange envoys ending 6-month dispute," *Associated Press International*, November 13, 1997, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3RWN-14S0-00BT-M50P-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶³⁸ Costas Pitas and Estelle Shirbon, "Britain Expels 23 Russian Diplomats over Chemical Attack on Ex-Spy," *Reuters*, March 14, 2018, sec. World, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1GQ1QG/>.

⁶³⁹ "European Council Conclusions on the Salisbury Attack, 22 March 2018," accessed March 10, 2024, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/22/european-council-conclusions-on-the-salisbury-attack/>.

the recall decision, a senior official stated, “*After agreeing on attribution, they continued the discussions on how they could go beyond just words and actually really have some deeds.*”⁶⁴⁰ The leaders of the member states also expressed their intentions to adopt more drastic measures at the national level. In the following weeks, 18 EU countries, the US, and others expelled an unprecedented number of Russian diplomats, totaling over one hundred expulsions.⁶⁴¹ Russia reciprocated in kind. The EU ambassador to Russia returned after three weeks.

The EU’s response to the alleged Russian nerve attack shows certain similarities and also differences to how they handled the Iranian case in 1997. Just like the Iranian case, the EU attempted to isolate Russia diplomatically by pursuing a multilateral strategy joined by both member and nonmember states, especially with the implementation of the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats. Similarly, it can be suggested that some of the principal objectives of the recall decision were to punish Moscow for its alleged attack, to prevent Russia from carrying out similar behaviors in the future, and to send a strong condemnation of the alleged Russian behavior by signaling what behaviors were not acceptable to various observant third parties. Moreover, it can also be suggested that the recall decision served the purpose of consolidating the Union as well as the Western bloc at a time when harmony within the Union had been seriously questioned due to the ongoing Brexit process and concerns about unity within the Western bloc had increased due to the policies of US President Trump.

However, unlike the Iranian case, the EU refrained from recalling individual country ambassadors, given that the recall decision only applied to the Union’s ambassador. Hence, the collective action under the auspices of the EU can be considered to have remained at a low level in terms of severity. This signifies, once again, the difficulty of crafting joint coercive actions. Adopting a lesser form of coercion, in this case, can also be interpreted as demonstrative of the importance of maintaining diplomatic ties, therefore implying how

⁶⁴⁰ “EU to Recall Envoy to Russia over Spy Attack: Officials,” *Agence France Presse – English*, March 23, 2018, <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5RXV-MJ01-DY93-M2K8-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁶⁴¹ “Which Countries Are Expelling Russian Diplomats?,” *Al Jazeera*, March 31, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/31/which-countries-are-expelling-russian-diplomats>.

countries consider the potential adverse effects of employing more severe forms of diplomatic sanctions. The vitality of maintaining diplomatic ties and communication channels at the highest possible level might be even more significant with Russia, given its great power status, ongoing military actions in Ukraine, and the legacies of the Cold War. Moreover, while member states managed to agree upon the recall decision, they did not pursue the follow-up measures in a similar manner or intensity. For instance, just like Greece did in 1997, Austria also refrained from expelling Russian diplomats by noting their good relations with Russia and being a neutral country, further exemplifying the embedded difficulties.⁶⁴² An interesting similarity to the Iranian case worth mentioning is related to the fact that economic sanctions were never considered in this case, too. This situation further underscores one of the utilities of diplomatic sanctions in terms of allowing policymakers to respond in a measured and delicate manner without incurring unwanted risks and costs. Yet, it should also be noted that economic sanctions on Russia as a result of the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were already in place during this period.

Another wave of deportation of diplomats took place after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as European countries, together with other states, started a mass expulsion of Russian diplomats in order to condemn Russian actions.⁶⁴³ The deportations intensified after images and reports were circulated displaying the civilian killings in Bucha, Ukraine, in April, causing worldwide outrage.⁶⁴⁴ From February to May 2022, over four hundred Russian diplomats were expelled. The EU member states carried out the majority of these expulsions, but non-EU members, such as the US and Japan, were also involved.⁶⁴⁵ The EU also expelled 19 Russian diplomats hosted in Brussels with the decision of the High

⁶⁴² Boris Groendahl and Radoslav Tomek, "Austria's Skipping Russian Expulsions a 'Bad Joke' to Allies," *Bloomberg.Com*, March 27, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2018-03-27/austria-draws-scorn-for-sitting-out-russian-diplomat-expulsions>.

⁶⁴³ Robbie Gramer Yang Mary, "West Boots Out Hundreds of Russian Diplomats in Wake of Ukraine Invasion and War Crimes," *Foreign Policy* (blog), March 14, 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/07/us-europe-russian-diplomats-ukraine/>.

⁶⁴⁴ Oleksandr Stashevskiy and Nebi Qena, "Russia Faces Global Outrage over Bodies in Ukraine's Streets," *AP News*, April 5, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy-kyiv-business-moscow-3a40c029638ffddb289ceba89462c1aa>.

⁶⁴⁵ Roksana Gabidullina and Pierre Morcos, "Curtailling Russia: Diplomatic Expulsions and the War in Ukraine," May 19, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/curtailing-russia-diplomatic-expulsions-and-war-ukraine>.

Representative.⁶⁴⁶ Russia also responded in kind by expelling diplomats from corresponding countries. While the actions were taken unilaterally by each country without a binding decision or invitation from the EU, since most of the European countries were involved in the joint effort, they deserve to be analyzed in this section.

Just like the previous incidents, the sanctions also served various purposes, such as punishing Russian deeds, sending strong signals of disapproval, and isolating Russia diplomatically. Moreover, similar to previous cases, some countries abstained from taking similar measures within the Union, such as Hungary. In addition to their constraining and signaling functionality, one important aspect of these global waves of casting Russian diplomats out has a lot to do with the heightened concerns within the Western bloc regarding the alleged malign activities of Russia in the form of disinformation campaigns, election interferences, and illicit finance.⁶⁴⁷ In this regard, it is suggested that Russia's alleged disinformation campaigns are aimed at undermining democratic values, deepening social divisions, and widening polarization within Western countries.⁶⁴⁸ Given that states may use diplomatic cover to carry out spy and espionage activities, which was the case during the Cold War,⁶⁴⁹ it can be contended that the expulsion of diplomats was also intended to curb Russian covert operations, which can help Moscow to exercise malign influence attempts. Illustrating this, in explaining their decisions to expel Russian diplomats in the aftermath of the Bucha attack, officials repeatedly attribute their move to spy activities, citing national security threats. For instance, in articulating the decision to expel twenty-one Russian

⁶⁴⁶ "EU Orders 19 Russian Diplomats to Leave Belgium," *Reuters*, April 5, 2022, sec. Europe, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-orders-19-russian-diplomats-leave-belgium-2022-04-05/>.

⁶⁴⁷ Heather A. Conley and Roksana Gabidullina, "The Costs of Weaponizing Russian and Western Diplomatic Expulsions," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, June 10, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/costs-weaponizing-russian-and-western-diplomatic-expulsions>.

⁶⁴⁸ Miriam Matthews et al., "Understanding and Defending Against Russia's Malign and Subversive Information Efforts in Europe" (RAND Corporation, August 16, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3160.html.

⁶⁴⁹ Kevin P. Riehle, "Soviet and Russian Diplomatic Expulsions: How Many and Why?," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December 6, 2023, 1–26, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2272216>.

diplomats, the Belgian Foreign Ministry stated that *“They were all accredited as diplomats but were working on spying and influencing operations.”*⁶⁵⁰

While collective expulsions may help limit Russian influence attempts, they might also have critical implications for the expelling states. Since Russia responded in a tit-for-tat move by expelling the same number of diplomats, the sender states also suffer from a diminishing ability to gather information about the internal affairs of Russia as well as shape Russian public opinion. Therefore, because diplomatic sanctions are generally reciprocated in kind, the potential benefits acquired through expulsions could be canceled out by retaliation. With respect to this effect, the Canadian Prime Minister, for instance, expressed his hesitancy about joining other countries in expelling Russian diplomats and highlighted that Canada’s information-gathering ability would also be weakened due to Russian reciprocation. He stated, *“We have to weigh the negative of that against the positive of having extraordinary Canadians in Moscow who are giving us feedback on what the Russian people are doing, connecting with civil society and understanding and supporting Canadians and others who happen to be in Russia at this time.”*⁶⁵¹

Additionally, the expulsion of diplomats en masse also increases the risk of misunderstandings, misinterpretations, or miscalculations, adding further difficulty to resolving ongoing conflicts. Reflecting these concerns, Moscow, for instance, expressed its regret for expulsions by noting that *“Narrowing down opportunities for diplomatic communication in such an unprecedentedly difficult crisis environment is a short-sighted move that will further complicate our communication, which is necessary to find a solution.”*⁶⁵² However, it is worth considering that raising the risk of uncontrolled escalation by heightening the possibilities of miscalculations and misunderstandings can help enhance the credibility of a coercive threat. Therefore, diminished communication and information

⁶⁵⁰ Marine Strauss, “Several EU Countries Expel Dozens of Russian Diplomats,” *Reuters*, March 29, 2022, sec. Europe, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belgium-expels-21-russian-diplomats-foreign-ministry-2022-03-29/>.

⁶⁵¹ Steven Chase, “Trudeau Hesitant to Make ‘Symbolic Gesture’ of Expelling Russian Diplomats for Fear of Retaliation,” *The Globe and Mail*, April 6, 2022, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-trudeau-hesitant-to-expel-russian-diplomats-due-to-likely-cost-of/>.

⁶⁵² “EU Countries Expel Dozens of Russian Diplomats,” *Al Jazeera*, April 5, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/5/denmark-italy-expel-dozens-of-russian-diplomats>.

exchanges through mass expulsions can also be considered a critical component of the overall coercive strategy, which could provide added benefits to constrain Russia.

6.2.3 Evaluation of EU's Diplomatic Sanctions

Overall, the EU appears to be hesitant to use diplomatic coercive measures as foreign policy instruments even though the use of the other targeted sanction tools has increased in frequency in the last decade. When the EU member states employ diplomatic measures, they are cautious enough not to downgrade relations completely by paying due attention to maintaining diplomatic relations at the ambassador level. As the Iranian case demonstrates, the EU countries were ready to send back their ambassadors quickly to maintain diplomatic and economic ties after demonstrating their disapproval. A critical point worth noting here is that in a multilateral setting, developing and maintaining collective coercive action is difficult due to the divergent interests and priorities of the member states. In each analyzed case, some countries refrained from taking coordinated actions or dragging their feet.

Moreover, notwithstanding the EU's timidity in using diplomatic measures, the recent mass expulsions against Russia also point out an emerging trend in the use of diplomatic sanctions both by the EU and the Western bloc. Because military measures are not feasible and economic measures are already in effect, the mass expulsion of diplomats appears to have come to the fore after the Western bloc's search for alternative mechanisms to send stronger signals of disapproval and also punish Russian behavior with additional instruments. It should also be noted that mass expulsions by multiple countries in a coordinated manner can be considered as allowing the Western bloc to create and consolidate a sense of solidarity and union among partners. Additionally, while mass expulsion seems to be an emerging coercive tool for the Western bloc, it could have critical repercussions.⁶⁵³ One of them is that it might lead the target country to adjust its foreign policy orientation. This was evident in both the Iran and Russia cases, where both countries expressed their intention to reorient their diplomatic relations in a way that focused more on countries that were willing to maintain good relations. In this regard, the Russian Foreign Minister, for instance, in response to the

⁶⁵³ Conley and Gabidullina, "The Costs of Weaponizing Russian and Western Diplomatic Expulsions."

collective expulsions, stated that “*There is neither point nor desire to maintain the previous presence in Western states*” and added that “*Under these conditions, we will shift the "center of gravity to countries that are ready to cooperate with us on an equal and mutually beneficial terms and look for promising joint projects*” pointing out the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.⁶⁵⁴ While the relations between the Western bloc and Russia have already deteriorated since the latter invaded Ukraine in 2014, and mass expulsions have constituted only one component of the overall Western responses; it can still be stated that the collective moves towards further downgrading diplomatic ties may potentially result in Russia shifting its orientation further away from the West, thereby producing lasting impacts on the relations.

6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

While this dissertation makes a critical contribution to the various fields of international relations literature, it has certain limitations. To start with, although the newly created Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset is a first-ever attempt, which makes it possible to test hypotheses about diplomatic sanctions because it covers only a period between 1990 and 2010, making inferences outside this time frame is challenging. In this regard, with the available data, it becomes hard to understand and compare the systemic effects of international politics. In order to overcome this limitation to a certain extent, I provided several recent cases of diplomatic sanctions illustrating their applicability in different periods. Increasing the time frame covered in the Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset by collecting new data should yield more generalizable results in future work.

Moreover, related to the dataset limitations, since the Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset contains diplomatic sanctions employed by only states, therefore excluding those applied by non-state actors, particularly international organizations, this leaves one of the critical aspects that might help better understand the dynamics of diplomatic sanctions uncovered. In this regard, limiting the dataset to state-to-state interactions comes with tradeoffs. Given that the decision-making process within a state can display certain differences when compared with those of international organizations, focusing only on state-imposed sanctions offers a more

⁶⁵⁴ “No Point for Russia to Maintain Previous Diplomatic Presence in the West, Lavrov Says,” *TASS*, October 18, 2022, <https://tass.com/politics/1524431>.

targeted approach at the expense of failing to account for the subtleties of their usage by international organizations. In order to overcome this limitation to a certain extent, I added a brief analysis of the EU sanctions in this chapter. While this analysis highlights some of the critical aspects of diplomatic sanctions employed under the auspices of the EU, further research is needed to understand their peculiar dynamics better.

As reiterated throughout the dissertation, states rarely rely on a single instrument to conduct foreign relations. This implies that an analysis of coercive campaigns should be undertaken with an analytical approach considering the potential use of coercive and non-coercive means in conjunction. Nonetheless, due to the imperative of narrowing down this research project to a manageable scope, the analyses in this dissertation, particularly in Chapter 4, primarily investigated diplomatic sanctions in isolation without regard to the use of other instruments. While this effort has helped yield novel findings about diplomatic sanctions, future work should adopt a more comprehensive and holistic approach accounting for the potential use of foreign policy instruments as mixed methods. It should also be noted that this ambitious undertaking will necessitate collecting data on negative diplomatic sanctions and positive ones, along with data on other foreign policy instruments employed throughout the life cycle of coercive campaigns.

Furthermore, while this dissertation attempts to understand the utility and functionality of diplomatic sanctions as foreign policy instruments, policymakers rarely pursue a single objective in using foreign policy tools. As such, it is noteworthy that diplomatic sanctions can have significant relations with domestic politics as well as the domestic public. Since this research project mainly focuses on the role of diplomatic sanctions in foreign policy-making for practical reasons, the aspects pertaining to domestic politics have been omitted from the analyses. However, this does not necessarily mean that diplomatic sanctions have nothing to do with domestic politics. Hence, it is imperative to incorporate domestic factors into future research.

Moreover, this dissertation aims to identify general patterns regarding the use of diplomatic sanctions. Therefore, it does not necessarily make distinctions between potential differences across countries. However, it is a possibility that certain countries might display

unique behavioral patterns in their use of diplomatic sanctions. As such, one of the productive research avenues can be related to the investigation of national styles of diplomatic sanctions.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

In light of the main findings, one of the significant implications of this dissertation is that diplomatic sanctions can be analyzed comparatively with other coercive tools. Yet, this requires identifying their specific advantages and disadvantages compared to other coercive measures. Otherwise, making appropriate assumptions about their causes and consequences becomes difficult. Lacking this, one might either dismiss diplomatic sanctions altogether, thereby deeming them as non-coercive or consider them as coercive as other tools and become disappointed by the outcomes, leading them to conclude that they are ineffective coercive instruments. Positioning diplomatic sanctions alongside other coercive and non-coercive tools with their distinct characteristics thus enables us to appreciate their roles without having erroneous expectations about them. Moreover, in a similar vein, the findings of this dissertation reveal that diplomatic sanctions have their own application logic, setting them apart from other coercive tools. In this regard, the results of the onset analysis are critical as they have helped showcase their unique functionalities. These results have indicated that some of the critical factors affecting state behaviors in one way or another are indeed operating differently when it comes to the use of diplomatic sanctions, sometimes having opposite effects than the widely held assumptions or common-sense expectations about their respective influences on states' coercive behaviors. These divergent impacts are more evident with respect to the influences of relative power capabilities, alliances, and rivalries on leaders' decisions to use diplomatic sanctions. This mere observation indicates that diplomatic sanctions are critical foreign policy instruments that expand the options for decision-makers and, more critically, equip them with alternative engagement techniques in certain strategic settings, especially when other tools are not available or applicable. In this sense, the following aspects need to be further underscored in this final section.

The finding that power capabilities do not play a significant role in their employment highlights that diplomatic sanctions provide many states with an alternative means of influence. This is especially relevant for small states, which are conventionally considered to

have limited tools at their disposal to exert influence when they dispute with a great power. This topic has recently garnered a great deal of attention, and diplomatic sanctions seem to be one of the critical instruments by which small states demonstrate their opposition to great powers.⁶⁵⁵

Moreover, the findings highlight the potential role of diplomatic sanctions in helping the management of alliance relations. Advanced and well-researched literature exists on the role of alliances in international relations, and particular attention has been devoted to the factors affecting alliance formation and their persistence.⁶⁵⁶ However, little has been said about how alliance partners overcome their disagreements, therefore managing their relations and preventing a potential fallout. In this regard, diplomatic sanctions appear to play a critical role in terms of providing alliance partners with the opportunity to demonstrate their disapproval in a coercive yet balanced manner without risking a downgrade in alliance relations.

Additionally, the results demonstrate that diplomatic sanctions can also play a critical but neglected role in the management of rivalry relations. Similarly, thanks to the increasing interest in understanding the impacts of rivalries in international politics, a well-developed literature focusing on various critical aspects of rivals has emerged. While many studies have focused on the factors affecting the duration of rivalries and their termination, the ways rivals manage their relations without engaging in violent behaviors remained a less studied topic.⁶⁵⁷ In this sense, diplomatic sanctions through enabling rival states to express their intention of de-escalation and restraint with a coercive method, seem to be playing an underappreciated role in helping them reduce the immediate tensions stemming from diplomatic crises, thereby avoiding riskier outcomes in the form of violent conflicts.

⁶⁵⁵ Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *The Diplomacies of Small States* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230246911>.

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Appendix A: Keyword List for Nexis Uni Search

- Ambassador + recall
- Expel + envoy
- (Break or cut) + diplomatic + (relations or ties)
- (Close or shut) + diplomatic + mission
- (Close or shut) + embassy
- (Limit or reduce) + number + (diplomatic personnel or diplomatic staff or diplomat)
- Reduce + diplomatic + presence
- (Limit or downgrade or lower or reduce) + (diplomatic representation)
- (Stop or halt or cancel or suspend) + high-level + visit

Appendix B: Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset Codebook

This codebook presents the variables of the new Diplomatic Sanctions Dataset and their definitions and operationalizations. The TIES dataset's codebook is taken as the reference point to maintain consistency across available datasets in the sanctions literature; therefore, the definitions of variables are reproduced verbatim when they overlap.⁶⁵⁸

Event No: Identifies the unique number of the event.

SCode: Identifies the standard COW's country code of the sender state.

Sender: Identifies the state that either initiates threats against the target state or imposes sanctions against the target state.

TCode: Identifies the standard COW's country code of the target state.

Target: identifies the state that is the target of the sanctions.

Start Date: Identifies the month, day, and year in which the incident occurs.

End Date: Identifies the month, day, and year in which the incident ends.

Type of Diplomatic Sanction: This variable presents several categories of sanction types threatened or imposed by the sender.

- **Ambassador Recall:** The sender orders its own ambassador to return from the target country. This variable includes the recall of top-level diplomats at the time of action, including the high commissioner, charge of affairs, etc.
- **Expulsion of Ambassador:** The sender orders the target state's ambassador to leave the sender government's territory. This variable includes the expulsion of top-level diplomats, including the high commissioner, charge d'affairs, etc.
- **Ask Withdrawal of Ambassador:** The sender asks the target country to withdraw its ambassador from the sender country. This variable includes asking for the withdrawal of top-level diplomats, including the high commissioner, charge d'affairs, etc.

⁶⁵⁸ Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, "Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005."

- **Closure of Diplomatic Mission:** The sender orders all diplomatic personnel to leave the territory of the target state.
- **Ask Closure of Diplomatic Mission:** The sender asks the target country to close its mission and withdraw all diplomatic personnel from the sender state's territory.
- **Reduce Number of Diplomatic Personnel:** The sender orders a reduction of its diplomatic personnel serving in the target state.
- **Ask Reduce Number of Diplomatic Personnel:** The sender asks the target state to reduce the number of its diplomatic personnel in the sender state.
- **Recall Diplomat:** The sender orders one or all of its diplomats except the top diplomat to return from the target country.
- **Ask Withdrawal of Diplomat:** The sender asks the target state to withdraw one or several of its diplomats from the sender state.
- **Break off Diplomatic Relations:** The sender permanently ends all diplomatic contact with the target state.
- **Cancel High-Level Visit:** The sender decides to cancel or postpone a high-level visit scheduled beforehand.
- **Reduce Level of Diplomatic Representation:** The sender decides to reduce its level of representation from ambassador to charge d'affairs.
- **Threat of Ambassador Recall:** The sender threatens to recall its own ambassador to return from the target country. This variable includes the threat of recall of top-level diplomats, including the high commissioner, charge affairs, etc.
- **Threat of Expulsion of Ambassador:** The sender threatens to order the target state's ambassador to leave the sender government's territory. This variable includes the expulsion of top-level diplomats, including the high commissioner, charge affairs, etc.
- **Threat of Break off Diplomatic Relations:** The sender threatens to permanently end all diplomatic contact with the target state.
- **Threat of Closure of Diplomatic Mission:** The sender threatens to order all diplomatic personnel to leave the territory of the target state.
- **Threat of Ask Closure of Diplomatic Mission:** The sender threatens to ask the target country to close its mission and withdraw all diplomatic personnel from the territory of the sender state.
- **Threat of Expulsion of Diplomat:** The sender threatens to order one or several diplomats from the target state to leave the sender government's territory.
- **Threat of Cancel High-Level Visit:** The sender threatens to cancel or postpone a high-level visit scheduled beforehand.

Companion Diplomatic Sanction: This variable identifies the existence of companion diplomatic sanctions imposed or threatened together with the primary diplomatic sanction. The list presented in the Type of Diplomatic Sanction is applied here.

Support of IGO: This variable identifies whether the sender state imposes or threatens diplomatic sanctions as a result of a decision taken by an IGO.

Multiple Countries Involved: This variable identifies if more than one country targeted the same country for the same issue.

Retaliation: This variable identifies whether the sender state imposes or threatens diplomatic sanctions in retaliation for the target state's diplomatic sanctions.

Issue Salience: This variable is designed to capture the issues at stake from the perspective of the sender state's issue salience. The categories are created with a rank-ordering in mind:

- **Normative:** A Normative issue is at stake when the sender perceives the target state's actions as threats to its domestic cultural, religious, or historical values and international norms and values.
 - **Illustration:** On May 10, 1990, the United States recalled its ambassador from Romania in response to what it believed were flawed elections.
- **Insecurity:** An insecurity issue is involved when the diplomatic corps of the sender state is under security risks because of the developments not directly linked to the target government.
 - **Illustration:** France closed its embassy in Liberia on August 9, 1990, after anti-government Liberian troops penetrated into the capital.
- **Diplomatic:** Diplomatic issues are at stake when target state policies erupt diplomatic crisis with the sender state.
 - **Illustration:** Brazil recalled its ambassador from Argentina on July 8, 1994, after Argentine President Carlos Menem expressed harsh remarks comparing low wages and high joblessness in the two countries.
- **Economic:** Economic issues are involved when the target state's policies run against the sender state's economic interests.
 - **Illustration:** Belarus threatened to expel the US ambassador on December 31, 2007, if Washington would impose more economic sanctions.
- **Political:** Political issues are at stake when the sender state perceives the policies of the target state as threats to its legitimacy, unity, and sovereignty.
 - **Illustration:** Liberia recalled its ambassador from Guinea on January 18, 2001, after accusing the latter of harboring Liberian dissidents and supporting armed rebellions.

- **Military:** Military issues arise when the target state resorts to threat, display, or use of military force against the sender state.
 - **Illustration:** India reduced the number of its diplomatic personnel in Pakistan on December 28, 2001, after border firing in Kashmir.

Issue Type: This variable is designed to capture as best as possible the issues involved in the imposition of sanctions. The categories are:

- **Inappropriate Behavior of Diplomats:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to activities including spying carried out by diplomats, which are perceived by the sender state as being done on behalf of the target state. Personal wrongdoings that are not backed by the target state or do not reflect the views of the target state are not included
- **Deteriorating Security Situation:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to activities carried out against the diplomats and diplomatic missions in the host country. It includes events where the host state is not directly responsible for the security threats but unable or unwilling to prevent them.
- **Diplomatic Behavior:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's attempts to limit the activities of the sender state's diplomats, preventing the functioning of diplomatic procedures and the target state's previous diplomatic sanctions
- **Alignment Choice:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's alignment choice during a war, militarized conflict, or peacetime. Additionally, the target state's policies of developing relations with a rival state/government or not supporting the interests of the sender state are included in this category.
- **Recognition:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's activities of recognizing a rival government or state and the target state's denial to recognize the newly established government in the sender state, mostly after a coup.
- **Ethnic Tension:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's activities directed at an ethnic minority group residing in the target state with which the sender state has an affinity. This includes both offenses and incentives.
- **Territorial Dispute:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's activities regarding disputed territories.
- **Military Behavior:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's military behaviors directed against the sender state, another state, or a population. The use of force against its own population, including minority groups, is not included here. The target state's nuclear activities are also included in this category.

- **Human Rights Violations:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's human rights violations against its own citizens or citizens of another country, including the sender state.
- **Judicial Process:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's perceived unfair judicial processes, such as the detention or arrest of diplomats or citizens.
- **Accusations and Hostility:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's accusations inculcating the sender state for carrying out criminal activities, including violations of human rights, genocide, war crimes, assassinations, and kidnappings. Offensive remarks delivered by the target state's officials or media outlets against the sender state or over issues valued by the sender state are also included in this category.
- **Support for Non-State Actors:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in reaction to the target country's policies towards non-state actors, including terrorists, assassins, kidnappers, political dissidents, or former political leaders.
- **Democracy:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in reaction to anti-democratic developments, fraudulent elections, and developments in the target state that disrupt constitutional order.
- **Economic Behavior:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the target state's economic policies, including economic sanctions that harm the interests of the sender state.
- **Interference:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in reaction to the target state's activities perceived by the sender state as interference in its domestic affairs.
- **Other:** This category includes issues that rarely appear in the news and are, therefore, not prominent enough to form a separate group.

Issue Details: This variable presents a more detailed account of the case.

Appendix C: Additional Analyses for Chapter 4

Appendix C, Table 1: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and sender democracy.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Sender Democracy		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	23374	26362	49736
	47.00	53.00	100.00
	99.36	99.22	99.29
Onset	150	206	356
	42.13	57.87	100.00
	0.64	0.78	0.71
Total	23524	26568	50092
	46.96	53.04	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 3.35 Pr = 0.0671

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 2: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and target democracy.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Target Democracy		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	23328	26408	49736
	46.90	53.10	100.00
	99.17	99.40	99.29
Onset	196	160	356
	55.06	44.94	100.00
	0.83	0.60	0.71
Total	23524	26568	50092
	46.96	53.04	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 9.43 Pr = 0.0021

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 3: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and joint democracy.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Joint Democracy		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	35659	14077	49736
	71.70	28.30	100.00
	99.19	99.55	99.29
Onset	293	63	356
	82.30	17.70	100.00
	0.81	0.45	0.71
Total	35952	14140	50092
	71.77	28.23	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 19.63 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 4: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and alliance.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Alliance		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	41828	7908	49736
	84.10	15.90	100.00
	99.39	98.78	99.29
Onset	258	98	356
	72.47	27.53	100.00
	0.61	1.22	0.71
Total	42086	8006	50092
	84.02	15.98	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 35.59 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 5: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and rivalry.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Rivalry		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	48658	1078	49736
	97.83	2.17	100.00
	99.39	94.89	99.29
Onset	298	58	356
	83.71	16.29	100.00
	0.61	5.11	0.71
Total	48956	1136	50092
	97.73	2.27	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 318.17 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 6: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and the US sender.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	US Sender		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	46561	3175	49736
	93.62	6.38	100.00
	99.36	98.30	99.29
Onset	301	55	356
	84.55	15.45	100.00
	0.64	1.70	0.71
Total	46862	3230	50092
	93.55	6.45	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 48.16 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 7: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and intrastate war.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Intrastate War		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	46367	3369	49736
	93.23	6.77	100.00
	99.35	98.48	99.29
Onset	304	52	356
	85.39	14.61	100.00
	0.65	1.52	0.71
Total	46671	3421	50092
	93.17	6.83	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 34.08 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 8: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and MIDs.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	MID		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	48758	978	49736
	98.03	1.97	100.00
	99.40	93.86	99.29
Onset	292	64	356
	82.02	17.98	100.00
	0.60	6.14	0.71
Total	49050	1042	50092
	97.92	2.08	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 444.86 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 9: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanction onset and economic sanctions.

Diplomatic Sanction Onset	Economic Sanctions		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	44822	4914	49736
	90.12	9.88	100.00
	99.38	98.44	99.29
Onset	278	78	356
	78.09	21.91	100.00
	0.62	1.56	0.71
Total	45100	4992	50092
	90.03	9.97	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 57.01 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix C, Table 10: Correlation matrix.

Variables	Sanction Onset	Sender Democracy	Target Democracy	Joint Democracy	Economic Interdependence	Joint IGO Members hip	Capabil ity Ratio	Allian ce	Rival ry	US Send er	Intrast ate War	MI D	Econo mic Sanctio ns
Sanction Onset	1.000												
Sender Democracy	0.008	1.000											
Target Democracy	-0.014	0.004	1.000										
Joint Democracy	-0.020	0.590	0.590	1.000									
Economic Interdepend ence	0.001	0.141	0.141	0.242	1.000								
Joint IGO Membershi p	0.010	0.187	0.187	0.309	0.282	1.000							
Capability Ratio	-0.006	0.015	-0.056	-0.026	-0.048	-0.121	1.000						
Alliance	0.027	0.051	0.049	0.218	0.255	0.291	-0.045	1.000					
Rivalry	0.080	-0.080	-0.080	-0.051	0.080	0.018	-0.026	0.124	1.000				
US Sender	0.031	0.247	-0.062	0.076	-0.026	-0.037	0.190	0.093	-	1.00			
Intrastate War	0.026	-0.006	-0.206	-0.114	-0.050	-0.048	-0.029	0.008	0.019	0.00	1.000		
MID	0.094	-0.051	-0.051	-0.057	0.016	-0.012	-0.023	0.078	0.022	0.00	0.062	1.0	
Economic Sanctions	0.034	0.017	0.017	-0.066	-0.053	-0.093	-0.007	-	-	0.13	0.012	0.0	1.000
								0.059	0.008	7		11	

Appendix C, Table 11: Missing values.

Variable	Obs=.	Obs>.	Obs<.
Diplomatic Sanction	0	0	62,442
Sender Democracy	5,611	0	56,831
Target Democracy	5,611	0	56,831
Joint Democracy	10,288	0	52,154
Economic Interdependence	8,876	0	53,566
Joint IGO Membership	698	0	61,744
Capability Ratio	698	0	61,744
Alliance	698	0	61,744
Rivalry	698	0	61,744
US Sender	698	0	61,744
Intrastate War	698	0	61,744
MID	698	0	61,744
Economic Sanctions	698	0	61,744

Appendix C, Table 12: Missing value patterns.

Frequency	Pattern									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
50,092	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2,947	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
2,947	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
2,062	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
1,730	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
1,730	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
698	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
222	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
14	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
62,442										

Variables are (1) Alliance (2) Capability Ratio (3) Intrastate War (4) Joint IGO Memberships (5) Rivalry (6) US Sender (7) Sender Democracy (8) Target Democracy (9) Economic Interdependence (10) Joint Democracy

Appendix C, Table 13: Alternative model specifications.

	Logit	Relogit	Probit
Diplomatic Sanction Onset			
Sender Democracy	1.151*** (0.217)	1.140*** (0.217)	0.413*** (0.0795)
Target Democracy	1.022*** (0.223)	1.014*** (0.223)	0.368*** (0.0821)
Joint Democracy	-2.212*** (0.295)	-2.199*** (0.295)	-0.798*** (0.111)
Economic Interdependence	-1.127 (1.301)	-0.760 (1.301)	-0.329 (0.462)
IGO Membership	0.957*** (0.209)	0.950*** (0.209)	0.355*** (0.0824)
Relative Capabilities	-0.000159 (0.000281)	-0.0000626 (0.000281)	-0.0000364 (0.0000832)
Alliance	0.437* (0.186)	0.438* (0.186)	0.164* (0.0706)
Rivalry	1.342*** (0.280)	1.347*** (0.280)	0.556*** (0.116)
US Sender	0.751*** (0.211)	0.744*** (0.211)	0.297*** (0.0826)
Intrastate War	0.563** (0.174)	0.573*** (0.174)	0.236*** (0.0676)
MID	1.489*** (0.250)	1.493*** (0.250)	0.663*** (0.103)
Economic Sanctions	0.725*** (0.158)	0.730*** (0.158)	0.273*** (0.0600)
Sanction Years	-0.215** (0.0784)	-0.214** (0.0784)	-0.0756* (0.0306)
Sanction Years^2	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0170 (0.0105)	0.00577 (0.00392)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000602 (0.000382)	-0.000586 (0.000382)	-0.000196 (0.000138)
Constant	-8.712*** (0.778)	-8.669*** (0.778)	-3.848*** (0.303)
Observations	50092	50092	50092
chi2	426.2		296.5
r2_p	0.115		0.114

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 14: Logistic regression results with alternative diplomatic sanctions onset specifications.

	All Cases	Threat Cases Excluded	Retaliation Cases Excluded	IGO Supported Cases Excluded	Multilateral Cases Excluded	All These Cases Excluded
Diplomatic Sanction Onset						
Sender	1.151***	1.230***	1.116***	1.087***	1.119***	1.168***
Democracy	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.214)	(0.223)	(0.250)	(0.255)
Target	1.022***	0.980***	0.755**	1.064***	1.305***	1.011***
Democracy	(0.223)	(0.216)	(0.236)	(0.226)	(0.245)	(0.252)
Joint	-2.212***	-2.131***	-1.941***	-2.178***	-2.566***	-2.264***
Democracy	(0.295)	(0.283)	(0.326)	(0.300)	(0.330)	(0.363)
Economic	-1.127	-1.560	-0.454	-1.219	-0.668	-0.0655
Interdependence	(1.301)	(1.485)	(1.159)	(1.339)	(1.268)	(1.164)
IGO	0.957***	0.941***	0.763***	0.954***	1.082***	0.833**
Membership	(0.209)	(0.212)	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.256)	(0.278)
Relative	-0.000159	-0.000131	-0.000121	-0.000142	-0.000117	-0.0000409
Capabilities	(0.000281)	(0.000261)	(0.000261)	(0.000266)	(0.000301)	(0.000242)
Alliance	0.437*	0.340 ⁺	0.404*	0.467*	0.673***	0.611**
	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.205)	(0.189)	(0.199)	(0.208)
Rivalry	1.342***	1.431***	1.330***	1.372***	1.431***	1.533***
	(0.280)	(0.270)	(0.305)	(0.287)	(0.304)	(0.328)
US Sender	0.751**	0.761***	0.642**	0.850***	0.829***	0.714**
	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.216)	(0.212)	(0.239)	(0.258)
Intrastate War	0.563**	0.620***	0.569**	0.522**	0.329	0.365
	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.188)	(0.182)	(0.204)	(0.227)
MID	1.489***	1.467***	1.385***	1.527***	1.454***	1.305***
	(0.250)	(0.245)	(0.282)	(0.255)	(0.273)	(0.304)
Economic	0.725***	0.686***	0.730***	0.684***	0.814**	0.781***
Sanctions	(0.158)	(0.153)	(0.173)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.180)
Sanction Years	-0.215**	-0.196*	-0.233**	-0.211**	-0.260**	-0.263**
	(0.0784)	(0.0762)	(0.0855)	(0.0808)	(0.0870)	(0.0923)
Sanction	0.0173	0.0150	0.0204 ⁺	0.0180 ⁺	0.0242*	0.0262*
Years^2	(0.0105)	(0.0104)	(0.0116)	(0.0108)	(0.0117)	(0.0128)
Sanction	-0.000602	-0.000540	-0.000707 ⁺	-0.000640	-0.000846*	-0.000924 ⁺
Years^3	(0.000382)	(0.000388)	(0.000422)	(0.000390)	(0.000427)	(0.000484)
Constant	-8.712***	-8.765***	-8.065***	-8.782***	-9.479***	-8.824***
	(0.778)	(0.787)	(0.799)	(0.796)	(0.947)	(1.015)
Observations	50092	50092	50092	50092	50092	50092
chi2	426.2	406.2	367.1	419.9	398.6	313.8
r2 p	0.115	0.116	0.102	0.115	0.123	0.106

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 15: Logistic regression results for alternative specifications of economic interdependence variable.

	Econ Dependency	Sender Dependency	Target Dependency	Sender - Target Dependency
Diplomatic Sanction Onset				
Sender Democracy	1.151 ^{***} (0.217)	1.145 ^{***} (0.217)	1.154 ^{***} (0.217)	1.153 ^{***} (0.217)
Target Democracy	1.022 ^{***} (0.223)	1.011 ^{***} (0.221)	1.018 ^{***} (0.222)	1.012 ^{***} (0.221)
Joint Democracy	-2.212 ^{***} (0.295)	-2.217 ^{***} (0.295)	-2.217 ^{***} (0.296)	-2.216 ^{***} (0.296)
Economic Interdependence	-1.127 (1.301)			
Sender Dependency		0.0682 (0.0555)		0.0690 (0.0549)
Target Dependency			-0.177 (0.285)	-0.180 (0.287)
Joint IGO Membership	0.957 ^{***} (0.209)	0.914 ^{***} (0.196)	0.926 ^{***} (0.199)	0.926 ^{***} (0.198)
Relative Capabilities	-0.000159 (0.000281)	-0.000156 (0.000276)	-0.000147 (0.000271)	-0.000145 (0.000269)
Alliance	0.437 [*] (0.186)	0.436 [*] (0.185)	0.448 [*] (0.185)	0.445 [*] (0.184)
Rivalry	1.342 ^{***} (0.280)	1.336 ^{***} (0.280)	1.327 ^{***} (0.278)	1.329 ^{***} (0.278)
US Sender	0.751 ^{***} (0.211)	0.752 ^{***} (0.212)	0.777 ^{***} (0.207)	0.780 ^{***} (0.207)
Intrastate War	0.563 ^{**} (0.174)	0.574 ^{***} (0.173)	0.568 ^{**} (0.174)	0.570 ^{**} (0.174)
MID	1.489 ^{***} (0.250)	1.487 ^{***} (0.250)	1.485 ^{***} (0.249)	1.485 ^{***} (0.249)
Economic Sanctions	0.725 ^{***} (0.158)	0.730 ^{***} (0.159)	0.722 ^{***} (0.159)	0.724 ^{***} (0.160)
Sanction Years	-0.215 ^{**} (0.0784)	-0.217 ^{**} (0.0789)	-0.216 ^{**} (0.0786)	-0.216 ^{**} (0.0788)
Sanction Years^2	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0176 ⁺ (0.0106)	0.0174 ⁺ (0.0105)	0.0175 ⁺ (0.0106)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000602 (0.000382)	-0.000614 (0.000385)	-0.000605 (0.000383)	-0.000609 (0.000384)
Constant	-8.712 ^{***} (0.778)	-8.561 ^{***} (0.729)	-8.601 ^{***} (0.736)	-8.599 ^{***} (0.733)
Observations	50092	50092	50092	50092
chi2	426.2	410.5	419.5	420.6
r2_p	0.115	0.115	0.115	0.115

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 16: Logistic regression results for alternative specifications of relative power capabilities variable.

	Sender/Target CINC	High/Low CINC
Diplomatic Sanction Onset		
Sender Democracy	1.151*** (0.217)	1.155*** (0.218)
Target Democracy	1.022*** (0.223)	1.037*** (0.224)
Joint Democracy	-2.212*** (0.295)	-2.211*** (0.297)
Economic Interdependence	-1.127 (1.301)	-1.155 (1.311)
Joint IGO Membership	0.957*** (0.209)	0.870*** (0.212)
Relative Capabilities Sender/Target	-0.000159 (0.000281)	
Relative Capabilities High/Low		-0.000485 (0.000427)
Alliance	0.437* (0.186)	0.453* (0.186)
Rivalry	1.342*** (0.280)	1.333*** (0.279)
US Sender	0.751*** (0.211)	0.779*** (0.205)
Intrastate War	0.563** (0.174)	0.550** (0.174)
MID	1.489*** (0.250)	1.472*** (0.248)
Economic Sanctions	0.725*** (0.158)	0.708*** (0.159)
Sanction Years	-0.215** (0.0784)	-0.215** (0.0784)
Sanction Years^2	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0175+ (0.0105)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000602 (0.000382)	-0.000611 (0.000383)
Constant	-8.712*** (0.778)	-8.373*** (0.796)
Observations	50092	50092
chi2	426.2	418.7
r2_p	0.115	0.116

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 17: Logistic regression results for alternative specifications of alliance variable.

	COW Alliance	COW Defense	ATOP Alliance	ATOP Defense
DS Onset				
Sender Democracy	1.151*** (0.217)	1.031*** (0.216)	0.995*** (0.215)	0.987*** (0.217)
Target Democracy	1.022*** (0.223)	0.915*** (0.221)	0.884*** (0.223)	0.876*** (0.226)
Joint Democracy	-2.212*** (0.295)	-2.014*** (0.300)	-1.942*** (0.300)	-1.928*** (0.310)
Economic Interdependence	-1.127 (1.301)	-1.226 (1.325)	-1.192 (1.317)	-1.200 (1.324)
Joint IGO Membership	0.957*** (0.209)	1.111*** (0.223)	1.166*** (0.229)	1.168*** (0.228)
Relative Capabilities	-0.000159 (0.000281)	-0.000134 (0.000264)	-0.000127 (0.000260)	-0.000127 (0.000259)
COW Alliance	0.437* (0.186)			
COW Defense Pact		0.0827 (0.249)		
ATOP Alliance			-0.0824 (0.200)	
ATOP Defense Pact				-0.103 (0.243)
Rivalry	1.342*** (0.280)	1.406*** (0.275)	1.404*** (0.278)	1.411*** (0.283)
US Sender	0.751*** (0.211)	0.785*** (0.209)	0.804*** (0.207)	0.811*** (0.208)
Intrastate War	0.563** (0.174)	0.578*** (0.174)	0.580*** (0.173)	0.577*** (0.173)
MID	1.489*** (0.250)	1.527*** (0.251)	1.534*** (0.250)	1.534*** (0.250)
Economic Sanctions	0.725*** (0.158)	0.728*** (0.160)	0.730*** (0.160)	0.728*** (0.159)
Sanction Years	-0.215** (0.0784)	-0.218** (0.0789)	-0.216** (0.0795)	-0.217** (0.0790)
Sanction Years^2	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0171 (0.0106)	0.0171 (0.0106)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000602 (0.000382)	-0.000606 (0.000383)	-0.000600 (0.000385)	-0.000601 (0.000385)
Constant	-8.712*** (0.778)	-9.103*** (0.817)	-9.255*** (0.831)	-9.254*** (0.829)
Observations	50092	50092	50092	50092
chi2	426.2	436.0	444.0	444.8
r2_p	0.115	0.113	0.113	0.113

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 18: Logistic regression results for alternative specifications of rivalry.

	Thomson Rivalry	Severe Rivalry	Lesser Rivalry	Combined Severe-Lesser
DS Onset				
Sender Democracy	1.151*** (0.217)	1.036*** (0.213)	0.972*** (0.214)	1.060*** (0.213)
Target Democracy	1.022*** (0.223)	0.895*** (0.223)	0.812*** (0.220)	0.878*** (0.221)
Joint Democracy	-2.212*** (0.295)	-2.113*** (0.295)	-1.897*** (0.273)	-1.893*** (0.274)
Economic Interdependence	-1.127 (1.301)	-0.186 (1.295)	-1.636 (1.515)	-1.234 (1.354)
Joint IGO	0.957*** (0.209)	1.101*** (0.227)	0.949*** (0.221)	0.919*** (0.211)
Membership				
Relative Power	-0.000159 (0.000281)	-0.0000872 (0.000232)	-0.000134 (0.000271)	-0.0000431 (0.000194)
Capabilities				
Alliance	0.437* (0.186)	0.473** (0.183)	0.504** (0.179)	0.395* (0.174)
Thompson Rivalry	1.342*** (0.280)			
Severe Rivalry		1.228*** (0.218)		
Lesser Rivalry			0.827** (0.263)	
Combined Rivalry				1.464*** (0.184)
US Sender	0.751*** (0.211)	0.685** (0.210)	0.605** (0.233)	0.533* (0.212)
Intrastate War	0.563** (0.174)	0.524** (0.172)	0.516** (0.190)	0.484** (0.178)
MID	1.489*** (0.250)	1.232*** (0.228)	1.799*** (0.245)	0.994*** (0.227)
Economic Sanctions	0.725*** (0.158)	0.724*** (0.167)	0.699*** (0.169)	0.679*** (0.170)
Sanction Years	-0.215** (0.0784)	-0.222** (0.0778)	-0.239** (0.0817)	-0.205** (0.0781)
Sanction Years^2	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0180+ (0.0104)	0.0196+ (0.0107)	0.0175+ (0.0104)
Sanction Years^3	-0.000602 (0.000382)	-0.000626+ (0.000378)	-0.000672+ (0.000385)	-0.000620+ (0.000376)
Constant	-8.712*** (0.778)	-9.123*** (0.830)	-8.441*** (0.794)	-8.639*** (0.766)
Observations	50092	50092	50092	50092
chi2	426.2	426.1	432.6	492.6
r2_p	0.115	0.115	0.108	0.124

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 19: Logistic regression results for alternative sender state variable.

	US	Russia	China	France	UK
DS Onset					
Sender	1.151*** (0.217)	1.413*** (0.214)	1.300*** (0.217)	1.356*** (0.215)	1.303*** (0.217)
Democracy	1.022*** (0.223)	0.983*** (0.220)	1.032*** (0.224)	1.016*** (0.222)	1.031*** (0.223)
Target	-2.212*** (0.295)	-2.225*** (0.292)	-2.288*** (0.301)	-2.285*** (0.298)	-2.280*** (0.300)
Joint Democracy	-1.127 (1.301)	-1.028 (1.259)	-0.944 (1.231)	-1.071 (1.260)	-1.070 (1.257)
Economic	0.957*** (0.209)	0.842*** (0.190)	0.903*** (0.203)	0.890*** (0.200)	0.888*** (0.201)
Interdependence	-0.000159 (0.000281)	-0.0000116 (0.000175)	0.0000380 (0.000143)	0.00000352 (0.000156)	0.0000163 (0.000149)
Joint IGO	0.437* (0.186)	0.479* (0.186)	0.469* (0.190)	0.486** (0.187)	0.502** (0.189)
Membership	1.342*** (0.280)	1.393*** (0.290)	1.318*** (0.291)	1.296*** (0.289)	1.317*** (0.291)
Relative Power	0.751*** (0.211)				
Capabilities		0.752** (0.251)			
Alliance			-0.301 (0.308)		
Rivalry				-0.295 (0.245)	
US Sender					0.209 (0.234)
Russia Sender					0.540** (0.174)
China Sender					1.527*** (0.256)
France Sender					0.802*** (0.152)
UK Sender					-0.225** (0.0789)
Intrastate War	0.563** (0.174)	0.535** (0.173)	0.543** (0.174)	0.535** (0.174)	0.540** (0.174)
MID	1.489*** (0.250)	1.492*** (0.252)	1.521*** (0.255)	1.517*** (0.254)	1.527*** (0.256)
Economic	0.725*** (0.158)	0.792*** (0.153)	0.792*** (0.152)	0.803*** (0.153)	0.802*** (0.152)
Sanctions	-0.215** (0.0784)	-0.232** (0.0793)	-0.227** (0.0789)	-0.229** (0.0789)	-0.225** (0.0789)
Sanction Years	0.0173 (0.0105)	0.0192+ (0.0106)	0.0185+ (0.0106)	0.0187+ (0.0106)	0.0183+ (0.0106)
Sanction Years^2	-0.000602 (0.000382)	-0.000667+ (0.000387)	-0.000639+ (0.000384)	-0.000644+ (0.000385)	-0.000634+ (0.000384)
Sanction Years^3	-8.712*** (0.778)	-8.382*** (0.710)	-8.496*** (0.753)	-8.463*** (0.745)	-8.486*** (0.749)
Constant					
Observations	50092	50092	50092	50092	50092
chi2	426.2	419.8	406.8	411.5	410.7
r2_p	0.115	0.113	0.111	0.111	0.111

Standard errors in parentheses, + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C, Table 20: Predicted probabilities of IGO membership variable.

VARIABLES	Joint IGO Membership
Mean	0.00479*** (0.00101) 0.00280 - 0.00677
Mean + Std	0.00766*** (0.00159) 0.00454 - 0.0108
Observations	50,092
Standard errors in parentheses	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1	

Appendix C, Table 21: Cross-tabulation of diplomatic sanctions onset and major-major power dyads.

	Freq.	Percen	Cum.
	t		
0	816	97.14	97.14
1	24	2.86	100.00
Total	840	100.00	

Appendix D: Additional Analyses for Chapter 5

Appendix D, Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables for economic sanctions onset and diplomatic sanctions analysis.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Economic Sanction	37259	.009	.092	0	1
Diplomatic Sanction	37259	.007	.085	0	1
Sender Democracy	37259	.505	.5	0	1
Total Trade	37259	3.722	6.208	-18.421	12.986
GDP Ratio	37259	.527	.435	0	1
Capability Ratio	37259	-5.067	2.232	-11.591	-1.939
Alliance	37259	.179	.384	0	1
US Sender	37259	.074	.261	0	1

Appendix D, Table 2: Missing Values for economic sanctions onset and diplomatic sanctions analysis.

Variable	Obs=.	Obs>.	Obs<.
Economic Sanction	0	0	49,170
Diplomatic Sanction	670	0	48,500
Sender Democracy	4,327	0	44,843
Total Trade	3,874	0	45,296
GDP Ratio	6,718	0	42,452
Capability Ratio	670	0	48,500
Alliance	670	0	48,500
US Sender	0	0	49,170

Appendix D, Table 3: Cross-tabulation of economic sanction onset and diplomatic sanctions.

Economic Sanction Onset	Diplomatic Sanction Onset		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	36681	259	36940
	99.30	0.70	100.00
	99.17	95.22	99.14
Onset	306	13	319
	95.92	4.08	100.00
	0.83	4.78	0.86
Total	36987	272	37259
	99.27	0.73	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 49.68 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix D, Table 4: Cross tabulation of economic sanctions onset and rivalry.

Economic Sanction Onset	Rivalry		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	35914	1026	36940
	97.22	2.78	100.00
	99.16	98.75	99.14
Onset	306	13	319
	95.92	4.08	100.00
	0.84	1.25	0.86
Total	36220	1039	37259
	97.21	2.79	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 1.96 Pr = 0.1610

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix D, Table 5: Cross tabulation of economic sanctions onset and ICB.

Economic Sanction Onset	ICB		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	36754	186	36940
	99.50	0.50	100.00
	99.17	94.42	99.14
Onset	308	11	319
	96.55	3.45	100.00
	0.83	5.58	0.86
Total	37062	197	37259
	99.47	0.53	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 52.15 Pr = 0.000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix D, Table 6: Correlation matrix for economic sanctions onset and diplomatic sanctions analysis.

Variables	Econom ic Sanction	Diplomatic Sanction	Sender Democracy	Total Trade	GDP Ratio	Capabil ity Ratio	Alliance	US Sender
Economic Sanction	1.000							
Diplomatic Sanction	0.037	1.000						
Sender Democracy	0.065	0.012	1.000					
Total Trade	0.056	0.018	0.274	1.000				
GDP Ratio	0.052	0.011	0.279	-0.036	1.000			
Capability Ratio	0.089	0.028	0.248	0.146	0.808	1.000		
Alliance	0.059	0.019	0.052	0.091	-0.002	-0.079	1.000	
US Sender	0.182	0.032	0.279	0.097	0.296	0.379	0.095	1.000

Appendix D, Table 7: Descriptive statistics of variables for MID onset and diplomatic sanctions analysis.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
MID	37477	.011	.104	0	1
Diplomatic Sanction	37477	.007	.083	0	1
Dem-Dem	37477	.263	.44	0	1
Capability Ratio	37477	3.334	1.886	0	9.544
Alliance	37477	.176	.381	0	1
Capital Distance	37477	8.322	1.139	2.003	9.867
Economic Development	37477	10.698	1.777	5.944	16.584
Total Trade	37477	4.061	5.886	-18.421	12.986

Appendix D, Table 8: Missing Values for MID onset and diplomatic sanctions analysis.

Variable	Obs=.	Obs>.	Obs<.
MID	0	0	49,170
Diplomatic Sanction	670	0	48,500
Dem-Dem	7,746	0	41,424
Capability Ratio	670	0	48,500
Alliance	670	0	48,500
Capital Distance	0	0	49,170
Economic Development	3,726	0	49,170
Total Trade	3,874	0	49,170

Appendix D, Table 9: Cross-tabulation of MID onset and diplomatic sanctions.

MID Onset	Diplomatic Sanction Onset		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	36833	235	37068
	99.37	0.63	100.00
	98.96	91.44	98.91
Onset	387	22	409
	94.62	5.38	100.00
	1.04	8.56	1.09
Total	37220	257	37477
	99.31	0.69	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 133.74 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix D, Table 10: Cross-tabulation of MID onset and rivalry.

MID Onset	Rivalry		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	36150	918	37068
	97.52	2.48	100.00
	99.21	88.44	98.91
Onset	289	120	409
	70.66	29.34	100.00
	0.79	11.56	1.09
Total	36439	1038	37477
	97.23	2.77	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 1084.03 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix D, Table 11: Cross-tabulation of MID onset and ICB.

MID Onset	ICB		
	0	1	Total
No Onset	36933	135	37068
	99.64	0.36	100.00
	99.07	68.88	98.91
Onset	348	61	409
	85.09	14.91	100.00
	0.93	31.12	1.09
Total	36439	1038	37477
	97.23	2.77	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Pearson Chi2 = 1646.20 Pr = 0.0000

First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages*, and third row has *column percentages*

Appendix D, Table 12: Correlation matrix for MID onset and diplomatic sanctions analysis.

Variables	MID	Diplomatic Sanction	Dem-Dem	Capab ility Ratio	Alliance	Capit al Dista nce	Econom ic Develop ment	Total Trade
MID	1.000							
Diplomatic Sanction	0.060	1.000						
Dem-Dem	-0.036	-0.017	1.000					
Capability Ratio	-0.087	-0.039	-0.124	1.000				
Alliance	0.047	0.021	0.213	-0.272	1.000			
Capital Distance	-0.101	-0.033	-0.058	0.499	-0.472	1.000		
Economic Development	0.023	0.031	0.300	-0.577	0.084	0.031	1.000	
Total Trade	-0.036	0.012	0.281	-0.177	0.096	0.025	0.480	1.000