

**FRIENDSHIP, CRISIS AND ESTRANGEMENT:
U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS, 1871-1920**

A Ph.D. Dissertation

**by
Bahar Gürsel**

**Department of History
Bilkent University
Ankara
March 2007**

To Mine & Sinan

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U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS, 1871-1920**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

**by
BAHAR GÜRSEL**

**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

in

**THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

March 2007

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Timothy M. Roberts
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Edward P. Kohn
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Oktay Özel
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Tanfer Emin Tunç
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

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Gürsel, Bahar

Ph.D., Department of History

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Timothy Mason Roberts

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In the 1870s, the united Kingdom of Italy brought together nearly the whole Italian peninsula under a single flag, and the United States left behind a civil war and strengthened the country and its institutions. This dissertation is an account of the relations between the United States and Italy from 1871 to 1920. This era witnessed numerous important incidents like the mass Italian immigration to America beginning in the 1880s, military service and the problem of naturalization, the lynchings of Italian immigrants particularly in the southern United States, anarchism in both countries, Italian colonialist activities in North Africa, the beginning of American overseas expansion, and World War I. By analyzing both countries' laws, political circumstances, internal affairs and ideological developments, the dissertation aspires to explore the aspects that shaped Italian and American foreign relations. While emphasizing these features, it seeks to clarify the fact that the main issue which both countries focused on was national greatness.

Keywords: United States, Italy, foreign relations, late nineteenth century, *Risorgimento*, World War I

ÖZET
DOSTLUK, BUNALIM, YABANCILAŞMA:
A. B. D.-İTALYA İLİŞKİLERİ, 1871-1920
Gürsel, Bahar
Doktora, Tarih Bölümü
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1870’li yıllarda Birleşik İtalya Krallığı neredeyse bütün İtalyan yarımadasını tek bir bayrak altında toplamış ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri de bir iç savaşı geride bırakıp ülkeyi ve kurumlarını güçlendirmişti. Bu tez, 1871 ve 1920 yılları arasında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve İtalya arasında gelişen ilişkileri anlatmaktadır. Sözü geçen dönem, İtalya’dan Amerika’ya 1880’li yıllarda başlayan kütleli göç, askerlik hizmeti ve vatandaşlığa kabul edilme sorunu, özellikle Birleşik Devletler’in güney eyaletlerinde İtalyan göçmenlerinin linç edilmesi, her iki ülkedeki anarşizm hareketleri, Kuzey Afrika’da İtalya’nın kolonileşme faaliyetleri, Amerika’nın deniz aşırı genişlemesinin başlangıcı ve Birinci Dünya savaşı gibi sayısız önemli olaya şahit olmuştur. Bu tez, her iki ülkenin yasalarını, siyasi koşullarını, içişlerini ve ideolojik gelişmelerini inceleyerek, İtalya ve Amerika’nın dış ilişkilerine şekil veren şartları belirlemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu konuların üzerinde dururken, aslında her iki ülkenin de içişleri ve dış ilişkilerinde odaklandığı ana unsurun ulusal büyüklük olduğunu vurgulamaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İtalya, dış ilişkiler, *Risorgimento*

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS, 1871-1920

This study is an account of the relations between the United States and Italy from 1871 to 1920, and the story of two young nations aspiring to global power, and the relationship they made to contribute to the acquisition of power. The late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries witnessed numerous events that brought the United States and Italy into relations with each other, especially the mass Italian immigration to America beginning in the 1880s. This mass immigration precipitated other issues including problems of citizenship, military service, and naturalization, and the lynchings of Italian immigrants particularly in southern United States. Other issues that involved both countries were anarchism, Italian colonial activities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the beginning of American overseas expansion, and World War I. By analyzing the relationship between popular attitudes and policy-making in both countries, this dissertation will trace the intersections of cultural and diplomatic history in Italian and American foreign relations.

1.1 Argument and Its Context

There are only a few works about Italian foreign policy concerning history before World War I. Exceptions are the works of Federico Chabod and R. J. B. Bosworth. Chabod's work, *Italian Foreign Policy* was first published in 1951.¹ It covers the period between 1870 and 1896. Chabod thought that foreign policy is based not only on "pure diplomacy," but also on the ideologies, the social conditions, and the internal developments of a country. In addition to that, Chabod focused on the importance of the individuals that shaped Italy's foreign policy. He stated in his work "the deeds of a single statesman always make a difference to the course of events."² Chabod also emphasized one aspect's continuity in Italian foreign policy. According to him, there was a "growing nationalistic sentiment" going back to Mazzianism that "grounded itself solely in the power, prestige, and greatness of Italy alone."³

In *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*, R. J. B. Bosworth also emphasized the lasting effects of the Italian sense of national greatness, but he made a distinction between the essence and style of Italian foreign policy.⁴ Bosworth focused on the period between 1902 and 1915 and emphasized that fascism did not represent change in the ideas about Italy's greatness and establishing the third Rome. Only the style of Fascist Italy was different from the style of the liberal period. "The foreign policy of Liberal Italy was more covert, more hesitant, more verbally restrained than of fascist Italy, but it was not different in kind; instead, from the Risorgimento to the

¹ Federico Chabod, *Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders*, William McCuaig, trans., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

² *Ibid.*, xiv.

³ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁴ R. J. B. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

fall of fascism, Italy pursued the foreign policy of the least of the Great Powers.” The motto was always the same: “to be strong and to seem strong.”⁵

The analyses made by Chabod and Bosworth are accurate to a great extent. There was continuity in Italian foreign relations, and particular policy-makers like Agostino Depretis and Giovanni Giolitti influenced the development of domestic and diplomatic affairs. Hence this dissertation will attempt to reflect the Italian sense of greatness that continuously increased throughout the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

Older historical works about U.S.-Italian relations concentrate on two major stages: The *Risorgimento* period and the post-World War I era. H. Nelson Gay, an early twentieth century expert of Italian culture and history, wrote about the early stages of Italo-American relations and the consequences of World War I.⁶ Howard R. Marraro devoted his work to the diplomatic relations between the United States and Italy during the *Risorgimento*. Marraro’s works like *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies*, *L’unificazione Italiana Vista dai Diplomatici Statunitensi [The Unification of Italy from the Eyes of the American Diplomats]*, *Relazioni fra l’Italia e gli Stati Uniti [Relations between Italy and the United States]* and *American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-1861* uncover most of the aspects of the American public and diplomatic opinion about the Italian unification as well the diplomatic correspondence of chief American officials such as George Perkins Marsh, the first U.S. minister to Rome.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 419.

⁶ H. Nelson Gay, *Le Relazioni fra l’Italia e gli Stati Uniti, 1847-1871 [The Relations between Italy and the United States, 1847-1871]* (Roma: Nuova Antologia, 1907); *La Miopia del Congresso di Parigi, L’Ingiustizia dei Mandati Coloniali [The Myopia of the Congress of Paris, the Injustice of the Colonial Mandates]* (Milano: Tip. Popolo d’Italia, 1927).

More recent dissertations written about U.S.-Italian relations focus on the period after the 1920s. These are Carl James Francese's "United States Policy toward Italy on Arms Limitation and War Debts, 1929-1933" (University of Houston, 1982), Eric Steven Edelman's "Incremental Involvement: Italy and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1948" (Yale University, 1981), John Lamberton Harper's "The United States and Italian Economy, 1945-1948" (Johns Hopkins University, 1981), Emory Timothy Smith's "The United States, Italy and NATO: American Policy toward Italy, 1948-1952" (Kent State University, 1981) and David F. Schmitz, "United States Foreign Policy toward Fascist Italy, 1922-1940" (Rutgers University, 1985). Published works appearing recently are Daniela Rossini's *Il Mito Americano nell'Italia della Grande Guerra [The American Myth in Italy in the Great War]*, and Christopher M. Sterba's *Good Americans*⁷. Italian fascism, World War II, and America's Cold War policy towards Italy have all found their place in historical analysis.

In describing American foreign policy, Michael H. Hunt's ideological approach is going to be useful in this dissertation. In *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*⁸ Hunt examines and rejects two preceding approaches to American foreign policy. In *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, William Appleman Williams stressed the importance of an economic national interest in American foreign policy based on expansionism, whereas George F. Kennan in *American Diplomacy* explained the driving force of American foreign policy as "the pursuit of national interest free from the vagaries of short-sighted legislators, moralizing critics, and an

⁷ Daniela Rossini, *Il Mito Americano nell'Italia della Grande Guerra*, (Roma: Laterza & Figli Spa, 2000); Christopher M. Sterba, *Good Americans: Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁸ Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

ignorant public.”⁹ By referring to United States foreign policy, Kennan stated that the responsibility of the governments is to conduct diplomacy, and moral considerations in foreign relations are related to the governments, not to individuals or entire people.¹⁰

As Hunt indicates, there is a strong relation between policy making and ideology, and “foreign policy ideologies are sets of beliefs and values, sometimes only poorly and partially articulated, that make international relations intelligible and decision making possible,”¹¹ Ideologies help historians to understand diplomatic relations more easily and clearly. The practices of the policy makers reflect both their ideologies and the general public opinion about the world affairs.

From this perspective, culture, as well as ideology, becomes an important aspect in foreign policy. As Hunt indicates, “ideology cannot be understood apart from cultural context, relationships of power, and the creation, transmission, and interpretation of meaning.”¹² The culture widely shared and absorbed by the society from which the policy makers come shapes their ideologies. In short, ideology has a distinct relation with culture, and that also should attract the attention of diplomatic historians.

According to Hunt, there are three ideologies that shaped American foreign policy: the quest for national greatness, the attitudes toward foreigners in terms of a racial hierarchy, and a general pessimism about foreign revolutions.¹³ The idea of national greatness was related to Thomas Paine’s idea about the “power to begin the

⁹ Ronald Steel, “Birth of an Empire,” *Reviews in American History* 16(1988), 151.

¹⁰ George F. Kennan, “Morality and Foreign Policy,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19851201faessay8456/george-f-kennan/morality-and-foreign-policy.html>, Jan5, 2007.

¹¹ Michael H. Hunt, “A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations: Ideology,” *The Journal of American History*, 77(1990) 108.

¹² *Ibid.*, 110.

¹³ John D. Martz, “Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *The Journal of Politics* 50 (1988) 539.

world again,”¹⁴ and goes back to the establishment of the United States. Hunt explains U.S. expansionism by revealing a dominant “Anglo-Saxonism” in American foreign policy, by which the United States was regarded as “a greater England with a noble destiny.” With the arrival of immigrants, the racial differences became clearer and a hierarchy among the European nationalities appeared. At the top, there were Americans and the English. The Irish and the Germans, who “lost their love for liberty” came after. At the third level there were the Spaniards and Italians who “lacked vigor; they were sentimental, undisciplined and superstitious, and consequently they were of small account in international affairs.”¹⁵ Lastly, American opinions about revolutions were related to the American interest in the political and social changes abroad, especially how dangerous and violent they were likely to be. In brief, “American policy makers measured the worth of other peoples and nations against a racial hierarchy. They displayed hostility toward revolutions that diverged from the American norm, especially those on the left. Finally, they were convinced that national greatness depended on making the world safe for liberty.”¹⁶

Principally, this dissertation will examine Hunt’s ideas about national greatness and racial hierarchy. Each chapter will approach the development of the United States and Italian foreign policies from these two perspectives, and will emphasize their influence and continuity in Italo-American relations. Both nations were seeking greatness, which impacted their foreign policies and the way Italian immigrants to the United States were treated in both countries. It will also show that American ideologies about national greatness and racial superiority generally

¹⁴ Hunt, *Ideology*, 20.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 171.

clashed with Italian opinions about nationalism, *italianità* and ethnic supremacy as well the designs about world hegemony. Cultural and social expressions of nativism and prejudice impacted United States and Italian foreign policies. The main idea of the dissertation is to point out that American and Italian foreign policies developed according to the dominant American and Italian national ideologies, and they did not display drastic changes throughout the indicated time period.

It will be noted that the dissertation does not study the Vatican's approach to Italo-American relations in the era. Firstly, Italy was an independent country from the Holy See, which during Italian unification was deprived of its former secular powers. There was a solid rivalry and suspiciousness between the monarchy and the Vatican, and many Italians had strong anticlerical feelings in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. In this period, Italian anticlericalism lived its most intense phase because of the emergent liberal, republican, nationalist, and socialist movements in the peninsula. Mazzinians and the Italian socialists hated each other, but the Church, regarded as the greatest enemy of the newly emerged country of the Italians, was largely isolated from policy making and did not play a major role in the relationship between the two countries. The Italian immigrants in the United States practiced a type of Catholicism known as the Virgin Mary cult. They regarded themselves as Catholics, but they did not obey the orders of the Catholic Church since it symbolized oppression and tyranny for the poor and illiterate Italian. Nevertheless, Catholicism became a significant aspect preserving the *italianità* of the immigrants, as an outcome of Italian nationalism's development.

1.2 Sources

The primary sources for U.S.-Italian foreign relations are rich and give the opportunity to analyze both American and Italian attitudes. The major source about the American perspective is *The United States Foreign Relations* correspondence (FRUS). This correspondence includes the translation of the Italian documents sent to the United States and the records of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Also, the papers of the United States presidents like Woodrow Wilson are useful in comprehending the relations between Italy and the United States. Additionally, the FBI files about the Italian American anarchist Carlo Tresca are noteworthy in comprehending the American attitude about anarchism.

Italian diplomatic sources like *I Libri Verdi [The Green Books]* issued by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on specific occasions-like honoring a diplomatic success, or representing the aspects of an international crisis-constitute a significant source for explaining Italo-American relations. The records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Historical Diplomatic Archive present a wide range of information about the Italian diplomatic presence in the United States, the Commissariato dell'Emigrazione (Commissary of Emigration), and the Italian Office of Immigration and Protection at Ellis Island.¹⁷ In addition, the pamphlets about

¹⁷ Cinzia Maria Aicardi e [and] Alessandra Cavatella, *I Fondi Archivistici della Legazione Sarda e della Rappresentanze Diplomatiche Italiane negli U.S.A. (1848-1901) [The Archival Sources of the Sardinian Legation and Italian Diplomatic Representation in U.S.A. (1848-1901)]* (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1988); Patrizia Catani e [and] Roberto Zuccolini, *I Fondi Archivistici dei Consolati in Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, New Orleans e San Francisco Conservati presso L'Archivio Storico Diplomatico [The Archival Sources of the Consulates in Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, New Orleans and San Francisco Conserved in the Historical Diplomatic Archive]* (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1990); Laura Pilotti, *L'Ufficio di Informazioni e Protezione dell'Emigrazione Italiana di Ellis Island [The Italian Office of Information and Protection on the Ellis Island]* (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1993).

immigration laws and regulations published by the Commissariato dell'Emigrazione of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specify the Italian attitude about immigration.¹⁸

Apart from the diplomatic sources about U.S.-Italian relations, there is also a broad variety of resources that clarify the different aspects about the subject. Both American and Italian magazines and newspapers are important to understand the conditions and the atmosphere of the times. In addition to the newspapers with large circulation like *The New York Times*, the influential Italian American newspapers like *The Progresso Italo-Americano* (*Italian-American Progress*) and *La Fiaccola* (*The Torch*), and the socialist and anarchist newspapers like *L'Avvenire* (*The Future*) and *La Cronaca Sovversiva* (*The Subversive Chronicle*) are significant to realize the consequences of certain incidents both in Italy and among the Italian immigrants in the United States.

Furthermore, the works composed by Italian writers about the United States, and by American writers about Italy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are beneficial. The accounts of the American and Italian travelers provide anecdotal impressions about the two countries.¹⁹ The revolutions of 1848 and their

¹⁸ Disposizioni sull'Emigrazione [Arrangements about Emigration], *Legge 31 Gennaio 1901, n. 23 e sulle Tutela delle Rimesse e dei Risparmi degli Emigranti Italiani all'Estero, Legge 1° Febbraio 1901, n. 24 Annotato* [Law 31 January, n. 23 about the Protection of the Remittance and the Savings of the Italian Emigrants Abroad, Law 1° February 1901, n. 24 Annotated] (Milano: Ditta Editrice Libreria Luigi di Giacomo Pirola, 1901); Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissariato dell'Emigrazione [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commissary of Emigration], *Leggi, Regolamenti, Norme Complementari della Legge sull'Emigrazione* [Laws, Regulations, Complementary Rules of the Law of Emigration] (Roma: Cooperativa Tipografica Manuzio, 1910); Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissariato dell'Emigrazione [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commissary of Emigration], *Istruzioni a chi Intende Emigrare per gli Stati Uniti* [Instructions for whom Intend to Emigrate to the United States], (Roma: Stab. Tip. Società Cartiere Centrali, 1913).

¹⁹ For detail, see Jenny Frenchot, *Roads to Rome: The Antebellum Protestant Encounter with Catholicism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Klaus Lanzinger, *Jason's Voyage: The Search for the Old World in American Literature. A Study of Melville, Hawthorne, Henry James, and Thomas Wolfe* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Giuseppe Massara, *Viaggatori Italiani in America (1860-1970)* [Italian Travelers in America (1860-1970)] (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1976); William L. Vance, *America's Rome: Catholic and Contemporary Rome* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

repercussions attracted the attention of many contemporary American intellectuals.²⁰

In addition, some late nineteenth-century books reveal the Italian attitude about American imperialism, and the Spanish-American War of 1898 in particular.²¹

Finally, and more importantly, American history books written by Italian writers display the nineteenth-and the early twentieth-century Italian views about American history, politics, institutions and society.²²

1.3 Dissertation Blueprint

The last part of this introduction outlines the chapters that constitute the dissertation. The dissertation is divided into thematic chapters to display the features of the relations between the U.S. and Italy thoroughly. The second chapter is about the preliminary period of U.S.-Italian relations between 1796 and 1870.

²⁰ See Sara Antonelli, Daniele Fiorentino e [and] Giuseppe Monsagrati, a cura di [eds. al.], *Gli Americani e la Repubblica Romana del 1849* [*The Americans and the Roman Republic of 1849*], (Roma: Gangemi Editore, 2003); Daniele Fiorentino e [and] Matteo Sanfilippo, a cura di [eds. al.], *Gli Stati Uniti e L'Unità d'Italia* [*The United States and Italian Unification*] (Roma: Gangemi Editore, 2004); Margaret Fuller, “*These Sad but Glorious Days*”: *Dispatches from Europe, 1846-1850*, Larry J. Reynolds and Susan Belasco Smith eds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991)

²¹ Domenico Bonamico, Comandante [Commander], *Il Conflitto Ispano-Americano* [*The Spanish-American Conflict*] (Roma: Rivista Marittima, 1898); Alfredo Feliciangeli, *la Guerra Ispano-Americana, 1898* [*The Spanish-American War, 1898*] (Roma: Enrico Voghera, 1898); Augusto Pierantoni, *Cuba e il Conflitto Ispano-Americano* [*Cuba and the Spanish-American Conflict*] (Roma: Stabilimento Tipografico della Tribuna, 1898); Timone (pseud.), *Riflessioni sulla Guerra Marittima tra Spagna e Stati Uniti, in relazione alla Marina Nostra* [*Reflections about the Maritime War between Spain and the United States in Relation to our Navy*] (Napoli: Stabilimento Tipografico R. Pesole, 1898); Ferruccio Vitale, *La Politica Imperialista degli Stati Uniti* [*The Imperialist Policy of the United States*] (Firenze: Ufficio della Rassegna Nazionale, 1901).

²² Diego Angeli, *La Repubblica Stellata* [*The Star Republic*] Firenze: R. Bemporad & Figlio, Editori, 1918); Umberto Biasoli, *Piccola Storia degli Stati Uniti d'America* [*A Short History of the United States of America*], (Milano: Antonio Vallardi, 1917); Vito Garretto, *Storia degli Stati Uniti d'America del Nord, 1492-1914* [*History of the United States of America of North, 1492-1914*] (Milano: Librico Hoepli, 1916); Rodolfo Giani, *Storia degli Stati Uniti d'America* [*History of the United States of America*] (Milano: Carrera, 1902); Luigi Rava, *La Fortuna di Beniamino Franklin in Italia, Prefazione al Volume “Beniamino Franklin” di Lawrence Shaw Mayo* [*The Success of Benjamin Franklin in Italy, Preface to Lawrence Shaw Mayo's “Benjamin Franklin”*] (Firenze: R. Bemporad & Figlio, Editori); Gedeone de Vincentiis, *L'America del Nord* [*North America*] (Napoli: Luigi Pierro Tip.-Editore, 1905).

Commencing with the accounts of the late eighteenth- century travelers, this chapter focuses on the incidents like the 1848 revolutions, the creation and fall of the Roman Republic, the *Risorgimento*, and the American Civil War in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Chapter 3 is about immigration, the related issue of naturalization, and the problem of military service. After indicating the different implications of immigration for the United States and Italy, this chapter discusses naturalization as a diplomatic problem between the two countries. Naturalization, which was regarded by the United States as a standard consequence of immigration, emerged as a huge risk for the Italians since it represented the loss of a significant number of Italian subjects. Since American and Italian officials had conflicting opinions about immigration, the outcome was a problem in Italo-American relations, especially after the mass immigration of the 1880s. This problem turned out to be most perceptible during World War I when the two countries argued about the compulsory military service of Italian Americans in their mother country.

Chapter 4 is about American and Italian stereotypes. As an outcome of the miscellaneous information about Italy among Americans, Italian stereotypes were often depicted as an organ grinder, or a vicious *Mafia* member, but sometimes they turned out to be republican heroes who saved their country like Guiseppe Garibaldi. This dualism in American images of Italians owed to the conflict between Americans' racial prejudice in the late nineteenth century, and the effect of the Italian *Risorgimento* on the American public. On the other hand, the American images among Italians generally were heroes and saviors from George Washington to Woodrow Wilson, resembling ancient Roman personages. In brief, Chapter 4

explains the importance of cultural images in shaping ideologies, and consequently foreign policies.

Chapter 5 focuses on the lynching of Italian immigrants, including Italian Americans who had gained U.S. citizenship, by “native” Americans, especially in southern states. This chapter explains lynching as an outcome of American racial attitudes and Italian immigrants’ settlement patterns. In addition, it demonstrates that the two countries could not comprehend the basis of each other’s legal institutions like American federalism and the Italian Civil Code; each lynching incident in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries brought these institutions into collision. The Italian immigrants, who chose to live within their “colonies”, and sometimes under the protection of their own illegal organizations like the *Mafia*, did not assimilate. Thus, they were victimized by vigilantism, the ultimate safeguard of the American racial order at the time.

Chapter 6 is about anarchism. It concentrates on the definition of anarchism in United States and Italy, and highlights anarchist leaders like Carlo Tresca and Luigi Galleani who lived in America, and had a significant effect on the American working class. Anarchism emerged as diplomatic problem especially after the assassinations of the Italian King Umberto I in 1900 by Gaetano Bresci (an Italian immigrant in America) and President William McKinley in 1901 by Leon Czolgosz (a Polish immigrant), which initiated a fierce discussion about anarchism on both sides of the Atlantic. The problem about immigrant anarchists turned out to be one of the most important and urgent issues in the agenda of American politicians. Anarchism, which had its background in Europe (communist anarchism, socialist anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism), and the United States to a certain extent (individual anarchism that focused on the individuals’ non-violent, passive

resistance to the system), turned out to be a common danger for the two countries' political systems. The consequences of the problems about immigration and the negative Italian stereotype revealed themselves again in relation to the international problem of anarchism.


Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrate the features of American imperialism and Italian colonialism respectively. Firstly, the definition of expansionism from the Italian and American perspectives is given. The motives that directed Italy and the United States to expansionism are discussed. Additionally, Italy's aspiration of establishing "agricultural colonies" on the American continent is described in Chapter 7 as another problematic outcome of the Italian perception of emigration and colonization. Lastly, the two countries' opinions about their policies of colonialism and imperialism are explored in this part.

Chapter 9 focuses on World War I and its consequences in U.S.-Italian relations. It demonstrates the different American and Italian ideologies in entering the war, the role of Woodrow Wilson in the war for the two countries, the meaning of "irredentism" for the Italian and American governments, and the American and Italian opinions about each other's armies. The Paris Peace Conference appears to be the vital point in the deterioration of Italo-American relations; the different expectations by the end of the war and during the conference became the reasons for the Italian frustration about the United States and Wilson in particular by 1919. This final chapter serves as a conclusion that symbolizes the termination of a significant era in U.S.-Italian relations. The cordial friendship which had started after the 1848 revolution came to an end with the Treaty of Versailles, and Italian frustrations about America were transformed first into fury and then resentment. The rise of fascism in Italy after 1922 was related to the immense Italian frustration and sense

of isolation in response to the United States' attitude during the Peace Conference. Mussolini's fascism initiated a new period in Italo-American relations that was going to last until the end of the Second World War. During that era, the two countries' divergent ideologies and policies clashed, and U.S.-Italian cordiality was not recover until the Cold War.

In brief, this dissertation seeks to concentrate on the neglected and crucial period of U.S-Italian relations from the establishment of the united Kingdom of Italy in the early 1870s to the end of World War I. By study of the cultural and diplomatic histories of the two countries, their different ideologies, perspectives and practices are going to be revealed in the subsequent chapters. Each part will focus on an essential theme that uncovers these differences and disputes between the United States and Italy. While exposing the two countries' emerging differences, the dissertation is going to argue that the basis of these differences was anchored in the greatest similarity between the United States and the united Kingdom of Italy; each countries' longing for national greatness.

Italy in 1815



Italy before *Risorgimento*

Source: www.dickinson.edu/~rhyne/232/Three/Italy_1815.htm, March 3, 2007.

CHAPTER 2

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ITALIAN PENINSULA:

THE PRELIMINARY ERA

By 1871, the kingdom of Italy brought together nearly the whole Italian peninsula under a single flag, and the United States left behind a civil war that united the country and its institutions. This chapter will seek to concentrate on the initial, often telescopic U.S.-Italian relations before the *Risorgimento*, which would frame the future relations between the two countries. In pursuing that, the accounts of individual travelers from both countries, as well as the diplomatic correspondence between Italy and the United States are going to be utilized.

2.1 Italy before the Unification: 1796-1846

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Italian peninsula was under French control. The Treaty of Vienna, concluded in 1815 after the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, restored the map of Italy to a state similar to that of 1748.¹ As the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Klemens Wenzel Lothar Metternich stated, Italy was only a geographical expression in the early nineteenth century. Nevertheless,

¹ Derek Beales, *The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1971) 39.

the most important consequence of Napoleon's rule in Italy "was to establish in men's minds the idea that Italy could become a unitary state."²

During this period, the Italian elite became interested in America. In 1821, the poet Vittorio Alfieri wrote his *L'America Libera [Free America]*, which consisted of five odes after the surrender of the English at Yorktown. In 1791, Count Paolo Andreani from Milan brought a copy of *L'America Libera* as a present to the United States President George Washington. He became a member of the American Philosophical Society, moved to Louisiana, and stayed in America long enough to write to Thomas Jefferson in 1808 from New Orleans. Another Milanese count, Luigi Castiglioni wrote the first Italian travel book about America under the title, *Viaggio negli Stati Uniti dell'America Settentrionale fatto negli 1785, 1786, 1787 [Journey made in Northern United States of America in 1785, 1786, 1787]*. Castiglioni also became a member of the American Philosophical Society.³ These writers composed their works on a romantic basis. America was a mysterious land where people made a revolution against an empire, and united their country.

Benjamin Franklin appears to be one of the prominent figures of the eighteenth-century Italo-American cultural and intellectual contact. He regularly corresponded with Padre Beccaria and other Italian scientists like the mathematician and physicist, Paolo Frisi, and the translations of his *Information to Those who would Remove to America* were published in Padova and Cremona in 1785.⁴ Nonetheless, the most well known Italo-American companionship in the eighteenth century was the one of Thomas Jefferson and his Florentine neighbor in Virginia,

² John Gooch, *The Unification of Italy* (London: Routledge, 1989) 3.

³ For detail, see Giuseppe Massara, *Viaggatori Italiani in America (1860-1970) [Italian Travelers in America (1860-1970)]* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1976), 11-13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

Filippo Mazzei.⁵ For Monticello's garden, Jefferson asked for help from Mazzei who brought him orange trees, vega loggia peach, the angelica apricot, the baccon di re plum, and the Poppe di Venere [Breast of Venus] peach from Italy. In return, Jefferson sent birds, seeds, and plants of Virginia to the Grand Duke of Tuscany with Mazzei.⁶

Pursuant to the Treaty of Vienna, Italy from 1815 to 1846 was divided into seven sovereign states: the Kingdom of Piedmont, the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Duchy of Modena, the Kingdom of Parma-Piacenza, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Austrian archdukes ruled Modena and Tuscany. Parma, which had been under Spanish rule, became an Austrian dukedom in 1815. An Austrian viceroy in Milan governed the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia. The Papal States, under the rule of the Pope, consisted of Lazio, Umbria, the Marches, and the Romagna. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was under the control of the Spanish Bourbon, King Ferdinand IV. San Marino and Monaco were other small Italian states. In short, "this was Metternich's Italy-a country of small states dependent on Austria's good-will and so organized as to be a bulwark against any revival of revolutionary tendencies."⁷ The Kingdom of Piedmont, which consisted of the Piedmont region in northern Italy and the island of Sardinia, turned out to be the most significant threat to Metternich's Italy. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the Dukes of Savoy became the kings of the united Kingdom of Italy.

⁵ For detail, see Howard R. Marraro, "The Four Versions of Jefferson's Letters to Mazzei," *The William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine* 22 (1942), 18-29; "Jefferson's Letters Concerning the Settlement of Mazzei's Virginia Estate," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 30 (1943), 235-42; "Unpublished Mazzei Letters to Jefferson," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 1 (1944), 374-396.

⁶ William Howard Adams, *Jefferson's Monticello* (New York: Albeville Press, 1983), 182-183.

⁷ Edgar Holt, *The Making of Italy, 1815-1870* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 43.

The first official correspondence between the United States and the Kingdom of Sardinia occurred on January 28, 1818 when Vittorio Adolfo Sasserno became the first American consul in Nice where he resided until the end of 1849. Gaspare Deabbate became the first representative of the Sardinian Kingdom in the United States on 18 May 1820, during James Monroe's presidency.⁸ Robert Wickcliffe, Jr. of Kentucky served as the American representative in Turin between 1843 and 1848. He supported the construction of a railroad from Turin to Genoa, and believed that when its Milan branch was terminated, American commerce with the port of Genoa would expand since more American commercial goods could be transported to Lombardy.⁹

The Italian travelers who went to the United States in the 1800s regarded America as a land and frontier of liberty. Their vague comprehension of the continent was often a combination of "an anarchist instinct or a romantic restlessness, of unforeseeable emotional components-fear and unconscious enthusiasm, the fascination of the unexplored regions, the wild land that could be never discovered or dominated entirely, and the taste of the primitive."¹⁰ Some of the most prominent Italian travelers of the early nineteenth century were Eusebio Valli, a doctor who died in America during his vaccination experiments; Orazio de Attellis, an ex-official of Napoleon in Russia who wrote in four languages; Carlo Vidua, a professional traveler; Giacomo Costantino Beltrami, the discoverer of the unknown springs of the Mississippi; Francesco Arese, a friend of Louis Napoleon and an exile in America; Leonette Cipriani, a patriot and adventurer who went to the

⁸ Howard R. Marraro, *Relazioni fra l'Italia e gli Stati Uniti [Relations between Italy and the United States]* (Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1954), 58.

⁹ *Ibid.* 62.

¹⁰ Massara, *Viaggiatori Italiani*, 17.

United States for three times, and finally, Antonio Caccia, one of the participants in the California Gold Rush.¹¹

Meanwhile, the experience of American travelers in Italy during the early 1800s was analogous to the one of the voyagers in Rome during ancient times. Different from the Italian travelers in America, American tourists, particularly New England intellectuals and artists, chose the peninsula as their destination for “the legendary cultural treasures of the Old World and a lost heritage.”¹² As well as that, traveling to other places helped the American tourists and Italian travelers to grasp their national characteristics. “Travel itself was both a cultural activity necessary to the continued formulation of national identity and a spiritual enterprise.”¹³ While exploring the remnants of Ancient Rome, American travelers tried to find their self-identity which was unique, but also attached to its glorious past in the Old World. The discovery of “pre-Cavourian Italy by pre-Civil War Americans was part of something larger and deeper in the shaping of a new American conscience: it partook of a phase and a stage toward the molding of American self-consciousness as a civilization.”¹⁴ Aside from its magnificent past, Italy was admired for its natural beauties, its cultural and intellectual heritage. It became “Dear Italy,” a place “where ‘a wind, ever soft, from the blue heaven blows, and the groves are of laurel and myrtle and rose.’”¹⁵ Italy was an eternal country, and as James Fenimore Cooper stated in 1830, “If New Yorkers thought only of the future, all Romans had to be shown ‘ruminating’ upon the past. Romans proudly traced their ancestry back

¹¹ For detail and some other names, see Ibid. 17-19.

¹² Klaus Lanzinger, *Jason's Voyage: The Search for the Old World in American Literature. A Study of Melville, Hawthorne, Henry James, and Thomas Wolfe* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), 1.

¹³ Jenny Franchot, *Roads to Rome: The Antebellum Protestant Encounter with Catholicism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 16.

¹⁴ A. William Salomone, “The Nineteenth-Century Discovery of Italy: An Essay in American Cultural History Prolegomena to a Historiographical Problem,” *The American Historical Review* 73 (1968), 1372.

¹⁵ “Critical Notes: *The Italian Sketch-Book*,” *The New England Magazine* 9 (1835), 142.

to dwellers on the Palatine, while New Yorkers scarcely knew their own grandmothers, or 'to what nation they properly belonged.'"¹⁶ In brief, the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the American intellectuals' pursuit of a mythic past in the Old World and Italy was one of the significant focal points of that search. For Italians, America was an uncivilized land of opportunity.

2.2 The Italian Revolutions of 1848 and American Responses

On June 17, 1846 Giovanni Mastai Ferretti became Pope Pius IX and immediately began to undertake liberal acts that affected the entire Italian peninsula; "it was the first time in many centuries that words of democracy had fallen from pontifical lips."¹⁷ Amnesty for political prisoners and the end of censorship created pressure for the governments of Piedmont and Tuscany to make similar concessions and support grew for the idea of a confederation of Italian states presided over by the Pope.¹⁸ However, the Pope frustrated the Roman people and liberal reformers elsewhere. In a short time, he returned to the conservative practices of his predecessors.

American opinion about the Pope was mixed. In 1847, Margaret Fuller arrived in Italy as the correspondent of *The New York Daily Tribune* to report the events during the Italian revolution. Fuller, by the end of the same year, sensed that the Pope "meant only to improve, not to *reform*, and should keep things in *status*

¹⁶ William L. Vance, *America's Rome: Catholic and Contemporary Rome* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 115.

¹⁷ Howard R. Marraro, *American Opinion on the Unification of Italy, 1846-1861* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 4.

¹⁸ Roger Price, *The Revolutions of 1848* (New Jersey: Humanities Press International Inc., 1989), 31.

quo, safe locked with the keys of St. Peter.”¹⁹ Fuller remained long enough in Rome to witness the flight of the pope from Rome and the establishment of the Roman Republic. The American public was divided into two camps over the establishment of an American mission to Rome, “the Protestants which took sides with the revolutionists [in Rome], and the Catholics who rallied to support the Pope.”²⁰ While these types of divisions often dominated American opinion about Italy in the early period of U.S-Italian relations, most Americans in the period came to believe Italian republicanism was flawed and futile.

In 1848, the first European insurrection started not in Rome but Sicily and spread to other parts of Italy and throughout the continent as well. The *quarantotto* was “a necessary stage in the development of national consciousness,”²¹ but could not unite the Italian people under a single flag because the revolutions were not well coordinated and had different objectives.²² The American public supported the 1848 Italian revolutions, but, for the U.S. government, “European stability was more important than European liberty.”²³ The revolutions in general could end up with a political and social chaos, and that could be dangerous for the *status quo* in the Old World. Also, the establishment of an Italian republic similar to the United States did not seem very likely in the near future. The U.S. government did not have confidence in the Italians’ ability to make revolutions. John Rowan, the American minister in Naples stated, “The Italian people, unable to comprehend the principle

¹⁹ Rome, December 17, 1847, Margaret Fuller, “*These Sad but Glorious Days*”: *Dispatches from Europe, 1846-1850*, Larry J. Reynolds and Susan Belasco Smith eds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 176.

²⁰ *American Opinion*, 309.

²¹ Denis Mack Smith, “The Revolutions of 1848-1849 in Italy,” R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds, *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 79.

²² *Ibid.*, 55.

²³ Timothy M. Roberts and Daniel W. Howe, “The U.S. and the Revolutions of 1848,” Evans, *The Revolutions in Europe*, 172.

which binds our country, in a union of peace, power & prosperity seem unsuited to the reception of Democratic Institutions.”²⁴ Thus, the primary relation between the United States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies remained commercial, and American officials’ principal objective was to have commercial relations with Sicily comparable to those of France and Britain. During the revolution, that objective did not change; Americans “were strictly neutral, not meddling in [Sicilians’] affairs in any way whatever, and by doing so [gained] the respect of both parties which neither England nor France [could] boast of.”²⁵ Until World War I, American neutrality in diplomatic relations won it favor in Italy.

The escape of the Habsburg minister Clemens von Metternich to England, after the revolution in Vienna on March 8, 1848, triggered the revolutions in the Lombardo-Venetian area. The “Five Glorious Days” in Milan between March 18 and 23 resulted in the expulsion of the Austrian troops under the command of General Josef Radetzky. Count Gabriele Cassati, the leader of the moderates in Milan, asked for the help of the King of Piedmont, Charles Albert, who was enthusiastic to enter Milan. Carlo Cattaneo, the leader of the Milanese republicans, was uncertain about Milan’s future under Piedmont’s control. He formed a war council separate from Cassati, and asked for France’s help. But Giuseppe Mazzini, the champion of Italian republican self-determination, arrived in Milan, and “undermined him by emphasizing the need to gain independence first, whereas Cattaneo saw the first requisites as the establishment of a republic and democracy.”²⁶ The plebiscite about the annexation of the city of Milan to the

²⁴ John Rowan to James Buchanan, Naples, March 3, 1849, Howard R. Marraro, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the Two Sicilies*, Vol 1: 1816-1850 (New York: S. F. Vanni, 1951-52), 670.

²⁵ Francis X. Holbrook and John Nikol, “Reporting the Sicilian Revolution of 1848-1849,” *American Neptune* 43 (1983), 175-6.

²⁶ Gooch, *The Unification*, 13-14.

Kingdom of Piedmont resulted with Charles Albert's victory, although it did not prevail for a long time. On August 6, 1848 Austrian troops entered Milan, and on August 9, Charles Albert signed an armistice with the Austrians. Internal divisions hurt the Italians' attempt at independence.

Meanwhile, Daniele Manin organized the revolution in Venice. On March 28, 1848, President Manin sent an address to the United States in which he stated: "The ocean divides us, but we are not divided by the bounds of sympathy ... We have much to learn from you; and, though your elders in civilization, we blush not to acknowledge it."²⁷ At the American consulate, "the American Consul, William A. Sparks, appeared, bearing in one hand the flag of the United States and in the other the Italian tricolor with the winged lion."²⁸ Revolutionary euphoria tested the American commitment to neutrality.

The Austrian defeat of the King of Piedmont at the battle of Novara on March 23, 1849 had mixed repercussions in the United States. The American press supported the Italians' war against Austria from the beginning, but there were different views in the newspapers after Charles Albert's defeat. For instance, the Cincinnati *Morning Chronicle* reported, "Charles Albert had fought for the Kingdom of Upper Italy, and not for the Italian independence."²⁹ But there were also supporters of the King of Piedmont. The editor of the New Orleans *Daily Picayune* said, "we must look for a resolution of the questions of liberty and progress in Europe. Their defeat would have the most disastrous effects, not only on

²⁷ *Ibid.* 37.

²⁸ Marraro, *American Opinion*, 36.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.

Italy but on the world.”³⁰ Americans viewed early Italian independence-seeking as either too provincial or too universal.

The establishment of the Roman Republic was the incident that attracted the greatest attention of the United States. No nation of the world, including the United States, recognized the Roman Republic, but its establishment divided the American public.³¹ The tension between the republicans and the clergy in Rome started with Pius IX’s Allocution of April 29, 1848 in which he “stated flatly his opposition to the ‘extremist’ movements that were everywhere challenging authority, his refusal to declare war on the [Austrian] Empire, his disavowal of any intentions to lead a unification movement in Italy.”³² The declaration of the Pope caused a great upheaval and shock among the republicans. After the assassination of Count Pellegrino Rossi, the Pope’s chief minister, on November 15, Pius IX “was forced to appoint as Premier, Giuseppe Galletti, a Mazzinian democrat.”³³ In a short time, the Pope lost control of the city and fled to Gaeta, and “patriots flooded into Rome, among them, Giuseppe Garibaldi.”³⁴ By the end of December, an assembly in Rome declared the city a republic on February 9, 1849.

However, it did not take a long time for the Austrians and the French to restore the Pope. The Romans defended the city for a month, but on July 2, 1850 French troops entered Rome. Giuseppe Garibaldi left the city on that night to continue his fight. One year later, he went to New York. Giuseppe Mazzini

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ For American views about Italian republicanism, see Paola Gemme, *Domesticating Foreign Struggles: the Italian Risorgimento and Antebellum American Identity* (Athens, GA & London: Georgia University Press, 2005).

³² George Fasel, *Europe in Upheaval: The Revolutions of 1848* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), 91.

³³ *Ibid.*, 92.

³⁴ Gooch, *The Unification*, 17.

meanwhile had slipped out Civita Vecchia on July 12 in disguise and using an American passport.³⁵

In the United States, the Catholic clergy and laity condemned the Roman republicans whereas Protestants supported them wholeheartedly, if temporarily. A controversy between Archbishop John Hughes and Horace Greeley, the editor of *The New York Daily Tribune*, about American Catholics sending gold to Pius IX occupied American newspapers for a certain period of time. There was also debate about the United States' official recognition of the Roman republic. For instance, Margaret Fuller urged the U.S. government to recognize the Roman republic. Secretary of State James Buchanan and Lewis Cass, Jr., American chargé d'affaires in Rome, "discouraged such recognition on the ground that the new government would be short lived."³⁶ The eventual return of Pius IX to Rome "was celebrated in New York City by a *Te Deum* at St. Patrick's Cathedral."³⁷

The last essential consequence of the 1848-1849 revolutions in the United States was the arrival of immigrants to America. During the revolutions over half a million immigrants arrived from Europe,³⁸ and that had a direct impact on the growth of anti-immigrant feelings, which later affected Italian-American relations. The coming of large numbers of the Irish and German immigrants beginning in the mid-nineteenth century inspired hatred among the native-born population, but Italian immigrants also met with hostility, as will be shown. "Provided the immigrant adopt[ed] American ways he [was] readily accepted, but those who [did not] comply with American habits and standards of living [met] with no mercy."³⁹

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁶ Marraro, *American Opinion*, 100.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Arnold Whitridge, *Men in Crisis: The Revolutions of 1848* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 293.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 295.

2.3 The Unification of Italy

In 1849, “the old regimes [in Italy] were again restored, and although some people had tasted liberty and learned to fight on the barricades, the bitterness of civil war and defeat secured the cause of patriotism.”⁴⁰ The only Italian state that preserved its constitutional government was the Kingdom of Piedmont,⁴¹ and, as a consequence, that state became the major decisive factor in the Italian unification. The period between 1850 and 1861 was the time when the government of Piedmont under Victor Emanuel II took every opportunity to support the unification of the peninsula under its control. It entered the Crimean War on the side of France and Britain, thus, in 1856, the Kingdom of Piedmont “earned the right to sit down with the great powers of the peacemaking congress in Paris.”⁴² France became Piedmont’s ally in its struggle against Austria on the condition that Nice and Savoy would become French territories. After a war with the Austrian Empire in 1859, Piedmont conquered Umbria and the Marches. In November 1860, Garibaldi resigned the dictatorship of Sicily and Naples, and “he left Victor Emanuel II acknowledged as constitutional monarch in all those territories.”⁴³

In 1861, Italy became a unified kingdom under the reign of Victor Emanuel II. Piedmont’s constitution of 1848 was maintained. It was “strongly monarchical; the king was head of the state, and had his own share in its legislative, juridical and executive functions.”⁴⁴ Rome became the capital of the country in 1870 after Louis Napoleon’s withdrawal of the French troops from the city because of the Franco-

⁴⁰ Denis Mack Smith, *Modern Italy: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 12.

⁴¹ For detail, see Holt, *The Making of Italy*, 176-200.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 191.

⁴³ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (London: Cassell Publishers Ltd, 1989), 11-12.

⁴⁴ Holt, *The Making of Italy*, 261.

Prussian war. As Denis Mack Smith states, “whatever the expense, Italy was at last substantially united and complete.”⁴⁵ By the end of the nineteenth century Italy was one of the most populous European countries.

The main goal of the leaders of the *Risorgimento* was to secure Venice and Rome. In 1861, Count Camillo Cavour, the prime minister of the Kingdom of Italy, stated, “Ho detto, o signori, e affermo ancora una volta che Roma, Roma sola deve essere la capitale d’Italia.”⁴⁶ Thus, Italy moved toward Bismarck’s Prussia, fought against Austria for Venice and Trentino, and established friendly relations with Britain and France.

Italy also developed relations with the United States. Italians perceived the United States as a commercial partner, but sometimes a competitor. In cotton manufacturing, Italians wished to compete with the United States, but their plans during the American Civil War did not succeed.⁴⁷ The Civil War only worsened Italy’s economic conditions.⁴⁸ Cavour’s fundamental ambition was to have a united Italy, and, for that reason, Italy was going to be the ally of the most beneficial countries. Cavour’s choice was France, and that was known among the members of the American diplomatic circle. John Moncure Daniel of Virginia served as the American consul in Turin during Cavour’s period in office. He was a typical Southern aristocrat, perhaps predisposed to oppose any threat to rights of property. His views about Cavour were harsh and critical. For instance, when Cavour wanted

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁴⁶ I said, gentlemen, and I affirm once again that, Rome, only Rome must be the capital of Italy.” March 25, 1861, Camillo Cavour, “Roma Capitale,” Giuseppe Talamo, ed., *Gli Ideali del Risorgimento e dell’Unità [The Ideals of the Risorgimento and the Unification]* (Roma: Ente Nazionale Biblioteche Popolari e Scolastiche, 1961), 171.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 43, 47.

⁴⁸ George P. Marsh, the U.S. Minister to Italy, to William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Turin, April 4, 1862, *The Diplomatic Correspondence and Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863), 580.

to pass a law to confiscate church property, Daniel thought that it was “monstrous,” even though Daniel was hardly a defender of Catholicism. In 1853, he stated that the Italian Premier was “an able man, but did not impress [him] as being either bold or sincere. Hence his ministry [was] cautious and timid in small and great things.”⁴⁹

Nevertheless, American opinion about Cavour was generally positive and supportive. In 1859, the American Radical Republican Charles Sumner described Cavour as the international personage of the moment “who [was] acting as a transcendent part in the world’s history.”⁵⁰ In 1871, the American Committee for the celebration of the unification of Italy, presided over by Theodore Roosevelt, the father of the future United States president, praised Cavour’s ideas, especially a “free Church in a free State” that rendered the Italian institutions very similar to those of the United States.⁵¹

The second half of the nineteenth century was an era when American travelers experienced a different Italy. Previously, American intellectuals perceived the Italian peninsula as a scene from ancient times. The idealized account of Italy now was converted into a more realistic and critical version. Apart from the history and the remains of an ancient culture, the late nineteenth-century travelers noticed dirt, poverty, ignorance, and disorder in Italy. From this perspective, this period is an important stage in the formation of the negative Italian stereotypes in American mind. An excellent example for that is the depiction of Civita Vecchia and its people by Mark Twain in *The Innocents Abroad*, which was published in 1869:

This Civita Vecchia is the finest nest of dirt, venim[sic], and ignorance we have found yet, except that African perdition they call Tangier, which is just like it ... [The people] are

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁵⁰ Gilles Pécout, “Cavour Visto dagli Stati Uniti” [Cavour seen from the United States], a cura di Daniela Fiorentino and Matteo Sanfilippo, *Gli Stati Uniti e L’Unità d’Italia [The United States and Italian Unity]* (Roma: Gangemi Editore, 2004), 128.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 126.

indolent, as a general thing, and yet have few pastimes. They work two or three hours at a time, but not hard, and then they knock off and catch flies ... They are very uncleanly-these people-in face, in person, and dress. When they see anybody with a clean shirt on, it arouses their scorn. The women wash clothes, half the day, at the public tanks in the streets, but they are probably somebody else's ... Their education is at a very low stage. One portion of the men go into the military, another into the priesthood, and the rest into the shoemaking business.⁵²

The details given above by Twain about the residents of Civita Vecchia anticipated the future depiction of Italian immigrants in America. Their idleness, occupations, and even their skin color are the same characteristics of the future “dago” image in the United States, and the consequences of that depiction were going to dominate an important part of U.S.-Italian relations in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.

2.4 Garibaldi, “Washington of Italy”

Nevertheless, the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi, the most famous exile on American soil, overall enjoyed high esteem in the United States. Theodore Dwight, in the preface of his translation of Garibaldi's autobiography, said that the book showed the general's “pure and noble heart, a character eminently humane and disinterested.”⁵³ Margaret Fuller praised the general and his troops who were “sparkling with genius and ennobled with the noble spirit, ready to dare, to do, to die.”⁵⁴ Giuseppe Garibaldi was unquestionably a hero in the United States in the

⁵² Charles Neider, ed., *The Travels of Mark Twain* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), 213.

⁵³ Marraro, *American Opinion*, 244.

⁵⁴ Letter XXXIII, Rome, July 6, 1849 from Margaret Fuller Ossoli, *At Home and Abroad, or Things and Thoughts in America and Europe*, Arthur B. Fuller, ed., (Boston: Crosby, Nichols and Company, 1856), 413.

second half of the nineteenth century. The American public observed Garibaldi's actions in the Italian peninsula carefully, and praised him wholeheartedly.

When news was heard that Garibaldi was on his way to the United States in 1850, a committee composed of the Italian immigrants in New York City began to make arrangements. "It must be remembered that his heroic defense of the Roman republic against overwhelming force had been watched in America, except in Catholic circles, with keen and sympathetic interest, earning for Garibaldi unbounded admiration and esteem."⁵⁵ Garibaldi was welcomed with a public reception in New York. Garibaldi's residence in the United States lasted nine months, 1850-1851, and four months, 1853-1854.⁵⁶ He led a different life from the other Italian immigrants because of his status. On his arrival, "two Americans, Robert B. Coleman and Charles A. Stetson, owners of the Astor House, 221 Broadway, offered the hospitality of their hotel to General Garibaldi."⁵⁷ Then he moved to Clifton, Staten Island and worked in the wax factory of Antonio Meucci, who, by the Italian Americans, recognized as the inventor of telephone. While he was there, Garibaldi joined the Tompkinsville Masonic Lodge No, 401, to which Meucci also belonged.⁵⁸

In November 1850 Garibaldi set off for Washington with a letter for appointment written by M. H. Grinnell of New York to the Secretary of State, Daniel Webster. The letter asserted that:

General Garibaldi visits Washington for the purpose of presenting to you, a communication signed by a large number of respectable merchants and other citizens, asking him for an appointment to some respectable place by which he[could] be able to support himself and family ... if our Government

⁵⁵ Howard R. Marraro, "Garibaldi in New York," *New York History* (1946), 2.

⁵⁶ "Garibaldi's Claim for American Citizenship," 7.

⁵⁷ Marraro, *Garibaldi in New York*, 4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

would only evince a liberal hand toward the General, it would gratify a large number of his countrymen residents here, as well as those Americans who have become personally acquainted with him.⁵⁹

There is no thorough information about the meeting of Garibaldi and Webster, but, as Howard Marraro also indicated, Grinnell's request failed, and Garibaldi did not receive any support from the American government.

However, Garibaldi's brief presence in the United States attracted the attention of the Italian leaders. In a letter to Massima D'Azeglio, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Sardinian minister in Washington, Luigi Mossi described the public welcome for the general, wrote that Garibaldi had presented in New York a letter of recommendation from Mazzini, and added that he was "informed that recently the clubs of the *Giovine Italia* established in New York [had] been very active."⁶⁰ Whereas the American public welcomed Garibaldi as an Italian hero of liberty, the Kingdom of Piedmont was concerned about the spread of Mazzinian republicanism on the American continent. The minister of the Two Sicilies at Paris, Baron Antonini, discussed with the American minister at Paris, William Cabel Rives, "the rumor that Garibaldi was raising men in America to send against the Two Sicilies with American money and ships," and he notified Rives that Garibaldi and his men "would be treated as pirates."⁶¹

However, in his address to the people of Italy at a celebration at Cooper Institute on December 18, 1860, Mr. Eli P. Norton expressed that the American citizens were on Garibaldi's side and could not "forget the countrymen of Columbus."⁶² The resolutions proposed in the same meeting stated:

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 318.

... we believe that Garibaldi, by his simplicity and purity of character, his lofty elevation above the selfishness of a conqueror, his marvelous successes and his great wisdom, stands near our Washington, as a Divine instrument in the cause of free government.⁶³

This statement is significant in the sense that the American public recognized Garibaldi as a hero-perhaps the most prominent one-of the Italian nation who was “once an exile on [American] soil.”⁶⁴

Giuseppe Garibaldi admired Abraham Lincoln, and Lincoln in turn asked for the general’s assistance, offering him a commission in the Union army. Garibaldi refused Lincoln’s offer because “he felt that he could be useful only if he were given the supreme command of all the Northern forces, with the right, if conditions should prove propitious, to claim the freedom of the slaves.”⁶⁵ In spite of his audacious response, Garibaldi remained a popular figure during the Civil War. There was a U.S. army guard, which invited Italian, Hungarian, German and French immigrants to participate in the service of their “adopted country.” A regiment of 250 “able-bodied men” was “formed under the name of the Garibaldi Guard, and encamped near Washington” (see page 39).⁶⁶ Giuseppe Garibaldi’s depiction as an ideal immigrant revealed itself during the course of the Civil War. He supported President Lincoln as the “great pilot of freedom.”⁶⁷ This illustrated the attitude of the majority of the Italians about the conflict, except for the Holy See, which sympathized with the Confederacy.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 296.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Gay, “Garibaldi’s American Contacts.” 12-13.

⁶⁶ For detail, see the appeal on The Library of Congress, “American Memory” site on <http://memory.loc.gov/ndlpcoop/nhynycw/ac/ac03/ac03150v.jpg>, March 23, 2005.

⁶⁷ See Giuseppe Garibaldi, Menotti Garibaldi, and Ricciotti Garibaldi to Abraham Lincoln, August 6, 1863 (Support and admiration), *Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress*, Annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/>, March 23, 2005.

The general also became the most beloved hero of the Italian immigrants in the United States. In the eyes of Italian Americans, Garibaldi shared their difficulties; he worked in a wax factory, and suffered financial hardships. Garibaldi was an ideal heroic figure in various ways. Like George Washington, he was a soldier, like Christopher Columbus he was an Italian, like Italian Americans he was a workingman. Garibaldi had a definite impact on U.S.-Italian relations; he was the first positive transatlantic Italian stereotype on the American mind.

2.5 Mazzini and a transatlantic *Risorgimento*

Like Garibaldi, Giuseppe Mazzini was a well-known figure in the United States. His most dedicated supporter possibly was Margaret Fuller, who called Mazzini, “Man of Italy. Thy bride is unworthy of thee.”⁶⁸ That was an interesting praise for the individual and scorn for the country. The organization based on his republican doctrines and equality of men, *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy), found many supporters in Europe and in the United States. By 1834, *Young Europe* was ready “to help every person rising against its government,”⁶⁹ and *Young America* began its activities soon thereafter, “with special interest in co-operation with European republican movements.”⁷⁰ June 6, 1841 was the official date of the beginning of the activities of *Young Italy*’s New York congregation.⁷¹ Mazzini made a “secret alliance” with some Protestant associations in the United States, which were ironically-connected to nativism, to get economic and moral support to *Giovine*

⁶⁸ Rome, January 5, 1849, in Leona Rostenberg’s “Margaret Fuller’s Roman Diary,” *The Journal of Modern History* 12(1940), 212.

⁶⁹ Whitridge, *Men in Crisis*, 124.

⁷⁰ Merle E. Curti, “Young America,” *The American Historical Review* 32(1926), 41.

⁷¹ Salvatore Candido, “L’Azione Mazziniana nelle Americhe e la Congrega di New York della *Giovine Italia*” [“Mazzinian Action in the Americas and New York Congregation of *Young Italy*”] *Bollettino della Domus Mazziniana* 1972 (2), 124.

Italia. Mazzini stated “the sole purpose of this ‘secret alliance’ was to overthrow the temporal power of the Pope and win recognition of the right of Italy to unity, liberty, and independence.”⁷²

Mazzini was acquainted with two American ministers when he served in the assembly of the short-lived Roman Republic: Nicholas Brown and Lewis Cass, Jr. Mazzini preferred Brown who “openly proclaimed sympathy for the Roman Republic ... [to] Cass, [who had] sincere sympathy for the Italian cause [but] necessarily concealed [such sympathy] under the formalities of diplomatic correctness.”⁷³ Cass was not authorized to recognize the Roman republic, and Mazzini could not excuse that act.

Nevertheless, after the French occupation of Rome, Lewis Cass, Jr. issued an American passport to Mazzini, and wrote a letter of introduction and recommendation to H. S. Paisley, the American consul at Genoa in which he presented Mazzini as “a man of great integrity of character, and of most extensive intellectual acquirements [whose] whole life ha[d] been devoted to the cause of liberty and independence.”⁷⁴

Mazzini never went to the United States, spending most of his lifetime in exile in England, and he never became a popular hero like Garibaldi. “Opposition to Mazzini and Italian republicanism increased in America following the attempted assassination of Louis Napoleon by the Italian revolutionists headed by Felice Orsini.”⁷⁵ *The Morning Courier* and *New York Enquirer* reported that the assassins were “headed by the ‘wretch’ Mazzini.”⁷⁶ Orsini, an Italian revolutionary and a

⁷² Joseph Rossi, *The Image of America in Mazzini's Writings* (Madison: The University of Washington Press, 1954), 33.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 68-69.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷⁵ Marraro, *American Opinion*, 223-4.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 215.

former member of *Giovine Italia*, attempted to assassinate Napoleon III, the emperor of France, in 1858 because he “conceived of the Emperor as a traitor to the Italian cause to which in his youth he had sworn support.”⁷⁷ Moreover, the death of the emperor would perhaps accelerate the re-establishment of the French republic. Orsini failed in his attempt and was executed, and “[Camillo] Cavour used Orsini’s attempt as a means of discrediting Mazzini.”⁷⁸ Mazzini could not prove that he was innocent, and “no one knew that Cavour ... had actually been subsidizing Orsini and Pieri [the other assassin] from his secret service funds.”⁷⁹ Cavour was aware that an apparent connection between Mazzini and the assassins would cause annoyance among Mazzini’s republican supporters all around the world.

Additionally, there were other reasons for the anti-Mazzinian feeling in the United States. Firstly, Mazzini’s absolute objective in establishing a united Italy was to accomplish the foundation of the United States of Europe, a European *Risorgimento*. The “free and constitutional states” would bring a unified Europe into being. According to Mazzini, “To Italy belong[ed] the high office of solemnly proclaiming European emancipation.”⁸⁰ Italy had the divine mission of establishing the third Rome, the *Rome of the People*, which would “unite, in a faith that [would] make Thought and Action one, Europe, America and every part of the terrestrial globe.”⁸¹ In brief, Mazzini’s master plan incorporated the United States in unification. But it was a plan that Americans would not accept. Even the viability of Mazzini’s program about the Italian unification was questioned since

⁷⁷ Beales, *The Risorgimento*, 81.

⁷⁸ Holt, *The Making of Italy*, 203.

⁷⁹ Denis Mack Smith, *Mazzini* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 122.

⁸⁰ Gaetano Salvemini, *Mazzini*, trans. I. M. Rawson (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 79.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 83.

“Mazzini was a visionary,”⁸² and the Mazzinians “became monomaniacs by living in exile and brooding over one idea.”⁸³

Secondly, Mazzini opposed federalism in Italy. He wrote, “the school of social *duty* must, logically and essentially, favor a single central authority.”⁸⁴ Mazzini believed that federalism could be appropriate for countries like the United States that covered a vast geographical area, but, for European countries, its results would be unsuccessful. Mazzini pointed to Switzerland, which he considered a weak federal state. It “was a federation of twenty-two partially autonomous cantons, and hence unable to withstand political pressure from Paris or Vienna.”⁸⁵ Mazzini did not know much about democratic republican federalism, which was different from the Swiss model.⁸⁶ He did not believe that separate states could be united under a strong central government and they could represent themselves equally.

Nevertheless, Mazzini had a high regard for Abraham Lincoln and praised the United States since the country stood “higher and nearer to the Ideal than any nation actually existing.”⁸⁷ Americans were “in the onward march of mankind ... in the great battle which is being fought throughout the world between right and wrong, justice and arbitrary rule, equality and privilege, duty and egotism, republic and monarchy, truth and lies.”⁸⁸ But, he also stated before the Civil War that the southern states would secede from the Union since the United States appeared too large to be governed.⁸⁹ Additionally, there was slavery in the United States, and

⁸² Marraro, *American Opinion*, 210.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 214.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁸⁵ Smith, *Mazzini*, 16.

⁸⁶ Salvemini, *Mazzini*, 59.

⁸⁷ Smith, *Mazzini*, 167.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

that proved the fact that “republican institutions were no guarantee of good government.”⁹⁰ Ironically, Mazzini supported first abolitionism and then the Confederacy in the United States since he believed that both secessionist movements could be used to divide the nation.⁹¹ Mazzini’s “lack of commitment to the policies of the kingdom of Italy might have left room enough for idealism and a general idea of individual liberties, of which the right of the states to secession was part.”⁹²

Nonetheless, Mazzini’s hesitations about the United States vanished after the Civil War. He considered America a model for the other nations of the world for “universal liberation.” In a letter he stated:

Through this almost fabulous amount of energies, unknown to our old rotten monarchies, which you have displayed; the constant devotedness of your men and women; ... and mainly—do not forget it—the canceling of the only black spot, Slavery, which was sullyng your glorious republican flag. ... All the numerous and ever increasing republican element in Europe have discovered in you their representative. You have become a *leading* nation.⁹³

Mazzini was passionate about global republicanism; whether Italy or America would lead the movement was less important to him. Mazzini continued to be the hero of a certain group in the United States. He became a role model for some Progressives in America like Jane Addams and William Roscoe Thayer, and for the socialist, George D. Herron.⁹⁴ In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson “ [said]

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁹¹ Dennis Speed, “Jim Crow, a cultural weapon in hands of the Confederacy,” (The Schiller Institute: Presidents Day, 1994), http://www.schillerinstitute.org/conf-iclc/1990s/conf_feb_1994_speed.html, November 7, 2006.

⁹² Luca Codignola, “The Civil War. The View from Italy,” *Reviews in American History* 3(1975), 460.

⁹³ Giuseppe Mazzini to Moncure Daniel Conway, October 30, 1865, in Howard R. Marraro, “Mazzini on American Intervention in European Affairs,” *The Journal of Modern History* 21(1949), 114.

⁹⁴ Smith, *Garibaldi*, 167.

that perhaps only Lincoln or Gladstone had such clarity of insight into the essence of liberalism.”⁹⁵

2.6 Italy, Rome, and the American Civil War

Howard Marraro studied the diplomatic relations between the Union and Italy during the Civil War, but showed only the “positive” elements of the relation between the Union and Italy, and between the Union and the Papacy. But the period between 1848 and 1865 was not as uncomplicated as Marraro described. Firstly, there was the problem of the sympathy of the Mazzinians and the Italian clergy for the Confederacy. The former supported the Confederacy because of the idea of confederalism, whereas the latter encouraged the Secessionists since the United States government had supported the 1848 Revolutions.

The difficulties of the Italian *Risorgimento* also have to be taken into account. One of the main reasons for the failure of the 1848 revolutions in the peninsula was the lack of a national feeling and unity. “The *Risorgimento*, during which many Italians continued to fight as part of the Austrian army, had been a succession of civil wars.”⁹⁶ The Italian revolutionaries did not all come from the same ideological and social backgrounds. “The *Risorgimento* seems to have been more a story of struggles and bitter rivalries between social classes, whose political expression happened to be defined by geography, than a uniform and a single minded “step in human progress [as Marraro argued].”⁹⁷ As a natural outcome of that, those different social classes and the different members of the ruling class, like

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁹⁶ Smith, *Modern Italy*, 72.

⁹⁷ Codignola, “The Civil War,” 460.

Garibaldi and Mazzini, did not share the same views about certain incidents like the American Civil War. Garibaldi was the son of “a man of modest means who owned a small cargo boat,”⁹⁸ whereas Mazzini’s father “was professor of pathology at Genoa University and as a physician once attended Queen Victoria’s father.”⁹⁹ Mazzini took a degree in law, and Garibaldi became an adventurer.

Italy’s majority support for the Union became clear. George P. Marsh wrote, “In no part of the continent was the sympathy with the government of the Union at the commencement of the rebellion so strong or so universal as in Italy.”¹⁰⁰ This was especially important amid intrigues early in the war because of the possibility that Britain would intervene on the side of the Confederacy.

⁹⁸ Herman J. Viola and Susan P. Viola, *Giuseppe Garibaldi* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), 24.

⁹⁹ Smith, *Mazzini*, 2.

¹⁰⁰ George Perkins Marsh to William H. Seward, Turin, January 6, 1862, *FRUS*, 577.

GARIBALDI GUARD!



**PATRIOTI ITALIANI!
HONVEDEK!
AMIS DE LA LIBERTE!
DEUTSCHE FREIHEITS KÄMPFER!**

APPEAL!

The aid of every man is required for the service of his ADOPTED COUNTRY! A Regiment of Riflemen, Bersaglieri, Honvedek, Chasseurs, or Scharschützen, is now formed under the name of the GARIBALDI GUARD, and encamped near Washington. This Regiment will be increased by order of Government to 1150.

**Wanted at once,
250 ABLE-BODIED MEN!**

Italians, Hungarians, Germans, and French, Patriots of all Nations,

AROUSE! AROUSE! AROUSE!

The Families of our Soldiers shall be cared for.

PER ORDER,

Quartermaster, CHAS. B. NORTON.

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Lieut. Col. A. REPETTI,
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At the beginning of the war, the British government “was sympathetic to the South but wary of the danger of war with the North.”¹⁰¹ In 1863, Britain presented a proposal to Italy about the condition of American ships. The Italian foreign relations minister informed Marsh about the suggestion of Britain that, “the Italian government should publish a declaration on the subject of the treatment of federate and confederate ships-of-war. ... a ship of the party should not be allowed to sail within less than twenty-four hours after a vessel of the other should have left the harbor.”¹⁰² The Italian government declined the British proposal, however, which would have meant the recognition of the Confederate ships. Meanwhile, a Colonel Cattabene offered “to organize four battalions of experienced soldiers and to embark them for the United States, for service in the army of the Union.”¹⁰³ That would have meant two thousand Italian soldiers in the Union army. Although the U.S. government rejected the Italian colonel’s offer, the Italian sympathy for the Union was evident.

The Vatican’s relations with the United States were less friendly on the other hand, based on several controversies both during and after the Civil War. Italy was not a completely united country until 1870, and Rome was under the control of the Pope. Therefore, the United States had two representatives in Italy: one in Turin, and later with the capital’s transfer, in Florence, and one in Rome. On November 29, 1862 R. M. Blatchford presented himself to the Pope as the United States consul. Pius IX welcomed Blatchford kindly. Initially, the Vatican declared its neutrality in

¹⁰¹ Robert A. Divine, *America: Past and Present* (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984), 432.

¹⁰² George P. Marsh to William H. Seward, Turin, July 6, 1863, *FRUS*, 1159-1160.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* William H. Seward to George Perkins Marsh, Washington, November 18, 1862, 1159.

the Civil War. The papal secretary, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, told the American consul the Pope's "strictly neutralist official policy"¹⁰⁴:

If I had the honor to be an American citizen I would do everything in my power to preserve the strength of the nation undivided. ... would surrender for the moment every minor question of policy and interest for the preservation of the Union and of its political power.¹⁰⁵

Yet "[the] nearly neutralist attitude changed drastically after Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 that freed all slaves held in rebellious states (considered a simple trick of war), in favor of the Confederacy,"¹⁰⁶ and thereafter the Papacy may have communicated with the Confederacy directly. On one occasion, the American consul asserted that there was a communication between Cardinal Antonelli, representing the Papal States, and Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, through Bishop Lynch of Charleston, South Carolina, "a reputed confederate agent."¹⁰⁷ Cardinal Antonelli stated that Bishop Lynch was never "recognized ... as an accredited representative of Jefferson Davis." But Lynch, after the capture of Jefferson Davis, took refuge at the Legation of the United States in Rome and complained, "that the cause of the south was hopeless."¹⁰⁸ Additionally, in 1865, Rufus King, the American consul in Rome, referred to "a rumor which ha[d] been in circulation in Rome, that the Pope had [contacted] Jefferson Davis, in the sense of encouraging him to persevere in his work of rebellion, and giving him the benefit of a papal recognition."¹⁰⁹ King interviewed Cardinal Antonelli, who "without hesitation pronounced the report untrue," but stated he himself had addressed a letter "general in terms and pacific in its spirit, to the southern

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 459.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* R. M. Blatchford to William H. Seward, Rome, November 29, 1862, 1152-1153.

¹⁰⁶ Codignola, "The Civil War," 459.

¹⁰⁷ Rufus King to William Hunter, Rome, June 2, 1865, *FRUS*, 160.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.* Rufus King to William H. Seward, Rome, June 24, 1865, 162.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* Rufus King to William H. Seward, Rome, January 14, 1865, 151.

‘commissioners’ who had addressed a circular to all the courts of Europe.”¹¹⁰ The Pope was only exercising his “moral influence” to restore peace in the United States by communicating with the southern representatives. Rufus King concluded his report, “Beyond this I do not think that the papal government will be in any more haste to interfere in our affairs than France and England.”¹¹¹

Finally, the emergence of John H. Surratt in Rome, an accomplice in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, deserves attention. Surratt’s “presence in Washington City on the day of the assassination was proven before the Military Commission by a single witness. ... He was clear in his statements, ... and it is scarcely possible that he could have been mistaken.”¹¹² The witness, a Sergeant Dye, saw Surratt on April 14, 1865 in front of Ford’s Theater, looking into the president’s carriage with John Wilkes Booth, who later shot Lincoln. Surratt escaped to Canada, but his mother was found guilty for aiding the assassination of the president, and was executed.¹¹³

On April 23, 1866, Rufus King sent a message indicating that on the twenty-first of the same month a private in the Papal army named Henri Beaumont de St. Marie, Canadian by birth, informed him that John Surratt was also serving in the Papal Zouaves. St. Marie also stated “he had known Surratt in America; that he recognized him as soon as he saw him at Sezze; ... Surratt acknowledged his participation in the plot against Mr. Lincoln’s life, and declared that Jefferson Davis

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 152.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² Thomas Maley Harris, *Assassination of Lincoln. A History of the Great Conspiracy. Trial of the Conspirators by Military Commission and a Renewal of the Trial of John H. Surratt*, (Boston: American Citizen Co., 1892).

¹¹³ For detailed information about Edward Steers, Jr., *The Trial: The Assassination of President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003); Elizabeth Steger Trindal, *Mary Surratt; An American Tragedy* (New York: Pelican Pub. Co.), 1996; Steven Wright and M. W. Seymour, *The Pursuit and Arrest of John H. Surratt* (USA: Proofmark, 2002).

had incited or was privy to it. ... Surratt seemed well provided with money.”¹¹⁴

Surratt exclaimed to St. Marie, “Damn the Yankees; they have killed my mother; but I have done them as much harm as I could. We have killed Lincoln, the nigger’s friend.”¹¹⁵ St. Marie believed that “[Surratt was] protected by the clergy, and that the murder is the result of a deep-laid plot, not only against the life of President Lincoln, but against the existence of the republic, as we are aware that priesthood and royalty are and always have been opposed to liberty.”¹¹⁶

Surratt was arrested, but escaped. George P. Marsh wrote to Visconti Venosta, the minister of foreign affairs of the kingdom of Italy, stating:

... I am credibly informed, and confidently believe that John H. Surratt, a leading actor in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, late president of the United States, who escaped from justice after that event, and has been recently serving as a zouave in the Papal army at Rome, is now at a hospital at Sora, ... an order for his arrest and committal to the military prison at Rome was issued ... on the sixth of the present month. ... Surratt, who had enrolled himself by the name of John Watson, was arrested at Veroli on the following day ... on the eight of the month he escaped from his keepers ...¹¹⁷

The escape infuriated Marsh. Before his capture, Pius IX appeared to be willing to detain Surratt; Cardinal Antonelli “was greatly interested by it, and intimated that if the American government desired the surrender of the criminal there would probably be no difficulty in the way.”¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, Surratt managed to escape from a guard of six men.

Surratt escaped to Alexandria from Naples, but American officers arrested him there. According to Thomas Maley Harris’ account, “he was put in chains [in

¹¹⁴ Rufus King to William H. Seward, Rome, April 23, 1866, *FRUS*, 128.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* Rufus King to William H. Seward, Rome, June 19, 1866, 136.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* George P. Marsh to Visconti Venosta, the Italian minister of foreign affairs, Florence, November 16, 1866, 123.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* Rufus King to William H. Seward, Rome, August 8, 1866, 139.

Alexandria], placed on board the United States man-of-war ship "Swatara," and brought back to Washington, where he was held to answer for his crime."¹¹⁹ In 1867, Surratt was tried before a civilian court but in 1870 the government dropped charges against him. He continued his life as a teacher. Undoubtedly, St. Marie's account could not yield an accurate outcome about Surratt's complicity in Lincoln's assassination. But Surratt's disguise in the Vatican guard was consistent with rumors of papal hostility for the Union. Rufus King, the last American minister in the Papal States departed from Rome in 1867 with the incorporation of the Papal lands into Italy, and the United States did not have a political representative in the Vatican for a period of seventy-two years.

2.7 Rome, the Italian Capital

The Italian capital was transferred from Turin to Florence in June 1865, and from Florence to Rome in September 1870. The major reference about the American opinion on those transfers is George P. Marsh, and his accounts about the relocation of the capital city of the Italian kingdom. Marsh's communication reveals the unexpected development about the capital's movement. On February 13, 1865, Marsh wrote: "... The departure of the King was extremely sudden. No previous notice of his intention to remove to Florence was given, nor, in fact, was that intention even generally suspected at Turin before it was carried into effect."¹²⁰ U.S. officials interpreted the transfer of the capital to Tuscany as a manifestation of Italy's progress toward unification, to which the United States gave its entire

¹¹⁹ Harris, *Assassination of Lincoln*, chapter 18.

¹²⁰ George P. Marsh to William H. Seward, Turin, February 13, 1865, *FRUS*, 142.

support. On June 5, 1865 the Legation of the United States was established in Florence.

Marsh reported the discussions about Rome as the Italian capital in early September 1870. Marsh assumed that the seizure of Rome would not occur instantaneously. That view, to a certain extent, was related to Marsh's analysis of Italian policy making:

The Italian government has long hesitated in the adoption of a decided policy, and in fact, it has been so constantly in the habit of blindly following of the dictation of the Emperor of France in the conduct of all its foreign relations, without attempting to mark out a policy for itself.¹²¹

Marsh did not rely on Italy's independence in taking decisions about its future. The United States encouraged the Kingdom of Italy towards unification, but assumed Italy's historical dependence on France would continue. The king of Italy made decisions based on or taking into account only the will of foreign powers in the absence of will on the part of the Italian people, and Marsh's account is a significant indication about America's perspective about Italian policies in the late nineteenth century.

However, contrary to Marsh's unpromising reports about Rome, Italian troops entered the city on September 21, 1870. Marsh described the situation in a confidential dispatch: "The Italian government, which in this matter appear[ed] to have acted from the beginning in obedience to popular dictation ... propose[d] a plebiscite on the question of annexation,"¹²² and the capital was rapidly removed to Rome in November. Despite their Catholic and politically subordinate background,

¹²¹ *Ibid.* George P. Marsh to Hamilton Fish, Florence, September 12, 1870, 450.

¹²² *Ibid.* George P. Marsh to Hamilton Fish, Florence, September 21, 1870, 452.

Italian unionists were capable of surprising American observers by acting democratically.

2.8 Conclusion

As Howard R. Marraro stated, “the history of the diplomatic relations between the various Italian states and the United States can be traced directly to the desire of the latter to increase its commercial intercourse with the Italian peninsula.”¹²³ Before the unification, the United States had signed commercial treaties with different Italian states, and aimed to continue its relation with the united Kingdom of Italy. To this end, the United States supported Italy in its struggle for freedom and independence, but always kept its neutrality regarding Italy’s relations with France, Britain, and Austria.

Another vital point about the early period of U.S.-Italian relations is the formation of stereotypes. While there was a mixed American perspective about Italians, nineteenth-century Italians overall had a positive view about Americans, revealed in the expressions of Garibaldi, and Mazzini, particularly after the Civil War. “Though America was not the country which actually accomplished most for Italian freedom and unity, it was the country where the passion for that cause was, beyond all comparison, strongest and most disinterested.”¹²⁴

The Italian *Risorgimento* was not a period of progress but rather an era of disorder when different authorities developed conflicting strategies. This chapter has considered some of these dominant groups in Italy as a way to demonstrate early relations between Italy and America, the origins of the contradictory Italian

¹²³ Marraro, *American Opinion*, 307.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 313.

stereotypes in American society, and Italy's difficulty in developing a foreign policy. In brief, the period between 1846 and 1870 is a curious but important stage in Italian-American relations when the two countries commenced to realize each other's social, political, and economic conditions of each other and mutually endeavored to shape their diplomatic policies.

Table 1 - Region and Country or Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population, With Geographic Detail Shown in Decennial Census Publications of 1850 to 1930¹

Southern and Eastern Europe	5,918,982	5,670,927	4,500,932	1,674,648	728,851	248,620	93,824	32,312	9,672
Southern Europe	2,133,092	1,939,600	1,544,149	539,968	216,387	66,249	30,416	21,726	8,152
Greece	174,526	175,976	101,282	8,515	1,887	776	390	328	86
Italy	1,790,429	1,610,113	1,343,125	484,027	182,580	44,230	17,157	11,677	3,679
Portugal	108,775	103,976	77,634	40,376	25,735	15,650	8,973	5,477	1,274
Azores	35,611	33,995	18,274	9,768	9,739	7,512	4,431	1,361	(NA)
Portugal	73,164	69,981	59,360	30,608	15,996	8,138	4,542	4,116	1,274
Spain	59,362	49,535	22,108	7,050	6,185	5,121	3,764	4,244	3,113
Other South Europe	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	472	132	(NA)	(NA)
	1930	1920	1910	1900	1890	1880	1870	1860	1850

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census,
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab04.html>, February 7, 2007.

CHAPTER 3

IMMIGRATION, NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP

According to the former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, the Italian immigration in the world “created a consistent network of ties between Italy and the host countries, which caused Italy to take a great and continuing interest in the state of those countries and in their mutual relations.”² Commencing with the 1880s, one of those host countries that received the highest rate of Italian immigrants was the United States, and thus the relationship between the United States and Italy entered a remarkable stage in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The influx of Italians to the American shore not only demonstrated the social, cultural and economic distinctions between the newly united Italy and the United States, it also revealed the diverse, and sometimes conflicting Italian and American ideas and laws about the issue of citizenship.

The early relationship between the United States and Italy began well but gradually grew worse. Because the influx of Italian immigrants, especially to big cities in the United States, fostered anti-Italian feelings. Between 1821 and 1904, 1,786,217 Italian immigrants arrived in the United States.³ By the end of the

² Giulio Andreotti, “Foreign Policy in the Italian Democracy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (1994), 531.

³ G.E. Di Palma Castiglione, “Italian Immigration into the United States, 1901-4,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 11 (1905), 83.

second wave of immigration in 1920 that number reached 4,000,000.⁴ In the process, the Italian gained a stereotype as an illiterate, uncivilized and depraved offender who could not adapt himself to American life and institutions.

By offering the immigrants citizenship through naturalization, the United States, in principle, aimed to create new Americans. U.S. citizenship implied not only an attachment to the new community, but abandonment of former citizenship and responsibilities. However, during the time period between the mass immigration to America in the late nineteenth century and the end of World War I, Italy considered emigration as a “safety-valve” for its deprived economy. In the eyes of Italian politicians, the ultimate consequence of emigration was financial benefit as well as intensification of *italianità* of the Italians abroad. Italian officials also anticipated that most emigrants would be “birds of passage,” and would return to their home country eventually as economically and socially advanced Italian subjects⁵, and thus help overcome domestic problems of poverty and ignorance. Italian authorities accomplished their plan about returnees and remittances; the rate of Italian return migration between 1905 and 1915 is striking. In this period, nearly two million Italian immigrants returned to Italy, and two thirds of these people were from the United States⁶. Thus, Italian and American ideologies and laws of citizenship clashed particularly in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

⁴ Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The Significance of Immigration in the Formation of an American Identity,” *The History Teacher* 30 (1996), 11.

⁵ For detail, see Betty Boyd Caroli, *Italian Repatriation from the United States, 1900-1914* (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1973), 54.

⁶ Dino Cinel, *The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870-1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 2.

3.1 Changing Times, Changing Immigrants: Italians in Nineteenth-Century America

America has been the land of immigrants since the sixteenth century. The revolutionaries who rebelled against Britain, and established the United States of America were the sons of the immigrants who had been living in the thirteen colonies. But “unlike the immigrants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who had been overwhelmingly English-speaking Protestants, an increasing number of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century immigrants were Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and Jews.”⁷ Those people were not Anglo-Saxon, and they did not even have the ability to speak in English. The “new” immigrants--sometimes referred to as the scum of Europe--were generally peasants and unskilled workers coming from the poorest regions of the European continent. Their main aim was to earn money, which they did not have the opportunity to possess in their native countries.

As a natural outcome, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the conflict between the “native Americans” and the “new” immigrants. In that period, American cultural pluralism, which was introduced by Horace Kallen in the 1910s as an ideal, was questioned, immigrants were labeled as ignorant criminals, and the tension between the old stock and the newcomers sometimes resulted in violence:

The wires are hot with fast-crowding news of our own Judge
Lynch and his exploits, of native riots, midnight mobs, wild
outbursts of

⁷ James Stuart Olson, *The Ethnic Dimension in American History* (New York: Brandywine Press, 1999), 168. See also John E. Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington:1985); Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990); John Higham, *Send These to me: Immigrants in Urban America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

murderous frenzy, that are tokens of a state of anarchy brought about by our own people, as serious, it would seem, as any agitator could plan for ... Poverty, vice, crime, dirt, ignorance, superstition, political corruptibility, anarchical tendency, and, more serious than all, a constant change for the worse in all of these respects in the character of immigration [are familiar] as it pours in upon us decade after decade.⁸

From the “native” American perspective, the single male immigrant from Southern Italy and Sicily was among the poorest and filthiest newcomers. He was an ignorant and superstitious criminal who threatened American laws and principles. This depiction of the Italian immigrant, which became prominent after the mass migration from Europe, was a significant sign for the challenges in the U.S-Italian relations between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. This “new immigrant” undermined Americans’ earlier praise for northern Italians who unified the country. Thus, this chapter will focus on the “new” Italian immigration to the United States and its characteristics, Italian reasons and perspectives and American opinions about the migration from the *Mezzogiorno*, and the difficulties that occurred between the two countries as a consequence of Italian mass immigration. The United States’ and Italy’s different policies about the same problems, and their outcomes in Italo-American relations will be demonstrated.

3.2 Send them to *la Merica*!: Italian “birds of passage”

Italian migration was not limited with the mass migration after 1880s; Italians have always been a migratory people. Long before that period, Italians had migrated to other places in Europe to earn money, explorers like Christopher Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, and John Cabot discovered new lands for foreign monarchs, and

⁸ Kate Holladay Claghorn, “Our Immigrants and Ourselves,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 86 (1900), 536.

artists and mercenaries traveled all around the world. They also migrated to South America—particularly to Argentina—in the nineteenth century. Before the mass exodus of Italians began in the 1880s, 64,361 Italians had immigrated to America after 1850. They had settled in some twenty states and established colonies.⁹ Italian emigrants before the late nineteenth century came mostly from the northern part of the peninsula. Apart from being artisans, artists, merchants, and skilled workers, their physical appearances were similar to “native” Americans. “Northern Italians have tended to be slightly taller and with a higher proportion of people with lighter complexion, hair, and eyes.”¹⁰ Significantly, many of these early Italian immigrants had little trouble in assimilating in America.

In *Building Little Italy: Philadelphia’s Italians Before Mass Migration* Richard N. Juliani describes the Italian immigrants in the city before the mass immigration. They were generally from Genoa and Tuscany. In 1860, 34 of the Italians in Philadelphia were tradesmen, 27 were *figurinai* (plaster figure makers), 24 were businessmen, and 60 were musicians and organ grinders.¹¹ Despite regional differences, the Italian community also had its own church, voluntary associations like Società di Unione e Fratellenza Italiana (Society of Italian Unity and Brotherhood), and newspapers that represented Italian national consciousness. However, the Italian immigrants did not have any problem in cultural transformation and acculturation. “Most Italians were quietly adjusted to Philadelphia,”¹² and

⁹ Gene P. Veronesi, *Italian Americans and their Communities of Cleveland*, <http://www.clevelandmemory.org/italians/table.html>, 99, Date of Access: April 21, 2006.

¹⁰ Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and Culture. A World View* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 142.

¹¹ Richard N. Juliani, *Building Little Italy: Philadelphia’s Italians Before Mass Migration*, University Park (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 210.

¹² *Ibid.*, 95.

“many Italian families shared buildings with members of other ethnic groups, particularly, the Irish.”¹³

The problem for both Italian immigrants and the old stock in the United States started with the mass migration from Europe. Between 1880 and 1924, 4.5 million Italians came to America.¹⁴ The majority were southern Italians who were different from northern Italian immigrants in many aspects: they were illiterate, superstitious and poor. Even their physical appearance was different from the “lighter-skinned” northerners. These people came from south of Rome, and a variety of motives urged them to immigrate to America:

A number of conditions in Italy are associated with the initiation and maintenance of this immigration, including cheap transatlantic transportation, government policies, general economic conditions, living standards, seasonal unemployment, avoidance of military conscription ... In the Italian South, with so many relatives in the U.S., America came to be [in Carlo Levi’s words] “an essential part of the daily life of the southern Italian village, a social and economic element mingled with their concepts of bread, work, family and sentiment of every kind, and at the same time a mystical sustenance and the basis of a magical religion.”¹⁵

“There was nothing in Italy, nothing in Italy. That’s why we came. To find work, because Italy didn’t have no work. Mama used to say, ‘America is rich.’”¹⁶ Generally, Italian immigrants came to the United States because of financial insufficiencies. As historian Antonio Genovese stated, “during the early 1800s 59

¹³ *Ibid.*, 237.

¹⁴ *Ethnic Dimension*, 117.

¹⁵ Ernest E. Rossi, “The Italian Myth of America,” Joseph V. Scelsa, Salvatore J. LaGumina and Lydio Tomasi, eds. *Italian Americans in Transition: Proceedings of the XXI Annual Conference of the American Italian Historical Association held at the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute, The City University of New York, the Graduate School and University Center, October 13-15, 1988* (New York: The American Italian Historical Association, 1990), 218.

¹⁶ Carla Martinelli in Peter Morton Can, *Ellis Island Interviews: In Their Own Words* (New York: Checkmark Books, 1997), 63.

out of 60 families in the south did not even own enough land to be buried in.”¹⁷ Different from the “old” immigrants, southern Italians were not coming from typical European urban centers. Most southern regions were barren, “the few visitors who ventured off the beaten track discovered that romantic Naples and glittering Palermo were exceptions.”¹⁸ People were living in isolated places disconnected from cities. In addition, the *Risorgimento* government could not achieve its plans about land distribution, and put heavy taxes on agricultural products. Industrialization had not yet come to southern Italy, and landowners continued to use peasants’ labor without making any modernization in agricultural techniques. The intense population growth in Italy during the late nineteenth century deteriorated the situation of the *contadini*, and emigration appeared to be the best solution to financial difficulties. In brief, “had there been no jobs for them abroad, few Italians would have ventured forth from their villages.”¹⁹

Working in America was attractive because the Italian government did not make the necessary economic reforms for the development of the south, and the “backward” south continued to be inferior to the industrial and urban north. With the *Risorgimento*, Italy accomplished a political union, but could not achieve a national unity. “Reality corresponded with a regional Italy, not a national Italy: Italians lived separated from region to region for several reasons that went beyond the straightforward internal divisions of the country.”²⁰ One of the most geographically, politically, and socially separated places, as pointed out before, was southern Italy. Thus, the division in Italy persisted. Consequently, southern Italians became more

¹⁷ Veronesi, *Italian-Americans*, 103.

¹⁸ Dino Cinel, *The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870-1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

¹⁹ Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas*, (London: UCL Press, 2000), 56.

²⁰ Francesco Barbagallo, “Italy: The Idea and the Reality of the Nation,” *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 6 (2000), 389.

“distrustful of the power of the state.”²¹ Rather than being united with the rest of the country, they favored unification within themselves; they preferred *campanilismo* to *italianità*, and many realized a regional identity in America, contrary to the aims of both the Italian and United States governments.

3.3 Americans and the Italian immigrants

“Italian American identity was pivotally formed under circumstances of injustice based on American racism.”²² Nearly 40 years before the mass immigration in the late nineteenth century, in his *Practical System of Modern Geography* (1841), J. Olney stated that “the Italians [were] ‘affable and polite’ and excel in the arts, ‘but they [were] effeminate, superstitious, slavish, and revengeful.’”²³ For most of the Americans, those newcomers were resistant to assimilation and becoming American.

“Lack of political unity, government by foreign nations, and a rigid provincialism made the southern Italian peasant quite unique.”²⁴ This uniqueness also separated the Italian immigrants from American culture and living. They came to the United States in huge numbers, and their physical appearances as well as their customs and traditions were unusual for the Americans:

There are now over twenty thousand Italians scattered among the population in New York ... It is no uncommon thing to see at noon some swarthy Italian engaged on a building in process of erection, resting and dining from his tin kettle, while his brown-skinned wife sits by his side, brave in her gold earrings and beads, with a red flower in her hair, all of

²¹ Cinel, *The National Integration*, 50.

²² David A. J. Richards, *Italian American*, (New York: 1999), 181.

²³ Carl F. Kaestle, *Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), 85.

²⁴ Nicholas John Russo, “Three Generations of Italians in New York City: Their Religious Acculturation,” *International Migration Review* 3(1969), 4.

which at home were kept for feasts days. But here in America increased wages make every day a feast day in the matter of food and raiment.²⁵

Secondly, in the Americans' eyes, Italian immigrants from the *Mezzogiorno* were not really eager to be Americanized like their northern brothers. As mentioned before, the Italian government's effort to maintain their Italian identity prevented their assimilation. Also, the influence of southern regionalism and isolationism urged them to unite in their own ethnic communities, "the Italian colonies in large cities [which were] becoming a perfect nuisance."²⁶ Generally, the Italian immigrants did not assemble in only one Italian community, but rather established numerous communities around their own *paesani* [peasant] groups. For example, in Chicago, "because of the sentiment of *campanilismo*, there emerged not one 'Little Italy' but some seventeen larger and smaller colonies scattered about the city."²⁷ This type of isolated and traditionalist communities, in which the Italian immigrants continue to live the way they had done in their own country, worried Americans who "feared that the Italians would never become assimilated and that the immigrant culture would perpetuate itself."²⁸

Jacob Riis, in *How the Other Half Lives* (1890), one of the most significant works about the tenements of late nineteenth-century urban America, described the Italian ghettos thoroughly. In the chapter, "The Italian in New York," Riis pointed out the characteristics of the Italian immigrant, and how he lived in his own community without any change:

²⁵ Charlotte Adams, "Italian in New York," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 62(1881), 676.

²⁶ "Pests Imported from Europe." *The Illustrated American* 7 (1894), 373; Salvatore J. LaGumina, *WOP! A Documentary History of Anti-Italian Discrimination* (Toronto: Guernica, 1999), 115.

²⁷ Vecoli, "Contadini in Chicago," 408.

²⁸ Russo, "Three Generations of Italians," 4.

Certainly a picturesque, if not very tidy, element has been added to the population in the “assisted” Italian immigrant who claims so large a share of public attention, partly because he keeps coming at such a tremendous rate ... The Italian comes in at the bottom, and in the generation that came over the sea he stays there. In the slums he is welcomed as a tenant who “makes less trouble” than the contentious Irishman or the order-loving German, that is to say: is content to live in a pig-sty and submits to robbery at the hands of the rent-collector without murmur.²⁹

The Italian made less trouble than the Irish, and was content to live where he lived, but he was at the bottom. Riis used the word “swarthy” for the Italian. He also stated that the Italian was not able to learn English. Riis’ opinions are vital to comprehend the public sentiment during the mass immigration. “In [Riis’s] hierarchy, the Italian is far inferior to the northern European Teuton, but also below his fellow ‘new immigrant’ Polish Jew.”³⁰

Campanilismo [*parochialism*] persisted in its influence in the education of the Italian immigrants’ children. For instance, in the afternoon and night schools in New York, established by the Protestant Children’s Aid Society, the students who were generally Ligurians “repudiate[d] indignantly all kinship with the Neapolitans or Calabrians, whom they refuse[d] to recognize as Italians.”³¹ That strong feeling of regionalism was an obstacle for the Americanization of the “new” Italian immigrants.

The negative Italian stereotype was sometimes the Italian organ-grinder child who began to work on the streets in the early nineteenth-century. There was also a more negative Italian stereotype, the *padrone*, who brought those little children to the United States to work as street musicians, and who treated them badly. For the

²⁹ Jacob Riis, *How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1890), 43.

³⁰ Joseph P. Cosco, *Imagining Italians: The Clash of Romance and Race in American Perceptions, 1880-1910* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 29.

³¹ Adams, “Italian Life.” 680.

American public, the *padrone* symbolized tyranny, and for the government an enemy to the legal system. The U. S. government attempted to curtail the power of padrones [with] the Foran Act, passed in 1885 to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States.³² The *padrone* system came to an end by the 1920s. The second-generation Italian immigrants did not need any bosses to control their business activities.

Some Americans continued to be hopeful about the future of the Italian immigrants on the condition that they accepted to be Americanized and became “like [their] brother immigrants, a permanent settler in [the United States].”³³ However, the Italian immigrants returned to their home country in greater proportion than other groups. The main obstacle to the permanent settlement of the Italian in the United States was seen as the Italian government, and a U.S. Commissioner of Immigration with these words criticized its emigration policy:

United Italy, only a little more than a quarter of a century in existence could not as yet succeed in securing safety, peace, and welfare to her subjects. Unsettled in her finances, under the bane of a violent conflict with her church, with the pretensions of a great power, but without means to bear the burdens of her ambition, she furnished the basis of a large emigration. Her government, absolutely unable to offset the disturbances of the political and financial welfare of her subjects, refrained from opposing such emigration, and has even seemingly favored it.³⁴

The struggle between Americans and the Italian immigrants about becoming American and remaining Italian continued for a long period of time. The Italian maintained his ethnic identity in the United States. The idea of going back to Italy

³² For detail, see Gunther Peck, *Reinventing Free labor: Immigrant Padrones and Contract Laborers in North America, 1885-1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

³³ Claghorn, “Our Immigrants and Ourselves.” 541.

³⁴ Dr. J. H. Senner, “Immigration from Italy,” *The North American Review* 162(1892), 650.

was also a prominent aspect in that decision. In contrast, the native-born American, who wanted to preserve the order and the “whiteness” of the United States, wanted the “dago” to become an American, or to leave the country. The picture below is a revealing symbol of the ongoing conflict between the Italian immigrant and the “native” American in the second decade of the twentieth century. In the photo, two “white” boy scouts are asking the two Italian boys to join the boy scouts. Apart from their physical differences, the Italian boys’ clothes are significant. They still wear the typical *contadini* caps and trousers, and listen to the boy scouts skeptically. The scornful expression on the boy’s face at the right-hand corner signifies the Italian immigrants’ perspective about Americans and pressure to assimilate.




Figure 3.1 Two boy scouts talking to two Italian immigrant boys³⁵

Source: *Chicago Daily News*, ca. February 16, 1915, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/>, March 28, 2007.

3.4 American Concept of Citizenship & Military Service

United States citizenship has three bases. The first is *jus soli* (the right of soil) according to which neither nationality of the parents nor their eligibility for citizenship is decisive for their children's citizenship. Most people in the United States gain citizenship by being born on American soil, and they claim *jus soli*, the common-law right of the land. Meanwhile, the people born to American parents in foreign countries may claim *jus sanguinis*, the right of blood.³⁶ According to the principle of *jus sanguinis*, a person does need not be to be born in a country to be its

³⁶ Linda K. Kerber, "The Meanings of Citizenship." *The Journal of American History*, 84 (1997), 834.

citizen; citizenship may be obtained through the parents if either one or both of them are U.S. citizens. In the cases where both parents are American citizens, the child automatically acquires citizenship if one of the parents resided in the United States for some time prior to the child's birth. But until 1934 the law did not allow U.S. citizenship's transmission by mothers.³⁷ The third and the final way of becoming an American citizen is by naturalization. In its simple definition, naturalization means admittance to citizenship, and it is an important type of assimilation based on the process of changing national allegiance,³⁸ requiring an absolute abandonment of the former nationality of the immigrant.

As Rogers Smith asserts, American citizenship has a legally confused, puzzling, politically charged and contested status, and American laws frequently disqualified most people to become U.S. citizens because of their ethnic origin or gender.³⁹ The history of citizenship laws reflects the complicated and conflicting nature of the subject in the United States. The Constitution did not offer a clear definition of U.S. citizenship, or define the relationship between state and national citizenship; states had much power to make decisions about individuals' citizenship.⁴⁰ The concept of national citizenship materialized only after the last of the nine required states ratified the U.S. Constitution in 1788.⁴¹ The Naturalization Act in 1790 was the first law that bestowed citizenship through naturalization only to "white" people who had resided for two years in the United States. By design, the

³⁷ For detail about *jus sanguinis* see, Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, David E. Martin and Hiroshi Motomura, *Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy*, 4th Ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1998), 25-43. The Act of May 24, 1934 stated that a child born abroad to one American parent rather than only the father had the right to acquire U.S. citizenship.

³⁸ Avery M. Guest, "The Old-New Distinction and Naturalization: 1900," *International Migration Review* 14 (1980), 494.

³⁹ Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions in U.S. History* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997), 14.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 115, 119.

⁴¹ Henry S. Matteo, *Denationalization v. "The Right to Have Rights": The Standard of Intent in Citizenship Loss* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), 32.

children of naturalized “white” persons also gained the right to become Americans.⁴² The Act of January 29, 1795 brought new and stricter terms to become U.S. citizens: five years of residence, a formal declaration of intention done three years before the admission of citizenship, and the renunciation of formal allegiance in swearing allegiance to the United States.⁴³ In 1798, the Alien and Sedition Acts implied that “certain aliens [and some naturalized immigrants] could never be fully Americanized, and that, therefore, a kind of two-tier system of citizenship was desirable.”⁴⁴ The Act of June 18, 1798 presented more severe naturalization requirements like fourteen years of residence, registration of aliens, and exclusion of alien enemies from naturalization. The 1798 Act was repealed after four years, and the principles of the 1795 Law were restored with the new act in 1802.⁴⁵

The Naturalization Act of 1802 arranged the naturalization procedure of immigrants and most of the essential points of this act (five years of residency, a declaration of intention, and an oath of allegiance that renounces all other allegiances) are still applied today. In the post Civil War era, with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that define the boundaries of U.S. citizenship, *jus soli* became the key principle for the ascription of American citizenship, and national citizenship gained legal meaning.⁴⁶ In the 1880s, Congress enacted laws that would bring immigration under direct federal

⁴² Ernest H. Hover, “Derivative Citizenship in the United States,” *The American Journal of International Law*, 28 (1934), 257.

⁴³ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 44.

⁴⁴ Maurice J. Bric, “The Irish Immigrant and the Broadening of the Polity in Philadelphia, 1790-1800,” Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf, eds., *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 173.

⁴⁵ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 44.

⁴⁶ William Rogers Brubaker, “Introduction” in William Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), 12.

control and allow the federal government to exercise its authority to restrict the entry of people thought to be undesirable.⁴⁷ By the early twentieth century, due to the immense increase in immigration and naturalization of aliens, the Act of 1802 turned out to be inadequate to overcome the problem of fraudulent naturalization. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt appointed a commission to investigate the insufficiencies related to the statute of naturalization, and on June 29, 1906 Congress enacted a new naturalization act. The head tax increased to four dollars with the Immigration Act of 1907, the U.S. Immigration Commission (also known as the Dillingham Commission) composed a forty-two-volume report on the evils of immigration in 1911, and Congress passed bills for literacy tests in 1913, 1915 and 1917, although all were vetoed by Presidents William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson.⁴⁸

Dual citizenship emerged as a problem in the United States as early as the second half of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the increase in immigration. The combination of the United States' *jus soli* rule with other countries' *jus sanguinis* laws creates plural citizenship.⁴⁹ That was a major difficulty in assimilating the new immigrants since dual citizenship meant dual allegiance. The Expatriation Act of 1868 declared the right of expatriation to be an inherent right of all people, and it also provided the naturalized citizens traveling abroad with the same protection of persons and property that is accorded to native-born citizens in like situations, so the President gained the authority to give extended protection to

⁴⁷ William S. Bernard, "A History of U.S. Immigration Policy" in Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov and Oscar Handlin eds., *Dimensions of Ethnicity: Immigration* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982), 87.

⁴⁸ For detail see Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 442-46.

⁴⁹ Peter H. Schuck, *Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 185.

the naturalized citizens abroad.⁵⁰ Citizenship of naturalized immigrants was canceled if they resided in their native or any other country permanently within five years after naturalization, but they were also “permitted to prove the good faith of their application for citizenship, by returning to the United States and taking other prescribed steps.”⁵¹ The United States persuaded most of the European countries about the right of immigrants to expatriate themselves and to choose American citizenship. For instance, in 1868, with the negotiations of the Bancroft Treaty by which Germany accepted the principle of expatriation of its own nationals, the United States aspired to reduce international conflicts related to its naturalized citizens.⁵² With the Rio Treaty of 1906, the right of abandoning a nationality and obtaining another was recognized reciprocally. In addition, an extended period of residence in the mother country would mean the renunciation of the adopted citizenship.⁵³

The Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907 was “the first general statute providing for loss of U.S. nationality.”⁵⁴ The law stated that “an American expatriate[d] himself by obtaining naturalization in a foreign country or taking an oath of allegiance thereto.”⁵⁵ The passage of this act was another outcome of the cultural, political, and economic consequences of the influx of non-Northern European immigrants to the United States.⁵⁶ The Act of 1906 was first tested by the decision of *MacKenzie v. Hare* in 1915 in which the Supreme Court supported the

⁵⁰ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 120.

⁵¹ William Anderson, *Fundamentals of American Government* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1940), 152-53.

⁵² Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 120.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Richard W. Flournoy, Jr. “Observations on the New German Law of Nationality,” *The American Journal of International Law* 8 (1914), 481.

⁵⁶ Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 9.

law that authorized the expatriation of an American woman married to a foreigner. According to the Court, this decision was “based on an ‘ancient principle of [American] jurisprudence’ in which the husband was regarded as ‘dominant’ over the wife.”⁵⁷ Mrs. MacKenzie had the right to recover her U.S. citizenship when she decided to dissolve marital ties with her foreign husband. Apart from generating multiple citizenship prerequisites based on gender, the significant point in *MacKenzie v. Hare* decision is the fact that “voluntary renunciation of citizenship proclaimed in the 1868 Expatriation Act was interpreted ... to include voluntary performance of an expatriating act without regard to whether the citizen actually intended or desired to lose his U.S. nationality.”⁵⁸ As one of the consequences of the women’s suffrage movement, the Cable Act of 1922 terminated this practice, but *MacKenzie v. Hare* is a case that illustrates the conflicted nature of American citizenship.

Through awarding or denying citizenship to soldiers, military service is an essential component of nation building. Thus, eligibility for U.S. military service also became an indispensable requirement in the naturalization process. Before the Expatriation Act of 1868, the Enrollment Act of March 3, 1865 stated that military deserters were considered to have voluntarily renounced their U.S. citizenship and their rights to become citizens.⁵⁹ There was a racial hierarchy in the U.S. Armed Forces, but foreign-born soldiers occasionally constituted a majority of the enlisted categories both before and after the Civil War, and “half of the enlisted men in the late-nineteenth century Navy were immigrants.”⁶⁰ However, the resentment for the

⁵⁷ Matteo, *Denationalization*, 35.

⁵⁸ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 121.

⁵⁹ Matteo, *Denationalization*, 35.

⁶⁰ Bruce White, “War Preparations and Ethnic and Racial Relations in the United States” in Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering and Stig Förster eds., *Anticipating Total War: The German and*

newly arrived immigrants in the American society revealed itself also in the Army. Retired officers took part in nativist organizations like “The Guardians of Liberty,” an anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant organization which aspired to protect the essence and cultural unity of the United States.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was a milestone for the American armed forces. After the war, the American officials as well as the society, decided that the Army and the Navy had to be modernized and strengthened. The decade after the Spanish-American War witnessed the renewal of the Navy by prominent people like President Theodore Roosevelt, naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. These leaders supported a “Big Navy” policy, and secured the necessary financial resources and legislation for the expansion program.⁶¹ The army also passed through an organizational transformation. Starting with the new century, the Secretary of War Elihu Root brought new developments to the Army.⁶² The General Board of the Navy was established in 1900, the General Staff of the Army, the Joint Army and Navy Board and the Army War College were founded in 1903.

On the eve of World War I, American opinions about mobilization began to change as a consequence of the United States’ need for more conscripts. The ideas of General Leonard Wood, an army physician and Theodore Roosevelt’s friend, were influential. Wood supported universal military training and Americanization, and implied that a mass citizen army, rather than professionals and long-term

American Experiences (Cambridge, UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1999), 98.

⁶¹ Maurice Matloff, ed., *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), 34.

⁶² Stephen Skowronek describes the administrative changes in the American Armed Forces in *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

soldiers, could be trained in a short period of time.⁶³ Another former army chief of staff Hugh Scott also supported the opinion that universal military training would not only be beneficial to the Americans, it would also be a moral and physical uplift for the Americanization of the immigrants, and this idea was also shared by Progressive reformers.⁶⁴ “By 1916, the campaign for preparedness and Americanization through universal military training was receiving wide publicity,”⁶⁵ and the ethnic minorities in the United States became eligible for the U.S. armed forces.

With the Act of June 3, 1916, “every able-bodied male citizen of the United States and all other able bodied males who ha[d] declared their intention to become a citizen of the United States, who [were] between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, [were] members of the unorganized militia, [and] required to bear arms when necessary.”⁶⁶ Thus, the allegiance of certain United States citizens, or would-be citizens, required possible military service and protection of their country against all enemies. The United States government gave particular importance to the commitment of the recently naturalized citizens to their new country. American courts rejected the immigrants’ claims of exemption from military service during World War I and denied thirty thousand petitions for naturalization for that cause.⁶⁷ The Selective Service Act of May 1917 made the declarant immigrants from friendly countries eligible for the military draft “since it was felt that they received the benefits of their adopted country and should, therefore, share the nation’s

⁶³ White, “Ethnic and Racial Relations,” 104.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 105.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 106.

⁶⁶ Flournoy, “Observations,” 788.

⁶⁷ Hazard, “ ‘Attachment to the Principles of the Constitution.’ ” 806.

burden.”⁶⁸ Additionally, on May 9, 1918 Congress allowed foreigners in the U.S. military to become naturalized without signing a declaration of intention, without paying the naturalization fee, and without passing an English examination. The essential motive for the act was to show that “the draftees were already fulfilling the most fundamental of citizenship duties.”⁶⁹ Between 1911 and 1920, 244,300 soldiers became American citizens through military naturalization.⁷⁰

3.5 Italian Concept of Citizenship & Military Service

In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, when Italy’s population was the lowest among other major European countries as an outcome of emigration (or in some Italian nationalists’ words, wastage or “hemorrhage”),⁷¹ Italian citizenship was based strictly on *jus sanguinis*, the right of blood, or blood relationship. Thus, the children of the Italian immigrants born in the United States automatically became Italian subjects. The *jus sanguinis* principle of Italian citizenship was defined in the Italian Civil Code. In the Civil Code, the Italian Kingdom recognized the naturalization of its subjects in foreign countries and renunciation of Italian citizenship, but with a qualification. While Article 11 of the Italian Civil Code provided for an Italian subject to expatriate himself if he had acquired citizenship in a foreign country, Article 12 stipulated that the loss of Italian citizenship did not imply an exemption from past obligations, especially military service, “nor from the penalties imposed on those who bear arms against

⁶⁸ Nancy Gentile Ford, *Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2001), 52.

⁶⁹ Schneider, “Naturalization and United States Citizenship.” 61.

⁷⁰ “Naturalizations Since 1907.” *INS Reporter* 26 (Winter 1977-1978): 41-46, <http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/history/since07.htm>, July 26, 2005.

⁷¹ Richard Bosworth, *Italy and the Approach of the First World War* (London & Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), 8.

their country.”⁷² The new nationality of a former Italian male subject did not liberate him from his military duties in the Italian armed forces since he was *born* an Italian. Italy recognized a father’s naturalization as an exemption from the military for his son, but the sons of former Italian subjects had the responsibility to serve in the Italian army if their fathers were not naturalized before their birth. Thus, Italy regarded those children as its subjects since citizenship was based on the idea of inheritance rather than place of birth.

According to the U.S. laws of citizenship, birth on American soil was sufficient for a person to be American. And an American-born child, whose parents were not American citizens, had the right to choose the citizenship he desired after the age of eighteen. But Italy held that the children of any subject, no matter where these children were born, take the status of the parent.⁷³ That situation provoked the controversy between Italy and the United States over naturalization and the definition of citizenship. In the Italian Parliament’s sitting on December 18th, 1899, Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Visconti-Venosta described the problem between Italy and the United States with these words:

Practically, from the Italian point of view, the question presents itself as follows: our Civil Code establishes at Article 4 that the son of a father who is an Italian citizen is himself an Italian citizen, and at Article 11 it declares that, whoever has obtained naturalization in a foreign country loses his Italian citizenship. Therefore, the Italian subject who has fixed his residence in the United States finds himself confronted by this alternative: either to remain faithful to his nationality of origin and renounce those political and administrative rights which, in the great centres of emigration, would be the most efficient means of influence and protection of his interests; or else to accept the

⁷² The Secretary of State ad interim to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Washington, June 9, 1915, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1924), 560.

⁷³ John Horace Mariano, *The Italian Contribution to American Democracy* (Boston: The Christopher Publishing House, 1922), 68-69.

nationality of the country he resides in, losing *de jure* and *de facto* his Italian citizenship.⁷⁴

And the Italian government continued to consider its emigrants, many naturalized Americans, liable for military service in Italy. This approach has not changed a lot with the passing time, and the Italian Citizenship Law of June 13, 1912 repealed all the previous laws, but like them it still contained the condition that loss of nationality did not work exemption from military service. As Ambassador Thomas Page indicated, that situation instigated “much dissatisfaction among [America’s] naturalized citizens of Italian birth who return[ed] to Italy on visits or for business purposes, and [was] liable to cause friction.”⁷⁵ In addition, with the law of 1912, “renewing Italian citizenship cost nothing, and it could be accomplished by returning to reside in Italy for two years.”⁷⁶

As indicated before, emigration turned out to be a major domestic problem for Italy by the early twentieth century. The reason for the Italian policy-makers’ insistence on preserving the citizenship of Italian emigrants abroad was related to the strategy of establishing firm ties between the Italian Kingdom and its subjects to strengthen the feeling of *italianità*. The formation of a united Italian state commenced in 1861. The *Risorgimento* continued to be the most essential issue in the country’s agenda until the mid 1900s. The reason for this long period of unification was the lack of a national sentiment in the Italian peninsula. For ages, Italy was a divided country, and the spirit of *campanilismo* rather than *nazionalismo* reigned in the minds of the Italian people. The sentiment for unification was limited

⁷⁴ Read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tommaso Tittoni in the sitting on March 3, 1905 in *Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy: A Selection from the Speeches Delivered in the Italian Parliament by the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister Senator Tommaso Tittoni (1903-1909)*, Baron Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino, trans. (London: John Murray, 1914), 168. Tittoni read this piece from Visconti-Venosta’s 1899 speech by stating that he could not better explain the difficulties of the question.

⁷⁵ Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome September 9, 1914, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1923), 407

⁷⁶ Caroli, *Italian Repatriation*, 86.

to the Italian elites and intellectuals. There were political and economic advantages of the *Risorgimento*, but the people living in the different regions of the country were not responsive to the nationalist motives which would transform them into a united nation. For the northerners, the southerners were not Italian descendants, and the southerners could not even realize the meaning of being Italian. Nationalist feelings of the nineteenth century were influential in outlining the main arguments about the integration of the country, but Italian ideas about nationhood were complicated because they were also universalist and Europeanist.⁷⁷ For instance, the goal of the renowned Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini was to establish the United States of Europe. In short, Italian officials until World War I could spark the feeling of nationalism in their country through economic reform or cultural propaganda, and thus they exercised alternative options to unite the Italian subjects.

Donna Gabaccia argues, “the main tie between Italy’s government and Italy’s citizens was through universal male military service,”⁷⁸ but making the Italian males perform their military service was not very easy. This was mostly related to one of their national characteristics; “Italians, whether by commission or omission, were not a people of war.”⁷⁹ One of the prominent Italian heroes on both sides of the Atlantic was Garibaldi, a soldier who fought for the unification of his country, but rather than being a member of the army of the King of Italy, Garibaldi was the soldier of the people, “Cato-like in the sternness of his criticism of the Establishment and his rejection of its ways.”⁸⁰ He was not the prototypical example of an Italian soldier physically and mentally loyal to the king.

⁷⁷ Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “National And European Citizenship: The Italian Case in Historical Perspective.” *Citizenship Studies* 7 (2001), 89.

⁷⁸ Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy’s Many Diasporas* (London: UCL Press, 2000), 36.

⁷⁹ R. J. B. Bosworth, *Italy and the Wider World, 1860-1960* (London: Routledge, 1996), 58

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 60.

3.6 The Controversy

The conflict between the United States and other countries about the military service of the naturalized Americans has a long history. Great Britain's impressments of formerly British but naturalized American seamen contributed to the War of 1812.⁸¹ In the late nineteenth century, immigrants from Russia and Austria-Hungary were regarded as draft evaders in their home countries. While the issue of military service sparked sharpest disagreement between the United States and Italy during World War I, the United States State Department noted the issue even earlier, in 1901:

Italian subjects between the ages of 20 and 39 years are liable for the performance of military duty under Italian law, except in the case of an only son, or where two brothers are so nearly of the same age that both would be serving at the same time, in which event only one is drafted, or when there are two sons of a widow, when only one is taken. Naturalization of an Italian subject in a foreign country without consent of the Italian government is no bar to liability to military service. ...There is no treaty between the United States and Italy defining the status of former Italian subjects who have become American citizens.⁸²

The points indicated in the notice constituted the essence of the naturalization crisis between the United States and Italy. The United States did not have an extraterritoriality agreement with Italy. Former Italian subjects had to perform their service in the Italian military, and there was also the risk of being imprisoned for the

⁸¹ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 119.

⁸² See "Notice to Citizens Formerly Subjects of Italy who Contemplate Returning to that Country," Department of State, March 18, 1901, *Papers Relating to the FRUS*, (1902), 282.

ones older than thirty-nine if they had not received a royal pardon. Consequently, the United States government warned its naturalized male Italian citizens between the ages of twenty and thirty-nine about their journeys to Italy since there would be no ground to protect them from compulsory military service. Italian men between the ages of twenty and twenty-eight were liable to serve in the active army, those between twenty-nine and thirty-one were liable to serve in the reserve army, and those between the ages of thirty-two and thirty-nine were liable to serve in the territorial reserve army.⁸³

Italy passed a new Emigration Act on January 30, 1901. Its enactment “signified cognizance on the part of the Italian government of the need to regulate and report on migration from its borders.”⁸⁴ In order to have a more organized migration policy, the *Commissariato dell’Emigrazione* [Emigration Commissariat] within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established. One of its main tasks was to improve the situation of the Italian emigrants abroad. The Commissariat also published report-like bulletins (*Bollettini dell’Emigrazione*) about the nature, characteristics, and the future of Italian emigration, and the emigrants’ problems. With an amendment in February of the same year, the new emigration act “assigned to the *Banco di Napoli* (Bank of Naples) the responsibility of forwarding remittances from Italians living in other countries.”⁸⁵ More importantly, between the period 1902 and 1914 the Italians abroad were welcomed back to Italy. As Tittoni stated in 1904, “if they return[ed], the mother country [would] never refuse to recognize them as her sons.”⁸⁶

⁸³ Ambassador Thomas J. O’Brien to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, June 11, 1913, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1923), 398.

⁸⁴ Caroli, *Italian Repatriation*, 53.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 72.

When Italian Americans returned to Italy, they were perceived as real Italians. Ironically, this meant they were obliged to perform their military service after their entrance in the kingdom. The conflict became visible at that instant; the American government could not prevent its naturalized citizens' military service in the Italian army, and Italian officials upheld the articles of their Civil Code. American concern about the Italian immigrants and their status in the United States became clear in the diplomatic correspondence by 1907:

The volume of immigration from Italy to the United States has in recent years become so large that it forces itself upon the consideration of this Government. Many of the Italians who thus come to this country intend to remain and establish their homes in the United States ... [But] some of these naturalized citizens, drawn by a natural affection for their parent country, desire to revisit it and do revisit it, and their status is at present ill-defined and the cause of misunderstandings which, as this Government believes, could be removed improbable of recurrence by a conventional agreement defining their status and their rights.⁸⁷

In 1894, Italy had refused to sign a naturalization treaty, but in 1907, the American ambassador, Lloyd C. Griscom, perceived a new willingness of the Italian foreign affairs minister, Tommaso Tittoni, to change the Civil Code:

Mr. Tittoni received the suggestion [about a naturalization convention] most favorably and said that that hitherto the Government of Italy had been disposed to regard the Civil Code [requiring military service] as almost unalterable. He, on the contrary, believed that the national code of laws should be altered to meet changed conditions. He thought that an agreement between the United States and Italy would be a useful and necessary measure, and therefore he was entirely willing to begin negotiations, and would at once appoint a commission to study the matter and report to him.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ The Secretary of State, Elihu Root to Ambassador Henry White, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1907, *FRUS* (1923), 390.

⁸⁸ Ambassador Lloyd C. Griscom to the Secretary of State, June 5, 1907, *Ibid.*, 393.

Tittoni appointed a committee that later submitted a report to him and to the Parliament about negotiations. But, in the end, he expressed “the Italian Government’s regret at being compelled to decline [the United States’] offer to open negotiations for the conclusion of a naturalization treaty.”⁸⁹ Rather than opening international negotiations about naturalization, Italians preferred to make alterations in their domestic laws. The only new development was the law of March 20, 1907, which amended Article 12 of the Civil Code concerning the military service requirement of Italians abroad. According to the new regulation, a former Italian subject who returned to Italy after reaching thirty-two years of age was considered liable for the territorial reserve army like Italian residents, but not punishable for previous absence as long as he had gone to the United States before the age of sixteen. Italian subjects qualifying for exemption from military service could do so as long as they resided in a foreign country, although they still had to enlist in the territorial reserve army, in the presence of Italian diplomatic or consular authorities.⁹⁰

With the law of July 17, 1910 on Measures Regarding Emigration, Article 12 was deleted from the Italian Civil Code,⁹¹ but new regulations about the emigrants’ obligations of military service were introduced. The law exempted Italian males born and residing abroad, or who had emigrated to a foreign country before completing their sixteenth year of age, regardless of their father’s citizenship, from

⁸⁹ Ambassador Griscom to the Secretary of State, June 18, 1908, *Ibid.*, 395.

⁹⁰ [Enclosure 1.], Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, November 4, 1913, *Ibid.*, 400. With the law of December 24, 1911, Article 91, it is stated that the members of the territorial army could be called on to receive military instruction when it was deemed necessary. See Ambassador Thomas J. O’Brien to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, June 11, 1913, *Ibid.*, 398-399.

⁹¹ Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissariato dell’Emigrazione [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Emigration Commissariat], *Leggi, Regolamenti e Norme Complementari della Legge sull’Emigrazione* [Complementary Laws, Regulations and Norms of the Emigration Law] (Roma: Cooperativa Tipografica Manuzio, 1910), 105.

the Italian armed forces until the time of their return to the Italian kingdom. That exemption was not valid at times of “general mobilization.”⁹² If those Italian subjects born or residing abroad reentered Italy before completing their thirty-second year of age, they had the obligation to present themselves immediately to the military districts to perform their military services.⁹³ Individuals could enter Italy in “exceptional cases” for a period no longer than two months after obtaining permission from diplomatic and consular authorities, although, if they could prove that they were continuing a “regular course of studies,” the period of exemption from military service could be extended.⁹⁴ In brief, the Italian government’s control over its emigrants remained in place with the ongoing and new laws and regulations.

3.7 Immigration and Citizenship: The Case of Garibaldi

Giuseppe Garibaldi’s claim for American citizenship can be accepted as an illustrative case for Italian immigration and the problems about citizenship in relation to the Italian understanding of the issue. Garibaldi claimed American citizenship when he went to the United States without knowing the liability of being an American. After the defeat the Roman Republic in 1850, Garibaldi left for Tangiers, and subsequently for New York via Liverpool. A large demonstration was planned for his arrival in the United States. Garibaldi declined to be present in the proceeding due to illness, but in a letter he indicated his wish to become an American citizen:

Though a public manifestation of this feeling might
yield much gratification to me, an exile from my

⁹² *Ibid.*, 11.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

native land, ...bI would rather avoid it, and be permitted, quietly and humbly, to become a citizen of this great Republic of Freemen, to sail under its flag, to engage in business to earn my livelihood, and await a more favorable opportunity for the redemption of my country from foreign and domestic oppressors.⁹⁵

Did Garibaldi really wish to become a U.S. citizen? Perhaps, but only until Italy's liberation. Moreover, Garibaldi did not send the letter to the government officials, but to the Italian Committee of New York. Obviously he did not realize the requirements of being an American citizen. On April 2, 1851, he had obtained an American passport in New York but as mentioned before, he resided in the United States for nine months in 1850-1851, and for four months in 1853-1854. Evidently, Garibaldi filed only his declaration of intention of becoming a U.S. citizen, and obtained an American passport, but did not reside in the United States for an adequate time.⁹⁶ Therefore, he could not be admitted to U.S. citizenship because "naturalization laws of the [United States] required of applicants renunciation of citizenship in any foreign country and residence in the United States for five years."⁹⁷ Additionally, George P. Marsh identified another problem about Garibaldi's naturalization:

... The question of General Garibaldi's right to the privileges of American citizenship was again raised though informally ... I had always understood that Gen. Garibaldi had taken only the initiatory steps toward naturalization, and besides his repeated acceptance of the post of a deputy in Parliament seemed to me a renunciation of his claim to American citizenship even had his rights as such been perfected. By the fortieth article of the Sardinian Statute, ... now recognized as the organic law of the Kingdom of Italy, it is provided that 'no

⁹⁵ Giuseppe Garibaldi to the Italian Committee, Hastings, August 7, 1850, in Gay's "Garibaldi's American Contacts," 6.

⁹⁶ For further information about declaration by oath and naturalization see Anderson, *Fundamentals*, 150.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

deputy can be admitted to the chamber, unless be a subject of the King, and enjoy civil and political rights.’⁹⁸

In these lines, Marsh referred to another essential obstacle to Garibaldi’s naturalization: the laws of the kingdom of Italy, which would not give consent to another country’s citizen’s membership in the chamber. Urbano Rattazzi, Italy’s prime minister, was eager to send Garibaldi to the United States since Garibaldi was a troublemaker. In the end, Garibaldi was released from prison on parole, but could not become American. Garibaldi’s unofficial appeal for U.S. citizenship is perhaps significant as the first naturalization problem of an Italian citizen in the United States.

One final detail about the issue of naturalization for Garibaldi is hidden in a note that he had sent “to the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty at Florence” from the Citadel of Alexandria when he was arrested “for infraction of the compact with France”⁹⁹ by organizing volunteers to conquer Rome. That was before his march on the Papal States and before he requested the protection of the American government:

Having the honor of being a British subject—I demand your high protection—in view of the unjust act committed against my person by the Italian government. ... I was arrested by armed force—conducted to this citadel—and lodged in a dirty apartment—where my health has already suffered.¹⁰⁰

A scholar of Garibaldi decided that “in his political ingenuity” Garibaldi seemed to “have forgotten—that in claiming American or British citizenship he was renouncing allegiance to Italy.”¹⁰¹ Evidently, he did not know the entire implication of citizenship, but wanted simply to benefit from it, and asked for other countries’

⁹⁸ George P. Marsh to William H. Seward, Florence, December 20, 1867, *FRUS*, 121-22.

⁹⁹ E. D. R. Bianciardi, “The Personal History of Garibaldi,” *The Century; A Popular Quarterly* 24(1882), 501.

¹⁰⁰ H. Nelson Gay, “Garibaldi’s American Contacts,” 15.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

assistance by merely claiming their citizenship. Garibaldi claimed United States citizenship without realizing its liabilities. Like the majority of the Italian immigrants in the United States, he wanted to become an American citizen to benefit from the rights and privileges of United States citizenship momentarily.

3.8 “Good Americans” or “Good Italians”?

As a consequence of military preparedness, universal military training, and the intense Americanization program, the U.S. Army in World War I consisted of a multi-ethnic combination of soldiers. Nearly half a million immigrants from forty-six different nationalities were drafted into the U.S. armed forces, and over 18 percent of U.S. soldiers were foreign-born.¹⁰² Those immigrants, especially those coming from southern and eastern Europe, believed that the war would be an opportunity to make their homelands independent of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires, prove their loyalty to the United States, and make their ethnicity acceptable. “They ... used the language of patriotism to achieve their own international goals and express ethnic pride.”¹⁰³ As the United States became an ally of Italy in 1917, the Italian immigrants were among the ethnic groups in the U.S. Army who felt patriotism and ethnic pride simultaneously. The war reversed some of the negative stereotypes of Italians accumulated from the late nineteenth century.

A recent study of the experiences of Italian Americans in New Haven, Connecticut during World War I found that members of the New Haven *colonia* developed a way to show loyalty both to their adopted and native countries. For the

¹⁰² Ford, *Americans All!*, 3.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 17, 44.

Italians in New Haven, serving in the American Army meant not only supporting Italian troops. Military service also allowed New Haven's Italian Machine Gun Company to "follow a cherished volunteer militia tradition in New Haven."¹⁰⁴ The Italian immigrants of New Haven were the good new Americans who did not forget their past. They supported their mother country first by offering financial assistance to Italy through aid organizations, especially the Italian Red Cross, and later by serving in the American Army. Thus, these Italians in the United States, naturalized or not, perceived the war both as a hope for the independence of their homeland and a chance to prove their loyalty to their adopted country.

Meanwhile, in Italy, there were some changes concerning the Italian Armed Forces. Antonio Salandra was appointed as the new prime minister of Italy in 1913. Salandra was a nationalist, and commenced to make plans to enter World War I. But the most serious obstacle in entering the war was the poor condition of the Italian Army. It did not have enough equipment—including winter clothing—and munitions. The Salandra cabinet had to renovate the armed forces before entering the war. Italy's neutrality, and its long and secret negotiations with the Triple Alliance and Entente powers came to an end after the Treaty of London signed on April 26, 1915 which offered Italy a vast territory including South Tyrol and Trentino the Istrian Peninsula, and a section of Dalmatia excluding Fiume. On October 19, Salandra introduced *Sacra Egoismo* [*Sacred Egoism*], which was "more or less Italian imperialism" and declared that Italy had to be a World Power, and "one of the prime movers of world politics."¹⁰⁵ The war offered a golden opportunity for Italy to become a prestigious and powerful country, but in order to

¹⁰⁴ Christopher M. Sterba, *Good Americans: Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 35.

¹⁰⁵ Ronald S. Cunsolo, *Italian Nationalism: From Its Origins to World War II* (Malabar, FL: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1990), 225-6.

achieve that, it had to have a strong army composed of loyal and patriotic Italian subjects. In World War I, 5.7 million men were enlisted, and this was a greater number than those who had the right to vote in 1913 elections.¹⁰⁶ Nearly 600,000 died and 500,000 were wounded, and financially the Italian government spent more than its expenditure from 1861 to 1913 on the war.¹⁰⁷ Like the United States, Italy entered a period of full mobilization, preparedness and Italianization, but that was not an easy task for a country which managed to call up only about 24% of its available conscripts in 1913.¹⁰⁸ The low percentage of the recruits was mainly related to the immense number of Italian immigrants in different countries. Without a doubt, Italy was in the need of its nationals abroad.

3.9 American Duty to American Citizens

During World War I, most Italian immigrants preferred to stay in the United States, though the Italian government began urging emigrant men to return home for active duty service in May 1915. The cases of five individuals caught between Italian and American concepts and policies of citizenship show how, perhaps especially in war-time, the United States broadened its definition of U.S. citizenship to protect persons outside the United States. Three of these were priests. One was the Reverend Raymond Carrá, the pastor of St. Patrick's Church in New Orleans. Another was the Reverend Dominic A. Cassetta, an Episcopal clergyman of Long Island and Curate of St. Augustin's Chapel, Trinity Parish in New York City. The

¹⁰⁶ Bosworth, *Italy and the Wider World*, 66.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

last one was the Reverend Gustave G. Danchise, a Presbyterian clergyman in New York.¹⁰⁹

Reverend Carrá, born in Vicari, arrived in the United States when he was ten years old in 1890. He resided in Louisiana continually for twenty-four years and became a naturalized American citizen, then returned to Italy at the age of thirty-four in 1914. But when he arrived to visit his relatives for three months, he was detained for military service in the territorial army of the Italian kingdom.¹¹⁰

Reverend Cassetta, born on May 30, 1878, at Auleta, in the province of Salerno, went to the United States when he was five years old. His father Aniello Cassetta became naturalized when his son was thirteen. The reverend returned to Italy for academic purposes in 1916, and was apprehended in Naples with his wife and child, though he possessed an American passport. Reverend Danchise was a naturalized American citizen of Italian birth. When he returned to Italy due to ill health, he was held for military service under notice by the Mayor of Sarzana, in the province of Genoa.¹¹¹

Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page requested from the Italian officials the return of these American citizens to the United States as soon as possible. Page considered that the detention “especially of the class represented by the priests and clergymen and married men, because of Italy’s military regulations, ha[d] done more to arouse an uncertainty of feeling in the minds of [American] people.”¹¹² Italy’s responses about the three clergymen illustrate the Italian approach to the

¹⁰⁹ Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, September 15, 1914, *FRUS* (1923), 406.

¹¹⁰ [Enclosure 3.] Ambassador Page to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, American Embassy, Rome, September 7, 1914, *Ibid.*, 414.

¹¹¹ The Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan to Ambassador Page, Department of State, Washington, September 23, 1914, p. 408 and *Ibid.* [Enclosure 1.] Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, December 14, 1914, *Ibid.*, 413-414.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

problem of naturalization and military service despite the United States' requests for their release. According to the conscription lists for the year of Carrá's birth in 1880, Reverend Carrá was a *renitente*, a person who had refused to perform his military duties. But since he left Italy at the age of ten and returned at the age of thirty-four, he could gain relief from military service after presenting himself to the *Consiglio di Leva* (Council of Recruitment). Subsequently, he would be allowed to go back to the United States following the legalization of "his status before the military authorities of the Kingdom."¹¹³

Since Reverend Cassetta (or Cascetta as stated in later accounts), like Carrá, had passed the age of thirty-two, he was released by the Italian authorities in a similar manner. He was also enrolled in the third category, the territorial army of Italy, but he had the right to turn back to his adopted country.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the official at the foreign office, Marquis Luigi Borsarelli di Rifreddo, reminded Ambassador Page that Article 12 of the Italian Civil Code was in force when Cassetta acquired American citizenship and "when he should ha[ve] been in Italy performing his duties as a soldier."¹¹⁵

Reverend Danchise apparently was less fortunate. According to the official records of the Italian Ministry of War, he had not responded to the call of enlistment in Sarzana for the years 1892, 1893 or 1894. At the time of the U.S. government's request about his return to America, his status under the conscription laws of the Italian Kingdom was not known, and thus, he could not be allowed to return to the United States with respect to his application.¹¹⁶ In sum, the Italian government maintained its right to the military service of these Italian-born

¹¹³ [Enclosure 15—Translation], *Ibid.*, 418.

¹¹⁴ [Enclosure—Translation], Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, January 11, 1915, *FRUS* (1924), 555.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ [Enclosure 19—Translation], *Ibid.*, 418-419.

Americans, though ultimately two of the three individuals were released. This policy was enforced despite the naturalization of all three individuals as U.S. citizens. American rights of citizenship carried little weight in the Old World.

But coincidental with Italian immigrants' readiness and capacity to serve in U.S. military forces, this compulsion of Italian Americans by the Italian government to military service prompted U.S. policy makers to more vigorously enforce an expansive concept of U.S. citizenship. The case of another individual illustrates this point. The military service case of Frank (Francesco) Ghiloni reveals the details of the critical divergence between the United States' and Italy's policies about citizenship and naturalization. Ghiloni was born in Marlborough, Massachusetts, on August 4th, 1885, and his father was naturalized on February 12, 1886. Thus, Ghiloni was born an Italian subject according to Article 12 of the Italian Civil Code. When he was two years old, he went to Italy, and returned to the United States after ten years, in May 1897. In June 1914, he again went to Italy temporarily for health reasons, and was impressed in the Italian army.¹¹⁷ As he had in the case of the three priests, American ambassador Thomas Nelson Page asked for the return of Ghiloni to the United States, but the Italian Ministry of War decided that it was impossible to exempt Ghiloni from liability to military service since his father was naturalized as an American citizen after his son's birth.¹¹⁸ The state department insisted on Ghiloni's release by the Italian authorities since he "was born a citizen under the law of [the United States] ... and ha[d] evidently made a practical election of American nationality."¹¹⁹ Italians repeated their decision about Ghiloni and stated that he could

¹¹⁷ [Enclosure 2.], Note Verbale, American Embassy, Vienna, March 16, 1916, "Dual Nationality—Military Service Case of Frank Ghiloni." *The American Journal of International Law*, 10 (1916), 474.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, May 18, 1915, 462.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State to Ambassador T. N. Page, Department of State, Washington, July 20, 1915, 463.

not be exempted from military service in Italy under Article 12 of the Civil Code which was still in force when he was first called to military service.¹²⁰

In the end, a third country solved the problem about Frank Ghiloni's military service in the Italian army. In September 1914, the American Embassy in Rome received a letter from Ghiloni's brother Alfred R. Ghiloni stating that his brother was "in poor health and believed to be suffering from gall stone."¹²¹ That kind of an illness justified a medical examination by military authorities for Ghiloni's exemption from service,¹²² but the Italian authorities, one more time, definitely refused to release him, and stated that he would receive the necessary medical treatment from army surgeons.¹²³ But another letter from Alfred Ghiloni, dated December 25, 1915, indicated that the Austrian army took Frank Ghiloni prisoner on October 21 in Mauthausen, Austria.¹²⁴ According to the Central Information Bureau of the Red Cross, Ghiloni was wounded and taken prisoner in October 1915, and was transferred to Mauthausen in November.¹²⁵ The United States requested the release of Ghiloni from the Austria-Hungarian officials since he was impressed in the Italian army involuntarily and he was a U.S. citizen by birth. In the end, the Austria-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to release Ghiloni under the conditions that he would make a sworn affidavit that he would not bear arms against the Central Powers, would not leave American territory during World War I, and he would not be

¹²⁰ Ibid., Ambassadors T. N. Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, August 27, 1915, 465.

¹²¹ Ibid., Ambassador T. N. Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, September 4, 1915, 467.

¹²² Ibid., Note Verbale, American Embassy, Rome, September 4, 1915, 467.

¹²³ Ibid., Ambassadors T. N. Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, October 25, 1915, 468.

¹²⁴ Ibid., The Secretary of State to Ambassador Frederic C. Penfield, Department of State, Washington, January 8, 1916, 470.

¹²⁵ Ibid., Ambassador Frederic C. Penfield to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Vienna, March 3, 1916, 471.

compelled to do military service by the Entente powers.¹²⁶ Consequently, Frank Ghiloni was released on June 19, 1916 and returned to the United States via Scandinavia.¹²⁷ But Italy did not make any attempt for his release despite the seventh article of the Italian law on Citizenship of 1912, which stated that an Italian born and residing in a foreign nation could abandon his Italian citizenship when he became of age.¹²⁸ Frank Ghiloni benefited more from being a prisoner-of-war of the Central Powers than he did being an Italian American citizen, in terms of his repatriation to America.

The case of Ugo da Prato is another significant indication of the problems between Italy and the United States about citizenship and naturalization in the 1910s.¹²⁹ With the da Prato case, the U.S. government adopted a more forceful tone, since Italy refused both to alter its laws about citizenship and to attend an international meeting about naturalization. The case is also noteworthy since it attracted the attention of “one of the most vicious anti-Italians in Congress,”¹³⁰ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Additionally, it revealed the growing problem of naturalization and expatriation between the United States and Germany after 1914 in spite of the Bancroft Treaty signed in 1868.

Mario Ugo da Prato was born in Boston, Massachusetts on August 25, 1895.¹³¹ His father Antonio da Prato was born at Barga in the Italian province of

¹²⁶ Ibid., Ambassador Frederic C. Penfield to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Vienna, May 5, 1916, 477.

¹²⁷ Ibid., Ambassador Frederic C. Penfield to the Secretary of State, 478.

¹²⁸ Ibid., Frank L. Polk for the Secretary of State to Ambassador T. N. page, Department of State, Washington, March 23, 1916, 475-476.

¹²⁹ About the da Prato case, see *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1923), 422-28; *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1924), 557-58, 559-64, 565-69, 571-74, 575-76, 577, 579; “Dual Nationality.” Supplement: Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce, *The American Journal of International Law* 9 (1915): 369-375.

¹³⁰ Gambino, *Vendetta*, 120.

¹³¹ Ambassador Page to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, American Embassy, Rome, November 27, 1914, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (1923), 422.

Lucca in 1859, migrated to America, and was naturalized in Boston on March 19, 1892, three years before the birth of his son. Thus, Ugo da Prato was born an American citizen according to the principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* in tandem, and, according to Ambassador Page, “even under the Royal Italian Government’s interpretation of the law of dual nationality, [he had] to be clearly exempt from military service as a native-born American citizen.”¹³² However, he was called upon for military duty by the authorities of the military district of Lucca in 1914 while he was residing in Italy, studying architecture at the art school at Lucca.

Italian authorities accepted that Ugo da Prato did not have the obligation to perform his military duty in the active Italian Army since his father was naturalized before his birth. But one detail about da Prato’s entrance in Italy caused the case to be problematic. Antonio da Prato came to Italy with his son in 1911 to do business with the Panama Exposition.¹³³ The da Pratos’ continuous residence in Italy from that year reconstructed their Italian citizenship, because according to the law of June 13, 1912, they repatriated themselves after two years of residence. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sidney Sonnino, presented this information to American authorities:

The Ministry of War has been obliged to find that Mr. Antonio da Prato, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9, Number 3 of the law of June 13, 1912, numbered 555, has reacquired Italian citizenship, because of his having returned to the land of his nativity and resided therein for more than two years ... For these reasons, young Mario Ugo da Prato is found to be an Italian citizen, amenable to military service; that his name cannot be removed from the recruiting lists of the Kingdom; and that he must soon respond to the call of the colors and serve as a soldier in the Italian army.¹³⁴

¹³² Ibid., 423.

¹³³ The Secretary of State ad Interim, Robert Lansing to Ambassador Page, Department of State, Washington, June 14, 1915, *FRUS* (1924), 565.

¹³⁴ [Enclosure 1—Translation], Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State ad Interim, American Embassy, Rome, June 17, 1915, *Ibid.*, 567.

American officials responded by referring to their own laws and regulations about expatriation. In a dispatch to Ambassador Page, Secretary of State ad Interim Robert Lansing brought up Section 2 of the American Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907, which, while admitting that a residence of two years of a naturalized American in his native country would imply the loss of his citizenship, asserted, “such presumption [could be] overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States under such rules and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe.”¹³⁵ Specifically, if a naturalized American could present evidence that demonstrated that he had gone to his homeland for commercial reasons and intended to turn back to his adopted country, by the circular instruction of May 14, 1908, his American citizenship would be retained.¹³⁶ Again, the restored Italian citizenship of Ugo da Prato clashed with the American laws of expatriation.

Ironically, given anti-Italian sentiments described earlier, American public opinion expressed general dissatisfaction about the da Prato apprehension, and called the Italian government to consent to his return to the United States. That course would be favorable to commercial intercourse between Italy and the United States.¹³⁷ The case became well known when *The New York Times* published the state department’s extensive correspondence between Robert Lansing and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on the subject of dual nationality.¹³⁸ The *Times* declared the da Prato case was unquestionably very important for the United States since “it outline[d] a policy of [the U.S.] Government toward many foreigners claiming

¹³⁵ The Secretary of State to Ambassador Page, Department of State, Washington, August 4, 1915, *Ibid.*, 572.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* 571.

¹³⁸ *The New York Times*, June 22, 1915.

American citizenship.”¹³⁹ Public and diplomatic pressure had an effect. Ugo da Prato was released by the Italian authorities on August 24, 1915 on the condition that he would leave Italy within two months, since “da Prato intend[ed] to reestablish his residence abroad.”¹⁴⁰

In the process that resulted with da Prato’s release there are some major aspects which should be noted. The first point is Henry Cabot Lodge’s involvement. In general, Lodge was known for his anti-immigrant attitudes. He “justified imperialism abroad and immigration restriction at home in terms of Anglo-Saxon superiority,”¹⁴¹ and “longed for a pure Anglo-Saxon America.”¹⁴² After the New Orleans lynching in 1891¹⁴³, Lodge referred to Italians as criminals and paupers who infected the United States with diseases like cholera.¹⁴⁴ He also declared Italy was not one of the United States’ best sources of immigration, unlike Scandinavia,¹⁴⁵ and argued that the quality of American citizenship had to be protected by “an intelligent restriction” that comprised “consular inspection in the country of departure” and “some such fair and restrictive test as that of ability to read and write.”¹⁴⁶ Lodge, with his fellow Harvard alumni friends in the Immigration Restriction League, aimed to reduce the immigration of “inferior” races like Italians, Russians, Hungarians, Greeks, and Asiatics by applying the literacy test.¹⁴⁷

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ [Enclosure—Translation], Chargé Peter A. Jay to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, August 24, 1915, *FRUS* (1923), 576.

¹⁴¹ Vecoli, “The Significance of Immigration,” 14.

¹⁴² Gary Gerstle, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided Character of American Nationalism,” *The Journal of American History* 86 (1999), 1296.

¹⁴³ See Chapter 5.

¹⁴⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge, “Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration,” *The North American Review* (1892), 604, 610.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. 609.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 612.

¹⁴⁷ Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 364.

But twenty-three years after that statement, Lodge decided to protect the rights of Ugo da Prato. Lodge wrote to the Secretary of State ad Interim, Robert Lansing on June 5, 1915, sending certified copies of the court record of Antonio da Prato's naturalization and the birth certificate of his son. Lodge also pointed out the *jus soli* principle of American citizenship by referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, and advised taking the strongest action against Article 12 of the Italian Civil Code, otherwise the American officials would "find [themselves] in a very awkward position with [their] large body of naturalized citizens."¹⁴⁸

Lansing replied to Lodge referring to the details of the Italian Civil Code, and the principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*.¹⁴⁹ He stated that the American ambassador in Rome was directed to call the attention of the Italian government for the immediate release of Ugo da Prato, and stated that "dual nationality [was] not a theory or doctrine promulgated by the department, but [was] the unavoidable result of the conflicting laws of different countries."¹⁵⁰

Lodge responded in an annoyed manner stating that he was familiar with the doctrines of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, but that the essential point for the United States was to abstain from "abat[ing] in any way its duty to those who under its own Constitution and Laws [were] American citizens."¹⁵¹ Ugo da Prato was an American citizen, and he had to be treated as an American both in Italy and the United States. In domestic matters, Lodge was a fervent New England politician about immigration restriction and the protections of American values and life style against the

¹⁴⁸ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to the Counselor of the Department of State, Nahant, June 5, 1915, *FRUS* (1923), 558.

¹⁴⁹ The Secretary of State ad Interim to Senator Lodge, Department of State, Washington, June 9, 1915, *Ibid.*, 559-564; also see "Dual Nationality." Supplement: Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce, *The American Journal of International Law* 9 (Jun., 1915), 369-375.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 561.

¹⁵¹ Senator Lodge to the Secretary of State ad Interim, Nahant, June 16, 1915, *Ibid.*, 566.

unsophisticated newcomers. Boston, his birthplace, was also the birthplace of the Immigration Restriction League in 1894, which “shaped the racial premises which were permanently embodied in the national immigration legislation of 1917 and 1924.”¹⁵² But when the immigrants were naturalized as American citizens, and then, when abroad, saw that citizenship violated, Lodge ardently defended the rights of his compatriots in the international arena, as a manifestation of his concern about the growth of American foreign policy which would serve domestic and especially international aims of the United States.¹⁵³

3.10 Disagreement over Dual Citizenship and a Naturalization Treaty

An additional reason for Lodge’s zeal for the protection of the rights of naturalized Americans was Germany’s change in its citizenship law. The United States signed the Bancroft Treaty about citizenship and naturalization with the North German Confederation and with the German speaking states on February 22, 1868 which stated:

Art. 1. Citizens of the North German Confederation, who become naturalized citizens of the United States of America and shall have resided uninterruptedly within the United States five years, shall be held by the North German Confederation to be American citizens, and shall be treated as such ...

Art. 2. A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to the territory of the other party remains liable to trial and punishment for an action punishable by the laws of his original country and committed before his emigration; saving, always, the limitations established by the laws of his original country.

¹⁵² Barbara Miller Solomon, “The Intellectual Background of the Immigration Restriction Movement in New England,” *The New England Quarterly* 25 (1952),. 47.

¹⁵³ William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

Art. 4. If a German naturalized in America renews his residence in North Germany, without the intent to return to America, he shall be held to have renounced his naturalization of the United States.¹⁵⁴

These conditions were also valid for a naturalized German citizen who was originally American.

The Bancroft Treaty was in effect until Germany enacted an Imperial and State Citizenship Law on July 23, 1913. That law allowed a former German subject to return to his German citizenship without going back to Germany, and permitted “a German about to become naturalized in a foreign country to retain, so far as Germany is concerned, his German, notwithstanding the acquisition of foreign citizenship.”¹⁵⁵ Previously, ten years of residence abroad resulted in the loss of German nationality. But the new citizenship law of Germany invalidated the articles of the Bancroft Treaty by emphasizing the principle of *jus sanguinis* rather than *jus soli*, and provided the possibility of repatriation of its former subjects without their residing in Germany. Additionally, it legalized the doctrine of dual allegiance by offering German citizenship to its former subjects who had already gained another country’s citizenship. In 1913, in his *Reichs und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [Empire and Laws of Citizenship]*, Delius, a German publicist, stated that the new law “aim[ed] to facilitate as far as possible the reinstatement of lost members of [German] population as citizens again.”¹⁵⁶ With that new law, “the performance of services to the state rather than domicil[sic] within its territory”¹⁵⁷ became the basis for German citizenship. German subjects abroad lost their citizenship when they entered the service of a foreign country

¹⁵⁴ “The German Imperial and State Citizenship Law,” *The American Journal of International Law* 9 (Oct., 1915), 942.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 939.

¹⁵⁶ Flournoy, “Observations,” 478.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 479.

without the permission of the German government, and when they had “actually deserted from the army or failed to obtain a decision as to their military liability at the proper time.”¹⁵⁸ The right of expatriation was also provided to German subjects with that law except for the ones who were liable for the performance of military service.¹⁵⁹ Finally, the new citizenship law of Germany allowed a German subject, who was in the process of naturalization in another country, to retain his German citizenship with the written consent of the competent authorities.¹⁶⁰

Germany’s encouragement of dual citizenship disturbed Henry Cabot Lodge since he thought that the United States was “the champion against the doctrine of the abandonment of indefeasible allegiance,”¹⁶¹ and therefore, against dual citizenship. Lodge’s concern was accurate. As stated earlier, starting with the late nineteenth century, the United States wanted to organize an international naturalization convention in which it could persuade Italy to sign a naturalization treaty. The United States had already signed naturalization treaties with Germany (although that treaty was no longer valid), Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden and Portugal to resolve the conflicting claims upon naturalized citizens.¹⁶² However, the United States could not settle the question of citizenship with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which accepted the principle of *jus sanguinis* like Italy.

The United States aspired to sign a naturalization treaty with Italy similar to the Bancroft Treaty since it opposed dual allegiance. If a person chose to be American, he had to refuse his former nationality, and had to reside in the United States permanently. According to U.S. officials, the requirement for adopted

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 481.

¹⁶⁰ “The German Imperial and State Citizenship Law,” 941.

¹⁶¹ Senator Lodge to the Secretary of State, Nahant, June 5, 1915, *FRUS* (1923), 557.

¹⁶² “Dual Citizenship,” *The American Journal of International Law* 9 (Oct., 1915), 947-948.

citizenship was residence in the adopted country. Therefore, if the naturalized citizens preferred to go back to their native countries, they would lose their United States citizenship. The second point in the proposed treaty was connected to the first one; if a naturalized American returned to his original country permanently, he would be punished for his past crimes. These were the conditions that the United States government requested from the Italians. Former Italian subjects should become American through naturalization, but they would have the opportunity of repatriation in Italy, and they would be responsible for their past crimes if they returned to Italy for good. U.S. officials also asserted that they did not have “any desire to intervene in behalf of any Italian who ha[d] remained in the United States only long enough to secure naturalization and then ha[d] returned to Italy in the hope of there residing as an American citizen, exempt from the operation of Italian military law.”¹⁶³ In brief, the abandonment of indefeasible allegiance would damage the prestige of the United States in international affairs, and would bring the American attempt for an international naturalization convention with Italy to an end.

Despite this last provision and several American requests, the Italians refused to join a convention. Germany’s new citizenship law attracted the attention of the Italian foreign affairs minister, Sidney Sonnino, at a time when the U.S. government requested that the Italian government sign a naturalization treaty. American officials argued to the Italians that most of the European countries, including Germany, had signed similar treaties in the nineteenth century alluding to the Bancroft Treaty of 1868. But in response to American demands, when Ambassador Page paid a visit to the minister to discuss the issue and to suggest an international naturalization convention, Sonnino asked about the United States’ latest experience with

¹⁶³ The Secretary of State, Elihu Root to Ambassador White, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1907, *FRUS* (1915), 391.

Germany.¹⁶⁴ The Italians also declined to sign a treaty because it would require significant modifications in their domestic laws, and as a U.S. official acknowledged “like all other European countries with large emigrant population overseas,” Italy needed “every available man for military service and [was] therefore disinclined to take any action tending to loosen the tie of nationality which binds her citizens abroad to the country of their origin.”¹⁶⁵ Traditional European concepts of citizenship, combined with the exigencies of war mobilization, prevented the Americans from seeing their concept of citizenship become transatlantic.

Accordingly, the complaints of the Italian American citizens about military service persisted throughout World War I. After the American entrance to the war, the problems of the Italian soldiers continued because of their service in the U.S. Army; they were listed as deserters in the Italian Army. With the General Order No. 33 on April 6, 1918, the War Department requested information about the Italian soldiers from the commanding officers. Then, a list of the naturalized and alien Italian soldiers in the U.S. Army was presented to the Italian government to allow them exemption from military service in Italy.¹⁶⁶

3.11 Conclusion

For the United States and Italy, World War I culminated a military restructuring that reflected the two countries’ ambition for national consolidation through projection of power. The renovation of the American Army and Navy in the late nineteenth century accelerated, and the United States began to project its

¹⁶⁴ Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State, American Embassy, Rome, August 4, 1915, *Ibid.*, 573.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 419.

¹⁶⁶ For detail, see Ford, *Americans All!*, 128.

strength with large armed forces not only in the western hemisphere, but also all around the world. Meanwhile, the United States showed determination to protect the rights of its citizens regardless of their ethnic origins or physical location. Likewise, where the Italian Army's responsibility had been limited to peninsular concerns, now the Kingdom of Italy's craving for colonies and the initiation of the Great War required mobilization of nearly 5.7 million Italians for action around the Mediterranean. Remote emigration of Italian subjects came to seem unhelpful to such a regime in pursuit of Great Power status. Thus U.S. officials defended their naturalized citizens zealously on the basis of *jus soli*, even though, when the immigrants resided in the United States, they were subjected to ethnic discrimination and even violence. In the meantime Italy maintained its policy of *jus sanguinis* throughout the period, reflecting both evolving government aspirations for emigrants and the necessities of Old World military readiness. The United States and Italy passed through the early 1900s with disagreement about their policies with reference to the concepts of citizenship and military service in both countries.

The potential crisis between the United States and the Kingdom of Italy about military service came to an end however in 1918 when the United States signed treaties with its European allies, including the Kingdom of Italy, after a series of military service conventions. The reciprocal military service agreement between Italy and the United States was signed in Washington, on August 24, 1918.¹⁶⁷ With this treaty, both countries stated that Italian citizens in the United States and American citizens in Italy could either go back to their country for military service or serve in the armed forces of the country in which they were living for the better

¹⁶⁷ Its ratifications were exchanged at Washington and Rome on November 14, 1918 and it was proclaimed on November 18, 1918. For detail see, Treaty Series No. 637, "Convention Between the United States and Italy Providing for Reciprocal Military Service, Signed at Washington, August 24, 1918," *FRUS, Supplement 2, The World War* (Washington D.C., 1918), 726.

prosecution of World War I.¹⁶⁸ Additionally, the agreement proscribed the loss of nationality of the people who performed their military service in the other country's army. The treaty of 1918 remained in effect until December 1941 when Italy declared war on the United States. The military service treaties of 1918 effectively established a kind of Atlantic citizenship for men of Allied nations, though that citizenship was fraught with risk of nativist violence and death or injury through military obligation. Italian migration exerted pressure on the Italian government to liberalize its military conscription laws, and exerted pressure on the American government to afford a non-Northern European immigrant group protection of U.S. federal law. But through that pressure, Italian migration effectively enhanced both governments' capacity to wage war and each country's international status as an aspiring Great Power.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

MYTH OR REALITY?: AMERICAN AND ITALIAN STEREOTYPES

Stereotypes are essential components of social as well as racial interaction. “Basically, a stereotype is an exaggerated belief, oversimplification, or uncritical judgment about a category ... Although stereotypes are most often exaggerations or distortions of reality, they are often accepted by people as fact.”¹ Stereotyping, “the application of these stereotypes when we interact with people from a given social group,”² usually constitutes the basis of racial discrimination and prejudice against one ethnic group or country by another, though it may constitute exaggerated positive or idealistic judgments as well. National stereotypes create the sense of Otherness, while defining the characteristics of the other racial clique, or nation. Italian and American stereotypes were fundamental elements of U.S.-Italian relations. This chapter will seek to elucidate the extent to which stereotypes, prejudice, and racial discrimination influenced U.S.-Italian relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

¹ William B. Helmreich, *The Things They Say behind Your Back: Stereotypes and the Myths Behind Them* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982), 2.

² Charles Stangor, “Volume Overview,” Charles Stangor, ed., *Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential Readings* (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 2000), 1.

4.1 The Definitions: Stereotypes, prototypes, prejudice, and “mythopoeic” images

The term “stereotype” was first coined by the American journalist Walter Lippmann in his 1922 book *Public Opinion*. Lippmann was interested in how individuals reacted to people from various cultures and ethnic groups, and he considered stereotypes as the “pictures in our heads.”³ Those pictures are generalizations and oversimplifications which are functional to cope with the complexities of social life. Lippmann himself emphasized that stereotypes are outcomes of flawed ideas which create erroneous viewpoints.⁴

For Lippmann, there are two sources for those flawed pictures; stereotypes either are shaped in people’s minds autonomously, or they are imposed by the culture that they live in. He stated, “in the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that we have picked out [the pictures] in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.”⁵ This brings forth another characteristic of stereotypes; they are the faulty products of a cultural group. Stereotypes are the labels that are utilized to depict the Otherness of another group, and they “also allow us to justify our behavior toward a group that we already dislike or are mistreating. In other words, they enable us to rationalize our actions.”⁶

³ Lippman quoted in *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴ John F. Dovidio, eds al., “Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination: Another Look,” C. Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor and Miles Hewstone, eds, *Stereotypes and Stereotyping* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), 279. Also see Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998 which is about white identity in the United States and the definition of race.

⁵ Lippmann quoted in Perry R. Hinton, *Stereotypes, Cognition and Culture* (East Sussex: Psychology Press, 2000), 9.

⁶ William B. Helmreich, *The Things They Say*, 4.

Since the main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the essentials of Italian-American relations, this chapter will chiefly concentrate on racial and ethnic stereotypes within American and Italian societies. From the definitions offered in this part, it can be stated that there were Italian stereotypes in American society, and a certain degree of prejudice was felt toward the Italian American community as a result of the overgeneralizations formed by the American public. American images of Italians early on were mythical, but later became racist. Meanwhile, there were American stereotypes in Italy, but the nature of Italian prejudice about Americans was different from the American biases about Italians. This chapter will assert the details of the formation of divergent stereotypes in the two countries and their consequences in U.S.-Italian relations.

After the mass immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth century, Italian immigrants experienced “discrimination.”⁷ Negative actions toward an ethnic group reveal variations from the least to the most destructive one: antilocution, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination.⁸ Antilocution is the form of passive action that comprises only the feeling of being different, but involves no physical assault designed for the stereotyped group or individual, while extermination is the most severe type of ethnic conflict between the aggressor and the victim.

However, along with its negative characteristic, ethnic prejudice may sometimes be positive.⁹ The *pro* condition was basically valid for the American stereotypes that Italians held by the beginning of the twentieth century. Italians created positive bias about Americans, and depicted some major figures in

⁷ Stangor, “Volume Overview,” Charles Stangor, ed., *Stereotypes and Prejudice*, 11.

⁸ Gordon W. Allport, “The Nature of Prejudice,” Charles Stangor, ed., *Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential Readings*, (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 2000) 25-6.

⁹ Allport, “The Nature of Prejudice,” Charles Stangor, ed., *Stereotypes and Prejudice*, 22.

American history according to those positive biases. The positively biased stereotypes always carry the risk of becoming generalizations like the negative ones. That was pertinent in the situation of the American positive stereotypes in Italy; Italians created “a *mythopoeic* image – a constructed myth of the [American] within [Italian] culture,”¹⁰ and visualized the United States as an idyllic land which was ruled by heroic leaders like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson.

4. 2 Christopher Columbus: Transformation of an Italian Hero into an American Myth

During the nineteenth century, Americans praised Christopher Columbus as a national hero and one of the uniting figures of their country. In the late nineteenth century, especially starting with the mass immigration to the United States, American society needed myths to justify the hopes and dreams of the newcomers as well as its native-born members. In this respect, Michael Kammen’s *Mystic Chords of Memory* explains the relationship between mythmaking and national identity. Kammen quotes Ralph Ellison: “That which we remember is, more often than not, that which we would like to have been; or that which we hope to be. ... our history [is] ever a tall tale told by inattentive idealists.”¹¹ Focusing on this idea, Kammen refers to the mythic heroes in American history and indicates that their human characteristics were transformed into “idealized virtues.”¹²

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 150.

¹¹ Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 2.

¹² *Ibid.*, 28.

Kammen emphasizes the centrality of founding fathers of the Revolutionary period to American myth making in the nineteenth century. But he neglects a remarkable national icon in the nineteenth century: Christopher Columbus. The United States government greeted the nineteenth century from its new capital, the District of Columbia, which was named in honor of Christopher Columbus. Columbus's popularity became widespread with Washington Irving's *The Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus*, first printed in 1828, and "the Anglicized image of Columbus received an official literary validation with [its] publication." Irving's biography assisted the development of the Columbian myth; a new American hero appeared. "By the time of the Civil War, [the] vision of Columbus was so well grounded in American culture that man and legend had become one."¹³

In general, the founding fathers of the United States of America like Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson share the same characteristics. They were Anglo-Americans, lived roughly in the same period, and came from the same religious origin. But Christopher Columbus came from a different origin, a different time and a different part of the world, and therefore would not seem a likely candidate to be a national icon in the United States. But he was, at least in the nineteenth century. "When the newly formed United States began the process of constructing a national identity and culture, the memory of Christopher Columbus was resurrected as a symbol of the virtues of rugged individualism, stoic determination and a ruthless pioneer spirit which the young republic sought to instill in its citizens."¹⁴

¹³ Amy Uhry Abrams, "Visions of Columbus: The 'Discovery' Legend in Antebellum American Paintings and Prints," *American Art Journal* 25 (1993), 77, 83, 96.

¹⁴ Barbara Ransby, "Columbus and the Making of Historical Myth." *Race and Class* 33(1992), 83.

Columbus was of course Italian. However, he sailed the ocean for Spanish monarchs, wrote his letters in Spanish, he also knew Portuguese. The multi-national background of his discovery of America was important for Columbus's myth. Different ethnic groups had inhabited America since the first Indian-European encounter, so an American myth like Christopher Columbus had to fit that standard. Columbus was "the first European immigrant: the first of the Italians, Germans, Slavs, etc., who made up America, and from the many created the one: *e pluribus unum*."¹⁵ With all these international features, Columbus would be a superb example for America.

The distinction between the New and the Old World was very important in nineteenth-century America. Christopher Columbus was a Renaissance man who had illuminated the road to the New World. "The city-state of Genoa had no associations with the poor immigrants from other areas of the Italian peninsula, and thus the mariner's birthplace could be comfortably subsumed into the rarefied atmosphere of Renaissance Italy."¹⁶ All his calculations, the techniques that he used during his voyages, and his correspondence with the Florentine scientist Toscanelli supported that interpretation. Additionally, European contact with the American continent symbolized the beginning of a new era, in particular, the coming supremacy of the American nation in the world. An editorial column from *The New York Times*, praising the 1892 Columbian Exposition, stated:

... the discovery of America is too remote and too great a thing for any of us really to take it in. It is an event not of national so much as of mundane importance. ... To celebrate the discovery of America is like celebrating the creation, or the evolution, of ADAM. It is not our festival, but the world's. ... [What COLUMBUS gave to civilization] was the

¹⁵ Nancy Murray, "Columbus and the USA: from Mythology to Ideology," *Race and Class* 33(1992), 50.

¹⁶ Ann Uhry Abrams, "Visions of Columbus." 83.

close of the Middle Ages, of feudalism, of privilege, and the beginning of liberty, equality, and fraternity that at the end of the fifteenth century [Columbus] closed the door upon the medieval world and opened it upon the modern world. All over Europe now, 400 years afterward, ... European institutions are becoming “Americanized.” ...it is the gift that he bestowed upon Europe in finding a virgin soil in which there might take root and spring and flower the “American idea.” This is not a national only, but a universal benefaction...¹⁷

Columbus became a symbol of the commencement of the “Americanization” of the world, and thus an ancestor of American globalization. “He at any rate arrived at the continent without assistance from any source but his own strength of mind, and to him, ... belongs the discovery of a New World.”¹⁸ An archetypal self-made immigrant and model of Anglo-Saxonism, Columbus began to be identified with the American Dream, his name associated with those of the founding fathers of the United States of America.

Another example about Columbus’ mythological portrayal can be given from a history textbook. In the nineteenth-century United States the national education system overall sought to guarantee the preservation of American ideals. By the 1830s, school leaders had a certain American ideology in mind, which “centered on republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism, three sources of social belief that were intertwined and mutually supporting.”²⁰ As a natural outcome, national heroes who had founded the country had to match these standards. The schoolbook *The True Story of Christopher Columbus called the Great Admiral*, was “offered and inscribed to the boys and girls of America as the opening volume in a series especially designed for their reading, and to be called ‘Children’s Lives of Great

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, October 8, 1892.

¹⁸ Charles Edward Lester, *Americus Vespicius*, 103.

²⁰ Carl F. Kaestle, *Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 76.

Men’.”²¹ The writer, Elbridge S. Brooks, previously had authored works on George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin Franklin, and the American War of Independence. The book appeared in 1892, the 400th anniversary of Columbus’s landing.

The most remarkable aspect about the book is Brooks’s complete account of Christopher Columbus. He described the navigator’s life, his physical features - “fresh-looking face, a clear eye and golden hair” - his relationship with different European monarchs, and his voyages; according to Brooks there were Irish as well as English sailors among the crew. Brooks deliberately illustrated the navigator as a Northern European rather than a sailor from Genoa. Columbus, different from the Italian people in general, according to Brooks was fair-haired like the white Europeans. Thus all these aspects, according to Brooks, proved that Columbus’s arrival was an achievement of white Europeans as well as the Catholic Spanish monarchs.

Despite his alleged introduction of slavery to the Americas, Columbus eventually opened the way to the establishment of the United States of America. “His life was full of mistakes, but those mistakes have turned out to be, for us, glorious successes.”²² Brooks asserted that the English people were different from the Spanish, because they had fulfilled Columbus’s dream:

English blood ... following after—because Columbus had first shown the way—peopled, saved and upbuilt the whole magnificent northern land that Spain missed and lost. They have found in it more gold than ever Columbus dreamed of in his never-found Cathay; they have filled it with a nobler, braver, mightier, and more numerous people than ever Columbus imagined the whole mysterious land of the Indies contained; they have made the home of freedom, of peace, of

²¹ Elbridge S. Brooks, *The True Story of Christopher Columbus called the Great Admiral* (Boston: Lothrop, Lee & Shepherd Co., 1892), 1.

²² *Ibid.*, 30.

education, of intelligence and of progress, and have protected and bettered it until the whole world respects it for its strength, honors it for its patriotism, admires it for its energy, and marvels at it for its prosperity.²³

This quotation gives a racial definition of the American Dream more exclusively than the extract from *The New York Times*. Around Columbus “the potent and self-celebratory myths which make up the national image and from which derive the ‘American Dream’ [had been crystallized].”²⁴ The rising popularity of Christopher Columbus in nineteenth-century America reflected the development of the United States as a major power as well as the continuity of the American Dream which denoted life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. A country like America, which had begun to be more and more powerful, especially in the late 1800s, was in search of some national and mythical figures that would present its emerging importance to the rest of the world.

In the transformation of Columbus into a national hero, the most critical obstacle was his religion. He was a Catholic, and Protestants often did not welcome Catholics in nineteenth-century America. How could an Italian Catholic be a national hero in America? The answer was again related to the circumstances in the nineteenth-century United States. The only thing necessary was to transform him into a figure that would not be against the American Protestant ideals. Accordingly, Columbus was identified with the religious figures of the Old Testament. Jewish apologists in the United States thus portrayed Columbus as a Moses of the Jewish immigrants. In the Bible, Moses led Israelites to the promised land of Canaan; Columbus was alleged to have done the same for Jewish Americans, whose ancestors had been expelled from Spain by Queen Isabella as a consequence of the

²³ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁴ Nancy Murray, “Columbus and the USA,” 50.

reconquista. Columbus was “a man of Israel,”²⁵ “the embodiment of an all-inclusive Americanism, sheltering among others the likes of them.”²⁶ Rev. Dr. Joseph Silverman’s sermon, “America, the Promised Land” is an example of Columbus’s religious mythification among Jewish Americans:

Moses was the Columbus of Israel. Like Moses, Columbus never realized his dreams or ambitions and saw them from afar. The conquest of America and its annexation to Spain and the planting of the Roman religion on its soil were his dreams, not to be seen by him. It was not Columbus whom America chose especially to honor in this festival, but it was the establishment of a new world, where science, philosophy, and religion were revolutionized. The discovery destroyed many erroneous notions, superstitions, and traditions. ... America is the promised land of the Jew. This land has become our Canaan. ... America is the Messiah of mankind, the redeemer of the world. ... the first prayers offered in this celebration should be in the synagogue, and that the Columbian memorial arch to be erected in this city is the design of a young man of Israel.²⁷

Another religious figure that Columbus was identified with during the 1892 celebrations was Noah. After the flood, described in Genesis, Noah had come to the Old World when his ship settled on Mount Ararat. Similarly, Columbus discovered the New World. The resemblance between them was the also reason why “the names of these two great sailors and land discoverers [should] be coupled together!”²⁸

Additionally, “Columbus seemed as an apt choice to serve as the patron of the new American Catholic group, for as the first Catholic in America, he was the symbolic ancestor of all American Catholics, whatever their ethnic background.”²⁹

²⁵ *The New York Times*, October 9, 1892.

²⁶ Lilian Handlin, “Discovering Columbus.” 90.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, October 9, 1892.

²⁸ *Ibid.* October 8, 1892.

²⁹ Timothy J. Meagher, “ ‘Why Should We Care for a Little Trouble or a Walk through the Mud’: St. Patrick’s and Columbus Day Parades in Worcester, Massachusetts, 1845-1915,” *The New England Quarterly* 58 (1985), 23. See also Matthew Dennis, *Red, White and Blue Letter Days: An American Calendar*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002 which refers to the Columbus Day.

He became a uniting figure also for the immigrant Catholics in the New World. The Knights of Columbus, first established in 1882 in New Haven by American-born, middle class Irish men, regarded Columbus Day parades as important chances for the Catholic immigrants in the United States to unite, so the Knights endeavored to organize all the Catholic organizations and societies to participate in the parade to show Catholic solidarity with their Protestant neighbors.¹⁹

A final illustration of Columbus's transformation into a mythic hero occurred at the Chicago's Columbian Exposition of 1893. There are numerous studies that focus on the significance of expositions in American culture, architectural designs, technical innovations, and countries invited to make exhibitions. For example, "the Chicago Fair would teach Americans about Columbus through a vast and colorful mosaic of visual devices."³⁰ In addition, the exposition also symbolized the dominant white culture in the 1890s that was linked to Columbus's heroic image.

Similar to the ideas of the founder of the Italian communist party, Antonio Gramsci about racial hegemony and social structures, in *Manliness and Civilization*, Gail Bederman refers to the Columbian Exposition as an example of "civilization building a hegemonic male power of white supremacy" and "American civilization's astonishing progress toward human perfection."³¹ Columbus's three white ships in front of the famous White City represented the dominant white culture in the nineteenth-century America whereas the Midway Plaisance was built for the inferior

³⁰ Karal Ann Marling, "Writing History with Artifacts: Columbus at the 1893 Fair," *Public Historian* 14(1992), 15.

³¹ Gramsci stated that social hierarchies are established not through coercive power, but through a process of consent and acquiescence. For more information see, Mark Browning, "Antonio Gramsci and Hegemony in the United States," *The Review of Communication* 2.4 (2002), 384. See also, Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: a Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 31 and Robert W. Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

racess. The White City covered 80 acres of land and was designed as a separate entertainment area and “the Columbian ships functioned in a manner analogous to the ethnological villages of native peoples-Russian, Japanese, Philippine, Turkish and so forth-that were the principal attractions of the Midway district at the Chicago Fair.”³² The villages were the constructions that mirrored the peculiarities, or the everyday life and customs of the countries which participated in the exposition. The Austrian Village was a reproduction of old Vienna, the Turkish Village had a mosque, a bazaar, a Bedouin camp, and a Persian tent within its boundaries, and the Venice-Murano Exhibit was a demonstration of Italian glassware.

The Chicago Fair of 1893 was an idealized reflection of American society in the late 1800s. As Elbridge S. Brooks wrote, “The four hundred years of the New World’s life closed its chapter of happiness in the electric lights and brilliant sunshine of the marvelous White City by Lake Michigan.”³³ Chicago was far from the ocean that Columbus had sailed. But there were special reasons for the city to be the host of the exposition. Chicago had suffered from a great fire a short time before the fair, and its reconstruction was a manifestation to justify the greatness of the American nation. A great country like the United States that managed to organize an event like the 400th anniversary of the discovery of the continent could also be the leader of the world in the coming century. With the World’s Columbian Exposition, “many Americans believed that Columbus’s voyage had initiated a chain of ‘progress’ that would lead to the worldwide preeminence of the United States.”³⁴

On the other side of the Atlantic, by the early nineteenth century, many Italians also believed that the discovery of Columbus had initiated advancement in

³² Marling, “Writing History with Artifacts,” 18.

³³ Brooks, *The True Story of Christopher Columbus*, 51.

³⁴ Abrams, “Visions of Columbus.” 96.

the history of Italy. In a bibliography of Columbus, published in Rome in 1809, it was stated, “because of the superhuman courage of Columbus, Europe and America were no longer strangers.”³⁵ According to the writer, the first contact between the two worlds was not an expression of New World hegemony, but growing Italian influence. Columbus had illustrated the Italian name with his magnificent discovery which provoked jealousy in various nations of the world.³⁶ Even before the *Risorgimento*, the Ligurian navigator was portrayed as a national hero who had changed the course of western civilization.

The 400th anniversary of the discovery of the American continent had an enormous significance for a united Italy as well. A commission of Italian intellectuals compiled the sources about Columbus in a multi-volume work, *La Raccolta Colombiana [The Columbian Collection]* for the honor of the anniversary. Italy also participated in the celebrations both in New York City and Chicago. Italy, despite the repercussions of the diplomatic crisis after the 1891 New Orleans lynching, helped organize the celebration in 1892. The erection of the statue of Columbus at Columbus Circle in New York City was a manifestation of that. Italians, particularly the Italian community in New York, desired to illustrate the importance that they gave to their hero, Columbus, by presenting his statue as “a donor to honor the Italian name.”³⁷ As Carlo Barsotti, the director of *Il Progresso*, asserted the Italian immigrants in America desired “the note of *italianità* to be heard

³⁵ Giovanni Gerson di Cavaglià, *Dissertazioni Epistolari Bibliografiche di Francesco Cancellieri Sepra: Cristoforo Colombo di Cuccaro nel Manfredato Scopritore dell’America* [Epistolary Bibliographic Dissertations of Francesco Cancellieri Sepra: Christopher Columbus, Discoverer of America] (Rome: Francesco Bovrlié, 1809), 96.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 76, 1-2 and 96. This idea can be related to Gramsci’s opinion about cultural hegemony and Italy’s quest for national greatness. As Gramsci indicated, cultures cannot be separated from the ideologies and social systems and *vice versa*.

³⁷ Carlo Barsotti, *Il Progresso Italo-Americano di Nuova York, Il Primo Giornale Italiano negli Stati Uniti d’America* [The The Italian-American Progress of New York, the First Italian Newspaper of the United States of America] (New York: Nicoletti Bros. Press, 1911), 76.

in the hymns sang by the Anglo-Saxon voices.”³⁸ From this perspective, Columbus Day was a momentous occasion to prove the solidarity of the Italian immigrant in America. In brief, Italians – both in Italy and the United States – aimed to confirm the *italianità* of the discoverer of the American continent during the 1892 celebrations. By that way, they had the opportunity to demonstrate both the greatness of Columbus as an Italian and the young Italy, descendant of “the antique ruler of the world.”³⁹ Thus, Anglo-Americans and Italians both celebrated Columbus, but appropriated his achievements for different national and ethnocentric purposes.

4.3 Giuseppe Garibaldi in America: A Transnational Italian Stereotype

While Americans, native-born and immigrant, wholeheartedly embraced Columbus, they had more ambivalent sentiments about Giuseppe Garibaldi. Giuseppe Garibaldi has already been discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to his attempt to become a United States citizen during his brief stay in the country. Nevertheless, before the 1850s, Margaret Fuller, who witnessed the revolutions in Italy during her stay in Europe, was one of the first significant intellectuals that praised Garibaldi. Fuller portrayed Garibaldi as a leader whose “look was entirely that of a hero of the Middle Ages, - his face still young, for the excitements of his life, though so many, ha[d] all been youthful, and there [was] no fatigue upon his

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

brow or cheek.”⁴⁰ In 1860 the anti-slavery newspaper *The Liberator* published a poem, “Brown and Garibaldi,” composed by Jane Ashby:

We praise thee, Garibaldi!
And in the roll of fame,
Among her noblest heroes,
Shall Europe place thy name.
Among them-far above them:-
Thou dost not fight for gain,
For crown, or lands, or titles,
Or empty glory vain.
The arms that froes thy country,
Italia’s noblest son,
Has over all earth’s tyrants
A lasting conquest won.
We honor thee, true hero,
More than great names of old;
Those Greeks and Roman warriors,
Whose tales so oft are told ...
And Brown, and Garibaldi,
The champions of this age,
Who led the van of freedom,
Shall brighten History’s page ... ⁴¹

The poem suggests the Italian general’s characteristics in the American mind. Ashby’s choice of John Brown was related to Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry, Virginia in October 1859. Before the incident, Brown was a public figure after he had rescued several slaves in Kansas and liberated them in Canada. But the attack on the federal armory at Harpers Ferry brought Brown’s end. He was executed on December 2, 1859 for inciting slaves to insurrection. From the poet’s point of view, Brown and Garibaldi shared a mission of liberating their people - in Garibaldi’s case, the Italian people - from the hands of tyranny and slavery. Reflecting abolitionist sentiments in antebellum America, Ashby desired to depict the heroes of freedom of her age by comparing them to an idealized Italian in American society.

⁴⁰ Margaret Fuller, *At Home and Abroad*, Arthur B. Fuller, ed., (Boston: Crosby, Nichols, and Company, 1856), 414.

⁴¹ Howard R. Marraro, *Garibaldi in New York* (*New York History*, April 1946), 35-36.

Garibaldi's portrayal is also significant since it describes the American affection for Italians on the eve of the *Risorgimento*, and more importantly, before the mass immigration of the 1880s.

On the other hand, the 1861 essay of Henry Theodore Tuckerman "Giuseppe Garibaldi," presented a less romanticized version of Garibaldi:

As compared with the majority of Italians, we remarked in this man's being and aspect a great simplicity and directness ... His calm manner, comparatively slow movement, and almost Saxon hair and beard, might have seemed characteristic of a northern rather than a southern European; yet his eye, voice, and air were essentially Italian. His nationality, however, was still more evident in the sudden though subdued, emotion apparent in his language and expression, when speaking or listening to what was said about his country.⁴²

Tuckerman was a Bostonian, and a famous essayist who had lived in Italy. He was also the author of *The Italian Sketch-Book* in which he described the Italian landscape. He claimed an extensive knowledge of Italy and Italians, who, according to Tuckerman, were indirect, timid, superficial, exaggerated in manners, and nervous. Garibaldi shared some of these characteristics, but he also had the physical features of a northern European.

Nevertheless, Garibaldi was depicted as a hero even after his defeat and the collapse of the Roman Republic. William Roscoe Thayer, who composed several biographies of the founding fathers like Benjamin Franklin and George Washington as well as a two-volume work about Count Camillo Cavour, in "Garibaldi's Early Years," portrayed the Italian general as "the most romantic figure ... an epic hero."⁴³ Thayer described Garibaldi as a boy shutting himself in his room weeping after accidentally breaking a grasshopper's leg. While narrating the early years of

⁴² Marraro, *Garibaldi in New York*, 19-20.

⁴³ William R. Thayer, "Garibaldi's Early Years," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 62 (1888), 484.

Garibaldi, Thayer referred to his brief stay in Staten Island as a “page from the Odyssey of the Italian Ulysses.”⁴⁴ The hero of Rome and Uruguay worked in a candle factory “without a Calypso to beguile his banishment, or a Penelope to welcome him home!”⁴⁵

However, Giuseppe Garibaldi was not the idealized type of leader and hero for some other writers. During his visit to Sicily, Henry Adams criticized him. In his eyes, Garibaldi was a dictator—Italians, Adams believed, deserved to be ruled by one—and demonstrated the characteristics of an ordinary man who never should have been compared to George Washington:

Garibaldi seems to discourage all formality, and though he has just now all the power of an Emperor, he will not even adopt the state of a General. Europeans are fond of calling him the Washington of Italy, principally because they know nothing about Washington. Catch Washington invading a foreign kingdom on his own hook, in a fireman’s shirt! ... He had his plain red shirt on, precisely like a fireman, and no mark of authority, his manner is, as you know of course, very kind and off-hand, without being vulgar and demagogic. He talked with each of us, and talked perfectly naturally; no stump oratory and no sham.⁴⁶

Among Italians, Garibaldi was a national hero, a leader, and also an individual for the Italian immigrants who had shared their destiny in America. The Italian American writer E. D. R. Bianciardi, who had composed essays like “A Florentine family in the Fifteenth Century,” “The Haunts of Galileo,” and “Life in Old Siena,”⁴⁷ conceivably offered the most realistic portrayal of the Italian general:

His personal appearance [in 1855] is thus described by one who knew him well: ‘Garibaldi is of medium height, with broad, square shoulders, and strong limbs. His hair and bear

⁴⁴ Ibid., 499.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Documents: Henry Adams and Garibaldi, 1860,” *The American Historical Review* 25 (1920), 246, 247.

⁴⁷ E. D. R. Bianciardi, “A Florentine Family in the Fifteenth Century,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 48 (1881); “The Haunts of Galileo,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 54 (1884); “Life in Old Siena,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 308 (1883).

are reddish, and slightly grizzled; his nose is straight; his eye is keen, yet mild. He walks with a firm and decided step, and his gestures, speech, and whole manner are those of a sailor. He converses with self-possession and simplicity, but is seldom garrulous; yet when he is speaking of Italy, or relating some daring exploit, he becomes animated and even eloquent.’⁴⁸

Evidently Garibaldi was a hero for the Italians not for his superhuman qualities, but for his traits which made him a leader of the Italian unification and freedom. Rather than labeling him as an impressive hero descended from the classical or middle ages, or stereotyping him, Italians preferred to feel affection for the Italian general merely for the features that made him Giuseppe Garibaldi; a bold and natural patriot.

Some of the nineteenth-century American representations of Garibaldi and the Italian people reveal that even before the mass immigration to the United States, Americans had prejudices about Italians and their character though they could make exceptions for transatlantic heroes. Giuseppe Garibaldi was an “in-between” stereotype that symbolized the transformation of American ideas about Italy from optimism to pessimism. After the revolutions in Italy and at the beginning of Italian unification, Americans expressed confidence in the Italian victory over tyranny. As a natural outcome, they encouraged and praised Italian republican figures like Garibaldi. But because of Italians’ insufficiency in their nation building, and the massive immigration from the southern part of the Italian peninsula in the late nineteenth century, the Italian stereotypes in the United States became darker, sinister, and more biased in early twentieth-century America.

⁴⁸ E. D. R. Bianciardi, “The Personal History of Garibaldi,” *The Century* 24 (1882), 498.

4.4 Anarchists and Mobsters: The formation of Italian Stereotypes in the U.S.

The Italian community has been one of the most illustrated ethnic stereotypes in the United States. By the 1870s, Americans had two pictures about Italy. The first Italy was the brave friend of the United States, the country of Garibaldi and the other Italian exiles coming from the middle class. The other was the poor, ignorant and decadent Italy from where the poor and the ignorant immigrants were beginning to arrive. The negative Italian stereotype was sometimes the Italian organ-grinder child who began to live in the United States in the early nineteenth century. There was also the Italian stereotype of the *padrone*, who brought those little children to the United States to work as street musicians, and who treated them badly. American newspapers in the second half of the nineteenth century began to report those incidents. The representation of Italian Americans – mainly the one depicting men as ignorant members of the *Mafia* – initially emerged in the late nineteenth century and developed in the twentieth century with minor divergences.

The characterization of immigrants for purposes of comic relief and dramatic entertainment on the stage represents an important aspect of stereotyping ethnic minorities within American society.⁴⁹ As a consequence of “the ethnocentrism of the majority,” Americans entertained themselves by differentiating the diverse characteristics of the immigrants on stage.

The first immigrant stereotypes appeared in minstrel shows in the nineteenth century. For instance, *The Emigrant Train, or Go West* of 1879 merged Irish, Dutch, and Italian immigrants and four blackface performers in one play.⁵⁰ In other plays

⁴⁹ For detail, see Carl Witke, “The Immigrant Theme on the American Stage,” *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 39 (1952), 211-232.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 225.

like *the Italian Padrone, or, the Slaves of the Harp*, the Italian stereotypes had the stage to themselves. Italians were among the most popular “bad foreign types,” and they frequently did the bloody work. Similar to white blackface performers, the actors who played Italian immigrant roles were not Italian.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Italian dialect, “Mariuch” songs became extremely popular. The most prominent Mariuch song was Edward Morton’s “Mariuch Makea-dea-Hootch-a-ma-Cooch Down at Coney Isle” (1907). “Mariuch, She Taka da Steamboat” was another song. More significantly, the early twentieth-century song sheets portray how the American public perceived the Italians in their country. These sheets are outstanding representations of Italian immigrants who were later transformed into rigid stereotypes.

Figure 4.2 is the sheet of the song, “Scissors to Grind.” This piece is an earlier example; it was composed in 1904, before Morton’s famous Mariuch song. The image, or the stereotype that was revealed in the picture is a scissor grinder. The features of the old and weary man – dark skin and moustache—resembles the characteristics of a southern Italian, and he is a representative illustration for the Italian immigrant on the streets of American cities. It is also interesting that the Italian appears on the same page as two black males—but bigger than them. Possibly this is an evidence of an “inbetween” racial image.




Figure 4.2 “Scissors to Grind”

Source: <http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/sheetmusic/b/b04/b0426/b0426-1-72dpi.jpeg>, May 5, 2005.

“Tony Verdi has a raggy hurdy gurdy” is a line from the 1917 song, “When Verdi Plays the Hurdy Gurdy.” The song was composed when Italy and the United States were allies in World War I, and the song sheet depicts a very well known Italian stereotype, the organ grinder. Similar to the Figure 4.2, Tony Verdi was portrayed as a typical southern Italian, presumably a Sicilian. His clothes and his physical features yield an unambiguous idea about the man’s nationality. In addition, the name of the organ grinder is noteworthy; he was named after the famous composer, Giuseppe Verdi, who resided in the United States for a period of time. Even the use of this name is a manifestation of how the Italian stereotypes were overgeneralized.



Figure 4.3 “When Verdi Plays the Hurdy Gurdy”

Source: <http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/sheetmusic/a/a00/a0066/a0066-1-72dpi.jpeg>, May 5, 2005.

The development of the film industry in the late 1890s initiated the introduction of various ethnic stereotypes to American audiences. Silent cinema, which came into its own during and immediately after the First World War,⁵¹ provided two negative portrayals of Italian male immigrants before Italy’s entrance to World War I in 1915: the mobsters and the anarchists.

The early twentieth- century Italian immigrant stereotypes on screen emerged as backward and superstitious villains. They also endangered the virtuous Anglo-American life and customs. “Because of Italians’ olive skin, the Americans thought they were racially different, too – somewhere ‘in-Between’ black and

⁵¹ Christopher P. Jacobs, “The Development of the Cinema: From Scientific Novelty to a New Art and Entertainment Industry,” Donald W. McCaffrey and Christopher P. Jacobs, *Guide to the Silent Years of American Cinema* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 1.

white—and attributed to them different emotional traits and sexual behavior.”⁵² So, in order to protect the *status quo*, young Italian men had to be punished, and their sisters and daughters had to be rescued from their sinister fathers and brothers. The first example for that kind of a depiction is the 1906 film *The Black Hand*, which had a Mafia theme, and it was also a prototype for the coming movies about Italian immigrants. In the final scene of *The Black Hand*, the wicked protagonist dies before he manages to achieve his evil plans; the audience is reassured that the bad foreigners in their country are always punished.

David Wark Griffith, who utilized the multiracial environment of the United States in his movies, helped fellow Americans to synthesize old attitudes about race with new patterns of life and law.⁵³ Before his famous *The Birth of a Nation*, Griffith directed 450 shorter films for the Biograph Company between 1908 and 1913. In most of these films, he used ethnic stereotypes to touch the fears of Anglo-Americans, but he also used the stereotype as a vehicle for exposing despicable urban housing and social conditions, or more often, in telling a sentimental story.⁵⁴ In addition, Griffith presented positive ethnic figures like the virtuous Catholic Italian woman, Pippa.

Griffith directed *Pippa Passes, or the Song of Conscience* in 1907. It was based on Robert Browning’s poem, “Pippa Passes,” but rather than narrating the story of Browning, Griffith preferred to portray Pippa as “a gamine of holiness, with a crucifix the only decoration of her tiny room. After dawn rises upon her (in a famous early lighting effect), she sets out with her lute and song: ‘God’s in his

⁵² Rosanne De Luca Braun, “Made in Hollywood: Italian Stereotypes in the Movies,” http://www.osia.org/public/pdf/Made_in_Hollywood.pdf, May 8, 2005.

⁵³ Jack Temple Kirby, “D. W. Griffith’s Racial Portraiture,” *Phylon* 39 (1978), 118.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 119.

heaven/All's right with the world'.”⁵⁵ After hearing Pippa's song, a drunken man swears off the drink and an angry sculptor forgives his wife who has lied to him. With her song, Pippa also accomplishes to stop a man who tries to kill his lover's husband, and after completing her tasks, she returns to her bed with the sunset. *Pippa Passes* was a success; it was the first film that *The New York Times* reviewed on October 10, 1909.

In addition to *Pippa Passes*, in which he depicted a Virgin Mary like woman figure, Griffith directed a number of films that comprised conventional Italian stereotypes. The 1909 films *At the Altar* and *The Cord of Life* represented the well-known Italian gangsters. *At the Altar* is about a furious rejected Italian suitor who hides a gun under the altar, and plans to use it just before the happy couple marries. *The Cord of Life* is about a “Sicilian profligate” whose “plan ‘dastardly in extreme,’ is to hang his victim's infant out an apartment window by a cord, cut the cord at the point where the window sash holds it, and wait for someone to open the window.”⁵⁶

Another 1909 film, *In Little Italy*, is again about the vengeance of a rejected suitor. The story occurs between a widow and two men in Little Italy. One of the suitors, who works in a barber shop, intends to kill his rival in order to marry the woman. In the end, the Irish police chief arrests the villain, and saves the day. Incidentally validating the presence of Irish immigrants in America, Griffith revealed the characteristics of an angry Sicilian. The film was presented in the *Biograph Bulletin* on December 23, 1909 with the statement:

STORY OF A REJECTED SUITOR'S PERSISTENCE

One of the most dominant traits in the Sicilian's nature is indefatigability of purpose where a score is to be reckoned. No amount of hindrance or disappointments can shake his bulldog sedulity, for he will wait, days, weeks, and even

⁵⁵ Scott Simmon, *The Films of D. W. Griffith* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 150.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

years to accomplish his plan and this Biograph story portrays this propensity most vividly, making it one of the most thrilling subjects yet released.⁵⁷

While directing a film about a sentimental story that ends happily, Griffith presented the racial characteristics of the group as well. By watching a film like *In Little Italy*, the American audience easily discovered the prescribed psychological traits of the Sicilians. D.W. Griffith continued to present the Italian immigrants' private sphere by depicting their lives, customs and traditions. For instance, in *Italian Blood*, a father and a daughter are saved from Mafia threats, and the nuclear Italian family is saved. In brief, the Italian stereotypes that Griffith presented in his films served his melodramatic objectives, but the alleged Italian temper and their relationship with organized crime and anarchy alarmed the director.

Yet the most prominent film about the Italian immigrants in the early twentieth century was Thomas Ince's *The Italian* (or *The Dago*), released in 1915. In the end, the vicious villains are again punished, but what is striking about the film is the introduction of the bright world of the Venetian gondolier who later finds himself in the slums of a big American city. The contrast between Venice and New York inverts the American Dream, and emphasizes the notion that the immigrants could have had better lives if they did not come to the United States. The dual representation of the Italian immigrant of Griffith as again revealed in Ince's movie. Italians had peculiarities that made them different from the Anglo-Americans, but they also suffered because of the depraved conditions of the city slums of America.

However, the Italian immigrant was not always depicted as a pathetic victim or perpetrator of crimes against the Italian community. Particularly after the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, the fear of anarchism created a new

⁵⁷ Paolo Cherchi Usai, *The Griffith Project: Volume 3, Films Produced in July-December 1909* (St. Edmunds, U.K.: St. Edmundsbury Press, 1999), 146.

stereotype: the Italian anarchist. Italians had a leading role in the “Black Hand” motion pictures. The Black Hand is used to designate the Mafia, but the Black Hand movies were not only about kidnapping or blackmailing; they also depicted anarchist activities like murder or bombings. This kind of film reinforced negative images that overlapped with the sinister trappings of radical stereotypes.⁵⁸ Films like *A Bum and a Bomb* (1912), *Giovanni’s Gratitude* (1913), *The Wop* (1913), *The Bomb Throwers* (1915) accumulated bomb tossers, laborers, radicals and anarchists. While films depicting Italians as anarchists disappeared after Italy’s entrance into World War I, Italian stereotypes continued to exist on the white screen throughout the whole twentieth century. From time to time, the Italian aristocrats were introduced, but they were typically ferocious bad characters. Similar to the plays at theaters, white artists played the Italian immigrants in the movies. The first Italian movie star in the United States, Rudolph Valentino, played exotic Oriental characters instead of swarthy Italians. In addition, “short, silent films and the exaggerated styles of acting appropriate to them probably made prevailing stereotypes even more vivid than before the time of the camera.”⁵⁹ The products of the nickelodeon era fortified Italian male stereotypes in American society, and, like Pippa, depicted women as pious Virgin Mary figures who endeavored to purify the ignorant and immoral men.

⁵⁸ Michael Slade Shull, *Radicalism in American Silent Films, 1909-1929: A Filmography and History* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2000), 22.

⁵⁹ Kirby, “D.W. Griffith’s Racial Portraiture,” 119.

4.5 American Heroes, Italian Dreams: Italians and American Stereotypes

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Italians had positive prejudices about Americans in their mind. They created a *mythopoeic* image of the American within their own culture, and gained positive biases about the United States as well as its inhabitants. This was partly related to works composed by Italian writers about America and its history especially in the early 1900s. In his two-volume work first published in 1819, *Storia della Guerra dell'Indipendenza degli Stati Uniti d'America* [*History of War of Independence of the United States of America*], Carlo Botta presented all the aspects and details about the American War of Independence from Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* to the accomplishment of independence, and provided information about George Washington and his role in the American victory. He depicted Washington as a serious man who was accustomed to dangers and did not like them, and who was also respected by his soldiers.⁶⁰ In a preface to his translation of Lawrence Shaw Mayo's *Benjamin Franklin*, Luigi Rava, the Italian minister of instruction from 1906 to 1909, listed the complete works of Benjamin Franklin published in Italian language as well as the works composed about him. These publications start with a 1797 translation of the Constitution of Pennsylvania for the Venetians and concluded with an 1877 edition of a monograph about Franklin written by Bartolomeo Aquarone.⁶¹ About Franklin, Rava stated that Italy was going to honor the great American apostle forever who loved working,

⁶⁰ Carlo Botta, *Storia della Guerra dell'Indipendenza degli Stati Uniti d'America* [*History of War of Independence of the United States*] Volume II, (Milano: per Borroni e Scotti, 1844), 409.

⁶¹ Luigi Rava, *La Fortuna di Beniamino Franklin in Italia* [*The Success of Benjamin Franklin in Italy*] (Firenze: R. Bemporad & Figlio, Editori, ?). The date of the work is unknown but by looking at the chronological order of the books that Rava listed, the book was published in the late 1800s or the early 1900s.

science and liberty, and his memory would be kept alive in the hearts of the Italians.⁶²

By the early twentieth century, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln came into view as the most prominent heroes of the United States history. Washington was a genius and Lincoln had a splendid character; he was patient, honest, pertinacious in work, and a lover of justice.⁶³ In *L'America del Nord [North America]*, which was composed for the readers who wanted to reach “the top of prosperity,”⁶⁴ the writer declared that Washington who had spared \$65,000 of his private wealth for the American independence “was the father of the country.”⁶⁵ In 1915, Woodrow Wilson’s name began to be associated with Washington’s and Lincoln’s names. Washington and Lincoln were not great only for their personal qualities; they were also the men of the greatest wars. Washington was the hero of the greatest war of liberty that history had witnessed a model for the Italian wars of independence.⁶⁶ Lincoln was the hero of the war of equality between men, and he accomplished the abolition of slavery. Could Wilson achieve to become the hero of the war or the fraternity among the nations?⁶⁷ With the Italian entrance to the First World War, President Wilson with “his good soul ... [and] supreme principles of liberty and humanity,”⁶⁸ became the greatest hope for the Italians as a leader that would give an end the war, and bring peace to all nations in the world. This belief

⁶² *Ibid.*, 56.

⁶³ Rodolfo Giani, *Storia degli Stati Uniti d’America [History of the United States of America]* (Milano: Carnera, 1902), 191.

⁶⁴ Gedeone de Vincentiis, *L’America del Nord [North America]* (Napoli: Luigi Pierro Tip.—Editore, 1905), 7.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁶ Francesco Ruffini, *Il Presidente Wilson (President Wilson)* (Milano: Fratelli Treves Editori, 1915), 31.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁶⁸ Umberto Biasoli, *Piccola Storia degli Stati Uniti d’America [A Short History of the United States of America]* (Milano: Antonio Vallardi, 1917), 80.

reflected both a mythopoeic image of America and the weakness of Italian national identity at the time.

Apart from the Italians in Italy, the Italians in America also composed works about the United States, past and present. For instance, Enrico Sartorio, whose Italian was poor because he had left Italy at a very early age,⁶⁹ presented detailed information about Americans, their institutions, and their culture. While depicting Lincoln, Sartorio stated that Lincoln would take his hat off in front of a farmer since he respected the aristocracy of the honest people.⁷⁰ Also, the American gentleman was simply an honest man⁷¹ different from the Europeans, and the American would find the essence of his happiness in the masses, in uncertainties, and in adventure,⁷² while the Europeans preferred to enjoy their lives in retiring. For Sartorio, the United States had the mission of bringing civilization to the world, and the Italian immigrants in America, whom he called the *mezzi Americani* [*half Americans*], had to become American citizens, and had to unite with the national spirit for progress for the greatness of the adopted country.⁷³

Meanwhile, for the Italian immigrant, the United States, or simply “Merica,” was an idyllic land where he could obtain all his needs and desires. For the southerners, most of whose relatives were working in the United States, “America came to be an essential part of the[ir] daily life, a social and economic element mingled with their concepts of bread, work, family and sentiment of every kind, and at the same time a mystical sustenance and the basis of a magical religion.”⁷⁴ With

⁶⁹ Enrico Sartorio, *Americani di Oggi* [*Today's Americans*], con prefazione di Francesco Ruffini [with the preface of Francesco Ruffini] (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1920), xiv.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*, 29.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Ernest E. Rossi, “The Italian Myth of America,” Joseph V. Scelsa, Salvatore J. LaGumina and Lydio Tomasi, eds. *Italian Americans in Transition: Proceedings of the XXI Annual Conference of*

the effects of the government's migration policy, cheap transportation, Italy's economic situation and living standards, the deprived southerners migrated to America to attain prosperity. The accounts of these immigrants are essential since they depict their perceptions about the United States. For example, Gino Gullace's *L'America ci Salverà dei Nostri Bisogni: Voce di Emigranti [America will Save our Needs: Immigrant Voices]* describes the sentiments and attitudes of a number of immigrants like the Messinò family whose members commenced to migrate to America in the last year of the nineteenth century. In his letter on July 25, 1899, Francesco Messinò informed his mother that she had to stay tranquil and believe that America was not only their salvation, but also all the Italians' salvation who were working there, and he concluded: "Blessed Christopher Columbus who found [America]."⁷⁵ The letter of his sisters, Marianna and Teresa to their cousins and aunt, who arrived in the United States in late 1900 portray the Italians' first impressions about the Promised Land: "The impression of America for us was good because we have a clean house which is not like our poor house in Ferruzzano."⁷⁶ In his letters to his parents between 1903 and 1904, another immigrant, G. Scala, told about the American people as well as the country. He stated that the philanthropy in the United States was of the greatest degree, and the gentlemen were not only gentlemen for their richness, but also for their surprising character of demonstrating high respect and esteem to their dependents.⁷⁷ All these immigrants mentioned above were informing their relatives that they were no more slaves in America, and they were working only for their own benefits. By the beginning of

the Italian American Historical Association held at the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute, The City of New York, the Graduate School and University Center, October 13-15, 1988 (New York: The American Italian Historical Association, 1990), 218.

⁷⁵ Gullace, *L'America ci Salverà dei nostri Bisogni: Voce di Emigranti*, unpublished dissertation, 50.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 74, 75.

the twentieth century as an outcome of the mass immigration from southern Europe, Italians began to collect information about the remote continent and the United States, and thus the Italian image of America began to change.

4.6 Conclusion

Americans, who had direct contact with the poor and illiterate southern Italians, developed negative Italian stereotypes. The image of the Italian immigrant turned out to be an overgeneralization made about the Italian nation as a whole. For Americans, Italians became idle, filthy, illiterate, appalling, criminal, and offensive people who occupied their streets as gangsters, *padroni*, and organ grinders. The more Italians they knew, the more they hated them. In Italy, it was the opposite; the more Americans the Italians knew, the more they liked them. The immigrants' descriptions about the United States and Americans as well as the portrayal of American heroes in books made the United States a preferred country, and Woodrow Wilson a highly esteemed leader in Italy.

The formation of the American stereotypes in Italy was a consequence of the increasing number of Italian immigrants in the United States, and Italian literary works about the United States. The interaction of the Italian immigrants with America enriched Italy's knowledge about that country. Despite the prejudice they experienced in America, Italian immigrants commenced to share the same dreams and aspirations with the older immigrants to the United States. In the United States, the Italian immigrant could not adapt himself to American culture, language and life-style so he chose to remain in isolation, but, in his heart and his mind, he shared the American Dream with the American people. Italians compared American heroes

to their heroes of the *Risorgimento*, and accepted the American War of Independence as a paradigm for their own country's freedom.

The effect of these stereotypes on policy-making both in Italy and the United States, was weakened by World War I. The war forced the Italian government to betray the cumulative positive image of America as a heroic as well as lucrative destination for poor Italians. By recalling them for military service during time of war as discussed in Chapter 8, the Italian government effectively attempted to limit or prohibit its citizens' access to the American Dream. In contrast, despite the racist image of Italians and among many Americans, officially the United States accepted, if it did not welcome, most Italian immigrants, and assimilated Italian males in the United States armed forces. Severe immigration restrictions affecting Italians did not arise until the 1920s, again because of military necessity. Although the effects of stereotypes were complicated by each country's military expression of its national strength, stereotypes affected each country's policies.

CHAPTER 5

LYNCHING: A NEW PHASE IN U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS

On June 13, 2005, the Senate of the United States passed a resolution that apologized “to the victims of lynching and the descendants of those victims for the failure of the Senate to enact anti-lynching legislation.”¹ In the resolution sponsored by Mary L. Landrieu of Louisiana and George Allen of Virginia, a hundred senators stated that lynching was a widely acknowledged practice and crime occurring throughout the United States until the 1950s, and that at least 4,742 people were reported lynched between 1882 and 1968. They also asserted that 99 percent of the perpetrators escaped punishment, two hundred anti-lynching bills were introduced in Congress, and seven presidents made appeals about lynching between 1890 and 1952.² Landrieu said, “now, when the United States is fighting a war against terrorism, was a good time to apologize for the past and remind [themselves] that terrorism existed in the United States in different ways.”³

This formal apology was basically issued for the African Americans who constituted the majority of the victims of mob violence in the United States. The senators declared that the recent publication of James Allen’s and Hilton Als’ *Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography of America*, “helped bring greater

¹ 109th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 39, <http://www.congress.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.RES.39>: June 6, 2005.

² Ibid.

³ Jim Abrams, “Senate to Issue Anti Lynching Apology,” <http://www.startribune.com/> Last updated June 6, 2005.

awareness and proper recognition of the victims of lynching.”⁴ The book is a significant source to understand the atrocious outcomes of mob violence in the history of the United States, and it includes numerous photographs of the lynched African Americans. But, among hundreds of pictures of those victims, there are two photographs that can escape the attention of the readers. The pictures of two Italian immigrants, Angelo Albano and Castenego Ficarotta, who were lynched in Tampa, Florida on September 20, 1910 during a strike of cigar workers, reveal an important episode in the history of American ethnic violence. Italian immigrants in the United States habitually became victims of lynching in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, although the New Orleans lynching in 1891 has attracted the most attention of historians since it was the largest lynching in U.S. history (eleven people were lynched at a single moment)⁵. In reality, Italian immigrants were lynched in numbers second only to blacks. They were lynched not only in the southern states, but also in other parts of the country.

This chapter will seek to elucidate the aspects of Italian lynchings in the late nineteenth- and the early twentieth-century United States. It will also comment on the definition of race, the features of race relations, and the social, political and economic conditions in the United States after the mass Italian immigration. In writing this chapter, classifications of Italian lynchings are based on W. Fitzhugh Brundage’s typology in *Lynching in the New South*.⁶ In his work, Brundage states that lynch mobs rarely tortured their white victims, and considered them as aberrant

⁴ 109th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 39.

⁵ There are two recent works about Italian lynchings in the United States. The first one is Patrizia Salvetti’s book, *Corda e Sapone* (Rome: Donzelli, 2003), which refers to most of the Italian lynchings in U.S. history. Heather Hartley’s documentary *I Linciati (The Lynched Ones)* appears to be a good visual reference about these incidents.

⁶ For detail, see Katherine Stovel, “Local Sequential Patterns: The Structure of Lynching in the Deep South, 1882-1930,” *Social Forces* 79 (2001), 857-859.

criminals since they did not assume that criminality was innate to the white race.⁷ He also differentiates Italian immigrants from whites because of their ethnic origin, though he does not provide the aspects of this different position in detail. The Italian immigrants, especially southerners, were considered as in-between people possessing the characteristics of both blacks and whites. The features of Italian lynchings are more similar to the lynchings of African Americans than they are white-on-white lynchings. In that way, questions about Italians' race and the Italian immigrants relations with "native" Americans can be answered.

5.1 Lynching: an "American practice":

Lynching has been a neglected subject in American historiography; the writing of the history of lynching has been "disjointed and discontinuous,"⁸ but lynching is also an important topic because it seems a genuine American invention. Vigilantism is generally perceived as America's unique contribution to the history of collective violence.⁹ The lynching era in the United States covers roughly the five decades between the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the Great Depression.¹⁰

Lynching is traditionally considered a southern phenomenon, but in reality it was a national fact. In 1905, James E. Cutler, one of the first historians of

⁷ W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 91, 92.

⁸ For detail, see Robert P. Ingalls, "Lynching and Establishment Violence in Tampa, 1858-1935," *The Journal of Southern History* 53 (1987), 613-644; Joel Williamson, "Wounds not Scars: Lynching, the National Conscience, and the American Historian," *The Journal of American History* 83 (1997), 1221-1253.

⁹ Ingalls, "Lynching and Establishment Violence," 614.

¹⁰ Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 17.

lynching, described lynching as “America’s national crime.”¹¹ The white majority across the country utilized mob violence and lynching to secure justice when they believed the laws to be insufficient. Eastern, western, and middle states used lynching as a *modus operandi* to perform vigilante justice. In 1895, a church minister, Washington Gladden, revealed his impressions about lynching in northern states:

A neighbor of mine, a most brave and loyal and nobleman, who, is the colonel of the 14th regiment of the Ohio militia, is now on trial for his life because he ventured to face a mob and to protect a negro whose life the mob was seeking ... It is time that we in our Northern communities should stop this lawlessness. All this white cap business which is going on in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and other parts of the North is of the same piece; and while such things can occur in Northern communities we ought to hide our faces for shame.¹²

Another example is the lynching of a black man, William “Froggie” James. James was arrested for the murder of a white, 24-year-old salesclerk, Mary Phelley on November 8, 1909, in Cairo, Illinois. Cairo was “a town geographically northern, yet on one night it was a town mentally and spiritually as southern as Mississippi or Alabama.”¹³ Apparently, neither the victim nor the executioners were southerners,¹⁴ but the incident resembled the numerous African American lynchings in the southern states.

Lynching is traditionally considered as a form of white violence against blacks. African Americans were the largest group in the United States that suffered from lynching, but representatives of various groups, including whites, were also

¹¹ Philip Dray, *At the Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America* (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 17. However, there is another theory which indicates that lynching came to America from Scotland. For detail, see David Hacker Fischer, *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹² Rev. Washington Gladden, D.D., “Address on Lynching,” *The American Missionary*, 49 (1895), 406-407.

¹³ Stacy Pratt McDermott, “‘An Outrageous Proceeding’: A Northern Lynching and the Enforcement of Anti-Lynching Legislation in Illinois, 1905-1910,” *The Journal of Negro History* 84 (1999), 61.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 66.

lynched in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. For instance, in South Carolina, carpetbaggers from the North and native scalawags became the victims of mob violence.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the most famous example of white-on-white lynching in the South was the Leo Frank incident. Leo Frank, a “Yankee Jew,”¹⁶ was lynched in Georgia on August 16, 1915 because of the rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl, Mary Phagan, who was working in his factory. For many years, lynching was also a way of extra-legal justice in the far West. Most of the victims were white, although a certain number of Native Americans, Asians, Mexicans, and African Americans were lynched.¹⁷ In Alaska and Wyoming the number of white lynchings was higher than black lynchings. In California, ten Chinese immigrants, fifteen Latinos, and ten Indians were lynched whereas only one victim was black. In addition, ethnic minorities were accused of crimes similar to the offences that blacks were held responsible for in other states like rape, theft, and murder.¹⁸

5.2 Were Italians really “white”?

“Guineas,” “wops,” “dagoes,” and “dark whites.” These are some of the several nicknames with which Italian immigrants were associated in the late nineteenth-century United States. Italian immigrants in the United States had the right to be naturalized as American citizens, and thus, males gained the right to vote.

¹⁵ Tolnay, *A Festival of Violence*, 9. Carpetbaggers were the northerners who went to the southern states after the Civil War, and worked with southern Republicans, the scalawags. The term “carpetbagger” derives from the carpetbag luggage that these people carried. Both scalawags and carpetbaggers were hated by the southern Democrats during Reconstruction.

¹⁶ Nancy MacLean, “The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Making of Reactionary Populism,” *The Journal of American History* 78 (1991), 917.

¹⁷ James Allen and Hilton Als, eds, *Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America* (Santa Fe: Twin Palms Publishers, 2000), 13.

¹⁸ For detail about the lynching statistics in the United States, see the ongoing “Project HAL: Historical American Lynching data Collection Project,” Elizabeth Hines, PhD, Eliza Steelwater, PhD, Principal Investigators, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, <http://users.bestweb.net/~rg/lynchings>, May 15, 2005.

The place of Italian immigrants in the history of American lynchings is peculiar from this perspective. Blacks were largely disenfranchised by racist vigilantism and Jim Crow laws, and Italian immigrants were treated similarly. Italian mob victims “were second only to blacks in numbers of lynch victims in the years 1870 to 1940,”¹⁹ and obviously the “native” Americans did not consider them “white”, but an “in-between” race which was above African and Asian Americans, but below “white” people.²⁰ They were generally regarded as “white negroes.”²¹ Italian immigrants did not leave written records of their self perception as “white” or “black”; they were merely the “birds of passages” who aimed to go back to their motherland after earning enough money.

Questions about the categories of Italian race were among the widely discussed issues in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Italy. Italians themselves tended to make a distinction between southern (*meridionali*) and northern Italians. For instance, in 1898, the Sicilian anthropologist Alfredo Niceforo stated that there were two different races in Italy, Northerners and Southerners. The *meridionali* were barbarians, “‘un popolo donna’” (a womanly people) in contrast to the more masculine northerners, and they could be transformed into modern men only after a process of civilization.²² Furthermore, the northern Italians perceived the Sicilians as “Turks” and “Africans” long before their migration to the United

¹⁹ Richard Gambino, *Vendetta: The True Story of the Largest Lynching in U.S. History* (Toronto: Guernica, 2000), 135.

²⁰ James R. Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ‘New Immigrant’ Working Class,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 16 (1997) on <http://intl-programs.uiowa.edu/projects/documents/INBETWEENPEOPLES.doc>, August 17, 2005.

²¹ Clive Webb, “The Lynching of Sicilian Immigrants in the American South, 1886-1910,” *American Nineteenth Century History* 3 (2002), 57.

²² Donna Gabaccia, “Race, Nation, Hyphen: Italian-Americans and American Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective,” Jennifer Guglielmo and Salvatore Salerno, eds. *Are Italians White? How Race is Made in America* (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), 53.

States, and continued to call them as “little dark fellows” when they reached American shores.²³

The social, political and economic conditions of the Italians—mainly, Sicilians—in Louisiana are worth mentioning because of the New Orleans incident in 1891. A report of an Italian official, Luigi Villiari, illustrates the significance of the peculiar relation between Italian immigrants and the natives of Louisiana in the early twentieth century. In 1906, Villiari discovered that a great number of the plantation owners in Louisiana did not regard the Italian immigrants as white people, and called them as “white-skinned negroes” who were better workers than the African Americans.²⁴ Between 1880-1910, thousands of Sicilian immigrants went to Louisiana from Palermo to work in the sugarcane fields.²⁵ “Italians, along with other immigrants, had been invited to Louisiana as early as 1865, when some planters were seeking ‘docile’ white to substitute for Negro laborers, and to enlarge the white electorate of the black parishes.”²⁶ But apparently in 1890, the Italian immigrants in New Orleans were not recognized as a part of the white population by most of the “native” residents of the city. The main reason for that repudiation was related to the ethnic and cultural differences of the Italians. In general, they had come to Louisiana from Sicily, the part of Italy which was even alien to other Italians. Sicilians routinely chose to live in isolation to preserve their way of living in their “Little Palermos”, and the Americans did not favor that. Moreover, the Italian immigrant community gained economic privileges in New Orleans through cooperation with the blacks. There was no racial hostility between the two groups,

²³ James R. Barrett, “Inbetween Peoples,” 16.

²⁴ Ibid., 19.

²⁵ Vincenza Scarpaci, “Walking the Color Line, Italian Immigrants in Rural Louisiana, 1880-1910” in *Are Italians White?*, 61.

²⁶ George E. Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance to White Solidarity, 1890-1898,” *The Journal of Negro History* 50 (1965), 23.

and that was not a typical circumstance of rural Louisiana.²⁷ “Both Sicilians and blacks were quick to realize the mutual benefits to be gained from commerce with each other—for example, trading Italian vegetables and clothing for possum and alligator meat gotten by black hunters.”²⁸ Furthermore, “the Italians were less sentimental about Louisiana’s past. Their economic outlook fitted more into the philosophy of the Populists than into that of the Democrats,”²⁹ and their participation in politics would be a great threat to the political status quo. In late-nineteenth century Louisiana, voting had become an important instrument for the Democratic Party to control the status quo, and wealthy plantation owners used their influence and money in the 1884, 1886, and 1888 elections. In 1896, Italians decided to vote for the Populist Party since the Democrats were making a plan about the disenfranchisement of the African Americans and Italians through “a suffrage amendment, based upon an educational and property qualification.”³⁰ In order to protest it, Italians paraded on the streets of New Orleans on March 24, 1896 by showing the Italian flag. That was a big mistake since, for the “white” New Orleaners, this manifestation meant “Italians [were united] on the basis of nationality ... and organize[d] the foreign-born population against the natives, in order to foster their own personal interests.”³¹ In brief, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Italian immigrants became the enemies of the “native” population in Louisiana economically, politically, and socially.

²⁷ Scarpaci, “Walking the Color Line,” 68.

²⁸ Gambino, *Vendetta*, 56.

²⁹ Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance,” 29.

³⁰ Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance,” 29.

³¹ Ibid. 30, from *Times-Democrat*, March 24, 1896.

5.3. The Rehearsal & the Actual Mass Mob Lynching: Michael Cancemi and New Orleans

As W. Fitzhugh Brundage states in *Lynching in the New South*, historians treat mass mobs as the most “typical” mobs.³² Suspects charged with rape or murder became the victims of mass mobs, and usually more than one person was murdered during mass mob lynchings. Sometimes lower-class whites, and sometimes the most prominent local residents became the members of these mobs, which numbered from hundreds to thousands, and they usually got local approval for their deeds.³³ Another important characteristic of mass mobs was the rituals, which occurred not as a result of uncontrolled violence, but as a disciplined rehearsal of right civil attitudes.³⁴ In short, as Brundage states, mass mob lynchings had didactic aims, and that kind of violence was performed in order to protect social order from the intruders. In general, African Americans were the victims of mass mobs, but two lynchings incidents of Italians reveal the same features with this form of vigilantism.

The following extract is from a song sheet about the murder of a policeman named Eugene Anderson, killed by “the desperate Italian burglar,” Michael Cancemi, at the corner of Centre and Grand Streets, New York, on July 22, 1857:

³² For detail about the features of mass mobs, see Brundage, *Lynching*, 36-45 and Stovel, “Lynching in the Deep South,” 859.

³³ *Ibid.*, 36, 37.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 40.




Figure 5.1 The Murdered Policeman, Eugene Anderson, Who was shot by the Desperate Italian Burglar, Michael Cancemi..."

The excitement was great beyond all control,
Kill the murderer—yes lynch him—cried every soul,
Take at all hazards the base monster vile
And make the first lamp-post his funeral pile.
To the Centre Street Tombs the mob sped their way,
Resolved the murderer should die on that day,
A rope was prepared, and a gallows likewise,
To see him advancing watching all eyes.
The butcher boys followed with determined will,
The Italian to lynch who did Anderson kill,
Give us the villain who murdered our friend—
The carriage by thousands completely was penned.³⁵

Thus, Italians had become the target of mob violence well before the 1880s.

The murderer, Michael Cancemi, was in the end imprisoned as indicated in the song

³⁵ "The Murdered Policeman, Eugene Anderson, Who was shot by the Desperate Italian Burglar, Michael Cancemi, corner of Centre and Grand Streets, July 22, 1857. Air-Indian Hunter, by Saugerties Bard." *America Singing: Nineteenth Century Song Sheets*, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=amss&fileName=as1/as109020/amsspage.db&recNum=0&itemLink=D?amss:26:/temp/~ammem_ZiqC:...POLICEMAN, April 8, 2005.

and was convicted of murder at his second trial since the jury could not agree on the first one³⁶, but the narration of the incident does not portray a typical white execution. Even in a city like New York in the antebellum period, Italians were treated differently from white people. This event was the rehearsal of another incident of the late nineteenth century, which sparked a major diplomatic crisis between the United States and Italy.

The New Orleans lynching in 1891 was a repetition of the Cancemi incident on a larger scale. In October 1890, New Orleans Police Chief David Hennessy was murdered while he was returning home. Hennessy had become a popular figure, a local hero in New Orleans in 1881 when he arrested a Sicilian criminal, Giuseppe Esposito, who had escaped Italian authorities after his gang “Leone” had kidnapped an English tourist, John Forrester Rose, for ransom. For two years, “it was a matter of Italy’s honor that [Esposito] be brought to justice by Italian authorities.”³⁷ But Esposito escaped to the United States taking refuge in New Orleans. There, Hennessy captured Esposito. That incident made Hennessy famous as a crime fighter in New Orleans, and a possible target for the Italian immigrants. According to an editorial, “Hennessy in some way learned many of the secrets of the worst Italian societies transplanted from Italy.”³⁸

Hennessy’s friend Bill O’Connor reported that his last words before his death were “Dagoes did it.” Only O’Connor remembered Hennessy saying this in the nine hours it took him to die, but, nevertheless, “at the time of Hennessy’s death, some

³⁶ “Monthly Record of Current Events.” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine* 16 (1858), 259.

³⁷ Gambino, *Vendetta*, 30.

³⁸ *The New York Times*, 17 October 1890.

fifty Italians had already been arrested, and between one and two hundred more were to be taken during the next twenty-four hours.”³⁹

The major figure in the Italians’ arrest was unquestionably the mayor of New Orleans, Joseph A. Shakspeare. The speech that he made to the City Council on 18 October, 1890 demonstrated the mayor’s enthusiasm for the punishment of the murderers as well as his attitude about the Italian community in New Orleans:

The circumstances of the cowardly deed, the arrest made and the evidence collected by the police department, show beyond doubt that [Hennessy] was the victim of the Sicilian vengeance, wreaked upon him as the chief representative of law and order in this community because he was seeking, by the power of our American law, to break up the fierce vendettas that have so often stained our streets with blood ... The Sicilian who comes here must become an American citizen, and subject his wrongs to the remedy of the law of the land, or else there must be no place for him on the American continent.⁴⁰

For the investigation of the Hennessy murder, Mayor Shakspeare appointed the “Committee of Fifty” which acted independent of the police department. The members of the committee were selected from the “native” citizens of New Orleans, and nineteen Italian immigrants were arrested: Pietro Monasterio, Joseph P. Macheca, Antonio Marchesi, Gaspare Marchesi, Antonio Scaffidi, Charles Matranga, Emmanuele Polizzi, Antonio Bagnetto, Bastian Incardona, James Caruso, Rocco Geraci, Frank Romero, Loretto Comitz, Charles Traina, Peter Natali, Charles Pietza, Charles Patorno, Salvatore Sinceri, and John Caruso. Of these nineteen names, the most significant one was Charles Matranga, one of the two important *padroni* in New Orleans. The Matranga family was in rivalry with the Provenzanos for the control of an important part of the city’s food supply, and “according to unconfirmed accounts, Hennessy and the Provenzanos were part owners of a whorehouse called,

³⁹ Gambino, *Vendetta*, 8.

⁴⁰ *The New Times*, 19 October 1890.

appropriately, the Red Lantern Club.”⁴¹ So Hennessy was hardly a paragon of morality himself. But Mayor Shakspeare convinced the whole nation that there was a fight against organized crime in New Orleans.

The Italian Consul in New Orleans, Pasquale Corte, made a great effort to save the Italian immigrants in the city. He addressed a letter to Mayor Shakspeare,

Asking him to calm the public excitement caused by the horrible crime and to see that the inoffensive prisoners be treated with the same consideration as those of other nationalities. The Consul [was] anxious that the assassins, whoever they [were], should be punished, but [did] not think it [was] just that an entire colony should be held responsible for the wrongdoings of a few of its worst representatives.⁴²

Consul Corte also paid several visits to Governor Nicholls, even on the day of the lynching of the prisoners. But he could not prevent the approaching incident. On March 14, 1891, a mob of 6,000 New Orleaners, shouting, “Yes, yes, hang the dagoes!” lynched eleven Italians. They hanged Antonio Bagnetto and Emmanuele Polizzi-with the help of three African Americans-on a lamppost and a tree; used them for “target practice,” and “some of the women of the city came and dipped their lace handkerchiefs in their blood as souvenirs, and crowds of souvenir hunters stripped the barks from the trunk of tree on which Bagnetto was hanging.”⁴³ The victims of the incident were accused of crimes that were believed to be innate to the Italian race, which was not regarded as a part of the “white” race:

These sneaking and cowardly Sicilians, the descendants of bandits and assassins, who have transplanted to this country the lawless passions, the cutthroat practices, and the oath-bound societies of their native country, are to us a past without mitigations. Our own rattlesnakes are as good citizens as they. Lynch law was the only course open to the

⁴¹ Gambino, *Vendetta*, 47.

⁴² *The New York Times*, October 21, 1890.

⁴³ Gambino, *Vendetta*, 87.

people of New Orleans to stay the issue of a new license to the Mafia to continue its bloody practices.⁴⁴

5.4 The Tampa Lynching: Terrorist Mob or Posse Violence

Similar to the Ku Klux Klan, “night riders” and “whitecappers” that targeted the African Americans for punishment, the citizens committee of Tampa was organized to discipline the Italian and other Latin strikers in the city through a murderous ritual. It was not analogous to the burning crosses of the Klan members, but the victims were left hanged on a tree with signals that signified who was *de facto* principal authority in Tampa.⁴⁵

Two Sicilian immigrants, Castenego Ficcarotta and Angelo Albano, were murdered in Tampa, on September 20, 1910, during a strike of the Cigar Makers International Union (CMIU) against the cigar shop owners. The cigar industry was the lifeblood of Tampa’s economy, but Tampa witnessed two other strikes before the one in 1910, one in 1899, and another in 1901. Consequently, the businessmen in Tampa used vigilante violence to repress the workers.⁴⁶ Cigar industry workers were ethnically diverse—Cuban, Spanish and Italian—but they overcame their ethnic differences within their unions. Before the Italian immigrants, the Hispanic workers were organizing in the city, but the arrival of the Italians “brought a new wave of socialists and anarchists. Many of the Italians came from a section of Sicily which had experienced rural uprisings, led in part by socialists, during the 1890s.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, March 16, 1891.

⁴⁵ There was a sign pinned on Albano’s trousers that warned the members of the strike, and a pipe was placed in Ficcarotta’s mouth.

⁴⁶ Robert P. Ingalls, “Strikes and Vigilante Violence in Tampa’s Cigar Industry.” http://www.lib.usf.edu/ldsu/digitalcollections/T06/journal/v07n2_85/v07n2_85_117.pdf, August 17, 2005.

⁴⁷ Robert P. Ingalls, *Urban Vigilantes in the New South: Tampa, 1882-1936* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 57.

They also supported a radical newspaper named *La Voce dello Schiavo* [*The Voice of the Slave*].⁴⁸ In a short time, Italian immigrants in Tampa began to be identified like their Latin neighbors, as the “undesired elements,” “radicals,” and “anarchists.” The Spanish and Cuban immigrants were the strike leaders, “but Italians were active in the ranks and in supplying street-corner oratory that helped to maintain worker solidarity.”⁴⁹ The attitude toward this ethnic group among the white citizens can easily be understood from a 1909 editorial in the *Tampa Morning Tribune* that referred to the number of assassinations within the Italian community: “... not one Italian has been punished for any degree of homicide. The spectacle of two or three Italians hanging from the gallows would be very edifying and effective about now.”⁵⁰

Opposition to the ethnic minorities in Tampa preeminently revealed itself in the actions of the so-called citizens’ committees. Citizens’ committees were groups of leading businessmen “act[ing] as vigilante groups, though many times sanctioned by local law. These committees used whatever means, legal or not, to cleanse their communities of ‘undesirable elements’.”⁵¹ In the 1901 strike, the citizens committee of Tampa forced thirteen union leaders to go to Honduras permanently, and in 1910, they lynched two Italian immigrants.

The two Italians, Ficcarotta, a forty-five year old unemployed man accused of killing his cousin and found innocent by a jury a year before the incident, and Albano, a twenty-five year old insurance salesman and a former cigar worker, were

⁴⁸ Ingalls, “Strikes and Vigilante Violence.”

⁴⁹ George E. Pozzetta, “¡Alerta Tabaqueros! Tampa’s Striking Cigar Workers.” on http://www.lib.usf.edu/ldsu/digitalcollections/T06/journal/v03n2_81/v03n2_81_019.pdf, Date of Access: August 17, 2005.

⁵⁰ Joe Scaglione, “City in Turmoil: Tampa and the Strike of 1910,” *The Sunland Tribune* 28 (1992), 31.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

“accused of shooting J. F. Easterling, a bookkeeper.”⁵² Easterling was employed at the Bustilla and Díaz Cigar Company, and had pulled a gun at one of the members of the union organizing committee. That event apparently made the bookkeeper a target for the union members. On September 14, 1910, when Easterling was entering the factory at 1:30 in the afternoon, he was shot. The *Tribune* called Easterling “the first American” who had been assaulted, and warned he should be “the very last American to be attacked, in this bold, bloodthirsty manner.”⁵³ When Easterling was shot, there was a huge crowd of Cuban and Italian workers in the factory demonstrating. However, only the two Italians were arrested. Consequently, Ficcarotta and Albano were “lynched by citizens of West Tampa with the connivance of the local police authorities,”⁵⁴ while they were being transferred to the jail on September 20. They were found hanging from a huge oak tree, still handcuffed together, with a sign pinned to Albano’s trousers saying: “Others take notice or go the same way. We know seven more. We are watching. If any more citizens molested, look out. (signed) Justice.”⁵⁵

⁵² James Allen, *Without Sanctuary*, 168.

⁵³ Scaglione, “City in Turmoil,” 32.

⁵⁴ Memorandum by the Solicitor of the Department of State, April 13, 1911, *FRUS*, 614.

⁵⁵ Scaglione, “City in Turmoil,” 32.



Figure 5.1 Albano and Ficcarotta

Source: http://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~jcane/Iron_Eyes_Cody.htm, February 14, 2007.

“The English language press pictured [the Italians] as hired assassins, ‘tools of anarchistic elements in the city,’ describing their fate ironically as a ‘rebuke to lawlessness’.”⁵⁶ Their lynching was the indigenous form of violence by which the native citizens of Tampa responded to immigrants’ disruption of the economic order, through violence. The confidential report the Italian vice-consul at New Orleans, Gaetano Moroni, about the Tampa investigation depicted the event as a conspiracy:

The lynching itself was not the outcome of a temporary outburst of popular anger, but was rather planned, in cold blood, to the most trifling detail, by some citizens of West Tampa with the tacit assent of a few police officers, and all with the intention of teaching an awful lesson to the strikers of the cigar factories who had passed from quiet protest to acts of violence against the manufacturers, and, at the same time, of getting rid of two ‘terrible ruffians’.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Gary R. Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, *The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and their Latin Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 120.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

“A crescendo of violence followed the lynchings”⁵⁸ in Tampa. Cigar industry workers used arson as a vehicle to act against business owners and their allies. They destroyed a cigar factory, and the firemen managed to save the Tribune building at the last moment. Eventually, the citizens’ committee took the control of Tampa, and on January 25, 1911 the strike came to an end.

5.5 Private Lynchings: Hahnville, Tallulah & Erwin

Private lynchings in the southern states were based on private vengeance.⁵⁹ They were usually the consequences of arguments and threats, and thus they were not public events in which hundreds of people took an active part, but consisted of small groups of people. Private mobs acted in secrecy, sometimes carried their victims to the place of the alleged crime, and the victims were already in legal custody when they were lynched.⁶⁰ Three other Italian lynchings in the southern states share the same characteristics of these private incidents, and they are worth revealing since their details are not widely known among the historians of lynching.

On August 9 1896, three Italians, Lorenzo Salardino, Salvatore Arena and Giuseppe Venturella, all Italian subjects, were lynched in Hahnville, Louisiana. Venturella and Arena had already been imprisoned for two months for the murder of a Spaniard, Joaquin Roxino. Salardino, with another Italian, Connel Marini, his son and his wife, had been charged with the murder of Jules Gueymard at his store at Freetown.⁶¹ At midnight, a group of armed men ordered the jailer, who was

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ For detail about private lynchings see Brundage, *Lynchings*, 28-32 and Stovel, “Lynchings in the Deep South,” 858.

⁶⁰ Brundage, *Lynchings*, 30.

⁶¹ Governor Murphy J. Foster to W. W. Rockhill, Acting Secretary, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, August 25, 1896, *FRUS* (1897), 403.

African American, to open the door and took out the three Italians who were crying and begging for mercy. The “crowd took them to a stable a short distance away, gave them two minutes in which to pray,”⁶² and then hanged them. The group waited for a few minutes, then opened fire at the dead bodies, and finally dissolved.⁶³ The lynching was performed to avenge the murder of Jules Gueymard, who was a prominent citizen of St. Charles Parish. Gueymard had a difficulty only with Salardino, an agricultural laborer and barber, who had threatened Gueymard after his testimony in a suit brought by creditors against Salardino.⁶⁴ Venturella and Arena were convicted of the murder of Roxino, a respectable and quiet old man, who was in business of gathering moss like the two Sicilians. One day, he was found dead along a road, and Venturella and Arena were arrested since they had a strong grudge against Roxino.⁶⁵ The United States officials asserted that the lynching was done not because of the race of the Italians, but because of “the intense feeling created by the murder of Gueymard,”⁶⁶ but that was not a reasonable explanation for the assassination of the other Italians who had been convicted with the death of Roxino.

In addition, there was no sufficient evidence for the Italians’ guilt, but “it appeared that the Italians now had the sympathy of the Negroes, for ‘a large number of Negroes and Italians were present at the burial [of the victims] and went home from the scene almost terror-stricken.’”⁶⁷ In the end, the United States paid an indemnity of \$6,000 to the relatives of the lynched men, all Italian subjects.

⁶² August 10, 1896, *The New York Times*.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Richard Olney to Baron Francesco Fava, Department of State, Washington, November 27, 1896, *FRUS* (1897), 408.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 409.

⁶⁶ *FRUS* (1897), 404.

⁶⁷ Cunningham, “The Italian, a Hindrance to White Solidarity,” 32.

The Tallulah lynching in 1899 shared characteristics with the New Orleans lynching. Firstly, Tallulah was also in Louisiana. The victims, Frank Difatta-a fruit vendor and small grocer⁶⁸- his brothers, Joseph and Charles, Rosario Fiducia and Giovanni Cirone were all Sicilian immigrants and Italian subjects. They were accused of shooting Dr. J. Ford Hodge, a prominent member of the “white” community, although Hodge later recovered from his wounds.

The Sicilians were captured, a mob gathered and hanged them. Giuseppe Defina, an Italian subject and the brother-in-law of one of the lynched men,⁶⁹ brought to the acting Italian consul at New Orleans a list of names of persons of Tallulah who wanted to lynch him. Defina stated in his affidavit that he had a shop for provisions and articles in Millikens Bend, Louisiana, and “by [his] good conduct [he] soon acquired a reputation in the village for honesty above the other shopkeepers, and thereby gained many customers ... and was able to lend money and sell [his] goods on credit to the families.”⁷⁰ According to Defina’s affidavit, if a Dr. Ward had not warned him at the proper time, he would not have the chance to escape to Vicksburg, Mississippi, and would have been lynched by an angry mob.

⁶⁸ Edward F. Haas, “Guns, Goats, and Italians: The Tallulah Lynching of 1899,” *North Louisiana Historical Association* 13 (1982), 1.

⁶⁹ Italian ambassador Baron Francesco S. Fava to John Hay, Secretary of State, January 15, 1900, Washington, *FRUS*, 715.

⁷⁰ Acting Italian consul Tapini to Baron Fava, New Orleans, January 13, 1900, *Ibid.* 717.




Figure 5.3 FIVE POOR ITALIANS

Lynched in Talulah [sic] in America

Source: Edward H. Haas, "Guns, Goats, and Italians: The Tallulah Lynching of 1899"

In response, Enrico Cavalli, the representative of the Italian consulate in New Orleans, traveled to Tallulah, but he was not welcomed there. However, from his observations it was obvious that "all the persons composing the population of that village had taken part directly in the murder or had consented to it."⁷¹ Cavalli added that on the day of the incident a shopkeeper stated that he would provide "whisky and beer gratis to [the villagers] if they would lynch the Italians, Frank Difatta, Rosario Fiducia and [Giovanni] Cirone."⁷² The motive for killing the Italians was also apparent; there was "a spirit of rivalry in trade ... [and] a desire to prevent the Italians from voting."⁷³ Italian merchants were selling goods to African Americans

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Baron Fava to John Hay, Washington, October 14, 1900, Disclosure 1-Translation, 726.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 727.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

at lower prices because of the cultural affinity between the two groups that developed as a result of Italians' humane attitude toward black customers.⁷⁴

The beginning of the twentieth century saw the continuation of this pattern with an incident in Mississippi. In July 1901, at Erwin, Mississippi, two Italian subjects from Cefalu, Sicily, Giovanni and Vincenzo Serio, "were attacked and killed by an armed mob,"⁷⁵ and a third one, Salvatore Liberto, "was wounded, under the circumstances which constituted a lynching."⁷⁶ As in the lynching in Hahnville, Louisiana, the Italian government demanded the punishment of the guilty people by the federal government of the United States. Secretary of State John Hay replied that he would transfer the Italian ambassador's note to the governor of Mississippi who would certainly take action.⁷⁷ However, the United States government reminded the Italian officials of the federal nature of the American government, which prevented the federal government in Washington from prosecuting the case in Mississippi. Later, a jury in Mississippi, composed of six people, stated "We, the jury, sitting as an inquest upon the bodies of Vincin Cerio [sic] and Joe Cerio [sic], do find that the said [people] came to their death by the act of God, in that they died from gunshot wounds at the hands of unknown parties to this jury."⁷⁸ The state government of Mississippi could not find the murderers of the Italian subjects, and simply declared them unknown, but the Italian ambassador narrated the incident in a different manner:

Vincenzo Serio one of the victims, eight months ago had a dispute in regard to a horse of his that was found on the property of an American citizen. The latter, and other citizens of Glen Allen, armed with guns, attempted to murder Serio, whom they left wounded, but who succeeded in escaping to

⁷⁴ Barrett, "Inbetween Peoples," 11.

⁷⁵ Italian Ambassador Signor Carignani to John Hay, Washington, July 15 1901, *FRUS* (1902), 283.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, John Hay to Signor Carignani, Washington, July 21, 1901, 283.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 286.

Greenville[sic]. Lately, having returned for the purpose of rejoining his father, Giovanni Serio (the other victim), at Glen Allen, the citizens ordered him to leave the village within thirty days ... At Glen Allen no secret was made of the preparations for the lynching ... At Erwin, Glenville, and Glen Allen everyone is afraid to speak, but knows that the citizens of Glen Allen are the organizers and authors of the lynching.⁷⁹

Despite the efforts of the Italian ambassador, the murderers of the Sicilians were not found.

5.6 Italian Lynchings in Colorado

Colorado has an important and undiscovered place in the history of Italian lynchings. Several Italian immigrants became victims of mob violence in Colorado, which demonstrates resemblance to black lynchings in the southern states. In *Lynching in Colorado, 1859-1919*, Stephen J. Leonard shows that Italian lynchings started in Colorado due the increase in the number of Italian immigrants. Colorado lynchings appear to have been the outcomes of economic insufficiency and lack of work in the late nineteenth century, but the features of the incidents refer to a more complex formation which was also related to race relations. A review of the details of these incidents will show that Italian lynchings were not peculiar only to the southern states. Thus, two of the lynchings in Colorado will be discussed in this part.

As early as 1881, conflict began to arise between the Italian immigrants and the residents of Colorado. The first incident occurred in Poverty Flats between

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Carignani to David J. Hill, Acting Secretary, Washington, July 24 1901, 287.

Americans and Italians that resulted with the destruction of a house.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the lynching of Daniel Arata, a manager of a hotel and a saloon in Denver, is a significant incident that exposes characteristics of a mass mob lynching in the late nineteenth-century American west.

On July 25, 1893 Arata was lynched because of the murder of one of his customers named Lightfoot, who was a Civil War veteran. It was alleged that Arata beat and shot the sixty-two-year-old man when he did not pay five cents for his second beer. Arata was arrested, and taken to the Arapahoe County jail. An angry mob including women and the prominent citizens of Denver, marched to the jail, shouting, "We're going to lynch the Dago."⁸¹ They eventually found Arata in the prison, wounded him in the stomach with a knife, took him out, and hanged him. The crowd also wanted to burn him, but could not accomplish that because of rain.⁸² Instead, similar to Polizzi in New Orleans, they hanged his body from a telegraph pole, and chopped pieces from the bloody pole.⁸³ The Arata lynching did not cause a crisis between Italy and the United States because the victim was a native-born American citizen, though of Italian ancestry.

However, Lorenzo Andinino, Francesco Ronchietto, and Stanislao Vittone were Italian subjects when they were murdered in Walsenburg, Colorado, on March 14, 1895. This event caused another diplomatic problem between the two countries. The Walsenburg incident is also significant in the sense that it demonstrates the aspects of a typical southern private lynching. However, the victims were not Sicilians like the other ones; they came from Turin. Everything started with the rumors that a party of Italians at Rouse murdered Abner Hixon, the keeper of a

⁸⁰ Stephen J. Leonard, *Lynching in Colorado, 1859-1919* (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 2002), 135.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 138.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 139.

saloon, on March 11, 1895. Hixon was from Arkansas and thirty-six years old, and he was known as a quiet person. It was claimed that Italian miners Antonio Gobetti held Hixon, and Andinino (or, Danino) hit him on his head with a table leg on the road to Walsenburg to Rouse, and some workmen from the mines discovered Hixon's dead body with his fractured head.⁸⁴

On March 13, Andinino and his alleged counterparts, Francesco Ronchietto, Stanislao Vittone, Pietro Giacobini, and Antonio Gobetti were arrested for the murder of Hixon. When they were on their way to the prison under the custody of two armed sheriffs, a man on horseback met the wagon on Bear Creek Bridge, and ordered the driver to stop.⁸⁵ Then, four or five other people on horseback shot the Italians in the back with revolvers. Vittone was killed instantly, Ronchietto was wounded in his heart, and Gobetto and Giacobini took flight. The driver, Joseph Welsby also died.⁸⁶ Around 1 o'clock on March 14, a group of seven armed and masked men broke into the Walsenburg jail, deceived the guard by calling for the sheriff, and shot Andinino and Ronchietto to death, but spared other prisoners of German origin who were in the same cell.⁸⁷ Order was restored in Walsenburg on the same day, only the Italians in Denver were "watched by the police to prevent any organized attempt at retaliation."⁸⁸ Italy asked for the punishment of the murderers, but the consequence was the same with the other lynchings; the families of the victims were paid indemnities by the United States Treasury, and the case was closed.

⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, March 14, 1895.

⁸⁵ [Enclosure No. 1-Translation] Baron Fava to Mr. Grisham, Washington, March 27, 1895, *FRUS*, 945.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, March 15, 1895.

5.7 Italian and American Reactions to Italian Lynchings

The New Orleans lynching of 1891 caused a diplomatic crisis between the United States and Italy. In order to understand the reasons for the crisis, a treaty signed between the United States and Italy on February 26, 1871 should be discussed briefly. The treaty's third article guaranteed the protection of the citizens of both countries:

The citizens of each of the High Parties to the convention will receive within the States and territories of the other one, the most continuous protection and security to their personal lives and properties, benefiting to this end of the same rights and privileges which are already provided or shall be provided to the national citizens, as long as they submit themselves also to the same conditions imposed on these ones.⁸⁹

Relying on the 1871 treaty, the Italian government declared that a crime had been committed in New Orleans against the Italian subjects living in America. The Italian Ambassador in Washington, Baron Francesco Fava, presented the evidence to the United States with the reports of Consul Corte. The United States government indicated its dual nature, and stated that the federal government did not have a right to intervene in state or local matters. Italy then asked for the payment of an indemnity to the families of the lynched Italian subjects and also for the punishment of guilty people, but the executioners of the eleven Italians were never brought to justice. Consequently, the Italian government recalled Baron Fava in 1892 in dissatisfaction of his ineffectiveness. In the end, President Benjamin Harrison ordered the payment of the indemnity of \$24,330.90, and the Italian ambassador returned to Washington.

⁸⁹ Bradley "The 1891-92 New Orleans Negotiations," *The 1891 New Orleans Lynching*, 339.

The remarkable point that should be emphasized regarding the New Orleans crisis is the solidarity of the Italian immigrants. It is important in the sense that this solidarity signifies the development of Italian nationalism on American soil, a transformation from *campanilismo* to *italianità*. The Italian American organizations in major cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York held demonstrations for the Sicilian victims of the lynching. With “analogous lively meetings held in [different cities] people dressed in mourning ... [and] requested the sending of a warship, if necessary.”⁹⁰ In addition, major Italian American newspapers like *Il Progresso Italo-Americano* and *L'Eco d'Italia* asked for the support of Europe as well as the Italian government by stating that “Italy must have reparation, and the nations of Europe must aid [Italians] in getting this reparation.”⁹¹

There were similar developments in Italy where people protested the lynching of the Sicilians in New Orleans, and the newspaper *Popolo Romano* declared, “Relying on the foresight of the American authorities and out of regard for a sincerely friendly power, Italy [had] refrained from sending an ironclad to the mouth of the Mississippi.”⁹² However, there were also other Italian voices that manifested the “latent bourgeois’ respectability in disapproving the conduct of some groups of emigrants, especially from the South, which perpetrated and exported the methods and goals of the Mafia into distant foreign regions.”⁹³ The Milanese newspaper, *Il Corriere della Sera*, was the most significant example of that attitude. The newspaper reported the New Orleans lynching with the headline: “Guilt of the Sicilians Lynched in New Orleans.”⁹⁴ Rather than emphasizing the Italian

⁹⁰ Liborio Casilli, “The Impact of the 1891 New Orleans Incident on the Italian Press,” Rimanelli, *The 1891 New Orleans Lynching*, 362.

⁹¹ *The New York Times*, March 16, 1891.

⁹² *Ibid.*, March 17, 1891.

⁹³ Casilli, “The New Orleans Lynching,” 358.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 359.

nationality of the victims, the newspaper referred only to their southern origin, and asserted that they were killed because of their “guilt,” presumably because of being the members of a secret organization. In addition, in a letter sent to *Il Corriere della Sera*, which was published on the front page, one I. M. Guastalla affirmed that most of the Italian emigrants were *mafia* members, who were also responsible for the death of many Americans:

Italian colonies leave a lot to be desired in America and Africa, because, with the exception of a few honest people, they are composed of many ‘scoundrels’ escaped from justice, and in New Orleans there is a flowering of secret societies that carry out the murders of so many American citizens, and which have remained unpunished.⁹⁵

Italian regional prejudice helps us understand why American lynchings of Italians did not compromise the positive image of America in Italy. However, Sicilians were more devoted to the troubles of the Sicilian immigrants in America. An article entitled “American Savagery” in the Sicilian newspaper, *Giornale di Sicilia*, stated, “it was unfair to ‘throw mud on an entire generous people, as civilized as any other.’”⁹⁶ Italy had to unite and protect the rights of its people abroad. In addition, at a conference held in Palermo on May 3, 1891, a lawyer, Alberico Pincitore stated, “the federal government [of the United States had] to have all its interest in resolving the problem in Italy’s favor, and cooperate with [the Italians] for that,” and added that “Italy’s policy [had to be] of patience and firmness.”⁹⁷ That was “how [they could] win against America.”⁹⁸ The Italian

⁹⁵ Ibid., 358.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 361.

⁹⁷ Alberico Pincitore, *Sulla Maniera di Risolvere Il Conflitto Italo-Americano: Conferenza tenuta in Palermo nella Sala delle Adunanze della Croce Bianca* [About the Way of Resolving the Italo-American Conflict: The Conference held in Palermo in the Meeting Hall of the White Cross] (Palermo: Tipografia del Giornale di Sicilia, 1891), 6.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

argument about U.S. protection of immigrants relied on Art. VI, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and the Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State, shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

For Pincitore, “this article pronounce[d] that the treaty signed with Italy ha[d] the power of supreme law like the [U.S.] Constitution in the United States territory, and because of that, the federal government ha[d] to impose the observation of the treaty in the same manner and the same force that it [did] respecting the Constitution.”⁹⁹ From the Italian perspective, the federal government had to have the sufficient authority over the whole United States, and that could only be achieved by enforcing the federal laws.¹⁰⁰

Pincitore argued that if “the law of granting protection and security to the Italians in America was only for one particular State, the federal government would not have been included in the treaty with Italy in 1871.”¹⁰¹ As also declared in the 14th Amendment, the citizens of the individual states were also “the citizens of the United States, and in [Italians’] case, the judges had to be the federal magistrates.”¹⁰² Pincitore’s argument, or understanding, was very clear: Only the articles of the Constitution and the 1871 Italo-American treaty were valid in the Italians’ situation; state law did not apply.

Traditionally, however, the United States government did not involve itself in local and state law enforcement of civil rights. The United States Supreme Court

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

upheld this jurisdictional arrangement in the Slaughterhouse cases, 83, U.S. 36 (1873), by differentiating “state citizenship” from “national citizenship.” In effect, for American authorities, the 1871 Treaty conferred rights of national citizenship on Italian immigrants, but not rights of state citizenship. This was the legal rationale for the United States federal government’s weak response to the Italian lynchings.

Another document approached the New Orleans lynching from a different point of view. Referring to the alleged American idea that “when justice did not function properly, the lynch law became a legitimate way,”¹⁰³ Pietro Nocito, a member of the parliament, and a famous Sicilian jurist and professor of law in the University of Rome, referred to the New Orleans lynching as a “complete barbarous act.”¹⁰⁴ He stated that the acts of the New Orleaners became legitimate to Americans since they were thinking that they were fighting against the *mafia*. Nocito also recalled an incident in 1851 when Spanish subjects were wounded in the United States. As a result of that event, the U.S. government paid reparation to Spain. He indicated “the American minister James G. Blaine, in his note ... remembered the diplomatic incident between the United States and Spain, but forgot that American Congress had admitted the principle of indemnity in a case more remote [than the New Orleans lynching].”¹⁰⁵ Nocito added that he believed in “the good intentions of the American government for the completion of penal justice.”¹⁰⁶ As a consequence of the crisis between the countries, Italy would not wish to declare war on the United States, “but there [was] also an abyss between war and

¹⁰³ Pietro Nocito, *La Legge di Lynch e il Conflitto Italo-Americano [The Lynch Law and the Italian-American Conflict]* dalla *Nuova Antologia* [from *The New Anthology*], (Roma: Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, 1891), 9.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

resignation, between the rumble of the cannons of [Italian] battleships and the silence of [Italian] diplomacy.”¹⁰⁷

Gino Speranza¹⁰⁸, an Italian American who was born and raised in the United States, and who was also the founder of the Society for the Protection of Italian Immigrants, approached United States federalism from an entirely Italian point of view. In his 1904 article entitled, “How It Feels to Be a Problem” he asked what would have happened if Americans were lynched in Italy:

What appeal can the doctrine of state supremacy and federal non-interference make to [the Italian immigrant]? Imagine what you would think of Italian justice if the American sailors in Venice, in resisting arrest by the constituted authorities, had been strung up to a telegraph pole by an infuriated Venetian mob, and the government at Rome had said, with the utmost courtesy: ‘We are very sorry and greatly deplore it, but we can’t interfere with the autonomy of the province of Venetia!’...¹⁰⁹

In brief, the Italian authorities as well as the Sicilian intellectuals were aware that there was federalism in the United States, but their attitude about the issue was different from that of the Americans. The United States officials indicated the federal government’s limits of authority over the states, but Italy continued to emphasize the omnipotence of a federal ruler by referring to the American laws and the Constitution, and especially to the treaty signed between the United States and Italy. Giuseppe Mazzini’s earlier critique of American federalism was vindicated.

The response of the American public to the New Orleans lynching was best reflected in the newspapers. There were different voices about the assassination of the Italians. Often in the local newspapers like the *Picayune* and the *Times-Democrat* of New Orleans, the actions of the “native” citizens, were justified. Apart

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁰⁸ Also see Chapter 9.

¹⁰⁹ Gino Speranza, “How It Feels to Be a Problem,” Michael M. Topp, *The Sacco and Vanzetti Case: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston & New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005), 55.

from that, one of the points that the lynching supporters indicated was the connection between the murdered Italians and organized crime. Most Americans considered the victims of the incident as the members of the *mafia*, so their murder was a natural reaction to save the order of the country:

Such a society is not only an offence against civilization and decent citizenship; it is itself 'Lynch Law' organized and made permanent. Here was a society which was a continuous conspiracy against everything that is righteous and civilized. The lynchers of New Orleans were "law-abiding" men in the sense that they waited for the administration of justice according to law before undertaking to execute justice not according to law.¹¹⁰

In "Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration," Henry Cabot Lodge revealed the same attitude about the lynched Italians and their connection to the *mafia*. He asserted, "the men who were killed were members of the Mafia, a secret society bound by the most rigid oaths and using murder as a means of maintaining its discipline and carrying out its decrees."¹¹¹ Lodge also indicated that the secret organizations like the *mafia* were completely alien to American culture, and they were "the product[s] of repressive government on the continent of Europe."¹¹² In his opinion, those organizations were formed after the immigration of the European people to the American continent, but the tendency to commit a crime did "come not from race peculiarities, but from the quality of certain classes of immigrants of all races."¹¹³ Nevertheless, he also indicated that the best immigrants to America were from Germany and Scandinavia. In order to prevent the arrival of "alien" people, Lodge concluded that Congress had to bring certain regulations to southern European immigration to the United States.

¹¹⁰ *The New York Times*, March 17, 1891.

¹¹¹ Henry Cabot Lodge, "Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration," *The North American Review* (1892), 603.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 604.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 605.

As noted earlier, some Italians called for military action in response to the New Orleans incident. The Italian navy was the third largest navy of the world in the late nineteenth century, and thus, the New Orleans incident created a short-time war scare in the United States. For the first time after the Civil War, “the sudden war scare climate ... galvanized the whole United States into true national unity.”¹¹⁴ But, in fact, apart from some individual declarations, the Italian government did not have the intention to declare war on America. However, Americans took the war scare with Italy seriously. “Besides preaching the gospel of national unity in the face of the Italian threat, [the war scare] also emphasized [the Americans’] belief that sectionalism would disappear in the event of hostilities.”¹¹⁵ The consequences of the New Orleans lynching that created a war scare in the United States became significant elements in the reunion of the southern and northern states, and the establishment of a new navy that represented the new American expansionist foreign policy. By the 1890s, the United States navy was one of the most powerful and modern navies of the world which could repel alien forces from the American continent. It became one of the symbols of American national greatness.

The consequences of the Walsenburg, Hahnville and Tallulah lynchings were similar to the New Orleans incident: the Italian government asked for the trial of the guilty people, the American government stated that the victims were all naturalized United States citizens at the time of their lynchings, but Italians asked for and eventually received an indemnity for the murdered men who were mostly Italian subjects. In Walsenburg, the Department of State declared that “a high and honorable sense of justice w[ould] determine a suitable amount to indemnify the

¹¹⁴ Marco Rimanelli, “The New Orleans Lynching & U.S.-Italian relations from Harmony to war Scare: Immigration, Mafia, Diplomacy,” Rimanelli and Postman, *The 1891 New Orleans Lynching*, 154.

¹¹⁵ J. Alexander Karlin, “The Italo-American Incident of 1891 and the Road to Reunion,” *The Journal of Southern History* 8 (1942), 245.

families of the victims of the Colorado mob.”¹¹⁶ In the Hahnville incident, the United States paid an indemnity of \$6,000 to the relatives of the lynched men.

About the Tallulah lynching, the Italian ambassador Baron Fava sent all the information about the incident to the U.S. government on January 15, 1900, and he also referred to Article 1018 of the Louisiana Statutes, which indicated the duty of the attorney general of the state to take action if judges did not act on the case. U.S. Secretary of State John Hay replied to the ambassador after thirty days, indicating that he “immediately sent [the report] to the governor of Louisiana.”¹¹⁷ On April 17, 1900, the Italian ambassador received a message from Acting Secretary David J. Hill, which enclosed a message from District Attorney W. S. Holmes to Governor Murphy James Foster. The governor asserted that all the witnesses had testified, swearing they knew nothing about the event and the grand jury’s investigation into the Tallulah lynching “ha[d] been thorough and ha[d] resulted in failure to implicate anyone.”¹¹⁸ Baron Fava stated that with this verdict the violations of the 1871 treaty became more apparent, and in order to prevent a recurrence of the crime in the future, Fava demanded the president to take action against the failures of the states as in the case of Louisiana.¹¹⁹ The discussion between Italian and American authorities came to an end in December 1900 with President William McKinley’s message to Congress in which he referred to the 1871 treaty and Italy’s demand for justice:

I renew the urgent recommendations I made last year that the Congress appropriately confer upon the Federal courts jurisdiction in this class of international cases where the ultimate responsibility of the Federal Government may be involved, and I invite action upon the bills to accomplish this

¹¹⁶ Acting Secretary Edwin F. Uhl to Governor McIntire, Department of State, Washington, October 23, 1895, *FRUS* (1896), 952.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, John Hay to Baron Fava, Washington, February 15, 1900, 718.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, David J. Hill to Baron Fava, Washington, April 17, 1900, 721.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Baron Fava to John Hay, Washington, May 6, 1900, 722.

which were introduced in the Senate and House. It is incumbent upon us to remedy the statutory omission which has led, and may again lead, to such untoward results ... Its enactment is a simple measure of previsory justice toward the nations with which we as a sovereign equal make treaties requiring reciprocal observance.¹²⁰

The policy of the United States did not change in the Erwin lynching. After nearly six months of correspondence, on January 2 1902, David J. Hill informed the Italians “the Senate and House of Representatives [were going to] have under consideration the president’s recommendation that indemnity be graciously tendered to the families of the victims and that legislation be enacted to give the Federal courts original jurisdiction of treaty offenses against aliens.”¹²¹

An important detail about the Erwin lynching is the Italian government’s attitude about the incident. The message that the U.S. ambassador G. V. L. Meyer sent to John Hay on December 23, 1901 revealed the reaction of the Italian Senate to the lynching. The message enclosed a translation of an extract from the newspaper, *Tribuna* of December 21. According to the reports, the foreign affairs minister Giulio Prinetti declared that Italy was going to accept the indemnity offered by the U.S. government, but the Italian government was also expecting that the federal government would achieve its promise “for the future to use all possible efforts to prevent the repetition of similar occurrences.”¹²² Prinetti also emphasized the importance of Italian emigration to “far regions [where] the Italians were received with a great measure of benevolent hospitality.”¹²³ The Italian government considered that U.S.-Italian relations could not be sacrificed over the murder of a small number of Italian immigrants, especially those of southern Italian

¹²⁰ 1900, Presidential Message, *FRUS*, xxii.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 299.

¹²² *Ibid.*, G. V. I. Meyer to John Hay, Rome, December 23, 901, 298.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

origin. Again, Italian regional prejudice undermined the stated Italian goal of national unification.

The Tampa lynching also concluded with the payment of an indemnity to the Italian victim. At the time of the incident, Ficcarotta was a naturalized American but Albano was still an Italian subject, thus the Italian government again asked for an immediate punishment and for the payment of indemnity of \$6,000 to Albano's mother.¹²⁴ President Woodrow Wilson recommended Congress to pay an indemnity to Albano's family "as an act of grace and without reference to the question of the liability of the United States."¹²⁵ Consequently, the U.S. government paid the indemnity, the Italian ambassador "warmly thank[ed] [the Secretary of State] for [his] official and cordial action, by which this painful occurrence ha[d] been satisfactorily settled,"¹²⁶ and the case was closed.

5.8 Conclusion

After the New Orleans lynching, the U.S. House of Representatives "took up the subject of lynching, albeit briefly, and for the first time, a number of states adopted official remedies for lynching, enacting legislation to punish collusion and the dereliction of duty on the part of sheriffs, jailers, and other officers."¹²⁷ Federal efforts for a law which would make "any State violation of international treaties a federal juridical case"¹²⁸ commenced with President Benjamin Harrison in December 1891. "Following out the president's request, Senator Sherman

¹²⁴ For detail, see *FRUS* (1913), 613-624.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, Message from the President of the United States, transmitting report from the Secretary of State in relation to the case of Angelo Albano, an Italian subject, Washington, June 26, 1913, 619.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, Italian ambassador Cusani to John Hay, Washington, November 18, 1913, 624.

¹²⁷ Dray, *At the Hands of Persons Unknown*, 132.

¹²⁸ Rimanelli, "1891-92 U.S.-Italian Diplomatic Crisis," Rimanelli and Postman, *The 1891 New Orleans Lynching*, 246.

introduced a resolution instructing the Committee on Foreign Relations to draw up a bill to protect the treaty rights of aliens.”¹²⁹ That was basically about a more powerful federal control over the states concerning international legal cases, and the prosecution of the criminals in federal courts. The Sherman Act was introduced on March 2, 1892, but Congress did not pass it as a law. In 1911, the Republican Missouri representative Leonidas C. Dyer, “who represented a largely black constituency in St. Louis,”¹³⁰ introduced an anti-lynching law, but Congress again did not pass it. Questions about the Dyer Bill’s constitutionality arose, centered on its provision for federal punishment of lynchers which critics believed was federal encroachment on the jurisdiction of states.¹³¹ But finally, “the Dyer Bill of 1922 [that Congress passed] included a clause for the protection of aliens, adopting the form suggested in 1891,”¹³² and reflecting a significant strengthening of federal authority after World War I.

The lynchings of the Italian immigrants in the United States in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries were the results of a variety of social, political, and economic causes. The negative Italian stereotype that had its origin in the 1850s created the bias against the immigrants in America and the influence of ethnic stereotypes exerted an influence in subsequent lynchings.¹³³ A short time after their arrival, the southern Italian *contadini* [peasants] were put into the same place with blacks, especially in southern states. Most of the Italians, as a result of the Italian government’s policies about emigration, saw America as a model country filled with economic opportunity. Thus, they perceived America as a

¹²⁹ David O. Walter, “Legislative Notes and Reviews: Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lynching Law,” *The American Political Science Review* 28 (1934), 436.

¹³⁰ Dray, *At the Hands of Persons Unknown*, 259.

¹³¹ Mary Jane Brown, *Eradicating this Evil: Women in the American Anti-Lynching Movement, 1892-1940* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000), 115.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 438.

¹³³ Webb, “The Lynching of Sicilian Immigrants,” 54.

temporary residence where they could obtain material welfare and then return to their homeland. Their isolation in the United States was a natural outcome of that belief, but that remoteness deteriorated the situation. Additionally, the alleged Italian involvement in organized crime and anarchism made the Italian immigrant more unwanted. He was perceived as a peril to the white solidarity in America. The aftermath of the lynchings demonstrated the diplomatic complexities and confusions between the United States and Italy. Italy, whose statesmen did not grasp the meaning of American federalism entirely, considered the incidents as diplomatic breakdowns between Italy and the United States that violated the 1871 Treaty, and urged the U.S. government to take federal action against criminals. Simultaneously, the Italian officials could not risk the economic benefits of the Italian emigration to the United States, and therefore maintained a moderate policy. The United States, meanwhile, starting with the Harrison administration, “faced either the domestic political death-trap of tampering with State Rights by modifying the Constitutional separation of Federal and State powers, or risked offending traditional nationalist and isolationist feelings by ‘caving-in’ to a European Power.”¹³⁴ Only as the United States was enacting strict immigration restriction laws did it also enact a federal anti-lynching law. Nonetheless, the presence and controversy of Italians who were victims of lynching eventually contributed to the strengthening of federal authority over “states’ rights.”

¹³⁴ Rimanelli, “The 1891-92 U.S.-Italian Diplomatic Crisis,” 183.

CHAPTER 6

THE *MALFATTORI*: ITALIAN ANARCHISM AND ITALIAN ANARCHISTS IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WORLD WAR I

As the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta noted in his *L'Anarchia* [*Anarchy*] in 1891, anarchism comes from the Greek word *anarchos* meaning “without a government.”¹ It is old as the formation of the first state, and distinguished from other political theories because of its rejection of power, formal organization, hence the state.² It was initiated as the individual’s reaction to the will of the tribe, and grew as “the credo of the idealist who discovered that power corrupts and must be destroyed at its source.”³ Anarchism was transformed into a social doctrine in modern times with the rise of the age of the reason and then the French Revolution. Anarchism became a distinctive ideology in Europe during the era of the First International and the Paris Commune. It became powerful in the 1870s and 1880s in Italy when the political philosophies of Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin were adopted in the society.

¹ “Errico Malatesta—Anarchy,” Paul Sharkey, trans., Daniel Guerin, *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*, Book Two (Edinburgh, San Francisco & London: AK Press, 1998), 6.

² William O’Reichert, “Anarchism, Freedom and Power,” *Ethics* 79 (1969), 139.

³ Charles A. Madison, “Anarchism in the United States,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 6 (1945), 45.

Italian anarchist violence in Europe became extremely intense in the late nineteenth century when Sante Geronimo Caserio killed the French president Sadi Carnot in 1894, Michele Angiolillo shot the Spanish prime minister Antonio Canovas in 1897, Luigi Luccheni killed Empress Elizabeth of Austria in Geneva in 1898 and finally when Gaetano Bresci killed the Italian King Umberto I in 1900.

All the Italian assassins of the late nineteenth century manifested the emergent transnational aspect of Italian anarchism. Bresci, in particular, was born in Italy, but later moved to Paterson, New Jersey as an immigrant and went back to Italy to assassinate the king. This detail demonstrated that anarchism was also prevailing on the western side of the Atlantic. This chapter shows how anarchism provoked a joint response from the United States and Italian governments and was a basis for their informal alliance.

Italian anarchism in the United States began as one of the consequences of the mass immigration of the 1880s to the major cities in the north, and in the mid-1890s it reached the Pacific Coast. The first Italian anarchist group, named the “Gruppo Anarchico Rivoluzionario Carlo Cafiero” [Carlo Cafiero Revolutionary Anarchist Group] was formed in New York City in 1885, and another one with the same name was established in Chicago in 1887. The same Cafiero group started to publish the first Italian anarchist newspaper, *L’Anarchico* [*The Anarchist*] in 1888 in New York.⁴

Cafiero was a prototypical Italian anarchist of the late nineteenth century. He was an educated son of a middle class Italian family. His sense of injustice done to the poor and defenseless made him intolerant of the pietistic liberalism of Giuseppe Mazzini, and—with Giuseppe Garibaldi aging and reluctant to become involved

⁴ Paul Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 164.

again in the struggle—Michael Bakunin was the leader to whom he turned.⁵ Bakunin changed Italian anarchism by attacking Mazzini's ideological domination of the Italian left.⁶ Bakunin was a positive anarchist who became the main reason for anarchism's later association with violence and chaos. With other collectivists, he rejected individual possession of property and preferred possession by voluntary institutions.⁷ Bakunin emphasized the importance of making a social revolution to destroy the state which would open way to the complete and direct abolition of classes and political, economic and social inequalities through the destruction of the existing framework of society.⁸ His approval of violence as a weapon against the oppressors ended up with nihilism in Russia, and individual acts of terrorism.⁹ The growth of the anarchist movement and First International in Italy was a consequence of Bakunin's presence in Italy.

But that growth was observed by the Italian government with concern, thus the Minister of the Interior sent instructions to the provincial authorities to destroy the International in their regions. The police raided the Bologna Congress and arrested Cafiero, Costa and Malatesta."¹⁰ Several insurrections like the ones in Bologna (1874) and in Benevento (1877) failed or were repressed by the government. Indeed, the suppression of the International in Italy was achieved by the left's leaders like Agostino Depretis, Giovanni Nicotera and Francesco Crispi who assumed power on March 18, 1876 in Italy. The Ministry of the Interior Giovanni Nicotera defined anarchists as *malfattori* [malefactors]. The definition

⁵ George Woodcock, "Anarchism in Italy," in *Anarchism: A History of Liberterian Ideas and Movements* (London: Penguin Books, 1986), 278.

⁶ Nunzio Pernicone, *Italian Anarchism, 1864-1892*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 13.

⁷ Woodcock, "Prologue," in *Anarchism: A History of Liberterian Ideas and Movements* (London: Penguin Books, 1986), 20.

⁸ Tosti, "Anarchistic Crimes," 411.

⁹ Madison, "Anarchism in the United States," 49.

¹⁰ Woodcock, "Anarchism in Italy," 281.

infuriated the anarchists since it announced them as ordinary criminals rather than fighters for justice and liberty. By denying political legitimacy to the anarchists and branding them common criminals, Nicotera had devised a brilliant strategy whereby the anarchists would be prosecuted almost as criminals and outlaws; he struck on April 19, dissolved internationalist sections, suppressed newspapers, and arrested every anarchist of importance.”¹¹ From then on, Nicotera’s *malfattori* strategy was used against the anarchists in Italy, many of whom consequently sought refuge in the United States. But Italian anarchism entered a period of decline in the 1880s. However, during the May days of 1898, riots spread to Florence and Milan, and demonstrators were shot down by the government forces. “It was in revenge for the severe repressions of this year that [Gaetano] Bresci later killed King Umberto I.”¹²

That Bresci returned to Italy to assassinate Umberto was not surprising because the United States was a common place for the Italian anarchist exiles, or in other words, the intelligentsia of Italian anarchism. Several notable Italian anarchists followed Carlo Cafiero to America. The first significant anarchist that arrived to the American shores was Francesco Saverio Merlino, who landed in New York in 1892.¹³ Merlino was one of the founders of Italian anarchism, and he was a lawyer who had defended the Italian anarchists in various cases in the peninsula. Unlike most of the Italian anarchists in the United States, Merlino was fluent in English, and founded one of the earliest Italian anarchist journals in the United States, *Il Grido degli Oppressi* [*The Cry of the Oppressed*], and the English-language

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Woodcock, “Anarchism in Italy,” 293.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 165.

Solidarity. As well as these, Merlino carried out a speaking tour in the United States. In 1893, he returned to Europe.¹⁴

Pietro Gori, “the poet of the anarchists,” was another influential anarchist who went to the United States in 1895. During his one-year stay, he held between two hundred and four hundred meetings.¹⁵ He wandered from one place to another with his guitar, sang like Christian evangelists, and lectured on anarchism.¹⁶ Gori, like most of the Italian anarchist leaders, came from a middle-class family, had a university degree in law, and was widely read in America and Europe. He died at the age of forty-five, in 1911 after his return to Europe.

Giuseppe Ciancabilla arrived in Paterson, New Jersey—which was one of the most important Italian anarchist centers in the east—in 1898. He became the editor of *La Questione Sociale* [*The Social Question*] that was established by Gori in 1895. Ciancabilla later moved to Spring Valley, Illinois which was a small coal-mining town with a population of seven thousand. After President William McKinley’s assassination by the Polish anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, in 1901, Ciancabilla, along with 300-500 other Italian anarchists in the town, became the target of the residents of Spring Valley. In Spring Valley, the Italian anarchists published a newspaper entitled, *L’Aurora* [*Dawn*] and Ciancabilla was its editor. After McKinley’s assassination, the newspaper extolled Czolgosz’s deed, and hailed him as a martyr.¹⁷ As a consequence, Ciancabilla was ordered to leave the town after a mass meeting, but he refused to do that. However, he was arrested on September 27, 1901 and was jailed on a charge of publishing lottery advertisements in his journal and thereby

¹⁴ For more information about Merlino, see Ibid. 165 and Paul Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 46.

¹⁵ Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, 165.

¹⁶ Paul Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 47.

¹⁷ Sidney Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” *The American Historical Review* 60 (1955), 785.

violating postal regulations.¹⁸ Ciancabilla ended up in San Francisco, where he edited the journal, *La Protesta Umana* [*The Human Protest*]. He suddenly took ill, and died in 1904, at the age of thirty-two.¹⁹

The renowned Errico Malatesta also made a brief visit to the United States in 1899, during which he took up the editorship of *La Questione Sociale*. During one of his lectures in West Hoboken, New Jersey, he was shot by another Italian, Domenico Pazzaglia, whose motives are still unknown. Malatesta was seriously wounded in the leg, and interestingly, the person who subdued Pazzaglia was Gaetano Bresci, who was going to kill King Umberto I in 1900.²⁰ Malatesta returned to Italy, and died in Rome under house arrest in 1932 during the fascist era.

6.1 Luigi Galleani and *La Cronaca Sovversiva*

The leading Italian anarchist in the United States for the first two decades of the twentieth century was Luigi Galleani. He was born on August 21, 1861 in Vermicelli, Piedmont to a middle-class family. While studying law at the University of Turin, Galleani was attracted to anarchism, and refused to become a lawyer. He spent more than five years in prison and exile before escaping from the island of Pantelleria in 1900. He arrived in the United States in October 1901, one month after the assassination of William McKinley. He settled in Paterson, New Jersey and followed Malatesta as the editor of *La Questione Sociale*. Galleani was a very powerful orator; his “rhetoric and vision of total freedom raised his listeners to a

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 786.

¹⁹ Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, 166.

²⁰ Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 48.

high pitch of enthusiasm.”²¹ Therefore, in a short time, a great number of anarchists commenced to gather around him including Niccolo Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. One of the most devoted Galleanisti groups was the Barre anarchist group in New England, which was established in 1894. The members of the group were stone and marble cutters, and among these people, Galleani began to publish his *La Cronaca Sovversiva* [*The Subversive Chronicle*] that turned out to be one of the most important periodicals of the anarchist movement.²² In 1914, he also published *Faccia a Faccia col Nemico* [*Face to Face with the Enemy*], a collection of his articles that had been published before in *La Cronaca Sovversiva*. The book defended propaganda by the deed and declared its practitioners like Angiolillo and Bresci as martyrs. A report of the Department of Justice described *Faccia a Faccia* as the “glorification of the most anarchistic assassins the world has ever seen.”²³ Another significant and lethal document written by Galleani was the forty-six-page bomb manual *La Salute è in Voi!* [*Health is in You!*], published in 1905. It was adopted from a guide to explosives written by Professor Ettore Molinari of the Politecnico in Mila, who was also an anarchist and friend of Galleani.²⁴ The manual was put into use by the Galleanisti in different occasions like the John Rockefeller attempt of 1914, the Preparedness Day Parade in San Francisco on July 22, 1916, and finally the Wall Street Explosion of September 16, 1920 which was presumably prepared and planted by Mario Buda, one of the militant revolutionary anarchists led by Galleani. The Federals called the explosion as “the work of a ‘gigantic plot’

²¹ Ibid. 49.

²² Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, 168.

²³ Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 97.

²⁴ Ibid., 98-99.

organized by anarchist terrorists (probably Italians) to overthrow the capitalist system.”²⁵

The final work of Galleani was *The End of Anarchism?*, which started as a series of articles which would serve as answers to Merlino’s interview, “The End of Anarchism,” published in the Turin newspaper *La Stampa* in June 1907. Merlino had joined the socialist movement, and declared that anarchism came to an end.²⁶ Galleani answered the former anarchists in ten articles by defending communist anarchism against socialism and reform. When World War I broke out, he opposed and denounced it in *la Cronaca Sovversiva* by repeating the slogan, “Contro la guerra, contro la pace, per la rivoluzione sociale!” [Against the war, against the peace, for the social revolution’!].²⁷ In May 1917 Galleani published his article “Matricolati!,” [Registrants!] which advised his followers to avoid registering the draft, even if that meant leaving the country.²⁸ For a period of time, the majority of the Galleanisti, including Niccolo Sacco and Bartalomeo Vanzetti, fled to Mexico to avoid military conscription. However, eventually, Galleani became the person who left the United States forever. He was arrested on charges of obstructing the war effort, and on June 24, 1919 he was deported to Italy where he died on November 4, 1931.²⁹

²⁵ Nunzio Pernicone, “Luigi Galleani and Italian Anarchist Terrorism in the United States,” *Studi Emigrazione* 30 (1993), 482, 469.

²⁶ Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, 169.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

²⁸ Paul Avrich, *Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America*, Abridged Edition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 72.

²⁹ Avrich, *Anarchist Portraits*, 170.

6.2 “Carlo Tresca, alias Carluccio: Alleged Alien Anarchist”

Despite the fact that he called himself not an anarchist but a syndicalist,³⁰ Carlo Tresca was the head of the anarchist syndicalists. Tresca was born on March 9, 1879, in Sulmona, Abruzzi.³¹ For a short term, he served as the secretary of the Italian Railroad Workers Union, and became the editor of a journal called *Il Germe* [*The Seed*]. Tresca continuously attacked the Italian monarchy in his writings, thus he was given two years of imprisonment, but accepted ten years of exile. First he went to Lake Lugano in Switzerland where he met Pietro Govi who advised him to go to America.³² Tresca took the advice, and immigrated to the United States in 1904 where he settled in Philadelphia. There he became the editor of the Italian Socialist Federation’s official organ, *Il Proletario* [*The Proletarian*]. In 1906, he began to publish his own anarchist newspaper, *La Plebe* [*The Plebs*] in 1906. Later, he moved to Pittsburgh, where there were a significant number of Italian coal-miners. In a short time, Tresca became well-known because of his radical activities. He was arrested three times in Philadelphia and nine times in Pittsburgh.³³

In 1912, the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) invited Tresca to Lawrence, Massachusetts to get support from him to free the Italian strike leaders. Tresca, who was called the “Bull of Lawrence” after the incident, participated also in the Little Falls, New York textile workers’ strike in 1912, the New York hotel workers’ strike in 1913, the Paterson, New Jersey, silk workers’ strike in 1913, and the Mesabi Range, Minnesota strike of miners in 1916.

In Mesabi Range, Tresca was arrested, and narrowly escaped lynching. After his arrest, labor demonstrations for Tresca were organized in every American city,

³⁰ “Carlos [*sic*] Tresca: Resume of Activities,” 9, Appendix C.

³¹ The biography of Carlo Tresca is mainly from Nunzio Pernicone’s entry in *Encyclopedia of the American Left*.

³² Marguerite Tucker, “Carlo Tresca,” *Greenwich Villager*, April 22, 1922.

³³ *Ibid.*

and Italian laborers protested the United States near the American consulate in Rome.³⁴ On September 19, 1916, the workers called one another to arms to protect the rights of the proletariat against the oppressive government. The workers had to act “with force against force, and with violence against violence.”³⁵ The decisive time had come not only to liberate Carlo Tresca, but also the future of that great country. In that way, the destiny of the oppressed classes would change, and those people would become liberated.³⁶ Italians’ image of America began to change.

Significantly, Eugene Debs, the former leader of the American Railway Union, and the presidential candidate of the Socialist Party stated:

There is not a [more] courageous fighter for the working class than Carlo Tresca and precisely because of this fact he is now under indictment in a capitalist court and threatened with the severest penalty that may be inflicted under capitalist law ... We must not fail [Tresca and his comrades] in this supreme hour. We must prove ourselves men and not cowards; we must stand by our class and not desert it; we must strike a blow for solidarity by freeing our comrades and thus vindicating our self-respect and our title to a place in the labor movement.³⁷

Eventually, Tresca was released from prison on December 22, 1916, and was acquitted of federal charges; however, *L’Avvenire* [*The Future*], the newspaper that he had published in New York since 1913 closed down. After that, Tresca commenced to publish *Il Martello* [*The Hammer*], which was also restrained by the United States government several times. He was also against the First World War since he considered that Wall Street and the capitalists wanted the war. The prices of consumer products were increased because of the war, and capitalists profited from “the misery of laborers,”³⁸ he said.

³⁴ *L’Avvenire*, October 13, 1916.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, September 19, 1919.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Vincenzo Vacirca, “Ora Decisiva” [Decisive Hour].

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Eugene Debs, December 1, 1916.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Carlo Tresca, “Chi Vuole la Guerra?” [Who Wants the War?], April 7, 1917.

Although the Justice Department kept him under surveillance for deportation in 1919-1920, Tresca avoided deportation. During this period, he became active in the Sacco-Vanzetti case by raising funds and keeping the issue alive in Italian and American communities. Thus, he played a significant role in organizing the defense of Niccolo Sacco and Bartalomeo Vanzetti in 1920-1921, but that was never a full-time occupation for him.³⁹ He succeeded the deported Galleani as the leader of the Italian anarchists in the United States who turned to him as a matter of course when they were in trouble.⁴⁰

Sacco and Vanzetti were executed on August 23, 1927. The Italian government's involvement in the issue began in 1920 in the form of reluctant gestures of a liberal government that had long shown deep-rooted hostility toward anarchism.⁴¹ Thus, none of the prime ministers issued a formal protest against the case. Despite his antagonism to anarchism, Benito Mussolini—presumably because of his socialist background—reacted to the political repression in the United States.⁴²

Tresca had started his struggle against Mussolini's fascism in his newspaper, *Il Martello*. In 1923, the Italian ambassador officially requested that the United States suppress the newspaper since it was "spreading poison among all the Italian workers in [the United States]."⁴³ The federal authorities commenced to search for seditious material among Tresca's correspondence, but they could never find the adequate evidence for his deportation. Eventually, Tresca was killed by an assassin on the night of July 11, 1943 in New York City. Official reports indicate that the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 541.

⁴⁰ Nunzio Pernicone, "Carlo Tresca and the Sacco-Vanzetti Case," *The Journal of American History* 66 (1979), 537.

⁴¹ Philip V. Cannistraro, "Mussolini, Sacco-Vanzetti, and the Anarchists: The Transatlantic Context," *The Journal of Modern History* 68 (1996), 537.

⁴² For more information, see *Ibid.*, 31-3.

⁴³ Quoted in Pernicone's entry on Tresca.

killer was unknown, however, it was known that Tresca had a lot of enemies from the fascist and communist groups in the United States. There is a theory which supports the idea that Tresca was shot by the boss of all bosses of the *Mafia*, Carmine Galante. According to this hypothesis, Galante took the order to kill Tresca from Mussolini since he was the most out-spoken anti-fascist in the Italian American community, thus he had to be silenced.⁴⁴

Actually, most of the details and secrets about Tresca's life and activities in the United States are revealed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 1, 358 pages long *Carlo Tresca Files* that were released under the Freedom of Information Act. The files start with the investigations about Tresca's nationality (it was discovered that he never became naturalized) in the early 1920s, and finish with the closing stages of his murder case in the 1950s. These documents are undoubtedly very valuable both to understand Tresca's and other Italian anarchists' activities, and the United States' government's prosecution alien anarchism in America.

6.3 Conclusion: Italian and American Perspectives about Anarchism

One day after the assassination of King Umberto, President William McKinley sent a message to the new Italian King, Vittorio Emanuele III to "offer the sincere condolences in [that] deep hour of bereavement."⁴⁵ In his message to the Italian Ambassador, Baron Francesco Saverio Fava, Secretary of State John Hay stated that the king's assassination "had profoundly shocked public sentiment in the

⁴⁴ "Assassin of Carlo Tresca shot in New York City," *Fifth Estate*, 14 (1979), 4. There is also another speculation which emphasizes the anti-communist attitude of Tresca (by stating that Tresca "dared to buck the Russian secret service and furnished information to the Federal Grand Jury." See Appendix B, "Office Memorandum."

⁴⁵ [Telegram] The President to the King of Italy, Executive Mansion, Washington, July 30, 1900, *FRUS* (1901), 734.

United States.”⁴⁶ The Italian officials thanked the United States government, and the new king Vittorio Emanuele III indicated that the American people “ha[d] strengthened the old bonds of friendship existing between the two nations”⁴⁷ by sharing the grief of the Italian people. Italians in turn warned the United States government through Baron Fava about the security of President McKinley. According to the *Daily Mail* of New York, the ambassador requested from the Department of State the arrests and punishments of the Italian anarchists. The United States officials accepted the Italian demand, and the authorities of the state of New Jersey made an investigation of the issue. The security around President McKinley was increased.⁴⁸ However, McKinley was shot by a Polish immigrant, Leon Czolgosz, on September 6, 1901 at an American exposition in Buffalo. Czolgosz, who believed that there should be no authority, signed a confession in which he stated that he had killed the President because he regarded it as his duty to do so.⁴⁹ Similar to the Italian anarchists, he indicated that his plot against McKinley was an individually made plan, and he was fully aware of the consequences. Nevertheless, McKinley’s death accelerated the anti-anarchist movements that resulted with the deportation of immigrant anarchists and communists.

After McKinley’s death, Theodore Roosevelt became the United States President. He began his first message by giving a clear definition of anarchism. Roosevelt stated that “President McKinley was killed by an utterly depraved criminal belonging to that body of criminals who object to all governments, good and bad alike, [and] who [we]re against any form of popular liberty.” According to him, the target of the anarchists was not the President but all presidents and every

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, [Telegram] Mr. Hay to Baron Fava, Department of State, Washington, July 30, 1900.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, [Telegram] The King of Italy to the President, Monza, August 3, 1900, 736.

⁴⁸ For more information, see Petacco, *L’Anarchico che Venne dell’America*, 231.

⁴⁹ Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” 780.

symbol of government. For Roosevelt, anarchy was special expression of criminality, warranting special international attention:

The anarchist, and especially the anarchist in the United States, is merely one type of criminal, more dangerous than any other because he represents the same depravity in a greater degree ... The anarchist is a criminal whose perverted instincts lead him to prefer confusion and chaos to the most beneficent form of social order ... The anarchist is everywhere not merely the enemy of system and of progress, but the deadly foe of liberty ... For the anarchist himself, whether he preaches or practices his doctrines, we need not have more concern than for any ordinary murderer ... He is a malefactor and nothing else ... Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all mankind should band against the anarchist. His crime should be made an offense against the law of nations, like piracy and that form of man-stealing known as the slave trade; for it is of far blacker infamy than either. It should be so declared by treaties among all civilized powers.⁵⁰

For Roosevelt, anarchism presented a form of international terrorism, which required the United States to collaborate with other nations in an unprecedented way.

There is a great similarity between the policies of the United States and Italy in relation to anarchism. Like Nicotera, Roosevelt used the word “malefactor” while referring to the anarchists. Similarly, he considered that those criminals had to be punished by the whole world since they were the enemies of the laws of all nations. Roosevelt aspired to find an international remedy to the problem of anarchism since the anarchists were overwhelmingly immigrants. According to him, the situation in the United States was an outcome of the unsatisfactory immigration laws:

We need every honest and efficient immigrant fitted to become an American citizen, every immigrant who comes

⁵⁰ Theodore Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” December 3, 1901. <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5032>, December 8, 2006.

here to stay, who brings here a strong body, a stout heart, a good head, and a resolute purpose to do his duty well in every way and to bring up his children as law—abiding and God—fearing members of the community. But there should be a comprehensive law enacted with the object of working a threefold improvement over our present system.⁵¹

According to Roosevelt's proposed plan, not only the anarchists but also the people who were known to have anarchistic tendencies had to be excluded from the United States. That would require a more careful inspection both abroad and at the United States' immigration ports. Secondly, an education test had to be applied to the people who intended to migrate to the United States. That kind of a test would provide information about the immigrants' intellectual capacity to understand American institutions and act sanely as American citizens. Lastly, the people who were below a standard economic fitness had to be excluded from immigration since they would not have adequate capacity to earn a living. In that way, both dangerous elements and cheap labor would stop.⁵²

Roosevelt supported immigration as long as the immigrants had the ability to become assimilated in the American melting pot. Thus, while discussing the solution for the problem of anarchism, he attempted to secure the Americanism of the newcomers by referring to literacy and education tests that many advocates of immigration restriction in the late nineteenth century supported. In fact, it was not the first time that a literacy test was introduced; in 1895, Congress passed a literacy test law, but President Grover Cleveland vetoed it. After Roosevelt's above-mentioned proposal, a new literacy test passed the House, but it could not gain a favorable vote in the Senate.⁵³ Nevertheless, two anti-anarchy bills were introduced

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 160.

in Congress. The Ray Bill provided the “death penalty for persons who killed the president, vice-president, those in the line of presidential succession, and ambassadors of foreign countries” whereas the Hoar Bill provided the “death penalty for the persons who willfully killed or attempted to kill the president, the vice-president, any officer upon whom the duties of the president might devolve, or the sovereign of a foreign nation.”⁵⁴

However, in order to stop anarchist immigrants’ arrival in the United States, new forms of anarchist-exclusion laws were made. On May 27, 1902, a measure that placed the “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of all governments, or of all forms of law, or assassination of public officials” in the category of excludable immigrants, passed the House.⁵⁵ The measure was expanded by including also the persons who were affiliated with organizations teaching anarchist views, and it passed the Congress on March 3, 1903, and received the president’s approval on the next day.⁵⁶

Despite these precautions, the annual number of the immigrants reaching the United States increased to 1,285,000, and according to the recommendations of the Dillingham Commission that was established in 1909 with the aim of studying the impact of immigrants on the United States, the twentieth century immigration was dominated by the so-called inferior people who were physically, mentally, and linguistically different from the native population of the country. Thus, new restrictions had to be brought upon the United States’ immigration policy.⁵⁷ Roosevelt himself was shot by an assassin when he went to Milwaukee on October

⁵⁴ Fine, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” 790.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 792.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 793.

⁵⁷ Aleinikoff, *Immigration and Citizenship*, 161.

14, 1912 for a scheduled address as part of his presidential campaign for the Progressive Party. The shooting took place in a street when Roosevelt was shaking his head to the crowd that was waiting for his speech. The assassin was caught, and Roosevelt showed the torn manuscript of his speech which the bullet perforated in his vest pocket. He only had a superficial flesh wound, and said "It takes more than that to kill a Bull Moose" while showing the bullet hole through the sheets of paper.⁵⁸ The former president was saved, but the assassination attempt reflected the presence of anarchists still in the United States, a problem that provoked more severe United States immigration restrictions beginning during World War I. In 1919-20, a right-wing reaction prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic in which Italian anarchists became the targets of repression.⁵⁹ The red scare in the United States reached its peak point with the Palmer Raids of 1919 and the deportation of alien anarchists like Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman.

Anarchism was a unique problem in Italo-American relations because anarchists did not have a single enemy or a single governmental system to fight. Thus, all the symbols of authority in the world were the foes of anarchism, and all these authorities allegedly stood together in their battle. Especially after the American entrance to World War I, the United States deported the anarchists to their native country, and Italy kept them under custody during the liberal, nationalist and fascist eras. Anarchism was an issue that brought the United States and Italy close together on the eve of World War I.

⁵⁸ "Teddy Roosevelt Shot by Anarchist Manuscript of Speech Saves His Life," *Detroit Free Press*, October 15, 1912.

⁵⁹ Cannistraro, "Mussolini, Sacco-Vanzetti," 35.

CHAPTER 7

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM: THE ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE

The second half of the nineteenth century was a significant era for both the United States and the Kingdom of Italy. There was rapid industrial development in the post Civil War period, and the westward expansion on the American continent for the United States came to an end in the 1890s. Hence the reunited and economically strong United States commenced to seek new ways of expansion that would support it in becoming a great power, and protecting its security at the same time. Similarly, Italy became a united country during the 1860s, and began to search for new ways of economic development. Lacking economic and social resources that the United States had, the Italian Kingdom aspired to dominate other lands in order to become a prosperous country among the wealthy nations of the Old World. The subsequent two chapters will attempt to clarify some aspects of American imperialism and Italian colonialism with the purpose of explicating what the two countries thought about each other's social, economic and political conditions in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. By revealing these details about the United States and Italy, their diverse conditions in the world arena will also be exposed.

7.1 The Spanish-American War: American Imperialist in the Eyes of the Italians

The last two decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the creation of a powerful United States navy. The United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The war manifested the ongoing development and expansion of the United States, which was recognized widely as an economic empire after the victory. Did Italy get interested and make comments about the Spanish-American War? Did the Italian politicians and strategists assess the increasing naval power of the United States? The answers to these questions as well as the Italian anxieties about American imperialism will be revealed in this part.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was an outcome of the Cuban civil war which started in 1895 between the Cuban *insurrectos* and the Spanish governors. The rebels were eager to involve the United States in their war, and the American daily yellow press (especially the *New York World* and the *New York Journal*) reflected the Spaniards' atrocities—particularly General Valeriano Weyler's (alias "Butcher Weyler") "reconcentration" camps in which the civilians were put to avoid their support to the rebels—in detail to the public. Thus, Americans started to feel sympathy towards the *insurrectos*, but the reluctance of Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley to declare war on Spain delayed the initiation of the conflict between the two countries. The sinking of the *Maine* at its berth in Havana Harbor on February 18, 1898 due to unknown reasons, and the death of 260 sailors accelerated the jingoist war plans in the United States. Mass demonstrations throughout the whole country supported the rapid declaration of war on Spain. From Spain, President McKinley demanded a swift armistice and the end of its

concentration camp policy. Otherwise, he stated that Spain would have to accept American arbitration in Cuba. However, Spain acted slowly and reluctantly, and eventually declared war on the United States on April 25, 1898. One day later, the United States declared war on Spain as a response. On June 22, the first United States troops landed in Cuba. Theodore Roosevelt, who was at the head of the Rough Riders, swept the Spanish troops off San Juan Hill, and the Atlantic fleet destroyed the Spanish fleet. Consequently, the Spaniards surrendered Santiago.

The war came to an end with the Treaty of Paris that was signed on December 10, 1898. With the treaty, Spain lost its control over Cuba, left Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States, and ceased its sovereignty in the Philippines in return for 20 million U.S. dollars. In brief, the Spanish empire came to an end with this war, and the hegemony of a more economically and politically powerful United States started in world affairs at the dawn of the twentieth century.

Italians were genuinely concerned with the war and its international consequences. Several Italian military writers wrote about the Spanish-American War. One was Commander Domenico Bonamico, the greatest naval strategist in modern Italian history.¹ The life and the works of Bonamico are not studied widely; nevertheless the significance of the commander in Italian naval history is undisputable. Bonamico compared favorably to the American naval historian and theoretician, Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1784* Bonamico read and analyzed.

Bonamico was born in Cavallermaggiore in 1846, and died in Turin in 1929. Throughout his entire career, he never had the opportunity to control a big fleet like Mahan, but he was indisputably the Italian counterpart of his American

¹ Theodore Ropp, "The Modern Italian Navy," *Military Affairs* 5 (1941), 32-48.

contemporary since he also believed that national greatness was related to possessing a strong navy.² Bonamico's works reflect his deep analyses of Mahan's studies; he admired, but also criticized the American strategist. Bonamico stressed the importance of the development of a strategic naval geography because he considered that it would not be possible to protect Italy only from the land. Mahan's book was "a true revelation for Bonamico,"³ and had a significant effect on the formation of his ideas about the protection of European supremacy.⁴

Similar to Mazzini, Bonamico placed the United States of Europe at the center of his works. His idea was to safeguard the integrity of Europe against the threats coming from Russia and the United States. The safety of the European colonial empires could be protected only by a solid military capacity and the perfect control of the sea. From this perspective, the control of the Atlantic Ocean was very crucial for Bonamico. The loss of European hegemony in that part of the world could put European economy and civilization in jeopardy.⁵

The Italian commander's forethought became concrete with the Spanish-American war. Accordingly, the compilation of his articles entitled, *Il Conflitto Ispano Americano* [*The Spanish- American Conflict*] is significant to comprehend Bonamico's analyses about Mahan and his influence on American expansionism. The book includes the articles that Bonamico wrote about the issue from June to

² For detail, see Ferruccio Botti, "Domenico Bonamico: Il Mahan Italiano?" [Domenico Bonamico: The Italian Mahan], (Ministero della Difesa: *Marina Militare*) <http://www.marina.difesa.it/editoria/rivista/rivista/2006/febbraio/articolo03.htm>, Date of Access: December 3, 2006.

³ Ezio Ferrante, "Domenico Bonamico et la Naissance de la Pensee Geopolitique Navale Italienne" [Domenico Bonamico and the Birth of Italian Geopolitical Naval Thought], (Sorbonne: ISC, Ecole Pratique des Haute Etudes/ Science Historiques et Philologiques) http://www.stratisc.org/pub/pn/PN5_FERANTEBON.html, Date of Access: December 3, 2006.

⁴ Along with Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power* (published in 1890), E.C. Callwell's *Effects of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo* (published in 1897) was influential in shaping his ideas about military and strategic geography. His article, "Mahan and Callwell" was published in 1899 (Rome: *Rivista Marittima*, 1898), 7, 10.

⁵ Ibid.

September 1898. It starts with an extensive summary of Mahan's strategies and the current conditions of the American and Spanish navies. Bonamico asserted that the conflict between the United States and Spain was a concrete and precise application of Mahan and his numerous disciples' theories, and the European states had to anticipate the consequences of the incident since the European decadence had started and was progressing with the Latin nations.⁶ In June 1898, Bonamico stated that the United States was in an advantageous position against Spain.⁷ In July 1898, the Italian commander denoted the ideological aspect of the war; he referred to Mahan, and pointed out the possibility of German-American solidarity, as well as the traditional one between England and the United States.⁸

La Guerra Ispano-Americana [The Spanish-American War] was another work that was published in 1898. Its author Alfredo Feliciangeli presumably was an officer serving in the Italian Army since the book was published by *Rivista Militare Italiana* [Italian Military Journal]. *Rivista Militare* began publication in Rome, in 1859, founded by Luigi and Carlo Mezzacapo, who were ex-officers of the Neapolitan Army. Carlo Voghera, who later established other military journals like *L'Esercito* [The Army], *Carabiniere* [Carabineer], *L'Esercito Illustrato* [The Illustrated Army], *L'Italia Militare* [Military Italy] and *Marina* [Navy], was the editor of the journal. The Mezzacapo brothers aspired to circulate a journal about Italian military science, which would be competent to its European counterparts, and thus invited officers and prominent military and political figures to write articles for the journal. Their objective was to issue an influential journal about Italian military affairs, and they mainly succeeded in that plan. *Rivista Militare* reflected the major

⁶ Domenico Bonamico, *Il Conflitto Ispano-Americo* [The Spanish-American Conflict] (Roma: Rivista Marittima, 1898), 7, 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 63.

military events in Italian history starting with the *Risorgimento*, and it offered substantial information to its readers about Italian colonial activities in North Africa and the World Wars.⁹

La Guerra Ispano-Americana involves a long description of the war with the maps of the island of Cuba, and provides information about the exact number of troops and the battleships. More significantly, Feliciangeli referred to the situation in Cuba by stating that the United States declared war on Spain to fight in the name of liberty and human rights, but by the end of the war, the Americans started the military occupation of the Cuban coast. According to the writer, the annexation of the island in the near future would end with a new evolution of the American Union to defend its possessions. That evolution would oblige the United States to integrate and complete its forces both on land and sea.¹⁰ As a consequence, that kind of a completion would mean a more powerful and dominant United States in the Atlantic Ocean.

Another prominent figure who wrote about the war between Spain and the United States was Professor Augusto Pierantoni. Professor Pierantoni was an Italian jurist and senator. He was born in Chieti in 1840 and died in Rome in 1911, and worked as an associate professor of constitutional and international law at the universities of Modena, Naples and Rome. Pierantoni wrote works about the ancient Roman lawyers, constitutional law and the *carbonari* of the Pontifical State.¹¹ He

⁹ For more information about *Rivista Militare*, see “150th Anniversario della *Rivista Militare*” [150th Anniversary of *Rivista Militare*] http://www.collezioni-f.it/museo/00new/il_passa/riv_mil.html, date of Access: December 5, 2006.

¹⁰ Alfredo Feliciangeli, *La Guerra Ispano-Americana* [*The Spanish-American War*], (Roma: Enrico Voghera, (*Rivista Militare Italiana*), 1898), 94.

¹¹ Augusto Pierantoni, “I Carbonari dello Stato Pontificio ricercati dalle Inquisizioni Austriache nel Regno Lombardo-Veneto (1817-1825)” reviewed by H. Nelson Gay, *American Historical Review*, 17 (1911), pp: 138-140; some of Pierantoni works are *Chiesa Cattolica nel Diritto Comune* [*Catholic Church in Common Law*], (1870); *Avvocati di Roma Antica* [*Lawyers of Ancient Rome*], (1900); *Trattato di Diritto Costituzionale* [*Treatise of Constitutional Law*], (monograph) .

was also concerned with the situation of the Italian immigrants in the United States, and he protested the Italian lynchings in America in an article in *The Independent* in 1903.¹² Beforehand, he wrote about the Spanish-American War in 1898 in his work, *Cuba e Il Conflitto Ispano-Americano* [*Cuba and the Spanish-American Conflict*].

Pierantoni started his book by referring to the discovery of American continent, and stated that the early Spanish settlement commenced on “the major island of Central America,” Cuba.¹³ The influence of Spanish colonization in America was reduced due to the declaration of independence of the United States and the French Revolution, and the separatist idea in Cuba that started to be influential in 1823.¹⁴ Pierantoni referred to a United States official note from October 22, 1851 that declared that the island of Cuba was not far way from mouth of the Mississippi River, an important commercial site for the United States. Thus, if a European nation were to gain the control of Cuba, that situation would be a great risk for the Americans.¹⁵

The book continues with the narration about the incidences that occurred in Cuba after the 1850s. Pierantoni focused on most of the important events in that period like the 1868 insurrection, the Cuban Republic, the constitutions of 1869 and 1870, the abolition of slavery on February 13, 1880, the new Civil Code of July 31, 1889, the 1895 insurrections, and finally the declaration of American neutrality on June 6, 1895. He also stated that the prolonged civil war in Cuba damaged the

¹² Augusto Pierantoni, "Italian Feeling on American Lynching," *The Independent*, LV (1903), 2040-42.

¹³ Augusto Pierantoni, *Cuba e il Conflitto Ispano-Americano*, (Roma: Stabilimento Tipografia della Tribuna, 1898), 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

American commerce and navigation, and that became an important factor for the American declaration of war on Spain.¹⁶

Before the initiation of the Spanish-American war, the American proposal about arbitration was not accepted. That was a wrong decision taken by Spain according to Pierantoni because Cubans' nationalism and desire for independence was growing.¹⁷ He suggested the Pope as a possible mediator, and stated that before the Declaration of Independence, the presence of Catholicism in the British colonies was the primary energy of republicanism, and the greatest modern monarchies in world history were all Catholic, thus America had separated the Church slowly from the State because the laws of Catholicism were living in the republic.¹⁸ In brief, Augusto Pierantoni indicated that while the United States' offer of arbitration was refused, arbitration could have been achieved by the Pope since the Cubans were also Catholics, and the real meaning of republicanism was veiled in the Catholic religion.

The book comes to an end with the Italian professor's remarks about the Monroe Doctrine and the changing characteristics of the United States. Pierantoni, warned America about the decadence of the Latin element in European political history. He also stated that the pacifist spirit of Penn, the religion of the Pilgrims, and the feeling of justice and high philanthropy of Washington and Franklin had provided the American nation a morality that was superior to the old European nations. However, the war of secession changed the American military tradition, and the Americans were no more pacifists. Additionally, the emigration from Europe reduced American isolationism. Therefore, it would not be a surprise for the

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

Europeans to witness the expansion of the United States' dominion outside the American continent.¹⁹

Another Italian who wrote about the Spanish-American War was Ferruccio Vitale. He was born on February 5, 1875 in Florence to an upper-class family. His father Lazzero Vitale was a renowned architect, and the ancestors of his mother Countess Giuseppina Barboro were the designers of the world's first botanical garden in Padua.²⁰ After having his classical education, Vitale graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Modena in 1893, and became a military engineer. In 1898, he was appointed as the Italian military attaché in Washington, D.C. In the same year he was sent to the Spanish-American War as an international observer to accompany the American troops. "Vitale witnessed the famous blockade of Manila harbor by Admiral George Dewey as well as the battle of Malate outside Manila, where the Spanish troops were repulsed."²¹ After his return to Italy, he was also made a Chevalier of the order of the crown of Italy for his service in the Philippines. Vitale resigned from his office in 1900 and returned to the United States in 1904, and began to work in New York as a landscape architect. In 1921, he became a naturalized American citizen, and died in New York City on February 2, 1933.

Vitale's story is different from the majority of the Italian immigrants in the United States. His prominence continued in America; he was appointed as a member of the Fine Arts Commission in September 1927 by President Calvin Coolidge, and took part in designing Meridian Hill Park, Washington. He was also a trustee of the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 62, 61.

²⁰ For detail, see Terry R. Schnadelbach, Horrace Havemeyer III, *Ferruccio Vitale: Landscape Architect of the Country Place Era* (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001), 1-4.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

American Academy in Rome and a member of the Architectural Commission of the Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago.²²

What is striking and completely unknown about his years in the Italian military was the pamphlet that he wrote about the Spanish-American War issued by the *Rassegna Nazionale* [National Review]. *Rassegna Nazionale* was published in Florence in 1879-1952, and its most vital period was between 1898 and 1908.²³ The directors of the journal declared themselves as “Catholics and Italians,” and they believed that Italian politics, society, and religious institutions had to be protected. *Rassegna Nazionale* was read by aristocrats, teachers and academics, ministers and patrons of public libraries, and Americanism was among the issues that the journal concentrated on.

Vitale's *La Politica Imperialista degli Stati Uniti* [The Imperialist Policy of the United States] was published in 1901, three years before his migration to the United States. In general, the pamphlet is about the United States' reasons for declaring war on Spain, and its consequences on the subject of American imperialism. Vitale started his discussion by referring to the essence of American policy about Cuba: was it an altruistic policy or a policy of interest?²⁴ According to Vitale, the politicians had the desire to agitate troubled waters of national diplomacy for their personal comfort, and also to make favors to their friends. The contractors constituted another part that benefited from the wars. Thus, the politicians presented the “terrible disgrace” of the *Maine* to the American public as the motive for a

²² See Ferruccio Vitale's biography on <http://eng.archinform.net/arch/73615.htm?ID=85b3664e54307b82ce8e802dc955fc70>, November 15, 2006.

²³ For more information, see Ornella Confessore, “Conservatorismo politico e riformismo religioso: La “Rassegna Nazionale” dal 1898 al 1908” [Political Conservatism and Religious Reformism: *Rassegna Nazionale* from 1898 to 1908] reviewed by Raymond Grew, *The American Historical Review* 81 (1976), 624-625

²⁴ Ferruccio Vitale, *La Politica Imperialista degli Stati Uniti*, (Florence: Ufficio della *Rassegna Nazionale*, 1901), 3.

sacred war and redemption of the oppressed humanity from tyranny. Vitale stated that these politicians and contractors had nothing to lose, but a lot of things to earn in an international adventure. These people were also powerful due to the support of the public, bankers, and industry, as well as the majority of the yellow press.²⁵

Vitale asserted that the altruism of the majority of the public should not be confused with the egoism of the few who manipulated the society's enthusiasm for their personal purposes.²⁶ However, the press started to think that the war could increase the wealth and power of the country besides liberating the oppressed Cubans. Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico and other naval bases were fundamental points for the national greatness of the United States, and the "first puff of imperialism" was delivered to the public opinion in that way.²⁷ Hence the imperialist dream was clearly designed, and the society, little by little, welcomed this mirage which was not far away.²⁸

Similar to Commander Bonamico, Vitale warned about the Anglo-American solidarity by stating that those people were coming from the same race, thus a formal alliance had to be made between them.²⁹ Accordingly, England and the United States had stipulated a new convention which would support the Americans to gain the possession of the naval stations on Cuba, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, and to control the Antilles.³⁰ Yet, the events that took place in Cuba could also be an advantage for the Cubans. The United States was guaranteeing a stable and secure

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

regime, thus the Cubans could benefit from that stability and develop their industry and increase production.³¹

Nevertheless, Vitale acknowledged that the United States had entered a new era. The sentiments of liberty and independence were coming to an end as a result of the new current of imperialism, which was a degeneration of the spirit of nationalism. The War of 1898 affirmed that the aristocratic-military imperialism of the old Spanish kingdom was being transformed into the democratic-commercial imperialism of the young North American Confederation, and that was a genuine symbol of the global hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race.³²

The fears of a growing Anglo-American alliance that would end up with an Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the Old World were also revealed in *Riflessioni sulla Guerra Marittima tra Spagna e Stati Uniti, in Relazione alla Marina Nostra* [Reflections about the Maritime War between Spain and the United States in Relation to our Navy] which was published in 1898. Nothing is known about the writer since he used a pseudonym “Timone” (meaning helm in English) instead of his real name. Yet, he was evidently a southern officer in the Italian navy or a very nationalist political thinker Timone indicated that the war had opened the eyes of the governors of the “noble Latin nation.” He believed that the character of a nation could directly influence the politics of its government, and a country could have the desire to maintain the voice of its ancient fierceness without supporting that fierceness militarily.³³ Timone was definitely searching for a Latin solidarity as an alternative to the one between the United States and England. He knew that Italy did not have continental or insular colonies except the ones in Eritrea, and the semi-

³¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

³² *Ibid.*, 8, 19, 20.

³³ Timone [pseud.], *Riflessioni sulla Guerra Marittima tra Spagna e Stati Uniti, in Relazione alla Marina Nostra* (Napoli: Stabilimento Tipografico R. Pesole, 1898), 8-9.

security of the Italians would be lost in the near future.³⁴ Thus, the Italian navy should be immediately “cured” in order to protect the country from the future threats. Otherwise, the days of mourning would start for Italy similar to the days of the Spanish misfortune.³⁵

Timone was deeply concerned with the renovation of the Italian navy. Like Bonamico, he believed that the national greatness of a country was strongly related to the power of its navy, and, as Timone suggested, the Italian navy had not been renovated for the last 38 years. According to him, the courageous, talented, and ingenious Simone de Saint Bon was the last commander who had modernized the Italian navy.³⁶ But for the future, Italians needed strength to take the risks, and perseverance to achieve their purposes, and the Eagle of Savoy had the power to defeat its great rival under the shadow of the ancient Roman Eagle.³⁷ The pamphlet ends with the words “Viva il Re—Viva la Marina!”³⁸

7.2 Italy and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-03

The Venezuelan crisis of 1902 occurred as a consequence of the unpaid debts of Venezuela to Britain, Germany and Italy. United States President Theodore Roosevelt called Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro “an unspeakably villainous

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 23, 24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 40. Simone Pacoret de Saint Bon was born in Chambory in 1828, and died in Rome in 1892. He was sent on diplomatic missions to France and Great Britain in 1861-1865, and became the commander of the Naval Academy in Naples. In 1891, he established an important naval base in Taranto. He was also a senator. For more information, see <http://www.marina.difesa.it/Storia/MOVM/Parte03/Bio03/MOVM305b.htm>, Date of Access: December 3, 2006.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

³⁸ “Long live the King—Long Live the Navy”

little monkey,”³⁹ because Castro resisted the pressure of the three countries which ultimately blockaded the Venezuelan coast to collect debts.

When on November 25, 1902 Britain and Germany officially informed the Department of State that they planned to blockade the Venezuelan coast, “Secretary of State John Hay replied that the United States greatly deplored any European intervention in the affairs of the South American republic, while conceding that the action in this case was justifiable.”⁴⁰ However, there was nothing for President Roosevelt to do except to send Admiral John Dewey in the gunboat, *Mayflower* to the Venezuelan coast on December 1 to observe the situation. On December 8, the British and German ambassadors in Caracas informed President Castro that they were closing their embassies in Venezuela. They were also planning to “initiate ‘specific measures’ to satisfy their claims against Venezuela.”⁴¹ Italian claims against Venezuela started on December 17, and in order to protect Italian interests in Venezuela, the Italian foreign affairs minister Prinetti made a start. After referring to the offenses made against British and German citizens, violation of trading vessels and nonfulfillment of government contracts, the foreign affairs minister stated:

Italy has also considerable claims to make against Venezuela for damages to the property of Italian citizens during the insurrections which have now been going on for years in that Republic. As early as April last the royal minister at Caracas, having exhausted all efforts for a friendly settlement, had presented to the Government of Venezuela a list of the claims examined by him, and which had reduced to the smallest amount possible, to be duly paid, and amounting to 2,810,255.95 bolivars ... as soon as I was informed of the action of Germany and England, I communicated with the cabinets of Berlin and London ... Italy’s proposal was willingly accepted ... our fellow citizens will not lack

³⁹ Judith Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe’s Hemisphere to Petroleum’s Empire*, (Athens, Ga. & London: University of Georgia Press, 1996), reviewed by George W. Schuyler, H-LatAm (March 1997), 2.

⁴⁰ Edmund Morris, “‘A Matter of Extreme Urgency’: Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902 - United States-Germany conflict over alleged German expansionistic efforts in Latin America,” *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2002), 4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

efficient protection, similar to that enjoyed by English and German subjects.⁴²

In this message, there are a few points that should be highlighted. Firstly, Prinetti informed the American ambassador that the situation in Venezuela was getting worse, and it warranted an intervention. Secondly, he stated that Italy was in communication with Britain and Germany, and thirdly—perhaps most importantly—Italy wanted to be treated equally with Britain and Germany. This message was repeated to American officials throughout the whole crisis. It reflected Italy's effort, like that of the United States at the time, to become a great power measurable in terms of acquiring overseas territories, building a modern navy; and asserting itself as a significant diplomatic player.⁴³

On December 19, Italy officially informed the United States that starting with December 20, it was going to participate in the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuelan ports since “the United States of Venezuela [did] not satisfy Italian complaints.”⁴⁴ In addition, Prinetti declared that Italy would be glad if the office of arbitrator of the claims which the Governments of Italy, Germany and England had against Venezuela might be assumed by Roosevelt by guaranteeing that the same treatment would be provided to all governments.⁴⁵

Cipriano Castro answered the questions about the payment of the debts and arbitration with a telegraph in which he stated that the payments were delayed due to the civil war in Venezuela. He also supported the idea of an immediate settlement of

⁴² [Enclosure—Translation] G. V. L. Meyer to John Hay, Rome, December 17, 1902, *FRUS* (1903), 602.

⁴³ Paul Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), 203-6.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, [Subenclosure--Translation] Mr. Meyer to Mr. Hay, Rome, December 21, 1902, 604.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, [Enclosure—Translation] Mr. Meyer to Mr. Hay, Rome, December 25, 1902, 605.

the problem at the Hague or by the arbitration of an American republic, but not the United States.⁴⁶ The United States did not accept that suggestion.

One of the champions of Anglo-American solidarity was unquestionably Theodore Roosevelt. He strongly believed “in the oneness of the American and British interest ... and in the combination [with which] the Americans and the British could dominate the world—to the advantage of civilization.”⁴⁷ In addition—regarding the Venezuela crisis of 1902—he thought that Germany, not Britain, was the most threatening part since its imperialist aims had gained impetus in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Roosevelt believed that Germany had the desire of establishing a strongly fortified place near the future isthmian canal, which would be a great disadvantage for American hegemony in the Caribbean.⁴⁸ Thus, the main antagonist of the 1902 crisis from his perspective was Germany.

Roosevelt’s Anglo-Saxonism was particularly related to the common ethnic origin of the British and American nations. As a patriot, he definitely believed in the greatness of the American nation, and that greatness was related to the white, Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking race of which the British constituted a significant part. Influenced by Darwinian scientific explanations, Roosevelt placed the “white” race at the top of racial hierarchy, but he also welcomed the Europeans who aspired to become Americans regardless of their ethnic, religious and social origins. He believed that America was a melting pot in which a hybrid race could be formed, and that mix would create and sustain American racial superiority.⁴⁹

⁴⁶[Enclosure—Translation] Mr. Hay to Mr. Meyer, Washington, December 31, 1902, 606.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 85.

⁴⁸Morris, “A Matter of Extreme Urgency,” 6.

⁴⁹Gary Gerstle, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided Character of American Nationalism,” *The Journal of American History* 86 (1999), 1281.

He felt that his “true Americanism” allowed him to welcome all “racially inferior” European immigrants to become Americans.⁵⁰ This was presumably behind the inclusion of Jews, Italians and African Americans in Roosevelt’s Rough Riders. The Americans, of different ethnic backgrounds, fought for liberty and human rights against one of the most powerful tyrants of the Old World according to Roosevelt. In brief, Roosevelt’s racism was based on the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race, but other Europeans could also become Americans by submitting themselves to the ideals and principles of Americanism.

Roosevelt had mixed feelings about the Italy and its people. When he went to Italy in 1887, he wrote a letter to his sister Anna Roosevelt in which he stated that Italy was a country where there was an immense manual labor. However, he did not like the people, and said “Praise heaven for America—even with the alderman and the anarchists.”⁵¹ Significantly, Theodore Roosevelt made a comment about the fall of the Latin races:

I feel very strongly that the English-speaking peoples are now closer together ... their interests are really fundamentally the same they are far more closely akin, not merely in blood, but in feeling and principle ... The day of the Latin races is over ... we must stand together!⁵²

From this perspective, Italians did not constitute one of Theodore Roosevelt’s favorite ethnic groups. Most of the Italians did not arrive in the United States with the intention of becoming Americans. Italians represented the scum of Europe as Roosevelt’s friend, Jacob Riis noted in his work entitled *How the Other Half Lives*. They did not eagerly dissolve in the melting pot that formed the ideal mix of the American nation. In short, Roosevelt did not like Italians. Regarding the

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1296.

⁵¹ To Anna Roosevelt, Sorrento, January 30, 1887, Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Volume I (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 120.

⁵² To Arthur Hamilton Lee, Oyster Bay, November 25, 1898, Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Volume II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 890.

New Orleans lynching of 1891, he told “various dago diplomats” that lynching was “rather a good thing.”⁵³ Conceivably, the only common idea and policy that the Italian officials and Roosevelt shared was the preventive measures that should be taken against anarchy as mentioned in Chapter 6.



Figure 7.3 Theodore Roosevelt and Judge Bernard Barasa, Municipal Court, standing with Italian soldiers in railroad station, *Chicago Daily News*, 1918 (The Library of Congress: American Memory), <http://memory.loc.gov/>

Theodore Roosevelt was not the favorite American president for the Italians on the other side of the Atlantic either. He was not praised or admired like Abraham Lincoln or Woodrow Wilson in the pre-Versailles era. Roosevelt was a prominent name both in the world and in Italy, and he had also the virtues and defects of a strong man; he had a lot of friends, but also a lot of enemies who fought with him and denigrated him.⁵⁴ According to the Italians, he was a successful president who fought with trusts, and promulgated special laws against anarchism. However, he

⁵³ Roosevelt quoted in Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 53.

⁵⁴ Vito Garretto, *Storia degli Stati Uniti dell'America*, 448.

was not interested in the situation of the blacks, and that created a discontent in his country.⁵⁵

In the end, the Venezuela crisis came to an end when Britain accepted the American proposal about arbitration, and also persuaded Germany to accept the condition. An agreement about the crisis was reached on May 7, 1903 that declared that the Tribunal at the Hague should decide how the revenues would be divided between the blockading powers.⁵⁶ The Venezuela crisis provoked the United States Congress to welcome Roosevelt's appeal for a buildup of American naval power as well as Roosevelt's assertion of his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.⁵⁷

7.4 Conclusion

The late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries were the times when American imperialism started to accelerate, and Italians were aware of that fact. With the Spanish-American War, the reality about U.S. expansionism became more visible. The Italian politicians, soldiers and intellectuals approached the issue from different perspectives. Firstly, they understood that Old World imperialism in the New World came to an end with the defeat of the Spanish navy in Cuba. Secondly, they also knew that there was a traditional alliance between the American and British nations, and a possible alliance could also include Germany. In 1910, Roosevelt visited Italy again and met the Italian king, but his biases about the Latin race come to the surface once again:

⁵⁵ Umberto Biasoli, *Piccola Storia*, 77.

⁵⁶ Protocol of Agreement between Venezuela and Italy, to which the United States and Other Powers are Parties, respecting the reference of the question of the preferential treatment of claims to the Tribunal at the Hague, Washington, May 7, 1903, *FRUS* (1904), 611-13.

⁵⁷ Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," *Military Affairs* 25 (1961), 22.

The king showed that he was deeply and intelligently interested in every moment for social reform, and was not only astonishingly liberal but even radical, sympathizing with many of the purposes and doctrines of the Socialists ... I should have liked to see more of him; but after all I am doubtful whether it would have been worth while, for even with the pleasantest and kindest king there must of necessity be a little that is artificial in association with a civilian foreigner, and especially a civilian foreigner from a huge democracy.⁵⁸

That racial ideology and policy making could be very dangerous for the Italians who were originally Latin like the Spanish, and who also traditionally lacked a strong navy. Due to the development of Italian nationalism, jingoistic voices about the greatness and strength of the Italian navy began to be heard. Professional naval strategists like Bonamico expressed the dangers that were awaiting the Italians if they did not renovate their navy. In brief, Italians anticipated that the American continents were going to be ruled under the hegemony of the United States, and possible Anglo-Saxon solidarities could endanger the future of Italy. America was acting according to its designs about becoming a great power by centering its might on the idea of racial superiority and naval supremacy, and Italy had to enhance its national power at least in its own region, and possibly the Atlantic.

The Venezuela crisis of 1902-03 can be examined from this perspective. In December 1902, Italy decided to join the Anglo-German blockade at the last minute. Its main objective was to recover its debts from the Venezuelan government, but Italy would not act alone in that blockade if Britain and Germany had not decided to do so. Afraid of yielding to a complete Anglo-American alliance, Italy preferred to be on the side of the Americans, the British and the Germans. By requesting arbitration from Roosevelt, the Italian officials wanted to secure America's support

⁵⁸ Joseph Bucklin Bishop, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time: Shown in His Own Letters*, Vol. II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), 202-3.

in their relations with South America. Therefore, they decided to be on the side of the United States which had declared its hegemony over the whole American continent in the last years of the nineteenth century. Thus one would-be great power could gain acknowledgement of its own rise by itself acknowledging the rise of another.

CHAPTER 8

AMERICA AND NORTH AFRICA: DIFFERENT TYPES OF ITALIAN COLONIALISM

As an outcome of the Italian unification, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a preindustrial Italian imperialism that was heavily based on agriculture. Colonization—settling men on the land—was one of the major concerns of Italian imperial policy.¹ The Italian policy makers considered that a greater Italy or an Italian empire could be established through emigration. Consequently, all of the places that Italians migrated to became potential Italian colonies. From Argentina to Asia Minor and from the United States to Libya, Italy sought to establish its colonies in different forms. But the definition of the word “colony” changed from one place to another. This chapter will seek to clarify some aspects of Italian colonialism by referring to Italian colonial activities in North Africa and America, and the United States’ attitude about Italian expansionism both in the Old and the New World.

¹ Claudio G. Segre, *Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), xiv.

8.1 From the Heirs of Ancient Rome to a “Proletarian Nation”: The Features of Italian Colonialism

Italian colonialism is important because it was central to the construction of nationhood for the newly united kingdom.² In order to understand the meaning of Italian colonialism, a thorough definition of this term should be provided. Firstly, it should be stated that there was a strong connection between the idea of colonization and the consequences of Italian emigration. Significantly in the late nineteenth century, Italian liberals wished for the Italian emigrants to establish spontaneous colonies that would enhance the economic conditions of the Italian kingdom. An “ethnographic empire” built through the peaceful toil of emigrant laborers could produce “colonies of direct dominion” that followed the footsteps of the ancient Roman Empire.³

The double meaning of the word *colonia* was first mentioned by Leone Carpi in 1874. Being one of the first Italian intellectuals who studied Italian colonialism, Carpi stated that the word “colony” referred to both overseas expansion and the emigrant settlements in foreign countries, thus emigration was a form of colonial expansion.⁴ Similar to Carpi’s approach, Francesco Crispi, the first Italian imperialist politician who became the prime minister in 1887, designed a definition for colonization:

The [Italian] Government ... must never lose sight of [emigrants] in their new home ... Colonies must be like arms that the country extends far away in foreign districts, to bring them within the orbit of

² Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, eds. *Italian Colonialism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 2.

³ Mark I. Choate, “From Territorial to Ethnographic Colonies and Back Again: the Politics of Italian Expansion, 1890-1912,” *Modern Italy* 8 (2003), 66.

⁴ *Ibid.*

its relations of labor and exchange, they must be like an enlargement of boundaries of its action and its economic power.⁵

Crispi was a leader who longed for the national greatness of the Italian people and for a strong Italian foreign policy. Hence he aspired to have solid ties with the scattered Italian population all around the world by establishing cultural and economic bonds between the migrants and their mother country. In brief, starting with Crispi, Italian policy makers aimed at establishing ethnographic colonies in the Americas, and direct dominion in North Africa. Crispi was an example for the southern politicians who were in a search for land where Italy's surplus population could be settled in prosperity under the Italian flag.⁶

Nevertheless, Luigi Einaudi—later the first president of the Italian Republic in 1948—introduced a different colonial perspective in his book, *A Merchant Prince: A Study of Italian Colonial Expansion* published in 1900. He hoped to establish a colonial myth of Italy's medieval republics, whereas Crispi fantasized a new Roman Empire.⁷ Instead of North Africa, Einaudi presented South America as the ideal place of Italian colonization; he was an example for the northern traders, bankers and manufacturers who were in a search for markets, natural resources and investment opportunities,⁸ although he neglected the fact the number of the Italian merchants sent abroad was very few.

The first Italian colonial society, *Società Geografica Italiana* [*Italian Geographic Society*] (*SGI*) was founded in Florence in 1867, and moved to Rome in 1871 when the Eternal City became the capital of the Italian Kingdom. The membership of the society was dominated by political, military and diplomatic not

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Christopher Seton-Watson, "Italy's Imperial Hangover," *Journal of Contemporary History* 15 (1980), 170.

⁷ Choate, "From Territorial to Ethnographic Colonies," 68.

⁸ Seton-Watson, "Italy's Imperial Hangover," 170.

scientific interests. Also, the society was an organization that was seriously interested in emigration problems and searched for scientific solutions. In the 1880s, the Neapolitan *Società Africana d'Italia* [*African Society of Italy*] was established with the aim of establishing colonies in North and East Africa that would serve as markets for Italian commerce and destinations for southern emigration.⁹

The Italian Kingdom was the last European state that moved toward Africa during the imperialist movement that was initiated by Belgian King Leopold II's activities in Africa, and German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's colonial policies.¹⁰ However, colonialism was generally neglected in late nineteenth-century Italy. Firstly, Italy became a united country as a consequence of national self-determination; hence colonialism was completely contradictory to the Italian character according to the liberal politicians. Secondly, Italy was not a developed country like France and England, and economic underdevelopment was an important obstacle for its overseas expansion. That was why the Italian governments gave the impression of being extremely cautious about colonialism during the age of European imperialism. That caution began to disappear when the Italian state colonized the Asab settlement in Africa¹¹ notwithstanding Italian apologists who emphasized this different position of Italy in regard to imperialism and colonization. They referred to the backwardness of Italy, and stated that it needed lands in other parts of the world where the Italian emigrants could go, settle and prosper.

The idea of Italian demographic colonization entered a different period with the Sicilian Prime Minister, Francesco Crispi, who indicated that Italy had a

⁹ David Atkinson, "Constructing Italian Africa: Geography and Geopolitics." Ben-Ghiat, *Italian Colonialism*, 18.

¹⁰ Gianfausto Rosoli, "La Colonizzazione Italiana delle Americhe tra Mito e Realtà, 1880-1914" [Italian Colonization in the Americas between Myth and Reality, 1880-1914] *Studi Emigrazione* 11 (1972), 298.

¹¹ Giampaolo Calchi Novati, "Italy in the Triangle of the Horn: Too Many Corners for a Half Power," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32 (1994), 369.

historical mission in Africa. Suggesting later nationalist and fascist rhetoric, he stated that that mission was dictated by Italy's maritime history and geography, and the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea were the seas where "[Italians'] fathers cleared the path to new civilization."¹² However, Crispi was a hesitant politician; he did not show his enthusiasm for the colonialist cause in the Parliament, and never voted in favor of the colonial enterprises during his two ministries.¹³ He always stated that he inherited the colonial policy of Italy, and the defeat of Italian forces at Adowa by Menelik II of Ethiopia in 1896 brought Crispi's political end but intensified the nationalist feelings of the Italians.

Italian imperial activities in Africa that started with Crispi can be divided into three parts. The first period started with the acquisition of Eritrea and Somaliland and came to an end with the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896. The second phase for the quest for an Italian colonial empire began with the occupation of the Turkish territory of Libya in 1911, which had become an important land for the Italians especially after the French occupation of Tunisia. In this period, Italy also gained the control of the Dodecanese Islands that had a significant strategic importance. By 1914, Italy expanded its territory to Eritrea, Somali and Libya. The final stage of Italian colonialism in Africa started with the conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-6. Fascist Italy gave a particular importance to overseas expansion of the Italian Empire. Mussolini, obsessed by the Italian defeat in Adowa, stated that "the tendency to Empire [was] a manifestation of vitality, [and] its contrary or the 'stay at home' mentality [was] a sign of decadence."¹⁴ As a consequence, he combined Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia in a united Italian East Africa in 1936.

¹² Segre, *Fourth Shore*, 11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁴ H. R. Tate, "The Italian Colonial Empire," *Journal of Royal African Society* 40 (1941), 151.

The most important and influential colonial society in the post-Adowa period, the *Istituto Coloniale Italiano* [Italian Colonial Institute] was established in 1906 by the prominent colonial advocates and geographers with government subsidies. The society was one of the few organizations that made scientific studies about Italian emigration. In 1890, it published a book entitled, *Researches about Italian Emigration to Foreign Countries*, and discussed the profound problems about emigration in three congresses in 1892, 1895 and 1898.¹⁵ Its first president was the future foreign affairs minister, Antonino di San Giuliano. Another future foreign minister of Italy, Baron Sidney Sonnino was also a member of the institute. These people also favored the creation of *magna Italia* in Africa. San Giuliano stated that the nation's chief export was not capital but peasants, and Italy needed a suitable empire for its development.¹⁶

The expansionist cause that was inflamed in the early 1900s gained impetus also with the literary movements of the period. The Italian nationalists utilized literature to defend Italian expansionist objectives. One of the leading spokesmen of the nationalist ideology, Errico Corradini stated that Italy's condition could be improved by converting the spirit of emigration to the spirit of colonialism and imperialism. In that way, Italians could become a great nation.¹⁷ Another significant name that had a great influence on twentieth-century Italian colonialism was Giovanni Pascoli who summarized Italian expansionism in his oration, "La Grande Proletaria si è Mossa!" [The Great Proletariat is Stirred!] on November 26, 1911.¹⁸ The "great proletariat" that Pascoli referred to was the Italian nation because Italians did not have any wealth except their physical power. The poet noted the

¹⁵ Rosoli, "La Colonizzazione Italiana," 302.

¹⁶ Segre, *Fourth Shore*, 16.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁸ For the original and integral text of "La Grande Proletaria si è Mossa!" see <http://www.cronologia.it/storia/a1911f.htm>, Date of Access: February 17, 2006.

humiliations that the Italian immigrants faced in other countries. For instance, he indicated that the Italian immigrant were treated like Negroes in the United States; they were lynched in an inhumane manner. Thus, Italians had to go to North Africa, to Libya, as the successors of the Roman Empire, in order to overcome the humiliations of emigration and to have a proper population outlet. From that perspective, the war was a test of national unity.¹⁹ American nativist violence helped encouraged Italian imperialism in Africa.

Undoubtedly, Libya was one of the significant symbols of the Italian nationalist movement. It was the “Promised Land assigned by Providence to Italy.”²⁰ The motive that lay behind Italian colonization in Libya was the mission that Italy embraced with the rise of nationalism: bringing civilization to the neglected parts of the world. A typical attitude that promoted Italian national greatness in relation to colonial expansion in Africa was Chevalier Tullio Irace’s *With the Italians in Tripoli*, published in 1912. The book is a rich source about the Italian occupation of Libya that shows Crispi’s thoughts about Africa. It consists of numerous maps and illustrations. Irace started his account by declaring that the world owed nothing to the Turks except distress, and to Italy its present civilization to a great extent.²¹ For him, the occupation of places like Tripoli and Benghazi, which resembled old Italian towns, was very natural since Young Italy had drawn once more the sword of the Caesars in Northern Africa.²² The conquest of Libya was not an invasion; it was “a great work of civilization.”²³ Nevertheless, Irace also referred to the anti-Italian campaigns that would urge the Italians to “an

¹⁹ Segre, *Fourth Shore*, 21-22.

²⁰ Ronald S. Cunsolo, “Libya, Italian Nationalism, and the Revolt against Giolitti,” *The Journal of Modern History* 37 (1965), 189.

²¹ Tullio Irace, *With the Italians in Tripoli: The Authentic History of the Turco-Italian War, with Maps and Illustrations*, (London: John Murray, 1912), ix.

²² *Ibid.*, 84.

²³ *Ibid.*, 241.

International Conference for the purpose of putting an end to the war in the interest of the Turks.”²⁴ Irace declared that Italy was going to continue its expansion on its “fourth shore” as the redeemer of the deprived people despite all criticism. While promoting Italian imperialism he preferred to refer to Italians as “the proletariat nation” like the poet Giovanni Pascoli did:

The Italians are returning today to this land which belonged to them of Old, and in which their glorious ancestors have left many traces of civilization and greatness that even the Arabs and the Turks have never been able to efface ... Italy, the world’s greatest proletariat, Italy, the simple-hearted, the laborious, more used to suffer than enjoy; Italy the redeemed of barely fifty years, steps down today into the arena, fit and ready to become in her own good time the redeemer of other lands and other peoples!²⁵

In 1915, Italy’s friends Britain and France gave the promise of African compensations to Italy as a reward for entering World War I. However, after 1919, Britain offered only a small land on the Egyptian-Libyan Frontier and a Kenyan province, and France made small adjustments of the Tunisian-Libyan frontier.²⁶ The outcomes of the Italian colonialism in North Africa ended with frustration and anger. Once more, the major powers of the Old World showed that they regarded Italy as the least power among themselves.

8.2 Italian Government’s Emigration Policy

Being convinced of migration’s economic benefits to the Italian kingdom as well as to the poor *contadini*, the Italian government encouraged the emigration of southern Italians as “a ‘safety valve’ lessening the social tensions that might

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 182.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 321.

²⁶ Seton-Watson, “Italy’s Imperial Hangover,” 169.

otherwise have exploded into revolt.”²⁷ However, with the increase in the number of the Italian migrants, the government continued to promote return migration and intended to control emigration and to take necessary precautions to carry on labor and return migration successfully.

Initially, Italians used an efficient way to control migration: the *padrone* system, “which was a logical outcome of the economic individualism and ‘amoral familism’ of south Italian society.”²⁸ The *padroni* provided connections of the unskilled Italian laborers to the world, and “Italian laborers were not slaves but rather ‘servi’ (clients or dependents) to their *padroni* ... patronage was an integral part of Italian life at every level of society.”²⁹ Those “patrons” or “bosses” found jobs for the unskilled immigrant workers, “supervised them at work ... [and] did not hesitate to protect their investment by maintaining a prison-like control over the workers.”³⁰ For their “service,” the *padroni* received a fee called *la bossatura*.³¹ This management of Italian labor in foreign countries was vital for the Italian government before the mass migration. “In 1868, Italy’s Minister of the Interior actually instructed mayors not to issue permission to emigrants to go to Algeria or America without a *padrone*.”³² Because of a shortage of labor during the Civil War, the United States authorized contract labor in 1864. Thus, the *padrone* system helped the Italian immigrants “in introducing them in the American labor world,”³³ and was

²⁷ Spencer M. Di Scala, *Italy: From Revolution to Republic, 1700 to the Present* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 146.

²⁸ Rudolph J. Vecoli, “Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of the Uprooted,” *The Journal of American History* 51(1964), 412.

²⁹ Gabaccia, *Diasporas*, 65.

³⁰ Sowell, *Migrations and Cultures*, 165.

³¹ For detail see Rudolph J. Vecoli, “Negli Stati Uniti,” Piero Bevilacqua, Andreina DeClementi and Emilio Franzina eds., *Storia dell’Emigrazione Italiana: Arrivi [History of Italian Emigration: Arrivals]* (Roma: Donzelli Editore, 2002), 58.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ “L’Italia Ufficiale e la Realtà dell’Emigrazione in USA (1886-1914)” [Official Italy and the Reality of Immigration in the USA (1886-1914)], *Studi Emigrazione* 33 (1974), 12.

the Italian government's first policy of emigration, previously "left to take its own course without receiving encouragement or obstacles of any kind."³⁴

Francesco Crispi, who became the Prime Minister in August 1887, believed that emigration had to be a part of Italy's foreign policy, and the government had to focus on the Italian population abroad for both the migrants' and Italy's benefit.³⁵ "If Italy was going to be a great power, every sector of its foreign policy had to function in that scope ... the emigrants, too, had to contribute to a 'winning' image of Italy abroad."³⁶ For that purpose, the role of the Italian representatives abroad had to be strengthened. Thus, the opening of the Italian Information and Protection Bureau at Ellis Island in 1894 was regarded in Italy as a significant diplomatic achievement. Both the United States and Italian governments supported the Bureau to combat the *padrone system*.

The U.S. government regarded the *padroni* as a menace on American soil, prohibiting contract labor by federal statute in 1885. To enforce this law, an Italian Bureau on the Ellis Island would be a great advantage for the Americans since the desirable immigrants would be separated from the undesired *padroni* with the support of the Italian government. The Bureau was opened with the support of the United States Treasury, and existed for five years. It actually offered little protection to the Italian immigrants. Its main objective was not to fight the *padroni*, but, as Fava wished, "to find employment directly for [Italian] people and to scatter them through the States especially in the agricultural districts."³⁷ On 10 July 1894, Fava wrote to Alberto Blanc: "My success in obtaining the Office on Ellis is directly

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁵ Laura Pilotti, *Ministero degli Affari Esteri: L'Ufficio di Informazioni e Protezione dell'Emigrazione Italiana di Ellis Island [Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Office of Information and Protection of Italian Emigration at Ellis Island]*, (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1993), 27.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 28.

³⁷ "L'Italia ufficiale," 16.

related to my careful use of the argument that it is the United States government that must take steps to suppress the evils of the bosses and speculators.”³⁸ For the Italian government, the Bureau was going to initiate the desired transitional process for the Italian immigrants by sending them to the areas specifically selected for colonization programs.³⁹

With the Emigration Act of 1901, the Italian government advanced its emigration policy. Emigration “ceased to be a gentlemanly discussion of economic and social change, and became instead a clamour for imperialism.”⁴⁰ Italian emigration was the major basis for colonization, and “in mass emigration nationalists found the justification for Italian colonialism.”⁴¹ The method of colonization was widely discussed, but Italian nationalists agreed that the government had to stimulate colonization by regulating emigration in order to compete with the leading powers in Europe.

The following extract is from “The Ten Commandments for Italians Abroad” which was published on December 25, 1912, in *Rivista Coloniale (Colonial Review)* by the Istituto Coloniale Italiano (Italian Colonial Institute). The institution was significant for “the nearness of the membership to those who made foreign policy. ... Vice-Presidents were two former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, San Giuliano and Guicciardini.”⁴² The commandments demonstrate the continuity in Italy’s policy about emigration in the twentieth century:

³⁸ Carol Bradley, “Ellis Island: The Italian Government and the Office for Information and Protection of Italian Immigrants,” in Joseph V. Scelsa, Salvatore J. LaGumina and Lydio Tomasi, eds., *Italian Americans in Transition: Proceedings of the XXI Annual Conference of the American Italian Historical Association held at the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute, October 13-15, 1988* (New York: The American Italian Historical Association, 1990), 263.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Martin Clark, *Modern Italy, 1871-1982*, 4th ed., (London: Longman, 1988), 167.

⁴¹ Cinel, *The National Integration*, 82.

⁴² R. J. B. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 60.

1. The *patria* is one only. Your *patria* is Italy. No other country can be loved by you like Italy. ...
7. Do not take fellow citizens away from *patria*, allowing your descendants to lose their *italianità* and be absorbed by the people among whom you have emigrated. Educate your sons in the cult of Italy. ...
8. Be proud to declare yourself, always, on every occasion, an Italian by origin and sentiment, and be respectful without servility among those who give you hospitality.⁴³

The “new” Italian immigrants in the United States seem to have obeyed these “Ten Commandments,” for they continued to live in their own communities, or “ethnic colonies,” and preserved their lifestyles. In this regard, the Italian policy of colonization proved stronger than the American policy of citizenship. The first immigrants were usually single young men who came to America to earn money to buy land or to pay dowries. The ones who were married left their families behind. Other family members went to the United States after the father had sent them tickets and money. As well as their family union, the southern Italians brought brigandage, Mafia and Camorra—criminal activity—from Italy to the United States. “The propensity for violence of the south Italians was not a symptom of social disorganization caused by emigration but a characteristic of their Old World culture.”⁴⁴ These organizations were manifestations of the “patron-client type” of relation that flourished in the *mezzogiorno*, which was an important aspect of southern Italian culture that the immigrants continued to preserve in the United States.

⁴³ “Appendix I: The Ten Commandments for Italians Abroad,” *Ibid.*, 421-422.

⁴⁴ Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers*, 409.

8.3 Italian Agricultural Colonies in the United States

After the 1880s, the number of the Italian immigrants increased rapidly in major cities of the United States. That was not a desired situation for both the Italian and United States governments. Americans did not prefer to receive immigrants in large numbers in major industrial centers. The immigrants could not become assimilated, lived in isolation and were manipulated in the hands of the illegal *padroni*. The Italian policy about those illegal bosses was strict since their presence was a hindrance to the Italian government's economic control over its emigrants. Italians aimed to divert their immigrants to the southern parts of the United States where they could have the chance to establish agricultural colonies. At this point, it should be stated that Italian officials were referring to the authentic meaning of colonization, which "generally means the distribution of farm laborers and farm lands to agricultural sections, and their eventual conversion into farm owners."⁴⁵ The southern states seemed to be the very best section of the country for the Italian immigrants where their work was most needed. Thus, they had to "leave the congested cities and seek a purer atmosphere in agricultural work."⁴⁶

The Italian Foreign Affairs Minister was Alberto Blanc when the Bureau was opened in 1894. Blanc personally gave a great importance to the establishment of Italian agricultural colonies in the southern part of the United States. Therefore, the Italian government celebrated the establishment of the Italian Information and Protection Bureau at the Ellis Island with the publication of the 78th *Libro Verde* [*Green Book*]. The book is a significant source that provides information about

⁴⁵ " 'Italian Farmers in the South: An Interview with Adolfo Rossi,' in Lydio F. Tomasi, *The Italian in America: The Progressive View, 1891-1914*, (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1972) 185.

⁴⁶ For more information, see Gustavo Tosti, Acting Consul-General of Italy, New York City, "The Agricultural Possibilities of Italian Immigration," Lydio F. Tomasi, *The Italian in America*, 104, 106.

the idea of having agricultural colonies in the United States. It is a compilation of the reports sent by all of the Italian consuls in the United States. After stating that the *padrone system* was a menace to the Italian immigrants in America, Blanc indicated the importance of protecting them from the illegal intermediaries and the violence of the Lynch Law by establishing a “Labor Office” in New York.⁴⁷

The book continues with the reports of the Italian consuls in the United States. From the published documents, it is clear that some Italian diplomatic officials were in favor of an agricultural colonization in America. But in big industrial cities like New York, Chicago or Philadelphia this was not possible since the Italian immigrants continued to be ignorant and isolated laborers who could not even talk in the language of their adopted country. Therefore, as Ambassador Baron Francesco Saverio Fava stated, the Italian immigration in the United States had to be directed to the agricultural centers in order to give the opportunity of prosperity to the immigrants.⁴⁸

The Green Book continues with the observations of Professor Alessandro Oldrini who agreed with Baron Fava. Professor Oldrini indicated that the Italians in the United States did not have protection, and there were some Italians living in Texas, Alabama and significantly California, but not enough for agricultural colonies.⁴⁹ Another important detail about the *Green Book* is the fact that the reports of some consuls contradicted the others. For instance, the report of the Italian consul

⁴⁷ From the Foreign Affairs Minister to the Royal Ambassador in Washington, Rome, March 21, 1894, *Libro Verde No. 78, Provvedimenti Concordati col Governo degli Stati Uniti dell’America del Nord a Favore dell’Emigrazione Italiana. Documenti Diplomatici Presentati al Parlamento Italiano dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri (Blanc), Seduta del 7-VII-1894* [*The Green Book, No. 78, The Agreed Measures with the United States of America in Favor of Italian Emigration, The Diplomatic Documents Presented to the Italian Parliament by the Foreign Affairs Minister (Blanc), Session of July 7, 1894*] (Rome: Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, 1894), 4.

⁴⁸ Telegraph, The Italian Ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Washington, April 22, 1894, *The Green Book*, 10.

⁴⁹ Memorandum, Annex A (Translation), *The Green Book*, 37.

attention and did not make effort towards directing our emigrants to those regions.⁵²

Apparently the Italian officials could not achieve their plan for a mass agricultural colonization in the United States, and they were still searching for a solution. However, there were some organizations that assisted the government's colonization plan, and established individual colonies in the southern United States. In 1905, the above mentioned Italian ambassador visited one of those colonies during his visit in America.

8.4 Tontitown: An Agricultural Colony in Arkansas

Due to the increasing intensity of the emigration problem of Italy and the deprived conditions in which the emigrants were living in other countries, the discussions about preserving the *italianità* of those people became stronger in the mother country. The Italian “political” Catholics like the Bishop of Piacenza, Giovanni Battista Scalabrini, and the Bishop of Cremona, Geremia Bonomelli, warned the emigrants about the “perils of the deep, and of that soul-destroying Protestantism or godless materialism and socialism which waited upon them in the New World,” and searched for the ways to institutionalize Catholicism in emigrant communities which would move hand in hand with Italian nationalism.⁵³

Bishop Scalabrini (1839-1906), is one of the most significant names in the development of Catholicism among Italian immigrants in the United States. In Italy, he was first clergy who organized the religious and social assistance to Italian

⁵² “Sitting of June 15th, 1905—(Senate)” Tittoni, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*, 173-174.

⁵³ Bosworth, *Italy and the Wider World*, p. 121.

immigrants in South and North America.⁵⁴ In 1888, Scalabrini asked for permission from Pope Leo XIII to establish at Piacenza the Istituto Missionario Cristoforo Colombo [Christopher Columbus Missionary Institute](later renamed the Congregazione dei Missionari di San Carlo [Congregation of Saint Charles Missionaries]) to train priests for overseas missions to Italian migrants and a lay association (the Società di San Raffaele [San Raphael Society]) to provide material and moral assistance to them.⁵⁵ It is widely known that the Italian Kingdom was in conflict with the Catholic Church from the first days of the *Risorgimento*, but the problem of emigration became a common issue for these two powers. In fact, Bishop Scalabrini had a significant influence on the Italian government, and the people who established St. Raphael's Society for Italian Immigrants in Italy acted under the direct influence of Scalabrini.⁵⁶ Also, in addition to the papacy and Italian hierarchy, the interested European laity blamed substandard pastoral care in the United States. Thus, the American clergy "adopted a policy of providing Italians with national parishes in which compatriot clergy and sisters offered continuity in language and devotional customs."⁵⁷ And that compatriot clergy became an important component of the development of Italian colonies in the United States.

In 1895 Austin Corbin, a wealthy resident of New York City, sought inexpensive Italian workers to work his land in Chicot County, Arkansas on the Mississippi River, which was an ideal place for his cotton plantation. Prince Ruspoli, the Mayor of Rome, supported Corbin in his plan for sending 100 Italian

⁵⁴ Antonio Perott, "L'Apostolo degli Emigrati, Giovanni Battista Scalabrini." *International Migration Review*, 3 (1969), 102.

⁵⁵ Gianfausto Rosoli, ed., *Scalabrini tra Vecchio e Nuovo Mondo. Atti del Convegno Internazionale [Scalabrini between the Old and the New World. Acts of International Conference]*, reviewed by Emiliana P. Noether, *International Migration Review* 25 (1991), 639.

⁵⁶ Sylvan M. Tomasi, "La Società Italiana di Fronte alle Prime Migrazioni di Massa." *International Migration Review* 3 (1968), 97.

⁵⁷ Mary Elizabeth Brown, "Archbishop Corrigan and the Italian Immigrant." *International Migration Review*, Special Issue: Ethics, Migration, and Global Stewardship 30 (1996), p. 340.

families to the colony annually for five years. Each family was to be sold 20 acres of land with various improvements, and for these tracts the families were to pay \$2,000 each over a 20 year period.⁵⁸ Ruspoli also wrote a letter to Scalabrini indicating that the colony should be established with the moral cooperation of a missionary.⁵⁹ The first group arrived in Chicot County in December, 1895, and named their colony Sunnyside. Corbin had chosen Father Pietro Bandini, organizer and at that time secretary of the St. Raphael Society of the United States for the Protection of Italian immigrants, to direct the colony.⁶⁰ In fact, Father Bandini had arrived in New York in 1891 to open the Italian office at Ellis Island. He also had a strong relation with Scalabrini, and the two men corresponded in the early 1890s about Bandini's plans of establishing colonies in Alabama, Wyoming and the border line between the United States and Canada.⁶¹

Shortly after the establishment of Sunnyside, Austin Corbin died, and the colonists began to scatter as a consequence of the harsh climate and malaria. Some returned to Italy, and some went to South America. Father Bandini persuaded the remaining 35 colonists to accompany him to Northwest Arkansas. They left Sunnyside on February 17, 1898, and on April 6. "Father Bandini then organized the settlers into a community, directing them to grow apple orchards and grape vines which were familiar crops to [the] farmers [from central and northern Italy],"⁶² and gave the name of the Italian explorer, Enrico Tonti (1650-1704) to the new Italian colony.

⁵⁸ Florena Fontinel, "History of Tontitown," *The Springdale News*, Golden Anniversary Edition, April 29, 1937.

⁵⁹ Rosoli, "La Colonizzazione Italiana," 364.

⁶⁰ Fontinel, "History of Tontitown."

⁶¹ Letter from Bandini to Scalabrini, July 31, 1891, Rosoli, "La Colonizzazione Italiana," 363.

⁶² "Tontitown's Founding Priest Dies: Father Bandini Honored Here and in Italian Home," *The Arkansas News*, 1988 (Fall).

The first years in Tontitown were not very easy. The Italian immigrants had crop problems, and prejudiced locals attempted to burn the Catholic Church and to frighten the colonists.⁶³ Nevertheless, the Italians developed an ideal colony in Tontitown under the leadership of Bandini. The Italian Ambassador in the United States, Baron Edmondo des Planches visited Tontitown on May 16, 1905. The visit was a major event. Hundreds of people waited for his arrival, and the ambassador was welcomed by a salute of guns and the waving of American and Italian flags in Tontitown. Baron des Planches attended a reception and made brief talks to Father Bandini and other residents of Tontitown. He also encouraged the Italian immigrants to strengthen their ties with the United States by describing Northwest Arkansas as the most progressive section of the country he had seen.⁶⁴ Later, des Planches mentioned his visit in an address at St. Louis:

I went into a strange and beautiful country . . . and found my people happy, contented, prosperous, upright and respected citizens During my stay in Tontitown, I have investigated carefully my people, their habits and environment, and the manner in which they were treated by their neighbors. Many of them came into the locality without a dollar and hardly a coat to their backs. Today every man in the colony owns a farm and has paid for it, while a good many of them have a good-sized bank account. They have built up a model little village from one or two huts and hovels, and are supplied with all the conveniences of modern times, including a post-office and telephone system There has been but one death in five years, and never an arrest in the history of the colony.. The men are respected by their business associates, and not one has ever failed to pay a bill or an obligation.⁶⁵

⁶³ "Catholic Priest was Longtime Guide for Italian Settlers in Arkansas," *The Arkansas News*, (Spring) 1987.

⁶⁴ For more information, see "Celebration When Ambassador Came: Italian Minister Given Welcome on Occasion of Visit to this Section," *The Springdale News*, Golden Anniversary Edition, April 29, 1937.

⁶⁵ Florena Fontinel, "History of Tontitown," *The Springdale News*, Golden Anniversary Edition, April 29, 1937.

The ambassador's observations indicated that Bandini achieved what the Italian and United States governments had been aspiring to for a long time. In Tontitown, the Italian immigrants were transformed into happy and prosperous respected citizens. They were no more illiterate and poor immigrants, and they also showed that Italian emigration could be transformed into a functional type of colonization which could be favorable for both the United States and Italian officials.

By 1917, more than 85 families were living in Tontitown and the grape crop was flourishing.⁶⁶ Father Pietro Bandini introduced the silkworm industry to the Italian immigrants. He published two articles about the problems of Italians in 1908 and 1911, and supported the establishment of the Catholic Colonization Society in 1910 of which he became the vice president because of his dynamism and exemplary altruism.⁶⁷ Bandini also received a gold medal from the Italian government and an award from the Vatican in 1911. He died of a stroke on January 2, 1917, but his colony never diminished.

There were other Italian agricultural colonies in the United States besides Tontitown like Knobview and Marshfield in Missouri; St. Helena, North Carolina; the Gangi Farm of Progressive Agriculture in Ladson, Daphne and Lambert in Alabama; Natchez, Canton, Gulfport, and Greenville in Mississippi; Bryan (2,500 Sicilians under the leadership of Father Giovanni Militello), Dickinson, Galveston and Houston in Texas, Vineland and Hamilton in New Jersey, and Avon, Genesco and Mount Morris in New York.⁶⁸ However, they were not always successful like Bandini's Tontitown. For instance, the presence of Italians in St. Helena increased white hostility in the surrounding township where Italians were described as

⁶⁶ "Tontitown's Founding Priest Dies."

⁶⁷ Rosoli, "La Colonizzazione Italiana," 367.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 349.

foreigners whose speech, custom, and religion identified them as outsiders.⁶⁹ The failure of the Italian agricultural colonies was partly related to the political, social and economic factors in the southern states, including the collapse of cotton prices and periodic depressions after the Civil War⁷⁰, and partly to the irresolute and inconsistent emigration policy of the Italian kingdom.

8.5 Conclusion

Colonialism started as a required commercial and political activity for the Italian kingdom after the *Risorgimento*. Specific political leaders had a significant role in accelerating the idea of imperialism and colonization, whereas some others did not get involved with the issue. For instance, Francesco Crispi was a significant policy maker who initiated the idea of Italian imperialism as a consequence of his scheme of Italian national greatness. Italian expansionist policy was postponed after the Battle of Adowa, and the period of Crispi's main adversary started. Giovanni Giolitti did not give a real importance to Italian colonialism, but the situation changed with the rise of Italian nationalism. In general, national greatness was the leading factor for the development of Italian colonial activities, but because of the contradictions between the policy makers, the aspects of colonialism could not become clarified. Italy could not develop a coherent colonial policy and endeavored to adapt different definitions to different situations. Its agricultural colonization policy in the United States was a combination of the Italian quest for national

⁶⁹ John Santucci, "Early 20th Century Inter-Ethnic Relations: A Case Study in North Carolina" in Joseph V. Scelsa, Salvatore J. LaGumina and Lydio Tomasi, eds., *Italian Americans in Transition: Proceedings of the XXI Annual Conference of the American Italian Historical Association held at the John D. Calandra Italian American Institute, October 13-15, 1988*, (New York: The American Italian Historical Association, 1990), p. 130.

⁷⁰ For more information, see Edward L. Ayers, *Promise of the New South? Life After Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

greatness and emigration policy. Italian policy makers aspired to have social and economic ties with their emigrants in other parts of the world by preserving these people's ethnicity and religion. At the same time, they wanted the Italian immigrants to be transformed into respected and civilized ambassadors of Italy. These goals were partly attained, and Italians gained significant achievements in South American colonization.

The United States supported and acted together with Italy in relation to the establishment of Italian communities in the southern states. The large number of immigrants in major American cities was a menace for political, social and economic order in the United States. It was not possible to control the ignorant and illiterate Italian immigrants who were manipulated in the hands of the illegal *padroni*. Hence the United States officials supported the establishment of the Italian Protection Bureau at the Ellis Island. On diplomatic level, the United States maintained its neutrality regarding Italian expansion in North Africa. The Italian ideal of establishing the Third Rome with the acquisition of the Fourth Shore was not a major incident for the United States during period between the late nineteenth century and World War I. On October 24, 1911, President William Howard Taft declared the United States' neutrality during the Turco-Italian War in Libya. When the Italian kingdom asked for the American recognition of Italian sovereignty over Libya, the Secretary of State, Alvin A. Adee declared:

It was not the custom of [t]his government to proceed in that manner, especially with regards to European affairs; that when the United States took over the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico, foreign governments were not asked for their acquiescence nor for their recognition, and none was given ... the United States was fully aware of what had taken place ... and while it had no objection at all to the attitude of Italy,

nevertheless an explicit form of recognition must not be expected.”⁷¹

The United States did not want to intermingle with European affairs. In return, American officials demanded European neutrality in the American sphere of influence. The hegemony of the United States was built in the western part of the world, and, for the moment, Americans did not seem to be interested in the affairs of the Old World unless the Europeans intruded in America’s territory and attempted to challenge its national greatness. Nevertheless, Italian expansionism and irredentism became a nuisance for American officials during World War I and after Italy’s demands in Paris Peace Talks in 1919 when President Woodrow Wilson would perceive Italian imperialist and colonial aims in Asia Minor and East Europe to be perilous for both the Old and the New World.

⁷¹ The American Ambassador, Thomas J. O’Brien to the Secretary of State, Rome, October 30, 1912, *FRUS* (1913), 609.




Figure 8.1 Father Pietro Bandini

Source: <http://www.encylopediaofarkansas.net>



Figure 8.2 Father Pietro Bandini celebrating mass at St. Joseph Catholic Church in Tontitown, circa 1917.

Source: <http://www.encylopediaofarkansas.org>

CHAPTER 9

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I ON U.S.-ITALIAN RELATIONS

When World War I erupted in August 1914, there were two opposing alliance systems in Europe: the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia, and the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary, minus Italy. Italy was one of the members of the Triple Alliance, but it declared its neutrality due to the eruption of the war. Because of that decision, Italy has been usually regarded as a selfish country by its former allies, but as the United States Ambassador in Italy from 1913 to 1919 Thomas Nelson Page indicated, that decision was partly related to the “sibyllic” [sic] character of the Italian statesmen and partly to Italy’s determination of securing its higher interests.¹

The most vital interest of the Italians in the early twentieth century was to secure their national greatness. The Italian kingdom had made the first attempt of becoming a unified and powerful country with the *Risorgimento*, which was a half-achieved development for Italy. Therefore, Italian officials utilized every possibility that would provide them the opportunity of becoming a more powerful and united country in the world arena. From this perspective, World War I was an opportunity

¹ Thomas Nelson Page, *Italy and the World War* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920) <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/comment/Italy/Page04.htm#12> (January 5, 2007).

for Italy rather than being an obligation. Thus, Italians changed sides in April 1915 with the London Pact that provided Italy's entrance to the war against Austria.²

However, with the United States' entry in the war, Italian plans were changed. During the era of American neutrality, Italy searched for the ways to secure its irredentist aims, and the Italian nation supported its leaders for their expansionist and imperialist motives. When the United States became a member of the Allies, Italy changed its domestic as well as diplomatic policy and aspired to accommodate United States policy by manipulating Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and his ideas about the New World Order and the League of Nations for its irredentist potential. This chapter will assert that both nations exhibited positive opinions about each other in the beginning of the war. But will also state that more than the politicians, the Italian people confided in the United States and Woodrow Wilson's New World Order in relation to *Italia irredenta* [irredentist Italy]. However, by the end of the Paris Peace Conference, due to the immense frustration that Wilson caused in the Italian society, the relation between the two countries entered a period of estrangement.

9.1 Americans and the Italian Army

Italians entered World War I later than the other countries, and only reluctantly. That was partly related to Italy's plans about irredentism and gaining the optimal outcome from the war. However, the Italian army's insufficiency was another significant factor for the postponement of Italy's entrance in the war.

² Italy's part in the Middle East was decided later with the Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne that was signed on April 26, 1917. According to this agreement, Italy received the whole southwestern Anatolia except the Adana region that was given to France. During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Italian and Greek claims on Ottoman lands clashed, and the Greek prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos obtained the permission to occupy Izmir.

Although it possessed a noteworthy numerical advantage over the enemy, the Italian army did not have highly trained officials, heavy artillery, and advanced strategy.³

It is generally considered that American society did not have adequate information about the Italian military, but there were a few sources that presented thorough information about the Italian Army. For instance, a detailed depiction of the Italian Army was provided to the American society in 1892 by General Staff Colonel Giovanni Goiran. His article, which was composed in a solid military manner and offered detailed information about the Italian army to the English speaking reader, was published in *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. The drawings in the article were made by the artist Brore Thure de Thulstrup (1848-1930) who lived in New York, and is often known for his works about military, horse, and narrative genre.⁴ In its introduction, Goiran indicated that the history of the Italian army went back to the history of the army of the former kingdom of Sardinia, and the nucleus of the army of the United Kingdom of Italy was constituted by the army of the Savoy.⁵ The army was reorganized in 1862, 1866 and 1870, but the political relations between France and Germany, and Austria and Russia, the new colonial policy of the principal European powers particularly after the Treaty of Berlin, and the changes in the commercial policies especially of France placed Italy in a fully dangerous position. Thus, new modifications in the military system were made in 1882 with which the country counted on 400,000 perfectly armed and equipped combatants of the first line.⁶

In 1887, the Italian national army was modified once again under the organization that consisted of the active or first-line army, which was composed of

³ James Burgwyn, *The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915-1919*, (Westport & London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 37-38.

⁴ For drawings, see Appendix C.

⁵ Giovanni Goiran, "The Italian Army," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 85 (1892)\ 419.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 421.

corps kept permanently in active service; the active militia that was kept under arms only during the period of instruction and for the maintenance of public order and peace; and the local militia that was kept under arms in time of peace temporarily for the same purposes as the active militia.⁷

In the article, Goiran referred to the insufficiencies of the Italian army. He stated that the army was far from having the proportions of cavalry and horse batteries that the armies of Germany, France and Austria-Hungary had, partly as an outcome of the poor state of Italy's national finances. However, Italy was able to check with its army any offensive movement from either the west or the east.⁸ The writer also indicated that every able-bodied Italian was liable to military service from the age 20 to 39 under the most liberal conscription laws of all Europe,⁹ and that mechanism brought additional troops to the Italian army. Undoubtedly, victory would finally be achieved by the Italians, only the exact time could not be estimated. "In the meantime, the Italian army remain[ed] what it ha[d] always been, the most vivid expression of reconstructed Italy, and the most elevating and effective school of national unification."¹⁰ In brief, Colonel Goiran was well aware of the weaknesses of his country's army, but he was also optimistic about its future. Therefore, he aimed to provide comprehensive information about the development of the Italian army in a short time like fifty years, and indicated that the Italian army would keep on improving.

Twenty-five years after Colonel Goiran, an American journalist E. Alexander Powell composed a work about Italy and its army in the Great War. He started the book, *With the Italians and the Allies in the West*, by expressing a widely held

⁷ Ibid., 422.

⁸ Ibid., 434.

⁹ Ibid., 435.

prejudice about the Italians and war. When Powell told his friends that he was going to the Italian front, they smiled disdainfully, and said “There isn’t anything doing there.”¹¹ Throughout the whole book, the journalist challenged that idea of Italian significance by referring to the fact that Italians were fighting with arms that was third in Europe in numbers, second in quality, and probably second in equipment.¹² However, despite that fact, Powell admitted many Americans did not have any adequate conception of why Italy entered the war and did not appreciate the part Italy played in the war. This was due not to Italian laziness but to the government’s reticence about its war effort:

They are suspicious of foreigners. They are by nature shy. More insular than the French or English, they are only just commencing to realize the political value of our maxim: “It pays to advertise” ... What little news is permitted to filter through is coldly official, and is altogether unsuited for American consumption. The Italians are staging one of the most remarkable and inspiring performances that I have seen on any front—a performance of which they have every reason to be proud—but diffidence and conservatism have deterred them from telling the world about it.¹³

Powell started his journey in Rome, then moved to Venice, and then to the northern parts of the country near the Alps. When he reached a village named Campo Formio, he met the Italian soldiers and Austrian prisoners. The high-spirited and confident Italian soldiers “were dog-tired, dirty, caked with mud and blood, but they grinned at [Powell] cheerfully.”¹⁴ Bersaglieri, “the flower of the Italian army,” were still wearing their flat-brimmed hats with huge bunches of drooping feathers.¹⁵ At that instant, Powell asserted that the Italian troops could be compared very favorably with any in Europe. The men were generally short and very thickset, but they were

¹¹ E. Alexander Powell, *With the Italians and the Allies in the West*, (London: William Heinemann, 1917), 1.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

all clean shaven and extraordinarily neat.¹⁶ The Northern troops had stamina and endurance, but the Neapolitans and the Sicilians were the best fighters who advanced through storms of fire that the northerners refused to face.¹⁷

Powell also mentioned the color of the Italian uniform, and stated that it was claimed to be the ugliest and the least visible of any worn in Europe. That was related to the fact that the Italian military authorities were among the first to make a scientific study of colors for uniforms. They did not prefer blue like the French, and chose the color green-gray since it was the best option to camouflage on the tree-clad mountain slopes where Italians were fighting.¹⁸ Also, the uniform of the Italian officers was the same cut and of same material as that of the men, and it was difficult to distinguish an officer from a private.¹⁹ In addition, despite the fact that the war was a heavy financial strain for Italy, the Italian government never objected to the expenditures that were necessary to keep the soldiers in good health.²⁰

In 1917, the Italian army was “war-hardened by experience and encouraged by the results of the past,” and the official report about Italy’s spring offensive was composed in a similar way to Powell’s account. According to the report, the organization of the Italian army was improving, its units were enlarged and strengthened, and the most recent scientific inventions were being adopted. New regiments were formed, powerful artillery was cast and distributed, and the number of the machine guns was largely increased as well as the engineer corps service. Aviation was also greatly developed. In brief, Italy entered its third year in the war victoriously with a great increase in material and continued progress in organization,

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 65. There is also a recent secondary source that gives information about the Italian army’s uniform and protective clothing during World War I. David Nicolle and Raffele Ruggeri, *The Italian Army of World War I* (Osprey Publishing, 2003).

²⁰ *Ibid.*

and it had a perfect faith in final victory. Despite its organization and modern techniques, the army in Italy had always been regarded as an unpopular institution among the Italian public. It was always torn between rivalry between the king and the parliament that aspired to control military leadership, and suffered from financial insufficiencies.²¹

The last example about the positive image of the Italian Army among Americans can be given from Ernest Hemingway. In his *A Farewell to Arms*, which was published in 1929, Hemingway tells the love story between the ambulance driver, Frederic Henry and the nurse, Catherine Barkley. The setting of the novel is Italy, starting in 1915, and ends when the two lovers escape to Switzerland, and Catherine dies during childbirth in 1917. In the novel, Hemingway refers to Henry's escape from the hands of the fanatical Italian soldiers and the whims of the Italian army by portraying their disastrous retreat from Caporetto in 1917.²²

In reality, Hemingway arrived in Italy in 1918 at the age of nineteen, served only two weeks as an ambulance driver when the war was not active, and was wounded after only six days of serving refreshments to the Italian soldiers.²³ He never had enough time to serve in the Italian army, but was awarded the Italian Cross of Merit because of Italians' extended courtesy to the volunteers driving ambulances and serving at canteen posts.²⁴ Hemingway also wrote some letters to

²¹ For more information see, John Gooch, *Army, State and Society in Italy, 1870-1915* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). Another work that notes the technological developments in the military and the insufficiencies during World War I is John Keegan's *The First World War*, (New York: Knopf, 1999).

²² The Battle of Caporetto is also known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo. The Italian line around the northern Isonzo were broken by the Austrians and Germans who combined their forces for the first time in World War I. After the defeat, Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna lost his position.

²³ Henry Sellano Villard and James Nagel, *Hemingway in Love and War: The Lost Diary of Agnes von Kurowsky, Her Letters, and Correspondence of Ernest Hemingway*, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989), 267.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 252.

his parents from his hospital bed that reflected his genuine opinions about the Italian army.

In a letter that he wrote on August 29, 1918, after indicating that his Italian vocabulary was improving, Hemingway stated “This war makes us a lot less fools than we were. For instance Poles and Italians. I think the officers of the two nations are the finest men I’ve ever known. There isn’t going to be any such thing as ‘foreigners’ for me after the war now.”²⁵ And in another one, he wrote:

And the Italians have shown the world what they could do. They are the bravest troops in the Allied Armies! The mountain country is about impassible to skilled Alpine climbers and yet they fight and conquer and by the time you get this they’ll have the Austrians all the way out of Italy. Italy has been fighting her own war all along and deserves all the credit in the world!²⁶

Apparently, eleven years before the publication of his semi-biographical fiction, *A Farewell to Arms*, Hemingway had a more positive perspective about Italy and the Italians. That change was presumably related to the era after World War I and the rise of fascism.²⁷ However, Hemingway’s private letters to his family would not have been a source for American public opinion, and his uncomplimentary view of the Italian army was more characteristic of American opinion.

9.2 Woodrow Wilson and the Italians

In *Il Mito Americano nell’Italia della Grande Guerra* [*The American Myth in the Great War’s Italy*], Daniela Rossini states that Italians had mixed feelings about the Americans and their country. That was partly due to the fact that the middle and

²⁵ August 29, 1918, A. R. C. Hospital, Milan, Italy, *Ibid.*, 179.

²⁶ November 1, 1918, American Red Cross, *Ibid.*, 188.

²⁷ For detail, see John P. Diggins, “The American Writer, fascism, and the Liberation of Italy,” *American Quarterly* 18 (1966), 603-604.

high class Italians were not well-informed about the United States. For instance, Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page indicated that the majority of the Italians did not know the difference between the United States and the South American states.²⁸ Once, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino stated that the United States was quasi non-existent for him since he was too old to go there.²⁹ Some Italians did not like the United States at all because they believed it was a violent and venal country, a “decadent republic.”³⁰ American isolation from Europe until World War I prevented the Italian upper classes from needing to know much about American history or politics. However, there were also some Italians who regarded the United States as the Promised Land, or the land of liberty. These were mainly the villagers, the *contadini*. They created the “Merica myth” that would enable them to have better lives, and as an American writer in Italy indicated in 1917, the Italian immigrants knew more about the United States’ political importance and power than the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.³¹

By 1916, the United States was a country that was ideologically far away from Europe according to the majority of the Italian newspapers.³² Therefore, the United States initiated a pro-American propaganda in the peninsula. Charles E. Merriam was appointed as the high commissioner of American propaganda in Italy by the United States Committee on Public Information. Merriam believed that Italians accepted Wilson as their hero in the World War, but he intuitively felt that the situation could easily change according to the shifting conditions of the war. Hence, American strategists commenced to search for the Italian Americans who

²⁸ Daniela Rossini, *Il Mito Americano nell'Italia della Grande Guerra* [*The American Myth in the Great War's Italy*], (Roma & Bari: Laterza & Figli Spa, 2000), 18.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 29.

³² *Ibid.*, 20.

could spread the Wilsonian gospel in Italy in a Mazzinian and Garibaldian manner, i.e. which they believed was purely democratic.³³ For instance, John Spargo, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic League of America, was invited to Italy by the Committee of Public Information to engage the Italian socialists in a Wilsonian dialogue. Spargo later befriended the socialist leader Filippo Turatti who considered that American intervention in the war had transformed an imperialist struggle into a crusade for democracy.³⁴

The United States also utilized the American Red Cross and YMCA to make propaganda through assistance.³⁵ Consequently, Italians began to play basketball and watched American movies and chewed American chewing gums.³⁶ Under the command of William Wallace, the 332nd regiment of the United States Army showed the Italians that Americans had arrived to their country to guard the Italian frontier.³⁷ The first Italian American elected to Congress, Captain Fiorello LaGuardia, was also among the volunteers who went to his native country during World War I.

The support that Italian Americans gave to Italy is also noteworthy. The war-time relationship between Italy and its immigrants in the United States emerged with the Royal Italian Mission that went to America in 1917 under the leadership of Prince Ferdinando, Duke of Genoa. The main aim of the mission was to impress upon the United States government the urgent necessity of supplying Italy with coal, steel and other raw material.³⁸ The United States gave economic

³³ Burgwyn, *The Legend*, 215.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ The United States supported Italy through the expenditures of the Red Cross in the early twentieth century. See Appendix A.

³⁶ Rossini, *Il Mito Americano*, 110.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁸ Luigi Crisculo, *Italy and the United States and the Liberty Loan*, reprinted from the May-June issue of *Il Carroccio* (New York: *The Italian Review*, 1918).

support to Italy, partly because as an Italian American journalist boasted at the time, no people had supported the American Government's plan of war financing to a greater extent than those of Italian extraction.³⁹ Luigi Criscuolo, who was the chairman of the Italian Committee for the Liberty Loan in the Second Federal Reserve District and the Assistant Secretary of the Italy-America Society, noted the significance of Italian Americans' economic support to Italy. Criscuolo stayed in Washington as a financial expert for the Advisory Committee on Finance until the end of the war. In 1921, he was knighted by the King of Italy.⁴⁰ He stated that Italian Americans had bought nearly \$15 million in the Third Liberty Loan. Buying Liberty Loans was a good investment for the Italian immigrants to aid their mother country in its war against Austria, and to have an interest in the future and prosperity of the Italian nation, and the Order Sons of Italy took an active part in that war finance movement.⁴¹

The most important factor that shaped the Italo-American relations during and after the war was United States President Woodrow Wilson's ninth point in the Fourteen Points, which stated that "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be affected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." The Italian government initially perceived this as a pro-Italian point in relation to *Italia irredenta*, however, the Italian government later realized that the Fourteen Points were completely against Italy's gains especially in Fiume. When Wilson went to Italy in January 1919, he never referred to Fiume, but even at that time he believed that Italians did not have any rights in that region. On April 13, 1919, Wilson suggested to the Council of Four (Italy, the United States, France and Britain) that Fiume had to be

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Luigi Criscuolo, *Italy's Mission at Washington: A Series of Editorials Published in Il Bollettino della Sera from November 8 to November 14, Inclusive*, (New York: 1925), 5.

⁴¹ Criscuolo, *Italy and the United States*, 1, 2.

made a free city. However, the agitations in Italy about the city's annexation were increasing. Wilson did not listen to the Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando's demands about Fiume. He had already made a favor to Italy by accepting the position of a major part of Slovenia, the northern side of the Dalmatian border and Trentino and Trieste as indicated in the secret treaty of London, which was signed between France, Russia, England and Italy.⁴² Wilson believed that Italy did not have the right to annex Fiume since the city was not ethnically a part of the Italian kingdom. Yet, Orlando continued to invoke the principle of self-determination, and "Wilson could not resist the temptation to ask whether New York City was claimed because of its Italian population."⁴³ Wilson saw the treaty during the war, however in 1919, he declared that the United States was not bound to secret treaties like the London Pact which was signed on April 26, 1915. With the Treaty of London, Britain offered Italy a large territory in the Adriatic, including Tyrol, Dalmatia and Istria. On January 13, 1919 Wilson stated to Orlando that the Treaty of London was no more valid. The discussion ended with Orlando's great sobs near a window. Wilson went near Orlando and assured him that he had everything for his country, but Italy could not possess Fiume. This anecdote suggests an important point. As previously revealed in the conflict over Italian military conscription of Italian Americans, the role of assimilation in building "national greatness" had opposite implications for the United States and Italy: for American policy-makers assimilation of immigrants was crucial; for Italian policy-makers assimilation of Italians elsewhere was intolerable.

⁴² For more detail see, Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempts to End War* (London: John Murray Publishers, Ltd., 2001), 279-283.

⁴³ Arthur Walworth, *Woodrow Wilson*, Book 2, 3rd ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 310.

Americans actively promoted Woodrow Wilson as an ideological savior of the Italian common people. And despite his opposition to Italian expansionism, Wilson became one of the most favorable heroes of the Italian nation during the Great War. Thomas Nelson Page indicated Wilson's popularity to the president before his visit to Italy:

The Italian people, whatever their faults, are singularly idealistic and every word that you have uttered has found its way to their heart. You have become to them something which I scarcely know how to express. A man of high standing said to me today that they regard you now as a sort of a Messiah sent to save them from all the ills that the war has brought on the world. It is because of this feeling for you and for America I have been so urgent for you to come to Italy. Your visit will, I believe, not only prove to you the devotion which they feel towards you as the leading champion of the people in their struggle for liberty and peace but will give you one of the strongest backers of your policies which the world affords. You have just been elected a citizen of Rome and Don Prospero Colonna, the Mayor of Rome, representative of perhaps the oldest noble family in Italy or for that matter oldest in Europe, spoke of you in terms which only his knowledge of the sincerity of the people of Rome with himself at the head could have inspired.⁴⁴

Therefore, the ambassador urgently recommended Wilson to go to Italy.⁴⁵ On January 3, 1919, Wilson arrived to the train station in Rome at 9.30.⁴⁶ In his address to the Italian Parliament, he stated that "the United States knew Italy and witnessed its sufferings, its sacrifices, its heroic action upon the battlefield and its heroic endurance at home."⁴⁷ He also asserted that he was aware of the fact that "Italy had gone into the war for the same exalted principles of right and justice that moved the [American] people ... therefore, [their] task at Paris [would be] to

⁴⁴ From Thomas Nelson Page, [Personal and Confidential], Rome, December 24, 1918, Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Volume 53, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986), 495-6.

⁴⁵ Thomas Nelson Page asked the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing to say to Wilson: "For heaven's sake don't come to Europe without visiting Italy before returning home." The Ambassador in Italy to the Secretary of State, Rome, November 17, 1918, *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, Volume I, *FRUS*, 142.

⁴⁶ "From the Diary of Dr. Grayson," Friday, January 3, 1919, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 595.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, "An Address to the Italian Parliament," January 3, 1919, 597.

organize the friendship of the world, to see to it that all the moral forces that ma[d]e for right and justice and liberty [were] united and [were] given a vital organization.”⁴⁸

However, at this instant, the significant point in Wilson’s days in Italy is the admiration that the Italian people showed to him. Nearly two months before his arrival, the Italian King Vittorio Emanuele saluted “the strong people of the United States of America in [that] era which mark[ed] for liberated democracies that triumph of the ideals for which the great American Nation under [Wilson’s] will and firm guidance ... took up arms on the side of the peoples fighting for their independence.”⁴⁹ During Wilson’s presence in Rome, Premier Vittorio Orlando and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino did not want Wilson to talk in front of the public presumably because of his negative opinions that the two men sensed about the Italian annexation of Fiume.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Wilson was welcomed like a victorious Caesar in the Eternal City. Even a “very plain man” in Rome, approached him and told that the Americans had helped to feed Italy during the war.⁵¹ When Wilson met the Reformist Socialist leader Leonida Bissolati and asked if most Italians had confidence in the League of Nations, Bissolati replied, “The Italian people are the most Wilsonian in Europe, the most adapted to your ideals.”⁵² These incidents and the great affection that the Italian people—who had mixed feelings about the United States—illustrate Wilson’s heroic depiction in Italy.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 597, 598.

⁴⁹ King Vittorio Emanuele of Italy to President Wilson, Rome, November 16, 1918, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume I, *FRUS*, 4-5.

⁵⁰ Fiume, today Rijeka, is a harbor in Croatia and was a part of *Italia irredenta* during World War I. Thus Italians made claims about that port.

⁵¹ After Dinner Remarks at the Quirinal, January 3, 1919, *Woodrow Wilson Papers*, 601.

⁵² Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 197.

There were a variety of books written about Woodrow Wilson during the war in Italy, and most of them were utilized to create a connection between *Italia irredenta* and the Fourteen Points of Wilson. These sources are also significant to demonstrate the reasons for the Italians' frustration by the end of the Paris Peace Conference. The first striking example about the books written on Wilson was one composed by Meuccio Ruini (1877-1970). Ruini is one of the most important characters of modern Italian history since he is considered to be the protagonist of the Constitutional Assembly and the father of the Italian Constitution.⁵³ He supported the reforms of the Socialist Party—thus he was on the side of the interventionists in Italy's entrance in the war—and became a deputy in the Italian Senate in 1913. Ruini also served as the President of the Senate in 1953.

His book, *Il Pensiero di Wilson [The Thoughts of Wilson]* was published in 1918, when the writer was a deputy in the Parliament. While eulogizing Wilson, he cunningly endorsed Italian irredentism. According to Ruini, Wilson was a powerful thinker, and had an aristocratic subtlety and an apparent conservatism in his mentality that he presented in his democratic and republican thoughts.⁵⁴

Two of the Fourteen Points were significant for Italy: the freedom of the seas and the systematization of colonies.⁵⁵ In relation to them, Ruini considered that the formulated Italian projects about the Latin American and African colonies could be achieved in a short time. Undoubtedly, Italian politicians perceived the benefits in Wilson's ideas about the new world order, with Italy as a great power.

⁵³ For more information, see "Il pensiero e l'opera di Meuccio Ruini nei Lavori dell'Assemblea Costituente" [The Thoughts and Works of Meuccio Ruini in the Constituent Assembly's Works], <http://crolonologia.leonardo.it/cost01.htm>, Date of Access: January 5, 2007

⁵⁴ Meuccio Ruini, *Il Pensiero di Wilson [The Thoughts of Wilson]*, (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli Editore, 1918), 6, 9.

⁵⁵ For the Fourteen Points, see Appendix D.

Ruini also indicated that there were only a few states that were less imperialist than Italy, but European countries and Wilson could not understand the complicated problems of the Italians in the Alps and the Adriatic. Thus, Italy's problems related to ethnicity of the people living in those regions; indispensably the problem of security needed to be clarified.⁵⁶ Thus, no country more than Italy required the United States' help and integration in and after the war. Italy had established itself with its own efforts, but it needed an economic assistance from the outer world to walk on the road of sufficiency.⁵⁷

After revealing the Italian need for American support, Ruini stated that the United States had its own interests in Italy, which could be its economic station and collaborator. None of the other countries in Europe could present that kind of a position to the Americans.⁵⁸ In the future, Italy was going to be the location that the United States would need to reach the Mediterranean and the Orient, and in return, the United States would support Italy in building its ports and railroads. In short, Americans would economically support Italians, and Italians would provide them a position that had a significant geopolitical importance for the United States' expanding future in Europe.

Another interesting work about Wilson was composed by Professor Giovanni Gallerani, a colonel and the director of the physiotherapy center of the 7th Armed Corps in Camerino during World War I. Gallerani also served as the rector of the University of Camerino before and after the war, and made nationalist speeches at the opening ceremonies of the university.⁵⁹ The document entitled, *Alla Triade Luminosa di George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson* [To

⁵⁶ Ruini, *Il Pensiero*, 75.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁵⁹ For detail, see "Ateneo" [University], <http://www.unicam.it>, January 5, 2007.

the Bright Triad of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson] was based on the discourses that were held at the physiotherapy center on July 4, 1918. The title of the pamphlet suggests that the writer praised these three leaders throughout the whole work, but he also acclaimed Italy's greatness by referring to the common civilization shared by the Italians and Americans as a consequence of Columbus's discovery of the American continent. Gallerani began his words by stating that July 4, 1776 was an unforgettable date and it still had a supreme importance, and the sun that had risen on that day was illuminating the entire sky.⁶⁰ Italy had a great significance in American history because Italian genius was the revealer of the New World and the primary reason for the actual existence of the United States, thus the Italian spirit was transfused in the virgin lands of America.⁶¹ Italians in Italy mythologized Columbus, although, different from their compatriots in the United States, without rendering him as an Anglo-Saxon.

For Gallerani, Washington, Lincoln and Wilson were the representatives of the capital periods of the United States history that coincided with three great wars. The first one was fought for political liberty, the second one for the liberty of the slaves, and the third one was being fought for justice, liberty and equality of the nations.⁶² The spirits of Washington, Franklin and Jefferson were with the Italians, and the American and Italian flags were together on the mountains, in the valleys and rivers of Italy symbolizing victory.⁶³ *The Declaration of Independence* and Wilson's inspirations were the sources of a new liberty for the whole world. Hence,

⁶⁰ Giovanni Gallerani, *Alla Triade Luminosa di George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson* [*To the Bright Triad of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln*] (Camerino: Tipografia Marchi, 1918), 2.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 19.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 21.

Gallerani finished his pamphlet with the sentences: “Glory, America ... Rise the empire of Justice and Reason. Viva America—Viva the Armies of Civilization.”⁶⁴

Likewise Carlo Paladini dedicated his twenty-three pages long pamphlet, *The United States, Wilson and Italy* to the American press in general, but to the *New York Herald, Times, Tribune*, and *Evening Post* in particular which, according to him, “ha[d] always upheld the patriotic and democratic aims of Italy, with gratitude and sympathy”⁶⁵ The document is basically about the United States’ presence in the Great War, but Paladini also emphasized the cordial relation between Italy and United States by making references to Mazzini and Garibaldi, and the great sympathy that the American nation showed to Italian unification. He asserted that before the United States’ entrance in World War I, Wilson was misunderstood because of his delay, but he “induced his country to enter the arena, where nearly all of old Europe [wa]s fighting, to win independence and peace for the world.”⁶⁶ Before Wilson’s declaration of war, European countries considered that America would continue to look upon a bleeding Europe selfishly, seeing in it only an economic gain. However, Wilson was “a powerful, generous American, willing to fight for the rights of man, not only in America, but in Old Europe”⁶⁷ By the end of his work, Paladini revealed the resemblance between Italy and the United States by emphasizing Italian irredentism:

...The policy of President Wilson was and is inspired by the traditions of the United States and the doctrines of the founders of American democracy, and that these doctrines were those of the Italian patriots ... We are fighting as is the United States for democratic freedom and to liberate our brothers of Italian blood and

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

⁶⁵ Carlo Paladini, *The United States, Wilson and Italy* (Florence: Istituto Micrografico Italiano, 1918), unpaginated preface.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

traditions from the yoke which so many years was borne by part of what is now Italy.⁶⁸

Italian propagandists utilized the American ideology of expanding liberal democracy to justify Italian ethnic nationalism.

The last example about the books on Wilson written by Italian writers during World War I is Vico Mantegazza's *Gli Stati Uniti Alla Difesa dell'Europa* [*The United States in the Defense of Europe*]. Mantegazza was a Florentine writer and journalist, and the director of the newspaper *La Nazione* [*The Nation*]. He composed works about Italian foreign policy, the Balkans, and the Italian colonies in North Africa. In *Gli Stati Uniti*, Mantegazza demonstrated his profound knowledge about United States history by referring to general issues like the aspects of the American Revolution, and specific topics like John Brown. He asserted that Wilson was not merely a theoretician and a dreamer, and his interventions in Mexico in 1914 and 1916 were a consequence of his ideal of universal peace which required actual war to maintain civilization and the greatness of nations.⁶⁹

Mantegazza approached the American entrance from that perspective like the other writers, and indicated that Wilson declared war to bring peace by making war. Thus, Wilson's message of the declaration of war on the Entente was an excellent document of uprightness, sincerity, faith and guidance. In the future, Wilson's name was undoubtedly going to be written near the names of the glorious Washington, Lincoln and Grant.⁷⁰ At that point, the writer also referred to the fact that Americans always felt themselves as the greatest power in the world, and thus

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁶⁹ Vico Mantegazza, *Gli Stati Uniti Alla Difesa dell'Europa* [*The United States in the Defense of Europe*], (Milano: Fratelli Treves, 1919), 17.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

their soldiers were going to be glorious in the Old World as they had become victorious during the Civil War.⁷¹

9.3 The War and the Peace Conference: Italy and the United States

Italy entered the World War because of its irredentist schemes and yearning for empire, and made neat calculations during the period of its neutrality. That was the reason why before denouncing its membership in the Entente, all the Italian prime ministers before Antonio Salandra had a flexible relation with the Allies. From that perspective, the Italian announcement of neutrality, Giolitti's *parecchio* [lot] letter that implied the acquisition of the territories populated by unredeemed Italian populations without making war, and more significantly Salandra's declaration of Italian *sacro egoismo* [sacred egoism; selfish national interest; egocentric nationalism especially in foreign relations] were all the components of a well-designed Italian plan about entering the war. Since the unification, Italians had had the desire to obtain two unredeemed Italian regions, Trentino and Trieste, which were under the control of the Austrian Empire. However, with the passing of time, these two regions became only parts of *Italia irredenta* [unredeemed Italy]. In the early twentieth century, all the portion of the Tyrol lying south of the Brenner, the Carso plateau, the entire Istrian peninsula, the Hungarian port of Fiume, and the whole of Dalmatia and Albania were regarded as parts of *Italia irredenta*. After ten months of neutrality, Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies, which promised more territory than the Central Powers. In addition, that was a strategic decision since by entering the war in that way, it reduced the number of

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 36, 37.

its enemies to one: Austria. Italy signed the secret Treaty of London on April 26, 1915, which awarded to the Italian Kingdom the Trentino and South Tyrol to the Brenner Pass, the Friuli-Julian area eastward to the Julian Alps, as well as Trieste, Istria, and several islands off the Dalmatian coastline and the Albanian city of Valona. The Italian officials, especially Sidney Sonnino, considered that that alliance would be an optimum benefit for Italian irredentism since the Allies (although not the United States) also promised a sphere of influence on the southern coast of Anatolia, and a future share in German colonies in Africa. If the Italian kingdom could have gained all those territories, it would become a major power in Europe. The Treaty of London gave the impression of being the vital sign of Italian national greatness in the twentieth century, but when the war ended, Italians realized that they would not be able to secure all that had been promised.⁷²

Italy was not the only country that signed secret treaties. In May 1916, the British and French reached the Sykes-Picot Agreement with which they projected their partition of the Ottoman Empire. Sidney Sonnino was not notified nor Italy compensated with that agreement.⁷³ The Italian government attempted to secure its territorial gains by obtaining “an equitable share in the division of Turkey in Asia,”⁷⁴ despite the rising problems with Greece in relation to Anatolia. Nevertheless, Italians had a more important problem that was related to the United States and Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic arrangements after the war. As Sonnino

⁷² Rene Albrecht-Carrie, “Italy and Her Allies, 1919,” *The American Historical Review* 46 (1941), 837.

⁷³ Burgwyn, *The Legend*, 24.

⁷⁴ Enclosure, Memorandum Concerning the Saint Jean de Maurienne Conference, Versailles, December 28, 1918, The Paris Peace Conference, Volume 1, 1919, *FRUS*, 467.

indicated, “the Allies would help Italy to win, and also to lose,”⁷⁵ and the United States was the strongest ally that could lead Italy to victory or defeat.

When the United States declared war and entered the fight on the side of the Allies, Italians welcomed the Americans in the Old World. Americans were aware of the fact that Italians had a small but a well-organized army that needed economic support. Nevertheless, the United States realized that there was “the obvious danger of social revolution and disorganization”⁷⁶ for the Italian kingdom. Socialism and anarchism had always been important risks for Italy and with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, those threats became more serious for the peninsula. In addition, Germany could utilize every opportunity to become Italy’s ally. Thus, the United States took action to protect the *status quo* of Italy, to strengthen it and to support the Italian participation in the Great War.

The British and French premiers, Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, aspired to find a midway between Italy and the United States by introducing a draft letter to Orlando that denied Fiume,⁷⁷ but on April 23, 1919, Wilson decided to make a dramatic stand and released his manifesto on April 24. He wanted to explain the reasons why he was against the London Pact and why Fiume must not be given to Italy. He indicated that “Italy’s frontiers could be extended at the expense of Austria, but not at the expense of the new states arising from the defunct empire.”⁷⁸ After reading the manifesto, first Orlando and then Sonnino departed from

⁷⁵ Paolo E. Coletta, “The United States and Italy in the Allied Naval Council of World War I,” in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Storia Americana [Acts of the International Congress of American History]*, *Italia e Stati Uniti dall’Indipendenza Americana ad Oggi [1776-1976 Italy and the United States from American Independence to Today, 1776-1976]*, (Genova: Casa Editrice Tilgher, 1978),

⁷⁶ “Liabilities,” *The Paris Peace Conference*, Volume 1, 1919, *FRUS*, 47.

⁷⁷ Arthur Walworth, *Woodrow Wilson*, Book 2, 3rd ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 310.

⁷⁸ Burgwyn, *The Legend*, 279.

Versailles. Colonel Edward Mandell House⁷⁹ also attempted to effect a compromise about the Adriatic between Wilson and the Italians,⁸⁰ but the manifesto of April 24 symbolized the end of an era in U.S.-Italian relations in which the two nations believed their similar goals of national greatness were compatible. In his manifesto, Wilson stated that the London Treaty was unacceptable since Italy had acquired a lot of advantages since the beginning of the war. It was the time for the Italians to act in a friendly manner towards the other side of the Adriatic. Italy needed to work together with the United States for the rights of all nations.⁸¹ In short, Fiume did not belong to the Italian nation.

The manifesto was a heavy blow for the Italian nation that previously held President Wilson in high esteem, it was an attack on *Italia irredenta* as well. On April 24, the streets of Rome were full of intense anger and the newspapers made violent attacks on Wilson. During a demonstration in Piazza Colonna, Italy's rights in demanding an immediate adjustment of her frontiers and a settlement of her claims in the Adriatic were emphasized.⁸² The Mayor of Rome, Prospero Colonna—who had welcomed Wilson in January 1919—stated that Italy would rise against any formation which offended justice and which denied Italy's rights, “the people of Italy would rise, rise against all and everyone.”⁸³ The United States consuls were warned to instruct Americans and especially soldiers in uniform and

⁷⁹ Colonel House was Woodrow Wilson's friend and consultant. During World War I, he acted as the president's representative in the United States' relations with England France and Germany. After the Peace Conference, the relationship between House and Wilson came to an end. For more information about House, see Godfrey Hodgson, *Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2006).

⁸⁰ Count Macchi di Cellere, one of the foreign diplomats who accompanied Wilson in Paris stated that according to a plan emanated by Colonel House, all the boundary problems of Italy would be resolved, and the Adriatic question would be referred to the League of Nations, and the decision about Fiume and Dalmatia would be settled after five years. For detail see, Gino Speranza, “An Italian Ambassador's Diary of the Peace Conference.” *Political Science Quarterly* 37 (1922), 301.

⁸¹ MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, 294.

⁸² Three Telegrams from Thomas Nelson Page to the American Mission, Rome, April 24, 1919, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Volume 58, 91.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

to keep out of crowds.⁸⁴ When House met Sonnino in Paris on May 8th, the Italian minister told him that he and Orlando were exceedingly sorry for what had been said in Italy both in public speeches and in the press⁸⁵, but undoubtedly the Wilsonian era came to an end in Italy after the Fiume manifesto.

Wilson caused a major crisis between his country and Italy because of his idealistic approach to the future of Europe, but Italy was also remote to the main European theater of war, and to Wilson it seemed stubbornly fixed on its irredentist cause, and some of its leaders sounded imperialist in their loud claims for *Nostra Guerra* [*Our War*].⁸⁶ Italians fought their own irredentist war against the Austrian Empire, and regarded the World War and the Allies as exceptional opportunities to gain Italian national greatness.

9.4. Conclusion: Friendship, Crisis and Estrangement

The First World War was a period when friendship, crisis and estrangement were felt successively in Italo-American relations. The kingdom of Italy entered the war to enhance its national greatness that it had been endeavoring to develop since the unification. The declaration of Italian neutrality, and then the decision of fighting in the war were the consequences of that policy of Italy. If other countries than the Allies would have proposed the regions that were offered in the Treaty of London, Italy would easily switch its standing point in the war. In brief, Italians were pragmatic in their quest for great power status.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* 9,3.

⁸⁵ From Edward Mandell House, Paris, May 8, 1919, *Ibid.*, 552.

⁸⁶ Frank E. Vandiver, "The United States, Italy, and the Problem of the Western Front, 1917-1918," *Italia e Stati Uniti dall'Indipendenza*, 68.

When the United States declared war in 1917, Woodrow Wilson became the hero of the Italians since they considered that the American president would support them in their plans about *Italia irredenta*, and especially Fiume. Italy assumed that it had found a friend that could solve the peninsula's domestic problems which hindered the country's national and international greatness. By manipulating Wilsonian principles, Italians believed that they could have the opportunity to solve their border and colonial problems.

The United States socially and economically supported Italy because, first of all, Italy was an ally. Secondly, there was the risk of social turmoil in Italy, and that would be a great disadvantage for the United States. As the Italian writers who wrote about Wilson indicated, Italy could give an excellent support to the Americans in the Mediterranean, and "integrate" the United States in the region. In addition, as a consequence of the inconsistency between the Italian Premier Orlando and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonnino regarding Italy's priorities, the crisis was deepened and became worse by the end of the Peace Conference. Eventually, Italians left the conference with an immense disillusionment about the European countries and especially the United States. The peace talks that were designed with the objective of establishing a League of Nations, were brought to a close with Italy's frustration and estrangement.

Similar to Orlando and Sonnino, Wilson also failed in his aspirations about the League of Nations a world safe for democracy. World War I brought estrangement also to the United States. The outcome of the war showed that Europeans rejected American policy-makers' pursuit of national greatness through democratic assimilation.

In Italy's disappointment, Sidney Sonnino expressed nationalist and irredentist impulses expressed in the language of *sacro egoismo*.⁸⁷ He never completely trusted Wilson's plans, but he also could not grasp the limitations on the irredentist plans of his country. The Orlando cabinet left office on June 19, 1919, and Francesco Nitti became the prime minister of Italy with the support of the Left and Giovanni Giolitti. However, he could not invigorate the deprived domestic and diplomatic conditions of Italy. The invasion of Fiume by a group of adventurers worsened the situation. From 1920 to 1922, Giolitti became the Premier, but he also could not eradicate the disappointment and isolation that materialized in post-war Italy. Eventually, Benito Mussolini came to power in October 1922 because he promised his people that Italy was going to have an imperial foreign policy despite its social, military and economic weaknesses. With boundless ambitions and an arrogant style, the Duce guaranteed the national greatness to the Italians, which they had been yearning for since the *Risorgimento*. In this way, the pursuit of Wilsonian democratic principles by the United States helped contribute to the rise of Italian fascism.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Burgwyn, *The Legend*, 316.

⁸⁸For detail, see R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy: Under the Fascist Dictatorship* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006) and Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini* (Detroit: Phoenix Press, 2002).

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

SACCO AND VANZETTI: TWO ITALIANS IN AMERICA

1920 started as a dreadful year for the radicals and anarchists in the United States. In January, about 10,000 radicals were arrested in the Palmer Raids. On April 15, 1920, in South Braintree, Massachusetts, Frederick Parmenter and Alessandro Berardelli were killed by two men while they were carrying two metal boxes containing \$16,000 for the workforce of Slater and Morrill shoe factory. The two killers took the money boxes and drove out of town.¹ In May 1920, two Italian immigrants, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were arrested for the crime, and their trial commenced on May 31, 1921. That day was an important date since some agreements and controversies were initiated with the hearings of the two Italian American anarchists. Sacco and Vanzetti had their supporters and opponents; the debates that were centered on the Red Scare and Progressive ideas reflected the existing and clashing socio-political developments in the post-World War I United States. When Sacco and Vanzetti were executed on August 23, 1927, the writer John Dos Passos declared, “All right we are two nations.”² The execution of the two men

¹ For more detail see Topp, *The Sacco and Vanzetti Case*, 1-7.

² *Ibid.*, 46.

represented an estrangement within the American society and the incident had long term consequences, and caused enduring discussions. However, the story of Sacco and Vanzetti also uncovered some certain outcomes of the Italian immigration to the United States, which are also referred to in this dissertation's chapters separately.

Sacco and Vanzetti were two Italians who migrated to the United States as a consequence of the new immigration wave that started after the 1880s. Both of them arrived in America in 1908. Vanzetti was a northerner who was born in Villafalletto in 1888, and Sacco was a southerner who was born in Torremaggiore in 1891. They had better family backgrounds than many Italian immigrants in the United States. Sacco's father owned a vineyard in Italy whereas Vanzetti's father was a "bird of passage" who owned a farm in Italy; he lived in California temporarily.³ However, both men obtained their skills in the United States. For nearly five years, Vanzetti worked as an unskilled laborer in various jobs, and sometimes faced extreme poverty. Eventually, Sacco became a shoe worker and Vanzetti a fish peddler. They were beyond the stereotypical representations of Italian immigrants in America. "Where Italian immigrants were presumed by their critics to be stumbling clods, Sacco and especially Vanzetti remarkably was thoughtful and articulate."⁴ Nevertheless, they had a radical tendency that made them potential dangers both in the United States and Italy: Sacco and Vanzetti were anarchists.

In the United States, generally Italian immigrants were associated with anarchism. They were regarded as bomb-throwers, that was the stereotype.⁵ From this perspective, Sacco and Vanzetti fitted the conventional depiction of the Italian immigrant which was designed by the overwhelming white population in the United

³ For more information, see *Ibid.*, 11-14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵ Paul Avrich, *Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America*, Abridged Edition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 67.

States. In fact, the two Italian immigrants became anarchists after their arrival in the United States. That was partly related to the injustices they witnessed among the working class in the United States, and partly to the American perspective that regarded the Italian immigrants as the members of an inferior social class in the country. Anarchism was the way of avoiding Americanization and overcoming economic insufficiencies. For these reasons, the two men become devoted anarchists. Sacco collected money for the workers (Vanzetti was among the strikers) who participated in the textile strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912. He was also a devoted reader of Luigi Galleani's *La Cronaca Sovversiva*. Nonetheless, the *bona fide Galleanisti* among the two men was Vanzetti.

Beltrando Brini, who testified that he was delivering eels with Vanzetti on the day of the murder, indicated that Vanzetti was "anarchism personified," who believed in the perfectibility of human nature.⁶ Vanzetti met Galleani in 1916, and became an occasional contributor to *La Cronaca Sovversiva*.⁷ Two years later, in May 1918, Sacco and Vanzetti were among the sixty *Galleanisti* who fled to Mexico to avoid military conscription. In September 1918, they returned to the United States, and in June 1919, Galleani was deported to Italy. There campaign that the United States government started against the radicals and anarchists which commenced after the numerous bombs that exploded in seven cities in June 1919 ended up with the prosecution of numerous Italian anarchists. The federal government's war against the radicals reached its peak with the Palmer Raids in early 1919.

Sacco and Vanzetti were prosecuted in that atmosphere. The trial did not only reflect the United States government's policy of eradication of radicals, but it

⁶ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁷ Topp, *The Sacco and Vanzetti Case*, 185.

also signified the condition of the Italian immigrants in the United States. From many perspectives, the Sacco and Vanzetti case was a consequence of the aspects that are indicated in this dissertation. The two Italian immigrants were blamed and prosecuted as an outcome of the several biases and prejudices that the “white” Americans possessed about the Italian immigrants in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. According to them, Italians were the people who had “low foreheads, open mouths, weak chins, poor features, skew faces, small or knobby crania, and backless heads,” and they lacked “the power to take rational care of themselves.”⁸ Sacco and Vanzetti were not the stereotypical representatives of their ethnic group, but their active participation in anarchism turned out to be a manifestation for the Italian immigrants’ discomfort and resistance to Americanization. Another significant detail about the Sacco and Vanzetti case was the fact that one of the victims of the murder was an Italian, and that could be an illustration for the habitual *vendetta* among the Italian immigrants.

For the supporters of Sacco and Vanzetti, the trial and the men’s execution was the example of an official lynching. Like African Americans, Italians were occasionally lynched in the United States, but the Sacco and Vanzetti case had a more profound impact on the American society. As the poet Edna St. Vincent indicated, “Justice [was] Denied in Massachusetts” on August 23, 1927, and the trial became the manifestation of a crisis, and later an expanding estrangement between different ethnic groups in the United States.

⁸ Edward Ross, “The Old World in the New,” in Topp, *The Sacco and Vanzetti Case*, 56. Ross was a sociologist who made critical analyses of immigration.

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APPENDIX A

MONONGAH MINE DISASTER, 1907

On December 6, 1907, around 10 o'clock in the morning, the mines Nos. 6 and 8 of the Fairmont Coal Company exploded in Monongah, West Virginia. Three hundred sixty-two men were killed as a result of the explosion. The impact of the explosion was so great that the underground structure was twisted, and the roof of the engine house was blown more than 500 yards, and the victims, who were suffocated with toxic gases, were found sitting in upright positions.¹ The American Red Cross Society initiated a relief campaign for the relatives of the catastrophe's victims, but only \$ 3,762.11 were spent as expenditure for one of the greatest coal mine disasters in world history.

Significantly, 171 of the victims of the Monongah mine disaster were Italian immigrants, and 86 of them came from the same region in Italy, San Giovanni in Fiore, Calabria. Today, they are all buried in Monongah's Mt. Calvary Cemetery, and a commemorative monument salutes them from San Giovanni in Fiore. Below is the list of the Italian victims of Monongah mine disaster. The list consists of a few distinctive characteristics of Italian immigrants in the United States. Firstly, it illustrates that Italian *campanilismo* was prevalent also in a small town in West Virginia; half of the miners came from the same region in Italy. It also demonstrates that these men were married to Italian women who were relatives, and some of the

¹ "Monongah Mine Disaster," *The Illustrated Monthly West Virginian*, (January 1908).

widows went back to their native country after the disaster. It is also evident that mining was a family profession for most of these men. Tragically, 11 people from the same family died in Monongah explosion. As the 77-year-old Joseph F. D'Andrea, who has been making a research about the incident for 15 years, indicates these people are not only names, they are human beings with a history.²

In November 2004, owing to an invitation from the Vatican, miners from various parts of Italy went to Monongah to raise a cross in Mt. Calvary Cemetery. Also, during his visit to the United States, the former Italian president Carlo Ciampi made a speech that recalled the disaster. However, ninety-nine years after the Monongah incident, the Italian American governor of West Virginia, Joe Manchin has gone to Calabria to sign a pact of friendship between Calabria and his state. Manchin is undoubtedly a living evidence that shows the transformation which the Italian immigrants passed through during the last century.³ He also demonstrates the success of American colonialism in the United States.

² Jessica Legge, "Author Honors Miners Killed in 1907 Disaster," *Charleston Daily Mail*, November 20, 2006.

³ Valeria Sabatini, "1907. Quella Strage Dimenticata" [1907. That Forgotten Destruction], *Oggi*, December 3, 2006, 22.



The entrance of the Monongah coal mine after the explosion.

Source: <http://www.boisestate.edu/history/ncasner/hy210/mining.htm>

Monongah Mine Disaster Italian Casualty List¹

Abbate, Carlo

Abbate, Francesco

Abbate, Giuseppe

Abbruzzino, Francesco: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on June 28, 1881. On June 4, 1905, he married Caterina Oliviero in San Carlo Borromeo Church in Monongah. His wife returned to Italy in 1908.

Adducchio, Angelo

Adducchio, Antonio

Adducchio, Pasquale

Agostino, Domenico Pasquale

Anciello, Biase

Anciello, Celestino

Anciello, Fomenico

Anciello, Paolo

Angiollilo, Antonio

Bagnoli, Angelo

Basile, Francesco Antonio

Basile, Giovanni

Basile, Salvatore

Basile, Saverio

Belcastro, Giuseppe

Belcastro, Serafino: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on May 15, 1875.

Berardo, Angelo

Berardo, Felice

Berardo, Celestino

Berardo, Giacinto

Berardo, Vincenzo

Bitonti, Antonio: married Giulia Nicoletti on February 13, 1904 in Madonna di

¹ <http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/read/WVMARION/2004-01/1074562481>,
<http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/read/WVMARION/2004-01/1074562543> (last access:
 January 19, 2004), and "1907. Quella Strage Dimenticata," 23.

Pompei Church in Monongah.

Bitonti, Rosario: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on May 5, 1878. On August 26, 1905, he married Barbara Veltri in San Carlo Borromeo Church in Monongah.

Bonasso, Giovanni: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on August 18, 1884. On May 9, 1907 he married Caterina Veltri.

Borzonio, Tomasso

Brandi, Adolfo

Cavallaro, Vincenzo

Ciambetiello, Giovanni

Ciambetiello, Liberto

Ciambetiello, Nicola

Cimino, Domenico

Colaciello, Giuseppe

Colaciello, Nicola

Colanero, Felice

Colantuono, Andrea

Colarusso, Francesco

Colarusso, Giuseppe

Colasessano, Felice

Coletto, Nicola

Comercia, Antonia

Condino, Francesco

Cuoccio, Raffaele

Davia, Victor

D'Alessandro, Antonio

D'Allesandro, Giuseppe

D'Alessandro, Pasquale

D'Amico, Donato

D'Amico, Michael

D'Andrea, Victor

D'Elia, Pasquale

D'Uva, Giuseppe

D'Uva, Michele

D'Onofrio, Michele

D'Onofrio, Pietro

DeElsi, Giovanni

DeFelice, Antonio

DeFelice, Michael

DeMaria, Giuseppe

DeMaria, Sebastiano

DePetrì, Felice

DeProspero, Antonio

DiBartolomeo, Clemente

DiBartolomeo, Domenico

DiMarco, Giuseppe

DiMarco, Umberto

DiMaria, Angelo

DiMaria, Michele

DiMaria, Sebastiano

DiMaria, Lucia

DiPlacito, Nicola
 DiSalvo, Celestino
 DiSalvo, Domenico
 DiSalvo, Felice
 DiSalvo, Fiorangelo
 DiSalvo di Antonio, Fiorangelo
 DiSalvo, Gioacchino
 DiSalvo, Giuseppe
 DiSalvo di Antonio, Giuseppe
 DiSalvo, Vincenzo
 DiSalvo, Vitale
 DiSalvo, Ruggero
 Dosa, Ventura
 Fallucca, Armando
 Fasanelli, Vincenzo
 Farese, Giovanni
 Feoli, Luigi
 Ferrara, Carmine
 Ferrara, Matteo
 Ferrari, Guiseppe: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on August 31, 1879. On November 30, 1905, he married Rosa Bitonti.
 Fiorentino, Prospero
 Foglie, Antonio
 Frateiacove, Pietro
 Fratino, Antonio
 Fussaro, Giuseppe
 Gaetani, Francesco
 Gallo, Antonio: born in San Giovanni in Fiore in 1870 and married Teresa Guarascio
 Guarascio
 Giacobini, Vincenzo
 Gioia, Antonio
 Gioia, Pietro
 Girimondi, Raffaele
 Guarascio, Francesco
 Guerra, Domenico
 Iaconis, Francesco: had three sons and his wife returned to Italy in 1909.
 Iaconis, Giovanni
 Ianero, Gennaro
 Ianiro, Giuseppe
 LaVigna, Pasquale
 Lelli, Luigi
 Leonetti, Giovanbattista: born in San Giovanni in Fiore in 1876. On May 28, 1900, he married Maria Guarascio.
 LaRosa, Carmine
 LaRosa, Francesco
 Lombardi, Giovanni
 Lopez, Salvatore
 Loria, Francesco
 Mainella, Domenico
 Manzo, Antonio

Manzo, Domenico
 Manzo, Leonardo
 Manzo, Michele
 Marinetti, Giuseppe
 Marra, Salvatore: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on March 4, 1876. On July 24, 1898, he married Teresa Tricoci, right after moving to Monongah.
 Mascia, Domenico
 Masella, Felice
 Mastropietro, Michele
 Meffe, Carlo
 Meffe, Francesco
 Meffe, Michele
 Meo, Cosimo
 Morsella, Pietro
 Oliverio, Giovanni: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on February 10, 1894. On August 16, 1902, he married Giovanna Iaquina
 Olivito, Antonio: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on July 15, 1868. On October 25, 1892, he married Anna Maria Lopez.
 Pasquale, Antonio
 Pellillo, Basilio
 Pellillo, Giacinto
 Perri, Thomas
 Pignanelli, Saverio
 Pirrocco, Nicola
 Priolella, Berardino
 Priolella, Francesco
 Priolella, Pasquale
 Priolella, Pietro
 Provenzale, Pietro: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on October 14, 1862. On April 1, 1893, he married Serafina Urso.
 Prozzillo, Carmine
 Riccinto di Domenico, Antonio
 Riccinto di Nicola, Antonio
 Riccinto, Domenico
 Riccinto, Pasquale
 Rinaldi, Antonio
 Rinaldi, Giuseppe
 Rizzo, Michele
 Scalise, Luigi: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on November 30. On January 20, 1898, he married Maria Febbo.
 Serafini, Giuseppe
 Silletta, Antonio
 Todero, Francesco
 Urso, Gennaro: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on September 26 to Bernardo Urso and Maria Iaquina.
 Veltri, Leonardo: born in San Giovanni in Fiore on January 1.
 Vendetta, Domenico
 Vendetta, Francesco
 Vergalito, Pasquale
 Vergalito, Antonio

Yannacone, Pasquale
Zampino, Francesco
Zeoli, Carmine
Zeoli (Barone), Francesco
Zeoli (Barone), Sebastiano

Monongah mine disaster on the list of the American Red Cross' relief expenditures,
January 1, 1906-April 30, 1909, "Circulars," *FRUS*, (Washington: Government

Printing Office,
1909), 7. Note
that the second
largest
expenditure is the
Italian earthquake.

CORRESPONDENCE.

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Russia, Jamaica, Chile, Canada, Italy, Turkey, and Mexico. The contributions for such relief work have amounted to considerably over a million and a half dollars and have consisted entirely of voluntary donations. In case of such foreign relief the American Red Cross has relied largely upon the information received from, and the assistance rendered by, the diplomatic representatives of the United States in the respective countries wherein the assistance is rendered.

As showing the high patronage and the scope of the American Red Cross, which has been chartered and sanctioned by act of Congress, I quote a letter which the President of the United States has addressed, as president of the American Red Cross, to the governors of the States of the Union:

The purpose of this letter is to bring to your knowledge the facilities of the American Red Cross for conducting large measures of emergency relief or assisting in their conduct in any part of the United States.

Its national director, Mr. Ernest P. Bicknell, who devotes his entire time to the executive duties of the Red Cross, has had an extended experience in the organization and direction of work of this character. Mr. Bicknell is prepared to proceed instantly to the scene of any great disaster and confer with the State or local authorities, as well as the local representative of the Red Cross, in regard to the efficient organization of relief. This service is wholly free and is quite apart from any question of the source of the relief funds.

The Red Cross is a national organization, the only one chartered by the United States and maintained for the sole purpose of relieving the sufferings caused by war or by calamities in time of peace. In the United States, fortunately, the Red Cross has been almost entirely free from the demands of war, but has found an important and growing field in the relief and rehabilitation of communities devastated by fire, flood, storm, or other disaster of an extent or magnitude exceeding local relief resources. It operates under a special charter from Congress and is governed by a central committee appointed in part by the President of the United States from the Departments of State, War, Navy, Treasury, and Justice, and is required to submit an annual report to Congress. In the event of war the Red Cross is the only organization whose agents in the military encampments and upon battlefields will be officially recognized and authorized to maintain hospitals, hospital ships, etc.

Should any calamity occur within the bounds of your State which requires large and unusual relief measures, you are invited to make the freest use of the services of the Red Cross or of its national director in either an executive or advisory capacity.

Since the reorganization of the Red Cross in 1905, the amounts enumerated on the attached sheet have been raised and expended at the places or for the objects stated.

Respectfully,

WM. H. TAFT.

(The following is inclosed with the above:)

"Relief expenditures, American Red Cross, from January 1, 1906, to April 30, 1909:

Philippine typhoon.....	\$1,150.00
Japanese famine.....	245,865.67
Vesuvian eruption.....	16,226.25
California earthquake.....	2,963,200.64
Valparaiso earthquake.....	9,844.81
Chinese famine.....	327,897.50
Kingston earthquake.....	5,381.25
Russian famine.....	9,000.00
Mississippi cyclone.....	2,767.38
South Carolina and Georgia floods.....	942.05
Canadian forest fires.....	300.00
Monongah mine disaster.....	3,762.11
Italian earthquake.....	988,378.61
Turkey-Armenian relief.....	29,500.00

APPENDIX B

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CARLO TRESKA FILES

W. J. Davis

New York City

May 7, 1920

May 7

RE: CARLOS TRESCA.

Resume of Activities.

W. J. Davis

The following is a resume of the data contained in the files of this office, together with extracts taken from newspaper clippings. Concerning the citizenship status of Carlos Tresca the information showing him to be an alien was received by this office from the Police Department, said information having been secured by a member of the Police Bomb Squad in an interview with Tresca during the earlier part of this week.

Carlos Tresca, the well known Italian agitator, author and editor, is at the present time 42 years of age. In a recent cross examination by the New York Police Department he gave his residence as 511 West 124th Street, New York City. He stated that his occupation was that of an editor, and said he was married. He arrived in this country some sixteen years ago on the Steamship "Touraine" of the French line. His birth place is Samonia, Province of Aquila, Central Italy. He stated that he is not a citizen of the United States at the present time.

1912. Tresca made his first prominent appearance in radical circles during the Lawrence, Mass. textile strike of 1912. At that time he was residing in Pittsburgh, Pa. He came to the Massachusetts district in the capacity of an I.W.O. organizer. At Lawrence he associated with Elizabeth Gurley Lynn, Joseph Ettor and Arturo Giovannetti. William D. Haywood personally led the strike.

It is needless to relate here the stories of riot

connected with the Lawrence, Mass. textile strike.

however,

see heading p.

under

see heading p.

W. J. Davis

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Charles Treason

May 7, 1920.

arrested at the time, but subsequently released. It will also be recalled that as a result of this strike Ettor and Giovanetti were arrested by the Massachusetts authorities for murder, being charged as accessories before the fact. Treason's activities in Lawrence were of such a character that just before the strike ended patriotic citizens of the town banded themselves together and threatened to tar and feather him unless he left the place--which he did. A record of his activities in Lawrence can be obtained from the Massachusetts authorities if desired.

1913. During the early part of 1913 Treason transferred his activities to New York City where he and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn caused one of the most disastrous hotel workers strikes in the city.

On January 11, 1913 he was arrested for his activities in this strike and it was at this time that the romance between Treason and the Flynn woman was uncovered. Papers in his possession indicated that his home was in New Kensington, Pa., where he edited an Italian newspaper. The charge against him at that time was for causing a disturbance and riot, he being the leading organizer of the waiters' union. His associates in this strike were Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, A. Frank, William E. Troutman and Arturo Giovanetti. Treason at the time announced publicly that his purpose was to bring about a general strike of all persons engaged in the hotels in New York City. He admitted that the I.W.O. was at the back of the strike and he acting as their leader. He did succeed in bringing out 12,000 persons who, after listening to several of his speeches, had to be dispersed by the police. When this failed he called help in and on January 11 the strikers were involved in one of the worst riots in the history of New York City.

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Charles T. Brown

May 7, 1920.

After this hotel strike, which proved unsuccessful, Trezona transferred his activities to organizing the barbers, whom he succeeded in calling out on strike in New York City. In this strike he was likewise the leader making daily speeches to the men and it is notorious that there was much bloodshed in the affair.

During the latter part of February, 1913, Trezona transferred his activities to Paterson, N.J., where, with the Flynn women, Ed Whinston and others, succeeded in calling a strike of silk weavers and spinners. They succeeded in pulling out some 20,000 workers.

On the 22d of February Trezona and others were arrested by the Paterson police for causing the strike.

On March 1st he and others were re-arrested after they addressed a meeting of strikers in Paterson which was dispersed by the police. He was charged with making seditious utterances and unlawful assemblage.

At this point of the strike it was decided to call William F. Woodward who was then in Ohio, to Paterson, which Trezona did. As soon as Woodward set foot in Paterson he was taken into custody and placed in jail. In the meantime Trezona and his associates had been released on bail. They continued their speech-making and organizing to such an extent that Paterson became the seat of a small-sized revolution. The situation became so bad that the local police were unable to handle it and were forced to call upon the Governor for State troops. Trezona, besides his speech-making, was personally active. For instance -- on March 1, 1913, he was seen in the city and was seen in the streets of Paterson, for the police had many difficulties disposing of him.

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Charles J. Davis

Jan 7, 1934

Tresca was arrested for inciting to riot. Quinlan in the meantime had been sentenced to seven years in the State's prison at Trenton, N.J.

During the Paterson strike several deaths occurred from this law and fighting. One of the deceased was Antonio Vischio. On the day of his funeral a procession was held in Paterson and at the grave Tresca was called upon to speak. New York newspapers of April 1934, quote Tresca as saying as follows:

"Fellow workers do not forget the principle of the tollers who came from Italy. -- FOR BLOOD, YOU MUST TAKE BLOOD."

It was also during this strike that an Erie Railroad Chicago express was derailed and while suspicion was placed on Tresca for causing it, there was no evidence to actually prove the charge.

On December 12, 1913, the jury heard the first charge against Tresca for causing the strike, they disagreed and were discharged by the judge. At this time Tresca was back in New York, the strike being over. He was associating at the latter point with Alexander Berkman and Rosa Goldman, and when he was being tried on the second charge against him in Paterson for seditious utterances, Berkman made a statement to the effect that he expected Tresca to be convicted, and that the only way "to throw the fear of God into the capitalists was to assassinate Tresca's judge and the prosecuting attorney." Tresca, however, was acquitted of the second charge on July 1, 1914. Just before this acquittal, however, a very threatening letter signed by the I.W.O., New York,

was sent to the District Attorney in Paterson. The letter in effect stated that the judge, prosecuting attorney and individual members of the jury would be held strictly responsible for the conviction of Tresca. The contents of this letter were that:

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Charles T. Ross,

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letter had a great effect in having Treves acquitted.

During the trial of Treves for seditious utterances several witnesses were introduced who had overheard his speeches. In one of these he is alleged to have said -

"This strike is the start of a great revolution. As I am a man, too, I realize that when you hit them, (strikes-breakers), you hit them easy."

The prosecution alleged that Treves meant to have the strikers hit the strike breakers hard.

On the third charge against Treves, that of causing a riot, he was sentenced to 60 days imprisonment. He appealed to the State Court in Trenton, which finally dismissed the conviction against him.

While the Paterson strike was on Tom Mann, leader of the I.W.O. in Great Britain, came to the United States. He was met in New York City by Treves and Daywood, who after having him make several speeches in the city took him over to Paterson where he assisted in running the strike. Mann announced his purpose in coming to the United States was to further the international solidarity of the working class through the I.W.O.

The Paterson strike ended on July 8, 1913, after five months of incessant warfare. It was a complete failure so far as the I.W.O. was concerned. And Treves, in explaining this, stated that it was no fault of the I.W.O. that the strike was not continued, but it had been brought to an end by the action of individuals, who becoming hungry finally went back to their jobs. The I.W.O., however, never sanctioned their return. He announced at the time that he would return to Pennsylvania to continue the publication of his paper. There is nothing to show that the name of the paper was that he was editing in Pennsylvania.

At one stage of the strike in Paterson the American

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Charles Treason

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organizing the workers into their organization, and then calling upon them to return to their jobs. However, Treason, had the Italian workers who were in the majority among the strikers so well lined up that after a short time the American Federation of Labor gave up this idea completely. It was feared by the Paterson authorities that should the American Federation of Labor officials and the radical strikers under Treason meet, bloodshed would ensue.

While the strike was on in Paterson during June, 1913, an in case pageant was organized in New York City by Treason, Elisabeth Cunley Flynn, John Reed, Giovanetti and others. Madison Square was hired and a complete reproduction of scenes which took place in Paterson staged, including riots, overcoming the police, starvation, alleged beatings by the authorities and clashes between strikers and strike-breakers. The proceeds were used for the relief of the strike strikers in Paterson.

On October 11, 1919 Agent Stone of the Newark office furnished Mr. J. E. Hoover, at Washington, D. C., the complete criminal records of both Treason and the Flynn woman in the Paterson district, consisting of copies of all indictments against them, dates of trials and results, to which I refer.

1914. On April 24, 1914, Treason, speaking in New York for the I. W. O., issued a statement that all members of the United Mine Workers of America would be officially requested by the I. W. O. to carry out a general strike adopted at the Indiana Convention two months previously. This strike, he said, would be a protest against the war in Europe.

Instead of returning to Pennsylvania, as he stated he would, Treason transferred his activities in 1914 to New York City. It was in New York that various demonstrations and disturbances were caused by or under the direction of Treason.

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Carlos Tresca

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situation to further their ends. He was surrounded by such persons as Alexander Berkman, Marie Gams, Pietro Allegra, Lincoln Steffens, Frankie Wilson and others. Demonstrations were staged throughout New York City. Tresca and his companions were the speakers. Usually the meetings ended in the forming of processions through New York, principally on 5th Avenue and Union Square. At no time did these groups have police permits, and on several occasions they were so boisterous and persistent that the police were unable to handle them. On one occasion during April, 1914, after a successful demonstration had been made in Union Square, which the police had failed to interfere with, Tresca declared to newspaper reporters that the police were afraid to interfere.

"The police," he said, "were undoubtedly afraid, and that is why we are making arrangements for further demonstrations. The I.W.O. will make as much capital as possible out of the cowardice of the authorities. We are simply going to defy them to squelch us."

He further stated at the time that an International Army of Unemployed was being organized and that similar demonstrations would be held in Chicago, San Francisco and Philadelphia. The demonstrations themselves were actually held under the auspices of the Free Speech League and Anti-Militarists League, both of which were headed by Berkman and Goldman. (For complete record of these demonstrations and Tresca's part in them I refer to the police records of New York City.)

In the latter part of May, 1914, Tresca was active in New York speaking for the I.W.O. strike then being waged in Colorado. He gathered together a group of sympathizers and proceeded to Park Lane, N.Y., near the home of John A. Bonheffer. Although refused a permit to hold a meeting there, he defied the police and made his speech. One of his defiant remarks was

"so this

N. Y. World Telegram, May 1, 1935.

Carlos Trezona.

speech at the White House. (Rockefeller's Estate). we will hold our demonstrations as near the Rockefeller estate as possible and will go as near the door of Mr. Rockefeller's as we can get. The right of free speech should be upheld there as anywhere else."

During his activity on behalf of the I. W. O. strikers in 1934, he announced in New York that an army of "hobs" would be sent to the scene of disorders by the I. W. O. to protect the strikers the minute the United States troops were withdrawn. He then sent a night letter to John D. Rockefeller, stating that he wished to meet him in order to discuss the holy bible, which he said, advocated "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, etc." He would ask Mr. Rockefeller he said whether in his support of religious movements he advocated this passage, which he allowed to be applicable to the working class as to the millionaires.

Trezona was an associate also of Caron, Hanson and Berg, three New York anarchists, who were blown to pieces while making a bomb in a house on Lexington Avenue during 1934. Following the demise of these three men Trezona was one of the speakers at a meeting held in 1934 in Denver. When a newspaper reporter interviewed him, following the incident, Trezona confirmed the statement of the under treasurer he was then in Denver, Colorado, that the bomb which blew these men to pieces was intended for John D. Rockefeller.

"I have no fault to find with him", (Caron), said Trezona. "I believe he was justified in what he intended to do. I believe in violence. Nothing can make me believe any other way than Caron did." He told the reporter, who was from the New York World, that he knew Caron personally and was the 1st. "what he was doing was burning for revenge."

In 1934 Trezona and his wife Hilda were arrested for possession of their eight year old child, and were deported from the United States.

M. J. Davis

Charles Treves

May 7, 1920.

wife was not very good at the custody of the child. The child was several months been living as

at 434 Street, New York City.

Mrs. Treves filed a divorce suit against him for divorce naming as respondent Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, declaring that Treves and the Flynn woman had lived as husband and wife at 511 East 134th Street, New York City, N.Y. Mrs. Willa Treves was finally refused a divorce.

1915. In 1915 Treves, still associated with prominent New York anarchists, named, interested himself in the case of Carbone and Abarno, who were arrested and finally convicted for planting a bomb in St. Patrick's Cathedral. Treves was active with the lawyers for these men in preparing their defense. When a "World" reporter interviewed Treves as to the probable guilt of defendants, Treves is alleged to have said:

"If these defendants are guilty I want to see them convicted. I believe in violence, but only in violence when it advances the cause of labor."

This is reported in the New York World of April 3, 1915.

Continuing his remarks, Treves said:

"I am not an anarchist but a Syndicalist."

During the trial of Carbone and Abarno, Police

Inspector Tunney took the stand and testified that when Abarno was questioned subsequent to his apprehension, he told Mr. Tunney that:

"He wanted to blow up the banks to get some capitalist money and that he got the idea of planting bombs while attending anarchists meetings and hearing fellows like Treves speak."

It was also brought out during the trial that Treves made several addresses before the Italian anarchist groups in New York at their secret meetings previous to the explosions.

In September, 1915, Tressa and the Flynn woman attempted to take an active part in the strike at the Standard Oil Plant in Bayonne, N. J. They were apprehended in Bayonne on their way to attend a radical meeting of the strikers. In their possession was found a suitcase full of incendiary literature which they had intended to distribute. Chief of Police Reilly refused to permit them to enter, however, and they subsequently disappeared from the town.

In September 1, 1915, both Tressa and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn returned to Paterson and endeavored to again call a strike of silk workers. However, they were forcibly removed from the town by the police authorities immediately after their arrival, and made no attempt to return.

During this time also, Tressa again turned up at the trial of Margaret Sanger, the birth control exponent, when he and others made a demonstration following a speech by Mrs. Sanger in court.

Despite the fact that he was forcibly removed from Paterson, N. J., in September, 1915, Tressa in company with Leonard Abbott, Thomas Rice of the American Federation of Labor, Lincoln Steffens and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, returned there. They attempted to hold a mass meeting, but before it got under way the police drove them from the town. Not until, however, a riot had occurred. This meeting was to have been held under the auspices of the "Free Speech League of America".

Also in 1915 Tressa was active in New York City for the defence of Joseph Hillstrom, under sentence for murder in Utah. He spoke at meetings in Hillstrom's behalf in New York, and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn went to Utah to assist him in the defence of this man.

speaking in English, he was mobbed by 10,000 patriotic
Italians, who charged that Socialists and I.R.C. were trying to
prevent Italian recruits from returning to Italy to fight in the
war. In the Italian column there stated to
have been a demonstration and the trouble started with Treason arriving
in his ship and after he had made several of his violent
speeches. It was stated charged that Treason and others offered
700,000 dollars to the Italian Government, for Italy during
July, 1938, to remain in this country.

In 1938 he was also active in the defense of Schmidt
and Geylan, arrested in connection with McKenna dynamite case in
New York.

The Chicago Chicago Association which Treason
was associated with, is a group of the Chicago Chicago
Group and Chicago Chicago of the Chicago Chicago, recently
deported, is revealed in copies of personal correspondence addressed
to Treason to Chicago. These letters were seized on Gallant's
premises in 1937, when he was arrested by agents of this Department.
The first is dated March 1, 1938, and is sent in the envelope of
"Chicago Chicago, 100 East Avenue, New York City, marked Chicago
Chicago Chicago Chicago Chicago Chicago, Box 879 Lynn, Mass. It
reads:

My dear friend:
The facts, I believe, are now known to you. It
does not seem a police plot that charges you have
formed with the consent of the committee. I have a certain
defense, in which we intended to invite the participation of
all the papers of our life. We must issue an appeal for the
necessary funds for the defense of the two victims of the
provocative agent. Will you please place your signature for the
C. (Grenson Corroborative). Let me know through the mail, I pray
vividly, a prayer which I make to you in the name of all,
in the name of seeing our request accepted, as your name
the affluence of the cause.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 26, 1950

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: CARLO TRESCA

Reference is made to the attached letter from Norman Thomas, chairman of the Tresca Memorial Committee, dated April 14, 1950, in which Mr. Thomas referred to his memorandum to this Bureau dated November 15, 1948, dealing with the Carlo Tresca murder case and the Juliet Stuart Poyntz disappearance in which the name of George Mink was mentioned as being involved in certain crimes. He pointed out that according to reports of April 5 and 6 in Victor Riesel's syndicated newspaper column, Mink was reported to be on the West Coast and supposed to have come to the United States from Russia.

You commented: "Let me have memo on Tresca murder & what we did re memo of Nov. 15, 1948 referred to by Thomas."

CARLO TRESCA MURDER CASE

Carlo Tresca was shot and killed on January 11, 1943, as he left his office on Fifth Avenue, New York City. Tresca was an anarchist and the publisher of the newspaper "Il Martello." He was intensely disliked by Fascists and Communists whom he vitriolically attacked in his newspaper.

The murderer has not been identified although the New York City Police Department reportedly conducted an extensive investigation of this case. As you will recall, the FBI took no part in this investigation.

MEMORANDUM FROM MR. THOMAS
DATED NOVEMBER 15, 1948

In this memorandum Mr. Thomas called our attention to information concerning the Tresca and Poyntz cases which appeared in the book entitled "The Whole of Their Lives" by Benjamin Gitlow, former secretary general of the Communist Party, USA. Gitlow declares that the Tresca killing stemmed from a feud between Tresca and Enea Sormenti, with aliases Contreras and Vidali, an agent of the Russian secret service. That feud, Mr. Gitlow states, had grown out of the murder of one of Tresca's close friends in Spain for which Tresca blamed Sormenti and George Mink.

Another factor leading to the Tresca murder, according to Gitlow, was that Tresca dared to buck the Russian secret service and furnished information to the Federal Grand Jury. Gitlow claims Poyntz was kidnapped and murdered by the Russians because she was writing a book concerning her experiences with the Russians and planned to defect.

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
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
APPENDIX C
GOIRAN'S ITALIAN ARMY



INFANTRY OF THE LINE.



BERSAGLIERI.



ALPINE INFANTRY.



KING HUMBERT AS GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

VOL. LXXXV.—No. 507.—43



OFFICER OF CUIRASSIERS.



CAVALRY—"ROYAL PIEDMONT REGIMENT."

APPENDIX D

WOODROW WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS¹

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own,

¹ The Avalon Project, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm>, January 25, 2007.

wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, -- the new world in which we now live, -- instead of a place of mastery.