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THE CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN FOREIGN AID

Bilkent University 2025

THE CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY
IN FOREIGN AID:
A STUDY OF CHINA AND JAPAN IN AFRICA (2001-2021)

A Master's Thesis

by
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September 2025



To my grandmother

THE CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN FOREIGN AID:
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The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

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By Dilay Erdil

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ABSTRACT

THE CONVERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN FOREIGN AID: A STUDY OF CHINA AND JAPAN IN AFRICA (2001–2021)

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September 2025

This thesis examines the post-Cold War merger of development and security in foreign aid by analyzing China's and Japan's aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021. Guided by the research question, "How have development aid and security merged in the post-Cold War period?", the study investigates whether the merger pattern, previously identified in the aid strategies of North American and Western European donors, is also reflected in the cases of China and Japan. Employing a case study approach, the analysis draws on official documents from the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), using policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger derived from existing scholarship. The findings reveal a consistent pattern: development and security are merged in both policy discourse and policy design in China's and Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa after the Cold War.

Keywords: China, Japan, foreign aid, development aid, Africa

ÖZET

DIŞ YARDIMDA KALKINMA VE GÜVENLİĞİN KESİŞİMİ: ÇİN VE JAPONYA'NIN AFRİKA'DAKİ DIŞ YARDIM FAALİYETLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME (2001–2021)

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Eylül 2025

Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde kalkınma ve güvenlik alanlarının dış yardımda nasıl birleştiğini, Çin ve Japonya'nın 2001 ve 2021 yılları arasında Afrika'ya yönelik yardım stratejileri üzerinden incelemektedir. “Kalkınma yardımı ile güvenlik Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde nasıl birleşmiştir?” sorusuna yanıt vermek için bu çalışma, daha önce Kuzey Amerika ve Batı Avrupalı donör ülkelerin yardım stratejilerinde tespit edilen birleşmenin Çin ve Japonya örneklerinde de gözlemlenip gözlemlenmediğine bakmaktadır. Vaka çalışması yaklaşımının benimsendiği bu çalışmada, Çin-Afrika İşbirliği Forumu (FOCAC) ve Tokyo Uluslararası Afrika Kalkınma Konferansı (TICAD) kapsamında yayımlanan resmî belgeler incelenmekte ve mevcut literatürden türetilen politika söylemi ve politika tasarımına ilişkin göstergeler ışığında analiz yapılmaktadır. Sonuçlar, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Çin ve Japonya'nın Afrika'ya yönelik dış yardım stratejilerinde kalkınma ile güvenlik alanlarının hem politika söyleminde hem de politika tasarımında birleştiğini işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Çin, Japonya, dış yardım, kalkınma yardımı, Afrika

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I am profoundly grateful to my thesis advisor, Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin, for her patience, guidance, and support throughout this process. The opportunity to learn from her has been a privilege and a defining experience of my academic journey at Bilkent University. The courses I took under her instruction were among the most engaging and enriching, and I consider myself fortunate to have had the chance to learn from her both in the classroom and during the course of my thesis work.

I would also like to sincerely thank Esra Çuhadar and Selver B. Şahin for their time and invaluable feedback. I was lucky to have them as my defense jury members.

Lastly, I would like to thank my dearest friends, Alper, Cansu, and Özge, for their love, patience, and unwavering support. I feel truly blessed to have met them and to share their friendship. Having them by my side throughout this journey has meant more than words can express.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and Research Question

Foreign aid has been used as a tool for pursuing foreign policy goals of the states. During the Cold War, both superpowers and their allies extended aid to countries in Africa and other parts of the 'Third World' as a means of expanding their influence by securing new allies or strengthening the relations with the existing ones. With the end of the Cold War, many donors from North America and Western Europe began to withdraw from regions no longer seen as strategically vital, despite the persistence of severe development challenges in these regions (Thomas, 2001, p. 164). In many cases, the aid that had previously been justified on security grounds was scaled back or redirected, reflecting a shift away from Cold War priorities. No longer constrained by the bipolar international system, donors from the Western bloc ended their aid commitments to some of their allies, while those from the Eastern bloc curtailed their aid due to "domestic challenges" in the aftermath of the Cold War (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 24). As the superpower rivalry faded, so too did the urgency with which most donors approached 'Third World' security concerns, even though internal crises of legitimacy, persistent poverty, and global inequality remained in the recipient countries (Thomas, 1996, p. 103-104; Thomas, 2001, p. 164). In the absence of "the stabilizing effects of bipolarity," the 1990s saw a rise in conflicts and civil wars (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 24). During this period, ongoing and repeated conflict in some of the poorest and least developed regions of the world has disrupted development efforts and led donor governments and aid agencies to think about the ways to "harmonize" security and development goals (Chun, 2018, p. 131). Thus, the link between development and security was "reinterpreted," with poverty and underdevelopment increasingly viewed as key drivers of conflict and insecurity (Duffield, 2000, as cited in Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 24). In line with this view, some scholars noted that donors began to include security-related goals in their development aid strategies and development-related goals in their security cooperation initiatives. At the same time, security actors started to have a more prominent role within development, "both as recipients and implementers of development assistance" (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 25).

Against the backdrop of the changes in donor strategies after the Cold War, this study is guided by the question: “How have development aid and security merged in the post-Cold War period? An analysis of China’s and Japan’s aid to Africa (2001–2021)”. Some scholars have observed a pattern of ‘merger’ of development and security in the post-Cold War period in the aid strategies of North American and Western European donors. This thesis examines whether a similar pattern is reflected in the foreign aid strategies of China and Japan. While the research question is framed as a “how” question, the analysis begins by examining whether this ‘merger’ is present in the cases of China and Japan. Only if such a pattern is identified, the thesis proceeds to explore how this merger is reflected in their aid strategies. In doing so, the study does not assume the ‘merger’ in advance but treats it as an open empirical question.

To address the research question, the thesis begins by reviewing the existing scholarship on the ‘merger’ and outlines its indicators. It then introduces the background of China and Japan as former aid recipients, followed by an examination of their history as donors and their respective approaches to aid-giving. It then analyzes their foreign aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021 through the official documents of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), in order to determine whether the same pattern of the merger of development and security is reflected in their aid strategies.

1.2. Methodological Framework

1.2.1. Case Study Approach

A case study can be defined as a detailed and “sustained” examination of one or a small number of cases, utilizing “observational data” with the aim of generating insights that are applicable to a broader set of cases (Gerring, 2017, p. 28; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, p. 89). Gerring (2017, p. 30) also notes that a study qualifies as a case study if it can be situated within a broader context, even when such positioning was not intended by the author. Although the research question is framed in terms of “how,” the inquiry proceeds cautiously by first investigating whether such a merger is empirically present. This sequential logic aligns with the strengths of the case

study method, which permits researchers to study cases without presupposing the outcome.

This study adopts the case study approach because it enables an “in-depth” examination of both China and Japan as individual cases (Gerring, 2017, p. 53). While this study covers two cases, it does not adopt a comparative case study approach. Instead, these two cases are examined respectively due to their shared characteristics as major Asian donors with a significant history of aid engagement in Africa. This methodological approach provides a basis for discussing the broader relevance of the post-Cold War ‘merger’ of development and security.

1.2.2. Case Selection

Since the 1950s, China has emphasized South-South cooperation in its foreign aid approach, viewing this as an ideal mechanism to promote shared development among developing countries (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). Consistent with this approach, China’s provision of foreign aid to Africa commenced in 1956, signifying the start of its ongoing involvement with the continent (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). Since then, China’s aid strategy in Africa has frequently emphasized economic growth through infrastructural projects, with an increasing focus on regional stability and security, particularly with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), founded in 2000, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated in 2013 (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2015; Taylor, 2006, p. 67).

Through its aid programs, Japan has maintained a consistent commitment to development in Africa since the 1960s (Cornelissen, 2016, p. 149-150; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994). Japan’s commitment to African development is further demonstrated by the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), established in 1993 in response to the declining donor interest in Africa after the Cold War (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016b). TICAD, adopting the principles of “international partnership” and “African ownership,” has since hosted multiple meetings in collaboration with the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the African

Union Commission (AUC), and the World Bank (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023b, p. 117).

The selection of the cases is based on the goals of the research (Gerring & Cojocaru, 2016, p. 394; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, p. 184). China and Japan stand out as major Asian donors in Africa with substantial aid budgets and a long history of engagement on the continent. Their respective roles as donors will be examined in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4. In this study, China and Japan are categorized as non-traditional¹ donors not due to a lack of engagement in Africa or other regions, but because their foreign aid strategies have not been sufficiently examined within the context of the post-Cold War ‘merger’ of development and security. This gap will be identified in Chapter 2 through a review of the existing literature. Consistent with common terminology in the literature, this thesis categorizes North American and Western European donors as traditional² donors.

The selection of China and Japan as case studies is therefore motivated by their status as significant non-traditional donors from Asia whose foreign aid strategies toward Africa provide an opportunity to examine whether the patterns of the ‘merger’ between development and security, commonly observed in the practices of traditional donors, are also reflected in their aid approaches. This focus allows the thesis to explore the broader relevance of the merger argument beyond the context of traditional donors.

1.2.3. Data and Data Sources

This research relies on primary and secondary sources to analyze whether China’s and Japan’s foreign aid strategies fit the pattern set by the North American and Western European donors regarding the ‘merger’. The primary sources include official documents from the respective governments, which outline the narratives reflecting their self-understanding and objectives in development assistance, as well as the policy frameworks guiding their aid strategies. In addition, records of major

¹ For a broader discussion of donor classifications and related terminology, see Mawdsley (2012).

² For a brief historical overview of the traditional foreign aid donors, see Apodaca (2017).

development initiatives reflect their financial commitments and priority areas regarding their foreign aid commitments in Africa.

For China, triennial action plans from the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which outline China's strategic plans and aid commitments to Africa, and related white papers issued by the Chinese government will be used to obtain primary data. To date, three white papers have been published by the Chinese government. These are titled *China's Foreign Aid* (2011), *China's Foreign Aid* (2014), and *China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era* (2021). English versions of the FOCAC action plans and white papers are accessed through the digital archive of the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Similarly, for Japan, primary data will be obtained from official documents released through the TICAD and Japan's white papers on development cooperation (also known as Japan's ODA white papers). Documents of the TICAD meetings, as well as relevant information about TICAD, are accessed via the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025a). The official English translations of Japan's white papers published from 2001 to 2022 are also accessible via the Ministry's website (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2025b).

Secondary sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles and scholarly books, will support the analysis by providing insights from the previous case studies on the post-Cold War merger of development and security. These sources will help frame the academic debates surrounding the evolution of foreign aid strategies by China and Japan.

Quantitative data that covers the scale and scope of China's and Japan's aid commitments will also be used. The AidData dataset (*China Global Development Dashboard*, n.d.) offers comprehensive, project-level data on China's global development finance, while the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) dataset provides

standardized, internationally recognized data on Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Given that China does not disclose its foreign aid statistics per the ODA criteria established by the OECD, researchers approximate China's foreign aid in a manner that allows for comparative analysis with ODA data from other countries by integrating information from various accessible sources. AidData offers one of the most comprehensive datasets for tracking China's international development assistance globally and across Africa. The dataset is compiled using an open-source methodology called Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) to compensate for China's lack of official reporting to the OECD-DAC. According to Strange et al. (2017), China's lack of official reporting to the OECD-DAC and "a centralized foreign aid management system" make it difficult to track underreported finances concerning development assistance (p. 7). The TUFF methodology overcomes this challenge of tracking China's development finance by integrating data from various government agencies in China and recipient countries, the World Bank, peer-reviewed scholarly works, and media reports (Strange et al., 2017, p. 19). Hancké (2009) suggests that it is essential to "check other official statistics" regarding the direction of the data and make sure that it is "comparable across cases" while dealing with official statistics (p. 99). The project-level database captures both the Chinese development finance and China's broader geopolitical engagement through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). AidData's dataset has undergone extended review and is supported by a team of economists, political scientists, and data analysts to ensure its credibility (Strange et al., 2017, p. 5-6). To conclude, the open-source approach and reviews enhance the transparency and reliability of the data, making it possible to assess the scale and scope of China's aid in a manner that aligns with international comparisons.

It is also important to acknowledge the limitations of both datasets. While reliable, AidData's dataset can have a time lag of 2 to 3 years due to the complexities of tracking unreported financial flows. This delay can affect the timeliness of the data, particularly for the most recent aid commitments. In contrast, Japan's ODA data reported through the OECD-DAC is consistently updated and offers standardized international figures. However, as it focuses primarily on ODA, it may only partially

capture private sector flows relevant to Japan's broader development cooperation efforts.

1.2.4. Temporal and Regional Scope

When conducting research, it is important to establish a temporal and regional scope for the cases as the analysis is likely to yield insights that are more closely aligned with the data when confining them to a specific "time and space" (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, p. 217; Hancké, 2009, p. 62). As mentioned earlier, this study examines China and Japan's aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021 to explore whether the 'merger' identified in traditional donors is reflected in the foreign aid strategies of these two non-traditional donors as well. The regional focus on Africa in this thesis follows the 'merger' argument while the existence of Africa-focused aid platforms in both countries, namely FOCAC and TICAD, provides a foundation for the analysis of official documents, as discussed earlier. This study does not cover the immediate decade after the Cold War. Instead, the temporal focus for this research, 2001–2021, is determined by the significant global developments and the availability of relevant data.

The period of 2001-2021 captures the reorientation of aid strategies in response to rising global security concerns after the 9/11 attacks. For China, the time frame of this study follows the launch of the FOCAC in 2000 and the introduction of the BRI in 2013, both crucial initiatives for China's development cooperation in Africa. As noted in the previous section, China's white papers on foreign aid were also published during this period. Despite the limited number of white papers on China's development cooperation, they provide a clear trajectory of China's evolving development approach, especially the 2021 white paper. The 2021 white paper provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date overview of China's aid strategies and principles. Additionally, quantitative data from AidData covers development cooperation from 2000 to 2021, offering a regional and sectoral account of China's global aid activities during this period.

During this period, Japan maintained its commitment to human security, as reflected in the official documents covering the TICAD meetings and the *Development*

Cooperation Charter (2015). There were several TICAD meetings between 2001 and 2021. The quantitative data on Japan's ODA have been available since the 1960s through the OECD-DAC database. However, more detailed figures (including sectoral, regional, and project-specific data) have been consistently documented and published since 2001 through Japan's white papers on development cooperation. These white papers provide information on how Japan's aid was distributed and highlight its priority areas and the evolution of Japan's aid policies.

The availability of relevant data for China's and Japan's foreign aid starting from 2001 allows the analysis to focus on this period, which aligns with the timeframe of the 'merger' argument following the Cold War. Although Japan's ODA data and latest white paper extend to 2022, China's most recent white paper and aid data are from 2021. Therefore, the analysis concludes in 2021 to ensure consistency between the two countries' data.

1.3. Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research question guiding this study. This chapter presents the methodological framework by explaining the rationale for adopting a case study approach, justifying the selection of China and Japan as cases based on their significance as non-traditional donors in Africa, and outlining the primary and secondary data sources used in the analysis. It also establishes the temporal scope (2001–2021) and the regional focus on Africa, both of which are aligned with the study's objective of examining the post–Cold War merger of development and security in their foreign aid strategies. Chapter 2 identifies the research gap and outlines the indicators of the merger of development and security after reviewing the existing literature on the merger.

Having identified the research gap and outlined the indicators of the merger in Chapter 2 after reviewing the existing scholarship of the merger, Chapters 3 and 4 begin by introducing the background of China and Japan as former aid recipients, followed by an examination of the history of China and Japan as donors and their respective approaches to aid-giving. This is followed by the analysis of their foreign aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021 based on the FOCAC action plans

and TICAD documents to determine whether the same pattern of the merger of development and security is reflected in China's and Japan's aid strategies.

Chapter 5 concludes the study by discussing the findings from the case studies of China and Japan to evaluate the extent to which their foreign aid strategies in Africa reflect the post–Cold War ‘merger’ of development and security. Rather than adopting a strictly comparative approach, the chapter systematically applies each indicator to the two cases to assess how development and security are merged within their respective foreign aid strategies. In doing so, the chapter determines whether the patterns observed in traditional donors are also evident in the strategies of these two non-traditional donors.



CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction: The Merger of Development and Security

The existing scholarship demonstrates that the merger of development-related goals and security-related goals in foreign aid strategies became increasingly pronounced following the end of the Cold War. Scholars such as Brown and Grävingholt (2016) and Mohan and Lobo (2020) note that donors have been mainly motivated to pursue their geopolitical interests during the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar system led to a decrease in the ideological rivalry that previously shaped the politics of aid. Following the end of the Cold War, the transition from state-centered security to human security transformed the discourse on security, incorporating revised priorities related to development (Woods, 2005; Stern & Öjendal, 2010). McConnon (2014) states that the notion of human security is aimed at “merging security and development as a way of gaining greater attention for development issues” (p. 1128). However, while attracting more focus on developmental concerns, this shift also laid the foundation for the post-9/11 era, where the merger of development and security became more pronounced as donors began using development aid as a tool to support their security-related goals, particularly in the regions that they considered strategically important (Woods, 2005). Accordingly, the humanitarian and development-related objectives of aid allocated to African countries are also merged with the security-related objectives of the donor countries. Grovogui (2010, p. 183) states that the 9/11 attacks resulted in the U.S. assistance to African countries to adopt new security-related goals, such as combating terrorism in the recipient countries.

In her article “*Return of the generals? Global militarism in Africa from the Cold War to the present*,” Rita Abrahamsen (2018) argues that the boundaries between development and security have become increasingly blurred since the end of the Cold War. She observes that development policies, including those concerning foreign aid, often include security-related goals along with their intended development-related goals, and security initiatives frequently include development-related goals alongside security-related goals. Donor countries increasingly view underdevelopment and poverty, which they believe are among the factors that can

potentially lead to conflict and political instability in the recipient countries, as threats to global peace and security, prompting them to tie development aid to broader security-related goals. Abrahamsen (2018, p. 24) refers to this phenomenon as the ‘merger’ of development and security.

The ‘merger’ is particularly evident in Africa, where instability, terrorism, and fragile state structures have made the continent a focal point for international development and security interventions. Donors have integrated security imperatives into their development agendas, framing poverty and underdevelopment as a concern for global instability (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 56-57). For instance, donors like the United States and the United Kingdom often link development aid with military support, counter-terrorism initiatives, or capacity-building in governance (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 26-27). In this way, the provision of development aid is not just about promoting economic growth and reducing poverty in the recipient countries. It is also about serving “the national security interest(s) of donors” by mitigating potential security risks (such as conflict and political instability in the recipient countries) that can result from underdevelopment and poverty (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 26).

Building on this, Abrahamsen (2018) raises concerns about the dangers of merging development with the security interests of the donors, as it can undermine the original goals of development aid. By tying development to security, resources can be diverted “away from poverty reduction toward military and security sectors,” which ultimately weakens efforts to improve the social and economic well-being of those in recipient countries (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 27). Additionally, this merger threatens to empower military and security institutions over “civilian leaders and politicians” or lead to the establishment of “new forms of alliances emerging between political leaders and militaries,” in which the latter is more influential in “social and political affairs,” potentially reducing roles for civil society and civilian bureaucracies (Abrahamsen, 2018, p. 27). In summary, Abrahamsen (2018) argues that the merger of development and security has not only altered the nature of aid but has also contributed to empowering military and security institutions and harming democratic processes in Africa. This incorporation of development-related goals with security-related goals might reinforce military actors’ centrality in contemporary

politics and society, thus undermining the goals that development assistance originally aimed to accomplish.

2.2. The Merger of Development and Security after 9/11

Abrahamsen (2018) provides a compelling account of the post-Cold War merger of development and security. Alongside her work, a broader body of scholarship, produced both before and after her study, has addressed similar arguments, particularly in relation to the changes in foreign aid policies of donor countries following the 9/11 attacks. According to the scholars, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror (GWOt) marked a critical moment where donors reoriented their aid strategies, increasingly merging development-related goals with security-related goals.

Woods (2005) presents an overview of the politics of aid in the post-9/11 era. One of her main concerns is related to the goals of foreign aid. She focuses on the new aid strategies of the EU, the U.K., the U.S., and Japan after 9/11. While not explicitly framing it as the ‘merger’ of development and security, Woods (2005) argues that when foreign aid policies were reconsidered in the 1990s, security issues were not treated as separate from development (p. 394). Instead, security became a central concern, with issues concerning conflict, peace, and stability incorporated into the restructuring of aid policies. This reflects the trend after the Cold War, where development and security became more closely connected, similar to Abrahamsen’s (2018) argument about the ‘merger’. By examining current research and policy papers to assess the shifts in aid policies and their impact on security and development, the author argues that donors may hinder the advancement of development-related goals tied to human security in recipient countries to meet the security priorities determined after the 9/11 attacks (Woods, 2005, p. 396). Woods (2005) shares the same concern with Abrahamsen (2018) regarding the potential ‘overshadowing’ of the developmental-related goals of aid by the security-related goals of the donors. She discusses the potential consequences of the rise in aid budgets allocated to Afghanistan and Iraq as the “front-line states” of the GWOt (Woods, 2005, p. 397). To address the issue of development-related goals being overshadowed by security-related goals, she suggests that donors should offer consistent, long-term assistance to uphold good governance and sustainable growth

in recipient countries (Woods, 2005, p. 409). Woods (2005) states that having a “foreign aid system” driven by development-related goals rather than global security concerns to ensure responsibility for achieving common international objectives will become more relevant due to the increasing “mixture of security and development goals” of assistance (p. 409).

McConnon’s studies (2013, 2014, 2019) illustrate how the ‘prioritization’ of security concerns was institutionalized in donor policies, mainly through content and discourse analysis, which revealed the systematic linkage of security concerns and foreign aid in policy documents. His analyses trace the ways in which government documents and speeches reflect this prioritization, particularly within the context of the GWoT. Through content analysis of policy documents from the late 1990s to 2010s, supported by fieldwork and interviews, McConnon (2019, p. 187) examines the cases of Canada, the U.S., and the U.K. as aid donors and Ethiopia and Kenya as recipients. According to his findings, he argues that ‘merging security and development’ favors the security interests of these donors, potentially at the expense of addressing the needs of recipient countries (McConnon, 2019, p. 8). McConnon (2019) uses the framework of the “theory of risk society” by Ulrich Beck to explain the different degrees of integration of development and security of the donors’ policies, stating that they have “different risk priorities and assessments” from each other (p. 8, 187-188).

In another study, McConnon (2013) examines the documents of the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DfID), the U.K.’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence (p. 1227). Through his analysis, he concludes that there is a significant increase in the use of terms in association with ‘the merging of security and development’ in official documents, especially after the 9/11 attacks, indicating a shift towards ‘merging’ these two in policy discussions (McConnon, 2013, p. 1136). This shift is characterized by establishing a link between issues of poverty and instability in developing nations and the potential risks like “terrorism and religious extremism” posed to the U.K.’s national security (McConnon, 2013, p. 1128). According to McConnon (2013), the justification for this transition of the official discourse is based on the assertion of a shared interest between “development for people in the global South and security for [... the people

in] the U.K.” through the notion of human security, wherein the promotion of development is presented as a strategy to address challenges related to national security (p. 1128).

In another study that focuses on the U.K. as a donor, McConnon (2014) argues that the DfID has shifted its focus from solely addressing poverty to incorporating security concerns tied to the GWoT, which led to an increased merger of development and security policies concerning aid (p. 136). This argument is connected to DfID’s adoption of the concept of human security to justify its increased involvement in ‘hard’ security issues like terrorism and political extremism in the post-9/11 era, moving away from its sole poverty reduction agenda (McConnon, 2014, p. 142). This shift can also be viewed in relation to peacebuilding scholarship that sees poverty among the root causes of violent conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 571), for instance, point to economic factors such as poverty and resource dependence in the outbreak of civil war. Therefore, DfID’s adoption of the concept of human security can be regarded as an effort to continue addressing poverty while also responding to the security concerns of the post-9/11 era. McConnon (2014, p. 136) uses content and discourse analysis to examine six official documents from the 1990s to the 2000s to support his argument. Through content analysis, the author’s findings show a significant increase in the use of security-related terms (such as conflict, security, and terrorism) in DfID documents over time, indicating a growing emphasis on security in development policy (McConnon, 2014, p. 141-142). The author continues with the discourse analysis to contextualize the findings of the content analysis. Through discourse analysis, McConnon (2014) concludes that DfID’s policy discourse after the 9/11 attacks evolved from a humanitarian perspective to one based on “fear and insecurity,” framing development problems as threats to national security (p. 154). His findings illustrate how developmental concerns have been progressively merged with security issues, highlighting the growing focus on addressing terrorism and instability through development initiatives.

Howell and Lind (2009a, 2009b) similarly situate these shifts in aid policies within the broader context of GWoT. To analyze the impact of the “Global War on Terror

regime” on the ‘securitization³ of development and aid policy’ (2009a, p. 101), they focus on Australia, the U.S., the U.K., and Sweden as donors (Howell & Lind, 2009b, p. 1280, 1282). In their case studies, they study the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DfID), the Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID), and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Their analysis of the case studies of agencies such as USAID, DfID, AUSAID, and SIDA illustrates the broader pattern of traditional donors merging security priorities into their development frameworks. They define “the War on Terror regime” as an interconnection of “discourses, political alliances, policy and legislative shifts, institutional arrangements and practices,” including the reconstruction of institutional and policy frameworks characterized by integrating development-related and security-related goals (Howell & Lind, 2009b, p. 1280). According to them, this regime aligns with the trend of merging development-related and security-related goals in aid since the end of the Cold War (Howell & Lind, 2009a, p. 101; Howell & Lind, 2009b, p. 1280). Howell and Lind (2009b, p. 1282) emphasize that while security issues have been “mainstreamed into development,” development has been incorporated “into global and national security agendas” since the 1990s. They use the term ‘securitization of development and aid policy’ to refer

³ Clarification about the use of ‘securitization’ in the literature: In the literature, the term securitization is sometimes used colloquially, referring to increasing funding for security measures or integrating security concerns into various domains without its use in securitization theory. It is important to point out that most of the authors whose work is covered in this literature review use the everyday meaning of securitization. By using the term ‘securitization,’ they aim to emphasize the increasing influence of security concerns over the developmental goals of aid and the budget increases or redirections in line with this rising influence. Unlike the Copenhagen School’s theorization, their use of ‘securitization’ does not involve a speech act (Wæver, 1995) or framing particular issues as existential threats that emphasize their urgency to justify actions beyond regular political protocols, thus enabling the deployment of extraordinary measures (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). In most of the works covered in this literature review that adopts the securitization terminology, there is no explicit discussion of a referent object (Wæver, 1995), a securitizing actor that advocates for taking extraordinary measures to respond to an existential threat, and an audience that needs to be convinced about the severity and urgency of the threat (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). For instance, Howell and Lind (2009) discuss the ‘securitization’ of aid without distinguishing between the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School and the general increase in security objectives linked to aid. Similarly, Shannon (2009) uses the term to describe the influence of security agendas on humanitarian aid without engaging with the process of how these agendas are framed as existential threats. Lazell and Petrikova (2019) adopt the definition of the ‘securitization of development’ as the process by which donors frame conflict and instability in the Global South as international security threats, thereby prioritizing security-related goals over development-related goals in their foreign aid policies toward recipient countries without engaging with the theoretical elements of securitization theory, such as the speech act, existential threat framing, or the roles of a referent object, securitizing actor, and audience.

to the process of integrating global and national security concerns into the framing, organization, and execution of initiatives related to development, including development aid (Howell & Lind, 2009a, p. 101; Howell & Lind, 2009b, p. 1280). They conclude that the GWoT has resulted in increased “securitization of development policy and practice,” indicating that security issues are increasingly incorporated into the aid policies and practices of Australia, the U.S., the U.K., and Sweden (Howell & Lind, 2009b, p. 1279). Despite the broader trend towards ‘securitization’ of aid, Howell and Lind (2009b, p. 1292) note SIDA’s continued emphasis on “human security” since the 1990s compared to other agencies analyzed in their study. In summary, the authors outline a general trend among traditional donors using ‘the War on Terror regime’ to justify the ‘merging’ of security-related goals “with aid structures and processes” (Howell & Lind, 2009a, p. 101).

While the studies of Howell and Lind (2009) and McConnon (2013, 2014, 2019) focus on the integration of security concerns into development aid strategies, the influence of security priorities also extends into humanitarian assistance. Shannon (2009) investigates the impact of security priorities on humanitarian aid, particularly in conflict zones like Afghanistan. Her study reveals that humanitarian relief has increasingly been influenced by political and military objectives, resulting in aid distribution being determined more by strategic interests than by immediate needs. Even though Shannon’s study is about humanitarian aid, it has important implications for increasing the integration of security-related goals into the original intentions of humanitarian aid. Through interviews and fieldwork conducted in Afghanistan in 2006, as well as the analysis of official documents and research reports, Shannon (2009) concludes that the merger of humanitarian relief’s objectives with development and security agendas has led to aid being distributed based on political and military priorities rather than purely on need, affecting the most vulnerable communities (p. 28). She distinguishes the objectives of humanitarian relief from development and security agendas. Humanitarian relief addresses immediate needs and protects “vital needs” without necessarily considering future implications compared to long-term objectives of development projects and security partnerships (Shannon, 2009, p. 28). Moreover, the provision of humanitarian assistance is based on the principles of neutrality and impartiality, as aid is provided according to the needs of the recipients without being influenced by any political

bias, while development and security agendas have political goals that might undermine these two principles (Shannon, 2009, p. 28). Shannon's study is important for understanding the politics of aid in the post-9/11 era. Her research results indicate that the increasing integration of security-related goals into humanitarian relief may affect NGOs' ability to help those in need effectively. It is important to note that the author uses the term 'securitization' to describe the influence of security agendas on humanitarian aid without discussing the process of how these agendas are framed as existential threats.

Lazell and Petrikova (2019) provide a comprehensive examination using a multi-method approach that combines qualitative and quantitative analyses. They study how 'securitization' has influenced development aid distribution by sector by focusing on four donors, which are Denmark, the U.K., the U.S., and Sweden (Lazell & Petrikova, 2019, p. 323). Their dataset covers 145 recipient countries "between 1995 and 2015" to compare the policy discourse of the donors to their "actual" long-term aid commitments (Lazell & Petrikova, 2019, p. 324). In line with their findings, they argue that the 'securitization' of development aid has significantly influenced aid commitments, particularly in countries not affected by conflict, indicating a shift in donor priorities towards security concerns even in "peaceful" countries (Lazell & Petrikova, 2019, p. 339-340). Drawing on the previous literature from Brown and Grävingholt (2016) and McConnon (2014), Lazell and Petrikova (2019, p. 324) define the 'securitization of development' as the process by which donors frame conflict and instability in the Global South as international security threats, thereby prioritizing security-related goals over development-related goals in their foreign aid policies toward recipient countries. Their research has contributed to the literature by emphasizing the disparity between the policy rhetoric of addressing conflict and instability and the actual aid commitments, which are influenced more by security considerations and strategic interests than by the developmental or humanitarian needs of the recipient countries.

In another study, Petrikova and Lazell (2017) adopt a multi-method approach to examine multilateral assistance across 132 recipient countries from 1995 to 2015 (p. 494, 499). They draw from the prevalent notion in the literature that conflict and instability in the Global South are intricately linked with development concerns that

can potentially have broader “security implications” for the Global North after the Cold War (Petrikova & Lazell, 2017, p. 493). By analyzing data from the recipient countries, they conclude that multilateral assistance provided to states affected by conflict mirrors the transnational security interest of the prominent traditional donors (Petrikova & Lazell, 2017, p. 493).

The literature reviewed in this chapter shows an agreement around the idea that development-related goals and security-related goals have become increasingly merged in donor aid strategies since the end of the Cold War. Across these studies, there is a shared recognition that donor governments frame underdevelopment and poverty as security threats, leading to the inclusion of security-related goals in the foreign aid strategies. It is also observed that there is the inclusion of development-related goals like economic growth and poverty alleviation in national security strategies. While the terminology used varies (such as ‘merger’ or ‘merging’ and ‘securitization’) and the scope of analysis differs across development and humanitarian contexts (Shannon, 2009), these works collectively reflect the trend toward the merger of development-related and security-related goals in the aid policies of the traditional donors after the Cold War, especially after the 9/11 attacks. McConnon’s (2013, 2014, 2019) research complements Howell and Lind’s (2009) findings by providing further evidence of how North American and Western European donors have adjusted their development aid strategies post-9/11. While Howell and Lind (2009) emphasize the influence of the GWoT on policy frameworks, McConnon’s (2013, 2014, 2019) analyses of policy documents show a shift in language and priorities, highlighting the ‘merging’ of development-related and security-related goals of foreign aid. Lazell and Petrikova (2019) provide a quantitative dimension to this literature by demonstrating how ‘securitization of development’ has influenced long-term aid allocation patterns, even in countries not directly affected by conflict. Together, these studies reveal a consistent trend in which traditional donors have increasingly used development aid as a tool to address security concerns, especially in strategically important regions (Woods, 2005).

The ‘merger’ of development-related and security-related goals has also coincided with the emergence of the “do no harm” principle in the 1990s (Anderson, 1999, p. 3) and the concept of conflict-sensitive development in the early 2000s. As

awareness has grown about the connections between conflict, development, and foreign assistance, greater emphasis has been placed on the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in both alleviating and potentially aggravating “the root causes of violent conflict” (International Alert, Saferworld, & International Development Research Centre, 2000, p. 2). In 1997, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released the *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*, which are widely regarded as a turning point in donors’ approach to conflict prevention, as the guidelines set out how ODA can be used to support conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery, reconstruction, and peacebuilding (International Alert, Saferworld, & International Development Research Centre, 2000, p. 2; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997). Following their release, many donors sought to incorporate conflict prevention goals into their ODA strategies (International Alert, Saferworld, & International Development Research Centre, 2000, p. 2). The *DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (2001) was published later, urging donors to adopt a conflict prevention lens in the design and implementation of development programmes, and stated that the primary principle for policymakers in aid is to avoid causing harm and to ensure they do not inadvertently aggravate “existing or potential conflicts” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001, p. 23).

Since then, the DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) has taken a leading role in promoting conflict sensitivity as a key principle for working in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Recent guidance from INCAF emphasizes that conflict sensitivity has moved beyond harm avoidance toward approaches that actively support peace and resilience (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2024, p. 74). Thus, it can be argued that conflict sensitivity aims not only to reduce the risk of violent conflict but also to enhance the effectiveness of foreign aid. In parallel, the DAC’s States of Fragility framework offers a structured approach for linking conflict analysis to development practice by assessing fragility across 6 dimensions (political, economic, societal, human, security, and environmental) and 56 development-related indicators (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2025, p. 22). At the operational level, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has integrated this approach into its programming through tools such as the Conflict and Development Analysis (CDA)

(United Nations Development Programme, 2017), along with guidance from the United Nations Sustainable Development Group (UNSDG) on monitoring and evaluation practices that pay explicit attention to how aid interventions interact with conflict dynamics (United Nations Sustainable Development Group, 2022).

Alongside the aforementioned developments, the World Bank formalized a conflict and fragility agenda that explicitly links security, governance, and development in the late 1990s. The Board discussed a first strategy for post-conflict engagement in 1997, published as a framework in 1998, and stood up a dedicated Post-Conflict Unit and Post-Conflict Fund to resource early recovery and analysis in war-affected settings (World Bank, 1998; World Bank, 1999). This was codified institutionally with Operational Policy 2.30 in 2001, which required teams to factor conflict risks and political economy constraints into country strategies and project design (International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 2001, p. 11). To operationalize that commitment, *the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)* set out domains and indicators to assess how “development interventions” interact with drivers of violence (World Bank, 2002, p. 1). It then consolidated the “security, governance, development” interdependence at the level of strategy in the *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development* and, later, *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020-2025*, both of which frame inclusive institutions, citizen security and jobs as mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable development outcomes (World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2020).

Although the literature reviewed in this research primarily focuses on donor countries, these examples suggest that the ‘merger’ of development-related and security-related goals is not limited to bilateral donors but also extends across major international organizations within the development sector. In summary, it can be argued that there is alignment across the development sector, with the ‘merger’ reflected in the aid strategies of both bilateral donors and major international organizations.

2.3. Conclusion

The focus on Abrahamsen’s (2018) work in this literature review is due to her contribution to the debate on the ‘merger’ of development and security, which forms

the analytical foundation of this study. Her analysis captures both the policy discourse⁴ and policy design components of the merger of development-related and security-related goals, allowing for a more holistic understanding of the changes in aid strategies of the donor countries. Furthermore, Abrahamsen (2018) critically examines the potential political consequences of this merger concerning its implementation, including the empowerment of military and security institutions at the expense of democratic processes and the original goals of development aid.

The existing literature demonstrates a clear trend toward the merger of development-related and security-related goals in the aid policies of the donors in the post-Cold War era, particularly after the events of 9/11. A prevalent argument in the literature is that security-related goals can precede the development-related goals of foreign aid. However, the scholarship on the merger of development and security has predominantly focused on traditional donors from North America and Western Europe, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Despite their significant and longstanding role in Africa, there remains a gap in research on the aid strategies of non-traditional donors such as China and Japan.

Although Abrahamsen's (2018) argument primarily focuses on the foreign aid strategies of North American and Western European donors, it is equally relevant for studying other important donors that allocate aid to African countries. For this study, Abrahamsen's (2018) argument provides a valuable lens through which to analyze the foreign aid strategies of China and Japan as case studies. Based on Abrahamsen's (2018) argument concerning the merger of development and security, and drawing from the literature reviewed in this chapter, this study derives a set of indicators to capture how this merger is reflected in donor strategies. These indicators are grouped into three categories: policy discourse, policy design, and outcomes.

⁴ The use of the term "policy discourse indicator" in this study does not imply the adoption of the discourse analysis approach. Rather, it refers to the ways in which official language and policy rhetoric frame development through a security lens, and vice versa. This includes not only linguistic choices but also broader rhetorical and narrative structures that reflect the merger of development and security in the language used by donor governments. This study adopts a case study approach and analyzes official documents using policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security, without applying discourse analysis as a formal methodological approach.

Policy discourse indicators include:

- The use of security-related rhetoric (references to national security, global peace, stability, and security) as well as the inclusion of security-related goals in official documents concerning the foreign aid strategies of donor countries.
- The inclusion of development-related goals (such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, and infrastructure development) in national and international security strategies (including military aid strategies of the donor countries).
- The framing of poverty and underdevelopment in recipient countries (as causes of potential conflict and instability in the recipient countries) as security threats by donor governments.

The *policy design indicator* focuses on:

- The alignment of development aid with security cooperation, such as linking aid to military or intelligence collaboration, and increased funding for military and security sectors under development budgets. This includes support for police training, military capacity-building, and surveillance infrastructure in recipient countries.

Outcome indicators consist of:

- Military or security actors become primary agents in delivering aid or executing development projects, thus the militarization of aid implementation. This is closely related to peacekeeping missions because in many cases, military or security forces are not just there to keep the peace. They also take on roles like delivering aid and supporting development. With their involvement, aid can become linked to military goals instead of purely developmental and humanitarian goals.
- The growing influence of security and military institutions over civilian authorities, reducing the roles of civil society and civilian bureaucracies.
- Development projects with dual functions, for example, infrastructure development projects for communication networks that serve both civilian and surveillance purposes, or public health initiatives that prioritize the needs of military and security personnel.

The outcome indicators are longer-term and are discussed in the literature primarily as potential results. Because their discussion extends beyond the scope of the available data, this study focuses on the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger, as observed in both primary and secondary sources.

Having identified the research gap and outlined the indicators of the merger, Chapters 3 and 4 begin by introducing the background of China and Japan as former aid recipients, followed by an examination of the history of China and Japan as donors and their respective approaches to aid-giving. This is followed by the analysis of their foreign aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021 based on the documents of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) to see whether the same pattern of the merger of development and security is reflected in China's and Japan's aid strategies.

CHAPTER 3: CHINA

3.1. Introduction: China's Experience as a Recipient

Drawing on its experience as a recipient of foreign aid for development purposes, China was able to formulate its own foreign aid strategies aimed at supporting developing countries. Zhou et al. (2015, p. 16) divide China's recipient experience in two periods: the first, during the 1950s and 1960s, when China received foreign aid from the Soviet Union; and the second, after 1978, "when China instituted its policy of Reform and Opening Up," and started to receive aid from OECD-DAC members, the United Nations agencies, and the World Bank. The most dominant goal of China in receiving foreign aid was to "support its economic growth" and "development strategies" throughout both periods (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 122; Zhou et al., 2015, p. 26). The first period supported China's early industrialization. During this period, Soviet assistance to China heavily prioritized military support and concentrated on China's modernization efforts to improve its heavy industries (Zhou et al., 2015, p. 17). In addition to the provision of "hardware and equipment," aid commitments of the Soviet Union during this period brought technology transfer, "management methods," and "management systems for planning" to China (Zhou et al., 2015, p. 17). The allocation of Soviet aid to China ended with the "breakup" of the Sino-Soviet alliance (Zhou et al., 2015, p. 97).

The second period was shaped by a different set of donors and priorities. The bilateral and multilateral donors in the second period focused on "education, good governance, environmental protection, systemic reform, gender equality, human rights dialogue, and rule of law" in their aid strategies to China (Zhou et al., 2015, p. 21). During this period, one of the most significant bilateral donors to China was Japan. Although diplomatic normalization between Japan and China began in 1972, talks on foreign aid did not start until "the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty" in 1978 (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 120). Following China's opening up, Japan emerged as a major donor to China in 1979 (Howe, 2013, p. 192). In the 1980s, Japan's foreign aid to China was mostly concentrated on "industrial infrastructure" development to support China's economic growth (Howe, 2013, p. 194). From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, Japan remained China's largest bilateral

donor (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 120). Japan's foreign aid commitments to China focused on "infrastructural development, health care and social security, industry, agriculture, environmental management and conservation, natural disaster prevention and mitigation, legal system development," and lasted until 2022 (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2022). Japan's role as a major donor to China not only supported China's development but also influenced China's approach to foreign aid. Reilly (2012, p. 217) argues that, based on China's lengthy experience as a recipient of Japanese aid, its foreign aid strategies have prioritized economic growth and infrastructure development in the recipient countries.

In addition to China's experience as a recipient, its foreign aid practices have also been profoundly shaped by the ideological framework provided by the "Three Worlds Theory."⁵ Chan (1985, p. 378) explains that as articulated by Deng Xiaoping in his speech at the UN in 1974, the Three Worlds Theory divided the world into three categories: the First World, consisting of the United States and the Soviet Union as two superpowers; the Second World, made up of other developed countries; and the Third World, comprising developing countries including China.

It can be argued that China's approach to its relationship with other 'developing' countries, influenced by the Three Worlds Theory, has contributed to its enduring rejection of the traditional vertical hierarchy between donor and recipient countries.⁶ Chan (1985, p. 377) states that the Three Worlds Theory was intended to position China to assume the "leadership of the Third World." This leadership can be translated to seniority in China's relationship with the other countries of the Third World (Chan, 2017, p. 83-84). For instance, the fraternal relationship between the Soviet Union and China as "elder and younger brother[s]" would be mirrored in

⁵ Although the Three Worlds Theory is no longer central to China's foreign policy discourse given the end of the Cold War rivalries (Taylor, 2006, p. 43), Chan (2017, p. 83) argues that a "residue" of this ideological framework continues to influence China's diplomatic relations with other countries. By using the term 'influential' here (and throughout this chapter), I do not suggest a direct causal relationship or imply that the Three Worlds Theory provides the sole explanation for China's contemporary foreign aid strategies. Rather, I aim to highlight a subtle ideological continuity that persists within China's approach to aid-giving.

⁶ The Chinese government avoids using the terms "donor" and "recipient," as they imply a vertically hierarchical relationship between countries (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 117). Instead, Chinese policy-makers prefer the term "partners" (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 122). However, this thesis uses these terms to ensure clarity and maintain consistency with the terminology commonly used in the literature.

China's relationship with African countries (Zhou et al., 2015, p. 71). China will assume the role of the "older brother" when it comes to its political and economic engagement with Africa (Chan, 2017, p. 84). Thus, China adopts a horizontal approach to foreign aid, which is based on the principles of partnership and mutual benefit (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 10). Although China presents its foreign aid approach as horizontal, emphasizing partnership and mutual benefit, certain structural features suggest that vertical hierarchical dynamics may still persist. While it positions itself in opposition to traditional donors associated with colonial legacies, China often retains significant control over critical aspects of its aid programs, such as financing, project design, and implementation. This suggests that China's foreign aid practices may still reflect a degree of vertical hierarchy in its relations with recipient countries.

Unlike many traditional donors, China was still receiving foreign aid when it became a donor in the 1950s (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 13). This dual identity makes it crucial to first examine China's historical experience in both roles before analyzing its foreign aid strategies. Accordingly, this chapter began with an overview of China's history as a recipient. It can be argued that China's foreign aid strategies toward Africa are influenced by its own experience as a recipient and the Three Worlds Theory. China's emphasis on industrial infrastructure projects in Africa reflects its own experience as a recipient of Japanese aid that prioritized industrial infrastructure to support economic growth, and it is framed through the Three Worlds Theory by presenting China as a fellow member and "older brother" of the Third World. The guiding principles of China's aid-giving approach associated with these influences will be discussed in the relevant section of this chapter. The remainder of this chapter analyzes China's history as an aid donor, its approach to aid-giving, and the analysis of its foreign aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021, outlined in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) action plans. The main goal of this analysis is to determine whether the post-Cold War merger of development and security observed among the traditional donors is also reflected in China's foreign aid strategies.

3.2. China's History as a Donor

China's history as an aid donor can be traced back to the 1950s. After the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's first act as a donor was to provide material aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Vietnam in 1950 (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). China's provision of "grain, medicine, cotton, and other industrial material to North Korea" lasted until the end of the Korean War in 1953 (Park, 2011, as cited in Mawdsley, 2012, p. 54). Bräutigam (1998, p. 44) notes that while China's official sources declare the starting year of their foreign aid as 1950, the first recorded instance of China's economic assistance was in 1953 with its provision of a grant of 338 million dollars to North Korea for post-war reconstruction. Through the Bandung Conference held in 1955, China enhanced its diplomatic ties with various developing countries and began to provide aid to them (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). The following year, China started aiding African countries (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011).

While China initially focused its aid on Asian countries such as Vietnam, North Korea, and Cambodia, an increasing number of African countries established diplomatic relations with China and began receiving aid in the late 1950s (Bräutigam, 1998, p. 44). During the 1950s and 1960s, China's foreign aid, whether directed toward Asian neighbors or newly independent African states, was primarily shaped by efforts to support "socialist or revolutionary movements" and secure diplomatic recognition over Taiwan, in line with Mao-era foreign policy (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 32). In the 1960s, based on the shared experiences of China and many African countries with extended civil war and foreign occupation, China's foreign aid policies prioritized agriculture, industry, and technical training to address both the immediate and long-term development needs of the recipient countries in Africa (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 33). Beyond competing with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, China's foreign aid initiatives were also influenced by its geopolitical rivalry with the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, and with the Soviet Union from the late 1960s to early 1980s (Jerve, 2007, p. 3).

As China completed its first decade as an aid donor, the foundational principles of China's foreign aid began to take form in the 1960s. The core principles of China's

foreign aid were established with the *Declaration of Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries* in 1964 (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). These principles are “equality and mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty with no conditions attached, [provision of] interest-free or low-interest loans, [promotion of] self-reliance [instead of] dependency, quick results, [use of] best-quality equipment of Chinese manufacture, [emphasis of] technology transfer through technical assistance,” and experts from China living in the same conditions and earning the same fare as the local ones (Zhou, 1964, as cited in Bräutigam, 2011, p. 760).

Some of these principles originated from the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence* proposed by China and India in 1954. Among those are “equality and mutual benefit,” “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and “non-interference in each other’s internal affairs” (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 30). The first and perhaps the most important one, along with the non-conditionality principle (discussed in the next paragraph), is the “equality and mutual benefit” included in both the *Five Principles* and *Eight Principles*. Even today, the principle of “equality and mutual benefit” reflects the aid philosophy of China, seeing it as a form of “partnership” rather than a one-sided “charity” (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 30). The latter two align with the “respect for sovereignty with no conditions attached,” or the non-conditionality principle for short, which continues to be an integral and unique aspect of China’s foreign aid.

In the context of China’s foreign aid, “no conditions attached” means that aid is provided without the political or economic conditions often required by traditional donors or organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank. Bräutigam (2011) notes that members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) frequently collaborate to “impose economic and political conditions” on recipients through aid (p. 761). It is important to note that among DAC’s 32 members, Japan and South Korea stand out as the only two Asian donors, making them exceptions to the predominantly ‘Western’ composition of the committee (Jain, 2015, p. 100). Unlike aid from such donors, which demands reforms in areas like governance, “human rights,” or economic policies, China’s aid focuses on mutual benefit and economic cooperation without such prerequisites (Dreher & Fuchs, 2015,

p. 993). China often gains access to resources, markets, or geopolitical support through cooperation built around its aid, especially in Africa, even though it does not require governance or human rights reforms as conditions for receiving that aid. As mentioned earlier, Mawdsley (2012, p. 55) states that a critical political factor driving China's interest in Africa was its effort to "displace the Taiwan-based Republic of China at the United Nations," a goal that was eventually achieved in 1971. Notably, of the 76 votes in favor of the People's Republic of China, 26 came from African countries (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 55). Therefore, it can be argued that while addressing the developmental needs of recipient countries through non-conditional aid, the Chinese government also advances its political interests.

The 1970s were an active decade for China as an aid donor. One of the most well-known projects of China's aid program in Africa is the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), which employed approximately 15,000 Chinese workers from 1970 until the project's completion in 1975 (Bräutigam, 1998, p. 43; The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). Bräutigam (2009) states that foreign aid was a "surprisingly central focus" for the Chinese government between the years 1972 and 1977, and "five national conferences on foreign aid" were held during this period (p. 41). In 1978, after adopting reform policies and opening up, China expanded its economic cooperation with other developing countries, adjusted its aid focus, started to give more priority to the least developed countries as recipients, and adopted more flexible approaches to enhance long-term economic impacts (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). Bräutigam (2009, p. 2) highlights that by the same year, China was providing aid to 74 countries, with the largest number of recipients located in Africa, establishing aid programs in more African countries than the United States.

Until the late 1970s, China, despite substantial economic challenges and what it described as "domestic imperatives," managed to provide technical and infrastructural assistance alongside limited material aid (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011; Mawdsley, 2012, p. 55). The late 1970s and 1980s underwent a transformation in Sino-African relations as Deng Xiaoping's "pragmatic" policies replaced Mao Zedong's ideologically driven approach, which ultimately influenced China's foreign aid policy and resulted in declining aid flows

to African countries (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 56-57). According to Jerve (2007, p. 3), starting from the late 1970s, China's "new aid policy" under Deng Xiaoping was about getting more and giving moderate aid, emphasizing China's economic growth over its ideological motives. Aside from its rivalry with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition, China largely stepped back from Cold War power struggles during this period and, starting from 1979, became a major recipient of aid from Japan and other donors, at one point becoming the largest recipient of ODA (Jerve, 2007, p. 4). Bräutigam (2009, p. 18, 24) notes that China's approach to aid-giving has been shaped by its "own experience as an aid recipient" during this period, reflecting elements from the aid strategies previously employed by Japan and other donors in its current aid policies towards African countries.

Even under the new aid policy, China pledged 258.9 million dollars in aid, making it the sixth-largest donor to Africa in 1984 (Bräutigam, 1998, p. 47). China's sustained focus on Africa continued as its aid to Africa grew even as it declined in other regions. From 1986 to 1995, more than half of China's foreign aid was allocated to Africa, with "an average of 57 percent" (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 54). Bräutigam (2009, p. 54) argues that this particular focus on African countries led to the lasting impact, "credibility," and solid foundation of China's aid to Africa, which would expand on even after 1995.

As China transitioned from a planned economy to a socialist market economy, it implemented several reforms in its foreign aid mechanism, emphasizing diversification in both funding sources and methods in the 1990s (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). In 1994, a reform program was launched to enhance the coordination among institutions responsible for administering China's foreign aid (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 124-125). Another important aid reform in 1995 introduced new mechanisms to better integrate China's foreign aid, trade, and investment (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 78). This reform emphasized a business-oriented model of foreign aid allocation in line with China's transformation to a market economy (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 124). However, even with the foreign aid reforms in the 1990s, instead of funding new development projects, the majority of China's aid to Africa was for "rehabilitating (...) its former aid projects that had collapsed" in the previous decade due to the economic crisis faced by African countries (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 56-57).

This section traced China's history as an aid donor, beginning with its initial assistance to Korea and Vietnam in the 1950s, continuing with the expansion of its aid activities after the Bandung Conference, the formulation of its core aid principles in the 1960s, its commitment to providing aid to African countries during the 1970s and 1980s, and the reforms regarding the allocation of foreign aid in the 1990s. In doing so, it provided an overview of China's role as an aid donor during the Cold War and in the 1990s, with a particular focus on its involvement in Africa. The next section will build on this historical context by discussing the core principles of China's approach to foreign aid.

3.3. China's Approach to Foreign Aid

To contextualize the guiding principles and strategies discussed in this section, it is important to introduce China's definition of foreign aid⁷ from its most recent white paper from 2021. China's foreign aid aims "to promote economic and social development" bilaterally and multilaterally (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). Concessional loans, grants, and interest-free loans constitute the three categories of China's foreign aid. Aid recipients are categorized by income levels similar to the OECD criteria, but focus on the least developed, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income countries. Historically, China's foreign aid strategies have evolved from its own experience as a recipient of aid and its commitment to South-South cooperation, emphasizing the solidarity among developing nations concerning their pursuit of "individual and/or shared" development goals (The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, n.d.).

According to the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), South-South cooperation for development involves a collaborative process where two or more developing countries work together to strengthen their national capacities by sharing knowledge, expertise, resources, and technical skills (The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, n.d.). This cooperation extends through collective actions at regional and interregional levels and includes

⁷ While Chinese policymakers prefer to use the umbrella terms like "South-South cooperation" and "development cooperation" to describe their foreign assistance, this thesis adopts the term "foreign aid" to ensure conceptual clarity and maintain consistency with the terminology commonly used in the literature (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 13; The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).

partnerships between governments, regional bodies, “civil society, academia, and the private sector,” aiming to achieve both individual and mutual goals across different regions (The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, n.d.).

Since the 1950s, China has aligned its foreign aid with the principles of South-South cooperation, viewing this framework as the ideal mechanism to promote shared development among developing nations. This approach is formalized in the 2021 White Paper, as it establishes that China aims to take on international responsibilities that align with its development stage and capabilities (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). On this basis, China remains committed to enhancing South-South cooperation, striving for “common development” among developing countries (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). In the 2021 White Paper, China frames itself as “the world’s largest developing economy,” a classification that reflects China’s own narrative rather than the widely accepted international classification (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).

Furthermore, all of the guiding principles of the South-South cooperation, “respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit,” align with the principles guiding China’s foreign aid (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). The core principles of China’s approach to foreign aid include equality, prioritizing the economic and social development of recipient countries, fostering independent development, offering diverse and effective forms of cooperation, ensuring the sustainability of development projects, promoting mutual benefit, respecting sovereignty, and adhering to a policy of non-conditionality (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021; Zhou, 1964). As discussed earlier, many of these principles are traced back to the 1964 *Declaration of Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries*, which was, in turn, derived from the 1954 *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*. These principles have been shaped by the Chinese ideals of universal harmony, reciprocity, internationalism, and responsibility, which are foundational to Chinese diplomacy and play a significant role in shaping China’s approach to aid-giving.

China's principles of equality and mutual benefit are rooted in its experience as a recipient and the "ideal of universal harmony," which emphasizes peaceful and cooperative relations across borders (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). The Soviet Union's engagement with China through foreign aid was based on the notion of equality between the two countries (Zhou et al., 2015, p. 71). These two principles are reflected in China's approach to foreign aid, particularly in its focus on infrastructure projects and technical assistance, which aim to support sustainable development and foster long-term partnerships with recipient countries.

The notion of "repaying kindness with kindness" mirrors China's focus on non-conditionality, where aid is provided to promote development without expecting political or economic concessions in return (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). Chan (2017, p. 63) argues that the presence of the principle of non-conditionality in China's approach to aid-giving can be traced back to "Zhou Enlai's speech at [the] Bandung [Conference] in 1955" about China's foreign aid to the developing countries. Thus, the adoption of the notions of reciprocity and non-conditionality in China's aid-giving approach shows how China's historical experience as a recipient and the "ideological framework" provided by the Three Worlds Theory are reflected in its foreign aid strategies toward African countries (Chan, 2008, p. 344; Taylor, 2006, p. 43).

The "tradition of internationalism" refers to China's commitment to supporting other nations, especially those in the developing world, in their pursuit of national independence, socio-economic development, and prosperity (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). This idea is rooted in China's "sense of justice" and solidarity with other nations as a result of China's own experience of underdevelopment and poverty (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). It also emphasizes that China's growth should not come at the expense of others but rather alongside their development, emphasizing China's motivation to contribute to global development. Finally, due to China's self-proclamation of its "responsibility as a major country," China recognizes aid-giving as a fundamental obligation as a responsible participant within the global community (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).

3.4. An Overview of China's Foreign Aid Strategies in Africa: FOCAC 2003-2021

As mentioned earlier, China's foreign aid strategies were driven by ideological and political motivations until the end of the 1970s (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 18). However, after opening up in 1978 and experiencing reforms, China's experience as an aid recipient from Japan and traditional donors significantly influenced its foreign aid strategies. China's foreign aid strategies to African countries were no exception to these changes. Even today, China's foreign aid strategy remains consistent with the "developmental state" model, drawing inspiration from Japan's foreign aid strategies once directed toward China (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 18). Derived from Japan's postwar recovery and development experience, "developmental state" model proposed that economic "growth could be best achieved by a strong state to establish a long-term development strategy and organize the public and private sectors to carry out [this] strategy" (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 39). In line with the principle of mutual benefit, this model utilizes the use of foreign aid not solely "to support the development of recipients" but also to facilitate the establishment of "competitive Chinese multinational corporations" in recipient countries to contribute to China's own development (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 25). This mutually beneficial approach extends to China's "economic and social development projects in the [African-led] peacekeeping and peace-building" efforts in the region (Xuejun, 2018, p. 79). Starting from the 2000s, China expanded its foreign aid efforts by providing large-scale humanitarian aid, joining internationally coordinated programs, and addressing its growing energy needs through aid linked to trade and investment in oil-producing countries in Africa, such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan (Jerve, 2007, p. 4). Additionally, China became involved in global debt relief initiatives, especially for highly indebted African countries (Jerve, 2007, p. 4). These changes established the foundation for China's more active and comprehensive involvement in Africa, backed up by AidData statistics, indicating China's growing role as a donor.

AidData's figures suggest that between 2000 and 2021, China emerged as one of the world's most significant development aid donors, committing an estimated 843 billion dollars in international development assistance globally (*China Global Development Dashboard*, n.d.). This includes a mix of grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. The data from the AidData dataset reveals that of this total,

approximately 44% was directed to African countries, making Africa one of the primary regions for aid flows from China. AidData's estimation is supported by China's 2021 white paper on foreign aid, which reports China's aid to African countries to be around 44.65% (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).

A significant development just before the start of this period was the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. It has become a key platform for dialogue between China and its African partners, as well as "an effective mechanism for [fostering] pragmatic cooperation" in response to new global dynamics (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). The members of FOCAC consist of 53 African countries, China, and the African Union Commission (*African Members of FOCAC*, n.d.). The ministerial conferences are held triennially.

The Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000) acknowledges that political instability in some African countries is rooted in "economic and social factors" and directly links it with underdevelopment (*Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, 2000). This signifies the shift following the Cold War era, wherein underdevelopment and poverty are recognized not merely as obstacles to development but also as significant security threats that can result in political instability and conflict, which is consistent with the merger of development and security identified among non-traditional donors.

Alongside FOCAC, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013 further illustrates changes in China's development cooperation. This initiative aims to "promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development" (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Under China's broader development cooperation, BRI is also based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference (The State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Drawing from China's 2023 white paper, BRI has continued to be regarded as an important pillar in building a global community of

shared future by the Chinese government, representing a significant contribution to global governance and development while also enhancing China's political, economic, and security engagement around the world (*The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future*, 2023).

Shinn and Eisenman (2023, p. 59) argue that despite China's global aspirations with the BRI, Africa was initially seen as an "afterthought" within its framework, as early versions of the initiative did not prominently feature the continent. While the Africa policy paper published in 2015 made no mention of the initiative, the 2015 BRI Action Plan mentioned the continent only in general terms, and FOCAC was not mentioned at all (Shinn & Eisenman, 2023, p. 59). China started to include Africa in the BRI only after African leaders showed interest in the initiative, and more African leaders participated in the second BRI summit in 2019 compared to low attendance at the first BRI summit in 2017 (Shinn & Eisenman, 2023, p. 59–60). Shinn and Eisenman (2023, p. 61–62) also make the interesting observation that although the BRI's security components have received little attention from the Chinese media, the initiative is seen as a way for China to extend its "interests and presence globally (...) using its strong economic relations to broaden its political and security engagement," which also includes China's engagement with African countries. Based on their observation, it can be argued that the inclusion of the BRI framework in China's foreign aid approach to Africa further demonstrates the merger of development-related and security-related goals.

The white papers on China's foreign aid also started to be released in the 2010s. Mawdsley (2012, p. 108) states that China's 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid may have been published partly to counter suspicions about its activities by offering greater transparency in reporting its spending and aid programs. The first white paper on China's foreign aid covers the period of 1950-2009. In 2014, the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China published another white paper that covered China's foreign aid activities between 2010 and 2012. The third white paper on foreign aid, titled *China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era* was released in 2021. It outlines China's foreign aid policies, progress, and initiatives from 2013 to 2018, including international cooperation under the BRI, efforts toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and China's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The most recent white paper on China's foreign aid also covers the cultural and philosophical origins of China's development cooperation. The remainder of this section examines China's foreign aid strategies toward Africa as articulated through the FOCAC action plans. The examination of China's foreign aid strategies will be based on a chronological order, covering the action plans from 2003 to 2021.⁸

2003 FOCAC Addis Ababa Action Plan (2002-2006)

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006)

serves as the starting point for the examination. Infrastructure development projects and support for agriculture are seen not only as development initiatives but also as ways to prevent instability and conflict. The 2003 action plan emphasizes that through infrastructure (Section 4.2) and agricultural (Section 4.1) development projects, the Chinese government aims to help the landlocked African economies overcome the logistical challenges, which in turn foster regional stability and security (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006)*, 2003). These efforts exemplify the argument that China's foreign aid in Africa serves both development-related and security-related goals.

The practice of peace operations, wherein external entities engage in the internal conflicts of sovereign nations, constitutes a significant element of international security governance. These operations are typically "led by the UN or regional organizations" in the forms of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction (Xuejun, 2018, p. 69). It can be argued that China's participation in African peacekeeping operations and provision of training, "financial and material assistance" to those efforts, reflects the merger of development and security (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006)*, 2003). Through its support of the UN, the AU, and other regional

⁸ While the overall timeframe of this thesis is 2001–2021, the analysis of FOCAC documents covers the period from 2003 to 2021. This is based on the availability of official FOCAC Action Plans, which began with the first ministerial conference in 2003 and continued through the most recent summit within the study's timeframe. Although the 2021 Action Plan outlines China's aid commitments to Africa for the period from 2022 to 2024, it is included in the analysis as it was published within the timeframe of this study.

organizations “in preventing, mediating and resolving conflicts in Africa,” the Chinese government aims to ensure “international and regional peace and stability” necessary for sustainable economic development (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006)*, 2003).

Within the framework of the South-South cooperation, the initiatives undertaken by China to provide debt relief (Section 4.6) and non-conditional development assistance (Section 4.7) to African countries can contribute to economic development and political stability within the region (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006)*, 2003). Reducing economic pressures on African countries can help prevent conflicts over resources. China’s ‘no-strings-attached aid’ can also help maintain the sovereignty of the recipient countries, which can stabilize political systems, thus contributing to a secure environment for development projects.

2006 FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)

A transformative phase for China’s aid program began with China’s declaration of a “new strategic partnership” during the Beijing Summit of FOCAC in 2006, announcing its intentions to “double its aid efforts to Africa by 2009” (Dreher & Fuchs, 2015, p. 933). The 2006 action plan builds upon the foundations laid by the 2003 action plan, maintaining continuity in its core themes while introducing new priorities, particularly in energy cooperation. Both action plans feature sections on peace and security, emphasizing China’s continuing support for African peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution, and anti-terrorism efforts in the recipient countries. This reflects China’s growing role in contributing to African peacekeeping and security.

Although there is continuity in the themes of natural resources and energy development from the 2003 to 2006 plans, the 2006 plan introduces more concrete mechanisms and a heightened focus on energy cooperation, reflecting China’s increasing demand and strategic objectives in Africa. While the 2003 plan focuses on broadening the scope of cooperation in natural resource exploration and ensuring environmental protection, the 2006 plan significantly expands the focus on energy and resources cooperation by promoting joint exploration and sustainable management of energy and mineral resources. In the 2006 plan, Section 3.6 reflects

China's growing strategic interest in Africa's energy and raw materials, coupled with its concern for Africa's economic development (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)*, 2006). In order to support related investments in energy and resources cooperation, the *China-Africa Development Fund* was established (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)*, 2006).

2009 FOCAC Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)

The 2009 action plan builds on the peacekeeping and non-traditional security cooperation themes from the 2003 and 2006 action plans and expands its focus on environmental and food security. The expansion of non-traditional security cooperation reflects China's growing awareness of how environmental degradation and "public health emergencies" can impact both security and development in Africa (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)*, 2009).

The support for agriculture and infrastructure development projects continues from earlier action plans, intending to address poverty and food insecurity as development issues that can contribute to instability (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)*, 2009). In this sense, the action plan continues to tie economic development through agriculture and infrastructure cooperation to long-term peace and stability in the region.

2012 FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)

The 2012 FOCAC highlighted the significance of collaborative efforts in peace and security (Shinn & Eisenman, 2023, p. 54). The 2012 action plan not only builds on the foundations laid in the 2003, 2006, and 2009 action plans but also expands the scope of development projects with increasingly security-related goals. Among those are the inclusion of counter-piracy efforts and a stronger focus on non-traditional security threats in China's foreign aid strategies. In order to "manage [...these] non-traditional security issues and global challenges," the *Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security* (ICACPPS) was launched in 2012 (Chun, 2018, p. 123). ICACPPS provides financial and technical support to African peace operations, "personnel exchanges and training [...for] Africa's conflict

prevention,” supporting “post-conflict reconstruction and development” and “the African Peace and Security Architecture” (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012). The launch of ICACPPS indicates that international security initiatives can also include development-related goals alongside security-related goals, reflecting the pattern of the merger of development and security identified among non-traditional donors after the Cold War. By improving the security capacities of the recipient countries, China is fostering an environment where economic development can thrive, contributing to both the recipients’ development and international security. The 2012 FOCAC action plan’s inclusion of China’s counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia illustrates how maintaining safe shipping routes in the sea is critical for economic development and trade (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012).

The 2012 action plan continues the trend seen in previous plans by expanding support for African-led peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction. The earlier 2009 action plan also included these themes but lacked the deeper institutionalization seen in the ICACPPS. The 2012 plan formalizes peace and security cooperation more extensively than before, with explicit financial and technical support to the African Union (AU) and sub-regional security organizations covered in Section 2.5 (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012).

As mentioned earlier, the focus on non-traditional security threats, like disease control and climate change, first emerged in the 2003 and 2006 action plans and was strengthened in the 2009 action plan. The 2012 action plan expands on these areas, particularly regarding climate change, and introduces mechanisms for cooperation on environmental protection and disaster risk reduction.

The 2012 action plan frames climate change as a critical security threat. In Section 5.6, climate change and environmental degradation are framed as developmental and security issues that can cause conflict and instability in the region. China’s focus on capacity-building and disaster prevention mechanisms, as well as “poverty eradication and sustainable social development” in Africa, highlights China’s use of

developmental assistance to combat the security risks posed by climate change and environmental degradation (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012).

The expansion of collaborative efforts aimed at addressing HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases in Section 5.5 (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012). By supporting the development of the healthcare sector in the recipient countries through the provision of infrastructural support and training, China indirectly addresses sources of instability, framing public health as a security concern that can be combated through development.

As in earlier plans, the 2012 action plan continues to stress the importance of infrastructure and agricultural development for ensuring food security and tackling other socio-economic issues, discussed in Section 4.1 (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012). Infrastructure projects were already present in the 2003 and 2006 plans. However, they have grown in scale, reflecting China's deeper involvement in Africa's development. Cooperation on energy development continues, with an added focus in Section 4.6 on ensuring that Africa can process its own energy resources (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)*, 2012). This is framed as critical not only for development but also for ensuring energy security in the recipient countries.

2015 FOCAC Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)

As in previous action plans, economic growth and infrastructure development remain central goals in the 2015 action plan. Infrastructure development is heavily prioritized, including projects in railroads, highways, regional aviation, ports, power generation, and telecommunications, covered in Section 3.3.1 (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)*, 2015). These investments are linked to promoting “economic integration” across Africa, ensuring that regional “infrastructure connectivity” is enhanced, which is framed as essential for maintaining regional peace and stability (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)*, 2015). Notably, China proposed the *China-Africa Railway Cooperation Action Plan (2016-2020)* in Section 3.3.4 to promote

connectivity, which aims to support the economic development and the maintenance of stability of the recipient countries through enhanced mobility and trade (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)*, 2015).

The 2015 action plan broadens the scope of security and development cooperation, building on previous plans and incorporating new elements such as cybersecurity and ocean economy cooperation. Cybersecurity and the protection of digital infrastructure have become newer additions reflecting the expanding scope of non-traditional security threats in an increasingly digital world, linking information technology to governance and social stability under Section 6.2.3 (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)*, 2015). The addition of ocean economy cooperation under Section 3.5 reflects an expansion into the “blue economy,” where China aims to cooperate with African nations in maritime activities, marine environment management, and offshore energy exploration (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)*, 2015). The blue economy expansion not only addresses economic growth but also touches on security concerns around maritime borders and piracy.

Following the launch of the ICACPPS in 2012, the Chinese government announced military assistance to support the initiative in 2015. China’s military aid commitments, such as the 60 million dollars provided to the African Union (AU) to support the *African Peace and Security Architecture* covered in Section 6.1.2, can be discussed within the framework of the merger of development and security (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018)*, 2015). In order to understand how China’s military aid relates to this merger, it is feasible to examine how it also includes development-related goals and decide whether it mirrors the pattern observed among North American and Western European donors. Consistent with the principles of non-conditionality and respect for sovereignty, China’s military aid, which is mostly “provided in the forms of loan or donation of materials or equipment,” generally avoids direct intervention in governance structures or promoting political reforms, unlike the traditional donors, which often adopt interventionist approaches (Zhixiong, 2018, p. 110). Instead, China emphasizes capacity-building and infrastructure development in the security sector to foster independent economic and social development in the recipient countries (Zhixiong,

2018, p. 110). By strengthening the AU's peacekeeping capacities and conflict prevention mechanisms, China aims to create a stable environment necessary for economic growth in the region, which, in turn, makes the stability in the region more attractive to Chinese businesses and investors, further advancing China's economic interests in Africa. A parallel often noted is South Sudan under the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which is framed as linking peacekeeping to the conditions for economic recovery and development (United Nations Security Council, 2012, p. 6). This is reflected in the mandate under *Security Council Resolution 2057 (2012)*, which underlines that "security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing," and identifies them as essential to achieve "sustainable peace" (United Nations Security Council, 2012, p. 2).

2018 FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)

The 2018 action plan not only includes security-related goals in various development projects but also expands on earlier commitments by linking public health and infrastructure development to broader security-related goals. This action plan also integrates the BRI framework more explicitly into China-Africa cooperation.

Under Section 4.2, the 2018 plan strengthens the connection between public health development and global health security, mainly through support for initiatives to combat communicable diseases like Ebola, malaria, and HIV/AIDS (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*, 2018). The emphasis on health security as part of development assistance aligns with the approach adopted by the previous action plans.

The 2018 plan expands on previous commitments to peacekeeping and counter-terrorism cooperation outlined in 2012 and 2015 action plans by establishing new training programs, allocating military aid, and committing more funds to peace and security, such as the *China-Africa Peace and Security Fund* covered in Section 6.1.3 (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*, 2018). It also advances cooperation in areas introduced in the 2015 action plan, such as cybersecurity and anti-piracy efforts.

As mentioned earlier, a new element in the 2018 plan is the emphasis on aligning China-Africa cooperation with the BRI. As stated in sections 1.3 and 1.5, security-related goals are also included with the development-related goals of the infrastructure projects (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*, 2018). Under Section 6.1.1, the 2018 plan promises 50 security assistance initiatives “to advance China-Africa cooperation” within the framework of the BRI, specifically focusing on domains such as law enforcement, UN peacekeeping operations, and anti-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*, 2018). The integration of the BRI framework into China’s foreign aid strategies in Africa reflects China’s broader geopolitical interests, where infrastructure development is also tied to securing trade routes and enhancing its economic and political influence over African countries. Section 6.1.2 covers China’s support for UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, along with China’s direct involvement in training African peacekeepers, with a promise of “100 million dollars military assistance” (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*, 2018). China’s consistent support for peacekeeping operations is framed within its broader development agenda that ties development to peace and political stability in both policy discourse and policy design.

2021 FOCAC Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024)

Lastly, the 2021 action plan reflects China’s adaptation to global challenges, particularly the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, while maintaining its focus on security cooperation with African countries (Shinn & Eisenman, 2023, p. 55). Due to the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the eighth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was predominantly conducted via video conferencing in 2021 (Shinn & Eisenman, 2023, p. 53).

In Section 6, titled “Peace and Security Cooperation,” China’s emphasis on military and law enforcement training programs for capacity-building (Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.7) and counter-terrorism support to Africa can be seen as an example of the merger between development and security (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024)*, 2021). Zhixiong (2018, p. 111) argues that military training has been an important aspect of China’s military assistance to Africa since

the establishment of bilateral relations. By bolstering African military and law enforcement capacities through training programs, China aims to support regional security while simultaneously fostering environments sustainable for economic development. China's military assistance to Africa, intended to establish a secure political environment, is also framed as critical for the economic investment and development projects to succeed in the 2021 action plan. It can be argued that China's military aid strategies include development-related goals alongside their security-related goals, reflecting the merger pattern observed among traditional donors in China's foreign aid strategies as well.

While the 2018 action plan has limited references to the BRI, the 2021 action plan incorporates the BRI framework into China's foreign aid strategies in Africa, particularly through "food security cooperation" and infrastructure development projects (*Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024)*, 2021). By supporting infrastructure development through the BRI framework, China not only promotes economic growth in the recipient countries but also aims to strengthen regional connectivity to support regional peace and security.

3.5. Conclusion: The Merger of Development and Security in China's Foreign Aid Strategies in Africa (2001-2021)

This section concludes the chapter by analyzing China's foreign aid strategies toward Africa from 2001 to 2021 by applying the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security outlined in Chapter 2. The analysis of the official FOCAC action plans from 2003 to 2021 shows that China's foreign aid strategies in Africa reflect the merger of development-related and security-related goals.

Policy Discourse Indicators of the Merger

The use of security-related rhetoric and the inclusion of security-related goals in official documents concerning the aid strategies of the donors: Across the FOCAC plans, in addition to the use of security-related rhetoric, security-related goals are consistently embedded within development assistance strategies of China toward African countries. The 2003 action plan links infrastructure and agricultural development with regional stability and security. The 2006 and 2009 action plans use

references to peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and anti-terrorism efforts within the context of development assistance. The 2012 action plan institutionalizes the merger of security-related goals and development-related goals in China's foreign aid strategies with the launch of ICACPPS. The expansion of the 2015, 2018, and 2021 action plans by the inclusion of cybersecurity, maritime security, and public health security further reflects this indicator. In the 2018 and 2021 action plans, infrastructure development projects within the BRI framework are directly associated with regional peace and security.

The inclusion of development-related goals in national and international security strategies: The FOCAC action plans consistently include development-related goals (such as poverty alleviation, economic growth, and infrastructure development) into their security strategies (including those involving military aid), and recognize these goals as vital to achieving peace and security. The 2003 and 2006 action plans present infrastructure and agricultural development as tools not only for economic growth but also for achieving regional stability and peace, framing development as a prerequisite for security. Similarly, in the 2009 action plan, development-related goals such as poverty alleviation are positioned as integral to achieving long-term peace and regional security. In later plans, particularly from 2012 onwards, security-related goals related to the anti-piracy initiatives, peace operations, and law enforcement cooperation are increasingly merged with development-related goals. Across these plans, development-related goals are not treated in isolation but are consistently situated within national and international security strategies, including military and law enforcement cooperation frameworks, confirming the presence of this indicator.

The framing of poverty and underdevelopment as security threats: Throughout the FOCAC action plans analyzed in the previous section, underdevelopment is recognized as a source of conflict and instability. The 2003 action plan acknowledges that political instability in Africa is rooted in economic and social factors, identifying poverty and underdevelopment as a cause of insecurity. This plan also establishes that infrastructure and agricultural development are necessary to overcome logistical barriers to promote regional peace and security. This framing continues in the 2006 action plan, which emphasizes that the initiatives for the exploration and sustainable

management of natural resources not only promote economic development but also support regional stability, indicating an understanding of economic deprivation as a security concern. The 2009 action plan expands this framing by connecting food insecurity and public health emergencies to instability in the region, highlighting how poverty-related issues can generate conflict and social unrest. The 2009 action plan also frames climate change alongside poverty as possible causes of instability and explicitly ties their resolution to the promotion of sustainable development initiatives. In the 2018 and 2021 plans, the framing of poverty and underdevelopment as security threats is extended by the launch of new development initiatives within the BRI framework that aim for better regional integration and infrastructure connectivity to ensure peace and stability in the recipient countries. Thus, China's official discourse concerning its foreign aid strategies frames poverty and underdevelopment not merely as development challenges but as possible threats to security.

Policy Design Indicator of the Merger

The alignment of development aid with security cooperation: Across the FOCAC action plans from 2003 to 2021, China's development aid is consistently aligned with its security cooperation with the African countries. The 2003 action plan reflects China's support for peacekeeping operations through financial and material assistance and its collaboration with international and regional organizations to "prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts in Africa," thereby integrating security cooperation into its development assistance. The 2006 action plan continues to reflect this alignment through China's ongoing support for African peacekeeping and conflict resolution, particularly in the context of its expanding strategic partnership with African countries. In the 2009 action plan, China's security cooperation with African countries broadens to include non-traditional security concerns such as environmental protection, which are to be addressed through the allocation of development aid. The inclusion of food security, public health, and climate change in the 2009 and 2012 action plans reflects how security cooperation is aligned with the foreign aid strategies of China. In the 2021 action plan, military and law enforcement training programs and capacity-building for counter-terrorism are prioritized under the peace and security cooperation section. These activities are framed as essential for the success of development initiatives and are embedded within China's

development aid strategies in Africa, particularly through the infrastructure projects under the BRI.

In conclusion, the analysis of the FOCAC action plans from 2003 to 2021 reflects the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security in China's foreign aid strategies in Africa. Across the FOCAC action plans examined in this study, it is revealed that China consistently uses security-related rhetoric and goals in FOCAC action plans, frames poverty and underdevelopment as security threats, and merges development-related and security-related goals in its foreign aid strategies. For instance, development-related goals such as poverty alleviation, infrastructure development, and economic growth are included in China's national and international security strategies, including those involving military assistance. Following the pattern of the post-Cold War merger observed among the North American and Western European donors, China's military assistance strategies include development-related goals alongside their security-related goals (policy discourse indicator). By focusing on African-led security solutions and capacity-building efforts that aim to promote peace and stability in the region, China's security cooperation with African countries aligns with its development aid initiatives in the region (policy design indicator). These findings show that China's approach to aid-giving does not treat development and security as separate domains but merges them in both policy discourse and policy design, reflecting a pattern similar to that identified among traditional donors in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter examined China's foreign aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021 by applying the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security outlined in Chapter 2. It began by introducing China's experience as a former aid recipient, followed by an overview of its history as a donor and its approach to aid-giving. The analysis then focused on the official FOCAC action plans from 2003 to 2021, identifying key developments in China's engagement with African countries through foreign aid. The final section applied the aforementioned indicators to determine whether China's foreign aid strategies in Africa reflect the pattern of the merger of development and security observed among traditional donors after the Cold War. The next chapter will focus on Japan, adopting the same structure as this one.

CHAPTER 4: JAPAN

4.1. Introduction: A Brief History of Japan's Recipient Experience

Following the end of the Second World War, Japan underwent complete devastation of its industrial infrastructure and faced a severe economic crisis. Japan received foreign aid from the United States, the World Bank, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) to alleviate "shortages of food and other essential goods" from 1945 to 1966 (Furuoka et al., 2010; Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 29). Foreign aid was also utilized for economic restoration and rehabilitation through various development projects, contributing to Japan's postwar recovery starting from the 1950s. Furuoka et al. (2010) state that these projects targeted Japan's infrastructure and significant industries such as coal, steel, shipbuilding, and automobile were crucial in stimulating and maintaining Japan's "economic boom" in the subsequent decades. Beyond its economic recovery and subsequent growth, however, Japan's experience as an aid recipient would have longer-term consequences for its future role in international development as a donor country, shaping key aspects of its later foreign aid policies.

It has been argued that the experience of Japan as a recipient of foreign aid following the end of the Second World War has profoundly influenced its approach⁹ to foreign aid as a donor country. Furuoka et al. (2010) identify three major implications of this experience that shaped Japan's aid-giving approach. First, the notion of self-help emerged as a central principle, grounded in Japan's own postwar recovery achieved with the support of foreign aid. Although Japan received significant assistance, both the government and the public regarded economic recovery as a task that had to be achieved without complete dependence on external support (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 29–30). This emphasis on self-reliance became a defining principle of Japan's foreign aid approach and was formalized in Japan's Official Development Assistance

⁹ While Japan's approach to foreign aid is often referred to as its aid-giving 'philosophy' in various official documents and scholarly work, this usage does not imply a systematic or coherent philosophical framework. Rather, Japan's aid-giving approach should be understood as a combination of guiding principles and strategies that evolved progressively through its experience as both a recipient and a donor. In this thesis, I refer to the combination of these principles and strategies as Japan's approach to foreign aid as a donor.

(ODA) Charter issued in 1992¹⁰, which states that Japan would support the self-help efforts of developing countries in their pursuit of economic growth (Furuoka et al., 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1992). The notion of self-help, rooted in Japan's historical experience as a recipient, continues to underpin its aid-giving approach today. However, Japan's experience with foreign assistance also influenced the way it understood its broader responsibilities toward developing countries.

Second, alongside the emphasis on self-help, Japan's past dependency on aid fostered a sense of obligation to assist other countries in similar situations. Drawing on cultural concepts such as *giri*, meaning obligation, and *on*, meaning favor, Japan's aid is often framed not as an act of charity, but as a form of repayment (Furuoka et al., 2010). As Furuoka et al. (2010) explain, official narratives and Japanese media at the time commonly described American aid to Japan as a favor that now obliges Japan to similarly support developing countries in repaying the favor. This rationale, frequently cited in the publications of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), reflects a reciprocal approach grounded in Japan's experience of receiving aid (Furuoka et al., 2010). In addition to shaping its sense of obligation, Japan's experience as a recipient also informed its awareness of the needs and vulnerabilities faced by recipient countries.

Third, some scholars like Nishigaki and Shimomura (1993, as cited in Furuoka et al., 2010) argue that Japan's background as an aid recipient has given Japan a distinctive ability to recognize the vulnerabilities and needs of recipient countries, an attribute often lacking among donors without such experience (p. 133-134). In addition to the principle of self-help, the sense of obligation, and the sensitivity to recipient needs, Japan's aid-giving approach is also shaped by the constraints imposed by its "pacifist constitution" (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 28). Japan's post-war constitution¹¹ prohibits it from using foreign aid for combat-related purposes.

¹⁰ This chapter discusses the four existing Charters: ODA Charter (1992), ODA Charter (2003), Development Cooperation Charter (2015), and Development Cooperation Charter (2023). For simplicity, I will sometimes refer to them as the 1992 Charter, 2003 Charter, 2015 Charter, and 2023 Charter, respectively.

¹¹ Article 9 of the *Constitution of Japan* (1947): "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

Following its post-war recovery and rapid economic growth, Japan transitioned into a major donor within just a few decades of receiving aid, building on its experience as a recipient (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 29). The following section traces the beginning of this transformation, which formally commenced with Japan's provision of war reparations¹² to several Asian countries in the 1950s.

This chapter will therefore examine Japan's history as a donor, its approach to foreign aid, and its aid strategies in Africa from 2001 to 2021 within the framework of the post-Cold War merger of development and security. The latter will be based on the analysis of the official documents of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which are TICAD 3 (2003), TICAD 4 (2008), TICAD 5 (2013), TICAD 6 (2016), and TICAD 7 (2019).

4.2. Japan's History as a Donor

Japan began its history as a foreign aid donor in the 1950s, around the same time as China. As the focus of foreign aid shifted globally from postwar reconstruction to development, particularly with European countries extending assistance to their former colonies, Japan underwent a comparable transition. Emerging from its position as a recipient, Japan became a donor to its Asian neighbors, beginning with reparation payments to states it had occupied before and during the Second World War (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 2). Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) program originated from its commitment to war reparations, as stipulated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951 (Yamamoto, 2020, p. 635; Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 31). The official start of Japan's ODA was marked by the signing of the Japan-Burma Peace Treaty and the Agreement on Reparations and Economic Cooperation in 1954 (Yamamoto, 2020, p. 635). As part of its postwar reparation efforts, Japan subsequently signed agreements with the Philippines in 1956, Indonesia in 1958, and Vietnam in 1959 (Sato, 2022, p. 49). In total, Japan paid approximately 1.5 billion dollars in war reparations until the 1970s (Kato, 2016, p. 2). Japan's involvement in the Colombo Plan in 1954 marked another pivotal moment, initiating its "government-to-government economic cooperation with

¹² Although some scholars debate whether war reparations should be considered part of Japan's foreign aid history, in this thesis, I adopt the view that Japan's role as a donor began with its war reparations commitments. For further discussion, see Furuoka et al. (2010).

developing countries,” followed by the “first yen loan” issued to India in 1958 (Kato, 2016, p. 1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994).

Following the previous decade of “war reparations and economic recovery,” Japan’s foreign aid increased in volume and diversified in form due to its steady economic growth in the 1960s (Kato, 2016, p. 1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994). Yasutomo (1989, p. 492) quotes a Japanese government official stating that Japan’s primary objective for economic cooperation in the 1960s was to promote its “commercial and industrial interests” by enhancing its exports and supporting its industries in foreign investments. Japan joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1964. Until South Korea officially became a member in 2010, Japan was the only member of the OECD from outside North America, Europe, and Oceania (Jain, 2015, p. 100). In 1966, Japan started an ODA program in Sub-Saharan Africa through development loans to Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Nigeria (Cornelissen, 2016, p. 149, 151). At the end of the decade, in 1969, OECD-DAC introduced the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in response to mounting international concerns over the slow pace of development in developing countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994). In the same year, alongside the initiation of “general grant aid,” Japan consistently worked to enhance the “tying status of ODA loans” to promote the efficient utilization of aid resources (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994). Sato (2022, p. 53-54) states that Japan established itself as a prominent provider of international aid during this period.

Japan’s aid became more prominent in advancing its extended foreign policy goals as it “grew in magnitude and coverage” in the 1970s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994; Yasutomo, 1989, p. 492). For Japan, this period marked the beginning of using foreign aid for “broader political-diplomatic purposes in Asia” beyond strictly commercial interests (Yasutomo, 1989, p. 492-493). Furthermore, the oil crisis in 1973-1974 led Japan’s foreign aid strategy to expand outside Asia and adopt a “resource diplomacy” approach, aiming at securing alternative energy sources across the developing world, including the countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America (Yasutomo, 1989, p. 493). Japan’s ODA disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa began to steadily increase during this period (Cornelissen, 2016, p.

151-152). Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was established in 1974 in line with the geographical expansion of Japan's aid. This shift in Japan's aid strategy also aligned with the geopolitical interests of the United States, as successive Japanese administrations prioritized supporting countries that were strategic allies of the U.S., such as Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, and Türkiye (Kato, 2016, p. 3; Yasutomo, 1989, p. 494). Another development at the end of the decade was Japan's decision to begin providing ODA to China in 1979, which continued until 2022 (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2022).

In the 1980s, Japan's foreign aid continued its expansion in volume and scope, solidifying its place as an important part of Japan's foreign policy in general (Kato, 2016, p. 3; Yasutomo, 1989, p. 493). The growth of Japan's domestic economy in the 1980s resulted in an expansion in its ODA budget, which was reflected in the continuous increase in Japan's aid commitments in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cornelissen, 2016, p. 151-153). By the end of the decade, in 1989, Japan became the largest ODA donor in the world (Kato, 2016, p. 3). Yet, despite this achievement, Japan's ODA program faced significant domestic and international criticism throughout the decade. The Marcos Scandal in 1985 exposed corruption within the Marcos regime related to ODA, revealing strong ties between Japanese companies and the Filipino government (Sato, 2022, p. 59). Japanese ODA was criticized for its lack of conditionality and inadequate grounding in fieldwork, as well as for insufficient loan monitoring, since the funds were not allocated to specific projects (Sato, 2022, p. 59-60). These criticisms highlighted weaknesses in Japan's foreign aid strategies, prompting growing discussions at the government level on how to refine Japan's overall ODA strategy.

The criticisms the Japanese government faced in the 1980s regarding ODA, combined with the shifting global priorities toward environmental protection following the end of the Cold War, were further amplified by several significant international events that drew domestic and international attention to Japan's role as a donor and its stance toward political developments in recipient countries. These events included the Myanmar pro-democracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988 and the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, which raised international expectations that aid donors should consider human rights conditions in recipient

countries (Sato, 2022, p. 62). In 1990, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait emphasized the limitations of Japan's "international security role," as it was unable to send personnel to support the U.S.-led coalition (Carvalho & Potter, 2016, p. 87). Instead, Japan "contributed 13.5 billion dollars to" support the costs of the coalition, though the U.S. government dismissed this as an insufficient and delayed effort (Sato, 2022, p. 62). Together, these global developments, along with increasing domestic and international pressure over Japan's lack of a clear foreign aid 'philosophy,' led to the reevaluation of its ODA strategy. In response, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki proposed the "Four Guidelines for ODA," a framework that would later be formalized in the 1992 ODA Charter, marking a critical shift in Japan's approach to foreign aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1992; Sato, 2022, p. 62).

Howe (2013, p. 199) argues that the Japanese policy-makers began to more explicitly define "security-related goals" alongside the development-related goals of Japan's foreign aid in the 1990s. This started with the introduction of the 1992 Charter, which was intended to provide a 'philosophical' foundation for Japan's foreign aid in response to both domestic criticisms and international developments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1992; Kato, 2016, p. 4). It outlined four foundational principles, which are the prioritization of humanitarian concerns, the recognition of the interdependence of nations, the support for the "self-help effort[s] of developing countries," and the commitment to environmental conservation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997). Beyond these principles, the 1992 Charter also establishes four key guidelines for aid implementation. These are balancing development with environmental protection, ensuring aid is not used for military purposes, monitoring recipient countries' military activities, and promoting democratization, economic reform, and human rights in recipient countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997). Moreover, it emphasized a "comprehensive approach" to foreign aid, considering the requests of the recipient countries, economic conditions, and bilateral relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997). Sato (2022, p. 62) notes that "environmental conservation and [the] ban on utilizing aid for military purposes" are additions to Toshiki's original proposal for ODA guidelines. It can be argued that the introduction of the foundational principles and implementation guidelines for Japan's foreign aid reflected the "comprehensive security" approach adopted by Japan in the early 1980s (Holliday & Howe, 2011, p. 75). This approach emphasizes the

importance of non-traditional elements of national and international security, such as environmental protection, alongside traditional ones (Holliday & Howe, 2011, p. 75).

Following the adoption of the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan launched the TICAD in 1993 to redirect global attention to Africa amid what it identified as “growing disinterest” among North American and Western European donors despite the persistence of the development challenges within the region (Cornelissen, 2016, p. 155; Kato, 2016, p. 4). This initiative reflected the principles outlined in the 1992 Charter, emphasizing international cooperation and addressing persistent development challenges in Africa. Corneliessen (2016, p. 156) summarizes the “six goals for African development” outlined by the *Tokyo Declaration on African Development*, which was adopted during the first meeting of the TICAD as:

commitment by African states to economic and political reform; international support for women’s issues (gender empowerment), and the combatting of HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation; the promotion of and cooperation toward regional integration; steps to ameliorate the impact of natural and other disasters, and donor commitment to provide emergency relief; enhanced private sector activity to support job creation and to boost economic growth; and finally, the promotion of South-South cooperation and the application of Asia’s successful development experiences to Africa.

Among these objectives, the emphasis on addressing HIV/AIDS, gender empowerment, environmental degradation, and disaster relief highlights Japan’s growing recognition of urgent humanitarian concerns in African development. While these priorities reflect social vulnerability and welfare, their inclusion alongside economic and political reform also points to the influence of a broader understanding of security. In particular, Japan’s prioritization of these areas reflects the post-Cold War discourse on human security, which offers an alternative to state-centric approaches. Bilgin (2003, p. 213) states that the idea of human security emerged from acknowledging that the security of individuals and communities is not necessarily guaranteed by the security of the state that they are citizens of. She further explains that the UNDP’s 1994 *Human Development Report* called for two

major changes in the way security is understood: first, shifting the focus from territorial security to the security of people; and second, seeking security not through military means, but through sustainable development (Bilgin, 2003, p. 214). As defined in General Assembly resolution 66/290, “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” and calls for “people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people” (The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, n.d.). Although the term “human security” was not explicitly used in TICAD 1 in 1993 (it would later be formally introduced with the 2003 Charter and mentioned during TICAD 3 in 2003), the *Tokyo Declaration on African Development*’s focus on the protection and empowerment of vulnerable groups suggested a proximity to this emerging approach in Japan’s foreign aid.

4.3. Japan’s Approach to Foreign Aid

Japan’s approach to foreign aid as a donor is rooted in its post-World War II experience as a recipient and its subsequent recovery and economic growth. Although Japan’s official engagement with foreign aid allocation began in the 1950s, its aid-giving approach has since evolved in response to both domestic and international developments, reflecting shifts in Japan’s foreign policy over the following decades. The most notable addition to Japan’s approach to foreign aid is the introduction of the concept of human security in the early 2000s. This section examines the guiding principles and strategies that gradually came to define Japan’s aid-giving approach.

To contextualize the guiding principles and strategies discussed in this section, it is important to clarify how Japan defines foreign aid.¹³ Japan’s definition of foreign aid in its 2015 *Development Cooperation Charter*¹⁴ aligns closely with the ODA definition provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). The OECD

¹³ Similar to their Chinese counterparts, Japanese policymakers also prefer the umbrella term “development cooperation” over “foreign aid” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015; 2023).

¹⁴ Although the most recent Development Cooperation Charter was issued in 2023, it adopts the same definition of foreign aid as the 2015 Charter.

defines ODA as “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.-a). This aid can be bilateral or multilateral. The allocation of “loans and credits for military purposes” is excluded from ODA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.-a). The countries and territories eligible for ODA are categorized into four groups based on their income levels and development status: least developed, low-income, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.-b). The DAC updates this list every three years, with the next revision scheduled for 2026 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.-b). As outlined by the 2015 Charter, Japan’s foreign aid seeks to foster economic development and social welfare in developing countries, significantly focusing on human security, peacebuilding, and capacity-building in governance. This focus on peacekeeping and capacity-building broadens the traditional ODA scope, which centers more on economic development. Japan’s foreign aid also focuses exclusively on non-combat-related military purposes, reflecting its constitutional commitment to maintain peace and not be involved in international conflicts after the Second World War (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 10-11).

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government did not articulate a unified and systematic “aid philosophy that explained or guided” its foreign aid policy until the 1980s (Yasutomo, 1989, p. 495). The 1980 document titled *The Philosophies of Economic Cooperation: Why Official Development Assistance?* outlined the two key motives that guide Japan’s economic cooperation as “humanitarian and moral considerations” and “interdependence among nations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994). In the 1990s, with the publication of the 1992 ODA Charter, it was established that the “basic philosophy” of Japan’s foreign aid was based on humanitarian and environmental considerations, recognition of “interdependence among nations of the international community,” and “support for self-help efforts” of recipient countries to support the sustainable economic development of the recipients while strengthening Japan’s diplomatic ties with these countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1992). Yasutomo (1989, p. 501) states that Japan’s emphasis on self-help in its foreign aid arises from its successful post-war reconstruction and

economic boom. Additionally, Japan's reliance on other nations economically, especially regarding access to natural resources, supports Japan's adoption of the principles of self-help and mutual benefit that guide Japan's approach, as this reliance significantly influences its priorities as a donor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1994).

The 1992 ODA Charter was revised in 2003. The revision of the Charter was made to "address new global concerns arising from the global war on terror" and China's growing economic and political influence, which had significant implications for Japan's national interests (Jain, 2015, p. 100-101). As a part of the international community and an ally of the U.S., Japan viewed addressing security threats like international terrorism as a way to contribute to global stability while also protecting its economic interests abroad and securing access to vital resources. In response to China's rising influence, Japan sought to strengthen its ties with developing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, to reinforce its role as a key development partner. This effort was not only aimed at counterbalancing China's expanding influence but also at advancing with Japan's strategic interests, particularly in terms of economic growth and security, with a strong focus on securing energy sources.

Alongside these geopolitical considerations, the revised 2003 Charter introduced new priority areas for Japan's foreign aid policies. Poverty reduction was established as the top priority, reflecting a stronger commitment to addressing fundamental socio-economic challenges in recipient countries (Takeuchi, 2022, p. 9). Additionally, the concept of peacebuilding was explicitly included for the first time as one of the 2003 Charter's four main priorities (Takeuchi, 2022, p. 9). The inclusion of peacebuilding in the Charter supports the argument that it is part of the security agenda because it seeks to sustain peace by preventing the resurgence of "violence and conflict" through efforts to address their "root causes" and outcomes (McCandless, 2021, p. 2). According to Carvalho and Potter (2016, p. 89), the inclusion of peacebuilding in the 2003 Charter as a priority issue reflects Japan's "new" approach to aid-giving that merges development aid and security. The growing emphasis on security-related goals alongside development-related goals of the foreign aid was further reinforced by the inclusion of "human security" in the official discourse and policy design (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 28). Although a pillar of Japan's foreign policy since the

late 1990s, the concept of human security was formally incorporated into Japan's foreign aid approach for the first time in the 2003 ODA Charter and start to play a role in "determining the content and allocation of aid" (Carvalho & Potter, 2016, p. 85). Thus, the inclusion of the concept of human security within Japan's security discourse offered Japanese aid policymakers an opportunity to support international security efforts without revising the constitution or increasing military expenditures (Carvalho & Potter, 2016, p. 85; Howe, 2013, p. 197).

A key figure in shaping Japan's approach to human security was Sadako Ogata,¹⁵ whose experience in working with refugees and contributing to peacebuilding efforts helped expand the concept to include both *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want* (Sato, 2022, p. 65). As a result, Japan's approach to human security came to include not only poverty reduction and development (*freedom from want*) but also protection from violence and conflict (*freedom from fear*), which was reflected in its overall ODA strategy (Jung & Takahashi, 2022, p. 121). This approach to human security adopted by Japan reflects its commitment to fostering "nation and community building" by empowering and protecting individuals, ensuring they can live "in dignity, free from fear and want" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2021). Howe (2013, p. 201) argues that the use of the concept of human security in official documents concerning Japan's foreign aid strategies gives those "a sense of purpose."

Building on the foundations of Japan's foreign aid approach outlined in earlier charters, Japan's 2015 Charter establishes the basic policies guided by Japan's foreign aid approach as the contribution to international peace and prosperity by "cooperation for non-military purposes," promotion of human security, and support for self-reliant development through "self-help efforts" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 4-5). Following these principles, the 2015 Charter states that "stable development through quality growth" cannot be achieved without guaranteeing the rights of individuals, emphasizing that people should engage in economic and social activities with a sense of safety, stability, and equality (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 6). To reinforce the foundations for socio-

¹⁵ After serving as the head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 1990 to 2000, Ogata served as the president of JICA from 2003 to 2013.

economic development in the recipient countries, Japan commits to sharing universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights, and the rule of law, with the aim of realizing a peaceful, stable, and secure society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 6). It can be argued that Japan's commitment to promoting peace and security to foster development aligns with the post-Cold War merger of development and security. The 2015 *Development Cooperation Charter* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 6) states that:

Peace, stability and security are prerequisites for nation-building and development. Accordingly, Japan will comprehensively address a wide range of factors causing conflict and instability, including poverty. It will also provide seamless assistance for peacebuilding, from conflict prevention, emergency humanitarian assistance in the conflict situation, and promotion of conflict termination to emergency humanitarian assistance and assistance for recovery, reconstruction and development in the post-conflict stage.

Japan has consistently upheld the belief that aid should be directed toward socioeconomic development, mutually benefiting the donor and recipient countries (Jung & Takahashi, 2022, p. 107; Taylor, 2006, p. 118). Through its *Development Cooperation Charter* (2015), Japan openly links its development efforts in recipient countries with its national interests that aim to promote its own economic growth, peace, and security. Japan's strategic investments in infrastructure, education, and healthcare, with a strong emphasis on the empowerment of individuals and communities in Africa, reflect its broader geopolitical interests. This alignment between the socio-economic development-related goals of Japan's aid and its broader geopolitical interests is evident in the initiative of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which was developed in response to China's growing influence in Africa (Takeuchi, 2022, p. 15). This also supports the argument that both China and Japan are adopting a mutually beneficial approach to aid-giving, while simultaneously engaging in a degree of competition over their diplomatic relations with, and economic influence in, African countries by using foreign aid (Stallings & Kim, 2017, p. 38).

In addition to the principle of self-help, the notion of mutual benefit, the sense of obligation, and the sensitivity to recipient needs that shape Japan's aid-giving approach, there are also constraints imposed by Japan's post-war constitution. Japan's constitution prohibits allocating foreign aid for direct combat purposes. However, Japan's military personnel can engage in development-related activities. Hoshiro (2022) defines it as "non-military cooperation with military personnel" (p. 326). In accordance with its constitutional restraints, Japan's 2015 Charter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 10-11) dictates that:

Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance.

Furthermore, Takeuchi (2022, p. 11) highlights that the most important addition to the 2015 Charter was the explicit reference to the "national interests" of Japan. *Development Cooperation Charter* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 3) states that:

...Japan will promote development cooperation in order to contribute more proactively to the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Such cooperation will also lead to ensuring Japan's national interests such as maintaining its peace and security, achieving further prosperity, realizing an international environment that provides stability, transparency and predictability, and maintaining and protecting an international order based on universal values.

The revised 2023 Charter continues to build on the existing principles with a stronger emphasis on "the dissemination and implementation of international rules and guidelines based on inclusiveness, transparency, and fairness" in Japan's foreign aid strategies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023a, p. 6). The 2023 Charter also

continues to emphasize “Japan’s duty as a responsible major power to cooperate with developing countries” on equal grounds to ensure their development and stability, while at the same time realizing its own “national interests” by ensuring peace and security for Japan and its citizens and accomplishing “further prosperity through economic growth” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023a, p. 3-4). Additionally, the emphasis on Japan’s responsibility as a major power mirrors China’s declaration of its own responsibility as a major country¹⁶ to engage with other countries through foreign aid.

4.4. An Overview of Japan’s Foreign Aid Strategies in Africa: TICAD 2003–2019

As previously examined in this chapter, Japan’s engagement with African countries as a donor began in the 1960s and steadily expanded from the 1970s onward, culminating in the launch of the TICAD in 1993. Since then, TICAD has played a central role in guiding Japan’s foreign aid initiatives in Africa. As an aid donor, Japan has maintained a significant role in the African continent through its foreign aid efforts. Japan’s commitment to Africa has continued throughout the 2000s, 2010s, and into the early 2020s. Japan’s bilateral ODA disbursement to Sub-Saharan Africa has shown a fluctuating but generally upward trend since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2000, Sub-Saharan Africa received approximately 7.9% of Japan’s total bilateral ODA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023c, p. 14). By 2010, this percentage increased significantly to 15.4%, highlighting Japan’s growing focus on Africa during that decade (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023c, p. 14). However, the allocation fluctuated slightly in the following years, stabilizing around 10% from 2017 onwards. Japan’s overall bilateral ODA disbursement to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 is approximately 1.69 billion dollars, constituting about 9.5% of its total ODA disbursements, making it the third-highest recipient region of Japan’s aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023c, p. 12). This significant allocation of aid highlights Japan’s prioritization of Africa as a critical region for its foreign aid strategy, aiming to enhance the recipient countries’ socioeconomic development and regional stability. As mentioned earlier, central to this strategy is TICAD, which has been instrumental in Japan’s long-standing efforts to foster peace

¹⁶ See Chapter 3.

and stability in Africa by establishing cooperative partnerships at the international level, embodying the principle of “international partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016b). Initiated by Japan in 1993 in response to the decline in donor interest in African countries following the Cold War, TICAD facilitated the creation of “the first comprehensive development plan” by African participants, highlighting the principle of “African ownership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016b). These principles of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ have become significant aspects of Japan’s ODA policy for Africa. Cornelissen (2016, p. 161) highlights that TICAD serves as “a model for engagement between Africa” and other donors and gives the example of the launch of China’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)¹⁷, drawing upon their similarities. Both TICAD and FOCAC serve as important platforms for fostering dialogue and cooperation between their respective countries and African counterparts. Both initiatives are dedicated to the socioeconomic development of African countries and hold regular summits and ministerial meetings. Both initiatives are built around the notion of partnerships with African countries rather than the more traditional donor-recipient dynamic. As mentioned earlier, while TICAD promotes the idea of “ownership” by African nations and global “partnership,” FOCAC emphasizes China’s principles of “equality, mutual benefit, and non-interference,” guiding its development cooperation with African countries (Bräutigam, 2009, p. 30; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016b). Both initiatives are not just about the promotion of development of the African countries but also about the pursuit of China’s and Japan’s respective interests. Similar to the analysis of the FOCAC action plans in the previous chapter, the remainder of this section examines Japan’s foreign aid strategies toward Africa as articulated through the TICAD conferences. This examination will be based on the official TICAD documents¹⁸ from 2003 to 2019, corresponding to TICAD 3 through TICAD 7¹⁹.

¹⁷ See Chapter 3.

¹⁸ The official documents of TICAD conferences, accessible through Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provide an overview of each conference. However, the format of these documents varies. Some conferences have detailed reports, while others have more concise summaries resembling presentation cards. Since there is no standardized document title comparable to the FOCAC action plans (see Chapter 3), I refer to them as TICAD 3, TICAD 4, TICAD 5, and so on, corresponding to the respective conferences.

¹⁹ While the overall timeframe of this thesis is 2001–2021, the analysis of TICAD documents covers the period between 2003 and 2019, corresponding to TICAD 3 to TICAD 7, due to the availability and relevance of the official documentation.

TICAD 3 (2003)

Japan's aid approach in Africa, as demonstrated through the TICAD meetings, has been consistently revolving around the concept of human security since 2003. The 2003 conference explicitly declared its commitment to advancing the human security approach through the TICAD framework, culminating in the adoption of the *TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration* (2003). This declaration emphasized that while state security was necessary for the development of African countries, it might not inevitably translate into better conditions for individuals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.d.-b). Instead, protecting people from threats to their survival, dignity, and livelihoods was seen as equally vital (The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, n.d.). Furthermore, the declaration stressed the importance of empowering all members of society, especially vulnerable groups such as women and children, to actively participate in the development of their communities and nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.d.-b).

TICAD 3 (2003) positioned “poverty reduction through economic growth” as a core objective, framing human security as the guiding approach for achieving this goal. This perspective aligned with the broader discussions on conflict and security, as the conference recognized that unresolved conflicts remained a major obstacle to effective resource utilization and economic development in Africa. There was broad agreement that “consolidation of peace” was an essential first step toward development, and that preventing the resurgence of conflicts required sustained efforts in conflict resolution and management (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003).

The conference participants acknowledged that addressing the developmental challenges of African countries was not only crucial for Africa but also essential for maintaining global peace, security, and prosperity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003). To support peace and stability in Africa, TICAD 3 (2003) emphasized institutional capacity-building for conflict prevention and resolution. The conference acknowledged the roles of the UN, the AU, and other regional organizations in promoting peace and called for stronger collaboration between African nations and the international community.

TICAD 3 (2003) also advocated for a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, incorporating measures to rebuild communities and ensure human security. These measures included disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, as well as support for refugees, internally displaced persons, and former child soldiers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003). These initiatives reflected Japan's approach to development assistance, which linked security and stability to the long-term economic progress of the recipient countries.

By integrating human security into Japan's development agenda in Africa, TICAD 3 (2003) reinforced the notion that security and development were deeply interconnected. This conference stressed that Africa remained the region where human security was most fragile, citing persistent challenges such as poverty, hunger, disease, and limited access to education (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003). In response, Japan positioned the TICAD process as a mechanism for alleviating these hardships, fostering peace, and ensuring that African populations could actively participate in their own development.

TICAD 4 (2008)

The *Yokohama Declaration: Towards a Vibrant Africa* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008b), adopted at TICAD 4, further solidified the merger of development and security by integrating conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping into Japan's approach to African development. This approach reflected Japan's growing recognition that underdevelopment and poverty can contribute to instability and the risk of conflict, ultimately challenging sustainable growth in the recipient countries (*Yokohama Action Plan (TICAD IV) - "The World and Japan" Database*, n.d.).

Recognizing the urgent needs of post-conflict societies, the declaration outlined a comprehensive strategy for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. It emphasized quick-impact interventions to facilitate early recovery, such as rebuilding basic social infrastructure and services and assisting the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (*Yokohama Action Plan (TICAD IV) - "The World and Japan" Database*, n.d.). Economic stability was also a major concern,

with Japan committing to supporting vocational training, job creation, and small business development as pathways to long-term recovery.

Beyond immediate post-conflict recovery, TICAD 4 (2008) prioritized strengthening Africa's long-term security capacity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008a). The declaration emphasized support for military, police, and civilian personnel involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, including strengthening peacekeeping training centers in Africa (*Yokohama Action Plan (TICAD IV)* - "*The World and Japan*" Database, n.d.). It also promoted exchange programs between Africa and Asia, recognizing the value of cross-regional learning in peace operations (*Yokohama Action Plan (TICAD IV)* - "*The World and Japan*" Database, n.d.).

The commitments to peacebuilding and capacity-building outlined in TICAD 4 (2008) built upon the foundation set by TICAD 3 (2003). In this context, the commitments established in both conferences align with the priorities outlined in the 2003 ODA Charter, particularly in their emphasis on peacebuilding and human security.

TICAD 5 (2013)

The fifth conference outlined Japan's fundamental approach to aid for Africa by emphasizing the importance of boosting economic growth through trade and private sector investment, as well as advancing human security through Japan's aid initiatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). Based on Japan's commitment to promoting human security in Africa through its aid initiatives, the *Yokohama Declaration 2013: Hand in Hand with a More Dynamic Africa* (2013), adopted at TICAD 5, further emphasized Japan's comprehensive foreign aid strategy in Africa. This strategy includes deepening cooperation, coordination, and strengthening capacity in areas such as humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, development, and countering terrorism, continuing the focus and commitments from previous TICAD meetings (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013a).

TICAD 6 (2016) and TICAD 7 (2019)

As reflected in the previous TICAD meetings, Japan views economic growth and infrastructure development as key drivers for achieving both development and security in Africa. As part of its foreign aid strategies in Africa, Japan has consistently prioritized investments in infrastructure development, such as roads, ports, and energy projects, which can be seen in TICAD 6 (2016) as well. These infrastructure investments are intended not only to stimulate economic development but also to function as mechanisms for combating instability by addressing its root causes. TICAD 7 (2019) further advanced this by endorsing the *African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA)*, linking economic integration and infrastructure with regional security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). This approach reflects Japan's view that economic resilience is crucial for reducing the security risks associated with underdevelopment and poverty. Japan's commitment to the economic growth and infrastructure development of African countries is similar to China's, as reflected in the FOCAC action plans.²⁰

Since the notion of human security was introduced in the 2003 ODA Charter and TICAD 3 (2003), Japan has been committed to the protection and empowerment of individuals by addressing poverty, health, and education, which Japan views as foundational to peace and stability. In this context, TICAD 6 (2016) and TICAD 7 (2019) highlighted initiatives such as *Universal Health Coverage (UHC)* and disaster risk reduction, linking these directly to broader security concerns. By ensuring access to healthcare and resilient social services, Japan aims to reduce vulnerabilities that might lead to instability. Positioning development as a way of mitigating conflict and poverty, thereby fostering long-term security in the region, is a significant part of Japan's approach to foreign aid.

Japan's approach to aid-giving also emphasizes the importance of job creation and youth training programs, particularly for women and youth, as a means for ensuring stability in the recipient countries through developmental initiatives in TICAD 5 (2013) and TICAD 6 (2016). By empowering youth with skills and employment opportunities, Japan seeks to address the factors contributing to instability, such as

²⁰ See Chapter 3.

high unemployment rates. TICAD 7 (2019) further reinforced this theme by focusing on “long-term human resources development” and vocational training, underscoring the view that empowering individuals through education and employment leads to a more stable and peaceful society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023b, p. 117).

Through the TICAD meetings, Japan has consistently emphasized the importance of a stable Africa for maintaining global security. This is particularly evident in the *Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy* (FOIP), first introduced at TICAD 6 (2016). This initiative connects Africa’s stability with Japan’s geopolitical interests by promoting peace and infrastructure development in Africa to ensure the security of the maritime routes and advocating for a rules-based international order (Shiga, 2023, p. 251). Shiga (2023, p. 251) argues that the introduction of FOIP was not only for revitalizing Japan’s long-stagnant economy by tying “yen loan projects for quality infrastructure development” with Japanese companies, but also for countermeasuring the large-scale infrastructure development projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), positioning Japan as a competitive alternative to China’s engagement with African countries.

Over time, in line with its ODA Charter, Japanese foreign aid strategies have incorporated a peacebuilding approach aimed at preventing the outbreak and recurrence of conflict, addressing the challenges faced by populations during and after conflict, and promoting long-term development (Carvalho & Potter, 2016, p. 92). As reflected in the TICAD meetings and the 2015 Charter, this approach deliberately excludes the use of military force to enforce peace, which is constrained by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and instead allows Japan to take an active role in supporting “fragile states consolidate peace through aid” by its involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in Africa (Lam, 2009, as cited in Carvalho & Potter, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, p. 13; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, n.d.-a). Through TICAD 6 (2016) and TICAD 7 (2019), Japan continues to include capacity-building for peace support operations, conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction in its foreign aid strategies for African countries. Japan’s involvement in sending the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for non-combat roles in infrastructure rebuilding in South Sudan reflects its commitment to

stabilizing conflict-affected areas through logistical and humanitarian support. By investing in infrastructure and governance to strengthen state capacity, Japan aims to address the root causes of instability and promote long-term development in the recipient countries.

4.5. Conclusion: The Merger of Development and Security in Japan's Foreign Aid Strategies in Africa (2001-2021)

This section concludes the chapter by analyzing Japan's foreign aid strategies toward Africa from 2001 to 2021 by applying the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security outlined in Chapter 2. The analysis of the official documents from TICAD 3 to TICAD 7 demonstrates that Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa reflect the merger of development and security.

Policy Discourse Indicators of the Merger

The use of security-related rhetoric and the inclusion of security-related goals in official documents concerning the aid strategies of the donors: This indicator is consistently present in TICAD documents from TICAD 3 (2003) to TICAD 7 (2019). Since TICAD 3 (2003), the concept of human security has consistently guided Japan's aid initiatives, with the protection of individuals from threats to their survival, dignity, and livelihoods placed at the center of the development agenda. The TICAD 3 (2003) noted that state security does not necessarily translate into better conditions for individuals, thereby prioritizing a form of security directly tied to development outcomes. Throughout the subsequent TICAD meetings like TICAD 4 (2008) and TICAD 5 (2013), the official documents have consistently used terms such as peace, stability, and included security-related goals like conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and counterterrorism alongside development-related goals. Similarly, TICAD 7 (2019) links economic growth and infrastructure development with regional security through the endorsement of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). For Carvalho & Potter (2016, p. 106), Japan's adoption of "human security institutionalized the link between aid and security for development purposes" in Africa.

The inclusion of development-related goals in national and international security strategies: This indicator is also reflected in the official TICAD documents.

Development-related goals like poverty alleviation, economic growth, and infrastructure development are presented not only as ends in themselves but also as necessary tools for promoting peace and preventing the possible resurgence of conflict in the recipient countries. For instance, TICAD 4 (2008) merges development-related goals like job creation, small business development, and post-conflict reconstruction with broader peacebuilding efforts. FOIP's introduction in 2016 at TICAD 6 (2016) can be considered another instance of the merger, which includes development-related goals in national and international security strategies by promoting peace and infrastructure development in Africa to ensure the security of the maritime routes and advocating for a rules-based international order. FOIP also serves as a countermeasure to China's infrastructure development projects in Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The framing of poverty and underdevelopment as security threats: Another policy discourse indicator of the merger present in the TICAD documents is the framing of poverty and underdevelopment (as causes of potential conflict and instability in the recipient countries) as security threats by Japan. This framing is evident across all TICAD meetings analyzed in the previous section. For example, TICAD 3 (2003) identifies unresolved conflicts as major obstacles to development, and describes poverty, hunger, and limited access to education as key vulnerabilities that undermine human security. TICAD 4 (2008) emphasizes that underdevelopment and poverty might increase the risk of conflict. TICAD 5 (2013), TICAD 6 (2016), and TICAD 7 (2019) stress that unemployment, youth marginalization, and lack of public services may generate instability. Thus, the official discourse adopted in the TICAD documents consistently presents poverty and underdevelopment not only as developmental challenges but also as a source of insecurity that needs to be addressed through developmental means.

Policy Design Indicator of the Merger

The alignment of development aid with security cooperation: In addition to these policy discourse indicators, the policy design indicator is also present in Japan's aid strategies in Africa. The TICAD documents show an alignment between

development aid and security cooperation. This is reflected in Japan's continued support for conflict prevention, peace support operations, and post-conflict reconstruction, particularly from TICAD 4 (2008) onwards. Japan's participation in UNPKO and its deployment of the SDF for rebuilding infrastructure are examples of security cooperation while maintaining a development focus. By allocating aid for infrastructure development to strengthen state capacity, Japan aligns its peacekeeping initiatives with its broader development agenda, aiming to prevent future conflicts by addressing the root causes of instability. These instances of the alignment of Japan's aid with security cooperation (policy design indicator) are closely tied to the use of security-related rhetoric, like stability and conflict prevention, and the inclusion of security-related goals alongside the development-related goals in official documents concerning Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa (policy discourse indicator). Thus, Japan's approach reflects the merger of development and security, where development aid is not only intended for development-related goals like economic growth and infrastructure development but also intended as a strategic measure for ensuring regional peace and stability through security cooperation.

In conclusion, across the five TICAD meetings analyzed, Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa reflect the pattern of the post-Cold War merger of development and security. This pattern is predominantly reflected in the foreign aid strategies of traditional donors such as the United Kingdom and the United States, as identified in the scholarship.²¹ The presence of the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger confirms that Japan's approach to aid-giving does not treat development and security as separate domains but merges them both in discourse and policy design. As such, Japan's approach positions the allocation of aid to African countries not only as a means of addressing development-related goals but also as a way of pursuing security-related ones, particularly through TICAD.

This chapter examined Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa between 2001 and 2021 by applying the policy discourse and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security outlined in Chapter 2. It began by introducing Japan's experience as a former aid recipient after the Second World War, followed by an

²¹ See Chapter 2.

overview of its history as a donor and its approach to foreign aid. The analysis then focused on the official TICAD documents from 2003 to 2019, identifying key developments in Japan's engagement with African countries through foreign aid. The final section applied the aforementioned indicators to determine whether Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa reflect the pattern of the post-Cold War merger of development and security observed among traditional donors. The following chapter concludes this thesis.



CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The review of the scholarship on merger in Chapter 2 reveals that the existing literature on the merger of development and security has predominantly focused on traditional donors from North America and Western Europe, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. These studies have examined how, in the post-Cold War period, these donors merged development-related and security-related goals in their foreign aid strategies. Despite their significant role as donors, there remains a gap in research on this merger concerning the aid strategies of non-traditional donors like China and Japan.

China's foreign aid strategies in Africa are primarily facilitated through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC action plans indicate that China's aid approach prioritizes large-scale infrastructure projects, energy and natural resources development efforts, and agricultural development initiatives to promote economic growth in the recipient countries. Alongside their role in promoting socio-economic development, initiatives within the infrastructure, energy, and agriculture sectors are also regarded as effective measures to prevent or mitigate instability and conflict in the recipient countries, thus serving both development-related and security-related goals. China's military assistance includes the provision of loans, goods, equipment, and military training to African peacekeeping operations while adhering to the principles of non-conditionality, non-interference, and respect for sovereignty. In line with these principles, China's military assistance refrains from direct involvement in the political affairs of the recipient countries. China's foreign aid strategies correspond with its overarching goal of advancing its political and economic interests while fostering economic growth and stability in recipient countries. By supporting African-led security initiatives, including participation in peacekeeping operations, conflict resolution, capacity-building efforts, and military training, China's military assistance aims to promote regional peace and stability.

Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa are shaped by its commitment to human security, which seeks to address the root causes of instability through socio-economic development, such as poverty and unemployment. This is institutionalized

through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). To address these root causes, the Japanese government prioritizes healthcare and education, infrastructure development, capacity-building for governance, and peacekeeping support. However, in line with its constitutional constraints, Japan contributes to peacekeeping primarily through non-combat roles and focuses on capacity-building instead.

China and Japan have many commonalities when it comes to their foreign aid strategies in Africa. Both countries prioritize economic growth and infrastructure development in their respective foreign aid strategies in Africa, recognizing that these are significant factors in fostering stability and long-term development in the region. Additionally, both prioritize social development, with a focus on healthcare and education, as they believe that improving these sectors is critical for building resilient and stable communities. Healthcare projects and educational exchanges established by the Chinese government and Japan's focus on universal healthcare coverage (UHC) and youth training programs demonstrate a shared understanding that socio-economic development can mitigate conflict and instability, which will, in return, contribute to further development and increase the well-being of the individuals in the recipient countries.

Furthermore, in line with the principle of mutual benefit, both countries align their aid strategies with their national interests, using foreign aid as a tool to strengthen their diplomatic ties and economic influence in Africa. However, their respective approaches to foreign aid are influenced not only by transactional considerations but also by culturally grounded notions of international obligations and cooperation. Both China and Japan also share a self-proclaimed responsibility as major countries to support global development efforts. Despite the similarities, Japan's foreign aid approach is more closely aligned with liberal peacebuilding norms and the concept of human security than China's approach, which is instead rooted in the principles of South-South cooperation.

The remainder of this chapter presents the findings concerning China's and Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa in relation to the merger of development and security. Although analyzed separately in Chapters 3 and 4, both cases are now examined

under the same analytical framework provided in Chapter 2, using the policy discourse and policy design indicators derived from the existing literature. Rather than a comparative approach, this discussion synthesizes the findings by applying each indicator first to China and then to Japan. Where appropriate, brief remarks are made on similarities and differences, but the focus remains on systematically presenting the extent to which the aid strategies of these two non-traditional donors reflect the pattern of the post-Cold War merger of development and security.

Policy Discourse Indicators

The use of security-related rhetoric and the inclusion of security-related goals in official documents concerning the aid strategies of the donors: In the case of China, this indicator is observed consistently across the FOCAC action plans from 2003 to 2021. From the outset, the 2003 action plan linked infrastructure and agricultural development to regional stability and security, explicitly articulating that economic development serves not only developmental but also security functions. The use of security-related rhetoric becomes increasingly institutionalized in the subsequent FOCAC plans, with repeated references to peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and anti-terrorism measures embedded within broader aid strategies, particularly in the 2006 and 2009 action plans. The 2012 plan formalizes this merger with the launch of the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security (ICACPPS), which is structured to support both peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction as development cooperation. The 2015, 2018, and 2021 action plans further broaden the scope of this merger by including goals related to cybersecurity, maritime security, and health security, which are framed both in security and development terms. Notably, the 2018 and 2021 plans explicitly link infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with regional peace and security, thus including security-related goals alongside the development-related goals of foreign aid.

In Japan's case, this indicator is likewise present across the TICAD documents from TICAD 3 (2003) to TICAD 7 (2019). Since TICAD 3, the guiding concept of human security has underpinned Japan's development assistance to Africa. The use of security-related rhetoric, such as peace and stability, is consistent across the TICAD action plans. TICAD 4 (2008) and TICAD 5 (2013) integrate counterterrorism and

peacebuilding into development planning, while TICAD 7 (2019) links infrastructure development with regional peace through Japan's support for the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). In the case of Japan, security-related goals are included alongside development-related goals of its foreign aid strategies.

In both cases, this indicator is strongly present as both countries adopt security-related language and include security-related goals in their foreign aid strategies towards Africa. While China's adoption of security rhetoric is closely aligned with institutional security cooperation at the state level, Japan's use of security rhetoric in its development aid strategies centers on the protection of individuals and empowerment of those in the recipient countries.

The inclusion of development-related goals in national and international security strategies: China's foreign aid strategies demonstrate this indicator through the systematic inclusion of development-related goals, such as poverty alleviation, economic growth, and infrastructure development, within its broader security cooperation frameworks. The 2003 and 2006 FOCAC action plans identify infrastructure and agricultural development not merely as a way of promoting development in the recipient countries, but as an instrument for promoting regional peace and stability. The 2009 plan includes development goals related to poverty alleviation and food security in China's long-term peacebuilding strategies. From 2012 onwards, development-related goals are explicitly linked to anti-piracy initiatives, peace operations, and regional law enforcement training. For instance, the ICACPPS integrates poverty reduction, environmental protection, and disease control within its broader security-focused initiatives. In the 2018 and 2021 plans, the BRI framework is presented as advancing regional peace through economic integration and infrastructure development, reinforcing the inclusion of development-related goals in China's national and international security strategies.

For the case of Japan, the inclusion of development-related goals in international security strategies is most evident with the introduction of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in TICAD 6 (2016). FOIP frames infrastructure development in Africa as integral to Japan's regional security vision for securing maritime routes, thereby aligning development-related goals with international security strategies

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016a). Both China and Japan reflect this indicator by explicitly including development-related goals in their national and international security strategies through initiatives like ICACPPS and FOIP.

The framing of poverty and underdevelopment as security threats: Based on the examination of China's FOCAC action plans and Japan's TICAD documents, it can be argued that both countries frame poverty and underdevelopment as security threats in their foreign aid strategies. While the language used in relation to their framing can differ (China favors words like "instability," "crisis," and "conflict," and Japan emphasizes "vulnerabilities," "human security," and "marginalization"), both uses similar framing to justify their use of development aid as a tool to mitigate potential conflict and instability in the recipient countries.

Policy Design Indicator

The alignment of development aid with security cooperation: China's development aid strategies exhibit a strong alignment with its security cooperation initiatives in Africa. This alignment is observed in the 2006 and 2009 action plans, which incorporate energy security and environmental risk mitigation into China's development aid strategies. As mentioned earlier, the 2012 action plan launches ICACPPS, which ties development aid to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. The 2021 action plan continues this alignment with police training and support for counter-terrorism efforts in the recipient countries. Japan's alignment of development aid with security cooperation is visible primarily from TICAD 4 (2008) onward. Japan supports peacekeeping operations mostly through non-combat roles, focusing on infrastructure development and capacity-building activities. An example of this is the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in South Sudan for capacity-building. In line with one of the policy discourse indicators of the merger, FOIP, introduced in TICAD 6 (2016), reinforces this alignment by connecting development-related goals with maritime security strategies of Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016a). In both cases, the allocation of development aid is used as a mechanism to support security cooperation.

In summary, the findings across both case studies demonstrate that China's and Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa from 2001 to 2021 reflect the policy discourse

and policy design indicators of the merger of development and security. Both countries consistently use security-related rhetoric, include security-related goals in their foreign aid strategies, and include development-related goals within their security strategies. Additionally, they frame poverty and underdevelopment as security threats in the official documents covering their foreign aid strategies in Africa. In policy design, both align their development aid with security cooperation. Therefore, it can be argued that the pattern of China's and Japan's foreign aid strategies in Africa after the Cold War is consistent: development and security are no longer treated as separate domains but are merged in both policy discourse and policy design.

The findings of this study contribute to the literature on the merger of development and security by demonstrating that it is not exclusive to traditional donors. While it may be premature to claim that *all* donors adopt the same approach, the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and later the analysis of the foreign aid strategies of China and Japan in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that traditional and non-traditional donors increasingly link development-related goals to security-related goals in policy discourse and policy design in the post-Cold War period. The presence of the merger in the foreign aid strategies of traditional and non-traditional donors raises the question of whether a universal motivation underlies this shift following the Cold War. The findings imply that development and security are no longer treated separately in donors' foreign aid strategies. This broader trend, in turn, raises further questions about how the merger is understood and implemented across different donors, and whether all the identified indicators can be observed for each case.

Finally, there are some promising directions for future research. First, whether this pattern of the merger extends to other non-traditional donors remains an important question to explore. Studying other non-traditional donors, such as South Korea and Turkey, would help explore whether the merger of development-related and security-related goals is also present in their foreign aid approaches, especially given their different regional contexts and historical experiences. Second, how foreign aid is perceived within the culture of a donor country is a particularly interesting yet understudied area that merits further attention. While this thesis briefly touched upon the cultural concepts that influence Japan's approach to foreign aid by drawing on

existing scholarship, the cultural influences shaping the foreign aid approaches of other donors, especially non-traditional ones, could be explored further by adopting a comparative case study approach. This could include examining whether aid is perceived as charity, a political responsibility shaped by international norms, or an obligation to give back to the international community based on the donor's own historical experiences. Third, although this thesis could not cover in detail how the bureaucratic structures of Chinese and Japanese government agencies shape their respective aid strategies, further research on who makes these decisions and how the policymaking process works in each case would help clarify how internal institutional dynamics influence the merger of development and security.



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