

AN APPLICATION OF EXCLUSION THEORY TO WORLD POLITICS: CORE-
PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

AN APPLICATION OF EXCLUSION THEORY TO WORLD POLITICS: CORE-PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST HISTORY

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The central claim of the thesis is that when world political relations are assessed from a systems perspective, the main template of relations can be established along core-periphery dichotomy, instead of a state-centric approach. From this perspective, the underlying relationship in world politics is the one between the core and the periphery and this relationship is characterized by the dynamics of exclusion vs. inclusion. Exclusion and inclusion concepts are derived from Niklas Luhmann's system theory, and based on these concepts a new model has been offered. Then, this model has been applied to the history of the Middle East from ancient Mesopotamia to the Ottoman-Safavid period. The reason why this region and this period is chosen is that they are understudied in the discipline of IR. Second, it is this region and period where for the first time the regional political relations became observable in history. The findings that are achieved by studying the political relations of the region are mostly in compliance with the predictions of the theoretical model we developed. The findings are: (1) It is more appropriate to read the world politics from a lens of core-periphery dichotomy rather than a state-centric perspective. (2) The underlying relationship between the core and the periphery is exclusion. (3) Peripheral areas seek inclusion in

their relations with the core. (4) Core areas are not opponents of each other, rather they cooperate with each other. (5) Peripheral areas do not show a cohesion.

Keywords: International Relations of the Middle East, the Exclusion Theory, Niklas Luhmann, Systems Theory and International Relations, International System.



ÖZ

DÜNYA SİYASETİNE DIŞLAMA TEORİSİNİN BİR UYGULAMASI: ORTA DOĞU TARİHİNDE MERKEZ-ÇEVRE İLİŞKİLERİ

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Bu tezin iddiası, dünya siyasi ilişkilerinin sistem yaklaşımı bakımından değerlendirilmesi durumunda, ilişkilerin ana şemasının devlet merkezli olmak yerine, merkez ve çevre dikotomisi üzerine kurulabileceği yönündedir. Bu bakışla, dünya siyasetinde altta yatan ilişki merkez ve çevre arasındaki ilişkidir ve bu ilişki “içerme” ve “dışlama” dinamiklerinin karşılıklı üzerine kuruludur. İçerme ve dışlama kavramları Niklas Luhmann’ın sistem teorisinden adapte edilmiş ve bu kavramlara dayanarak yeni bir model önerilmiştir. Daha sonra bu model, antik Mezopotamya döneminden başlayarak Osmanlı-Safevi dönemine kadar olan süreçteki Orta Doğu tarihine uygulanmıştır. Bu bölgenin ve bu dönemin seçilmesindeki birinci sebep, bunların Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde genel olarak az çalışılması olarak öne çıkmaktadır. İkinci olarak bu bölge ve dönemde, tarihte ilk defa dünya siyasi ilişkilerinden bahsedilmeye başlanmıştır. Somut dönemler ile ilgili çalışmamızda elde ettiğimiz bulgularımız, geliştirdiğimiz teorik çerçeve ile büyük ölçüde uyumluluk göstermektedir. Şöyle ki: (1) Dünya siyasetinin, devlet merkezli yaklaşımdan ziyade merkez-çevre ilişkileri gözlüğünden okunması daha anlamlıdır. (2) Merkez-çevre ilişkilerinde ana eğilim dışlamadır. (3) Çevre, merkezle olan ilişkilerinde içerme

arayışındadır. (4) Merkez bölgeler birbirlerinin hasmı olmayıp tam tersine işbirliği içerisinde dirler. (5) Çevre kendi içerisinde bir bütünlük arz etmemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Doğuda Uluslararası İlişkiler, Dışlama Teorisi, Niklas Luhmann, Sistem Teorisi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler, Uluslararası Sistem.



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of Study

Generally speaking, in development of theories, the scholars of International Relations (IR) draw their inferences from the European/western historical experience (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001; Walt 1987; Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1973; Kissinger 1998; Kennedy 1989; Gilpin 1988; Wight 1977; Ruggie 1993; Doyle 1986; Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1993; Tilly 1990; Elias 1982; Spruyt 1994; Wallerstein 1974; Teschke 2005). The empirical developments in other parts of the globe are most of the time excluded from the analyses. It is assumed that the relations in other regions of the world are a mirror image of the world political relations of Europe. Not only is the region limited to Europe but the period that is taken as the source of empirical evidence is also a specific era of European history, that is the post-Westphalian era. Even though some studies (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994; Ruggie 1993) explore the pre-Westphalian era, they are still seeking to find the dynamics leading to formation of Westphalian order or the particularities of this order. On the other hand, some other studies in IR discipline (Wendt 1999; Nye and Keohane 1976; Strange 2015; Gilpin and Gilpin 1987; Gilpin and Gilpin 2001; Cox 1981), base their findings on either contemporary world or the theoretical inferences of others who draw from European history. Thus, we may say that the discipline is mostly Eurocentric, and there is a lot of history and regions whose historical experience is not explored for refining the IR theories (Zhang 2001, 43-44; Yalvaç 2016). The result of the Euro-centrism is the state-centric analysis of world political relations because the division of globe along the national boundaries in Europe led to the impression that state has ontology. It was considered that states are ultimate reference points whose concerns and activities are explained through the interests and capabilities of them.

This criticism of Euro-centrism, however, is different in content from what critical perspectives attribute to the Euro-centrism. The critical approaches point to the fact that the social sciences are oriented to look from a European perspective to achieve generalizations about other regions in European terms, thus ending up with a view implying that the others are inferior to the Europeans while omitting the views of people from other regions about themselves (Said 1978; Grovogui 2007). However, our Euro-centrism proposition does not criticize IR discipline since it has a value-laden approach toward other regions. Here, we aim to pay attention to the fact that the study of social sciences is immanent with imperfections, both methodologically and scope-wise. Indeed, besides other disciplines, International Relations, as well, has imperfections making it unable to embrace the entirety of reality, as reality is too large to be comprehended (Luhmann 2013a; Wallerstein 1974; Yalvaç 2010; Yurdusev 2003; Cox 1981; Albert 2004).

In other words, it is not possible to grasp the entirety of reality, as it is “too general to form a basis for systematic knowledge”. Therefore, parts of reality are separately studied for getting “systematic knowledge”, which leads to emergence of separate branches of knowledge (Yurdusev 2003; Cox 1981). Most of these branches appeared in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and it seems that the study of reality is compartmentalized for practical purposes. Because we cannot study everything, we study parts of it. Everyone chooses a part of reality which interests him/her the most. However, this compartmentalization is not that much innocent. Indeed, even though, initially the division of study of reality was a practical need, at some point, these divisions have been reified. Now it is considered that the knowledge that is produced in one branch of science cannot be incorporated into the other branches of science since they owe their existence to their distinctiveness (Yurdusev 2003; Wallerstein 2006).

With this caveat in mind that the division of knowledge to branches might lead to emergence of flaws, it could be said that it is the limitations of the scientific inquiry that made IR emerge as a branch of social sciences. However, scaling down of the scientific knowledge into disciplines is once again repeated within each discipline. Therefore, the studies within each discipline are far from reflecting the entirety of knowledge in that particular discipline either. Various subject matters and various eras

are separately studied in each discipline. In light of these remarks, we may assume that the empirical studies carried out solely on European history in IR might be a result of limitations dictated by the inability to include everything that is relevant. That is fine as far as we acknowledge that studying distinct eras, or distinct regions will allow production of knowledge that has imperfections, meaning that there is always something missing in the studies carried out. Thus, there is need for broadening the scope of the discipline toward regions and theoretical perspectives that are not included in IR as this endeavor would help with reducing the imperfections (mainly, state-centrism and inability to address the inequalities in world politics) in the theories of IR.

1.2. Purpose and Significance of Study

The purpose here in this dissertation is to broaden the scope of the discipline, to the degree it can be done within the limitations of a dissertation. We noted that the lack of enough empirical studies about other regions necessitates bringing in developments in other parts of the world into the field. This is not to say that empirical study would suffice to provide all the needed knowledge for a good understanding of any subject. Indeed, reality consists of not only empirical aspect but also underlying relationships and systems that might not be observed. Thus, not only the empirical research but also a description of underlying relationships and systems should be performed for understanding the multilayered nature of reality. This is possible by looking to as many aspects of a phenomenon concerned as possible to be able to achieve a more accurate description of the realm studied (Yalvaç 2010; Yalvaç 1996, 145-148). As an extension of this understanding, we may surmise that we need to expand our scope to regions other than Europe and to theoretical perspectives from other disciplines to come up with an outlook not explored in IR. Out of this need, in this dissertation, first, we aim to study the concept of system and its implication in existing IR theories. Second, by taking Niklas Luhmann's views as the departure point, we will build a system approach for world political that could be used for analysis of underlying tendencies in this realm. Finally, Middle Eastern history, starting from ancient Mesopotamia around the invention of writing until the Ottoman-Safavid period, will be reviewed. This will help us find out what underlying relationships can be traced,

and test the validity of the system approach that we have developed. This way, we would be able to say that we can contribute to broadening the scope of the discipline and to come up with new insights.

With the aim of contributing to the broadening the scope of the discipline, the significance of the dissertation can be seen in several respects. First, the dissertation would contribute to studies attempting to apply systems thinking to world political relations (Kaplan 1969; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999; Singer 1961). Each of these studies was influenced by a branch of system studies. They accomplished certain goals and missed some points. It seems that they need some more effort to put the system concept at the center of the analysis of world politics. We attempt to put the system concept at the center of analysis of world political relations. Second, the ideas of Niklas Luhmann will be adapted to world political relations, thus a new interpretation of his ideas would be provided, next to other studies in this line (Albert 2004; Albert 2010; Albert and Cederman 2010, Jung 2004; Kessler and Kratochwill 2010). Third, the dissertation will add to analyses of world political relations of the ancient Middle East (Podany 2010; Watson 1992; Buzan and Little 2000; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007; Cohen and Westbrook 2000). Not only would a theoretical perspective be provided about the world political relations of the ancient Middle East but also a more complete account of these relations would be delivered.

Fourth, the dissertation will be able to bring ancient era, middle ages, and early modern era analysis of world political relations of the Middle East in a single study. The literature about the ancient era, middle ages and early modern era world political relations of the Middle East are covered by incorporating sets of studies that have little commonality. Our study would be able to bring these different literatures together. This endeavor is in line with the idea that when we study the historical experience, we should not limit ourselves to a short period. Rather, we should be able to include larger periods (Modelske 1987, 2). This belief is also an assumption of this dissertation. Without covering large spans of time, a theoretical model that would be different from existing IR theories cannot be developed. Because existing IR theories spatially and temporally claim universality, any contribution to these theories should be able to exploit data from large periods rather than shorter periods. Such an approach will make us to be able to have more sound generalizations. Otherwise, we truncate the

data available with no good justification. Short periods of time of course can be studied, but if they do not have a good knowledge of larger data, they would fail to provide insights that would add to our knowledge about existing IR theories. More importantly we run the risk of generalizing the findings about shorter periods to all eras, which might lead to judging theories in light of extremities of specific periods.

Finally, the core-periphery dichotomy will be adapted to the world political relations, differently from interpretations that adopted this dichotomy to world economic relations (Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein 2006; Frank 1966; Palma 2009). This endeavor is being carried out by developing the exclusion theory that is explained in the Chapter 3. Exclusion theory was developed based on a synthesis of three elements. One is the ideas of Niklas Luhmann about systems theory, the second is the history of world political relations in the Middle East, and the third is the concepts from other IR theories. Exclusion theory, differently from other theories that adopt a core-periphery dichotomy in their explanation of world economic relations, adapts this dichotomy to world political relations. For example, World-system theory, explains the world economic relations since this theory is formulated from an economic perspective (Tayfur 2000, 26). However, it adopts multi-state approach for the explanation of world political relations. It says world political relations has an inter-state system that is working based on the concerns and interests of the individual states. Exclusion theory differs from this logic by saying that the states are structures of either the core or the periphery in world political realm. Depending on whether they are located in the core or the periphery, their actions takes certain forms. Thus, the core-periphery dichotomy is at the center; it determines the state actions. This way, exclusion theory would contribute to adaptation of core-periphery dichotomy to the world political realm.

1.3. Research Questions

Having such a significance in literature, the dissertation will answer these research questions:

1- Whether world political relations, such as war, oppression, opposition, independence, autonomy, dominance, allocation and appropriation of resources by

force, cooperation, and conflict can be explained in a non-state-centric way (i.e. core-periphery perspective) or not.

2- Whether a non-state-centric explanation of world political relations can survive the scrutiny of empirical data.

3- Whether, adaptation of systems thinking in world political relations can make a difference or not.

4- Whether there are underlying tendencies in world political relations that go beyond the face value of relations, and whether these underlying tendencies put all events into identifiable categories or not.

1.4. Methodology

The research questions of the dissertation are closely related to the application of system perspective to IR. It might be questioned as to why the system aspect must be focused for broadening the scope of IR. Indeed, different strands of IR studies emphasize various phenomena as topics that are considered important for research. Looking at studies in IR, it could be said that such subjects are significant research topics in the theory of IR: system, structure, state, power, state interests, state's role in economy, inter-state relations (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001; Walt 1987; Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1973; Gilpin and Gilpin 1987; Gilpin and Gilpin 2001; Wight 1977; Buzan and Waever 2003); capitalist system, inequalities, imperialism, world economy (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974; Cox 1981; Lenin 2010); identities, shared culture and values (Wendt 1999); rules, regulations, and diplomacy (Wight 1977; Wight et al. 1992; Watson 2009); non-state actors (Nye and Keohane 1976; Strange 2015); ideologies or political regimes (Doyle 1986; Fukuyama 1989); religions and civilizations (Huntington 1993); the sources of change in the fate of the states (Kennedy 1989; Gilpin 1988); the relationship between the national and international realm (Tilly 1990; Elias 1982; Yalvaç 1991; Teschke 2005; Hobson 2000; Hobson 1998; Halliday 2005), criticisms to general tendencies in the discipline and proper way of studying the subject (Singer 1961; Cox 1981; Ruggie 1993) etc.. Any IR analysis, empirical or theoretical, most of the time, will center on one or a number of these issues. At worst, any International Relations study would touch on these topics

in one or another way.

Of these subjects, system concept has a special importance. It has been imported from natural sciences and sociology as a way of studying world political relations; it is not a concept belonging to International Relations. However, in its adaptation to International Relations, it somehow lost its original meaning. In IR discipline, this concept has been adopted as a variable or as a level of analysis. When it is referred to as a variable, it is said that the system level qualities (structure) determine or effect the unit (state) level developments (Waltz 1979). When it is referred as a level of analysis, it is about the width of the phenomenon studied. It is said, when system level is adopted, the totality of the phenomenon that is going to be studied is included in the analysis, as opposed to analysis of a part of the phenomenon. System level analysis, it is said, is not about particular attitudes of units but about general patterns that are applicable to all parts of a totality (Singer 1961). In both cases, system is an ordinary concept in the discipline like other concepts and topics mentioned. However, for systems theory, system is at the center of study and everything in the discipline must be interpreted from that perspective. Every other thing other than the system lacks originality. System approach denies the multiplicity of beings that has ontology. Ontology here means being not dependent on another thing to exist; having its own agenda; and being able to produce results. Hence, states, non-state entities, national realm, international realm, structures, power, state interests, inter-state relations, identities, shared culture and values, rules, regulations, diplomacy, ideologies, political regimes, and civilizations all are relegated to a derivative position. They are defined in relation to system.

It is this aspect of system approach that makes it suitable to broaden the purview of world politics since it reinterprets the entire realm. Furthermore, our study shows that world political relations are mentioned when it is possible to talk about a world political system. Therefore, the subject that would most contribute to IR theory seems to be the “system” concept. It helps to draw the boundaries of the discipline and to identify the relations within and outside the system. For system theory to attribute ontology to something in a realm it must be a system. If something is able to produce consequences and is discernible from its environment, it is a system. Because the system is at the center, in systems approach we start to explain the phenomenon

studied from an inside and outside perspective. What takes place within the system differs from what is going on outside of the system. System thinking enables us to look at the realm to be studied from a dual perspective; the system and the environment. Owing to the system and environment dichotomy, one gets the opportunity to grasp inequality or asymmetry in the realm in question. Without recognizing inequality and asymmetry in a realm, other developments such as conflict, evolution, development, and the like cannot be explained. Thus, system is a new conceptualization that is utilized in systematizing, formulating, understanding, and expressing the phenomena studied. A theory, in this sense, would be either a system theory or not; it cannot be both a system theory and at same time treat system as a variable or level of analysis. There is no difference between a theory that says structure of system determines the attitudes of the units, and a theory that says that the units are independent of system or its structure. Both of these approaches attribute originality to the structures or units. In sum, methodologically, because system theory marginalizes other approaches in IR and opens the door to reinterpret the discipline, it is chosen for broadening the scope of the discipline.

Methodologically the second important point is whether it is justified to focus on empirical developments in a single region and why this region is the Middle East. As we have already noted, the studies in IR, by focusing on European history, are truncating the historical data. Entire European history is not covered but rather post-Westphalian European history is taken as a laboratory where the empirical bases of theories are drawn. This methodology, in fact, is adopted out of the belief that historical experiences of the entire globe can be explained by generalizing the ideas produced from the post-Westphalian European order. This is as an extension of evolutionary perception dominant in social sciences that says all societies undergo similar stages of development (Tilly 1990; Rostow 2007). Whether the premise that inferences from European history are generalizable to other regions is dependable or not needs to be tested. This can be performed by carrying out more empirical research on other regions of the world, encompassing longer periods of time.

At this point we should also acknowledge that studying a region as a research area is not always welcome. Some claim that social reality is a whole, and it is better to be studied as a totality (Wallerstein 1974; Luhmann 2013a; Yalvaç 2010; Yurdusev

2003; Albert 2004; Gorelik 1984, iii). Despite such an opposition that might be raised, we may say that the regional level study of any issue is a commonplace approach. To explain any subject, one should be able to decide the proper time period and the proper width of area that will assist the analyst to determine proper explanations. The regional level is a proper level because the developments in different parts of the region are most of the time closely interdependent, and any societal level development takes place as a result of interplay between different elements in the regional level (Tilly 1984; Tilly 1990). More importantly, in the time period that we take as our area of study, the Middle East itself was totality (world) because the contacts between different regions of the world in the far past were either absent or sporadic (Wallerstein 2006). Thus, a region is somewhere where the interactions between parts of it are dense. These interactions provide autonomy to the region. A region can be mentioned when we can talk about its autonomy, thus its autopoietic (self-producing) quality (Banai 1993, 395; see also Moeller 2006, 12-13). Drawing from this idea, we can say that any region, wherever possible, could be taken as an independent area of study. In our thesis we take the Middle East as a region, which is recognized as an area of study by many scholars even today (Brown 1984; Fawcett 2016; Little 2008; Mamdani 2005; Bilgin 2004; Maoz 2011; Hourani 2001; Fromkin 1989; Halliday 2005; Walt 1984; Buzan and Waever 2003; Chomsky and Achcar 2008).

Once it is recognized that a region is a proper level of study, another question is why Middle Eastern history should be studied. The first reason is because the basis of knowledge in social sciences is history (Cox 1981), it is always welcome to study the history of world political relations; it does not matter which region's history is studied. The second and more relevant reason has to do with the special position of Middle East history. The early history of the Middle East provides an unmatched feature, that is, many developments in world history first occurred in this region. Civilization, the forms of the state (i.e. empire, city-state, suzerainty etc.), organized wars, bureaucracy, trade, religion, diplomacy, extensive agriculture, management of economy, stratification of society, and mass production appeared in the early civilizational era in the Middle East. In the period that roughly corresponds to fourth and third millenniums BCE, almost all of these phenomena were in the process of making, namely emerging for the first time in history (Çıvgın 2015; Crawford 1973;

Frankfort and Davies 1971; Lamberg-Karlovsky 2009; Mann 1986; Moscati 1960; Nissen 1988; Parsons 1966; Podany 2014; Robinson 1984; Silver 1983; Wengrow and Yerxa 2011; Yoffee 1995; Zagarell et al. 1986; Henrich and Boyd 2008; Hole 1966; Simmons 2007; Wright 1998).

Alongside all of these developments, world political relations were witnessed in the Middle East for the first time in history (Buzan and Little 2000; Watson 2009; Mann 1986). Therefore, we could study the world political relations of the Middle East by stretching as far back as the 3rd millennium BCE. This endeavor, within the context of our dissertation, entails processing the knowledge that is obtained from archeological findings and written material from the past, both of which are interpreted by the experts on history of the region and utilized in our dissertation. Our purpose is to bring cumulated knowledge of the history of the Middle East together to interpret them in light of the theoretical studies about world political relations. This will firstly provide a test of the exclusion theory that we have developed based on Niklas Luhmann's system theory. Second, it will give us the opportunity to determine inferences that will help us develop the exclusion theory by going back to earliest experiences of world political relations.

Another thing that makes this region special for theoretical assessments is that we can detach the past of the Middle East from the modern Middle East because most of the polities, systems, and ideologies of the past no longer exist today. That, counter to the European example, enables us to apply different theories to the empirical data more easily. The biases attached to the contemporary Middle East would not be conflated to the entire history of the region. Since we do not have these issues with history of the Middle East, application of system approach renders fruitful results that are not common in the historical and theoretical accounts that take the European experience as their base. Therefore, we are going to focus on the regional developments to come up with theoretical insights that will help us contribute building exclusion theory.

1.5. Delimitations and Terminology

While we are studying the history of the Middle East, developing the exclusion theory, and applying this theory to the historical data, we have certain limitations. First, in

building the exclusion theory, we mainly aimed to study world political relations. World political relations can be considered a subsection of International Relations discipline. It omits the economic, cultural, intellectual, demographic, and many other relations that are covered in International Relations. World political relations, within the confines of this study, covers developments especially relevant to such concepts as war, diplomacy, conflict, cooperation, independence, autonomy, oppression, freedom, allocation and appropriation of resources by force, and the like. These concepts are subjects of world political relations as far as they are about the status, rights, and relations of core and peripheral areas whose boundaries do not necessarily correspond with the boundaries of polities (city-states, empires, nation-states, and the like). “World political relations” as a concept is not ordinarily chosen; it can be considered a substitute of “international political relations”. The reason why we prefer “world political relations” instead of “international political relations” is that the “international” term has a more state-centric connotation. State-centric approach is the dominant approach in International Relations discipline which rejects multi dimensions that the world politics concept has (Waltz 2002). World politics concept allows us both to specify the realm that we study and also to avoid the state-centric implications that the international political relations concept has.

Second, world political relations cannot be equated with International Relations; as we noted, there are many types of relations in various realms, i.e., economic, political, cultural, intellectual, demographic, and many others. These realms could have different dynamics than what the exclusion theory predicts about world political relations. What the exclusion theory claims to explain is world political relations. However, even though the main orientation of the dissertation and exclusion theory is world political realm, in Chapter 3 we have made some predictions about world economic relations as well. Yet, these predictions have not been applied to the world economic relations of the Middle East because we presumed that there was no world economic system in the era we studied. There was neither a world economic system nor were the structures of the world economic system, such as firms and markets. Thus, the test of exclusion theory’s predictions about the world economic relations has not been performed. This test can be performed in eras where world economic system can undeniably be claimed, i.e., modern European history.

Third, one thing that is striking with regard to system discussions in IR is that all the studies seem to assume that there is a single system to be analyzed in International Relations, that is “international system”. However, our study shows that there can be multiple systems in International Relations; each being attached to the realm that one chooses to probe. There can be systems having international character in many realms such as economic, political, cultural, and military. We do not have to call them “international”, we can call them as “world economic system”, “world political system”, “world cultural system”, “world military system”, and the like. The studies in IR, on the other hand, seem to assume that all these realms are included in a single system, and it can be called “international system”. In our study, based on Luhmann’s systematization we treat every realm in International Relations as distinct. In each of these realms, a separate system, which carries out some functions of world society, can emerge. Luhmannian system theory suggests that each system is distinct from the other; they are not involved in internal operation of each other. To illustrate, economic operations in the economic system can communicate only with the economic operations within the economic system. Other systems cannot take part in working of economic system (Moeller 2006, 15). Different systems might have an influence on each other as each other’s environment. In this dissertation we mainly studied world political system. “World political system” concept refers to only political part of what other scholars call international system.

Fourth, the world political system does not represent the entirety of world political realm. Based on Niklas Luhmann’s exclusion conception, we can say that a realm that is going to be studied from a systems perspective needs to be divided as system and its environment. The system and environment together constitute the entirety of the realm studied; i.e., world political relations. As elaborated in detail in Chapter 3, the system refers only part of this realm, namely the core. The environment, on the other hand, represents the periphery. The system is a difference between the system and environment. The system or core is a non-spatial communicational network that connects and governs the political events in the most endowed areas of the world society or the region that is a world for sustenance of the system. The endowed areas, depending on the period concerned, have superiority in one or a number of realms, such as production, military, innovation, natural conditions, ideas, and the like. Even

though the realm that provides the system/core to differ from the periphery changes from one period to another, the idea that the system is a difference from the rest of the region is a constant. Almost entire history of the Middle East indicates that such cores/systems formed in different periods, and they had the least endowed areas in the region as their periphery. These peripheral areas were connected to core areas but they were excluded from the core. Exclusion means, the limitation of the independence of peripheral areas and prevention of peripheral areas to elevate to core status.

Fifth, in studying the Middle East history we have excluded the modern Middle East developments. The modern Middle East history starts from the end of Ottoman-Safavid system in the early 18th century CE. The reason we can start the history of the modern Middle East from this era is that it is the era where autonomous existence of the Middle East came to a halt. The Middle East has become a region whose destiny could not be analyzed independent of developments in the World at large. We can see this interconnectedness between the Middle East and the other regions by looking at the discourse saying that there has been significant interference of European/Western region in the Middle East in the modern era (Brown 1984; Little 2008; Mamdani 2005; Chomsky and Achcar 2008). However, prior to the modern era, the Middle East could be taken as a world by itself because it had its autonomy. In the ancient era this was much more so. While the connections between the Middle East and the other regions were negligible, intra-regional interactions were substantial in such a way that they were creating dependencies within the boundaries of the region. Hence, prior to the European influence in the Middle East, the analysis of political relations within the boundaries of the region was similar to analysis of the world political relations at global level. During the early Islamic period, the Middle East was still autonomous; it was the dynamics in the region that shaped the world political relations in the region. In the Ottoman-Safavid era, world was no more consisted of regions that were constituting a world by themselves. However, during Ottoman-Safavid era, the dominant region of the world, namely Europe, was interested in other parts of the world instead of the Middle East. Therefore, the Middle East in the Ottoman-Safavid era was still a region that could be taken as a world by itself. Yet, by the end of the Safavid-Ottoman system, this autonomous existence of the Middle East came to an end, which made us to exclude the modern period from our analysis.

1.6. Systems Theory

It is recognized that International Relations is a relatively new discipline. Many dates the beginning of it to early 20th century. However, it is recognized that the relations IR investigates existed before emergence of the discipline (Burchill and Linklater 2005; Wight et al. 1992). Yet, even though International Relations is a new discipline, the claims of it are universal, meaning that each of the theories in the discipline claim their propositions are valid not only for every society but also for every period in history. Therefore, the fact that the subjects of the International Relations discipline have long been there and IR theories have universal claims, then a theory claiming validity in explaining world political relations should be able to prove strong against historical data covering large periods. Since this dissertation attempts to adapt the systems theory to world political relations, it is going to be tested in light of the world political relations in history. The exclusion theory that is developed as a system approach in the Chapter 3 should be able to prove strong against the empirical data. This test will be performed in the Chapters 4-11. While we develop the exclusion theory in the Chapter 3 as a systems theory, here in this subheading, we provide an introductory review of the systems theory in general.

To begin with, it must be stated that systems theory is already developed to a large extent; it has a wide literature. As a way of thinking it has “universal pretentions” and “scientific claims” (Luhmann 2013a, 51). Systems theory as we know it today came into to being as a result of integration of theoretical developments in various fields, such as biology, cybernetics, sociology, and systems engineering (Bausch 2001, 9). It is argued that there is a similarity across various realms, in particular between the organization patterns in nature and human constructs, which enable us to talk about a general system theory. Men imitate nature in developing various means (Bogdanov 1984, 7-8). Thus, the concept of “system” gained a wide reputation owing to developments in technology first. Computers and automation significantly contributed to adaptation of system approach. Self-controlling machines, which range from “the humble domestic thermostat to the self-steering missiles”, were a milestone in this process. The machines in general evolved from a single machine toward a set

of machines that can be called systems. While simple machines were “within the competence of the engineer trained in the respective specialty”, the machine sets required many specialties. For example, in a ballistic missile or space vehicle, “heterogenous technologies” were involved, and this required specialties from various realms. In addition to these, as the “relations of man and machine” became a factor in working of machines, “financial, economic, social and political problems” came to play a role in these systems. In turn, this complexity made it necessary to adopt a system approach for understanding them (Bertalanffy 1969, 3-4).

This need for a systems perspective in the technology field later spilled toward other realms. In fact, it was argued that it is possible to find parallels in various fields, which will enable importation of theoretical accomplishments developed in one field to the other fields that lack such models. Thus the “unity of science through improving communication among specialties” would be possible (Bertalanffy 1969, 15; Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 169; Gorelik 1984, ii). Looking this way, it should be noted that system approach is not a discipline, but it is a way of thinking. For the systems thinking to be successful, system thinkers from different disciplines should interact with each other, and the information that each of them produces should be accessible to the others (Checkland 1988, 99). Concepts and models of systems theory can be applied both to “material and nonmaterial phenomena” (Skyttner 2005, 56).

Out of this wholistic perception, the systems are equated with organization of parts. They say an organization (system) comes into being as a result of people’s ability to utilize such means as word, idea, and social norms. It is people who design and put into practice this organizational ability, not anyone else. People by bringing otherwise separate elements together create a whole and this whole is more than sum of its parts. Nature also is an organizer, next to people (Bogdanov 1984, 2-4). People create organization (system) through cooperation among each other (39), and the study of organization is about to find out the connections between all relevant parts. This view maintains that thinking in terms of systems allows us to come up with higher and more abstract generalizations than those that specialized sciences can generate (55). “A generalization is completed in this sense only when it expresses equally well the connections or combinations of *bodies, representations, ideas, etc.:*” (55-56). This understanding takes the system as something to be aimed and created by the parts to

achieve certain results. The system does not come into being as a result of its own capabilities. Therefore, the autonomy of the system is seriously harmed. Second, the system is treated as an expansion of the realm of study to the extent possible. It posits that many different things in kind can be taken as parts of a single system. In this sense, this approach does not respect to the boundaries and multiple manifestation of the systems. Rather it aims to reach generalizations about the reality mainly by integrating different fields of study. However, systems have boundaries based on differences that they create from other realms and within each realm. Modern system approach suggests that a realm can be studied by taking what is included in the system and what is excluded. The boundaries of the system are designed by the system, not by the elements of the system; another point that is missed in the early formulations of system thinking.

In line with the holistic logic, system approach is claimed to be applied to social realm. It is said, applying the system theory to social realm would at least render to grasp the notion that “social entities are systems rather than sums of social atoms, or that history consists of systems” (Bertalanffy 1969, 24-25; Bausch 2001, 14). Adopting this approach in social sciences would end up calling the social sciences as “the science of social systems” (Bertalanffy 1969, 194, 195). It is further argued that study of social relations that are ignored in atomistic approach would become observable (195). To be more specific, the application of systems theory would enable us to deal with problems “partly immaterial and highly heterogeneous” realms. For example, business enterprises, which are comprised of “men, machines, buildings, inflow of raw material, outflow of products, monetary values, good will and other imponderables”, can be studied by the system theory, and a better understanding and prediction capability can be attained (7, 8). This definition of system gives the sense that there can be systems that have both mechanical and social elements. However, this should not make us think that social systems include human and mechanical beings or products; this notion is against the social system understanding of Luhmann that we adopt throughout the study.

A Luhmannian opposition can be raised against some other understandings of social systems as well. Some claim that natural systems and social systems make an ecosystem; there cannot be a separation between natural and social systems. Another

view is that social systems are comprised of people and nature because human beings have left no realm that is not interfered (Westley et al. 2002, 104). The third view says social systems and natural systems can be differentiated from each other. The ideologies, myths and paradigms give a symbolic dimension to the social systems to differentiate themselves from the environment, in the sense that they can generate a self-identity in the realm of meaning independent of material environment. Besides, in social systems, there is “forward looking behavior” which renders purposefulness (105). This view maintains that social systems are consisted of a group of people integrated enough to share common norms and “established patterns of dominance and resource allocation”. Social systems, owing to human ability can construct and manipulate symbols, namely words. They also have structures of domination (the distribution of power and resources, and patterns of authority), alongside the structures of legitimation (namely, norms, rules and routines) (107).

The first and second social system views bring the natural environment within the boundaries of the social systems. Luhmann would say that natural systems are environment of social systems; they cannot be included in the social systems. On the other hand, the third view says, social systems are separate from the natural systems and what differentiates the social systems from the natural systems is that they are comprised of people. However, Luhmann says, human beings too are an environmental element of social systems. Social systems are dependent on people to form and maintain themselves, but the social systems are not under the authority of human being. Social systems have their own agenda that might clash with the agenda of people (Luhmann 2013a). Parsons also considers human beings as psychological systems that are placed outside of the social systems, even though both systems interact with each other (Parsons 1970, 844, 848). Besides, human beings are purposeful, hence, they cannot be equated with the cells of an organism, i.e., a system (Banai 1993, 390). Because of this too, human beings are an outsider of the social systems. Thus, both the idea that social systems include human beings and the idea that social systems include natural environment are misleading. Another misunderstanding about the social systems is the idea that they produce equilibrium continuously (Bogdanov 1984, 9). However, because the idea that the social systems produce equilibrium leads to conservative views and an inability to explain the

change, it is being criticized as being inadequate to show the true nature of social systems (Bailey 1982, 509).

Social systems are autopoietic (self-producing) in terms of the relationship between the system and its environment. The autopoietic systems are not like open systems which have an input-output relationship with their environments. Rather autopoietic systems are closed; they reach to a complexity level that enable them to reproduce themselves through their internal processes. Yet, this does not mean that they do not have a relationship with their environment; the relations between the system and the environment are rare and they cause the systems to change; they are not regular interactions that are carried out to sustain the system (Banai 1993, 392; Luhmann 2013a). In this sense, one central property of social systems is that they have boundaries that separate the system from the environment (394). Therefore, the social systems have things that are included in the system, and other things that are excluded from it (396).

When we look at the types of the social systems, a society is the largest social system, after world society (Parsons 1966, 2). Luhmann objects to this idea by saying that there are no national societies in the modern world but there is a single world society (Luhmann 1997). However, societies, either national societies or world society, are not the only social systems. Next to societies there are other social systems that can be located beneath the society (Parsons 1966, 1). What makes a society different is that it is the most self-sufficient form of social system. Other social systems are either “too specialized” or “too loosely organized” large entities (2). Societies as social systems are both dependent on their environment and autonomous from it. The environment of societies is cultural, physical biological, psychological, and social environment (3, 8). These environmental factors are the environment of other social systems as well. The social systems provide order of interaction, which deal with the potentialities of “conflict and disorganization” (7). An interaction system (social system) then is an abstractable analytical entity that can be separately studied from other environmental elements (8). People are an environmental element of the society/social systems (12). We adopted the social system views in our analysis of world political relations. However, general systems theory seeks to come up with a definition of system that is applicable to all types of systems.

In general systems theory, it is believed that “the universe is a hierarchy of systems; that is, simple systems are synthesized into more complex systems from subatomic particles to civilizations” (Skyttner 2005, 51; Checkland 1988, 103-106). It is assumed that each of these systems can be studied independently and also be considered a part of the hierarchy of systems. So far, there is no convincing hierarchy that will show us the hierarchy of systems and each level’s properties and “the sizes of gaps between levels” (Checkland 1988, 103-106). However, this does not mean that we cannot come up with a general description of the system qualities. Old way of defining the systems was that it is a “set of interrelated components” (Bailey 1982, 510), or that the system is more than sum of its parts¹ (Bogdanov 1984, 38-39), or that the system is composed of parts and a structure. These approaches are criticized because they do not attribute the system a self-producing entity character (Luhmann 2013a; Bertalanffy 1969, 9). Instead of old way approach there is a new description of system. Summarizing what many system thinkers say, we can define the properties of the system in general. These are; (1) a system can be mentioned when it is “unitary enough to deserve a name”; the system is a difference between the system itself and its environment (Skyttner 2005, 57; Luhmann 2013a). (2) Every system has boundaries that shows what is excluded and what is included in the system (Skyttner 2005, 52; Banai 1993, 394). This makes us able to differentiate the system from its environment (Checkland 1988, 101). (3) The systems have the capacity to show external influences besides their intra-system dynamics (Checkland 1988, 101-102). In this sense, a system is an *entity rather than being a cumulation of the parts* (Bertalanffy 1969, 9). (4) This system conceptualization can be applied to various phenomena; “the solar system, the academic system, the nervous system, etc.” (Skyttner 2005, 70). (5)

Applying the system approach to the discipline of International Relations, we must be aware of these discussions. In International Relations, systems theories must not be equated with the idea that the system is a combination of units and the relations between them. Rather it must be considered a phenomenon whose boundaries can be specified in relation to its environment. This understanding is different from the simple formulation of systems as “interaction-based regular patterns” (Albert 2010,

¹ This view maintains that if a cooperation produces something less than its parts, then this cooperation is not an organization (system), but rather it is a disorganization (non-system) (Bogdanov 1984, 39).

45; Kaplan 1969, 57). Thus, the system must be considered having a “certain autonomy and that is not reducible to elements such as individuals, states or other collective actors” (Jung 2004, 104). Therefore, since the system is not a regular pattern, the belief that the system is constituted by units and interactions between these units should be abandoned (Albert 2010, 44).

When we look at the roots of systems theorizing in IR, it can be traced back to 1950s (Albert and Cederman 2010, 5). The first attempts of adopting system theorizing in IR were influenced by developments in cybernetics and systems theories. Morton Kaplan was the first who introduced this approach to the discipline. Kaplan defined the “system as a social system of action, constituted by the observable regularities among its variables”. In his ideal form, by including a high number of actors, the system gains autonomy, or a “life of its own”, owing to the complexity of interactions in the system. Neither an actor nor a system was able to dominate the system and impose its preferences over the system. Later, Karl W. Deutsch introduced cybernetics to International Relations, where the system is called as a “system of communication and information”, which consisted of “networked communication and information” that governs the system. Deutsch says, the learning systems are the most advanced forms of social systems, they can change their goals through learning that is taking place by means of “self-regulating communicative feedback” (Albert and Cederman 2010, 6). He criticized the equilibrium notion in systems theory, which can be considered a criticism toward the understanding of the “system as a power equilibrium” (Albert and Cederman 2010, 6-7).

However, it was Waltz’s utilization of systems approach that made the system concept popular in the discipline. His approach was based on equilibrium and conservatism. He said we can talk about existence of system and its structure in international relations because we can see that any unit in international relations is not able to produce an effect in system level. This, he said, shows that there is a system that is above the units (Albert and Cederman 2010, 7). Yet, Waltz's theory cannot be considered a system theory in the sense of system theory literature that says system is something that itself produces results. Waltz treats the system as a level that has influences over the units (Albert 2010, 49). Alexander Wendt also has a say regarding system. He takes Waltz’s approach as his point of departure, but criticizes the

materialist understanding of Waltz regarding structure of system, and offers to add ideational elements to the structure of the system (Albert and Cederman 2010, 7; Wendt 1999). In sum, in the mainstream IR approaches, the system is treated as something unable to produce results because it is a concept used to refer to the entire field, namely all the units and the relationships (Waltz 1999; Mearsheimer 2001; Wendt 1999).

Other scholars who are known as emphasizing the concept of system in IR, too, do not describe it in detail. Hobden (1999) criticizes Michael Mann, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, and Immanuel Wallerstein as scholars who use the concept of international system but who do not provide a consistent understanding of it (Hobden 1999). On the other hand, historical sociological accounts touch upon the interdependency of intra-state and extra-state relations, thus emphasizing a two-way relationship rather than a one-way relationship between the system and the units of it (Halliday 2005; Hobson 1998; Hobson 2000; Yalvaç 1991; Yalvaç 2016, 81; Hobden 1999; Tilly 1990; Elias 2002). They say or imply that the domestic and international realms are most of the time independently studied, but they are respectively affecting each other. For example, inter-state conflict causes change within the societies and this, in turn, affects the inter-state rivalry. However, these studies also, as a matter of fact, treat the system as a variable that is affected from or affecting the units. The system is not adopted as a way of interpreting international relations. What is a system, how the inside and outside of the system are differentiated, and how the relations within and outside the system vary are not answered by these scholars.

In sum, it seems that the subject of system is under-theorized in IR and this diagnosis could be generalized to the studies carried out on the Middle East history as well. The study of Middle Eastern history shows that from the emergence of civilization onwards we could mention emergence of a world political system. However, even the sources saying that a system emerged around 3000 BCE (Buzan and Little 2000; Watson 2009), suffer from under-theorizing criticism. Indeed, their understanding is limited to the idea that the emergence of states led to emergence of the system. While they say that the system is a new level, they reduce it to the states and their interactions. Hence, the system is something that is secondary to other things; it is not an entity in itself that led to emergence of other things such as its structures (i.e., states

and institutions). Therefore, these studies suffer from the same drawbacks. The other flaw common to IR approaches is that, as we have pointed out above, they assume that there is a single international system that embraces all realms. However, depending on the realm that we are talking about, there is a different system that has effects and functions in world society level. Thus, we can talk about world economic system, world political system, world cultural system, or world military system. All these systems can be examined as systems that fall within the purview of the discipline of International Relations, but they can be studied separately. We cannot assume that there is a single system in International Relations.

1.7. Organization of the Study

Even though system thinking did not receive much attention in IR as an approach to be applied, our review of some of IR theories in the second Chapter will show that there are elements of system thinking in various IR theories, i.e., balance of power, society of states, World-system, imperialism, and postcolonialism. In these theories, system thinking has not been applied systematically, but when we look at these theories from a systems perspective, we can see the implicit assumptions and explanations of these theories that partly fit in the system conceptualization. Therefore, we are able to suggest a system interpretation of these theories and assess the validity of their findings. The fact that these theories only partially meet the requirements of systems approach, we will attempt to build a full-fledged systems approach of world political relations in the Chapter 3. In order to do it, first, in Chapter 2, we will assess the IR theories that are developed in different paradigms in light of a system perspective. The second task that we will attempt to do in this Chapter is finding out the characteristics of world political and world economic realms. This is necessary because as the discipline of International Relations lacks a system perspective, the system approach too, in general, lacks an assessment of world political relations. Therefore, in order to build a system approach for world political relations we need to know the field of world politics, which can be accessed by reviewing the IR theories. The review of the IR theories enables us also to identify the issues that are at the agenda of world political and world economic realms.

In the Chapter 3, based on Niklas Luhmann's system approach, we will try to formulate boundaries of a system framework for world political relations. We chose the approach of Niklas Luhmann because it renders a definition of systems that can be applied to different realms in International Relations, (i.e., politics, economics, military etc.) as far as these systems carry out a function of world society. Owing to this feature of Luhmann's theory we can define a world political system, a world economic system, a world military system, a world cultural system etc. Secondly, Luhmann provides the tools to probe the inequality in any realm that we study, owing to his exclusion and inclusion concepts. In the Chapter 3, we will develop a framework mainly for world political system. While the system concepts and main relationships within and outside the system will be drawn from system theory, the subjects and problem areas to which the system theory will be applied are going to be drawn from IR literature. This is necessary because there is not an account of world political relations that is explained by the system theorists. In order to build a system framework that would be applied to empirical data from the Middle East history, we incorporate the conceptual framework of system theory with the topics that are drawn from the existing IR literature.

The result of this attempt is radically different from existing IR theories. First, such entities as states, firms, institutions, and organizations relegate to a position where they would be defined as structures of world political or world economic systems. These structures act within the boundaries that the system dictates; they are not actors which have independent action capability. The system not only dictates the direction of action on these structures, but also it designs and legitimizes the existence and powers of these structures. Second, even though the system includes only some areas of the world (the core areas), it decides how conflicts will be resolved and cooperation will be achieved in the entire region/world. Relations within the system (among the core areas) are about resolving the conflicts and maintenance of cooperation based on fairness or equality principle. The core areas act in harmony toward the maintenance of the core as a system. The environment of the system is the areas of the world that are not included in the system (the peripheral areas). The relations within the peripheral areas do not reflect a system quality, so the relationships between peripheral areas are sporadic. The nature of relations from the system/core toward the

periphery is exclusion, meaning that the independence and rights of the peripheral areas are treated arbitrarily and unequally. The conflicts of the peripheral areas between themselves and with the core areas are resolved unfairly, and the cooperation problems of peripheral areas are resolved in accordance with the expectations of the core. While the direction of relationship from the core toward periphery is exclusion, the peripheral areas seek inclusion in the core. Seeking inclusion means being part of the core for getting equal treatment with the core areas in terms of independence and the capacity to resolve the conflicts and cooperation problems of the peripheral areas.

While the main inspiration in the Chapter 3 comes from Luhmann's thought, it does not mean that every aspect of exclusion model fully reflects Luhmann's ideas. At times, exclusion model diverges from Luhmann's ideas. First of all, the thesis differs from structure definition of Luhmann. While Luhmann claims that the structure is a repeated relation/regularity between experiences or actions in the system, exclusion model suggests that even though a structure might be constituted of repeated relations, it cannot be an element of a system unless it does not gain action capability. The relation of a structure to system is that system creates structures as Luhmann puts. However, without action capacity a structure is useless. In fact, in world political realm, action is mostly taken by states even though the system determines the course of action. A state is a structure of the world political system in terms of being dependent on and, in part, being shaped by the system². It is a construct of the system. On the other hand, it is able to take action on behalf of the system. These remarks make us depart from Luhmann's view that a structure is a mere repeated relation, as will be elaborated in the Chapter 3 in detail.

The second aspect that is different from Luhmann's thought is the functions that are assigned to world political system. We borrow from other IR theories, especially balance of power theory and society of states theory, in terms of defining the functions of the world political system. These functions, namely conflict resolution and maintenance of cooperation, are not determined by Luhmann. Instead, we borrow

² We must caution at this point that this is not suggesting that state is a structure that has a role only in relation to the World political system. Rather, a state can have role in many other systems, i.e., World economic system. Luhmann recognizes the possibility of an organization to be active in more than one function systems.

them from other IR theories. The third aspect of the exclusion model that is different from Luhmann's thought is that exclusion model tries to predict the main inclination of peripheral areas too. Even though Luhmann suggests a tendency regarding the attitude of core toward the periphery, namely exclusion, he does not explain the tendency of the periphery in relation to the core. Exclusion model, by incorporating ideas from other IR theories, i.e., postcolonialism, as well as empirical study of Middle East history, suggests that the main orientation of the environmental elements is seeking inclusion.

The fourth point where exclusion model diverges from Luhmann's ideas is that exclusion model applies exclusion concept to system's attitude toward the environment. However, Luhmann applies exclusion concept to the system elements that are on the margins. The elements of the system that are not benefiting from system endowments are treated as those excluded. However, the dissertation, as will be elaborated in the Chapter 3, argues that it is not possible to make such a distinction between elements of the system as those included and excluded. Such an attempt blurs the boundaries of the system; and because of this it cannot be decided what is included and what is excluded from the system. Therefore, if something is excluded from the system it should be treated as an environmental element, whereas all included elements must be considered system elements. This approach is in compliance with what we have found in analysis of world political relations of the Middle East in history. In sum, the model that we develop in the Chapter 3 is not a simple repetition of Luhmann's views, but rather it is a synthesis of views of Luhmann, history of the Middle East, and existing IR theories.

In the first section of the Chapter 4, the formation of core and its structures, the city-states and empires, will be explained. We will explain the formation of core because in world political relations, periphery is defined in relation to the core. The core did not always exist in human history. Its appearance dates back to 3000 BCE ancient Middle East. Prior to that era there was not a core because there was no differentiation between separate parts of the world and the Middle East; all the regions of the world were egalitarian. The core or the systems emerge when there is a differentiation between separate parts of the world society or of a region that is itself a world society. Besides differentiation across the region (or world society) there must also be enough

interactions that create inequalities and dependencies within the boundaries of the region for a system/core to emerge. The system/core addresses the conflict and cooperation needs in the world society, which becomes apparent with the increasing inequalities/differences and dependencies. Prior to 3000 BCE, the population was not concentrated in towns; the subsistence level economy was sufficient for the people to maintain their life. However, around 4000 BCE, the climatic conditions allowed people to converge in certain regions and produce surplus. This instigated the development process of differentiation, inequality, and dependencies, which in turn led to emergence of conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance problems in the regional level. The core or the system addressed these problems again based on inequality. While the system addressed these problems, it built a structure, namely the city-state, for achieving results that the core dictates. State was entitled with coercion and military powers for dealing with conflict and cooperation problems, but it did not deal with these problems on its own behalf. Rather the state acted in ways that produced the results that the system required. These results are (1) the maintenance of the system or core, (2) the exclusion of peripheral areas from core areas, and (3) the harmony in attitude of core areas among each other.

In the Chapters 4 and 5 we deal with world political relations in ancient Middle East. The era that covers 2900 to 1200 BCE (Sumerian, Akkad, Amorite, Amarna ages) is an era where world political relations occurred in a multiple structures/states environment. The only exception was the Akkadian system/core. However, the generalizations about core periphery relations are applicable to both types of systems (one-state or multiple-state). The findings about these systems and their relations with the environment are that core and periphery conceptualization perfectly fits in the analysis of the world political affairs of the ancient Middle East. The dominant relationship from the core toward the periphery was exclusion, and from the periphery toward the core was seeking inclusion. However, inclusion of excluded areas and people to the core rarely and temporarily occurred; the dominant pattern was exclusion of the excluded for very long. The excluded people and regions obtained inclusion only when they were not contained by the core. The core, most of the time exported its structures to the periphery or applied predation for routinizing its relations with the closer peripheral areas in a way that it maintained the peripheral status of excluded

areas. Despite the preventive actions of the core, some peripheral areas (areas at the margins of the periphery) remained outside of the reach of the core. These peripheral areas that were in the margins sometimes were able to destroy the core, but this occurred rarely and temporarily because once people destroyed the core, a new core replaced it in a different form. Thus, the core-periphery relationship was reestablished. The core areas were sometimes identical with a certain geographical area (i.e., South Mesopotamia or entire Mesopotamia), but at other times it brought geographically distant areas together (as in Amorite and Amarna ages). The criterion for the core to form was that it differed from the rest of the Middle East by forming a unity. The unity formed in areas that had higher level of production power, innovative capacity, military prowess, and climatic advantages. All other areas that lacked these qualities yet were in close contact with the core were peripheral areas.

After a long-lasting dark age, the Assyrian system emerged as the last ancient system that is going to be analyzed. It was similar to the Akkadian system, and it tells us about the world political relations between 934 and 609 BCE. The system (core) that was formed in this era was based on military superiority available in Assyria or previously in Akkad. Later a similar era was witnessed in the Persian system between 550 and 330 BCE. However, for avoiding repetition, the Persian system was not included in the dissertation, even though there was a chapter on the Persian system in earlier drafts. In the Assyrian, Akkad, and Persian systems, the core differentiated itself owing to the communication that occurred about the military capability. Except the Akkadian, Assyrian, and Persian systems, in other systems that we analyzed, we do not see a military superiority as the single element that rendered core status to an area. In the Amarna system/core, Hatti was a militarily superior state but Egypt and Babylonia were not areas that elevated to the core status owing to their military might, even though it cannot be stated that they lacked high-end military capabilities. In contrast to the systems that had different sources of capabilities, Assyrian, Akkadian, and Persian systems had a clear military characteristic as a defining feature. Second, Assyrian, Akkad, and Persian systems were constituted of a single core area that kept the rest of the region as their periphery. Assyria, Akkad, and Persia continuously excluded the peripheral areas from the system/core, in the sense that the rest of the Middle East was not equally treated.

The equality could be achieved when an area was able to decide what constituted a reason for conflict and cooperation for itself without approval of another area, to have a say in world political relations, to avoid use of force by core areas for unhindered use of resources, and to be subject to the same code of conduct as that of core areas. These rights belonged only to the core areas which were structures of the system/core. The system was an entity that protected rights of the core elements. The periphery on the other hand lacked such a unity that would protect its rights. The peripheral areas most of the time acted independently to get equal participation in the system, yet, they most of the time failed in that. Sometimes some peripheral areas established an alliance among each other to get equal participation in the system/core, but we do not see any case where all peripheral areas united against the core areas at a time. Therefore, inclusion was not attained most of the time, except when non-contained areas in the periphery, i.e., the groups of loosely organized people, unexpectedly attacked the core areas. Other than these occasions, the core maintained the exclusion toward the peripheral areas.

In the Chapter 6, we explore the way the peripheral/environmental groups attain core status and then the socialization of them to the old way core-periphery relations. While in previous chapters, many cases of inclusion in the core were mentioned, the way people attained inclusion was not explained in detail because of the lack of data. However, with the emergence of Islam in the Middle East, we are able to explain exactly how the peripheral areas get the core status, how the people in the periphery organize, how they challenge the core and then get included in the core. This explanation indicates that inclusion attempt is not an automatic occurrence that emerges among the peripheral areas. Rather there was a need for a force trying to organize the people around a cause. This force was a combination of a strong message/idea/religion and a small committed group that was motivated to organize people around a cause. While the small group tried to mobilize the people, it faced a lot of hindrances both from the peripheral people that they wanted to organize and from the core areas. Therefore, the leadership of the small group not only tried to spread the message, but also fought against the loosely organized tribal communities and the clients of the core areas. The commitment of the small group and strength of the message finally succeeds in the goal of mobilizing people around a cause and

challenges the core areas.

However, once the peripheral people got the inclusion, the cohesion among the people who believed in the cause got harmed. Therefore, the people lost their initial strength that they received from being an organized group of people. In such a situation, the polities that were formed with the contribution of these people forgot the initial motivation of peripheral people to change the core-periphery relations. Hence, they socialized into the old way core-periphery relations. In socialization of these polities there were many institutions and qualified human resources inherited from the previous core areas that took various roles. Now these new core areas treated people as a peripheral element, meaning that they ignored the expectations of their people as well as the people living in the peripheral areas. Thus, the system/core was once again reproduced. This new core area established a collaborative relationship with old core areas that people initially wanted to demolish. Indeed, even though the Byzantium/Roman Empire was a core area that Muslims in their initial attempts wanted to destroy, the Umayyads and Abbasids developed a mutual dependence and cooperative relationship with Byzantium. This was so in spite of the fact that populations of both sides were very different from each other. Therefore, Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids collaborated against their population; otherwise they could not cooperate and build a mutually dependent relationship.

A similar case can be seen in the Ottoman-Safavid system too, which we will analyze in the Chapter 7. The core status of the Ottomans and Safavids was achieved at the expense of their people, mainly the Turqomans. The era preceding the formation of the Ottoman-Safavid system was devoid of a system/core. This era, which lasted from around the 10th century to the end of 15th century CE, was characterized with the continuous flow of people from the Central Asia toward the Middle East. Because there was a continuous flow of people, these people had a significant level of autonomy in relation to the governments. On the other hand, the polities formed in this era were mostly short-lived. Besides, there was a multitude of them in the Middle East. Yet, as soon as the Ottoman-Safavid system was established, we started to see a considerable degree of exclusion of the people, in terms of depriving them from freedoms and autonomy that they enjoyed for almost six hundred years. Therefore, we can say, the systems/cores excluded not only the peripheral areas but also the

people who were the subjects of the core areas. This exclusion was applied through restriction of the autonomy of groups of people.

When the Ottoman-Safavid system established in the Middle East, the region was an ordinary one, after its resurgence between 600-1000 CE (Modelska 1987, 70). This deserves attention because until the weakening of the Abbasids, the Middle East as a region was either superior or equivalent to the adjacent regions, in terms of the capabilities concentrated in the region. The systems that emerged in the Middle East until the Ottoman-Safavid system were able to produce a core area that treats both the rest of the Middle East and other regions as the periphery. However, at the time of Ottoman-Safavid system, the Middle East was an ordinary region. Being an ordinary region might lead to becoming the periphery of core areas in other regions. However, in spite of being an ordinary region, the Middle East was able to produce the Ottoman-Safavid system. The explanation for this is that the core polities of superior regions (mainly European) focused in other regions of the world because of the oceanic discoveries. This shift in the attention of the European polities allowed the Middle East to enjoy an isolation that enabled pretension of a superior region. In such a conjecture, the Ottomans and the Safavids played core roles in the Middle East, enjoying the non-interference of the major polities in other regions, mainly Europe.

Another finding that can be mentioned by looking at the Ottoman-Safavid system is that core areas tended to cooperate to such a degree that wars between them almost disappeared. In other chapters, we saw that the cooperation between the core areas against the peripheral areas, but the Ottoman-Safavid system indicated that this cooperation might evolve from tacit cooperation to a formalized agreement. Indeed, the confrontations between the Ottomans and Safavids, which were multiple, evolved toward forming an agreement (Qasr-i Shirin) that put an end to all wars between them. This agreement had effects even in today's Turkey-Iran relationship. This perfect cooperation was explicable with the idea that if there was enough time, the core areas would achieve a perfect cooperation condition that they perfectly exclude the peripheral areas. In other systems, the systems collapsed because of a peripheral strike to the systems, hence they did not have enough time to achieve such collaboration. The Ottoman-Safavid system proves that the core areas not only tacitly cooperate, but also if there is enough time, they will openly cooperate against the people and the

peripheral areas.

In sum, throughout the empirical chapters we will see that the findings of the exclusion theory are confirmed. The data available, mostly deals with the inter-state relations. They do not attempt to explain the underlying tendencies in these relations. When we attempt to explain the underlying relationships that the exclusion theory predicts, we too utilize inter-state relations. First, the data available has this format. Second, using this data is not a challenge to reading the world political relations from a system perspective, where the focus is on the relations that the system dictates on the polities. When we mention the inter-state relations, we try to depict the tendencies in these relations. These tendencies, most of the time, comply with the findings of the exclusion theory in terms of the underlying relationships. To reiterate, we find that these underlying relationships are: (1) the core areas work in harmony even when they fight with each other, thus their relations show harmony. Core polities do not harm each other in opposition to many accounts that say core areas are competitors of each other. (2) The core areas do not produce a tendency that would be destructive to the system/core. Core does not produce dynamics that would destroy the core. (3) The central conflict in world political affairs is between core and periphery. The core excludes the periphery, by restricting its independence and appropriating its resources. On the other hand, periphery seeks inclusion in the core in order to attain full independence rights and equal participation in the conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions.

CHAPTER 2

SYSTEM IN IR THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS

In this chapter, the IR theories that have some traits of systems thinking and some empirical applications of system conception in IR are reviewed to see how much they absorbed the systems thinking, to clarify the problem areas in the discipline, and to have an idea about the main topics in the agenda of the discipline. The theories under review are balance of power, society of states, World-system, imperialism, Postcolonialism, and long cycles. These theories, besides being theories that seem more systemic, on the other hand are chosen from different paradigms, i.e., realism, Marxism, postmodernism, and rationalism. We find that some of these theories have strengths in some respects, but all of them suffer from some drawbacks. We review these theories separately in detail for being familiar about the strengths and weaknesses of the theories as well as for understanding why it is necessary to have a full-fledged system perspective in order for explaining world political relations.

The review shows that these theories do not apply the system and environment dichotomy to the analysis of world politics. Not applying the dichotomy to the relations leads the inability to explain the way change occurs in the system level. System change can occur only if system enters interaction with the environment. Other changes occur only within the boundaries of the system; and these intra-system changes only help with reproduction of the system. They do not explain the change of system. Lack of adaptation of a dichotomy between the system/core and environment/periphery also causes overlooking the inequality and asymmetry in world political relations. The main area of conflict, namely, the main relationship in world politics is omitted. The IR theories that have system aspect are also introvert, meaning that they explain only intra-system relations, not necessarily correctly. The introvert outlook causes them to focus only in one type of relationship, that is, the relations between areas included in the system. The relations between areas included

in system and areas excluded from system are neglected from the analysis. Another point is that IR theories do not have a consistent system understanding. While they explain some aspects of world politics with system conceptualization, they resort to non-system explanations in other aspects of world politics. Thus, they do not stick to single paradigm, rather they are eclectic. The last drawback of system theories in IR is that, except postcolonialism, they are unable to explain the intra-system coherence and collaboration. They interpret the relations between the areas included in the system at their face value, by interpreting the confrontations between them as an underlying conflict. They ignore the fact that a system can be sustained only if system elements support each other. Now let us assess the theories chosen in detail.

2.1. Balance of Power Theory

The balance of power theory has systemic roots but the dominant interpretations of it use the theory in a way that skew the theory toward a non-systemic direction. Here we will review the theory to see how the theory is systemic in essence and non-systemic in its applications to more concrete political debates. The reason why it is the first one to be assessed is because the balance of power theory is the oldest theory of International Relations and anyone interested in IR should get a strong understanding of the tenets of this school (Donnelly 2005, 29; Wight et al. 1992, 19). It has roots stretching back to the mechanistic scientific approach that developed in the 15th century CE first in arts and architecture as a reflection of renaissance. The mechanistic scientific approach sought balance, equilibrium, symmetry in relations and situations (Wight et al. 1992, 18). Over time, this mechanistic understanding of things spilled over to “practical affairs” (18-19), whose influence can be seen in world politics as the balance of power idea emerged around this time. Indeed, Machiavelli formulated his theory based on this mechanistic perception. He thought that until 1494 CE there was a balance in Italy that was demolished with the arrival of the French (19). Thus, the first systems theory that appeared was equilibrium or balance idea even though it was not named as a systems theory. In the 17th century, the equilibrium idea was in circulation not only in world political relations but also in trade relations. The balance of trade and the balance of power concepts were resorted to in explaining the world political relations and world trade (Luhmann 2013a, 26).

The balance of power theory is based on equilibrium, which is important because it is the condition for stability and peace. Equilibrium is producing itself continuously; whenever it is disturbed, it will reestablish itself by means of various mechanisms, i.e., rearmament. Even though at the beginning it was thought that equilibrium reestablishes itself at the same point every time, later it was recognized that each of the equilibrium points has a limit (Luhmann 2013a, 88; Paul 2004, 5-6). Therefore, a dynamic equilibrium idea was proposed, through which equilibrium could be established at a point different from the previous one. For example, “a new type of coalition” could be established in “European balance of power”. In this sense, balance, it was said, was not returning to a prior state (Luhmann 2013a, 89; Kaplan 1969, 213; Paul 2004, 6). It either returns to the previous point or to a different point. In both cases, balance/equilibrium has the capability to emerge and to produce stability every single time (Luhmann 2013a, 27; Paul 2004, 6). In this conception of balance, it can be said that disturbance and stability are the two elements that help with the creation and sustenance of order (Luhmann 2013a, 27).

The balance of power does not only produce equilibrium among states but also it is equipped with the necessary mechanisms to maintain itself as a system. Not only the system as a whole but its parts also have such a role to maintain the system (Kaplan 1969, 213). Equilibrium is not necessarily based on equality; in fact, equality is not an attribute of the systems that restore and maintain themselves (61). This idea that stability is achieved through balance that adjusts itself against the negative feedback and is capable of sustaining its system identity can be extended to contemporary Waltzian balance of power theory as well (Albert and Cederman 2010, 13). Balance of power theory, formulated in this way, does not treat the units as the actors. It is the system itself that produces equilibrium thus the stability and peace. In other words, in mentioning equilibrium and stability, the theory is system centric, meaning; it gives agency to the system. However when the theory touches on more concrete world political issues that relates to state, it gives agency to states by naming them as actors. In the concrete interpretations of the world political issues, the system comes into being as a result of interactions of states. Indeed, balance of power theory says when states act in accordance with the essential rules, their motivation is not to “maintain equilibrium” but it is the present conditions that make them act in a way toward

producing equilibrium (Kaplan 1969, 213). Hence, states have their own conditions and perceptions of the things, and they act according to these conditions and perceptions. Yet the end result is emergence of a systemic quality, the equilibrium. This means that emergence of balance in world political relations is an unintended consequence (Paul 2004, 6).

As we said, this balance is dependent on the existence of the states/parts/units. The units on the other hand are limited to states, which have the capability to act and which is the most important actor. Theory says world can best be described in a state-centric approach, and even when we mention non-state “actors” and “transnational movements”, we should bear in mind that they are placed within the state-centric milieu. The non-state actors are not alternatives to the state-centric reality (Waltz 1979, 95; Kaplan 1969, 215-216). Rather than treating states as a structure of the world political (diplomatic) system, balance of power surmises that the units of the system are actors and these actors are states. States are not only the actors, but also they are the “units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems.” (Waltz 1979, 95).

States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of nonstate actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal rules to develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them. When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate (Waltz 1979, 94-95).

States have an independent existence from the system (balance of power) since they are able to take action. It is the relationships between states that create a balance, and it is the relationship between states whose balance is being disturbed. What disturbs the equilibrium is “preponderance of a single state or of a coalition of states”, which is undesirable since it can lead to “aggressive behavior” that disturbs peace and stability. Stability renders survival of states in the system (Paul 2004, 5-6). In other words, state has a concern about its survival, but this survival motive is not something that is assigned by the system to it; state has this concern independently. States, by having a survival motive, act according to maintenance of survival when it is

endangered. The result is a systemic quality; that is, equilibrium or stability or peace. The thing is that the state with its actions produces the system (balance of power).

Being dependent on the states, balance of power is on the other hand is a closed system; it does not have a relationship with its environment. The only form of relationship is the one that takes place within the boundaries of the system because it suggests that the world political realm is limited to what the states do; and all the states in the world are included in this political system. Therefore, since there remains nothing outside of the balance of power, there is no relationship between the balance of power and the outside world. In other words, the balance of power system is an introvert system. Indeed, it suggests that world politics “can be conceived of as a domain distinct from the economic, social, and other international domains that one may conceive of” (Waltz 1979, 79). Yet, while on the face value the system encompasses all states in the world, when it comes to the details, the idea that all states, thus all parts of the world, are included in the balance of power turns into a mere assumption. Even though all the states in the world are considered legitimate sovereign states, balance of power is focused on a limited number of states, the great powers. Therefore, when we mention the balance of power as a system, we should know that it refers to a system that is composed of only major states. The theory says: world politics “is mostly about inequalities anyway. So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them. That theoretical statement is of course borne out in practice” (Waltz 1979, 94-95; Mearsheimer 2003). As the theory is limiting itself to explanation of the relationship between states which are part of the balance of power system, it detaches itself from system theory’s conception of system and environment differentiation. It focuses on the relations within the system only. By explaining the situation of the lesser states as having little or no role in the system, the lesser states are excluded from balance. These lesser states are not considered in the environment of the system either. By both omitting relations other than those among the great powers and refraining from description of an environment and relations with the environment, the theory becomes an introvert one.

While balance of power theory needs states (major states/great powers) for we can mention about the system, contradictorily, it is the system that has effects on the state

actions, not the other way around. In fact, for the balance of power theory, the system has determining effects on the actions of states. The system, in balance of power theory, is something that is composed of structure and the interacting parts. "The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole." (Waltz 1979, 79). "Systemic effects...affect both the interactions of states and their attributes" (100). With this suggestion, the balance of power theory might seem as if it is a system theory since the system has effects on the actions and attributes of the units. However, its definition of structure and the qualities attributed to the structure once again makes it detach from modern system theory. Structure, in balance of power theory, is a constitutive element of the system, not something that the system builds for fulfilling system functions. Thus, for balance of power theory, just as state independently exists, the structure also exists independently, and it is structure that affects the actions and attributes of states, not the system.

Explaining how the structure determines or affects the state actions, balance of power theory says different types of structures lead to different effects on the state attitudes. For understanding the world politics, its structure must be compared with the structure of the internal politics of the states. These compared, anarchical and hierarchical systems represent two types of ordering principles in the systems. Whereas in anarchical systems there is no higher authority that can be resorted to for resolving the conflicts between the states; in the hierarchic systems, the disputes among members of the society are resolved by a higher authority; states. In hierarchic systems, the units have different functions; i.e., legislative, judiciary, and executive, so they can complement each other toward the unity of the system. In the world political system (anarchic systems), on the other hand, the units are similar to each other, meaning that they are not complementing each other but they are competing with each other. (Waltz 1979, 100-101; Nexon 2009, 336; Kaplan 1969, 215-216; Donnelly 2005, 35; Tayfur 2000, 17).

Role differentiation is not seen in the anarchical systems, so the states compete with each other to resolve the disagreements. Under anarchical structure, the major nations of the system are seeking the optimization of security since productivity has an unpredictable tendency to increase the capabilities of the rivals. Therefore, each state seeks to reach a higher proportion of capabilities in the system (Kaplan 1969, 215-

216; Paul 2004, 4-5). States, in such a situation, are concerned more about their relative power than anything else. When a distribution of power that would endanger the self-help capability of state for survival is the case, this state would seek balancing. States that are not able to respond to changes in the power distribution are doomed to “fall by the wayside through conquest, through informal subordination, or by becoming weak and insignificant actors in international stage” (Nexon 2009, 336). For this does not happen, states aim to build up power as the means for survival and independence. Power has political, military, and economic aspects, but among these aspects the military might is the most important (Paul 2004, 4-5). Thus, the typical effect of the anarchical systems, by means of its structure, is to make states to be concerned about their security and survival, and in order to ease these concerns states act in ways that strengthen their position. Here we should also note that similar to states, the structure as well has an independent character from the system (balance of power). It is not clear how the structure comes about but it is not a product of the system, rather it is the independent element of the system that creates the systemic impact on the states. In this, the balance of power loses its systemic character once again; it does not point out the capability of the system to create structures, i.e. states or organizations to fulfill the functions of the system.

Since balance of power theory suggests that structure exerts a determining effect on the state actions toward making it to be concerned about its security, the theory predicts a conflictual type of relationship in intra-system affairs. Other types of relationship could be cooperation, indifference, oppression, exploitation, seeking equality, exclusion etc. Yet, instead of these, the balance of power theory offers conflict as the main form of relationship. It says there is a constant state of conflict, rivalry and violence between members of the system (balance of power) (Wight et al. 1992, 16). The balance of power does not foresee any other relationship other than conflict and competition in world politics. The only form of non-conflictual relationship is alliance formation. States might forge alliances against the rising hegemons or states threatening the balance. Yet, alliance is not a permanent condition; it is conjectural. When the conditions for the alliance formation fade away, the allies return to competition form of relationship. Thus, the main form of relationship in world politics is conflict or competition.

However, the conflict or competition between major states and the lesser states is insignificant, while the competition and conflict between the major states is vital. What concerns us here is that: because the theory does not deal with the extra system relations (between great powers and lesser powers), it assumes conflict in intra-system relations. This will later be an important element in developing the exclusion theory. The form of relationship between states is conflict, and the rivalry is only within the system; it is among the major states, not against other systems or lesser states. The lesser states do not constitute a significant rival against the major states; therefore, the major states do not have considerable concerns about the lesser states. This means that not only do the lesser states lack the quality to be a rival of the major states but also potential rivals other than states do not exist. For example, people of lesser and major states, other systems (i.e., world economic system) cannot be a threat or partner with or foe of the great powers. There is also no formulation where all of the major states as a group have a common goal or common foe or friend. The major states could have enmity and amity (alliance) only with each other. The rivalry between the major states is real. Saying that conflict is real has the meaning that states in their conflict do whatever they can for defeating and thus forcing their adversaries to come to their terms. The ultimate foundation that the supporters of the theory rely for this claim is the existence of war. The fact that war is an act that encompasses widespread use of violence, that the lives of people are sacrificed, and that huge amounts of money are spent, it is inferred that states commit this act because the conflict between states is real and war as an indicator of conflict is the worst thing a state can do to the other states.

This rivalry as a pattern within the system is claimed to be generalizable to international politics in all eras; it is not specific to one period. It is said;

The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly. The relations that prevail internationally seldom shift rapidly in type or in quality. They are marked instead by dismaying persistence, a persistence that one must expect so long as none of the competing units is able to convert the anarchic international realm into a hierarchic one. The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent (Waltz 1979, 66).

In sum, Waltz says, despite changes in boundaries, and in social, economic, and political realms, the “substance and style of international politics remain strikingly constant” (Nexon 2009, 337-338). While the prediction of the balance of power about world politics is conflictual, at times the theory explains state actions that are not conflictual. We see this in the strategies that are adapted by the states in balance of power. For example, Kaplan names six tendencies of states in balance of power that are worth mentioning. These are; first of all, states seek to increase their capabilities, and while doing this, they prefer negotiation over fighting. Second, when actors face an opportunity for increasing their capabilities, they try not to miss it even if it costs a war. Third, actors prefer that a nation not disappear even when they fight each other. Fourth, an actor opposes another actor or an alliance which seeks dominance in the system. Fifth, the actors maneuver to restrain the possibilities of supranational organizing. Lastly, the defeated actors are allowed to reenter the system, or when it is possible previously “inessential” actors are allowed to enter the system (Kaplan 1969, 216). Even though these strategies are offered for explaining purely conflictual relations between major states of the system, in fact these can be interpreted otherwise. It reveals not a conflictual picture but a self-sustaining system conception, which the balance of theory does not concede. Our analysis of the relations among the members of the balance of power shows that conflict among them is only on the surface. There are occasions of the conflict but the major states do not seek annihilation, exclusion, or exploitation of other major states. They prefer peace over war; they allow the defeated states and previously inessential states to enter the system. States help each other toward adjusting the potential harmful events to the unity of the system (balance of power). We may even say that the aim of war or similar events is conflict resolution. In this context, it seems that war or similar events as balancing attempts help with the reproduction of the equilibrium. Balancing is the main means through which the equilibrium is sustained. If the balance of power is a self-sustaining system, then the assumption of the theory that world politics is a self-help system where the states are rivals of each other is false. In framing the exclusion theory in the Chapter 3, we will show that the relationship among the core areas shows a self-sustaining character. This is an opposite observation than the dominant view among the supporters of the balance of power theory that states are in continuous state of conflict and competition.

Analysis of balancing will allow us to find out if this reinterpretation is true or not. In the balance of power theory, balancing is different from the balance of power. While the balance of power is an outcome at system level, balancing is a “foreign policy behavior” of a state (Paul 2004, 2). When a state changes the balance, it would face a balancing behavior from other states that would set the balance in a new point (Kaplan 1969, 66-67). Balancing behavior encompasses a wide array of strategies, but we can say that depending on the strategies adopted there are three main forms of balancing: Hard (traditional) balancing, soft balancing, and asymmetric balancing (Nexon 2009, 341; Paul 2004, 2). Traditional balancing includes “standard menu of arms buildups, military modernization, the exchange of territory in postwar settlements such as the concert of Vienna, and the creation of formal and informal alliances designed to rectify military imbalances”, and the like. This form of balancing is the most important form of balancing but it is not the only form. For hard balancing to be adopted, namely alliances form and military buildup occur, there must be an “intense interstate rivalry” (Paul 2004, 3; Nexon 2009, 345).

The soft-balancing conception says that the traditional balance of power sometimes is not able to explain the systemic situation in world politics. States sometimes “pursue tacit and indirect means other than open arms buildup and alliance formation to balance a powerful state or one threatening their security” (Paul 2004, 13). The means utilized in interstate relations also include “limited arms buildup” and cooperation with other countries in various platforms to balance the threatening power. The cooperation takes place in international institutions and in other regional and international forums. Soft balancing may at times convert to hard balancing as the need may arise (Paul 2004, 3). Asymmetric balancing is also in compliance with the logic of traditional balancing. However, this time balancing includes different types of actors. While in soft balancing and hard-balancing states balance each other, in asymmetric balance, there are situations where some states utilize non-state actors to balance another state. Besides this, there are situations where all states unite against a danger posed by non-state actors. In the latter situation, states consider the non-state actors as alien groups of individuals who are “intruding in the field of world politics”. Considering the non-state actors as such, even states that are potential adversaries come together to defeat the “elusive yet powerful non-state threat to state system

itself". On the other hand, while states create coalitions to balance the rising non-state groups (Paul 2004, 16), also non-state actors (subnational groups) emerge in order to balance and undermine hegemony status of a single state; at least they raise the "costs of maintaining hegemony" (Paul 2004, 20)

By reinterpreting these balancing types, we can see that all of them serve to the resolution of the conflict. The aim is not exclusion, destruction, or exploitation of other states, except in the asymmetric balancing, where states unite against the asymmetric threat for destroying it. The thing is that asymmetric balancing is not between the major states. In asymmetric balancing the balancing act is not against a member of the system but it is against a non-systemic force. When it comes to the aim of the intra-system balancing (balancing between the states), the function of war or similar balancing acts is limited to resolving arising imbalances either due to the unequal power accumulation or due to the attempts to dominate other states. Saying that balancing in the form of war or other strategies is aiming resolution of conflict means that the major states are not adversaries of each other but they are partners. However, balance of power theory would not agree with this proposition because it assumes that conflict is the main form of relationship between states, not the resolution of conflict. This understanding of the balance of power emanates from its inability to differentiate between system and its environment, and inability to acknowledge that intra-system attitudes are different from extra-system attitudes.

To sum up, from a systems perspective, the inferences that we can make from review of the balance of power theory are multiple. First, the system does not create states, rather the existence of states allows the emergence of the balance of power system. Yet, the system in turn affects the way states would act. States have the capacity to be an actor and to have an agenda independent of the system. Second, the system is a closed one, meaning that there are major states that constitute the core/balance of power, and important relationships occur among these major states. The relationships between the major states and lesser states, people, and other systems are negligible. The interactions between the balance of power and its environment (i.e., people, other social systems, natural/physical environment, and the lesser states) are not included in the analysis. Third, the balance of power system does not have a unity that forces all major states to act in a certain way because the states are rival to each other, they

do not collaborate. Fourth, any significant partner other than states does not exist in the system; different types of partners do not have coherence for they can be considered a system. Fifth, balance of power theory is an introvert theory that seeks to identify the relationships/events that occur within the system. Although this relationship has a function that is conducive to the sustenance of the system, the proponents of the system call these relationships as a conflict. Sixth, the system is composed of parts and the structure; the anarchical nature of the structure determines the way the parts would act, which makes the states to be concerned about security and survival. Besides, the structure is independent of the system; it is not a construct of system for fulfilling system functions. Seventh, only the states can communicate with each other in the system; probably because of this, the states are like-units. It is suggested that only similar units/parts can interact and can be organized along a purpose, such as alliance formation or balancing for the stability and unity of the system. Reversely, only similar units can have conflictual relations because their interests or means or capabilities are similar. It is not possible that different types of partners, such as states, organizations, firms, markets, social classes are positioned in the same side, acting along a logic or purpose or function because each of these parts have different interests, means and capabilities. Different types of parties cannot meet on a similar ground, or they cannot have conflict. Lastly, a reinterpretation of the intra-system relations allows us to say that the political systems have function of conflict resolution as opposed to conflict because the main form of action, namely balancing, produces stability, which is a must for sustenance of the system.

2.2. Society of States Theory

Society of states theory is sometimes called as international society or English school, but from a system perspective it seems that it is more proper to use the society of states title because it has stronger ramifications about the systemic quality of the theory. This theory has a similar purview to the balance of power, in that both seek to explain the world political realm. In explaining the world political realm, society of states applies the concept of society to the world political realm for showing that it is a system and there are patterns and rules that are at work in this system. However, the existence of the society of states does not make the domestic society redundant. Rather

they coexist; what makes both the society of states and the national society a system is the normative basis of integration that they have, and this normative base could not be easily overcome by the disintegrative tendencies (Albert 2004, 16-17). Even though some scholars differentiate the concept of system in world politics from the society of states and say that society is a denser form of system (Bull 2002), we can say that this differentiation does not question the system character of the theory. Rather it only marks different degrees of cohesiveness. The systemic character of the theory is derived from its claim that society of states has the capacity to maintain itself, once an order based on norms is established. The existence of order at world level is claimed to show that a system (society of states) exists because order, owing to norms, is above states and it restrains the states and makes them to be a society.

With regard to the question as to when we can talk about order, a parallel is being drawn between domestic and international society. The society of states theory expresses that order in domestic society, as opposed to disorder, means regularity or a pattern in relations that is leading to a particular result (Bull 2002, 3). It promotes goals or values, and fulfills some functions. Bull suggests that there are three universal values that we can see in all societies as showing the existence of order. These are security against violence, assurance that the promises would be kept and agreements would be abided by, and agreement that possession of things would be respected. When these universal goals are achieved then we can talk about existence of order (4). These values can be considered the needs the international society/order addresses; society has these functions. For we can talk about world society these national societal level functions must be met at least in elementary level in world scale (8).

For order can develop at world level, a pragmatic need must emerge between different states (Linklater 2005a, 90). Society of states says that it is possible that commerce might have been the first realm that made different societies to feel the need to come into contact and this provided the basis for the formation of society of states (89). In time, development of relations allowed formation of a “diplomatic culture, that is, a system of conventions and institutions which preserves order between states with radically different cultures, ideologies and aspirations”. This diplomatic culture becomes stronger when it is supported with a common cultural, linguistic, and religious unity, even though these are not a must for a system to emerge (Linklater

2005a, 90; Wight 1977, 29-34). This reasoning maintains that as there were dynamics that moved the world society toward a unity, the states also achieved balance among each other by compromise. Indeed, it says, balance between the great powers can be established intersubjectively (as opposed to being established through power projections), by agreeing on the rules to be applied, as it emerged out of many conventions held between the European great powers in the 19th century CE. There are independent states but they are forming a society where balance between the states is agreed by negotiation (Nexon 2009, 339). In this sense, the world society approach, considers the balance of power principle as serving to “self-restraint” among the states. This society of states is “norm-governed” and it “promotes a kind of rational political order above state level” (Jung 2004, 115). The needs force states to build an order and restrain themselves; for this they create norms to be applied among each other (Linklater 2005a; Nexon 2009; Jung 2004). In other words, states, in this approach, having the monopoly over the means of violence, find a merit in restraining themselves about use of force, therefore they develop a base for “accommodation and compromise”, which in turn allow the society of states to materialize (Linklater 2005a, 87).

As order at the world level is established out of a pragmatic need and addressed by the states intersubjectively, order/society of states undertakes several key functions that are particular to world society. The first function of order is the “preservation of the system and society of states itself”. This is about states’ attitude to preserve the monopoly of states as being the primary actors in world politics which are the “chief bearers of rights and duties”. Thus, states have an outlook that aims to keep themselves to be “prevailing form of universal political organization”, as well as to preserve the system itself (Bull 2002, 16). The second function of the order is “maintaining the independence of external sovereignty of individual states”. States enter society of states for being recognized as sovereign. However, this goal is sometimes treated subordinate to preservation of the society of states. Indeed, the “predominant role played in shaping international society by the great powers” shows this preference. The great powers are concerned the order of system more than anything. The third function of world order is keeping peace. By this, universal and permanent peace is not meant. It is meant that the normal condition between states is maintenance of

peace in the sense of lack of war. However, peace in world political relations is being treated as secondary to preservation of the society of states because it is agreed that in case it is necessary wars can be waged. Also, peace is subordinate to the sovereignty of the states as it is seen legitimate to wage wars for self-defense or for protection of other rights (17).

Other goals that are perceived as necessary by society of states for world order are the goals of social life in general; namely limitation of violence, keeping promises, and stabilization of possession. Commitment of states to keep the monopoly of violence and forbid it to other actors is a commitment that shows a form of limitation of violence. Also, they do not kill each other's envoys or messengers for keeping communication working among each other. Likewise, in the society of states, states do not wage wars arbitrarily; for a war can be waged, there must be justifying reasons for it. In terms of keeping promises, it seems that states, as far as the conditions do not change, uphold their promises (Bull 2002, 18). The stability of possession is being rendered through recognition of the rights of possession and sovereignty. It has long been accepted that the states recognize each other's "spheres of jurisdiction" and they claim that certain people and territories are the "property" of the state (18-19)

The assessment of these goals and functions show that the system by creating order also assists in its own sustenance. Thus, society of states theory assigns an independent existence to the system (society of states); an existence that is self-sustained by the system. In fact, this function is the most important one as compared to the protection and maintenance of state and peace. Yet, one view warns that this does not mean that the society of states is given an agential capacity, in the sense that the society of states is a system of action that is capable of producing results. Rather it says, the concept of system should be used "to identify a particular kind of international constellation" (Bull 2002, 11). The society of states is an assemblage of states that lacks the quality to be called as a "social totality". It is an "association of states that agrees on some shared regularities such as non-intervention, peaceful means and justice" (Jung 2004, 115). Yet this objection contradicts with what they say about the functions of the system, i.e. that the system has a concern about preservation of itself as well as of the elements of the system, and that society of states prevents the states to act without restraint (Bull 2002, 17; Jung 2004, 115). We can

say that the proponents of the theory resort to different explanations in different contexts since they do not have conceptual tools available in systems theory.

Nevertheless, a fair treatment will show that society of states theory attributes an independent character to the society of states (system) in relation to states since they say that apart from national societies, there is a society of states that fulfills certain functions, i.e. maintenance of the system, protection of sovereignty of states and the sustenance of peace. These are not functions attributed to states, but to the system/order. Hence, the system has an agential role. The system comes into being in the form of norms and order, in that they are differentiated from their environment, and they determine how states would act (Linklater 2005a; Bull 1982; Wight et al. 1992; Luhmann 2013a). In addition to this, even though states come together for formation of an order/world society, it is not states that voluntarily decide this, rather there are needs (i.e. maintenance of cooperation and conflict resolution) to be addressed that makes states to come together. This makes us suggest that the wider social reality assigns a function to the society of states/system to meet the needs. The functions are maintenance of the system, protection of sovereignty of the states and the sustenance of peace. The society of states is just one system among others that social reality forces the emergence of it (Luhmann 1997; Wight et al. 1992). The system, by having some functions, dictates states to come together. The rationale of the system is not decided by states; rather states are forced to take roles. This makes us believe that the society of states theory in this respect is a system theory. One thing that is missing probably is that the society of states does not assume that states are structures produced by the international system. We could say, as far as it suggests that state emerged as a product of the system it will approximate to a system theory, but to the degree that it takes the system as a variable affecting state behavior it would lean toward a non-system theory.

Even though, with these explanations we claim that the society of states theory is a system theory, the proponents of the theory do not call it as such, rather their conceptualization is that there are norms/order above states, and these norms are embedded in the reality. It is said that in the universe there is a moral unity and principles attached to it, and the emergence of the society of states is attributable to this essence in reality (Wight et al. 1992, 14). This essence in reality is within reach

of human reason, which is a “reflection of the divine light in us” (13-14). The reason, owing to its ability to grasp true knowledge, finds ways to live together and meet the obligations even when there is no higher authority as it is seen in world political relations (14). Being rationalist, the theoreticians of society of state have a teleological standpoint, they seek to understand the ontology, the essence. They do not try to make sociological generalizations that realists make. Thus, they, for example, seek to find the unity in the autonomous and separate existence of different states/nations (22).

In this sense, the society of states seeks particularly to find the normative standards of world politics (Jackson 2009, 21). As opposed to the positivist understanding of norm, which says that a norm is “a pattern of behavior ... [that shows] how people generally behave”, the society of states understands norm as a moral and legal concept. “A norm is a standard of conduct by which to judge the rightness or wrongness, the goodness and badness, of human activity” (22). However, this normative inquiry is not a prescriptive endeavor despite the opposing view that normative approach is recommendatory about the course of action to be taken. The society of states school claims that it is “interrogatory and expository” rather than being advising (23). In other words, it does not moralize the subject, instead it makes judgment and “render judgement”. In doing this, society of states theory is “expository: it involves observation, discernment, interrogation, diagnosis and explication” (24). However, the aim of this endeavor is not to impose external norms on the society of the states, rather the society of state scholars seek to explicate the norms already embedded in the world political realm itself. The norms of world politics are not external phenomena to be dictated from outside. Rather this ethics is internal to the activity, which has developed over long periods (29). The theory discovers the norms/system embedded in the world political realm and judges the events in light of these norms. Norms/systems not only facilitate us to judge the events but also, they help with creating an order where maintenance of the system, protection of sovereignty of the states, and the sustenance of peace are rendered. Yet, all of these should not be taken as a statement that the society of states is a full-fledged system theory of IR.

The society of states theory deems order as the overarching quality of the system. Order/system is something both desirable and the constitutive element of an entity, i.e., a system. Order comes into being not because it creates a difference from the

environment, rather order is embedded in reality. There is no role anyone or anything can play for formation of order and thus system. Order does not come into being based on the difference that it creates against the environment, by giving birth to communicational foundation of the system. Furthermore, the system/order does not create a contradiction, inequality or asymmetry; rather it is something almost divine that comes into being as a desirable condition. This system understanding has parallels with old way system thinking that takes the integration as the constitutive aspect of the system. However, this approach omits the undesirable consequences that the systems create, which leads to understatement of the role of the peripheral areas in world politics. A typical system theory should make a differentiation between inside and outside, namely the system and its environment. However, the society of states theory does not have an inside and outside outlook where the inside of the system is differentiated from the outside of it. Rather, the theory has universal pretensions. Instead of dividing the world as the areas that are included in the system and the areas that are located in the environment, the theory treats the entire world as a single system.

It not only does treat the world as a single system, but it also suggests that world political relations have the potential to evolve toward perfection in the sense that a more humane milieu can be achieved for the entirety of the world. Thus, society of states theory not only is interested in finding principles of world political relations but also it foresees that the current order would be even better. The order would transform toward a situation, where the conditions for the sustenance of civility are rendered, and rampant use of power is prevented. Thus, while the primary orientation of the society of states is order/norms, it also wants to explore the possibilities of justice in world politics. Hedley Bull says, in a justice oriented society, not only the states but also the individuals are the members of the world society. Individuals would in this case be “subjects of international law”. However, Bull warns that we are far from having such a society at this moment (Linklater 2005a, 93). Indeed, even though human community is a whole, every element of the system restrains itself from arbitrariness, and they apply the norms to constitute a society; a “universal human community” did not ensue this yet because states have differing conceptions about the “human rights and global justice”. Even when some states commit serious human

rights violations, the interventions toward enforcement of the rules/norms is not allowed. The society of states says that these sorts of interventions that aim to improve world politics for the time being can seriously harm relations among states, and “damage international order” (87). However, the society of states says that the situation is not dire, in fact world society evolves, and this means that when in the future the current fragility of the society of states evades, the attempts to improve world politics can be welcome.

Already the barrier to formation of a universal human community is the clash between order and justice ideals. Bulls says, order and justice require different stances, they clash with each other as two values. Sometimes justice is compromised for the sake of order; for example, justice says every state has the right to have nuclear weapons, order says it is necessary to prevent new states from acquiring nuclear weapons. While justice requires that each state should be treated equally and every state’s sovereignty should be respected, order sometimes dictates that not every state can be treated as equals (Linklater 2005a, 93-94). Similarly, it is rarely agreed when justice is achieved, while order can be easily agreed upon. It changes from state to state about what justice requires (94).

While the theory assumes a global order, at some occasions it expresses that the order and justice discussions lead to formation of two sides in the international society. When these concepts are applied to, for example, western and non-western groups of the states, we see that western world is concerned more about order than justice, while the non-western world seeks more justice (Linklater 2005a, 95). The justice concern of the non-western societies is centered on five topics. One is that they ask for “equal sovereignty”. Second, they want to be able to apply their domestic laws to foreigners as well. Third, they want freedom from colonial domination. Fourth, they want that all forms of racism abandoned and slavery abolished. Fifth, they want to end cultural imperialism, namely ending the imposition of the way that people should live and imposition of “liberal-individualistic conception of human rights” (99-100). These insights might be considered clues showing that the society of states perceives two groups of states in the world, where each of which can be identified with system and environment respectively. However, this is not the case, the society of states theory considers that both sides are included in the system, and the reason why demands of

both sides are not met at the moment is insufficient maturity level of society of states. When the conditions allow, both order and justice demands would be equally met in the universal society of states.

By assessing the universalistic views of the society of states theory, we could say that the theory fails in drawing the boundaries of the system, and specifying what is included in and what is excluded from the system. It is exactly this tool that the system approach provides us with the ability to analyze world political relations. It allows us to specify what the system includes for we can focus on the types of relationships that are available in the system. However, society of states theory does not make this specification. Because the theory does not identify the boundaries of the system, events belonging to the system are generalized into events in the environment or vice versa. The result is inability to explain events at least in one part of the world. For example, because society of states does not identify the realm that constitutes the system and the realm that constitutes the environment, it is not able to explain the forms of relations between western and non-western states. The relations in the non-western areas are omitted. The second criticism to society of states would be that it considers that a system comes into being if there is order and norms. The system is identified with order. However, a system comes into being not because there is an order in world political relations. Rather the system comes into being because it creates a difference. Order has the connotation that system creates equality, and that discontent disappears from the world politics. Conversely, system thinking suggests that a system, rather than creating a neutral environment, creates and enhances the conflicting tendencies. In this regard the system understanding of the society of states is conservative; it does not recognize the instability and disagreements.

2.3. World-System Theory

There are alternative narratives of the world system conception. Some of them (Modelski 2003; Wilkinson 2003), refrain from explaining the nature of relationships that occur on a global level. Rather they aim to describe the process that led to formation of world system from very far past. They argue that the human being has been part of a continuous development that evolved from multi-civilizational context

of the past to the contemporary single world system (Wilkinson 2003). Throughout this process, all economic, political, cultural and social realms are interwoven and evolve in harmony. Thus, we are able to define the entire human history as a single process. Not only are these realms interwoven but all the regions of the world also have evolved toward being part of this single world-system (Modelski 2003). These accounts of the world system describe large organizational forms (i.e. civilizations, world systems, empires etc.), without explaining the relationships within and outside these organizational forms. Since they are deficient of explaining the relationships within and outside the system, these approaches are generally not included in the world-system approach that aim to describe the relationships (Wallerstein 2006; Wallerstein 1974; Shannon 1996), which is more widespread. We will review this second perspective. This second version of the World-system approach is generally associated with the Marxist paradigm, but it also has its particularities. While classical Marxists believed that the spread of capitalism would ultimately “bring industrial development to poorer regions”, the neo-Marxist theories, such as world-system and dependency theories claim that spread of capitalism does not bring “industrial development to poorer regions”. Besides, instead of looking at the relations of production, new theories look at the “unequal exchange in world market”. The dependency theory says that cooperation between the dominant classes in the core and the periphery inhibits the poorer regions to industrialize (Frank 1966; Linklater 2015b, 123). The world-system approach also opposes the view that capitalism will bring industrial development to the peripheral regions (Linklater 2005b, 123).

The World-system theory is the one that starts with a duality, it has a narrative that accounts for two different sides of the world. By explaining the production processes, which are organized along a single global level division of labor, the theory defines two related but unequally situated sides and one type of relationship (exploitation) between these two sides (Shannon 1996). One of these sides is core and the other is periphery. If the theory was not dividing the globe into two sides, marking the two as dissimilar and explaining us the type of relationship between these sides; it would only be an account of the macro level emergent trends, i.e., the total output of the production process or goods that are produced at the global level etc.... In this case, we would be devoid of an understanding of the patterns of relationships that are

available at global level between dissimilar partners. Yet, since the theory adopts a dual approach and explains how the core and the periphery are related but different from each other, we have a theory that explains nature of the relationships that occur at the global level between two dissimilar parts of globe. This does not mean that the theory is the one that perfectly explains the relationship, nor does it mean that it is the only theory that does so. These remarks are made just to submit one significant accomplishment of it as a systemic IR theory.

From a systems approach perspective, the World-system theory is a system theory in that it takes the entirety of the phenomenon (World-system) that it aims to explain as a system, not as an assemblage of parts/units (Brewer 2001, 176-178). In terms of role of actor, the World-system analysis differs from other approaches. Wallerstein says that contemporary social sciences take homo-rationalis individual as its actor; state autonomists take it as political man; the cultural particularist take it as each of individuals who are autonomously in interaction with others; the orthodox Marxists take it as “industrial proletariat”. The actor understanding of World-system theory is different from all of these. For it, the actor, including structures, is part of a “systemic mix”. The actors act freely but their freedom is constrained by the social prison they are a part of (Wallerstein 2006, 21). If it was not a system theory, it could have claimed that the world-system is composed of states/societies/individuals and that world-system is an assemblage of these states/societies/individuals. Instead, the world-system theory substituted the national state with the world-system as the unit of analysis. According to the World-system theory, “World-system” is not something completely new; in fact, it can be traced in various forms in history. There have been three forms so far: mini-systems and two types of World-system, namely World-economy and World-empires (Wallerstein 2006, 16; Brewer 2001, 176). Mini-systems do not exist anymore, and the world-system is the only social system to be studied (Tayfur 2000, 25). World empires have a single state that are in charge of economy because they collect all the benefits and redistribute them to different parts of the empire. On the other hand, world economies do not have a single state (26). What makes us call these forms as world-systems is not the fact that they are empires or economies. When we mention a World-system in either form we do not mention

any type of economy or empire, rather we mention “systems, economies and empires that are a World” (Wallerstein 2006, 16-17).

The contemporary World-system’s boundaries, which is also named as world-economy, do not overlap with the boundaries of any state, or any “unitary political structure”. It contains multiple states, cultures, religions, languages (Wallerstein 2006, 23). This diversity is united by the economic organization of the world, which has a single division of labor that cuts across “multiple cultural systems”. This understanding rejects the idea that the world economy is constituted of “isolated and independent national economies that just happen to trade with one another” (Shannon 1996, 23-24; Brewer 2001, 176). Thus, what makes the world-economy a system is the production system that is maintained through a single global level division of labor. The production is not locally decided and labor is not locally employed, rather each of them is decided globally. Which specific region would produce what group of products is decided at the global level. This world-wide social system has an identifiable “set of relatively stable economic and political relationships” that characterize it (Shannon 1996, 23). There are many institutions in the system; namely, “states and the interstate system, production firms, households, classes and identity groups of all sorts”. These institutions “form a matrix which permits the system to operate” (Wallerstein 2006, x).

As we can see, the theory defines a World-wide system that has a unity; it is not an assemblage of states, firms, households, classes and identity groups. Rather there is a system that assigns roles to the institutions/structures. In this respect it is a system theory. Yet, although the theory’s description of World-system conforms to the definition of system approach, it fails to meet the criteria of system and environment differentiation. Defining the entire world as a world system does not explain the differentiation in the relations in world politics. A single type of relationship cannot be applied to the areas that are qualitatively differentiated. The level of development of different regions and the ability of the individuals to accede to the opportunities vary widely in the world. This variety causes differentiation in the nature of relationships from one area to another. For example, relations among the developed areas, relations among the underdeveloped areas, relations between developed and underdeveloped areas... etc. are different from each other in nature. It cannot be stated

that there is a single type of relationship in all sorts of interactions. Defining a system without determining the non-system elements leads to the conclusion that there is a single type of relationship. Therefore, a system theory in IR must be able to define differentiation in world political relations by using the system approach's "system and environment" dichotomy, and its suggestion that all systems have related systems. World-system, by defining the entire world as a system and refraining from defining higher or sub-systems and environment in the world, detaches from system theory.

However, there is one aspect of the theory that might lead us to think that the theory successfully applied the system and the environment dichotomy to its own framework. In this vein, the World-system theory suggests that there are two sides in the World-system; the core and the periphery. These sides come into being as a result of division of the production process among different countries. Therefore, it is possible to divide countries as core and periphery (Wallerstein 2006, 17). The "economically and politically dominant states in the world-system are those in the core" (Shannon 1996, 27). In their economy, "industrial production is the most efficient and the level of capital accumulation is the greatest". Therefore, they "specialize in the production of the most advanced goods, which involves the use of the most sophisticated technologies and highly mechanized methods of production (capital intensive production)". Capital intensive production is the one that has a high level of investment in the production facilities (Shannon 1996, 27-28). Some world-system theorists say that the goods produced in the core are those that have highest rates of return. Others agree that these goods have the highest returns, but they add that the sectors in the core areas are also the most protected activities from competition. On the other hand, the states and colonies in the periphery are involved in economic activities that are technologically less "sophisticated and more labor-intensive than those in the core". Some scholars add that the economic activities in the periphery are also the ones that are open to competition the most. Therefore, prices and profits of the products produced in the periphery are low (28) Thus, the difference between the core and the periphery is a result of the specialization in production of goods necessitating different technologies (Brewer 2001, 177). The exchanges between core and peripheral processes cause an unequal relationship. The surplus value in the

periphery countries flows to core countries (Wallerstein 2006, 18; Brewer 2001, 177; Tayfur 2000, 30).

Differentiating the regions of the world as core and periphery, one might think that the theory shifts the focus of the IR theories from intra-system uniform relationships to the system and environment relations. Indeed, it analyses a type of relationship that is not addressed by balance of power and society of states theories which explain a symmetrical relationship not an asymmetrical one. Therefore, the theory has the potential to be competent in applying the system and environment conceptualization to the core and periphery dichotomy. By identifying the core and the periphery as two dissimilar sides, it approximates to the system and environment conceptualization because it explains the relations between the dissimilar parties rather than relations between similar structures, which are about inside of the system. Though the theory has these promising aspects, unfortunately it suffers from some insufficiencies because it does not clarify the status of the core and the periphery; it does not say whether they are systems or not. Rather the theory says that the system is the World (economy) itself. It does not explain the status of the core and the periphery in relation to the World-system in language of systems perspective. Are the core and the periphery two subsystems of the world-system that are themselves independent systems or not? The answer of World-system theory is no. Because the theory treats the core and the periphery as the parts of the system, it shows the traits of old way system thinking that suggest that systems are a cumulation of parts. Nor, according to World-system theory, the core and the periphery are structures of the system that the system utilizes for realization of its functions. Given the fact that the World-system is given no function, and core and periphery are not defined as structures that the World-system constructed; the system character of the theory is flawed. However, the theory is useful in shifting the attention from the relations between similar sides (i.e. state to state relations) to relations between dissimilar sides (developed and underdeveloped regions).

Another flaw of the theory is that it assumes a system that does not change. In other words, the system does not change; the only change that occurs is the one that occurs inside of the system. This flaw emanates from its omittance of the relations between the system and its environment. In other words, because there is no outside influence

toward the system, the system does not change or faces the possibility of extermination or revision. Because the boundaries of the system are identified with the entire world, there is not outside force that would lead to change in the system. Rather the system has a logic that repeats itself in all eras in history; the only chance of change is the cycles that are witnessed within the boundaries of the system.

The cycles that are witnessed in the World-system develop as an automatic result of the working principles of production. “The cyclical rhythms of the world-economy” are witnessed because at some point the monopolies dissolve. Monopolies are established in core areas; they are protected from competition by the government; and they receive high returns for the goods that they produce. At the establishment period of the monopoly when a leading product is first introduced there is not only high profits for the producers but also the economy is doing well. The unemployment rates decline, wage levels rise, and a general sense of prosperity prevails. However, as more and more firms enter into the market to produce the profitable product, the supply of the product increases to exceed the demand. Then a price competition starts that leads to the decline in profits that the monopolies get, which leads to a slowdown in production. At this stage, we arrive at the reversed side of the cyclical curve. In this situation unemployment rises and demand decreases because overproduction is coupled with contraction in wages (Wallerstein 2006, 30).

These cyclical rhythms in the World-economy are accompanied by the rise, decline and replacement of the hegemons in the World-system. World-system theory’s hegemony concept has a political as well as an economic character. A hegemon can exert influence in “economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural” realms. Yet, the hegemony period is “brief, rare, and peculiarly related to war”. We can mention hegemony, “when no second power or combination of second powers seems capable of challenging the economic supremacy of the strongest core power” (Wilkinson 2003, 63) The hegemony is achieved only for a short period, during which the hegemon state has productive, commercial and financial superiority simultaneously (Wilkinson 2003, 64). Wallerstein names three hegemons that were seen in the modern times, the Netherlands, the Great Britain and the United States. They, he says, came to that position after a world war (Thirty Years War 1618-48; Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815; and the single long world war 1914-1945). These three

states were sea powers previously, but they defeated a strong land power (Habsburgs, France and Germany), which at the time were striving to “transform the world economy into a world empire”. In these wars where the sea powers aimed to counter hegemony tendencies of land powers, all the major powers of the era fought with each other in a very destructive way (65). The would-be hegemons were originally sea powers, whose armies were weak. They were reluctant to build strong armies, fearing that it would have negative effects on the state revenues. Yet, all three states found it necessary to have a strong land army to counter the strong land-based power (66). At the end of these wars, the sea powers emerged as the hegemons.

Thus, we can say that the historical systems have a period of life that is marked with the dominance of monopolies and hegemons. Their life continues in the “framework and constraints of the structures that constitutes them”. These periods end up with a crisis (Wallerstein 2006, 76). The crisis period, which can also be called the transition period, takes some time. At the end of the transition, we find ourselves in a different historic system, where there is a new hegemon and monopolies (76-77). The thing that leads to the crisis is the adaptation capability of weaker states and firms to copy the capabilities of the core areas. The reason why hegemony is brief is that other states copy the productive capacity of the hegemon, and the military costs of the hegemon are too high (Wilkinson 2003, 66). There are three areas of production costs: These are wages paid to the employers, the costs undertaken for purchasing the inputs of production, and third, the taxes that the firms have to pay to state structures (79).

This explanation of cycles within the World-system is the way change is explained by the World-system theory. This change occurs only when one hegemon replaces the other, and when one monopoly is being replaced by another monopoly (Wallerstein 2006, 27). This change occurs within the boundaries of the World-system, and no outside influence is seen. The system has a mechanism of itself that witnesses certain cycles inside. This limited change forecast emanates from the designation of the world system as the widest possible system that leaves nothing outside. Since there is nothing remaining outside, there is no fundamental system change (i.e. termination of system to exist, transformation of system from one form to another irreversibly, replacement of system with another one... etc.). Linked to this problem we do not know whether the system is valid for a period of time or it is valid for all times, this

is not clear. At this point, it should be emphasized that the study of system approach also proves useful in explanation of system change. If the system approach was adopted in the World-system theory, it would suggest that there is an environment of the system that can lead to termination or revision of the system. Thus, the system approach predicts fundamental change in the system when it has relations with elements outside of the system (i.e. physical-biological environment, human beings, and other systems such as world society). Without the environment of the system, the internal dynamics of the system would only repeat themselves and the system would be a closed one. Thus, we see that, in addition to its contribution in recognizing different types of relations, also the possibilities of change can be grasped with the adaptation of the systems theory to analysis of world political relations.

Unable to explain system change, the theory also fails in indicating the differences between structures of core and periphery. Even though the theory differentiates core and periphery and says that the relationship between them is one of exploitation, it does not differentiate the structures of core from those of periphery. In World-system theory, difference between the core and the periphery does not make them have differentiated structures. The structures (the states, organizations, institutions, firms, markets) of the core and periphery are depicted as showing the same functions. Of these structures, for example the states exhibit the same qualities across the globe, i.e., they are all sovereign (Wallerstein 2006, 42). Nationalism is another denominator of all states in the world. As an identity, nationalism has a key role in the inter-state system in that nationalism is the cement of state structures; this is true of both strong and weak states. The nations are also myths that are constructed; states play a key role in this construction. Even the states claiming that they are multinational try to create an identity that would encompass all members of the state in question. The nation construction by states has many facets, i.e., they create a history and they define the set of characteristics of the nation. The “state school system, service in the armed forces, and public ceremonies” are the mechanisms through which this nation construction takes place (54). Hence, we see that the World-system approach does not see any difference in the qualities of state and the role states adopt against their citizens in general.

When it comes to the relations between state and firms, again states have similar functions both in the core and in the periphery. State's role against firms is enforcing the relationship between owners and workers by "protecting property rights and enforcing the terms of exchange among participants in the economy". It helps creating favorable conditions to the "operation of productive enterprises". Whoever receives the surplus generated from these activities and uses it for capital accumulation becomes the winner. Capital accumulation renders a more competitive position to those possessing it over the others (Shannon 1996, 25). This capacity of state to favor owners emanates from various means that are at the disposal of state:

From the point of view of entrepreneurs operating in the capitalist world-economy, the sovereign states assert authority in at least seven principal arenas of direct interest to them: (1) States set the rules on whether and under what conditions commodities, capital, and labor may cross their borders. (2) They create the rules concerning property rights within their states. (3) They set rules concerning employment and the compensation of employees. (4) They decide which costs firms must internalize. (5) They decide what kinds of economic processes may be monopolized, and to what degree. (6) They tax. (7) Finally, when firms based within their boundaries may be affected, they can use their power externally to affect the decisions of other states. This is a long list, and just looking at it makes one realize that from the point of view of firms, state policies are crucial (Wallerstein 2006, 46).

Thus, we see that state has a uniform function across the globe; either it is a weak state in the periphery or a strong state in the core, it does not matter. The states by using their means toward facilitating, inhibiting, protecting, regulating, and taxing show some preferences. They favor their own firms while they take a negative attitude against the firms located in other countries. Firms also demonstrate the same functions. They want protection, facilitation, and low taxes. It does not matter where they are located; they have the same goals. In other words, even though the type of relationship between the core and the periphery is that of inequality, dissimilarity, and exploitation; the structures of the core and periphery (states, firms, and other structures) have the same functions and goals. This makes us question consistency of the theory by asking how it is possible that the same structures perform so differently, if they have no differences between each other. Probably the answer would be that these structures at both sides have different levels of wealth/capabilities. If so, then the functions of the core structures and peripheral structures must differ because of differing levels of wealth/capabilities that the core and the periphery have. In other

words, the core and the periphery must have produced different structures. These two sides must maintain certain identities or features that cause the structures of them to also display different qualities. However, there is no such differentiation between the structures (i.e., states, and firms) of core and periphery in the World-system theory.

The system approach would say that the systems create their structures that would be conducive to the realization of the functions of the system. If the structures, such as states and firms are created by the world wide phenomenon of the World-system, then these structures must have served to levelling off the differences between the core and the periphery rather than consolidating the differences. If the differentiation between the core and periphery is constant, then the only plausible explanation would be that the structures of the core are only imitated in the periphery only in the form. Function-wise the structures in periphery must be helping reproduce the difference between the core and the periphery. The structures of core are serving to advancement of the advantaged position of the core, while the structures in the periphery serve keeping the periphery in the lower rank. Because this difference is not defined as such, the World-system is not a system that offers consistent structure definitions that varies depending on the location of the structure, namely the core and the periphery. The application of the system theory's consistency test (namely that structures are the products of system and that they are conducive to realization of functions of system) shows that world system theory mistakenly treats all structures in the world as if they have similar functions.

Furthermore, the fact that the World-system claims that the entire globe is included in the system, but the structures of the system are not producing uniform consequences across the globe, we can say that boundaries of the system are not properly designed. If the boundaries of the World-system were properly delineated, all structures of the system would act in a way conducive to the realization of the functions of the system. Where the structures start to show different functions, the system's boundaries stop and the boundaries of another system or environment of the system starts. Applying this criterion to World-system theory, we can say that because the structures in the World-economy differ by having different effects in the position of core and periphery, the World-system is not a system that includes both core and periphery.

Therefore, it can be asserted that World-system theory's definition of the entire world as a unit is problematic.

If we continue to assess the World-system theory from a system approach perspective, another flaw is that firms and states have an identity independent of the system in World-system theory, even though, in principle, the theory claims that the system constrains the structures (Wallerstein 2006, 21). For instance, taking the interstate relations, it is implied that the states' relationship with each other is little affected by the unique character of the World-system theory. The states are almost situated in a parallel environment next to the World-system. The theory says the primary feature of the modern state is its sovereignty (42), meaning that state finds its base in sovereignty (mutual recognition), and not in system. The theory maintains; sovereignty is a claim that needs to be accepted by the others, meaning that a state's sovereign capability is a matter of legitimacy, not something that the World-economy renders. The "reciprocal recognition" of sovereignty by the states provides legitimacy. Even hostile states, by recognizing the sovereignty of each other, admit the "realities of power". Thus, sovereignty is a primary feature of the interstate system (44). Reciprocity is not only an external quality but also an internal quality of sovereignty. In fact, the local authorities too should recognize the sovereignty of state, while it is also necessary that state recognize local authorities' sphere (45). Thus, sovereignty has its logic; it is not something that the World-system designs and puts in practice.

World-system approach classifies states according to two criteria. They are first categorized as weak and strong powers. Second, they are recognized from the category where they are located, i.e., core, periphery, and semi-periphery. The weakness or strength of the states is derived from their position relative to domestic elements, other states, and non-state entities. Thus, there is a hierarchy between the states. In the core states, production is efficient and state is strong. Peripheral states are at the bottom, the production is inefficient and production processes are less rewarding. While export-oriented economy of peripheral areas produces weak states, the economic organization that is strong in industry, commerce and finance produce strong states in the core. Next to the core and the periphery there is also semi-periphery. Semi-periphery is "both exploited and exploiter"; it reduces the criticism from periphery toward the core. Semi-periphery is more like a political category than an economic

one (Tayfur 2000, 28-31). It is a category in between core and periphery; it is offered to solve the problem of inability to define a clear-cut border between the core and the periphery (Tayfur 2003, 16, 22). While the core and the periphery are defined in relation to each other, the semi-periphery is not such a category. Even though semi-periphery is a political category, it is not identified with a type of economic activity. However, the core and the periphery are identified with certain forms of economic activities (Tayfur 2000, 17, 36). Semi-periphery is located between the core and the periphery. On the other hand, according to Chase-Dunn, these categories are helpful for us use them as metaphors; it is not essential to identify the empirical cases that fit these categories. Semi-periphery should also be considered in this vein (Keenes 1993, 151).

Overall, in World-system theory, states, different from exploitation based logic of core and periphery relationship, have another logic in their relations with each other. The type of relationship among states is conflictual (Wallerstein 2006, 57; Tayfur 2000, 29). Both the rivalries between the strong states and the semi peripheral states' ambition to climb to higher ranks create a continuous condition of interstate rivalry which is called balance of power. The balance of power means that no state is able to automatically get its own way. This does not mean that the strong states do not attempt to achieve a power level where they can act upon their own way. There are two different ways of doing so, and both of these ways were tried. The first one is transforming the "modern world-system into a world-empire". None of states so far has achieved this goal even though there have been attempts. The world empire can be achieved when the entire world system is controlled by a single political authority. The first unsuccessful attempt to achieve such a condition was that of Charles V in the 16th century CE. The second of these attempts was under Napoleon at the beginning of the 19th century CE, and the third unsuccessful attempt was that of Hitler in the mid-20th century CE. All these attempts were serious and had the possibility of success, but all failed (Wallerstein 2006, 57).

Next to the World-empire, the second form of attempt to be able to go its own way in state to state relations is creation of a hegemony. This capacity has already been achieved by three different powers but for only a limited period of time. The Netherlands in mid 17th century, the Great Britain in the mid 19th century and the

United States in mid 20th century have achieved hegemony status (Wallerstein 2006, 57). The factors that make us assign them hegemony are (a) their ability to set the rules of the game in the inter-state system, (b) their ability to dominate the world-economy; production, commerce, and finance all being included, and (c) their capacity to apply their policies with minimal use of military force (58). As we can see, this logic is different from core-periphery conceptualization. Even though the World-system claims that it explains the world affairs with a single system, it fails to provide an answer to the question of what is the role of state in the core-periphery relations. As a structure, its role is not attributed to the World-economy, but to independent balance of power logic. One might think that the reason why World-system theory assigns an independent character to the state and states-system is because it considers them as a different system from the World-system. In other words, it does not take states as the structures of the World-system but as elements of another system. We can see that the theory, in fact does not explain the world political relations; its purview is limited to world economic relations.

The theory says; capitalist world system has a “single division of labor, multiple state structures... and ... multiple cultures”. These qualities of capitalist system do not allow creation of a world empire and a continuous hegemony because a world empire would constrain capitalism’s aim of endless capital accumulation. Thus, when the possibility of a world empire arises the capitalist firms oppose it (Wallerstein 2006, 58; Yalvaç 2017, 41-42). In this context, the world entertains a unique form of political organization, where there is no single state that rules over the entire world. Instead, there is an “interstate system of competing, sovereign nation-states” (Shannon 1996, 26; Yalvaç 2017, 41-42) The theory suggests that this contrast between the scope of the economic realm and political realm is something different from old ages. Previously, if there was a “geographically extensive economy” it would end up with control of a single state, thus creation of a world-empire. The modern World-system differently from previous eras has this multitude of states, and this is not something unfavored by the World-system, rather the world economic system benefits from this. In fact, “interstate competition and capitalism reinforce one another”. Capitalist World-system would not be able to thrive if the state system was not divided, a “single world system” would have used its coercive power to “destroy the independence of

the capitalist class” (Shannon 1996, 27; Yalvaç 2017, 41-42). To wrap up, on the one hand, the theory claims universality, on the other hand it allows existence of parallel paradigms. On one side the system dominates core-periphery relations; on other side state to state relations have an independent character. This contrast indicates that World-system theory fails in providing a consistent world political theory. Rather it is a theory for world economic relations.

2.4. Imperialism Theory

Different from balance of power and society of states, but similar to the world system theory, imperialism focuses on relations between dissimilar sides. However, while World-system theory focuses on how global production is unequally divided between the core and periphery where exchange of the products between the two sides lead to the exploitation of periphery by the core, imperialism theory suggests that there is an imposition of will by the imperialist states over exploited states. Opposite to the World-system theory, which sees the exploitation as an automatic result emanating from specialization in production of different products, imperialism says that this exploitation is not automatic; rather it is enforced by various means including violence. The first imperialism theories that were developed in the late 19th and early 20th century CE pointed out that imperialism came about as a result of “perversion of both nationalism and capitalism”. This perversion led to emergence of states aiming “territorial and industrial aggrandizement” in such a way that they left “wholesome stimulative rivalry of varied national types into the cut-throat struggle of competing empires” (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 244).

In the World-system theory, there is a division of labor that benefits the core areas the most. Imperialism says it is not division of labor but the problems in production relations in the imperialist states (where capitalism dominates) that lead to exploitation of non-capitalist areas by force. Thus, there is not a World-wide system that designs roles to core and periphery. Rather there is a capitalist system that exists in imperialist countries only, and next to them there are non-capitalist regions, which are outside of the system. This division allows the definition of two sides in imperialism theory; the imperialist countries and the colonized regions. The

relationship between these two sides is that imperialist states exploit unindustrialized regions. Although the theory emerged in late 19th century CE, it argued that imperialism developed in parallel with human civilization, so it had roots from very early. As such, today imperialism as an idea is as valid as it was in the past. There is not much difference for example between the colonies of Ancient Greece and Rome, and the European colonies in America and West Indies (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 244).

Thinking in system terms, capitalism is a system that makes projections on non-capitalist regions (areas outside of the system) and the reason why the capitalist system has projections is because capitalism experiences its internal problems that force it to seek an exit toward non-capitalist regions through exploitation. Even though this duality disappears in new imperialism theories, the classical imperialism theories base their analysis of world political relations on this duality. Having such commonality, however, the early imperialism theorists demonstrate differences among each other. The first thinker to theorize imperialism, Hobson, was instrumentalist in his explanation of imperialist state's attitude, by saying that the state was usurped by "sectional interests" who were "financiers of capital". He maintained that, as opposed to increasing production capability and abundant capital "in search of investment", consumption was limited in industrialized countries. Therefore, there was an *under consumption* in these countries, which led to pressure from capital toward their national states to secure "foreign markets in which [they would] invest and sell commodities" (Sutton 2013, 221-222; Brewer 2001, 73-74). This reasoning about imperialism that is based on over-accumulation in imperialist states becomes the basis for both classical and newer theories of imperialism (Sutton 2013, 222).

Imperialism theorists after Hobson were mainly from Marxist tradition of thought. The main argument of Marxist theories was that imperialism was a product of capitalism and it was forcing the capitalist states toward war (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 244). Hilferding was the first Marxist author who wrote on imperialism. He carried the argument to another point. Instead of pressure from over accumulation in the imperialist countries, Hilferding said, the *interests of the capitalists abroad* have been the motive behind imperialism. The argument went on that state was needed to control new territories that were colonized both to protect the interests of the capitalists and also to prevent the entrance of capitalists of other industrialized states, which can enter

into a competition with them. Thus, each national capitalist class, in the imperialist stage of capitalism, was aiming to preserve their interests in the controlled territories. The capitalists were able to unite for influencing state decisions because “personal relationships between influential capitalists” played a unifying role among them (Sutton 2013, 222; Brewer 2001, 105-106; Yalvaç 2017, 37). Once a personal relationship was established between the capitalists, then they established a relation with the state, by instrumentalization of it (Sutton 2013, 223; Brewer 2001, 106).

Following Hilferding, Bukharin wrote on imperialism. He periodized capitalism and said that when the finance capitalism stage was achieved, imperialism by the industrialized states started to be seen. According to him, *imperialism was “a policy and ... an ideology, ... a characteristic of the world economy at a particular stage of development”* (Sutton 2013, 223; Brewer 2001, 110). In Bukharin’s thought, in the imperialist stage, there was a tendency of *monopolization* of the economy. Besides, state and the national economy were united, and the competition among the firms was eradicated. Each imperialist country, thus, acted as a unified entity (Brewer 2001, 114-115; Yalvaç 2017, 37). However, even though competition was eradicated inside the national economies of imperialist countries, competition between different imperialist countries in the world level continued to exist, and it was not likely that this competition would end any time soon. Competition in the world created a competitive anarchy that generated the “imperialist annexation” of peripheral areas (Brewer 2001, 115-116; Yalvaç 2017, 37).

While in the works of Bukharin there were signs of periodization of capitalism as the reason behind the emergence of imperialism, in Lenin, this became more explicit as he said that imperialism was the “*necessary and the highest stage of capitalism*” (Sutton 2013, 224; Bush 2006, 45; Yalvaç 2017, 38) that was *based on “economic exploitation of the oppressed”* (Bush 2006, 45). His views on imperialism were a reinterpretation of the views of Hilferding, Bukharin and Hobson (Brewer 2001, 116). Lenin talked about capital export from industrialized countries to unindustrialized states as a process “to gain control of sources of raw materials, or at least to prevent others from gaining monopoly control of them” (Brewer 2001, 119). Thus, imperialism had a parasitic character; in the imperialist stage, the “countries richest in capital” decayed as the unevenness between the rich and poor countries grew to the

degrees unseen. The rentiers in rich countries, more and more refrained from production, and by exporting capital in the unindustrialized countries exploited the labor in these countries (Brewer 2001, 120-121). Lenin expected that the relations between the imperialist countries would evolve toward more militarization (Yalvaç 2017, 38).

The contribution of first imperialism theories was that they pointed at the “crisis-prone nature of capitalism” that led the industrialized countries to exploit the unindustrialized countries. In the exploitation process, state was utilized as a mechanism that resorted to “violence and conflict” (Sutton 2013, 225; Linklater 2005b, 120-1). In other words, they said capitalism was causing the states to control foreign territories for either serving to the interests of the monopolies or to find new areas for “surplus capital” that could not be utilized in the domestic boundaries for profitable activities (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 244-245; Linklater 2005b, 120-1). Thus, the result of this machination was that the major powers got involved in competition and conflict (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 245; Linklater 2005b, 120; Brewer 2001, 89). These were systemic pressures (the systemic pressures mean the pressure from working of the capitalist economy) driving the imperialist states toward conflict among each other (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 245). On the one hand, the industrialized countries exploited the unindustrialized countries through use of force; on the other hand, they had conflict among each other.

Thus, we can see that the first wave of imperialism theories categorized the countries into two groups. One group was industrialized countries that were under control of capitalist system and the other group was non-industrialized countries that were exploited by industrialized countries. The exploitation was achieved through use of force in two directions. One was that the industrialized countries used force against non-industrialized countries, and the other was that the imperialist countries used force against each other. While the use of force was applied among the imperialists for getting more share compared to other industrialized countries (Brewer 2001, 89), the use of force against non-capitalist countries was because of imposition of will on unindustrialized countries. From a systems theory perspective, we can say that classical imperialism theories took the imperialist countries together as a system owing to capitalism; dominance of capitalism in industrialized countries forced them

to have a single attitude against the non-industrialized countries. However, the status of non-industrialized countries was not clarified; whether they were a system or not was not mentioned. The fact that the capitalist system imposed the way the industrialized countries would act made state in imperialist countries just an instrument of capitalism or capitalist class. The role of the states in non-industrialized countries was once again unmentioned. Yet, state's role in the capitalist regions was explained in conformity with what system theory would suggest. States did not enjoy autonomy, rather they were means utilized by the capitalist system. The imperialist states did what they did (i.e. rivalry among each other or exploitation of the non-capitalist regions) because capitalism as a system forced the states to act this way. Such an understanding of capitalism as a system allows us to apply the system and environment conceptualization of systems theory to imperialism theories. In this case, while the industrialized countries formed the system the non-industrialized countries were the environment of the system.

This system, taking the non-capitalist regions as the environment, had an adversarial attitude against the non-capitalist regions; for system could exist and sustain itself. Capitalist system needed to establish an exploitative and adversarial relation with the environment. Therefore, it can be inferred that for a system can be established as an entity it must be able to impose its existence on the environment. After the system emerges as an independent entity, for meeting its needs and rendering its sustenance, the system imposes its will on the environment. Indeed, as one system theorist suggests, it is the harmonious and connected character of system that makes those outside of the system sense the existence of the system as an imposition (Bogdanov 1984, 5; see also Deutsche 1952, 478). This imposition might encompass forceful means through structures of the system; i.e., states, firms, classes... etc. In the balance of power theory, too, states use force; but the aim of use of force is not differentiating themselves from the environment and obliging the environment to do certain things. The states in the balance of power use force inside of the system and they aim to achieve the balance in the system, there is no environment in balance of power. Therefore, imperialism stands distinctive in formulating the use of force as a means to draw the boundaries between the system and environment. In this respect, imperialism theory adds something to system approach in world politics, but it omits

the attitude of the environment against the system. We do not know what is the attitude and capabilities of colonies or exploited regions against the imperialist countries/capitalist system.

Second, imperialism theory's explanation regarding the relations among the imperialist states is problematic since it assumed a conflictual relationship between them. The imperialist states had similar capabilities and similar policies toward non-capitalist regions, and they were similarly affected by capitalism. Given these assumptions, one expects that the imperialism theory to suggest that imperialist countries were not in conflict in the face of so much similarities between them. A more reasonable explanation would be that the imperialist countries were acting in harmony against the non-capitalist regions, as they had no issues with each other on whether each of them was entitled to exploit non-capitalist regions or not. System theory also would expect that imperialist countries exhibit coherence in their attitude toward each other as they had similar attitudes against the environment. In this regard, imperialism theory is not able to explain the cohesiveness in attitudes of the imperialist states against each other. At the end of wars, they do not exploit each other. Rather they check and balance each other in a way that the system sustains itself. Therefore, wars between imperialist countries are not an indication of fundamental conflict that exists between them.

In recent years a new wave of imperialism theories sprung, called new imperialism theories. The assertion of these studies is that a new form of imperialism emerged and this is different from all of its forerunners (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 245). New theories focus on contemporary "international state system". In this, they particularly deal with the policies of the USA, and the globalization process. They say that different from the late 19th and early 20th century CE imperialism, the new imperialism does not resort to conquest, but rather it utilizes "soft power" and "shared values"; it resorts to violence only in some cases (Sutton 2013, 226). These new approaches maintain that the United States, by defeating its rival the Soviet Union, embarked on an expansionist outlook, by forcing other states to liberalize their economies and by using its military power against other states. Washington became the new Rome. Therefore, the main theme of new imperialism studies became world political relations of the United States (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 246; Yalvaç 2017, 39).

These theories say that the world market has tremendously expanded and deepened, and that this has something to do with the development of new imperialism. One version of new imperialism theories states that global capital replaced states in being the dominant source of sovereignty, thus the global capital itself became an empire, through “the impersonal rule of world market”. National boundaries lost their significance; capital replaced the state system; global level ruling by capital became dominant. Second version of theories stresses the role of “capitalist class”. It maintains that the global authority is not capital or states but it is an “international elite”. This elite class is mainly resident in the United States and has representatives from other states as well. The global economy is governed in accordance with the interests of this elite group (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 247; Yalvaç 2017, 39). The third approach denies both the global capital and transatlantic elite theories, it rather says that the nation-states continue to play the key role in management of the global economy. It is true that the global economy expanded, but this does not cause the role of state to diminish, rather the expansion of the world economy is “orchestrated by the most powerful capitalist states” and these states, to a large extent, are benefiting from the management of the world economy. Thus, states are the key players in this new form of imperialism, but differently from old theories of imperialism they say that, states are playing their role not by controlling new territories but rather by controlling the global markets (Kettell and Sutton 2013, 247).

While in the first generation of imperialism theories there was a system, capitalism, forcing the industrialized countries to apply imperialistic policies in the non-industrialized regions, in the new imperialism theories, this systemic pressure on the state to pursue imperialistic policies does not exist. Rather, capital or an elite group or a group of states control the world economy for their interests. While these parties seek control, the old dichotomy of imperialist areas vs. the exploited areas loses its appeal. Rather there is a single power that controls the entire globe; everything is united as being part of a single phenomenon. Thus, the systemic character of the new imperialism theories is seriously damaged in comparison to the old imperialism theories. In new imperialism theories, there are not systems in charge; rather there are actors in charge. The actor could be the global capital, international elite, or the imperialist states. What we see in world political relations is a result of what these

actors wish to do, which is controlling everything for whatever interests. This suggests a single form of relationship, a hierarchy, where a system and environment differentiation becomes senseless. Global capital, international elite, or industrialized states are able to design the entire global affairs for their benefits. There is not “the other” of the new imperialism theories. Therefore, even if we want to imagine a system within the new imperialism theories’ discourse, it is difficult to find it because the entire world is controlled by an actor, not by a social system that is not under control of anyone.

2.5. Postcolonialism Theory

Postcolonialism, as a perspective that offers systemic explanations about the world political relations, aims at showing the means that the “south” has against the “north”. It diverts the general focus of systemic IR theories from the attitudes of the north to those of the south. Even though postcolonialism in its accounts does not claim to be systemic, its arguments demonstrate that it is a systemic theory which takes the south and the north as two interacting systems. While the north is placed in the environment of the south, the south is placed in the environment of the north. In other theories, while the powerful/imperialist states or regions mostly seem as if they are a system because of some form of cohesiveness in these regions, colonized/lesser states or regions lack this cohesiveness. Because the colonized/lesser states are disorganized, they can best be named as an environment composed of scattered entities, rather than a system. However, postcolonial theory aims to give an agential capacity to the entirety of the south; it claims that the south has the capacity to produce results and to challenge the north. In this challenge, the south can change the dominant form of relationship between the south and the north, namely cultural, political, economic exploitation. This stance of the theory is substantiated first through problematizing the approach of other theories, especially those of Marxist and Poststructuralist theories, by showing that they are, in their analysis of north-south relationship, either assigning an inferior position to south or portraying the south’s difference as intractable.

To start with the Marxist theories; according to postcolonialism theory, Marxism neglects the “racial, ethnic, religious and gender inequalities” in favor of economic inequalities (Linklater 2005b, 132) since Marxism considers *culture* and politics of representation as secondary realms to be studied in the relations between the western/north and non-western/south regions. By exploring capitalism’s history as the sole source of unequal development, also, the Marxist approach takes the European history as the center of study. The European development path is being portrayed as the path to be emulated for the developing world (Kapoor 2002, 654). Because of these, postcolonialism adheres to the idea that Marxism does not pay attention to the uniqueness of each identity and “their struggle for the historical and ethical right to signify” (655). Marxism’s cosmopolitan character, therefore, seems just as a “new form of domination” (Linklater 2005b, 132). Indeed, Marxism emerged in an era of European dominance, and Marx himself welcomed the process of colonization (124). The enlightenment thinkers generally had a “disparaging” view of non-western societies. In line with this tradition, Marx and Engels also had a “contemptuous” view of non-western societies. According to them, imperialism and capitalism would have a liberating effect on the “historyless peoples” and save them “from religious myth and the tyranny of tradition” (133). These biases of Marxist theory led a more favorable impression of postcolonial theory regarding world politics in the third world as opposed to Marxist theories (Kapoor 2002, 647). For many third world Marxists, “proletariat in the industrial world is one of the beneficiaries of neo-imperialism”, and this belief made Marxists in the third world to support the national movements in the peripheral areas rather than showing allegiance to the “Western socialist ideal of proletarian internationalism” (Linklater 2005b, 123). Thus, we can say that postcolonialism has a perspective that detaches itself from the cosmopolitan views, and this leads to an impression of the south as a separate system from the north. Having such an approach, postcolonialism includes the argument that the north should not be idealized because it has its own agenda. This opposes the Marxist belief that achievements of the north should be emulated. According to postcolonialism the south is an alternative that should be considered an independent form of existence where multiple identities, races, ethnicities, and cultures could co-exist. Not only the economic exploitation but also other forms of exploitation committed by north toward the south must be brought on the table. It is not necessary that the south follows a path

that aims homogenization with the north. At this point, we can say that postcolonialism aims to define another system alternative to the north.

Another theory that postcolonialism criticizes is poststructuralism. The criticism is made on the grounds that poststructuralism restricts its analysis to describing the marginalization and the oppression of the other (the south) but refraining from taking side with the south, thus abstaining from expressing what the south is able to say and do. Poststructuralism avoids being concerned with this because it portrays the oppression and marginalization that the south undergoes as permanent. According to Postcolonialism, this stance is in contradiction with the origins of poststructuralism (Sajed 2012). In fact, postcolonialism theorists argue that the emergence of deconstruction as a tradition can be associated with the “French colonial system in Algeria and with the violent anti-colonialism struggle that ensued”. Poststructuralism is originally a resistance project. However, postcolonialism maintains, despite its postcolonial background, poststructuralism only idealizes the “marginalized, the oppressed or the native”, while avoiding opposition to this oppression. Poststructuralism is far from understanding the complexity of the oppressed groups’ situation and the content of the voice that these groups/nations are raising (141-142). In poststructuralism, the “postcolonial subject” is in fact being “recolonized” in that it is portrayed as someone whose position is intractable. The difference attributed to the oppressed groups/nations serves only to “refashion a knowable Western discourse” (142). As opposed to the knowable West, the poststructuralist authors in IR portray the “other” as someone who cannot be defined in full, the details of which are unknown, but which is resistant against the West (147). If something cannot be conceptualized within the western context, it is beyond the knowable. Once again IR’s purview is limited to knowing what occurs in the north (156). The “other” is pacified in terms of taking any action; “very grounded and grassroots mobilizations that have taken place” in colonized areas are omitted (150).

Not only does poststructuralism omit the “grounded and grassroots mobilizations” of the south, but it also intentionally refrains from speaking on behalf of the “others”. Poststructuralists rather claim that they are expecting that the others/south would make their voice heard by themselves. However, this refusal in fact makes poststructuralists refrain from taking the responsibility to express the brutalities in

history (Sajed 2012, 154). Here, the passive role attributed to the south by poststructuralism, and poststructuralism's unwillingness to take side with the south is criticized. Postcolonialism rather states that the south has an agential role, in the sense that it is capable of producing results, and its agential role must be supported. The south can organize grassroot mobilizations resistant to the north, as well as enter an anti-colonial independence struggle successfully. A simple definition of the south as an oppressed and marginalized area portrays it as lacking the quality of a system while the north is a system that can have an agential role. Postcolonialism challenges this and claims that the south has an agential role, even though this did not materialize in an organized fashion. The south, while keeping its diversity intact, is also able to show a harmonized attitude towards the north. The south also has no significant disagreement within itself. This ability of the south to act harmoniously and the lack of conflict within the south can be interpreted as an attempt to assign the south a system identity. In a similar vein, postcolonialism attributes a system character to the north on the grounds that there is the synchronous attitude in the north (exploitation and oppression) against the south. At the same time, there are common attributes of the north, i.e. knowable, oppressive, exclusionary, exploitative, powerful. The north does not have a clash within itself, but it has a uniform approach toward the south. These features make the areas in the north agents capable of showing identifiable tendencies among each other and against the south. The south is able to oppose this system of the north with its own capabilities. For the south can do this, its capabilities and its right to oppose the north should be acknowledged and supported.

After clarifying the differences between postcolonialism and other theories, now it is convenient to mention explanations of postcolonialism regarding the relations between the north and the south. Postcolonial thought argues that in the north and south relations, *culture and knowledge* are used as mechanisms of repression and violence for controlling (Bush 2006, 51; Kapoor 2002, 647-648). Even though the general understanding is that power and truth has no relationship (Doty 1996, 145), in fact, production of knowledge involves "construction of identities and relationships, and power inheres in this". Therefore, production of knowledge most of the time confirms control and domination carried out through military and economic power (146). The north uses knowledge as a means of domination by taking the south as its

image of the other, and while doing this it portrays the other as inferior (Bush 2006, 52). However, this does not reflect the reality, this is rather a “distorted representation of reality” (53). Indeed, postcolonialism claims that different attributes are assigned to the societies in the north and the south. While societies in the south are “irrational, degenerate, primitive, mystical, suspicious”, the societies in the north are “rational, peaceful, liberal, logical... without natural suspicion”. Yet, these depictions are not neutral or value free. Rather, these “representations” are “laden with a will to power, a will to control, manipulate, even to incorporate what is a manifestly different world” (Kapoor 2002, 650). This form of representation helps the north have control over the south (Bush 2006, 54).

One should not imagine that this capacity of the north’s culture and dominance is unchallengeable (Kapoor 2002, 651; Bush 2006, 51). In fact, colonizing powers have never been capable of fully colonizing and effectively controlling the colonized territories, and this gives us room for imagining that the colonial rule is not unchallengeable. In fact, colonized areas have the ability to undermine domination of the north (Kapoor 2002, 657). The challenge by the south has the potential to produce counter discourses that will intervene in the discourse produced by the north (651). This means that the dominated societies should produce and control knowledge (agency) as a way of resistance to the dominance. However, the dominated areas cannot resist the dominant powers by directly opposing them; neither with action nor with discourses. Rather the discourse should be produced in current conditions which are created by the dominant societies. Hence, critique and negotiation are key approaches to be adopted in resistance. The goal of the resistance is to “preserve heterogeneity and to criticize ... disparagement or transcendence by any master discourse” (652). It is necessary to improve more ideas about “otherness” and “difference” for “transcending the West as a system of reference”. About these issues, postcolonialism would prove useful by bringing “perspectives, histories, and voices from elsewhere” to the field (IR) (Sajed 2012, 144), for rewriting the history from the perspectives of the north’s others (145). Thus, the south has the capacity to challenge the dominance of the north through criticism and negotiation. The purpose of actions of the south is ending dominance and equalizing the relationship between the north and the south; a proposition that is not seen in other IR theories. Postcolonialism is

not only a theory that clearly finds a collaboration and cohesiveness as opposed to conflict in the north/system, it also offers a new type of relationship from the south toward the north, at least a proposed relationship, that is seeking equality and neutralizing the dominance.

The north, on the other hand, has worries about the demands of the south toward equality. Postcolonialism puts that we can see there is a fear in the north that the south is entering the “international society of states” because this will erode the role of power as a “constitutive element of international politics” (Doty 1996, 147). In the north, it is believed that inequality in world political relations is a given, and in fact the world political relations starts from the inequalities; this inequality is rarely problematized and investigated (156-157). Therefore, when inequality between the south and the north is problematized, the IR scholars pay attention to it. They say that the third world radicalizes the world society by bringing collectivist ideologies to the foreground (157). In line with this view, IR scholars in the north suggest that what the south should do is to stop challenging inequality in the world political relations because they say these demands are incompatible with the core values of the world political relations, namely “order” and “stability”. The more the third world countries join world institutions, the more they question order and stability. When the third world countries ask for change, this change demand is about the merits. However the north asks that these demands should not be raised for the purpose of promotion of stability (161). Thus, postcolonialism claims that the north not only dominates the south but also it resists any demand toward change in the north-south relationship. Against demand for change, the north again develops a discourse, that is, the stability and order should not be damaged.

The domination is not because of the inability of the south to live up to requirements, rather the north has a domination attitude because it is a preference of the north. In fact, the north is not willing to offer any remedy to the plight of the south. For example, the south demands economic assistance from the north, but the north considers this incoherent because third world countries on the one hand enjoy the sovereignty rights on the other hand make demands from the international community. The north claims that it is weary of this sovereign situation of the third world countries (Doty 1996, 154). In sum, it is certain that the north does not wish to provide equality

to the south. We could infer from this that the north acts like a system that considers the south as the environment, not as an equal system.

On the other hand, the south claims equality and says that equality is attainable. This is a new type of relationship that is not offered in other theories. Besides, postcolonialism is the only theory that reflects on tendencies of two interacting systems: the north and the south. Other theories either have a flawed system conception or if they have a proper system conceptualization they reflect on tendencies of the system and ignore the tendencies of the environment. In postcolonialism, the south is placed in the environment of the north and the north is placed in the environment of the south. When the theory reflects on tendencies, it explains the tendencies of both the system and the environment. The relationship from the north toward the south is named as domination and exploitation, but this form of relationship is not new; there are similar forms of relationship in other theories as well. What is absent in other theories is the tendency of seeking equal relationship with the north. From a system theory perspective, this is an innovative contribution of postcolonialism that the dominated seeks equality in its relations with the dominating. One questionable aspect of postcolonialism is that even though the theory suggests that the south is a system in the sense that it shows a unity, this system is dependent on another system, namely north. A system, ideally, does not need another system in order to exist; it would rather impose itself on its environment. Against this principle, in postcolonialism, the south does not have a commonality that makes it a system to impose itself on its environment. Rather, countries in the south seek recognition from the north, and it does not seem that they seek recognition in an organized fashion. This dependency on the north and the unorganized configuration in the south shows that the south lacks a system quality. In other words, what gives the south an identity is its being situated in the environment of the system (north), not the superiority or coherence that it has. Thus, from a systems perspective, postcolonialism too is not a full-fledged system theory; it misses the basics of the systems theory. It does not make a system and environment differentiation and does not explain the system and environment relations.

2.6. Long Cycles Theory

The idea that there are cycles in world politics finds resonance in many studies (Kennedy 1987; Gilpin 1988; Modelski 1987; Rosecrance 1987, 284; Campbell 1988, 472; Keenes 1993, 145; Aslan 1997; Yalvaç 2016). Of these studies, the one that claims a systemic perspective is the long cycles theory. Its systemic quality emanates from its adaptation of Talcott Parsons's perspective. It has some resemblances to the exclusion perspective that we will study in the next chapter. First of all, the long cycles theory says there is a world system that is above all social systems. Second, the world system has functional subsystems, including world political system. These aspects are similar to what Luhmann says about the world society and the functional subsystems. The long cycles theory also associates a realm with a system in the sense that a realm such as politics or economics is a derivation of a system. For instance, the world political realm is a product of the world political system. In the Chapter 3, we also propose that world political realm is associated with (or a product of) the world political system. The long cycles theory is an adaptation of systems perspective of a leading system theorist (Parsons) in world politics. The review of this theory is useful to see how system perspectives of Luhmann and Parsons differ and converge. In associating the world political system and world political realm, the long cycles theory claims that the system includes entire world political realm. Therefore, the relations between different parties in the world political realm are reduced to the relationships between the states within the system. Conversely, it also propose that not all states are included in the analysis; only the states that have a global impact are included in the analysis. Then, it is further stated that not all global powers are equally important, rather there is a leader (world power) in world politics. Hence, the changes in the position of the leaders that replace each other are the most important aspects of world politics. In fact, the relations in world political system are not among equals or among unequals; rather there is a leader that shapes the world politics and also helps progress in world history take place. The long cycles theory, in this sense, takes the world as a single unit that operates in harmony for realization of certain ideals. This is a conservative interpretation of system in that the system is designed by someone and it serves to certain ideals. There is no possibility that the system has its own dynamics that does not necessarily fulfill the expectations of someone. It is not expected that

some undesirable consequences may emerge. On the other hand, the exclusion model that is based on Luhmann's theory considers that the system is not governed by someone, and the system can produce unexpected results, such as exclusion.

By taking the entire world as a single political unit, the long cycles theory also differs from Parsons's views in that while Parsons considers the world as constituted of multiple societies, long cycles theory says the world is a single society. Parsons does not envisage a full-fledged world society, and the reason is that he does not see a "normative consensus and a value system" that is formed in the world society (Modelski 1987, 110). The long cycles theory opposes this view, and suggests there is a global level sort of society in that it acquired an existence in the form of "naval-maritime and commercial" structures in the political and economic realms. These structures enable dealing with the global problems. Even though world is not entirely integrated, it still has the elements of integration. It is true that there are not world laws, but there are some rules that are observed at the global level. The elites in the world are integrated enough. They have a culture, a life style, and solidarities. There is a lingua franca that is in use. Thus, the global layer has a distinct character from other layers, i.e., regional, and national. This global layer has the basics of a polity, where four functional needs of the social system are met. The function of who is going to govern (politics), the function of allocation of resources (economics), the function of handling the global issues, and the function of coalition building as an integrative aspect are all included in the global layer in order for us to be able to talk about a global polity (111).

For long-cycles theory, global political system is based on system conception of Parsons. In Parsonian thinking, the social systems have four functional needs (Modelski 1987, 105; Parsons 1970, 844). These needed functions are;

usually referred to as: Adaptation (abbreviated as A), that is concerned with 'external-means'; Goal Attainment (G), governing 'external ends'; Integration (I), the domain of 'internal-ends'; and Latent Pattern-Maintenance (L), the sphere of 'internal-means'...The entire scheme is also known as the AGIL formula or, when in reverse order, as the LIGA sequence. In large-scale societies, the four functional needs are said to be met by distinct institutional complexes: adaptation functions are performed by the economy, and collective goal-attainment ones by the polity; integration is the function of the 'societal community' that creates identity and hence solidarity; latent pattern-

maintenance functions are the arena of educational, legal and constitutional systems (Modelska 1987, 106)

These four functions are the problems that any systems analysis deals with to see how these problems are addressed by the system (Parsons 1970, 844). According to Parsons, these functions, on the other hand, are themselves systems. In fact, they are the subsystems of the world system. In other words, world system needs four functions to be met, and each of these functions, in turn, constitutes an autonomous system (Luhmann 2013, 12-13; Parsons 1970, 845-846). Adaptation function of world system constitutes the world economic system. Goal Attainment function of the world system corresponds to world political system. Societal community system is a representation of Integration function. Finally, educational, legal, and constitutional system (namely, the cultural system) is the mirror image of Latent Pattern Maintenance. Cultural system has the role of enabling the control of the system through information. However, cultural system does not have a coercive role as seen in political power. Thus, we cannot suggest a hierarchical order between different systems (Modelska 1987, 106-107; Parsons 1970, 850). This AGIL formula also foresees phases. Parsonian model suggests that there is a phase-movement in the social systems which shows the progress of the social systems. Not all phases of social systems do occur at the same time; rather they follow each other. Each of the phases addresses “different social needs and system requirements”. Since a system cannot deal with all tasks and problems at once, concentration on one problem may lead to emergence of other problems. Therefore, in order to maintain equilibrium, the system may move from one phase to another not in the sequence of AGIL but diagonally, i.e., from I to A or from G to L (Modelska 1987, 106-107). When this shuffling of Parsonian phases is adopted to the phases of long cycle theory, it is claimed, we can see a correspondence between phases of long cycles theory and theory of Parsons (Modelska 1987).

The Parsonian systems theory can be identified with an order-producing system conception (Parsons 1970, 869-870). Each system has four functions to maintain itself. These functions do not bear anything surprising. The effect of excluded elements (i.e., people, other subsystems, or other environmental elements) is not incorporated in the system analysis. Hence, the contradictions and imbalances

affecting the system are left outside. Because it has the tendency to cherish four functions, these functions are also values that Parsons adopts. The system produces harmony not contradiction. If the society is a system and it produces these values, such as integration, goal attainment, and adaptation, then this system conception has a preference toward order that the system produces. If there is a system, it produces order, and it is good to have it. This tendency can also be seen in long cycles theory as we will see below.

While the long cycles theory recognizes the existence of other subsystems and their relevance to the world political system, it analyses world political system only. Global political system (global polity) is the highest polity of the world system in relation to other functional subsystems, i.e., economy. The interactions of global powers put the global polity in an order. The global powers are the units that can take action. They build alliances and they have a presence in every part of the world. It is their actions that shape the global politics (Modelske 1987, 9). Of these global powers the most important one is the world power (the leader country) because it governs the world polity. Since the leader is in charge, we can say that the global politics is not anarchic (10). Thus, long-cycle theorists claim that the absence of an authority above the states is not a problem in world politics. In fact, the leadership in world polity reduces the problem of anarchy; anarchy becomes an exception (Keenes 1993, 146).

The interactions of the global leader conditions global level politics. The global leader provides the world with order and stability owing to its ability to form and maintain alliances and installing forces all around the world. The global power not only does maintain order and stability in world polity but it also arranges the relations between polity and other functional subsystems. While the world power maintains order with its power, at the same time it provides services to the world. The definition of problems and solution of problems, management of the world economic system, global innovation, and the initiatives to build coalitions are such services (Tayfur 2000, 20). Of these services, innovation is especially important. Innovations help us understand the development of world polity. For example, industrial revolution is such an innovation that contributed to the development of world polity (21). As we can see, the leader, with assistance of other global powers is able to form and govern the world political system; the system is directed by someone. Not only is the leader in charge,

but the world political system also produces certain results that are desirable, namely order by provision of certain services, solution of global problems, management of world economic system for smooth functioning, and the like. These duties are necessities that world political system meet, therefore, the system does not cause divergence but it produces conditions that take the world forward. The problems, i.e., inequalities and exclusion that the system cause, are marginalized in the theory. Besides, the autonomy of the system is compromised.

According to the long cycles theory, the leadership is a necessity of all social systems including global polity. Leadership is a function that comes into being as a result of specialization of the global political system. For specialization take place, the interactions should expand both in terms of the scale and the intensity. Leadership is not seen in every social system; some threshold must be passed in terms of density of interactions within the society. In the other systems, the leadership generally refers to an individual, while in global political system the leadership is undertaken by nation-states (Modelski 1987, 13). In the 19th century CE, the leader was Britain and in the 20th century it was the United States. In the 17th century it was the Dutch (14). Thus, long cycles theory suggests that leadership in world politics is a functional necessity. Even when there is not a leader state that meets all the criteria for leadership, this position is still filled by a state, i.e., Portugal in 16th century CE. A leader vacuum is not possible in world politics; leadership function must be met (Keenes 1993, 148). In other words, the existence of a leader is a must; otherwise, the system cannot sustain itself.

According to Modelski, in world politics, periodically major wars take place where the world leader is determined. This world leader governs the world polity for around 100 years. This leader dominates the system, and at the same time, guides other states about actions to be adopted. The global leadership is not a simple management that is based on force only, but this rule is also legitimate. However, this situation does not last forever; over time the influence and legitimacy of the existing power deconcentrates and a process of determining the new leader starts (Rosecrance 1987, 284-285). As we can see, this centrality of leader makes the system a product of interactions of the leader in long cycles theory. The world political system loses its centrality in relation to state. This is a drawback that harms the systemic aspect of

long cycles theory. A world political system cannot be so much dependent on the actions of a polity/state. Otherwise, the system identity of world political system becomes questionable. When we mention existence of a system, we assign certain autonomy to the system that develops with system's own capabilities. Different approaches might offer different sources of system capabilities. For example, Luhmann says all social systems have the communication capability that is independent of any structure, i.e., state. However, the centrality of leader in long cycles theory harms the system quality of the theory.

As we noted above, next to global political system (a subsystem of world society), there are other functional subsystems in long cycles theory; namely economy, societal community, and cultural system. The global economy, which is another subsystem of world system, is separate from global political system. The global economy is a network that connects long distance economic interactions (Modelski 1987, 8). Such structures as media, universities, science, and learning help the global system produce information and communication for pattern maintenance of global system; hence, they constitute cultural subsystem of the global system (8-9). The societal communities (the fourth subsystem of world system), which can be called as structures of global community, provide solidarity within the global system. The societal communities bind the international elites and others who are interested in the global problems. As the global political system (polity) is significantly directed by the country that take leadership, as such other subsystems are directed by the leader country (9).

The global system is "a system of diverse interactions that attends to vital problems of international security and economic relations" (Modelski 1987, 25). Global political system is a subsystem of global system and it came into being as a result of the functional differentiation (26). Compared to other subsystems of world system, the global polity is the primary subsystem. Global problems and the necessary actions to address these problems are all included in the world political system. There is a global interdependence and this interdependence has some problems that need to be addressed and the global political system manages these problems (Tayfur 2000, 19). The long cycles theory by recognizing existence of other systems next to world political system, differs from mainstream understanding of system in International Relations. The mainstream understanding is that there is a single system in

international relations. The long cycles theory challenges this and get closer to exclusion theory in that there are multiple systems in international relations. This understanding helps us refrain from a system understanding that includes everything and refuses any interaction with its environment.

The long cycles theory differs from mainstream treatment of system in International Relations also in terms of assigning a limited period of existence to a system. In other theories of IR, system is something that has transhistorical roots; it does not dissolve and reestablish. However, the long cycles theory claims that the global political system is something that repeats many times; it is not a continuous system. Even if the long cycles theory foresees that the system may dissolve and reestablish, each world political system again produces order and desirable values. Furthermore, each system adds something to the previous systems. There is a progress from one system to the next system. Each global political system can be considered a long cycle that has four phases. These phases lead to evolution of global political system. Thus, the systems start and end with a global war. The first phase of a cycle is global war, during this phase the expectation for order increases. All global powers are involved in the global war, and they fight over the issue of “organization and the constitution of the global political system” (Modelski 1987, 100). Global wars include all the global powers. In terms of their size and duration, these wars are the wars that has no matching. While other wars have no such impact, the global wars have an impact that shapes the system (101).

The second phase is world power phase. In this phase, order is attained, in the sense that other countries enjoy the leadership of the world power. In the third phase (delegitimation), the security felt by the consumers leads to a decrease in the value given to security. This leads the delegitimation. In this phase, the preference for wealth and knowledge surpasses the preference for security and order. Therefore, the fourth phase starts: deconcentration. In this phase the preference for order is at its lowest levels, and the global power is in decline. In such a situation, the circumstances necessitate the long cycle to restart, which is performed with a global war. This phases idea assumes that global political system is a self-sustaining system (Modelski 1987, 29-31). Based on Parsonian thinking, Modelski claims that cycles are not exact repetitions of each other. There is a learning process that takes place as the cycles

repeat. In every cycle, there is a higher amount of complexity. Population expands and technology leads to higher levels of interdependence, while the need for order increases. Therefore, it can be said that “integration remains an ultimate unrealized objective of the international system” (Rosecrance 1987, 289). We can assess that the long cycles theory assumes that world political system is something that provides order, wealth, security, and probably independence. The destruction of the world political system amounts to losing all these values. As we can see the theory omits the inequalities instigated by the system. Even though, it is said that at some point in the future there would be a situation where inequalities caused by the system could be eradicated (Modelski 1987, 204, 208), the theory has a preference toward sustenance of the system. Even if it admits that the system causes inequalities, it does not say that the inequality problem is more prominent than the order and progress that the system produces. This inequality that the system produces is an aspect that the exclusion theory stresses in detail.

Another drawback of the long cycles theory is that it limits its applicability to a certain period of world political relations. It says the global political system emerged as a result of three processes. The first is the emergence of modern world system, which is a result of the switching from the pre-modern world system into modern world system (Modelski 1987, 18-19). The second is the functional differentiation of the world society into political and non-political systems. The third process is the transformation from two-tiered system to four-tiered system. The two-tiered system of traditional societies was constituted of the nobility (the court, the town, and the nobility) and the village peasantry. The modern world system is constituted of local, national, regional, and global level parties. The three processes emerged around 1500 CE. Therefore, the global political system is something that did not exist in the premodern era (19, 24). The global political system is considered something new. Previously not something like this existed. However, this theory, by limiting its empirical data to a specific period, makes sweeping generalizations about the pre-modern era. It does not say how the relations in world politics were in pre-modern era. The study of relations in pre-modern era might show both similarities and divergences between modern and pre-modern eras. In fact, our study regarding ancient and medieval history of Middle East politics shows that neither leadership idea is

particular to modern era, nor is the idea that there is replacement of dominant countries in world politics anything new. This makes us to be suspicious about any theory that limits its applicability to a certain period. Otherwise, that perspective would not be a theory, rather it would be an explanation attempt of developments in a certain period. However, a theory is an explanatory perspective in a certain realm (i.e., world politics). The emergence of the realm might start to be observed in a certain period, but then the theory should be applicable to the realm from its beginning. The long cycles theory does not claim that world political relations started by 1500 CE, but it limits its explanatory scope to the period after this date. This limitation makes the applicability of the theory to the realm of world politics as a general perspective that could be used for different periods questionable.

Long cycles theory forecasts that the main problem that the world political system as a learning system is going to face is finding a way for selecting world leader in a non-violent way, namely replacement of global war with other means. It can be possible that world leadership might be decided by division of labor. In this case, the leadership would be shared and negotiated by more than one state (Keenes 1993, 147). It is suggested that because there is evolution and development in the world polity, in the future, transition from one leader to another may develop more smoothly, instead of destructive global war. Furthermore, it may not be necessary that a single power to become the leader (Rosecrance 1987, 289). Again, we can see that the long cycles theory is after perfection and order, it sees no problem in leadership of one or a number of countries over other countries. As soon as the leadership is acquired in a less violent way, there is no reason to be regretful about the world political system, because it is perfect. Therefore, one criticism directed against long cycles theory is its teleological nature that emanates from Parsonian structural-functional perspective. It projects that a system is “predestined for some desired historical end” (Keenes 1993, 149).

Another criticism directed against the long cycles theory is that even though the long cycles theory assigns some traits to the leader country, these traits are not emanating from superiority of the leader. For example, the theory says leader countries are insular or peninsular. The critics say that insular or peninsular status does not provide power to the leader state. Instead, states having these traits cause less threat on other

states. That is why the peninsular and insular states are assigned this hegemonic role. Hence, the critics imply that the leader does not become a leader owing to its own capabilities, but rather there are some duties assigned to leaders by other countries. As a complementary finding that critics mention regarding the long cycles theory is that no power in modern history dwarfed other major powers. Rather the leaders resembled “first among equals”. They never reached “unquestioned dominance” (Rosecrance 1987, 296). If so, the basic presumption of the long cycles theory that the system is maintained by a leader country is problematic. The exclusion theory also disagrees with the idea that world political system is maintained by a leader state, or that fate of the system is decided by the powers having global impact. The exclusion theory instead gives preeminence to the system over states. States are subject to the system, not the other way around.

So much of focus on states and the presumption that the system is something established by someone (i.e, states) and directed by non-systemic forces to produce some ideal consequences is problematic in light of the systems theory. A full system-centric perspective never assumes that a system is designed by someone for some purpose. Rather system emerges by its own capabilities, which Luhmann says to emerge owing to communication within the system. Communication is not something that is governed, rather communication is something that the systems benefit from. Communication is something like life that has its own capabilities to reproduce itself. Communication in social systems is something that allows the social systems to produce and reproduce themselves. When communication occurs to form a system, it also draws boundaries. Communication occurs only within the boundaries of that system. This makes us differentiate between the different social systems. World political system is such a system that has its own autonomy; it does not belong to someone or something. Even though, system is formed autonomously, this does not mean that system produces something desirable. To Luhmann it is probable that the system produces a situation that some peoples or states enjoy and others regret. This allows us to focus on the asymmetric relations taking place in the world political realm because of system formation, rather than order and hierarchical rule that a leader and its coalitions create.

2.7. State and System in Empirical IR Studies

In a compilation of essays, more than a dozen scholars³ discuss the dominant patterns of world political relations in various parts of the world in different eras. What is typical in these essays is exemplary of other applications of system and state concepts in IR. They apply concepts of IR to empirical data. The world political relations in pre-modern and ancient China, pre-colonial and colonial Africa, ancient Greece, medieval Europe, 18th and 19th century CE Europe, modern era Russia/the Soviet Union, post-Cold War USA, and post-Cold War world are assessed. Almost all of the essays adopt a different perspective. Thus, besides the empirical variety, the perspectives are different. Each of the essays strives to find out the most applicable patterns to the world political phenomena regarding the empirical data that they study. While the concept of state enjoys a similar understanding in different perspectives, the concept of system suffers ambiguity. State is described with its sovereignty over a territory and population, which entails legitimate use of force (Warner 2001, 67-68).

On the other hand, the system concept has various meanings, based on the essays that are reviewed. It is sometimes used to refer to the co-existence of multiple states in world political relations. To illustrate, a multi-state system (a states system) that is different from empires, suzerainty, and hegemony is such a system. This system has multiple states and these states are linked to each other. They have common culture and other commonalities among themselves. Besides European states system, other states systems existed in the world; i.e., Chinese states system and Greek states system in ancient era. The states in the system enjoy sovereignty and independence. They recognize no superior to themselves, but still their relations show some patterns, namely the patterns of cooperation and conflict (Cox et al. 2001, 3, 5; Zhang 2001, 46-48; Kokaz 2001, 91-92). However, this understanding of the system is not the only understanding in IR literature; there are also some other meanings, which are associated with the concept of system. A world political system can be identified with the concept of order since it is suggested that a system is mentioned when there is

³ These essays are published in *Review of International Studies* (2001), Volume 27, Issue 5. This volume later has been published as a book: see Cox, Michael, Tim Dunne, and Ken Booth. (Eds.). (2001). *Empires, Systems, and States: Great Transformations in International Politics*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

order, legitimacy, and welfare in that system (Meadwell 2001, 166). This order comes into being as a result of co-existence of different states. For example, the 19th century dynasties formed a social system, thus, an order (170). Alternatively, world order sometimes is defined as a system in which a state is in charge; i.e., the American system. This system is said to be based on the alliances that the US developed with Europe and Asian countries, with various organizations that have multilateral character, and with adherence to democracy and capitalism. The US as a state designs and maintains this system (Ikenberry 2001, 192). Another interpretation of the system is that it is created by human beings (Jervis 2001, 281). This is completely different from all existing perceptions of the system in IR. It establishes a direct link between human beings and the world political system, which makes the system a servant of people, even though the system is beyond the boundaries of the states. The same essay could use a completely different perception about the system concept. It is said, even though anarchy is a fact, it cannot be said that all international systems that develop under anarchy are similar to each other (286). While the balance of power suggests that an anarchical structure is an element of the system, here, the structure is positioned above the system.

The variation in the meaning of the system concept is not limited to aforementioned accounts. Another system conception takes the world political system as a condition that could show different characters. In this regard, there are systems providing a competitive environment where states emulate “successful rivals” or seek to increase their capabilities in comparison to those of their rivals (Wohlfort 2001, 218). This assumes that the system is not an entity itself; it is rather the name of conditions in which the states carry out world political relations. In the same essay, a completely different perception can be found. Even an empire can be called as a system. Thus, a polity is classified as a system. Wohlfort calls an empire an international system. This system has two strategies: one is that the system resorts to deterrence against the areas outside of the empire’s boundaries. The second strategy is that the empire takes necessary measures to deter the groups within the empire’s boundaries from seeking statehood. This relationship between the system (empire) and the groups that are part of the empire is a core and periphery relationship (220). A system is also considered a variable, a factor among others, to shape the main concern of the states (namely

survival) and a variable that also contribute to the formation of domestic institutions and ideas necessary in governance of a state, as seen in the case of Russia/the Soviet Union (222).

In another interpretation, it is suggested that a system is an entity that designs the realm of international relations. For example, the system that was in place during the cold war stabilized international relations (Arrighi and Silver 2001, 257). The system that dominates international relations is the world capitalist system. This system, from its emergence until now, has expanded in scale and scope, involving many governments and business agencies (262). This understanding suggests that there is a distinct realm called international relations, and in this realm, world capitalist system shapes the relationships. Thus, the international relations realm and the world capitalist system are originally alien to each other. Yet, the world capitalist system, which is controlled by one state, dominates the international relations. This understanding actually denies the existence and autonomy of the world political system. It is suggested that if world political relations are to be understood, attention must be paid to the world capitalist system. On the other hand, the same article, contradictorily assigns a determinative role to the elements of the system, thus harming the autonomous character of the capitalist system. It is said that the system is considered a combination of units composing the system and transactions between the units. The system grows when the number of the units increases within the system, and the number and variety of transactions expand. Even though, in essence, there is a cooperation between the units of the system, the increase in the volume and density of interactions within the system lead to the emergence of competition among the units of the system because the regulative power of the institutions of the system are not able to maintain the cooperation and harmony in the system (270, 271-272). Thus, while the system is controlled by a single state, it is also susceptible to the destructive actions of the units against the system since they can go into conflict with each other. Units are capable of pursuing policies that counter the system's requirements of survival. As can be seen, in a contradictory way, even the capitalist system is not able to maintain its own autonomy.

In sum, there is no consistency in the system perception in IR even among the studies that complement each other in the same volume. This finding is in line with the

criticism that was directed at the theories that have system elements. Let alone applying a system and environment dichotomy to the world political realm, there is not even an agreement about whether the system is an entity, an order, an environmental condition, a coexistence of multiple states, a human creation, or a variable among other variables affecting state action. At some point, the same essay could apply different conceptions of system. This ambivalence shows that in IR, system concept is not systematically analyzed. The fact that system thinking developed in other fields and was adopted by IR scholars, we can say this adoption is arbitrary. Of course, there is not a single understanding of system in original system studies either, but at least, they specify where the system is positioned; i.e., above other units of analysis. In IR studies, there must be a minimum to identify the position of system in relation to other concepts, if a system perspective is offered. In previous sections of this Chapter, we have summarized some of the system theories of IR, which show some insufficiencies. The empirical studies also lack a consistency that even IR theories adopted. Therefore, we cannot take the analysis templates of these empirical studies as a model for our study of world political relations in the Middle East.

State-Centrism

This dissertation strives to adopt a systems perspective, which means that the system is at the center of analysis; the system is in charge. However, in IR, most of the analyses are state-centric. Even the perspectives suggesting that system (through its structure) affects states take state at the center of analysis because system is simply a variable or an environmental condition that affect the actions of states. System is not ontologically the more prominent entity compared to state. What matters is state, and the ontologically prominent entity is state. We can see this state centrism in many accounts of world politics. Here it is not claimed that states have no place in world political analysis; what is pointed out is that state is secondary to the system as it is elaborated in the rest of the dissertation. The difference between a state-centric and system-centric perspective can be seen in whether a study strives to understand dynamics leading to state actions or it strives to identify the system in world political relations and utilization of state for materialization of system expectations. The system is not a condition that allows or impedes states to adopt certain patterns of

action in their individually oriented search. Rather the system is an entity that has its agenda and that creates and shapes states to carry out the requirements of the system. The assumptions, the proofs, and the reasoning of this system perspective will be seen in the Chapters ahead. For now, we are going to take a short look at the state-centrism in texts written about different eras from different perspectives.

In the sample essays, we could see that state-centrism is the main feature of IR perspectives. To begin with, Chinese tributary system that emerged in ancient era and lasted until the 19th century is analyzed from a state-centric perspective. Even though China is not alone in this system, China is situated above the tributary states and areas. No authority/entity enjoys superordinate position to China, the tributary states, and other entities. Besides, no role of the system is mentioned, a role which might have affected the actions of China or tributary system. Rather it is said the tribute system was based on hierarchical relations between China and other countries in Central, South, and Southeast Asia. At its heights, the number of the tributary countries reached 72. It included political aspects in terms of submission of non-Chinese elements of the system; i.e., barbarian tribes and the tributary states. China maintained the system with a combination of an ideology, institutions, and force (Zhang 2001, 52-53). In a system-centric perspective we would have found the separate existence of a system giving roles not only to China but also to the tributary states. Furthermore, the essential feature of the system-centric perspective is that a world political system does not reflect the entire realm of regional political relations. There must have been excluded areas and entities by the tributary system in regional political realm. These non-included but interacted areas and entities are an essential partner in assessment of world political relations. These areas and entities must have been defined in relation to the system. Therefore, the lack of environmental elements in the analysis of the regional political relations in Central, South, and South East Asia in pre-modern and ancient era is another indication of the lack of a system-centric perspective. Instead, state is at the center; state is an entity that receives influences from outside and act upon those influences. State is the ultimate entity that has an ontology. On the other hand, system and environment are not identified and analyzed.

Similar observations can be made about the pre-colonial and colonial period African regional politics and ancient Greek states system. For pre-colonial Africa, it is

observed that there were some different forms of polities in Africa, some of which resembling the Westphalian state (Warner 2001, 69). However, different names were used to refer to polities existing in Africa. Even though we are not sure about the differences between the names used to call the polities that existed from 15th to 19th centuries CE, there were such types of organizations as states, kingdoms, theocracies, empires, peoples, nomadic confederations, dynasties, clans, and the like (70). The fact that polities had different names does not mean that sovereignty did not matter in these polities (76); these polities had their territory which was ruled by a ruler. They had their “bureaucracy which administers the law, collects taxes, and so on” (72). As we can see, these polities in Africa are ultimate reference points. We do not know whether there was a regional political system in this era in Africa because region-wide interactions, dependencies, and connections are little mentioned. Yet, there is not a concern that we should identify a regional political system and its tendencies and effects. Identifying the existence of polities is considered sufficient for talking about the political relations that were characterizing the region. Similar observations can be made about the reading of ancient Greek regional politics. It is said, the Greek city-states system that was in place between 8th and 4th centuries BCE was a reminiscent of the contemporary Westphalian state system. Each of the city-states was independent and there was not a higher authority that would regulate the relations between these states, therefore it was anarchic. Each of the city-states resembled the nation-states of today, in the sense that they did not recognize any superior. They also expected recognition from other independent states. This reciprocity has been the basis of the states-system (Kokaz 2001, 91).

In a similar vein, medieval Europe’s regional politics had multiple polities acting based on their resources and expectations (interests), not according to system requirements. It is observed that the medieval Europe was constituted of multiple and different forms of political entities, such as local lords, kings, emperor, pope, bishops, independent towns etc. The transition from medieval Europe to modern states was from this multiple and various polities to contemporary European multiple states system (Osiander 2001, 120). The form of relationship among the medieval polities was no different from the relations among the modern states. Even though the ideology of the day was claiming the “unity of Christendom and on the need for

solidarity and peace among Christians”, in actuality the polities were in conflict with each other continuously (121). The medieval European polities until 1200 CE were not that much powerful, in terms of having enough money, armies, and weapons. Therefore, they could not extend their influence to remote places; rather they were able to control the adjacent areas (122). What was determining the boundaries and influence of a polity was the size of its capabilities (Osiander 2001). Thus, the rulers had interests and capabilities. What restrained things that the rulers could do were limits of their capabilities. To the degree that their capabilities allowed, they extended their influence. While all rulers aimed to extend their influence, they came across the expectations of other rulers; therefore, they were continuously in conflict with each other. The rulers or the polities were not subordinate to a system that had region wide effects and plans that circumscribed the outlook, capabilities, goals and powers of the polities or rulers. The ruler or the polity was the ultimate reference point.

When it came to 18th century European regional politics, views that would deny any system role in world politics are proposed, let alone delineating a systems perspective. Counter to the proposition that there was balance of power system dominating the regional politics of Europe in 18th century, it is argued that balance of power had no relevance in politics of the century. It is put that for we can mention balance of power, first, there must be a status quo and all the powers concerned must respect to the status quo. Second the external and internal balancing must be functioning. However, it is said, the major powers rejected the status quo in 18th century. Second, internal and external balancing did not work. Rather, the rulers aimed to “dismember, depopulate, demilitarize, and destroy rivals”. Even though in other accounts, the idea of destruction of opponents is suggested to start by Napoleon era, in fact throughout the 18th century, the search for hegemony and destruction of the rival was rampant. All of these attempts, however, failed (Sofka 2001, 151, 161-162). The failure was because of insufficiency of resources (military and economic) for materializing the hegemony search, not because of adherence to balance of power logic (152). What constrained states were the costs that would be borne (161). One state’s gain was attained at the expense of other states (163). As we can see, the states recognize no superior. They are the ones who determine the course of regional political relations. Each state individually acts. Each has its interests and the capabilities to achieve the interests.

The states are multiple and an analysis of world political relations should take this multiplicity as a given.

This state-centrism that claims the multiplicity of entities and the complex network of clashing interests takes us nowhere actually. We are not able to identify the main cleavages in world politics that do not take the individuality and centrality of state into account. Indeed, the state-centric approach hinders us to discern the inequalities and the asymmetry in world politics. Inequality and asymmetry in world politics cannot be grasped, when every state/polity is acting based on its interests and within the limits of its capabilities. Such a perspective equalizes every part of the world, by taking the entities having ontology as the multiple states. It is assumed that there is symmetry in world politics. On the other hand, a system-centric approach allows us to categorize the areas in world politics into two parts in order to find the inequality in world politics. System-centrism helps us focus on the main cleavages. The states in systems perspective are not equal partners, but some are included or utilized by the system, while others are excluded from the system. This is the main contribution of systems perspective in world political analysis in relation to the state-centric analysis. Therefore, we are going to develop a system-centric model based on Niklas Luhmann's perspective and then to apply it to world political relations in the Middle East History.

CHAPTER 3

BUILDING A NEW APPROACH: THE EXCLUSION THEORY

3.1. Exclusion Theory: Why, How, and What?

Exclusion theory, the first time labeled as such, is not a theory that is included in IR textbooks. However, it seems that it could be a proper theory to be included in IR studies, especially when the system concept is concerned. The system theories in IR that were reviewed show certain characteristics that we criticized in the previous Chapter. These theories do not adopt a coherent system concept throughout their arguments. We can judge these theories based on lack of a coherent system understanding because an insufficient system understanding deprives us from the ability to reinterpret world political relations. Systems theory marginalizes every other subject that is explored in world political relations. If something is not a system, then it does not have ontology. However, in other IR theories, everything is not interpreted from a systems perspective; system is just another variable next to other concepts. It is an ordinary concept. Yet, because system theory assigns individuality to system (Moeller 2006, 10), it says, the system is at the center of any phenomenon that is going to be studied. All other concepts of world politics, as a result, would be derivations of the system. Given that system theory provides us the perspective to look at entire world politics from a different angle, it is justified to adopt it in studying world politics and to judge other theories to see whether they are system theory or not. If there is not a systems theory in IR that would provide us the tools to interpret world political relations, then there is a need to develop a systems theory for reinterpreting world political relations. Moreover, our historical review of world political relations of the Middle East from ancient era until the early modern era shows that world political relations can be mentioned only when there is a world political system. A realm comes into being with the emergence of system(s) in that field. Thus, the system approach provides both the chance to reinterpret world political relations and the ability to

define the foundational element of these relations, namely the system, and the relations that it entails.

The system thinking differs from IR in defining the system concept. In IR, the system is considered either as a variable affecting actions of the actors or it is a level of analysis that shows that the whole is studied rather than the parts. The system thinking suggests that the system is an entity that has a difference from its environment. This entity is the main phenomenon that must be taken into consideration. All other entities, structures and beings in the realm studied are defined and positioned in relation to the system. Hardly do we find an approach that has this definition of system in IR. In this chapter, we investigate the possibility to build an approach that will adopt the system as the main entity in the world political realm.

In doing this, we adopted Niklas Luhmann's system approach because it provides a framework where different realms of study can be identified by referring each realm to a system. The realms of study that can be identified are such functional subsystems of world society as political, economic, military, scientific, and the like. Each of these realms can be associated with a system. Relating a realm with a system enables looking at the entire realm from a system's perspective. When we grasp the knowledge of the system, we define every other thing in that realm in relation to the system. Besides functional subsystems, there are also secondary functional systems, i.e., world political system or world economic system. Niklas Luhmann's system approach allows the definition of a world political system within the confines of the systems theory. In this context, we mainly try to explain world political relations by sticking at the system concept. Not all system theories have the tendency to assign such autonomy to world politics as a field of study. Second, Luhmann takes the entire world as a unit, which makes his theory overlap with the purview of IR. IR also claims that there are relations that cannot be grasped with a nationally-oriented perspective. There is a separate realm (namely world level) that has its dynamics and its particularities. Thus, we discern parallels between Luhmann's thinking and purview of IR.

Not only that, Luhmann's theory also helps us know about the undesirable consequences that the systems cause. Some other system theories focus on other aspects of the system. For example, Parsons (1966; 1970, 869-870) seeks to identify

order in systems. He is being criticized because of his focus on maintenance of system and his conservative approach toward change in the system (Borch 2011, 6). Bertalanffy (1969) and Bogdanov (1984) seek to study the whole rather than the parts and to achieve higher level abstractions. Some other students of systems thinking (Bausch 2001; Checkland 1988; Skyttner 2005, Westley et al. 2002; Banai 1993; Bailey 1982) have similar tendencies. Yet they omit the unexpected and undesirable consequences that the systems produce. Luhmann's inclusion and exclusion concepts help us focus on the undesirable results that the systems cause (Borch 2011, 11). One might wonder why the undesirable aspects are worth to focus. Our study of world political relations in history shows that world political relations that are centered on world political system are far from being smooth. In fact, inequalities that system causes are rampant in history. Thus, these aspects need to be explained. These aspects could be addressed by a theory that is especially focused on disorder/difference, which Luhmann's theory is able to address, especially through its concepts of inclusion and exclusion. For this reason, Luhmann's approach is one of the best to be adapted to any realm of International Relations especially if inequalities and disorder is going to be studied.

Exclusion theory as a systems theory is a synthesis of three elements. One is the ideas of Niklas Luhmann about systems theory, the second is the world political relations in Middle East history, and the third is some ideas and concepts from other IR theories. The main input is the ideas of Niklas Luhmann. In fact, the title "exclusion theory" is a derivation of concept of exclusion in Niklas Luhmann's theory. This concept defines the relationship between what is included in the system and what is excluded. The system's approach to the outside areas is exclusion. This gives us the main ingredient of the exclusion theory. It suggests that the social phenomena can be read from a system and its environment dichotomy. A system is not the entirety of the phenomenon that is going to be studied. This system understanding provides a different perspective than that of other IR theories which treat the system as an all-encompassing variable. However, if a realm is going to be studied from a systems perspective, that realm should be divided as the system and its environment. Thus, two parties are defined. This is a finding that other IR theories fail to recognize in the world political realm, even though they apply it to world economic relations. Other

theories, rather, treat the entire phenomenon studied (i.e., world politics) as a system and the components that constitute it. However, systems perspective makes it necessary to define the boundaries of the system first and then delineate the environment as the elements related to the system but not included in the system. When the system defines its own environment, not everything that is kept outside of the system is the environment of the system. The system exists with its own capabilities and it envisages an environment for itself. Thus, the system's environment is consisted of the most relevant environmental elements to the system (Moeller 2006, 16).

Once this division is made for recognizing the parties (the system and its environment) in the world political realm, another important topic for world politics is that what is the relationship between the system and its environment. We interpreted Luhmann's views by saying that this relationship is exclusion. This is the most striking aspect of the exclusion theory, which gives the theory its name. Having such a perspective, exclusion theory's system and its environment dichotomy needs to be associated with the concepts in world politics. In fact, we found out that this dichotomy of exclusion theory corresponds with similar dichotomies in other IR theories. Realism has the great powers against the lesser powers as a dichotomy. Postcolonialism has the north against the south. Imperialism theory has the industrialized and the non-industrialized countries. The World-system theory has core-periphery dichotomy. All theories recognize the dichotomy, but they name it with different concepts. We adopted the core-periphery dichotomy because it can be applied in all eras in history. However, the World-system theory does not apply the core-periphery dichotomy that it finds in the world economic system to the political realm. Instead, World-system theory says the political realm is dominated by multiple states whose interests clash with each other. Exclusion theory finds that the core/system and periphery/environment differentiation can be equally applied to world political relations.

As Luhmann defines the system as the difference between the system and its environment, the system corresponds to the core in core-periphery dichotomy. The core is a system in world political realm that differentiates itself from other elements of world political realm. Originally the system/core is a non-spatial network/communication that connects and governs the political events in the most

endowed areas of the world society or the region toward the goal of sustenance of the system. The endowed areas, depending on the period concerned, have superiority in one or a number of realms, such as production, military, innovation, ideas, natural conditions, and the like. Even though the realm that provides the system/core to differ from the periphery varies from one period to another, the idea that the system is a difference from excluded/environment is a constant. Almost entire history of the Middle East indicates that such cores/systems formed in different periods, and they had the least endowed areas in the region as their periphery. The central relationship between the core and the periphery is exclusion. Exclusion means two things. One is that the core has two different codes of conduct. One is adopted among core areas, and the other is adopted between the core and peripheral areas. Whereas equality and fairness dominate the relations between the core areas, inequality and unfairness characterize the relations between the core and peripheral areas. Conflict and cooperation opportunities of the peripheral areas are designed and limited by the core areas. The second aspect of the exclusion is that the core adopts a stance to prevent the elevation of peripheral areas to core status. These aspects of the exclusion are a synthesis of what we found in the study of world political systems/cores and their relations with the peripheral areas in Middle East history. In this relationship of exclusion, the core has cooperation inside of itself against the periphery. The core acts like a unit, and the states being its structures taking action. States do not act independently rather they act in accordance with the underlying relationships that the core/system dictates. For example, the core areas do not end each other's existence. When their disagreements are resolved by war, the disagreements are minor issues over small pieces of land and resources. These states similarly do not harm the system/core; rather they contribute to the maintenance of the core. Lastly, the core areas cooperate with each other against the peripheral areas. The core areas have consensus that peripheral areas should be treated unequally and the peripheral areas should not be allowed to elevate to the core status. These patterns are the dictates of the system over core states. Hence the system/core is the main unit that determines the way of relationships. These and many other findings of the exclusion theory are substantiated in the following subheadings of this chapter.

As we can see, the system approach takes a realm as constituted of the system itself and its environment. It focuses on the relations both within the system and the relations between the system and its environment. Similar approach can be found in Bogdanov's thinking (Gorelik 1984, ii). At this point, one might raise the question as to whether this thesis focuses on the core-periphery relations only, at the face of holistic approach of the system perspective. This criticism, at first look, might seem plausible. However, the core-periphery dichotomy is offered in order to grasp the entirety of world political realm. As we have criticized in Chapter 2, other IR theories mostly focus on the relations within the system (core). Yet, focusing on the core only omits the entirety of the realm of world politics because world political realm is constituted of the core and the periphery, not the core only. This helps us find not only harmony but also the contradictions and "destructive activities and disorganizing problems" that can be seen everywhere in social life, including world political realm (Bogdanov 1984, 4). As the purpose of the dissertation is to contribute to other explanations of world politics, it limits its scope to world political relations since it cannot embrace all realms of IR. World political relations center on such relations as war, oppression, opposition, independence, autonomy, dominance, allocation and appropriation of resources by force, cooperation, conflict, and the like. These relations are read from a core-periphery perspective in the dissertation, rather than from a multiple state perspective. Because a system must have an environment in order to exist (Moeller 2006, 9), when we talk about the core-periphery relations, we refer to the world political relations as a whole, namely the system and its environment. World society or any subsystem of world society is not comprised of smaller units constituting a larger unit. Rather the system is a difference from its environment. Thus systems theory, in Luhmannian sense, is a theory that focuses on the difference between the system and the environment. A social system defines itself not by creating a unity but by differentiating itself from the environment (40). We will analyze these relations in empirical chapters. The material available in terms of these relations in Middle East history shapes the scope of the thesis.

Therefore, in this Chapter, we will try to identify the type of relationships within the system (harmony) and the relationships that the system has with its environment (conflict). These principles then will be tested by looking at the world political

relations in the Middle East in the following Chapters. In the following subheadings in this Chapter, we will firstly try to lay down principles of Luhmann's views that will help us know what the necessities of a social system are. Then, we will frame the findings of exclusion theory that are applicable to world relations.

In developing a new approach, the exclusion theory, we could not purely rely on the tenets of systems theory. Systems theory provides us with the clues about the criteria for designating a system, and the potential relations that this system entails. However, system theory does not document the particularities of every realm. Each realm's problems and needs are addressed in the disciplines that deal with that realm. This does not mean that theories in discipline perfectly define the relations; rather it means that the issue areas that need to be addressed are already defined in each discipline concerned. Therefore, any system theory that would deal with a specific realm has to be familiar with the problems and needs in that realm by borrowing from existing theories. We did not hesitate to utilize the knowledge accumulated in other IR theories. Similarly, the world political relations in the Middle East history are going to be employed both for testing the exclusion theory and for finding out elements that are valuable to refine the exclusion theory.

3.2. The Requirements of a Social System

Before elaborating on the implications of exclusion theory for world political and economic relations, we must clarify the requirements of a social system in Luhmann's thought. Some requirements of the social system are more elaborately dealt with than the others. Some are implicit while others are more explicit. In this section, we will elaborate on the basic requirements of a social system that would be taken as a given throughout the rest of the dissertation.

3.2.1. The Social Systems Must Have a Function

The first quality of the social systems that Luhmann implicitly mentions and seems to be important is that a system must have a function. The idea that a social system must have a function is a novel idea to be included in IR since in IR the system is generally

regarded as something that is composed of elements and a structure. The system is a variable in IR that explains the actions of the elements; be they the states, regions, or international organizations. While in balance of power theory, the anarchical nature of a system's structure determines the actions of the elements, in the society of states theory, system is emergent norms and order that regulate the relations between the elements. In the World-system theory, the system is the world economy that assigns roles to different regions of the world. In imperialism theory, the system is a capitalist system that determines the actions of the parts. In postcolonialism theory, the system is the culture and discourse produced in the north that shapes the actions of the parts. In all these theories, system is the highest level order, there is not something above the system. However, the system in none of these theories has its own agenda; rather it is a variable that affects the actions of the elements; it does not carry out a function of higher system; i.e., world society, either.

Therefore, the idea that a social system is an independent entity that does not recognize the unity and independence of the parts is alien to IR. In the same vein, the idea that a social system is just one of systems that has a relation to a higher order, and the idea that a social system carries out functions that the higher order/system (mainly world society) assigns to it is not recognized in IR. As a result, it is important to claim and elaborate that a social system (i.e., world political system/core) has a function. This idea gives the system a unity and an agential role in explaining world political relations. We can infer the idea that Luhmann considered the function of the system as essential by bringing together his ideas about the main differentiation within the society. Luhmann says a society cannot be described by one of its parts, i.e., the “religious commitment, the political state or a certain mode of economic production”. What is more proper to characterize the society is “primary mode of internal differentiation”. Internal differentiation occurs along functional lines, and it helps us understand the way subsystems of the system are built. The subsystems (functions) of world society come into being as a consequence of difference repetition. At first, the world society comes into being as a difference between the world society and its environment. In turn, the subsystems of world society come into being by repetition of development of difference between subsystem and its environment within the society (Luhmann 1990, 177; Jung 2004, 108). Each of these social systems has a

function; these systems are known with the function that they have (Moeller 2006, 24). To illustrate, Luhmannian approach suggests that a scientific system has the function of producing knowledge and making it available for social purposes. The legal system produces “norms for social expectations”. In political system, it is suggested the function is “making collectively binding decisions possible”. In economic systems, the function of system is reduction of shortages (25, 29). This approach is a new one compared to the traditional societies where the differentiation of the society was defined with the concepts of stratification or hierarchy. The modern society is defined by the “principle of functional differentiation”. This is the culmination of a process in human history where we see a trend of “increasing importance of functional differentiation” along such realms as economy, politics, religion, science, law etc. (Luhmann 1997, 68; Jung 2004, 108).

The traditional societies not only were defined along stratification and hierarchy, but they were also multiple. Each of these societies was emerging in distinct parts of the world, so they had a regional character. They were dependent on cities and land. Although they were aware of each other and certain communication between them was taking place, these societies were multiple. The modern world society, unlike traditional societies, is a single society and realizes the differentiation through functions of the society. Instead of multiple societies, there are functions of world society. Out of this system/society we could name such subsystems as political subsystem, economic subsystem, scientific subsystem, educational subsystem, military subsystem, medical care, law etc. All these subsystems in turn have their own environment (Luhmann 1990, 177; Luhmann 2012, 86; Moeller 2006, 24). The subsystems are not part of a super system; rather they are independent systems (Moeller 2006, 24). Each of these subsystems creates their boundaries and these boundaries are not “integrated with a given space or group of human beings” (Luhmann 2012, 86). All other systems are the environment of each specific subsystem and there is no matching between the boundaries of the function systems and any piece of territory (Luhmann 1990, 178). Only the political subsystem uses frontiers, but it is “because segmentation into states appears to be the best way to optimize its own function”. In sum, it is no more possible to mention societies in plural (178).

As the society is differentiated along functional lines and the subsystems of the world society are formed based on each function of world society, we can say that social systems in world society come into being when they have a function that addresses a need of world society and communication occur within the boundaries of that system. The emergence of systems in the society according to their functions is not limited to the subsystems of society. There could be secondary functional subsystems as well as organizations that can be called as systems. An example of secondary functional systems that Luhmann brings to foreground is the aid system that takes both social welfare and development aid form. This aid system emerged because; as we will mention later, functional differentiation of the world society creates exclusions in the form of impoverishment of individuals in various parts of the world. The growing deficiencies in different parts of the world are being addressed by the aid initiatives that together can be called as a “secondary functional system” (Luhmann 2013b, 26).

Another example where we see the emergence of a system as a response to an emerging need of world society is contemporary organizations that can be called social systems. These organizations emerge to carry out the interregional affairs, which was undertaken by a group of people in the far past. In the pre-modern era, the long-distance contacts between different regions of the world were centered on the few families, i.e. nobility or “few major trading houses”. In other words, the contacts did not involve the entire society or large masses of population. Furthermore, not all goods were exchanged; rather some precious goods that could be called “prestige goods” were exchanged. The few houses that had the contacts with the other regions exchanged the prestige goods for their implications inside of the society. These goods gave them the possibility to claim that they were different from the rest of the society. Yet, today, the inter-regionality is mainly rendered by the organizations, be it “in business, the mass media, politics, science and transport”. For example, economy is not only “interlinked worldwide through its markets”, such as “financial markets, commodity and product markets, and increasingly even labor markets”; but also, it creates organizations “that operate worldwide”. These organizations are differentiated as social systems, meaning that they hold an autonomous existence from the world society. Emerging as such, the organizations possess dynamics through which they “permeate the functional systems of society”. They are equipped with the function of

meeting “the need for decisions and the necessity of communicating decisions to set points of departure for further decisions”. These organizations are placed between functional systems and society (Luhmann 2012, 95). This makes us conclude that when a need emerges in world society, a system to address this functional need emerges. In other words, a social system must have a function, and this necessity can be generalized to the world economic system or world political system too. To reiterate, when a system has a function, this function is defined in relation to a higher system, that is world society. A system undertakes the function of a higher system. In this case, a system is not the highest order of things or a variable as it is suggested in IR. Rather, a system is just a system among other systems.

3.2.2. Non-Spatiality of the Social Systems

Besides having a function, the second quality of the social systems is that they are space free. The boundaries of the social system are not spatially determined because they exist in a non-spatial realm. In general, systems could be of different types depending on the character of operations. Biochemical structure enables living systems, communicative operations enable social systems and “actual attentiveness” enables consciousness systems (individuals) (Luhmann 2013a, 64-65). Of these, the social system “produces itself through communication” and communication is a non-spatial realm (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 170). This social system understanding “excludes the traditional understanding that human beings, with body and soul, are parts of the society” or of the social systems (Luhmann 1990, 176). This is failure of neither human beings nor the systems. It is neither something to be regretted to nor to be cherished (Moeller 2006, 5). Traditional view, by imagining the social systems as “composed of individuals and their communicative and linguistic recursions”, implies that social systems cannot be autopoietic (self-producing), rather it says they are dependent on individuals because they are consisted of “a group of living beings” (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 172; Luhmann 1997, 71).

The understanding that treats social systems as social groups suggests that social systems come into being out of either cooperation or love between individuals, and when these bonds are removed, the social systems cease to exist. The social systems

are “subordinated to the goals established by their parts (individuals) either individually or collectively”. This is a spatial definition of social systems because it is based on “spatial principles used for living beings”. There is a parallelism between traditional understanding of the social system and part-whole paradigm that see the character of the social system as “interactional”. Luhmann’s approach requires rejection of the understanding that society is a group (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 173) because it omits the existence of a social system as “an independent acting unit” (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 172; Luhmann 1990, 176). Instead of spatiality, in Luhmann’s approach the boundaries of the subsystems are designed according to inclusion and exclusion, which we will later elaborate on. The space renders the medium of communication but it does not show any significance in terms of boundaries of the social systems (Albert 2004, 23). The fact that the social systems do not have spatial borders does not make them “more metaphorical than other systems” (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 174).

The realm where Luhmann places the social systems is the realm of meaning, as “communication is not a spatial phenomenon but one of meaning”. Once a system comes into being it is neither limited to a space nor it belongs to anyone, it is the system that “define[s] the positions in the communication”, it defines “roles, communicational limits, belongings or major symbolic generalizations” (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 171). In this sense, human beings are placed in the environment of the social system not inside of it (Borch 2011, 3). They have a relation to the social system, but this relationship is one of give and take (structural coupling), not a relationship where individuals are in charge. As the system has an independent existence in the realm of meaning, it is not controlled by the individuals, groups of individuals, states, social classes, a group of states, and a region. Applying this idea to the world political system and world economic systems, we can claim that they must exist in the realm of meaning and must not be controlled by individuals, groups, classes, states or any other mechanism.

3.2.3. The Boundaries of System

The third characteristic of the social systems is that what renders the unity of a social system is the boundary and difference that it has in relation to its environment, not an idealized concept or an essence. Despite a high level of differentiation and unpredictability within the system, what provides the system its consistency/identity is its boundaries, namely the emergence of difference between itself and its environment. The differentiation within the system creates new systems. However, as long as the boundaries of a system are stable, which develops as a result of evolution, these boundaries are indicators of stability of the system. It is the boundaries/difference that enables the system “grow in complexity... [and] operate, build up, change, or forget structures”. Owing to the boundaries, the stability of the system is rendered in spite of “evolution toward an ever-increasing improbability of structures and ‘evolutionary universals’ such as advanced forms of differentiation”. Therefore, stability and unity of the system cannot be achieved by inventing an idealized concept for society or an essence. Instead, it is the boundary that can define a society’s unity, and it is the boundary that renders the complexity to grow in the system. What draws the boundary of a system in relation to its environment is system operation (communication) that takes place within the boundaries of the system (Luhmann 1997, 71). The system draws the boundaries between itself and the environment by its own capabilities. The boundaries help the system prevent the interference of environment in the system (Moeller 2006, 14). The system is able to establish itself with its own capabilities (22).

Thus, we can say that a system does exist not because of its “essence, essentials or other unalterable structures”. Rather it exists when it can maintain its difference from the environment. It is persistence that enables the identity of a system; this does not necessitate any “minimal or essential elements at the structural level”. In other words, the structure of a system, in the sense that system has an essence, is not the source of system’s existence. The source of system’s existence is the persistence of difference between the system and its environment. Hence, it can be said that the system theory is not interested in “concept of being”, rather it deals with the difference (Luhmann 2013a, 44; Banai 1993, 390). While the existence of a system can be mentioned when

it is possible to talk about a difference between the system and its environment; it is the operations (communication) that help the system develop (Luhmann 2013a, 38).

3.2.4. Communication

The fourth requirement of social systems is communication, which renders the system operational capability. However, this capability does not entail every kind of operation, instead there is one single operation that a social system could carry out, and that is communication. Even though communication is an operation that the system has the capability to carry out, the operation does not take place toward the environment or other systems. In this sense, the system has communication only within itself. It could be about the environment and about itself, but this communication is not with the environment or with itself. Thus, the subject of communication is either the system itself or the environment of it. These communications are producing the unity of the system; they are recursions of previous communications and they are expecting that other communications will follow (Luhmann 2012, 52).

This communication is different from common understanding of communication that is defined as verbalization of thoughts and emotions (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 171). Similarly, it is different from an understanding that communication is a control mechanism and cement that any system needs⁴ (Deutsch 1952, 470). It is a special kind of communication. There is not a transmission in this type of communication, opposite the views saying that communication entails the “transmission of the messages and information or understanding expectations”. The thing that is emphasized in Luhmann’s understanding is that communication is something that

⁴ This view maintains that communication enables a group, which is a system, to perceive and to react to the things outside the system. The elements of the system are in continuous contact with each other owing to communication. This principle is applicable to all types of organizations and even non-social systems that are based on communication and control. Communication enables transmission of messages that include a lot of information (Deutsch 1952, 470). The systems “store, process, and apply information” in order to react to their environment and to what they produced internally. They also have a learning capacity owing to communication (472). In societies (social systems) what makes the society cohere and integrate is communication that involves transmission and processing of information (474). The communication systems adjust themselves with feedback to the environment and they have a purpose. Feedback helps the system to adjust itself to its environment. The purpose shows the priorities of the system for its maintenance. Without the purpose system might drift in its relations with the environment (476-477).

emerges; this is different from the notion that communication is something that is being transmitted (Luhmann 1992, 254). For Luhmann, communication does not occur between human beings. Communication is rather a system quality. For example, society is a system and it is able to communicate within itself, but this communication is not controlled by human beings. Thus, social systems theory does not look at the members of society, but rather it concentrates on events in each social system. When someone buys something, in social systems theory, this is an economic transaction in the economic system. The connectedness of these types of events creates communication in the system. Human beings are a necessity of communication but not an internal element. Rather, they are an external necessary condition (Moeller 2006, 5-8). We cannot reduce the social life (systems) of individual human beings to their “bodily data and/or mental activity” (11). Communication is not carried out by human beings or subjects, but rather communication communicates (Borch 2011, 3). This means that in a social system communicational events communicate with each other not the people. In this sense, economic activities in the society constitute communication in the economic system. Political activities in the society constitute the communication in the political system.

As the communication is not about the transmission of messages or information, it is not about achieving consensus either. In fact, communication is open to both “yes” and “no”, and it has this bifurcation from the beginning (Luhmann 2013a, 223). Having such a feature, we can say that the communication in Luhmannian perspective is not about achieving consensus. Rather communication is the sum of events in the social system. Communication in this sense is the existence of interconnected events or transactions of the same kind (i.e., economic, political) throughout the system (Moeller 2006, 22). Communication events in one system cannot connect to the communication events in another system. One cannot pay for goods with law; academic studies cannot be judged with holy scriptures (33).

On the other hand, the lack of interconnected events of the same kind shows the absence of communication, thus, system. For example, in antiquity it was believed that the geographical distance made the communication more “difficult and uncertain”. Communication was limited to that taking place within the boundaries of the polities. Of course, there were contacts between different polities even when they

were distant from each other; for example trade relations always existed. Yet, this was not sufficient for arguing that this trade had a “communicative effect”. Like trade, another example of contact was adoption of technology that developed in another society. Depending on the capacity of the recipient society the technology was imitated from the originating society. Technology and knowledge developed as a result of adaptation to the conditions. Despite these contacts, the “knowledge about distant parts of the world remained sporadic” (Luhmann 2012, 84). Later, the empires that developed in antiquity and survived as an organization form until the modern age were maintained thanks to the communication improvement that enabled the rule over large territories from a center because the communication rendered control (84-85). Starting from the 16th century CE onward, the division of the globe into different societies (empires) irreversibly evolved toward creation of the entire globe as a single entity, which started in Europe and spread toward the entire globe. The entire globe at the end got unified and “regular communicative relations” emerged in the global level (85).

Today, we talk about the world society as “the occurrence of world in communication”, and printing has an important role in making communication to multiply and intensify. This role of printing now gained an irreversible effect (Luhmann 2012, 87). In this sense, the world is not an “aggregate but a correlate of the operations taking place in it” (89). A societal system’s boundaries shrink or grow depending on “how much is communicated” (91). What constitutes the boundaries of the functional systems is the realm where communication takes place; what is outside of the functional system is non-communication (86). In this context, communication as an operation of the social system is a “complex recursive network” which creates some sort of reality (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 171). So there are;

recursive, self-referring network of communications on the inside, and everything else (including human bodies and minds) on the outside... [communication is not] an application of language in concrete cases. Each communication identifies itself by referring to past communications and by opening a limited space for further communication. It cannot happen as one single event, it cannot be recognized as communication outside of its own recursive network. Communication is recursivity (Luhmann 1997, 72).

Thus, it can be said that communication of social systems is a sort of cognitive activity, it is cognition within the system about its identity and unity. Luhmann says even though an objection can be made by stating that communication is ultimately performed by the individuals or subjects who communicate or act, he points out that communication is not an action of subjects. Communication is something that came into being at some point and from then on by itself rendered the occurrence of itself by its own capabilities (Luhmann 1992, 251). Luhmann draws from biology, for demonstrating that communication has an independent existence⁵. He says, for reasons that are unknown to us, once life started, it did not stop; instead it multiplied. All the beings that emerged later are of the same chemical composition with the one that emerged in the beginning. Once it occurred, “the unity of life [became] guaranteed”. This is called autopoiesis (Luhmann 2013a, 52). Luhmann, therefore, suggests that we need to find an answer to the central question as to whether we can find “one single operation” for social systems that is always “repeating the same as the beginning operation”. He answers that question positively, and says that it seems to be “communication” that constitutes the basis of a social system as an operation. A social system develops “when communication develops from communication”. Even though we do not know about the first communication, communication is the basis of the social systems, it does not matter how complex the social system and interactions are (53). In other words, the communication started at some point and created the social realm, and it multiplied to cover the entire society, which itself reached a global level. In the society, there are different social subsystems; each of them exists independently and has their own communicative operations. Whenever a social situation is the case, there we mention the existence of communication (Luhmann 1992, 252). While living being is creating the difference by living, a social system creates this difference through communication by enabling understanding between people or actions to occur about events of the same kind (Luhmann 2013a, 64). However, this does not mean that communication does occur in a vacuum. For communication can take place, many factual prerequisites are needed, and these are

⁵ Parsons also draws a parallel between social systems and organic systems of biologic world. He says, genetics in organisms and the culture in social systems have similar functions; they help controlling the system (Parsons 1970, 831).

not things that can be produced by the system. Thus, the system is always inside something. In other words, the “establishment and maintenance of system boundaries... presupposes a continuum of materiality that neither knows” the boundaries of the system nor respects them (Luhmann 2012, 54). The environment of the system is always there; it is always involved for we can talk about the system, and without environment nothing can happen (52).

Understood as such, communication is the operation of all social systems that render their existence. Even when a system might be a subsystem of another system (i.e., the political system is a subsystem of world society), each of them has their distinctive communication operation (Moeller 2006, 10). As every social realm is related to a social system and every social system has a communicative operation, communication is spread throughout all sociality; all sociality is constituted through communication. Therefore, communication is the necessary condition for sociality can be mentioned, but social reality is not a single unit, rather it is constituted of many self-producing realities (systems). These systems also define an environment to themselves. Hence, social reality is constituted a multitude of systems and their specific environments (14, 16). This role attributed to communication is similar to the role of life to the existence of biological beings. However, even though there is communication available everywhere in sociality, each social system has a closed communication circle. There is no entanglement between the communications of different systems, even when the systems are dependent on each other. Each system executes its operation (communication) independently. This is possible because there are no overlaps between communication of different systems, as the communication systems (social systems) are not space bound. They exist in the realm of meaning, and this allows identification of multiple independent systems that do not interfere with each other (10). Regarding the world political relations, we can say that when a world political system emerges, this is an indication of the fact that the system communicates within its boundaries for self-sustenance. This communication comes into being not because individuals or states want it. What instigate the communication to occur are the needs that world society produces as a result of the new developments in the various subsystems/realms of world society. When such a need appears, a system that would address this need forms. However, it is not someone who decides what kind of system

would form to address that need. Communication occurs across an area by itself; the boundaries of this system are determined according to the elements that are capable of serving to the realization of the functions of the system. All the relevant and capable elements to address the surfacing needs are included within the boundaries of the system. At the end of this process, a system where communication occurs across the boundaries of it and a realm that includes the system and its environment becomes discernible.

3.2.5. Extra-System Orientation of System Operations

The fifth requirement of the social systems is that system operations are concerned with the survival of the system⁶. This can be called as extra-system orientation of system operations, which means that all system operations are concerned with what the system fate would be. This concern is addressed by three underlying tendencies in system operations. One is that the system is alert about making sure that the system maintains itself, through prevention of any harmful act by the structures of system against the system. The second is that the system forces the structures of itself to act in harmony, in such a way that they do not harm each other. The third is that the system excludes the non-system elements by adopting an unfavorable code of conduct to non-system elements compared to the code of conduct within the system.

Thus, such economic and political interactions as war, diplomatic exchanges, rules adopted in world politics, world trade, and the like are part of the communication/operations that can be attributed to the world political and economic systems. The structures (i.e., states, firms, world organizations, markets, militaries, diplomatic institutions... etc.) of the world political and economic systems carry out these activities within and outside the system. When these activities take place within the boundaries of the system, they are part of the communication. Otherwise, when they occur between structures of the system and environment, they are system responses to the environment. In any case, owing to underlying tendencies, the events produce

⁶ A similar claim is made by Modelski about his Parsonian model. He says that the social systems have a tendency to sustain themselves, and this applies to world system as well. This sustenance concern is related to what occurs in system's relations with its environment (Modelski 1987, 231).

system unity, system coherence, system difference from the environment, system autonomy, and exclusion of the environmental elements from the system.

The concern of structures and their activities is resolution of problems emerging both among the structures within the system and between structures within and outside the system. Yet, these activities cannot challenge survival of the system. The activities and the structures foster the system, and the system determines the structures for them to be coherent with the survival of the system. These claims can find backing if we can demonstrate that the operations within the system inherently are concerned with the fate/survival of the system from what Luhmann says about communication. If this can be shown, it can be claimed that communicative activities in the world economic and world political systems react to environmental developments threatening the system or parts of it toward destruction or change. This is so because the social systems are responsive to what occurs in the environment (Modelska 1987, 231). The response of the system does not make the system something that has an input-output relationship with the environment. The environment is not involved in the internal operation of the system. The response of the system is oppositional against environmental developments that have an effect on the system (Moeller 2006, 15), especially on its survival. These concerns of the system are addressed by the actions of the structures, through prevention of any harm to harmony in attitudes of the structures of the system and exclusion of environmental elements from the system. This does not mean that the sole motivation of the communication is survival or the threats from the environment. System communications also help the realization of system functions. Communicative activities across the system communicate to each other since they are similar in kind. This gives different activities synchrony and conformity. Because the structures are determined by the system, actions and interactions of the structures are automatically in compliance with functions of the system.

The first argument that can be taken as supporting the idea that communication always has a dimension related to the fate of the system is that communication is a response to a disturbance from outside of the system. The fact that the system carries out operation in response to an external disturbance makes us think that survival of the system or its parts is at stake. Indeed, Luhmann says, it is the environment of the

system that provides the irritation or stimulus to the system, which triggers an operation/communication (Luhmann 2013a, 88). When the system reacts to a disturbance or irritation from the environment the reaction is a selection from a range of limited possibilities. The disturbance is conceptualized by the system, by trying to identify the irritation (89). System brings the irritation from outside and the past experiences of itself together for producing information that will initiate communication. We cannot say that information is “solid bodies or constant elements” that freely exist in the environment and are transferred into the system. Rather, the system has “types or schemata at its disposal in order to categorize something” (92). It produces information by bringing the irritation from environment and its past experiences together. Thus, the irritation or disturbance that emanates from the environment of the system shows that the system is affected from an external environment in producing communicative activities.

In demonstrating the operations’ external orientation, while the first argument is that disturbance is “initiation of information processing”, the second argument that can be utilized is the nature of information. Information is not a continuous phenomenon but rather it is a new thing to the system. Even though information is sometimes confused with structures, in fact “information is always an event”, it does not exist continuously. For example, a university is a structure that has no information value. When you come to it, you do not react to it, it has a meaning, but it is not information. Information is something that is always new (Luhmann 2013a, 90). Besides being new, information must be surprising. However, this surprise aspect does not mean that the information is alien to the system. As much as the information is surprising it is also expected; because it “is a selection from a range of possibilities” (91). Information, as it is uttered, is not something completely unknown. In fact, information that is uttered is just one of the information choices that can be possible. It is chosen from a set of choices that was seen previously. Because of this, there is always a context that conditions the information, which limits what can be said and claimed. It must be within a range of possibilities, and this range in fact is quite limited (216). When information first emerges it is information, but repetition of that information is not information anymore, even though when it is repeated it still has a meaning (91). As information is new and surprising, we can assume that information that will instigate

communication/ operation is not produced continuously within the system. There are certain events that are within range of knowable, yet surprising, and force the structures of the system to confirm the integrity of the system. Besides them, there are activities that are repetitions. These repetitions help the system to fulfill its functions but they do not start a communication within the system. Therefore, communication is rarer than the everyday repetitions of actions of the structures within the system (Skyttner 2005, 64). If the communication occurs rarely it is most possible that when it occurs it has an aspect regarding the most vital issues to the system; that is, survival or sustenance of the system or parts of it.

The third reason we can claim that communication as an operation of a system is about the fate of the system is that information, which is the first part of communication, is a difference. In other words, it has a changing effect on the system. The situation of the system before and after the information is different (Luhmann 2013a, 91). The fact that a change in the system would be a remarkable development compared to minor intra and extra system structural repetitions; information and the connected communication/operation would be related to the fate of the system. Furthermore, the possibility of a change in the system would be lower than structural repetitions within and outside the system. As the information would have a wider impact on the system and it would be less frequent, we can assume that there would be fewer occasions where the system receives information. If this is so, the system operations/communications occur especially to put the interactions of the structures in the direction that would be conducive to the maintenance of the system. This endeavor does not have to be frequent; communications/ operations occasionally occur. To illustrate, wars, surprising diplomatic interactions, forceful administrative practices, and tailored policies of sustenance of system (cultural policies, demographic policies... etc.) can be considered communications in world political system. These are communications within the system and responses to the disturbances from the environment.

Having such a projection we will be able to elaborate more on a Luhmannian world political relations theory. The arguments above show that even though there is a single system operation, namely communication, it is not necessary that the system operation is one single act of world political or world economic systems. Taking the fate of the

system as the central concern of system operations, there can be a multitude of operations. These operations show certain tendencies as an extension of the survival motivation of the system. The first of these tendencies is that the structures of the system communicate that any act harming the system, which might emanate from system or environmental structures, must be prevented. Second is that any harmful action from one system structure toward other system structures must not be allowed. The third would be that any environmental element must not be allowed to be included in the system; they must be excluded, meaning that there must be a double standard against the environmental elements. These types of communication tendencies render us to conclude that there are at least three logics of relations in world political and economic relations, when we look from a systems perspective.

In other IR theories there is a single logic or tendency recognized in relations between structures. From a systems perspective, a single logic in world economic and world political relations is flawed. Therefore, we cannot for example identify an anarchical structure (balance of power) and attribute every relationship in the world political realm to that structure's nature, by saying that all relations are conflictual. Nor can we pinpoint a system (World-system) in world level and attribute everything in the world and national level to that system's logic, by saying that there is exploitation and conflict in relations. Similarly, we cannot ascribe what occurs in world political relations solely to the norms (society of states) supposedly governing the world political relations, by saying that order is the main form of relationship. Lastly any claim that there is exploitation of different types (imperialism, postcolonialism) that dominates the world relations also suffer from a single tendency or logic criticism. Even though all of these theories are systemic, they are incomplete images that interpret/explain everything in world economic and political relations with a single logic. Luhmannian exclusion theory suggests that there can be multiple logics or tendencies that are governing the world political and economic relations.

3.2.6. A Structure is a Means of System to Take Action

Above, it has been argued that the structure is helping the system maintain its existence. Such entities as states⁷, firms, markets, militaries, diplomatic institutions, international organizations, and the like were named as structures. This interpretation of the structure is different from understanding of IR scholars. In IR, generally the structure is considered distinct from units, events, and interactions. According to mainstream IR interpretation of the concept, structure is a systemic quality; it is different from qualities of the units of the system. The structure is the way each unit (state) in the system is positioned vis-à-vis the other units; it shows how the units are arranged in the system. We cannot see structure; what we can do is grasping the existence of structure by abstraction of it from the reality (Waltz, 1979, 79-80). This structure shapes events, exchanges, and interactions among the units. It is suggested that the structure of the world political system has an anarchical nature, meaning that there is no higher authority above the states to decide about the relations among them. In such a structure, there can be a single form of relationship between units; that is, conflict. There is no other structure in the world political realm. By many scholars of IR, this approach is taken as a given (Waltz 1979; Yalvaç 1996; Walt 1990; Mearsheimer 2003; Gilpin and Gilpin 2001; Wendt 1999; Cohen 2008).

In this adaptation of structure concept, IR was influenced by the structuralism that developed in other disciplines. The structuralism aimed to reveal the continuity in human relations as opposed to the variation that occurs depending on time and space. The structuralism looks beyond fragmentation in social life and aims to find out the unifying elements. It adheres to the idea that it is more important to look at the relations between elements forming a whole rather than analyzing the elements

⁷ Wendt says that state is in essence a structure composed of shared information and discourse. The reason we call state as a structure is that the actions of state cannot be reduced to actions of the individuals constituting state. We understand the irreducibility of the actions of states to the actions of the individuals from regularities. For example, even when governments in a country change, the boundaries of states, their flags, symbols and names, even their interests and foreign policies show continuity. Thus, state is a structure that can be called as a corporate person. It is this feature of state that allows us to refer a collective intentionality and consciousness to state (1999, 215-221). Even though this attribution of action capability to state cannot be generalized to all structures, still we can infer from his views that not only states but also other structures may have a corporate personality and an action capability. In order for we can say a structure has action capability, we must be able to identify a corporate identity and a decision making mechanism available, which can be achieved when there is a hierarchy and centralization within the structure (217-218).

individually. In sum, according to this approach, human action is a result of a deeper and independent structure that must be revealed (Yalvaç 1996, 134). Thus, structure in IR is assumed to be leading regularities in world politics (Kessler and Kratochwill 2010, 29). Not only does structure lead to regularities, but also it is transhistorical, meaning that it has always been there, and it will continue to exist. Luhmann's conceptualization of structure opens a new window to this discussion. It departs from the idea that "the structure of systems [is] universally and ahistorically valid" (Kessler and Kratochwill 2010, 27-28; see also Spruyt 1994, 13). Rather the structure is subject to change, and it should include time and context as its new elements (29).

In its origin, the idea that structure is a constant has developed as an answer to the question of how society is held together. Yet, Luhmann says there is not such a problem since the foundation of social systems is communication, not integration. In such an understanding, integration of society is not a necessity for being able to talk about world society. Its communication capability suffices. In other words, Luhmann rejects the idea that there is a structure providing unity "above constitutive units" (Albert 2010, 52; Luhmann 1990, 183, 178-179). But what is structure? Luhmann says, opposite to the view that structures are lasting elements of the system, structures exist only if the system operates, and they can be observed only in the present (Luhmann 2013a, 71). Being dependent on the system's operability, structures are built by the system, rather than being an import from outside (74). This view opposes the idea that structures exist independently; it suggests that structures are only elements of systems. However, we cannot suggest that the relation between structure and system is a one way relationship. Structure and operations of the system are connected to each other in a circular manner that has the development potential for both system and structures. The system operations help structures to be more complex, and the more complex structures lead to variety in operations of the system. Thus, in the mutual relationship between the structure and the operations, there is a continuous development aspect (76).

Regarding the development/formation of structures, Luhmann points out that structures do not emerge in the sense that they are undergoing a production process, where one knows the necessary elements and put them together to produce the structures. Rather, what shows that a structure exists is repetition, that is, a structure

is mentioned when one situation is repetition of another one. It is true that every event takes place under different conditions, but in fact not everything is unknown. In case things were not repeating, it would not be possible to learn anything about reality (Luhmann 2013a, 74; Luhmann 2012, 50). Therefore, repetition of certain relationships between actions or experiences is the case in the social realm. In order to talk about repetition, repeated relationship itself must be recognizable. Recognition has two aspects; one is identification and the other is generalizability. Identification is necessary as it entails the identification of main features of the identities. Generalizability, on the other hand, is the possibility of knowing the identity under very different conditions, for example, recognizing a person in different conditions, and at different times (Luhmann 2013a, 75; Luhmann 2012, 50).

In this context, a structure is the “*expectations* [regularities] in relation to the connectivity of operations. These operations can consist of mere experiences or action”. Given this definition, we can surmise that when an action or experience has an effect on another experience or action in the system, and this is repeated at different times and different places, then we can think of the structures. A structure is this relationship between action A and action B. These relationships, which occur as regularity, are not random relationships; rather they are expected. Expectations are not necessarily subjective; they are rather shaped by the system. Expectations are requirements of the system; system imposes the way relationship between the actions would take place. This relationship is different from understanding that a stimulus causes a response independently. Rather, the system defines what would be the nature of relationship (Luhmann 2013a, 72).

In light of this summary, we may notice that Luhmann concurs with IR’s structure understanding that says structure is the continuity element, as he argues that structure comes into being when there is repetition in different times and different places. However, this continuity element in Luhmann’s thought has a difference from that of IR. IR assumes that structure exists independently and it does not have a beginning or an end. Luhmann’s approach differs by expressing that a structure is continuity in relationships so long as the system exists. Like the systems they come into being and also disappear, which means that structures may expire. Different systems produce different structures. For each system, every structure must be defined from zero. The

structure endures as long as the system that produces the structure in question persists (Luhmann 2013a). The second similarity between IR and Luhmannian structure understanding is that structure is the relationship between the elements. IR calls this relationship as the order between the units. There are two orders, one is hierarchy and the other is anarchy. Hierarchy occurs inside the boundaries of states, while anarchy occurs in the world political relations. In both hierarchy and anarchy there is a certain continuous form of relationship. The relationship in anarchy is that the units are rivals/adversaries of each other; in hierarchy, the relationship is that the units are connected in a way that they complement each other (Waltz 1979). As we can see the structure is the relationship between the units. Luhmann also defines the structure as the relationships that are identifiable and generalizable. The difference that Luhmann makes is that he does not take the units as the element that has the continuous relationship. He takes actions and experiences as the elements that have relationship. However, the actions and experiences are vague concepts. We do not know whose actions and experiences they are. We can only suppose that experiences and actions belong to the system. The structure is the regularities between the actions and experiences of the system. Once it is recognized as such, we can say that Luhmannian structure definition is similar to IR conception in that both call the regularity in the relationships as the structure.

However, structure understanding of both Luhmann and IR is problematic because they say that structure is a repeated relationship. IR's approach regarding structure is misleading in two respects. The first drawback of it is that it assumes structure/regular relationships occur between the units. The units have the capability to decide what should be done, and while they act, they are independent in the sense that they pursue their own interests. The regularity in the relationship between these independently acting units is the structure. This conception suffers the flaw that both units and structure between units are independent of the system. System does not exert a role in the emergence of structure, even though IR has the view that structure and units constitute the system. Counter to its assumptions, in mainstream IR, the system has an effect on neither structure or on units. Therefore, assuming that units came into being irrelevant of the system and that they enjoy interests that are determined by the units is not in compliance with system-centric thinking. The second flaw of IR's

structure approach is that it conceives the structure as regularity in relationships. A closer examination would reveal that a relationship alone cannot acquire a capability to influence the units to generate certain actions, unless this relationship leads to formation of a new entity. While IR suggests that structure exerts an effect on units, it refrains from assigning a role that will equip the structure with an identity. This is a contradiction in that structure is assumed to influence the units but it is nothing but regularity in relationships.

In this respect, Luhmannian approach should also be criticized. In general, a relationship is mentioned when a certain form of relation between actions is repeated. Action, in one understanding, means the behaviors of one person, who is the actor. When this action involves another person, who is the object of the first action, then we talk about social action (Martin 2009, 9). Social action is thus social interaction (9-10). On the other hand, because each interaction is too specific, for we can claim that this interaction is a relationship, instead of a single interaction, a tendency between actors must be identified. That said, it is not necessary that the parties to the relationship continuously interact; what is necessary is discernibility of a type of relationship, i.e., friendship between two persons (11). These remarks about the relationships between persons are applicable to the relationships between “corporate bodies” as well (10).

However, a relationship cannot be a mechanism/product of the system that helps maintenance of the system, because this relationship does not gain its own identity. Rather a relationship is between two parties/actions. Unless this relationship leads to emergence of a new entity, this relationship is between two or more parties, and it is caused by a system. This relationship cannot be considered a structure because it does not exhibit the properties of an identity. The question is who are the parties taking action (actions meaningful with respect to functioning of the system) on behalf of the system? It seems that action takes place among the structures of the system. Indeed, taking the system at the center of analysis, Luhmann consistently puts that the structure is a product of the system. He maintains that the structure owns a capacity to do things that are in compliance with the system expectations. Within such a framework, a structure must be something more than the relationship between actions/experiences of the system. Now, we have three propositions. One is that

units/parts are an outdated concept that is attached to systems thinking. Therefore independent units/parts cannot be taken as elements partaking in relationships in systems approach. Second, structure is a genuine system mechanism in systems thinking, which must be able to wield an influence in the working of the system. Third, a relationship relevant to the system is caused only by the system and carried out by the structures; no other party is capable of causing relationships. Given these propositions, we should admit that regular relationships caused by the system take place between system structures. The structures take action in accordance with the system expectations. These structures (i.e. states) cannot be repetitions, rather they are agents of the system that are able to act (Spruyt 1994, 14) and have relationships in the way the system dictates. There are relationships forming the structures, but structures gain a life of their own that is independent of these relations. Gaining their own identity structures partake in repeating relationships that are required by the system. The system makes the structures have certain relationships with each other, with the system itself, and with the structures outside of the system. These relationships are recognized owing to the repetition in interactions.

This definition of structure, (namely the structures are constructs of the system, and they are capable of taking action in accordance with system expectations), is different from both IR and Luhmannian approaches. However, it is not completely unknown to the definitions of the structure in literature. In general, in the definition of structure, there is no agreement between different authorities. Furthermore, the concept of structure is frequently used but it is rarely defined and discussed (Crothers 2013, 17, 21). It was originally imported from biology and engineering; later in the 20th century the term was started also to be used for social phenomenon, where mentioning relationships that are fixed and permanent is harder (17). There are numerous definitions of the structure. One, as we mentioned above, takes the structure as the permanent and stable relations between not only individuals but also groupings and institutions (4). There are extensions of this definition, i.e., calling the structure as the patterns in social realm or as the quality that gives social phenomena system character (16)

A definition that is close to our suggestion that structure is a construct of system which acts in accordance with system expectations can be found in studies of earlier

sociologists. The earlier sociologists such as Herbert Spencer, Thomas Hobbes, and Emile Durkheim had a similar view about structures. To them, structures were similar to organs of an organism. These organs met the functions of society or the nation-state. In such an understanding, organizations in the nation-state were the structures of it (Martin 2009, ix). Given that at the time of these sociologists, it was considered that the national society was the largest social system possible (Luhmann 1997; Luhmann 1990), we may infer that they thought that the organizations were structures of system. These structures were able to take action and have relationships with other structures and with the society/system. Even though recent understanding of structure takes structure as the relations between individuals/units/actions, they admit that these relations must gain an independence from the relations between individuals/units/actions. This independence makes them organizations that should be taken as an external force that affect the actions of the individuals/units, by making predictable demands from the individuals/units (Martin 2009, 3).

Thus, the organizations/structures are not mere relationships between the individuals or the groupings. There are relationships within the structures that constitute the structures; however, in turn, let the structures gain a life of their own (Martin 2009, 24). System is interested in relationships that the structures carry out as an identity/whole, not the relationships forming the structure. Structures change over time and they become more refined. The big structures come into being as a result of evolution of previously smaller structures (ix). In anthropology also, some sort of organizations such as family or a kinship group that are larger than family are taken as structures (5-6). All sorts of structures are defined in relation to the system/society/the whole (5).

In sum, the structure understanding that we propose is a framework that finds its counterparts in the literature. The structures are constructs of systems; they develop as organizations acting according to system expectations in line with Luhmann's thoughts. They show regularities in their relationships. We can thus call states/polities, firms, markets, diplomatic institutions, military institutions, international organizations, and the like as the structures of the world political and world economic systems. These structures can fight, cooperate, negotiate, trade, buy, produce, sell, mediate, organize with others etc. They are the means of the system; they emerge from

scratch or evolve from a previous form in accordance with the system needs. They act in accordance with the system expectations. They enter relationships with other structures of the system or the structures outside of the system. Some of these structures may be structures of more than one system; i.e., state is a structure of multiple systems. In this case, some relationships of these structures are produced by the relevant system; for example, war related relations of states are determined by the world political system. Other systems would determine other relations of this structure.

3.3. Exclusion Theory in the Context of IR

So far, we have summarized the basic requirements of system thinking in exclusion theory. In light of these tenets, now, we will frame its basics regarding world politics. In doing this, we aim to show that there is both a world economic system and a world political system in light of the criteria put by exclusion theory. Elaborating on these systems, we find that exclusion theory is a promising one in terms of offering new insights that are not explored by other theories.

3.3.1. Functions of the Systems and Intra-System Tendencies

To start with, above we pointed out that a social system should have a function in relation to the world society. Do world political or economic relations produce distinct systems carrying out certain functions of the world society? One view says that in world economic and political relations, we cannot mention the existence of a system since it has an “inter” character (Albert 2004, 22). However, if we adopt an understanding that assigns an independent existence to world economic and world political systems, which are able to produce political and economic results, we can overcome this impasse. Indeed, our review on the history of the Middle East will show that there is a system in world politics that cannot be reduced to inter-state relations. World political system imposes actions on the polities in a way that produces similar tendencies in world politics throughout history. Similarly, we can suggest that the world economic system also has an independent existence that has no “inter” character. Regarding the function that these systems exhibit, in IR theories, we do not

see an attempt that aims to show the functions of the system, in the sense that they meet a need of the world society. This does not mean that IR theories do not have a function assigned to the system at all. Rather it means that other IR theories assign a function to the system only in terms of its effects on the attitudes and tendencies of politics, markets, and parts of the world.

For example, the balance of power theory suggests that the system, through its structure (anarchical), plays a role in the determination of state tendencies in world politics (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2003; Nexon 2009; Paul 2004). Similarly, the World-system theory pronounces that the world economy determines the status of core and peripheral regions. That is, the system defines what role will be undertaken by which region of the world (Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein 2006). Imperialism puts that there is a capitalist system that imposes the imperialist states exploitation of the non-capitalist states by means of violence (Kettell and Sutton 2013; Sutton 2013; Bush 2006). Hegemonic stability theory, on the other hand, implies that there is a system ruled by one hegemon state that makes other states cooperate in harmony (Lake 1993; Cohen 2008). Postcolonialism joins the previous theories by hinting that a system composed of culture, knowledge, and discourse leads to the establishment of an unequal relationship between the south and the north (Bush 2006; Kapoor 2002; Sajed 2012; Doty 1996). Another theory, cosmopolitanism, supposes that there is a system that evolves in such a way that it forces the particularistic identities and clashes to fade away toward building the universal peace (Harrison 2002; Held 2003; Kleingeld 2013). Lastly, society of states theory suggests that there is a system consisted of norms, and this system shapes the tendencies of the states (Bull 2012; Linklater 2005a; Jackson 2009; Wight et al. 1992). As we can see, all of these theories suggest or imply that there is a system that has effects on the attitudes of states or some parts of the world. In other words, the system undertakes the function of assigning roles to the states or parts of the world. However, these theories do not define a function to the system, in the sense that the system addresses a need of world society. The function these theories assign to the system is that it is a variable affecting the relations.

Therefore, the question is what function the world political and economic systems might have? The answer to this question, in fact, can be drawn from the literature of

other IR theories. The function that the system has in relation to the world society can be synthesized from what other theories present as the central problems of world political and world economic relations. From the outset, it must be stated that the world economic system and world political system have different functions. According to exclusion theory, the systems enjoy autonomy in relation to each other. We say this because Luhmann suggests that every system excludes things that are not within its boundaries. For example, when we talk about the world political system as a secondary autonomous system, we exclude both the world economic system and some political issues in the world. In this vein, the world political system includes only parts of the world society. At this point, it should be noted that, for Luhmann, included and excluded are two parts of the system. The excluded is not outside of the system (Luhmann 2012, 91). However, we can claim that the excluded is outside of the system. If something is excluded, it means that it does not meet the requirements of the system according to Luhmannian reasoning. When something is not included, it does not participate the working of the system.

In this context, we can say that world political and economic systems emerge as autonomous systems where only some of states, firms, markets, regions, institutions, and organizations are included in the system. Luhmannian approach suggests that neither function systems such as economics or politics nor any other social system can include the entire world society (Moeller 2006, 29-30). World economic and political systems are “secondary functional system” that can be classified under the world society. They constitute the communicational base of the included areas only. These systems are separate from each other because it is not possible one system, i.e. economics, to regulate the other system i.e., politics (Albert 2004, 26). A system is highly autonomous and therefore it is indifferent to the excluded. In fact, the very success of function systems depends upon neglect because evolution has made the systems differ in such a way that their success depends upon operational closure (Luhmann 1997, 73). Therefore, when we assign a function to the world political or economic system, the function of each should be different from the other as they address different needs of the world society.

To start with, the world political system’s function can be defined based on problems that other IR theories bring to foreground. The theories that specifically deal with the

political realm, for example the balance of power, long cycles, and society of states, in fact wrestle with two main themes; conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance in the world political relations. Balance of power articulates that by means of war, negotiation, and diplomacy the disagreements or the attempts to change the balance established between the states are resolved (Paul 2004; Nexon 2009; Waltz 1979; Kaplan 1969, 68-69). The society of states says that despite the disagreements, the states seek to find ways of mutual cooperation based on norms (Bull 2012; Wight et al. 1992; Jackson 2009; Kaplan 1969, 68-69). Long cycles theory mentions the way a leader country deals with both conflicts with challengers and cooperation among the allies of itself (Modelski 1987). Although there are non-state political activities emerging in the context of global governance that the states are not able to address (Held 2003), these theories specifically deal with the state related political activities. Yet, what these theories indicate as problem areas in the world political realm can be generalized into non-state areas as well. Therefore, conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance are two themes that are translatable as functions of the world society, and are undertaken by the world political system. Furthermore, world political structures, such as states are means that the world political system invents to deal with conflict and cooperation problems that are considered the main problems that the world political relations deal with (Zhang 2001, 46; Kokaz 2001, 91).

Society of states and balance of power theories suggest that their findings are applicable to the entire globe. We can apply this to exclusion theory as well, with one caveat. World political system does not include the entire globe, but it addresses conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions across the globe. As we can see, the world political system includes limited areas of the world, but it addresses the problems of the entire globe. Such an incompatibility can be overcome by differentiation of policies applied to areas included and the areas excluded. While the problems in the included areas are addressed based on equality, the problems in excluded areas are handled based on arbitrariness. Suggestions made here, not only are applicable to the modern world but also to ancient eras, and the middle ages. In ancient and middle ages, the world was not a world society in its entirety; it was constituted of regions, each of which by itself was a world. The system in these regions was including only parts of the region but it was addressing the problems of

the entire region based on differentiation of policies applied to the included and excluded areas.

When we closely look at the functions pointed out, it can easily be seen that they occur within and outside the boundaries of the system. Conflicts are resolved through war, diplomacy, and international law. The cooperation is maintained through diplomacy, international law, and norms. These means are not mentioned by Luhmann, but these are major recurring themes in the relevant IR literature. We can import them to exclusion theory, as they fit in properly. The system/core makes use of these means by adopting different policies to core and peripheral⁸ areas. When attention shifts from intra-system relations to extra-system relations, a different logic starts. Conflicts and cooperation within the system/core are distinctly addressed as opposed to conflict and cooperation between system/core and its environment/periphery. While the dominant tendency in intra-core relations is adjustment of conflicts and sustenance of mutual cooperation, the conflicts with peripheral areas are resolved in a punitive and arbitrary way, and cooperation between the core and periphery is achieved asymmetrically.

Functions of the system/core are carried out by the structures of the system, which are states, military establishments, diplomatic institutions, international courts and other law enforcing international organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations that are instrumental in governance issues within and outside of the system. From the empirical chapters of this dissertation, we can infer that structures take action whenever a conflict and cooperation issue arises within or outside the system. The system/core does not face any destructive or unfair tendency or dynamic emanating from the core structures. Every structure within the system acts in a way to help the system sustain and other structures of the system get unharmed. Even though events such as wars between structures of the core areas may cause one to think that there is an enduring conflict within the system, as some claims that the core areas aim complete destruction of each other (Sofka 2001, 151-152, 161-162), in fact war is the means that resolves intra-core confrontations in a way that the system sustains. We can claim this because no war between the core areas leads to replacement of core

⁸ The core and periphery dichotomy can be applied to the system and environment dichotomy of system theory; because core, as we will elaborate below, has the characteristics of the system, while periphery has the characteristics of the environment.

areas with peripheral areas. On the other hand, in relations between the core and peripheral areas, the structures of core take a punitive and asymmetric stance. Still conflict and cooperation issues that may arise between the core areas and peripheral areas are resolved by the core structures. However, because peripheral areas are not included in the system/core, the independence of peripheral areas is little respected and unfavorable conditions are dictated to the peripheral areas (Cox et al. 2001, 7). Similarly, the conflict and cooperation problems within the periphery are resolved arbitrarily or they are frozen by the core/system.

As we can see, exclusion theory differs from other theories as it assigns an autonomous status to the system by attributing to the system some functions that the structures of the system carry out. The theory claims that everything that occurs within and outside of the system, including war, assists in realization of the functions of the system. Conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions are carried out in the entire world/region but the principles applied in the core and periphery are different. The main point that must be stressed is that the system is not just a variable that affects developments, but it carries out a duty that world society assigns. This is a new attribute that is referred to the system in world politics. On the other hand, the structures of the system, such as states are not floating freely. These structures act in ways that system requires. Certain tendencies and relationships emerge in fulfillment of these functions. We will later deal with these tendencies in detail. However, for now it must be stated that, in contrast to what balance of power theory, long cycles, and society of states assumes, system structures such as states cannot produce instability or destruction to the system. These theories suggest that it is possible that chaos can emerge within the system especially due to wars, which are thought to be uncontrollable (Waltz 1979). The exclusion theory leaves little room for such an autonomy to the structures and their actions. The theory says structures and operations of the system are in a mutually supportive relationship where one contributes to the reproduction of the other. The structures of the system help the maintenance of the system; they cannot work counter to the system unity and function. Besides their role to support the system, core structures also support other core structures; they work in harmony, rather than being in rivalry with each other. This harmony can be seen in differentiation in attitudes toward core and peripheral areas. Whereas in relations

between core areas, there is fairness and equality; in relations between the core and the periphery there is arbitrariness and inequality.

Regarding the function of the world economic system, we could draw from the IR theories that are mainly dealing with the economic realm, by utilizing their description of problem areas of world economic relations. World-system theory, imperialism, and hegemonic stability theory have some commonalities in their description of problem areas. When we look at the commonalities, what we see is that first of all they deal with wealth; the distribution of which being the primary concern. Imperialism says that imperialistic states or their capital class exploit the rest of the world for wealth maximization of themselves (Kettell and Sutton 2013; Sutton 2013; Bush 2006). World-system theory suggests that core areas of the world established an order where they can get most of wealth (Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein 2006). Hegemonic stability theory says the existence of a hegemonic state in the world is conducive for generation of higher levels of wealth for the entire world (Lake 1993; Cohen 2008; Gilpin and Gilpin 2001).

Given this focus of other theories, exclusion theory would suggest that, world economic system emerged for addressing the wealth distribution needs of world society. The firms, states, social classes, world production networks, financial, commercial and labor markets, international economic organizations are only taking roles in distribution of wealth (Yeung 2009; Strange 1999; Nye and Keohane 1976; Gilpin and Gilpin 2001; Cohen 2008; Wallerstein 2006; Wallerstein 1974). The roles that these structures undertake are defined by the world economic system. Once again, as the world economic system is a “secondary functional system” under world society, it is encompassing only the core areas of world society, leaving the peripheral areas outside. As it is the case in the world political system, the structures of the world economic system too do not bear a destructive tendency against the system. The competition theme in literature among the world economic structures should not cause one to think that they have the potential to destroy the system. Competition is a means of world economic system that resolves the particularistic tendencies of firms or different parts of the world economic. The structures of the system not only do assist in the system to maintain but they also refrain from harming each other. When

structures of core areas compete with each other, the aim is not to eliminate the rival; they rather adjust distribution of resources and wealth based on fairness.

This logic that we have identified regarding the intra-system relations has so far been little addressed in International Relations. True it has been argued that the core areas of the world are benefiting more from the relationships between core and peripheral areas by imperialism theory (Kettell and Sutton 2013; Sutton 2013; Linklater 2005b; Bush 2006), World-system theory (Wallerstein 2006; Wallerstein 1974), and postcolonialism (Bush 2006; Kapoor 2002; Sajed 2012; Doty 1996). Yet, these and other theories suggest that while core areas are benefiting from the relationship with the periphery, there is a clash within core areas that will be detrimental to the system as a whole or to the parts of system (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2003; Wallerstein 2006; Kettell and Sutton 2013; Sutton 2013). The only exception might be postcolonialism, because it assumes that the north as a whole is establishing relations of dominance over the south. Other than this, no significant theoretical attempt claiming that there is cohesion and harmony within the core areas has so far been articulated.

Thus, Luhmann's view that the system has a self-sustaining perspective provides a new outlook in world economic and political relations. So far, in this subheading, we brought to light some aspects of exclusion theory. First, we have identified functions that diplomatic and world economic systems undertake in relation to world society. The world political system carries out conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions in the world society/the region. The world economic system undertakes wealth distribution function in the world society/the region. Second, the first logic of world economic and political relations has been identified as that core structures aim to maintain the system. No harm occurs from core structures against the system; in contrast, structures, such as states or firms, help system sustain. Third logic of world economic and political relations has been identified as that core structures do not harm each other. Rather they work in harmony. As Bogdanov puts, harmony and synthesis are the qualities that produce system (Gorelik 1984, iv). They have a different code of conduct among each other as opposed to the different code of conduct adopted in relations with the peripheral areas. It might seem confusing to say that core areas work in harmony in the face of the many wars that they are involved

with each other or the competition between them. However, cooperation or harmony between elements of the system does not assume total extinction of friction; there could be little disagreements and hindrances (Bogdanov 1984, 43). Therefore, competition and wars between core areas and those between core and peripheral areas are never the same. The aim of wars and competition between core areas is to achieve a fair resolution about the disagreements. These identified logics and functions will prove strong when applied to the empirical evidence in the following chapters.

3.3.2. The Duality in World Politics (Core and Periphery)

The analysis of world political relations, in its mainstream treatments, suffers from focusing on the more apparent relations than the underlying relationships. The more apparent relations are state-to-state wars, alliances, cooperation, state interests, state's role in the economy, and the like. These relations are taken at their face value. It is said that these relations take place between states, and states are the ultimate reference points. States have their own interests and agenda. Each state has its interests and agenda because it is a unit that does not depend on anything else for its existence. Since states are independently existing units and they are multiple, the relations between them are the main concern of the world political analysis. When state A enters war with state B, it is because the interests of these states clash. There is no underlying tendency that directs the decision of the states A and B to go to war with each other, except the clash of interests. Thus, states are at the center. As each of the states has separate interests, world political relations are the relations between states and their decisions. Multiplicity of these states is a point that is cherished by the mainstream treatments of world politics. The number of sides in world politics depends on the number of available states.

This multiplicity of sides omits the more underlying relationship in world politics, which can be found out by adopting systems approach. Adoption of systems approach allows analysis of the world political realm from the lens of a duality, namely the system and the environment. More importantly, if the systems are at the center of social phenomena, including world politics, then the relations between entities that are not systems are marginal in relation to developments involving a system. It does

not mean that a system analysis does not deal with the relations between states, but it means that system approach interprets relations between states from a different perspective. The meaning of the relations is not bound by the motivations of states, but by the system tendencies. States and other entities such as international organizations, military and diplomatic institutions are structures of the system. The structures are not independently acting units, but they act depending on their position in the system or environment. When the state A is located in the system/core, it does not perform an action that would harm the system. Similarly, it would not harm other states in the system, even though they may go to war with each other because of disagreements. Wars between the members of the system do not cause disappearance of one or more members; rather they end up with consolidation of the dominant status of them. Against the states in the environment, on the other hand, the states in the system would exhibit a hostile attitude. The states in the periphery would be subjugated by the states in the system/core and their independence would be limited. In turn, the state B in the periphery would seek inclusion in the system for being recognized as an equal.

As we can see, states do not act in accordance with their own agenda, but rather they act according to their position in the system and environment dichotomy. Implication of this duality would be abandoning multiplicity of the unit of analysis and focusing on the system and environment as two systemic sides. Once the idea that world political relations should be analyzed from a dual perspective is adopted, the next problem is identifying the system and environment dichotomy with IR concepts. At this point, it can be said, we could replace the system-environment dichotomy with the core-periphery dichotomy as a more familiar conceptualization in world political analyses. The system represents the core and the environment represents the periphery. There are similar dichotomies that could have been adopted; i.e., the north-south, the great powers-minor powers, and the industrialized-nonindustrialized countries. Of these dichotomies, the north-south has a reference to a geographical division, while the great powers-minor powers dichotomy implies the multiplicity of sides in world politics. Finally, the industrialized-nonindustrialized dichotomy has connotations to a specific period where colonization was prevalent. However, the core-periphery conceptualization does not bear with it these drawbacks. Therefore,

we adopted the core-periphery dichotomy as a conceptualization that could be applied universally and throughout history.

Now the problem is to clarify what the core and periphery are referring in the context of exclusion theory. Above, we have argued that the world political system is constituted of a smaller area than the entire world society/region. While core addresses the political problems of the entire world/region, it does not include every area of the world in the boundaries of the core. However, attributing some functions of the entire world society/region to only core areas of the world/region should be a little elaborated on. Luhmann mentions the exclusion of the miserable areas of the world, but he does not specify the included areas and the functions they carry out. He highlights that different areas of the modern world are described as developed and less developed. He adds that in the developed areas we cannot dispute the existence of communication, which is essential for the system unity. In contrast, he points out, in the less developed areas there is a silence in terms of communication. One would expect that if there is a silence of communication in the less developed areas, then these areas are not part of the system that developed areas constitute. Yet, Luhmann says even though there is a silence in less developed areas, it does not make these areas to be considered outside of the system that the developed areas constitute. Rather both types of the areas are included in the world society/system, but some areas' participation in communication is limited or paused (Luhmann 2012, 91).

This is, in fact, a proposition that differs from our suggestion that world political and world economic systems are containing the core areas of the world only. Even though Luhmann recognizes that there are separate parts of the world in terms of their development levels, he does not admit that less developed areas are not part of the system. This seems to be stemming from the failure to recognize that when a "secondary functional system" emerges to address some functions of the world society it also applies inclusion and exclusion principle. This new system can be named as the world political system which embraces the core areas of the world only. We can derive this idea from Luhmann's view that each system creates exclusion and inclusion. Whenever a system creates exclusion and inclusion, the included elements act like an independent unity/a system. This is not an intended consequence. When the need for conflict management and cooperation maintenance emerges, a system/core that will

address this need forms. Yet, not every part of the world society is included in fulfilling conflict management and cooperation maintenance activities of world society; only eligible areas are included (Luhmann 1997, 74; see also Modelski 1987, 227). Once eligible areas are organized, all other areas remain outside of the core. Thus, the formation of core and periphery is not an intended consequence rather it is a result of addressing a need of the world society. The matter is whether we can define a core which we can associate with the world political and world economic systems.

The idea of an area identified with a system is something that systems theory welcomes. In line with this, the dichotomies such as “the north and south” or “the core and periphery” implies that there is a system approach involved (Banai 1993, 394). That said, systems theory does not specify which parts of the world are core and which ones are periphery. Therefore, we can specify the core areas based on historical record and findings of other IR theories; i.e., balance of power, World-system, and imperialism. These theories postulate a core area that has a boundary. The realists spell out the great powers, which are of a limited number and which have different relations with each other than they have with lesser powers of the world. Great powers are a club of selected states designed according to limited membership principle. Thus, the great powers concept bears an inclusion and exclusion aspect. The relations in this club are different from the relations in the rest of the world. Even wars of the great powers are more important than wars of the minor powers. The thing that makes the great powers distinct from minor powers is the difference between the levels of military, economic, and organizational power that they have (Liverani 2000; Podany 2010; Yalvaç 1996, 131; Wohlforth 2002; Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Paul 2005, Kennedy 1987; Kennedy 1991; Kennedy 1999; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2003).

The World-system and imperialism theories also specify a core area which has limited membership principle. The core areas’ relations among each other are different from the relations with the rest of the world. Core countries receive a higher share of wealth than the peripheral areas, because they have more capital-intensive production capabilities as opposed to labor-intensive production capabilities of the peripheral areas (Kettell and Sutton 2013; Sutton 2013; Wallerstein 2006; Wallerstein 1974). We can say that there is a parallel between the core and the peripheral areas in all three theories. They overlap, because the wealthy and powerful areas of the world are

geographically the same. In the same sense, there is a similarity in terms of the least wealthy and least powerful areas, which constitute the periphery. However, it is more important to define core because it constitutes a system, while periphery lacks the qualities of a system. The historical data shows that the system/core is located in the most endowed area(s) of the world society/region in terms of its production power, innovative capacity, military prowess, ideological power, and climatic advantages. All other areas are excluded peripheral areas. The more endowed core areas are limited to only certain areas of the world society/region, but their influence far exceeds their geographical scope.

At this point, we can discern a difference between the core and the periphery understanding of IR theories and that of exclusion approach. The difference is that IR theories attribute the emergence of peripheral areas to inability of peripheral areas or to preference of core areas. To them, the difference/inequality between these parts of the world can be overcome. In contrast to this suggestion, exclusion theory assumes that inequality between the core and the periphery is insurmountable. This does not mean that the core and the peripheral areas would always be the same. Core areas can be replaced with the peripheral areas, but the difference between core and periphery would always exist. This is because core includes only eligible elements; others automatically remain outside in the periphery. Luhmann says in the formation and maintenance of systems there are always boundaries and neglect (Luhmann 1997, 75). Once world economic and political systems include only core areas, the peripheral areas remain outside of the system/core. This differentiation, it can be stated, is a result of evolutionary developments, and it cannot be planned (Luhmann 1990, 181). Once the difference emerges, functional subsystems tend to preserve the differences/inequalities (181-182). The employment of differences by the system is a result of realizing the functions of the system. Therefore, society is in a continuous situation of witnessing inequality, i.e., between classes, between regions etc. (182). In sum, core-periphery distinction will always be seen.

The second difference between core-periphery understanding of other IR theories and exclusion theory is that exclusion theory is totally system-centric. Other IR theories assume that states have their originality that makes them have a state-centric logic in their relations with each other. The difference between core and periphery in other

theories has only a marginal role. Imperialism and the World-system theories have a somewhat systemic outlook that differs from state-centric approach because differently from the balance of power, they draw attention to the inequality between the core and the periphery. Yet, when it comes to their explanation about the inter-state conflict in the core, they quit adhering to duality between core and periphery, and lean toward the state-centric approach. The balance of power never abstains from claiming centrality of the state in world politics. On the other hand, the World-system and imperialism theories apply the duality between the core and the periphery only to world economic relations. Besides, they do not see the collusion among core states and areas. To them, the states have a different logic of clash of interests that is not explicable with the division of the world into the core and the periphery. Therefore, imperialism and World-system theories sacrifice their dualistic and system-centric approach. To wrap up, exclusion theory departs from the state-centric and multiple unit perspective; it rather focuses on the main division between the core and the periphery. It attempts to explain all world political relations from a core-periphery dichotomy. The core is part of the world society/region that is most endowed in production, innovation, military, ideas, and climate conditions. It is geographically a limited part of the world society/region but has influence in the entirety of the world society/region. All world political relations can be explained by looking at relations that core-periphery dichotomy implies.

3.3.3. Underlying Relationships between the Core and the Periphery

Above we have stated that it is possible that one part of the world replaces the other in being the core or the periphery of the world, but the difference between them would always exist because the difference is a consequence of system emergence based on functional differentiation (Luhmann 2012, 93-94). When a system emerges it includes some elements and leaves other elements outside of the system. This differentiation leads to development of a form of attitude from core toward periphery. The exclusion theory pronounces that the nature of relationship from core toward periphery is exclusion. This logic is about the relations between the core and peripheral areas as a whole, even though nations, classes or states in the core and the periphery are the structures which take action. Exclusion is a different form of relationship than other

forms of relationships such as cooperation, competition, exploitation, dominance, or any other relationship. Exclusion is a pragmatic relationship that core/system adopts against periphery. In the formation process, the system/core makes some choices regarding its environment. It decides what ecological elements and which people would be included in the system, and what ecological elements and people would be excluded from the system (Luhmann 1997, 74). In fact, even if the world political system and world economic system attempt to include the excluded areas, this would not be possible because a system cannot include “all kinds of concerns” (75).

Since the world society is differentiated along the functional systems, the inclusion and exclusion are regulated by these systems; there is no authority that is in charge with regard to inclusion and exclusion. Functional systems determine who will be included and what would be degree of inclusion (Luhmann 2013b, 24). In order to clarify what is exclusion and inclusion, it can be useful to talk a little about Luhmann’s view about exclusion in other fields and systems. Luhmann points out that, for example, how much money an individual would have is decided in the economic system; how much legal capacity would be available to an individual is decided in the legal system; whether a work of art is going to be seen as such is decided in the art system. The religiosity level of an individual is decided in the religious system. Scientific system decides what scientific knowledge would be available to the individual. All in all, functional systems decide who would be included and what would be the degree of inclusion. When a system includes someone or something it excludes other things. The exclusion in the modern society takes the form of, for example,

no work, no income, no papers, no stable intimate relationships, no access to contracts and to the legal protection of the courts, no possibility of distinguishing between electoral campaigns and carnival events, illiteracy, inadequate medical care and food supplies (Luhmann 2013b, 24).

Exclusion in one realm has effects in other realms too. The exclusion in one of the realms would have effects for exclusion in other systems as well. When someone does not have the means of inclusion in one function system, this significantly restrains what they would have in other function systems as well (Luhmann 2013b, 24).

However, there is a risk of overlooking exclusion in modern society as some misleading cases in modern society blur the difference between inclusion and exclusion. In modern society, everyone to some degree is included in all systems, and this may lead us to believe that there is an unprecedented level of inclusion in modern society (Luhmann 2013b, 24). Therefore, modern society at first glance implies that it does not have an exclusion aspect. It is assumed that in principle everyone enjoys some legal rights. He/she has an income level that can make us think that he/she is included in the economy. He/she is able to participate in and make assessment of the elections. He/she has the ability to take at least elementary schooling and minimum social security, medical care... etc. No permission is required for marriage and it is possible to choose the religious faith. Under these conditions, it is assumed that if anyone fails to participate in inclusion, it is because they did not fulfill the necessary requirements for being part of society (21). Thus, in modern society, exclusions are not explicitly mentioned; rather, exclusion cases are treated as emanating from failure of those excluded (22). Even though exclusion is being treated as if it is obsolete, this is not the case. Only the pressure of human rights makes the appearance of exclusion less obvious. This never means that the exclusion problem is solved; rather treating exclusion as if something nonexistent only hides the problem (23).

While Luhmann provides a clear description of exclusion in societal level, he does not offer a detailed clarification about the exclusion that occurs in world politics. He only points out that when we look at the areas of the world that are called as developing countries, we can clearly see that there is an exclusion there too (Luhmann 2013b, 24). However, by looking at the history of world political relations in the Middle East, we can derive some insights about exclusion that occurs from the core toward periphery. The most striking manifestation of the exclusion in world politics is seen in adaptation of double standards against the excluded areas. Above, it has been stated that core emerges in areas of world society that are most endowed in terms of production capacity, innovation level, ideological strength, military prowess, and the climatic properness. The core/system is a world political phenomenon. It includes the areas enjoying superiority in production, military, innovation, ideas, and ecological fields, and excludes the areas suffering low capabilities. Exclusion may occur in all

these fields, but the most prominent aspect of exclusion in the system/core is the political exclusion.

Political exclusion occurs through embracement of double standards by the core. Independence of the peripheral areas is restricted as opposed to the high level of independence that the core areas experience. On the conflict and cooperation issues that may arise in the periphery, the peripheral areas are not allowed to equally participate in the decision making. If the conflicts are going to be resolved through war, the decision of war is made by the core. Sometimes these disagreements are frozen, and a resolution is not allowed. In the conflicts in the core areas, peripheral areas do not have a say at all. The conflict and cooperation cases in both the core and the periphery are decided by the core areas through equal participation to either war or achieving consensus. Thus, the core areas and the peripheral areas are not equally represented in the world political relations. While the expectations and concerns of the peripheral areas are treated arbitrarily and based on unfairness, the concerns and expectations of the core areas are settled through fairness and equality. As a result of this, peripheral areas do not experience as much freedom as the core areas. On the contrary they face more oppression and appropriation of resources by force. As we can see, exclusion has many facets. A similar observation is made about the modern global political system. Modelski says, while the world powers (core areas) enjoy excessive rewards, the other countries (peripheral areas) are excluded from such rewards (1987, 156). The search for more economic advantages and the motivation to resort to force for guaranteeing the advantages in world politics by core areas led ignoring other necessities of the world order such as seeking solidarity and consensus among all the parties (154).

Next to double standards applied to relations with the periphery, the second aspect of exclusion is purposeful attitude of core to keep peripheral areas in the periphery and prevention of elevation of peripheral areas to core status. For example, during pre-colonial and colonial period, the European states, in their relations with African polities (empires, kingdoms, nomads), preferred these polities to not adopt European forms of state. This was not an ordinary preference, in fact the Europeans tried to prevent the Africans to have consolidated kingdoms that would make the Africans have better terms in their relations with the Europeans (Warner 2001, 78-79). Core

areas also prevented the unification of the peripheral areas as was seen in the post-colonial period in Africa (86). This may be taken as an indication of the conflict between core and periphery. As opposed to some interpretations of the relations among the core areas as conflictual, the exclusion theory finds that the real conflict is between the core and the peripheral areas. While the core areas have no issue with each other in terms of being accepted to the club as core areas, they have a motivation to keep the peripheral areas outside of this club rather than facilitating participation of peripheral areas to the core areas. The core areas apply force to deter the peripheral areas from the endeavors to leave their peripheral status behind. The wars between the core and the periphery are mostly of this nature. The term conflict to identify the core's attitude to keep the periphery in the periphery is meaningful, because it shows that underlying conflict is between the core and the periphery, rather than being between core areas. When two sides are not organized, in other words they do not form a system, they have a situation where an essential conflict between them emerge, in contrast to the situation where the elements of system are able to generate more capabilities by acting together (Bogdanov 1984, 43-44). This lack of organization between the core and the periphery leads to emergence of conflict between them. On the other hand, the core areas not only do go to war with peripheral areas but they also fight with other core areas. One might consider these wars as indication of conflict. However, this is an interpretation that is achieved only through interpretation of appearance of developments. It misses the underlying conflict, which is between core and periphery. We could say this because the core areas do not have a motivation to leave each other outside of the core league, but they time and again try to leave the peripheral areas outside of the league. This shows that the real conflict is between core and periphery, which takes the form of exclusion. Another implication of these remarks is that when a system draws boundaries between itself and the environment, it also has a motivation to treat the environment with double standard and also to keep the environment outside of the system.

Luhmann also recognizes that exclusion is not simply a result of the fact that the excluded is excluded because it does not meet the basic requirements of the system. Indeed, the attitude of the system is not neutral. Functional differentiation (system formation) in its pure sense assumes that the divisions between the system and the

environment and those between included and excluded are formed because objective conditions make them so. However, in reality things are different. Luhmann says, the world has its particularistic identities that have their history in which advantages and disadvantages have already been distributed unevenly across the globe. This uneven distribution of advantages and disadvantages are preferred by included particularities and are resented by peripheral particularities of the excluded identities. This makes us to be suspicious about the neutrality of exclusion. Indeed, Luhmann recognizes the fact that the particularistic identities can at some point be disruptive to the functional differentiation. The direction of this disruption would be that no matter what the functional differentiation's requirements are, the particularistic identities would seek to get more advantages and transfer the disadvantages to other identities or areas (Luhmann 2013b, 129-131).

These views make us believe that functional systems and traditionally established habits create particularities, and these particularities may have their own agenda that can be different from the necessities of the functional systems. Furthermore, particularities such as core regions of the world, as they are already benefiting from inclusion, would seek to deprive the excluded areas from these benefits. Therefore, we must be aware of the problems (inequalities) that system formation leads to (Luhmann 2012, 93-94), namely the problems that the core and periphery differentiation poses. These problems can be named as an intended tendency in the core to keep the excluded regions outside of the core by utilization of various means, including wars, diplomacy, economic sanctions, discriminatory economic incentives, international law etc. We can sum up that system-environment differentiation is not neutral, and this has ramifications in application of system approach to world political relations. The core and the periphery, as reflections of the system and the environment in the world politics, denote that the relationship from the core toward the periphery is exclusion. Exclusion in world politics, first, means the existence of double standards in the relations between core and periphery. Second, exclusion shows an underlying conflict between core and periphery where core does everything at its disposal to keep the peripheral areas at the periphery.

Once we have specified the attitude of core toward periphery as exclusion, one wonders what the attitude of periphery toward core is. Even though Luhmann does

not address the inclination of the periphery toward the core, we can speculate about it. When we look at other IR theories, we see that this question is not addressed by other IR theories either. Only postcolonialism says that periphery seeks equality with core. From the outset we can suggest that the attitude of periphery toward core is seeking inclusion. We can claim this based on historical trends that occur between core and peripheral areas. A survey of the history of the Middle East from ancient times until Ottoman-Safavid era shows that core areas have access to a larger wealth and hold more power at their disposal. On the other hand, the peripheral areas are less wealthy and less powerful. There are interactions between the core and the periphery but the peripheral areas are not organized as opposed to the organized situation of the core areas. However, when peripheral areas start to organize at certain periods, they seek to own what the core regions already have, namely equality and independence. This tendency can be called as seeking inclusion in the core. As it is the case in core areas, the peripheral areas also, in achieving their goals, utilize various means including violence in the form of war and pillaging (Buzan and Little 2000; Kuhrt 2013; Mann 1986; Moscati 1960; Roux 1992; Saggs 2000; Dale 2010).

Peripheral areas seek inclusion not only when they are organized, but also they seek it when they act separately. Yet, it is significantly rare that a peripheral area, individually, attain inclusion. Almost all the attempts of individual peripheral areas to be included are frustrated by the core areas. On the other hand, when peripheral areas unite, they succeed in achieving inclusion in the system. We can derive from these remarks that the main tendency of the peripheral regions toward core areas is seeking inclusion in the core. Inclusion might be sought through criticism in regular relations as it is seen in modern times and through invasion and destruction of the core as was the case in the past. Even though we can identify that peripheral areas as a whole seek inclusion in the core, this is rarely a coordinated tendency that includes the entire periphery. Rather periphery seems to suffer from lack of communication that would have rendered it a unity. The communication and unity in principle does not exist in periphery, occurrence of it is rare. The inclusion attempts of particular areas in the periphery are never welcome by the core regions, and when peripheral areas seek inclusion in a coordinated manner, this generally materializes in the form of invasion.

Now the question is whether the peripheral regions are also constituting a system in which communication takes place or not. It seems that the peripheral areas do not have a system identity because there is not a function that we can assign to the periphery, either economically or politically. Second, the peripheral areas are not freely interacting among each other. Their relations among each other are constrained by the core areas. The diplomatic and political relations, wars, cooperation cases, international trade, international law, international organizations are marginal in the relations that take place within the boundaries of periphery. The rules of these relations are not determined within the peripheral areas; the peripheral areas in most of the cases half-heartedly adopt the structures developed in the core areas. Indeed, as an example of non-volunteer adaptation of structures of core, Luhmann mentions the nation state. He says, we must acknowledge that the political state forced upon all regions on earth does not fit all local and ethnic conditions (Luhmann 1997, 73). Such an argument is also developed by Charles Tilly. Tilly says; states in Europe first consolidated as a consequence of working of internal forces; there was a struggle among various classes and groups to dominate. Then, the threat of war, war itself, and impact of other states in Europe shaped the form of state in this region, the nation-state. However, in the third world, the state did not consolidate according to the working of internal dynamics; rather they came into being as a result of the decisions of outside powers. The administrative structures, fiscal systems, and armed forces were designed on Western lines artificially. Thus, the state formation in the periphery developed based on external influences (Tilly 1990, 192-225; see also Modelski 1987, 146). By looking at these arguments we can say that if the periphery is using the structures of the core in an artificial manner, it is proven that periphery is not a system similar to the core but it is outside of the system/core, and it has structures that are imitating the structures of the core. The ability to claim systemhood depends on the ability of the elements of the system to show organizational capabilities as pointed by Bogdanov (Gorelik 1984, iv). The difference between being a system and not being a system is that a system (an organized entity) imposes its will on non-organized areas (Bogdanov 1984, 1, 5). Similar arguments can also be made about the history of the Middle East. The peripheral areas did not show organizational capabilities.

At this point, it might be interesting to compare what we find out in relations between the core and the periphery with Ibn Khaldun's opinions about relations between the sedentary and nomadic people. Ibn Khaldun says that there is not an order that can continuously keep going. Rather the interaction between sedentary people and the settled people leads to cyclical destruction of sedentary order that was created previously by a nomadic group having the group feeling. A settled area comes into being as a result of attempt of a superior nomadic group consolidating order and creating a state. This civilized state over time decays, generally in the lifetime of few generations, and in the periphery new nomadic groups that are not decayed emerge to take over the existing state. This was a cyclical scenario; therefore it was not possible that a stable and evolving political organization to emerge among Arabs (Yalvaç 2016).

As it will be seen in the empirical chapters, the history of the Middle East shows that the core-periphery dichotomy does not have a connotation regarding the settled status of the core or periphery. Second, we will see that, in general, sedentary forms of life are not short-lived, but rather there are forms of governments that lasted for centuries. For long periods, these polities were able to repulse the destructive capacity of nomadic people. Third, we do not see a cyclical replacement between nomadic and settled people in having the superiority in relations with one another. Ibn Khaldun seems to be under influence of political atmosphere of 14th century CE regional politics where there was not a stable government. However, both Umayyad/Abbasid period and Ottoman-Safavid period shows that there was dominance of settled and long-lasting polities in the Middle East. Therefore core-periphery relations should not be considered cyclical movement between nomadic and settled people. Rather, influential peripheral areas are generally urban areas that are excluded but seeking inclusion. This comparison shows that there is not equality in relations between the core and periphery in terms of succeeding each other. Rather the core is dominant in its relations with the periphery.

3.3.4. The Structures as Means of Interaction

Above, it was stated that the core applies exclusion toward periphery. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the core and the periphery do not interact. In fact, contacts between system and environment are constant (Luhmann 2013a, 88). These contacts are not communications, because communication is closed; it only takes place within the system. On the other hand, causal relations, Luhmann says, are contacts between the system and environment (66). Even though the causal relations are between the system and the environment, these relations are not established between the system and the environment collectively, but between the structures of system and environment. Not all structures of the system are in continuous contact with all structures of the environment. Rather the links are established only between relevant structures of the system and the environment. Because the environment is too large, the system reduces the environment to only the most relevant areas to the system; irrelevant aspects of the environment are excluded from consideration (Luhmann 2013a, 84-86; Albert 2010, 45). In this sense, it can be said that the world political and world economic systems have deeper relations with some elements in the environment than the others. The primary environmental elements that are being structurally coupled with structures of world political and world economic systems would be peripheral political and economic structures as opposed to other environmental elements.

This supposes that even though there are a multitude of elements in the system, not all elements and parts of the system are affected by contact with the environment. When there is an economic problem, it does not automatically mean that you face a political problem too. Another implication of this is that not the entire system is responding or the entire system is undergoing a change against a disturbance from the environment. This is also a departure from the idea that everything is dependent on everything within the system (the old way system thinking) (Luhmann 2013a, 122). Therefore, we can say that it is not necessary that the entire system is reorganized for responding to a disturbance from the environment. Otherwise, the system could never be a stable one, for example, while the system was reorganizing to respond to a

disturbance from the environment already another disturbance would have taken place (122-123).

From these we can infer that the regular relations between the core and the periphery are realized through the structures, such as states, militaries, firms, markets, diplomatic establishments, international organizations, and the like. Out of practicality, the core and the periphery do not act collectively. Rather, relevant structures of core interact with relevant structures of periphery. In these relations, core structures do not independently act; rather they act in conformity with the function and goals of core. Indeed, the system bundles the environment; it categorizes different events under the same identity, and relates them to its reaction patterns (Luhmann 2013a, 121). Whenever it identifies these identities it activates its reaction patterns (122). In other words, structures act according to these system patterns.

The fact that not all elements of the system or environment are in contact with each other and that it is the structures which come in contact with each other, there is something needed that will render coherence and cohesiveness to the structures of system in their relations with the structures of environment. The thing that is needed in rendering coherence is communication (operations of the system). In fact, Luhmann says, the means that system has at its disposal are its operations (communication) only. System operations also produce the structures (Luhmann 2013a, 70). Coherence and cohesiveness among the structures of the system develop as the system operations are connected to each other with the system maintenance purpose. This feature of connectedness among the communication events is embedded in every interaction between the system/core and the environment/periphery. The operations (communications) of the system that are carried out by the structures are continuously connected in the background.

Thus, the structures have three functions; one is that they are the elements that enable connections with the environment. Second, Luhmann says, structures are the means that help the system lower the complexity of the system as it is required to take some actions. Third, structures contribute to complexity and variety of possibilities available in socially complex systems. This third function is similar to language; the more a language is nuanced, thus complex, the more it can help precision in the

expression of ideas (Luhmann 2013a, 73). The structures enable variation of possibilities for operations, otherwise options would be limited (75). This understanding is in conformity with the idea that structures are means of the system to take action.

3.3.5. The Role of Structures in the Periphery

Even though the structures of core/system and periphery/environment are in contact with each other, the structures of both sides differ in some respects. The structures of the environment are not created by the environment itself for they function in conformity with the environment's goals. Rather they are installments by core in the environment, out of the need to enter relations with the environment. As they are not designed by the environment/periphery to address the needs of periphery (Cox et al. 2001, 7; Warner 2001, 80-81), these structures are different in kind from the structures of the core. For example, many developing states adopt policies deemed appropriate in world politics by looking at what core areas ask them to do (Krasner 2001, 25). Leaders in peripheral areas are not able take all possible policy options into consideration. Their options are restricted by "externally imposed domestic structures, policies, or personnel". These parties in peripheral areas collaborate with the core areas (31). Rather than promoting the unity of periphery, these structures help with the core propagate that there is not any part of the world that is excluded. The core by differentiating itself from periphery is able to impose itself as a unity. While it imposes its unity on the periphery, it is also able to interfere in the periphery for designation of structures that would interact with the structures of the core itself. The idea that a system is able to impose structures on the environment is not addressed in Luhmann's thought. The fact that the periphery lacks a function due to the lack of communication/operational capability across its borders explains why it is possible that the core can impose structures on the periphery. We can derive the idea that communication does not occur in the environment from the suffering of periphery in its relationship with the core. The historical record shows that when periphery gets organized, meaning that it acts in coordination, it is able to destroy the structures of core, and the core itself. Nevertheless, since periphery is not able to show this competence continuously, we can say that the periphery lacks a system character, and

its structures are not more than installments of the core within the periphery for enabling the interactions between core and periphery take place smoothly. Also, the periphery is willing to import the structures of the core.

The periphery does not have the wherewithal to render coherence and cohesiveness in its relations with the system/core in that the structures available in the periphery are not coherent in such a way that they are organized with other structures in the periphery. Each structure, for example, each nation-state and international organization in the periphery is a device designed for the relations between the core and scattered parts of the periphery. These structures are not inventions of environment/periphery; they are replicated counterparts of the structures in the core for establishing the relationship between the particular region in the periphery and the core (Tilly 1990; Frank 1966; Palma 2009; Modelski 1987, 146). This should not be taken as that there is no initiative emanating from periphery toward core. There are attempts in different parts of the periphery toward seeking the system to include them. These attempts are mainly made through criticism toward the structures of the system and the system itself. The aim of the critical approach is to undermine the unity of the system/core, to get more aid, and to achieve more representation and equality in the system. However, here, not the structures of the periphery perform this pushing toward core; rather the people in periphery seek ways of inclusion. Indeed, Luhmannian system theory suggests that social systems or sociological developments cannot control what is going on in minds and bodies of human beings (Moeller 2006, 11).

This demand or threat from periphery, in the past, was performed by mobilization of the peripheral nomads and pastoral people or by continuous uprisings in certain prosperous cities of peripheral regions against the core areas (Kuhrt 2013; Roux 1992; Saggs 2000; Mann 1986; Buzan and Little 2000). In modern times, this mobilization of people against the structures of periphery and core is performed by nationalist and religious groups (Luhmann 1997; Hayes 1926; Hayes 1960; Gellner 1992; Özkırımlı 1999; Mamdani 2004). The people in various parts of the periphery at times are able to mobilize, in a way that they endanger the structures in both the periphery and the core. Another influence that the people of periphery can exert is propaganda to influence the people of the core areas, who are also environmental elements of the

core/system. When the people of core are mobilized toward inclusion of a peripheral region, these people can force the structures of the core to be more inclusive or to reach some level of conciliation with the periphery. This inclusion theme is about the inclusion of large groups (identities, loosely organized people, nationalities etc.). These are not remarks about the individuals. Individuals have less resistance about inclusion compared to the groups. Therefore an individual from a peripheral area can easily elevate to an included position within the periphery or in the core. It all depends on the capabilities of the individual because for the system there is no difference between individual A and B. Individuals do not challenge the inclusion position of the groups in the core areas. However, the peripheral groups or identities face resistance, even though it does not prevent the inclusion attempts of the peripheral groups or identities. Groups or identities can also get inclusion, but this inclusion is temporary and rare.

3.3.6. Compromises in Relations between the Core and the Periphery

As the relations between the core and the periphery are a fact, one wonders whether there is any compromises on the side of core toward the periphery. We could answer this question positively because of the fact that the core/system has to attract people for its sustenance. It is only people who enable a social system to exist; without communication activities carried out by people social systems cannot exist, even though this does not make people the elements of the system. People are in fact placed in the environment of the system, but the system has a dependence relationship with the people (Luhmann 2013a, 187-188, 199). In order for people take a role in the functioning of the social systems, they must be convinced that the system/core is working in conformity with some values, ideologies, or the benefits of the individuals. For example, human rights and the agreements guaranteeing them are assurances of certain rights of individuals against their governments. When governments conform to these rights, some expectations of people are met for they support the governments (Krasner 2001, 24). People in the core areas help with sustenance of the system when the benefits and values rendered to them are reaching to an agreeable level. People will be concerned when these values and benefits are not sufficiently addressed. People in the core, at times, can also be concerned about the conditions of people in

the periphery. They could object to obvious unfair treatment to people in the periphery. Or people in the periphery might convince the people in the core that the systems (core) are enslaving human beings as a whole. It is possible that more than people of the core, people of the periphery are concerned about the relationship between the core and the periphery, but all human beings have a concern in core-periphery relationships. The bottom line is that social systems, in our case world political and world economic systems, are dependent on the people's consent in both the periphery and the core. Therefore, the core areas are concerned about revolutions made by people more than they are concerned about the confrontation among the core areas as it was also observed in 19th century CE Europe (Cox et al. 2001, 11).

For people in the periphery to participate in relations between the core and periphery and not challenge the core/system, they must be convinced that the people in the periphery are treated decently. Relatively decent conditions are reached as a result of a compromise between the core and people of periphery. This compromise can be achieved in various realms. Peripheral structures or people could receive aid from core areas, more and more knowledge transfer can be made toward the peripheral areas, religious beliefs and cultural practices of peripheral people might be respected, self-government or autonomy might be endowed to peripheral areas, favorable economic conditions might be provided, advantageous tax policies might be adopted... etc. One form of compromise in world political relations can be seen in building of some institutions. Institutions based on equality must be established between the core and the periphery, where structures interact. These institutions must be established on the terms that implies as if the structures of core and periphery are similar and equal. There must be platforms and areas where relationships are established.

Regarding the establishment of the institutions where the core and periphery relations are compromised, "structural coupling" concept is relevant (Luhmann 2013a, 84). The causal relations between systems, in Luhmann's approach, are formulated with the concept of "structural coupling", which provides the relation between function systems. For example, a state's constitution is "a device of structural coupling between the political and the legal system" (Albert 2010, 54). If we extrapolate this logic to world political relations, we could say that, for example, the General Assembly of the United Nations is a structural coupling case of relationship between the core and

periphery. In the past, the gods of peripheral areas were included in the family of gods where they were equal to the gods of core areas. Similarly, gift exchanges and diplomatic correspondence between kings were not only performed between the kings of core areas but also between kings of core and peripheral areas. Another example; while the kings of core areas were considered brothers, the kings of peripheral areas were not without status. The kings of peripheral areas were also considered members of the king family in the status of sons. These institutions are devices or syntheses that are achieved between the core and the periphery. It does not necessarily mean that the synthesis is achieved on equal terms; it just clarifies that synthesis is achieved. Similarly, the sovereignty concept is a compromise where every state argues equality in their relations. It does not matter whether all states have equal sovereign rights, but this equality can be claimed by all states in the world to some degree. In actuality, there is a gap between what the sovereignty principle implies (autonomy, mutual recognition, possession of territory, and control) and what takes place in real politics. In reality many instances of violation of sovereignty take place. This imbalance between the principle of sovereignty and the actions that violates sovereignty is a feature of all eras (Krasner 2001, 18-19). These devices such as sovereignty or syntheses provide enough grounds for believing that there is no exclusion of the periphery from the core. The consent of the people in periphery as well as in core is contracted by the core/system through these mechanisms. Alongside these; manipulation, sweetening of the practices of the core by claiming that they are to the mutual benefit of both sides, some limited exemptions, preferential treatments, and negotiation can be the methods resorted in relations between the core and the periphery. As long as the relations between the core and the periphery are carried out without any disturbance; the system, which encompasses the areas in core areas only, faces no serious challenge or manipulation from the environment.

In sum, we established a framework of exclusion theory for IR but especially for world political relations. In delineating the requirements of system thinking we basically relied on Luhmann's thoughts. On the other hand, in designing the content of exclusion theory with regard to world politics, we not only utilized Luhmann's views but also we made use of history of the Middle East and the suggestions of other IR theories. The basics of exclusion theory regarding world politics were put based on

several propositions. One is that the world political system has the function of conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance. Otherwise, a world political system cannot exist. Secondly, regarding the intra-system relations we suggested that core areas do not aim to harm each other. Not only do core areas not harm other core areas, but they also tend to cause no harm to the system/core as a whole. Rather core areas seek sustenance of the system. Thirdly, exclusion theory puts that world politics can better be analyzed based on core-periphery dichotomy, rather than analyzed based on multiple states perspective. The core-periphery approach reveals the underlying unequal relationship in world politics. Fourthly, we made clear that in relations between core and periphery, the core adopts exclusion attitude against the periphery. Exclusion entails restriction of independence of peripheral areas and prevention of elevation of peripheral areas to core status. Fifthly, we argued that against the exclusion attitude of core, periphery embraces an attitude that can be called seeking inclusion, in the sense that achieving equality and independence. Sixthly, it was elucidated that the system and the environment (the core and the periphery) interact through their structures, such as states, militaries, diplomatic establishments, and the like. Seventhly, we illuminated that the structures of the periphery are different from structures of core in that they are imports from core to periphery. This feature of these structures made them not help with the goals of the peripheral areas in full. Eighthly, we stressed that people are both located within the environment of the core and also that the core is dependent on people. Because of these, the core seeks consent of the people in the periphery. All these propositions that we developed and defended form a coherent set of ideas supporting the exclusion theory which can be taken as a system centric interpretation of world politics.

CHAPTER 4

CORE PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN ANCIENT ERA (2900-2004 BCE)

In designation of the empirical chapters, several criteria are applied. First of all, the history of the ancient, middle and early modern ages reveals that there are multiple cores/systems in history, each of them being independent from the others. However, there are also some similarities and continuities. The chapters were designed based on similarities between different cores and the length of material about each system. Basically, ancient era and common era are taken as two main parts of the empirical study. In turn, each of the parts is divided into two chapters. One of the chapters about the ancient era is the present Chapter. This Chapter would be the one where the template of the empirical analysis of world political relations is presented. In the previous chapter, the contours of exclusion theory were outlined, which has revealed that the most prominent relationship in world politics is the one between the core and the periphery. Out of these two, the core comes first. The periphery is defined in relation to the core. Therefore, one of the things that will be done in this Chapter is to trace the process of core formation in history. This is important because it is the core that emerged for the first time in history. The following cores in history have been repetitions of this first core. However, this core also is the story of emergence of the Sumerian core. Sumerian core did not automatically emerge. There is a long time during which the core came into being. This core was centered on Mesopotamia (south of contemporary Iraq). Following the Sumerian core, we started to see a new core, namely Akkad core. Akkad core also was centered on Mesopotamia. Therefore, geographical continuity makes it necessary to take formation process of core, Sumerian Core, and Akkadian core to be studied in the same chapter.

4.1. Formation of the Core and Its Structures

By surveying about the origins of the core, we would be able to see how a system forms in world politics. One thing we notice out of this search is that neither the core nor the periphery is eternal. They cannot be mentioned prior to 3000 BCE. This is the period when we can talk about the surfacing of a system/core for the first time in world history. The fact that the core formed at some point in time makes us think that some conditions must be met in order for the core to emerge. Indeed, our survey of the ancient history of the Middle East region prior to the formation of a world political system shows that the system/core needed some conditions to appear. One of these conditions was the differentiation of parts of a region from each other in terms of level of production, innovative capacity, military prowess, and climatic advantages. These differences between parts of the region, in turn, led to development of dependencies between the parts. The dependencies created a region or a world society.

A region can be mentioned when we can talk about its autonomy, thus its autopoietic (self-producing) quality (Banai 1993, 395). The era that we cover in this heading (mainly fourth and early third millennium BCE) allows us to call Middle East region as a world society by itself. It did not have significant contacts with other regions of the world, while the contacts between parts of the Middle East were dense. Once the world society/region did form, it needed a system that would deal with the problems that should be tackled at the regional level. These problems were conflicts (mostly handled through wars) and cooperation needs (i.e., dealing with common regional problems) that had region-wide effects. These problems of the world society emerged in Mesopotamia by the beginning of the 3rd millennium BCE. World society/region deals with these problems by delegating them to a system/core. The world political system/core is the communication that connects and governs the political events in the most endowed area(s) of the world society/region in terms of production power, innovative capacity, military prowess, and climatic advantages. Thus, in the first part of this chapter we provide an account of the formation of core.

Besides providing an account of the formation of the world political system/core, we will also explain how the structures (mainly the city-state) of the system came into being. The system and the city-state/structures are indispensable to each other.

However, the core/system comes first; state is subject to the dictates of the system. The system/core designs and utilizes state as a structure in dealing with the conflict resolution and cooperation needs in the world society. The reason why the system sometimes needs multiple structures/states instead of one structure/state in the core is because sometimes the endowed areas in the core are many and each of these areas is able to successfully and individually claim core status. Accordingly, the system is not interested in whether there are many structures or one structure. What the system is interested in is whether the peripheral areas are excluded from the core or not. Another concern of the system is whether war, diplomacy, trade, and other interactions among the core states/structures are carried out based on fairness or not. Thus, the system is involved in activities of core states by giving them a direction. Yet, when there is a reason for conflict or cooperation, it is states which take action. States rely on coercion and military power in dealing with conflict and cooperation problems. Both coercion and military powers of state appeared at the same time with the emergence of the system. Indeed, it was the regional conflicts and cooperation opportunities that legitimized coercion and military capacities of state. Therefore, we can say that the coercive and military powers that gave state existence were designed in accordance with the functions of the system/core. In its origin, the state is a structure of the system. This dependency of state to the system and the emergence of state is elaborated in the following pages of this chapter.

4.1.1. History of Mankind without a Core

Most of human history passed without a world society, a world political system, and its structures. To begin with, humankind's existence traces back to millions of years ago. Human beings started their life as gatherers who took advantage of large territory and utilized the resources that appeared seasonally. Later, they developed their own hunting capabilities. Until the emergence of the literate era in the Middle East, during the entire hunter gatherer stage, everywhere in the world the traces of human being showed similarity (Mann 1986, 34; Nissen 1988, 15; Hole 1966, 608). Daily practices, human organization, and nutrition habits of people in different places of the world were similar. Differentiation between practices and organization capabilities in separate regions is a phenomenon that later emerged. During the hunter gatherer stage,

not sophisticated though, the human being had some sense of social organization. It is difficult to guess the exact size of the earliest groups of people. Yet, alongside families, which were “tight but impermanent,” there were also bands, which consisted of around 15-75 people coming together for hunting and gathering. These bands were, in turn, members of a larger but looser community, the tribe. The total number of tribe members is estimated to be around 500 (Buzan and Little 2000, 116; Mann 1986, 43; Nissen 1988, 15). These communities were self-sufficient and every member of the society had the same opportunities to reach resources (Hole 1966, 608). Thus, in the hunter gatherer stage, the entire world exhibited similar development levels and the role differentiation among the people was absent.

It has been thirty thousand years since human beings started using tools for subsistence. However, even after starting to use tools, human beings continued to live in hunter gatherer situation for another twenty thousand years. They did not plant and harvest. This situation changed around ten to twelve thousand years ago. In some areas that ecological conditions were appropriate, human beings started to plant grains and raise animals (Diakonoff 1991b, 27). This change marked a new stage almost everywhere in the world simultaneously, the Neolithic period (10000-3500 BCE) (Mann 1986, 34; Nissen 1988, 16-17). Up to the end of Neolithic age, social development continued to be uniform in the entire Middle East and the world (Nissen 1988, 36; Frankfort and Davies 1971, 71). In the Neolithic period, some important developments that were everywhere similar took place. Not entirely unknown in the hunter gatherer stage, extensive agriculture (especially wheat and barley) and domestication of animals (especially sheep and goat) reached to considerable levels in the Neolithic age; thus, the sources of food expanded. Production capacity developed; production of pottery, textiles and stone tools was particularly important. Using bricks, people built houses and temples. Besides, gradual development of permanent settlements became noticeable. Evidence from at least 6500 BCE shows that trade and exchange of goods started to be seen, but only for limited extent. Accompanied by these developments, complex societies emerged with some level of division of labor, social differences, and political authority. Religion and art became visible. However, it is difficult to pin down the exact time when most of these developments took place (Frankfort and Davies 1971, 71; Mann 1986, 34, 41, 44;

Moscatti 1960, 12-13; Nissen 1988, 20; Lamberg-Karlovsky 2009, 59; Podany 2014, 16-17; Simmons 2007, 214; Pollock 2017, 17-19; Diakonoff 1991b, 28).

Although the Neolithic Age witnessed many innovations, it is hard to tell that communities in the Neolithic age achieved a production level that would enable them to create civilizations different from other parts of the world. The standard of living improved but agricultural production and animal husbandry sufficed only for survival (Diakonoff 1991b, 28, 29). Thus, production and other conditions were similar across the Middle East; there was no differentiation in one part of the Middle East compared to the other parts. However, this similarity does not indicate that the Middle East was a region because there were not enough contacts between the parts of the Middle East. Geographic proximity alone does not make an area a region. For a region to emerge, there must be high level dependencies and contacts across the parts of the region that make it an encompassing system, in which a world political system can form. In this period, even though the number of settlements considerably increased and the distance between them decreased as little as one-day walking in the Neolithic era (Hole 1966, 605, 607), this did not lead to interaction between the settlements. Besides no interaction, there was also no threat from one settlement toward the other. We could understand the lack of interaction and disagreements between settlements from the fact that the dominant characteristic of early permanent settlements was their openness (Nissen 1988, 36), as opposed to closed and protected settlements seen in early 3rd millennium BCE. As we can see, until the end of the Neolithic age, there was no system/core. Also, there was no region where a system emerged, no differentiation within the boundaries of the region, no disagreements and cooperation between parts of the region, and no mechanisms of dealing with these issues. Therefore, we can say that until the end of Neolithic age, around mid-4th millennium BCE, we do not have grounds to mention a system/core and world political relations.

4.1.2. The Core Emerges for the First Time in World History

As we noted, during wanderer gatherer, hunter-gatherer, and Neolithic ages there was no indication of necessary conditions of a system/core. However, by 4000 BCE, things started to change toward formation of conditions for the emergence of a world

political system. We began to see differentiation between separate parts of the Middle East. Throughout 4th millennium BCE, the South Mesopotamia (in the south of contemporary Iraq) rose to prominence compared to other parts of the Middle East and became the area which would host more advanced developments. New settlement patterns appeared in South Mesopotamia, namely the settlement systems (Nissen 1988). The settlements showed a new characteristic; they were not independent settlements that had no links with other settlements. Rather, they were parts of settlement systems. The settlements consisted of more than one settlement that showed the existence of systematic relationship (dependence) between them. This makes us consider this cluster of settlements as a single unit/entity. Entire South Mesopotamia was not a single settlement system, rather a multitude of settlement systems existed at the same time. Even though the first types of these settlement systems appeared in Iran, later they discontinued in Iran to be seen in the South Mesopotamia (Nissen 1988, 52, 54-55; Wright 1998, 179).

These settlement systems form the nucleus of citification. Between 4000 and 3000 BCE, we see rapid development of cities and towns, a process which is named as urban revolution. This corresponds to the Uruk period; Uruk being the largest and the most advanced city in the South Mesopotamia (Holes 1966, 607; Mann 1986, 79). In this era, sites ten times larger than those in previous periods were found. They were totally distinct from and much more developed than those found in Susiana (South West of Iran) (Nissen 1988, 66). At this time, in Anatolia, North Mesopotamia, Syria, and Iran, we do not see anything similar to these settlement systems. These areas were still hosting separate distant settlements. Therefore, we can point out a form of regional differentiation between different parts of the Middle East. While previously all the areas in the Middle East were undergoing similar developmental patterns of settlements, this changed with the developments in settlement patterns first in Susiana and then in South Mesopotamia (Nissen 1988, 39, 55). This differentiation was the case even between North and South Mesopotamia. Until the beginnings of 4th millennium BCE, urbanization and social organization development levels of north and south Mesopotamia were similar. However, this situation changed throughout the 4th millennium BCE; the settlement development process in South Mesopotamia surpassed the one in the north considerably (Çıvgın 2015, 113).

As we can see, one of the conditions for development of a system, namely differentiation between parts of the Middle East started occurring. What were the reasons for regional differentiation or why did the complex settlement systems appear in the South Mesopotamia? One of the theses on this issue suggests that in this region the need for building an administration that would be able to manage water supplies, which was needed for agriculture, might have caused South Mesopotamia organizationally become more sophisticated (Nissen 1988, 58, 60; Hole 1966, 606). However, this view was proved wrong in the face of the fact that developed administration for irrigation emerged only in later periods of South Mesopotamia. Irrigation during this time (Uruk Period) in South Mesopotamia was not that much necessary for agriculture (Nissen 1988, 59; Zagarell et al. 1986, 418; Mann 1986, 80; Hole 1966, 606). In fact, the beginning of the 4th millennium BCE corresponds to an era where significant climatic changes affecting sea level and river flow took place in lower Mesopotamia. This led to population increase and formation of completely developed settlement systems with a center, in lower Mesopotamia (Nissen 1988, 55, 39; Yoffee 1995, 284). As a result of climate change and minimal irrigation that was applied even before the urban revolution, once unsuitable lands for agriculture (due to floods) became suitable for agriculture and attracted people to there for new permanent settlements. People in South Mesopotamia adopted the capabilities of adjacent regions in terms of knowledge of food production and organization of people. As a result, the area inhabited in a settlement system rapidly increased from 60 to 440 hectares, and population movement from other areas toward the South Mesopotamia reached considerable levels (Nissen 1988, 60, 67, 69; Yoffee 1995, 284; Simmons 2007, 212). Thus, the increase in agricultural production, climate change, and development of advanced forms of settlements (namely cities) marked the emergence of a divergence between different parts of the Middle East.

Importance of the regional divergence in these realms was that it led to increase in the interactions between different parts of the Middle East, thus, creating dependencies that will allow us to call the Middle East a region. Indeed, the systematic relationship between South Mesopotamia and other parts of the Middle East intensified around the Late Uruk Period (3200 BCE). In this era, the process called the Uruk expansion started owing to the innovations that came about in South Mesopotamia. The Uruk

expansion was mainly manifested in the form of the spread of South Mesopotamia's influence toward other areas in the Middle East. Without this spread of influence and interaction throughout the Middle East, it would not be possible to mention the emergence of a region. The developments in South Mesopotamia were influencing the adjacent areas from an earlier era. Yet, starting from Late Uruk Period until Early Dynastic I period (3200-2700 BCE), South Mesopotamia was able to come up with the most advanced economic, political, and social innovations influencing other areas. It witnessed unfolding of big changes in every sphere of life (Nissen 1988, 105-106, 127; Frankfort and Davies 1971, 74; Robinson 1984, 113-114; Yoffee 1995, 286). This momentum affected the entire region. The Uruk expansion means the material culture of Uruk (South Mesopotamia) to spread to North Mesopotamia, Iran, Syria, and Anatolia (Çivgin 105, 112; Nissen 1988, 114). Rather than expanding in one direction, it extended in all routes (Nissen 1988, 125; Frankfort and Davies 1971, 89-90). The center of these revolutionary developments was the city of Uruk, which was characterized by the inventions encompassing technologies, architecture, wheel, government, and writing (Podany 2014, 25). We can say that the general character of these inventions was "simplification and acceleration... in every sphere" (Nissen 1988, 90). The changes occurred in this period had more enduring impact on the course of history than many other developments (105-106).

The Uruk expansion entailed not only the spread of innovations, but also extensive trade through installation of colonies in other regions. The South Mesopotamian colonies started to appear in the other parts of the Middle East. What attracted Uruk people to create colonies in North Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Syria and Iran was procurement of raw materials from these areas, in return for the products that they were manufacturing for exchange (Podany 2014, 25; Nissen 1988, 125; Zagarell et al. 1986, 419). The functions and sizes of these colonies varied. While some of them were merely way stations, others were self-sufficient communities. Most of the time, these colonies were interacting with the locals and adapting to the social and political environment (Zagarell et al. 1986, 419; Yoffee 1995, 286).

It was vital for the Mesopotamians to bring resources from other regions. Indeed, in the hunting gathering era, when people were able to dwell in areas adjacent to the various resources, hunting and gathering was sufficient for them. This was not only

giving them food security, but also an independence from other groups and individuals. However, once they settled and lived in densely populated closer cities, they lost some of their independence, in terms of accessing different resources. Settled life, in fact, led to the appearance of dependencies. South Mesopotamia, on the one hand, was devoid of the variety of goods that man relied on for food security. On the other hand, it was preferred for settlement (Hole 1966, 608). In such a conjecture, trade with highlands rendered the procurement of resources that were vitally needed by the South Mesopotamians. In getting those goods, the South Mesopotamians relied on their own exports. The exports were something that the Mesopotamians aimed to sustain at all costs because these exports were providing them the resources they needed from other regions. It was a reliable way to get resources without resorting to war (Algaze 1993, 5; Hole 1966, 608). The exchanged items were most of the time the same. In return for the raw materials and foreign labor from other regions, the South Mesopotamians were providing agricultural products, labor-intensive processed or semi-processed products (Algaze 1993, 3; Lamberg-Karlovsky 2009, 62). Other parts of the Middle East were also dependent on the trade of goods available in the South Mesopotamia (Crawford 1973, 238). Agricultural products, fish and fish products, sheep, goats, and wool and textiles were especially abundant in the South Mesopotamian economy, whereas metals, raw materials and “luxury goods such as precious stones, oils, essences, ivory, slaves and exotic animals” were scarce. This imbalance rendered trade to take place between South Mesopotamia and other areas in the Middle East (Frankfort and Davies 1971, 91; Crawford 1973, 232, 233).

Owing to this systematic and high level of dependencies between South Mesopotamia and other parts of the Middle East, it became possible to notice the formation of a region, namely a world society, in the Middle East. We could name the Middle East at this era as a world society because it was a relatively isolated area from other parts of the world while it had dense interactions within its boundaries. The importance of a world society/region, for our study, is that a world political system/core is a subsystem of world society/region. A world political system is defined in relation to a world society/region. When there is no world society, a world political system is not needed. Thus, the formation of a world society provided one condition of the world political system to be realized.

However, we are still not able to say that a world political system formed. For the world political system/core to emerge in the world society there must also be some dysfunctionalities of the world society that must be addressed. One of these dysfunctionalities was the problem of resolution of conflicts that had regional effects. Conflicts with regional effects appeared due to increasing geographical proximity, growing dependencies, increasing inequalities, and growing needs for surplus management. The second problem was achieving cooperation that had regional implications under increasing complexity of interactions in the Middle East during that period. There were no such problems prior to the beginning of the 3rd millennium BCE; the conflicts and cooperation activities that had regional effects became issues only by this time. Previously, conflict and cooperation were local issues. It was the emergence of these regional dysfunctionalities that completed the necessary conditions for the system. For the world society, namely the Middle East, to sustain, it needed a system/core that would take care of these problems. Indeed, a system that would take care of conflict and cooperation problems of the Middle East emerged by this time. We noticed the formation of a system by looking at the formation of structures of the system and the orchestration between the actions of different structures.

4.1.3. Formation of the Structures of Core

The emergent system/core needed structures that would address conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance tasks. The structure that was utilized by the world political system in addressing these problems mainly was the city-state. This argument might sound as state-centric since it pronounces that state addressed the conflict and cooperation needs emerged in the Middle East. However, state was just a mechanism/structure designed and utilized by the system because the problems were regional while the scope of each individual state was local. Without the orchestration of the world political system/core, multiple states could not produce the same results in their actions. The system was in charge even when there was a single state as we will see in the Assyrian systems later. Perimeters of the state actions are determined by the system. The fact that the contours of state action do not change irrespective of the number of states, we could say that states are structures of the world political

system, which act within the perimeters designed by the system to produce results that are dictated by the system. The results produced are (1) the exclusion of peripheral areas and inclusion of core areas, (2) the prevention of any destructive tendency toward the core areas, and (3) the maintenance of the system.

Within this framework, the system/core produced states in dealing with the dysfunctionalities of the world society/region. Conflict and cooperation problems that appeared by the beginning of 3rd millennium BCE, as we noted, were new types of conflict and cooperation; they were regional in character. The local problems such as arbitration of disputes, regulation of marriage, and organization of labor for irrigation and construction of monumental buildings had always existed. However, because they were local problems, they were addressed by the locally oriented authorities, such as religious organization or the council of elders. These authorities did not have coercive and military powers. However, conflicts and cooperation need that exhibited regional implications turned out to be problems that could be addressed regionally by the region's world political system which utilized the city-states.

The system produced state as a structure that would carry out functions on behalf of the system. State was able to carry out the system's functions owing to its coercive (taxing, policing, redistribution) and military (war) powers. These coercive and military powers of state evolved through a long process. Transformation from the city in the 4th millennium BCE to the city-state in the early 3rd millennium BCE did not automatically materialize. Tracing the evolution of the status of the kingship says something about the emergence of state and its coercive and military powers. Kingship itself came about as a result of an evolutionary process. In the language of South Mesopotamians, the concept to refer to a leadership was in use for a long time, but it was not referring to a full-fledged kingship (Mann 1986; Diakonoff 1991a; Robinson 1984; Çivgin 2015). Only when it came to the Jamdet Nasr Period (3100-2900 BCE), we could see some slight indication about the role of the king. Nevertheless, in this period, the role of the king was still lower than the status of the highest priest. For we could talk about the existence of kingship and his palace, Early Dynastic Period (2900-2350 BCE) had to be waited (Robinson 1984, 116; Maisels 1993, 162-163; Frankfort and Davies 1971, 92). In other words, while there was a leader position in the community, the kings in Mesopotamia (Uruk) were not known

and referred by their names until around 2900 BCE. Only after this date, were the kings and their palaces started to be named (Podany 2014, 26; Çivgin 2015, 107; Robinson 1984, 160).

In this context, the political organization form of communities just prior to 3000 BCE can be called as transitional communities, which constituted one stage in the process of transition from chiefdoms (rank societies) to city-states (stratified class societies) (Mann 1986, 86). Social stratification and state formation are closely related (Robinson 1984, 1). Indeed, the development of stratification allowed the emergence of a class of people who would be in charge of state affairs (Diakonoff 1991b). By social stratification, a “system of social inequality in a society in which there is differential access to strategic resources and the benefits derived therefrom” is meant (Robinson 1984, 3). “Stratification as the emergence and persistence of institutionalized ... differences between social groups... is not ...inequality among individuals but ... persistent inequality among social groups such as classes, castes, ethnic groups, and guilds.” Social stratification involves both coercion and a learning process within the groups (Henrich and Boyd 2008, 715). Thus, state emerged in societies where the ruling class had preferential access to resources; society was able to spare resources for the sustenance of the ruling class; and the ruling class constituted the authority that will be in charge of state affairs (Parsons 1966, 13).

On the other hand, transitional societies had a leadership (chief) but not a king; there was no strong political authority; i.e., an autonomous ruler who was capable of using his authority against the people who had endowed kingship to him (Mann 1986, 49, 86; Parsons 1966, 63). Hence, leadership in transitional communities did not have coercive power (Çivgin 2015, 103; Mann 1986, 62). Even though his authority was more advanced than chiefs of egalitarian societies (Mann 1986, 62; Parsons 1966, 63), he was *primus inter pares*; a facilitator of common rules, rather than being a ruler (Çivgin 2015, 103; Parsons 1966, 63). This semi-authority situation was not something that lacked originality. In fact, existence of a leader who exercised limited powers is a stage that is experienced in all societies moving from egalitarian to complex organization. However, the transitional society was not identical to the stratified society. In the transitional society, authority was, in fact, no more than a position acting on behalf of the collectivity; it was not capable of distributing

resources. The chief/elder/leader had only prestige (Mann 1986, 53; Çıvgın 2015, 103). His power was limited; applicable only to such topics as regulating marriage, arbitrating disputes etc... He was not able to organize society for more challenging tasks, such as military campaigns (Mann 1986, 67, 68).

From these remarks, we may conclude that what discerned a stratified society with a king from rank societies is the availability of a ruling class that enjoyed a preferential access to resources, a high level of authority possessed by the king, and the variety of roles that he had (Zagarell et al. 1986; Maisels 1993; Mann 1986). Indeed, differently from the previous authorities, the kings were able to unite military, civil and temple authorities together. All these powers gave them the ability to control over the surplus grain, raw materials, labor, as well as mediating the relationship between people and the deities (Zagarell et al. 1986, 423). The king was the one who owned various qualities, such as warrior, farmer, mighty, justice provider... etc. (Maisels 1993, 163-164). This, however, is not the story of how all other parties in society lost their space; rather local communities (i.e. clans) continued to play a role besides supra local rule of King. Remember! The local authorities were older units than the king (Robinson 1984, 116, 161).

Acknowledging the transition from chiefdoms to the city-state and the evolutionary process of emergence of kingship, one may wonder what was the driving factor in appearance of kingship and state. By looking at the timing of emergence of kingship, we may get a clue. Emergence of kingship in its fullest sense coincided with appearance of fortified city walls of defense and the concepts about the military (Mann 1986, 99; Robinson 1984, 131, 160-161), which were linked to one of the central functions of the new kingship, being in charge of military affairs. After emerging as a role separate from stewardship to divinity, the king gained a supreme role which equipped him with a political role having the war leadership as well as legislative functions (Maisels 1993, 163). At the disposal of rulers of the city-states, there was an army that was used in resolution of disagreements with other cities. Besides, there were some units that were at direct disposal of the ruler for protection of him (Diakonoff 1991b, 79-83). The king used soldiers for inter-city conflicts, rather than for policing activities (Maisels 1993, 164). He was the leader of the army against adversaries and the authority to sign peace treaties with them (Roux 1980, 130-131).

In line with this, it is meaningful that the king and his powers formed simultaneously with the appearance of continuous confrontations between city-states over irrigable lands and water supplies (Maisels 1993, 162). Thus, we can see that one of the reasons that the South Mesopotamian system provided coercive and military powers to the state and utilized its powers was the growing need for resolution of conflicts that had regional ramifications.

State's coercive and military powers, not only, were useful for dealing with the dysfunctionality of conflict, but they also were needed for cooperation purposes. One aspect of cooperational role of the state was about its undertakings related to trade. At this period, long-distance trade reached to a magnitude that without involvement of a structure like state would face significant setbacks (Algaze 1993, 1). Indeed, for an exportable amount of manufacture could be produced, the South Mesopotamians would need to carry out many operations and employ a large number of workers and supervisors. Furthermore, functioning of the irrigation canals, large-scale planting, harvesting, storage, and shipment procedures could not be maintained without planning capacity of a central authority (4-5). Thus, cooperation needs that were related to maintenance of trade were one type of duty that necessitated the coercive power of state. Another type of cooperation that needed a structure like state was finding solutions to the common problems of the South Mesopotamia. Such problems as seasonal changes in the flow of water or silt caused by the floods were necessitating cooperation among the South Mesopotamian cities (Mann 1986, 90). These problems could not be dealt with, in the lack of coercive power of the state over society.

One externality of these increasing cooperative interactions between South Mesopotamian states was the increasing level of similarities across South Mesopotamia.

By the time they enter the historical record, perhaps half a million inhabitants of southern Mesopotamia were part of a single civilization, ... They may have spoken the same language. Their few professional scribes wrote in a common script, learned their trade with the help of identical word lists, and asserted that they were indeed one people, the Sumerians (Mann 1986, 90).

Some take this similarity across South Mesopotamia as an indication of an identity, namely civilization. They say that civilization is mentioned when we could see

“sharing and mixture of cultural ideas and practices over very large areas beyond the boundaries of states and empires” (Wengrow and Yerxa 2011, 9). This sharing and mixture of cultural ideas and practices is considered a form of identity (Sumer) that was above city-states in Mesopotamia (Watson 1992, 24; Freire 2013, 138; Maisels 1993, 126). One might wonder whether this civilizational identity has something to do with the world political system/core idea or not. A short assessment will make it clear that civilization is a term that does not refer to what we mean by the system/core. Civilization is not an identity that imposes certain types of action on the states or areas in the world society. It does not have its independent character from the states or the areas in world society. Civilization has no action capability; however, the system is able to affect developments in the region. Second, similarity alone does not say anything about the system. In order to talk about the existence of a system, the system must be able to carry out actions against outside of the system. Third, civilization has no functions regarding the conflict and cooperation problems in world society. Fourth, civilization does not have a reference to world society, it is an isolated phenomenon. Therefore, the civilization theme in literature about early Middle Eastern history must not be confused with the system theme.

Returning our subject, now, we can say, coercive and military powers of state emerged owing to regionally important conflict and cooperation problems that appeared in the Middle East. One might think that states were the parties conflicting or cooperating. However, it should be clarified that even though state, by owning coercive and military powers, was a structure of the world political system and it was acting on behalf of system, conflict and cooperation relations are not between states. Both conflict and cooperation interactions are between areas of the world society. Thus, it is not states that cooperate or clash. States just mediate conflict and cooperation cases between different areas of the world society, in accordance with the expectations of the world political system. By each area of world society, we mean one or a group of settlements, depending on whether they have common interests or not. When a settlement has an interest regarding wealth, political independence, or autonomy, which is distinct from those of other settlements, then it is an area to be considered in world society. When a group of settlements adjacent to each other have such common interests, then they form an area in world society as a group. The boundaries of states

may or may not overlap with the boundaries of these areas in world society. States, most of the time, defend the cause of areas in world politics; they use their coercive and military powers for defending or advancing the interests of these areas based on an inequality. The inequality that is at question is the one between core and peripheral areas. The core states treat the interests of the core areas based on fairness and equality, while they treat the interests of the peripheral areas based on inequality and unfairness. This differentiated treatment emanates from the system's exclusion tendency toward the peripheral areas.

In sum, the core and its structures city-states emerged at the same point in history, by the beginning of 3rd millennium BCE in South Mesopotamia. Consequently, they are not transhistorical. They emerged at a time period when there was a need for them. The fact that there was a need for them does not ensure that they will carry out their functions based on equality. Rather, both the system and state were founded on inequality and they were reproducing inequality. This inequality exists both within the individual societies and among the societies. We are mostly interested in inequalities among the societies, which are reproduced by state and the system. Of state and system, the system is in charge. What legitimizes an area that has a high level of endowments to be part of the system/core is the need to deal with conflict and cooperation problems in world society. Once a system connects the regional/global political events of the most endowed areas, then it legitimizes and shapes the establishment of its structures, namely states. States, on the other hand, are established in society by reinforcing the inequalities within society. Therefore, if there was not a need for a world political system, there would not be a need and legitimacy for a state reproducing inequalities. The system not only allows the establishment of state⁹ but also it determines the perimeters of the actions of state. State cannot produce results in world politics that are outside of the dictates of the system/core. State is not a designation that can produce independent results from the core. The main rules applied to state actions are that states cannot destroy the core; states cannot treat the core areas based on inequality; core states must exclude the peripheral areas by treating them unequally and by limiting their independence. The system, on the other

⁹ Modelski also concurs that system determines the most eligible states as leading ones in World system (1987, 227).

hand, is an independent entity that takes care of two main problems of the world society in favor of the most endowed areas of the world. For a system to emerge there must be a world society and there must be a high level of interactions between the parts of world society. These conditions appeared in the Middle East, for the first time in history. Therefore, from now on, we will trace how core repeatedly emerged in different periods in the Middle East, and how the relations between the core and peripheral areas unfolded.

4.2. The Sumerian Core and Its Periphery

As the formation process of core in South Mesopotamia has been theoretically explained, now it is time to lay down the core-periphery relations during Sumerian core. By the Early Dynastic Period (2900-2350 BCE), the South Mesopotamia was known as Sumer. Sumer can be taken as a core that was distinguished from the rest of the Middle East. However, it was not isolated; it had relationships with its environment. Hence, it can be considered a system/core. Sumer consisted of a large number of city-states, and it had political relations with other parts of the Middle East. Despite these relationships, the areas outside of Sumer were not part of the Sumerian system/core. The relations between non-Sumerian areas and Sumer resembled the relations between two different sides. We could see this difference, for example, in the wars waged. The wars among the Sumerian states and the wars between Sumerians and non-Sumerian areas (i.e., the pastoralists in non-urban areas and settled areas in parts of Iran and Syria) were different from each other. The wars among the Sumerians were subject to rules. Sumerians did not show disrespect to traditions, economic functioning, and religious establishment of each other. In contrast, it was expected that the forces outside Sumer could destroy the civilizational heritage of Sumer. Thus, the relations between Sumerians and non-Sumerians were different from intra-Sumerian relations. At times, Sumerians were united against the threats emanating from outside the Sumerian core.

The economy of Sumerians also differed from other areas of the Middle East. The economies of the Sumerian cities were similar, but they differed from areas outside the Sumerian core. The Sumerians needed raw materials from other regions, and in

return, they sold their manufactured products. The maintenance of this form of economic exchange was vital for the Sumerian system to sustain. These exchange patterns between Sumer and the adjacent areas were established during the Uruk expansion, and they continued to be so during the Sumerian system. Therefore, we can suggest that the Sumerian civilization was imposing itself on the adjacent areas by exporting its inventions. We can call this form of relationship with non-Sumerian areas exclusion. The exclusion entailed not only preventing inclusion of non-Sumerian areas to the Sumerian core but also the imposition of certain structures and practices over non-Sumerian areas.

The Sumerian system differentiated itself from the rest of the Middle East, and it performed the functions of the system. These functions are the resolution of conflicts and maintenance of cooperation within and outside the system. The system performed these functions by enabling harmony in the relations between the structures (city-states) of the core, and exclusion against the areas outside the system. Therefore, we can adopt the core and periphery template to Sumer and non-Sumerian regions of the Middle East in the Early Dynastic Period. Sumer constituted the core areas, while the remaining parts of the Middle East were peripheral areas.

As to the political relations among the Sumerians themselves, we can mention multiple examples of military confrontations, treaties, diplomatic exchanges, etc. Looking from the perspective of the balance of power, the society of states, imperialism, and the world-system theories, the relationship within the Sumerian context might seem conflictual. Nevertheless, looking from exclusion theory's perspective, we can say that this relationship was one of coexistence; it entailed inclusion and harmony. We can claim this even though some of the wars between the city-states of Sumeria lasted for centuries (Roux 1980; Diakonoff 1991a; Lafont 2001, 39). Indeed, disputes in the wars between Sumerian cities were mostly over land, water, trade routes, canal routes, and the like (Roux 1980, 134; Diakonoff 1991a 79; Mann 1986, 90; Watson 1992, 25; Moscati 1960, 23). The parties involved in these wars did not aim at annihilation of each other. Rather, they aimed to resolve the problems arising from living in a dense area. There were also treaties and diplomatic exchanges within the Sumerian context besides wars. As an indication of the non-conflictual nature of relationship in intra-core interactions, we can see the

regionalization attempts made by several Sumerian city-states through building hegemony. In these attempts, only the Sumerian areas were aimed to be united, not areas outside of Sumer. The religious authority was also organized along regional lines. When a king aimed to rule over the entire Sumer, he needed to get support from the regional religious authority. The religious authority in each city-state was part of the regional religious organization. Even though the city-states of Sumer were independent, they did not consider each other as foreign. The foreign areas were non-Sumerian areas.

Therefore, we can say that Sumer was a system that aimed for inclusion and harmony within the Sumerian context, and exclusion against non-Sumerian areas in the Middle East. The reason why we can call Sumerian civilization a system/core is that it differentiated itself from the rest of the region as a system. There was a significant contrast between the relations within the boundaries of Sumer and relations with the rest of the region. When the Sumerian system differentiated itself from the rest of the region, it did not have the same form of relationship with all parts of the non-Sumerian areas.

4.2.1. Intra-System Confrontations

The data available about the world political relations of the Sumerian system allow us to make generalizations about the intra-core tendencies, and the core and periphery relations in the Sumer era. In this subheading, we will assess the nature of relationships within the boundaries of the Sumerian system. The general appearance of the Middle East in terms of world political relations in the Early Dynastic Period (2900-2350 BCE) could best be read based on a dichotomy. On one side, there was the Sumerian system/core, and on the other side, there was other parts of the Middle East (periphery) that interacted with the Sumerian core areas. The Middle East was not a world political system in its entirety; rather only a small part of it, Sumer, constituted the system. The area called Sumer roughly covered an area that was as big as the territories of Belgium (Roux 1980, 124). It was composed of city-states, each of which controlling settlements in their countryside. The names of some of these city-states were Sippar, Kish, Akshak, Larak, Nippur, Adab, Shuruppak, Umma, Lagash,

Badtibira, Uruk, Larsa, Ur and Eridu (125). This system/core emerged at a time when proper climatic change was accompanied by military fortifications against the neighboring areas, by development of collective agricultural labor utilized for irrigation, and by building significant shrines and markets (Yoffee 1995, 284).

The main theme that sources mention in terms of the relationships between Sumerian city-states is conflict, which can be interpreted as a result of incommensurability of the expectations of city-states. It is claimed that each city-state considered the countryside surrounding its perimeters as its hinterland, which might have been contested by different city-states. The countryside of each city-state was connected to a city with its production and administration system, leading to specialization between the city and the countryside (Yoffee 1995, 284; Nissen 1988). As Sumerian kings sought to control the surrounding agricultural valuable areas, as well as trade routes, this caused a confrontation between city-states, each of which being a mini territorial state (Yoffee 1995, 290). The sources maintain that the Sumerian city-states were in conflict with each other for long periods, even though there are no details of the disagreements (Pollock 2017, 94; Maisels 1993, 171; Roux 1980, 134; Buzan and Little 2000, 174). The Sumerian cities were surrounded by defense walls as a result of the war and defense needs (Maisels 1993, 171; Pollock 2017, 66). It is pronounced that the warfare theme between Sumerian city-states was recurrent; only transiently they were brought together under one authority (Maisels 1993, 126; Nissen 1988, 135). Some of the disagreements between city-states lasted for centuries (Roux 1980; Diakonoff 1991a; Lafont 2001, 39). The reasons for these disagreements were disputes over land, water, trade routes, and canal routes (Roux 1980, 134; Diakonoff 1991a 79; Mann 1986, 90; Watson 1992, 25; Moscati 1960, 23).

One relatively well-documented confrontation was between the city-state of Umma and the city-state of Lagash (Girsu). Some texts show that the city of Lagash (Girsu) and Umma fought for generations over the land that separated them (Podany 2014, 35). In one occasion, both sides sought the alliance of other city-states. For example, in a conflict with Lagash, Umma was backed by Mari, a state outside the Sumerian system/core. On the other hand, Lagash established an alliance with the kings of Uruk and Ur (Roux 1980, 138). In another case, a coalition of three city-states: Kish, Mari and Akshak, fought against Lagash, and they seriously weakened it. In another war

between Lagash and Umma, the King of Lagash won, but the city-states were able to strike a peace. The Lagash king imposed a tax on barley on the King of Umma (136-137).

This portrayal of the conflictual relationship between Sumerian city-states is far from being unproblematic. We cannot deny that the Sumerian city-states at times had disagreements that ended up with war. However, when we look at the causes of wars and the results of them, we can see that the city-states were not aiming at exclusion or depriving the rivals of equal status and rights. Rather, there were disagreements between the structures (states) of the system over the resources that would be controlled by the members of the system/core. The disputes were about whether one piece of countryside, water canal, or trade route would be controlled by state A or B. The structures did not aim to exclude one structure/city-state from accessing the rights and resources completely, as it would be the case in competition with non-Sumerian (extra-system) areas and structures. Therefore, we can call the warfare between the city-states of Sumer as conflict resolution attempts, not predation or exclusion attitude which could be deemed proper only against non-Sumerians.

This form of confrontation between Sumerian city-states over resources continued until 2500 BCE. From this time onward, the confrontations between Sumerian city-states took a new form. By the mid third millennium BCE, a new figure emerged in the Sumerian system; the hegemonic king. The appearance of this new type of king showed a new trend in inter-state confrontations. While previously, the theme of confrontation was disagreements over the hinterlands of city-states, now domination over the entire Sumer became the main theme (Diakonoff 1991a, 76-77; Yoffee 1995; Maisels 1993). Representing this new situation, the hegemonic king was able to control more than one city-state. This king had his own military and personnel that would support him and enable him to place himself above the councils of controlled city-states (Diakonoff 1991a, 76-77). In line with these developments, starting from around 2500 BCE, the unification of lands of South and North Mesopotamia became a goal that the kings wanted to achieve (Roux 1980, 134). However, it was not that southerners and northerners were continuously fighting with each other; rather, each city attempted to unify all Sumerian lands. Once, for example, the city-state of Ur and another time Lagash attempted to establish hegemony in Mesopotamia, in which they

were successful. Alongside these cases of single hegemon, there were cases where more than one state claimed hegemony at the same time over entire Mesopotamia. Each of them, respectively, controlling only a number of states without controlling the entire Sumer or Mesopotamia (Diakonoff 1991a; Roux 1980). As a result of this, sometimes, there was more than one hegemon in Mesopotamia ruling over a number of city-states (Diakonoff 1991a, 79).

The first hegemonic dynasty that ruled over entire Mesopotamia seems to be the First Dynasty of Ur. Getting rich from the trade with the east, in 2550 BCE, the First Dynasty of Ur was established in the city-state of Ur. This dynasty put an end to the Uruk dynasty and dethroned the king, who then claimed the “King of Kish” title (the king who claimed the kingship of South and North Mesopotamia). The First Dynasty of Ur created a sort of “Pax Sumerica,” and its authority lasted for one hundred years. During this period, Girsu (Lagash) and Umma were at peace. This dynasty’s rule came to an end with attacks from Elam (Iran) and Northern Iraq (Roux 1980, 135-136; Diakonoff 1991a, 78-79). The second hegemony was established by the King of Lagash, Eannatum (2450 BCE). He first purged the Elamites from Sumer and also conquered some Elamite territories. Eannatum built big temples and functionalized new canals. These activities were deemed characteristics of great kings in the ancient Middle East (Roux 1980, 136). He managed to bring all cities of Mesopotamia together into his sphere of influence for a short period (Nissen 1988, 142; Yoffee 1995, 290)

Following Eannatum, for some time, Uruk and Adab cities sequentially took Kish and Nippur, and they were considered the supra-regional authority above all Sumerian city-states. Uruk and Adab were challenged by Mari, located in Syria. It seems that for some time, Mari from very remote was able to rule over Sumer since there was anarchy in Sumer (Roux 1980, 137-138). Later, the King of Umma, Lugalzagesi, came on the scene. He fought with Girsu and defeated it, thus ending the losses of two hundred years (138). After overpowering Girsu, Lugalzagesi conquered the city of Uruk, and then he took control of entire Mesopotamian cities (139). Thus, he was another ruler who carried out a regionalization enterprise (Nissen 1988, 147). Yet, this rule did not last long because Akkads put an end to Umma’s domination (Roux 1980, 139). Lugalzagesi, the King of Umma, was known by his destructive approach toward

other cities. For example, not only did he conquer Lagash but also ordered the destruction of areas of significance in the city, i.e., the holy places. The Sumerians considered Lugalzagesi's approach as inconsistent with their culture because they could only expect such a destructive approach from people of the mountains, such as the Gutians and the Elamites (Maisels 1993, 168).

This theme of regionalization makes clear that Sumerian city-states were naturally in harmony with each other to such a degree that they could be unified. Identifying harmony in the actions that seem conflictual opposes the view that the city-states in Sumer were in conflict with each other. Rather it shows that an area composed of many city-states (Sumer) might have attempted to be hierarchically united only if it was strongly differentiated from its environment, and these states showed a harmony that only structures of a system could show. Without these qualities, a system/core could not be attempted to be controlled hierarchically. Thus, Sumer was a system/core, and the city-states in Sumer were the structures of this system. It provided consistency in the attitudes of the city-states and made them to be in harmony with each other. This also prevented the emergence of attitudes that would be destructive to the system/Sumer as a whole. While the system rendered harmony among the states that were located in the core, it also made sure that states would develop an exclusionary attitude against the areas that were outside of Sumer/core. If Sumer was such a system, we could not say that the Sumerian city-states had conflictual relations. In fact, the hegemonic kings, in principle, did not rule over Sumer in a hostile manner. The only exemption is Lugalzagesi, who was blamed because of his approach and was likened to the foreigners. In other words, the principle was that the attitude toward non-Sumerian areas and Sumerian areas must be different. While the attitude of the Sumerians against the Sumerians is non-conflictual and non-destructive (inclusionary), it was conflictual (exclusionary) against the non-Sumerian regions.

Indeed, the relations between Sumerian and non-Sumerian areas were not friendly; they could be destructive at times. Attacks from Elam, Northern Iraq, and Mari terminated the hierarchic regional rule in Sumer twice. We can also mention the Gutians as another non-friendly and non-Sumer party. When the Sumerian polities regained control over Sumer, the first thing that they conducted was purging non-

Sumerian elements because they were deemed outside of the Sumerian sphere. Sumerian areas were not only in harmony with each other, but they also collaborated against the non-Sumerian regions, as exclusion necessitated as such. On the other hand, non-Sumerian regions had stakes to be included in the system. Their attempt was to use force to be included in the Sumerian system, to the degree they could do. Yet the Sumerians resisted these attempts and continued to exclude non-Sumerian areas. These non-Sumerian areas did not form a system; rather, each group acted independently. They rarely acted in a joint fashion against Sumerian areas. When they got united as in the case of Northern Iraq and Elamites, they were able to achieve temporary inclusion in the Sumerian core. Another way of getting inclusion in the core was states that were included in Sumer due to weakening of authority in Sumer. Mari, as a Syrian structure, achieved temporary inclusion in Sumer due to such a weakening in Sumer. Nevertheless, as soon as the system restored its harmony, it was able to stop the inclusion that non-Sumerian areas attained.

Despite this clear division between the Sumerian and non-Sumerian areas, it is worth asking how Sumerian city-states continued to survive in multiple forms instead of a single regional state. We can definitely say that Sumer was a system/core, but this system had a multiple number of states. This discrepancy is not something that the system decides alone. It was not the system alone that decided whether there would be one or more core states/polities in the system. What system was potent was making sure that states act the way the system dictates in world political relations. The system (core) made sure that polities/structures did not destroy each other; did not harm the core; did exclude non-Sumerian areas, and did include Sumerian areas. On the other hand, when it comes to the dynamics that had an influence on the form of state (i.e., multiple city-states or single regional state), we could see that other Sumerian systems played a role. While the world political system might have an inclination toward avoiding multiple polities/structures, other systems in Sumer might have preferred the fragmentation of polities.

Indeed, the regionalization attempts in Sumer faced significant resistance from the religious system in Mesopotamia. Religious system of Sumer was against hierarchical organization of the entire Mesopotamia (Nissen 1988). This was so even when there was a need for resolution of continuous disagreements between the city-states by a

mediating authority. The attempts to establish regional state were in conformity with the aim of having a single state in the service of the system/core. Yet, these attempts mostly remained futile because for centuries the particularistic interests (which were mostly organized by the religious system in Mesopotamia) opposed these attempts (Nissen 1988, 143; Yoffee 1995, 290). The tension between religious system and world political system found its expression in the different approaches adopted regarding centralization and fragmentation (Nissen 1988, 9).

The religious system of the Sumer was resembling the particularistic city-state form (Nissen 1988, 142; Mann 1986, 91). Each city-state had its own god and these city gods were considered part of a larger union of gods in the region. Each god had a city under its control where the god had a temple. Each of these gods was recognized in other cities as well. When there was no regional state, the boundaries of the religious organization and political organization mostly overlapped. The conflicts between the cities were dealt in accordance with rules that were also applied between the gods in the pantheon (Çivgin 2015, 106; Watson 1992, 25; Mann 1986, 91; Podany 2014, 30). Thus, each city god (namely religious authorities) would favor separate city-states rather than the regional unification of cities (Nissen 1988, 142). Among the cities that had a primary role, Nippur was special due to the fact that the supreme god of Sumer, Enlil, was residing there. Differently from other primary city-states of Mesopotamia, Nippur seems to have political independence and isolation rather than claiming ascendancy over others (Roux 1980, 134). Hence, it was important for any king to be recognized by the clergy of the Nippur (134).

This recurrent pattern of tension between religious authority and the regional king lasted from the appearance of first city-states until the emergence of a truly regional state, Akkadian empire (Nissen 1988; Parsons 1966; Moscati 1960; Mann 1986). It was a source of instability in the politics of Mesopotamia, because regional kings or kings of city-states were dependent on religious authority (Parsons 1966, 64-65). It was always necessary the king get the legitimation from the religious authority; even the regional king would need religious legitimation by one or more gods in the regional pantheon of gods. Nevertheless, the regional king and recognition of him by the regional gods did not end the authority of local cults. (64). Therefore, religious authority was always a hindrance against the formation of a regional state (64-65).

Thus, we can see that the system/core is not the only party that decides about the form of state (i.e., multiple city-states or regional states). However, regarding the world political relations (namely, on inequality, domination, freedom, independence, inclusion, and exclusion matters), it is the system that decides how the polities would act at the regional level. It does not matter for the system whether the form of state is a fragmentary city-state or a centralizing regional state. The system/core makes sure that polities would act in a way that they respect the independence and rights of other core polities. Even when they fight with each other, the wars are waged for making sure that their disagreements are resolved in a way that no party's independence is compromised.

4.2.2. Relations with Non-Sumerian Areas of the Middle East

While Sumer, with its multiple city-states, constituted a single core/system, there was no such system in other parts of the Middle East. Furthermore, until toward the end of Early Dynastic Period, there was no equivalent of the Sumerian states in other areas (Nissen 1988, 157). The first sophisticated states emerging in non-Sumerian areas started to be seen toward to end of Sumerian era (129). There were many parallels between the South Mesopotamian states and such centers as Assur in northern Mesopotamia, and Tell Huera and Ebla in Syria (127). These states/structures that emerged in non-Sumerian areas (i.e., Iran, Syria, and Anatolia) were mostly distant from each other as opposed to the closer positioning of the Sumerian city-states. The states in non-Sumerian areas (periphery) were not only distant from each other but also were comparatively less advanced than the Sumerian states (157). Therefore, there were significant differences between different areas of the Middle East, where South Mesopotamia showed the most advanced form of development in terms of the political organization (163). As a result of this, South Mesopotamia was quite successful in influencing the areas outside of Sumer, mostly through peaceful ways (Roux 1992, 146). However, there is no sign that states in other parts of the Middle East became parts of the Sumerian system. Even though the Sumerians entered political relationships with these areas, these areas remained outside of the Sumer system. Consequently, they remained in the periphery. The states in the non-Sumerian areas did not constitute a system either. Rather as we already pointed out, each of the

states in the periphery acted independently, instead of acting like the structures of a system or being part of the Sumer system. They were part of the environment/periphery of Sumer/core.

To illustrate, Elam, a state located in the South West Iran, was especially an important center that was comparatively developed, but it was in continuous conflict with Sumer. Clashes between Elam and various city-states of Sumer had roots going very early, and for the following three thousand years these clashes many times renewed (Roux 1908, 135). Hence, Elam was not a part of Sumerian system. Its status in relation to the core/Sumer was similar to that of the nomads; it was part of the periphery. Another significant element of the periphery of Sumer was nomads/pastoralists with whom the Sumerians were also in continuous conflict. The nomads at times showed a destructive attitude against Sumer (Buzan and Little 2000, 183; Freire 2013, 135; Mann 1988). In other words, Sumer, by being a system/core that was situated against the non-Sumerian areas, excluded periphery, while periphery continuously sought inclusion; at times by being destructive against the core. The destructive capacity of periphery seems to be mostly derived from organization of people who were not included in an urban polity. It also seems that at times nomadic people established alliances with the urban regions such as Elam in attacking Sumer. However, when Sumer recovered it purged the non-Sumerians from the core.

The Sumerian religious authorities also stressed the demarcation between the cities as well as the one between the settled and unsettled areas (Nissen 1988, 142). In other words, even though Sumer was composed of multiple states, they had a common stance against non-Sumerian areas, especially the non-settled areas (Roux 1980, 134). It seems that Nippur was the place where the kings of city-states of Mesopotamia met and selected a war leader against the threats of foreign invasion (135).

Even though the non-Sumerian regions were excluded from the Sumerian system, Sumer had a continuous relationship with these peripheral areas. Especially in relations with the closer areas, Sumer maintained a pattern of interaction that was vital for its survival; it was dependent on the goods from other areas. Due to this dependence, it can easily be expressed that Sumer imposed certain forms of relationships with the nearby areas such as Akkad, Elam (Iran), North Mesopotamia,

and parts of Syria. The core/Sumer shaped the environment to the degree that it guaranteed its survival. It shaped the environment both for procurement of the needed materials and for isolation of any threat from the periphery toward the core. Hence, parts of the periphery (i.e. near regions) were structured along the principles of the core for isolating them from being a threat to the system. We already saw in the first section of this Chapter that South Mesopotamia shaped its near periphery during Uruk expansion. Second, above we noted that states similar to those in South Mesopotamia emerged in some peripheral areas toward end of the Early Dynastic Period. Even though, one may suggest that the state formation in parts of Syria and Iran was a natural development that came about owing to the conditions available in these areas, we have reasons to be suspicious about this. The Syrian and Iranian states were neither part of a core alternative to Sumer nor part of the core that emerged in Sumer. The states in non-Sumerian areas were also not a response to undertaking conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions of entire Middle East, because they were not capable enough of taking care of these problems at Middle Eastern level. Despite this dissimilarity between Sumer and non-Sumerian areas, the same political entities, namely the city-states emerged in Iran and Syria. In the lack of necessary motives for the state formation in non-Sumerian regions, we can say that the state structure was imported from Sumer rather than being a product of evolution of conditions in Syria and Iran.

Consequently, it is plausible to suggest that Sumer exported the structures of the system (core) to the peripheral regions that Sumer was dependent on. On the other hand, these peripheral areas had a high possibility of endangering the survival of Sumer/core. The core introduced structures (states) that would help the system and environment interact in a way that the core would have access to resources, and the threat from periphery would be eradicated. Once the structures of the system/Sumer were being adopted by the environmental areas (Syria and Iran), the danger that they could pose was encircled. The actions and responses that could be expected from these areas were now restricted to a range of possibilities; i.e. war over resources or pieces of land, signing treaties, establishing alliances, exchanging gifts and diplomatic messengers, securing unhindered commercial and other interactions, recognition of each other's legitimacy... etc.

What did not change in relations between the core and the periphery, however, was exclusion. The core made sure that peripheral areas would stay in the periphery. The core areas did not hesitate in taking common action against the peripheral areas. Even the particularistic religious system collaborated with the political system in excluding the peripheral areas from the core. The peripheral areas sought inclusion in the core, in the sense to be part of the core, but this search of periphery was encircled by providing limited participation of peripheral areas into core. Core areas interacted with peripheral areas, yet this interaction was limited to maintenance of accessing raw materials of periphery and prevention of development of any destructive capacity from periphery toward core. Peripheral areas did not become part of the Sumer. There was no reason to consider that states emerged in the near periphery of Sumer to be parts of Sumerian system because the Sumerian and non-Sumerian regions together did not create a difference against another periphery. Even though states in North Mesopotamia and parts of Syria and Iran were similar, they do not have common friends and foes. They did not deal with common problems.

From all these, we can infer that in the Early Dynastic Period, Sumer was the core in the Middle East. By being core, it was a system that differentiated itself from non-Sumerian areas. These non-Sumerian areas could be called the periphery of the core. The core areas had a sort of cooperation among each other against the periphery. The wars and disagreements between states in the core might cause us to question this assumption. However, given the exclusion theory's predictions and historical data that we summarized above, we can safely suggest that the wars and disagreements did not lead to serious revisions in the core. Furthermore, while it is not possible to mention a united action between the core and the periphery against a threat from another area, it is mentioned many times that the core areas united against peripheral areas of the Middle East. Second, there are examples of destruction of the Sumerian culture and institutions by peripheral areas. These hostile attitudes between the core and peripheral areas oppose the attitude that Sumerians embraced among each other, which was accommodatory. The disagreements among core areas on the other hand centered on minor issues, such as water resources, a piece of land.. etc. The core areas did not challenge each other's essential rights.

On the other hand, core had issues regarding the rights of periphery. Core areas excluded peripheral areas. They not only did adopt exclusion against peripheral areas but also predation, as seen in the imposition of Sumerian structures (state) on some parts of the non-Sumerian regions. This means that core's understanding of rights of core and periphery were different from each other. Against this exclusionary attitude of core, the periphery sought inclusion in the Sumerian core, which always met with resistance. Therefore, inclusion attempts of periphery succeeded only temporarily. The attempts of the people in periphery to be included, namely their attacks, are not well documented in the resources. However, we know that the nomads/pastoralists, who were less organized and little contained by the Sumerians, attacked Sumer. Unfortunately, we do not know about the details of how peripheral areas mobilized, compared to the comparatively well documented history of urban areas. All in all, inclusion and exclusion conceptualization of exclusion theory is applicable to the Sumerian core and its periphery.

4.3. The Akkadian Core and Its Periphery

In previous section, we clarified that Sumer (South Mesopotamia) constituted a system/core and the rest of the Middle East was the environment/periphery of Sumer. Sumer not only did differentiate itself from the periphery but it also shaped the adjacent regions in accordance with its needs. However, the influence did not take the form of military control over these areas. This form of relationship between core and periphery changed with the arrival of the Akkadian empire. In the Akkad system, there was a formal core and periphery with a hierarchy between them (Freire 2013, 135). The Akkadian empire directly controlled the areas that South Mesopotamia exported its inventions and political structures to. Parts of Syria and Iran as well as North Mesopotamia came under direct military control of the Akkadians. This did not lead to formation of a system that encompassed non-Mesopotamian areas. Rather, these areas continued to be periphery, the only difference being that the core militarily controlled the periphery. The core used force to shape the periphery in accordance with the needs of the core. This direct control is something new. Another thing that was new in the Akkadian core and periphery relations was that the core expanded its boundaries. In the Sumerian era, the boundaries of the core were limited to South

Mesopotamia. Yet, with the arrival of the Akkadians, the boundaries of the core expanded to include both South and North Mesopotamia. Now, the core area in the Middle East was the entire Mesopotamia area. This area (Mesopotamia) as a core came into being with the influence of the Akkadian people, who were Semitic people from various parts of the Middle East.

4.3.1. Formation of a New Core

The formation of entire Mesopotamia area as a core shows how a core/system expands its boundaries compared to the preceding system. Several observations can be made about formation of a new core. First, the movement of people from the peripheral areas toward core areas causes the destruction of the present core and the reestablishment of it in a wider area. Second, the boundaries of the core are determined according to the needs (conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance) of the world society/region. As the region assigns these functions to the core, the core's boundaries should be properly designed for the core can deal with these functions. Finally, the core expands to include all the areas that have superiorities in the region. To start with, people who played a key role in the formation of the Akkadian core were the Semites. Next to the Sumerians, who were inhabitants of South Mesopotamia since the proto-literate era, there were also Semitic-speaking people living in Mesopotamia. Semitic people were originally living in the Fertile Crescent and some other parts of the adjacent areas, but later they started to appear in Mesopotamia (Roux 1992, 150; Frankfort and Davies 1971). They were characterized with historical and linguistic factors, not racial ones. From the beginning, the Semites merged with various people (Moscati 1960, 10; Roux 1992, 147-151). They were a minority in South Mesopotamia, whereas in North Mesopotamia they were much more influential in society (Roux 1992, 150). The Sumerians and their language were different from the Semites and their language, but Sumerians did not seem to have an issue with the arrival of the Semites in Mesopotamia. Therefore, it can be stated that the Sumerians and the Semites coexisted in Mesopotamia. There were no signs showing that these two conflicted; in contrast, it seems that they cooperated in policy making as well as in economic and societal life (Moscati 1960, 11; Yoffee 1995, 290-291; Roux 1992, 151). Even though the relations between Semites and the Sumerians did not show a

serious tension, what occurred was that an excluded element from South Mesopotamia infiltrated to the Sumerian core. Over time, this led to the process of demolishing of Sumerian system by the Akkadian system.

The early Semites who lived next to the Sumerians are called the Akkadians, who adopted the Sumerian culture and religion (Roux 1992, 151). Later, they became a new influential group. The Akkadians, under the leadership of Sargon, established a kingdom in North Mesopotamia that survived approximately between 2350-2150 BCE (Moscatti 1960, 25). Sargon initiated an enterprise that would unite the entire Mesopotamia area and many others. When Sargon initiated his campaign to unite Mesopotamia, at first, he defeated Lugalzaggesi of Umma, who controlled South Mesopotamia, Sumer, at the time (Roux 1992, 152; Maisels 1993, 169). Later, Sargon allowed Lugalzaggesi to return home and govern his city as a dependent (Maisels 1993, 170).

By uniting North and South Mesopotamia, Akkadians demolished the Sumerian core, which was a culmination of the inclusion attempts of the Semites to the Sumerian system. Sargon of Akkad then arranged major attacks in two directions, against Iran and Syria. In his campaigns to the east, he faced substantial resistance, but he was able to defeat those united foes in the South and West of Iran. He made these groups his vassals and transferred power from mountain settlements toward settlements in the plains. He also imposed the Akkadian language as the official language of Iranian cities (Roux 1992, 153). Akkadians swiftly moved toward the northwest and took control of Mari and Ebla in Syria, as well as mountainous regions in Lebanon, Amanos, and Taurus areas to secure wood and metal supply for Akkad center. With these attacks in Syria, they also made sure that they ridded themselves of two formidable foes, Mari and Ebla (153-154). It seems that Sargon also arranged campaigns in Anatolia, Northern Iraq, the Gulf, and Oman. However, these campaigns did not aim at gaining control of these regions as was the case in Syria. Sargon ruled in Akkad for 55 years (2334-2279 BCE) (154). He was able to unite an area that had never been brought together; it was the first empire in world history (Yoffee 1995, 292). He controlled the entire Mesopotamia area, and Akkadian influence stretched from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean. Akkadian king claimed that he ruled the entire world (Podany 2010, 45; Watson 1992, 29). This general tendency of

imposition of will in various spheres by the Akkadians culminated with the spread of Mesopotamian culture and cuneiform writing to such peoples as the Hurrians, Lullubi, and the Elamites. Also, Elam, Oman, Bahrain, and the Gulf became areas that Mesopotamia started to influence with its innovations and structures (Roux 1992, 159-160).

The Akkadians, by uniting North and South Mesopotamia, made the entire Mesopotamia the core area of the Middle East. The Akkadians, being a group of people living both in North and South Mesopotamia, seemed to play a facilitating role in the unification of North and South Mesopotamia. Before this unification, the North Mesopotamians had already adopted the Sumerian way of life, religion, and culture. However, cultural, religious, and political similarities were not the only reasons why North and South Mesopotamia became a core that differed from the rest of the Middle East and carried out core functions in the region. Rather, the formation of the core was achieved with the use of coercion. However, coercion was not applied to an arbitrary place. As we saw in the analysis of the Sumerian era, the conditions in Mesopotamia were already ripe for the creation of a core encompassing the entire Mesopotamia area. The reason why unification did not last in the Sumerian era was the resistance from other systems; i.e., religious systems. However, as the Sumerian innovations spread to other parts of the Middle East, South Mesopotamia alone was not able to deal with conflict resolution and the cooperation maintenance problems of the Middle East. Furthermore, new areas that had superiorities in terms of production power, innovative capability, military capabilities, and ecological properness started to emerge; i.e., North Mesopotamia. These areas should have been included in the new core. Thus, in this era, conflict management and cooperation maintenance by means of a core in the Middle East became attainable only when the core embodied the entire Mesopotamia. It was possible that the entire Mesopotamia, culturally or religiously, had been a single system before it became a world political system/core, but we do not deal with that. We are interested in the emergence of the world political system across the entire Mesopotamia area. The emergence of Mesopotamia as a system had something to do with the emergence of a situation where conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions of world political system could be performed only if North and South Mesopotamia were included in a single political system. This is

because North Mesopotamia became an area that had superiorities, and the unification of capabilities of North and South Mesopotamia would generate a larger capacity to deal with core functions in the Middle East. The use of force by the Akkadians did not create the core; it just pacified the resistance to the formation of the Mesopotamia as a core.

One such resistance that we already mentioned was the one that emanated from the religious authority. In order to deal with this resistance, the Akkadians attempted to rearrange the religious organization in Mesopotamia. The involvement of the king in the religious system was not possible in the South Mesopotamian context, but the inclusion of North Mesopotamia to the core enabled the interference in the religious system to be not only possible but successful. For example, Sargon appointed his daughter as the moon god in the city of Ur and claimed that only the ruler of the entire world could arrange such an appointment. Such an appointment was the first in Mesopotamia; it was interpreted as an appointment made for meddling in the religious organization of the area (Yoffee 1995, 292; Nissen 1988). Sargon's grandson, Naram Sin (2254-2218 BCE), who was a conqueror similar to his grandfather, engaged in continuous military operations. He fought against Ebla, Mari, Hurrians, Lullubi, and Oman (Roux 1992, 157). Naram Sin also interfered in religious organizations; he declared himself as a god. Deification of the king was seen for the first time in Mesopotamia (156). These cases of kings meddling in the religious system can be interpreted as attempts to curb the religious organization's involvement in the world political relations in Mesopotamia. The deification of a king was especially a measure to enable the submission of local city-state religious authorities to the regional king (Roux 1992, 156; Nissen 1988, 170).

In sum, we can see that a new core forms as a response to new developments. The large-scale movement of people into the core that was present in South Mesopotamia transformed the core to include a larger area where these people (Semites) were influential. Besides this, chronologically, the Akkadian system emerged in a different world society (the Middle East). In this era, in terms of superiorities, the differences between North and South Mesopotamia diminished. The military prowess of North Mesopotamia surpassed that of South Mesopotamia; South Mesopotamian city-states were forced to be included in the Akkadian system. North Mesopotamia adopted the

practices of South Mesopotamia, and differences between the capabilities of North and South Mesopotamia diminished. Thus, the core should have included the newly emerging superior areas. Furthermore, such groups of peripheral people like the Lullubi, Hurrians, and Gutians appeared in the Middle East. These were posing new conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance problems in the Middle East, which North and South Mesopotamia only could deal with together. All in all, these factors played a role in the formation of a new core centered on the entire Mesopotamia.

4.3.2. Core-Periphery Relations (Exclusion)

The Akkadian system left the non-Mesopotamian areas outside of the system/core. This is in conformity with the exclusion of periphery prediction of exclusion theory. The analysis of relations between the Mesopotamian core and the rest of the Middle East shows that the core diversified its exclusion attitude toward peripheral areas. In other words, the exclusion was not applied in a single form toward all peripheral areas. One characteristic of the Akkadian core compared to the Sumerian core was that it applied exclusion through forceful control over some areas. One might suppose that forceful control meant the inclusion of all the areas that were forcefully controlled. However, forceful control was a way of exclusion by pacifying the controlled area in order to dissuade them from seeking inclusion in the core. In this respect, Southwest Iran, and Ebla and Mari in Syria were forcefully controlled.

Besides, in these areas, the Akkadian core imposed cultural policies that privileged Akkadian manners and means over the local ones. The core made Akkadian the official language of the Iranian cities that they controlled (Roux 1992, 153). The Akkadian core brought some other innovations, as well. The empire not only did end the independence of conquered cities but also attempted to transform the administration form of city-states by placing Akkadian-speaking people in their administrations (Podany 2014, 41, 48). The previous kings of the city-states remained in their place but the Akkads appointed Akkadian governors next to local kings (Roux 1992, 153). These were innovations that helped sustenance of the relationship between core and periphery (Nissen 1988, 168; Yoffee 1995, 292). These systematical policies to control the peripheral areas were embraced for excluding the periphery. We can

claim this by comparing the Akkadian policies in Sumer to its policies in Iran and Syria. Even though Akkads incorporated the Sumerian areas into the Akkadian empire, they did not force Sumerians to adopt the Akkadian language, and they did not apply cultural and administrative policies against the Sumerians (Moscati 1960, 11, 27), because Sumerians were part of the core. Thus, forceful measures were indications of exclusion, not inclusion. They aimed to restrict the independence, autonomy, and freedom of peripheral areas that were forcefully controlled. This was one form of exclusion that was implemented in areas that could seek inclusion.

Another form of exclusion was adoption of military campaigns toward areas that were not included in the administrative organization of the Akkadian empire but had resources the Akkadians/Mesopotamians needed. In this case, there was not fear from the areas that had resources to attack in the core (seek inclusion). However, these areas having resources were not considered independent core areas either. Even though, the Mesopotamians were dependent on the resources that these areas owned and they were far from Mesopotamia, they were not taken as equals to the Mesopotamians. According to the exclusion theory, in world political relations, treating an area as subordinate is a form of exclusion. Exclusion, in this case, takes the form of predation that forces the peripheral areas to accept terms that they would not consent in the lack of use of force.

Akkadians arranged expeditions for procurement of resources in two areas. One was Lebanon and Amanos areas for securing wood and metal supply (Roux 1992, 153-154), and the other was Oman. Oman (Magan) was relatively distant but on the other hand was a source of needed raw material; copper. The distance probably made the direct control of the region impossible and unnecessary but the fact that copper was badly needed by Mesopotamians made them to attack Oman when it was considered necessary. For example, under Manishtusu, Sargon's son, Akkadians seemed to arrange an expedition to Oman. The reasons for it seem getting copper sources (Roux 1992, 155; Podany 2010, 47). It was an alternative to an expedition toward north. The northern routes to metal sources in Anatolia were cut by hostile groups, such as Hurrians around the Taurus Mountains and Upper Zab, Lullubi in the east of the Akkads, below Lullubi around Zagros mountains the savage Gutians, the tribes in Elam, and various groups in northern Syria. There were difficulties in accessing to

metal resources to the north. The ruler would either fight against northerners or move toward Oman which was rich in copper and hard stones. Manishtusu chose Oman, where he secured copper procurement (Roux 1992, 155-156). Yet, this expedition did not end up with control of the Oman. Akkadians were only interested in the riches of the Oman. As long as they had secure access to these resources, no direct control was necessary (Podany 2010, 47).

As we can see, the core in Akkadian era embraced varying forms of exclusion depending on the area that would be excluded. The level of dependency of the core to the materials in the periphery, the capacity of system to control the region that host the resources, and the potential that a peripheral area had in terms of seeking inclusion in the core (destroying the system) were variables that determined the exclusion strategy that would be implemented per peripheral area. The strategy could be direct control, expeditions at intervals, exporting structures and practices, and isolation as much as possible. While the urban areas in Syria and Iran were pacified by direct control, relatively distant urban areas (i.e. Oman, and Amanos areas) were forced through expeditions. On the other hand, non-urban areas were excluded through isolation. The isolation was applied to such groups as Hurrians, Lullubi, Gutians, the tribes in Elam, and various groups in northern Syria. All these groups were non-urban groups that were relatively in near abroad of core. However, no matter how close to the system's boundaries they were, these groups were excluded from the system through isolation. Mesopotamians at times fought with these groups but they did not control these groups. The fact that these groups were excluded from the system and they had limited access to the wealth made them to be in continuous search of being included in the system/core. No matter how powerful and stabilized was the core, the excluded groups, whether urban or non-urban, always had discontent with the core areas; it seems that all the groups continuously sought inclusion. The destruction capacity of peripheral areas was higher in isolated groups of people compared to the more advanced and more controlled areas of periphery.

4.3.3. Inclusion Attempts

While Akkadian core employed exclusion against the periphery, the periphery continuously sought inclusion in the system. Indeed, even though Sargon invented new means (Akkadian governors, standing army, cultural policies, religious policies etc.) to pacify the periphery, this did not mean that no opposition took place against the Akkadian core. Rather Akkad was never short of intra-system and extra-system opposition, continuing during succeeding rulers' tenure (Nissen 1988, 168-175). Towards last years of Sargon's rule there were some problems that later developed into an influential revolt in Iran and Sumer. The son of Sargon, Rimush (2278-2270 BCE) pacified the revolt. However, after Naram Sin (2254-2218 BCE), Shar-kali-sharri again faced widespread revolts in Sumer and Elam, besides wars with Lullubi, Gutians, nomads of Syria and Amorites. All these inclusion attempts ended up with inclusion of peripheral areas in the Akkadian system. Following Shar-kali-sharri, there was a period of puppet kings ruling over the country, during which the kings were responsive to the directives of the Gutians, who were pressing from periphery of the Akkadian core. It was ultimately Gutians (from Zagros Mountains) who defeated the Akkadians and ended the Akkad Rule (Roux 1992, 158). In other words, what ultimately led to the fall of the Akkadian Empire/core was a peripheral element. This is a result of developing conflictual relationship between Akkadians and people inhabiting areas next to the borders of Akkadians, who were mostly nomadic or pastoralist people (Podany 2014, 51; Roux 1992; Mann 1986). This pattern that people having less organized political and economic forms causing the fall of large empires became a general rule in ancient the Middle East that would repeat many times. Wars in the frontiers never ceased to be a reality of the core areas, and the final blow to the core came from loosely organized people; i.e., the Gutians, Elamites, Kassites, Medes and Persians etc. (Roux 1992, 159; Buzan and Little 2000, 178). Thus, there was an inevitable paradox. The expansion to pacify the periphery created new peripheries that brought new people, new periphery, and renewed threat (Mann 1986, 162). There was always a potential in the periphery to seek inclusion in the core, and we see this pattern in Akkadian case as well.

We have already stated that toward the end of the Akkad reign, the Gutians, a loosely organized group of people in the periphery, started to take control of some of the cities and gradually dominated Mesopotamia to the detriment of Akkadian system (Yoffee 1995, 294; Moscati 1960, 25; Podany 2014, 51). However, the domination of Gutians did not last long. Some time later, the King of Uruk (Utuhegal) defeated the Gutians and removed them from the Mesopotamian cities. With the removal of Gutians a new conjecture emerged, which was utilized by the rulers of the city-state of Ur. At this time a new dynasty has appeared in Ur, the Third Dynasty of Ur, which started to consolidate power in the Sumer and Akkad regions, South and North Mesopotamia (Yoffee 1995, 294). We can see that the inclusion attempts of peripheral areas do not always lead to permanent inclusion in the system, rather the inclusion is temporarily attained as the Gutians were quickly removed. The Third Dynasty of Ur formed an empire similar to Akkad empire, surviving between 2193 and 2004 BCE, but Ur was not able to bring the entire territories of Akkad under its control; the Iranian and Syrian territories remained outside (Podany 2014, 51). Even though the Third Dynasty of Ur reassumed the title of “king of the four quarters of the earth” who brought Sumer and Akkad together (Moscati 1960, 26), in fact it was not able to establish an exclusionary relationship in the urban regions of Syria and Iran.

Furthermore, toward to the end of the Third Dynasty of Ur, the Amorites (the Western Semites from Syria) infiltrated into Mesopotamia and made invasions. Therefore, when Elamites captured the capital of Ur, Mesopotamia already became an area where large or small kingdoms turned out to be the dominant form of political organization (Roux 1992, 179). Once again, peripheral elements (the Elamites and Amorites), seeking inclusion, caused the disintegration of system. The internal disagreements within the system did not lead to the destruction of the system. It was the peripheral elements that determined the fate of the system. This scenario previously occurred when the Akkadians/Semites infiltrated into the Sumerian system. The Akkadians originally did not belong to Sumerian core; they were a peripheral element. Their demographic expansion in the Sumerian core, overtime, led to destruction of Sumerian core, even though Sumer continued to be part of the new core (entire Mesopotamia).

The Akkadian system was in place between 2350 and 2150 BCE, but toward to the end of this period, peripheral elements triggered the process that would lead to collapse of the system. The Gutians, a group of mountain people around Zagros Mountains, infiltrated into the Akkadian core and terminated system quality of the Akkadian core. The Gutians were an excluded peripheral element in the wider Middle East politics. The Akkadians treated them as an isolated peripheral element as much as possible. The Gutians, on the other hand, continuously sought for inclusion in the system, which made them attack the Mesopotamians. Their attacks culminated with the defeat of Akkadians and then the disintegration of Mesopotamian core. The Mesopotamian system was established based on cooperation against the peripheral elements, but this cooperation overtime got looser as the domestic popular discontent erode cooperation capacity of the system. However, intra-system opposition did not engender the collapse of the core; what led to the demise of the system were peripheral inclusion attempts. When the peripheral elements got organized along the discourse that the peripheral elements are excluded from the system and that if the core can be destroyed inclusion can be achieved, peripheral elements were able to get the support of excluded groups and people. The cooperation among the peripheral elements led to formation of a destructive capacity at the disposal of peripheral elements. They defeated political structures of the core, and the core itself. This happened in collapse of Sumer by the Akkadians, in collapse of Akkadian system by the Gutians, and in the collapse of Third Dynasty of Ur by the Elamites and Amorites. In all three cases, a peripheral element caused to the destruction of core, which accelerated the process of reestablishment of a new core.

CHAPTER 5

CORE PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN ANCIENT ERA (2004-609 BCE)

While the previous Chapter focused on the Mesopotamia-based world political relations, this chapter elaborates on the world political relations in wider Middle East, first Iraq and Syria, and then Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia. World political relations are no more Mesopotamia-centric. However, we are still in the context of ancient era, where the region was based on the same values, peoples, production and trade patterns, manners of war and diplomacy, causes of cooperation and conflict etc. Although the ancient context did not change, world political relations evolved in way to include more diverse peoples, territories, and core areas. The spread of Sumerian influence helped the adjacent areas to get higher capabilities. Areas previously in the periphery emerged as new core areas, while the core in Mesopotamia was destroyed by the arrival of Semites (Amorites). This led to emergence of new core areas in Syria and Iraq to be structures of the Amorite core. This core was followed by the Amarna and Assyrian systems. The Amarna and Amorite systems resembled each other in many respects in terms of core-periphery relations. The Assyrian system, on the other hand, had differences in the forms of core-periphery relations. Yet, the Assyrian system shared the same geographical extent with the Amarna system, namely, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia. Because of these similarities, in this Chapter, three different cores and their peripheries are analyzed to test the validity of exclusion theory.

5.1. The Amorite Core and Its Periphery

After the disintegration of Akkad and Third Dynasty of Ur, a new world political system/core emerged in Iraq and Syria between 2004 and 1595 BCE. Instead of a single polity (state), a number of them existed in this system (Nissen 1988, 185; Podany 2014, 63; Yoffee 1995, 296). The studies show that there were around 160

kingdoms in this era. While most of these kingdoms were tiny, several of them were called as great kingdoms (Elam, Babylonia, Mari, Assur, Isin, Larsa, and Eshnunna) (Podany 2010, 94; Roux 1992). The Amorite system/core seemed similar to the Sumerian system in that both had multiple structures (states) within the system. However, they also had differences. The city-states included in the system/core during Sumerian era were multiple, mostly equivalent, and geographically connected. Reversely, in the Amorite era, the great kingdoms constituting the system/core were few, alongside a large number of lesser polities that were dependent on the great kingdoms. The lesser polities geographically were separating the Great Kingdoms from each other (Podany 2010, 65). A couple of large kingdoms were controlling many other lesser kingdoms. This was not only the case in Mesopotamia, but also in Syria and Elam (Iran) (Podany 2014, 74-75; Lafont 2001, 41).

In such a picture, the Amorite system was the one where the core and the periphery had a different look compared to previous systems. The core was no more enclaved in a geographical area. The core areas/polities were rather dispersed over the Syrio-Iraqi geography. One core area, i.e., Mari, was surrounded by the peripheral kingdoms that were subjects of Mari. Similarly, other core kingdoms were also surrounded by the peripheral kingdoms. Second, the geographical area that hosted the core areas expanded to such a degree that it included almost all Iraq and Syria. Yet, the cities in this landscape were not equal. A group of them (the great kingdoms/core areas) were continuously interacting with each other about their disagreements and cooperation opportunities, while another group (lesser powers/peripheral areas) was subject to what the core areas decided about them. Thus, we can discern a differentiation between relations among the core areas, and the core-periphery relations. From a system theory perspective, we interpret this differentiation as reflecting intra-system and extra-system relations. Relations among the core areas were intra-system relations, while relations between the core areas and the peripheral areas were extra-system relations. We can assume that in intra-system relations, the core areas collaborated against the peripheral areas. The peripheral areas on the other hand were not able to seek inclusion in a coordinated fashion because their capacity to seek inclusion was mutilated.

5.1.1. Inclusion of People and Formation of a New Core

Syria and Iraq area as a new core emerged owing to concentration of superiorities in the dispersed areas of them and the spread of people called Amorites in the area, which was a result of the inclusion search of peripheral people to Akkadian and Third Dynasty of Ur territories. This era is called the era of Amorite kingdoms or Old Babylonian Period (Lafont 2001, 40). Amorites were of Semitic origin, and they replaced the Sumerians and Akkadians as an ethnicity in Mesopotamia (Moscati 1960, 27; Lafont 2001, 40; Yoffee 1995, 297). The reason that the Amorites sought inclusion was that, first; they had military capabilities that were developed enough so that they can assert core status (inclusion). Second, the exclusion that Akkadian and Third Dynasty of Ur system applied to peripheral areas became unbearable at the face of deteriorating climatic conditions in the periphery. The Amorites came from the West and North West areas to Mesopotamia, the steppe lands. They were not nomads since camel was not domesticated yet, but rather they were semi-nomads who reared sheep and goats. Starting from the era of Akkadians in small scales and reaching its height at the end of the 3rd millennium BCE, the flow of Amorites continued until the beginnings of the 2nd millennium BCE. It seems that they were migrating due to the improper climatic conditions that were unfavorable for pasturage; a situation that lasted for several centuries. The inclusion attempts of the peripheral Amorite people were not welcomed by the core areas. For example, the last kings of Third Dynasty of Ur attempted to stop the flow of Amorite people by building a defense wall of 170 km length, which was not sufficient to stop the migration. Already by the 2029-2006 BCE era, the Amorite groups were armed and carrying out activities in Mesopotamia (Saggs 1995, 91). They took one city after another. Not only were they migrating to Mesopotamia but also to Syrian urban areas (91-93).

The inclusion search of Amorites, at first, took place at low-density. They moved to included areas individually. This first migration wave was not a challenge that the periphery posed against the core. They took part in bureaucracy and agricultural activity in included areas (Yoffee 1995, 297). However, later, the inclusion attempts of the Amorites took a mass character that bore with it the possibility of destroying the Akkadian and Third Dynasty of Ur systems. At this point, the core resisted to the

challenge of the periphery, without success. Once the Amorites succeeded in attaining inclusion, they rapidly adapted to the Sumero-Akkadian culture and language (Roux 1992, 180-181). They mostly referred their origins to one or another dynasty of Mesopotamians. During their domination in the region, the Mesopotamian culture, literature, and history were both reproduced and protected (Yoffee 1995, 297; Podany 2010, 126). This shows that peripheral areas seek inclusion to achieve similar status with the core areas, even though they do not necessarily seek inclusion peacefully. Once Amorites became dominant, they enabled a homogeneity in Iraq and Syria regions (Lafont 2001, 42), which facilitated formation of a new system (core) in Iraq and Syria.

The migration and settlement of Amorites in urban areas of Iraq and Syria also showed that there was a disparity between urban Syrio-Iraqi areas and other parts of the Middle East. The people migrated to urban areas because these urban areas were more developed/included. In the Sumerian system, South Mesopotamia was the most developed area in the Middle East, in terms of production, military, innovation and the ecological conditions. In Akkadian system, entire Mesopotamia was superior to the rest of the Middle East. When it came to Amorite age, now the superior areas of the Middle East were some areas in Syria and Iraq that were geographically separate from each other. However, despite this geographical distance between the most endowed areas, their superiority in relation to the rest of the Middle East rendered the new system to include these separate areas all. Thus, what made the Amorite system to form in Syria and Iraq was superiority and homogeneity of development level in urban areas of Syria and Iraq compared to rest of the Middle East. The Amorites were attracted to these superiorities, due to worsening conditions in the areas where they inhabited. On the other hand, the migration of Amorites facilitated and enhanced the formation of a new system/core that encompassed Iraq and Syria, which is the Amorite system.

The inclusion attempts of Amorites triggered the destruction of one system (Akkadian and Third Dynasty of Ur) in the Middle East and formation of another one (Amorite system). The motivation of the Amorites in migrating to core areas in Mesopotamia was to overcome the exclusion coupled with the climatic deterioration. When exclusion and harsh climate gained an unbearable nature, the Amorites migrated to

the core areas, both peacefully and violently. The aim was to achieve inclusion in the core. The core resisted to this inclusion attempts successfully for a long period, but at the end peripheral people attained inclusion. We could understand the ultimate goal of the Amorites in this migration by looking at their final achievement. They simply attained what the core areas had; benefiting from what system provides to the people. This means uninhibited access to wealth opportunities, some level of autonomy, and participation in decision making. In these terms, the peripheral areas were subject to less favorable conditions. Thus people, by moving to core areas were able to overcome these conditions. However, it must be emphasized that the inclusion of Amorites did not mean the inclusion of the areas where the Amorites originally inhabited. Rather, Amorites succeeded in inclusion as individuals or groups by moving to most endowed areas. The inclusion attempt of Amorites questioned their inhibited access to the resources, which worsened with deteriorating climatic conditions in areas they inhabited. The previous system, the Akkadian, had established an unequal relationship between the core and its periphery that was sustained through forceful measures. Amorites with their migration instigated the demolition of this core and periphery relationship, and establishment of a new core.

How do people's migrations cause formation of a new system/core? It can be put that the large-scale movement of people allow the association of otherwise separate endowed areas. People render communication between distant areas to occur, about the system identity, system functions, system's relations with the environment, and intra-system harmony. People envision the system and participate in the activities that render the communication occur throughout the system. This gives life to the system. The communication occurs among the areas that are able to absorb innovation, produce in large amounts, build advanced military and social organization forms; feed larger numbers of people; attract talented individuals of the world society, and enjoy favorable climatic conditions (Nissen 1988; Mann 1986; Zagarell et al. 1986). Therefore, we can interpret the migration of people in search of inclusion into the core areas, also, as facilitation for establishment of a new system/core. This had been the case previously in the movement of Akkadians to Sumer, and that of the Gutians to Akkad. In all these cases, people's discontent in the peripheral areas caused the destruction of the existing core to be replaced by another core. Now, in order to see

whether the new system shows the characteristics of system envisioning of exclusion theory, we can try to understand what kind of system it was, by elaborating on the intra-system patterns in Amorite period.

5.1.2. Intra System Disagreements

The type of system and the relationships within the system can best be understood by looking at disagreements within the core. Disagreements are the ultimate events which any argument about world political relations are built upon. The lack of disagreements is interpreted as the indication of cooperation, while the existence of disagreements is interpreted as the indication of conflict. Thus, it is worth to know whether there were disagreements and whether these disagreements were indications of conflictual relationship in the core that other theories foresee or indications of harmony that exclusion theory predicts. It is also worth to know whether relations between great kingdoms of the era denote that great kingdoms of Amorite era were structures of a larger system/core or not. If the great kingdoms were structures of a larger system, then we can propose that the main theme of world political relations at this era was not between multiple states but between the core that great kingdoms were structures of it and the periphery. If the core areas did not have issues with each other's core status, then we can interpret this as the indication of harmony between the core areas. Similarly, if the core areas did not question the unequal status of the peripheral areas, then we can say that the core areas collaborated against the peripheral areas. The core areas of the Middle East in the Amorite era were Elam, Mari, Assur, Isin, Larsa, Eshnunna, and later Babylonia. Four of these kingdoms are from Mesopotamia; two of them (Isin and Larsa) in the South, and the other two (Assur and Eshnunna) in the north. The resources note that Isin and Larsa were in continuous competition for controlling entire Sumer and Akkad lands. Assur and Eshnunna on the other hand were competing over major trade networks in the north (Roux 1992, 179). Mari was an important core area that was located in Syria (Saggs 2000, 98). Elam on the other hand was located in Iran as a great kingdom.

The relations between the polities/structures in the Middle East in the Amorite age are generally portrayed as conflictual. It is posited that the polities were acting

independently according to their interests or passions. For example, it is said, at the beginnings of the Amorite era, Isin dominated over South Mesopotamia in its competition with Larsa (Roux 1992, 181). During 100-year period, most of the important cities of Mesopotamia such as Nippur, Uruk and Eridu were possessed by Isin (182). Isin, holding the city of Nippur where “the god of gods” resided, was claiming that it was the successor of Third Dynasty of Ur. Isin inherited all practices and institutions of previous empires (Akkad and Third Dynasty of Ur) in Mesopotamia (Saggs 2000, 95). On the other hand, the dynasty that ruled in Larsa at this period was of Amorite origin. By the rule of fourth king of the dynasty of Larsa, (Gungunum 1932-1906 BCE), Larsa took Ur (96), which gave Larsa upper hand in controlling most of the South Mesopotamia, but their competition with Isin continued for some time (Roux 1992, 182-184). In 1794 BCE, finally, Larsa put an end to the Isin rule in its capital (185).

This portrayal might seem as though the polities/core states had their individual logic and interests that were independent from machination of the system and periphery dichotomy. However, we can say that this was not so by looking at the nature of disagreement between Isin and Larsa. The assessment of the relations of two structures of the system (Isin and Larsa) in South Mesopotamia, in fact, shows that there was not a conflict between the two that aimed relegation of one core area to a subordinate position. Rather, what we see is the attempt to achieve hegemony in South Mesopotamia. The search for hegemony search is not a conflict that occurs between two dissimilar sides, rather it is a dispute about form of government. The dispute about hegemony of Isin or Larsa is not about who would be superior (system) and who would be subordinate (periphery). The search for hegemony is a search for deciding about the form of government that would be dominant in the system. Hegemonic forms of government are not necessarily coercive. Rather, the relations can be based on reciprocity and consensus (Ikenberry 2001, 196). Systems theory looks for what is included and what is excluded, it does not look for what form of government is in place. When there is hegemony, all the core areas in the hegemony enjoy fair and equal participation. Hegemony is a form of government, just like the hegemonial states seen in the Sumerian era. In the hegemony, the states or the areas that states represent do not relegate to an inferior position. Just the conflict resolution and

cooperation maintenance needs are handled in a more coordinated fashion in hegemony. On the other hand, the system/core decides who will be included and who will be excluded, namely which areas of the world society/region would enjoy fair treatment and which areas would be devoid of fairness. In this context, it does not matter whether Isin or Larsa become the hegemon, because it does not affect who would be included and who would be excluded. The real conflict takes place between the excluded and included. However, the wars between Isin and Larsa were between two included structures that disputed over the form of government. These wars were a mechanism of intra system dispute resolution. In intra-system dispute resolution wars, both sides are winners, both at the beginning and at the end of the war. The search for hegemony is a search by the system for identifying the best structure that would serve to realization of the functions of the system, namely resolution of conflicts and cooperation maintenance.

Another disagreement type in the core was in the north among Mari, Assur, Eshnunna, and Babylon (Saggs 1995, 94; Roux 1992). The confrontations among these states are generally interpreted as conflicts where each state was acting on its own behalf. However, a rereading of the events among these core areas from an exclusion theory perspective reveals that there were two themes in these relations. Above we dealt with the hegemony theme in Mesopotamia between Isin and Larsa. Now we add two other themes in the Amorite age. One was the capture and return of some vassals between some core polities, and the other was consolidation of core status of some newly emerging polities, namely Babylon. These were typical relations between core polities in the north. They were not indications of a conflict among the core areas; they were rather adjustments made to maintain coexistence. The capture and return of vassals first helped the resolution of disagreements between the core areas. Second, it helped the structures of system check each other for making sure whether each of the parties involved in confrontations continues to be a core structure (state) in the system or not. Exclusion theory predicts that the system (core) utilizes only eligible structures (polities) for realization of its functions. Therefore, the core structures by entering in confrontations with each other not only do resolve the disagreements between the core areas but they also prove that they are competent to be a core structure. The core areas test each other's eligibility through fighting, which is a system requirement. This is a

sort of examination between the core areas that continues for long time until they fully become confident that the core areas and structures do not aim to harm each other, and that they are not rivals of each other. Another mechanism of world political system to test the eligibility of a state to be recognized in the core takes place when a new core area emerges or a core area loses its core capacity. The rise or fall of core areas is sealed at the end of fights between the core areas and the rising or declining area. However, this test is a confirmation of deterioration or improvement in the endowments of the rising or declining area. The decline or rise is not caused by the wars. New core areas may emerge or existing core areas may lose their core status, owing to developments taking place inside of the area concerned. The core areas do not fight to put an end to core status of a core area, or they do not fight to raise a peripheral area to core status. Improvements or deteriorations in an area itself lead it to rise to or to fall from core status. Warring capacity of an area or state is one of the means that can be used for measuring its usefulness in terms of being a structure of the system/core.

The confrontations among Assur, Mari, Eshnunna, and Elam confirm exclusion theory's finding that core areas keep checking each other's core status. Indeed, around the tenure of fourth king of Babylon, an Amorite (Shamshi-Adad) came to power in Assyria, as a usurper who was not from the Assyrian dynasty. During his kingship, Assyria was a kingdom with such centers as Assur, Ekallatum, and Shubat-Enlil. Then Assur annexed Mari. Thus, Shamshi-Adad was able to rule over a kingdom stretching from Mediterranean to north of Mesopotamia. Later, when Shamshi-Adad died, a man named Zimri-Lim, overthrew Shamshi-Adad's son in a coup and came to throne in Mari (Saggs 2000, 98). The other son of Shamshi-Adad continued to rule over Ekallatum and Assyria. Both Mari and Assyria, on the other hand, had disagreements with Eshnunna. For resolving these disagreements Mari encouraged Elam to take action against Eshnunna. Having troops from Mari and Babylon, Elamites were able to arrange a successful attack to Eshnunna. Next year, Elam attacked both Babylon and Ekallatum. Babylon was able to repulse the Elamites, but Elamites occupied Ekallatum and other towns of north east, which caused disturbance among these kingdoms. In 1771 BCE, this time Eshnunna retaliated and took Ekallatum back, but Eshnunna did not invade Mari (Roux 1992, 198, 192-194). Rather, it negotiated for

supremacy over the vassals of Mari. The supremacy of Eshnunna was accepted through submission of vassals of Mari to Eshnunna, but later the lesser kings resubmitted to Zimri Lim (Roux 1992, 199; Podany 2010, 72). As we can see these confrontations between the core areas led no significant development; the structures in the core areas continued to be structures of the system/core. Therefore, it can be put, these confrontations emanated from the system requirement to make sure that the great kingdoms of the era continue to be structures of the system. These kingdoms did not live long enough to avoid any war among themselves because “internal” changes (i.e., unexpected throne succession cases) in each of these kingdoms were frequent. In Assyria, Shamshi-Adad came to throne as a usurper who was not a member of Assyrian dynastic family. The death of Shamshi-Adad also caused significant uncertainties in Assyria. Zimri-Lim came to power in Mari again as an unexpected throne successor, and pursued an unconventional way of regional political relations. Babylon, as a small kingdom, on the other hand, was emerging as an area that could potentially rise to a core status, thus adding to uncertainties among the core areas. As these cases show, the frequency of changes in the internal situation of the core polities made each of the kingdoms to be suspicious about the core status of each other. Confrontation for checking core status of other core areas in the north also showed that relations in the core were not conflictual in the sense that the core structures wanted to relegate each other to a peripheral position. Rather these confrontations were performed out of the system requirement to check the eligibility of the core areas. Therefore, these relations cannot be interpreted as indications of conflicts between the self-referential states which pursued their interests and passions. Instead, it must be clarified that the polities were fulfilling the system requirement.

The third form of confrontation in the core in the Amorite age was related to the rise of Babylon. The confrontations that occurred in the core due to the rise of Babylon had similarities to the confrontation between Isin and Larsa, in that these confrontations were about deciding what form of government (structure) should be adopted for sustenance of the system. The difference is that Babylon became a hegemon from scratch. It was originally a core area. Its rise to the core status mostly had to do with the improvements in many realms such as agriculture, law, and defense in Babylon. These improvements, in turn, resulted in some ramifications for intra-

system relations. Originally, exclusion theory suggests that the core areas do not harm each other, meaning that the core areas do not perform an action that would relegate another core area to peripheral status. However, in the case of Babylon, we see that Babylon put an end to existence of two core areas, namely Eshnunna and Larsa. The reason for this exceptional attitude from a core area toward another core area seems to be that Babylon was not a core area from the start of the Amorite system. Initially, it was a peripheral area (a vassal) that later turned into a core owing to improvements in Babylon. Once it rose to core status, the core areas reshuffled in Amorite system (core). Two core polities disappeared and Babylon grew into the largest core area that was superior to other core areas. However, this does not challenge the idea that the superior core polities are structures of the system that assist the core to fulfill its functions. Babylon was nothing more than a useful core structure alongside other core structures to support the functions of the core. In order to substantiate these arguments, it is better to take a look at the emergence of Babylon as a core area and then its rise to core status.

When Shamshi-Adad was ruling in Assyria, Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) came to throne in Babylon (Saggs 2000, 98). At the time, Babylon was still a small kingdom that was surrounded by large kingdoms. To the south there was Larsa, in the north Shamshi-Adad's Assyria, and in the east Eshnunna which was allied with Elam (Roux 1992, 197; Podany 2010, 68; Podany 2014, 76). When Babylon was still a small kingdom, significant improvements in terms of agriculture and the defense took place in Babylon (Saggs 2000, 97). Hammurabi either as a junior or vassal made an alliance with Shamshi-Adad and this gave him the opportunity to make some expeditions (98). At this time, Zimri-Lim (king of Mari) and Hammurabi also seemed to have good relations. They had ambassadors in each other's court, who were both representatives and intelligence gatherers. These good relations of Babylon with Assur and Mari gave space to Babylon to become a core area, thus attain inclusion (Roux 1992, 199; Podany 2010, 72). In the first five years of his rule, Hammurabi did not attack anywhere. In the sixth year, he took Isin from Larsa. Then, in his tenth year, he occupied some key areas between Tigris and Zagros. Finally, at his 11th year, he took some area near Sippar. He then remained silent for twenty years during which he took

leadership in building of irrigation canals, temples, and fortifications of the cities (Roux 1992, 197-198; Watson 1992, 29; Saggs 2000, 98).

After gaining enough superiority, Babylon was ripe for seeking inclusion in the core. Hammurabi took leadership of a process that led to unification of large parts of contemporary Iraq. At first, he was dealing with Elam (Iran), but later this turned into a mission of fighting former allies as well; i.e., Zimri-Lim's Mari (Watson 1992, 29). In the twenty ninth year of Hammurabi's rule, Babylon was able to defeat a coalition of the Elamites, the Gutians, and the Assyrians which attacked Babylon. Thus, we can see that existing core areas unite to prevent the inclusion (rise of a peripheral area) to core status. The next year, Hammurabi attacked Larsa and took it. In the thirty first year of Hammurabi rule, again the coalition of the Elamites, the Gutians, and the Assyrians attacked Babylon. Hammurabi was not only able to repulse this attack but he also advanced to the frontiers of Assyria. Eshnunna's independence ended at the end of this confrontation. After this, Hammurabi attacked his friend Zimri-Lim, with the pretext that Zimri-Lim did not assist him against Eshnunna. Finally, in his thirty sixth and eighth years, he defeated the Assyrians, but the Assyrian dynasty was able to survive, even though their rule in northern Iraq came to an end (Roux 1992, 200; Saggs 2000, 99). Thus, we can see that Babylon was included in the core at the end of a series of wars with core areas. While these wars took place, the structures of the system/core reshuffled; Eshnunna and Larsa disappeared and Babylon became the hegemon over a large core area. Besides putting an end to independent rule of Eshnunna and Larsa, Babylon also defeated many other core structures, such as Assur and Mari. However, it does seem that Assur, Mari, and Elam continued to stay outside of the direct control of Babylon. Furthermore, even at the climax of Babylonian rule, the main template of the core periphery relationship of Amorite age remained the same. Several large kingdoms (great powers/core structures); i.e., Assur, Babylon, Elam, and Mari continued to be the core areas whereas the dependent vassals and non-urban areas surrounding the core structures constituted the peripheral areas. It does not seem that Babylon and other core areas had significant confrontations with each other once Babylon became the largest core structure. Thus, we can see that Babylon's involvement in terminating two core areas was not a result of the conflict between core areas. It was, rather, a result of the inclusion of a peripheral area into core status.

Therefore, the claim that core areas do not harm each other is once again proven. In contrast, after the rise of Babylon, intra-core confrontations became rare, which is an indication of intra-core harmony. During 16th century BCE in the Amorite system until the appearance of Amarna system, the core was mostly stable, where little confrontation took place (Roux 1992, 254; Moscati 1960).

While the intra-core confrontations lost their prominence, another major theme began to appear in world political relations of the Amorite era. As a matter of fact, the central theme in world political relations of the Amorite system started to unfold between the core and the peripheral areas, which was characterized with the inclusion attempts of peripheral areas and people. With the death of Hammurabi, his son Samsuiluna came to throne. During his rule and in subsequent kings' era, people of Babylonia and other peripheral areas sought inclusion in the core which led to significant weakening of core structures. Some time later, after Samsuiluna's ascendance to power, a rebellion broke out in Babylonia, which Samsuiluna was able to suppress. However, the rebellion was destructive, and the empire was in ruin when it was pacified. In order to suppress the rebellion, the Euphrates channel was shifted as a part of the strategy to deter the rebels. Yet, this led to the migration of large number of people from south toward Babylon and north. Babylon continued to be ruled by the Babylon dynasty for around a century, but the state shrunk and ruined. The ruling authority weakened and especially the southern part of the country was depopulated. As the inclusion attempts of people weakened the core structures of the Amorite System, the peripheral areas gained more autonomy; for example, in the appointments to the local offices, the principle of inheritance was started to be applied (Foster and Foster 2009, 85-88).

Later, the emergence of a peripheral structure that was not contained by the Amorite core, made it worse for the system. The Hittites emerged as an endowed area that was not included in the core. Because it was not included in the core it was a peripheral area that needed to be included, which led to destruction of Amorite system. Besides the people's inclusion attempts and emergence of the Hittites, a new wave of people migrating to Iraq completed the process of destruction of the system. These people were the Kassites migrating to Iraq, who first appeared as soldiers and workers. Finally, in 1595 BCE the Hittites under the king Mursilis defeated Babylon and dethroned the Babylonian King. This was an inclusion attempt by the Hittites. The

Hittites did not occupy Babylon. Therefore, the withdrawal of the Hittites led to easy inclusion of the Kassites in the system. The Kassites established a dynasty in Mesopotamia. As a result of their search for being included, Kassites showed a high degree of adaptation to the Babylonian manners and regional state ideal. Besides, they adopted the religious practices and policies of the Babylonians (Foster and Foster 2009, 85-88). Their presence in Babylonia lasted for around four centuries 1595-1157 BCE (Saggs 2000, 114). As we can see, the main theme in world political relations in the Amorite age evolved toward inclusion attempts of the peripheral polities and people.

To wrap up, we can easily say that in the Amorite era, the core polities did not aim to harm each other in the sense that they exclude each other from independence and equality. Even when they had confrontations, these confrontations did not aim at exclusion of core areas. These confrontations, first, aimed to decide which form of structure should be proper in realization of system functions. The second form of confrontations between core areas was the one that aimed to resolve the disagreements about sharing vassal (peripheral) areas. Third form of confrontation was the one that the core areas aimed to check each other to see if each of the core polities were eligible to be treated as a core area or not. All these confrontations were centered on the theme of intra-system adjustments. On the other hand, the conflicts between Babylon and other core areas, and the conflict between Babylon and the Hittites were exceptional in that they occurred because of inclusion of a peripheral area in the core. These sorts of confrontations had the effect of destroying or at best reshuffling of the core areas. One should not confuse these sorts of conflicts with the intra-system confrontations. The rise of Babylon and Hittites fall in line more with the core-periphery conflict, rather than intra-core confrontations.

However, the general interpretations of the relations in the Amorite age do not use this template that we applied. Looking at the relations in Amorite era, the sources do not make a differentiation between relations within and outside core. Rather they claim that the relations in this era between all polities were antagonistic (Lafont 2001, 42; Podany 2014, 62, 74-75; Roux 1992). They maintain that there was a great political fragmentation. Throughout the era, there were a large number of kingdoms competing with each other (Lafont 2001, 40; Podany 2010, 68; Yoffee 1995, 297).

Even though diplomacy was commonplace, they say, the era was never short of wars. Diplomacy was resorted to as something for preparation to or prevention of War; the kings had a real enmity between each other where their interests clashed. During this period, they say, the near east was like a “chess game, as each player tried to gain an advantage over his rivals” (Podany 2010, 83, 89, 93, 119). This is the kind of narrative in literature regarding the relations in Amorite age. If we missed the difference between intra-core and core-periphery relations, we may have adopted the same interpretation. However, the systems perspective allows us to make a differentiation between what is included and what is excluded. The wars between the core areas are not necessarily means resorted to exclude each other; rather the confrontations solidify their status of being a member of core. If so, the wars between them should be interpreted as adjustments that were made based on equality for the maintenance of the system that renders them to be core areas. In this respect, exclusion theory’s suggestion that the relations between core areas show harmony rather than conflict is proven. Second, the state-centric approach that assumes states are the ultimate reference points is also falsified because states/polities act depending on where they are positioned. What creates states and dictates them how to act is system and environment dichotomy. The system dictates states in the core to act in accordance with the system functioning. What is essential is the system and the environment dichotomy, not the multiple states. Because core states are structures of the system, the underlying relationship between the core areas is cooperation and collaboration rather than being conflict.

On the other hand, core, in its relations with the periphery, had a conflictual relationship. However, this conflict was not the same as the one that other accounts propose. Other accounts of the world political relations suggest that conflict occurs between the states/polities. However, exclusion theory suggests that the conflict occurs between the core and periphery as a whole. The existence of this conflict can be seen in differentiation between the relationships within and outside of the system. There were peripheral areas which never happened to be part of the history of the core. Core areas were cooperating and were dominant side, while the peripheral areas remained unheard and scattered. As a sign of collaboration (inclusion) among the core

areas and conflict (exclusion) with the peripheral areas, the kings of core areas called each other as brothers, while the vassal kings were called as sons.

We know that since the Early Dynastic Period, diplomatic means and manners were developing. In Amorite age, diplomacy was practiced over a larger zone and more sophisticatedly (Podany 2010, 93). In the treaties and letters, the great kings were referring each other as brothers. As previously was the case, the kings were considered forming a family whose members had certain roles. Thus, the great kings were considered fathers, while the vassals were sons (Podany 2010, 28; Westbrook 2000, 29). The great kings generally did not want to marry to the sisters of their vassals; rather they preferred the marriage of their sister to the vassal kings so their sister could spy to great kings (Podany 2010, 83-89). Even the marriages between royal palaces were designed in accordance with the core-periphery duality. In line with this; while rules, methods and means were applied between the core kingdoms equally, between the vassals and core kingdoms they were applied unequally. This difference is an indication of underlying inequality between the core and the periphery.

5.2. The Amarna (Indo-European) Core and Its Periphery

World political relations during the Amarna period were relatively well-documented compared to the previous eras. The examination of the world political relations in the Amarna period once again shows patterns that exclusion theory predicts. Intra-core harmony, conflict (exclusion vs. inclusion) between core and periphery, and insignificance of intra-core confrontations are patterns that are observable in the Amarna era. The Amarna system (core) appeared with the expansion of the boundaries of the core in the Middle East, mainly due to the appearance of the Indo-European people and three new core areas, namely Egypt, Mitanni, and Hatti that were eligible to be structures of the new system (core). The arrival of Indo-Europeans in the Middle East and the improvements in the production and military capabilities in Anatolia and Northern Syria due to Mesopotamian influence led to the formation of two new core areas, namely Hatti in Anatolia and Mitanni in northern Syria. Alongside these, an Indo-European group of people, the Kassites, took leadership in an old core area, namely Babylonia. On the other hand, Egypt was previously a core area in a different

system than the Middle Eastern systems. However, the attacks of new people from Middle East to Egypt (Hyksos invasion) at a time when the Indo-Europeans appeared in the Middle East made Egypt a part of the core in the Middle East. Egyptian system was no more an independent system, because the interactions between Egypt and other Middle Eastern areas expanded. During previous systems centered on Mesopotamia, Egypt was isolated from the Middle Eastern context, even though the innovations formerly developed in Mesopotamia were emulated in Egypt (Moscati 1960; Podany 2010; Mann 1986; Saggs 2000).

This picture of the system in the Amarna age that was centered on Iraq, Syria, Anatolia, and Egypt crystallized in the 15th century BCE (Roux 1992, 225). The preceding century witnessed the consolidation of Hatti, Egypt, and Mitanni, as the structures of the new system. Each core area was dealing with consolidation within its own sphere. Egypt, during the reign of Ahmose I (1576-1546 BCE), in the aftermath of removal of Hyksos people, was recovering from the destruction incurred during Hyksos invasion. The Hittites in Anatolia were suffering from the disputes between elites of the Kingdom. The King who had taken Aleppo and defeated Babylon, Mursilis I, was assassinated in 1590 BCE. The successors of Mursilis I left all territories to the south of Taurus area. The Babylonians were not very much interested or able to involve in world political affairs. Only the Mitannians were active in terms of expansion. The vacuum surfaced in the aftermath of the demise of Babylonia and internal troubles in Hatti allowed Mitanni to become a core area and structure (Roux 1992, 254; Moscati 1960).

While Hatti and Mitanni participated in the core owing to the new improvements in production and military of these areas and ascendance of Indo-Europeans, Egypt was incorporated into the core because Egyptian system was no more isolated from the wider Middle East. Owing to the natural protection provided by the surrounding deserts, for two thousand years, Egyptian system and its environment had existed in an isolated situation, even though it had limited commercial relations with the outside world. The Egyptian system was also closely related to the river Nile; it was shaped along the lines of the river. These factors made the Egyptian civilization “enclosed”, “autonomous”, “united”, “organic”, and “uninterrupted” (Roux 1992, 255; Moscati 1960, 97-98, 106; Parsons 1966, 52-53; Murnane 2000, 101-102; James 2000, 112).

The Egyptians were quarrelling only with the southerner Nubians (Sudan), who had gold, as the peripheral element. The Egyptians considered the Nubians too miserable, and they regularly attacked them. Regarding the other regions in the north, Egyptians had a less exclusionary outlook. Egypt had close trade relations with Canaanites and cities in Eastern Mediterranean shores, especially Byblos, but these cities were not conquered by Egypt until 17th century BCE (Podany 2010, 139). Thus, the areas in the north were also excluded. In Egyptian history, in several occasions the outsiders infiltrated into Egypt from the Suez Isthmus, but they were not able to stay long in Egypt. Thus, Egypt had serious concerns regarding neither its periphery nor the areas beyond the periphery; i.e. Sumerian, Akkadian, and Amorite areas (Roux 1992, 255). However, the Hyksos invasion was different; they took control of the delta around 1630 BCE, and became the kings there. This caused a shift in Egyptian outlook toward areas outside the Egyptian system (Podany 2010, 139), because, a core area named Egypt could no longer sustain its core status without becoming a part of the core in the wider Middle East encompassing Iraq, Syria, Anatolia and Egypt. Thus, the Amarna system (core) emerged in the Middle East.

5.2.1. Cooperation/Inclusion within the Core

Recognizing the emergence of a new system, it is time to understand what the nature of relationships within the system (core) was. Our findings about the nature of intra-system relations do not cohere with the general interpretation of these relations in some of the resources. The general interpretation about Amarna era world political relations is that even though there were regulated relations and shared practices, there was no higher authority resorted in case of disagreements in this system. The states were capable of acting independently. They acted in an anarchical world. Each of the states was considered sovereign. There was no higher authority over these kingdoms to enforce the treaties, and no one was able to claim that one state was more powerful than the other (Podany 2014, 92; David 2000, 58; Ragionieri 2000, 49). The order was achieved through the power relations of great states and vassal states. Even though gods were appealed at times, no state relied on gods only (David 2000, 58). It was true that the kings seriously believed in gods, and this mitigated the nature of anarchy at

this age. However, it was also the case that the treaties were infringed many times, and many wars broke out (64).

In other words, the resources say, while peace was not something unexpected, wars broke out many times. For example, Hatti ended the independence of Mitanni long before the end of cooperational system (Podany 2014, 91). Egypt sought the alliance of Arzawa against Hatti, and also played divide and rule game against the vassals. Similarly, Mitanni and Hatti separately balanced Egyptian expansion toward the north. While Mitanni was destroyed by the Hittites and the Assyrians, Egypt was on the threshold of 100-year war with Hatti. Assyria replaced Mitanni, and Babylonia was under the threat of barbarians (David 2000, 62, 65). Wars were not regarded immoral, and both the great kingdoms and the vassal states went to war with each other. In their relations, “political assassination, fomenting insurgency, and rampant corruption” were frequent (62-63). States used cheating and lying frequently in their actions, and the great powers sought to extend their sphere of influence at the expense of others (58).

This interpretation is in line with the view which considers the intra-system wars between the core areas of the system as conflictual. On the other hand, this view also ignores the differentiation between the core and peripheral areas. According to them, not only major kingdoms (such as Egypt, Mitanni, Hatti, and Babylonia) but also minor states, the vassals, were members of this system (Ragionieri 2000, 46; Liverani 2000, 20). By looking at the wars between core areas, this interpretation generalizes a conflictual perspective to all relationships in world political relations. There is no difference between the core and the periphery. However, these views are doubtful. Intra-core relations cannot be automatically generalized as similar to the core-periphery relations. Instead, the core had different relations within and outside the core. In fact, the relationship among the core areas was one of cooperation rather than conflict. It is this cooperational relationship that allow the scholars to call the relationship between the great kingdoms of the era with terms such as “brotherhood”, “great power club”, “society”, “community”, “alliance system” etc... (Ragionieri 2000, 46; Liverani 2000, 20). The membership to the great power club was restricted (Liverani 2000, 20). Superior capabilities were decisive for a state to enter the great power club (Ragionieri 2000, 49) which we can call core. The members of this club

used a discourse that legitimized and substantiated the brotherhood between the great states. There was a simple pattern applied to past, present, and future relations. It was suggested that there had been positive relations in the far past, then some negative developments in the near past occurred, and yet these negative developments were replaced with good and positive relations now, and this will continue in the future (Liverani 2000, 19-20).

The entire manners and styles of Amarna system matured in Mesopotamia and Syria and were later adopted by Egypt and Hatti (Podany 2014, 91; Freire 2013, 148). In this system, the kings were considered to constitute a family (Podany 2010, 10). Whereas the kings having the same status were deemed as brothers, the kings having a difference in rank were seen as father and son (Zaccagnini 2000, 144). The brotherhood meant being a loyal and reliable partner as well as a friend (Podany 2010, 10, 29). In this system, there were institutionalized practices and rules that were in place. Even though each state in the system had a different language, in the diplomatic correspondences and treaties Akkadian was used. It was the lingua franca, not only in exchanges among the great kingdoms but also between great kingdoms and vassals (Foster and Foster 2009, 93; Podany 2014, 91; Wight 1977, 25). There were two principles governing the relations among the structures of the core and the relations between the core and the periphery; reciprocity and submission (Ragionieri 2000, 47). Rule of reciprocity was applied between the equals (brothers) (48). The reciprocity principle was obsessively stressed; it was sine qua non for starting relationship between the equals (Liverani 2000, 20-21). As to the principle of submission, the vassals could have a relationship only with the great king that they had vassal relationship. They could not have a relationship with other great kings (Ragionieri 2000, 48).

Thus, we can see that the core areas shared a lot; they built manners, styles, mechanisms to cooperate. They even had an identity which every great kingdom adhered. It was a club to which not everyone was accepted, and because of this it was based on exclusion. As far as the relations between the core areas were concerned, we can easily say that the relationship among the core areas was cooperation. This cooperational attitude among the structures (states) of the core was a result of belonging to the core. It is hard to expect such a harmony to take place among the

states that have an independent agenda because of lack of a higher authority. On the other hand, the views that see the conflict among the core areas fail to offer an underlying dynamic that make the core states cooperate. Exclusion theory predicts that because the states are structures of the core or periphery they act in accordance with their role in the core-periphery dichotomy. The core states act in harmony because they are structures of the core that are designed to avoid harming other core structures and to assist in system survival. Cooperation among the core states is a system requirement, not an achievement between states out of their rational assessment of mutual benefit.

5.2.2. Exclusion against the Periphery

From what we said above, it can be inferred that the core areas constituted a club, membership in this club was restricted, and non-members were unequally treated. This shows that the system (the core) had a cooperation (inclusion) relationship rather than a conflictual (exclusion) relationship within itself. However, this does not mean that the core did not have a conflict at all. In fact, the core had a conflict with the periphery. The core as a whole was in conflict with the periphery as a whole. This conflict was formalized with exclusion (unequal treatment) of the periphery. Periphery could not resist to unequal treatment by the core because it was contained. When the core establishes a vassal and suzerain relationship with peripheral areas or exports the structures and practices of the core to the peripheral areas, these areas become contained. A sketch of relations between Egypt and its vassals will show how the periphery was unequally treated, because they were not included in the system. If we call Egypt, Mitanni, Hatti, Kassites and Assyria as great kingdoms, besides them there were vassal states (Podany 2010; Ragionieri 2000; Westbrook 2000; Cohen 2000). The relations between vassal and suzerain were hierarchical, meaning that each belonged to a different side (Ragionieri 2000, 49). The vassal obeyed the superior in this age. There was an agreement between them, which was formalized with an oath (Westbrook 2000, 40). The pledges of vassal were not only binding the vassal king who agreed but also the successor vassal kings (Murnane 2000, 104). This form of agreement between vassal and suzerain was different from the agreements between the core areas. When the core areas reached an agreement, they did not compromise

their sovereignty to the other party; rather they were supposed to submit to a higher authority, the gods. Yet, the vassal treaties were different. They were unilateral compromises by the vassal to the suzerain (Westbrook 2000, 39). Generally, the pharaohs sent goods or money for the goods that they received from the vassals. However, we cannot say that there was a strict reciprocity in the relations between the vassals and the pharaoh (Murnane 2000, 104-105). The vassals who were far or located in the difficult geography were enjoying more autonomy or independence. In their relations, suzerain and distant vassals had more troubles with each other, even though vassals did not question the suzerainty of the great kingdom (James 2000, 114-115).

The suzerains were not even willing to incorporate the vassals into their kingdom. For example, it is documented that Egypt was considering the vassals as outsiders, they were not people of Egypt. Furthermore, Egypt did not try to impose its culture on its sphere of influence or convince them to believe in Egyptian religion. Therefore, there were no significant signs of adoption of Egyptian religion and culture by the vassals (Murnane 2000, 106-107). Rather, what was expected from vassals was satisfaction of certain duties. Vassals were supposed to pay tribute, provide troops, report about the activities of other powers, and consider its suzerain's enemies as their own enemies. The princes of vassals were sent to Egyptian palace to be trained and to be held as hostages. Even though these were the obligations of the vassals, it was not one hundred percent working process. For example, it was known that there were complaints of pharaohs about the vassals being short of meeting their obligations (Murnane 2000, 104; Podany 2010, 160-161). The king of a vassal state would contact to great kings only when it was necessary. They were paying their tribute, stayed loyal to great king, and enjoyed autonomy. The more a vassal state was affluent the more it would contribute to the well-being of the empire in general (Podany 2010, 158).

The documents show that control of vassals by Egypt had various other advantages for Egypt (Cohen 2000). Egypt received most of its intelligence from the Canaan (South West Syria) since one of the duties of the vassal was gathering intelligence (90). Intelligence helped Egypt have better knowledge in its decision-making process. It was not necessarily espionage. Rather most of intelligence was open source. Travelers, diplomats, or any observer could be the source of intelligence (85). The

information from some letters indicate that the vassals were providing information not only about the great kingdoms, but also about the relations between the vassals and great powers and the relations between the vassals, their enmities and rapprochement (91). This is striking in that we can see how the vassals acted in ways that undermined the unity between the peripheral areas. They gathered intelligence about other vassals to pass it to the core areas. A vassal of Egypt would consider other vassals of Egypt as its enemy. These vassals were positioned to maintain the exclusion between the core and the periphery because the core exported its structures to the periphery and contained them. The peripheral states (structures) helped the maintenance of the core-periphery differentiation rather than undermining the exclusionary attitude of core areas against the peripheral areas.

In sum, what we see in the vassal and suzerain relations is that the vassals were contained by the suzerain so that they could not elevate to the status of a core area. Even when the conditions were proper, the suzerain was not willing to incorporate the vassal to the core, which was an indication of the exclusion of vassals. Vassal was a peripheral element in many realms, i.e. political, economic, military etc. With tribute, the vassals transmitted wealth to the core areas; with espionage and provision of troops, they provided military assistance; with submitting to the great king, they sealed the subordinate position of the periphery in relation to the core. These indicate that the exclusion of the periphery from the core meant not only isolation of the peripheral elements from the benefits of the core, but also, predation against the periphery, for extraction of various benefits from the periphery. Hence, similar to the core-periphery relationship of Amorite age, in the Amarna system also the core-periphery relationship was established along the great kingdoms (core) and the vassals (periphery) differentiation. The underlying relationship between the core and periphery was conflict (exclusion vs. exclusion). The core excluded the periphery, by treating it unequally, by using predation on the periphery, by isolating it from the core mechanisms, and by denying benefits to the periphery. Periphery, on the other hand, sought inclusion in the sense that it tried to get what are forbidden to periphery.

The core areas (Egypt, Mitanni, Hatti, Kassites) were distant from each other; between them the vassals were located. Therefore, the core or periphery was non-spatial identities. The status, not the location of the area in question, determined whether an

area belonged to core or periphery. The peripheral areas in the form of the vassals were contained. On the other hand, the people who were not organized along a state were outside of the reach of the core areas. The core areas did not have any projections about the people that remained outside of the reach, mainly the non-urban regions. A peripheral area entered the reach of core areas by exportation of the structures of the core to the periphery and by predation. The contained peripheral areas (mainly people) might have sought inclusion in the core through their structures (namely by the state), but this doomed to fail because what they could get was only approval of the core that the vassal was meeting the expectation of the core area. Indeed, there is evidence showing that some vassals of Egypt tried to convince Egypt that they were useful to help Egypt maintain its core status. Thus, it is difficult to expect that the peripheral areas, through their structures, would be able to elevate to the core status. Only people in periphery, and sometimes people in core, can claim inclusion in the core, and only uncontained people in the periphery (non-urban regions) are able to seek and succeed in inclusion but only temporarily.

5.2.3. Confrontations among the Core Areas

Above, we claimed that the main tendency in intra-core relations was harmony, while relations between the core and periphery were conflictual. The claim that the relations among the core areas were cooperational needs further clarification in the face of many confrontations that took place among the core areas. One way to show that there was harmony in intra-core relations is to stress the actions that showed unity among the core areas. However, as we also did above, focusing on cooperational actions omits the confrontations that took place. One aspect of the relations, namely confrontations, is left outside of the analysis. This way of studying might lead to criticism that not all evidence about the intra-core relations is included in the analysis. Such an assessment would be a strong criticism to the finding of the exclusion theory that core areas collaborate in their relations with each other. In order to face this criticism, we lay down the details of the confrontations between the core areas to see if these confrontations were of conflictual nature or they were dispute resolution mechanisms that helped the maintenance of harmony.

If the confrontations among the core areas are about the disputes over some parts of the territories or resources instead of questioning the core status of core areas, then we will claim that these confrontations were not conflictual but about the dispute resolution. In other words, exclusion theory puts that conflict occurs when two sides disagree about the status of each other. Disagreement about status of each other entails unequal treatment between the two sides. Disputes over some territories or resources, however, implies that disagreeing parties do not have issue with status of each other. It is rather a question of attaining a deal between the two parties about some territories or resources. While we are able to say that there is no conflict between the core areas by looking at the mutual recognition of core status of each other, this does not suffice for we can say that there is a cooperation or harmony between core areas. However, if we can see that core areas always agree on the peripheral status of the peripheral areas and are resolute about keeping the peripheral areas at where they are, then we are able to say that the core areas cooperate with each other. We already have seen that core areas collaborate in keeping the peripheral areas at the periphery and exclude them from the core and benefits that inclusion entails. In this subheading, we will provide an account of the confrontations between the core areas to see if they questioned the core status of each other or not.

The wars between core areas in the Amarna era were not single battles that were fought once. Rather, the wars were waged as a series of battles and confrontations. The first series of wars between core areas started with the Egypt's expansion toward the smaller kingdoms in Syria. This was a result of Egypt's inclusion in the wider Middle Eastern world political relations. Egypt attempted to contain the peripheral areas that would be under its control for preventing the peripheral areas to assert inclusion in the core in the form of invasion toward Egypt. As an extension of this reasoning, first, Thutmose I of Egypt started a campaign against Syrian peripheral states, around 1504 BCE. This was a move that marked the initiation of participation to Syrian and Mesopotamian diplomatic and political affairs, something that Egypt refrained from up until that time (Podany 2010, 131). In these campaigns of the Egyptians, the Mitannians meddled in Egyptian projections and supported the Syrian kingdoms so that it could prevent Egyptian trespassing to peripheral areas under control of Mitanni. However, Thutmose I deliberately refrained from a direct

confrontation with the Mitannians. Thutmose I was surprised when he faced superior military capability at the disposal of vassals of Mitanni which probably deterred him from undertaking a substantial campaign (Bryan 2000, 225). At their initial attack, Egyptians gained some local successes, but they did not stay there, as previously Hittites did not. Rather they plundered and left no treaties behind (Podany 2010, 133).

This Egyptian involvement in the Syrian politics is generally interpreted as a starting point for a great game between Egypt, Hittites and Mitanni over Canaan (southern Syria) area. They say, none of the powers was able to take control of Canaan, while cultural and trade interactions between these powers were taking place through Syria. Canaan was an area where various people from many places came and met since it was located in the area where many of roads, sea and land alike, crossed each other (Cohen 2000, 87-88; Moscati 1960, 106). It is true that the following disagreements between the core areas kept being about the vassals in Syria. However, this did not mean that the core areas had a conflict with each other. Rather, conflict was between the core and the periphery. The core areas did not aim at harming each other. They had disagreements about which vassal would be under control of which core area. Neither the status of the vassal states nor status of the core areas was questioned.

The second Egyptian attack to Syria came under Thutmose III. It took 17 years for Thutmose III to conquer Palestine and coastal areas of Lebanon and Syria. Because Egypt was new to the system/core in the wider Middle East, it faced the presence of other great powers, mainly Mitanni. Mitanni made sure to Egypt that Egypt was not the single core area in the Middle East (Roux 1992, 255). Egypt was able to take control of the kingdoms that were not located at the periphery of Mitanni. These areas resisted to peripheralization by Egypt by forming a coalition, yet Egypt was able to defeat this coalition. Egypt got a lot of spoils from this campaign (Bryan 2000, 237-238). The next war was organized against the kingdoms that were under overlordship of Mitanni (239). However, Mitanni was able to repulse the Egyptian aggression against its periphery. Once again, we see that the disagreement between Egypt and Mitanni was over sharing the vassal kingdoms; they never tried to harm each other. What they did was pacifying the vassals and sharing the benefits of controlling vassals. It can easily be stated that the confrontations between Egypt and Mitanni were

never large-scale, in the sense that they can cause the demise of the core or one of the core areas.

Fight of a core area with another core area about controlling vassals did not have a system-wide effect, namely turning the system upside down. Indeed, we could see the low-profile character of confrontation between Mitanni and Egypt by looking at the attitude of other core areas. While, Egypt and Mitanni were fighting, Hatti and Babylonia stayed neutral (Podany 2010, 161). Hatti and Babylonia continued their friendly relations with the parties involved in the war. Neither did they attempt to upside down the core, nor questioned the secondary position of the peripheral elements. The plunder and devastation that was caused in the peripheral areas during the long wars in the peripheral areas was not an issue among the core areas. What they were interested was a continuous reaffirmation of the status quo between core and peripheral areas. The vassal states of Mitanni and Egypt were next to each other, and Egypt previously did not closely engage with other great powers due to its isolation. When they started to get in contact, Egypt and Mitanni were measuring each other to see the degree to which they could consider each other as a core area; this was the question. The vassals in Syria on the other hand were merely battlegrounds that mattered little.

The third confrontation between Mitanni and Egypt came about when Egypt was content with the status quo between Mitanni and Egypt. The peripheral areas were controlled by the dispersed local garrisons in the strategic locations, and the local rulers paid tribute (Moscati 1960, 108). In this conjecture, Mitanni initiated a new series of wars with the hope that it could have better terms in sharing the peripheral areas with Egypt (Podany 2010, 150). Against this, successor of Thutmose III, Amenhotep II, attempted to oppress the rebellions in Canaan and fought with Mitanni. However, once again Mitanni and Egypt avoided a direct fight (Podany 2010, 165; Bryan 2000, 244-245). After some time of fighting, something new occurred in terms of the world political relations; Mitanni started to send gifts to Egyptian king (Podany 2010, 167). When Mitannian messengers arrived in Egypt this marked the beginning of a new era both in Mitanni-Egypt relations and in the Middle East as a whole (Podany 2010, 168).

Indeed, we start to see in Egyptian sources about the good relationships established between Mitanni and Egypt. Mitanni was now represented among other great allies that had peace with Egypt, such as Hatti and Babylonia (Bryan 2000, 245). Peace replaced the continuous confrontation, and this lasted for several generations (Podany 2010, 169). All the diplomatic manners that were used by the kings in the Amarna age were practices developed in Syrian-Mesopotamian context. Egypt was alien to these practices but it adapted itself to these practices (169). After several visits of messengers between Egypt and Mitanni, they reached an agreement. The first condition of an alliance was equivalence of kings. Pharaoh, to a lot of surprise, accepted the equal status of Mitanni (176). Even though Egyptian kings would want their people to believe that Mitanni, Hatti, and Babylon were their vassals, they knew that it was not the case (168). As we can see, the fights between the core areas ended up with deals that celebrate the friendship and equality among the core areas. The normal condition between them is cooperation; confrontations occur only to determine the terms of the coexistence and cooperation.

The cooperational relationship among the core areas started to gain a formal character. Instead of ambitions toward the vassals of Mitanni, Egypt paid more attention to its peripheral areas in Syria. Thus, the core areas focused on the exclusion of the peripheral areas rather than dealing with other core areas. Thutmose IV of Egypt married to daughter of Artatama of Mitanni, for strengthening the diplomatic relationship between Egypt and Mitanni (Bryan 2000, 250). Under Amenhotep III, the relations of Egypt with other Middle Eastern great kingdoms also were of peace and prosperity character (Bryan 2000, 260-261). A couple of alliances were established. The alliance between Egypt and Mitanni was followed by a series of peace agreements, between Egypt and Hatti, and Hatti and Babylonia. These peace agreements were supplemented with mutual oaths, royal marriages, letters, and ambassadors (Podany 2014, 87). Hence, during the first quarter of the 14th century BCE, the diplomatic approachment between Mitanni and Egypt spread to other kingdoms as well (Roux 1992, 257). Some calls this reproachment as the establishment of a club of great powers, which was is called the core in exclusion theory's conceptualization. This was a diplomatic and political network that linked the core areas on the basis of mutual recognition of each other's rights and obligations.

The core areas were making treaties, sending each other “embassies and gifts, such as gold and gems, weaponry, art objects, and textiles, as well as physicians, princesses” (Foster and Foster 2009, 93).

Thus, we can see that the primary relationship among the core areas is cooperation, which is a result of being the structures of the core (system). Even the wars between the core areas are waged for achieving an agreement about the terms of cooperation. Their wars never escalate to a point where the core status of each other would be terminated. Not only do the warring parties but non-warring parties also are careful in keeping the atmosphere calm among the core areas. The general attitude of the core areas neither harms other core areas nor the core (system) as a whole. While many consider the wars between the great powers as the most challenging action that could have system-wide effects (Modelski 1987, 101), the wars between Mitanni and Egypt do not show such a character. The core areas, rather, act in ways that would contribute to the maintenance of the system (core). In the lack of a system that directs the actions of the structures (polities), there would not be such a harmony among the core areas. The actions of the core areas provide us with the evidence about the system qualities and effects.

At the time the core areas had such peaceful relations with each other, one of the core areas (Hatti) underwent some internal changes that led to the reappearance of confrontations between core areas about the peripheral areas to be controlled in Syria. Another important development was that Mitanni lost its core status to be replaced by Assyria. Not only were the Mitannians hit by the internal troubles, but also the Hittites initiated their attacks against the Mitannians. Hatti had troubles at home since their attack to Babylonia in 1595 BCE (Podany 2010, 169). However, under Suppiluliuma, the Hittites consolidated the central authority’s powers. Once, they recovered, they first attacked Mitanni and the Mitannian vassals, because their dispute subjects with other core areas were frozen. Therefore, Hittites also attacked Egyptian sphere of influence (Roux 1992, 258; James 2000, 112; Moscati 1960, 161). The peace treaty between Hittite and Egypt was broken by Suppiluliuma of Hittite (Podany 2014, 94-95; Van Dijk 2000, 270). We see that, once again, the core areas did not aim at relegating each other to the peripheral status, rather they fought over the peripheral areas, probably most of the time with the resources of the peripheral areas. The Hittites

did not aim to annihilate Egypt or Mitanni, the other core areas. For example, while Mitanni had internal troubles, Hittites did not attempt to conquer the Mitannian core areas. They rather took control of vassals which were dependent on Mitanni and Egypt.

This period where Hatti solved its internal problems coincides with the period where Egypt was quite weak due to the religious reforms of Amenhotep IV (Akhenaten) (Moscatti 1960, 161). Therefore, Egypt remained indifferent to the Hittite attacks for some time. While the Egyptians were indifferent to the Hittite occupations in Syria, Mitanni was unable even to retake the control of its previous vassals due to the civil war within its boundaries (Roux 1992, 259). At this time, Assyria and another small state called Alshe divided Mitanni between themselves. After this, the Assyrian King Ashur-Ubalit I established diplomatic relations with Egypt and Babylonia (260). Babylonia expressed dissatisfaction to Egypt with regard to the rise of Assyria to core status, with no avail (Zaccagnini 2000, 150). Assyria rose to core status, owing to internal troubles of Mitanni and indifference of Egypt due to the religious turmoil in Egypt (Van Dijk 2000, 270). When Suppiluliuma of Hatti, returned from home back to affairs with other states, twenty years later, he wanted to pacify all the vassal resistance capabilities in Syria and to restore Mitannian rule back. Assyria successfully prevented the Hittite attempt and consolidated its core status (Roux 1992, 260-261). We may be surprised that a core area's rule, Mitanni, ended in the Amarna system. However, even though the end of Mitannian rule might be considered a case of a core area to be a vassal area, this is not so. In fact, it was just replaced with another great kingdom, Assyria. The same core area rejoined to the club of great powers, thus to the core. Some (Roux 1992) says that Mitannian rule ended because of Hittite attacks. Yet, Mitannians had internal troubles that had nothing to do with Hittite attacks. They were not able to recover from throne succession problems which ended up with replacement of Mitannian rule with the Assyrian rule. The replacement of one core area with another one just means that the more competent structure (state) replaced the less competent one (Mitanni). The new core area just easily adapted itself to the core status. Thus, our claim that core areas do not cause the relegation of other core areas to peripheral status still holds up.

Due to the indifference of Egypt to its losses, after about nine years, an empire that was unprecedented in size was built by the Hittites. However, this did not mean that Egypt was content with this status quo; rather it was indifferent to developments because it was dealing with internal religious problems. In other words, even though Egypt and Hatti were two core areas, the disagreements between them were not settled yet; not only for Egypt but also for Hatti. Suppiluliuma of Hatti was preparing for a second Syrian war, and Egypt was preparing to take the territories back, especially Qadesh (Podany 2010, 281- 283). After some unusual diplomatic exchanges between Egypt and Hatti, Hatti started a major war in Syria that lasted 5 years. During this period, Syria was a really different place that peace seemed quite fragile; the vassal kingdoms were battlegrounds of the core areas (Podany 2010, 288; Van Dijk 2000, 284). However, this war was not consequential in terms of solving the dispute between Egypt and Hatti. The dispute again was not about the core status of each other, rather about the peripheral areas to be controlled. However, the longevity and repetition of wars between the core areas may distract us from conceiving harmony between core areas. Yet, time and again we see that core areas do not attempt to terminate the core status of each other, no matter how much they fight. Second, their fight is always about the disputes that are marginal to them; i.e., sharing vassals, some territories, or resources. Resolution of these disputes just makes the cooperation and harmony between core areas more obvious. In the following series of wars between Egypt and Hatti, we just see a confirmation of these observations.

Indeed, the five-year war was followed by another series of war between Egypt and Hatti. In the ninth year of Mursili II of Hatti, Egypt attacked Amurru (a vassal kingdom), which again caused the relations between Hatti and Egypt to deteriorate. Both sides held each other's messenger as hostage (Podany 2010, 301-302). The hostility between them lasted for several decades of 13th century BCE even after the death of Mursili II in 1282 BCE (Podany 2010, 303; Moscatti 1960, 163). Ramesses II of Egypt, in his fourth year of kingship, started another campaign in Syria, and took Amurru back. This did not last long since Hittite king Mutawalli reconquered Amurru. The next year, Ramesses renewed his attack but this time his goal was not limited to taking Amurru back. He aimed to face his rival Hatti, which culminated with one of the most famous wars of ancient era, the battle of Qadesh (Van Dijk 2000, 289). The

battle ended in stalemate; the sides struck a truce but Ramesses declined the Hittite peace offer. In the following years, several times Egypt took some of the cities in Syria but when they returned home, these cities resubmitted to Hatti. Finally, in the 21st year of Ramesses's rule they reached peace (Van Dijk 2000, 290). We see that dispute about marginal issues was finally resolved. Following this, the true nature of cooperation between core areas became more apparent.

The wars between Hittite and Egypt show quite a repetitive form, it almost looks like a regular relationship rather than an exceptional one¹⁰. Each side became the suzerain of a vassal back and forth many times. This form of wars continued for tens of years. The most serious war seems to be the Battle of Qadesh that ended up with a stalemate. However, at the end of these wars, finally they achieved peace. As both sides reached to peace, the trade in the area encompassing the Black Sea, Euphrates and Eastern Aegean flourished (Van Dijk 2000, 290). Not only that, the relations between Hatti and Egypt took the form of a true cooperation. As Hittites were good at weaponry technologies they even sent specialists to Egypt for making the Egyptian military technology better (292). The ultimate agreement achieved when Hattusilis III signed a treaty with Egypt (Moscati 1960, 163). Pharaoh took daughter of enemy as his wife and they mutually celebrated the peace (109).

To wrap up, what we see from this review is that, first, even though the great kingdoms (core areas) frequently fought with each other, most of the time the subject of the conflict was disputes over the peripheral areas. The core areas had interest in controlling the vassals (peripheral areas). They fought about them but this never ended up with the elevation of a peripheral area to core status. No matter what, the disagreements between core areas did not lead to the demise of a core area, or emergence of a peripheral area as a new core area. Second, the review of the wars between the core areas reveals that no core region aimed to annihilate the other. Their wars resembled more the actions to prove that they belonged to the core. All wars and fights between the core areas only reaffirmed the core status of areas being structures of the system/core. All wars between the core areas were waged for making sure that

¹⁰ A similar observation is made about the relationships between core areas in Europe, by saying that confrontations between core areas resembled a "routine form of statecraft" (Sofka 2001, 156-157).

each of them was a core area that should be treated equally in world political relations because they were the structures of the system.

Third, the core areas acted in accordance with the predictions of the exclusion theory. In their actions, states did not act according to the interests that were defined per state. Rather, we can say that the polities were only structures in the system in that they were neither able nor willing to change the world political conjecture, where few core areas constituted the core and all remaining areas in the Middle East formed the periphery. While the core had coherency, the periphery lacked this; all the peripheral areas were scattered and there was nothing uniting them. We could see this scattered nature of peripheral areas from their inability to unite and resist to collusion of core areas. This picture emerged not because the core areas (states) wanted this to be so. This picture emerged because there was a system/core that formed in areas that were able to absorb innovation, feed large numbers of people, attract talented people, produce advanced materials, and generate sophisticated military capabilities etc. This system, in turn, utilized the structures to act in ways that would maintain a core periphery division. We could understand the existence of the system only by looking at the differences that it created, and the actions of the structures of the system. When an area as whole or scattered areas together show signs of unity that other areas do not show, then we mention about existence of a system. In our case, a system (core) became visible because the elements of the core had different codes of conducts between themselves and against peripheral elements. The political system emerged in reference to the largest social system possible. In the second half of the 2nd millennium BCE, the Middle East was the largest social system, in the Middle Eastern context. The world political system was the system that dealt with conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance within this largest social system possible. The core polities were the means that helped the system to maintain these roles, as we observe the harmony in their relations with each other and collaboration against the peripheral areas. The states in the system, with none of their actions, including war, instigated a system change; rather they reproduced the system/core and the core-periphery relations.

5.3. The Assyrian Core and Its Periphery

After indirect control of periphery by the core in the Amarna system, an era of direct control started. The Amarna system seems to end because of deteriorating climate, famine, and diseases (Podany 2010; Podany 2014; Kuhrt 2013). This is a different reason from the previous argument that we made by saying that the systems collapsed because of the attacks and intrusion of peripheral people into the core. This time, there was not succession of one system with another one because of interference of people. Rather, the Indo-European system (Amarna) just disappeared because of natural/physical causes; diseases, climate, and famine played the major role. Second, when the Indo-European system collapsed, a new core did not emerge for some time in the Middle East. This is unusual in that in previous systems (i.e., Sumerian, Akkad, Amorite, and Indo-European), the fall of one system and the rise of another one was connected to each other. The rise of a new system was following the demise of the previous system. However, this time, the system fell, and no new system ensued it. There was a dark age following the Indo-European system. The emergence of this Dark Age was attributable to the natural/physical environment, rather than the emergence of a new system.

Indeed, around 1200 BCE, we see a devastation in Syria, Cyprus, and Greece that later replicated in other parts of the Middle East. There are several reasons to think that there was a devastation ruining the region. First, the Hittite Empire almost suddenly disappeared, and left only few small kingdoms that were once under Hittite control (Kuhrt 2013, 3-4). Then Mycenae, Canaanite, Kassite Babylonia were all destroyed and abandoned or burned. Even Egypt collapsed, and Assyria shrank to its smallest size (Podany 2010, 307; Podany 2014, 99). In the east, there were Assur and Elam polities that showed certain degree of stability until 11th century BCE. Egypt shrank to its smallest boundaries ever by losing its control in the South Levant, Sinai, and Nubia. Some of the prominent cities in Levant such as Ugarit and Amurru were either abandoned or destroyed; no settlement appeared in these places anymore (Kuhrt 2013, 4). This devastation emanated probably from deteriorating climate, famine, and diseases. For the next 200 years, small kingdoms dominated the near east until the neo-Assyrian period started in 10th century BCE (Podany 2010, 307; Podany 2014,

99). At this transitional period that lasted for around 200 years, another important development that took place was spread of people called Aramean into the Middle East. These people at times became a major problem for the states of that era. There is no indication implying that these people shared anything more than language. Yet, they have left a clear mark in this era and later. Their language dominated the region until Arabic replaced it in 7th century CE. Thus, unlike the sea people, who did not leave any permanent mark in the region other than the Philistines, the Arameans had an enduring influence in the region (Kuhrt 2013, 15).

After this era of devastation, the first millennium became the era of systems that had a single empire as its structure. These structures were alone capable of meeting the system requirement to fulfill conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions in the region. Therefore, no other state (structure) was allowed to emerge next to the empires. Assyria, Babylonia, Achaemenid Persia, and finally Alexander the Great succeeded each other as being the single structure of the system (Lafont 2001, 41). The characteristic of the previous systems was that the core had multiple states and these core areas applied indirect containment toward the peripheral areas. However, this time, all core-periphery interactions and exchanges took place through direct control. The core used more direct ways of containing the periphery. Second, instead of a multiplicity in the number of the core polities, now there was one single core state. The first of these polities was Assyria, which was the structure to be emulated for several hundred years to come (Bedford 2009, 31; Podany 2010; Podany 2014; Mann 1986; Kuhrt 2013; Watson 1992). Assyria brought entire core and periphery in the Middle East under the same state (Watson 1992, 34; Bedford 2009, 30). This empire/structure, lasting over 300 years (934-605 BCE), was also the most durable one that was ever seen (Bedford 2009, 30; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 22-23). The Assyrians did not seek to establish any mutual and equal relationship with any other state (Podany 2010, 307).

Assyria, as the core structure of the system, applied more sophisticated methods of containing/excluding periphery compared to previous core methods. Coercion as well as other means was utilized. Coercion is especially mentioned in the case of Assyrian approach to the peripheral areas. Rather than economic motives or delegation of authority to the local rulers, military measures were more frequently used. Assyria did

not tolerate independence of any other area that was part of either core or periphery of previous systems. In addition, instead of vassal and suzerain relationship between the core and periphery, now the core (the Assyrian empire) incorporated the vassals into its administrative system. It provincialized the vassal kingdoms, appointed governors of Assyrian origin, and collected taxes instead of tribute from them. This might sound as if all the provincialized areas became the core, but this is not the case because Assyria always kept an Assyrian core that controlled the rest of the empire. There was a sensitivity regarding the core Assyrian cities and nationals, who were in charge of running the empire (Mann 1986; Kuhrt 2013).

The core, in the Assyrian period, not only did include core cities but also the networks of containment/control in the peripheral areas. Thus, the core was not identical with a territorial area. Rather, it established networks that included the core territories (such as Nineveh, Assur, Kalhu, Kilizi, and Arbela), and the networks of administrative and military organization in the peripheral territories. Even though, the core established networks of administration through appointment of elites and stationing military garrisons in the peripheral areas, the periphery was not included in the core. Instead, this network of the administrative and military installments was instrumental in the exclusion of the periphery from the core. The peripheral people and territories were excluded from the core while the Assyrian elites and the military in the periphery were included in the core. The Assyrian core frequently resorted to military pacification of the peripheral areas against their attempts to get outside of the Assyrian orbit by rebelling. Assyria used various methods to leave these attempts futile. Besides using military pacification; such other measures as differentiation of administrative measures per peripheral area, utilization of religion in manipulating peripheral people to submit to the authority of Assyria, applying deportation and relocation policies for dealing with rebellion, and redirecting the surplus created in the periphery to the core areas were all resorted. In the following subheading, we will provide an account of these measures that the Assyrians used in pacifying and excluding the periphery.

5.3.1. The Means Facilitating Exclusion

Because the Assyrian empire was the single core state in the Assyrian system, intra-core confrontations that obscure the core-periphery conflict were absent. We are able to identify the facets of core-periphery relations more clearly. Not only the conflictual interactions but also the means of excluding the periphery are well examined. Here, firstly we are going to lay down the mechanisms that the core used to exclude the periphery. Exclusion not only does mean the unequal representation of periphery in the relations with the core, but also, the predation used on the resources of the periphery and the containment of periphery's capability to assert core status. The core applied policies that rendered exclusion in its relations with the periphery. These policies/mechanisms were employment of military to pacify the inclusion attempts of the periphery, appointment and limitation of powers of the king by the core only, differentiation of level of autonomy given to each peripheral area, appropriation of the resources of the periphery to the core, provincialization of the peripheral areas instead of keeping them autonomous kingdoms, mass-relocation of the rebelling people, and manipulation of the religious symbols to make sure that people submit their consent to the Assyrian dominance etc. These were the mechanisms of exclusion.

To begin with, what gave superiority to Assur to maintain exclusionary core-periphery relationship was its military capacity¹¹ (Podany 2014, 103; Roux 1992, 346). Assyria had troops available in every part of the Empire (both in the core and peripheral areas) at any time. These troops might have been needed to suppress a rebellion or to keep away a sudden attack to Assyrian assets. Besides these, in the local garrisons there was a standing army used for major campaigns (Roux 1992, 347). The army had an advanced capability of communication among the military units as well as a developed intelligence organization (Roux 1992, 348; Watson 1992, 33-34). Intelligence organization helped with gathering information on movements of armies, priorities of peripheral rulers, commercial activities, as well as subjects' intents and their priorities (Watson 1992, 33-34). The Assyrian army made use of the latest technologies, which

¹¹ A core area that owes its core status specifically to military capabilities is something that was seen in modern times too. For example, Russia or the Soviet Union had military capabilities that made it a core area as opposed to the commercial, economic, technological, and naval powers of other core areas such as Britain and the United States (Wohlfort 2001, 219, 232).

accumulated in Mesopotamia over long periods of time (Podany 2014, 104). They combined the iron related innovations with the military patterns of agricultural community which allowed them to come up with new military techniques (Mann 1986, 236). The Assyrians were the first settled group that utilized horse in wars, and they had significant siege capabilities (Watson 1992, 33; Roux 1992, 349; Podany 2014, 105). Even though, Assyria (the core) had significant military capabilities, it was well aware of the costs of military expeditions. Hence, their first preference was not to resort to military means in applying the exclusion policies. They would first try to use promises and threats, then encourage others to play the role Assyrian army would carry out. The military expedition was the last resort (Watson 1992, 34). Yet, the military superiority of Assyria gave it the capacity to deny equality to the peripheral areas and to pacify any inclusion attempt of the peripheral areas. The detailed account of these military encounters would be provided in the following subheading.

The second mechanism of exclusion was the role played by the core in appointment process of king. The king had a central role in concentration of core duties in the core of the empire. The peripheral areas had no role in appointment of king and restriction of his powers. Officially the peripheral areas were part of the empire; the king was the king of peripheral areas as well. However, a position that had no equivalent, the king, was determined, trained, and restrained by elites of core areas only (Kuhrt 2013, 185, 187-190; Roux 1992, 339; Köroğlu 2006, 183; Bedford 2009, 36). The peripheral areas had no say in this regard. Therefore, we can say that the role of king in Assyrian society helped with sustenance of core-periphery inequality, namely the exclusion relationship. He was positioned in the core; he descended from a major family of the Assyrian origin; and he was nominated, trained, and restrained by the Assyrian core elements. This makes us have no doubt about the idea that king would be on the side of the core as opposed to the side of periphery. If the king enjoyed vast authorities, and he had no responsibilities against the peripheral areas at any form, then his powers were utilized for imposition of core's will on the periphery. The imposition of will of the core on the periphery meant that the periphery was contained and shaped by the core in a way that the periphery could not act independently. In case the peripheral areas obtained organized inclusion capability they would claim equal status to the

peripheral areas. This was prevented by the core, for example, by denying any role the periphery in appointment of the king.

The third mechanism of exclusion was predation over the resources of the periphery. The core designed the administration and processing of land to enable flow of surplus from the periphery to the core. The core took measures to increase the productivity, bringing raw materials for using the labor effectively, and diminishing the costs of controlling the periphery (Bedford 2009, 47-48). Owing to its military power and expeditions, Assyria was able to bring a lot of wealth to the core; i.e., means of new architectural structures, labor force to be used in construction, animals, ornaments and exotic material (Kuhrt 2013, 184). All this booty made core areas in the Assyrian empire to be able to access to previously expensive and rare things (185). Besides redirecting the peripheral surplus to the core, some part of the surplus would be allocated for the maintenance of the local government (Bedford 2009, 38), which was instrumental in implementing the exclusionary policies of core. In other words, the core's interventions in the economy of the empire were designed in such a way that they helped with fulfillment of the core's needs. The rest of the empire, the periphery, was just forced to contribute to the core's needs. It can also be said that the engagement of the periphery to produce what the core needs distracts the periphery from seeking inclusion, which can be considered an accomplishment of the containment strategy of the core.

The fourth mechanism of exclusion was applying differentiated administration forms and differentiated level of autonomy toward the peripheral areas. The peripheral areas exhibited different traits, so was the administrative and autonomy policies of the core. This differentiation of policies helped the core maintain exclusion. When a less costly and less direct way of control was proper, Assyria would not resort to more costly and direct ways of control. The aim was to optimize the means of exclusion. In this respect, the periphery of Assyrian core was layered. It was comprised of provincialized non-Assyrian city-states (i.e., the polities on trade routes toward the Mediterranean Sea), non-provincialized vassal states (i.e., the Phoenician states, such as Tyre, Sidon and Byblos) and free entities (i.e., Phrygia, and Urartu). In the provincialized regions, there was a capital city. The king would visit these provinces in his travels. The taxes were collected in these provinces and some of the taxes and other revenues would be

spent for the province, and the other parts would be sent to the palace. These provinces were also expected to provide military assistance in case of war, to maintain roads, and to provide security to the roads and caravans (Kuhrt 2013, 201-202; Bedford 2009, 38, 57-58). While the Syrian-Palestinian kingdoms were provincialized as they caused troubles many times, the same system was not applied to Phoenician states and Babylonia (Bedford 2009, 57-58). Babylonia had a special status, even though it was causing a lot of trouble, it was not provincialized. Provincialization was a more direct way of controlling adopted against the kingdoms that resisted to exclusion and predation policies of Assyria. This was different from the vassal-suzerain relationship that was seen throughout the ancient Middle Eastern world political relations (47-48). Provincialization was an indication of a higher level of containment of the peripheral areas. In the provincialized regions, the use of force was inherent rather than being resorted frequently, the officials of Assyrians were directly appointed as local rulers (42). While the population in the provincialized cities and their surrounding were paying taxes, the payments of other dependent areas were tribute (35-36). In addition to these, beyond the Assyrian control, there were other peripheral elements that were not included in the administrative organization of Assyria (i.e., Urartu and Phrygia), but were parts of the world political relations of the Middle East (Watson 1992, 38). All in all, these differentiated policies helped with adaptation of proper means to pacify the inclusion capabilities of the peripheral areas and to maintain exclusion in the form of denying equality to the periphery and the predation for appropriation of the resources of periphery.

The fifth mechanism that the core adopted against periphery to maintain the exclusion through mutilating periphery's capacity to seek inclusion was mass deportations of the people. These demographic policies helped with exclusion through impoverishment of people by disassociation of them and their land. As people were impoverished, their capability to seek inclusion was reduced. The deportations were resorted both to deal with the fragmentation trends and to meet arising economic needs. The relocation of people created communities formed of many identities from different places. Once these communities emerged, it was possible to move these people from one place to another when the economic conditions (i.e., land cultivation) or rebellion cases necessitated. The deportations seem to be an invention of Assyrians,

at least when their scale and frequency considered (Bedford 2009, 56; Kuhrt 2013, 208). People would not be individually deported, rather they would be deported as groups so they could work the land they moved in (Kuhrt 2013, 203; Bedford 2009, 34). When deportations were resorted, for example, Levant people would be forced to settle in Med region and people of Med region would be forced to move in Levant (Kuhrt 2013, 207). When a rebellion broke out, the entire population that joined to the rebellion would be deported (Watson 1992, 34). These policies facilitated the Assyrian core to minimize the peripheral areas' capacity to object to the exclusion and claim equality.

The sixth mechanism of exclusion in the Assyrian era was manipulation of religious symbols. For example, when the Assyrians deported the peripheral people, the local gods were also relocated, by moving the statue of city god (Bedford 2009, 55). When the Assyrians relocated the gods of rebelling or resisting clients for care they claimed that the local deity was calling the Assyrian king to punish the peripheral people. People of deity that was relocated must have followed the deity to the new place where the deity was placed (53). Without deporting the people, the capture of the statue of city god had the meaning that god abandoned the city, which should be interpreted as capture of city by the foreigners. In this vein, when the gods returned home this meant that Assyria and the revolting peripheral area reached an agreement. This agreement would be achieved as a result of long and complicated negotiation. With the agreement, not only the statue of the god but also the personnel in the service of the statue were returned by the Assyrians. This was supposed to mean that the local god would now strive to help with the Assyrian king, as the Assyrian king enabled it to return home (Kuhrt 2013, 177). Thus, Assyrians by utilizing the deportation and religious beliefs impoverished people in the periphery for preventing them to gain an independent capability to seek inclusion. If the rebelling people were not forced to deport they could continue to seek inclusion by mobilizing other people, which would be a challenge against the exclusion policies of Assyrian core. Disassociation of the people from their lands deprived people of their capabilities at their lands. When they were detached from their lands they were impoverished, which helped with consolidation of exclusionary relations. Religion and religious symbols also were utilized in accordance with these policies.

In sum, we could see that the Assyrian core had various means to exclude the peripheral areas. The exclusion of the peripheral areas had several meanings. Exclusion first meant the denial of equality in independence to the peripheral areas. The peripheral areas could not claim equal status and rights to the core areas. Second, exclusion meant limitation of the capabilities of the periphery to claim equal status (inclusion). Finally, exclusion entails the predation by core areas over the resources of the peripheral areas. For realizing these objectives, the core had means enumerated above. These means restrained, forced, and manipulated the peripheral areas. The peripheral areas were included in the administrative organization of Assyria. In this respect, Assyrian system differs from previous systems where the periphery was outside of the administrative organization of the core. This administrative organization of Assyria makes it hard to imagine a core-periphery dichotomy in the Assyrian world political relations. However, this administrative organization was part of the Assyrian capabilities to adopt more sophisticated methods of exclusion. Few Assyrian cities constituted the core of the world political relations of the Middle East and the rest of the Middle East formed the periphery. The Assyrian military superiority and its manipulative administrative, demographic, and economic strategies enabled it to maintain exclusion in relation to the periphery. However, these strategies of exclusion never went without objection from the periphery. In fact, periphery never fell short of seeking inclusion, even though it never succeeded in it. Now it is time to see the way inclusion attempts of the periphery unfolded and the way core suppressed these inclusion attempts.

5.3.2. Inclusion Search of Peripheral Areas

The Assyrian core, in its relations with a diverse periphery continuously fought with the peripheral elements, because they continuously claimed inclusion in the core. The aim of the inclusion search was getting equal status to the periphery, in other words, including themselves in the core. However, the Assyrian core was excluding the peripheral areas by treating them unequally. Assyria claimed a privileged position as opposed to peripheral subordinate position of the periphery. This privileged position enabled Assyria to have the right to decide what the reasons for conflict and cooperation were, namely the key functions of a system. The core structures (polities)

not only did decide what the reasons for conflict and cooperation were but also, they decided how these would be handled. This was a privilege that was particular to Assyrian core and was denied to the peripheral elements. The core decided who would be the partners in the conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance in the region (the Middle East). Those who did not take part in fulfillment of these functions were peripheral elements; they were subject to what the core decided about these functions. The peripheral areas, on the other hand, were in continuous struggle to be taken as equal partners in conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance. This was a result of the search for inclusion. However, Assyria denied the inclusion or equal partnership to the peripheral areas. Instead of mutual participation, Assyria dictated the definition of conflict and cooperation, and the way these functions would be handled.

In the Assyrian system, the primary reason for conflict was peripheral attempts to seek inclusion; all other conflicts were frozen, and the attempts for inclusion were numerous. The peripheral areas continuously rebelled, quit paying the tribute, forged alliances against the Assyrians, and attempted territorial expansion. Assyrian core always took these attempts as a reason for war, which should be interpreted as an attempt to exclude the peripheral areas. In almost all inclusion attempts, Assyrians frustrated peripheral areas; it did not matter whether the peripheral area in question was a province of Assyria, or a vassal of Assyria, or an independent state such as Urartu. None of the inclusion attempts succeeded to grant peripheral areas to be treated as a core area. In fact, this was also a confirmation of the fact that there was no area entitled to be called as core in this period, other than Assyrian core. Because there was no other core area in the Middle East at this period, Assyria excluded almost the entire periphery in the Middle East. Excluded areas were treated unequally. Wars between the core and periphery were about this inequality. In these wars, most of the time, the peripheral areas started the war with Assyria. They opposed the single and dominant status of Assyria but all failed in their opposition. Therefore, we can say that in the Assyrian era, it was wars between Assyrian core and peripheral areas that were decisive for deciding whether an area would be a core or peripheral element. Below we will provide an account of the wars between the Assyrian core and peripheral areas that showed the continuous struggle between the core and the periphery, where peripheral elements strived to be considered equals to Assyrians.

Assyria, by fighting them, tested their capability to be a core area, but in each of the tests, the peripheral areas failed in either defeating or forcing Assyria to treat them equally.

Following a dark age, in which talking about the existence of a core and core-periphery relationship was not possible, Assyria reemerged as the core area in the Middle East to leave the rest of the region as periphery. Assyria got core status owing to its military superiority. It had been the single core structure that was instrumental in realization of functions of the core/system. The system/core was able to rely on the Assyrian military capability to resolve the conflicts in the Middle East and maintain cooperation. The military superiority in Assyria made it different from other parts of the Middle East to emerge as a system. Owing to this differentiation, a communicative capability developed in the Assyrian core, and it allowed the formation of a core in a conjecture where there was no core. Concentration of superior military capability and communication possibility in some cities surrounding Assur allowed them to form the Assyrian core to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Middle East, which means that a system/core emerged in relation to the peripheral areas. The Assyrian state and military/diplomatic organization came into being as structures that supported the Assyrian core system. From that moment on, the Assyrian state and diplomatic/military organization gained a privileged status compared to other states, militaries, and diplomatic organizations. Other states, militaries and diplomatic organizations were not able to define the causes of conflict, cooperation, and regulation. If a conflict or cooperation was to take place, this was decided by the Assyrians. Assyrian state did not allow the inclusion of peripheral elements in determining what constitutes the causes of a conflict and cooperation as well as in which ways they should be handled. Below we will see that there was a continuous discontent among the non-Assyrian peripheral areas about this exclusionary policy of the Assyria. Indeed, after the rule of Assur-dan (934-912 B.C.E.), Adan-Nirari II (911-891 B.C.E.), and II Tukulti-Ninurta (890-884 B.C.E.), peripheral areas started acts of resistance, rejection, and independence. Therefore, Ashurnasirpal II's rule witnessed the beginning of cases of conflict between Assyrian core and its periphery.

When Ashurnasirpal II came to power, he arranged several expeditions toward to the north, especially to suppress two revolts in Bit-Zamani. He then attacked the areas in

Zagros Mountains and three cities in the south. In all of these actions, he achieved significant successes. In the south, he defeated Babylonia over suzerainty of at least one area. In the west, two of the states; Bit-Adini and Carchemish paid tribute and also contributed to his army. Besides, he settled Assyrian colonies to Tushhan in mid-Anatolia (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 27; Kuhrt 2013, 138). Thus, the first attempts by the peripheral areas to free themselves from the Assyrian exclusionary policies such as imposition of tribute, relegation to a subordinate political status etc. were halted by the Assyrian core. This theme of peripheral inclusion attempts and opposition of core had many other examples.

Ashurnasirpal's son, Shalmaneser III, also faced significant peripheral inclusion attempts, especially in the west. Most of the polities in the west were connected to each other in terms of the commercial network that included Egypt and Phoenician polities. All these polities felt that they were going to be excluded from this commercial network in the sense that Assyria would be dominant side. Therefore, they came together to fight against Assyria twice (Kuhrt 2013, 142-143; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 28; Bedford 2009, 42). In the first alliance, there were Bit-Adini, Carchemish and several neo-Hittite states, but they were defeated by Assyria. As a result, they either paid tribute or they were destroyed. The second alliance was established among states in the west and the south (i.e., Hamath, Damascus and Israel), and it seems that the forces they built and those of Assyria were quite large. The alliance succeeded in the first battle, but this battle had little political returns. After about five years, they fought again, and this time it seems that Shalmaneser defeated the alliance (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 28). Even though the victory took a long time (853-841 B.C.E.), Assyria was finally able to control the trade routes (of especially iron and silver) to Anatolia and Cilicia, as well as both banks of Euphrates (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 28, 30; Kuhrt 2013, 28, 144). As Israel held the leadership in these alliance attempts, Assyria forced the Israeli population to move from where they lived. In their place, Assyria brought Arabs and Zagros region people (Kuhrt 2013, 114-116). Thus, we can see that the peripheral areas in Syria were not content with being excluded in trade relations. Therefore, they formed alliances for elevating into a core status. However, the Assyrian core was able to defeat them,

proving that the peripheral areas did not have enough military power to be included in the core/system.

Another peripheral area that sought inclusion, in the sense that being an independent area claiming equal political status was Urartu. It was situated around the Lake Van and was expanding by controlling more and more territories in the periphery of Assyria. By the era of Shalmaneser III (Assyria), in Anatolia, Assyria figured out that it should take measures against the inclusion attempts of Urartu. Therefore, Shalmaneser III arranged several expeditions toward areas where Urartu presence was gaining intensity. However, the fights with Urartu at some point were locked, and no significant progress was recorded (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 28-29; Kuhrt 2013, 144). As an environmental element, Urartu sought to elevate to core status as an independent entity, but the Assyrians were not content with this. Therefore, they fought with Urartu, even though no significant result was achieved (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 29; Bedford 2009, 42; Kuhrt 2013, 145). While compared to other peripheral areas, Urartu enjoyed a higher level of independence; Assyria was not content with the rise of Urartu to a core status. Assyria did not tolerate Urartu as a structure that would have a say in conflict resolution and cooperation functions in the wider Middle East.

Toward to the end of Shalmaneser's rule, when his brother organized a revolt for taking the throne, a significant revolt took place in Assyria. Taking advantage of this weakness of Assyria, some peripheral states in the west stopped sending their tribute and declared independence from Assyria, thus, the peripheral areas never missed an opportunity to get inclusion. However, under the rule of Shalmaneser's son Shamshi-Adad V (823-811 B.C.E.), Assyria suppressed the revolt and pacified the peripheral areas' claims (Kuhrt 2013, 146; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 30; Bedford 2009, 42-43). Under Shamshi-Adad V, the relations with Babylonia also gained exclusion vs. inclusion character, whereas previously Babylonia was treated as an equal to Assyria. The new Babylonian king attempted to forge an alliance with Elam, the Chaldeans, and the Arameans against Assyria, but Shamshi-Adad V was able to defeat this coalition and abort the subsequent attempts for forging an alliance. Shamshi-Adad took the Babylonian king as hostage, and declared himself as the "king of Sumer and Akkad". In the ensuing 12 years, Babylonia had no king (Kuhrt 2013, 261, 147;

Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 30). Thus, we see that Babylonia was also relegated to a peripheral status, and the attempt of Babylonia to regain core status by allying with other peripheral areas was upset by Assyria.

By the time Assyria was dealing with the inclusion attempts of peripheral areas in Babylonia and Syria, Urartu continued to spread its influence on the way to be a core area which would have a say in conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance issues in the wider Middle East. Assyria started a new mission to undermine Urartu's inclusion attempts. Under Shamshi-Adad V, Assyria entered Western Iran (the Meds, the Mannaeans, and Hubushkia), to gain control in several key areas in the sphere of influence of Urartu, while Urartu was spreading its control in other areas, i.e., Southeastern Anatolia. When Assyria continued its activities toward curbing Urartu's inclusion attempts, it also expanded the scope of excluded areas. In line with this, Shamshi-Adad arranged expeditions in the area between Elam and Babylonia in order to force Persians and Meds to pay tribute to Assyria. Thus, he forced more peripheral areas into submission. Toward to end of his reign, Shamshi-Adad penetrated into the Chaldean territories in the south without any trouble. In the southwest, in Syria, Shamshi-Adad defeated two coalitions (Arpad and Damascus) within the span of ten years. Following this, all polities in Syria offered tribute to Assyria (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 30-31).

One might wonder what was the motivation of Assyria in keeping the peripheral areas excluded and expand the areas excluded from near abroad to remote parts of the Middle East. It should be clarified that it was not the Assyrian ambitions or plans that instigated the Assyrian attitude to exclude the peripheral areas and expand the controlled areas. Rather, it was the result of system requirements. Assyria was the single core area in the Assyrian system. If Assyria was a state that had its own projections about world political relations, the logical way for Assyria would not be to become the single core area that handle all conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions by itself. Rather, the logical way of action would be to act like a state among other states, not to exclude some areas and include others. Having projections to decide exclusion and inclusion in the regional level are not the projections of so-called autonomous states, these are system projections that are dictated to the core areas. This system is world political system that came into being

to meet the conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance needs arisen in the Middle East as a region. Assyria was not a so-called autonomous entity, rather it was the structure/state that could handle conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance needs in the region, as it was designed by the system. Assyria was the state that was designed as the core areas by the system because the core areas in Assyria had military, administrative, and manipulative powers. Thus, when we interpret the Assyrian expansion and its actions to exclude more and more areas in the Middle East from a system perspective, it is easier to make sense of these actions. The structure of the system (Assyrian state) undertook conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions in the regional level, because the system that was emerged in the region necessitated so. Otherwise, regional level developments cannot be explained with the outlook of a specific area (Assyrian core) in the region. The reason why Assyria was the single core area that carried out functions of the system was that no other area was competent at this era to share the core status with Assyria, as it was seen in many wars between Assyria and other areas. In all the wars that Assyria opposed the peripheral inclusion attempts, the peripheral areas failed to keep up with the Assyrian capabilities. Therefore, what Assyria did in opposing the peripheral areas and spreading the exclusion capacity of Assyria was identical with what system projected.

As we have seen above, the conflict between Assyrian core and the peripheral areas was continuous, and it had many other conflicts to be accounted. Following Shamshi-Adad V, under Adad-Nirari III (811-783 B.C.E.), Urartu was still engaging in activities that aimed to have a say in wider Middle East. Besides, some Syrian polities stopped sending their tributes as a move to challenge the exclusion Assyria put in place. In some places there were revolts developing, and some local governors gained a significant maneuvering capacity (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 31). We see that the peripheral areas never missed an opportunity to free themselves from the containment/exclusion of the core. They always objected to the containment, and when they found a chance to free themselves, they took advantage of it; hoping that they would gain equal status with the core areas. These inclusion activities of the peripheral areas continued under Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser III. Tiglath-Pileser period saw another round of Assyrian opposition to the inclusion attempts of

peripheral areas. When he was ruling, some of the states in Syria and Southeastern Anatolia forged an alliance against Assyria, including Arpad, Urartu, and several neo-Hittite states. Tiglath-Pileser defeated this alliance and annexed Arpad. A few members of this coalition later formed another alliance. Others (including Israel) remained neutral, which they later regretted since Assyria annexed many of these states after the second victory. Tiglath-Pileser III also fought against Urartu and defeated it significantly, instigating retreat of Urartu. In Western Iran, while Elam and Babylonia were quiet, Tiglath-Pileser fought against many other tribes (including Meds) and forced them to pay tribute (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 32-33; Kuhrt 2013, 155). The Assyrian core once again succeeded in keeping the peripheral areas outside of the core. It did not matter whether the peripheral areas formed alliances or they acted independently. The military superiority of the Assyrians helped with them exclude non-Assyrian areas and treat them unequally.

During Tiglath-Pileser III rule, Babylonia became an area that was one of the main sources of inclusion attempts. In the era prior to Tiglath-Pileser III, North Babylonia's occupation by Assyria caused a shift in the source of the domestic political support in Babylonia from the north toward to the south. As a result of this, the Chaldeans were able to participate in the Babylonian politics directly. Indeed, after the death of Adad-Nirari III in Assyria, a Chaldean was able to capture the Babylonian throne (around 770 B.C.E.) with the assistance of Elam, by taking advantage of the weakness of Assyria. The struggle between the Chaldean (Babylonia) and Elam alliance and Assyria was centered on fertile and strategic lands. Tiglath-Pileser III, in 732 B.C.E., started a comprehensive program against the Chaldeans. Defeating the Chaldeans, he took the disputed regions between Assyria and Babylonia under his control, forced the Chaldean people to pay tribute, declared himself the king of Babylonia, and used the title of the king of Sumer and Akkad (Kuhrt 2013, 154-155, 264, 268; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 33). Thus, the first comprehensive Babylonian inclusion attempt was aborted by Assyria. Assyria imposed tribute on both Babylonia and the Chaldeans and reconfirmed the peripheral status of these areas. The Assyrian exclusion activities continued under Shalmaneser V (726-722 BCE). The Assyrian influence spread to the mountains in the east, and the polities on trade routes toward the Mediterranean Sea were provincialized. Many other minor inland and coastal states as well as many Arab

groups gave loyalty oath to Assyria and started to pay tribute. Besides, Urartu's influence was significantly pushed back (Kuhrt 2013, 156).

However, these harsh activities of Assyria never guaranteed the exclusion that they applied against the periphery to be saluted by the peripheral areas. Indeed, when Sargon II (721-705 B.C.E.) usurped the throne, which spurred internal troubles in Assyria, many peripheral areas of the empire took advantage of this; they manipulated and deepened the crisis (Kuhrt 2013, 268; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 35; Bedford 2009, 47). In Babylonia, Syria, Egypt, Urartu, and Phrygia, all peripheral areas were involved in one or another form of seeking inclusion. One of the core areas that took advantage of the crisis was Babylonia under the Chaldean Marduk-Apla-Iddina, who freed Babylonia from Assyrian control with the assistance of Elam (Kuhrt 2013, 268; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 35). When the Chaldean king came to throne in Babylonia, he strived to gain the support of people by preserving the privileges that the people held and by restoring the temples. He claimed that when Marduk, the Babylonian god, left the city, which was taken by Assyrians, he chose him as the King of Babylonia among the entire human being on earth (Kuhrt 2013, 267). He forged coalitions with Elam, the Aramean and the Chaldean tribes, people of northern Arabia, and even with some areas in Syria. Assyria, to oppose this inclusion attempt of Babylonia, sent an army to confront the coalition between Elam and Babylonia, but it seems that the coalition was able to defend against Assyria (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 35). Babylonia from this moment on became a strong peripheral area that significantly challenged Assyrian core.

Then, Assyria had to deal with another coalition in the west, this time including Egypt, together with Arpad, Samaria, Damascus and other kingdoms in Syria and Palestine. Thus, the tradition of forming coalition to be included in the core revived in the West of Assyria. However, Assyria was able to defeat this coalition. Egypt retreated and Assyria stationed a garrison at the border (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 35). Following this, Assyria attempted to deal with Urartu and Phrygia which were also seeking inclusion. Assyria fought with Phrygia and Urartu separately, first with Phrygia and its allies, and then with Urartu. Urartu and Phrygia were not able to unite even though they wanted to do so. Both of them were defeated. Urartu was heavily defeated, and many people from Urartu were forced to move to Syria. After this,

Sargon II captured Babylonia back in 710 BCE. He claimed that people invited him to be the king, and he expelled Merodach-Baladan. Alongside this successful oppression of inclusion attempts, Sargon was able to isolate and exclude Elam from the affairs of the Middle East. This might have worsened the situation of Elam and accelerated its disintegration process which started in the 7th century BCE (Kuhrt 2013, 269-270; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 36-37). While Assyria was able to prevent this round of inclusion attempts from various peripheral areas in different fronts, Babylonia was still the area that preserved its capability to challenge Assyria to become a core area.

During Sennacherib's rule in Assyria, some revolts took place in Babylonia that were at times supported by the appointed kings as well as Elam. Against these revolts, Assyria sometimes obtained decisive victories, but sometimes the results were ambivalent. The troubles in Babylonia never completely quelled (Kuhrt 2013, 271-274). Except one expedition, all of Sennacherib's expeditions were arranged toward Babylonia (Kuhrt 2013, 270). At the end, Sennacherib destroyed the city of Babel and removed their gods from the city, until the end of his kingship. However, toward the end of his kingship, he returned their gods and sent slaves for renovating their temples (694-681 BCE) (Kuhrt 2013, 271-274; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38). One thing that Sennacherib applied was abandoning the double kingship of Assyria and Babylonia. Rather he appointed his son as the king to Babylonia (Kuhrt 2013, 270). This meant that Babylonia turned out a province of Assyria (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 37-38).

We can see that the inclusion attempts of the peripheral elements never stopped. Whenever, they found an opportunity they sought gaining independence from the containment of the core. Against this, the core areas were continuously alert about any inclusion attempt. The reason why the periphery sought independence was that it would help them have equal status to the core areas. The containment means that the core restrained periphery through tribute, military garrisons, deportations, economic reorganization, local rulers and administrative officials from Assyria. These means served to the exclusion of the peripheral areas from equal participation in the system/core. However, the periphery was never content with this; it never internalized the exclusion as something unquestionable. The peripheral polities in Syria, Urartu,

Phrygia, Babylonia, and Elam always discovered ways of objecting to Assyria's core status as a single state, even though none of their attempts ended up with inclusion. Assyria never treated them as equals, therefore all conflict was centered on the core and periphery conflict; all other conflicts were frozen. This was the central theme of world political relations in the Assyrian era. Even though the general definition of Assyrian dominance in the peripheral areas is called as control in many sources, control is not a concept that reflects the true nature of the relations. Rather inclusion and exclusion are more proper terms to be used. When Assyria defeated a peripheral area, stationed military, and installed administrative personnel; this was not control of the region because the aim of control is ambivalent. However, when we say that the aim of defeating a peripheral area was exclusion, we not only do clarify that the nature of relationship was asymmetric but also, we can see that core aimed exclusion of the peripheral area from participation in the world political relations. On the other hand, the periphery, by seeking inclusion, wanted to participate in world political relations by having a say about the reasons of the conflict and cooperation, and the way these issues would be handled. The periphery could achieve inclusion only if it could remove the Assyrian containment tools. However, Assyria not only did oppose this but also it succeeded in aborting the attempts of the periphery to be included. Yet, this machination of relations between core and periphery was going to change gradually at the face of the appearance of a new peripheral element, Meds, in world political relations of the Middle East.

Babylonia was going to deepen its claim to be a core area against Assyria, and this seriously weakened Assyrian capabilities. For example, in between the Babylonian campaigns, Sennacherib once attempted to start the conquest of Egypt, but because of Babylonian inclusion attempts, Assyria was not able to force Egypt into submission (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 37-38). The Babylonian inclusion search was not going to recede, in contrast, it would develop into something that Assyria could not avert, therefore, lead to end of Assyrian core status later. The next Assyrian king Esarhaddon (680-669 BCE) also had to deal with several Chaldean revolts, Elam interventions, and the Babylonian collaborators of Elam. The whole situation was dire (Kuhrt 2013, 275; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38). Unable to quell the Babylonian inclusion attempts, in fact, Assyria compromised in terms of Babylonia's status.

Under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, the reconciling activities ended up with the returning Marduk (Babylonian god) to Babylonia (Kuhrt 2013, 276). The growing inclusion potential that Meds posed at the time made Assyria to not only compromise with Babylonia but also with Elam and Chaldeans (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38). These compromising policies of core (Assyria) aimed to prevent the unification of peripheral areas against Assyria, because the contribution of Meds would make this coalition in the East to succeed in inclusion.

As Egyptian capabilities were not as substantial as they were before (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38), and Egypt was pretending like a core area; Assyria strived to test core-like role that Egypt played in some parts of the Middle East, especially in parts of Palestine and Syria. As a natural consequence of weakness of Egypt, Assyria defeated Egypt, without a protracted struggle. After defeating the Egyptians, the Assyrians appointed governors, administrators, port administrators, inspectors, and commanders to offices in Egypt. The process of pacification was intensively carried out. Esarhaddon was not able to finish the pacification process and installation of a local government in Egypt in his life time. When he was ruling, no local administration that could survive without the support of standing army was possible to install (Kuhrt 2013, 336; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38). On the other hand, there were pockets of resistance in Egypt with the hope that they could refrain from relegation to a peripheral status with low level of autonomy in the periphery of Assyria. Indeed, after the death of Esarhaddon in Assyria, a Kushite ruler (Taharqa) in Egypt took advantage of his death and captured Memphis, then encouraged some of the small kings in the delta to revolt against Assyria. Esarhaddon's successor Assurbanipal (668-635 BCE) defeated Taharqa in 667 BCE, took control of Memphis, and suppressed the revolt in delta. Taharqa's successor Tantamani once again attempted to confront the Assyrian exclusion regime and to conquer Egypt. In 664 BCE, Assurbanipal repelled Tantamani, captured and destroyed the city of Teb, which Tantamani fled to. This marked the end of the Kushite rule in Egypt, which was followed by the Sais Dynasty (XXVI) (Kuhrt 2013, 336, 338). The difficulties that Assyria had in terms of logistics constrained it to be able directly to contain Egypt, therefore it installed a dynasty that would not question the peripheral position of Egypt (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38).

As Assyria conquered and relegated Egypt to a peripheral area, one might think that Assyria reached to a position where no peripheral area would be able to seek inclusion or challenge Assyria's core status. On the contrary, there were new groups appeared in the periphery of Assyria, which were acting like they had rights and capabilities to act independently. These groups appeared in the north and north east. Cimmerian tribes were challenging Assyrian core status by bandwagoning to Lydia as well as Syrian states. In the northeast, Meds were gaining upper hand in some areas. The independent situation of these loose federations of people finally found allies in the east and south east, namely Babylonia and Elam (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 38). Apparently, the Assyrian policy to quell Babylonia with minor changes in its status did not stop the Babylonian search for core status. First, Elam took advantage of Assyrian engagement in Egypt and attacked Babylonia in 665 BCE. They were pushed back. Nine years later, now Elam assisted to the Assyrian appointed king of Babylonia for his rebellion, together with Arab princes, the Chaldeans, and the Aramean groups (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 39; Kuhrt 2013, 277). Assyria first suppressed the rebellion in Babylon in 650 BCE, and then it defeated Elam and left it in devastation, from which Elam never been able to recover (Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 39). However, Babylonia and Meds were still formidable peripheral areas that sought inclusion.

For some time, a period of low tension between Assyria and Babylonia ensued, where Babylonia improved its internal conditions and enjoyed more autonomy. On the other hand, Meds formed a significant kingdom which was constituted of tribes (Kuhrt 2013, 278; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 39-40). After this period of calmness, Babylonia and Meds came up with comprehensive and successful inclusion attempt against Assyria. In 616 BCE, Babylonia was strong enough to attack areas beyond Babylonian boundaries in Assyria. They took some cities of Assyria and guaranteed tribute from them. In their attacks, they deported some people, pillaged the resources, and displaced some religious symbols. The Egyptians and the Assyrians came together to fight against Babylonia, but they were not able to defeat it (Kuhrt 2013, 219; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 40).

As Assyria was not able to suppress the inclusion attempt of the peripheral Babylonia, in 615 BCE, Babylonia attacked the Assyrians in the east of Tigris and forced them

to retreat to Zap River. Some two months later Babylonians were forced by the Assyrians to retreat; the Assyrians laid siege on Babylonians at Takrit. Yet, at this moment, Med army arrived in assistance of Babylonia, which cut the road that provided east west connection of Assyria; the Assyrian center was under direct threat (Kuhrt 2013, 219). Following this, some Med attacks to Assyria took place without significant success. Ultimately, Babylonian and Med alliance arranged an attack in 612 BCE, where they destroyed Nineveh and defeated Assyrians. The Assyrian king with the support of Egypt fled and established a kingdom in Harran, but Babylonians and Meds destroyed that center too in 608 BCE. After 608 BCE, there was no sign of Assyrians at all (Kuhrt 2013, 220; Kauffman and Wohlfort 2007, 40).

As we can see, core-periphery conflict finalized with the inclusion of some peripheral areas in the core. Inclusion came at the cost of disappearance of present core. Not the deteriorations in the core but the peripheral insistence on getting inclusion was consequential. The Assyrian core was able to suppress all inclusion attempts from many peripheral areas in different fronts. However, when comparatively less contained peripheral areas (Meds) entered equation, the periphery was able to get inclusion and terminate the existence of the core. This came as a result of alliance between peripheral areas. All peripheral areas at first, at some point strived for inclusion. While the inclusion attempts in some areas faded over time (as in Syria), in some others, they continued (as in Babylonia). Almost all inclusion attempts of all peripheral areas were frustrated by the Assyrian core, until a peripheral area (Meds) that was not within the reach of Assyria allied itself with Babylonia.

Here we see that, once again, it was the input of a loosely organized people, Meds, which caused the demise of the system. The Babylonians were influential in the demise of the Assyria, but probably it would not be successful, if it was not assisted by an uncontained peripheral area, the Meds. Assyria was able to contain the peripheral elements that had long lasting relationship with it, but Meds, as a newly emerging peripheral element that was a federation of tribes was not contained enough. As an uncontained area, the loose federation of Meds put an end to the core status of Assyria. Once again, we see that the core did not produce dynamics that would cause its demise, because it was a system that had elements working in harmony. On the other hand, in the case of relations between core and periphery we see that the

peripheral elements always disputed their exclusion. However, they were not able to avoid exclusion and attain inclusion, because the core already pacified them by containment through various means. As we have seen in the final fight between Assyria and alliance of Babylonia and Meds, the peripheral elements of Assyria at times collaborated with Assyria. Egypt and other peripheral elements provided support to Assyria until the final demise of it, a situation showing that the contained peripheral elements had lost some of their independent character. Therefore, we can say that the core status of the core areas cannot be destroyed by the dynamics within the system, nor by the peripheral elements that were contained by the core, i.e. Syrian states, Babylonia alone, Urartu, Phrygia etc. They could have a destructive role only if their people could cooperate with uncontained regions, as the Babylonians and the Meds cooperated.

After the fall of Assyria, a replication of Assyrian system dominated by the Babylonians survived between 626 and 539 BCE, but later, with the emergence of Persian Empire, the Achaemenids, the structure of a new system that had its environment, formed. In the previous drafts of the dissertation we had a section dedicated to analysis of Achaemenid system. However, because it had many similarities to the Assyrian system, we have removed that section from the final draft. Similar to Assyria, the Achaemenids constituted the single core element that formed the world political system of the Middle East. The Achaemenid system had other resemblances to Assyrian system; they utilized the same means of consolidating their core status and containing the periphery. The Achaemenids did not have an effect in the collapse of the Assyrian system. Rather, this role of transition from one system to another was undertaken by the Meds, who were a loosely organized federation of people that was little contained by the Assyrians. Meds, a peripheral element, not only played a role in the collapse of Assyrian system but also paved the way for formation of Achaemenid system. It was the defeat of Meds by Achaemenids that allowed the Persians to form the backbone of the new system. Therefore, we can say that with the defeat of the Assyrians, the core shifted from Ancient Iraq to Ancient Iran through Meds. As it was the case in formation of Assyria, the military expeditions of Achaemenids, which was possible owing to concentration of military superiority in

Iran, allowed to the formation of a new core and periphery in the Middle East (Kuhrt 2013; Wiesehöfer 2009; Mann 1986; Moscati 1960; Watson 1992; Foltz 2016)

The Achaemenid empire constituted the single core area that treated entire Middle East, including Greece, as its periphery. In this respect, it had similarity to the Assyrian system. In both Assyrian and Achaemenid systems, we could not mention multiplicity of core areas, rather there is a single core area. The character of this single core area is that it is capable of generating a significant military might that overwhelms over all other military organizations in the Middle East. The core did not have notable economic, cultural, religious superiorities that would be emulated by the periphery, as it was the case in the Sumerian system. Instead, the core had significant military technology and organizational capabilities that did not tolerate freedom of peripheral areas.

Like in the Assyrian system, in Achaemenid system as well, there were continuous attempts from the side of periphery to be included. Especially the Greeks, Egypt, and to a certain degree, Babylonians disputed the single core status of Achaemenids. They sought inclusion in the core, but against this search, the Achaemenids prevented these areas from inclusion. The Achaemenid empire was able to deny inclusion to these areas owing to its military might. In every test of the military might between the peripheral areas and the Achaemenids, Achaemenids overwhelmed, even when the peripheral areas established alliances, as in the case of the Greeks and the Egyptians. Therefore, the peripheral areas and the Achaemenids were in continuous conflict; this conflict was about exclusion and inclusion.

In the wars between the core and periphery what was at stake was the freedom of peripheral areas. The conflict decided whether the periphery would be a free core area or not. The confrontations between the core areas as we saw in the Amorite and Indo-European system were not so. The parties of the war did not question the independence of each other. Rather they entered confrontations for resolving the question of peripheral areas to be controlled. The restriction of freedom of the peripheral area had economic, military, and political meanings. When a vassal state was being controlled it paid tribute to the suzerain state, or some valuable sources were accessible to the suzerain state. Politically, the restriction of periphery showed

that there was a differentiation between the core and periphery. The core area acted independently while the peripheral area acted dependently. Militarily, control over a vassal provided manpower and logistical superiorities to the core area in oppressing the peripheral area. In the Assyrian and Achaemenid systems there were not intra-system confrontations that did not have exclusion and inclusion character. Rather there was a single core area that entered conflicts with peripheral areas in which it questioned equal existence of others in the world political relations.



CHAPTER 6

CORE PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN EARLY ISLAMIC PERIOD

After the fall of Achaemenid Empire and victory of Alexander the Great, most of the core areas of the Middle East relegated to peripheral status by 330 BCE. Later, when Islam appeared (610 CE), the Middle East started to show the particularities of a new region in a new age, namely the common era. Therefore, the early Islamic period is analyzed in a separate chapter. Most of the time, the analyses about Middle East politics do not bring together material about the ancient and common eras. It is because they seem as separate eras/worlds that has little in common. Even though they might be different in terms of language, beliefs, technology, economy, the width of the region etc., this dissertation brings ancient and common eras together at least in terms of world political relations. This endeavor shows that disconnected eras and different worlds can be analyzed politically from a single perspective. There are many commonalities that can be traced between the ancient and common eras. Such a finding allows the inference that the theoretical perspective adopted in this dissertation can be applied to other regions and eras of the world as well. In this Chapter, the analysis is stopped around the beginning of the 10th century when the Abbasid caliphate lost its prominence. The reason is that the Middle East seems to relegate to a peripheral position once again where there was not a core in the Middle East any more. Thus, this Chapter will elaborate on a different world from ancient world to contribute to the development of exclusion theory.

6.1. The Early Islamic Era Core and Its Periphery

The study of emergence of Islam and the relations between Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantine empire tells us a lot about the way people in the periphery seek inclusion in the core. Indeed, the emergence of Islam enabled a group of peripheral people to claim inclusion and succeed in this attempt. Even though we previously claimed that

at times people in the periphery seek inclusion and succeed in this, so far, we did not document the process that enables inclusion. Here, in this Chapter, because there is enough data, we would substantiate the claim that it is people in the periphery who are able to succeed in inclusion. While people in the periphery succeed in achieving inclusion, the states in the periphery rarely succeed in this. In previous chapters, we have given a large amount of data about the struggle of the peripheral states to get inclusion in the system. Most of these attempts failed. However, the organization of people in the periphery at some point succeeded in achieving inclusion. The emergence of Islam led to such an occasion where the periphery attained inclusion. Apart from the content of the religious message, the spread of Islam among the people allowed mobilization of Arabs for seeking inclusion in the core. Here it is not argued that Islam emerged as an ideology for mobilizing the people; we do not deal with why and how religion of Islam emerged and spread. Rather we aim to show an effect of the emergence of Islam, namely its utilization by the people for seeking inclusion in the core.

Prior to the emergence of Islam, the geopolitical picture of the Middle East was based on three pillars (Hill and Awde 2003, 19-20). One pillar was the Arabian Peninsula. Nomadic, called Bedouin, as well as sedentary people inhabited Arabian Peninsula, even though climate and environmental conditions were not so much proper. These people adapted to the conditions in this area and took part in the trade between Syria, Persia, East Africa, and India. They mediated this trade (19). Next to Arabia, there were two core structures of the time: The Sassanid and Byzantium empires. Byzantium empire was Christian and controlling the eastern Mediterranean basin. On the other hand, Sassanids were controlling Persia and they were Zoroastrians. These two empires had disagreements with each other about the “control of the surrounding regions and their lucrative trade routes”. They sometimes used violence in this struggle and sometimes they used religious or ethnic rivalries (19-20).

Even though this classification assumes as if the entire Arabian Peninsula was a somewhat autonomous area, in fact, this was not the case. Emanating from the presence of the Sassanid and Byzantium Empires, the Arabian Peninsula was de facto divided into three parts. North and north west of the Peninsula was dominated by Byzantine Empire either directly or by its proxy local rulers or tribes. On the other

hand, the Sassanids either through proxy rulers or local tribes dominated the north east and east of the Peninsula. The Arab proxy of Byzantines was a somewhat autonomous state called Ghassanids. While the Sassanid proxy was Lakhmids (Istanbuli 2001, 58; Zarrinkub 1975, 1-2). On the remaining part of the Peninsula, especially in the inner peninsula and south west of it, sedentary or nomadic Arab tribes enjoyed more autonomy. However, the status of the people and the territories in the Arabian Peninsula in one or other way was contained by the Sassanids and the Byzantium. Arabian Peninsula and its people were within the periphery of Sassanid and Byzantium empires.

Thus, while the Persians and Byzantine dominated most of the contemporary Iraq and Syria, in these lands the presence of Arab speaking people was also a fact that will later influence the strengthening of Arabs' capacity to seek inclusion in the core. However, it was not the Arabs in Syria and Iraq which would attain inclusion successfully. The Arabs who attained inclusion were inhabiting the inner areas of Arabian Peninsula where they had a higher level of autonomy. In this community, there was not a form of state like Sassanids and Byzantium. Rather, in Arabia in general, there was the dominance of nomadic and tribal forms of organization. In Mecca, which was a prominent settlement of Arab communities, a single tribe, Quraysh, was dominant. Even though Quraysh was dominant in Mecca, it maintained the nomadic and tribal spirit, and the way of life and principles. Rather than a state apparatus, there was an assembly or council called "mel'e" which in charge of administering. Mel'e was consisted of chiefs of families, nobles, and the like. Above these chiefs, there was a chieftain who was the leader of the tribe. However, the chieftain was elected; thus, he was not an autonomous leader. He was expected to conform to the general opinion of the tribe. Furthermore, the rules of the tribal leader were consultative. No state officials existed in this society (Ucar 2012, 40-42).

Tribe of Quraysh was also prominent in trade. They managed trade between Syria and Yemen; and Abyssinia and Iraq. By this trade, they prospered compared to other tribes. They also excelled in arranging deals with both local tribes as well as with Byzantine and Sassanids (Hill and Awde 2003, 20). Ideationally speaking, at the center of these trade relations there was religious relations. Ka'aba, in Mecca, was a shrine even before the arrival of Islam. Therefore, members of every faith had their

gods in Ka'aba. Environment of Ka'aba was considered sacred; no one would carry arms, and no one would challenge their enemies around it. In this respect, Ka'aba provided a peaceful place for establishing business networks and having cultural contacts. In addition, a long period of pilgrimage every year was considered a period of truce, where every tribe visited Ka'aba and forged trade contacts (Hill and Awde 2003, 21; Ucar 2012, 43). Being home to Ka'aba, Mecca was at the center of this trading network. Prophet Mohammad was born in this lively city, where trade and interactions took place and the news about the outside world and empires were exchanged (Hill and Awde 2003, 22). Living in the harsh conditions, tribal nomadic Arabs had a high degree of mobility. This mobility, later, would help them gain successes against the core areas in their search for inclusion (Ucar 2012, 42). As we can see, even though the Arabs were autonomous and tribally organized, they had some rules and some practices. However, they were excluded from the core. In terms of being represented in world politics, they were not ranked equal to the Sassanids and Byzantium. Rather the isolated condition of the Arabian lands and the loose organization of the community were supported by the core areas. This way, the Arabs would not be able to seek inclusion, in the sense of seeking equality to core areas.

Thus, the Arabs were a peripheral element in the Middle East in relation to the core that Byzantium and Sassanids formed. In fact, one would not expect that the loosely organized Arabs would be a prominent peripheral entity that can outcompete the core structures. This peripheral element, Arabs, was partially contained by Byzantium and Sassanids, in the sense of being pacified from seeking inclusion in the core. Therefore, we can say that any move from the side of Arabs that would challenge the Byzantium and Sassanids can be considered a move toward inclusion in the core. Furthermore, any move from the side of the Arabs should be taken as a move of people free from a state. Indeed, this community was free from any state-like political organization; rather tribal bonds were dominant. If they succeed in overthrowing the core areas, such as Sassanids and Byzantium, then we would once again see that the organization of peripheral people leads to the demise of established core systems. We would also be able to see how the process of people's organization and inclusion attempt is materialized.

6.1.1 The Mobilization of Peripheral People Around an Idea

The process of creating a power that could object to the peripheral status and claim core status necessitated a two-way struggle. One was that a new idea was necessary for destroying the old way of thinking among the peripheral people for making them have a cause. The other was the utilization of the existing bonds (i.e., tribal ties), for creating cohesion and helping mass participation in the new cause among the people. Once these conditions were met, we see that people were able to challenge the core for their inclusion in the system. We can see this machination in the mobilization of Arabs against the Sassanid and Byzantine Empires. Yet, in order to grasp how the people organized, we must firstly see the details of inter-Arab struggle that ended up with embracement of the new idea, first, and then the way this new idea destroyed the old way autonomous tribal organization of society. These processes were indications of the fact that formation of a cohesive peripheral community seeking inclusion in the core started from scratch.

Prophet Mohammad started to spread the message of Islam firstly to his family and friends. This did not aim at the creation of a state, but to make people to be familiar with the message and also accept Islam. Following this, he aimed to reach the entire Meccan population as well as the groups visiting Mecca for pilgrimage (Istanbuli 2001, 12). However, most of the Meccans did not welcome the invitation of the Prophet, they received his message as an offence. Therefore, the Meccans sought to target the Muslims as a community for stopping their activities. Once the Meccans reckoned that they are not able to dissuade the Prophet from his teachings, they sought to convince Abu Talip, the Prophet's uncle, and a prominent member of the Quraysh tribe. They firstly asked him to stop the Prophet from what he was doing, and then they threatened Abu Talip with the use of force. Failing to convince Abu Talip, they asked him to return the Prophet to them. In case the Prophet stopped spreading the message they would reward the Prophet. As we can see, even though the Meccans opposed the Prophet and his activities, they did not directly use force, rather they tried to solve the issue within the conventions of the community. Indeed, at first stages of activities of the Prophet, while Meccans were able to persecute the Muslims, they were not able to persecute the Prophet because he was a member of a prominent family

of Quraysh. His uncle Abu Talip protected him, even though he was not a believer to the Prophet. Once Meccans considered that they were not able to convince the Prophet via Abu Talip, they decided to negotiate with the Prophet directly. Once again, they offered some rewards and wealth to him, or tried to convince him with good words, i.e., poems. However, they still did not aim to use violence. All these were applied within the conventions of the time (Istanbuli 2001, 12-16; Hill and Awde 2003, 25). Thus, we can see that the emergence of an idea that would mobilize people does not emerge easily, rather it faces resistance and even destruction attempts. Therefore, we cannot assume that people suddenly and in masses gather around an idea to challenge the core for inclusion. Rather, at first a small group of people believe in a message and they try to convince others to believe the message. When they try to spread the message, on the other hand, not everything goes smooth; they face significant preventive actions from the community. Indeed, the struggle between the Prophet and the Meccans escalated.

As the Meccans and the Prophet struggled with each other, each side also sought to get the assistance from third parties by sending delegations to outside of Mecca (Istanbuli 2001, 13). By the way, when the pressures on the Muslims intensified, the Prophet allowed some of the Muslims to seek refuge in Abyssinia. In response, the Meccans sent delegations to prevent Muslims from getting refuge (17). The argumentation between the Muslims and the Meccans before the Abyssinian king convinced the king to receive the Muslims, even though the Christian patriarch of the Abyssinia did not like what the Muslims said about Jesus (17, 20). The new idea and the followers of the idea needed to have assistance from others. In this case, the Muslims received support from Abyssinia. However, this did not suffice for the Muslims to be a self-sufficient group of people. Still the Muslims needed the assistance from both their non-Muslim relatives in Mecca and tribes outside of the Mecca.

The Meccans unable to dissuade the Abyssinian king then decided to deepen their sanctions against the families providing support to the Prophet. Quraysh decided to impose sanctions against these families given the fact that they were not giving up protection of the Prophet. They agreed on a written agreement among each other to impose sanctions on these families (Istanbuli 2001, 17). They would not trade with

the members of these families; and marriage and any other social contact with these families was forbidden (17-18). It was interesting that the pre-Islamic bonds between the Prophet and his family and his family's commitment helped the Prophet to be able to stand against the attacks of the Meccans. Even though not every member of Bani Hashim and Bani Abdul Muttaleb families were Muslims, the sanctions aimed at all members of the family. These families showed solidarity and they did not leave the Prophet alone (18). Although Bani Hashim and Bani Abdul-Muttaleb were protested and sanctioned, there were people secretly infiltrating the agreement and helping with these families. These people then arranged a plot where they convinced other Quraysh members that it was not fair to sanction against these families who were their relatives and their noble people (20). In terms of the organization of people for a cause, this information provides us with enough material to argue that the Prophet received substantial assistance from his non-Muslim relatives who acted according to their pre-Islamic societal principles and bonds. Hence, one process or variable that contributed to organization of Arabs was the pre-Islamic bonds and principles of life.

Second, the Prophet sought refuge outside of Mecca which was necessary for the Muslims to get the support of larger groups of people/Arabs. Above we already mentioned the Muslims' attempts in Abyssinia for asylum of some Muslims. However, later the Prophet himself sought alliance and protection from other societies, especially after his uncle Abu Talip passed away. Around the tenth year of the prophetic mission, the Prophet's uncle Abu Talip passed away. Thus, the Prophet became more vulnerable. He firstly sought friendship with people of al-Taif, who refused his proposal (Istanbuli 2001, 18). However, he did not stop his contacts with people visiting Mecca. He utilized every occasion that he can use to convince people to become Muslim. He invited people visiting Mecca to accept Islam. Not only did the Prophet invite the people from different places but also people from different areas were curious to learn about Islam (21). Yet it should be bear in mind that the Qurayshite people were never short of sabotaging the efforts of the Prophet and the Muslims (22).

After al-Taif's refusal, he once asked for refuge in Yemen which did not succeed (Istanbuli 2001, 22). Following this, the Prophet and the people from the city of Medina held a series of meetings. In these meetings, the people of Medina were

invited to Islam, and protection that would be provided to Muslims that would move to Medina was discussed. Finally, the Prophet and the Muslim community emigrated to Medina in 622 CE. At the time, Medina was composed of two hostile pagan tribes and a considerable Jewish community (22-26). After arriving in Medina, the two Arab tribes and three Jewish tribes who had disputes among each other invited the Prophet to resolve their disputes and to convene about management of the resources of the city. They came up with a sort of constitution that arranged the relations between these communities (Hill and Awde 2003, 25, 28). Thus, Muslims consolidated some level of security for themselves in Medina, but we are far from saying that the community was ready to claim core status. In fact, at this stage, probably nobody expected that all Arabs would unite around a cause, i.e., seeking inclusion in the system where Sassanids and Byzantium were the core areas. The safety of the small group that sought to spread a message was only one step in the mobilization of a large community that was loosely organized. We will see other steps that were necessary for mobilization of large masses of people who would seek inclusion. One of these steps was to resort to coercion against the old forms of organization among the people who were going to pose resistance against the spread of the message.

Indeed, once the Muslims consolidated their position in Medina, and formed a sort of state, they began to clash with their adversaries, the Meccans. Three wars were fought between Muslims and Meccans. The first battle between the Muslims and Meccans that broke out was the battle of Badr (624 CE), when Muslims intercepted a caravan of Meccans. The Muslims won this battle although they were outnumbered. With this war, the Muslims became an entity that could compete with the Meccans. As a result, the Prophet's status among the Bedouin tribes in Arabian Peninsula increased. Following this, Muslims lost in the battle of Uhud (625 CE), but the Muslims continued to be a force against the Meccans. In 627 CE, at the battle of Trench, Muslims resisted successfully against a major offence of Meccans and their allies. Following this, Muslims were able to strike a treaty with the Meccans, which enabled them to make pilgrimage to Ka'aba. While Muslims were able to emerge as a considerable power in the Arabian Peninsula, they also had to deal with issues in Medina. After a period of good relations, in Medina, some problems emerged

involving Muslims and the Jews, which resulted with the expulsion of some of the Jews from Medina (Hill and Awde 2003, 29; Ozkuyumcu 2006; Avci 2002).

After the Badr, Uhud and Trench battles, and handling of the issues in Medina, Muslims made military preparations aiming at Mecca. Mecca submitted without resistance. Therefore, Muslims did not harm the property and lives of the Meccans. After taking Mecca, the Prophet ordered destruction of the pagan gods in Ka'aba (Hill and Awde 2003, 31). Even though it was a significant step, the control of Medina and Mecca did not mean that the Muslims gained a safe haven. In fact, this state could be easily contained by the core areas, Byzantium and Sassanids. Additionally, Muslims could not seek inclusion in the core with this limited level of power. Because the community was not able to seek inclusion with its limited level of military and economic power, they should have sought further consolidation of the people, the Arabs, for Muslim polity could be a core element. The Muslim community and its influence expanded during lifetime of the Prophet. As he utilized the pre-Islamic bonds and traditions to secure the Muslim community in Mecca and Medina, he was able to utilize these pre-Islamic bonds and relationships also for furthering the Islamic influence especially in the Arabian Peninsula. As a matter of fact, the sketch of the tribal structure and the relations reveals that the foundation of the power of the Muslim community was the pre-Islamic bonds and relations next to the message that the Prophet delivered.

The Prophet's consolidation of authority in the Arabian Peninsula partly depended on his ability to bring the nomadic tribal groups under the authority of Hejaz's elite (Donner 1981, 108). Hence, in the lifetime of the Prophet, Muslims became the dominant group in the Arabian Peninsula, which made the tribes in the Peninsula offer their allegiance to Muslims (Hill and Awde 2003, 31). There was not a uniform way of contacting the tribes. The Prophet made agreements of non-aggression with some of the tribes; some others fully adopted Islam and chosen settled life; and some others only paid Sadaqa (Donner 1981, 109). Toward the last years of the Prophet, his influence was substantial over the nomadic tribes. To the north, the Gulf of Aqaba and Wadi Rumm, two main cities of the region, were subject to successful Muslim campaigns, Tayma and Tabuk. The Prophet's rule of the cities generally was preceded by the control of the surrounding nomadic tribes. When the nomadic tribes were under

control, the cities were afraid of Muslims, because they knew that it was difficult to survive when all the nomadic tribes were hostile to them (Donner 1981, 109).

Thus, the Prophet was able to unite all the Arabs who were not contained (who were not in the orbit of Byzantine and Sassanid Empires). The elevation of Muslims to a higher position among the Arabs, later, enabled Muslims to be able to mobilize Arabs under control of Byzantine and Sassanid Empires too. However, the process of relegating the Byzantine and Sassanid presence from Arab populated areas was not easy. We will see the details of this process, but it should be noted that mobilization of peripheral people, in our case the nomadic Arabs, necessitated a dedicated small group of people who were defending a message among the people for a long time. Second, this small group over time got strength owing to strategic alliances, coercion, and attraction. The mobilization of these people also necessitated a stable and long-lasting leadership. Once again, we see that the process of mobilization of peripheral people for a cause, i.e., inclusion in the core is not attained easily. In fact, the conditions for peripheral people to mobilize around a message is something that would occur only rarely. We cannot expect that in every peripheral group of people a momentum of seeking inclusion can emerge. For this to happen, a dedicated group with a strong message should be working, in spite of many hindrances from within the group.

6.1.2. Periphery's First Engagements with the Core

Once Muslims ensured the support of the nomadic Arabs, the next step was to receive the support of the Arabs who were contained by the Byzantium and Sassanids. This was necessary because these Arabs could at any time destroy the consolidation that Muslims achieved among the nomad Arabs. Therefore, Muslims started their activities to bring Arabs in Southern Syria to the alliance network that they created. In creating alliances with the Arabs in Southern Syria, the Muslims had one significant barrier, which could prevent them from achieving their goals: The Byzantine empire. The Byzantine empire had a similar motivation to the Muslims regarding the Arabs in Southern Syria. Byzantium, at this juncture of Muslim attempts to consolidate their alliance network, was striving to consolidate its authority over the Southern Syria

through alliances system with the tribes (Donner 1981, 98) since its previous connections were disrupted in the wars with the Sassanids. Thus, we can see that before peripheral people, Arabs, challenge the core areas (i.e., Byzantine Empire) they were being harassed by the core areas for stopping the mobilization and strengthening of the peripheral people.

These Byzantine attempts were not new at all. In fact, the Byzantium was more experienced than the Muslims in having political contacts with the tribes of Syria, and normally they would easily destroy the Muslim attempts to establish alliances among Arab tribes. Therefore, Muslims had little chance to surpass Byzantium in establishing a network in Southern Syria. Yet, what helped Muslims was the destruction of the tribal system of the Byzantium by Sassanids who invaded Syria some 15 years prior to the arrival of Muslims. This invasion demolished the old institutions and the ways of enduring Byzantium control. This does not mean that Byzantium quit its actions to prevent the spread of Muslims in Southern Syria (Donner 1981, 98-100). The Muslims, for dealing with the Byzantium activities, had several expeditions into Syria. Two of these campaigns against the tribes were defeats; one Dhat al-Atlah and the other Mu'ta. However, the raid on Dhat al-Salasil was successful in bringing Wadi al-Qura and Northern Hejaz under their control. The Tabuk campaign consolidated the Muslims position in northern Hejaz and brought some nomadic tribes under control of Muslims (109). These campaigns show that peripheral people had to enter some fights with the clients of the core area when they were harassed by the core area.

As a matter of fact, when we analyze the causes of Muslim inroads into Syria, we can see that this endeavor was out of necessity rather than being out of will. The aim was preservation of the community so as to prevent smash of the community by Byzantium. It was known that the Muslims, in order to consolidate their community, needed to have the alliance of the Arab tribes in Arabia. This job was itself a difficult task. However, the Byzantium aspiration to unite the Arab tribes of Syria was a direct challenge to the Muslims project of establishing an alliance system of Arab tribes because this would, in turn, challenge the alliance system of the Muslims in Arabia. The Muslims, in order not to risk this, they made their way to Syria (Donner 1981, 101). The fact that the alliance system of Arab tribes was fragile was demonstrated after the Prophet. Indeed, as soon as the tribes heard that the Prophet passed away,

many of them repudiated Islamic rule, even though the Muslims pacified these challenges quickly. This indicated that the Muslims' concern was valid. (110-111). However, it became evident with ridda wars that it was quite possible that the inter-tribal disorder could ruin all the political consolidation that the Prophet created. Hence, the Muslims had reasons to reach South Syrian Arabs, who could challenge the Muslim community and its alliance system among the Arab tribes. Having these concerns, it seemed that there were indications showing that the Prophet had military goals, specifically aiming at Syria.

Even though the extra communal contacts, namely wars and alliances, were important for the creation of the Muslim state that would claim core status, in fact, the state took its initial momentum from what the Prophet instructed; a new way of life and a new ethical framework. The analysis of the methods and instruments that contributed to the unity and coherence of the Islamic community shows that the ideational basis and the new principles that Muslims introduced were essential for consolidation among peripheral people. It was neither the coercive power nor state institutions that could initiate the process of building a community from scratch. There was not a material basis on which the Muslim community depended. Given the fact that there was not a coercive power of the Prophet nor any substantial economic base to bring people together, it was indeed the ideational power that Muslims had, which gave birth to Muslim community. Following this, some other factors played a role. These were confrontations and interactions with other groups and polities which gave the impetus for consolidation of order among Arabs. Then use of force became an element in the search to be equal with the core powers. This was also necessary for the prophetic message to be delivered and practiced properly (Istanbuli 2001; Ucar 2012; Hill and Awde 2003). Thus, we can say that in creating a momentum among the peripheral people, both wars and alliances and the message uniting the people around a cause were necessary. It was these factors that brought loosely organized and autonomous tribal people together. In sum, we can see that the organization of peripheral people toward challenging the core is not a quickly developing phenomenon. Uniting people for a common cause necessitates a lot of effort that includes a new and strong message, coercion, negotiation, attraction, alliance, wars, and a long-lasting commitment of a smaller group of people (i.e., a Prophet and his companions) who want to influence

the larger groups of people for the ideas that they defend. When there are not such dynamics among the peripheral people, they cannot elevate to a position that could challenge the core areas.

The Prophet succeeded in spreading the message of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula before he died (Istanbuli 2001, 57). Apart from the Arabian Peninsula he had a special interest in Southern Syria. During his lifetime he arranged four expeditions to northern Hijaz and Southern Syria (Doner 1981, 101-102). Of these campaigns, two were defeats. One Dhat al-Atlah and the other Mu'ta. However, the raid on Dhat al-Salasil was successful in bringing Wadi al-Qura and northern Hijaz under Muslim control. The Tabuk campaign consolidated the Muslims position in northern Hejaz and brought some nomadic tribes under control (109). The early military and political contacts with Syria were as summarized. Yet, the Muslims still did not prove that they were able to defeat the core areas and achieve inclusion in the system. The process that would show that the Muslims achieved enough mobilization and consolidation among the Arab tribes and that they could challenge the core areas started at the era of Rashidun Caliphs. During Rashidun Caliphs, Muslims defeated the Byzantium significantly by taking the entire Syria, and put an end to the Sassanid rule. With these achievements, they caused the demise of at least one core area, and started to take part in the system as one of two members of the core, together with Byzantium.

Indeed, after the Prophet passed away, during the rule of Rashidun Caliphs, Muslims continued their expeditions in Syria in three phases. In the first phase, there were some minor engagements between the Muslims and some local garrisons of Byzantium (Donner 1981, 118-119). The aim of these expeditions was to bring Arab tribes under the control of Medina. Muslims' main interest was limited to the countryside, they did not engage with the cities. They were able to control the countryside in southern Syria, whereas the towns were out of their reach (Donner 1981, 111, 116 -118; Ucar 2012, 78). However, at this phase there is not enough evidence showing that the Muslims' aim was to take control of the entire Syria. This decision was made later (Donner 1981, 113-114). In the second phase of the Muslim expeditions, their influence spread to the major towns. It is at this phase that the Muslim leaders decided that they could take entire Syria; hence they expanded their military activities. At the face of the inability of the local garrisons against the Muslim forces, the Byzantium dispatched

portions of imperial army, which were defeated by the Muslim forces in a series of wars between 634 and 636 CE, including the Battle of Yarmuk, which was decisive in defeat of Byzantium (Donner 1981, 111-112, 146-147; Ucar 2012, 31, 78-79). In the third phase, the Muslims consolidated their presence in Syria. After Syria, the attention of Muslims shifted toward Egypt, Iraq, and Jazeera (Parts of North Syria and south East Anatolia) (Donner 1981, 112).

The completion of conquest of Syria by Muslims was a case where we can for the first time see that a peripheral element engaged directly in a fight with a core area, Byzantine Empire and defeated it. We have already noted that the ability to outcompete a core area depends in the peripheral area's ability to mobilize peripheral people around a cause. On the other hand, the core area, because it did not previously sufficiently contain the peripheral area, is not able to stand against a peripheral area that mobilized people. However, it should be noted that the peripheral area did not end the core status of Byzantine Empire; rather the peripheral area took control of a peripheral area of a core empire. Such act occurs only between core areas as we saw in previous Chapters. In other words, we can say that the completion of Syrian conquest meant that the Muslims almost elevated to a core status. However, we are still far from saying that they were equivalent of Byzantium or Sassanid Empires. We can clearly see that the only thing that the Muslims depended was mobilization of people and a message that helped with the mobilization of people. They lacked organizational, military, and economic capabilities that core areas enjoyed. These sources of power that the core areas had, normally, provided them the core status and containment of the peripheral areas. Yet, when people get organized, in case they were not subject to the containment of the core, they could generate an ability that would overwhelm over the organizational, military, and economic capabilities of the core areas. This confirms the idea that successful inclusion attempts are achieved when loosely organized people come together. In other words, the system/core is vulnerable to the organized attacks of the people, rather than to the inclusion attempts of the structures/states in the periphery which are contained by the core and therefore are only serving to the maintenance of the core periphery relations.

6.1.3. Putting an End to the Existence of a Core State

While the conquest of Syria provided evidence that a peripheral area that started from scratch can inflict serious damage to a core area, the engagements of the Muslims in the east with Sassanids proved that the peripheral area elevated to core status, even though the entire system did not terminate. In previous chapters, the evidence indicated that when peripheral areas achieve inclusion, they mostly destroy the entire core system, but the inclusion of the Muslims in the system did not cause the destruction of the entire system. Muslims, in the East, dealt with the Sassanid empire, which was one of two core areas of the late antiquity, and ended the existence of it. On the other hand, Byzantium continued to be a core element, which meant that the inclusion of the Muslim state was limited to getting equal participation in the core, instead of destroying the entire system. Later we will see that the intra-community weaknesses among the Muslims led them to fail to terminate the entire core. Now we are dealing with the process that led the Muslims elevate to core status by ending the Sassanid Empire. The first military encounters between the Muslims and the Sassanids occurred through the exposures of the Khalid B. al-Waleed forces which were assigned primarily to fight with the ridda. As the Prophet passed away, especially the newly converted tribes reverted to their old practices and allegiances, besides challenging the authority of Medina. This was also the case for the tribes in adjacent regions of the Sassanids. Muslims, especially during the tenure of caliph Abu-Bakr fought with these centrifugal tendencies so as to bring them under the umbrella of the Medina again, especially the Arabs in the sphere of Sassanids (Istanbuli 2001, 58; Ucar 2012, 77; Zarrinkub 1975; Donner 1981, 120-126).

On his way to fight against these reverting tribes, Waleed, after completing activities in the inner Arabia then moved along the Sassanid frontiers toward to north. En route, after a small battle, Khalid b. Waleed faced the Iranians three times. None of these battles in which he fought with local garrisons was big, although some of the fights were more organized than the others. Khalid b. Waleed was able to defeat his foes in all of these battles. At the end of these fights, Muslims controlled Hira. Alongside the Sassanid local forces, Muslim forces also fought with Christian Arabs and the apostates. Following this, Abu-Bakr ordered Waleed to leave for Syria to assist the

forces there since his priority was Syria at the time (Zarrinkub 1975, 7-8). However, even though the Muslims did not give priority to the Sassanids, the Sassanids started to take the successes of the Muslims in the adjacent areas more seriously. Indeed, following the loss of Hira, the Iranians prepared for a battle. At this time, Abu-Bakr passed away and Umar became the caliph. In order to respond to the Sassanid preparations, Umar appointed another commander other than Walid to meet Iranians with insufficient number of soldiers. This ended up with a full-fledged Muslim and Sassanid war, the Battle of Bridge, where the Iranians were successful. However, interestingly, Sassanids did not pursue their enemy to get a consequential victory (Zarrinkub 1975, 8-9).

After the Battle of Bridge, one year elapsed, then the Muslims started to recruit Arab tribes who were seeking booty, as well as the former apostates who regretted leaving Muslim community. Thus, the hostilities between the Iranians and Muslims restarted. Firstly, the Battle of Buwaib (635 CE) was fought. In this war, even though the Iranians at first were advantageous, the Arabs later defeated the Iranians significantly. The end of this battle coincided with the Battle of Yarmuk in Syria, where Byzantium was defeated decisively. Caliph (Umar), relieved in Syria, now allocated more forces and attention to Iraq (Sassanids). Indeed, as soon as the battle of Yarmuk ended in 636 CE, the Muslims once again prepared to attack Iran, with the forces from Syria added, especially the forces that came to Syria from Iraqi front (Zarrinkub 1975, 9-10; Donner 1981, 137). Rustam, the Iranian commander, hesitated to attack Arabs and negotiated with the Arabs for four months with no avail. He did not attack Arabs because he knew that they would use the desert in case they were forced. Yet, once it became clear that the negotiations were abortive, he commenced the battle (Zarrinkub 1975, 11). The Battle of Qadisiyya lasted three to four days, and at the beginning, the Iranians were superior, but later with the arrival of forces from Syria, Muslims gained superiority and won the Battle. The most important consequence of this war was that agriculturally valuable lands in South Iraq went under control of Arabs. As in Syria, Arabs faced no significant resistance from the local people, rather local people received the Muslims as liberators (11).

After Qadisiya, Caliph ordered for marching to the capital of Sassanids, Ctesiphon or Mada'in. The capital of Sassanids was composed of a number of adjacent cities on

both banks of the Tigris River near to contemporary Baghdad. Muslims laid siege to cities in the west bank of Tigris. The siege was quite long, it is reported that the siege lasted around two years. Finally, some cities asked for submission due to scarcity of food and the spread of diseases. Muslims marched to Ctesiphon, but before their arrival, the Sassanid ruler left the city, and after a short resistance the city fell. As a result of this war, Muslims acquired a lot of booty, and at the time of the capture of the city, the number of the Arab forces reached to around 60.000. Thus, the capital city of Sassanids for four hundred years became the camping ground of the Muslim general (Zarrinkub 1975, 11-12). However, even though the Muslims defeated the Sassanids and captured their capital, the caliph was not willing to further pursue the Iranians behind the mountains. The Muslims were ready to accept the Zagros Mountains as the natural border between the Arabs and the Iranians. As a matter of fact, this would also enable the Muslims to have no significant geographical limitations for communication among themselves. Yet, this was not a dream to be realized for two reasons. One is that the Iranians were not content with the Arab invasion of their capital and Iraq. Indeed, the Muslims had constant fear that the Sassanids would attack them with a fresh army. Second, given the fact that there were Arabs joining to Muslims for booty, there was a motivation for the continuation of the advances into Iran. Thus, it can be inferred that even though the Muslim decision makers were not willing to advance further into Iran, the conditions made it untenable to sustain the status quo (13-14).

On the other hand, on the Iranian side, there were the local rulers as well as fugitive Sassanid king preparing against the Muslims. At this time, some of the Arab local leaders were also making inroads into Sassanid territories. While Muslims were dealing with one of the local rulers (Khuzistan's ruler) they took Shustar and then they proceeded towards Shush and Jundishapur. Finally, Muslims crossed the Zagros Mountains, even though they did not aim this at first. Utilizing these Muslim inroads, Yazgard, the Sassanid King, summoned to all Sassanid generals to gather a large army. As such the Muslims gathered a large army, core of which was Kufa army; whereas Syria, Basra and Uman armies were supportive (Zarrinkub 1975, 14-16). The armies prepared to meet in Nihavand, and this was, so far, the largest battle in terms of the numbers and the stakes concerned. Iranians mobilized all their powers for

defeating Muslims, and Muslims mobilized all their forces that they can allocate for stopping this ever larger threat. Muslims were superior in plains, so when both armies met, Muslims, in order to draw the Iranians from their bases, spread the rumors that Caliph died. Iranians, emboldened with this news, came to the plain to fight against Arabs. Arabs lost their commander in this battle, but with the reinforcements, they later won the battle. With this war, the last effort of the Sassanids was aborted, and it marked the end of the Sassanid empire (16).

As the Muslims replaced the Sassanians, Muslims' status as a core area was formalized. They proved that they can end the rule of a core area and replace it. As we can see Muslims had a priority to take Syria first, and once they took Syria, they turned to Iraq. Even though there was a Sassanian insistence on fighting the Muslims, there was a clear Muslim stance that had issues with the core claims of Sassanids. Core claims presume that anyone not included in the core is a peripheral element. A peripheral element can be contained, in other words pacified in the periphery in such a way that it cannot claim core status, namely equal participation in world political relations. Indeed, Sassanids did not consider achieving an agreement with the Muslims by consenting on what the Muslims acquired. On the other hand, Muslims seemed to aspire to challenge the very existence of Sassanids, in such a way that to relegate Sassanids into a peripheral area. We may assume that Muslims, at this stage, were not content with the core status of another area other than themselves. The inclusion meant the termination of core status of all core areas. This was particularly true for the Rashidun Caliphs period. Given that the message of Islam was still a considerable cohesive element, and consolidation of the Muslims was not disrupted, they had a typical tendency of inclusion attempt. Almost all peripheral people claiming core status aim at destroying the entire core system, almost as a requirement of inclusion. However, this tendency got diluted with the end of the Rashidun Caliphs period, in that Muslims retreated from their tendency to destroy the entire core.

6.1.4. Peripheral Polities Emulating Core Areas

Even though Muslims, by ending the core status of the Sassanids, were able to elevate to the core status, they did not put an end to the entire system. Indeed, in the previous

Chapters, we have seen that when peripheral people get organized and enter competition for inclusion, they generally cause the demise of the entire system. All the core elements either disappear or relegate to the peripheral status, while a new core replaces them. However, in the case of the Muslims' search for inclusion, this scenario did not materialize; rather Muslims just replaced one core structure (Sassanid empire) to be included in the system. In other words, Muslim state gained equality in the core together with Byzantine Empire rather than ending the rule of both Sassanid and Byzantine Empires and establishing a new system where Muslim state would become the sole core area. One might be surprised with what is stated, that is, the Muslims gained equality with the Byzantium. Indeed, the general understanding regarding the political history of the era is that Muslims challenged the entire non-Muslim world. It is argued that Muslims did not accept the equality of any other core area at this period. Yet, this was not the case. Yes, Muslims were able to end the core status of Byzantium at this period, but they did not systematically try to do this. There occurred few premature attempts to end the Byzantium rule, but the general trend was toward the equal coexistence of two core areas. This was not a matter of choice; rather some factors contributed to habituation of Muslims into core instead of destroying the entire core system.

It is not easy to substantiate the arguments made here, in the face of the biases that exist in terms of the nature of the political developments in the early Islamic period. It seems that the sources (Ucar 2012; Bahadir 2009; Bosworth 1992; Donner 1981; Hill and Awde 2003; Zarrinkub 1975; Kennedy 1998) treat the era stretching from the Prophet's message until the end of the Abbasid Caliphate as a single process that can be named as the history of spread of Islam. Therefore, the sole purpose of the Muslims and the polities that they formed is supposed to be spread of message of Islam and bringing as more territories as possible under control of the Muslims. However, a closer look shows that the polities that the Muslims formed (Umayyads and Abbasids) habituated to the preexisting world political relations. Prior to emergence of Islam there was a system where the Byzantines and Sassanids were the core elements having all areas surrounding them as their periphery. These parties seemingly were in continuous war with each other, but in fact their fights were about the peripheral areas that they controlled. They never tried to seriously damage each other, but they agreed

about the peripheral status of all other regions that they contained/excluded. The peripheral people who were not contained by these empires were called barbarians, and the empires cooperated against these peripheral people. Not only this, each of the empires treated their own subjects as a peripheral element. They cooperated against the expectations of their population. At the surface, the empires treated each other as if they were foes, but in essence they cooperated (Foss 1975; Higgins 1941; Graff 2011). Thus, Umayyads and later Abbasids as two states that Muslims supported just emulated Sassanids in having a long-lasting relationship with the Byzantines. Therefore, we are able to split the early Islamic era (from birth of Islam to end of Abbasid rule) into two separate processes. One of these processes (covering the era of Prophet and Rashidun Caliphs) was characterized with the spread of Islam, thus the search for inclusion and maybe the destruction of the system/core. The other process (Umayyad-Abbasid period) was characterized with conventionalization of Muslim state into old way world political relations.

The emulation of Sassanids by Umayyads and Abbasids was not a decision made deliberately by these empires. Instead, there were several dynamics that rendered these empires to develop a coexistence strategy with the Byzantines. First of all, the intra-community struggles over the question of who was going to rule and how they were going to rule was consuming much of the energy of the Muslim community during Umayyad period, and this contributed to the adoption of coexistence strategy. As a result of the disagreements among the Muslims, the non-Islamicized elements in the Muslim dominated areas made alliances with the parties involved in the intra community struggle. Non-Islamicized elements were mostly the institutions, relations, and personnel inherited from the Sassanid and Byzantine empires in the occupied lands. These forces together enforced the conventionalization of the Muslim state. While this took place, economic interactions and relations also helped with establishment and consolidation of the old order.

When we test the actions of the Muslims in order to see whether they were really socialized into the old order, we find supporting patterns. We can trace the idea of conventional coexistence of different states in the actions of the Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantines. Indeed, the scrutiny of the military encounters of these polities/structures and the course of these encounters indicates that the Muslims

socialized into the pre-Islamic world political patterns in a gradual manner. This socialization firstly occurred via the hesitance in the Muslim side to end the Byzantium's core status due to intra community issues. However, later socialization of the Muslims in the following era was because of imperatives, namely the Byzantines forged a resistance capacity that could be manifested at times in offensive capability which made the Muslims to take the Byzantine as an equal. Now let's elaborate about the arguments made here.

The first thing that contributed to the conventionalization of the Umayyads and Abbasids to the existing system rather than the emergence of a completely new system/core was the inherited imperial practices of the Sassanids and Byzantines. The Umayyads and then Abbasids did not destroy the institutions, qualified human resources, and accumulated knowledge in the peripheral regions that they took from the Byzantines and Sassanids. We can assume that a similar case might have occurred in the previous system reestablishments. In fact, we found in previous Chapters that once a peripheral area achieved inclusion in the core, it started to exclude the new peripheries from equal participation to the system/core. Second, no matter who destroyed the system and no matter which system had come into being, the relationships did not change. Not only did the relationships (intra-system harmony, exclusion against the periphery, inclusion toward core) endure, but also, the character of the core areas was the same. It did not matter whether the peripheral element gained the core status owing to its economic, military, or ideational superiority, they always acted in a way to exclude the areas that remained in the periphery. The peripheral areas were denied equal participation to the system. This might have developed as a result of the fact that the new core areas adopt the institutions, human resources, and accumulated knowledge of the previous core areas. This helps reproduction of the core-periphery relations whenever a core system is destroyed and a new one is established. We could see this scenario realizing in the emergence of the Umayyads and Abbasids as well.

Indeed, the Umayyad empire, which was established in Syria, firstly imitated the administrative practices of the Byzantines. The Umayyads were considering themselves as the successors of the Byzantine Empire at first. However, after 718 CE, when the Umayyads failed in taking Istanbul, they stopped to imitate Byzantine

Empire. They returned toward the eastern tradition of ruling, that of the Sassanid-Iranian tradition. At this period, the cultural and religious center of the Muslims shifted to Iraq, and the traditions in Iraq resembled the Sassanid manners, while the Syrian traditions were similar to those of the Byzantium (Gibb 1958, 231-233).

The imitation of Byzantines by the Umayyads was realized through old personnel and institutions existed prior to arrival of Islam. For example, the Umayyads instrumentalized the Syrian (dominantly Christian) residents in the army and the administrative offices. The Umayyads had five divisions of army in Syria, two of these divisions were in south and were composed of the tribes which were located in the south and were familiar to Byzantium prior to Islam. Tribes that were composing the two divisions in the center were auxiliaries of the Greeks against Persia. Thus, they were the most familiar ones to the Byzantium. They knew the Byzantium manners; they helped caliph access to the manners of the Byzantium emperor. The last division on the north was the least familiar one to the Byzantium (Gibb 1958, 223).

Of course, the utilization of the residents of Syria was not just limited to the recruitments in the army. The Syrian residents were utilized in other realms too. Indeed, the first encounters of the Prophet and early Muslims occurred with the Monophysite and Nestorian communities, not the Orthodox Byzantium community. Later, when Muslims conquered the Byzantium lands, they “found many civil servants, diplomats, and businessmen who were willing to help in the building of their Empire”. These Christians also at the beginning preferred the Muslims rule rather than that of “Orthodox Chalcedonian” (Meyendorff 1964, 115). The archeological record also confirms these findings. The remnants indicate that the transition from Byzantine to Muslim rule was a comparatively peaceful process. There was not a decline in the prosperity of the cities captured by the Muslims (Constable 2003, 53). Furthermore, there was not a substantial demographic change, for a while, Christianity remained dominant among the people. So was the city, residential areas, and even the military barracks (54). As Muslims conquered Syria and Egypt, they borrowed the city infrastructure of the Byzantine cities and transformed them over time (40). As late as the eighth century CE, Greek was the language used in the administration (45).

The Sassanid manners also were adopted through the residents of Iraq who were employed in the period of Sassanids. When the Muslims gradually captured Iraq, they also kept the taxing system of the Sassanids. For example, a *divan* was established that was responsible to keep the records of the taxes, expenditures, as well as taxed people. As such, Persian was used in this institution and Persian people were in charge of this task. Under Caliph Umar, the *divan* in Iraq became the central revenue authority of all Islamic realms (Zarrinkub 1975, 45-46). Thus, *divan* as the most important institution was in the hands of the *mawali* (46). As such, the previous landed aristocracy under the Sassanid Empire which was responsible for collecting taxes kept their position. These people were not only collecting taxes but also, they were deciding who was going to pay what amount of tax (43-44).

Not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Egypt, the non-Muslim residents were influential in the administration of the Muslim community. Egypt was captured after the decisive defeat of Byzantine in Syria. Byzantine emperor Heraclius, who waged successful wars against Sassanids in Egypt, noticing the futility of the resistance against the Muslims evacuated Egypt with little resistance. All his efforts against Sassanids only paved the way for Arab conquests (Ucar 2012, 79). The Byzantines at first negotiated with Arabs about Egypt, which lasted too long. In the meantime, the Muslim inroads in Egypt continued, and they firstly took Alexandria (642 CE), and then Tripoli (643 CE). Following the death of Caliph Umar, Caliph Uthman stopped the attacks. This gave Byzantium a chance to take its losses in Egypt back, so they took Alexandria. Because of this, Muslims sent their armies back to Egypt and they took Alexandria again. The Copt Christians submitted peacefully to Arabs, in other words, they preferred Muslims to Byzantium. Thus, Egypt's conquest was completed (Ucar 2012, 80). Under Muslim rule, Egypt also enjoyed a significant level of autonomy, thus the institutions and human resources of Egypt continued to be utilized by the Muslims (Kennedy 1998).

In sum, we can see that the institutions, qualified human resources, and accumulated knowledge of previous core areas were taken over by the new core areas. What made the new core areas to take over these manners of the previous core areas was the weakness that was witnessed among the people (Muslims) after some time. We previously said that Muslims gained the capability to challenge the core areas owing

to strength of the new ideas that was making them to be mobilized and cohesive. This was the source of the strength of the Muslims to be able to challenge the core areas. However, later, some disagreements within the Muslim community and some deviations from the principles of Islam created weaknesses that made them to emulate the previous core areas rather than challenging the entire system and come up with an unprecedented world political picture. In other words, when a system replaces the other, we can say, they do not lead to formation of an unprecedented system, rather each system is a copy of the previous systems. Therefore, we can say, even though the systems replace each other, there is continuity in the principles of the system. Once it has formed in the ancient Mesopotamia, it replicated itself in different conditions and different eras. What led to the continuation of the system in all ages was that human knowledge about previous relationships did not die with the end of each system. The human knowledge provided continuity. However, even the institutions and practices of previous cores helped formation of similar systems and relations, this was also a result of the tendency of the system to draw its boundaries and to apply exclusion relationship against the outside areas. The previous practices only facilitate the exclusion and other relationships that are dictates of the system dominance in world political relations. Once a region that is closely interacting emerges, a system that would dominate the conflict resolution and the cooperation maintenance functions tends to ensue. This system, by emergence, leads to intra-core relations to be harmonious, while core-periphery relations to be conflictual (inclusion vs. exclusion). The previous experiences of structures/polities of the core are transmitted to following structures just as facilitators not as original decision makers.

While the core dictates its patterns, it is a question worth asking as to why people comply with the system dictates. In fact, there is an objection to continuity of core-periphery dichotomy at the initial stages of the peripheral challenges to the core. However, this motivation of people, over time loses its effect. We know from our historical review of a long period of history that there was always a human objection to the continuation of core-periphery relations that the systems created. As we have seen in this Chapter, the Muslims were another example of human objection to the core-periphery dichotomy that the Sassanid-Byzantium system created. However, not only in the case of Muslims, but also throughout history, people raised objections to

the core-periphery patterns that the system dictated, i.e., groups like Akkadians, Amorites, Indo-Europeans, Arameans, and Meds. Yet, eventually, all of these groups failed to create a world political conjecture where the exclusion that the system created was excluded. We know that all these peripheral people, at the beginning, lacked a strong political structure, and they were only loosely organized groups. What made these people to seek inclusion was sometimes such natural developments as drought, famine, and diseases; sometimes the concentration of military and/or economic capabilities available to the loosely organized people; and sometimes innovativeness of the ideas that spread in the periphery. Surprisingly, once these people caused the demise of the system/core, they started to support structures emulating the previous core areas, rather than seeking continuous inclusion for everyone, and relegating system and environment dichotomy to nonexistence. It seems that after the defeat of the core, the people lose the motivation that provided them cohesiveness due to some factors that harm cohesiveness. For example, they overcome the consequences that the natural disasters caused, or the disagreements start to arise among them with the death of leadership, or life conditions of a considerable portion of these people improve. All these factors, after some time, lead people to question the solidarity among themselves, and start to show allegiance to the system structures, thus helping the patterns that the system dictates to reproduce. As a result, the objection of people to the core-periphery patterns marginalizes. At the face of this marginalization, the knowledge and capabilities available about the previous practices of core regain their role and contribute to the reproduction of the old core-periphery relations. Here, such a development also occurred among the Muslims. The previous cohesiveness among the Muslim people weakened, and inter-family and inter-sectarian disputes (Istanbuli 2001; Ucar 2012) eroded the cohesiveness and the objection that the Muslims at the beginning developed against the core areas. Hence, power holders started to support the new core structures such as Umayyads and Abbasids in return for benefits that these empires provided.

The idea that the Umayyads and Abbasids just replicated the Byzantium and Sassanids as a core area that acted in accordance with system-environment dichotomy can be traced in the mutual relations between Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium. The review of the relations between them shows that Umayyads/Abbasids left aside their

initial argument that they came up with a new message. They just replicated the relationship between the Sassanids and Byzantines. The religious, economic, and diplomatic relations as well as confrontations between Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids just confirm this. Now we will elaborate on the relations between Umayyad/Abbasids and Byzantium, to find whether their relations resembled the relations between typical core areas. In this sense, we will elaborate on diplomatic, economic, and religious relations as well as the confrontations that took place between them.

6.1.5. Diplomatic, Economic, and Religious Relations in the Core

The development of the diplomatic relations between Muslims polities and Byzantium, in the sense of recognizing the counterpart as a legitimate partner, developed after Muaviyah became the caliph. Even though the Prophet himself and later the Rashidun Caliphs also exchanged letters with the leaders of other states, we cannot say that with these letters the Muslims recognized the legitimacy of their counterpart. As a matter of fact, these letters were challenges to their counterparts, in that the counterparts were invited to Islam. However, starting from the era of Muaviyah, even though caliphs in their letters to the Byzantine Empire invited them to accept Islam (Istanbuli 2001), the exchanges were more like those between equivalent partners. These exchanges contributed to development of conventional diplomatic relations that occur between counterparts that have no issues with the existence of the other. Thus, with the end of Rashidun Caliphs' era, we may say that the era of challenging the entire core (especially Byzantium) almost became nonexistent, because the Umayyads themselves became a core area that found its existence dependent on existence of its counterpart, Byzantium. They became the structures of a system/core.

We can see this dependency of one core area on the other in the utilization of the counterpart core area (Byzantium) in the Intra-Muslim community relations. Indeed, Muaviyah introduced a new strategy. During his engagement with Ali at Siffin, Muaviyah made an agreement with Byzantine. By paying tribute to Byzantium, he ensured avoidance of pressure put on him by Byzantium (Istanbuli 2001, 88; Ucar

2012). This tendency of establishing diplomatic relationships based on mutual dependency was not limited to Muaviyah, rather all the following caliphs followed the suit. Muaviyah was just an innovative and leading caliph in introducing conventional governing and diplomatic manners and methods in the Muslim state. Another pioneer of diplomacy, manners, and governing was Harun al-Rashid in the Abbasid era (Istanbuli 2001). Harun al-Rashid was the Abbasid caliph who introduced new manners, and deepened the previous manners. When he was at the throne (786-809 CE, Baghdad had “grown to become a world center of prodigious wealth and international significance”. Alongside this, at this time, Baghdad became a center of luxury. Poets, wits, musicians flowed to the capital. As such it became a center of “intellectual awakening” that was remarkable for the “history of thought and culture” (Istanbuli 2001, 89).

The intensification of the peaceful relations between the Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantium indicates that they had relations that occur between conventional powers, namely the core areas. However, the Arab-Byzantine relations are mostly known to have consisted of conflict (Gibb 1958, 221; Istanbuli, 2001, 98). This judgment is not groundless because most of the sources that deal with the relations of the time mention mostly the wars, and there are few studies that deal with the relations other than wars. Furthermore, the historical record is mostly conferred from the perspective of the rulers. The implications of historical events are assessed to the degree that they are related to the developments in the capital (Gibb 1958, 221; Ostrogorsky 1959, 14). Yet a closer look indicates that the relations between Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantines were quite sophisticated, which makes us think that there were more than wars. As a matter of fact, the relations were established in such a way that they make us think that they were two core areas constituting a system/core, who had relations similar to the previous core areas. The quotation below will be fruitful to get a sense that there was more than war. The relations had a character that showed a considerable level of conventional world political relations.

It was during this period [Umayyad and Abbasid] that State institutions were established, and relations with foreign states took a new course. After a period of conquests and expansion during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) and the Orthodox Caliphs, the Islamic Empire was more or less established as to its territory and to the pattern of government. Except for the first period of the

Umayyad Caliphate when military engagements continued in the far west of Africa and far east of Asia, the center of the State witnessed a peaceful and prosperous life. Past the peak of its strength, with its self-sufficiency diminishing, giving way to dependence on the luxuries of life, the Muslim Empire proceeded to have greater international intercourse, commercial, cultural, as well as political. Diplomacy, therefore, gained increasing significance especially in matters of international trade. Muslim envoys were sent to the courts of several monarchs for various political, commercial, cultural and social reasons, for the exchange of gifts and for other purposes. It is significant to observe that in the Abbasid period, a branch of Islamic studies was devoted to questions regarding relations with other nations. This branch of studies within the Islamic jurisprudence (Al-Fiqh) became known as Siyar (Istanbuli 2001, 86).

Thus, it was the Umayyads who brought other aspects other than warfare as the attributes of the foreign relations, a mix of opposition and attraction. Indeed, the Umayyad caliphs were imitating the Byzantine emperors in their practices to the extent the Muslim population was content. For example, the revenue administration, coins, upkeeping of the roads, the usage of rescripts for filling the gaps in the law etc. were the practices that Umayyads adopted. Another striking similarity was that the Umayyads attempted to build monumental mosques similar to the religious architecture of Byzantium (Gibb 1958, 222-224). After the Umayyads, the palaces of Bagdad (Abbasids) were not any different from palaces of the age. In fact, they were symbols of magnificence to show the grandeur of the Abbasids, especially on ceremonies where the messengers of other kings were present (Istanbuli 2001, 90). When the Muslim emissaries arrived at Byzantium, they received the highest status compared to other emissaries. The reception of the Arab emissaries was quite elaborate. As such the Byzantium emissaries were received quite elaborately and they were shown the magnificence of the empire. Both the Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids considered each other as the most prominent counterpart (101). In sum, even though the relations of Umayyads/Abbasids with Byzantines are claimed to be marked with hostilities, there was an aspect of relations that went beyond the conflict. There were undeniable and remarkable cooperative relations between the parties (98).

The diplomatic relations in this era in the core areas of the Middle East were similar to the diplomatic relations between previous core areas in history. They were an indication of the fact that Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids were two structures

of the core that worked in harmony. Each of the counterpart's survival depended on the other. Even though the sources say that Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids had conventional relations that were stabilized and long-lasting, they do not say that these relations were necessary for the survival of each party. However, we can say that the Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium were dependent on each other based on the fact that the Umayyads and Abbasids, while they can, did not attempt to end the rule of the Byzantium Empire. Second, Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids cooperated with each other against their own subjects. This attitude was a reversal from the attitude to end all core claims of Byzantium and Sassanids. Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids became the structures/polities of the core/system.

Among the core areas, functions such as conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance are performed with the equal participation of the core members. The periphery lacks any way of performing these functions according to regular principles of world politics. Rather, their problems or opportunities are frozen since they are not a system. Their issues come to the foreground to the degree that the core allows. The core areas resolve their disagreements (which are mostly about the control of the peripheral areas) mostly with minor wars, diplomacy, and other means. They reach cooperation with diplomacy and negotiation. They make regulations about the issues that all sides in the core feel the necessity of. We can infer the existence of such a core/system by looking at the nature of the relations between the core areas. Each core area takes the existence and participation of other core areas in world politics as a precondition for its own core status. We already have seen that the diplomatic relations show that the parties (Byzantines and Umayyads/Abbasids) treated each other as natural partners. Now we will take a look at the religious and economic relations and the confrontations between Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids to see if these parties were taking the existence and participation of each other in the relations as a precondition of the existence of themselves or not.

The material that we accessed supports the idea that the Muslim and Byzantine economies were closely interacting. Even if we suggest that Byzantine and the Umayyads/Abbasids were in continuous war, Gibb argues, it was common at the time that two warring parties or the subjects of them to continue their economic relations as well as courtesy relations (1958, 229-230). The examples of interactions that

suggest a lively trade between these two areas were numerous. Indeed, the Umayyads, as an indication of widespread trade relations, differentiated taxes over the trade based on status of the merchants, i.e., non-Muslims residents in Muslim territories, the Muslims, and foreign traders. This differentiation between the taxes to be collected indicated that there were widespread interactions and these interactions were regulated through taxes. Furthermore, the Umayyads did not restrict the sea trade, so the Muslims were allowed to involve in sea trade, which necessarily implied the interactions with Byzantines (230-231).

The gold money (coins) of the Byzantine Empire, Bezant, was accepted as the most trusted money of the time, at least until the 13th century CE. Even though it was Byzantine money, it was circulated in other countries too. Indeed, no other ruler was able to mint coins of their own effigy. Some rulers of other countries minted their own coins, but they were not successful. None of other coins could match the fame of the Byzantine coins. The Byzantine gold coins maintained their stability for such a long period that no other money matches its stability and acceptability as the international money (Lopez 1951, 209-210). Byzantines were claiming that it was particularly the right of the Byzantine Emperor to mint coins (209). However, Byzantine Empire was relatively weaker in terms of foreign trade compared to the Umayyads/Abbasids. Umayyads/Abbasids were exporting more goods than they imported. They had a larger diversity of products and a better living standard (225). Thus, while the Byzantium had a comparative advantage in managing the currency of the age, the Umayyads/Abbasids were superior in other economic activities.

In sum, there were considerable economic interactions, and Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantium did not have any bias against each other in terms of trading, even though the wars and at times other specific problems such as the regulation of the strategic goods, i.e., gold, may have slowed down the trade relations (Gibb 1958; Lopez 1951; Lopez 1959; Constable 2003). However, these relations were not invented just in this era, in fact they were only continuation of previous trade relations. The infrastructure of the trade was just inherited from the previous era. Mentioning one critical institution in the trade would suffice, it is funduq (khan). It was originally an ancient institution of Mediterranean world, which had continued to exist for around 2000 years in the Mediterranean basin, with some modifications (Constable 2003, 2).

Starting from “pagan, Jewish, and early Christian milieu of late Roman period, into Islamic context, then later into the Latin Christian sphere of southern Europe- it was both a point of common understanding across cultures and mediation between them” (3). The funduqs were used for various purposes and various people travelling for various purposes, i.e., “travelers, merchants, warriors, pilgrims, sailors, ambassadors, and vagabonds” (2). The travelers needed several things such as “shelter, food, security and other amenities to make their voyages possible” (3). These people were able to find a hospitable place for themselves, which was the early form of funduqs. As the Muslims arrived, they also adopted this institution that was providing the needs mentioned. Thus, in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims too, the funduqs became an acceptable place to stay (8).

In terms of the functions fulfilled, funduqs evolved. Funduqs were originally the places designed for only lodging of travelers. Over time, some other functions started to be associated with them, i.e., storage of goods. When Muslims utilized the funduqs, in addition to lodging and storage, “provision of space for commerce” became another specific attribute of these places. Given the expansion of the functions of these institutions, the governments, especially local officials took advantage of these places for regulation of economic activities and other purposes (Constable 2003, 6-7). The local administrations oversaw funduqs to facilitate official communication, to monitor the “movement of people and goods, to collect taxes and fees, and to profit from trade” (7). Another function, which had nothing to do with trade and economy, was religious and charitable. The rulers used these places for “lodging pilgrims and poor wayfarers” (Constable 2003, 8).

The review of these economic relations and institutions also shows that, counter to the general understanding that the Umayyads/Abbasids were in conflict with Byzantines, the core areas in this era had typical relations between the core areas, namely mutual dependence. This mutual dependence was not a simple give and take relationship; it meant that each of them had an interest in the existence of other core areas for survival of themselves. Together, they were structures of the system. The core areas counter to prediction of many other IR theories were not in conflict with each other due to anarchical conditions. Rather they were in a mutual dependence relationship. However, we cannot generalize this dependence relationship between the core areas

to intra-periphery relations and the relations between core and peripheral areas. Therefore, the arguments of this study also oppose the idea that the general state of world political relations is cooperation. The relations are more nuanced. While core areas have cooperation among each other, they have a conflictual relationship with the periphery. In this case, we can say that the Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids, having mutual diplomatic and economic relations witnessed a dependence relationship with each other. On the other hand, they had conflictual relations with the peripheral areas.

We can see this in their religious relations as well. These two core areas were defined with their religious attributes among their subjects. The Umayyads/Abbasids were identified with Islam and the Byzantine with Christianity; each claimed that they were protector of members of two religions. Thus, one might expect that Byzantines would be exclusionary in their relations with the Umayyads/Abbasids due to exclusionary discourse of both religions. The same applies to the Umayyads/Abbasid. However, below we will see that the religious relations between these two core areas were pragmatic. The universal claims of the religions were abandoned in the relations between the core areas.

When we look at the religious relations between Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids, we can see that the language used internally about each other was different from the language used in formal relations. Furthermore, the language of correspondences that took place in the form of letters from the caliph to the Emperor and vice versa were more diplomatic and informed (Meyendorf 1964; Istanbuli 2001). If we take the popular stances in both sides, it can be assumed that the religious divide between the Muslims and Christians was very big. Indeed, both of the religions had universal claims that prevented the legitimization of the other. This should have made mutual relations hard. One might even expect that the standard relationship between the two sides was war and conflict (Meyendorff 1964, 129). However, in practice the religious divide was handled more easily. The divides got more moderate in the official level. It seems that the uncompromising principles of the two religions were modified by the governments. One practice where we can observe the moderate nature of religious affairs was the letters exchanged between the Umayyad/Abbasid caliphs and the Byzantium Emperors.

It was customary for the Muslim caliphs to send letters to the “infidel princes” to accept Islam upon their accession to the throne (Meyendorff 1964, 126). In these correspondences, the Muslims were more self-confident in that they were inviting the emperor to be Muslim, and they were questioning the Christian practices, such as the trinity issue, the usage of portraits and the icons etc. On the other hand, the emperors’ attitude was more defensive in that they were trying to prove that they did not compromise from monotheism, and the usage of icons was not an indication of paganism. Therefore, the emperors were more careful and informed about the religious issues. For example, in one of the letters by Leo III around 717-720 CE, he responded to the caliph’s question about why he did not accept Islam and why he chosen Christianity instead of Islam. His response indicated that Byzantines were very well informed about Islam. He did not use the misperceptions about Muslims, i.e. the pre-Islamic practices of Arabs, as if they were the attributes of Muslims, which were quite widely used in the popular assessments of Islam in the Byzantium society (125-127).

The manners in the correspondences toward the end of the Abbasid rule, we may say, became even more moderate, reflecting the diplomatic politeness (Meyendorf 1964). There was a moderate expression of religious views between Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium. These refined views were adopted mostly because of conventions of diplomacy and “the necessity of coexistence in the occupied areas, and the cool reflection of informed minds” (115). This moderation did not develop at the official level only. As a matter of fact, the representatives of the Church also embraced manners of moderation, which echoed also in the Umayyad/Abbasid side. In their correspondences, patriarch Nicholas Mystikos and caliph showed to each other tolerance. For example, in a letter by patriarch Nicholas to caliph, there were quite interesting remarks. He said that both Muslims and Christians receive their authority from God. The Arabs and the Romans “represent two powers over all powers” thus shine as two big lights, which “in itself is a sufficient reason for them to live in fraternal fellowship” (128).

As we can see the Umayyads/Abbasids socialized into the core ideology of mutual dependence between core areas. The same applies to the Byzantium. Both developed a channel of communication where they softened the religious discourse, which could

cause conflict between the core areas in case the popular approach was pursued. The core areas, by softening the religious discourse, avoided the potential destructive capacity of the people in both sides. The Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium dared to face the people's criticism toward them. The core areas did this for the sake of the sustenance of dependence relationship between the core areas. The core areas, i.e., Byzantium and Umayyads, were not identical with their people. People and the political organizations were independent from each other. The core areas ignored the people's demands to the degree that they can, for core/system can sustain. Hence, we can say that the core at times was in conflict with the people (even when they were the citizens/subjects of the core areas) since they were considered as a peripheral/environmental element of the core.

The system/core has an independent existence that, on the one hand, treats the people as an environmental/peripheral element, but on the other hand, needs people in order to exist (Luhmann 2013a). We could see that the system, core areas, by ignoring the people's expectations regarding their beliefs put them in the environment of the system. On the other hand, the core areas cannot completely ignore people because they are dependent on the people for their survival. Therefore, the system does not openly challenge the beliefs, ideas, expectations of people, rather at face value the system attaches itself to the people's expectations. Yet, in reality, the system softens the tone of people's expectations. The system, on the one hand, continuously strives to show that the interests and expectations of the system and that of people are the same, on the other hand, it treats the people as an environmental element. We can see this system stance in the core areas of the early Islamic period system that had people believing universal religions; Islam and Christianity.

Therefore, as the system (core areas) treats their people as an environmental element, we can claim that just as the Byzantium and Sassanids collaborated with each other against their own people, so did Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantium against their own people. The most influential population of both core areas were either Muslim or Christian, and their expectations would require that their states to target each other. For the empires, the way to avoid the destructive criticism of the people was to collaborate against the people. The softening of religious message between Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids was such a collaboration between core areas to exclude the

peripheral/environmental elements (their people). Thus, when we say that core areas cooperate with each other, we imply that the core areas (system) cooperate not only against the peripheral people and states but also against the people living in the core.

6.1.6. Inconclusive Military Confrontations Between Core Areas

The most challenging relations to the claims of this study can be argued to be the military encounters between the Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantium. One might be overwhelmed with the fact that both sides almost continuously fought with each other. If there was a continuous state of fighting between the Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantium, then it can be supposed that they were in conflict with each other. Otherwise, why should they had wars with each other continuously. However, a closer examination shows that these confrontations never escalated into an all-out war. If the confrontation never escalated into destruction of one side, then there must be another definition for these confrontations. Our study of these confrontations shows that there was little at stake in these fights. Rather than being indication of the overarching conflict between the Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium, with few exceptions, the confrontations between them were show off cases where both sides confirmed that their counterpart continue to be a core area. Another purpose that these fights served seems to be convincing people that the states were continuously fighting their enemies for spreading their religion (Christianism or Islam) or for protecting them from the offenses of the enemies.

Therefore, the story of military encounters between Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids was that of discrepancy between the actual and claimed reality. At face value, it seemed as if the Umayyads and Abbasids fought with the Byzantines to take Anatolia and to end the Byzantine rule, but out of the inability, this process did not culminate with success (Ucar 2012). However, when we closely look at what happened, the reality is much more different. Reassessment of the empirical findings indicates that the military encounters between the Umayyads/Abbasids and the Byzantium were far from the story of incapacity of Umayyads/Abbasids to end the Byzantium rule. Rather, we see that, the Umayyads/Abbasids never fully paid enough attention to the conquest of Anatolia and ending the rule of Byzantium. This was, in

fact, an indication of the fact that the Umayyads/Abbasids socialized into the pre-Islamic world political milieu of the Middle East, which was based on low-tension coexistence of two core areas. The sketch of the history of military encounters will reveal the ideas proposed here, even though some counter facts may distract us from thinking this way, i.e., the second siege of Istanbul, we will see that it was just an exception to the general tendency.

Prior to the emergence of Umayyads, during caliphate of Umar, Muslims were unwilling to build a strong fleet that would be helpful in attacking Istanbul (Ucar 2012, 85). Later in the caliphate of Uthman, Muslims prepared a large fleet that obtained some successes in the Mediterranean Sea (82-89). However, the superiority gained in the sea was not utilized by Muslims against Byzantium and for conquest of Istanbul. As a matter of fact, the disorder in Muslim community ended up with murder of caliph Uthman, and the turmoil and the chances that Muaviah saw for being caliph led him not execute the conquest of Istanbul (89). Rather, he made peace with Byzantium in return for tribute to Byzantium, and then headed to join the civil war among the Muslims, in which he fought skillfully against caliph Ali to become caliph (89). Because of this civil strife, the preparations for conquest of Istanbul, which started in the era of Caliph Uthman as early as 653 CE (83), were postponed and the operations started as late as 669 CE, under the Umayyads. This was a long period to initiate the conquest (92-95). The war preparations lasted until 674 CE. The Umayyads started a large campaign in which they employed both sea and land operations, where they did not accomplish the surrender of Istanbul, and retreated to a near area (98-99). Considering twenty years between planning and execution of the conquest one can notice how half-heartedly the operation was carried out.

Finally, in 675-676 CE, the Umayyads initiated another large attack both from sea and land. This time, Byzantium was close to fall, but they invented a new weapon (Greek fire) that exploded when delivered to a target. This fire was also effective over water. It is fair to say that it was this new weapon that saved the Byzantium throne from the Umayyads. This became more obvious in the next sieges (Ucar 2012, 99-100). Indeed, Umayyads arranged another siege in 678 CE, both from sea and land. However once again Byzantium used this new weapon (Greek fire) successfully. In this siege, almost entire Muslim fleet was destroyed; the Muslims heavily were defeated this time (100).

Thus, this first attempt to conquer Istanbul was not been carried out carefully, rather the Umayyads seemed that they dragged foot in implementing the project that started during Rashidun Caliphs. It was planned during era of Uthman, but firstly, intra Muslim strife then the unwillingness of the Umayyads led this attempt to become unsuccessful. This unwillingness on the side of the Umayyads shows that the Umayyads, from the beginning, were ready to take Byzantium as a partner rather than as a foe. Furthermore, when Muslims first initiated their plan to take Istanbul, they had upper hand which was over time lost since the plans executed very late and Byzantium invented a new weapon.

Following the siege of Istanbul, the Umayyads arranged small attacks to various places in Anatolia, which were initiated from Malatya (Ucar 2012, 75). Almost every summer, the Umayyads arranged some attacks in Anatolia. The routes that were used to move in Anatolia were not fixed, they could vary (75). During these attacks, the Arabs showed presence in almost every part of Anatolia except Black Sea costs; only this region remained intact. The most plundered and visited areas in Anatolia were Cappadocia and Lykonian. When the Umayyads had to remain in Anatolia, during winter, they would prefer to remain in Aegean region due to mild climate, where they could also benefit from the presence of their fleet (76). This trend of yearly expeditions in Anatolia by the Umayyads became a regular interaction between the Byzantines and the Umayyads. They never meant a serious confrontation.

While minor confrontations were taking place, Byzantium entered in a restructuring period that ended up with Byzantium's gaining an equal and sometimes a higher status in military terms with the Umayyads and later with Abbasids. The first restructuring attempt was carried out among the religious sects in Byzantium. Byzantium interfered in the realm of religion for resolving the disagreement between Alexandria and Antioch schools (Ucar 2012, 56-63; Ostrogorsky 1959, 4). Second, as Byzantium was shrinking, it restructured the administrative organization in areas that it controlled, especially Anatolia (Ostrogorsky 1959, 4; Donner 1981).

These reforms contributed to the Byzantium's capability to stand against the Umayyads. The sketch of the Umayyad and Byzantium military encounters after the appointment of Yazid (Mu'awiyah's son) indicates that the military encounters were

no more in the full control of the Umayyads. Rather, Byzantium at times gained upper hand, and even was able to arrange counter attacks to the Umayyads to receive tribute, or to harass the Umayyad presence in Armenia, the sea, and North Africa. This improvement in the Byzantium's capabilities coupled with the civil strife during tenure of three caliphs in Umayyad territories paralyzed the Umayyads, and the Byzantium gained significant advantages (Ucar 2012, 102-106; Gelovani, 2013, 28). Following the internal strife in Umayyad territories, the Umayyads were able to capture back what they lost, but the overall character of the confrontations was low-profile (Ucar 2012, 107-115; Gelovani 2013, 28).

So far, we have seen that the conflicts between Umayyads and Byzantium, including the first siege of Istanbul, were either small scale or underprepared confrontations that occurred for resolving minor disagreements between them. There was no serious preparation and operation to finish Byzantium rule by the Umayyads. On the other hand, Byzantium, did not seem to be interested in seriously harming the Umayyads despite the fact that the Umayyads were in serious trouble at home. We have already said that it was loosening of the message of Islam among the Muslims during Umayyad period that led to disagreements emerge between different groups in the Muslim society. This, in turn, led to dependence of the Umayyad dynasty to the existence of Byzantium. If the Umayyads did not collaborate with the Byzantines, the Byzantines could dethrone the Umayyad dynasty. There was no formal agreement of the collaboration between the Umayyads and Byzantium, but we can infer this collaboration from their actions against each other. The general tendency of the confrontations between Byzantium and Umayyads was small scale that occurred about minor disagreements. There was one exception to this trend, that is the second siege of Istanbul by Umayyads, which was different from summer expeditions of the Umayyads to Anatolia.

While the small expeditions from the Umayyads to Byzantium were routinized, in 711 CE, throne fights took place in Byzantium, which gave the Umayyads advantage to make an exception in their routine, that is attacking to Istanbul (Ucar 2012, 117). Considering the susceptible situation of Byzantine, Velid contemplated a large expedition to Istanbul. Byzantium took reports about these preparations and it also started preparations for a long fight, by fortifying the walls, piling grains, and

procuring defense arms (118). Yet, Velid died in 715 CE, before arranging the Istanbul campaign. The next caliph, Suleiman also followed the suit and continued preparations both from sea and land (119). The second siege of Istanbul finally started in 716 August CE. The Umayyads sieged the exits and put bricoles. It was also reported that the Umayyads, first time ever, used “naphtha” in this war. Furthermore, the Umayyad army brought a lot of grain and did not consume it until the winter, instead they relied on plunder (123).

In this siege, even though the Umayyads received a peace proposal, they declined it (Ucar 2012, 124). However, the logistic chain of the Umayyads failed to provide the army with enough material, due to Byzantium interference (124-125). Hence, during the second siege, the Byzantium managed to cut the lines of logistics of the Umayyads as well as cutting the lines of additional forces. In addition, they were able to do this several times, especially in the sea (126). In spite of many setbacks the Umayyad forces went through, Mesleme, the commander of the Umayyad army, in this expedition resisted to the harsh conditions. However, in 717 CE, Mesleme was ordered stop siege and return home, by the new caliph Umar Abdul-Aziz, as Suleiman died (127). Once again failed in a considerable attack, lasted from 717 to 718 CE, the Umayyads restarted old way summer expeditions (129).

Even though, Umayyads sieged Istanbul second time, it seems that they did not allocated enough time and logistical material for surrender of Byzantium. For example, Muslims laid siege on the capital of the Sassanids for two years, until it cracked down. However, both in the first and second sieges of Istanbul, there was not enough time paid for the surrender of Byzantium. While in the sieges of Istanbul, there was not a determination on the side of the Umayyads, in the minor summer attacks there was not any hesitation. Therefore, we can suggest that the general trend in the confrontations between Umayyads and Byzantium was toward coexistence and dependence relationship that handled the minor issues among themselves through minor confrontations. The sieges of Istanbul seem to be exception to this trend, but a closer look shows that the first siege was half-heartedly executed because probably it was necessary for satisfying the criticism among the Muslims since it was planned during Rashidun Caliphs era. Yet, because it was half-heartedly executed and not enough time allocated, it failed. The second siege also was an exception because it

seemed to be a plan of two caliphs rather being a goal that was adopted by the establishment of the Umayyads. Indeed, the second siege was interrupted when the supporting caliph died. Despite this hesitance against the conquest of Istanbul, all caliphs carried out small scale summer expeditions against Byzantium. This shows that the expeditions were products of overarching policy of the Umayyads against the Byzantium (that is co-existence), while the sieges of Istanbul were face saving attempts. These generalizations are also applicable to Abbasid era.

Indeed, the small summer expeditions to Anatolia and some retaliatory attacks of the Byzantines, and vice versa, continued in the Abbasids era as well. Yet, this time we do not see any extensive expedition from either side that can be compared to the two sieges of Istanbul in the era of the Umayyads (Bahadir 2009; Bosworth 1992; Ucar 2012). The summer expeditions did not change the frontier between the Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids, there was a buffer zone between the territories of both sides. Once the Byzantine frontier was drawn and a buffer zone (which was cleared of military bases and castles) was determined, this frontier maintained its existence during both the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Neither the Umayyads nor the Abbasids sought to alter the frontier (Bahadir 2009, 165-168). This was particularly so under the Abbasids; for them, it was an essential issue to protect the Byzantine frontier (166).

In the Abbasid period, the interactions and military encounters totally resembled relations of two established, coexisting and recognized powers. While Umayyad caliphs did not lead the army in the confrontations with Byzantium, under Abbasids this was not the case. For example, even though he was still the nominee to throne, Harun el Rashid led a war that ended up in front of Constantinople; he did not attack Istanbul though. Furthermore, even though he was victorious he retreated to the previous frontiers rather than seeking to change the status quo. Simply he was content with the previous frontier. What he did was fortification and strengthening of the castles and garrisons in the frontier, not more than that (Bahadir 2009, 167). In another case, in 830 CE, the caliph (Memun) himself led an expedition into Byzantium territories. The peace request from the Byzantium emperor was declined; therefore, both sides met in a fight in Tarsus. In this battle, both the emperor and the caliph were commanders to their army. Byzantium defeated the Abbasids (170). Next year, Abbasids again under the command of caliph restarted their attack into Byzantium

territories; this time the Abbasids defeated the Byzantium, and they made peace (171). The peace proposals and responses were exchanged between the emperor and the caliph, rather than being between the local rulers. Thus, these two sides conceived each other as equivalent, coexisting powers.

Other than these expeditions led by caliphs and Byzantine emperor, all other fights between the Abbasids and Byzantium were local summer expeditions. Despite these summer expeditions, what mattered was the maintenance of the frontiers, which was the case under the Umayyads too, but more institutionalized under the Abbasids. This resembled the maintenance of frontiers between two core areas that were dependent on each other. The maintenance of status quo between Byzantine and the Abbasids was even costly to the Abbasids; the expenses that they made in order to maintain the garrisons, spies, couriers, and security of roads far exceeded the revenues collected from these cities in the frontiers. Yet, Abbasids maintained them, rather than changing the frontier against Byzantium (Bahadir 2009, 170). This routine in the fights causes us even say that the summer expeditions were not planned by the caliph or the central authority. Indeed, the attacks in Anatolia were mostly initiated with the push of commanders and local garrisons, rather than being with the planning of the caliph (Bosworth 1992, 284-285). If this was so, the summer expeditions were not even wars between the Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids. They were expeditions carried out for satisfaction of expectations of the people. The governments gave the sense that they were fighting the infidels, spreading religion, and the protecting the people from attacks of the infidels. Indeed, given that the local garrisons at the frontiers were the fighters for faith, or ghazis, who were independent of central control and recruited from various places among the Muslims to fight for the religious cause (Bosworth 1992, 284-285), we can say that these fighters were satisfying the people's expectations rather than implementing the policies of the central government.

In sum, we see that the considerable military confrontations between the Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids are few, and even these were not wholeheartedly aiming to put an end to the existence of the counterpart. The regular confrontations at the local level, on the other hand, were carried out for satisfaction of the popular expectations. They did not aim at harming the other side seriously. Thus, the military confrontations do not reveal a counter argument against the claim that the Byzantium and the

Umayyads/Abbasids were structures of a system/core which dictated the two empires to co-exist, as equivalent core areas. The economic, military, diplomatic, and religious relations proved that they got along well, and in fact they had an interest in well-being of their counterpart. The military interactions between these two core areas just confirm this. Their military confrontations were mostly staged at the peripheral areas in Anatolia, and the aim of these confrontations was the satisfaction of expectations of the people in core areas. Both of the core areas (Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids) were claiming that they were the protector of religions, which were praised by the people in the core areas. This way, the core structures/polities of the system were getting the support of the people for sustenance of the system, by arranging low profile attacks.

The system was a world political system that included Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids as the core areas. The areas in the periphery can be said to be most of Anatolia, Iran, Egypt, Iraq and later Syria. The core areas were the capital and surrounding areas as well as the military and administrative personnel in the provinces. Byzantium and the Umayyads/Abbasids were included in the system/core, and the peripheral areas and people were excluded. Even though, at face value all the Muslims were included in the Umayyad/Abbasid Caliphates, and all the Christians were included in the Byzantium, this was only partially so. In essence, the members of the religions were peripheral elements, their expectations were only partially met to render the support of them. We saw this in both religious relations and military confrontations between the Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium. The core areas, at times, might have been more tolerant of the members of the most widespread religion compared to the members of other religions. Yet, this did not emanate from the fact that, for example, Muslims were included in Umayyad/Abbasid caliphates, rather, because Umayyads/Abbasids needed the support of the Muslims.

Therefore, the core areas were defined in terms of concentration of economic, innovative, ideational, and military capabilities in those areas. They were the capitals, some surrounding regions, and the administrative and military institutions and people in the provinces. In such a situation, the Byzantium Empire and that of the Umayyads/Abbasids were dearer to each other. They were included in the system, while the peripheral areas within the boundaries of them (i.e., people) were excluded

from the system/core. The interests of the core areas were overlapping with each other. The enmity/conflict between them could only occasionally be mentioned. When this conflict was going to be mentioned it was because of the popular demands, not a desire of the establishments of the empires.

The inclusion in the system/core meant that Umayyads/Abbasids and Byzantium were equally participating in the conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance in the wider Middle East region. This equal participation entailed suppression of the people's demands at their territories and suppression of independent conflict and cooperation tendencies among the peripheral areas. Second, they checked each other every time to see if they continue to be a core area, if they are worth to cooperate on issues that would be conducive to the maintenance of the system. Third, core areas had a monopoly in the areas they contained; no other state in the world had a say in the Middle East region. For example, such areas and peoples as China, India, France, Italy, Avars, Slavs, Khazars, Bulgars etc. did not participate in the conflict management in the Middle East region.

This system/core emerged following the spread of Islam. Prior to this system there was a system that was dominated by the Sassanids and Byzantium/Rome. The emergence of Islam led to transformation of the system of the Sassanids and Byzantium/Rome to a system of Byzantine and Umayyads/Abbasids. Islam's impact on this system change presented itself in the change in the status of Muslims/Arabs, who were peripheral elements before the emergence of Islam. Islam played a role to make loosely organized Arab community in the Middle East to consolidate around a cause, then challenge the core areas, and then become a part of the core areas. This role played by Islam gives us clues about the way the peripheral areas seek inclusion in the core successfully. In the previous Chapters, we provided many examples where peripheral people achieved inclusion in the core. Yet, due to lack of data, we did not see how the peripheral people organize, and how they become a force that is capable of successfully challenging the system/core, and how they attain being part of a newly emerging system. By studying the story of emergence and spread of Islam, we saw that there is not an automatic process that leads to the people to successfully challenge the system. The existence of large numbers of peripheral people alone is not enough for a system change unfold. Rather there is a small group among the peripheral people.

This small group is motivated with an idea/religion/message and is aiming to unite people around a cause. Without the efforts of this small group and a strong idea/message/religion, it seems, peripheral people cannot organize around a cause, accumulate strength, and challenge the core.

The Muslims were able to mobilize the entire Arab population in the Middle East and challenge Byzantium and Sassanid system. However, this did not mean that polities overtaking the Muslims' heritage kept the spirit of motivations and message of first Muslims. Rather, we saw that the Umayyads and the Abbasids adapted themselves to the previous core-periphery patterns of the Byzantium and Sassanids. Their story was no more the story of a group of peripheral people seeking inclusion in the core, rather their story was that of core areas we observed throughout the written history of the Middle East. They were the part of the core where Byzantium was the other core area. Together they developed a relationship where they cooperated against the peripheral areas as well as against the people who were their subjects.

CHAPTER 7

CORE PERIPHERY RELATIONS IN EARLY MODERN ERA

The present chapter is the second one on the world political relations in the common era. This Chapter focuses on world political relations when the world started to take a global nature and the Middle East witnessed the emergence of a new core (the Ottoman-Safavid core). The region, from the weakening of the Abbasids until the emergence of Ottoman-Safavid system lacked a core. During this period, groups of people were more autonomous as opposed to the dominance of a core. On the other hand, from around 10th century until the emergence of Ottoman-Safavid system by the beginning of 16th century, the developments in the world at large were not enough interconnected to allow the subjugation of a region by other regions. Therefore, the Middle East was able to sustain its autonomy despite the lack of a core and concentration of a superiority in the region. Incidentally, by the end of the 15th century, Europe started to gain prominence in the global scale, which made the autonomous existence of the regions of the world obsolete. Thus, a new world has emerged by this time which makes the analysis of world politics in the Middle East interesting to test the validity of exclusion theory. This test shows that we are able to see that exclusion theory is relevant in early modern era as well. This test has not been applied to modern Middle East politics because it is no more an independent region.

7.1. The Ottoman-Safavid Core and Its Periphery

The Ottoman-Safavid system was the one that emerged out of movement of people from Central Asia toward Iran and Anatolia. The system emerged gradually, and it was different from previous systems. Even though it had two core areas (the Ottomans and the Safavids), it was constituted of people from the same origin. The population base of both core areas was almost identical, the Turqomans. However, these core

areas (the Ottomans and the Safavids) were structures of a system that resembled the Sassanid-Byzantium/Roman system, where two distinctive people constituted the base of them. Thus, the Ottoman-Safavid system shows us that for a system can have more than one core area it is not necessary that these core areas have different population base. The reason why the same population base can generate two different core polities is that people do not decide to the formation of a system and its core polities. A system and its core areas emerge in a region or in world society. Taking the region as the reference point; in order for a system emerge in a region there must be concentration of military, economic, ideational, and innovative superiority in that region. When there is such a concentration in a region, a world political system emerges for administering that capacity and for carrying out conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions. The system carries out these functions by means of core polities which become the structures of the system. The Ottomans and the Safavids were two core areas/polities of the system/core.

Regarding the question as to why the core areas were more than one, given that the population base of the Ottomans and Safavids was similar, we can say that the system is not interested in whether there is one or more than one core areas included in the system. As we saw in previous chapters, there could be one, two or more than two core areas. What determines the number of core areas is the number of geographically different areas in a region where enough economic, innovative, ideational, and military capability is concentrated so that they can claim core status in the world political system in a region. All of these capabilities might be concentrated at once, or one or two of them could be more obvious compared to the others. For example, an area in a region might primarily have concentration of military capability and less of other capabilities, but still it might prove its core status to other core areas. Or an area might have superiority in multiple realms, i.e., economic, military, innovative, and ideational; and attain core status. When there is such a concentration of capabilities in an area compared to areas that are not equipped with such superiorities, then it is a core area. Other core areas in the region just recognize such a core area, instead of entering conflict with it. All the core areas are structures of a system/core. Thus, in the Ottoman-Safavid system, the Ottomans and the Safavids constituted the two core areas (structures) of the system. The Ottomans and Safavids were able to coordinate

military and ideational capabilities available in the Middle East owing to military capabilities that they acquired from the Central Asian roots and the administrative capability that they borrowed from the Sassanids and Byzantium.

Other parts of the wider Middle East were the periphery of the system. However, the study of the relations in this era shows that the peripheral areas (i.e. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Anatolia, different areas of Iran, Hejaz, and the Balkans etc.) were not able to considerably dispute the dominance of the core. On the other hand, we could say that the main periphery/environment of the Ottoman-Safavid system was people, who were subjects of these empires. Above, we stated that both the Safavids and the Ottomans were dependent on a specific type of population; the large numbers of warrior people who migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia and Iran. Yet, over time, the dependency on this population decreased as both of the empires started to recruit military and administrative personnel by adopting new mechanisms, namely *devshirme* or *ghulam*. The empires, as the core areas, reduced the dependency of the system/core to the powerful population groups in their territories. Hence, we can say that the empires by excluding warriors of Central Asian origin created a situation where all people, except the military and bureaucratic personnel, were outside of the core; they were excluded. In some areas, people disputed this exclusion, especially Turcoman people, both in the Ottoman and Safavid empires. Therefore, there was significant number of uprisings within these empires by the Turcoman origin people. They sought inclusion in the system through claiming that the government should provide more space for autonomy of them.

However, the inclusion attempts from the people did not succeed; both of the empires accomplished the repulsion of inclusion attempts emanating from the people. It is striking that both of the empires embraced a similar approach which permits us to infer that there was a tacit agreement between the empires regarding the people. The sources on the Ottoman-Safavid relations do not easily allow us to claim that there was cooperation between the Ottomans and Safavids; rather the sources assume a conflict between these empires. Despite this prejudice, in line with one of our claims that core areas of a system/core cooperate with each other, we find that there was cooperation between these core areas. Furthermore, the Ottoman and Safavid system shows that cooperation relationship between the core areas of a system did not develop

at once, rather it matured over time. If there is enough time that the system does not collapse because of peripheral interference, the core areas not only do cooperate tacitly but they also achieve formal agreement that confirms the cooperation among them against their populations/subjects as well as peripheral areas. When a formal agreement is achieved, even the confrontations that might occur between the core areas about testing each other's core status just fade away. Likewise, the confrontations that might occur about adjustment of disagreements disappear. When the core areas formalize the cooperation with an agreement, they reach perfect condition of excluding the environment, i.e. people, and the geographies that are contained/excluded by each of the core areas. Indeed, we see such maturation in the Ottoman-Safavid relations.

This opposes other views about the Ottoman-Safavid relationship. One view says that there was a competition between the Safavids and the Ottomans (Allouche 1983; Olson 1975; Fattah and Coso 2009; Kortepeter 2011; Inalcik 1997; Savaş 2000; Matthee 2003). Another view stresses the similarities of these empires as representatives of the Muslim world in the early modern history (Dale 2010; D'Souza 2002; Cleveland and Bunton 2009). According to the third view, the Ottoman-Safavid relations evolved toward building peace, even though the war rhetoric was rampant in these relations (Tucker 2012). This third view approximates to our findings regarding the type of relationship between core areas; the Ottomans and Safavids. However, we do not see a trend toward building peace. Peace was not a goal that was pursued by these core areas. The Ottomans and the Safavids did not decide what approach they should embrace against each other. Rather they were two structures that were positioned in the system to cooperate with each other and to exclude people and the peripheral areas from the system.

The system was a non-spatial communication network that existed independent of Ottomans and Safavids. It exists when there is a concentration of military, economic, ideational, innovative, and administrative capabilities in certain areas of a region. This concentration of capabilities exists before the core areas come into being. In our case, these capabilities preceded the existence of the Ottomans and Safavids; the Ottomans and the Safavids did not bring them into being. The proper functioning of the economic, ideational, innovative, and military capabilities prefers the emergence of a

core/system that handles the conflict and cooperation functions in a defined wider area, i.e., the Middle East or the world society. This wider area is divided into the core and the periphery. The core is the system where the most endowed areas of the region are included, and the periphery is the areas and people remaining outside of the system. Whether there would be a conflict or cooperation in the wider region, or how much freedom and autonomy would be enjoyed is decided only by the core. The core/system does not necessarily instrumentalize a single geographical area in the wider region for realizing its conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions. More than one core polity/state could be included in the core. If there are more than one core areas, i.e., the polities such as the Ottoman and Safavid empires, they are the structures of the core/system. Therefore, they would cooperate with each other out of the role they have in the system not because they prefer so.

Because the system/core is based on exclusion of the peripheral areas, the main conflict area is the one between core and periphery. The core decides what actions of the periphery are challenges to the core and how they should be resolved. When the peripheral areas or elements try to claim a conflict they are suppressed, because when the peripheral areas claim conflict this would mean a centrifugal tendency. This opposes the main goal of system, which is keeping difference between the core and the periphery. Similarly, the core decides on what subjects can cooperation be made, which is basically between the core areas, either about the issues in the core or the issues in the periphery. Third, when there is a need for creation of new rules regarding the interactions, once again the core areas carry this function out.

Thus, we can see that what we find about the relations between the core areas (the Ottomans and Safavids) is different from what is suggested in other sources. Therefore, we are going to clarify how the system formed and how it functioned. Understanding how the system was formed would show us that both the Ottomans and the Safavids at their initial stages needed the same population base, namely the Turqomans migrating from the Central Asia to Anatolia and Iran. However, after the Ottomans and the Safavids became core areas of the system, they started to estrange Turcomans. This estrangement implies the peripheralization of the people who were once main pillar of these polities. If the main pillars of these polities become peripheral, this will be a proof of the idea that people are not part of the system/core,

but rather they are within the periphery of the system. On the other hand, counter to the thesis that the Ottomans and the Safavids were archenemies of each other, understanding how the system functioned will show us that they tacitly cooperated for the sustenance of the Ottoman-Safavid System. The confrontations between the core areas were no more than adjustments in potential disagreement areas so as to make the relations among the core areas run smoothly.

7.1.1. Relations between the Core and the People

Above, we stated that the Ottomans and the Safavids depended on the same population base and the same political conjecture at their initial stages. The population base that the Ottomans and the Safavids utilized in their formation stage was not available at the Abbasid era. This population became available with the movement of people from Central Asia to Anatolia and Iran. The movement started when Abbasids were losing their control in the provinces. By the 10th century CE, Abbasids still retained their status as the “legitimate leader of Sunni Muslim world” (Dale 2010, 10-11). However, once Arab conquests stopped, Arab character of the Abbasid empire changed significantly. Too soon, the non-Arab Muslims took control of the empire that was created with the Arab conquests (Lloyd 1947, 185). Now, most of the territories previously controlled by the Abbasids were controlled by various independent Muslim dynasts. These sultans owed their status of being a sultan to their military capabilities, while for legitimacy they still needed Caliph’s “titular Islamic sovereignty” (Dale 2010, 10-11). Regional sultans characterized their wars as either Ghaza or Jihad. Most of the regional sultans were of Turkish origin (11). The Turks started to convert to Islam by 8th century CE, accelerated by the Muslim conquests. Then the Turks came to be seen in main Islamic lands either as military personnel or as pastoral nomads. The military personnel started to be employed in Abbasid empire due to their loyalty to protect the throne (Kortepeter 2011, 64; Dale 2010, 16). With the weakening of Abbasids, a conjecture where centrifugal tendencies of these newly Islamized people and sultanates started to be seen. While the number of the polities multiplied, this was accompanied by the existence of free groups of people and mass movement of people from Central Asia toward the Middle East. The relationship

between these people and the governments would later show that the governments treated people as environmental/peripheral elements.

In this period when there were multiple regional sultanates and the mass movement of people from the Central Asia, four characteristics of the Middle East could be discerned. One was that in the territories on which different sultanates established there was a pervasive influence of Sassanid administrative traditions. Second there was a pervasive Turco-Mongol military dominance (Dale 2010, 10). Thus, before emergence of the Ottoman-Safavid system, there was a division of functions between the Turks and the Persians, starting from Samanid-Gaznavid times (900-1050 CE). In this division, whereas the Turks exercised military command and executive authority, the Persians, formed the secretarial and administrative function. This tradition also was adopted and transmitted by the Timurid, Mughal, Safavid, and most other Turkish-ruled polities (Perry 2011, 86). Third, a political fragmentation was the main character of the era (Dale 2010, 10). Fourth, we can say, was spread of Sufism among the inhabitants of these territories. “Sufism ... deemphasized traditional public worship, in favor of individual study with a religious teacher (pir, shaikh)”, and it “profoundly influenced Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal societies” (12). Despite orthodox criticism toward Sufism, it spread rapidly in Islamic world. Many independent spiritual lineages emerged. Many of these lineages had close personal relationship with Muslim monarchs (13), which helped people have autonomy in relation to the governments.

Thus, from around 10th century to 16th century CE, people in the Middle East were mostly uncontrolled, meaning that they were not contained in the periphery of a system/core. The spread of uncontrolled population was accelerated in Iran and Anatolia during Saljuq rule. In 1071 CE, a Saljuqs led-army defeated Byzantine empire’s army, which led to the movement of large numbers of Oghuz Turks in Anatolia (Dale 2010, 16-17). Yet, the migration did not start with this war; rather it was a long process that reached to its peak during Saljuq rule (Dale 2010, 32; Perry 2011, 84). This movement of substantial number of Oghuz Turks to Iran and Anatolia later would have significant impact on military, economic and social history of the Middle East; it changed the ethnic composition of Iran, Anatolia, and northern Syria (Dale 2010, 33). When we look at their cultural, religious, and political leanings, we

can see that popular Oghuz tribesmen at that time were mostly prone to be Shia (43). They did not know the Twelver Shia beliefs; rather they were unorthodox groups that were prevalent in Eastern Anatolia and Western Iran. At the initial contacts between the Turqomans and the Safavids, who would later adopt the Shia as the official teaching of state, the differences between Twelver Shia and other Shia teachings were omitted by the Safavids (Keddie 1969, 39).

These Turqoman people did not settle in the territories that they first arrived. Rather they had a long tradition of moving back and forth between Anatolia and Iran. There are reports indicating that even prior to the Safavids there was migration of Turkic people toward Iran from Anatolia (Savaş 2000, 184). This, in fact, indicates that the people who moved back and forth between Anatolia and Iran did not have issues in doing this, because it was their way of living with a considerable degree of freedom. Similarly, as there was a mobility of people back and forth, as such there was a mobility of cultural products too. As a matter of fact, the cultural influence was not westward only. There was a cultural influence eastward too, mainly from the previously westward migrating Turqomans. These eastward and westward move of cultural products and motifs included “folkloric motifs, cultic emblems, ritual terms, linguistic features”, especially between 16th and 18th centuries CE. The Safavids played a significant role in occurrence of these influences (Perry 2011, 85).

Enjoying such a freedom and mobility in Anatolia and Iran, the Turqomans also constituted the major military source that the rulers can exploit. The core military input of the Middle Eastern states between 10th and 16th centuries CE, the Turqomans, also formed the core of the military of the Safavids and Ottomans, we can say. They were however quite mobile. When the Turqomans had issues with the Ottomans’ centralizing policies or imposed taxes (Savaş 2000, 185), they did not hesitate to rebel or move to Iran. Even the Sipahis, the military personnel of the Ottoman Empire, did not hesitate to move to Iran and join the Safavid forces when they thought they questioned the policies of the Ottoman Empire. At this time, Janissaries were enjoying privileges, as they were able to influence the government (Olson 1975, 13-14). Again, this shows that a substantial population of Anatolia and Iran was consisted of Turqomans, and especially at the establishment and consolidation stages, both Safavids and Ottomans relied on the unorthodox Turqoman population who moved

from the Central Asia (Cleveland and Bunton 2009 2009, 38, 39; Lowry 45-54; Savaş 2000, 186; Dale 2010, 52). As we can see, in the era stretching from the weakening of Abbasid Empire until the emergence of Ottoman-Safavid system, there was a dominance of people in the Middle East, who were mostly under the influence of Sufism which was at odds with the governments. Second, the military capabilities were not only accessible to the governments but also there was a significant level of free military capability at the disposal of the people. Third, people had a significant level of mobility in the Middle East territories; there was almost no or little impediment to the movement of people from one area to another. Therefore, we can say that people had a significant level of autonomy in relation to the governments prior to the emergence of Ottoman-Safavid system. The Ottoman-Safavid system formed at the expense of this autonomy; the system excluded the people from the system, which can be translated as reduction in the autonomy level of people.

These remarks show that Anatolia and Iran were characterized with military dependence on the Turcoman people who moved from Central Asia to Anatolia and Iran, starting from at least mid 9th century CE. One would expect that Iran and Anatolia should be included in the same state or empire, which was realized several times, during the Saljuq, Mongol, and Timur empires (Lapidus 2002). Yet, none of these empires really became a structure of a system/core where we can see core-periphery relations and core activities. These empires either disintegrated quickly or ended up with division of them into different polities ruled by the family members. A system did not emerge and these empires did not become core areas of a system because they did not achieve to the stage of excluding some areas and people from the system. The empires were still at the stage of being dependent on the people because people still were the dominant element in the Middle East when these empires emerged. The reason why these empires never reached to a stable position was that there was a continuous flow of people from the Central Asia toward west (112). These people, however, were not ordinary people, but they were warriors who can challenge the established polities/states. The states, on the one hand, militarily were dependent on these groups; on the other hand, they were vulnerable to this free military power that could organize to the detriment of empires. Each of the new group of people came

with their traditions, i.e., the right of ruling family members to share the territories conquered or the right of groups of people to be autonomous (119-120, 248-249).

Thus, even though there was a significant amount of military capability available in the Middle East, this did not suffice for a system to come into being. People were clung to nomadic forms of living, and the empires were not able to oblige these people to go sedentary. This became a source of continuous struggle between the polities and the people (Lapidus 2002, 248-249). When people went sedentary they would stop being a threat to the empires, in other words, they would lose their capability to influence the decisions of the empires. On the opposite end, the empires would acquire the ability to exclude people from system. Yet, if there was a continuous flow of people who asserted military capabilities, then it was not easy for the empire to exclude these people to the peripheral status. Thus, the empires and other types of governments which emerged after the decline of Abbasids in Iran and Anatolia until the rise of the Ottomans and the Safavids to core status, suffered from the inclusion that people enjoyed. Because people were able to succeed in inclusion, meaning that they had a say in the government policies and they could retain their autonomy, the empires or sultanates never become core areas of a durable system/core where they can exclude/restrain the people. Only with the emergence of Aq Aoyunlu and then the Safavids in Iran and the Ottomans in Anatolia and Balkans, the mobility of the people was contained. At first, these two empires were dependent on these people for their military capabilities. Later, this dependence decreased because they invented new mechanisms of recruiting military personnel. Indeed, reliance on autonomous groups of people declined as the Safavids and Ottomans got strengthened and built devshirme or ghulam systems instead of tribal unorthodox Turqomans (D'Souza 17; Kortepeter 65, 72; Cleveland and Bunton 2009 47, 54; Dale 2010, 59; Allouche 1983, 45-46; Fattah and Coso 114). Added to this, the sweeping military threats from the east stopped at this period. The fact that there was not an extensive military threat and human mobility from the east, the Ottomans and the Safavids were able to pacify the people in Anatolia and Iran.

Along these lines, we could say that the inclusion attempts of people bear fruit when there is not a system/core. Even though the lack of a system might be considered an undesirable incident, in fact the inclusion level of people reaches to its heights when

there is not a system. The first migration of Central Asian people to the Middle East started by the mid 8th century CE, but it did not stop, rather it continued unabated almost for six hundred years. During this period the people had the highest level of say in their administration because the governments were not independent of the people; they had to please the people. This, however, does not mean that this was the most prosperous and peaceful era. Indeed, during this time, cities were destroyed and peasants witnessed pillaging many times in Anatolia and Iran. Being multiple and short living, all the states emerging after the collapse of the Abbasid Empire had a form of organization where nomadic chieftains and slave soldiers replaced “landowning and bureaucratic elites”. The cohesion of the society mainly depended on armies. The dominance of armies worsened the agricultural economy since no investment was made and peasants were exploited (Lapidus 2002, 114; Dale 2010, 120-121). Being not in a prosperous and peaceful condition does not mean that the people were not included. People’s inclusion means that they are able to influence the decisions of the polities, and their freedom is little restricted. In this sense, the era from the 10th to 16th centuries CE in the Middle East was the era of inclusion of people. When people are included, the polities are not long lasting because of disruptive activities of people, and the history is not the history of states only. However, introduction of the Safavid-Ottoman system ended the relative independence of the people; people once again relegated to the peripheral status. Thus, the study of Ottoman-Safavid system’s emergence shows that the emergence of system/core is realized at the expense of people. People and their activities became peripheral, while the activities of states, which were the structures of world political system, developed into central position.

People triggered collapse of the Abbasid-Byzantium system while they sought inclusion, and they succeeded in this. However, the destruction of a system/core is not enough for long time inclusion of people. We have seen in previous chapters that one system effortlessly replaces the other, so the included people quickly get excluded in the next system. For that reason, for people continue to be included for long periods, there is a need for continuous flow of militarily capable people who could destabilize a potential system/core and its empires or other polities. As long as the flow of people continued from the Central Asia, people were more autonomous in terms of being able

to participate in the decision-making. Yet, they could not maintain this state of freedom and autonomy perpetually; ultimately a new system replaced the autonomous existence of people, namely the Ottoman-Safavid system/core. Despite this, still we can argue that probably this era ranging from 10th to 16th century CE is the longest era where people were in the foreground against the exclusion by the states because a system did not emerge during this period. However, the flow of people from east stopped at some point, which enabled formation of a new system. When there was no human interference, the normal state of affairs seems to be dominance of a system. The economically, militarily, innovatively, and ideationally superior areas automatically exclude areas that are less capable in these respects. The Ottomans and the Safavids were just two areas in this era that had more capabilities and they turned into core areas of a system/core. From the beginning, these two core areas did not have any issue with each other's existence, but they had some disputes that were handled over time.

7.1.2. Formation of Core States

The study of Ottoman-Safavid system shows that some polities (empires, states, sultanates) might exist independently of the system. The existence of polities does not always mean that they are structures of a system/core. When there is no system, the states that exist are more responsive to the expectations of the people; as we saw in the era stretching from 10th to 16th centuries CE. However, when a system/core appears in a region, a state in the region is either a core state in that system or a peripheral state outside of the system. We can see both situations in the Ottoman-Safavid case. Before the Ottomans and the Safavids (Aq Qoyunlu was almost identical predecessor of Safavids) became the core polities of the Middle East system around the beginning of 16th century, they were states in the Middle East where the exclusion of people and some areas was not as harsh as the one seen in existence of system. Later, with the return of the Ottoman Empire from westward expansion toward eastward expansion, the Ottomans and the Safavids became structures of the system in the Middle East. Below, the process of how these two empires became core structures of the Ottoman-Safavid system/core will be seen.

The origins of the Ottomans and Safavids can be traced back to the same era. However, while the Ottomans from the beginning emerged as a political organization, the Safavids emerged as a Sufi order. The Ottomans emerged as a small principality after the defeat of Saljuq Sultanate in Anatolia to Mongols, where many new principalities established in Anatolia. In 1326 CE, the Ottomans seized Bursa, an important town. By 1345 CE, they crossed Gallipoli. Then they invited large numbers of Turkish warriors for their expeditions in the Balkans, where they took the northern Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. The decisive control of the Western Balkans came with the battle of Kosovo in 1389 CE. Once the Ottomans built an empire in the Balkans, they started an enterprise to take control of other Turkish principalities in Anatolia, and at the same time envisaged to conquer Istanbul. Unexpectedly, in 1402 CE, Timur, concerned about the eastward expansion of the Ottoman empire, defeated the Ottoman empire leading to a halt in the Ottoman expansion. Timur became the protector of the principalities in Anatolia. Despite this setback, the Ottomans later restarted to annex the principalities in Anatolia. In the west, against Ottoman conquests, two crusades were arranged by the Papacy. The first crusade coalition that was organized by Papacy and Venice was defeated by the Ottomans in 1396 CE. In 1444 CE, another crusade was arranged by Hungary, Poland, Naples, Transylvania, Serbia, Venice, and Genoa. Once again, they were defeated at the battle of Varna. In 1453 CE, Ottomans conquered Constantinople, a dream of the Ottomans. In the second half of the 15th century CE, they took Greece, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Albania. The Ottomans gained strength partly due to adoption of former Byzantine human resources in the administration and the army (Lapidus 2002, 249-250).

On the other hand, the Safavid dynasty came into being as a result of many facilitating conditions in the Middle East. The Safavid family was originally leading a Sunni (Shafii) Sufi order in Ardabil, Azerbaijan, located between Tabriz and Caspian Sea (Allouche 1983, 1, 32, 33, 34; Keddie 1969, 40-41). The leader of the order was Shaykh Safi al-Din Ishaq (1252-1334 CE), a member of a landed family, and the foundation of the order was traced back to him (Allouche 1983, 1, 32; Dale 2010, 65). Originating as a landholding Sufi order in the chaotic aftermath of the Mongol invasions of Iran, Safavid pirs made use of their prestige to acquire large territories and influence in Ardabil (Dale 2010, 52). Thus, the Safavid order grew fast and

attracted large numbers of people (Allouche 1983, 33). The first converted Muslim ruler of Ilkhanids (Mongols in Iran), Ghazan Khan, came to the throne in 1295 CE and provided protection to the Safavids, which further contributed to the spread of Safavid religious and economic base (Dale 2010, 66). After Ilkhanids, Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu dynasties (which were of Turcoman origin) competed over controlling Iran, and the Safavids took advantage of this rivalry to expand their political claims. While the Safavids were claiming political authority in some areas they also started to lean toward Shia teachings for getting support of Turqoman people. With this support they received from the Turqomans they attacked some Christian areas in Georgia (Allouche 1983, 41-48; Dale 2010, 52, 67; Savaş 2000, 186). Later, the Safavids started to confront Aq Qoyunlu, which put an end to Qara Qoyunlu rule and controlled entire Iran (Allouche 1983, 52).

Gaining institutional and military capability, the Safavids sought to have a territory to rule. At this time, Aq Qoyunlu was ruling Iran, and the Ottomans and other principalities were ruling Anatolia. It was Shah Ismail of Safavid family who succeeded to establish a dynasty and conquer territory to establish his rule. Succeeding Ali Padishah, Shah Ismail received religious education from some of the leading ulama. It is believed that Shah Ismail was mostly taught Shia (Allouche 1983, 60). By getting territories under their control, the Safavids united the temporal power and the spiritual leadership (1). In 1499 CE, previously forced to live in Gilan by Aq Qoyunlu, Ismail decided to move to Ardabil from Gilan. Yet, in Ardabil, the provincial ruler asked Ismail to leave the town. Ismail and his entourage left the town to Arjuwan, near Caspian Sea. While in Arjuwan, he ordered to the Turqomans in Anatolia and Syria to gather in Erzincan next year. Next year, leading the gathered soldiers in Erzincan, he attacked Shirvan and defeated Shirvan leader. Following this, he fought with Aq Qoyunlu and defeated them, although his men were outnumbered. Then he declared himself as Shah. As of 1508 CE, he took control of the entire Iran (Allouche 1983, 61-63; Fattah and Coso 112).

As we can see, both the Ottomans and the Safavids started from scratch; both were humble organizations at their initial stages. Both of the dynasties emerged in the post Mongolian conjecture, where there was not a significant state in the Middle East. However, the Ottomans as a state had a longer history before emergence of the

Safavids. Before emergence of the Safavids, the main expansion direction of the Ottomans was toward west, rather than to east, and the contacts in Anatolia were mainly with independent Turkish principalities and in Iran with Aq Qoyunlu. Around the time the Ottomans started to have an outlook toward east, the Safavids became the major empire to deal with. Prior to eastward leaning of the Ottomans, it was difficult to say that the Ottomans were a core area of a system in the Middle East. Rather, the Ottomans were expanding in the Balkans. Yet, with their eastward turn, it became possible to say that the Ottomans and Safavids turned into core areas of the system/core in the Middle East. The reason why the Ottomans returned to the Middle East was that they were part of the Middle East more than they were part of Europe. The Ottomans could not exist in the fringes of Europe without being a major partner in the Middle East, because it could be invaded from the east. This indicates that the Ottomans were an inseparable partner in the system that was developing in the Middle East. As Aq Qoyunlu and then Safavids put an end to the movement of people from Central Asia, a new system/core was developing in the Middle East. The Ottoman empire was a natural partner in this system. In case the Ottomans might have stayed outside of this system, the system in the Middle East could make the Ottoman empire a peripheral area. Hence, the Ottomans and Safavids naturally evolved to be the core areas of the system that was in the making.

The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the system/core in the Middle East developed as a result of a number of confrontations. At first, the Safavids created some troubles in the Ottoman territories through their influence on the Turqomans. During this time, rebellions in Anatolia among the Turqomans were so widespread that at times Ottoman authorities suffered large casualties. This Safavid offensive aggravated the disputes among the Ottoman princes which ended up with dethronement of Bayezid with the collaboration of janissaries by Selim the Resolute (Allouche 1983, 89, 83-100; Dale 2010, 70). Although Selim the Resolute was critical of Bayezid's soft approach to Iran, his policies did not show that he acted purely on the reactive grounds. Rather the rule of Selim the Resolute marked a turn in the Ottomans' attention from west toward east (Allouche 1983, 100). He took measures for consolidating the Ottoman authority in the East, which made the Ottomans to be a core area of the Middle East. Selim the Resolute did not just aim to punish the

Safavids; he changed the main orientation of the empire from west toward east. We can comprehend this from the fact that he conquered much more than necessary to punish the Safavids. To start with, Selim the Resolute firstly demanded from Safavids to give Diyarbakir, which was a farfetched demand because he knew that this would be declined. Second, he asked from Shah Ismail to return his fugitive nephew, Murad. Shah Ismail refused these demands, and regarding Diyarbakir, he said if Selim the Resolute wanted to take it, he should do it by force (109-110). Being refused, the Ottomans found the pretext to initiate the war, and at the end, they took Diyarbakir in the Battle of Chaldiran (1514 CE).

The defeat of the Safavids in Chaldiran put them in the defensive until the arrival of Shah Abbas (1587-1629 CE) in the Safavid Empire who had turned Ottoman offence in the opposite direction (Allouche 1983, 101). However, one should not consider this change of tide as a reversal of superiority of one power over the other. Rather, what changed was opening of a new session in the dispute above the peripheral areas that would be controlled by the Ottomans and Safavids. Hence, their confrontation should not be taken as an indication of an overarching conflict between them. What should be understood from the Battle of Chaldiran was that the Safavids and Ottomans turned into two core areas of the system/core in the Middle East. This Battle was waged to show to the Safavids that the Ottomans and the Safavids were core partners in the Middle East; the spread of the Safavid influence in the Middle East would be restricted, and the Ottomans should not be ignored in the Middle East world affairs. As a matter of fact, following Chaldiran, the Ottoman empire marched on Mamluqs and defeated them in Marj Dabiq, and Raydaniyah. With the end of Mamluq rule, Ottomans took Egypt, Syria, and Hejaz. These also contributed to enhancement of the core status of the Ottomans in the Middle East, alongside the Safavids (Allouche 1983, 102-103). Including the Chaldiran Battle, all succeeding wars between the Ottomans and the Safavids were waged to find a solution to the question as to how the peripheral areas between them should be shared. They did not aim to put an end to each other's existence. This was typical relationship between core areas. Core areas do not have issues about each other's existence. They are aware of the advantages that they have in relation to peripheral areas in the region that they dominate. They acknowledge that their interests overlap in relation to the peripheral areas in the region. Lastly, their

main confrontation is about the rewards that they will get by controlling the peripheral areas.

Now, as the Ottomans and the Safavids entered a stage of relations where they were core areas of the Middle East, their policies to exclude and restrict the people's autonomy turned out more evident. Indeed, Selim the Resolute, before waging the Chaldiran Battle, received fatwas from two theologians regarding the unorthodox groups of Turqomans. In these fatwas, it was stated that it is legitimate to fight the followers of Safavids or unorthodox groups. The Ottomans took measures that could be considered significant punishments with the excuse that these groups arranged rebellions (Allouche 1983, 110-112; Fattah and Coso 2009, 114). While Bayezid II, who was one of the most pious Ottoman rulers, relocated 30.000 unorthodox groups in order to deal with them, Selim the Resolute took stricter measures (Allouche 1983, 112; Lowry 2003, 50). Thus, the Ottomans not only made it clear to the Safavids that they are now a core area in the Middle East together with the Safavids, but they also pacified the popular discontent in Anatolia. This was in line with the Ottoman policy at this stage to limit the maneuverability of the groups of people within the empire. Now, since the Ottomans' dependency to the autonomous groups decreased, they started to restrict and exclude people from the core. This was typical core area attitude. Later, the Safavids would apply the same policies to the popular discontent, by replacing the Turqomans in the military and bureaucracy with the people recruited from the Caucasus.

As the Ottomans and Safavids now constituted the core areas in the Middle East political system, it is important to know about what made the Middle East a reference area where a core emerged. In other words, while the Middle East lacked a core for around 600 years, and the Ottomans seemed at first oriented toward west rather than east, it is worth to know the reason why the Middle East once again appeared as a region where a system/core emerged. Answer to this question will reveal about the traits of a region where a system/core and its environment/periphery surfaces. So far, we have learned that the core emerges as a system, as it creates a difference. This difference occurs when there is a reference region and concentration of military, innovative, economic or ideational capabilities in certain parts of that region. It seems that until the emergence of the Ottoman-Safavid system, the Middle East had a certain

degree of military, economic or ideational superiority compared to other regions of world. These superiorities led to materialization of a core/system in the region. Yet, with the Ottoman and Safavid system, we have learned another trait of a region where a core emerges; that is, the concentrated capabilities in a region must not be inferior to the capabilities in other regions of the world, if not superior than them. Indeed, the core states in the systems established in the Middle East, so far, did not have the motivation to look to outside of the region. On the other hand, the Ottomans first aimed to concentrate on the west rather than the Middle East. This leaning of the Ottomans toward west might have signaled that the Middle East in its entirety has fallen to a peripheral status compared to wider world. If a region in its entirety relegated to peripheral status, then a core/system that defines itself in reference to that region cannot emerge, because that region becomes the periphery of another region or the world society. Indeed, by the beginning of 16th century CE, the Middle East was an ordinary region, the focus of the world shifted toward areas outside of the Middle East. Under such conditions, one wonders what made the Middle East to be a region where a system/core once again emerged. It seems that the Middle East, in this period, enjoyed isolation in relation to the rest of the world which enabled it to have a system. We come to this conclusion with the analysis of the economic developments within and outside of the Middle East.

7.1.3. Emergence of a Core in a Peripheral Region

We have already noted that, by the early 16th century CE, the Middle East was an ordinary region. We should see why the region was an ordinary region in relation to rest of the world (mainly Europe). Second, despite being an ordinary region, how it kept being a region where a core that has the Ottomans and the Safavids as its core areas developed. To begin with the claim that the Middle East was an ordinary region at this time, we must say that economy of the region was not updated to the developments in that age. When we look at the economy of the Ottomans and the Safavids we see that they were agrarian societies; the bulk of their income came from taxes on agriculture. Their second source of income was taxes on trade; these taxes could be imposed on transit trade as well as production or export of goods (Dale 2010, 106; D'Souza 2002, 9). The primary goods traded using trade routes were silk, silver,

and spices. Of these traded commodities, silk was the “most important commodity traded in Ottoman and Safavid lands”, along with other woolen industries (Dale 2010, 114; Inalcik 1997, 218). Not only the Ottoman empire and Iran, but also, the Italian city-states were aware of the centrality of silk in their economic and financial conditions (Inalcik 1997, 228). Because silk was highly deemed in Europe, an important part of Ottoman and Safavid “revenues and silver stocks was from silk trade with Europe” (Inalcik 1997, 219; Olson 1975, 14-16). The trade that was beneficial for the Middle East, especially for the Ottoman empire, was the one that was carried out through land. Iran, Anatolia as well as other centers such as Cairo, Aleppo, and Istanbul were significant because of their contribution to trade activities (Dale 2010, 107; Inalcik 1997). But this configuration of economy was not enough for the Middle East maintain the status of being a major region. Trade between East and West was diverted from land toward sea, which led the Middle East relatively lose its revenues. Furthermore, other economic activities other than trade in the Middle East were not producing enough hard cash that was necessary for superiorities in the Middle East to continue. We can see the deterioration of economy in the Middle East by looking at the diminishing efficiency in the military of Ottoman and Safavid empires due to lack of enough revenues.

State revenues and military capability were closely interlinked in both the Safavid and Ottoman Empires. As a matter of fact, the fiscal system as well as society and state were designed in accordance with the war needs. The economies of the Safavids and the Ottomans were agrarian, and trade and production had relatively marginal role. This economic and fiscal structure was able to support a cavalrymen based military that had low gunpowder capabilities, we can say, because gunpowder capabilities were used only as a supplementary element to the effective cavalrymen. Therefore, the backbone of the Safavid and Ottoman armies was cavalrymen. The fiscal system and cavalrymen organization, were, in turn, reproducing each other because cavalry was “tied to the property regime and the political process” (D’Souza 2002, 8-11). However, after some time, cavalry warfare which was a product of agrarian societies was “no longer able to deliver military success... [therefore, the Ottomans and the Safavids] were plunged into a staggered crisis” (13). The military developments in Europe, thus the military innovation in the 17th century CE, however, showed different

traits because it was a product of a different economic and fiscal organization. European states started to adopt strategies for using firepower more efficiently. Therefore, while in the classical age of the Ottomans and the Safavids, cavalry was better than musket-infantry, from 17th century CE onward it was the opposite. This situation was best understood in several wars that the Ottoman Empire waged (13-14). The modern warfare was a capital intensive affair, which put expenditures ahead of income. In other words, because the success in war necessitated having more revenues, and the revenues of these empires, especially that of Ottomans, decreased, the Ottoman and Safavid reform efforts did bring no success (16).

The insufficiency of the attempts to recover can be seen in the Ottoman case more clearly. First, although the Ottoman Empire expanded in the 16th century CE as other European powers expanded, the investments of the Ottoman Empire did not bring enough revenue. For example, the acquired Hapsburg lands, Hungary, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Aleppo, and the Caucasus did not increase the revenues of the empire; instead, the revenues extracted from these territories remained in these regions (Olson 1975, 26; Dale 130-134). Second, the economic working of the world at large, namely the shift in trade routes, was causing the Ottoman Empire lose its revenues (Dale 2010, 130-134). While the revenues were decreasing, the expenses were surmounting due to the developments in military technology and methods (i.e. increasing reliance on Janissary and artillery rather than Sipahi system) and protracted wars (Dale 130-134; D'Souza 2002). Ottomans were not able to keep up with the innovation process in Europe (Modelske 1987, 11). Third, as the European powers were accessing to new sources of wealth, this caused the Ottoman empire to relatively get weaker. In other words, ratio of the income/expense of the polities in other regions was going upward opposite to downward ratio of the Ottoman Empire. Fourth, not only the revenues extracted from the state enterprises, but also, the revenues of the private enterprise were deteriorating due to the improvement of the position of private enterprise in other regions of the world (Olson 1975). This also caused shrinkage of the base of taxable income.

In fact, these problems of the Middle East were a major problem for a very long period. We could see this in continuous debasement of the coinage in the Ottoman Empire, which caused further deterioration of the revenue problem. In Ottoman

Empire, silver coinage (Akçe) was in use for commerce. Its value was stable during 150 years of Ottoman rule. However, as early as the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, revenue problem emerged; therefore, akçe was debased 30% to increase funds to meet the expenses. From his time onward, the Ottoman revenues became a continuous problem since it did not suffice to meet the military and bureaucratic expenses of the empire. With the accession of the Suleiman to the throne, the revenue issue became more critical (Dale 2010, 116). In other words, the revenue problem was a long-standing problem and it became more and more critical for the Ottoman Empire.

Thus, we can see that the economy in the Middle East was not performing well; it was not able to generate enough revenues. The shift in the trade routes and developments in the technology worsened this situation and made the Middle East to relegate to a peripheral position. Despite this low performance of the region compared to other regions, one wonder what made the Middle East to seem like a major region where a core (Ottoman-Safavid) can emerge. In fact, this had to do with the shift in the focus of the European powers that enabled the Middle East to stay isolated and allowed emergence of a core in the region (Hess 1973, 57). While the focus of core areas in Europe was other regions of the world, the focus of Ottomans never went beyond the Mediterranean basin (Modelska 1987, 11). At this time, British, Dutch and Portuguese played significant role in Indian Ocean; and significant amount of silver and gold flowed from the Americas to Europe, while Ottoman Empire was stuck in the Mediterranean basin (Dale 2010, 132, 133; Allouche 1983, 151). In other words, the emergence of Ottoman-Safavid system coincided with the rise of European powers and shift in their focus (Hess 1973, 57). During their rise, the European powers did not clash with the Ottoman empire because the impact of oceanic discoveries caused a shift in the center of power struggles in the world. It shifted from Eurasia to the shores of Atlantic, thanks to the oceanic voyages in 15th and 16th centuries CE (Hess 1973, 55-57). Hence, the main impact of this was a shift of attention of major European polities from the sphere where the Ottoman and Safavid empires could emerge as core areas. Now, we can say that even though when a region relegates to a peripheral status as a whole, still it can generate a core and a periphery; if only the core areas of other superior regions have no interest in the region in question. Therefore, emergence of the Ottomans and the Safavids as core areas in the Middle

East was something unexpected due to ordinary capabilities of the Middle East region, but it materialized. A peripheral region normally is not capable of producing a core because it is the periphery of superior regions. However, if the superior regions, for some reason, are not interested in the peripheral region, then the peripheral region can act like a superior region where a core dominates. Otherwise, the entirety of the peripheral region is the periphery of the core areas in superior regions. Now, as it is comprehended that a system/core emerged during Ottoman-Safavid period, we can turn to the relations between core areas to see whether their relations were typical core relations or not.

7.1.4. Intra-Core Confrontations over Peripheral Areas

As the economic deterioration was a fact in the Middle East, the wars that the Ottomans and the Safavids involved were about controlling the wealth generating peripheral areas. We have previously noted that the peripheral areas in this era rarely attempted to gain independence for attaining inclusion in the Ottoman-Safavid system. Most of the peripheral areas in the region were contained in such a way that they rarely objected to control by the Ottomans and the Safavids. As the peripheral areas were pacified by the Ottomans and the Safavids, the confrontations among the core areas were limited to getting rewards by controlling the peripheral areas. The core areas did not question the peripheral status of the Caucasus, Anatolia, Iraq, and Egypt etc., rather they reproduced the peripheral status of the peripheral areas. The Ottomans and Safavids did not have issue with each other's existence either. What they disagreed was who was going to control what part of the wealth generating peripheral areas. Even in this question, ultimately, they reached an agreement where no side was deprived of rewards entirely. They made an agreement where both sides received what they wanted the most.

The disagreement between the Ottomans and Safavids was about controlling Iraq and Caucasus, the two wealth generating peripheral areas. Starting from rule of Suleiman the Magnificent, until the signing of Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, Ottoman and Safavid wars were economy oriented. In 1534-1555 CE, Suleiman the Magnificent waged wars both in Caucasus and Iraq, but mainly in Iraq for taking Baghdad and Basra. In

1555 CE, the Treaty of Amasya was signed, which provided a period of peace until 1578 CE. From that year onward, firstly, the Ottomans waged wars for gaining control of the Caucasus wealth. Then in 1603 CE, Safavids started their offense to take the Caucasus back. In the Safavid offense, Iranians used Baghdad as a bargain chip to take losses in Caucasus back; similarly the Ottomans used Caucasus to take losses in Iraq back. Indeed, Iraqi and Caucasian territories were not equally valued by both sides. When we look at the insistence level of both sides and the sophistication level of the methods that both sides were using to control the peripheral areas, and the ease with which each side was able to intrude in the affairs of the particular peripheral area, we can see that the Safavids and Ottomans had different priorities. While Iraq was systematically targeted by the Ottomans, Caucasus was systematically targeted by the Safavids. Now let's first assess the significance of Caucasus and Iraq and the means utilized to control these areas by the Ottomans and Safavids.

Ottoman insistence on Iraq was because it rendered them to create a large sea-based empire, with access to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea and connections to Mediterranean (Fattah and Coso 2009, 120). As a part of Iraq, Basra was a crucial port for having a say in Indian Ocean trade. It was a meeting place for merchants, sailors, and agents of every kind (Fattah and Coso 2009, 120; Al-Tikriti 2007, 201). Mosul was a valued area to be controlled for its strategic location, which rendered access to many areas (Olson 1975, 11). As for Baghdad, it should be said that Baghdad had lost its significance as a wealth generating area, but "still, as the former capital of the Abbasid Caliphate (751–1258 CE), it commanded religious and cultural prestige throughout the Muslim world." (Al-Tikriti 2007, 201). Having such significance, Ottoman presence in Iraq was insistent and enduring. Ottomans' control of Iraq occurred gradually, rather than being at once (202). Once Mosul was captured by Selim the Resolute, it became an asset for the Ottomans for accessing to the rest of Iraq because of its strategic location (Fattah and Coso 2009, 115; Olson 1975, 9, 11). After Mosul, the next target for Ottoman attacks was Baghdad and Basra under Suleiman the Magnificent. The struggle over Baghdad started as the Ottoman advances in Europe came to a halt. After a period of back and forth, the Ottomans conquered Baghdad in 1534 CE (Lloyd 1947, 189). The Ottoman acquisition of Baghdad and Basra was sealed with the Treaty of Amasya (Svanidze 2009, 192). After

Suleiman the Magnificent took Baghdad, it remained a province of the Ottoman empire for four centuries, with one interruption at the beginning of 17th century CE (Fattah and Coso 2009, 117; Lloyd 1947, 190)

From Safavid perspective, the Caucasus and Khurasan were two most productive areas (Kortepeter 2011, 68). The Caucasus alongside being important for silk trade was also rich in terms of timber, minerals and foodstuffs. In addition to these, Safavids were raising girls and boys from Caucasus for recruiting them in the military or for placing them in harems. The ghulam, who were registered to the military, had to convert to Shia Islam (59-60, 65). In this respect, there is more mention of the Safavids than Ottomans, in terms of relying on Caucasus for raising military resources. These wealth and military sources in Caucasus were more vital for the Safavids than they were to the Ottomans, we can say. The Safavids used various methods to sustain their rule in the Caucasus as the Ottomans made in Iraq. These methods were: (a) Using extensive military measures when it was considered necessary (62), (b) the royal marriages, divide and rule, and replacing the challenging kings with alternative successors, and (c) forcing the local rulers to convert to Shia (66-67). In sum, for Iran it seemed that Caucasus was much more important.

These projections by the Ottomans and Safavids about the peripheral areas were typical core area projections. They did not question the peripheral status of Iraq and Caucasus. At the initial stage of their confrontation, while the Safavids and the Ottomans agreed on the peripheral status of Iraq and Caucasus, they did not easily decide who is going to control which peripheral areas. The agreement was achieved at the end of some series of wars. Starting from 1534 CE, long lasting wars took place between Ottomans and Safavids with ups and downs. Four series of wars can be mentioned: 1534-1555, 1577-1590, 1603-1618, and 1624-1639 CE. None of these wars aimed at or resulted with a threat to the existence of the parties (the Ottomans and the Safavids). Even though wars were long and multiple, the aims and results of these wars were marginal. They never escalated to major wars aiming to end the existence of the counterpart; rather they were about deciding what peripheral areas would be controlled by whom. Once a peripheral area (i.e., Iraq or Caucasus) was controlled by a core area, its resources were appropriated by the core areas and their independence was restricted. A core area insisted on control of a peripheral region

when it was vital for it, but it did not totally alienate the counterpart core area. Each of the war series was built above the conjecture created in the previous war series as if the wars aimed to create a deal. The interpretation of these wars allows us to claim that the real conflict was between core and periphery, rather than being between core areas. Indeed, as a result of these wars between the Safavids and the Ottomans, the resources of peripheral areas were appropriated and their independence was restricted. The core areas obtained what they wanted in terms of military needs and other resources. Besides, they did not compromise on their independence in any manner. Therefore, as two winners, the Ottomans and the Safavids were cooperating against the peripheral areas, and conflicted with the peripheral areas by restricting their independence and appropriating their resources. The review of the war series would confirm these arguments.

Prior to onset of war series in 1534-1555 CE with Safavids, the Ottomans failed in conquering Vienna; and the Safavids were dealing with civil strife emanating from the Turqomans. Targeting Iraq, Suleiman the Magnificent initiated a war series that had economic motivations (Inalcik 1997, 229-230; Olson 1975, 16). This economic motive could also be seen in Ottoman's targeting of Tabriz and the silk producing areas in the Caucasus first and then Baghdad, even though the main purpose was capture of Baghdad (Olson 1975, 16). In other words, the Ottomans were not motivated to end the Safavid rule but to capture an economically beneficial peripheral area, Iraq. Under Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottomans arranged three attacks in 1534, 1548, and 1553 CE. Each of these wars lasted 2-3 years. In between, some skirmishes occurred. The Ottomans firstly occupied access points to Eastern Anatolia and Georgia, and then took Baghdad and Basra in 1534 CE. In the second campaign, they took Armenia and some Kurdish populated regions; and in the third campaign Ottomans took some other Kurdish populated regions (Allouche 1983, 137-143; Svanidze 2009, 191). Against these Ottoman offences, the Safavids successfully resisted to further advances of Ottomans (Olson 1975, 12), thus proved its core status. These war series ended up with the Treaty of Amasya (1555 CE), which left Iraq to Ottomans as an access point to the Indian Ocean (Allouche 1983, 140-145; Svanidze 2009, 191; Olson 1975, 17).

Despite the fact that Ottomans were far stronger and Safavids at the time were in a vulnerable situation, the result of the Ottoman offence was only marginal, which shows the existence of core areas based on mutual recognition and understanding rather than conflict. This mutual understanding was established in the Chaldiran Battle in 1514 CE. It was this mutual understanding that established a long living equilibrium between the Ottomans and the Safavids. This equilibrium did not disrupt in one's favor since then, even today. The following wars only consolidated this equilibrium. We can see an exchange of Caucasus with Iraq here in the Amasya Treaty. While Ottomans acquired significant gains in Iraq, Safavids retained their position in the Caucasus. Thus, Suleiman the Magnificent's campaigns established the long-lasting balance between Iran and Turkey over the Caucasus and Iraq, even though until Qasr-e Shirin three more war series were waged. Pursuant war series changed this equilibrium only to be restored back.

A similar conjecture that preceded the 1534-1555 CE wars also occurred just before 1577-1590 CE wars. In 1576 CE, when Shah Tahmasp died, a disorder occurred in Iran. The Ottomans, after the Treaty of Amasya, were struggling in Europe for 25 years. When the Ottomans were struggling in Europe, Safavids were dealing Turqoman tribes inside of Iran and Uzbeks in the east. The Ottomans supported the Uzbeks in the East (Olson 1975, 17). Once again, the Ottomans started the war, as the relatively stronger side with economic motivations in the peripheral areas. At the time, Georgia was split into three kingdoms and a number of lesser principalities. Virtually all the relations in Caucasus were arranged by the Safavids, until the Ottoman occupation (Kortepeter 2011, 66-67). In 1577-1590 CE wars, Ottomans occupied all the Georgian kingdoms, extended into Azerbaijan and even threatened to take Ardabil. Furthermore, the occupation of Tabriz forced the Safavids to move their capital from Tabriz to Qazvin (68). In order to deal with Uzbeks and other troubles, Abbas offered signing a peace to the Ottomans (67-68). The Ottomans were able to hold their control over the rich silk producing regions (Olson 1975, 18). Being in advantageous position, the Ottomans accepted peace agreement, and Peace of Nowruz-Ferhat Paşa Anlaşması was signed in 1590 CE. With this Treaty, Shah Abbas agreed to make significant concessions by submitting Tabriz, Karadagh, Ganja, Karabag, Georgia, Shirvan, Nihavand and Luristan to the Ottoman Empire (Kortepeter 2011, 67-68). At the end

of this war, Ottomans even captured capital city of the Safavids, but they did not try to end the Safavid existence because they were motivated to control the wealth generating peripheral areas only. Engaged in protracted wars in Europe, Ottomans were seeking wealth generating areas, but not ending the existence of Safavids because they had a mutual understanding of being dominant polities in the Middle East.

After the Peace of Nowruz, Shah Abbas dealt with Uzbek occupations in the East of Iran; and replaced Turcomans with the ghulams from Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan and Circasia in the military, court, and bureaucracy of Safavids (Kortepeter 2011, 59, 65, 68-69). At this time, the Ottomans were engaged in a protracted war with Austria (73). Utilizing the opportunity, this time Safavids started a war series for regaining the losses in the Caucasus (69). Abbas in his march in 1603-1604 took back many places in the lack of an organized defense from Ottomans. Shah took territories not only in the Caucasus, but also in Iraq (73-74). In 1612 CE, with the treaty of Nasuh Paşa, Tabriz became the Safavid territory. In return for this, Ottomans were to receive some amount of silk and other goods from Safavids (Olson 1975, 19-20).

While Safavids were trying to consolidate their authority in Georgia, the Ottomans never missed an opportunity to make the Safavid plans not work. As the Ottomans were involved in these issues, these involvements led the Battle of Serab with Safavids in 1618 CE, in which Ottomans overwhelmed. With the request of Iranians, peace of Serab was accorded. According to it, both sides recognized Nasuh Paşa Treaty with conditions that Safavids would send less silk. Ottomans on the other hand were awarded with Ahiska while the Safavids were awarded with the districts of Derne and Dertenk in Baghdad. Also Ottoman suzerainty over Dagestan was accepted by Safavids (Kortepeter 69-70; Olson 1975, 20). As we can see, as soon as the Safavids considered the conditions proper, they utilized the chance to take their losses in the Caucasus back since it was one of the major sources of revenues and human resources. The Ottomans, however, lost a significant source of revenue, but they accepted this because they were not able to impose their will on the Safavids. Yet, the result of these wars was still marginal, it almost replicated the conditions of Amasya Treaty in 1555 CE. Because the balance was disrupted in Peace of Nowruz-Ferhat Paşa Anlaşması

1590 CE, these wars between 1603-1618 CE just reestablished the balance. The peripheral areas were shared and independence of them was restricted.

Following this peace, another war series started again by the initiation of the Safavids. Although an agreement was reached between the Ottomans and Safavids (Peace of Nowruz and Serab), Shah Abbas sought contacts with England to circumvent Anatolian trade routes through sea. In these efforts, the Safavids collaborated with English East Company to capture Hormuz back. Then they attacked Baghdad and captured it. The capture of Baghdad made the Ottomans to declare war (1623-1639 CE wars) (Olson 1975, 20-21). Even though the Ottoman Empire attempted to capture Baghdad back several times, all of these attempts failed until the capture of it by Sultan Murad IV. In 1635 CE, Sultan Murad IV marched to Erivan and took it; Safavids retook Erivan and offered peace. Murad (IV) asked for Baghdad, and in 1638 CE he took Baghdad back. In 1639 CE, Qasr-i Shirin treaty (the Peace of Zuhab) was concluded. According to this treaty Kars, Shehrizor, Basra and Ahiska went to the Ottomans. The Ottomans also got the suzerainty of Guria, Mingrelia, Abkhazia, Terek, and Kuban basin of North Caucasus. Qasr-i Shirin was a deal struck between the Ottomans and Safavids by concessions in Caucasus and Iraq; the Ottomans controlled Iraq in return for Iranian dominance in Caucasus. From this treaty onward until the end of Safavid dynasty, the border between Ottomans and Safavids remained the same (Kortepeter 2011, 76). Indeed, as Matthee says, “Shah Abbas’s successor, Shah Safi I, made peace with Istanbul and ceased being an active partner in the multilateral quest to encircle and isolate Ottoman empire” (2003, 103).

The agreement achieved at the end of these war series sealed the tacit understanding between Ottomans and Safavids that they depend each other, and that they are partners rather than foes in the Middle East. This was a typical relationship between core areas despite many wars between them. These wars never escalated into a major war that would end the existence of the counterpart; rather their wars were waged as a means of resolving the disagreements between them. Qasr-i Shirin agreement was a case that has rarely been seen between the core areas as a formal commitment by the parties to be partners rather than foes. Indeed, the Ottomans and the Safavids, in the following 90 years were in peace with each other until the end of Safavid dynasty in Iran. During this period, the Ottomans and Safavids had good diplomatic relations; they were

exchanging presents and tacitly supporting each other in other fronts. The Ottomans got silent when Safavids occupied Kandahar, and the Safavids got silent when the Ottomans were fighting in the west. Furthermore, there were European endeavors to manipulate the Safavids against the Ottomans but the Safavids did not respond positively to these attempts. Also, regarding the differences between the religious understandings, there were rapprochements between Ottomans and Safavids (Karadeniz 2016; Tukcer 2012).

To sum up, the study of the Ottoman-Safavid system indicates several things. One is that one of the central exclusion relations takes place between people and the core/system. Even though, the core has dependence to the human beings to exist, it is not acceptable for the system/core to act in accordance with the needs and expectations of the people because they might cause the system to collapse. Therefore, the system treats people as an environmental element. We have seen that the Ottomans and the Safavids, after achieving some level of stability, they suppressed the Turqoman people, who were at the beginning the main human resources these empires utilized. This shows that a system/core restricts the political independence of not only peripheral areas but also that of people. The restriction of independence does not necessarily mean that the wealth and quality of life decreases for the people. This is different from the independence. Independence is the ability to affect the decisions of the government as well as autonomy from the regulations of the governments. If these freedoms are restricted, then the people are excluded from the system. We have seen this in the Ottoman-Safavid system, but it is also applicable to all other systems/cores.

The second observation that we have made by studying the Ottoman-Safavid system is that for a region generate a core/system, that region must be either superior to other world regions in terms of economic, innovative, ideational and military capabilities or at least be equivalent to the other regions in the world in these capabilities. Otherwise, the region in question cannot produce a core that has its periphery in the region because the entire region would be the periphery of the core in other superior region (s). The only way that a region that has ordinary capabilities to have a core is that it is isolated from the regions having superior capabilities. In the era that the Ottoman-Safavid core emerged in the Middle East, the region was an ordinary one. The reason why the Middle East in its entirety did not become the periphery of another

region (mainly Europe) was that European core polities were engaged in the activity of controlling other regions in the world, rather than the Middle East. This provided isolation to the Middle East where a system could emerge. Toward to the end of this system, the European powers increased their presence in the Middle East affairs that marginalized the Ottoman-Iranian system formed in the Middle East.

The third point that can be made is that the Ottoman-Safavid system showed that core areas in a region at some point can reach to a condition where their disagreements relegate to such a marginal situation that they stop resolving the disagreements through war. In addition to this, the tacit cooperation and collaboration against the peripheral areas is formalized with treaties that are observed for centuries. Such a perfect cooperation that exists between two core areas so far was not seen, probably because the core areas did not survive enough to realize such an achievement. In almost all cases, before such a formal agreement was achieved, the system would be demolished by the people from the peripheral areas. The formalized agreement between the core areas creates a conjecture that the peripheral areas are perfectly contained, and peripheral attempts for independence are reduced to a minimal level. Peripheral areas are not only restrained but also they are shared between the core areas; and in this sharing, no core area is alienated, rather each core area is rewarded with what it wants most. Provided that the core areas (the Ottomans and the Safavids) cooperated, the peripheral areas and people lost their inclusion seeking capabilities significantly. In sum, the study of Ottoman-Safavid system on the one hand approves what we have found about intra-core and core-periphery relations in other systems, on the other hand it sheds some light to new aspects of the core periphery relations.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The field of world politics is dominated by the theories that assume multiplicity of units of analysis, meaning that there is a large number of interacting units in the realm of world politics. These units are mainly the states which can be considered full-fledged entities that take action, show reaction, and have an agenda. The theories that have such a perspective can be named as balance of power, long cycle, and society of states theories. They presume that if we are going to analyze the world politics we must focus on the relations between states because states are actors that have interests. Each state has interests that are independent of other states' interests, and the interests of different states may clash or overlap. When the interests of different states clash, the form of relationship between these states would be conflict that may escalate into war. Reversely, when the interests of the states overlap, then they would cooperate, which would evolve toward formation of an alliance in the military realm and international organization in other realms. The clash or cooperation is not between the state apparatuses only. The states also represent their population and geography, meaning that interests of the people and that of their states overlap. Therefore, if there is a conflict between the state A and state B, that also means that there is a conflict between the populations of these states. Also, it does not matter whether a state is a member of developed or developing groups of states, each state is independent, in the sense that each state has an ontology that separates it from other states and makes it continuously monitor clash and cooperation chances with other states.

Against this understanding of world politics that take state and multiplicity of it as the central feature of the world politics, one group of theories bring a new aspect to this discussion, that is the difference between wealthier and less wealthy states. This strand of theories is represented by World-system and imperialism theories. Even though this strand of theories does not reject the idea that state is independent and it has interests,

what differentiates this strand of theories from the mainstream theories is that they say that the imperialist states or core states enjoy more wealth than the states in unindustrialized or peripheral areas. This difference, as a source of conflict between core/imperialist states and unindustrialized/ peripheral states, is omitted in the mainstream theories. The mainstream theories simply ignore the unindustrialized/ peripheral states. However, World-system and imperialism theories stress the difference between the two groups of societies/economies, which ultimately leads to emergence of a type of relationship that is not mentioned in the mainstream theories, that is exploitation. By introducing this form of relationship in world economic relations, imperialism and World-system theories show that there are not multiple parties but rather there are two parties; exploited vs. exploiting. This suggests that there are two groups of countries, and the central relationship between these groups of countries is conflictual. The mainstream theories do not mention about conflictual relationship between the states enjoying more wealth and those suffering from less wealth. According to these theories, the attitudes of states do not change depending on level of wealth that they have. For state A, all other states are potential enemies or friends, meaning that at the beginning, the states are neutral to each other, but clash or overlap of interests leads to the formation of conflict and cooperation between the states. However, imperialism and World-system theories suggest that there is no neutrality among the societies, rather there are two groups of societies; wealthier and less wealthy, and the central relationship between them is conflict because of exploitation.

Imperialism and World-System theories, by stressing the clash between wealthy and less-wealthy societies, turn the focus from the inter-state character of the world politics to interaction between wealthy and less-wealthy societies. Even though this shift from multiple state approach to a dual approach is radical, these theories, still refrain from assuming that the wealthy and less wealthy areas are the only ontological entities in world politics. In other words, their dual perspective about the world economic relations changes when they explain the world political relations. Indeed, both imperialism and World-system theories agree with the idea that states have ontology by assuming that there is a conflict among the wealthier states. This means that each of the states is an entity that has its own interests and agenda independent

from the other core/industrialized states. If the states have an independent existence that makes them to act by themselves, then states preserve their central role in world politics. Imperialism and World-system theory in this sense recognize a separate inter-state system that has its own working principles, where states act based on their interests. Therefore, we can suggest that imperialism and World-system theories fall short of explaining world politics differently from the mainstream theories, because they assign ontology to states and underplay the central position of difference between wealthy and non-wealthy areas of the world.

On this issue, another theory that exhibits a more radical outlook is postcolonialism. Postcolonialism denies the centrality of state and multiple manifestation of it as the main aspect that should be studied in international relations. Rather, postcolonialism says that the differences between two regions (the north and the south) are the main aspects of international relations as opposed to the individual interests and clashes of the states. It says there are two parties in the world; one is the north and the other is the south. The main relationship between these parties is that the north culturally, economically, and politically exploits the south. The proponents of the postcolonialism seek to find ways of equal relationship but the current relationship, they say, is exploitation of the south by the north. The north is a block against the south. The differences between the states in north or differences between the states in south are negligible. Both current conflict and possible cooperation between the north and the south take place between the north and south as a whole not between the states. In this sense, postcolonialism differs from both the mainstream theories and more radical theories, such as imperialism and World-system. However, postcolonialism applies this perspective mostly to world cultural relations, and its world political relations perspective is something developing.

This difference between the two parts of the world and central role given to this duality is important because, it brings to foreground the unmentioned and unclarified character of the world politics. World politics is about inequalities; it is not about relations between equals. When we mention about inequality, it is between two sides; at one side there is equal and at the other side the unequal. This makes us to read the world politics from a duality lens, instead of multiplicity of independent states. We are able to have a lens of duality in world politics owing to systems theory. Even

though, the theories mentioned above have some system aspects, as we have reviewed in the Chapter 2, none has a full-fledged system perspective; all suffer from some drawbacks. Balance of power is an introvert theory that focuses only on the relations between the major states which have balance of power among each other. It says the main conflict is between the great powers which are sensitive to the disruption of balance between them. It omits the unity that these states constitute and the relationship between this unity and its environment. Society of states theory suffers from similar drawbacks. It treats all the states homogenously, but on the other hand, it says that there is a clash between order and justice in world politics. Yet, because it does not admit the dichotomy in world politics that can be attained with adoption of systems perspective, it says that theory has the hope that the difference between order and justice would be eliminated in the future. Thus, both balance of power and society of states assign central role to state rather than to the system as the entity that has an ontology.

World-system theory treats the entire world as a single system that is made of world economy, where the core and periphery constitute the two parts of the World-system. Because of its assumption that there is a single system, World-system theory fails to recognize both the subsystems of World-system and the environment of the World-system. Second, even though it mentions the core and the periphery as the main parties of international relations, which is an idea complying with the systems theory, it continues to attribute ontology to states; thus undermines the system perspective in analyzing world politics. Imperialism theory assumes a capitalist system that makes the imperialist states to act in ways to exploit the unindustrialized states. However, despite this system perspective, it says that the imperialist states have conflict among each other that can be explained with the state interests. Thus, Imperialism theory also is trapped in the idea of state centrality, which makes it to divert from systems perspective. The centrality of state shadows the genuine parties of world politics. In this sense, its system perspective is seriously damaged. Postcolonialism, attributes a system character to the north on the grounds that there is a synchronous attitude of the north (exploitation and oppression) against the south. However, instead of treating the south as the environment of the north, it says that the south is another system. This idea omits the asymmetric relationship between the system and its environment (the

north and the south), that is the source of underlying conflict in world politics. For that reason, postcolonialism also has deficiencies for being called as a system theory.

Because of these flaws, we are able to claim that the underlying conflict and the parties involved in this conflict are under theorized in world politics. The adoption of system theory would render an exit for formulating the underlying inequality in the world politics as an alternative to inter-state formulation of conflict. Once we recognize the underlying conflict/inequality between the core and periphery, we can then focus on the relations between the sides of the conflict/inequality as the central theme of world politics. The concept of system was applied in studies of world politics, but they mostly treated the system either as a variable that affects the state actions through its anarchical structure or as a level of analysis that is a way of studying the subject by looking at the whole instead of the parts of the whole, i.e., state or the individuals. However, this conceptualization does not show anything about the formulation of the underlying conflict, the sides of the conflict, and the tendencies inside and outside of these sides. Therefore, there is a need to look to system theories designed outside of the International Relations discipline. When we look at the system definition and its properties in the system studies, we see that a system is “a set of variables sufficiently isolated to stay constant long enough for us to discuss it” (Skyttner 2005, 57). This system must have boundaries that show what is excluded and what is included in the system (Skyttner 2005, 52). Therefore, the system is defined in relation to its environment since the system differentiates itself from the environment (Checkland 1988, 101). The systems have the capacity to show external influences and also to undergo dynamics working inside of the system (Checkland 1988, 101-102). In this sense, a system is an ***entity rather than being a cumulation of the parts*** (Bertalanffy 1969, 9).

As we can see, the system approach is based on a duality; the system itself and its environment. System theory originally does not say that the system and its environment are in conflict with each other. However we can claim this based on the fact that the system by differentiating itself from the environment, it also imposes itself on the environment. Drawing a boundary between the system and its environment implies a conflict with the environment not a commonality; otherwise, there would not be a need for separation of the system from the environment. Looking

from this perspective, Luhmannian system theory looks appropriate in providing an outlook that will help us formulate the relations in world politics from a duality perspective. Luhmann's theory is conducive in that in defining the system, Luhmann mainly relies on the difference between the system and its environment. If there is something that is applicable to all systems it is the difference between the system and its environment. This insistence on the difference makes us to believe that there must be an endeavor on the side of the system to sustain the difference. This insistence must be because of some privileges that the system enjoys, from which it wants to deprive the environment. At this point, we can trace the signs of inequality in the system and its environment dichotomy. This also overlaps with the inequality aspect that we see in the world political relations between two different sides. Inequality is the central theme that should be focused on in world politics, because one side has some privileges that the other side lacks. This is not a neutral inequality, in fact the parties involved (the system and its environment) has disagreement over this inequality that causes a friction between them, which we can call conflict between the parties.

This idea of conflict between the system and environment, we can say, is further enhanced with the Luhmannian dichotomy of exclusion and inclusion. Luhmann says, when a system is formed, it includes the most relevant assets and excludes the others. It can be stated that what is excluded overlaps with the system's environment, and what is included overlaps with the system's boundaries. Luhmann does not say that there is a tension between the system and its environment, but he says that what is excluded mostly suffers from unfavorable conditions while what is included enjoys favorable conditions. Favorable conditions may include high level of wealth, high level of independence/autonomy, and high level of participation in decision making processes etc. This excluded and included dichotomy gives us the clue that there is an inequality at work in relations between the system and the environment, which necessarily implies an underlying conflict between them. Indeed, the main relationship between the system and the environment is exclusion of environment from the system. Exclusion is the result of system thinking in Luhmann's theory. System thinking is a way to explain the world. Not only physical and biological environment but also social realm is explicable with the concepts of the systems thinking. The question is how does system thinking fit in the study of world politics?

Taking the world society as the largest social system, other social systems are a derivation of world society in Luhmann's thinking. Hence, it is possible to imagine a system in world politics that can be placed below the world society. In this vein, we can say that the system that is related to the world society in the realm of world politics can be named as world political system, which would be a "secondary functional subsystem" of world society that has relations taking place inside and outside. When the system emerges, the primary form of relationship that it develops with its environment is exclusion; and exclusion, as we noted, implies conflict between the included and the excluded. Yet, in order to clarify this conflict relation, we must identify what corresponds to the system in world politics and what corresponds to the environment of this system.

Given that we named the relevant system in world politics as world political system, and given that we called this system as the "secondary functional subsystem" of world society, one could get the sense that the entire world politics is encompassed by the world political system. This is not the case. The entire world politics cannot be encompassed by the world political system because if the world political system was equivalent to the world politics, then the environment in world politics would remain unaddressed. This problem can be solved when we notice one commonality that can be seen in almost all system theories in International Relations, that is the two types of states or areas in world politics that keep appear again and again. For example, balance of power says that there are great powers and minor powers in world politics. Imperialism theory says that there are industrialized and unindustrialized states. World-system theory says there are areas located in the core and areas located in the periphery. Postcolonialism says the world is divided between the north and the south. In this division, the great powers, the industrialized states, the core, and the north refer the same thing; the club of states that include the eligible states and exclude the non-eligible states. The non-eligible states are minor powers, unindustrialized states, periphery, and the south. If we say that world political system includes both eligible and non-eligible elements, then we cannot identify an environment because every party possible would be assumed to be included in the system. However, if we attempt to say that only one party of a duality in a realm constitutes the world political system and the other party is the environment of this realm, then this problem is resolved.

Indeed, our survey of the history of the Middle East shows that the areas enjoying favorable conditions have coordination in their attitude toward the areas that have unfavorable conditions. On the other hand, coherency and cooperation between areas suffering unfavorable conditions occur rarely, while the coherence and cooperation in the areas enjoying favorable conditions is continuous. Thus, while included areas act like a system, the excluded areas show scattered existence, which conforms to appearance of environment. The areas enjoying favorable conditions create a difference from the rest of the world known to them, owing to the economic, innovative, ideational, and military superiority in their capabilities. As they create a difference from their environment with the superiorities that they have, they become the elements that the system unites, while the areas suffering from unfavorable conditions can be named as environmental element of world politics.

Now, the question is how we can name the areas enjoying favorable conditions (included areas) versus the areas suffering from unfavorable conditions (excluded areas). It seems that core-periphery dichotomy can be the best option for naming these two sides since this labeling does not have a geographical limitation as in the case of the north-south dichotomy, a reference to a historical period as in the case of industrialized-unindustrialized states, and a connotation to multiplicity of parties involved as in the case of great powers-minor powers dichotomy. Thus, throughout the study we employ the core-periphery dichotomy to refer the system and its environment. However, the core-periphery dichotomy in this study refers only the world political relations; it is not about world economic relations, as formulated by the World-system theory. This dichotomy helps us read the world political relations from a dual perspective as opposed to multiple manifestation of states. In such an approach, inter-state confrontations and relations become marginal since they are a derivation of the core-periphery relations, not an alternative of them.

We came up with core-periphery conceptualization of the world politics by adopting Niklas Luhmann's system theory (which can be named as exclusion theory), and by studying the Middle East history. To begin with, what makes exclusion theory of Luhmann useful for world politics is the central role given to difference between the system and its environment since, as we noted, this differentiation allows the formulation of world politics in terms of an asymmetry between two sides, which

shows the inequality. However, this theory is not a world politics theory in its origin. Therefore, in formulating a system theory for world politics we have widely borrowed concepts from other theories. Yet, before mentioning the implications of Luhmann's theory regarding world politics, we have clarified the traits of Luhmannian system thinking in the Chapter 3.

One quality of the social systems that Luhmann implicitly mentions and we think is important is that a system must have a function. This means that a system must address an emerging need in world society. The boundaries of the world society in the past were overlapping with the boundaries of regions; the entire world was not forming an interconnected whole. Because of this, we can call the regions in the past, i.e., the Middle East as a world society, as it was isolated from the rest of the world considerably. The world political system that emerged in this region addressed the needs of this region. Even though exclusion theory implies that a system must have a function, it does not define what that function for the world political system is because exclusion theory originally is not a theory of world politics. Therefore, we borrowed the function that the system must have from other theories of world politics and from the history of the Middle East.

The most relevant functions that can be discerned are "conflict resolution" and "cooperation maintenance" in the world society. Conflict resolution function is about deciding what a conflict in a region is and how it should be resolved. This is a need to be handled by world society. The system, namely the core, addresses this need that world society faces. The core handles this function in two ways; first, it freezes the potential claims and freedom of the peripheral areas. Peripheral areas cannot claim dispute with other peripheral areas and core areas, especially if they are going to resort to war. This means that one way of handling the conflict in the world is the restriction of independence in peripheral areas. Second way of handling a conflict in the world is that the core areas are allowed to claim a dispute and resolve the disagreements between each other through diplomacy and war. There is no limitation to the core areas in claiming a dispute either with the core or peripheral areas. However, the core areas do not turn their dispute with each other into the annihilation (putting an end to the political independence) of each other or into the termination of the system as a whole. There is not such a limitation on the core's attitude toward the peripheral areas.

The second function of the system is maintenance of cooperation. This function is a need of world society that must be addressed by the system (core). The core does not limit in the degree of cooperation between the core areas regarding the maintenance of interactions in economic, diplomatic, and cultural realms. Even when the core areas are at war, the cooperation between them keeps going.

The second feature of the social systems, in our case the system/core, is that it is space free. The boundaries of the core are not spatially determined, because the core exists in a non-spatial realm. This understanding of social system “excludes the traditional understanding that human beings, with body and soul, are parts of the society” (Luhmann 1990, 176). Instead of spatiality, in Luhmann’s approach, the boundaries of the systems are designed according to inclusion and exclusion. Being space free, the system/core is not controlled by the individuals, groups of individuals, states, social classes, a group of states, a region... etc. Rather, the core has an existence that cannot be controlled by these elements. The core has its own logic and reasons of existence. This independent existence must be understood as separate existence of system from people and states. The goals and functions of the system do not necessarily reflect those of states and other structures such as military and diplomatic establishment, economic structures etc. The system/core has its own boundaries that exist in the realm of meaning; that is, the system makes it possible to limit violence and to maintain cooperation among the included areas of the world without being in the service of the included areas. This separate existence of the system allows working of functions such as conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance by utilization of core polities (the system structures), even though conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance rules are not designed by these core polities.

The system’s capability to generate some results that are not designed by its structures (such as states) is achieved through communication within the boundaries of the system, which is the third feature of the social systems. Communication, which makes the existence of the system possible, is the operation of the system. Communication produces the unity of the system since it is the linkage that takes place across the system, or a “complex recursive network” that creates some sort of reality (Cadenas and Arnold 2015, 171). The communication in the system is made possible by people because they take part in realization of actions that communicate with each other for

providing coherence across the system. Hence, the system is dependent on people. However, people do not produce or control the system. The actions of people produce and sustain the system; however, the system comes into existence because it creates a difference in relation to its environment. This means that the core/system is dependent on people for its sustenance, but the core does not produce what people want. The core has its own agenda; namely conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance. While performing these functions, the core favors (includes) some areas and excludes the others. Thus, nation-states, empires, city-states or individuals are outside the communication network of the core, including the core states, empires, city-states and the individuals. Communication is the system's capability to create its separate reality, which allows the core to become an entity that is distinct from states, armies, diplomatic personnel, and other individuals.

Laying out the features of the core as such provides us with some insights that can be helpful in explaining world politics in ways that cannot be performed by other theories. One of the insights that the exclusion theory provides us with is that there are multiple logics in world politics, some of which are not addressed by any other theory. Other theories, mostly, have a single logic in their explanations of world politics. For example, balance of power theory identifies an anarchical structure of world politics and attributes every relationship in the international realm to that structure's nature, by saying that all inter-state relations are conflictual. World-system theory identifies a system (World economy) at world level and attributes everything in international and national realm to that system's logic, by saying that there is exploitation in the relations. Society of states attributes what occurs in international realm solely to the norms/order supposedly governing the international relations by saying that cooperation is the main form of relationship in world politics. Lastly, imperialism and postcolonialism claim that exploitation dominates the world politics. Even though all of these theories are systemic, they are incomplete images that interpret/explain everything international with a single logic.

However, exclusion theory has at least three logics that are applicable to world politics. One of the logics is that, a system has the tendency to maintain itself in the sense that it has a concern regarding its survival. In maintaining itself, the system/core does not rely on the polities/states, the people, and the militaries. Rather, the core is

able to do this through its own capabilities, namely the communication capability. As an entity, the core is kept reproduced in the realm of meaning as something at work, which creates the difference between the core and periphery, while committing exclusion against the periphery. This capability is an accomplishment of the system not an accomplishment of any other authority. The idea that the system maintains and reproduces itself brings to mind several implications. One of them is that the system would not allow the destruction of itself by its own structures (i.e. states). Second, the system is not something that exists eternally. System has a beginning, and it can terminate. These predictions do not exist in other theories. Other theories treat the system as something that exists forever, and the system is immune to the threats and destruction. However, exclusion theory suggests that systems come into being at some point in history and they can be terminated. Even though the systems can be terminated, the systems have the capacity to reproduce themselves as long as no external effect (i.e., people and nature) destroys them. The system maintains itself by the prevention of destructive tendencies within the system. Thus, we cannot expect that the structures of the system (i.e., core polities/states) can in any way lead to the destruction of the core. In other words, we cannot expect that the core areas enter a conflict that would lead to dismantlement of a system.

The second logic in exclusion theory is that the elements of system/core work in harmony with each other; they are not in conflict. Except postcolonialism, other theories suggest that within the system/core, there is a conflict among the structures (polities) of the system. This suggestion is partly a result of an immature system conceptualization in these theories, but to a greater extent this emanates from their adoption of inter-state conflict logic to intra-system relations as well. According to them, states in the core are independent of each other, and they have a real conflict with each other, which is confirmed by their wars. However, exclusion theory implies that the elements of the system must be in harmony rather than being in conflict. Indeed, a review of the history of the Middle East shows that core areas are not in conflict in the sense that they want to end each other's independence. Rather, their fights are about resolving the disagreements between each other so as to maintain their core status. Therefore, their wars are not indications of conflict between them. Conflict in our study means a disagreement over the independence of parties involved.

Given this definition, core areas do not have a problem with regard to the independence of each other, which is an indication of harmony between them. Only the included areas can have independence to claim their rights to full extent. However, if an area is excluded from the core, it does not exercise all the rights attached to its independence. Our survey of cases in history of the Middle East shows that while the core areas are sensitive in respecting each other's independence, they do not hesitate in limiting the independence of the peripheral areas. Thus, harmony between core areas is extended to limiting the independence of peripheral areas. There is almost no case in our study that shows that the core areas disagree and fight with each other to render independence to a peripheral area. Rather the limited independence of the peripheral areas is taken for granted and something that should be sustained.

The third logic that the exclusion theory implies is that the core and periphery relations are based on inclusion and exclusion patterns. The core and periphery interact through their structures, such as states, firms, diplomatic missions, militaries...etc. In these relations, while the core uses exclusion and predation against the periphery, the periphery seeks inclusion in the core. Luhmann identifies the pattern of relationship from the system (core) toward environment (periphery) as exclusion, but he does not mention the pattern of relationship from the environment/periphery toward the system/core. Luhmann says exclusion is a different form of relationship than the forms of relationships offered by other theories, i.e., cooperation, exploitation, dominance, or any other relationship. System/core makes "very specific distinctions with respect to its environment, e.g. usable and not usable resources with respect to ecological questions or (excluded) bodies and (included) persons with respect to human individuals" (Luhmann 1997, 74). In fact, even if the world political and world economic systems attempt to include the excluded areas, this would not be possible because a system cannot include "all kinds of concerns" (75). In this context, exclusion means the differentiation of the included from the excluded. The interpretation of these principles in terms of the world politics is that the core areas have different codes of conduct toward core areas and the peripheral areas. The core areas are interested in enforcement and protection of the rights and obligations of the polities, firms, markets, organizations, and institutions in the core areas. This attitude is different from the attitude adopted against the peripheral areas. The core areas use

predation against the assets of the periphery when there are assets that could be included in the world political system. Thus, exclusion in world politics has two meanings; one is that core areas have different code of conduct toward other core areas and the peripheral areas. Second, the core areas do not hesitate to use predation against the assets of the peripheral areas and limit the independence of the peripheral areas. Core areas seek to impede the inclusion attempt of the peripheral areas. These tendencies of the core are also drawn from our study of the history of the Middle East.

With regard to the attitude of the environment (periphery) toward the system (core), as we noted, Luhmann does not say anything, but based on the historical cases, we can suggest that the environment (periphery) seeks inclusion in the system (core). The peripheral areas are aware of being excluded and being peripheral in their relations with core areas, and this is something undesirable. Therefore, the peripheral areas continuously seek inclusion in the system; it does not matter whether the peripheral area concerned is a province of an empire, a vassal state, an autonomous tributary state, or a group of loosely organized people. What is at stake is that the peripheral areas are reduced to a secondary political status because their independence is limited compared to the independence level of core areas. Not only that, the peripheral areas are also subject to predation from the core. These make the peripheral areas to seek elevation to independence status, which occurs only by inclusion in the core since there is no option to create an alternative core where independence can be achieved. This inclusion attempt can take different forms; for example, in modern times we see continuous criticism from the periphery toward the core. The aim of the criticism is to get more aid, and to be more equally represented in the system. The second form of inclusion attempts in modern times is the demands raised by the nationalist and religious groups. In the pre-modern era, successful inclusion attempts were performed by mobilization of the peripheral nomads and pastoral people against the core areas. Thus, from an exclusion theory perspective, the attitude of the peripheral areas against the core is getting equal participation in the core. This does not mean that the peripheral inclusion attempts are always pacifistic; in fact the historical cases show that the inclusion attempts, similar to the exclusion practices of the core, may go violent.

As we can see, the exclusion theory provides a framework where the world politics is explained from a core-periphery perspective. The underlying conflict and inequality is between the core and the periphery, where the inter-state relations are no more than a variation of these underlying relations. States/polities, depending on where they are positioned, i.e., in the core or in the periphery and depending on whether they are dealing with a core or a peripheral state/polity, adopt different attitudes. When a core state is dealing with another core state, it would work in harmony with that state. Yet, if a core state deals with a peripheral state, the core state would have a different code of conduct toward the peripheral state. This dependency of the state attitude in its position shows that the underlying conflict and inequality, which is what the world politics is about, is between the core and the periphery. Inter-state relations are a variation of core-periphery relations. Exclusion theory not only reveals this underlying relationship but also it offers at least three logics of relations that are both theoretically and empirically proven. This capability of exclusion theory to offer a new outlook is achieved because it is a system approach. The system approach adopted in the exclusion theory allows us to define the system in world politics as the entity to be studied in the world politics, which enable us to focus on relations within and outside the system.

This capability of the exclusion theory is further supported with the historical cases that we covered in the Middle East history. As our survey starts from the prehistoric times onward, the first thing that we notice is that world political relations cannot be mentioned in the entirety of history of human being; it became possible only with the emergence of a world political system by the first half of the 3rd millennium BCE in South Mesopotamia. In the hunter gatherer stage (pre 10000 BCE eras) and in Neolithic era (10000-3500 BCE) there were no proper conditions to talk about a system and the world political relations. We assume that without a system, it is not possible to comment on the world politics. The possibility to talk about the system/core became viable with some developments that first time appeared in the South Mesopotamia in south of contemporary Iraq. The first thing that was necessary for emergence of a system was disappearance of the symmetric conditions across the Middle East. In general, the systems/cores activate their networks in the most endowed areas in a region, which are able to absorb innovation in production; have

advanced military and social organization forms; feed larger numbers of people; and attract talented individuals of the world society or the region (Nissen 1988; Mann 1986; Zagarell et al. 1986). These conditions, which are necessary for a system/core come into sight, are also the indications of asymmetric conditions in the world/region, as opposed to the symmetric conditions across the region in the hunter-gatherer stage. When the conditions were similar across the World or the Middle East, the differentiation between the core and the periphery did not appear. It was the emergence of an area with favorable conditions in the South Mesopotamia that rendered the differentiation in the Middle East.

The differentiation of South Mesopotamia in relation to the other parts of the Middle East (i.e., Anatolia, Iran, Syria, rest of Iraq, Egypt, and Arabian Peninsula) was associated with the emergence process of cities with large population. The emergence of cities was both a result of increasing production capability in agriculture and a propeller of further increase in agricultural production and manufacture. This differentiation between the South Mesopotamia and the rest of the Middle East contributed to the formation of a region because it helped with expansion of interactions throughout the Middle East. The Middle East gained the character of a region with the appearance of close contacts starting from at least 4th millennium BCE (Podany 2014, 7). The Middle East by being the largest society (social system) possible at the time was itself constituting a world society. However, being a world society/region was not rendered with geographical proximity only. The formation of a region/world society was closely associated with the emergence of dependencies and frequent contacts, which occur only when the parts of the region are differentiated. Prior to the formation of a world society in the Middle East, the conditions were similar across the Middle East, meaning that no area was superior to the other. Contacts between parts of the Middle East were limited to transfer of technology from one area to other areas. There were not dependencies between the parts of the Middle East; each settlement or settlement system was self-sufficient.

The limited level of contacts and self-sufficiency of the settlements in the Middle East ended with the changes in South Mesopotamia. By 4000 BCE in the South Mesopotamia, changes in climatic conditions enabled considerable increase in agricultural production that led to concentration of the large number of people in this

area and the emergence of sophisticated settlement systems. From this time onward, high levels of agricultural production characterized South Mesopotamia, which was associated with agricultural surplus and release of some labor from subsistence activities. Free labor specialized in the manufacturing activities. As South Mesopotamia was able to generate agricultural surplus and manufactured products, the level of exchanges between the South Mesopotamia and other parts of the Middle East rose. The South Mesopotamians were exporting agricultural products and manufactures in return for the raw materials from other regions. What we start to see was the growing level of contacts and dependencies between different parts of the Middle East, which made the region a world society. Thus, the first condition of a system, namely the formation of a world society/region, was met.

However, even though the differentiation between South Mesopotamia and the rest of the Middle East developed in the realm of production and exchanges, and the Middle East evolved to be a region, this did not automatically lead to the development of a world political system/core in the Middle East that would be centered in the South Mesopotamia. For the system/core emerge in South Mesopotamia another thousand years must be waited, when the society was stratified in a way that it allowed the emergence of an administrative class in society to be in charge of state functions. Second, the city-state emerged by attaining military capability to use coercion against the peripheral areas as well as in resolving the disagreements between the core areas. Thus, even though the Middle East was a region that was the largest social system (world society) possible at the time, and the South Mesopotamia differed from the rest of the Middle East owing to its production capacity and population size, the South Mesopotamia was not a system/core. This was because until the beginning of the third Millennium BCE, there was no need to resolve the conflicts that would have region-wide implications and to render cooperation in the regional level. Only by the first half of the 3rd millennium BCE, it became observable that the inter-settlement conflict that had regional impact gained an undeniable existence. This type of conflict needed to be addressed with the emergence of a system that would need a structure like city-state. State possessed capabilities such as military function against other city-states or less organized groups of people, coercion within the society, a special administrative

personnel for running the state apparatus, territorial¹² definition of states instead of tribal or clan criteria, and taxing function (Diakonoff 1991b, 36).

The emergence of the structures of system (namely the city-state) for conflict resolution and the cooperation maintenance were indications showing that the system was already formed in the South Mesopotamia. This system could be recognized from the fact that the city-state was a South Mesopotamian phenomenon. It did not emerge in a single settlement, rather many of the cities in South Mesopotamia turned into city-states at the same era. This co-emergence of city-states in many settlements in South Mesopotamia was a sign showing that the city-state was a response/structure that formed according to the logic of the system for addressing the conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions in South Mesopotamia and other closely connected areas of the Middle East. Conflict was resolved by treating the included areas (the South Mesopotamian settlements) differently from the excluded areas (the rest of the Middle East). Cooperation topics and the extent of the cooperation were decided by the South Mesopotamian core areas. The system had some principles. One was that the South Mesopotamia was different and superior than the rest of the Middle East, in terms of its production, innovation, and military capacity. Second, this core that was a (South Mesopotamia) should have protected and advanced its existence in relation to the periphery. Third, the code of conduct by the South Mesopotamian elements against the South Mesopotamian elements must be different from the code of conduct against the elements outside of South Mesopotamia; South Mesopotamian areas are included while the other areas are excluded. Finally, the relations between the areas in the South Mesopotamia must be collaborative as opposed to be conflictual. The city-state was a structure that was developed to carry out the duties attached to these principles; it could not invent alternative templates of actions.

Once the system and its structures emerged (namely city-states and later empires), the following eras witnessed the appearance of different systems that found new areas to concretize in the Middle East. The core that for the first time emerged in the South

¹² In some studies, there is almost an obsession with the territoriality as a defining feature of contemporary world politics (Spruyt 1994). It is suggested that territoriality had never been the case prior to the Westphalian order. Allegiance to a territory and fixation of this territory is attributed to modern era only. However, the study of the regional political relations in Middle East history shows that allegiance to territory is a much earlier quality of World politics (Diakonoff 1991b; Nissen 1988).

Mesopotamia was the Sumerian system (2900-2350 BCE). This system had multiple structures (city-states), where core and periphery conceptualization perfectly fits in the analysis of the world political affairs. While the Sumerian system constituted the core (included areas), other areas in the Middle East were the environment (excluded areas) of Sumer. The dominant relationship from core toward the periphery was exclusion, and from the periphery toward the core was seeking inclusion. Even though the city-states of Sumerian system had many disagreements over pieces of land, water resources, and canals; the disagreements did not gain a character that would lead to each party to annihilate the other. As they adopted prudence in relations with each other, they also cooperated with each other against the attacks of the non-Sumerians. The common problems that were emanating from management of irrigation canals also made them to cooperate. The Sumerian system/core either exported its structures (i.e., city-state and diplomacy) to the periphery or applied predation for routinizing its relations with the closer peripheral areas, which limited the destructive capacity of the periphery to challenge the core or to seek inclusion. None-Sumerian areas were not constituting a system that could show coordinated attitude against the Sumerian core, rather peripheral areas were individually positioned in accordance with the maintenance of unequal relations with the core. The core was able to maintain favorable relations with the periphery owing to facilitating role played by the city-states located in the periphery.

Following the Sumerian system, Akkadian system (2350-2150 BCE) formed, owing to collapse of Sumerian core as a result of the spread of Semite people to the North and South Mesopotamia. A city-state, controlled by Semites, Akkad, took control of both South and North Mesopotamia, thus becoming the political structure of the new core of the ancient Middle East. It was called as the first empire in the world. The North and South Mesopotamia were united in the Akkadian system to form the new core, Mesopotamia. This system formed owing to the fact that the conflict resolution and cooperation maintenance functions of the system could be performed only if the entire Mesopotamia was included in the system since Mesopotamia in its entirety gained core characters, namely superiority in military, innovative and production realms. The Akkadian core was not content with simply exporting its structures and practices to the peripheral areas as it was the case in Sumerian era. This time, direct

control (exclusion) through military means was adopted in relations with other closely contacted parts of the Middle East, i.e., parts of Iran and Syria. Thus, exclusion as well as predation of core against the periphery was more direct than the Sumerian system. On the other hand, while parts of Iran and Syria were militarily controlled, other peripheral areas, i.e., Oman, Taurus region in Anatolia, and loosely organized groups of people (i.e., Gutians, Lullubi, Hurrians) were excluded through isolation or expeditions at intervals. When Akkadians needed natural resources from other areas, it did not matter whether an area was controlled or isolated, they would wage wars against these areas. Thus, core and periphery relations were militarily sustained. Akkadian system ended with the attacks of a non-urban peripheral element, Gutians from Zagros Mountains.

After the end of Akkadian system, following an interval where Third Dynasty of Ur (2193 and 2004 BCE) rose to prominence, the Middle East witnessed a new wave of people leading to formation of a new system, Amorites. The era from 2004 to 1595 BCE was called as the Amorite age, in the Middle East. In this age, the core-periphery relationship was established along the vassal and suzerain relations; there were few larger kingdoms which had allegiance of a large number of smaller kingdoms. The large kingdoms were not concentrated in a geographically adjacent area, rather they were scattered across various areas of the Middle East, mostly along the Fertile Crescent. Therefore, the large kingdoms were geographically separated from each other by the peripheral areas (vassals). In this era, Assur, Eshnunna, Babylon, Mari, Elam, Isin and Larsa were the core kingdoms. Despite geographical disconnectedness they were included within the core. Alongside them there were about 160 smaller kingdoms. In terms of the relations between the core kingdoms and vassals, it can be said that there was not transitivity between core and peripheral areas; rather core areas had interest in keeping the peripheral areas in the periphery (exclusion). As to the intra-core relations, we find that when the core areas fought with each other, the contention was mostly about vassals to be controlled. The second cause of war between the core areas was the search for hegemony that was a result of the rise of a peripheral area to core status. That was Babylon. Other than that, the confrontations between the core areas were not indications of a conflict between them, the real

conflict was between core and periphery that entailed denial of some rights, such as independence, to peripheral areas.

Amorite system was replaced by a new system (core) in the Middle East that once again formed with the entrance of peripheral people to the system. As it was seen previously (in the case of Akkadians, Gutians, Amorites), a flow of people in large numbers toward core areas caused a system change. This time Indo-Europeans appeared. Therefore, the era from 15th to 11th century BCE witnessed the dominance of Amarna (Indo-European) system. In this system, four kingdoms, namely, Egypt, Hatti, Mitanni, and Babylon (Kassites) were core areas, of which Hatti and Egypt for the first time joined in the Middle Eastern core-periphery relations. These four core areas together were united by the core in a way that it differentiated them from the peripheral elements, mostly the vassal kingdoms. The vassal kingdoms were excluded from the system, whose exclusion was not limited to restriction of the vassals' independence. Besides exclusion, the resources of the vassals were appropriated through tribute and military contribution by the core areas. This era where Amarna system was prevalent is a comparatively well- studied era. It is mostly agreed that the core kingdoms in this era acted in a true "brotherhood" manner. However, some considers that the wars between the core areas were showing that rather than brotherhood, conflict concept would be proper to define intra-core relationships. Yet, the account of wars between the core areas in this study revealed that these wars were waged actually to pacify the vassals and to share them among core areas. Egypt, Hatti, and Mitanni frequently fought in Syria which was home to many vassal kingdoms and located between these three great kingdoms. Instead of posing a threat to other great kingdoms, Egypt, Hatti, and Mitanni frequently lost and recaptured the vassal kingdoms in the wars with each other. These wars never escalated to a situation where the independence of one great kingdom endangered. Therefore, the confrontations between the core areas in the form of war seemed more like a reaffirmation of core status of warring parties since war was almost a regular activity, and also making sure that the peripheral areas would remain peripheral.

The Amarna system seemed to end because of deteriorating climate, famine, and diseases. This was a different reason from the previous argument that we made by saying that the systems collapsed because of the attacks and intrusion of peripheral

people into the core. Second, when the Indo-European system collapsed, a core in the Middle East did not emerge for some time. This was unusual in that in previous system emergence cases, (i.e. Akkad, Amorite, and Amarna), the fall of one system and the rise of another one was traceable and they were connected to each other. The rise of a new system followed the demise of the previous system. Yet, this time, the system collapsed and no new system ensued it. There was a dark age following the Indo-European system. Following this dark age, the Assyrian system emerged.

The Assyrian system was in place between 911 and 609 BCE, in the Middle East. It was centralized in the cities such as Nineveh, Assur, Kalhu, Kilizi and Arbela. However, the territories occupied in the Assyrian empire were much larger than these cities, owing to the networks of administrative and military people in the peripheral territories. Thus, the Assyrian core was consisted of some cities and the military and administrative elements in the peripheral areas. The fact that Assyria appointed people in the peripheral areas did not mean that these areas became the core, rather appointment of the administrative and military personnel rendered exclusion of the periphery from the core. The Assyrian containment of the periphery was different from Sumerian, Amorite, and Indo-European systems. Instead of indirect control, direct control was applied. The reason we say so is that military measures were much more prevalent in Assyrian treatment of the peripheral areas. Instead of vassal and suzerain relationship between the core and periphery, Assyrians incorporated the peripheral areas into their administrative system, they appointed governors who were Assyrian origin, and they collected taxes instead of tribute. Besides the military measures, Assyrians adopted other means for pacifying the peripheral areas; such as mass deportations and relocations, manipulation of religion, and differentiation of administrative measures by each peripheral area. Despite these measures of the core, peripheral areas never fell short of seeking inclusion through rebelling, quitting payment of tribute, forging alliances against the Assyrians, and attempting territorial expansion. The aim of these inclusion attempts was getting equal status with the Assyrians. Equal status could be attained when the peripheral areas got their independence, which would give them the ability to decide what is a reason for conflict and cooperation in world political relations of the Middle East. When the peripheral area was not independent it could not escalate its disagreements into a war

where a solution would be decided in accordance with the mutual benefit of the warring parties. When an area was not part of the core, its disagreements were either frozen or resolved arbitrarily by the core area. When the peripheral areas (i.e., the states in Syria, Urartu, Phrygia, Babylonia, and Elam) sought inclusion either individually or as an alliance, Assyria always took this as a reason for war, where it every time accomplished the defeat and exclusion of peripheral areas. Even though, these contained areas were not able to defeat Assyria and get inclusion, at the end, a loosely organized federation of tribes, the Meds, by establishing an alliance with the Babylonians, were able to defeat Assyria and put an end to existence of the Assyrian system. Once again, a peripheral group of loosely organized people succeeded in putting an end to the existence of a core/system. Following the Assyrian system, the Persian system emerged, which was a replication of the Assyrian system. Therefore, we did not cover Persian system, even though in the earlier drafts of the dissertation there was a chapter regarding the Persian system.

The end of Persian Empire by Alexander the Great is mostly taken as the end of ancient civilizations of the Middle East. Therefore, our study of the ancient Middle East as a historical period finished with Assyrian system. The next period that we studied for finding clues about core and periphery relations in the world politics was the era where Islam emerged as the dominant religion in the Middle East. Relatively abundant nature of information about this period enabled us to shed light on aspects of core-periphery relations that were not clarified in the study of the ancient Middle East. Yet, still the world political relations of the Middle East could be explained along the core-periphery dichotomy. There were tempting events that might have made us read the world political relations from an inter-state perspective due to the dominant narrative in the studies that cover this era. A closer examination shows that central relationship in the world politics was between core and periphery.

To start with, the era of Byzantine and Umayyad/Abbasid system (610-900 CE) that starts with the emergence of Islam until the relative decline of Abbasids is useful because by looking at the data about this era, we are able to discern the process of peripheral inclusion in the core, as there is enough data. The first thing that we notice is that in the process of seeking inclusion, large numbers of peripheral people do not automatically organize and seek inclusion in the core. Peripheral people organize only

when there is a uniting message/idea/religion and a small committed group within the larger group. The message and the dedicated group mobilize the loosely organized people to demolish the core and lead to emergence of a new core. This mobilization of people around a cause, however, later deteriorates. When the peripheral people succeed in achieving inclusion and give support to new states, i.e., Umayyad and Abbasid empires, people lose their initial motivation as a committed group of people. From then onward the established states start to emulate the previous core areas, i.e. Sassanids and the Byzantium/Rome. Once the new empires consolidate their position, their people become the peripheral element of the system that these empires are a structure of it. This scenario realized in the Middle East after the era of Rashidun Calips. Following this era, a new system formed. In this system, two core areas existed, namely Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids, and in each of these core areas there was a dominant universal religion, namely Islam and Christianity. The expectations of the people in each of these core areas were exclusionary towards the members of the other religion. However, the empires ignored this attitude of the people; they found ways of eschewing the expectations of the people with low profile confrontations that did not affect the general cooperative relationship between core areas. In other words, the core areas cooperated against the expectations of their own people. Therefore, we see that not only people in the periphery but also people in the core were treated as a peripheral element by the core areas. While the core areas excluded their people, they cooperated with each other. The religious, economic, and diplomatic relations between Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids show that the two sides were cooperating with each other, in spite of the low-profile wars between them. A closer examination of the wars between Byzantium and Umayyads/Abbasids reveal that these wars were mainly low-profile wars waged for the satisfaction of the people's expectations, just to prevent a destructive move from people. Thus, we can say that the periphery of the universal empires in the Middle East was their own people rather than peripheral areas outside of the core. This was so because their people could at any time destroy the system, in case they were not pacified through mild satisfaction of their expectations.

The system of universal religions demolished with the arrival of the people from the Central Asia to the Middle East. The arrival of the people in the Middle East led to an

interval in world politics of the Middle East that saw no system until the emergence of the Ottoman-Safavid system (1501-1736 CE). By studying the Ottoman-Safavid system and its preceding eras, we can say that there were opposite tendencies between the freedom of people and thriving of a system. The development of the system occurred at the expense of the people's freedom or autonomy. We could see this opposition in the case of Turqomans in the Ottoman and Safavid system. The people could avoid the repression of the system if there was a continuous flow of people toward the region where they live. If there was not flow of people to the system, the normal state of the region was that either it will produce a system that would exclude the people or it would be the periphery of another region which would once again exclude the people. Thus, by studying the Ottoman-Safavid system, we found that system/core not only excludes the peripheral areas but also the people, both citizens and non-citizens. The second finding is that for a region generate a system/core, it must have superior or at least equivalent capabilities to the adjacent regions. Otherwise, the region in its entirety would be relegated to periphery of another region's core politics. When the Ottoman-Safavid system emerged in the Middle East, the region was an ordinary one, after a period (600-1000 CE) where the Middle East resurged thus became a prominent region (Modelski 1987, 70). It did not have superiorities in relation to other regions, mainly Europe. Despite this, the region was able to generate a core because the attention of the core politics of Europe shifted toward other regions. Another finding that can be mentioned by looking at the Ottoman-Safavid system was that core areas tended to cooperate to such a degree that wars between them disappeared. This perfect cooperation was explicable with the idea that if there is enough time, the core areas achieve a perfect cooperation condition where they reach a formal agreement that puts an end to even low-profile fights between core areas. The Ottoman-Safavid system proved that the core areas not only do tacitly cooperate, but also if there is enough time, they would openly cooperate against the people and the peripheral areas.

As we can see from this sketch of world political relations in the Middle East from ancient era to the Islamic period, core-periphery conceptualization based on exclusion theory perfectly fits in explaining the world political relations. This is an alternative reading of the world political relations where the underlying conflict (exclusion vs.

inclusion) is between the core and the periphery, opposite to the understanding that major conflict is between core areas/states. In explaining core-periphery relations, we too gave an account of the inter-state relations; however, we claimed that the city-states/empires/polities are acting in conformity with the logics of the exclusion theory, rather than according to the so-called individual state interests. Therefore, we found out that, as world politics is about conflicts emanating from inequalities, the real conflict is between the excluded and included, instead of states. Inter-state disagreements are subordinate to the central conflict between the core and the periphery. In their fights with each other, the core areas do not aim to end each other's independence, rather they try to find a solution acceptable to all parties included. If a core/system sustains for long enough, core areas can reach to a condition where the fights between them disappear for long periods of time. Not only this, counter to the mainstream treatments of the inter-state relations, the core states cooperate amongst each other when core-periphery relations are concerned. For example, regarding the status of the peripheral areas, core areas do not question the peripheral status of the peripheral areas. Rather core areas collaborate to sustain the peripheral status of peripheral areas. Such collaboration does not exist between the peripheral areas. Nevertheless, when peripheral areas, especially the loosely organized peripheral groups of people, cooperate against the core, they can destroy the core to end up with a new core system or an era of nonexistence of a core, where people are more autonomous and are included. In this regard, another central contribution of the exclusion theory is that it sheds light on the relations between the people and the system/core. We found out that the interests of the people and that of the core are in conflict with each other. It does not matter whether they are located in the core or periphery, people are excluded from the core. When a core forms, it excludes people by restraining their autonomy, especially the large groups of people. The core, for reducing the discontent among people, sometimes applies policies that would be welcome by the people since it gives to people the sense that they are not excluded and that the interests of the core and people are identical. The core applies these policies because people are the main source of threat to the core. Other peripheral elements, i.e., peripheral states/polities cannot achieve inclusion in the core because the core contains them. Core contains peripheral structures either by exporting in the periphery its institutions that are organized for maintaining the existing relations

between the core and periphery or by militarily and administratively controlling the peripheral states/polities. All the attempts of the peripheral polities to liberate themselves from the core failed in the Middle Eastern history, except Babylonia in the Amorite age. The only possible way for getting inclusion by the peripheral areas is the organization of people who are at the margins of the periphery.

Finally, any further research that would adopt exclusion theory should first of all study the modern era world political relations. This study should take the entire world as a world society because the entire world is connected to each other, which makes it a whole. The areas that constitute the core must be identified and relations between the core areas and the relations between core and periphery must be analyzed. This will provide further empirical evidence regarding the analysis of world politics from an exclusion theory perspective. Similar studies can be performed by looking at the pre-modern regional politics of different regions, such as East Asia, South Asia, Europe etc. Besides these empirical studies, conceptual refinement studies can be done, for finding new ways of matching IR concepts with the concepts of systems theory. The state-centric IR already has a myriad of concepts that are developed within the discipline. This conceptual richness and the multitude of the studies that adopt the state-centric approach help it dominate the accounts of world political relations. Therefore, any standard account of political relations in history is explained from a state-to-state perspective. For alternative perspectives to world politics gain popularity, more empirical research and conceptual refinements about alternative perspectives must be carried out.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Oğultarhan, Adem

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 1975, Kars

Marital Status: Married

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Ph.D	Middle East Technical University, International Relations	2021
MS	University of Massachusetts- Boston, International Relations	2011
BS	Gazi University, International Relations	1998
High School	G.A.M.P. Vocational High School, Kars	1993

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014- Present	Ministry of Trade	Internal Auditor
2001-2014	Ministry of Customs and Trade	Customs and Trade Expert

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

HOBBIES

Walking, Photography, Cycling, Travelling.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini yoğun bir Avrupa-merkezciliğin olduđu bir alandır. Alana ilişkin teori ve ampirik alıřmalar, bu Avrupa-merkezciliğin izlerini tařımaktadır. Avrupa-merkezcilik, disiplinin teori geliřtirirken dayandıđı verileri Avrupa deneyiminden elde etmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bunun sonucunda da disiplin, “dnya siyaseti” alt alanı bađlamında devlet merkezli okuma yapmaktadır. Devlet, bu anlayıřta, ontolojisi olan nihai referans noktasıdır. Bir bařka deyiřle dnya siyaseti denince her bir devletin kendine zg ıkarları ve beklentilerinin bulunduđu sylenir. Dnya siyasetinde olup bitenler de devletlerin ıkarları arasındaki atıřma ve uzlařmanın birer tezahrdr. Devletlerin tabi oldukları daha st bir sistem bulunmamaktadır. Bu devlet merkezciliğin temelinde, belirtildiđi zere, Avrupa-merkezcilik yatmaktadır. Vestfalya Barıřından sonra Avrupa’da grlmeye bařlanan oklu ulus-devlet durumu, uluslararası politikanın temel zelliđi olarak kabul edilmiřtir. Devletin stnde bir st otoritenin bulunmadıđı, uluslararası siyasetin de devlet davranıřlarını anlamaya adanması gerektiđi kabul edilmiřtir. Bu anlayıř, daha sonra sadece Avrupa siyasetine deđil tm dnya siyasetine ve tm dnya tarihine uygulanmaya bařlamıřtır.

Bu Avrupa merkezciliğin ve beraberinde gelen devlet merkezciliğin geerliliğinin olup olmadıđının anlařılması amacıyla, Uluslararası İliřkiler disiplininde yaygın olan teorik yaklařımlara yeni teorik katkılarının yapılması ve modern Avrupa tarihi dıřındaki blgelere ait tarihi verilerin arařtırılarak disiplinin bakıř aısının geniřletilmesine ihtiya duyulmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, bu tezde antik dnemden bařlayarak Osmanlı-Safevi dneimine kadar olan geniř periyotta Orta Dođudaki blgesel siyasi geliřmelere bakılarak, Avrupa dıřındaki bir blge ve Vestfalya sonrası dnem dıřındaki bir dnem incelenerek, Avrupa-merkezci olmayan bir veri seti analiz edilmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, Avrupa-merkezci olmayan bu veri seti, Uluslararası İliřkiler disiplininde henz ele alınmayan bir teorik yaklařımla (dıřlama teorisi) analiz edilmeye alıřılmaktadır.

Orta Doğunun incelenen bölge olarak seçilmesinin iki sebebi bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle antik Orta Doğu, dünya tarihinde dünya siyasetinin ilk defa bahis konusu olduğu bir bölgedir. Öte yandan, Orta Doğu, bölge çalışmalarında olmasa bile, Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinde bir veri seti olarak nadir olarak ele alınmıştır. Bölgenin bu özellikleri, Orta Doğu’yu Avrupa merkezci olmayan bir dünya siyaseti okuması yapabilmek bakımından elverişli kılmaktadır. Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki teorilerin dışında bir teorik perspektifle bu veri setinin yorumlanmak istenmesinin sebebi ise dünya siyaseti söz konusu olduğunda mevcut teorilerin hemen tümünün devlet-merkezcilikten muzdarip olmasıdır. Bu teorilerden herhangi birini benimseyerek, devlet merkezci olmayan bir yorum elde etmek oldukça güç görünmektedir. Bu bağlamda, önemli bir sistem teorisyeni olan Niklas Luhmann’ın görüşlerinden esinlenilerek ve Orta Doğu tarihinin çalışılması sonucu elde edilen bulgulardan da yararlanılarak oluşturulan “dışlama teorisi” bir model olarak geliştirilmiş ve test edilmiştir. Bu yaklaşım, sistem yaklaşımı kapsamında değerlendirilebilecek bir modeldir.

Kısıtlar

Çalışmayı yaparken çeşitli kısıtlarla hareket edilmiştir. Öncelikle, kimi zaman, dünya siyaseti dendiğinde Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin kastedildiği düşünülebilir. Hâlbuki, bu eskiden belki böyleydi ama, günümüzde Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini oldukça geniş yelpazedeki alan ve alt alanların çalışıldığı bir sosyal bilim alanıdır. Dünya siyaseti ise bu disiplinin sadece bir alt alanıdır. Dolayısıyla, tezde, Uluslararası İlişkiler için değil, dünya siyaseti için bir model oluşturulmuş ve test edilmiştir. İkinci olarak, dünya siyaseti kavramı, disiplinde daha yaygın olan uluslararası siyaset kavramına tercih edilmiştir. Uluslararası siyaset kavramının daha devlet merkezci yaklaşımın bir iz düşümü olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Buna karşın, dünya siyaseti kavramı, iç siyaset dışındaki siyasi ilişkileri inceleyen ve bunun için devlet merkezli olmayan bir tutum içeren bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Dünya siyasetinin; savaş, diplomasi, çatışma, iş birliği, özgürlük, baskı, muhalefet, bağımsızlık, otonomi, dominasyon, kaynaklara güç vasıtasıyla el konulup konulmadığı gibi konular etrafında dönen gelişmeleri içerdiği değerlendirilmektedir. Bu gelişmeler, devlet merkezli analiz edilmek zorunda değildir. Üçüncü olarak, dışlama teorisinin bir sistem yaklaşımı olduğu göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki sistem

kavramından ayrı bir yaklaşım benimsendiğinin belirtilmesi gerekir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde genel olarak bir sistem bulunduğu ve bunun adının da uluslararası sistem olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Ancak, tezde, hayatın her alanında birden çok sistem bulunduğu gibi uluslararası ilişkilerde de birçok sistemin bulunduğu varsayılmıştır. Bu sistem türlerine dünya siyaset sistemi, dünya ekonomik sistemi, dünya askeri sistemi, dünya kültürel sistemi gibi örnekler verilebilir. Tezde, dünya siyaset sistemi ve dünya siyasi ilişkileri ele alınmaktadır.

Dördüncü olarak, dünya siyaset sistemi, tüm dünyayı içermemektedir. Sistem yaklaşımı, özellikle de Luhmann, sistem ve çevresine ilişkin bir ayrım yapmaktadır. Sistemin tanımını çevresiyle olan fark olarak nitelemektedir. Yani sistem, çevresine nazaran var olan bir entitedir. Böyle bakınca, incelenen herhangi bir çalışma alanı, sistem yaklaşımıyla bakıldığında, bir bütün olarak bir sistem oluşturmamaktadır. Sistem bir çalışma alanının, örneğin dünya siyasetinin, sadece bazı kısımlarını içerebilir. Yani dünya siyaseti, dünya siyasi sistemi ve onun çevresini oluşturan unsurlardan oluşur. Bu da dünya siyasi sisteminin, tüm dünya siyasi unsurlarını içermediğine ilişkin bir veri olarak alınabilir. Çevresel unsurlar, sistemin dışındadır. Dolayısıyla dünya siyasi sistemi dendiğinde, dünyadaki tüm siyasi unsurların değil sadece bazı bölgelerin sisteme dahil olduğunun bilinmesinde fayda görülmektedir.

Son olarak, Orta Doğu tarihi incelenirken, modern Orta Doğu tarihi analizin dışında tutulmuştur. Modern Orta Doğu tarihinin yaklaşık olarak Safevi Hanedanlığının yıkılışından itibaren başlatılabileceği varsayılmıştır. Böyle bir ayrım yapılmasının sebebi ise modern Orta Doğunun artık bağımsız bir analiz birimi olma özelliğini yitirmesidir. Orta Doğu geçmişte kendi başına bir dünya olarak değerlendirilebilecek bir bölgeydi. Diğer bölgelerin siyasi gelişmelerinin dışında kendi dinamikleriyle var olan bir bölgeydi. Bu durum, diğer bölgeler için de geçerliydi. Dünya henüz global bir nitelik arz etmeye başlamamıştı. Dünya global bir özellik göstermeye başladıktan sonra ise önceden müstakil varlıklar olan bölgeler bu özelliklerini yitirdiler. Bunun bir yansıması da bölgelerin dış müdahalelere açık bir yapı arz etmeye başlaması oldu. Dış müdahale aslında bölgenin dinamiklerinin bölgesellikten çıkıp global sistemin parçası olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu da Orta Doğu olaylarının tek başına incelenmesinin artık doğru sonuçların elde edilmesine yetmediğini göstermektedir.

Dolayısıyla, modern Orta Doğu analizin dışında tutulmuştur. Modern dönemle ilgili analizler global ölçekte yürütülmelidir.

Sistem Teorisi

Tezin öne çıkan özelliklerinden bir tanesi sistem yaklaşımını benimsemesidir. Dünya siyasetini incelerken sistem yaklaşımından yararlanmakta ve Niklas Luhmann'ın sistem prensiplerini önceliklendirmektedir. Sistem yaklaşımı esasında önce doğa bilimlerinde kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Daha sonra bu yaklaşımın sosyal bilimlerde de kullanılabileceği kanaati oluşmuş ve çeşitli uygulamaları söz konusu olmuştur. Bir alandaki teorik bulguların diğer alanlarda da kullanılabileceği düşünülmüştür. Bu yaklaşım, parçaların sistemi oluşturduğunu, ancak sistemin, parçaların toplamının aynısı olmadığını, ondan farklı olduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Bunu sosyal sistemlere de uyarlamıştır. Bu şekilde oluşan sistemler, sadece parçaların toplamının ötesinde bir varlık göstermemekte aynı zamanda birden çok çalışma alanındaki verileri/unsurları bir araya getirerek bir sistem oluşturmaktadır. Bütüncül bir yaklaşım olan bu sistem perspektifi, hep daha üst düzey genellemelere ulaşılmasının mümkün olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Sosyal sistemler özelinde olaya baktığımız zaman ise, bütüncül yaklaşıma göre sistemin parçaları insanlardır ve insanlar sistemleri planlar ve hayata geçirirler. Fakat bu sistem yaklaşımı, Luhmann'ın perspektifinden yola çıkarak bakıldığında, sosyal sistemlere insanların amaçladığı ve ürettiği bir entite olarak bakması ve sistemin kendi kendini üretme imkanını yadsıması nedeniyle eleştirilmektedir. Dahası, her şeyin bir sisteme dahil edilmesi durumunda, var olan alt sistemlerin görülememesi ve bunlara özgü çalışma dinamiklerinin anlaşılamaması söz konusu olabilecektir. Fakat bu eleştiriler de göz önünde bulundurularak, sistem için genel bir tanıma ulaşılması mümkündür. Sistem, kendisi dışındaki alanlardan (çevresinden) farklılaştığı ve bir isim almayı gerektirecek bir varlık göstermeye başladığı durumda bir sistemden bahsedebiliriz. Her sistem sınırları ile bilinir, yani neyin dahil neyin hariç tutulduğu bilinir. Sistem hem kendisi dışındaki alanları etkileyebilir hem de kendi içinde kendine özgü çalışma dinamikleri barındırır.

Sistem yaklaşımı kendi içinde zengin bir alan olmakla birlikte, tezde, Luhmann'ın sistem teorisine ilişkin görüşleri esas alınmıştır. Bu çerçevede, öncelikle Luhmann'ın sosyal sistemlere ilişkin görüşleri özetlenmeye çalışılmış ve daha sonra bu

özelliklerden yol çıkarak, dünya siyaseti açısından anlamlı öngörüler belirtilmiştir. Luhmann'ın görüşlerinden yola çıkılarak söylemek gerekirse, sosyal sistemlerin öncelikle bir fonksiyonunun olması gerekir. Luhmann dünya toplumunun var olabilecek en geniş sosyal sistem olduğunu söyledikten sonra, ulusal toplumların artık anlamlı bir entite olmadıklarını savunmaktadır. Yani dünyada çok sayıda toplum bulunmamakta tam tersine tek bir toplum bulunmaktadır; o da dünya toplumdur. Dünya toplumunu anlamak için onun fonksiyonel bölünmesine bakılması gerekir. Üretim biçimi, toplumun siyasi durumu veya dini yönelimi toplumu tanımlamaz. Toplumu, fonksiyonel bölünmesine göre anlayabiliriz. Fonksiyonel bölünmeden, toplumun birbirinden bağımsız ekonomik, siyasi, dini, bilimsel, hukuksal sistemlere ayrılması anlaşılır. Yani bu sistemlerin her birisi, dünya toplumunun bir alt sistemidir. Alt sistemler, dünya toplumunun bir fonksiyonunu yerine getirir, ancak, işleyişlerinde bağımsız bir niteliğe sahiptir. Bununla paralel olarak, Luhmann başka sosyal sistemlerin de ortaya çıkan bir ihtiyacı karşılamak üzere geliştiklerini ileri sürmektedir. Bunlara ikincil fonksiyonel sistemler (mesela uluslararası yardımda bulunmak amacıyla ortaya çıkan oluşumlar) veya uluslararası örgütler örnek verilebilir. Farklı sistemlerin bir fonksiyon üstlenerek ortaya çıktıkları tespitinden yola çıkarak, Luhmann tarafından dile getirilmemiş olsa bile Uluslararası İlişkiler bakımından anlamlı olan dünya siyasi sisteminin de bir fonksiyonunun olması gerektiği değerlendirilmektedir. Dünya siyaseti ile ilgili görüşler ortaya atan güç dengesi (the balance of power), devletler toplumu (the society of states) ve uzun devreler (long cycles) teorilerinin temelde uğraştıkları konulara bakarak, dünya siyasi sisteminin fonksiyonuna ilişkin bir öngöründe bulunulabilir. Söz konusu teorilerden yararlanılmasına gerek duyulmasının temelinde, dünya siyaseti ve dünya siyasi sistemi özelinde Luhmann'ın ortaya attığı görüşlerin bulunmamasıdır. Dolayısıyla, dünya siyasi sistemi ile ilgili fonksiyonların tanımlanmasında, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplindeki teorilerden yararlanılması gerekmektedir. Yapılan değerlendirmede, Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki teorilere bakarak dünya siyasi sistemi için çatışmaların çözümü ve iş birliğinin sürdürülmesi fonksiyonlarının belirlenebileceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Dünya siyasi sisteminin, bu fonksiyonları üstlenen bir entite olduğunu Orta Doğu tarihine bakarak da anlayabilmekteyiz.

Luhmanncı sistem teorisinden yola çıkarak, bir sosyal sistemin sahip olması gereken ve dünya siyasi sisteminin de anlaşılması açısından önemli olan bir diğer özellik ise sosyal sistemlerin mekânsal olarak değil anlam dünyasında var olan entiteler olduğu yönündeki görüştür. Luhmann, sosyal sistemlerin insanlar tarafından oluşturulduğu ve insanların sosyal sistemler tarafından içerilen unsurlar olduğu görüşüne karşı çıkmaktadır. Luhmann'a göre, insanlar, mekânsal olarak bir yer işgal eder, ancak sosyal sistemler insanların oluşturdukları bu mekânsal sınırlarla bağlı değildir. Sosyal sistemlere varlık veren iletişimdir (communication). İletişim, tıpkı biyokimyasal gerçekliğin yaşayan sistemlere hayat vermesi gibi, sosyal sistemlere hayat verir. İletişim sayesinde ki, sosyal sistemler varlık bulurlar ve mekâna ihtiyaç duymazlar. İnsanların mekânsal konumuyla bağlı olmadıkları gibi, sosyal sistemler, bir ülkenin veya bir bölgenin sınırlarıyla da bağlı değildir. Yine mekânsal bağımsızlığın sayesinde ki; sosyal sistemler herhangi bir insan grubunun, devletlerin, sosyal sınıfların veya herhangi bir entitenin kontrolünde değildir. Dünya siyasi sistemi de, bu özellik ışığında, insanların oluşturduğu ve insanların kontrol ettiği bir sistem değildir. Bu sistem, geçmişte, dünyadaki farklı bölgelerin her birisinde ayrı ayrı varlık buluyordu. Günümüzde ise dünyada sadece bir tane dünya siyasi sistemi bulunmaktadır. Dünya siyasi sistemi (merkez), dünyanın üretim, askeriye, yenilikçilik, olumlu iklim koşulları, ideolojik kapasite bakımlarından ileri olan bölgelerinde gerçekleşen bölgesel/global önemdeki siyasi olayları ve gelişmeleri birbiriyle bağlayan bunlar arasındaki iletişimdir. Bu anlamda, dünya siyasi sistemi varlığını herhangi bir bölgeye borçlu değildir. Devletler veya insanlar dünya siyasi sistemini yönetmezler, tam tersine dünya siyasi sistemi devletleri yönetir ve insanlardan ise yararlanır. Sistem insanlara bağımlıdır, ancak, insanlar sistemi kontrol edemez.

Modelimizdeki bir diğer sosyal sistem özelliği ise sınırlardır. Sistem, idealize edilmiş bir öz veya kavram veya değiştirilemez yapılar gibi kavramlarla tanımlanamaz. Daha ziyade, sistemlerin varlıklarını mümkün kılan şey onun sınırlarıdır. Sınır, sistemin çevreye karşı sahip olduğu bir özelliktir. Sistem, sistem ile çevre arasındaki farklılıktır, Luhmann'a göre. Görüldüğü üzere sistem öncelikle çevreye nazaran tanımlanmaktadır. Çevre ile arasındaki sınır da sistemin kimliğini mümkün hale getirmektedir. Sistemin sınırlarının varlığı, onun daha sofistike bir nitelik

kazanmasına da yardımcı olur. İletişim de sistemin sınırları içerisinde meydana gelir. Sınırları çizen ise, herhangi bir otorite değil, sistemin kendisidir.

Yukarıda da belirtildiği üzere, sosyal sistemlerin varlığını sağlayan şey iletişimdir. İletişim aynı zamanda bir sistem operasyonu olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bir sistem operasyonu olsa da, iletişim dışarıya doğru, yani çevreye doğru olan bir faaliyet değildir. Daha ziyade, sistemin içerisinde meydana gelir iletişim. İletişim, çevre veya sistemin kendisi hakkında olabilir, fakat çevreyle veya kendisiyle kurulmaz. İletişim, sistemin bütünlüğünü sağlar, önceki iletişim faaliyetlerinin bir tekrarını oluşturur ve gelecekte de bu iletişim faaliyetlerinin devam edeceği beklenir. Görüldüğü üzere, iletişim, düşünce ve duyguların dile dökülmesinden farklı bir faaliyettir, Luhmann'cı sistem teorisinde. İletişim daha ziyade oluşur, meydana gelir. Bir sistemdeki bu sisteme özgü olaylar veya gelişmeler birbirlerini tamamladıkları zaman, birbirleriyle sistemin devamlılığı bağlamında örtüştükleri ölçüde, sistemde iletişim meydana gelir. Farklı kişi ve unsurların dahil olduğu sisteme özgü olaylar birbirleriyle aynı amaca hizmet edecek şekilde örtüştüğünde, iletişimin varlığından bahsetmek mümkün olur. Sistemin içinde iletişime dahil olan şeyler aynı zamanda sistemin sınırlarını belirlemektedir. Bir sistemin iletişimine dahil olan şeyler sistemin sınırlarına dahilken, iletişimin haricinde kalan şeyler sistemin çevresinde yer almaktadır. İletişim, biyolojide hayatın sahip olduğu role sosyal sistemlerde sahiptir. Hayat bir kere var olduktan onun kontrolü dünyevi bir otoritenin eline geçmemiştir. Hayat kendi kendini üreten ve sürdüren bir görünüm arz etmektedir. Sosyal alandaki iletişim de işte böyle bir kere başladıktan sonra kendi kendini üreten ve kimsenin kontrolünde olmayan bir unsurdur. Dünya siyasi sistemi de bir sosyal sistem olduğuna göre bunun da oluşması ve devam etmesi iletişim sayesinde olmaktadır. Bunun için dünya siyasi sistemi bir otoriteye ihtiyaç duymamaktadır. Bir kere aynı türde faaliyetler arasında bir uyum ve bu uyum içerisindeki faaliyetlerin içerilmesine ilişkin bir durum ortaya çıktıktan sonra sistem için gerekli olan iletişim kurulmuş olur. Yani, dünya siyasi sistemi herhangi bir devlet veya devlet grubunun veya belirli bir bölgedeki insanların oluşturdukları bir olgu değildir. Tarihi veriye dayanarak görmekteyiz ki, dünya siyasi sistemi, nispeten daha iyi koşullara sahip olan bölgelerde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yani dünya siyasi sistemini oluşturan iletişim bu bölgelerde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu da sistemin bir tercihi olarak alınmalıdır. Sistemin tercihini varlıklı bölgelerden yana

kullanmasının olası sebebi de sisteme atfedilmiş olan çatışmaların çözümü ve iş birliğinin sürdürülmesi fonksiyonlarının bu sayede daha kolay yönetilebilmesi olarak görünmektedir. Dünya siyasi sistemindeki iletişim, sistem teorisinin bir gereği olarak, sadece bu sisteme özgüdür. Başka sistemlerdeki iletişim dünya siyasi sisteminin iletişimine dahil olmadığı gibi dünya siyasi sistemi de başka sistemlerin iletişimine dahil olmamaktadır.

Dünya siyasi sistemi ve bunun ortaya çıkardığı ilişkileri anlayabilmek açısından önemli olduğu değerlendirilen ve Luhmanncı sistem teorisine atfedilebilecek bir başka sosyal sistem özelliği de sistem operasyonlarının sistem dışındaki gelişmelere olan duyarlılığıdır. Yani sistem operasyonları, daima sistemin geleceği ve varlığının sürdürülmesine odaklıdır. Bu, sistemde iletişimin ortaya çıkmasını sağlayan faaliyetlerin tek amacının sistemin sürdürülebilirliği olduğu anlamına gelmez. Her bir sistem içi faaliyet başka güdüler de barındırabilir, ancak, nihai olarak tüm faaliyetler sistemin sürdürülebilirliği motivasyonuna arka planda sahiptir. Sistemin sürdürülebilirliğine olan odaklılık sistemdeki faaliyetler (Örneğin dünya siyasi sisteminde, savaş, diplomatik alışverişler, ilişkilerde benimsenen prensipler gibi faaliyetler) arasında bazı temel eğilimlerin ortaya çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Bunlardan bahsetmek gerekirse, öncelikle, sistemdeki bir faaliyet, sistemin sürdürülebilirliğine yarayan başka bir faaliyetin işleyişini engelleyici bir etki göstermez. İkinci olarak, iletişim sağlanmasına yardımcı olan bir faaliyet, sistemin kendisine zarar vermez. Üçüncü olarak, sistem faaliyetleri, sistemin haricinde kalan faaliyetlerin sistemin işleyişine katılmasına izin vermez, onları dışlar. Dünya siyasi sistemi açısından bakıldığında, devlet, uluslararası örgütler, askeri kuruluşlar veya diplomatik kuruluşlar gibi sistem yapıları, sistemin işleyişi ve diğer sistem yapılarına zarar vermeyecekleri gibi sistem dışındaki yapıların faaliyetlerinin sisteme dahil olmasına da engel olacaklardır. Sistemin sürdürülebilirliği, sistem içindeki uyumdan daha fazla sistem dışından gelecek etkilere bağlı olduğundan sistem faaliyetlerinde sistemin çevresinde olup bitenlerin sistemin varlığına olumsuz etkide bulunmasının önlenmesi kaygısı hep canlıdır. Sistem faaliyetlerinin dış gelişmelere duyarlı olması da bu yüzdendir. Dolayısıyla, dünya siyasi sisteminin kendi dışında yer alan çevre ile olan ilişkileri dünya siyasi ilişkilerinin en önemli unsurlarını oluşturmaktadır denilebilir.

Dünya siyasi ilişkilerini, sistem merkezli bir okuması yapılırken, açıklığa kavuşturulması gereken bir boyut da yapı kavramıdır. Yapı kavramı, Luhmanncı sistem teorisinde ele alınmış olup Uluslararası İlişkilerdekinden farklı bazı boyutlar içermektedir. Ancak, Luhmann'ın yapı tanımının, sistem merkezli bir dünya siyasi yaklaşımının formüle edilmesine yetecek bir çerçeve sağladığını söylemek güç görünmektedir. Uluslararası İlişkilerde yapı, dünya siyasetinin değişmeyen yönü olarak nitelenmektedir. Her bir birimin (devletin) diğerine göre konumunun nasıl olduğunu yapı belirlemektedir. Örneğin, anarşik bir yapıda, devletler birbirini tamamlayan unsurlar olarak değil birbirinin rakibi olarak konumlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla, yapı, devletler (birimler) arasındaki süreklilik arz eden ilişkidir. Luhmann ise yapının değişken bir şey olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Yapı, sistemin ürettiği ve sistem ürettiği sürece var olan bir olgudur. Yapı, değişmeyen ve birimlerin üzerinde yer alan bir unsur değildir. Bu yönleriyle Luhmann'ın yapı anlayışı Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki yapı tanımından ayrılmaktadır. Ancak, bir başka açıdan, Luhmann'ın yapı anlayışı Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki yapı anlayışına yaklaşmaktadır. Luhmann, yapının, sistem deneyimleri ve aksiyonları (operasyonları) arasındaki tekrar eden durumları ifade ettiğini belirtmektedir. Eğer eylemler ve deneyimler birbirlerini etkiliyorsa ve bu etkileme tekrar eden biçimde farklı zaman ve yerlerde ortaya çıkıyorsa bu durumda yapıdan bahsedebiliriz. Bu anlamda, Luhmann, Uluslararası İlişkilerle paralel biçimde, yapının, sistem unsurları (eylem veya deneyimler) arasındaki ilişki olarak ortaya çıktığını öne sürmektedir. Uluslararası ilişkilerde ilişki birimler arasındayken Luhmann'da eylemler ve deneyimler arasındadır. Böylece, yapı, süreklilik arz eden ve bir eğilim gösteren (örneğin dostluk veya rekabet) bir ilişki olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Fakat bu şekildeki bir tanım, Luhmann'ın ileri sürdüğünün tersine, yapıyı sistemin hizmetinde ve onun sürdürülebilirliğine hizmet eden bir unsur yapmaz, çünkü bu yapının kendine özgü bir kimliği bulunmamaktadır. Esasında, bir ilişki kendi başına bir kimlik veya eylem kabiliyetine sahip bir unsur haline gelmeden bir yapı olarak ele alınamaz. Ancak, yapılar eylem kabiliyetine sahip olduğu zaman görülür ki, eylemler sistem yapıları arasında meydana gelir ve bu eylemler sayesinde, yapılar sisteme hizmet eder. Söylenenlerden yapılacak çıkarım şudur. Öncelikle, birim veya parçalar sistemde eylemde bulunan unsurlar olarak alınamazlar. İkinci olarak yapı, sistemin gerçek bir mekanizmasıdır ve bu yönüyle sistemin işleyişine etki eder. Üçüncü olarak sistemdeki

ilişkiler, sistemin yapıları arasında meydana gelir ve sistem bu ilişkileri yönlendirir. Yapılar sistemin beklentilerine uygun olarak ilişkiler içerisinde bulunur. Tezde, işte bu çerçeveden bakılarak yapılar, devletler, imparatorluklar, ulus-devletler, firmalar, askeri birimler, uluslararası örgütler, pazarlar vb. unsurlar yapı olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Tezin Öngörülleri

Tezde yukarıda çerçevesi verilen sistem modelinin ışığında, dünya siyasi ilişkileri ile ilgili olarak bazı öngörülerde bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, dünya siyasi ilişkilerinin devlet merkezli bir okuması yerine, sistem merkezli bir okumasının yapılmasının gerekliliği öne sürülmektedir. Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürüne bakıldığında zaman, dünya siyasetinin genel olarak devlet merkezli okunduğu görülmektedir. Devlet merkezli yaklaşım sadece günümüz dünya siyasetine uygulanmamakta aynı zamanda geçmişte var olan dünya siyasi ilişkilerine uyarlanmaktadır. Örneğin, antik Çin, antik Yunan, orta çağ Avrupası, kolonyalizm öncesi Afrika, antik Orta Doğu gibi bölge ve dönemlerin bölgesel siyasi ilişkileri ağırlıklı olarak devlet merkezli yorumlanmaktadır. Halbuki sistem merkezli bir yaklaşım, dünya siyasetinde devleti önemsiz bir unsur olarak almasa bile, devletin bu merkezi konumuna bir itiraz ortaya koyabilmektedir. Sistem merkezli yaklaşımın devleti ikinci plana itmesinin sebebi, devletin bir sistem yapısı olmasıdır. Devlet sistemden önce gelmemektedir, aksine sistem devletten önce gelmektedir. Önce sistemin oluştuğu ve bunun devlet gibi bir yapının güç kullanma kabiliyetini meşrulaştırdığını incelememizden çıkarabiliyoruz. Sistem merkezli yaklaşım, çoklu devlet varlığının domine ettiği bir alan olmaktan ziyade, dünya siyasetinin bir ikilik (dikotomi) üzerine bina edildiğini iddia edecektir. Bir dikotomi üzerine kurulu dünya siyasetinde sistem ve çevresi diye iki unsur bulunacaktır. Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinde, herhangi bir alanın tümünün bir sistem olarak algılanması yönünde genel bir anlayış bulunmaktadır. Örneğin, dünya-sistemi, güç dengesi, devletler toplumu ve uzun devreler teorileri dünyada tek bir sistem olduğunu ve bu sistemin tüm dünyayı kapsadığını, yani tüm siyasi veya ekonomik alanı içerdiğini varsaymaktadır. Oysa ki, sistem teorisi, sistemi bir çevreye nazaran tanımlamaktadır. Çevre olmadan sistemin kendisini farklılaştıracağı bir unsur olmayacaktır. Sistem, kendisiyle ilgili olan ve fakat kendisinin dışında kalan alanları kendi çevresi olarak belirler. Ancak, bir sistemin geçerli olduğu sahanın dışında kalan

alanlar, sistemin biyolojik ve fiziki çevresi gibi bütün sistemler için geçerli olan çevre koşullarını oluşturur. Dolayısıyla, biyolojik ve fiziksel çevre, sistemin kendisini kendisine karşı tanımladığı çevreyi oluşturmazlar. Sistemin kendisini kendisine bakarak tanımladığı çevre, sistemin varlık bulduğu sahada var olur. Örneğin, dünya siyaseti bir alan/saha oluşturur. Dünya siyasi sistemi bu sahanın içerisinde yer alır, ancak bu sahanın tümünü kapsamaz. Dünya siyasetinin, sistem dışında kalan unsurları, sistemin çevresini oluşturur. Buna karşın, dünya ekonomisi gibi bir alan, dünya siyasi sisteminin kendisini kendisine bakarak tanımladığı bir alan oluşturmaz. Daha ziyade, tıpkı biyolojik ve fizyolojik çevre gibi daha az ilişkide bulunan çevredir. Netice itibarıyla, dünya siyaseti gibi bir alan sistem ve çevresi olarak ayrılır ve bu sistem yaklaşımının gerektirdiği bir okumadır. Buradan yola çıkarak, diyebiliriz ki sistem yaklaşımının dünya siyaseti analizinde sağladığı fayda, dünya siyasetini sistem ve çevresi diye bir dikotomi üzerine kurulu olarak okumamızı sağlamasıdır. Luhmanncı sistem teorisi de dikotomik bakmaya elverişli bir teoridir, çünkü sistemi çevreyle arasındaki fark olarak tanımlayan bir perspektif sunmaktadır. Bu dikotomiyi Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürü ile uyumlaştırmak amacıyla merkez-periferi dikotomisinin sistem ve çevre dikotomisi yerine kullanılabileceği değerlendirilmektedir.

Tezin ikinci öngörüsü, merkez alanların, birbirleriyle uyum ve iş birliği içerisinde hareket ettiklerine ilişkin tespittir. Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerine bakıldığında zaman genel olarak merkez alanların birbirleriyle çatışma içerisinde oldukları ve bu çatışmanın dünya siyasi ilişkilerindeki en önemli çatışma olduğunun öne sürüldüğünü görebilmekteyiz. Örneğin, güç dengesi teorisi ve uzun devreler teorisi, dünya devletlerinin büyük güçler ve küçük güçler olarak ikiye ayrıldığını, dünya siyasetinde büyük güçlerin kendi aralarında bir rekabet içerisinde olduklarını, bu rekabet sonucunda büyük savaşlar çıktığını ve büyük kayıplar verildiğini öne sürer. Küçük güçlerin kendi aralarındaki çatışmalardan ve küçük güçlerle olan çatışmalardan da önemsiz olarak kabul edildikleri için bahsetmez. Dünya-sistemi ve emperyalizm teorileri, merkez ile çevrenin arasındaki çatışmayı önemli görmelerine rağmen, merkezdeki ülkelerin iş birliği içerisinde olduklarını kabul etmez. Tam tersine merkez ülkelerin kendi aralarında sıkı bir rekabet ve çatışma içerisinde olduklarını öne sürer. Ancak, tezde değişik bölümlerde açıklığa kavuşturulduğu üzere, merkez alanlar kendi

aralarında esasında temel bir çatışma yaşamamaktadır. Merkez alanlar, birbirlerinin varlıklarını sonlandırmadıkları gibi birbirlerinin bağımsızlığını kısıtlayıcı hareketler içerisine girmezler. İçerisine girdikleri çatışmalar genellikle periferiyal alanlardaki kontrol sahaları veya küçük toprak parçası veya ekonomik bazı kaynakların kontrolü üzerinde meydana gelir. Bu çatışmalar genellikle birbirinin varlığını sona erdirmeye kalkışmakla sonuçlanmaz, tam tersine birbirlerinin merkez statüsünün teyit edilmesi ile sonuçlanır. Sadece savaşın varlığı, merkez alanlar arasında bir çatışmanın varlığına delalet etmez. Savaşlar sonucunda nelerin meydana geldiği de önemlidir. Merkez alanlar arasındaki savaşlarda bir merkez alan, merkez statüsünü kaybetmez, tam tersine, diğer merkez alanlarla kendisinin saygı duyulacak partnerler olduğuna ilişkin bir anlayış ortaya çıkar. Bu da, merkez alanlar arasındaki savaşların, olası anlaşmazlıkların çözümüne ilişkin bir mekanizma olduğu, bunun ötesinde sistemi değiştirecek veya merkez alanların statüsünü sorgulayacak eylemler olmadığı gerçeğini vurgulamaktadır. Bu da doğaldır, çünkü merkez alanlar, merkezin (yani sistemin) yapılarıdır, bunların birbirine zarar vermeleri beklenemez.

Üçüncü öngörü merkezin periferi ile ilişkisinde dışlama eğiliminin bulunduğu yönündedir. Dikotomik bir sistem yaklaşımında, dünya siyasetinin aslolan ilişkisi merkezin içindeki ilişkiler olmayıp merkez ile periferi arasındaki ilişkidir. Bu aynı zamanda, dünya siyaseti çalışmalarının asıl odak noktasının merkez ve periferi arasındaki ilişkiler olması gerektiği anlamına gelir. Peki, merkez ile periferi arasında nasıl bir ilişki bulunmaktadır? Dışlama teorisi, bu ilişkinin iki yönlü olduğunu öngörmektedir. Merkez, periferiye karşı dışlama siyasetini izlerken periferi de içirme siyasetini gütmektedir. Merkezin dışlama siyasetinin kaynağında, merkezin bir sistem olması yatar. Sistem meydana gelirken, sistem için elverişli ve elverişsiz unsurlar arasında bir ayırım yapar ve sistem için elverişli olan unsurları sistemin içine alırken, elverişsiz unsurları sistemin dışında tutar. Bu sadece objektif bir prosedür değildir. Dışarda kalan unsurlar açısından olumsuz bir durum söz konusudur. Yani, sistemin yaptığı içerenler ve dışlananlar ayırımının, periferidekiler için arzu edilmeyen sonuçları vardır. Merkez, periferideki unsurları dışarda tuttuktan sonra, bu dışlamayı sürekli kılmak için çalışır. Dünya siyasetinde, dışlama iki şekilde meydana gelir. Merkez, kendi içinde uyguladığı kurallar ile çevreye karşı uyguladığı kurallar arasında bir ayırım yapar. İçerilenlere karşı daha eşitlikçi ve bağımsızlığa saygı duyulan bir

kurallar bütünü varken, periferiye karşı eşitsiz ve bağımsızlığı sınırlayıcı bir tutum söz konusudur. Bu anlamda, bir çifte standart vardır. Dışlamanın dünya siyasetindeki ikinci yönü ise periferinin içerilme arayışına engel olunması, bağımsızlığının sınırlandırılması ve gerekirse periferinin kaynaklarının güç ve diğer mekanizmalar kullanılarak merkeze aktarılması şeklinde vücut bulur. Görülmektedir ki, dışlama, merkez ile periferi arasındaki çatışmanın aldığı şeklin adıdır. Bu kavram, Luhmann'ın "exclusion" kavramından türetilmiş olup, dünya siyasi ilişkilerine uyarlanmıştır.

Merkezin periferiye karşı izlediği siyaset dışlamayken, periferinin izlediği siyaset içerilme arayışdır. İçerilme kavramı da Luhmann'ın "inclusion" kavramından esinlenilerek formüle edilmiştir. Genel olarak, Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerinde periferyal bölgelerin nasıl bir siyaset izlediklerine ilişkin olarak pek değerlendirme yapılmamaktadır. Postkolonyalizm teorisi bu bakımdan bir istisna teşkil etmektedir. Postkolonyalizm, periferyal bölgelerin merkez bölgeler ile eşit bir statüye kavuşmak amacıyla bir arayış içerisinde oldukları ve bu arayışta başarılı olabilecek kabiliyetlere sahip olduklarını ileri sürmektedir. Periferyal bölgelerin eşitliği sürekli olarak sağlayabileceklerine ilişkin veriler tarihi dönemlerle ilgili yapılan çalışmada ortaya çıkmasa da periferyal bölgelerin bir eşitlik arayışında olduğuna ilişkin önemli ölçüde veri bulunmaktadır. Bu eşitlik arayışı, dünya siyasi meselelerinde söz sahibi olmayı, sahip olunan sorunları çatışma veya iş birliği ile merkez bölgelerin onayını almadan çözümleyebilmeyi, kaynakları kullanırken güç kullanımıyla engellenmemeyi, içerilenler için uygulanan kuralların kendisi için de geçerli olmasını ifade etmektedir. Fakat, merkez bölgeler, periferyal bölgelere karşı ortak bir tutum alarak onları dışlarken, periferyal bölgeler ortak bir tutum gösterme kabiliyetinden genellikle yoksundur. Daha ziyade her bir periferyal bölge tek başına bir içerilme arayışındadır. Dolayısıyla, postkolonyalizm teorisinin öngördüğünün tersine belirli bir istikrar gösteren bir içerilme meydana gelmez.

Bir başka önemli öngörü ise, merkezin (sistemin) dışlama politikası uyguladığı periferyal alanların dışında, insanlar da merkezin periferisinde yer almakta ve dışlamaya tabi tutulmaktadır. Sadece periferideki insanlar değil, merkezdeki insanlar da dünya siyasi sisteminin periferisinde yer almaktadır. Buna karşın, insanlar da bu dışlamayı kırmak için bir içerilme arayışındadır ve esasen sistemler için tehlike oluşturan ve sistemleri zaman zaman yıkan unsur da insanların organize olmasıdır.

İnsanların oluşturdıkları tehdit bir içerilme arayışıdır. İnsanların bu potansiyeli, merkez tarafından insanların belirli taleplerinin karşılanıp onlarla uzlaşma içerisine girilmesine neden olmaktadır. Dünya siyasi sistemi, insanların kontrolünde değildir, ancak insanlara bağımlıdır. Merkez, merkez bölgelerdeki insanlara daha geniş, periferyal bölgelerdeki insanlara ise daha az olsa bile çeşitli içerilme imkanları sunmak zorundadır ki; insanların kendisine karşı organize olmasını engelleyebilsin. Diğer taraftan, belirtmelidir ki, insanların içerilme gayreti, insanlar ancak grup haklarından bahsettiklerinde merkezde (sistemde) bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır. İçerilme haklarından da grup hakları anlaşılmalıdır. Bireysel olarak insanlar her zaman içerilmeyi (sistemin sağladığı imkanlardan yararlanmayı) başarabilirler. İster periferide isterse merkezde olsun bireylerin böyle bir imkânı bulunmaktadır. Ancak bireysel içerilme, grup olarak içerilmeye nazaran daha kolay ve dünya siyaseti açısından daha az önemlidir. Dünya siyaseti açısından önemli olan merkezdeki ve daha da önemlisi periferideki insanların grup olarak içerilme arayışı ve bunlara karşı uygulanan dışlamadır. Bu dışlamayı yumuşatmak için, merkez, insanlara çeşitli tavizler verir. Ancak, bu tavizler bazen yeterli olarak görülmez insanlar arasında. İşte bu durumlarda, insanlar toplu olarak içerilme arayışına girebilirler. Periferyal bölgelerdeki insanların geçmişte merkezi ortadan kaldırma veya önemli ölçüde değiştirmek suretiyle içerilme arayışları zaman zaman başarıya ulaşmıştır.

Orta Doğu Tarihinde Merkez Periferi İlişkileri

Yukarıda özetlenen teorik çerçeve, Niklas Luhmann'ın sistem yaklaşımı, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinindeki birikim ve antik dönemlerden başlayarak Osmanlı-Safevi dönemine kadar olan dönemde incelenen Orta Doğu siyasi ilişkilerinin incelenmesiyle elde edilen verinin birleştirilmesiyle oluşturulan bir sentezdir. Luhmann'ın "exclusion" (dışlama) kavramından esinlenilerek ve dünya siyasi ilişkilerinde temel olan ilişkinin dışlama olmasından yola çıkılarak, tezde oluşturulan modele dışlama teorisi ismi verilmiştir. Modelin hem oluşumuna hem de test edilmesine yarayan ampirik kısımda da modelin öngörülleri değerlendirilmiştir. Orta Doğu tarihinde ortaya çıkan dünya siyasi sistemleri sırasıyla ele alınmış ve değerlendirilmiştir.

Bu sistemlerin ilki olan Sümer sistemi (merkez) ve periferisinin incelendiği bölümde ayrıca tarihte ilk defa bir merkezin ortaya çıkması dolayısıyla, bu merkezi ortaya

çıkaran dinamiklere daha yakından bakılmıştır. Merkez, kendi başına bir dünya olan Orta Doğu bölgesinin bir bölge niteliği kazanmasıyla ancak ortaya çıkmıştır. Sümerlerin yurdu olan Güney Mezopotamya'nın Orta Doğunun diğer bölgelerine göre daha ileri üretim, yenilik ve iklim koşullarına sahip olması sayesinde farklılaşması sonrasında Orta Doğu bir bölge hüviyeti kazanabilmiştir. Ondan önceki dönemlerde, bugün Orta Doğu dediğimiz bölge, dünyanın diğer bölgelerinden farklı olmayan gelişmelere sahne olmaktaydı. Tıpkı dünyanın farklı bölgeleri arasındaki irtibatın kısıtlı olması gibi, Orta Doğunun farklı kısımları arasında da irtibat kısıtlıydı. Ancak Güney Mezopotamya'nın diğer yerlerden daha ileri bazı uygulamalara sahip olması sayesinde yaygın ticaret, yerleşim yerlerinin yakınlaşması, farklı alanlar arasında insan hareketleri gibi olgular görülmeye başladı. İrtibat ve ilişkilerin artması Orta Doğuyu bir bölge haline getirdi ve bu bölgede bir dünya siyasi sistemi ortaya çıktı. Bu sistem (merkez) bölgedeki çatışmaların halli ve iş birliğinin sağlanması fonksiyonuna sahipti. İşte böyle bir ortamda ilk devletler de ortaya çıktı. Merkezin fonksiyonları devletler gibi güç kullanma tekeline sahip yapılar eliyle yerine getirildi. Oluşan bu bölgede ilk defa ortaya çıkan Sümer merkezi (MÖ 2900-2350) çok sayıda şehir devletinin yer aldığı bir sistemdi. Bu şehir devletleri arasında küçük toprak parçaları, su kaynakları ve kanal sistemi ile ilgili olarak sıklıkla çatışmalar yaşansa da Sümer şehir devletleri birbirlerinin varlıklarına kastedecek bir faaliyetin içerisine girmedikleri gibi herhangi bir şehir devletinin özgürlüğünün kısıtlanması da söz konusu olmamıştır. Bu anlamda, Sümer şehir devletleri (merkez bölge yapıları) arasında birbirlerinin varlığını tanıma ve birbirlerine eşit davranma konusunda bir iş birliği söz konusuydu. Buna karşın, Sümerler, Güney Mezopotamya dışında kalan gerek şehirleşmemiş topluluklar gerekse de şehirleşmiş topluluklara karşı farklı davranış kuralları geliştirmişlerdi. Onlar, Sümerlere nazaran yabancılar olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Sümerler ile diğer Orta Doğunun diğer yerleri arasında ticaret ve bazen diplomatik ilişkiler sürdürülmüştür. Bu ilişkilerde, eşitsizlik vardı. Sümer şehir devletleri arasındaki kurallar yabancı olarak addedilen yapılara uygulanmıyordu. Eşitsizlik aynı zamanda diğer Orta Doğu kısımlarının, Sümerleri yenilikler ve siyasi organizasyon bakımından taklit etmesinde de görülüyordu. Örneğin şehir devlet örgütlenmesi ve bunun bir parçası olan diplomatik kurallar Suriye gibi yerlerde Sümerlerden devralınmıştı. Sümerlere yönelik bu özentinin sonucunda adapte edilen yapılar, Sümerlerin baskın olduğu ilişki şeklinin yeniden

üretimine katkıda bulunuyordu. Bu yapılar, Sümerler dışındaki toplulukların kendi ihtiyaçları için orijinal olarak tasarladıkları araçlar değildi. Daha ziyade, periferiden gelecek bir tehlikeyi bertaraf etmeye ve Sümerlerin sahip olduğu baskın konumu sürdürmeye yarıyordu. Merkez ve periferi ilişkisinin kazananı Sümerlerdi, çünkü şehirleşmiş bölgelerden gelecek tehlikeler bertaraf edilmiş oluyordu. Bu şekilde devam eden Sümer siyasi sistemi (merkez) Sami kökenden bir topluluk olan Akadların, Güney Mezopotamya'ya göçleri ve etkinlik kazanmalarıyla sona erdi.

Samilerin yeni bir merkezin dayandığı insan grubu olmaları sadece Akad İmparatorluğu zamanında değil, aynı zamanda Babillerin de bir parçası olduğu Amoriler zamanında da devam etti. Fakat, Akadlar döneminde tek bir imparatorluğun odakta yer aldığı bir sistem varken, Amoriler zamanında birden çok büyük devletin var olduğu bir sistem vardı. Başka farklılıklar da vardı. Akad sistemi (MÖ 2350-2150), sadece Güney Mezopotamya'da var olan Sümer sisteminden farklı olarak Kuzey ve Güney Mezopotamya'nın her ikisini de kapsıyordu. Akadlar zamanında Mezopotamya merkez iken, Suriye ve İran'ın bazı bölgeleri periferi olarak doğrudan kontrol ediliyordu. Doğrudan kontrol, askeri mekanizmalarla sağlanıyordu. Bunun yanında, Amanos ve Toros bölgelerine ve Umman gibi uzak yerlere askeri seferler düzenlenerek buralardan ihtiyaç duyulan kaynaklar temin ediliyordu. Diğer bir deyişle, Sümerlerden farklı olarak Akadlar askeri mekanizmalara daha fazla dayanıyordu. Fakat gerek askeri seferlerle ve gerekse de imparatorluğun idari organizasyonuna dahil ederek yapılan kontrolün temelinde dışlama vardı. Akadlar, Mezopotamya dışında kalan alanlara çifte standart uyguluyordu. Mezopotamyalılar içerilen unsurlar iken, bunun dışında kalan bölgeler dışlanıyordu. Dışlanan alanlar, merkezdeki alanlar ile eşit haklara sahip olma, özgürlüklerinin sınırlandırılmaması, kaynaklarının özgürce kullanılabilmesi bakımından sahip oldukları kısıtlar nedeniyle dışlanmışlardı. Akad sistemi, İran topraklarında bulunan şehirleşmemiş toplulukların (Gutiler) istilasıyla sona erdi. Buradan bir kere daha görülüyor ki, insanlar, yani merkez tarafından periferide kontrol altında tutulamayan periferyal unsurlar, dünya siyasi sisteminin sonunu getirebiliyorlar.

Gutilerin Akad sistemine son vermelerinin ertesinde, Mezopotamya'da Üçüncü Ur Hanedanlığı (MÖ 2193 and 2004) dönemi başladı. Bu dönemde bir merkezin tam olarak oluştuğunu söylemek güç görünüyor. Nitekim Amoriler (bir başka Sami

kökenli halk) Suriye ve Irak'ta yayılmaya başladılar Üçüncü Ur Hanedanlığına son verdikleri gibi yeni bir dünya siyasi sisteminin (merkez) (MÖ 2004 -1595) oluşmasına ön ayak oldular. Bunların yayıldığı dönemde, Mezopotamya, Orta Doğunun en ileri yeri olma özelliğini yitirmeye başlamıştı. Önceki dönemlerde, Mezopotamya'daki yenilikler Orta Doğunun diğer alanlarına da yayılmıştı. Dolayısıyla, Amorilerin yayıldıkları dönemde, Suriye ve Irak hemen hemen bir bütün olarak merkezin oluşabileceği bir alan olma özelliğine sahipti. Fakat, homojen bir gelişme düzeyinin tüm Suriye ve Irak'a hâkim olduğunu söylemek güçtür. Daha ziyade, merkezin (sistemin) irtibatlandırabileceği merkezi alanlar (şehirler) dağınık bir biçimde var olabilmişlerdi. Bu dağınıklığa rağmen, Suriye ve Irak, yeni merkezin odağı olmuşlardı. Merkez (sistem) yukarıda belirtildiği gibi belirli bir coğrafi bölgeyle bağımlı değildir. Farklı coğrafyalarda bulunan ve fakat merkezin bağlantısını kuracağı farklı şehirler (alanlar), sistem tarafından sistemin amacına hizmet etmek üzere kullanılabilirler. Amori sisteminde Assur, Eshnunna, Babylon, Mari, Elam, Isin ve Larsa gibi büyük devletler vardı. Bu devletler önceki sistemlerde anlatıldığı gibi kendi aralarında önemli bir çatışma yaşamamaktaydı. Ancak derebeyleri (vassal) konumunda olan başka küçük devletleri dışlama ve onları kontrol altında tutma konusunda iş birlikleri vardı. Merkez ve periferi ilişkisi, farklı coğrafyalar arasında kurulmak yerine, aynı coğrafyada yer alıp farklı statülerde olan alanlar arasında kurulmaktaydı. Örneğin, sayılan büyük devletler, birbirlerinden coğrafi olarak ayrı yerlerdeydi, bunların aralarında ise derebeyi statüsünde küçük devletler yer almaktaydı. Her bir büyük devlet, kendi kontrol ettiği küçük devletlerle merkez ve periferi ilişkisi içerisindeydi. Küçük devletler, Akad sisteminde olduğunun tersine, büyük devlete idari olarak eklenmemişti, askeri olarak sürekli bir baskı da söz konusu değildi. Küçük devlet ile büyük devlet arasındaki statü farkı karşılıklı anlaşmayla sağlanmıştı, bu konuda ilk başta askeri bir baskı kurulmuş olsa bile. Amori sistemi, Anadolu'da Hititlerin güçlenmesi ve Amori sistemini sarsması ile Kassitler olarak bilinen halkın Mezopotamya'ya yerleşmesiyle sona ermiştir. Burada da bir kere daha periferyal unsurlar, içerilme arayışıyla merkezin yıkımına yol açmıştır.

Amori sisteminin yıkılmasına ve Amarna sisteminin (MÖ 15. ve 11. yy'lar) ortaya çıkmasına genel olarak Hint-Avrupa kökenli halkların ortaya çıkmasının sebep olduğu söylenir. Örneğin Hititlerin Anadolu'da, Kassitlerin Mezopotamya'da, Mitannilerin

Kuzey Suriye ve Güney Anadolu'da ortaya çıkmaları, Orta Doğuda yeni oluşacak merkezin temellerini atmıştır. Bu kez, Anadolu ve Mısır, Orta Doğu siyasetinin yeni ve önemli merkez bölgelerinden olmaya başlamıştır. Amoriler zamanında olduğu gibi merkez ve periferi ilişkisi büyük devletler ile yakınlarındaki küçük devletler arasında kurulmuştur. Merkez bölgelerde yer alan devletler Mısır, Kassitler, Mitanniler ve Hititlerdir. Bunların her birisinin bir de periferisi vardı. Amori sistemine kıyasla, Amarna sisteminde, merkezdeki alanların iş birliği daha açık bir hale gelmiştir. Merkez alanlardaki krallar birbirlerini kardeş olarak görürken, periferyal alanlardaki kralları oğul olarak niteliyorlardı. Bir bölge kralının merkez bölge kralları arasına katılabilmesi öyle kolay bir iş değildi. Aslolan büyük güçler kulübüne dışardan girişin sınırlanması ve engellenmesiydi. Bununla birlikte, büyük devletler arasında uzun yıllar süren savaşlar da olmamış değildir. Ancak, bu savaşlar, hiçbir zaman kontrol edilecek küçük devletlerin kimin tarafından kontrol edileceği probleminin ötesine geçememiştir. Hatta merkez bölgeler arasındaki savaşlar, bazen rutin bir faaliyet halini almış görüntüsü vermektedir. Bu da, savaşların, merkez bölgelerin birbirlerinin merkez statüsünün güncelliğini kontrol etme konusunda bir mekanizma olarak kullandıkları şeklinde de değerlendirilebilir. Periferyal alanlarla olan ilişkilerinde, merkez bölgeler, periferyal alanların statüsünün daha aşağıda olduğuna ilişkin resmi anlaşmalar da yapıyorlardı. Periferyal alanlar, merkez alanlara istihbarat sağlanması, askeri destek verilmesi, üretimin bir kısmının merkeze aktarılması gibi ikincil statüyü teyit eden yükümlülükler altındaydı. Bunlar da merkezin, periferiye yönelik olduğu dışlama stratejisinin bir parçasıydı. Önceki sistemlerden farklı olarak, Amarna sistemi, hastalıklar, kuraklık ve açlık gibi doğal felaketlerin sonucunda ortadan kalktı. Yani bir insan hareketinden ziyade, doğal afetlerin sistemi ortadan kaldırması söz konusu olmuştur.

Amarna sisteminden sonra uzunca bir süre yeni bir merkez (dünya siyasi sistemi) Orta Doğuda ortaya çıkmamıştır, ta ki Asur imparatorluğunun merkez alanını oluşturduğu Asur sistemi (merkezi) ortaya çıkıncaya kadar. Bu dönem, karanlık bir dönem olarak görülmektedir, gelişmeler ile ilgili sınırlı bilgi olması nedeniyle. Milattan önce 911 ila 609 yılları arasında Asur imparatorluğunun hüküm sürdüğü dönemde yeni bir sistemin (merkezin) oluştuğunu anlayabiliyoruz. Bu sistem, Akad sistemi gibi tek bir yapının (devletin) var olduğu bir merkezdir. Merkezin odaklandığı birkaç kilit Asur

şehri ve periferyal bölgelerdeki (eyaletlerdeki) askeri ve bürokratik unsurlar merkeze dahil olan unsurlar iken bunların dışında kalan imparatorluk unsurları dışlanmış periferyal alanlar ve insanlardı. Orta Doğuda Asur imparatorluğunun idari sisteminin parçası olmayan çok az yer vardı. İmparatorluğun parçası olmayan alanlar, Urartular ve Frigler gibi yerleşik toplulukların yanı sıra, özellikle İran'da bulunan dağınık topluluklardı. Asur imparatorluğu o zamana kadar görülen en geniş imparatorluktu. Fakat, imparatorluğun birer parçası olsalar bile içerilen kısımlar haricinde kalan imparatorluk unsurları, dışlanmıştı. Yani imparatorluk dahil olanlar ve hariç olanlar şeklinde bölünebilirdi. Bunun bir sonucudur ki; hariç olanlar (periferi), sürekli bir biçimde içerilme arayışında olmuştur. İçerilme arayışı, sürekli ayaklanmalar, periferyal alanlar arasında ittifaklar kurularak veya tek başına Asur otoritesine karşı savaş açılması, haraç veya vergilerin ödenmesinden geri durulması gibi şekillerde tezahür etmiştir. Ancak merkez, belki de o zamana kadar görülenlerden kat be kat fazla sayıda olan bu içerilme arayışlarını hayal kırıklığına uğratmayı başarmıştır. Asur sisteminde, dışlama sadece askeri araçlarla sağlanmamış; aynı zamanda, toplu sürgünler, idari organizasyon tekniklerinin uygulanması, dinin bir araç olarak kullanılması gibi pek çok teknikten yararlanılmıştır. Bütün bunlara rağmen, Asur sistemi (merkez), netice itibarıyla son bulmuştur ve bu yine periferyal bir topluluğun (Medler) Asur imparatorluğunun bir parçası olan periferyal Babil ile ittifak kurması sayesinde gerçekleşmiştir. Bir kez daha herhangi güçlü bir siyasi yapının parçası olmayan insanlar, bir düşünce etrafında mobilize olarak en güçlü merkezi yapıları ve sistemleri ortadan kaldırmayı başarmıştır. Buradan da bir kez daha insanların sistemler için periferyal bir unsur oldukları ve sistem için gerektiğinde çok önemli bir tehlike oluşturdıkları görülebilmektedir.

Asurlardan sonra ortaya çıkan sistem Ahameniş sistemidir. Ancak bu sistem, Asur sistemi ile büyük benzerlikler gösterdiğinden, tezde bu sisteme değinilmemiştir. Ardından gelen Büyük İskender, Antik Orta Doğunun tarihine bir nokta koymuştur. Büyük İskender'den sonra, İslam'ın ortaya çıkışına kadar Orta Doğunun önemli bir bölge olma vasfı durmuştur. Antik dönemde, var olan bir merkezi yıkan ve yeni sistemin kurulmasında yardımcı olan insanların tam olarak nasıl mobilize oldukları ve sistemi nasıl tehdit ettikleri veri eksikliği nedeniyle bilinmemektedir. Ancak, İslam öncesi, Bizans ve Sasani imparatorluklarının periferisinde yer alan ve gevşek biçimde

örgütlenmiş olan Araplar, Sasani-Bizans sisteminin yıkılmasını ve önemli bir merkezi alan olan Sasani imparatorluğunun ortadan kalkmasını sağlayabilecek bir güce sahip oldular. Bu sürecin nasıl işlediğine ilişkin veri bulunmaktadır. Bunu sağlayan faktörlere baktığımızda, Hz. Muhammed'in Arapları bir amaç etrafında organize etmesi ve İslam'ın Araplar arasında cevap bulması gibi faktörleri görebilmekteyiz. Ancak, bu süreç hiç de kolay olmamıştır. Hz. Muhammed ve etrafındaki esasında küçük bir grup öncelikle kendi güvenliklerini sağlamak ve Arapları bir araya getirmek konusunda oldukça büyük bir mücadele yürütmüştür. Peygamber, Arapların kendi aralarındaki kurallardan da yararlanarak onları mobilize etmiştir. Bu mücadelede görülebildiği kadarıyla, insanlar arasında içerilme arayışı otomatik olarak ortaya çıkmamaktadır. İnsanların bir amaç doğrultusunda mobilize edilmeleri, büyük bir mücadeleyi gerektirmekte ve gerektiğinde mobilize edilmeye çalışılan insanların husumetini üzerine çekmeye sebep olabilmektedir. Netice itibarıyla, Araplar, o zamanki merkez bölgeler olan Sasani ve Bizans imparatorluklarına karşı bir içerilme arayışına girip bunda önemli ölçüde başarılı olmuşlardır. Fakat özellikle dört halife döneminden sonra Emevi ve Abbasi devletleri Müslümanlar arasında var olan içerilme arayışı ve var olan sistemi sonlandırma motivasyonlarının tersine hareket etmiş ve Bizans imparatorluğunun da ortağı olduğu Emevi/Abbasi-Bizans siyasi sisteminin (merkezinin) yapıları gibi hareket etmişlerdir. Bizanslılar ve Emevi/Abbasi hanedanlıkları periferyal unsur olarak kendi insanlarını görmeye başlamışlardır ki bu tipik bir merkez tutumudur. Özellikle Emevi/Abbasi ve Bizans savaşlarına bakıldığında, tipik merkez alanlar arasındaki savaşlara benzerlikleri göze çarpmaktadır. Düzenli aralıklarla yapılan ve önemli bir netice doğurmayan birçok savaş özellikle merkez alanlar arasındaki dânişıklı dövüşün örnekleridir. Bunların yanı sıra, birkaç tane İstanbul kuşatması görebilmekteyiz. Bu kuşatmalar bir çatışmanın göstergeleri olarak görülebilecekse de aslında bu kuşatmalar yeterli hazırlık ve istekle icra edilmemiş ve özünde Bizans'ın merkez alan vasfını teyit eden hareketler olmuştur. Netice itibarıyla, erken İslami dönem sistemi incelendiğinde, periferyal alanların geçici olarak içerilmeyi başarabildikleri, ancak daha sonra başka periferilerin oluşmasına neden oldukları görülebilmektedir. Abbasi hanedanlığının 10. yy'den itibaren, Orta Asya'dan gelen göçlerle bağlantılı olarak etkinliğini yitirmeye başlamasıyla bu merkez etkinliğini yitirdi.

Abbasi hanedanlığının etkinliğini yitirmesinden Osmanlı-Safevi sisteminin kurulduğu döneme kadar olan periyotta (yaklaşık 600 yıl), Orta Doğu, Orta Asya'dan gelen göçlerin etkisiyle birçok irili ufaklı sultanlığın kurulduğu ve bir süre sonra ortadan kalktığı bir görünüm arz etmekteydi. Bu dönemde bir merkezin (bir bölgesel siyasi sistemin) kurulduğunu söylemek güçtür. Daha ziyade, belirli bir askeri gücü elinde bulunduran toplulukların çok yaygın olmaları nedeniyle, merkezi güçlü devletler kurulamamakta ve merkez belirli bir bölgede oluşamamaktaydı. Askeri kabiliyetleri olan topluluklar merkeze bir tehdit oluşturuyor ve özgürlüklerinin kısıtlanmasını kabul etmiyordu. Bu nedenle bu dönemde insanların otonomilerini sürdürebilmeleri itibarıyla içerilmeyi önemli ölçüde başardıklarını söylemek mümkündür. Ancak, bu durum Osmanlı-Safevi merkezinin Orta Doğuda oluşmasıyla önemli ölçüde sekteye uğradı. Osmanlılar ile Safeviler de ilk kuruldukları aşamada önemli ölçüde belirli bir otonomiye sahip silahlı toplulukların güçlerinden yararlanarak birer devlet oldular, ancak bu iki devletin devamlılığının sağlanması, çelişkili biçimde, bu toplulukların otonomilerinin kısıtlanmasına bağlıydı. Bunun sağlanması da Orta Asya'dan gelen göçlerin belirli bir dönemden sonra durdurulmasıyla mümkündü. Safeviler, bu göçlerin önüne bir engel olmayı başardılar. Her iki imparatorluk da merkez olmaları itibarıyla, önceden bağımlı oldukları toplulukları dışlayarak merkez ve periferi ilişkisini yeniden kurdular. Osmanlılar ve Safeviler, merkezin iki siyasi yapısıydılar ve ilişkileri tipik merkez alan ilişkilerine benzemektedir. Pek çok savaş yapmış olmalarına rağmen, bu savaşlar radikal sonuçlar doğurmamıştır. Daha ziyade savaşlar, her iki merkez bölgenin egemenlik kurulacak periferyal alanları belirlemelerine yardımcı olmuştur. Sonuçta, Irak'ın Osmanlıların kontrolünde Kafkasya'nın ise ağırlıklı olarak Safevilerin kontrolünde olmasına ve her iki imparatorluk arasındaki savaşların sona erdirilmesine yönelik bir anlaşma imzalanmış ve uzun yıllar uygulanmıştır. Böyle bir anlaşma merkez bölgeler arasındaki iş birliğini mükemmel bir şekilde göstermektedir. Osmanlı-Safevi sistemi, Orta Doğunun bir bölge olarak otonomisini yitirmesi ve özellikle Avrupa siyasi yapılarının dahil olmasıyla geçerliliğini yitirmiştir.

Görüldüğü üzere, ampirik çalışma teorik çerçevenin elde ettiği öngörülerle uyumlu sonuçlar ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Merkez alanlar çatışma yerine iş birliği içerisindedir. Merkez alanlar, periferyal alanlara karşı dışlama siyaseti uygulamaktadır. Periferyal

alanlar, merkezde içerilme arayışı içerisinde. Dünya siyasetinde temel çelişki merkez ve periferyal alanlar arasındadır ve bu nedenle merkezlerin sona ermesi periferi eliyle olmaktadır. Dünya siyaseti, çoklu devlet paradigması yerine dikotomik bir analizle okunmaya daha elverişlidir. Bu bulgularımız, Orta Doğu tarihi ışığında tespit edilmiş ve test edilmiş olmakla birlikte, Uluslararası İlişkiler teorilerine alternatif ve dolayısıyla günümüz için de geçerli önermeler olarak ortaya konulmuştur. Ancak, bu bulguların geçerliliğinin dünyanın diğer bölgeleri ve günümüz dünyasına da uygulanmasının gerekli olduğu değerlendirilmektedir. Bu sadece sunulan perspektifin geçerliliğine ilişkin bir test olmayacak, aynı zamanda dışlama teorisinin kavramsal araçlarının zenginleştirilmesine ve alternatif bir Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi olarak kabul edilmesine katkı sağlayacaktır.

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